Philosophia Vol . 4 No s , 2 - 3 Pp.

2 9 7 - 3 1 4 Apr i l - J ul y 1974
TWO ARGUMENTS AGAI NST ETHI CAL EGOI SM
J AMES RACHELS
The f or m of et hi cal egoi sm whi ch I shall discuss is t he
vi ew t hat t he ri ght thing for anyone t o do, on any occasi on,
is what ever woul d best pr omot e his own i nt erest s, no ma t t e r
how ot her peopl e' s i nt erest s woul d be affect ed. Very few
phi l osopher s who write books or publ i sh articles in j our nal s
believe in this doct ri ne, al t hough ma ny are at pains to r ef ut e
it. Ther e are at least t hree i nt er connect ed reasons f or want i ng
t o r ef ut e t hi s view: first, it is a perni ci ous doct r i ne whi ch goes
against some o f our mos t cent ral mor al beliefs. Accor di ng t o
et hi cal egoism, each of us shoul d t ake t he at t i t ude t hat ot her
peopl e si mpl y don' t mat t er , except i nsofar as t hey are useful
t o us; and t hat is a wi cked at t i t ude. Second, even t hough few
phi l osopher s accept the doct ri ne, many peopl e are t empt ed by
it. Moreover - and this is per haps t he mos t i mpor t ant reason,
f r om a phi l osophi cal poi nt of view - t he r ef ut at i on is bound
t o shed some light on t he r at i onal e behi nd t he al t ernat i ve
view t hat ot her peopl e' s i nt erest s shoul d be r espect ed for t hei r
own sakes.
Some phi l osopher s have argued t hat et hi cal egoi sm is
unaccept abl e because it vi ol at es pri nci pl es of logic whi ch
every rat i onal person must a c c e pt ) I am going t o present t wo
ar gument s against ethical egoism, but nei t her of t hem is of
this t ype. I will not t r y t o show t hat egoi sm is self-contra-
di ct ory. Rat her, I will argue t hat even i f et hi cal egoi sm is a
logically consi st ent doct ri ne, it is unaccept abl e on ot her
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JAMES RACHELS
grounds. My first ar gument will be t hat et hi cal egoi sm is
i ncompat i bl e wi t h a pri nci pl e whi ch expresses t he social-
pol i t i cal ideal o f human f r eedom, so t hat a nyone who accept s
ethical egoi sm will be f or ced to abandon t hat principle. The
second ar gument is based on t he i dea t hat et hi cal egoi sm is
si mpl y a wi cked view.
Before giving these ar gument s, I need t o say s omet hi ng
about my def i ni t i on of et hi cal egoism. I said t hat it is t he
view t hat t he ri ght t hi ng f or anyone t o do, on any occasi on,
is what ever woul d best pr omot e his own i nt erest s, no ma t t e r
how ot her peopl e' s i nt erest s woul d be af f ect ed. ( Reader s
fami l i ar wi t h t he rel evant phi l osophi cal l i t erat ure will recog-
nize this as a f or m o f what is known as "uni ver sal " or
" i mper s onal " et hi cal egoi sm - thus, what I have t o say will
not be di rect ed t o "i ndi vi dual " or " per s onal " versi ons of t he
doct ri ne. ) Thi s defi ni t i on al l ows f or the f act t hat sat i sfyi ng
some of a per son' s i nt erest s may confl i ct wi t h sat i sfyi ng ot her
of his interests. What woul d best pr omot e his i nt erest s is what
would lead t o the sat i sfact i on of t he mos t o f t hem, or of
those t hat are most i mpor t ant . The defi ni t i on also t akes i nt o
account t he possi bi l i t y of s omeone' s bei ng mi st aken about
what is in his own i nt erest s: it says t hat it is ri ght f or anyone t o
do what will pr omot e his i nt erest s, and not mer el y what he
t hi nks will pr omot e t hem. Fi nal l y, the def i ni t i on does not pre-
clude t he possi bi l i t y t hat in some cases what is in one' s own
i nt erest s also benefi t s ot hers. It is mer el y t hat , in such a case,
the benefi t t o ot her s is not what makes t he act right: what
makes t he act right is, rat her, the fact t hat it is t o one' s own
advantage.
1. Why an Egoi st Mus t Renounce Li bert y as a Soci al Ideal
I am going t o f or mul at e a pr i nci pl e whi ch I bel i eve
expresses what is at t he hear t of a c o mmi t me n t t o personal
l i bert y as a social or political ideal, and t hen use t hat prin-
ciple as a pr emi se in an ar gument t o t he concl usi on t hat
ethical egoi sm is false. I t mi ght be said, wi t h j ust i ce, t hat an
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AGAINST ETHICAL EGOISM
egoist coul d mai nt ai n his posi t i on in the face of this ar gument
si mpl y by r enounci ng t he pri nci pl e in quest i on. But t hat is
t he way it is wi t h any ar gument of t hi s t ype: one can al ways
escape t he concl usi on by rej ect i ng one or mor e of t he
premises. However, i f I am right about this, and t he egoi st
does have t o rej ect this pri nci pl e t o mai nt ai n his posi t i on,
t hen we will have exposed a bit mor e t hat is quest i onabl e in
t hat posi t i on, and we will have shed a little mor e light on t he
rat i onal e behi nd t he al t ernat i ve vi ew t hat we do have ot her-
regarding obl i gat i ons.
The pri nci pl e is:
(1) I t is not permi ssi bl e for one per son t o i nt erfere wi t h
anot her per son' s f r eedom of act i on unless t here is a
specific j ust i f i cat i on f or doi ng so.
The idea behi nd this pri nci pl e is t hat peopl e shoul d be
al l owed as much f r gedom as possible. But this is not t o say
t hat i nt er f er ence wi t h peopl e' s f r eedom is never j ust i fi ed.
Ther e is no pr obl em wi t h our right t o i nt erfere wi t h the
activities o~" mur der er s, thieves, and rapists. A c o mmi t me n t to
f r eedom merel y commi t s one t o t he view t hat such inter-
ference requires justiJ~cation; and in t he case o f mur der er s and
thieves and rapists the j ust i f i cat i on is easy t o give. The
i mpor t ant poi nt , t hough, is t hat in the absence of such a
j ust i fi cat i on, i nt erference is not per mi t t ed.
In this respect i nt erferi ng wi t h ot her peop. le' s conduct
di ffers f r om ot her sort s of act i ons which one mi ght per f or m,
such as t aki ng a bat h or going t o the movies. In most ordi-
nary ci r cumst ances t here is no obj ect i on t o a nyone ' s t aki ng a
bat h or going to t he movi es; so, such things do not requi re
any j ust i fi cat i on. A per son is, mor al l y speaking, free t o do or
not do t hem as he pleases. But it is di f f er ent when the act in
quest i on is i nt erferi ng wi t h anot her per s on' s f r eedom o f
act i on: t here is a pr es umpt i on against this which must be
over come by a speci fi c j ust i f i cat i on before it will be permi s-
sible.
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JAMES RACHELS
Now t he pr es umpt i on of non- i nt er f er ence wi t h ot her
peopl e' s conduct ma y be suspended in cert ai n speci al con-
t ext s. The rules o f compet i t i ve games, f or exampl e, may
per mi t i nt er f er ence wi t h t he act i vi t i es o f one' s opponent .
Moreover, t he pr es umpt i on of non- i nt er f er ence may be
suspended wi t hi n t he f r amewor k of social i nst i t ut i ons whi ch
give some i ndi vi dual s special aut hor i t y over ot hers. I n t he
army, f or exampl e, an of f i cer may have t he ri ght t o i nt er f er e
wi t h a pr i vat e' s activities by issuing hi m a qui t e ar bi t r ar y
command, wi t hout needi ng any special j ust i f i cat i on for doi ng
so. Similar exampl es coul d be drawn f r om par ent - chi l d
r el at i ons in the cont ext o f t he fami l y, and e mpl oye r - e mpl oye e
rel at i ons in the cont ext o f a busi ness or gani zat i on. However,
in a soci et y in whi ch f r eedom is valued, t hese i nst i t ut i ons
t hemsel ves will requi re j ust i f i cat i on bef or e t hey are admi t t ed
as a desi rabl e par t of t he social st ruct ure, preci sel y because of
the cur t ai l ment of personal l i bert y whi ch t hey involve. More-
over, i nsofar as it is possi bl e, i ndi vi dual par t i ci pat i on in such
i nst i t ut i ons will be on a vol unt ar y basis - mi l i t ar y con-
scri pt i on, f or exampl e, may not be t hought desi rabl e except
as an emer gency measure. And finally, in such a soci et y our
lives will never be so compl et el y organi zed al ong i nst i t ut i onal
lines t hat at every poi nt t her e is s omeone wi t h t he aut hor i t y
to tell us what t o do. The ideal will be t hat , wher ever
possible, peopl e will be l eft free t o make t hei r own deci si ons
and t o live t hei r own lives accordi ngl y. At any rat e, I am
going t o assume t hat f or t he pur poses o f this ar gument we are
talking about act i ons t hat t ake pl ace out si de any such special
cont ext s as these.
I f we need a j ust i f i cat i on f or i nt er f er i ng wi t h ot her
peopl e' s f r eedom of act i on, we need t o know what woul d
count as such a j ust i fi cat i on. Under what condi t i ons woul d we
be j ust i fi ed in i nt erferi ng wi t h someone? I t hi nk we can say
this small amount wi t h s ome conf i dence: a j ust i f i cat i on woul d
have t o show t hat t here is somet hi ng wrong or objectionable
in what t he ot her per son is doing. Suppose I am about t o
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AGAINST ETHICAL EGOISM
board a train which I think is the train to Amagansett, when
you grab my arm and stop me. To explain, you might say
that you had suddenly noticed that this was not the train to
Amagansett at all, but the train to Baltimore. I was about to
make a mistake and end up in the wrong place. Or, you might
tell me that my child has just been hurt, and I must not catch
the train because I am needed at the hospital. In either case,
if you are telling the truth, you have produced a justification
for your action. But notice that each justification succeeds
only by putting my action of boarding the train in a bad
light: 1 shoul dn' t be getting on the train to Baltimore because
that' s not where I want to go; and I shouldn' t be getting on
any train at all if I am needed at the hospital. On the other
hand, if I was not doing anything wrong - if I was getting on
the right train at the right time, etc., and if there was no
good reason why I shouldn' t be doing this - then you could
not produce any justification for stopping me. In line with
this, the second premise of our argument 2 is:
(2) If a certain act is the right thing for someone to do,
then there can be no justification for anyone to
interfere with his doing it.
The example of the train makes this claim plausible; but
in addition here are two general arguments in support of it.
First, if there is a reason sufficient to justify us in stopping
someone from doing something, then that same reason would
also serve to show that he shouldn' t be doing it in the first
place - that is, that it isn' t the right thing for him to do. If
so, then it will be impossible for there to be a counter-
example to (2) and so (2) must be true. Second, if an act A is
the right thing for someone to do, then it must also be the
very best thing for him to do. For, if there were an alter-
native action B such that it would be better for him to do B
than A, then B and not A would be the right thing for him to
do. And, if there were other actions available to the agent
which would be equally as good as A, then A would not be
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JAMES RACHELS
the right t hi ng f or hi m t o do, but onl y one among ma ny
things t hat he coul d do, any of whi ch woul d be right, but
none of whi ch woul d be the right t hi ng f or hi m t o do. (I t ake
it t hat expressi ons of t he f or m "the so-and-so" i mpl y uni que-
ness: thus, " Ve r t i go" is not the movi e di rect ed by Al fred
Hi t chcock, but onl y one of t he movi es, or a movi e, di rect ed
by Al fred Hi t chcock; and Noam Choms ky is not the critic of
Ameri can foreign pol i cy, but onl y one of t he critics, or a
critic, of Amer i can forei gn pol i cy. Her e I am fol l owi ng
Russell.) But now it seems clear t hat t her e coul d be no j ust i -
fi cat i on f or i nt er f er i ng wi t h s omeone who is doi ng the very
best thing that he could possibly be doing; and i f not , t hen
t here can be no j ust i f i cat i on for i nt erferi ng wi t h s ome one who
is doi ng what is t he right thing f or hi m t o be doing. There-
fore, (2) mus t be true.
We may be t e mpt e d t o doubt t he t r ut h of pr emi se (2) if
we forget t he di f f er ence bet ween t her e bei ng a justification
for doi ng somet hi ng and s ome one ' s wanting t o do it. We can
cert ai nl y want t o do things f or whi ch t here is no j ust i fi cat i on,
and t her e can be a j ust i f i cat i on f or things whi ch we don' t
want t o do. We also need t o r e me mbe r t he di f f er ence bet ween
having a j ust i f i cat i on and having a reason. Murderers, f or
exampl e, of t en have reasons for t hei r crimes, even when t her e
is no j ust i f i cat i on for what t hey do. The man who assassi-
nat ed Presi dent Garfi el d had a reason for killing hi m: he said
t hat he did it in or der t o cr eat e a demand f or a book he had
wri t t en. But of course this was no j ust i fi cat i on. Bearing t hese
di fferences in mi nd, premi se (2) onl y says t hat we can have
no j ust i f i cat i on f or i nt erferi ng wi t h right act i ons; it does not
deny t hat we may have a reason f or doi ng so, or t hat we
mi ght s omet i mes want t o do so. Moreover, pr emi se (2) does
not even say t hat we ought not t o i nt er f er e wi t h right
act i ons: for it does not fol l ow f r om t he f act t hat t her e is no
j ust i f i cat i on f or doi ng somet hi ng t hat we ought not t o do it.
( Re me mbe r t hat in many cases it is all ri ght t o do t hi ngs
wi t hout a j ust i f i cat i on si mpl y because no j ust i f i cat i on is
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AGAINST ETHICAL EGOISM
needed - t hi nk again o f going t o the movi es or t aki ng a
bat h. )
The precedi ng t wo premi ses have t o do wi t h t he ideal of
f r eedom and wi t h when we are j ust i fi ed in i nt erferi ng wi t h
peopl e' s freedom. The next one concerns a di f f er ent mat t er ; it
expresses a necessary connect i on bet ween t he concept s of
ri ght ness and permi ssi bi l i t y.
(3) I f a cert ai n act is the right t hi ng f or s omeone t o do,
t hen it is permi ssi bl e f or hi m t o do it.
Thi s seems t o me self-evident on its face; and i t is t aken as a
necessary t r ut h in st andard syst ems of deont i c logic. However,
i f a r at i onal e f or it is needed, one ma y be provi ded very
easily: any act is permi ssi bl e j ust in case it is not wrong; it is
never wrong f or someone t o do t he right t hi ng; t her ef or e, if
an act is t he right t hi ng f or s omeone t o do, it is permi ssi bl e
for him t o do it.
The final premi se of this ar gument has t o do wi t h situa-
t i ons in whi ch peopl e' s i nt erest s are in confl i ct . It s omet i mes
t hat it is in one per son' s i nt erest s t o do a cert ai n act ,
is in anot her per son' s i nt crest s to st op hi m. That is t o
happens
while it
say:
(4) Ther e are si t uat i ons in which it woul d best pr omot e
t he i nt erest s o f one person, X, t o do a cert ai n act A,
while it woul d best pr omot e the i nt erest s of a not he r
per son Y t o st op X f r om doi ng A.
Si t uat i ons of this sort are common. For exampl e, Jones is
expect i ng an i nheri t ance f r om his weal t hy aunt , but she is
consi deri ng changi ng her will t o excl ude hi m. I f he coul d get
away wi t h it, i t woul d be t o Jones' advant age t o poi son her;
but of course it woul d be t o her advant age t o st op hi m.
Peopl e have t ri ed in vari ous ways to show t hat such
confl i ct s of i nt erest cannot occur. Tr adi t i onal Chri st i an
t heol ogy, f or exampl e, provi des a Hell f or Jones t o roast in
for all et er ni t y if he shoul d do such a thing; so, on this
fami l i ar view, it coul d never really be in his i nt erest s t o do it.
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JAMES RACHELS
For all its i mpl ausi bi l i t y and obj ect i onabl eness on ot her
grounds, t he doct r i ne of Hell at l east had t he advant age of
el i mi nat i ng t he need f or any f ur t her expl anat i on as t o why
one s houl dn' t cut one' s br ot her ' s t hr oat f or per sonal gain. The
t hr eat of Hel l -for-t he-wi cked, t oget her wi t h t he i dent i f i cat i on
of wi ckedness wi t h har mi ng ot hers, kept peopl e' s i nt er est s
ni cel y in har mony. Someone who believes in Hell coul d rej ect
pr emi se (4) on t hese grounds. I will not discuss whet her such
a bel i ef is defensi bl e; rat her, I will address my ar gument onl y
t o t hose who do not find such a way out sat i sf act or y.
The mos t wi del y-di scussed nont hei st i c ar gument t hat
confl i ct s of i nt erest cannot occur derives f r om chapt er s 13-15
of Hobbe s ' Leviathan. Since this is t he onl y pl ausi bl e argu-
ment o f its ki nd t hat I know of, I will concl ude, i f it fails,
t hat we have no good reason t o deny t hat such confl i ct s can
occur. Hobbes argued t hat it is in each per son' s own i nt erest s
t o do what ever is necessary t o secure and mai nt ai n a peace-
able soci et y, in which he can live safe f r om t he t hr eat of
har m by his fellows, and in whi ch he can enj oy the advan-
tages t hat come f r om a division of l abor and f r om mut ual l y
cooper at i ve ent erpri ses. But in or der f or anyone t o secure
t hese goods, Hobbes said, t her e mus t be cert ai n rules in force
in the soci et y: among these are rules di rect i ng one t o keep
one' s cont r act s, t o respect the rights o f ot her s and not har m
t hem, t o tell the t rut h, and so f or t h; in short , all the rules
t hat are s ummed up in t he c o mma n d me n t t o t r eat ot her s as
you want t hem t o t r eat you. Ther ef or e, it is t o one' s advan-
tage t o agree t o obey t hese rules, pr ovi ded t hat ot her s will
obey t hem t oo; and in any r easonabl y wel l -ordered soci et y
this is j ust t he sort of ar r angement t hat is al ready in force.
The ups hot is t hat , in obeyi ng t he or di nar y rules o f mor al i t y,
a per son is mer el y doi ng his part t o mai nt ai n t he sort o f
social envi r onment whi ch it is t o his own advant age t o have.
So, appear ances to t he cont r ar y, sel f-i nt erest requi res con-
f or mi t y t o ot her-regardi ng pri nci pl es and does not conf l i ct
with t hem.
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AGAINST ETHICAL EGOISM
The pr obl em wi t h this ar gument is t hat , while i t surel y is
t o t he i ndi vi dual ' s own advant age t o live in a soci et y in whi ch
t he or di nar y mor al rules are obeyed, he does not have t o
obey t hem hi ms e l f all t he t i me in or der t o live in such a
soci et y. I f t he Hobbesi an ar gument were t o be t aken seri ousl y
on t hi s poi nt , we woul d have t o believe t hat soci et y is such a
fragile t hi ng t hat it coul d be br ought down by a f ew selfish
peopl e pursui ng t hei r own i nt erest s wi t hout regard f or t he
good of ot hers. But of course this is not so. Most peopl e will
go on behavi ng as t hey usual l y do, regardless of what any odd
individual here or t her e does; so no one need fear t hat , i f he
does not hi msel f c onf or m t o t he mor al rules on every occa-
sion, he will lose t he advant ages of living in a decent soci et y.
Of course, i f ever yone were t o make it his pol i cy t o devi at e
f r om t he rules of social mor al i t y whenever it is t o his own
advant age t o do so, t hen a t ol er abl e social or der mi ght be
i mpossi bl e. However, in est i mat i ng t he l i kel y consequences of
his own act i ons, an egoi st may t ake i nt o account t he fact t hat
ever yone will not do this, and t hat his own act i ons will not
bring about any such results. So t he careful fel l ow can, af t er
all, have it bot h ways.
The consi der at i ons advanced by Hobbes do show some-
thing, even t hough t hey do not show t hat confl i ct s of i nt erest
are i mpossi bl e. What t hey do show is t hat it is in each
per son' s i nt erest s t o wor k for and pr omot e social arrange-
ment s whi ch woul d make it very hard f or hi m t o advance his
own i nt erest s at t he expense of ot hers. I t is in each per son' s
i nt erest s, f or exampl e, f or t here t o be an effi ci ent and well-
run pol i ce force and j udi ci al syst em, so t hat peopl e cannot
hope t o gain f r om hur t i ng hi m or cheat i ng hi m of br eaki ng
t hei r agr eement s wi t h hi m. Hobbes was right t o observe t hat
not even t he cl everest and st rongest man can expect t o have a
decent life apar t f r om t he pr ot ect i on of such i nst i t ut i ons. But ,
in pr omot i ng t hese i nst i t ut i ons whi ch woul d make it har der
f or ot her peopl e t o benef i t f r om har mi ng us, we are at t he
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JAMES RACHELS
same t i me decr easi ng t he chances o f our benef i t t i ng f r om
har mi ng t hem.
The i mpor t a nc e o f Ho b b e s ' a r g u me n t is t ha t it poi nt s up
t he wa y in whi ch o u r ma j or soci al and pol i t i cal i ns t i t ut i ons
f or ce t he i nt er est s o f i ndi vi dual s i nt o a r ough b u t i mpe r f e c t
h a r mo n y , and h o w s uch i ns t i t ut i ons are vi t al t o t he wel f ar e o f
each per son. Ta ke n t hi s way, t he a r g u me n t is a bri l l i ant
success ( and I t hi nk t hat t hi s is t he wa y Hobbe s hi ms el f
i nt e nde d t he a r gume nt t o be t aken) . But t aken as a p r o o f t hat
pe opl e ' s i nt er est s are in f act al ways in h a r mo n y , it fails. So, I
can see no good r eason t o d o u b t wha t is in a ny case pl ai n o n
t he f ace o f it, t hat pe opl e ' s i nt er est s can and do conf l i ct in
t he ma n n e r spel l ed out in pr emi s e ( 4) or our ar gument .
No w gi ven t hese f our premi ses, we can easi l y de duc e t he
concl us i on t hat et hi cal egoi sm is an i ncor r ect vi ew. Ac c or di ng
t o et hi cal egoi sm, t he ri ght t hi ng f or X t o do is A, whi l e t he
ri ght t hi ng f or Y t o do is t o s t op X f r o m doi ng A. But f r om
t hi s it f ol l ows bot h t ha t t her e is a j us t i f i cat i on f or Y' s pre-
vent i ng X f r om doi ng A, and t hat t her e can be no j ust i fi -
cat i on f or Y' s pr event i ng X f r om doi ng A. The r e f or e , et hi cal
egoi sm mus t be i ncor r ect . The det ai l s o f t he der i vat i on are
obvi ous, but 1 will give t hem a n y wa y :
( 5) If ethical egoism is correct, then
the right tiring for X to do is A.
(6) If ed~i,:al egoism is correct, then
the right thing for Y to do is to
stop X l'rtml doing A.
(7) If the right thing for X to do is A.
then thetc cal l be 11o justilication
for Y's stopping him [lOlll doing it.
( 8) I f the righl thing for Y to do is
to stop X flora doing A. then it is
permissible for Y to stop X from
doing A.
This follows from the
delinition of ethical
egoism together with (4).
This ff)llows from tile
definition of ethical
egoism together with (4).
This follows from (2).
This follows f r o m (3).
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AGAINST ETHICAL EGOISM
(9) If it is permissible for Y to stop
X from doing A, then there is
a justification for Y's stopping
X from doing A.
(10) I f ethica~ egoism is correct, then
there can be no justification for
Y's stopping X from doing A.
(11) I f ethical egoism is correct, then
there is a justification for Y's
stopping X from doing A.
This follows from (1).
This follows from (5) and
(7).
This follows from (6),
(8), and (9).
(12) Therefore, ethical egoism is not This follows from (10)
correct, and ( t 1).
No w as I sai d bef or e, one ca~J al ways escape t he con-
cl usi on o f an a r gume nt b y r ej ect i ng one or mo r e o f t he
premi ses. Of t he f our pr emi ses o f t hi s a r gume nt , it seems t o
me t hat t he last t wo mus t be accept ed, f or t he r easons t ha t I
have given. As f or t he s e c ond pr emi se, it pl aces onl y t he mo s t
mi n i mu m sor t o f r es t r i ct i on on wh a t can c o u n t as a j ust i f i ca-
t i on f or i nt er f er i ng wi t h a n o t h e r pe r s on' s f r e e dom o f act i on.
Of cour se, i f a n y o n e t hi nks t hat such i nt er f er ence does n o t
need j us t i f yi ng, t hen he will not have t o accept , or r ej ect , any
vi ew a b o u t wha t c ount s as a j us t i f i cat i on. Fo r hi m, t he l at t er
ques t i on s i mpl y will not arise. But f or a n y o n e who does t hi nk
t ha t i nt er f er ence r equi r es j us t i f i cat i on - tl3at is, f or a n y o n e
wh o accept s pr emi s e ( 1) - t he mi n i mu m r es t r i ct i on expr essed
in ( 2) seems unavoi dabl e. Ther ef or e, it seems t ha t in or de r t o
avoi d t he c onc l us i on t ha t et hi cal egoi sm is an i nc or r e c t vi ew,
pr emi se ( 1) mus t be r ej ect ed.
An d t hi s coul d be done. I t coul d be sai d t ha t we do n o t
need t o j us t i f y i nt er f er ence wi t h ot he r peopl e. I t c oul d be
said t hat l i mi t i ng a n o t h e r pe r s on' s l i ber t y is no di f f er ent f r o m
goi ng t o t he movi es or t aki ng a bat h, in t hi s r es pect ; it is one
o f t he t hi ngs t ha t we are free t o do or not do, as we pl ease.
An d i f my a r gume nt has been cor r ect , t he et hi cal egoi st is in
t he pos i t i on o f havi ng t o say this. But t hos e o f us wh o ar e
unwi l l i ng t o say such t hi ngs will dr aw a di f f er ent concl us i on.
307
JAMES RACHELS
For us, the fact that ethical egoism lands one in such a
position provides a compelling reason for rejecting that
doctrine.
2. The Wickedness o f Ethical Egoism
The most obvious objection to ethical egoism is that it is
a morally pernicious doctrine. One aspect of this pernicious-
ness is that it is incompatible with the social ideal of freedom,
as I have just argued. But on an even more obvious level,
ethical egoism says straight-out that we need never be con-
cerned with the needs or interests of ot her people, except
insofar as they are useful to us; and this seems, on its face, an
encouragement to wickedness. However, not many philo-
sophers have pressed this point as a serious objection to
egoism. The reason, I think, is that most philosophers feel
that such an objection merely begs the question. To say that
this view is wi c ke d' - or, more precisely, that many actions
endorsed by it are wicked - is to express a moral judgment
which the egoist himself would not accept. The essence of his
theory is that those actions are right, and if we deny this,
then we are disagreeing with his theory but we are not
refuting it. We are merely substituting abuse for argument.
I believe that this way of thinking is mistaken, and that
the wickedness of ethical egoism is a decisive objection against
it. In what follows I will present an argument based on this
idea, and I will defend the argument against the charge of
question-begging.
A friend of mine who lives in a very small town in south
Georgia told me about the following incident which occurred
within the past year. The town is so small that there is only
one doctor, and he is, as one might expect, one of the t own' s
more affluent citizens. One day the doct or was visited by a
poor, uneducated black woman with a variety of minor com-
plaints. A brief examination showed that she was suffering
from malnutrition. The problem was that the woman did not
have enough money to buy food for herself and her several
308
AGAINST ETHICAL EGOISM
small chi l dren. She wor ked, whenever she coul d, as a cleaning-
woman in t he homes of t he bet t er - of f peopl e in t he t own,
but she was abl e t o earn onl y a few dol l ars a mo n t h in t hi s
way. All t hi s was known t o t he doct or . Af t er spendi ng no
mor e t han five mi nut es wi t h t he woman, and havi ng done
absol ut el y not hi ng f or her, t he doct or t ol d her t hat t he charge
woul d be t went y- f i ve dollars. The woman onl y had t wel ve
dollars - this was, literally, all t he mo n e y she had in t he
worl d - so t he doct or t ook t hat .
I t was t o t he doct or ' s own advant age t o t ake t he
woma n' s money, si mpl y because it made hi m t wel ve dol l ars
richer. Thi s was not much of an i mpr ove me nt in his fi nanci al
posi t i on, but it was s ome i mpr ovement . Moreover, as far as
anyone can tell, this slight fi nanci al gain was t he onl y ef f ect
whi ch his act i on had on his own i nt erest s. Ther e were no
har mf ul r eact i ons t owar d hi m f r om t he bl ack c ommuni t y, or
f r om any ot her quart er, and none were expect ed. The doct or
hi msel f had no gui l t y consci ence about t he mat t er , f or he
never gave it anot her t hought .
Now t he ar gument t hat I want t o pr opos e is this:
(1) I f et hi cal egoi sm is cor r ect , t hen t he doct or di d t he
ri ght thing.
(2) The doct or did not do t he ri ght thing.
(3) Ther ef or e, et hi cal egoi sm is not correct .
Thi s ar gument , al t hough it is r at her obvi ous, has all t he
vi rt ues whi ch a good ar gument shoul d have. The pr emi ses are
t rue and t he concl usi on fol l ows logically f r om t hem. Each of
t he premi ses is i ndependent l y pl ausi bl e; t he ar gument does
not t r y t o set t l e t he t r ut h of a cont r over si al mat t er by appeal -
ing t o consi der at i ons t hat are t hemsel ves equal l y cont roversi al .
Fi nal l y, t hi s ar gument goes t o t he hear t of t he mat t er : it
poi nt s out t hat et hi cal egoi sm leads t o t he concl usi on t hat
cert ai n act s are right when t hose act i ons in f act are not ri ght ;
and since et hi cal egoi sm is a t heor y about right and wrong, I
do not see what coul d be a mor e seri ous di f f i cul t y f or it.
309
JAMES RACHELS
Does this argument beg t he quest i on against et hi cal
egoism? I t hi nk not , al t hough accusat i ons of "begging t he
quest i on" are not or i ousl y hard t o answer. Argument s most
clearly beg t he quest i on when one of t he premises states t he
concl usi on in a disguised form. But nei t her of t he premises of
this ar gument does t hat . Nei t her of t he premises al one entails
t he concl usi on, al t hough of course t aken t oget her t hey do
entail it. Moreover, t he ar gument is a simple mo d u s t ol l ens ,
which is a f or m of argument not usually t hought t o be falla-
cious in any sense.
But still t he feeling may persist t hat this argument some-
how begs t he quest i on at issue. Ther e are several things t hat
might be said in an at t empt t o bri ng out exact l y how t he
argument begs t he quest i on. I will consi der t hem one at a
time:
" The argument begs t he quest i on because it has a
premi se which t he ethical egoist woul d not accept .
The egoist woul d not accept premi se (2). I f it was in
t he doct or ' s own interests t o take t he money, t hen
t he egoist woul d say t hat t he doct or did t he right
thing. Premise (2) says t hat t he doct or di d n o t do
t he right thing, so obvi ousl y t he egoist woul d not
agree. "
The pr obl em wi t h this, as it stands, is t hat it doesn' t
mat t er at all what some real or imaginary def ender of egoism
woul d s ay about premise (2). All t hat mat t er s is whet her
premise (2) is true. Premise (2) happens t o be t rue, so i f
someone denies it, he is saying somet hi ng false.
" But t hat is mere dogmat i sm; it presupposes t hat
ethical egoism is wrong. The poi nt is t hat i f et hi cal
egoism is correct , as t he egoist believes it t o be, t hen
t he doct or was fight t o t ake t he money. Again, t o
say ot herwi se assumes t hat et hi cal egoism is not
correct , and so begs t he quest i on at issue. "
310
AGAINST ETHICAL EGOISM
Thi s sort of t hi ng is of t en said in di scussi ons of
egoism, but it seems t o me not hi ng but a st ri ng of confusi ons.
In t he first place, t he condi t i onal s t at ement t hat I f ethical
egoism is correct, then the doctor was right to take the
money is cer t ai nl y t rue; but it is not hi ng mor e t han a rest at e-
ment of pr emi se (1) of our ar gument ! And as f or t he cl ai m
t hat pr emi se (2) pr esupposes t he fal si t y of et hi cal egoi sm,
cl earl y t hat is not so. Taken by itself, t he si mpl e s t at ement
t hat The doctor did not do the right thing does not pre-
suppose t he t r ut h or fal si t y of any et hi cal t heor y what ever.
Of course, when t aken t oget her wi t h pr emi se (1), pr emi se (2)
entails t hat et hi cal egoi sm is i ncor r ect - but t hat is not a
def ect of t he ar gument ; it is t he ar gument ' s whol e poi nt .
" Le t ' s st art again. Let ' s j ust say t hat pr emi se (2) is
controversial; non-egoi st s woul d accept it but egoists
woul d deny it. And any ar gument whi ch depends on
t hat sort of premi se cannot hel p us t o deci de t he
t r ut h or falsity of t he view in ques t i on. "
The suggestion t hat premi se (2) is cont roversi al may be
t aken in several ways. It may j ust be a r emi nder t hat it has
been, or may be, cont r over t ed, t hat is, t hat some peopl e may
delay it. But again, this by i t sel f is not impressive. Peopl e have
deni ed all sort s of t rue things, and what of it?
Or, in sayi ng t hat (2) is cont roversi al , it mi ght be meant
t hat its t r ut h is quest i onabl e, uncert ai n, or doubt f ul . But this
does not seem t o be so. Premise (2) is as obvi ousl y and
clearly t rue as anyt hi ng coul d be. What originally st ruck me
about my fri end' s st or y was t hat t he doct or ' s act i on was so
plainly reprehensi bl e.
Fi nal l y, in sayi ng t hat (2) is cont roversi al , it may be
meant t hat t here is no mor e reason t o believe it t han t o deny
it, because t he evi dence in its favor is not concl usi ve; and so,
anyone who insists t hat (2) is t rue is mer el y bei ng dogmat i c.
But t hi s is false. The evi dence t hat t he doct or did t he wr ong
t hi ng is overwhel mi ng. In t he first place, t he woman was
311
JAMES RACHELS
ext r emel y poor. She was sufferi ng f r om mal nut r i t i on, and
wi t hout t he twelve dollars she woul d have not hi ng t o eat.
And her chi l dren woul d have not hi ng t o eat. Moreover, t her e
are all t he ot her necessities of life which this wr et ched f ami l y
lacked. The doct or , on t he ot her hand, was well-off, and
twelve dollars meant relatively l i t t l e t o hi m ( al t hough i t di d
mean somet hi ng). And t o make mat t er s even worse, t he
doct or did not hi ng t o earn t he woman' s money: he simply
took advantage of her helplessness. All this provi des emi nent l y
good reason f or affi rmi ng t he t r ut h of (2). Judgment s backed
by such evi dence are anyt hi ng but ar bi t r ar y or dogma/tic. On
t he cont r ar y, it is t he denial of (2) t hat is unreasonabl e, since
no compar abl e case can be made on t hat side.
" Now we have got t en t o t he r oot of t he pr obl em.
None of t he reasons t hat have j ust been given in
suppor t of (2) woul d be al l owed by t he et hi cal
egoist. On his t heor y, all t hose consi derat i ons woul d
be irrelevant. At last, this shows why our ar gument
begs t he quest i on: premi se ( 2 ) r e c o r d s a j udgment
t hat can be suppor t ed onl y by non-egoistic evidence.
Thus, we affi rm (2) onl y because we are pre-
supposing a non-egoistic t heor y of right and wrong,
and so we beg t he quest i on. "
Thi s obj ect i on is based on what I t hi nk is a mi st aken
view about t he rel at i on bet ween individual moral j udgment s
and moral theories. I take it t hat t heori es such as egoism and
utilitarianism of f er universal general i zat i ons about t he charact -
eristics in vi r t ue of whi ch act i ons are mor al l y right. Utilita-
rianism, f or exampl e, says t hat all moral l y right act i ons
pr oduce t he greatest possible bal ance of good over evil results,
when ever yone' s i nt erest s are wei ght ed equal l y, and t hat is
what makes t hose act i ons right. And et hi cal egoism says t hat
all moral l y right act i ons are t hose whi ch best serve t he
i nt erest s of t he agent himself. I f this is right, t hen we may
test such t heori es si mpl y by l ooki ng t o see whet her , in fact ,
312
AGAINST ETHICAL EGOISM
right act i ons do have t he charact eri st i cs whi ch t hese t heori es
say t hey have. Thus, when it t ur ns out t hat some ri ght
act i ons, such as refusi ng t o hang an i nnocent man t o appease
a bl oodt hi r s t y mob, do not have t he charact eri st i cs whi ch
( some f or ms of) ut i l i t ari ani sm say t hey shoul d have, we con-
cl ude t hat t her e mus t be somet hi ng wr ong wi t h ( t hose f or ms
of) ut i l i t ari ani sm. Similarly, i f it t ur ns out t hat some ri ght
act i ons, such as l et t i ng t he woman leave wi t h her t wel ve
dollars, do not have t he charact eri st i cs whi ch et hi cal egoi sm
says t hey shoul d have, we mus t concl ude t hat t here is some-
t hi ng wr ong wi t h et hi cal egoism.
The mai n poi nt her e is t hat we do not det er mi ne what is
right merely by consul t i ng t heori es of rightness. Such a t heor y
ma y be hel pful in di ffi cul t cases, when we are not sure what
t o t hi nk: but in t he clear cases, in whi ch it is plain what is
ri ght and what is wrong, t hen t he t heor y is t est ed by how
well it cor r esponds t o t he mor al " f a c t s , " and not t he ot her
way ar ound. The same can be said of t he evidence or reasons
whi ch s uppor t individual mor al j udgment s. We do not di scover
what sort s of consi der at i ons are rel evant t o suppor t i ng mor al
j udgment s excl usi vel y by consul t i ng t heori es. Our abi l i t y t o
recogni ze t he rel evant consi derat i ons, at least in t he cl ear
cases, is pr i or t o any specul at i ons we mi ght make about mor al
t heor y; and again, our t heori es may be t est ed by t he degree
t o whi ch t hey do i dent i f y t he sort s of consi der at i ons t hat we
know t o be i mpor t ant .
So I do not say t hat (2) is t rue, nor do I ci t e t hi s
evi dence in s uppor t of it, si mpl y because I am pr esupposi ng
some non-egoi st i c t heor y of ri ght and wrong. The wrongness
of t he doct or ' s act i on is recogni zabl e i ndependent l y of any
such t heor y. I t is mor e cert ai n t han any mer e t heor y coul d
be: it is one of t he fi xed, const ant poi nt s against whi ch
pr opos ed t heori es may be t est ed, and t he whol e poi nt of t hi s
ar gument is t hat et hi cal egoi sm does not pass t hi s test. 3
UNI VE RS I T Y OF MIAMI
CORAL GABLES , F LORI DA 3 3 1 2 4
US A
313
JAMES RACHELS
NOTES
I See, for exampl e, Brian Medlin, "Ul t i mat e Principles and Ethical Egoi sm, "
Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 35 (1957), pp. 111-118; William H.
Baumer, "Indefensi bl e Impersonal Egoi sm, " Philosophical Studies, vol. 17 (1967),
pp.72-75; and Ri chmond Campbell, "A Short Ref ut at i on of Ethical Egoi sm, "
Canandian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 2 (1972), pp. 249-254.
2I n t he Moral Point of View (It haca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1958), Kur t
Baler present s an ar gument against egoism whi ch relies on a premise s omewhat like
t hi s one. Baier gives an ext ended defense of this premise in "Et hi cal Egoism and
Interpersonal Compat i bi l i t y, " Philosophical Studies, vol. 24 (1973), pp. 357-368
31 am grateful to Jack Glickman and Asa Rasher for hel pful c omme nt s on earlier
versions of t hi s paper.
3 1 4