Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
G.R. No. 173319 December 4, 2009
FEDERICO MIGUEL OLES, Petitioner,
vs.
!ON. D"NILO ". UEMIO, #$ %#& c'('c#)* '& ('#r#$+ (re&#,#$+ -.,+e o/ r'$c%
22 o/ )%e Me)ro(o0#)'$ Tr#'0 Co.r) o/ M'$#0', PEOPLE OF T!E P!ILIPPINES,
S"MIR MU!SEN '$, RO1EN" MU!SEN, Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
C"RPIO MOR"LES, 2.3
On complaint of Samir and Roena Muhsen, !ederico Mi"uel Olbes #petitioner$ as
indicted for %rave Coercion before the Metropolitan &rial Court #Me&C$ of Manila b'
Information
(
dated )une *+, *,,* hich as raffled to -ranch ** thereof. On October
*+, *,,*, petitioner posted bail and as released.
Den'in" petitioner.s motion to defer or suspend his arrai"nment in li"ht of his
pendin" petition for revie before the Department of )ustice from the Cit' !iscal.s
Resolution findin" probable cause to hale him into court, )ud"e /ipolito dela 0e"a
proceeded ith petitioner.s arrai"nment on !ebruar' (*, *,,1 in hich he pleaded
not "uilt' to the char"e.
*
Pre2trial as thereupon set to Ma' *+, *,,1 hich as,
hoever, declared a non2or3in" da' due to the occurrence of t'phoon 4Cheden".4
&he pre2trial as thus reset to October *1, *,,1.
1
5t the scheduled pre2trial on October *1, *,,1, petitioner failed to appear, promptin"
the trial court to issue a arrant for his arrest, hich arrant as, hoever, later
recalled on discover' that neither petitioner nor his counsel as notified of said
schedule. Pre2trial as a"ain reset to )anuar' *(, *,,6.
6
-efore the scheduled pre2trial on )anuar' *(, *,,6 or on November 1, *,,1,
petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss
7
the Information on the "round of violation of his
ri"ht to a speed' trial under Republic 5ct No. +681
9
or the Speed' &rial 5ct of (88+
and Supreme Court Circular #SCC$ No. 1+28+.
:
/e ar"ued that 4considerin" that ;he<
as not 2 ithout an' fault on his part 2 brou"ht to trial ithin +, da's from the date
he as arrai"ned, this case should be dismissed pursuant to Rule ((8, Section 8
+
in
relation to Rule ((8, Section 9 of the Rules.4
8
&he trial court, throu"h pairin" )ud"e Danilo 5. -uemio #respondent =ud"e$, denied
petitioner.s Motion to Dismiss b' Order
(,
of December 7, *,,1, holdin" that petitioner
pla'ed a bi" part in the dela' of the case, and that technical rules of procedure ere
meant to secure, not override, substantial =ustice.
Petitioner.s Motion for Reconsideration of the December 7, *,,1 Order as denied
b' Order
((
of March 1, *,,6 after respondent =ud"e noted that durin" petitioner.s
arrai"nment on !ebruar' (*, *,,1, he interposed no ob=ection to the settin" of the
pre2trial to Ma' *+, *,,1. -esides, respondent =ud"e held, strict compliance ith the
Speed' &rial 5ct as improbable, "iven the volume of cases bein" filed ith the
Me&C. 5dditionall' respondent =ud"e held that the term 4speed' trial4 as applied in
criminal cases is a relative term such that the trial and disposition of cases depended
on several factors includin" the availabilit' of counsel, itnesses and prosecutor, and
eather conditions.
Petitioner challen"ed respondent =ud"e.s orders via certiorari and prohibition before
the Re"ional &rial Court #R&C$ of Manila, alle"in" that not onl' as he #petitioner$ not
brou"ht to trial ithin +, da's from the date of his arrai"nment as re>uired under
Section 9, Rule ((8, but the prosecution had failed to establish the e?istence of an'
of the 4time e?clusions4 provided under Section 1
(*
of the same Rule to e?cuse its
failure to brin" him to trial ithin the +,2da' period.
-' Decision
(1
of )anuar' 1(, *,,9, the R&C denied the petition, holdin" that Section
8 of Rule ((8 of the Rules of Court does not call for the automatic dismissal of a case
=ust because trial has not commenced ithin +, da's from arrai"nment@ that the
proceedin"s before the Me&C ere not attended b' ve?atious, capricious and
oppressive dela's@ and that the concept of a speed' trial is not a mere >uestion of
numbers that could be computed in terms of 'ears, months or da's but is understood
accordin" to the peculiar circumstances of each case, citin" SPO( Sumban", )r. v.
%en. Court Martial PRO2Re"ion 9.
(6

&he R&C further held that in 4determinin" hether petitioner.s ri"ht to speed' trial
as violated,4
(7
the circumstances that respondent =ud"e as the pairin" =ud"e of -r.
** of the Me&C ho 4ma' be assumed also ;to< preside over his on re"ular court
and devotes limited time to his pairin" court4 and that first level courts in Manila have
an e?cessive load of cases should also be ta3en into consideration.
/is motion for reconsideration havin" been denied b' the R&C,
(9
petitioner lod"ed
the present petition for revie hich, in the main, faults the R&C
I
. . . IN 5!!IRMIN% &/E M&C2M5NIA5 )BD%E.S RBAIN% &/5& COMPAI5NCE
CI&/ RBAE ((8, SEC&ION 8 O! &/E RBAES IS NO& M5ND5&ORD. &/E RI%/&
O! 5N 5CCBSED &O 5 SPEEDD &RI5A IS 5 SB-S&5N&I0E RI%/& &/5&
C5NNO& -E DISRE%5RDED.
II
1
. . . IN 5!!IRMIN% &/E M&C2M5NIA5 )BD%E.S RBAIN% &/5& &/E
ENBMER5&ION O! 5AAOC5-AE &IME EECABSIONS BNDER RBAE ((8,
SEC&ION 1 IS NO& EECABSI0E, 5ND &/5& &/E !5IABRE &O -RIN%
PE&I&IONER &O &RI5A CI&/IN &/E PERIOD PRO0IDED BNDER RBAE ((8,
SEC&ION 9 C5S )BS&I!IED.
? ? ? ?,
(:

errors hich raise a >uestion of la.
Petitioner ar"ues that his ri"ht to speed' trial is a substantive ri"ht and that, contrar'
to the R&C rulin", Section 8 of Rule ((8 is mandator' in character, havin" been
ta3en from SCC No. 1+28+, strict compliance ith hich is ur"ed to remove an'
attempt on the part of =ud"es to e?ercise discretion ith respect to the time frame for
conductin" the trial of an accused@ that the last para"raph of said Section 8 clearl'
indicates that it is the ri"ht of an accused to move for dismissal of the Information
should the prosecution fail to prove the e?istence of the time e?clusions under
Section 1 of Rule ((8@ and that the enumeration of the alloable time e?clusions
under Section 1 is e?clusive, hence, the R&C erred in considerin" the e?cessive
caseload of respondent =ud"e, as a mere pairin" =ud"e, to be an alloable time
e?clusion under the Rules.
In its Comment,
(+
the People, throu"h the Office of the Solicitor %eneral #OS%$,
counters that 4speed alone is not the chief ob=ective of a trial4 such that mere
assertion of a violation of the ri"ht to speed' trial does not necessaril' result in the
automatic dismissal of an Information@ that the time e?clusions referred to in
para"raphs #a$ to #f$ of Section 1, Rule ((8 are not e?clusive and admit of other
e?ceptions@ that petitioner himself contributed to the dela' in the proceedin"s hen
he filed a frivolous motion to suspend proceedin"s and failed to appear durin" the
scheduled pre2trial@ and that the R&C statement about respondent =ud"e bein" a
mere pairin" =ud"e as not an apolo"' for the court.s con"ested doc3ets but a mere
statement of fact as to the impossibilit' of settin" the case for pre2trial at an earlier
date.
!urthermore, the OS% asserts that respondent =ud"e.s denial of petitioner.s motion to
dismiss as in order as he correctl' applied the principles of relativit' and fle?ibilit' in
determinin" hether petitioner.s ri"ht to speed' trial had been violated.
(8

Respondents2private complainants, on the other hand, maintain in their Comment
*,

that several Supreme Court decisions
*(
dealin" ith the issue of the constitutional
"uarant' of a speed' trial, the Speed' &rial 5ct of (88+, and SCC No. 1+28+ have
held that the ri"ht is deemed violated onl' hen the proceedin"s are attended b'
ve?atious, capricious and oppressive dela's, hich did not obtain in the present
case, petitioner himself havin" been instrumental in the dela' in the prosecution of
the case.
&he petition does not impress.
Petitioner dras attention to the time "ap of (,7 da's from his arrai"nment on
!ebruar' (*, *,,1 up to the first pre2trial settin" on Ma' *+, *,,1, and another "ap
of (6+ da's from the latter date up to the second pre2trial settin" on October *1,
*,,1 or for a total of *71 da's 2 a clear contravention, accordin" to petitioner, of the
+,2da' time limit from arrai"nment to trial.
It bears notin", hoever, that on his arrai"nment on !ebruar' (*, *,,1, petitioner
interposed no ob=ection to the settin" of the pre2trial to Ma' *+, *,,1 hich as, as
earlier stated, later declared a non2or3in" da'. Inar"uabl', the cancellation of the
scheduled pre2trial on that date as be'ond the control of the trial court.1avvphi1
Petitioner ar"ues, hoever, that the lapse of *71 da's #from arrai"nment to October
*1, *,,1$ as not =ustified b' an' of the e?cusable dela's as embodied in the time
e?clusions
**
specified under Section 1 of Rule ((8. &he ar"ument is unavailin".
In Solar &eam Entertainment, Inc. v. )ud"e /o,
*1
the Court stressed that the
e?ceptions consistin" of the time e?clusions provided in the Speed' &rial 5ct of (88+
reflect the fundamentall' reco"niFed principle that 4speed' trial4 is a relative term and
necessaril' involves a de"ree of fle?ibilit'. &his as reiterated in People v.
/ernandeF,
*6
viFG
&he ri"ht of the accused to a speed' trial is "uaranteed under Sections (6#*$ and (9,
5rticle III of the (8+: Constitution. In (88+, Con"ress enacted R.5. No. +681,
otherise 3non as the 4Speed' &rial 5ct of (88+.4 &he la provided for time limits in
order 4to ensure a speed' trial of all criminal cases before the Sandi"anba'an,
;R&C<, Metropolitan &rial Court, Municipal &rial Court, and Municipal Circuit &rial
Court.4 On 5u"ust ((, (88+, the Supreme Court issued Circular No. 1+28+, the Rules
Implementin" R.5. No. +681. &he provisions of said circular ere adopted in the
*,,, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. 5s to the time limit ithin hich trial must
commence after arrai"nment, the *,,, Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure statesG
Sec. 9, Rule ((8. E?tended time limit.22 Notithstandin" the provisions of section
(#"$, Rule ((9 and the precedin" section (, for the first telve2calendar2month period
folloin" its effectivit' on September (7, (88+, the time limit ith respect to the
period from arrai"nment to trial imposed b' said provision shall be one hundred
ei"ht' #(+,$ da's. !or the second telve2month period, the time limit shall be one
hundred tent' #(*,$ da's, and for the third telve2month period, the time limit shall
be ei"ht' #+,$ da's.
R.5. No. +681 and its implementin" rules and the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure enumerate certain reasonable dela's as e?clusions in the computation of
the prescribed time limits. &he' also provide that 4no provision of la on speed' trial
and no rule implementin" the same shall be interpreted as a bar to an' char"e of
denial of speed' trial as provided b' 5rticle III, Section (6#*$, of the (8+:
2
Constitution.4 &hus, in spite of the prescribed time limits, =urisprudence continues to
adopt the vie that the concept of 4speed' trial4 is a relative term and must
necessaril' be a fle?ible concept. In CorpuF v. Sandi"anba'an, e heldG
&he ri"ht of the accused to a speed' trial and to a speed' disposition of the case
a"ainst him as desi"ned to prevent the oppression of the citiFen b' holdin" criminal
prosecution suspended over him for an indefinite time, and to prevent dela's in the
administration of =ustice b' mandatin" the courts to proceed ith reasonable dispatch
in the trial of criminal cases. Such ri"ht to a speed' trial and a speed' disposition of a
case is violated onl' hen the proceedin" is attended b' ve?atious, capricious and
oppressive dela's. ? ? ?
Chile =ustice is administered ith dispatch, the essential in"redient is orderl',
e?peditious and not mere speed. It cannot be definitel' said ho lon" is too lon" in a
s'stem here =ustice is supposed to be sift, but deliberate. It is consistent ith
dela's and depends upon circumstances. It secures ri"hts to the accused, but it does
not preclude the ri"hts of public =ustice. 5lso, it must be borne in mind that the ri"hts
"iven to the accused b' the Constitution and the Rules of Court are shields, not
eapons@ hence, courts are to "ive meanin" to that intent.
5 balancin" test of appl'in" societal interests and the ri"hts of the accused
necessaril' compels the court to approach speed' trial cases on an ad hoc basis.
In determinin" hether the accused has been deprived of his ri"ht to a speed'
disposition of the case and to a speed' trial, four factors must be consideredG #a$
len"th of dela'@ #b$ the reason for the dela'@ #c$ the defendant.s assertion of his ri"ht@
and #d$ pre=udice to the defendant. #citations omitted$ #underscorin" supplied$
&he time limits set b' the Speed' &rial 5ct of (88+ do not thus preclude =ustifiable
postponements and dela's hen so arranted b' the situation.
*7
&o the Court, the
reasons for the postponements and dela's attendant to the present case reflected
above are not unreasonable. Chile the records indicate that neither petitioner nor his
counsel as notified of the resettin" of the pre2trial to October *1, *,,1, the same
appears to have been occasioned b' oversi"ht or simple ne"li"ence hich, standin"
alone, does not prove fatal to the prosecution.s case. &he fau? pas as
ac3noled"ed and corrected hen the Me&C recalled the arrest arrant it had
issued a"ainst petitioner under the mista3en belief that petitioner had been dul'
notified of the October *1, *,,1 pre2trial settin".
*9

Reiteratin" the Court.s pronouncement in Solar &eam Entertainment, Inc.
*:
that
4speed' trial4 is a relative and fle?ible term, Aumanla v. Peralta, )r.
*+
summons the
courts to maintain a delicate balance beteen the demands of due process and the
strictures of speed' trial on the one hand, and the ri"ht of the State to prosecute
crimes and rid societ' of criminals on the other.
5ppl'in" the balancin" test for determinin" hether an accused has been denied his
constitutional ri"ht to a speed' trial, or a speed' disposition of his case, ta3in" into
account several factors such as the len"th and reason of the dela', the accused.s
assertion or non2assertion of his ri"ht, and the pre=udice to the accused resultin"
from the dela',
*8
the Court does not find petitioner to have been undul' and
e?cessivel' pre=udiced b' the 4dela'4 in the proceedin"s, especiall' "iven that he had
posted bail.
C/ERE!ORE, the petition is DENIED.
Costs a"ainst Petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
3