CASE

DOCTRINE HELD



Lerum vs. Cruz,
G.R. No. L-
2783,
November 29,
1950


Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius (The express
mention of one thing in a law means the exclusion
of others not expressly mentioned)


Facts: This is an appeal for a petition for declaratory relief. Attys. Lerum and
Fernando filed for this petition in order to test the sufficiency and probative value
of a testimony in a bigamy case by (former) Judge Cruz regarding the issuance
of a divorce decree. It also appears that the petition was at first filed by City
Attorney Jose F. Fernandez, and by Attorneys Eulogio R. Lerum and G. Viola
Fernando as private prosecutors in the bigamy case No. 962, but later, upon
motion filed by City Attorney Fernandez, his name was stricken out from
the pleadings, and so an amended petition was filed wherein Attorneys Lerum
and Viola Fernando appeared as the only petitioners representing the People of
the Philippines. Itfinally appears that Attorneys Lerum and Viola Fernando made
an attempt to have the Solicitor General appear as counsel, but this attempt
was again ruled out on the ground that under the law the Solicitor General can
only be required to intervene when the validity of a statute is involved.

ISSUE:
Can the attorneys file a petition for declaratory relief regarding the sufficiency
and probative value of (former) Judge Cruzs testimony?

HELD:
No, the petition for declaratory relief cannot be granted. Under Sec 1, Rule 66 of
the Rules of Court, declaratory relief may only be granted to a person whose
rights are affected by a statute or ordinance, or who is interested under a deed,
will, contract or other written instrument. The sufficiency and probative value of
a testimony, which is the subject matter for declaratory relief in the instant case,
is not included in the enumeration. This means that the subject matter must refer
to a deed, will, contract or other written instrument, or to a statute or ordinance,
to warrant declaratory relief. Any other matter not mentioned therein is deemed
excluded. This is under the principle of expressio unius est exclussio alterius.
Thus, the assailed order is affirmed.

Centeno vs.
Villalon-
Pornillos, G.R.
No. 113092,
September 1,
1994


Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius (The express
mention of one thing in a law means the exclusion
of others not expressly mentioned)

Facts: The officers of a group of elderly men of a civic organization
known as the Samahang Katandaan ng Nayon ng Tikay launched a fund
drive for the purpose of renovating the chapel of Barrio Tikay, Malolos,
Bulacan. Martin Centeno, the chairman of the group, approached Judge
Adoracion G. Angeles, a resident of Tikay, and solicited from her a
contribution of P1,500.00. It is admitted that the solicitation was made
without a permit from the Department of Social Welfare and
Development. As a consequence, an information was filed against
Centeno, for violation of PD No. 1564 or the Solicitation Permit Law.
Centeno filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that the
facts alleged therein do not constitute an offense, claiming that PD No.
1564 only covers solicitations made for charitable or public welfare
purposes, but not those made for a religious purpose such as the
construction of a chapel.

Issue: Should the phrase "charitable purposes" be construed in its
broadest sense so as to include a religious purpose?

Held: No and that legislative enactments specifically spelled out
"charitable" and "religious" in an enumeration, whereas Presidential
Decree No. 1564 merely stated "charitable or public welfare purposes,"
only goes to show that the framers of the law in question never intended
to include solicitations for religious purposes within its coverage.
Otherwise, there is no reason why it would not have so stated expressly.

Solicitation for religious purposes may be subject to proper regulation by
the State in the exercise of police power. However, in the case at bar,
considering that solicitations intended for a religious purpose are not
within the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 1564, as earlier
demonstrated, petitioner cannot be held criminally liable therefor and
therefore acquitted.

Chua vs. Civil
Service
Commission,
G.R. No.
88979,
February 7,
1992

When not applied:
a. When adherence to the rule will lead to
incongruities and in a violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution


Facts: Republic Act No. 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and
voluntary separation from the government service as well as for involuntary
separation due to reorganization. Petitioner Lydia Chua believing that she is
qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application on 30
January 1989 with respondent National Irrigation Administration (NIA) which,
however, denied the same; instead, she was offered separation benefits
equivalent to one half (1/2) month basic pay for every year of service
commencing from 1980. A recourse by petitioner to the Civil Service
Commission yielded negative results.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the benefits granted under Republic
Act No. 6683.

HELD:
YES. Petition was granted.
Petitioner was established to be a co-terminous employee, a non-career civil
servant, like casual and emergency employees. The Supreme Court sees no
solid reason why the latter are extended benefits under the Early Retirement
Law but the former are not. It will be noted that Rep. Act No. 6683 expressly
extends its benefits for early retirement to regular, temporary,
casual and emergency employees. But specifically excluded from the benefits
are uniformed personnel of the AFP including those of the PC-INP. It can be
argued that, expressio unius est exclusio alterius but the applicable maxim in
this case is the doctrine of necessary implication which holds that what is
implied in a statute is as much a part thereof as that which is expressed. No
statute can be enacted that can provide all the details involved in its application.
There is always an omission that may not meet a particular situation. What is
thought, at the time of enactment, to be an all-embracing legislation may be
inadequate to provide for the unfolding events of the future.

[T]he Court believes, and so holds, that the denial by the respondents NIA and
CSC of petitioners application for early retirement benefits under R.A. No. 6683
is unreasonable, unjustified, and oppressive, as petitioner had filed an
application for voluntary retirement within a reasonable period and she is entitled
to the benefits of said law. In the interest of substantial justice, her application
must be granted; after all she served the government not only for two (2) years
the minimum requirement under the law but for almost fifteen (15) years in
four (4) successive governmental projects

Manabat vs.
de Aquino,
G.R. No. L-
5558, April 29,
1953

b. When enumeration not intended to be exclusive


Facts: Sued on a promissory note in the peace court of Tarlac, Tarlac, Enrique
S. Manabat and his wife, denied liability, alleging usury. Having failed to appear
and present evidence at the hearing, they were ordered to pay the amount of
P1,261.74 plus interest, upon the proofs and introduced by the plaintiffs,
Alejandra L. de Roxas and her husband Claudio Roxas.

Notified of the decision on September 7, 1951, the Manabats sent on September
22, 1951 their notice of appeal by registered mail together with a postal money
order payable to the justice of the peace for P16 as docket fees and a surety
bond in the sum of P30 as appeal bond. These papers were actually received at
the peace court of Tarlac, Tarlac, on September 24, 1951. Noting that the 15-
day period expired on September 22, and that the appeal papers were actually
received on September 24, the judge of first instance declared the appeal was
late and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction.

He expressly refused to apply section 1 Rule 27 of the Rules of Court that
section provides that "the date of the mailing" of the court papers "as shown by
the post-office registry receipt shall be considered as the date of their filing" in
court. His honor opined that this section does not regulate inferior courts, since it
is found only among rules governing courts of first instance, and, unlike other
rules, it is not extended to inferior courts and therefore excluded by section
19 Rule 4.

Issue: whether the appeal had been perfected within fifteen days as required by
section 2 Rule 40 of the Rules of Court.

Held: Yes.

That legal maxim is well-known, and respondents' position seems at first blush
tenable. But the maxim is not more than an auxiliary rule of interpretation to be
ignored where other circumstances indicate the enumeration was not intended
to be exclusive.
If section 19 Rule 4 is exclusive, justices of the peace may disregard, (a) the
principles of evidence prescribed in Rule 123, (b) Rule 131 as to costs and (c)
the fundamental principles about splitting or joinder of causes of action in Rule
2, and the theories about parties in interest, necessary parties, married women
etc. in Rule 3.
These undesirable consequences could not have been overlooked by the
framers of the Rules. They could not have intended, therefore, to make the
enumeration in section 19 Rule 4 as all-inclusive and exclusive. There can be no
legal obstacle to the application of Rule 27 section 1 to the justice of the peace
court of Tarlac. And it should be applied, to uphold the uniform principle that "the
date of deposit in the post-office by registered mail" of court papers is "the date
of filing" not only in the Supreme Court, the appellate court, and the superior
courts but also in inferior courts. Uniformity of rules is to be desired to simplify
procedure (Cf. Henning vs. Western Equipment, 62 Phil., 886).

Escribano vs.
Avila, G.R. No.
L-30375,
September 12,
1978

b. When enumeration not intended to be exclusive
The maxim is inapplicable if there is some
special reason for mentioning one thing and
none for mentioning another which is
otherwise within the statute, so that the
absence of any mention of such other will not
exclude it
Facts: Congressman Salipada K. Pendatun, the governor-elect of Cotabato,
filed complaint for libel against Mayor Jose Escribano of Tacurong, Cotabato
(now the province of Sultan Kudarat) to respondent Judge David P. Avila in the
Court of First Instance of that province (now North Cotabato).

Escribano questioned Judge Avila's authority to conduct the preliminary
investigation of the offense. He contended that the city fiscal of Cotabato is the
only one empowered to conduct the preliminary investigation, pursuant of RA
4363 and Art. 360 of the RPC which does not empower the Court of First
Issuance to conduct preliminary investigations of written defamations due to an
amendment made for Art 360.

Issue: Whether the Court of First Instance of Cotabato is invested with authority
to conduct the preliminary investigation of the crime of libel committed by means
of radio at Cotabato City or whether that power is lodged exclusively in the city
attorney of that city.

Held:
Yes. The lawmaking body, by means of that amendment of Art. 360, never
intended to take away the jurisdiction of the proper Court of First Instance to
conduct a preliminary investigation in libel cases. The amendment merely
sought to strip the ordinary municipal court of its power to hold a preliminary
investigation of written defamations. The fact that the Court of First Instance is
not mentioned in Article 360 as a tribunal that may conduct the preliminary
investigation of libel cases would seem to suggest that it cannot conduct such
preliminary investigation, following the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius
(the inclusion of one thing is the exclusion of another or the enumeration of
particular things excludes the Idea of something else not mentioned.)

However, the maxim inclusio unius est exclusio alterius cannot be applied in this
case because the fact that the Court of First Instance is not mention in the
amendment, as being empowered to conduct a preliminary investigation in
cases of written defamation, has nothing to do with the purpose of the
amendment. It should be stressed that in construing a law, the court must look
to the object to be accomplished, the evils and mischief sought to be remedied,
or the purpose to be sub served, and it should give the law a reasonable or
liberal construction which win best effect its purpose rather than one which win
defeat it. The silence of article 360 on the power of a judge of the Court of First
Instance to conduct an investigation of criminal actions for written defamations
does not preclude a judge of that court from holding such investigation. The
maxim is inapplicable if there is some special reason for mentioning one thing
and none for mentioning another which is otherwise within the statute, so that
the absence of any mention of such other will not exclude it (82 C.J.S. 670). The
maxim does not apply in case a statute appears upon its face to limit the
operation of its provisions to particular persons or things by enumerating them,
but no reason exists why other persons or things not so enumerated should not
have been included, and manifest injustice win follow by not so including them
(Springer vs. Philippine Islands, 72 Law. ed. 845, 227 U.S 189; People vs.
Manahan, 115 Phil. 657,6681).

People vs.
Manantan,
G.R. No. L-
14129, July 31,
1962

c. When no reason exists why a person or thing is
excluded

Facts: In an information filed by the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan in the Court
of First Instance (CFI) of that Province, Guillermo Manantan was charged with a
violation of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. A preliminary investigation
conducted by said court resulted in the finding of a probable cause that the
crime charged was committed by the defendant. Thereafter, the trial started
upon defendants plea of not guilty, the defense moved to dismiss the
information on the ground that as justice of the peace, the defendant is not one
of the officers enumerated in Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. The
lower court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that a justice of the peace is
within the purview of Section 54. A second motion was filed by defense counsel
who cited in support thereof the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in People
vs. Macaraeg, where it was held that a justice of the peace is excluded from the
prohibition of Section 54 of the Revised Election Code. Acting on various
motions and pleadings, the lower court dismissed the information against the
accused upon the authority of the ruling in the case cited by the defense. Hence,
the appeal by the Solicitor General.

Issue: WoN justice the peace included in the prohibition of Section 54 of the
Revised Election Code?

Held: Under the rule of Casus omisus pro omisso habendus est, a person,
object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted
intentionally. The maxim casus omisus can operate and apply only if and when
the omission has been clearly established. The application of the
rule of casus omisus does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal
in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object
or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. Substitution of terms is
not omission. For in its most extensive sense the term judge includes all
officers appointed to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity,
including justice of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts.
The intention of the Legislature did not exclude the justice of the peace from its
operation. In Section 54, there is no necessity to include the justice of peace in
the enumeration, as previously made in Section 449 of the Revised
Administrative Code, as the legislature has availed itself of the more generic and
broader term judge, including therein all kinds of judges, like judges of the
courts of First Instance, judges of the courts of Agrarian Relations, judges of the
courts of Industrial Relations, and justices of the peace. The Supreme Court set
aside the dismissal order entered by the trial court and remanded the case for
trial on the merits.


Primero vs.
Court of
Appeals, G.R.
No. L-48468-69,
November 22,
1989

c. When no reason exists why a person or thing is
excluded

Facts: Petitioner carried a bladed weapon outside of his residence while PD 9,
the prohibition against fan knives, balisong or clubs was in effect which
thereafter resulted in his arrest, thereafter the accused was charged with the
crimes of Acts of Lasciviousness and Illegal Possession of Deadly Weapon.

Petitioner answers in his defense that a bayonet, the bladed weapon he was
carrying, was neither a blunt nor bladed weapon enumerated in PD 9 and
therefore he was not guilty of violating the law against bladed or blunt weapons.

ISSUE: WoN a bayonet is a bladed and injurious weapon that falls under the
purview of PD 9.

HELD:
Yes, the bayonet is a bladed weapon that falls under PD 9. Petitioners defense
of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is weak and incomplete. It would make
no sense if possession of a fan knife, which is less lethal than a bayonet, would
be punishable while possession of a bayonet would not.

Liwag vs
Happy Glen
Loop
Homeowners
Association,
G.R. No.
189755, July 4,
2012

Ejusdem Generis - where a general word or
phrase follows an enumeration of particular
and specific words of the same class, the
general word or phrase is to be construed to
include or to be restricted to things akin to
or resembling, or the same kind or class as,
those specifically mentioned.

Facts: In 1978, F. G. R. Sales, the original developer of Happy Glen Loop,
loaned from Ernesto Marcelo, owner of T. P. Marcelo Realty Corporation. The
former failed to settle its debts with the latter, so, he assigned all his rights to
Marcelo over several parcels of land in the Subdivision including the receivables
from the lots already sold. As the successor-in-interest, Marcelo represented to
lot buyers, the National Housing Authority (NHA) and the Human Settlement
Regulatory Commission (HSRC) that a water facility is available in the
subdivision. The said water facility has been the only source of water of the
residents for thirty (30) years. In September 1995, Marcelo sold Lot 11, Block 5
to Hermogenes Liwag. As a result, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. C-
350099 was issued to the latter. In 2003, Hermogenes died. Petitioner, wife of
Hermogenes, subsequently wrote to the respondent Association demanding the
removal of the over headwater tank over the parcel of land. The latter refused
and filed a case before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board against T.
P. Marcelo Realty Corporation, petitioner and the surviving heirs of
Hermogenes. The HLURB ruling was in favor of the respondent Association.
One of the things it affirmed was the existence of an easement for water
system/facility or open space on Lot 11, Block 5 of TCT No. C-350099 wherein
the deep well and overhead tank are situated. However, on appeal before the
HLURB Board of Commissioners, the Board found that Lot 11, Block 5 was not
an open space.

Issue: Whether or not Block 11, Lot 5 of the Happy Glen Loop Subdivision is
considered an open space as defined in PD 1216.

Held:
Yes, the parcel of land mentioned is considered an open space. The term
open space is defined in PD 1216 as an area reserved exclusively for parks,
playgrounds, recreational uses, schools, roads, places of worship, hospitals,
health centers, barangay centers and other similar facilities and amenities.

The decree makes no specific mention of areas reserved for water facilities so
the Court used the basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis to
determine whether the area falls under other similar facilities and amenities.

The basic statutory construction principle of ejusdem generis states that where a
general word or phrase follows an enumeration of particular and specific words
of the same class, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include or
to be restricted to things akin to or resembling, or the same kind or class as,
those specifically mentioned. Applying that principle, the Court found out that the
enumeration refers to areas reserved for the common welfare of the community.
Therefore, the phrase other similar facilities and amenities should be
interpreted in like manner.

The water facility was without doubt established for the benefit of the
community. It was therefore ruled by the Court that the location of the water
facility in the subdivision must form part of the area reserved for open space.

Mutuc vs.
COMELEC ,
G.R. No. L-
32717,
November 26,
1970

Ejusdem Generis - where a general word or
phrase follows an enumeration of particular
and specific words of the same class, the
general word or phrase is to be construed to
include or to be restricted to things akin to
or resembling, or the same kind or class as,
those specifically mentioned.

Facts: The Commission on Elections (COMELEC) prohibited petitioner Amelito
Mutuc, a candidate for the position of a delegate to the Constitutional
Convention, from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems
and loud speakers on 22 October 1970. Petitioner impugned the act of
respondent as violative of his right to free speech. Respondent however
contended that the prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional
Convention Act, which made it unlawful for
candidates to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or
electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature),
flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches,
cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.

It was its contention that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the
recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda
material, under the phrase and the like.

Issue: Whether the taped jingles fall under the phrase and the like.

Held: Under the well-known principle of ejusdem generis, the general words
following any enumeration are applicable only to things of the same kind or class
as those specifically referred to. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated
in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of
inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its
distribution.

The Constitutional Convention Act contemplated the prohibition on the
distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to
obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution
(distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, mention being made of pens,
lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts,
hats, matches, and cigarettes, and concluding with the words and the like).
Taped jingles therefore were not prohibited.
The Supreme Court decision was made to expound on the reasons behind the
minute resolution of 3 November 1970. The Supreme Court permanently
restrained and prohibited the Comelec from enforcing or implementing or
demanding compliance with its order banning the use of political taped
jingle, pursuant to the SC resolution of 3 November 1970; without
pronouncement as to costs




United States
vs. Victor
Santo Nino,
G.R. No. 5000,
March 11,
1909

When not applied:
If the intent is clear, the rule must give way.
Facts: Respondent was caught possessing a deadly weapon ---(1) iron bar,
about 15 inches in length provided with an iron ball on one end and a string on
the other to tie the wrist, which weapon had been designed and made for use in
fighting, as a deadly weapon. He was prosecuted under Act No. 1780, which
stated that it shall be unlawful for any person to carry concealed upon his
person any bowie knife, dirk dagger, kris or other deadly weapons, provide that
this prohibition shall not apply to firearms in the possession of persons who have
secured a license therefore or who are entitled to carry the same under the
provision of this Act.

The trial court ruled that, using the principle of ejusdem generis, the law will only
apply to bladed weapons.

Issue: WoN the trial court was correct in applying ejusdem generis.

Held: No. The trial court erred in applying ejusdem generis because the latter is
only resorted to in determining the legislative intent, such that if the intent is
clear, the rule must give way. In this case, the proviso provides that unlicensed
revolvers were covered by the law and as such the law is not limited to bladed
weapons.

The rule of construction above referred to is resorted to only for the purpose of
determining what the intent of the legislature was in enacting the law. If that
intent clearly appears from one parts of the law, and such intent thus clearly
manifested is contrary to the result which would be reached by application of the
rule ofejusdem generis, the latter must give way.

City of Manila
vs. Lyric Music
House, G.R.
No. 42236,
September 24,
1935

When not applied:
The rule of ejusdem generis is resorted to
merely in aid of the construction of the statute,
and not where, on consideration of the whole
law on the subject and the purpose sought, it
appears that the legislature intended the
general words to go beyond the class
specifically designated.

Facts: Defendant is a private corporation engaged in the sale and distribution at
wholesale and retail, of various musical instruments and merchandise.

Then, plaintiff imposes the tax collection against defendant pursuant to the
Municipal Ordinance No. 1925.

However, defendant contests that The said Municipal Ordinance No. 1925, as
amended, imposing tax aforesaid was never submitted for approval to either the
Honorable Secretary of the Interior or the Honorable Secretary of Finance. The
said Municipal Ordinance No. 1925 is the sole and only basis of plaintiffs
present action against defendant.

The trial court rendered judgment against the defendant and sentenced it to pay
the plaintiff the sum of P525 with costs.

Issue: WoN defendants business as musical merchandise, which apparently
is not mentioned in the ordinance, cannot be taxed by the City of Manila in view
of its further contention that it is not dealing in general merchandise.

Held:
Ordinance No. 1925:
Group 1-A: (1) Retail dealers in general merchandise, and (2) retail
dealers exclusively engaged in the sale of rice, textiles, including knitted
wares; hardwares, including glasswares, cooking utensils and construction
materials; groceries, including toilet articles except perfumery; paper,
books including stationery.

Sec. 3 Establishments engaging in more than one kind of business as
named above or selling articles not enumerated in this Ordinance, will be
considered a general merchandise store . . .

By virtue of this ordinance, the business of the defendant was classified as
a general merchandise store in view of the fact that it was dealing in
articles not mentioned in the ordinance.

In view of this broad authority it would be absurd to hold that it was the
intention of the Legislature to limit the boards power to tax . . . only those
articles enumerated therein. To do this it must be presumed that the
Legislature, without an apparent reason, deliberately exempted from
taxation musical merchandise and all other merchandise not specifically
mentioned in that paragraph. This would be rank discrimination.

The RULE OF EJUSDEM GENERIS is resorted to merely in aid of the
construction of a statute, and not where, on consideration of the whole law
on the subject and the purpose sought, it appears that the legislature
intended the general words to go beyond the class specifically designated.

In view of the evident purpose the Legislature sought when it adopted Act
No. 3669, it would not be logical to restrict the meaning of the words retail
dealers in general merchandise to the narrow definition which the
appellant urges upon this court. It must be held, . . . that the municipal
board of the City of Manila had a perfect right to consider as general
merchandise stores, for the purpose of Ordinance No. 1925, those
establishments engaging in more than one kind of business, or those
selling articles not enumerated in that ordinance.

To uphold the contention of the defendant-appellant would make Act No.
3669 unreasonable and inconsistent. The courts do not sanction an
interpretation that would make a law unreasonable and lead to an
absurdity where a reasonable interpretation can be adopted.

Where a statute appears upon its face to limit the operation of its
provisions to particular person or things by enumerating them, but no
reason exists why other persons or things not so enumerated should not
have been included, and manifest injustice will follow by not so including
them, the maxim, Expressio unius est exclusion alterius, should not be
invoked, . . . (Blevins v. Mullally, 135 Pac., 307; 22 Cal. App., 519.)



Roman
Catholic
Archbishop vs.
Social Security
Commission
G.R. No. L-
15045, January
20, 1961

When not applied:
The rule ejusdem generis applies only where
there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where
the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature
would thereby be hindered and defeated.

Facts: On September 1, 1958, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, filed
to the Social Security Commission a request that they should be exempt from
the compulsory coverage of Republic Act No. 1611 or the Social Security Law.
Their contention is that they claim that the act is on the based of a labor law and
the Roman Catholic Archbishop is religious and charitable institution and not a
business and activities organized for profit.

Issue:
WON the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila is considered to be a
business enterprise or a religious or charitable institution.

Held:
In the case at bar, the definition of the term "employer" is, we think, sufficiently
comprehensive as to include religious and charitable institutions or entities not
organized for profit, like herein appellant, within its meaning.

These are the definitions provided by law:

Section 9 of the Social Security Law, as amended, provides that coverage "in
the System shall be compulsory upon all members between the age of sixteen
and sixty rears inclusive, if they have been for at least six months a the service
of an employer who is a member of the System, Provided, that the Commission
may not compel any employer to become member of the System unless he shall
have been in operation for at least two years and has at the time of admission, if
admitted for membership during the first year of the System's operation at least
fifty employees, and if admitted for membership the following year of operation
and thereafter, at least six employees x x x."

The term employer" as used in the law is defined as any person, natural or
juridical, domestic or foreign, who carries in the Philippines any trade, business,
industry, undertaking, or activity of any kind and uses the services of another
person who is under his orders as regards the employment, except the
Government and any of its political subdivisions, branches or instrumentalities,
including corporations owned or controlled by the Government" (par. [c], see. 8),

While an "employee" refers to "any person who performs services for an
'employer' in which either or both mental and physical efforts are used and who
receives compensation for such services" (par. [d], see. 8). "Employment",
according to paragraph [i] of said section 8, covers any service performed by an
employer except those expressly enumerated thereunder, like employment
under the Government, or any of its political subdivisions, branches or
instrumentalities including corporations owned and controlled by the
Government, domestic service in a private home, employment purely casual,
etc.

Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila contends that the term "employer" as
defined in the law should following the principle of ejusdem generis be
limited to those who carry on "undertakings or activities which have the element
of profit or gain, or which are pursued for profit or gain," because the phrase
,activity of any kind" in the definition is preceded by the words "any trade,
business, industry, undertaking." The contention cannot be sustained. The
rule ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It is not controlling
where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered
and defeated.

It is significant to note that when Republic Act No. 1161 was enacted, services
performed in the employ of institutions organized for religious or charitable
purposes were by express provisions of said Act excluded from coverage
thereof (sec. 8, par. [j] subpars. 7 and 8). That portion of the law, however, has
been deleted by express provision of Republic Act No. 1792, which took effect in
1957. This is clear indication that the Legislature intended to include charitable
and religious institutions within the scope of the law.

Colgate vs.
Gimenez, G.R.
No. L-14787,
January 28,
1961

When not applied:
The law must be seen in its entire context, not
the parts and categorizations posited by the
respondent.
"Ubi lex non distinguish nec nos distinguire
debemos", or "where the law does not
distinguish, neither do we distinguish".


Facts: Petitioner Corporation engages in manufacturing toilet preparations and
household remedies. Importation of materials including stabilizers and flavors
is among those Petitioner imports. For every importation, Petitioner pays the
Central Bank of the Philippines 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange
used for the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges pursuant to
RA 601, the Exchange Tax Law. Under such law, it was also provided
that:Foreign exchanged used for the payment of cost, transportation and/or
other charges incident to the importation into the Philippines of stabilizer and
flavors shall be refunded to any importer making application therefore. The
petitioner therefore seeks a refund of the 17% special excise tax

ISSUE:

WoN the imports of dental cream stabilizers and flavors are subject to a 17%
transportation tax exemption under the Exchange Tax Law.

HELD:

No. The refusal to deny refund was based on the following argument:

All the items enumerated for the tax exemption fall under one specific class,




namely: food products, books supplies/ materials and medical supplies. The
stabilizers and flavors the petitions refer to are items which must fall under the
category of food products. Because such items will be used for toothpaste, it is
not a food product and therefore not subject to exemption

Petitioners arguments effected the grant of the refund:

RA 601 does not categorize the exceptions as stated above. Though stabilizers
and flavors are preceded by items that might fall under food products, the
following which were included are hardly such: fertilizer, poultry feed, vitamin
concentrate, cattle, and industrial starch.

Therefore, the law must be seen in its entire context, not the parts and
categorizations posited by the respondent.

The rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are restrained and
limited by particular recitals when used in connection with them, does not
require the rejection of general terms entirely. It is intended merely as an aid in
ascertaining the intention of the legislature and is to be taken in connection with
other rules of construction. (See Handbook of the Construction and
Interpretation of Laws by Black, p. 215.216, 2nd ed.)