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Critical Cartography Module

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The 1ACs use of marine space demonstrates a cartographical construction. Their
dominant understanding of total scientific knowledge must be restructured.
Smith and Brennan 12 (Glen, School of Geosciences University of Edinburgh. Ruth, Centre for
Sustainable Coasts, Scottish Association for Marine Science, Scottish Marine Institute Ocean and Costal
Management Elsevier page 216
Despite their shortcomings, maps are key to the way marine spaces in Scotland, and around the world, are being
managed. They are tactically located in the process of arriving at governance solutions and are very
powerful governance tools. This fact makes critical thinking about maps crucial. Considerations should
include the potential of a map not only to inform us of the state of a marine space but also the
possibility that that space becomes what is depicted, as with the engineering of seascapes discussed
above. As such, maps need to be as well informed as possible and stories that marine space users have
to tell count towards this information, which is an important step in reducing the dominance of science
in map making. These same marine space users, such as the fishermen focused on in this account, can
be redefined as new maps are created and the policy landscape changes. This can have an enormous
impact on society, nature and social nature. With the policy landscape changing so rapidly in Scotland and with the nation
enjoying new autonomy over its marine space, the opportunity for ensuring the sustainability of Scotlands seas is huge. Using scientifically
sound methods to inform and implement marine spatial planning is one way to seize this opportunity. However, there is often a perceived
disconnect between marine environments e especially those further from the coasts- and society, and a view that scientists know best how to
govern these areas. Social science must avoid being muted as Scotland engages in ambitious projects like offshore renewable energy
installations. Every time a natural area is mapped, fished in or considered for development it becomes
innately social and we would do well to respect that fact.
The Affirmative allows status quo mapping relationships to go unquestioned. This
causes a loss of personal agency.
Wood, and Fels 8
(Denis, ph.D and MA. In Geography. Fels, Graduate Student NC State University, College of Natural
Resources cartographica (volume 43, issue 3), pp. 191-192
The continual assent given to the propositions made by maps endows them with the authority that is
uniquely that of reference objects. These include catalogues, calendars, concordances, encyclopaedias,
directories, phone books, dictionaries (Merriam-Websters, the OED *look it up!+), thesauruses
(Rogets!), glossaries (at the end of every textbook), textbooks (Organic Chemistry no subtitle), the
National Geographic, the Times (New York, London, Los Angeles), TV Guide, style guides (The Chicago
Manual of Style [fifteenth edition!], Turabian, Strunk and White), cookbooks, field guides, travel books (What does the
Mobil Guide say?), footnotes, citations, legal citations, priests, eye witnesses, constitutions, parliamentary procedures. All of these constitute
objectifying resources that permit a claimant to insist that, It is not I, not I who says this, but before dropping, like a tombstone, the name
of some revered reference object (Langenscheidts, Groves, the Britannica, Larousse, Merck). Maps too are objectifying
resources: the maps of Hammond, Bartholomew, Rand-McNally, Esselte, the National Geographic Society, AAA, Mobil, Michelin, the United
States Geological Survey, other national mapping services, state highway maps, the Thomas Guides, Falks, bus maps, maps of metro lines.
Maps objectify by winnowing out our personal agency, replacing it with that of a reference object so
constructed by so many people over so long a time that it might as well have been constructed by no
one at all (It is not I who says this, but . . . the entire human race). Citation enhances a sources authority but also the
authority of the one who cites it. The reflected light is blinding. Opposition is extinguished. You dont
believe the map? Check it out! This authority, apparently descriptive, is inherently prescriptive. The phone
book is not a guide to numbers from which one may feel free to pick and choose (though plenty evidently do): it tells you what to dial, it
prescribesthe number. A street directory gives you the address. There is no Hmmm here as there is over the choices a thesaurus offers or
among the shades of meaning provided by decent dictionaries, where even so there is little hemming or hawing over spelling. The dictionary is
absolutely prescriptive about spelling, a social fact we acknowledge that we dramatize in the annual rite of the National Spelling Bee.
Among the mutual validations spellers validating the authority of the dictionary, dictionary validating the spellers spelling the prescriptive,
the authoritative, is hard to miss.

The Alternative is to Counter-map, the process of questioning what we know and
rebuilding structures based of those answers. Counter mapping is key to redefining
spaces and counteracting hegemonic authorities that dominate nature
Martin 09 (Kevin, ph.D Department of Geography at Rutgers Toward a Cartography of the Commons:
Constituting the Political and Economic Possibilities of Place The Professional
Place-based politics and struggles around resources that counter neoliberal dispossessions of what had
been common require an ontological ground on which such politics and struggles might be enacted. A
host of contemporary movements, from indigenous rights to resources to antienclosure movements,
rely on a vision of community territory or local commons through which alternative forms of
environmental knowledge, productive utilization of resources, and local identities can be imagined (e.g.,
Escobar 2001; Sletto 2002; Mackenzie 2006). These spaces of difference counter hegemonic understandings of
nature as an inventory of discrete resources open to individual appropriation, and they are increasingly
represented using mapping and related technologies that fall under the rubric of countermapping
(Peluso 1995). Countermaps work against the displacement, valuation, abstraction, individuation,
privatization, and alienability of resources that are foundational to a capitalist appropriation and
exploitation of nature (Castree 2003), and, insofar as they recast space as the domain of resource-dependent communities, they work
against the representation of resource users as competing individuals bent on utility maximization. Countermapping, then, is not only an
effective method for reclaiming material resources for those who have been dispossessed, but it works to counter particular forms
of economic subjectivity and space (St. Martin 2005b); it inserts a noncapitalist presence into locations where only a capitalist
potential had been identified via scientific and institutionalized mappings of nature and resources (cf. Law 2004).
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Understanding map relationships is a pre-requisite for productive argumentation.
Corner 99 (James, Professor, Univeristy of Pennsylvania The Agency of Mapping, Speculation, Critique
and Invention. Mappings Pages 250-251
All perceiving is also thinking, all reasoning is also intuition, all observation is also invention,' wrote Rudolf Arnheim.57 Moreover, these
activities are not without effect; they have great force in shaping the world. It is in this inter-subjective and active sense that
mappings are not transparent, neutral or passive devices of spatial measurement and description. They
are instead extremely opaque, imaginative, operational instruments. Although drawn from measured
observations in the world, mappings are neither depictions nor representations but mental constructs,
ideas that enable and effect change. In describing and visualizing otherwise hidden facts, maps set the stage for future work.
Mapping is always already a project in the making. If maps are essentially subjective, interpretative and
fictional constructs of facts, constructs that influence decisions, actions and cultural values generally,
then why not embrace the profound efficacy of mapping in exploring and shaping new realities? Why
not embrace the fact that the potentially infinite capacity of mapping to find and found new conditions
might enable more socially engaging modes of exchange within larger milieux? The notion that mapping should be
restricted to empirical data-sorting and array diminishes the profound social and orienting sway of the cartographic enterprise. And yet the
power of 'objective analysis' in building consensus and representing collective responsibility is not something to be abandoned for a free-form
'subjectivity'; this would be both naive and ineffective. The power of maps resides in their facticity. The analytical
measure of factual objectivity (and the credibility that it brings to collective discourse) is a characteristic
of mapping that ought to be embraced, co-opted and used as the means by which critical projects can
be realized.58 After all, it is the apparent rigour of objective analysis and logical argument that possesses the greatest efficacy in a
pluralistic, democratic society. Analytical research through mapping enables the designer to construct an
argument, to embed it within the dominant practices of a rational culture, and ultimately to turn those
practices towards more productive and collective ends. In this sense, mapping is not the indiscriminate,
blinkered accumulation and endless array of data, but rather an extremely shrewd and tactical
enterprise, a practice of relational reasoning that intelligently unfolds new realities out of existing
constraints, quantities, facts and conditions.59 The artistry lies in the use of the technique, in the way in which things are
framed and set up. Through reformulating things differently, novel and inventive possibilities emerge. Thus mapping innovates; it derives
neither from logical possibility (projection) nor necessity (utility) but from logical force. The agency of mapping lies in its cunning exposure and
engendering of new sets of possibility.60
In order to have productive dialogue, we have to think about the process of gaining
knowledge instead of the knowledge itself.
Crampton 02 (Jeremy, Associate Professor at the University of Kentucky, Ph.D. in Geography.
Thinking Philosophically in Cartography: Toward A Critical Politics of Mapping Cartographic
Perspectives, Winter 2002 Page 8
We now go back to the difference between Robinson and Harley we can see that where the former described the fish in the net, the
philosophies of Foucault and Heidegger are concerned with the net itself. Harley also asked about the net. What does the net
catch? Do we like what it catches? Have other places or times had other kinds of nets which caught
different things? What do we suspect the net to be unable to catch? How can we change the net to
catch other things? According to Heidegger our present ontological net is critically flawed because it
sets up being in a very scientific way. We like to measure things and treat them as objective presences on the landscape that can
be represented. Again, this critique of science should remind us more of Harley than Robinson. The onticontological distinction is a familiar
one in the history of philosophy, dating back to Descartes and Kant. When Heidegger took it up, he distinguished between living life as such
(making choices against a background of possibilities) for which he coins the term existentiell understanding, and the questioning of what
constitutes existence and the structure of these possibilities, which he calls the existential understanding (Heidegger, 1962, 34). This
existential understanding is one directed toward the meaning of being. Heidegger begins his book by stating that we are very far from
answering the question of what an existential understanding might be; so far, in fact, that the very question itself is forgotten (Heidegger, 1962,
1). These bewildering terms might make us wonder why its worth worrying about the being of maps.
Why not study concrete maps that actually exist? Heideggers response is essentially to refer us once
again to the fishermans problem. Sure, we could study the contents of the net. This is what we do when
we study maps and mapping, especially from a scientific viewpoint. It is ontical enquiry about things. But
the only way to know anything meaningful about the nature of the ocean is to understand our
conceptual framework from within which we understand that oceanto look at the net itself. This
ontological looking means thinking about being as such, including the being of maps. The fact that it
sounds strange to say this (the being of maps) is just one indication that we hardly ever think this way,
that is, philosophically. Perhaps if we do so, we can open up a new and productive dialog about
mapping.
Link
Status quo geographical processes focus on the empirics of ocean and exploit it for
human use
Steinberg, 1 (Philip E., Florida State University Political Geography Professor The Social Construction
of the Ocean, page 10, Google books,)
Most recently, the International Geographical Union launched its OCEANS program, dedicated to holistic
study of the ocean as an integrated system (Vallega 1999; Vallega el nl. 1998), The Geographical Review (1999) devoted an issue to the
Oceans Connect program which is built around the idea that oceans define world regions rather than divide
them, and The Professional Geographer (1999) devoted a focus section to the geography of ocean-space
wherein it is urged that the social and physical aspects of the sea be analyzed with reference to each
other and to the land-based processes that interact with marine phenomena. Nonetheless, despite the
past and present significance of the world-ocean to modern society, and despite these calls for a
holistic geographical accounting of human interactions with the sea, relatively little research has been
conducted on the historical geography of the ocean as a space that, like land, shapes and is shaped by
social and physical processes. Within the discipline of geography per se, most marine research has been of
an empirical and applied nature (for reviews, see Psuty et nl. 2002; Steinberg 1999d; West 1989). Within the social
sciences more generally, the bulk of research has focused on one or another use of the marine
environment, but not on the ocean as an integrated space that is a product of - as well as a resource
for - a variety of human uses. Following a review of traditional perspectives on the ocean, this chapter presents a territorial political
economy approach for analyzing the geography of ocean-space.

Impact
The most destructive things in the world are rooted back to hegemonic knowledge
production
Burke 7 (Anthony, ph.D in political science, Associate Professor at the University of South Wales
Ontologies of War: Violence, Existence and Reason
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/theory_and_event/v010/10.2burke.html
My argument here, whilst normatively sympathetic to Kant's moral demand for the eventual abolition of war, militates against excessive
optimism.86 Even as I am arguing that war is not an enduring historical or anthropological feature, or a neutral and rational instrument of
policy -- that it is rather the product of hegemonic forms of knowledge about political action and community --
my analysis does suggest some sobering conclusions about its power as an idea and formation. Neither the progressive flow of history nor the
pacific tendencies of an international society of republican states will save us. The violent ontologies I have described here in
fact dominate the conceptual and policy frameworks of modern republican states and have come,
against everything Kant hoped for, to stand in for progress, modernity and reason. Indeed what Heidegger argues, I think with some
credibility, is that the enframing world view has come to stand in for being itself. Enframing, argues Heidegger, 'does not simply endanger man
in his relationship to himself and to everything that is...it drives out every other possibility of revealing...the rule of Enframing threatens man
with the possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to experience the call of a more primal
truth.'87 What I take from Heidegger's argument -- one that I have sought to extend by analysing the militaristic power of modern ontologies of
political existence and security -- is a view that the challenge is posed not merely by a few varieties of weapon, government, technology or
policy, but by an overarching system of thinking and understanding that lays claim to our entire space of truth and existence. Many of the
most destructive features of contemporary modernity -- militarism, repression, coercive diplomacy,
covert intervention, geopolitics, economic exploitation and ecological destruction -- derive not merely
from particular choices by policymakers based on their particular interests, but from calculative,
'empirical' discourses of scientific and political truth rooted in powerful enlightenment images of being.
Confined within such an epistemological and cultural universe, policymakers' choices become necessities, their actions become inevitabilities,
and humans suffer and die. Viewed in this light, 'rationality' is the name we give the chain of reasoning which builds
one structure of truth on another until a course of action, however violent or dangerous, becomes
preordained through that reasoning's very operation and existence. It creates both discursive
constraints -- available choices may simply not be seen as credible or legitimate -- and material
constraints that derive from the mutually reinforcing cascade of discourses and events which then
preordain militarism and violence as necessary policy responses, however ineffective, dysfunctional or
chaotic.
Alternative
Counter-mapping is the tool to stop exploitation of marginalized individuals; we can
reclaim our personal agency
Meek 12 (David Ph.D in Anthropology from the University of Georgia. Critical Cartography as
Transformational Learning http://antipodefoundation.org/2012/10/11/critical-cartography-as-
transformational-learning)
A fundamental principle of critical geography is that maps are embodiments of power, differentially
legitimizing particular communities, histories, and practices and obscuring others (Harley 1989; Pickles and
Didunyk 1995).Given the ubiquity of cartographic products in development and conservation work,
counter-mapping initiatives have skyrocketed over the last two decades, providing communities the
tools to spatially illustrate their histories and struggles (Brown 1999; Harris and Hazen 2006; Rambaldi et al. 2007; Sletto
2009). While much has been written about these projects, one under-explored area has been their pedagogical valuethat is, the valuable
learning that happens through counter-mapping. A major counter-mapping initiative called the New Social Cartography of the Amazon Project
(PNCSA Projeto Nova Cartografia Social da Amazonia) is taking place throughout the Brazilian Amazon, providing various marginalized
communities with the cartographic tools necessary to legitimize their own histories, and learn from each others struggles. The objective of this
blog post is to highlight this initiative, theoretically contextualize it, and report back upon its new project in the southeast of Par, Brazil
illuminating the learning that takes place as communities network and reflect on their situationality. The New Social Cartography of the Amazon
Project seeks to enable the self-mapping of traditional peoples (both indigenous and non-indigenous) as well as social movements. The
Projects basis in critical cartography is clear from its website, which notes that: The material produced by the project furnishes greater
knowledge about the process of occupation of the Amazon and, above all, a greater emphasis on and a new instrument for the strengthening of
the social movements that exist here. These social movements consist of expressions of collective identity referring to particular and
territorialized social situations. These specific territorialities, socially constructed by diverse social agents, sustain the collective identities
objectified in social movements. The strength of this differentiated territorialization process constitutes the object of the project.
Cartography appears as an element of combat. Its production is one of the possible moments of social
self-affirmation. It is not hyperbole to describe cartography as an element of combat. The southeastern region of the state of Par,
Brazil has long been one of the most violent areas of the Amazon (see Simmons 2004; 2005). Landless workers, indigenous groups,
communities affected by mega-development projects, ranchers and multinational corporations engage on a daily basis in both a physical as well
as ideological struggle over the future of the Amazon. In this context, counter-mapping is not only about making legible
cultural landscapes, but also in taking an ideological stand against the continuing exploitation of
marginalized communities. Between September 4th and 6th 2012, a counter-mapping workshop took place at the Cabanagem
Training Center (Centro de Formao Cabanagem) in Marab, Par, Brazil. The Cabanagem is a space for training and education of social
movement members, which has existed since the 1980s. The space is named after the Cabanagem revolt, which happened in the then named
state of Gro Par between 1835-1840, following the independence of Brazil. The workshop was a preparatory meeting to help create a
collaborative process for mapping communities affected by the large scale environmental devastation that is associated with industrial mining,
dams, and other mega-projects. Participants included researchers from the Federal University of Par, as well as members of the Brazilian
Movements of Landless Workers, Dam-Affected Peoples and Processors of Coco Babau. Over three days, movement members discussed their
individual and collective identities and began collectively mapping the threats to their communities. As a participant observer, I found that the
pedagogical aspect of this workshop pushed my geographical imagination. I have previously written here about the variety of forms of learning
that happen as people engage in social action (see here and here). However, the scholarship on learning in social action
has largely neglected the important learning that can happen as people participate in critical
cartography (Welton 1993; Spencer 1995; Foley 1999; Gouin 2009). Over three days I witnessed the forging of connections between social
movements, as members realized that their struggles were not isolated, but rather intrinsically related, emanating from the larger system of
capitalist exploitation. Educational scholars emphasize that it is the process of active reflection that is key to learning taking place (Mezirow
1990). One could hear the proverbial cognitive wheels turning as movement members placed their communities on the map and saw what
geographic features spatially, politically, economically, and ideologically linked their communities and struggles. For example, the rail line that
runs from Paraupebas to Marab in Par and then to So Luis in Maranho is operated by transnational mining giant Vale corporation. Each
community has been affected by Vale, whether through direct environmental exploitation, attempts at land grabs, or through enticing a
communities youth to work in the very mines they oppose. As the workshop wrapped up, plans were made to take the lessons learned in
counter-mapping to the next level. Discussions abounded concerning holding GPS training workshops, and realizing a longer-term community-
based mapping project. Yet, the learning was not simply located at Cabanagem. As we sat on the bus, returning back to the MST agrarian
reform settlement where I am currently conducting fieldwork, one conference participant remarked I cant wait to tell my Mom about what
the women who are part of the Movement of Processors of Coco Babau are doing. Some of their experiences working with artisanal products
could really take hold in our community. In addition to the maps produced, it was this learning from place-based narratives that was the take
home cartographic product.
Maps are the tool to include people that have been disenfranchised
Paulston et al 94 (Rolland Ph.D from Colombia An Invitation to Postmodern Social Cartography
Comparative Education Review Volume 38 No. 2 May 1994 page 231-232)
We propose, first, that the structures of multiple education and knowledge systems can be recreated in one
or more maps, in a social cartography where the space of the social map reflects the effect of social
changes in real space; and, second, that comparative education researchers consider representing
that space through the creation of maps. Our rationale for this proposal is that the map provides the comparative
educator a better understanding of the social milieu and gives all persons the opportunity to enter a
dialogue to show where they believe they are in society. The map reveals both acknowledged and
perceived social inclusions while leaving space for further inclusions of social groups and ideas. Whether
the map is considered a metaphorical curiosity or accepted as a more literal representation, it offers comparative researchers an opportunity to
situate the world of ideas in a postmodern panorama, disallowing the promotion of an orthodoxy. To conclude, we have demonstrated in this
article how social research may move one step further as it struggles to distance itself from the positivistic restraints of modernism through the
employment of a "social cartography"-the creation of maps addressing questions of location in the social milieu. Social cartography
suggests not a synthesis but the further opening of dialogue among diverse social players, including
those individuals and cultural clusters who want their "mininarratives" included in the social
discourse. We propose that social cartography has the potential to be a useful discourse style for
demonstrating the attributes and capacities, as well as the development and perceptions, of people
and cultures operating within the social milieu. It offers comparative educators a new and effective
method for visually demonstrating the sensitivity of postmodern influences for opening social dialogue, especially to
those who have experienced disenfranchisement by modernism.


Links
Environmental Conservation
Environmental conservation is just an extension of cartographies underlying power
structure only through counter-mapping can we identify and correct its primary
motives for conservation
Hazen and Harris 06 (Helen D. Hazen Department of Geography, University of Minnesota Leila M.
Harris Department of Geography and Gaylord Nelson Institute for Environmental Studies, University of
Wisconsin-Madison, http://www.iapad.org/publications/ppgis/harris_and_hazen.pdf)
Evaluating conservation practices in light of insights from the power of maps literature offers several key contributions. Understanding
mapping as a common technology of conservation practice allows for more explicit interrogation of the
spatial and territorial underpinnings of conservation, as well as the limitations of common conservation
mappings. Evaluating conservation practices as power-laden and heavily symbolic raises questions
concerning inequalities and power relations inherent to conservation mapping practice. Further, the
notion of counter-mapping is suggestive of several critical pathways and opportunities to revisit and
reinvigorate conservation cartographies. Viewing conservation through this lens forces us to ask
whether there are ways that cartographies of conservation can be made more effective and equitable.
We believe that there are. Certainly, some progress has already been made toward overcoming the limitations inherent to common approaches
to conservation mapping, including strategies to reduce the sharp edges of conservation boundaries or efforts to incorporate local people back
into conservation management plans. Considering the diversity of issues that are involved with protected area management, conflicting goals
are inevitable, and all conservation projects will involve some compromise between different ecological and social aims. At a minimum,
conservation planners must be more forthcoming and explicit about which goals are being pursued for conservation, and which are not.
Rather than consolidating areas under the banner of protected area, and mapping such spaces in ways
that allow communities to believe that conservation of species and habitats is under way, decisions
must be made as transparently as possible, and mapping and assessments of those efforts should,
where possible, reflect the uncertainties, limitations, and biases inherent to particular conservation
mapping strategies. In addition, it is clear that continued efforts are needed to overcome limitations, ineffectiveness, and inequalities of
conservation areas as they have commonly been conceived and pursued. First, increased emphasis needs to be accorded to
approaches that take into account whole systems and landscapes, rather ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical
Geographies, 4 (1), 99-130 122 than fragments thereof. This could take many forms, from transboundary reserves to continental scale
permeability for mega-fauna, to emphasis on urban ecologies and education campaigns. Second, although challenging, conservation
must proceed in ways that foster and respect flexibility and dynamism, rather than pursuing static or fixed notions of
spaces of conservation that are inconsistent with evolving ecological and social conditions. Finally, the reintegration of people into conservation
strategies is, in our opinion, the only viable long-term solution to conservation in an increasingly peopled world. Consideration of
space, territory, and the power of mapping from geography lends insights to the evaluation of common
conservation strategies, encouraging consideration of ways that conservation might be pursued in ways
that upset or minimize, rather than retrench, common power asymmetries. Conversely, tools and concepts in
human geography similarly benefit from application to conservation issues. In particular, conservation concerns challenge us
to reconceptualize power and other key concepts in the social sciences to more adequately consider
inequalities in eco-social senses and extend theorizations of power beyond anthropocentric definitions.
Conservation also poses a number of fundamental questions for geographers and cartographers. Among them, what assumptions and notions
of space and territory undergird conservation practices, and what are the limitations and implications of spatio-territorial approaches? Further,
what theoretical and cartographic tools are available to us to better understand and respond to needs of diverse populations, both human and
other-than-human? Such are calls that geography and cartography have only just begun to address.
The process in which we gather and interpret information from maps is flawed.
Ecological and Societal specifications for environmental importance have a negative
correlation and result in destructive policy making
Bryan et al 2009 (BRETT ANTHONY BRYAN, CHRISTOPHER MARK RAYMOND, NEVILLE DAVID
CROSSMAN, AND DARRAN KINGCSIRO Sustainable Ecosystems, PMB 2, Glen Osmond, South Australia
5064, Australia, Centre for Rural Health and Community Development, University of South Australia,
November 13, 2009;)
We sought to examine the spatial relations between a diverse set of social and ecological values for use in identifying strategies likely to achieve
conservation objectives in specific areas. In contrast to the results of others (Brown et al. 2004; Alessa et al. 2008; Ban et al. 2009b), we found
that although there are some areas of convergence between social and ecological values in the study area, there were large areas for which
social and ecological values diverged. Only a small proportion of the total area that was of high
ecological value was also of high social value. This presents challenges for conservation planners who need to
consider social, political, and ecological criteria in their decision making. If conservation is only aimed at areas that
have both high social value and high ecological value, large areas of high ecological value may not be managed to maintain that value. Similarly,
if community interests and lobby groups have a strong influence on conservation-investment decisions, conservation funding may be
directed to areas of high social value, the majority of which were not of high ecological value. Our
method allows the integration of ecological and social values into conservation planning at the regional
scale and supports the selection of conservation strategies for specific areas. Simple decision rules (e.g., Table 2)
can be used to select strategies depending on the nature of social and ecological values to support community engagement in conservation.
Conservation actions in areas of high ecological value and high social value require minimal additional community engagement for success. In
our study area, these areas are already being conserved and managed (e.g., Chowilla floodplain is under formal protection and natural
inundation regimes are being restored). Conversely, decision makers and the community may wish to divert conservation funding away from
areas of both low ecological and social value given limited conservation budgets. In our study area, areas of both low ecological and social value
were small and no known conservation programs are operating in them. Conservation of areas that are of high ecological
value and low social value requires strategies that increase the involvement of local communities (Table 2).
Education and awareness-raising strategies could be used to inform local communities about the
ecological components of value that they do not currently recognize, such as those negatively correlated
with social value (Table 1). Fine-resolution relations between individual components of ecological and social value could guide the
content of education and awareness programs. For example, in areas of high ecological value and low social value, education and awareness-
raising efforts could focus on ecological values such as the level of protection of vegetation communities, proportion of pre-European
vegetation communities that support native vegetation, and species richness of native plants. Incentive programs (e.g., grants, payments for
ecosystem services, auctions for conservation contracts) could complement education and awareness-raising strategies to further support
conservation actions by landholders and local communities. Incentive programs could be applied where conservation action is needed to
protect components of ecological value.

Nature
Mapping and nature co-constitute each other; The relationship isnt one of physical
reality, but one of ideological creation.
Wood, and Fels 8
(Denis, ph.D and MA. In Geography. Fels, Graduate Student NC State University, College of Natural
Resources cartographica (volume 43, issue 3), pp. 199202
It is our intention both to insert ourselves into this history of ideas about the nature of the map and to
embrace the ambiguity of the phrase, to explore the nature of maps by exploring the nature of maps
and the nature of maps by exploring the nature of maps. We contend there can be little understanding
of the one project except in the light of the other. We will show that the nature maps bring into being is
one actually it is a multitude dependent on the nature of maps, while the nature of maps is best understood
through its mapping of nature. This follows from the very idea of nature, which is about the intrinsic, the
essence, the physical, the out-of-doors, the forces of the physical world, the primitive, the untouched
by- civilization, the uninfluenced-by-artificiality: the real. Nature wants to be the just-born, the innate, the native, the
nave, the untutored, the untaught, the unsophisticated, the unpolluted, the apolitical, the above all- else nonideological, which is the one-word
way Harley described what hed been writing in those essays of his an inquiry into ways in which maps are ideological constructions and
have been used as a classic form of power/knowledge in past societies.3 In the years since Harley wrote these words it has grown apparent that
many people (if by no means all) are willing to accept maps as ideological constructions when it comes to zoning, school attendance districts,
legislative districts (people love to say gerrymander), and national boundaries. But, then, the subjects of such maps are
understood to be human constructions in the first place. There is nothing (it is said) natural about political boundaries; all
are ideological creations. In this way, the ideological construction gets displaced from the map to its subject. The map itself remains
uncontaminated; it is recovered as (what it claimed to be all along) no more than a conduit through which the ideological content as all map
content passes undistorted, or if at all, then by no more than the white lies necessitated by the difficulties of printing the world on paper.
We reject this sophistry in all its parts. The Structure of the Maps Construction of Knowledge By focusing our attention
on the nature of maps, that is, on what above all is supposed to be free of ideological construction
mapped wildlife, earthquakes, hurricanes, mountains, canyons, birds, butterflies, pinnipeds, ecosystems, landforms, vegetation, topography
we show that it is the map, hardly alone, in collaboration with other sign systems, which creates
ideology, transforms the world into ideology, and by printing the world on paper constructs the
ideological. It doesnt matter what has the maps attention. Whatever its subject is will be turned into
something it isnt and in the process inescapably, unavoidably made ideological. At a minimum, at the most
atomistic, it will be a construction, an invention, a conception, something drawn not from the world but from the mind of men and women; for
maps are made not of wildlife, earthquakes, hurricanes, mountains, canyons, birds, but of signs these themselves composed of marks and
concepts. The map: a field of concepts. There can be no escaping it.
Resource and Protected Areas
Reserves and Protected areas anthropocentric and focus only on what is desirable
culturally and economically-- this is all due to the power structures caused by mapping
Hazen and Harris 2006 (Helen D. Hazen Department of Geography, University of Minnesota Leila M.
Harris Department of Geography and Gaylord Nelson Institute for Environmental Studies, University of
Wisconsin-Madison, http://www.iapad.org/publications/ppgis/harris_and_hazen.pdf)\
Beyond socio-political and economic asymmetries that are written into conservation mappings, there are also asymmetries with
respect to the landscapes and species that are preferentially selected for protection. In short, idea(l)s of
natureespecially notions of pristine nature that underwrite many conservation strategiesare deeply
imbued with cultural, economic, and political meanings. As Cronon (1995) illustrates, socio-cultural imperatives
that drive conservation cartographies are clear when we consider the case of parks in North America,
which favor sublime landscapes (e.g., Yellowstone) over other landscapes that may have comparable
ecological importance. On a global scale, there is clear preference for the protection of biomes that have become
widely-publicized conservation targets, such as mangroves and tropical rainforest, over landscapes such as
grasslands that have not received such focused attention (Hazen and Anthamatten, 2004). As a final example, the role of capitalist
imperatives and colonialist histories can be seen in the example of the restocked reserve, a phenomenon that is common in Southern Africa.
Here, degraded agricultural land is converted into wildlife reserves with species selected specifically to cater to the ACME: An International E-
Journal for Critical Geographies, 4 (1), 99-130 108 8 In a discussion related to some of the concerns of this paper, Vandergeest (1996) considers
the mapping of forest areas as a critical step in the process whereby the Thai state asserted control over territory, people, and resources
(eventually with the forestry department claiming control of nearly half of Thai national territory). Given such examples, it is clear that
mapping practices are often central to the assertion of control and power (e.g., state power, see related discussions
on surveillance in Foucault (1979) or on state legibility in Scott (1998)). Further, it is suggestive that issues of control, surveillance and
resource access may be central to the determination of which features are preferentially mapped. If, as we
suggest, mapped features are more likely to be designated for conservation, this exposes the possibility that areas or resources that are the
focus of conflict with a particular population, or that may otherwise be of particular interest for asserting state power and control, may also be
protected preferentially over other features (again with the possibility that mapping practices may reinforce the types of socio-political
exclusions that are often the focus of political ecology and similar studies). preferences of ecotourists and trophy hunters. Such reserves
can be seen as the most recent manifestation of a long history of colonial influence on nature
preservation on the continent. Which areas are preferentially selected for protection is not only a
function of cultural or economic imperatives, but may also be influenced by the relative mappability of
different areas. For instance, grasslands are not only considered less majestic than other landscapes (see discussion in Cronon, 1995), but
are also less definable in carto-geographic terms than, for example, a lake or an island, and may therefore be neglected by conservation
designations. The preference for the protection of forest over dryland and grassland ecosystems that can be
seen at the global scale (Hazen and Anthamatten, 2004) may also be, in part, a reflection of the fact that forests
are often a mapped feature, whereas grasslands and drylands are invisible on all but the most
specialized of maps.8 As yet another example of the importance of mappability, consider the frequency with which jurisdictional
boundaries define at least one edge of a protected area. In such cases, the already mapped boundaries of contemporary states act to delimit
protected area boundaries, discouraging planners from using less easily "mappable" boundaries in making their decisions. As a result, most
protected areas remain limited to the confines of just one political state, although the number of transboundary
protected areas is on the rise (Zimmerer et al., 2004). Finally, the case of marine ecosystems is also notable in this
respect, with data limitations, mobile features, and other considerations contributing to the difficulty of
mapping and managing oceans (see Steinberg, 2001). This perhaps helps to explain why marine ecosystems
have not seen the same proliferation of protected areas over the past twenty years that has occurred in
terrestrial areas. While nearly seventy percent of the Earths surface is covered by ocean, in 1997 less than 20% of global protected areas
included marine ecosystems (UNEP 2005). Power of Maps: (Counter) Mapping for Conservation 109
Aquaculture
Aquaculture is based in flawed and anthropocentric mental mapping
Pitcher and Haggan 2001 (TONY J. PITCHER AND NIGEL HAGGAN Fisheries Centre, University of
British Columbia, Vancouver V6T 1Z4, 2001
https://circle.ubc.ca/bitstream/handle/2429/46159/FCRR_2002_11-1.pdf?sequence=1#page=461)
Is fisheries science drawn on a blank cognitive map, like Lewis Carolls snark hunters, as some scientific practitioners would
have you believe? We dont think that this has ever been the case. For example, Finlayson (1994) describes convincingly how misplaced
confidence in models (Walters and Maguire 1966) and policies (Hutchings et al. 1997a, 1997b) led to the collapse of the Newfoundland cod
stocks. Finlayson interprets this unhappy saga in terms of failed institutions, but underlying this in turn are the flawed mental
maps of individuals who dealt with fisheries management policies. Back to the Future encourages much
more complete cognitive maps than hithertofore used in attempting to set goals for management. First,
it embodies the widespread call for ecosystembased management, or for an ecosystem approach to
management (Cochrane FAO 2003). Questions that may appear purely the realm of policy using single species
ecology, such as what is an acceptable degree of restriction on harvest? (Healey 1997), turn out to have clearer answers if one evaluates
the consequences for the rest of the ecosystem under a rebuilding policy. Secondly, in Back to the Future the baseline relationship of
the maps structure with the perceptions of the present state are integral, but changes in ecosystem
structure may be rendered easier to conceive because the map already contains comparative elements
of then and now rather like the geomorphological shadows of past coastlines or river beds on a landscape map. And major
changes in peoples cognitive maps of ecosystems may be more easily accommodated than might at first
sight be thought. For example, the dissonant image of a drowned landscape is conjured up by archaeologists retrieving stone tools from
the present day sea bed, as has happened in Hecate Strait Northern British Columbia (Fedje and Christensen 1999). Hence, we think that the
cognitive maps of humans are profound, subtle, complex and malleable enough to accommodate the possibility of
major changes for the better, despite everyday miserable evidence to the contrary. At one extreme, the worlds great religions would not work
if this were not so, but in our case, BTF expresses a hope that a future may see healthier fisheries and ecosystems, in sharp contrast to the
pessimism surrounding fisheries policy both globally and in Canada. Modelling is imperfect, even when uncertainty is
accounted for as explicitly as possible. The Back to the Future cognitive map, based on a linked series of
past and future model representations, is only a representation of reality: The map is not the territory
(Korzybski 1995). So we may ask what of our policy goal for the future, derived from modelling that is imperfect and flawed? Another saying by
the originator of the cognitive map concept, Henri Poincar is relevant here It is far better to foresee even without certainty than not to
foresee at all.
AQ, Mining, Disposals,MPA
Aquaculture, Shipping Channels, disposal areas, mining zones, and marine protected
areas are all uses of Ocean space
Douvere 9 ( Fanny, The Coordinator of the Marine Programme at the World Heritage Centre of the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) in Paris, France The
importance of marine spatial planning in advancing ecosystem-based sea use management Marine
Policy 32 Page 762-763)
On the other hand, with only a few exceptions, no clearly articulated spatial vision for the future use of marine
areas existsno plan-based approach to management [3]. This does not mean that activities taking place in our seas are
unregulated or that we do not allocate ocean space already. To the contrary, ocean space has been regulated or
allocated in a number of different ways, but most importantly, this has been done predominantly within
individual economic sectors. Obvious examples of sectoral zoning include ship channels, disposal
areas, military security zones, concession zones for mineral extraction, aquaculture sites, and most
recently marine protected areas [4]. At present, there are few frameworks that facilitate integrated strategic and
comprehensive planning in relation to all activities taking place in marine areas [5]. The lack of such a framework, often translates
into: (1) A spatial and temporal overlap of human activities and their objectives, causing conflicts (useruser and userenvironment
conflicts) in the coastal and marine environment. (2) A lack of connection between the various authorities responsible for individual
activities or the protection and management of the environment as a whole. lack of connection between offshore activities and
resource use and onshore communities that are dependent on them. (4) A lack of conservation of biologically and ecologically
sensitive marine areas. (5) A lack of investment certainty for marine developers and users of ocean resources [2].
Couple Douvere 2009 with Smith and Brennan 12 and you have a good link card.

Impacts
Eco-social Exploitation
Cartography obscures and disguises the relations of eco-social exploitation. Instead,
industrial, anthropogenic norms are put in place
Strom 13 (Timothy Erik Strm Global Cities Research Institute, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia
Year: 2013 -http://global-cities.info/news-events/conferences-forums/conferences-proceedings)
Considering Google Maps material underpinnings, the aesthetic and political choices that inform the representation, and the historic artifacts
and processes that flow through them both, then Google Maps must not be considered a passive reflection of nature,
but rather an active constructor of culture. The other stroke of the chiasmus; the naturalization of culture is
present in every aspect of culturalized nature that I have been describing. Using the authoritative of
the power the map, Google depicts a specific vision of the world. For instance, Google Maps decision to depict north
as up follows the well trodden path of colonial cartography in legitimating this orientation, reinforcing it,
de-contesting it, normalizing it (Freeden 2003, Harley 2001). In short, the map naturalizes this value-laden vision.
Through constructing this common sense, understood here in Antonio Gramscis use of the word (1971, pp. 32143), this image
obscures and disguises real relations of eco-social exploitation. Consumerism, advertising, and
industrialism are all encoded into this image and its material underpinnings and, again, they are all
naturalized by the map. The world that Google Maps presents has been normalized: everyday one can bear witness to people shuffling
around gazing into their smartphones following Google Maps directions: where are we going? Google it, its common sense. As Google
Maps image of the world displays an almost infinite reduction of the biological and phenomenological characteristics of our Earth, this map
cannot be considered a mirror of the world in any ecological sense, nor, with respect to our worlds cultural diversity and social complexity.
And, despite the claims of Googles elite, their map is profoundly historical, cultural and political. Considering this, and that a
map can be read to say more about its authors than about what it attempts to represent, I suggest turning Googles metaphor around and using
the image of a mirror to ask: what world does Google Maps reflect? As the product, and in turn producer, of an oil-driven, advertising-funded,
industrial capitalist system, I argue that Google Maps is an active reflection of the current world order. This map
exemplifies anthropocentrism and embodies consumerism, overlaid on an implicit background of eco-
social exploitation, all of which has been naturalized in this culturalized representation

Industrial capitalism controls all parts of cartography - Maps are founded in the
exploitation and culturalization of the environment
Strom 13 (Timothy Erik Strm Global Cities Research Institute, RMIT University, Melbourne, Australia
Year: 2013 -http://global-cities.info/news-events/conferences-forums/conferences-proceedings)
This mode of production is enabled by a multicultural, intergenerational process of knowledge
accumulation. All the scientific and technological knowledge, and all the communicational and
organizational structures fall into this all-pervasive knowledge system. A system, may I add, that is not
politically neutral. Beyond this specific machine, Google Maps requires masses of transoceanic fibre-optic cables, satellite GPS systems,
and enormous privatized and centralized data farms, not to mention the digital structures that flow through them. And all of this requires huge
amounts of electricity, which is usually generated in a deeply unsustainable, and, considering the consequences of climate change, outright
dangerous manner. Industrial capitalism is founded on the exploitation of humans, it is also founded on the
exploitation of nature. Ecological balances are destroyed to extract non-renewable resources ranging from
the Canadian tar sands (unconventional petroleum deposit found under boreal forest) to Congolese coltan (a conflict mineral used in
electronic devices). These resources are sacrificed as the inputs of industrial capitalism, while the systems witchdoctors chant
mantras of progress, profit maximization and growth. The out-puts range from disposable devices like iPhones, with their
built-in obsolescence, to various externalities, including toxic waste products that belch from chimneys and drool from drains. These
material preconditions are the first fold of the culturalization of nature in Google Maps; for the maps
cannot exist without this underpinning world order, without this infrastructure, this knowledge, this
mode of production. And, at every step of this process, the Earth is being culturalized; appropriated, manipulated,
and exploited by humans; and in the same fell swoop, humans are exploited by humans. Or, more specifically, very many
humans are being exploited by a very few.
Conservation Cartography is a Western, power-laden process, leading to violence and
policing of indigenous populations
Hazen and Harris 2006 (Helen D. Hazen Department of Geography, University of Minnesota Leila M.
Harris Department of Geography and Gaylord Nelson Institute for Environmental Studies, University of
Wisconsin-Madison, http://www.iapad.org/publications/ppgis/harris_and_hazen.pdf)\
Ample work has highlighted the many ways that mapping for conservation is a power-laden process. For instance, Turner
(1999) describes how unsubstantiated claims about pastoralists in Southwestern Niger as competing with wildlife have resulted in their strict
exclusion from a local park (which, ironically, in turn exacerbated threats to protected species), while Peluso (1993) highlights
connections between conservation areas, violence, and the policing of local populations. These and similar
insights have underscored the need to examine assumptions about local populations in conservation planning
(Agrawal and Gibson, 1999), and to question the tendency to take peoples relationships to environments as
fixed and invariable. The inclusion of local peoples needs and interests in conservation planning is increasingly accepted as essential,
both to promote the well-being of human populations, and to ensure that biodiversity and conservation needs are met in the long-term (e.g.,
Sinclair et al., 2000). Central to these discussions are issues related to the relative value given to different
forms of knowledge, with Western or techno-scientific ideas often treated preferentially over traditional
or indigenous ways of knowing, even as traditional knowledge systems may involve complex
understandings of ecosystem processes, or as they may have successfully served to maintain ecosystems
over long time periods (Berkes et al., 1998). As just one example among many, Goldman (2003) describes how the exclusion of Maasai
knowledge in conservation efforts underway in Northern Tanzania further marginalizes those populations, and discourages more flexible land-
use management possibilities to which local knowledges may be particularly well-suited. Such ideas parallel themes in the literature on power
of maps, particularly ways that alternative map forms (such as charts of wave patterns or story telling) have often been de-legitimized or
excluded in the face of Western techniques, despite the fact that such alternative mapping practices often convey highly intricate spatial
relationships (see Sparke, 1995; and Harley and Woodwards History of Cartography, 1994, 1992, 1987).7 In the conservation realm, there is
increasing attention to the possibility that technologies such as GIScentral to the Western or scientific conservation planning
toolkitfurther cleave distinctions between expert and lay or indigenous knowledges, providing just
one example of how mapping practices can reinforce common socio-political exclusions. In response to such
potential, efforts to forge more just conservation futures are focusing increasingly on democratized mapping, and the incorporation of
alternative knowledges in GIS or cartographic forms, or valuation of alternative mapping practices (as detailed in the counter-mapping section
below) (e.g., see Armbrecht Forbes, 1995; Arvelo-Jimenz and Conn, 1995; Nietschmann, 1995). It is also critical to acknowledge
that mapping technologies such as GIS and remote sensing can augment reliance on territorially-focused
conservation more generally, as practitioners may be keen to utilize impressive new technologies that make conservation measures
appear to be more formal or legitimate. The issue of spatio-territorial fixity is therefore not only important to the
extent that it may exclude local populations, but there are also ways that such fixity may render other
non-territorial conservation strategies less possible, or even foreclose such alternatives altogether. Power
of Maps: (Counter) Any exploration of socio-political inequalities and power effects of conservation mappings
must also consider historical and geographical factors that help to explain how the current map of
conservation areas has emerged, as opposed to other possible configurations (i.e., reading the map and its silences). Neumanns
(1997) work is particularly instructive in this regard. In his analysis of the ever-increasing area designated for protection in eastern Africa, he
raises the critique that such extensions consolidate and extend state control over land, shifting resource
control away from local people. With over 10% of territory in some African countries dedicated to conservation and
managed by international organizations, he argues that such patterns merit critical attention in light of
histories of colonialism and continuing questions of sovereignty facing postcolonial states (see Map and Box 1,
and related critiques of conservation practice that enable Northern constituents and NGOs to gain access to territories in the Global South, e.g.
Chapin, 2004). Similarly, work on the creation of national parks in the U.S. and other countries has shown how the creation of
conservation areas has often been linked to forced movements of, and violence against, indigenous
peoples (e.g., Spence, 1999; Colchester, 1996). However, as we discuss in Box 1, the highest percentages of protected land are actually found in
Northern and industrialized countries. This raises yet other questions related to the relative importance of political
structures, recreational opportunities, or conservation awareness in defining conservation territories,
compared with biodiversity imperatives per se (see also discussion in Zimmerer et al., 2004). Given such
considerations, it is clear that socio-political conditions, economies inequalities, histories of colonialism,
and attendant uneven relations of power must be read as foundational to the contemporary geography
of conservation areas.
Heg authority
Maps are a tool of hegemonywe should reclaim the map as human
Wood 12 (Denis, ph.D and MA. In Geography. Mapping Cultures, Place, Practice, Performance. The
Anthropology of Cartography 2012. Page 299-300)
It is instructive in this regard to think about how many maps straight forwardly involved the state in that catalogue of maps my family
encountered during those 20 days in 1989: Chandler's map of France (including departments and capitals) for his school project; the world
maps covered with states that Tom Saarinen showed us, and the world map Chandler made; the Pictionary maps made to illustrate 'Brazil',
'Taiwan' and 'Illinois'; the Risk game board; the Amtrak maps (a state owned railroad); Randall looking up the Canary Islands for a school report
in an atlas 'Dedicated by gracious permission to Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth 11', crowned head of a constitutional monarchy; the Surrealist
map of the world on my shirt with its reinvention of the world's states; and the North Carolina logo on Chandler's shirt. With the exception of
the roleplaying maps Randall and Chandler made, and Chandler's water-park maps, all the rest of the maps acknowledged the state, which,
after all, most ever)' where these days grants cities their right to exist (city bus route maps, city road maps, city council planning maps, maps to
contest those, and so on). They' re hard to escape, maps that one way or another are issued by, refer to,
acknowledge or otherwise perform the state. And to the extent that in some way all the rest of the
maps derive their power, authority, contestatory edge, frissom, form, tropes - whatever - from state
maps, there's a powerful and extremely important sense in which it is not so much what people do with
maps as it is what maps do with people. Though, of course, maps have no agency of their own (do they?), so really it's 'What
does the state use maps to do with people?' It is unpleasant, in any case, this great map ritual of the state we all perform in
(images of French revolutionary festivals) - but essential to keep in mind. I remain hopeful that we can undo this hegemony
and reclaim the map as something truly human, but we're not going to be able to do that unless we
keep in mind, if only in some corner, the fact that maps also perform the state at checkpoints, border
posts and barrier walls. It's really important to keep in mind the way maps have us almost literally in
thrall.

Alternative Solvency
Through understanding our relationships to maps we can deconstruct their ideology.
Kitchen et al 12 (Rob, Ph.D in Geography, Professor at the University of Ireland. Unfolding mapping
practices: a new epistemology for cartography
In recent years, a small number of scholars have started to rethink the ontological foundations of
cartography, moving from a representational to a processual understanding of maps, from ontology (what
things are) to ontogenetic (how things become). In this paper, we have sought to complement these arguments by
reconsidering the epistemology of cartography, shifting the focus of analysis from approaches that
prioritise optimal (scientific) map design and techniques of map construction, or focus on
deconstructing the ideological meaning or processes of inscription or proscription, to those that
concentrate on how mappings unfold through a plethora of contingent, relational and contextual
practices and do diverse work in the world through discursive events and material sites in conjunction with other
modes of communication (such as text, images, spoken word, interactive new media) and forms of practice (such as collaboration,
presentation, publication, debate). Indeed, it is important to appreciate that mappings rarely unfold in isolation, but
are embedded within wider discursive fields (such as government reports, blog posts, academic papers, newspaper articles,
etc.) and forms of praxis (navigating, studying, interpreting, claiming, etc.). Operationalising such an epistemology can be
achieved through a diverse set of methods including genealogies, ethnographies, ethnomethodology,
participant observation, observant participation and deconstruction that are sensitive to capturing and
distilling the unfolding and contextual practices of mapping; how mappings are (re)produced through
discursive and material practices shaped by personal, social, embodied, political and economic relations;
how the sites in which they are embedded matters to their form; how they contextually operate with
respect to other discursive media and modes of praxis; and how they perform as actants in the world
shaping knowledge and actions. We have noted how such methods have been employed in a range of other studies and also
provided a detailed case example of mappings of ghost estates in Ireland by constructing through observant participation a genealogy of the
unfolding life of a set of mappings and their subsequent work in the world in terms of shaping public debate and public policy.
Critical Cartography challenges how the relationship between knowledge production
and power affect the oppression of people.
Crampton, 10 (Jeremy, Associate Professor at the University of Kentucky, Ph.D. in Geography.
Mapping A Critical Introduction to Cartography and GIS 2010, Page 39
Cartography is not what cartographers tell us it is. Brian Harley. Brian Harleys axiom quoted above that
cartography is not what cartographers tell us it is can well serve to summarize some of the essential
ideas behind critical cartography and GIS. Harleys life and contributions are examined in more depth later in this book (see Chapter
7), and his name is often invoked in the context of critical mapping. Calling things into question was a hallmark of Harleys
life. One of his obituaries went to so far as to title itself questioning maps, questioning cartography, questioning cartographers (Edney 1992).
How can his work help us understand the impact of critical cartography? I would suggest that a good definition of critical mapping
is that it calls things into question. Among the most notable things to be questioned are the claims of the discipline of cartography
to be a science, and to progress from the solution of one problem after another in what Arthur Robinson called The Essential Cartographic
Process (Wood and Krygier 2009). A related idea is that critical mapping (cartography and GIS) examines the
relationship of knowledge with power. What are the underpinning assumptions that help to govern
knowledge? That is, what rationalities are in play? The reason many critical mappers and critical
geographers think this is important is because these rationalities shape and form the subject of the map,
that is, how the map helps oppress, subjugate, or subjectify individuals and populations (Wood and
Krygier 2009).
We must intervene and focus on the relationship between knowledge, power and
hegemonic institutions
Crampton, 10 (Jeremy, Associate Professor at the University of Kentucky, Ph.D. in Geography.
Mapping A Critical Introduction to Cartography and GIS 2010, Page 179-180
If critique has achieved anything in GIS and cartography it has been to intervene, whether from outside or within,
and to challenge the assumptions of the production of geographical knowledges. This is a spirit of questioning in
which we ask what other ways of doing or thinking are available? If critique is not simply absorbed by disciplinary cartography and GIS in a
safe, enclosed manner (the response of the oyster),1 then at times it has established a pull in an altogether different direction. This view
was recently put forward by David Harvey, who identified a number of sites for the production of
geographical knowledge cartography among them. Harvey wondered why this site of production had been so overlooked:
cartography is, plainly, a major structural pillar of all forms of geographical knowledge . . . it is years now since Foucault taught us
that knowledge/power/institutions lock together in particular modes of governmentality, yet few have
cared to turn that spotlight upon the discipline of Geography itself. (Harvey 2001: 217, 220)
Other Arguments
Mapping is Political
Mapping is a form of political discourse
Crampton, 10 (Jeremy, Associate Professor at the University of Kentucky, Ph.D. in Geography.
Mapping A Critical Introduction to Cartography and GIS 2010, Page 9
One might register a few problems with both of these viewpoints however. It is noticeable that the second viewpoint, that of technology being
non-essential or neutral, often crops up when a new technology appears and people are thinking about it for the first time. Its as if
people want to try and get things straight in their mind and that this can be done by considering each
application before or outside of untoward influence. Bringing in politics only serves to muddy the waters. The problem
with these ideas is that they miss the point. Even casting a cursory glance at the history of cartography should lead
us to suspect that mapping and maps have a whole series of engagements in politics, propaganda, crime
and public health, imperialist boundary-making, community activism, the nation-state, cyberspace, and
the internet. That is, mapping has a politics. It is hard to imagine mapping that does not in some way or
other involve politics, mapping is itself a political act. As a politics of mapping, critical cartography and GIS
question what kinds of people and objects are formed through mapping. As the Canadian philosopher Ian Hacking
puts it, how are people made up (Hacking 2002)? This is a question about how categories of knowledge are derived and applied, a question as
old as Kant and as contemporary as racism. Maps produce knowledge in specific ways and with specific categories that then have effects (i.e.,
they deploy power). Categories are useful, but at the same time they encourage some ways of being and not others. Often, some ways of being
are accepted as somehow typical and are called normal, while others are called abnormal.
Mapping is about Knowledge Production
Mapping isnt about reflecting what we already know, it is about the production of
knowledge and what we consider truth
Crampton, 10 (Jeremy, Associate Professor at the University of Kentucky, Ph.D. in Geography.
Mapping A Critical Introduction to Cartography and GIS 2010, Page 39
Consider the word representation in the ICA definition. Critical cartography and GIS question what is meant by
representation, a question that has also often popped up in philosophy (Rorty 1979) and cultural studies, as well as geography (Thrift
2006). This is because representation naturally enough appears to imply that something already exists prior to the act of mapping (the space or
landscape being mapped). There is a landscape out there, and it is captured in some representative way by the map. Even if we agree that the
landscape is not the map, maps have to creatively leave out details as Monmonier has written: not only is it easy to lie with maps, its essential
(Monmonier 1991: 1). But still, the landscape comes first, and like a painting or photograph we take essential elements of it for our
representation. Critical cartographers (as well as cognitive developmentalists such as Roger Downs and Lynn Liben cited above), on
the other hand, argue that mapping creates specific spatial knowledges and meanings by identifying,
naming, categorizing, excluding, and ordering. The ICA definition of the map as a graphic representation does not exclude this
meaning, but it doesnt really emphasize it either. Furthermore, once these categories are put into play they can be used to exert power and
control people and things. Mapping creates knowledge as much as (and for some, instead of) reflecting it. Critical
cartographers do not argue that physical space is produced by the process of mapping, but rather that
new ways of thinking about and treating space are produced. Space, in this account, is not just a
question of physical and material disposition (although it is that) but also the constitution of objects. For
critical cartography, mapping is not just a reflection of reality, but the production of knowledge, and
therefore, truth.
Mapping key to Social Movements
Knowledge Practitioners like maps are key to redefining the political mindset and
produce active and strong social movement
Cortes et al 08 (Maria, Ph.D candidate for the University of North Carolina. Blurring Boundaries:
Recognizing Knowledge-Practices in the Study of Social Movements page 51-52)
In sum, when movements are understood as knowledge-practitioners, and not simply as campaigners, or
subjects to be understood by social movement researchers, their importance is rearticulated, challenging our
habits of practice and modes of engagement as researchers. Even beyond the specific cases we have described above,
we can understand many movement-related activities as knowledge-practices, which not only critically
engage and redraw the map of what comprises the political, but also produce practices and subjects
according to different logics. As such, knowledge-practices are part of the investigative and creative
work necessary for (re)making politics, both from the micro-political inscribed on our bodies and lived in
the everyday, to broader institutional and systemic change. It is in this sense that movements can be
understood in and of themselves as spaces for the production of situated knowledges of the political.
Despite these multiple and rich expressions of knowledge-practice, many social movements visibility in public and academic
debates is still confined to media-grabbing mobilizations, concrete and measurable victories, or
moments when bodily repression is suffered and sustained. The methodological and theoretical shift in
social movement studies that we propose makes visible different goals and effects of knowledge
production. Instead of detached, academic knowledge about movements that operate out there, we argue for the value of
seeing the continuous generation, circulation and networked nature of heterogeneous knowledges,
which in themselves work to make different futures possiblefutures that do not exist in a narrow or campaign-specific
space that closes once a certain demand has been met or a mobilization realized. In fact, rather than engage solely or primarily with the macro-
political, knowledge-practices seem to work as much on the level of the micro-political, a level of experimentation, memory, analysis and
intentional and ongoing critique, rather than the production of new and final solutions (Deleuze and Guattari 1987; see also DIganazio 2004).
We, too, offer not a new and final solution, but what we hope is an opening for greater recognition, valorization and engagement with the
conceptual praxis of movements themselves.
Debate is a cartographical event; Our decisions, actions and relationships affect the
knowledge production of maps.
Kitchin and Dodge 7 (Rob, Ph.D in Geography, Professor at the University of Ireland. And Martin,
ph.D Senior Lecturer in Geography. Rethinking Maps Progress for Human Geography Pages 11-13
Starting from a position of having specialised tools (scientific instruments or software) and resources (boundary and
attribute data, previously mapped information), and a degree of knowledge, experience and skills, John works to
create a map. The map thus emerges through a set of iterative and citational practices of employing certain techniques that
build on and cite previous plottings or previous work (other spatial representations) or cartographic ur-forms (standardized
forms of representation). This process is choreographed to a certain degree, shaped by the scientific culture of
conventions, standards, rules, techniques, philosophy (its ontic knowledge), and so on, but is not determined
and essential. Rather, instead of there being a teleological inevitability in how the map is constructed
and or how the final product will look, the map is contingent and relational in its production through the
decisions made by John with respect to what attributes are mapped, their classification, the scale, the orientation, the
colour scheme, labelling, intended message, and so on, and the fact that the construction is enacted through affective,
reflexive, habitual practices that remain outside of cognitive reflection (see Figure 2). Important here is the
idea of play - of playing with the possibilities of how the map will become, how it will be remade by its future makers
and of arbitrariness, of unconscious and affective design. Indeed, Figure 2 shows John experimenting with different colour schemes, different
forms of classification, and differing scales to map the same data. Making maps then is inherently creative it can be
nothing else; and maps emerge in process. Figure 2: about here For example, using mapping software the first stage might be
to plot administrative boundaries. In doing so, decisions have to be made in terms of the administrative units to use (postcodes, enumeration
areas, electoral divisions, counties, and so on), and the scale of the display. Next, these units need to be populated with data. To be able to do
this the data need to allocated to a zone and sorted into categories that differentiate rates of population change. There are technical solutions
to classification that can be performed using specialised algorithms. However, John still needs to determine which algorithm is most suitable
given the structure of the data (e.g., to use the default setting, choosing fixed intervals, mean standard deviation, percentiles, natural breaks
and so on). These technical solutions are not fixed and essential in their practice but are also subject to play and pre-cognitive judgement
through the evaluation of different algorithms in order to determine which work best. Alternatively, the classification can be devised through
a manual, iterative playing with the data in terms of class boundaries, number of classes, and so on (which in fact is the case with Figure 3).
Both cases, technical and manual, consist of practice (of running the algorithm or playing with the data), and these practices vary over time, by
context, and across people. In terms of the visual display, a colour scheme needs to be devised. Similarly, there are technical solutions such as
RGB, HLS or HVC models3 (see Robinson et al., 1995), in other cases the colour ramp is chosen by the cartographer. Finally, there are
considerations concerning where the legend appears, whether labels appear on the map and where, and so on. While some of these practices
seem prosaic, the procession of decisions and actions grows the map. Each might seem banal or trivial, but their sum
the culmination of a set of practices creates a spatial representation that John understands as a map
(and believes that others will accept as a workable map based upon their knowledge and experience as to what constitutes a map). Figure 3:
about here When a spatial representation understood as a map is printed for inclusion in a policy document
(see Figure 3), for example, we would argue that its creation is not complete it is not ontologically secure as a map. Although it has
the appearance of an immutable mobile its knowledge and message fixed, and portable because it can be read by anyone understanding how
maps work it remains mutable; re-made every time it is employed. Like a street geometrically defined by urban planning, and created by
urban planners, is transformed into place by walkers (de Certeau, 1984), a spatial representation created by cartographers
(the coloured ink on the paper) is transformed into a map by individuals. As each walker experiences the street differently, each
person engaging with a spatial representation beckons a different map into being. Each brings it into their own milieu, framed
by their knowledge, skills and spatial experience, in this case of Ireland and Irish social history. For someone familiar with the
geography of Ireland, their ability to remake the map in a way that allows them to articulate an analysis of the data is likely to be far superior to
someone unfamiliar with the pattern of settlement (to know what the towns are, what county or local authority area they reside in is, what
their social and economic history is, their physical geography is, and so on). For someone who does not understand the concept of thematic
mapping or classification schemes, again the map will be bought into being differently to people who do, who will
ask different questions of the data and how it is displayed. While all people who understand the concept of a map beckon
a map into being, there is variability in the ability of people to mobilise the representation and to solve particular problems. Moreover, the
beckoning of the map generates a new, imaginative geography (an ordered, rationale, calculated geography) for each
person, that of the spatial distribution of population change between the 1996 and 2002 census.

AFF Answers
Alt Fails
Counter-maps fail; they inevitably play into their own criticism.
Hogdson and Schroeder 2 (Dorothy, ph.D Professor at Rutgers, Richard Schroeder ph.D in
Geography Development and Change Volume 33 2002 page 95
In this article, we have briefly discussed four case studies that, in our estimation, display many of the quintessential dilemmas confronted by
would-be counter-mappers the World over. It has to be acknowledged, though, that the responses Tanzanian activists choose to make to these
'dilemmas', or, indeed, the extent to Which these problems are seen as 'dilemmas' at all, will hinge greatly on a set of normative political
considerations that are not necessarily ours to determine. Maps generated by counter-mappers and the legal and
extra-legal strategies that typically accompany them are explicitly political in origin and intent, and
the actors involved Will inevitably assess the fallout they generate on similar terms. This is not to say,
however, that there are no lessons to be drawn from these cases. First of all, while all of the mapping efforts described above were born of
complex and highly localized circumstances, it is important to recognize that they also represent much broader trends in environmental
management (Schroeder, l999a) - including Well publicized initiatives to territorialize community lands (village registration campaign), privatize
natural resources (community Wildlife management areas), integrate conservation With development (Tarangire buffer zone mapping project),
and protect indigenous land rights (pastoralist reserves). In this regard, it is somewhat difficult to separate out the politics
of popular resource map- ping exercises, per se, from the practical and political ecological problems
associated with the trends they represent.
Counter-mapping is just a magic bullet that isnt critical and misused
Fox 5 (Jefferson, ph.D Developmental Studies MAPPINGCOMMUNITIES ETHICS, VALUES, PRACTICE
http://www.eastwestcenter.org/fileadmin/stored/pdfs/FoxHershockMappingCommunities.pdf Page
336
The availability of computer-based SIT in the form of userfriendly GIS software, low cost global positioning systems (GPS), and remote sensing
image analysis software has enabled many disenfranchised groups to make their own maps, since the technology has become less expensive
and more easily available. Due to this development a number of non-government organizations (NGOs) have begun using these technologies to
develop a deeper and more fully conceptualized understanding of indigenous claims to land and to design resource management plans and
conservation studies that are compatible with local land-use norms and practices. In the last decade, counter-mapping has
gained such widespread support that it is in danger of becoming the thing to do, a magic bullet that
is applied uncritically or simply misused. As Sieber (2000: 776) writes: GIS may become essential to obtain
grants and data, to create competing models, to 'talk the talk' of the bureaucrats, and to appear more
scientific.


The K is a vague word game that is a vague word game disconnected from the lived
reality of people
Muller 2008 (Martin, Department of Human Geography, J. W. Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt am Main,
Reconsidering the concept of discourse for the field of critical geopolitics: Towards discourse as
language and practice, Political Geography, Volume 27, Issue 3, March 2008, Pages 322338,
http://af5ss8ab4n.scholar.serialssolutions.com/?sid=google&auinit=M&aulast=Mller&atitle=Reconside
ring+the+concept+of+discourse+for+the+field+of+critical+geopolitics:+Towards+discourse+as+language
%3C+i%3E+and%3C/i%3E+practice&id=doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.12.003&title=Political+geography&vol
ume=27&issue=3&date=2008&spage=322&issn=0962-6298)

In addition to the vagueness of the concept of discourse, in recent years a growing discontent with its
social reach in critical geopolitics research has been voiced. With the emergence of new arenas of social
inquiry in human geography, serious concerns have surfaced that the concept of discourse is too
narrow to grasp the little things. Some of the most potent geopolitical forces are *+ lurking in the
little details of people's lives, what is carried in the specific variabilities of their activities (Shotter &
Billig, 1998: 23), in the context of utterances (Thrift, 2000b: 384). Authors lament that the analysis of
texts, the mainstay in the analysis of discourses in critical geopolitics research, frequently paints an
incomplete picture and elides important sites of geopolitical production within institutions and at the
local level (Mamadouh & Dijkink, 2006: 357; see also Paasi, 2000 and Paasi, 2006). A pre-occupation
with elite representations and an emphasis on discourse study means that these literatures are in
danger of becoming both repetitious and lopsided, relegating or erasing people's experiences and
everyday understandings of the phenomena under question(Megoran, 2006: 622).



The discursive focus of the K makes empirical study arbitrary means we learn
nothing
Muller 2008 (Martin, Department of Human Geography, J. W. Goethe-Universitt Frankfurt am Main,
Reconsidering the concept of discourse for the field of critical geopolitics: Towards discourse as
language and practice, Political Geography, Volume 27, Issue 3, March 2008, Pages 322338,
http://af5ss8ab4n.scholar.serialssolutions.com/?sid=google&auinit=M&aulast=Mller&atitle=Reconside
ring+the+concept+of+discourse+for+the+field+of+critical+geopolitics:+Towards+discourse+as+language
%3C+i%3E+and%3C/i%3E+practice&id=doi:10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.12.003&title=Political+geography&vol
ume=27&issue=3&date=2008&spage=322&issn=0962-6298)

Despite recent bids for conceptual accuracy ( Tuathail, 2002 and Tuathail, 2004), the concept of
discourse in critical geopolitics appears to be relatively under-theorized and its theoretical breadth and
depth remain largely unexplored. There is a tendency for discourse to become a catch-all term with
only very vague notions of its conceptual underpinnings. What is more, besides discourse, a motley
mixture of alternative terms abounds, the conceptual boundaries between which have become
increasingly blurred if they have ever been drawn. Alongside discourse we find terms such as
geopolitical storylines, geopolitical imaginations, geopolitical scripts, geopolitical narratives,
geopolitical visions and geopolitical fantasies. It is by now hard to distil a lowest common
denominator that is shared across all the different usages we find in critical geopolitics. If anything, it is
perhaps the assumption of what Jennifer Milliken (1999: 229) calls discursive signification, i.e. the
communicative construction of meaning in a system of signification. While the vagueness of the
concept of discourse may have contributed, to some extent, to its initial success in critical geopolitics,
it also engenders a high degree of arbitrariness in the application of the concept to empirical material.



Colonialism Module
Links
Industrialization

Industrialization causes environmental colonialism, and justifies the exclusion of
groups deemed non-important
Meidan 07 (Michal Meidan, Master's degree, East Asian Studies/Political science PhD, Asian Studies,
China Practices "Ecological Colonialism" at its Own Expense, China Perspectives [Online], 2007/1 2007,
Online since 08 April 2008, connection on 21 July 2014)

How can China cope with the environmental problems it faces ? The Chinese press is full of questions about protecting
the environment, expressed in a variety of forms and slogans such as the cyclical economy (xunhuanjingji ), the conservation-
minded society (jieyuexing shehui), the energy saving economy (jieneng jingji), or the scientific development ( kexuefazhan): all the
contemporary political jargon carries an environmental label . So the urgency of the situation seems to have
reached political and popular awareness in China. But it is still not clear how the central governments
ambitious initiatives can be put into effect or how the obstacles can be identified . Of course, the experts are
pointing to a range of problems, but these often boil down to the need for governmental action. The selection of articles cited offers a
variety of points of view: those of entrepreneurs, local authorities, the Finance Ministry and the State Environmental Protection
Administration (SEPA). The result reflects economic and political interests at different levels, but does not readily lend itself to any
unanimity of view. What does come through , nevertheless, are the fault lines in public policy, the legislative
system and the funding mechanisms . According to Pan Yue, Deputy Director of SEPA, protecting the environment is
compatible with a socialist system of government, and even favourable to it. Drawing support for his thesis from Marx and Engels, he asserts
that a socialist government is in a better position to balance the need for economic growth with that for sustainable development, since
social equity lies at the heart of both. Capitalist governments have not only developed industrialisation at all
costs (albeit at a far slower rhythm than that experienced in China) but, now that they have become aware of the
environmental effects, they have also adopted a sort of environmental colonialism: they export
their most polluting and energy consuming industries to the developing countries. China, in its interior, is
living through a comparable phenomenon: the polluting industries migrate from east to west, and from the towns to the countryside.
The rich consume and the poor suffer from pollution, Pan Yue says. As a good official, he supports the governments
efforts and considers that scientific development offers the right answer to Chinese problems. For too long, China has imitated the
Western model (at an accelerated pace); but the model is illadapted to China. Contrary to some peoples thinking, scientific
development is not merely a change in production methods and growth: it represents a shake-up in
economic and industrial practices : It is a new civilisation, that China will be trying out between now and 2020. Yet, Pan Yue
does not explain what scientific development means in terms of real measures; nor does he say how these measures go beyond the
economic field and influence the political and social fields so as to end up with a new civilisation. Thus, having created the term socialist
environmentalism, Pan Yue adopts the stance of Party theoretician; he does not spell out the problems that might arise between now and
2020, or those already in evidence. In the field of public policy, the entrepreneurs gathered last year at Boao Forum for Asia, cited by Chen
Shanzhe, recommended that the government should make a real commitment to protecting the environment, introducing the cyclic
economy and developing renewable energy sources. To encourage enterprises towards less polluting production methods, a real system of
initiatives will be necessary alongside a real system of penalties for cases of default. The way things are currently, enterprises have no
financial motivation for changing their production techniques, since the fines they risk amount to no more than 600 yuan less than the cost
of making changes in equipment and production technology. Furthermore, measures and standards (such as those
devised for new buildings) are imprecise and difficult to adopt. The cited experts are unhappy that
the governments tangible hand is failing to direct the invisible hand of the market. Written
descriptions of the cyclic economy are at best an educational tool, which is not bad, designed to
spread the idea of energy conservation (yiben bucuo de xuanchuan jieneng guannian de jiaocai).

Ocean Rhetoric
The colonialist framing of the Ocean dislocates reductions of class in the name of the
Colonies.
Radhika Mohanram Professor, English and Critical and Cultural Theory, 2003, White Water: Race and Oceans Down Under
https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_colonialism_and_colonial_history/v004/4.3mohanram.html
In the previous sections, notwithstanding its subject being the fluidity of water, my article was sedentary, rooted in fixed, geographical points---Britain, its colonies. Do dislocation
and movements, a mimicking of the flow of water, provide a different comprehension of water in the
19th century? I want to cross the oceans in the next section to examine the story of the Pacific man, the quest for water, and the construction of whiteness down under. I want to
take a slow boat across the Pacific to examine how ocean crossings contribute to the whitening of the Pacific man in the final section of this article. Though this article is about the relationship
between race, class and water, my references to the Pacific, of necessity, remind the reader of the rise of Pacific Rim discourse within postcolonial
scholarship on globalisation. The Pacific Rim is a newly imagined zone constructed through the flow of
commodity and capital that, because of its anti-protectionist ideology in trade, is also posited as the post-national and post-modern. The connection between economics
and bodies of water, the fluidity of oceans, has been central to the rise of civilisations, the wealth of nations and anti-sedantary ontologies. The fluidity of oceans has
also caused the mass movements of people from one social, economic, and geographical space to the
new world. Fully 55 million Europeans moved to the colonies, traversing the oceans between 1815 to 1914, at the eve
of the First World War. Indeed, as Janet Abu-Lughod points out, Immanuel Wallerstein, Eric Wolf, Fernand Braudel's works which locate the year 1400 as a
defining moment for the beginning of modern world systems and for the advances of capitalism
predicated on trading and sailing the oceans, especially the Atlantic, need to be recontextualised because the
commercial importance of the Pacific Rim and the contemporary global economic system was predated by the commercial importance of the Indian ocean
around the beginning of the Christian era and the eastern Mediterranean and China seas from the 9th century onwards.43 One can argue for the importance of the
fluidity of oceans and crossings in the development of commerce and the construction of racial
identities. Crossing the oceans races the subject. Like the intra-uterine fluid, the ocean is the origin of emergent (economic) identities. But if we were to use the year 1400---
the onset of Western modernity--as the starting point, the term used for the perfect commonwealth, half-idealised and half-real, is Oceana. Sir James Harrington in
the 17th century insisted that this commonwealth was the destiny of the Scottish, English and Anglo-Irish.44 Like the imagined zone of the Pacific Rim,
James Froude defines Oceana to comprise N.America, Australia, New Zealand, and Ireland--the Anglo-Saxons spread across the globe in the name of
personal and economic freedom and enterprise. Oceana is the place which dislocates Englishmen (and Scottish, Welsh
and Anglo-Irish) from the reductions of class, and rebirths them as youth in the settler colonies: "those poor children of hers now
choking in the fetid alleys" would go to the colonies "where there was still soil and sunshine boundless and life-giving; where the race might for ages renew its mighty youth..."45 Oceana
thus becomes the clichd and mythical land that contains the fountain of youth that recirculated the
polluted English into the Pacific man. But beyond its life-renewing properties Oceana is the place
where England can dump its excess of manufactures for profit. Froude's work prophesies the desire of Australia, New Zealand, South
Africa and Canada to seek independence, become republics, but he posits that they could be kept together as a commonwealth, for then: In the multiplying number of our own fellow-
citizens animated by a common spirit, we should have purchasers for our goods from whom we should fear no rivalry; we should turn in upon them the tide of our
emigrants which now flows away, while the emigrants themselves would thrive under their own fig tree, and rear children with stout limbs and colour in their
cheeks, and a chance before them of a human existence. Oceana would then rest on sure foundations; and her navy---the hand of her strength and the symbol of
her unity---would ride securely in self-supporting stations in the four quarters of the globe.46 In this economic and racial narrative of Oceana, Froude concludes that
the future of the British lies in the sea, "the natural home of Englishmen."47

Development
The further development of the worlds oceans in the name of capital and commerce in
the ocean lead to slavery and colonialism
Radhika Mohanram Professor, English and Critical and Cultural Theory, 2003, White Water: Race and Oceans Down Under
https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_colonialism_and_colonial_history/v004/4.3mohanram.htmlslater
This paean to the ocean is sung under the auspices of the whaling industry by Herman Melville and Charles Olsen. For
them, the whaling industry converted the Pacific into the world's first sweatshop. With its division of labour and a
proletarian crew, it provided the first blueprint of 19th century factories. For Melville, the Pacific was an
extension of the West Coast of the US. The western borders of the US touches the Asian countries of
the Asia-Pacific Rim. The Pacific is perceived as belonging to the Americans. It resembles the Great Plains; its motions of
its wheat, the immensity of the Great Plains was a mimicking of the Atlantic; the Pacific, in its turn, was a repetition of the Plains. Yet the Pacific was the mother of
the Atlantic: "It rolls the midmost waters of the world, the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic but its arms."50 The Pacific with its abundance of whales located the US as
the leader of world trade. The fluid oceans functioned as the highway for Anglo-Saxons leading them to populate and whiten the New World. The non-white Pacific
body, thus gets superseded by the (white) Pacific man. This valorisation of water, of oceans, within modernity is saturated
with and underpinned by certain historical details, pertinent especially to Britain. From the 17th century and
especially in the 18th and 19th centuries ocean going commerce and enterprise expanded. Between 1660
(Restoration) and 1689 (just after the Glorious Revolution) English shipping tonnage doubled. (This was also caused by the capture and addition
of Dutch ships after the Dutch wars to the English fleet, especially the merchant marine, which drastically improved long distance overseas trade). The ports
of London, Liverpool, Bristol and Whitehaven were filled with ships sailing to the Mediterranean,
America, the West and East Indies.51 Commerce expanded with colonial products such as tea, tobacco,
sugar and cotton, timber from Scandinavia, and reexport of colonial products throughout Europe traversed
throughout the world. The burgeoning of English trade, and even European trade, in the 18th and
19th centuries is linked to the rise of colonialism and the traffic in slaves, especially from West Africa.
The ports of Bristol, and later, Liverpool grew in importance over the slave trade. By the middle of the 18th century, the port of Bristol rivalled that of London in
trade and commerce. In total, it is estimated that 12 million slaves from Africa were transported to the New
World, in which Britain played the major role. Produce such as gold, ivory, beeswax and cloth also
used the same extensive network that was established for the slave trade and transported in the
same ships as well.52James Walvin locates the British weakness for sugar with not just slavery and colonialism but also the development of domestic
industries, for instance, the popularity of tableware such as china from manufacturers such as Wedgwood. As Walvin points out, Jamaican plantation ledgers record
the importation of tools for slaves, clothes and fabric, firearms for their owners, metal goods for their factories, and foodstuffs for both slaves and owners. In
short , the boom in British commerce and capitalism in the 18th and 19th centuries and its superior mercantile
power, which made it a major player among European powers, is closely linked to the system of slavery
and colonialism. British commerce and capitalism and the traversal of oceans are also linked to the
system of indenture. The four main colonial crops, sugar, tea, coffee, and rubber, led to the diaspora of the Chinese and the Indians as indentured
labourers in the 18th century to the West Indies, Malaysia, Ceylon (Srilanka), Fiji, Mauritius, Runion, and South and East Africa. The 19th century form of indenture
was instituted after the abolition of slavery and the transportation of slaves. The indenture of labourers in the plantations, notwithstanding the free will of people
signing up, carried vestiges of slave laws within it, especially for vagrancy.54 Among Indian indentured labourers alone, it is estimated that 525,482 went to French
and British sugar colonies, 30,000 went to Mauritius, and 1,446,407 went to Ceylon between the years 1843-1867 of whom about 90,000 returned. Overall, it is
estimated between one and two million went to tropical plantations between 1830 and 1870.55 If previously the sea was an enclosure that protected a hermetically
sealed Britain, by the 18th century the sea shifted in cultural meaning to become a ubiquitous and fluid roadway that led to its prosperity. Brittania, indeed, ruled
the waves.
Pursuit of technology justifies US superiority and colonialism
Dinerstein 06, Joel, professor of English at Tulane University, where he also teaches in the American studies program. He
is the author of Swinging the Machine: Modernity, Technology, and African American Culture between the World Wars (2003),
which was awarded the 2004 Eugene M. Kayden Book Prize, given annually to the best book in the humanities published by an
American university press, Technology and Its Discontents: On the Verge of the Posthuman, American Quarterly, Volume 58,
Number 3, September 2006, pp. 569-595. Page 569.
Immediately after 9/11, a Middle East correspondent for The Nation summarized the coming war on terrorism as [their] theology versus [our]
technology, the suicide bomber against the nuclear power.1 His statement missed the point : technology is the American
theology . For Americans, it is not the Christian God but technology that structures the American sense of power
and revenge, the nations abstract sense of well-being, its arrogant sense of superiority, and its
righteous justification for global dominance . In the introduction to Technological Visions, Marita Sturken and Douglas
Thomas declare that in the popular imagination, technology is often synonymous with the future, but it is more accurate to say that
technology is synonymous with faith in the futureboth in the future as a better world and as one in which the
United States bestrides the globe as a colossus.2 Technology has long been the unacknowledged
source of European and Euro-American superiority within modernity, and its underlying mythos always traffics in
what James W. Carey once called secular religiosity.3 Lewis Mumford called the American belief system mechano-idolatry as early as 1934;
a few years later he deemed it our mechano-centric religion. David F. Noble calls this ideology the religion of technology in a work of the
same name that traces its European roots to a doctrine that combines millenarianism, rationalism, and Christian redemption in the writings of
monks, explorers, inventors, and NASA scientists. If we take into account the functions of religion and not its rituals, it is not a deity who insures
the American future but new technologies: smart bombs in the Gulf War, Viagra and Prozac in the pharmacy, satellite TV at home. It is not
social justice or equitable economic distribution that will reduce hunger, greed, and poverty, but fables of abundance and the rhetoric of
technological utopianism. The United S tates is in thrall to techno-fundamentalism, in Siva Vaidhyanathans apt phrase;
to Thomas P. Hughes, a god named technology has possessed Americans . Or, as public policy scholar Edward Wenk Jr.
sums it up, we are . . . inclined to equate technology with civilization *itself +.4



Exploring and developing the frontier that is the ocean demonstrates American
exceptionalism
Gouge, 01 [Catherine Courtney Gouge, Doctor of Philosophy in English @ Eberly College of Arts and
Sciences, Technologies of a New World Citizenship: American Frontier Narratives in the Late-
Twentieth Century,
http://wvuscholar.wvu.edu:8881//exlibris/dtl/d3_1/apache_media/L2V4bGlicmlzL2R0bC9kM18xL2FwY
WNoZV9tZWRpYS82MTI3.pdf]
American coherence and power , according to this structure, are things to be acquired . Furthermore, they
are both the motivation for exploring and conquering frontiers and, ultimately, that in which, on an individual level,
U.S. citizens are expected to invest in order to support frontier exploration. That is, as a nation, we desire to explore the frontier
because we believe that we must do so to secure the sociopolitical power and control of the
American nation-state ; however, individually, most Americans must demonstrate their civic loyalty and desire for powerful
subjectivity by admitting both that they fail to occupy the powerful and coherent subject position they seek to secure and that they will never
be able to acquire the coherence and power of whole citizenship. This is characteristic of most American national myths which, as Donald Pease
writes, presuppose a realm of pure possibility where a whole self internalized the norms of American history in a language and series of
actions that corroborated American exceptionalism (24). The myth of the American frontier similarly presupposes
just such a realm of pure possibility to support a fiction of American exceptionalism and, in so doing,
sutures over our individual identities with a fiction of a collective, national identity . In his popular book The
Case for Mars (1996), Zubrin invokes Frederick Jackson Turners notion of the role of the originary American frontier in the
creation of a distinctly American national identity and expresses anxiety about the future of
American exceptionalism. He argues that contemporary society faces the same set of questions that Turner posed in his speech
before the members of the American Historical Association in 1893: What if the frontier is truly gone? What happens to America and all it has
stood for? Can a free, egalitarian, innovating society survive in the absence of room to grow?74 (Case for Mars 296). For Zubrin, like Turner
and others before him, frontier-exploration is the foundation of American exceptionalism; therefore, a lack of a
new frontier is serious grounds for concern. In an interview I conducted with him in 1996, Zubrin offered what he called the oppression of
the uncertified as an example of one of the negative consequences of not having room to grow.

Capitalism
The use of a private actor entrenches colonialism and harms the environment
Wise et al., 2010 (Director of Doctoral Program in Migration Studies & Prof of Development Studies;
Universidad Autnoma de Zacatecas, Mexico, 2010 Ral Delgado Wise, Humberto Mrquez Covarrubias,
Rubn Puentes, Reframing the debate on migration, development and human rights: fundamental
elements, October, 2010, www.migracionydesarrollo.org)
The internationalization of capital. The expansion strategy of the global economy involves a
profound economic restructuring based on the establishment of subcontracting chains dominated by
large multinational corporations , which have a global reach. This form of expansion seeks to economically reinsert peripheral
countries that are rich in natural resources and ensure an abundant and cheap workforce. The new export platforms, in fact, operate as
enclaves, that is production, commercial and services zones dominated by multinational corporations and often exempted from national
taxation and regulation of working and environmental conditions. These types of plants currently employ between 55 million (Robinson, 2008)
and 66 million Southern workers (Singa Boyenge, 2006) and the strategy is widely implemented by large manufacturing, financial, agricultural,
commercial, and service-sector multinationals (Robinson, 2008). Financialization . Financial capital generates speculative
strategies that foster the channeling of investment funds, sovereign funds, pension funds and social
savings toward new financial instruments that offer short-term high profit margins but can entail re-
current crises and massive fraud. These speculative strategies obstruct and affect the functioning of
the so-called real economy (Foster and Magdof, 2009; Bello, 2006). Environmental degradation. Biodiversity,
natural resources, and communal and national wealth are privatized for the benefit of large
corporations that favor profits while ignoring social and environmental cost s. This leads to increased
environmental degradation, pollution, famine, and disease, as well as climate changes (global warming and increasingly frequent extreme
climatic events) that threaten the symbiotic relationship between humans and the environment (Foladori and Pierri, 2005). The restructuring
of innovation systems. Advances in IT, telecommunications, biotechnology, new materials and nanotechnology cater to the needs of large
corporations looking for increased profits. Scientific and technological research have been restructured under mechanisms such as outsourcing
and offshore-outsourcing, which allow corporations to employ southern scientists, transfer risk and responsibility, and capitalize on resultant
benefits by amassing patents. This has lead to unprecedented mercantilism in scientific research, short-term
perspectives and a lack of social concern (Freeman, 2005b, Lester and Piore, 2004).


Privitization of the ocean demonstrates the Euro-American tradition of colonialism
Mansfield 04 (Becky Mansfield, BA 1991, Environmental Studies, Honors, University of California,
Santa Cruz, MS 1996, Environmental Studies, University of Oregon, PhD 2001, Geography, University of
Oregon. Professor of Geography at Ohio State University. 2004 Neoliberalism in the oceans:
rationalization, property rights, and the common question.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016718503001155)
In this paper, I address these questions by analyzing the development of neoliberalism in the oceans , and in particular in
ocean fisheries. Examining the ways that past policy orientations toward fisheries have influenced the development of neoliberal approaches to
ocean governance, I contend that neoliberalism in the oceans centers specifically around concerns about
property and the use of privatization to create markets for governing access to and use of ocean
resources . Within the Euro-American tradition that has shaped international law of the sea, the oceans
(including the water column, seabed, and living and mineral resources) were long treated as common
property the common heritage of mankind (Pardo, 1967)open to all comers with the means to create and exploit oceanic
opportunities. Although historically there has also been continual tension between this openness of access and desire for territorialization
(especially of coastal waters), treating the oceans as a commons is consistent with the idea that oceans are spaces of
movement and transportation, which have facilitated mercantilism, exploration, colonial expansion ,
and cold war military maneuvering (Steinberg, 2001).1 Oceans have also long been sites for resource extraction, yet it has not been until recent
decades that new economic desires and environmental contradictions have contributed to a pronounced move away from open access and
freedom of the seas. New technologies for resource extraction combined with regional overexploitation have contributed to conflicts over
resources, to which representatives from academia, politics, and business have responded by calling for enclosing the oceans within carefully
delimited regimes of property rights, be those regimes of state, individual, or collective control. At the center of this new political economy of
oceans, as it has evolved over the past 50 years, has been concern about the commons, and the extent to which common and open access
property regimes contribute to economic and environmental crises, which include overfishing and overcapitalization. As such, the question of
the commons has been at the center of numerous, seemingly contradictory approaches to ocean governance and fisheries regulation. Thus, the
first argument of the paper is that neoliberal approaches in fisheries cannot be treated simply as derivative of a larger neoliberal movement
that became entrenched starting in the 1980s. Instead, examining trajectories of neoliberalism in fisheries over the
past half century reveals that the emphasis on property and the commons has contributed to a more
specific dynamic of neoliberalism operating in ocean fisheries and, therefore, to distinctive forms of
neoliberalism.

Aquaculture
The affs industrialization of fisheries harms the environment.
Bavinck 11 (Maartin, 1998 Ph.D. from the University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands. 1981 MA in
Development Sociology, Free University, Amsterdam, the Netherlands. 1972 High School diploma,
Kodaikanal, South India. The Megaengineering of Ocean Fisheries: A Century of Expansion and Rapidly
Closing Frontiers, 2011, http://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-90-481-9920-4_16?no-
access=true)
The industrialization of the worlds capture fisheries , also known as the blue revolution, took place in two phases. The
first phase of fisheries development took place in Europe and North America in the first half of the 20th century. Post-colonial governments in
Asia, Africa and Latin America instigated the second phase after WWII. This chapter investigates the parameters of the industrialization process
taking place in fisheries, by making use of historical chronicles on the fisheries of California and Southeast Asia. It pays specific attention to the
technology which underlies industrialization, and to the distant water fleets that represent its
summit. I argue that although the blue revolution has evolved from myriad centers and was only partially blueprinted, the process
as it has unfolded over the globe has many similar features and impacts. Industrialization of capture fisheries has
resulted in both the generation of significant wealth and improved food security. Its shadow side, however, is unprecedented
ecological destruction . The urgent challenge is now to devise governance regimes which contain further damage and contribute
toward ecological restoration.


Their approach to marine conservation is the same used to justify colonialism
De Santo et al 11 (Elizabeth M. De Santo, Ph.D. in Geography from University College London,
member of the IUCN World Commission on Environmental Law. Jones, P.J.S., and Miller, A. (2011)
Fortress conservation at sea: a commentary on the Chagos marine protected area. Marine
Policy 35(2): 258-260.
http://www.homepages.ucl.ac.uk/~ucfwpej/pdf/ChagosFortressConservation.pdf)
What lessons can be learned from terrestrial examples of conservation? The answer is not encouraging given the case described above. The
critical relationship between people and protected areas is obvious: without stakeholder engagement and support, long-term viability of a
protected area is at serious risk, though it should also be recognised that it is all too easy for societal economic goals to outweigh conservation
objectives. In addition, whilst the UK is promoting a more bottom-up approach to the designation of Marine
Conservation Zones (MCZs) within its waters, this top-down manoeuvre in the British Indian Ocean rings of
colonialism. Looking at previous experiences with terrestrial conservation and in particular the
history of protected areas, fortress conservation without the engagement of local stakeholders has
long been recognized as an approach that is both unjust and ineffective . In contrast, new conservation
approaches, such as community-based conservation, treat conservation as simply one of many forms of natural resource use and acknowledge
the role that markets play in the achievement of conservation goals [12]. In considering how protected areas have
evolved over the past half century, a paradigm shift can be seen , as outlined by Phillips [13], whereby local
engagement and wider societal benefits have become more of a driving force in protected area designation and management than complete
exclusion. However, there are still arguments for exclusionary approaches [14], and indeed there is often an inherent conflict between nature
conservation objectives and community development objectives which leads to mixed successes [15]. It must also be recognised that fortress
conservation approaches in Africa have in some cases transformed the way local communities frame their relationship with nature; whereas
they once accepted wildlife in their midst, they now view animals as intruders and conservation as a threat [16] With regard to MPAs , it is
important to consider the marine environments unique ecological and management challenges [17],
coupled with the fact that the majority of protected areas have been designated in nations where
governance is weak [18], resulting in the creation of numerous paper parks. Governance, defined as the interactions among
structures, processes and traditions that determine direction, how power is exercised, and how the views of citizens or stakeholders are
incorporated into decision making, is a critical aspect of effective conservation and a prominent component of the CBDs work on protected
areas [19, 20]. Discussions regarding the access and benefit sharing (ABS) provisions of the CBD to date have dealt more with the benefit
sharing component than access, including heated debates over the exclusion of local people from protected areas and related equity issues
(e.g. the distribution of benefits gained from genetic resources derived from biodiversity, such as pharmaceuticals). An exclusionary
fortress approach to conservation as implemented via no-take MPAs raises equity concerns regarding
access as well, in this case to marine living resources. It is this all or nothing approach that
alienates stakeholders and breeds fear and mistrust towards MPAs.


Offshore aquaculture would fund multinational, capitalist corporations
Food & Water Watch 07 (Food & Water Watch is a nonprofit consumer organization that works to
ensure clean water and safe food. They challenge the corporate control and abuse of our food and
water resources by empowering people to take action and by transforming the public consciousness
about what we eat and drink. Through research, public and policymaker education, media, and lobbying,
we advocate policies that guarantee safe, wholesome food produced in a humane and sustainable
manner and public, rather than private, control of water resources including oceans, rivers, and
groundwater, Charity Watch rates Food & Water Watch an "A" grade, Offshore Aquaculture: Bad for
the Gulf, https://www.foodandwaterwatch.org/common-resources/fish/fish-farming/gulf-of-
mexico/offshore-aquaculture/, )
Proponents of aquaculture often claim that it will lead to more jobs. However, history and the facts do not necessarily support such assertions.
A 2003 study found that a 200 percent increase in salmon production from fish farming in British Columbia would create few new jobs. In the
1990s industry in the province tripled but added no new jobs.24 Meanwhile, the salmon farming industry in Scotland and Norway dramatically
expanded production, but employment decreased due to increased mechanization.25 Aquaculture Fish Biz Consolidates Does offshore
aquaculture benefit local communities? Although it is too soon to say, some of the trends appear ominous. It does help a few
foreign companies , at least judging from the salmon farming industry. In 2001, 30 companies accounted for two-thirds of the world
salmon and trout.26 But that number has slowly dwindled to half a dozen or so multinational companies,
most of which are based in Europe .27 Unlike salmon fishing enterprises, most of which consist of boats and permits owned by
individuals who sell their catch to processors or, in some cases, to niche markets the large salmon aquaculture enterprises consist of
vertically integrated feed, hatchery, grow-out (where the smolts are raised to maturity), distribution, and value-added processing
companies.28 Economist Gunnar Knapp concluded that, unlike many kinds of fishing, offshore aquaculture is
not likely to develop as a small, family-owned businesses. It would be a larger-scale, corporate
activity . 29 Conclusion and Recommendations Gulf commercial and recreational fishing communities support
thousands of jobs and haul in billions of dollars in revenue for the region. Offshore aquaculture is
fraught with uncertainty for that continued economic vibrancy. Given this, the U.S. government
should not promote offshore aquaculture that could threaten coastal communities and the marine
environment in the Gulf of Mexico, and further research is needed on the issue before moving
forward.


Property of fisheries shows a neoliberal and colonial mindset
Mansfield 04 (Becky Mansfield, BA 1991, Environmental Studies, Honors, University of California,
Santa Cruz, MS 1996, Environmental Studies, University of Oregon, PhD 2001, Geography, University of
Oregon. Professor of Geography at Ohio State University. 2004 Neoliberalism in the oceans:
rationalization, property rights, and the common question.
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0016718503001155)
It is in this sense that putting property at the center of fisheries problems is a neoliberal, market-based
approach to ocean governance . All the approaches discussed in this paperwhether private-, state-, or group-orientedstart
from a particular economic logic that takes economic rationality (meaning individual profit maximization) as a given. From this starting point,
the problems in fisheries stem from the ways that open access regimes inherently create irrational incentives: incentives to overuse, to use
inefficiently, to race for the resource, and so on. In this view, open access represents a market distortion: what should be rational economic
behavior becomes distorted under open access so that outcomes are inefficient and environmentally destructive. The solution, then, must
eliminate the market distortion. Government regulation, these theorists argue, cannot in itself do this; instead governments can
assign property rights that allow the market itself to be the solution. From this neoliberal
perspective, market incentives decrease capacity and increase efficiency as individuals or groups
lease and sell privatized rights to fish ; market incentives encourage conservation because each individual or group knows they
can profit from the fish as much tomorrow as today, and thus they will fish more slowly and more carefully. Market incentives may also lead to
overfishing when mining fish stocks makes economic sense, and they will also cause a high degree of real pain among those who are not
the beneficiaries of privatization, but this, proponents argue, is inevitable and inexorable, and all in the name of the greater good (Christy,
1996, pp. 288, 297; see also Hanna, 1999). Property rights are at the center of a massive change in the political
economy of the oceans around neoliberal, market-based socio-environmental policies that enclose
for a few what was once the property of all. Neoliberalism in the oceans takes a particular form and
has its own history and timeline based on the ways that , for the last 50 years, fisheries analysts have
structured regulation debates around the question of the commons and rationalization of the oceans .


Impacts

Ignoring the basis of colonialism in regard to climate change dooms government
solutions to policy failure epistemic engagement is necessary to solve environmental
issues
Manuel-Navarrete 10 *David, Research Staff, Kings College, London. BA, Environmental Sciences,
ecological economics, and geography. Power, realism, and the ideal of human emancipation in a
climate of change WIREs Climate Change Vol. 1, November/December 2010+
Climate change is often portrayed as a management and policy problem.10 This positioning outside
the evolution of sociopolitical structures has the advantage of discussing mitigation and adaptation
as unproblematically carried out from, and by, these structures, without challenging them in any
significant fashion. This implies an abstraction of climate change as an external threat to social
stability, and an object of study that can then be elegantly compartmentalized into different types of
risk. In addition, mitigation and adaptation can be neatly defined as strategies to reduce overall threat
and cope with risks so that humanitys development can continue unaffected . Leaving the messiness of politics
outside the equation allows for the emphasis on technologies, targets, indexes, accounting schemes, and strategies that can be translated into
explicit policies or actions. The human dimension of climate change can then be studied by singling-out the parts of the social fabric that need
to be adapted or proofed, so that the system as a whole, more or less in its current state, can weather climate challenges. Unfortunately ,
this simplistic view fails to acknowledge the increasing penetration of climate change into all the
dimensions of human life .11 In fact, a growing body of empirical work reveals a more complicated picture than that portrayed by
apolitical policy approaches.12 WILL POLITICAL REALISM DO THE JOB? A realist agenda to study climate change politics is
consolidating around the notions of global environmental governance and regimes .13 Governance
refers to the wielding of power and authority by both government institutions, and other social
actors in order to influence and enact public decisions and actions . Indeed, the notion of governance stretches
Montesquieus checks-and-balances thesis beyond the three powers of democratic government (executive, legislative, and judiciary) to
include the role of private actors or markets, and civil society. These new political actors are then reified as stakeholders who have particular
interests, resources, values, and cultures. Accordingly, politics can be conveniently represented as stakeholders
negotiation and accommodation toward solving specific problems such as emission reductions or
shielding development from disasters. This approach to accounting for politics may advocate
adjustments of governance structures and the emergence of new regimes, but these adjustments are
justified in terms of problem-solving performance . Thus, the ethical dimension of power distribution is
brought to the background, so that attention can be directed toward goal setting, problem solving,
and policy outcomes . As noted above , political realism assumes a pessimistic stance of human nature .
Authority is needed to control peoples egoistic nature and prevent the harming of others and the environment. As a consequence,
coercion, and/or legitimation through consent are preconditions for order and security. The success
of political systems is measured in terms of stability and consensus between rulers and ruled, rather
than ideals of fairness, justice, or freedom. Corruption and oppression from rulers can be avoided through appropriate
checks and balances, or good governance. This realist position is particularly convenient in validating the liberal state, law, and the institution
of property as grantors of order. In fact, in the present historical moment, this realist stance often leads to neoliberal economic rationalities,
which are commonly assumed to provide the basis for co-ordinating conflicting interests in modern capitalist societies. At the core of realism is
the assumption that society is politically in a close to equilibrium state, orbiting around a liberal democratic attractor. The notion of an
attractor evokes a sense of final destination, the end of political history toward which Western societies perceive themselves to have been
tending during the last centuries. This semi-equilibrium politics allows for the conceptualization of power as an intrinsic
quality of prototypical actors and institutions, rather than an outcome of unstable historical
processes and social struggles. As a result climate politics can be represented as the negotiation
between a given set of social actors who, in the light of new scientific findings and technological
breakthroughs, rearrange markets, norms, institutions, regulations, or decision-making procedures .
Justice and fairness belong to the policy process, rather than being intrinsic to social structures. Thus, unrealistic idealist aspirations for
universal justice or emancipation can be reoriented toward pragmatic targets such as the implementation of transparent, inclusive, and
accountable policies, even if carried out in a context of inequality and mere representative democracy. The staging of international climate
negotiations is a case in point. Developed countries, developing countries, corporations, scientists, and
nongovernmental organizations are to follow pre-assigned roles and bargain our way out, without
even discussing the possibility of altering power or pursuing any form of social transformation . Instead,
the debate is centered on national emission targets, technological incentives, setting a price for carbon, and the transfer of economic resources
to compensate those who will bear the highest costs.


Expansionism by the US disguise racism and religious chauvinism
Fitzgerald, No date. [Michael, journalist, currently a correspondent for the Jacksonville Business
Journal and a contributing writer and book reviewer for The Humanist. Hes written for Folio Weekly
in Jacksonville, FL. Manifest Destiny: American Imperial Myth, Then & Now <
http://www.leftcurve.org/lc29webpages/manifestdestiny.html> ]
The U.S. , being founded on anti-monarchical and anti-imperialist ideals , is constrained by its own foundation
myth. Expansionism and foreign adventures must be couched in language that obscures the real
objective. "Duplicity in foreign affairs has sometimes served the national interest. The assumption that the public wont understand
has long made it tempting for both Democratic and Republican administrations to make their arguments clearer than the truth."*46+
Expansionism can only be presented to the U.S. public with one or more of the following "official"
justifications: - national security : there must be some threat, real or manufactured;[47] - humanitarianism: we have a
moral responsibility to "liberate" oppressed peoples from ruthless dictators or, in the case of civil wars, each other; - idealism: it is our
responsibility to protect democracy and/or freedom for the rest of the world. Tacit elements of racism, religious
chauvinism and greed operate below the surface . Away with wretched cant No U.S. leader would openly declare,
" Were going in there because there is something we want ." But there have been exceptions. One was
Representative William Duer of New York. During the furor leading up to the Mexican-American War, Duer thundered, "If you wish this
plunder, this dismemberment of a sister republic, let us stand forth like conquerors and plainly declare our
purposes. Away with mawkish morality, with this desecration of religion, with this cant about
Manifest Destiny, a divine mission, a warrant from the Most High, to civilize, Christianize and
democratize our sister republic at the mouth of a cannon !"[48 ] Racism and religious chauvinism are
the primary components of Manifest Destiny, but they obscure the true objective : plunder.[49] Albert
Gallatin, a Swiss immigrant who became Thomas Jeffersons and James Madisons secretary of the treasury, saw racist rhetoric as a
smokescreen for greed: " The allegations of superiority of race and destiny are but pretenses under which
to disguise ambition *and+ cupidity"*50+ The point was put even plainer by George Orwell. In Burmese Days, a character very
much like Orwell himself--who was once a British imperial policeman in Burma--asks a comrade: " How can you make out that
we are in this country for any purpose except to steal? "[51]


Race cards
When individuals experience disruptions in their place attachment- nostalgia is used in
order to construct new identities for themselves and those they feel responsible
associated with that disruption- this creates white privilege and the black other
Maly et al 12 (Michael Maly, Heather Dalmage and Nancy Michaels, associate professor at Roosevelt University with a PhD in
sociology, professor of sociology at Roosevelt University with a PhD in Sociology, Program Coordinator The Mansfield Institute for Social Justica
&Transformation & Grad Student at Roosevelt University, 11 September 2012, Critical Sociology Sage Journals 2013 issue 39: 757, The End of
an Idyllic World: Nostalgia Narratives, Race, and the Construction of White Powerlessness,
http://crs.sagepub.com/content/39/5/757.full.pdf+html)

Nostalgia is a special type of memory, one that elevates pleasurable experiences and screens out more painful ones. Scholars have
noted how nostalgia often emerges after loss or displacement as individuals seek to claim identity
through 'recognizing and redefining a shared past' (Milligan, 2003: 381). When individuals experience
disruptions in their place attachment, nostalgia proves a useful tool to construct identities (Davis, 1979).
The literature has specifically focused on how nostalgic narratives are used 'to defend territory, to create a sense of
authenticity, and to give legiti-macy to a way of life' (Kasinitz and Hillyard, 1995: 161). There is little literature, however,
that examines how nostalgia narratives are specifically used in the constructing and maintaining racial identities. We explore the role of
nostalgia in framing white racial identity in terms of innocence, virtuousness, and powerlessness or victimhood in the post-Civil Rights era.
Based on qualitative interviews with whites growing up in racially changing neighborhoods in Chicago between 1960 and 1980, this article
reveals how whites employ nostalgia narratives to claim white racial identities, even when faced with
social contradictions. Individuals in our study repeatedly spoke nostalgically of the old neighborhood and a time
when life seemed good, that is, orderly, friendly, safe, and homogeneously white. The good life, couched in a
specific geographic and historical space (segregated white neighborhoods in Chicago during the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s), is
viewed as having been disrupted, destroyed, and unrecoverable Because of unavoidable racial change. Blame for the
displacement is generally placed on the shoulders of those labeled the destroyers blacks.' Sometimes through racially
explicit language, most often through racially coded language of crime, housing upkeep, religion and culture, nostalgia narratives are
consistently built around a segregated white world. The memories of the loss of the old white neighborhood converge with
the nostalgia for a time when 'white culture' was the unquestion-ingly synonymous with American culture.
In the shared storytelling of this nostalgic past, these whites are creating a present that plays by color-blind rules,
while reproducing, reiterating, and strengthening whiteness by making explicit claims about what it means to
be a good American and a good human being. In this sense, nostalgia serves as a culturally sanctioned
strategy for shoring up white privilege. Prior to examining these data, it is important to review the scholarly literature around
race and place, collective memory, and racial discourse, to provide the context for our research.




Nostalgia creates new identity constructions that causes the alienation of the Other
that seemed to disrupt their place attachment
Maly et al 12 (Michael Maly, Heather Dalmage and Nancy Michaels, associate professor at Roosevelt University with a PhD in
sociology, professor of sociology at Roosevelt University with a PhD in Sociology, Program Coordinator The Mansfield Institute for Social Justica
&Transformation & Grad Student at Roosevelt University, 11 September 2012, Critical Sociology Sage Journals 2013 issue 39: 757, The End of
an Idyllic World: Nostalgia Narratives, Race, and the Construction of White Powerlessness,
http://crs.sagepub.com/content/39/5/757.full.pdf+html)
Racial transition generated varied emotions, with fear and anxiety about property value decline, anger against black
Americans, and a sense of loss prominent among them. This is not a surprise as scholars have recognized the importance
of whiteness as property (see Harris, 1993; Lipsitz, 1995) and the construction of attachments to place is important to
an individual's well-being and distress. According to geographer Yi-Fu Tuan, what starts as undifferentiated 'space'
becomes 'place' through the 'steady of accretion of sentiment' (1977, 1974:33). This affective bond between
people and places (usually residences and neighborhoods) is best known as 'place attachment' (Altman and Low, 1992;
Manzo, 2003). Place attachment can take on social, material, and ideo-logical aspects as individuals
develop kinship and community ties, own or rent land, and get involved in public life (Altman and Low, 1992; Manzo and Perkins, 2006).
The importance of place meaning to community members becomes quite clear when examining disruptions to place attachments. Studies of
families forced to relocate due to urban renewal projects demonstrate a profound sense of grief and mourning for places that no longer
physically exist as the physical and social fabric of their communities was destroyed (Fried, 1963; Gans, 1982; Marris, 1986). Studies of
environmental disasters also illustrate how disruptions of place attachment can disturb a sense of continuity (Belgrave and
Smith, 1994; Brown and Perkins, 1992; Erikson, 1976; Katovich and Hintz, 1997; Smith and Belgrave, 1995) and cause feelings of loss
and alienation (Hammon, 1992). Finally, and most applicable to our research, Cummings's research on the effects of racial change
on whites illustrates that racial change can generate similar emotions of loss for their neighborhood and the
emotional security it provided, particularly for those unable (or unwilling) to leave as the neighborhood shifts
(1998). In each case, change in the physical world, and thus to one's place attachments, leads to the loss
of 'taken-for-granted realities' and the identities that come with them (Milligan, 2003: 383). Nostalgia is an
important way individuals react to such a disruption (Milligan, 2003).2 Nostalgic memory is not regular memory,
rather it is a function of present fears and anxieties, and involves an 'active selection of what to
remember and how to remember it' (Wilson, 2005: 25). In this sense, then, nostalgia is 'one of the means ... we
employ in the never ending work of constructing, main-taining, and reconstructing our identities' (Davis,
1979: 31). Nostalgia narratives, then, are imag-ined stories of the past that select positive elements from one's
personal history, while scrubbing away stories that are unpleasant and even shameful. Individuals compose
nostalgia narratives when they feel their identities, status, and/or attachments to a place are threatened, and these nar-ratives
provide a means for constructing or framing identities that are positive. Like other tools (e.g. dress, talk, deviant
acts), nostalgic narratives serve as a method of group-level identity work (Schwalbe and Mason-Schrock, 1996).

Memory reaffirms identity constructions that halts change in the status quo through
political action
Maly et al 12 (Michael Maly, Heather Dalmage and Nancy Michaels, associate professor at Roosevelt University with a PhD in
sociology, professor of sociology at Roosevelt University with a PhD in Sociology, Program Coordinator The Mansfield Institute for Social Justica
&Transformation & Grad Student at Roosevelt University, 11 September 2012, Critical Sociology Sage Journals 2013 issue 39: 757, The End of
an Idyllic World: Nostalgia Narratives, Race, and the Construction of White Powerlessness,
http://crs.sagepub.com/content/39/5/757.full.pdf+html)

Urban scholars, particularly those focusing on gentrification, have examined how nostalgia nar-ratives
are employed in dealing with social and cultural displacement. In their research on Red Hook, Kasinitz
and Hillyard explored how old timers use nostalgic storytelling to highlight how their self-sufficient,
morally decent and authentic community was destroyed and in contrasting the area's 'golden age'
with the present era of decline, they make a claim for 'their own basic decency and assert ownership'
(1995: 161). Patillo's study (2007) of a gentrifying black neighborhood in Chicago highlights how existing
residents, threatened by residential, social, and cultural displace-ment, use nostalgia tales of
community, shopping, and entertainment prior to gentrification in an effort to stake their claim for the
future. Ocejo's (2011) study of the Lower East Side examines how early gentrifiers use a nostalgia
narrative to combat social and cultural change (i.e. commercial gentrification as highlighted by the
increased presence of bars and nightlife). Threatened with dis-placement as social authorities in the
neighborhood as well as displacing their attachment to its places, nostalgia allows early gentrifiers to
claim an identity as the area's authentic and symbolic owners. These studies, focusing on battles over
physical spaces, highlight the power of nostalgia to construct new identities that 'stands up to,
defines, and counters change in the present' as well as serving as a basis for political action (Ocejo,
2011: 306). The literature on nostalgia narratives is important in understanding why and how people
con-struct communities and identities. Since memory is not only personal but social and historic as well
(Ferrarotti, 1990; Johnson and Dawson, 1982 Lowenthal, 1985), remembering is a communal act.
Through storytelling (or 'mnemonic traditions' and 'mnemonic socialization'), we construct com-
munities and our notions of ourselves (Bellah et al., 1985; Schwartz, 1996). This collective mem-ory
process defines in-group from out-group, and guides how we think about ourselves. In short, shared
memories allow individuals to orient or situate a sense of identity (Hobsbawm, 1972; Hooker, 2009;
Schwartz, 1996), and thus, 'memory is a central, if not the central, medium through which identities are
constituted' (Olick and Robbins, 1998: 133). Recognizing that both identity and memory are ongoing
processes rather than static properties, scholars have explored the various ways in which identities are
fashioned and sustained. Memory propels and reaffirms identities, frames opposition, and helps make
sense of individuals and larger groups (Irwin-Zarecka, 1994; Schwartz, 1996; Zerubavel, 1996). Yet,
memory and the identities fashioned through collective memory are the 'reality of the past that is
socially articulated and socially maintained' (Irwin-Zarecka, 1994: 54). Thus, memory is not fixed, as it
has to be continually created and maintained, a process accomplished in a group context, and reflects
the concerns and anxieties of the present (Halbwachs, 1992; Schwartz, 1997). The most basic method
of accomplishing this socialization is through talk, particularly in small groups, where we ground and
substantiate our reevaluations of our personal recollections and thus, do the work of constructing
identity.

Claims of colorblindness are a faade meant to protect subtle, incremental, systemic systems of modern
political racism- this is a new link
Maly et al 12 (Michael Maly, Heather Dalmage and Nancy Michaels, associate professor at Roosevelt University with a PhD in
sociology, professor of sociology at Roosevelt University with a PhD in Sociology, Program Coordinator The Mansfield Institute for Social Justica
&Transformation & Grad Student at Roosevelt University, 11 September 2012, Critical Sociology Sage Journals 2013 issue 39: 757, The End of
an Idyllic World: Nostalgia Narratives, Race, and the Construction of White Powerlessness,
http://crs.sagepub.com/content/39/5/757.full.pdf+html)
Since memory is connected to the environment, it is important to attend to important shifts in the US
racial landscape as a result of the social, political, and cultural struggles since the 1950s. While these struggles
challenged legalized segregation and widely held beliefs about the innate biological inferiority of blacks, a new racial democracy failed to
emerge (Bonilla-Silva, 2001; Forman and Lewis, 2006; Forman, 2004; Omi and Winant, 1994). In its place, a new racial com-mon
sense (or sensibility) emerged that reproduces racial inequalities and protects white privilege through a
new set of discursive strategies (Bonilla-Silva et al., 2004). While the labels for this new racial common sense vary (e.g. 'symbolic
racism', laissez-faire racism', etc.), the label that best fits is color-blind racism (Bonilla-Silva, 2009; Can, 1997). Color-blind
racism suggests that racial parity has largely been achieved and that contemporary racial inequality is
the product of nonracial dynamics or individual and/or group-level shortcomings rather than
structural constraints (Bonilla-Silva et al., 2004; Gallagher, 2003a; Lewis et al., 2000). One element of color-blind
discourse involves the way in which racial antipathy is expressed. Unlike previous periods where racial prejudice was
more overt, today whites are more likely to express such sentiments in covert, contradictory, and subtle
ways (Bobo et al., 1997; Bonilla-Silva and Forman, 2000; Myers, 2005; Sears and Henry, 2003). These ways include white
virtuousness and the interconnected themes of racial resentment and white victimhood. In a color-blind
era, white stories often extol 'non-racial' positive virtues of white residents and neighborhoods with little acknowledgment of how institutions
have supported whites, while ignoring and/or discrimi-nating against others (Feagin, 2010). Related to tales of white virtue is the
rise of racial resentment and the sense that whites are now victims in a post-Civil Rights era. From the late 1960s through the 1980s,
the US experienced the rise of the 'new right movement', an authoritarian, resentment-fueled, and right
wing populist movement that sought to curtail the progressive civil rights gains of the 1960s (Kazin, 1995). The
new right `rearticulateds such gains through a facade of racial neu-trality while utilizing racial coding
or 'phrases and symbols which refer indirectly to racial themes, but do not directly challenge popular and democratic
or egalitarian ideals' (Omi and Winant, 1994: 123). Coded terms including busing, welfare or affirmative action suggest that blacks do not try
hard enough to overcome difficulties, take what they have not earned, and that the playing field is tilting away from whites (Kinder and
Sanders, 1996: 105-6; Wellman, 1997). By the early 1980s, at the national level, the Reagan administration borrowed from
the new right, arguing that racial discrimination had been eliminated and as a result, civil rights remedies
were now working against whites and group-based rights should be challenged (Omi and Winant, 1994). In the decades between, whites
continued to move to suburbs and communities defined as synonymously white-controlled, safe, and
good. This particular articulation of race allowed whites to paint themselves as victims of institutions, laws, and a too powerful government
that were creating an unfair playing field for whites (Bonilla-Silva, 2009; Formisano, 1991; Gallagher, 1993; Hooker, 2009). This can be seen in
whites' claims of being powerless against segregation and racial change, and unable to change things (Sokol, 2007). Similarly, Bonilla-Silva et al.
reveal how whites rely on a 'naturalization frame' when inter-preting racial segregation and isolation,
failing to see it as a problem or something that whites have control over (2006: 111-16). And yet, while whites
may profess to be powerless, they do act in) ways to protect white privilege. Scholars have demonstrated the numerous
'conscious and deliber-ate' actions that have institutionalized white group identity in the United States to create a 'posses-sive investment in
whiteness' (Lipsitz, 1995). These efforts have included policies sanctioned by the state, but also involve
cultural stories. Stories of powerlessness and white valor allow whites to not implicate themselves in
a system of racial inequality and still maintain white privilege (Wellman, 1993). We assert that nostalgia
narratives are similar efforts and represent 'culturally sanctioned' responses that 'defend the advantages
that whites gain from the presence of blacks in America' (Wellman, 1993: 29). In this sense, racism does not dwell in the
psychological (i.e. preju-dice), but is best described as defense of racial privilege. For residents of the Chicago's
Southwest and West sides, racial change resulted in an 'involun-tary disruption of place attachment' (Milligan,
2003: 385). This experience of loss is a form of displacement and given their age at the time, remained a formative experience.
Related to this displacement are the changes rendered by the Civil Rights movement, leaving whites with a
differ-ent context in which to understand race and racial identity. As we shall see, through nostalgia nar-
ratives and race talk, whites construct, maintain, and repair a positive white racial identity by calling
on color-blind discourse. Recalling racial change through a nostalgic lens and calling on color-blind
language, whites make claims of being victims of overwhelming circumstances (state-based changes) or
'others' (unruly blacks), rarely able to see other alternatives (e.g. integration). In the process, nostalgia narratives of
the old neighborhood prove a useful culturally sanctioned strat-egy to regain white ownership and provide a
common sense understanding of the way to achieve a good life and validate a social hierarchy of
white as good and justifiably dominant.
Race is a social construction that needs to be analyzed in order to understand the
ways identities are shaped
Maly et al 12 (Michael Maly, Heather Dalmage and Nancy Michaels, associate professor at Roosevelt University with a PhD in
sociology, professor of sociology at Roosevelt University with a PhD in Sociology, Program Coordinator The Mansfield Institute for Social Justica
&Transformation & Grad Student at Roosevelt University, 11 September 2012, Critical Sociology Sage Journals 2013 issue 39: 757, The End of
an Idyllic World: Nostalgia Narratives, Race, and the Construction of White Powerlessness,
http://crs.sagepub.com/content/39/5/757.full.pdf+html)
Finally, it is important to review the assumptions we are making in regard to the concepts of race and racial identity. While popular discourse
still maintains strands of biological race, since the late 1800s with anthropologists such as Franz Boas and later at the end of the Eugenics
Movement (post-World War II), race scholars have made a strong case that race is a social construction, alter-
natively called a 'cultural construction' (see, for instance, Smedley and Smedley, 2011). In the late 20th century, debates raged
in the academy about how scholars can walk that fine line between `race as an illusion' and 'race and objective
reality'. A few US scholars still demand that we stop using race terms so as to not reproduce racial categories (see, for instance, Webster,
1993) and now, in South Africa, with the introduction of democracy and a white minority (both numeric and politi-cally), some race scholars are
calling for the end of the use of race and racism (see Durrheim, 2011; Alexander, 2001). We take the position that race is a
social construction and like all social construc-tions is embedded in the day-to-day workings of society
and interactions. It does not exist in our biology (thus it is an illusion) and yet, it exists in the objective realities of
society (social institu-tions, wealth, housing, education, etc.) (see Duster, 2001). Our analysis is situated precisely at this nexus of race as
illusion (social construction through discourse and action) and race as objective reality (housing market, etc.). As such, we are able to
examine how social structures and social relations shape and are shaped by racializcd identities. Racial
identities are shaped in the context of human interaction, and human interaction happens in an ever-
shifting racialized context. By focusing on nostalgia narratives we are able to analyze the subtle and
obvious ways identities shape and are shaped by social relations.
Capitalism supports the idyllic worlds of white privilege by feeding their fear of the
Other
Maly et al 12 (Michael Maly, Heather Dalmage and Nancy Michaels, associate professor at Roosevelt University with a PhD in
sociology, professor of sociology at Roosevelt University with a PhD in Sociology, Program Coordinator The Mansfield Institute for Social Justica
&Transformation & Grad Student at Roosevelt University, 11 September 2012, Critical Sociology Sage Journals 2013 issue 39: 757, The End of
an Idyllic World: Nostalgia Narratives, Race, and the Construction of White Powerlessness,
http://crs.sagepub.com/content/39/5/757.full.pdf+html)
Woven into the narrative is a disjointed recognition of the institutions that supported their idyllic
worlds prior to the change. The narrative contains detailed stories of the various external forces in place undermining the
community. Previously city services, such as police, street and sanitation workers, parks clean-up, and construction of municipal buildings
such as libraries had been deliv-ered in a timely and efficient manner.' In the nostalgia narrative, integration and the
withdrawal of institutional support happened simultaneously. Prior to this time, institutions, including
business, police, and politics worked to support segregated white neighborhoods. By the time the 1968 Fair
Housing Act passed, whites understood that the government or businesses would no longer protect their neighborhoods; rather their
communities would be viewed as sites for predatory real estate practices. These predatory practices thrived in the context
of white fear of racial integration. Prior to racial change, whites in these neighborhoods viewed racial segregation as the natural
order of things and expected that institutions could be expected to maintain racial boundaries. By the late 1960s, whites began to see that
these institutions were no longer working to maintain racial boundaries in the city neighborhoods. The concerns of their parents became
centered on property values, a particularly important issue given their class location. Frank, a long time resident on the West Side, describes the
scene: We had the one real estate guy, he'd come, he'd knocked on the door, now my grandmother lived next door, and he told us, 'I hate to be
a burden or bring bad news, but you know the woman next door just sold to blacks. My mom was looking, he didn't know that was our
grandmother, and she said, really? You know, and then it started from there. It was a company ... that did a lot of block busting. They did a
lot of panic selling. And people started departing, you know, people started moving ... but at that time too, our houses were
in it for a long time. This was their [my parents] neighborhood. They got married in the neighborhood. Their [wedding] reception was in the
neighborhood. And as the blacks are buying ... property values declining, people were frightened, they were scared
... and the neighborhood went fast when it went. Various institutional actors, with realtors prominently figured, are viewed as
instigators that used the problem of race to make money and drive whites from their idyllic worlds.
Notably, these actors were often white. Jimmy, from the West Side, recalls: Our parents were influenced by people who had
other motives ... the business motive. Yeah ... we want you to move out of here and sell your property. And their intent was only to
make a buck on the transaction and they could give a shit about the fact that they were disrupting the community that we lived in.
Color-blind discourse allows for white privilege identities to be formed and maintain
racial boundries
Maly et al 12 (Michael Maly, Heather Dalmage and Nancy Michaels, associate professor at Roosevelt University with a PhD in
sociology, professor of sociology at Roosevelt University with a PhD in Sociology, Program Coordinator The Mansfield Institute for Social Justica
&Transformation & Grad Student at Roosevelt University, 11 September 2012, Critical Sociology Sage Journals 2013 issue 39: 757, The End of
an Idyllic World: Nostalgia Narratives, Race, and the Construction of White Powerlessness,
http://crs.sagepub.com/content/39/5/757.full.pdf+html)
Collective memories and collective forgetting at the intersection of racialized experiences are part of
the process of maintaining boundaries around racialized communities (Hooker, 2009). The maintaining of
boundaries is of central importance to the value of whiteness itself. That is to say, as long as whiteness holds value
tied to housing, education, and income (Lipsitz, 1995), whites have reasons to work to maintain the boundaries of
whiteness. Whites involve themselves in such boundary work because they benefit from an unjust
system that continues to reward whiteness as `property', that is, a system in which white racial
identities are inextricably tied to property owner-ship (Harris, 1993). The investment in whiteness is so strong, in fact,
that contemporary research in places such as South Africa, where whiteness no longer provides the kinds of returns it did under Apartheid,
shows that whites are willing to leave their country in search of returns on their whiteness in White dominated countries (Dolby, 2001; Griffiths
and Prozesky, 2010; Steyn, 2001). In both the US and South Africa, color-blind discourses give whites a means to claim
themselves as individuals, freed from racial legacies that continue to privilege their lives (Dalmage, 2004; Dolby, 2001; Lipsitz, 1995;
Steyn, 2001). Moving fonvard, it is important to build on these studies by examining how whites maintain
racial boundaries in other spaces and places in an era of color-blindness. In other words, as the settings shift what
other strategies might whites employ? Also, it will be important to develop an understanding of how we can
challenge contemporary collective memory constructions that (re)produce hegemony across various
communities of difference.

Color-line discourse leads to racial humiliation and the social construction of race
Farley 97 (Anthony Paul Farley, Prof. Farley specializes in Constitutional Law, Criminal Procedure and Legal Theory,
The Black Body as a Fetish object, Organ Law Review Journal, Vol. 76 1997, pg. 469-471)
In other contexts involving power and its uses, we have grown to understand the psychological impact of denial 35
For example, consider the following narrative of child sexual abuse: As time goes on he doesn't even bother to stroke or hold or touch me. I'm
not even there. But each time before he leaves, he leans down, his nose brushing against my ear, and whispers, "Just remember, Honey,
nothing happened." And being eager to please, I remember perfectly..36 This aggression against the victim's memories
and perceptions is part of the pleasure of abuse and bears strong resemblance to the dissembling and
the incitements to dissemble one finds in color-lined discussions. Race seems permanent because we
fail to re-member that its perpetrators enjoy it and that masking their enjoyment only enhances it.
Seducing one's victim into an after-the-fact complicity, making one's victims "remember perfectly," is not simply .a masking
technique, it is the central pleasure of race. Denial of someone else's pain is a form of torture in itself.
As a form of torture, it has destructive Consequences: If you take someone's thoughts and feelings away, bit by bit,
consistently, then they have nothing left, except some gritty, gnavviiig, shitty little instinct, down
there, somewhere, worm-ing round the gut, brit so far down; so hidden, it's imposSible to fuid. Imagine,
if you will, a worldwide conspiracy to deny the existence of the color yellow. And whenever you saw yel-low, they told you, no, that isn't yellow,
what the fuck's yel-loW? Eventually, whenever you saw yellow, you would say: that isn't yellow, course it isn't, blue or green or purple, or ...
You'd say it, yes it is; it's yellow, and become increasingly hys-terical, and then go quite. berserk 37 Imagine that it is your pain
which is denied by the world around you: The denial of that pain is an even greater humiliation than
the original injury.' When racial humiliation was explicitly writ ten into the fabric of our laws and our
lives, it was denied as humiliation. When the same racist thread is woven into the tap-estry of
American law and culture, some say in a more subtle pattern, it is similarly denied as humiliation.
Denial enhances the pleasure. In The Body in Pain, Elaine Scarry describes the structure of torture as
the conversion of real pain into the fiction of power. Although she writes of physical torture, her words also describe the
phenomenon of racial humiliation: The physical pain is so incontestably real that it seems to con-fer its quality of 'incontestable reality' on that
power that has brought it into being. It is, of course, precisely because the reality of that poWer is so highly
contestable, the regime so . unstable, that torture is being used.4 The torturer expands his world by
demonstrating, through pain, his victim's abSence of a world: "What by the one is experienced as a continual
contraction is for the other a continual expansion, for the torturer's growing sense of self is carried outward on the prisoner's swelling pain."41
The victim's world shrinks, under torture; to the vicinity of his own body. Scarry continues, "Mt is by the obseSsive mediation of agency that the
prisoner's pain will be perverted into the fraudulent assertion of power, that the ob-jectified pain is denied as pain and read as power."' In
regimes governed by the colorline, it is the objectified pain of those la-beled "black" which is denied
as pain and experienced as power. This newer ves reality to imaginary colorlines, thus imbuing those on either side with
whatever essential qualities are in season. Because torture "aspires to the totality of pain," we see that "the
torturers, like pain itself; continually multiply their re-sources and means of access until the room and
everything in it becomes a giant externalized map of the prisoner's feelings."' The "room," in the
case.of the colorline, is the world. The "tor-ture" is racial humiliation. The "externalized map" is the
social construction of the form of pleasure we have come to know as "race." This disaggregation of black and
white bodies, this social construction .of race, is experienced as pleasure by the latter and humiliation by the former.
Race is rape and of form of oppression that is created by ideology
Farley 97 (Anthony Paul Farley, Prof. Farley specializes in Constitutional Law, Criminal Procedure and Legal Theory,
The Black Body as a Fetish object, Organ Law Review Journal, Vol. 76 1997, pg. 469-471)
Race and rape are similar performances in that the pleasure of power that race-brings its perpetrators
is comparable to the plea-sure of power that rape brings its perpetrators. Indeed, both pleasures work a
similar pain into the identities of their victims. Rape, a crime of humiliation, often covers its tracks by reclescrib-ing itself as
seduction. The rapist seeks resistance. For it is only against resistance that the rapist can experience the pleasure-in-humiliating he seeks The
rapist, therefore, seeks to harm his victim in order to take pleasure in the thwarting of her resistance. That is, the rap-ist'S pleasure cannot be
separated from the harni he wishes to impose upon his victim. The victim's body is not the target of the rapist's attack. The victim's body is the
screen through which the rapist strikes at her soul, the source of her resistance. The soul, in rape, appears as
the theme, or identity, which one has selected for one's. body. The rapist seeks to impose his meanings on her
body.44 The re-characterization of rape as seduction is also a form of rape-plea-sure, occuring as it does in the face of the victim's resistance.
The rapist experiences the same pleasure during the struggle over the rape as in the struggle over the meaning of the rape, for in both cases he
struggles to impose his theme upon his victim's body. In Strangedays, a film set in a dystopic Los Angeles gone mad with police illegalities, this
concept of denial is played out more fully.' Drugs are pass in the braver, newer world of Strangedays because science has made it possible to
record inner experiences. Thus, everyone is able to relive her most personal moments, or those of others, at will. The "wiretrip" technology of
1999 A.D. makes it possible to record our memories or the inner experiences of other people without distortions of memory or perspective.
Pushers, like Lenny Nero (Ralph Fiennes), deal in "playback," recorded inner experiences, rather than pharmaceuticals. The future is a world of
glass. In a pivotal moment of Strangedays, a rapist sexually mutilates a young woman while recording his inner experience of the crime. As he
records his rape-pleasure experience, he "jacks her into his own output," that is, he simultaneously records and transmits his experience to his
blindfolded victim via the wiretrip apparatus. Thus, his victim, as she is being sexually mutilated, is brought to a full consciousness of just, how
much her feelings of pain and horror are enjoyed by her assailant. She sees her ruined flesh through his eyes. Moreover, she experiences his
rape-plea-sure as her own. This increases her fear and loathing; which, in turn, heightens his pleasure. This cinematic moment
represents the full experience of oppressionthe substitution of the oppres-sor's gaze for your own. In
Strangedays the rapist-oppressor sub-stitutes his story for his victim's story through technology In the real world this substitution
is completed through ideology.
The discourse of race is a discourse of pleasure-humiliation and the denial of it is
reaffirms the pleasure of humiliating the other and is accomplished through ideology
Farley 97 (Anthony Paul Farley, Prof. Farley specializes in Constitutional Law, Criminal Procedure and Legal Theory,
The Black Body as a Fetish object, Organ Law Review Journal, Vol. 76 1997, pg. 469-471)
This production of knowledge concerning the black body is a process by which whites exorcise their own
demons, and is, there-fore', a pleasure in itself. If the black body is the site and cite of all ills, then the
white body is not. The black body is the result of this convergence of power, knowledge, and pleasure.
The dis-course of race, then, is itself a discourse of pleasure-humiliation. In talking about race, we
make ourselves white and blacka process which produces pleasure for the former through the hu-
miliation of the latter. Race is not a matter of "difference;" it is a matter of power. There is no "race"
Without the colorline. The ideology of "differ-ence" functions as denial in our culture by masking, on
the ground of nature, the sadomasochistic relationship between whites and blacks. The discourse of
"racial difference" is not solely a way Of representing the social as the natural, it is also a pleasure-in-
itself. It is a way of transforming desire into dis course. Just as the invective "Look, a Negro!" produces
race-pleasure, so does the entire discourse of "race" produce race-pleasure by treating a social
conflict as a natural object; Just as the rapist enjoys his victim when he humiliates her through rape, so
too does he enjoy his victim when he humiliateS her by calling it seduction. Whiteness is a form of rape
which perpetually redescribes itself as seduction. Whites and fellow-travelers enjoy their victims in the
same way when they humiliate them through the act of racial labeling as when they humiliate them
through the discourse of racial catego-rization.' There is no "race;" there is but race which humiliates
and race which is humiliatedfift There is pleasure in humiliating the Other through race just as there.
is pleasure in denying that is what one has done. This denial is accomplished by engaging in a
discourse Which naturalizes the social. Finally, there is a pleasure in imposing your theme not just on
the body but on the soul of the Other. This last pleasure, the pleasure of re-characterizing rape as
seduction, or race as natural, is accomplished through ideology.

Capitalism and feminism cant solve racism
Farley 97 (Anthony Paul Farley, Prof. Farley specializes in Constitutional Law, Criminal Procedure and Legal Theory,
The Black Body as a Fetish object, Organ Law Review Journal, Vol. 76 1997, pg. 469-471)
Race is not reducible to economics or politics. Indeed, it is akin to sexuality: When taxicab drivers, a
store owners, bankers, farmers, Christian ministers, doctors politicians, patients in mental hospitals and
their attendants,. writers,: university presidents, union members and mill owners, garbage collectors
and Rotarians; rich and poor, men and women; unite in common worship and common fear of one
idea we know it has come to hold deep and secret Meanings for each of them, as different. as are the
people themselves. We know. it has woven itself around fantasies at levels !difficult for the mind to
touch, until it is a part of each man's internal defense system, embedded like steel in, his psychic
fortification&. And, like-the little dirty rag or doll that an unhappy child sleeps with, it has acquired .
inflated values that extend far beyond the rational concerns of economics and government, or the
obvious profits and losses accruing from the white-supremacy system, into childhood memories long
repressed.
Colorline thinking leads to dehumanization of the Other
Farley 97 (Anthony Paul Farley, Prof. Farley specializes in Constitutional Law, Criminal Procedure and Legal Theory,
The Black Body as a Fetish object, Organ Law Review Journal, Vol. 76 1997, pg. 469-471)
Edmund White, writing in a different context, captured a no-tion which can be applied to life governed
by the colorline: "Peo-ple were bodies, I thought; the only valuable people have beautiful bodies; since
my body isn't beautiful, I'm worthless. That was the humble feed I pecked at night and day."97 Black is
not beautiful in a world governed by the colorline.98 No bodying is a sensual experience that envelops
everything. It does not limit itself to the body. It cannot, for the body is the lens through which :we
encounter the world: "More than symbol, more than the bread and wine of Christ, the body is a
knowing connection, it is the telling thing, the medium of experience, ex-pression, being, and
knowing."99 People, neighborhoods, jobs, schools, style, language, religion, and art are all viewed and
sen-sualized through the coloring lens of the racialized body. The entire world of the social is submitted
to the libidinal economy of the colorline. The racialized body is a eulogized space, it is given a poetic
significance by the colorline. But the body is not the only eulogized space. Its poetry spills out upon the
universe it both creates and inhabits.








Aff Answers

Colonialism helps the economy, fosters long-term development
Easterly and Levine 12 (William Easterly BA from Bowling Green State University in 1979 and his
Ph.D. in Economics from MIT in 1985, Ross Levine; June 2012, THE EUROPEAN ORIGINS OF ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT, http://www.nber.org/papers/w18162)
The results are consistent with the view that the proportion of Europeans during the early stages of colonization
exerted an enduring, positive impact on economic development . These findings hold when (1) restricting the
sample to non-settler colonies, (2) conditioning on the current proportion of the population of European descent, and (3) using instrumental
variables to extract the exogenous component of Euro share. These results relate to theories of the origins of the divergent paths of
economic development followed since Europeans colonization. Engerman and Sokoloff (ES) (1997) emphasize that agricultural,
mineral, the size and robustness of the indigenous population, and other endowments encountered
by Europeans affected the formation of institutions, including political institutions, with long-run
effects on economic development . ES emphasize that the degree of European settlement reflects these
endowments , but Europeans per se are not a causal, independent explanation of the divergent paths of economic development since
colonization. In the findings presented above, however, the proportion of Europeans during the early colonial period had a lasting effect
beyond endowments and political institutions Europeans brought factors that fostered long-run economic
development . ES also suggested a negative effect of minority European settlement, but we find no evidence of this. We find the
positive effect of Europeans during colonization on economic development today becomes largernot smaller or negativewhen
examining only former colonies with a very few European settlers. Similarly, AJR stress that when endowments lead to the
formation of settler colonies, this produced more egalitarian, enduring political institutions that
fostered long-run economic development . We have shown nothing to contradict this view. But, it is not the full story. The
institutional measure does not robustly win a horse race with the European share of the population during the early stages of colonization.
Furthermore, our results are also not consistent with the Northian (1990) view that British institutions independently account for a large
proportion of comparative economic development. In contrast, a measure of education today does consistently win a horse race with
colonial European share. Although hardly definitive, the results are more consistent with the GLLS argument that Europeans
brought human capital and human capital creating institutions and the Galor and Weil (2000) and Galor, Moav,
and Vollrath (2008) emphasis on the role of human capital accumulation in explaining the divergence of
economies in the long-run. The previous literature was correct to focus on colonial settlement by Europeans as one of the pivotal
events in the history of economic development. We confirmed it in this paper by directly measuring this colonial European settlement for
the first time and showing it to have dramatic effects on outcomes today
Ecomanagerialism Module
Links
Neoliberalism= colonialism

Plans of environmental conservation and preservation result in neoliberal-colonial
exploitation of the local peoples and resources
Igoe & Brockington 7 (Jim Igoe, Department of Anthropology, University of Colorado At Denver / Dan
Brockington, Institute for Development Policy and Management, University of Manchester; Neoliberal
Conservation: A Brief Introduction; Conservation and Society Journal; 26 June 2009;
http://www.conservationandsociety.org/article.asp?issn=09724923;year=2007;volume=5;issue=4;spage=432;ep
age=449;aulast=Igoe)JFIII

In contrast to the rosy scenarios described by these broad-brushed assertions, the fine-grained case studies presented in
this issue reveal a world that is much messier than the neoliberal ideal suggests. Fortwangler's study shows
how state-sponsored protected areas have coincided with skyrocketing real estate costs in St. John, Virgin
Islands to the point where many local people can no longer afford to live there. Berlanga and Faust present a
case in which local people in Yucatan, Mexico worked to start a protected area only to see it taken away
by the federal government and its benefits appropriated by outside investors. Grandia's study introduces us to
Guatemalan peasants who have been displaced by commercial tree farms established to offset carbon
emissions. Ironically, the farms are destroying the biodiversity of the rainforests they replace. In her research
in Zanzibar, Levine found that 75 per cent of the people in Mnemba Village viewed a privately managed island that was
a protected area as a business venture that excluded them for the benefit of tourists. Meanwhile, in
mainland Tanzania, Igoe and Croucher studied the controversies surrounding a community-based wildlife management area,
which entailed (among other things) a group of elders being thrown into jail and a group of youth organising themselves to
attack a tourist camp (this never materialised). Finally, Bnscher and Dressler's work reveals Mozambiquan villagers being
displaced by the Greater Limpopo Transfrontier Park, while private companies in South Africa benefited from
business ventures 'under the guise of community-based natural resource management'. These types
of problems, which appear to be common place in international conservation, are consistently concealed by what
Bnscher and Dressler (this issue) refer to as a 'discursive blur'. They suggest this blur has a value of its own, as
ideas such as participation, sustainability, and win-win solutions are used by competing networks of
people to mobilise resources as efficiently and quickly as possible. In such a context, they continue, there is little
incentive to test these valuable but reified ideas against the complex realities of actual communities in
actual environments. Such ideas are also brought to life by the concentration of resources into showcase projects (Chambers
1983; Mosse 2004; Levine this issue). Increasingly, they are also represented in websites, which effectively associate the central
elements of neoliberal conservation without using a single related word. Accordingly, Grandia (this issue) describes a website
for the Meso-American Biological Corridor, which features an indigenous looking man's face, fading into
a forest landscape that fades into a seascape, cuts to some coffee beans, a toucan, and some ancient Mayan
Temples. Finally, these ideals are imposed onto actual landscapes, by managing them in ways that
highlight specific aesthetics and their leisurely aspects (West & Carrier 2004; Fortwangler this issue). Of course this
simultaneously renders these landscapes more marketable and valuable as touristic and consumptive
experiences. While these kinds of approaches may be effective in mobilising paradigmatic technical and administrative
interventions, the studies in this issue suggest that such interventions often have negative social, and sometimes
negative ecological, consequences. The critical literature on neoliberal conervation goes a long way in helping us to
understand why this might be so. Unfortunately, relevant studies are often inaccessible to many conservation practitioners,
especially those who are non-social scientists. In the remainder of this introduction, therefore, we seek to outline some of the
most salient features of neoliberal conservation. We illustrate these with specific examples of how they may manifest
themselves in specific local contexts. Our central motivation in doing this is to reinforce that the social side of conservation
should be as empirically driven as the ecological side. Accordingly, we believe that conservation with equity can only
be achieved by moving beyond the illusion of certainty presented by rigorously formulated
technocratic solutions. Doing so represents a crucial first step in effectively engaging with the
uncertainties, paradoxes and complex inequities of undertaking conservation in a rapidly
neoliberalising world.


Something for Cartographies: second section
http://www.conservationandsociety.org/temp/ConservatSoc54432-181018_003010.pdf

Colonialism link
Biological management efforts reinforce colonial domination and structural violence
against local peoples
Igoe & Brockington 7 (Jim Igoe, Department of Anthropology, University of Colorado At Denver / Dan
Brockington, Institute for Development Policy and Management, University of Manchester; Neoliberal
Conservation: A Brief Introduction; Conservation and Society Journal; 26 June 2009;
http://www.conservationandsociety.org/article.asp?issn=09724923;year=2007;volume=5;issue=4;spage=432;ep
age=449;aulast=Igoe)JFIII

Property rights qualify people with capital and/or collateral, allowing them to enter the global economy as investors,
producers, and consumers. Investments, however, carry no guarantee. In fact, the way in which property rights add
value to resources is by rendering them alienable (Mitchell 2007). It is possible, even probable, that people will lose their
capital due to limited opportunities on the bottom rungs of the investment ladder (Dove 1993; Li 2002).
Poor people are also more likely to consume capital due to the numer- ous emergencies in their lives.
Moreover, they have little capital and little experience of how to effectively invest it. The reregulation of resources,
even when ostensibly for their benefit, often works to their detriment. They often find themselves divested of
their property even when that property is putatively protected by law. For instance, Berlanga and Faust (this
issue) found that the more tourism spread through the Yucatn, the less competitive advantage local
people enjoyed in the tourist economy. This situation was reflected in increased sale of land to outside
investors. Likewise, Igoe and Croucher (this issue) documented a situation in which local people were being targeted
for conservation easements to leave their land open to wildlife. While these easements would increase the
value of the land to outside investors, they could not adequately compensate people who depended on
access to that land for their livelihoods. Bscher and Dressler (this issue) further found that assumptions that
rural people would be absorbed into the tourist industry facilitated and justified removing them from
landscapes that would become valuable to that industry (cf. McAfee 1999). As Levine (this issue) points out,
however, tourism is a fickle industry, one that is especially vulnerable to changes in the global economy and the impacts of
distant political events. For instance, in addition to its regular seasonal fluctuations, Zanzibars tourist industry experienced a
significant downturn following the attacks of 11 September 2001. In addition to these insecurities and inequities,
neoliberalised conservation often devalues local environmental knowledge and undermines local
environmental initiatives. As Fay (2007) discovered, this frequently occurs when local conservation initiatives are
unable to articulate effectively with interpretive communities and the resources they command. Levine (this issue)
documents a case in which a group of fishermen established a conservation committee, only to see their village passed by for
a conservation project because of its inconvenient location. Berlanga and Faust (this issue) worked with Maya villagers
who voluntarily placed their land inside a protected area, which was then taken out of their hands.
Igoe and Croucher (this issue) interviewed rural Tanzanians who thought they were making a conservation plan for their
village, only to have the plan appropriated to create a wildlife management area, from which many of them were evicted. Igoe
and Croucher were also scolded by a Tanzanian wildlife official who told them that they did not need to work with villagers.
He was the expert on these issues. If they wanted to know anything they should just come see him. Finally, Fortwangler (this
issue) quotes a St. Johnian employee of the United States National Parks Service, who told her: the problem with park
management is that they think locals dont understand or appreciate the environment. We do. We grew up here knowing
how to conserve. We had to conserve and be resourceful. What we do not appreciate is being disrespected. This
sentiment is exacerbated by technocratic approaches to conservation, which target perceived
deficiencies in the knowledge, skills and attitudes of local people. This approach can be intimidating, as
when rural Tanzanians found themselves at workshops conducted in a language that they did not
understand (English) and attended by high-ranking government officials and expatriate conservation
practitioners (Igoe & Croucher, this issue). In other cases, it is merely insulting, as when Friends of the Virgin Islands
National Park decided that local resentment to the park was happening because local people simply
did not understand or value the parks in the ways they should. Their strategy was to help local people
understand better through improved volunteer opportunities, dissemination of information, and outreach (Fortwangler, this
issue).



Democracy
Democracy inherently seeks to manage and conquer what is viewed as the irrational
environment
Byrne & Yun 99 (John Byrne, director and professor of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy,
University of Delaware / Sun-Jin Yun is a Ph.D. candidate and research associate at the Center for Energy and
Environmental Policy, University of Delaware; Efficient Global Warming: Contradictions in Liberal Democratic
Responses to Global Environmental Problems; Bulletin of Science Technology & Society; 1 December, 1999)JFIII

Beyond the expected opposition from at least some sectors of industry, there is a deep-rooted problem in the
type of democracy celebrated by liberal societies, especially with regard to relations with the natural
world. The foundational principles of contemporary liberal democracy were born in an era when emancipation
meant freedom from not only political tyranny but also natural constraint. Indeed, the salient question to
17th- through 19th-century architects of the new democratic society in thinking about nature was its
conquestthe transformation of a stingy nature to a productive contributor to the majestic aims of an egalitarian
society able to feed, clothe, and house all people. As Sheldon Wolin (1960) observes in his brilliant critique of the new
democracy, liberalism in the West sought to harness what it believed to be the liberating forces of science,
technology, markets, and democracy to defeat the old dynastic-feudal regimes and conquer the natural order.
Releasing humanity from the chains of the old political, economic, intellectual, and cultural hierarchies was seen as the
enterprise of science, technology, and market economy. But these forces were also to be directed to the
transformation of nature into a tool for use in building a future of not only liberty but also material happiness for
all. The liberating function of politics was to be situated, under liberalism, in the act of sweeping away all
resistance human and natural to the new ideas, values, and purposes of science, technology, and
market economy. From Locke (1698/1976) and Smith (1776/1915), to Condorcet (1793/1994), Saint-Simon (1802-
1813/1975), and Franklin (1725/1930), hope was sought in a political order that would free the new productive forces that
would actually make it possible to realize the long-promised egalitarian dream of democracy (in addition toWolin, 1960,
see also Kumar, 1978, 1995). This view led liberalism to conceive the productivity of science, technology, and economics as
the alter ego of equality: One could only be gained with the other. Environmental negotiationslike those of trade (General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade)have consistently been viewed by liberal democracies as the art of guiding the productive
forces of science, technology, and economics to achieve equitable (or, at least, reasonable) results. For an ideology that
understood the natural world as unreasonable and unproductive (see, especially, Merchants discussion in
her 1980 volume of the mechanistic turn in Western thinking about nature), the conquest of nature meant the
application of rational, productive thinking to the inspiring goal of material plenty for everyone. Thus, it cannot
be surprising that liberalism would be blind to the idea of sustainability when it means that the natural order should
somehow be consulted to set limits on social futures. Simply put, such thinking for liberalism would be irrational.
And ultimately, liberalism would anticipate that such a policy would halt progress toward equality.

(Some kind of embrace irrationality alt?)


OTEC (ish)
OTECs control over processes of nature epitomize total domination over the natural
world and clear the way for environmental domination and design
Byrne & Yun 99 (John Byrne, director and professor of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy,
University of Delaware / Sun-Jin Yun is a Ph.D. candidate and research associate at the Center for Energy and
Environmental Policy, University of Delaware; Efficient Global Warming: Contradictions in Liberal Democratic
Responses to Global Environmental Problems; Bulletin of Science Technology & Society; 1 December, 1999)JFIII

The current international discourse on climate change is leading the way in rendering natural
processes not simply resources found in natureas phenomena subject to global management. The
capture of core processes of the natural order, such as the carbon cycle, in the languages of scientific
and economic laws clears the way for policy regimes that intend to choose the state of nature wanted
by society, or at least its elites. The environment becomes an object for scientific and economic design.
This approach to the environment, as argued above, is enshrined in the ideology of liberal democracy. The political
ethos to manage environmental resources to ensure sustainable human progress and human
survival (World Commission on Environment and Development, 1987, p. 1) derives from the belief that science,
technology, and economics lift society from the constraint of nature, providing it with powers and rights over
natures design. Environmentalism is a form of managerialism in the era of liberal democracy. Technical and
organizational intelligence is concentrated on increasing the productivity of nature. As Sachs (1993) argues, modernity is
based on the exploitation of nature (human and physical) through the collaboration of dominant actors in government, the
economy, and the sciences. Indeed, as Mumford (1964) noted years ago, the agreement of these three institutional
elements on the direction and purposes of society has provided the very definition of what constitutes a democratic
consensus in the West since industrialization. Management of nature requires global economic,
bureaucratic, and technological organization. Elites who control capital, technologies, and
information are the only interests, practically speaking, who could aspire to the role of global manager.
As theorists of liberal democracy have consistently argued, elite power is not in itself inimical to democracy (see Bentley,
1949; Dahl, 1961;Walker, 1966). The issue is whether such power is accountable to a democratic consensus. When, in turn,
democratic consensus for political action is to be sought in a system of checks and balances among government, industry,
and science interests, the era of managed nature is surely upon us. Under an emergent regime of managed nature, the
global atmosphere is fast becoming, alternatively, an ecological laboratory and bank, cared for by
scientific experts and financial managers. The sustainability interest of liberal democracy in this era is to protect
environmental capital for future generations, not the regenerative capacities of the natural environment. This new form
of capital is to be managed in the public and scientific interest for future exploitation. In this specific
sense, liberal democracys interest is in the capitalization of nature, rather than its protection per se.

Generic
Nature must be turned into resources by discursive processes before it can be used
Luke 99 (Timothy, Executive Director of the Institute for Distance and Distributed Learning, the
Director of Graduate Studies in the Department of Political Science, and Co-Director of the Center for
Digital Discourse and Culture in the College of Arts and Sciences at Virginia Polytechnic., Book Eco-
Managerialism: Environmental Studies as a Power/Knowledge Formation., interview about
the book, 06/1999, http://aurora.icaap.org/index.php/aurora/article/view/79/91) Mana-T

Before scientific disciplines and industrial technologies turn its' matter and energy into products,
nature must be transformed by discursive processes into natural resources. Once nature is rendered
intelligible through such practices, it is used to legitimize many political projects. I think one site for
generating, accumulating, and circulating such knowledge about nature, as well as determining which human beings will be to society, is the
modern research university, where we sit. As a primary structure for credentialing individual learners and legitimating collective teaching,
universities help to construct our understanding of the natural world. Over the past generation, advanced study in environmental
sciences on many university campuses, especially in the United States, has become a key source of key
representations for the environment, as well as the home base of those scientific disciplines that generate analyses of nature's
meanings. These educational operations also produce eco-managerialists, or those professional technical
workers with specific knowledge as it has been scientifically or organizationally validated, and the
operational power as it is institutionally constructed in governments at various levels, to cope with
"environmental problems" on what are believed to be sound scientific and technical grounds. Professional
technical experts working on and off campus create disciplinary articulations of various knowledge to generate performative techniques of
power over, but also within and through, what is worked up as nature in the managerial structures of modern economies and societies.
These institutionalized attempts to capture and contain the forces of nature underpin the strategies of
eco-managerialism. Techno-scientific knowledge about the environment, however, is and always has
been evolving with changing interpretive fashions, shifting political agendas, developing scientific
advances. Such variations, as Foucault asserts designate a will to knowledge that is anonymous,
polymorphous, and susceptible to regular transformations, and determined by the play of identifiable
dependencies. What are some of these dependencies and perhaps some of these transformations? In this polymorphous
combination of anonymous scientific environmental knowledge, with organized market and state
power, as Foucault indicates, we find that it traverses and produces things. It needs to be considered as a
productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than a negative instance, whose function is repression. Schools of
environmental studies and colleges of natural resources often provide the networks in which the relations of this productive power set the
categories of knowledge and the limits of professional practice through the training of eco-managerialism. In accord with the prevailing regimes
of truth within science, academic centres of environmental studies reproduce these bodies of practice and types of discourse, which in turn the
executive personnel managing contemporary state and social institutions, what they regard as objective, valid, or useful, to facilitate economic
growth. From these discourses, one can define, as Foucault suggests, the way in which individuals or groups represent words to themselves,
utilize their forms and meanings, compose real discourse, reveal and conceal it in what they are thinking or saying, perhaps unknown to
themselves, more or less than they wish, but in any case leaving massive verbal traces of those thoughts which must be deciphered and
restored as far as possible in their representative vivacity. So given these tendencies, might we look at the workings of eco-managerialism?
Where life, labour, and language can join in a discourse of environmental studies, one finds another
formation of power knowledge which shows how man and his being can be concerned with the things
he knows, and know the things that in positivity determine his mode of being in highly vocalized
academic constructions of "the environment." Instead, the environment emerges in part as a historical
artifact of expert management that is constructed by these kinds of scientific interventions. And in this
network of interventions, there is a simulation of spaces and intensification of resources and incitement of discoveries, and a formation of
special knowledges that strengthen the control that can be linked to one another as the impericities of nature for academic environmental
sciences and studies. And probably in many ways, the key impericity here I would say, is the process of what I call the
resourcification of nature. How does nature get turned into resources? The new impericities behind
eco-managerialism more or less presumes that the role of nature is one of a rough and ready
resourcification for the global economy and national society. That is, the earth must be re-imagined to
be little more than a standing reserve, a resource supply centre, a waste reception site. Once
presented in this fashion, nature then provides human markets with many different environmental
sites for the productive use of resourcified flows of energy, information, and matter, as well as the
sinks, dumps, and wastelands for all of the by-products that commercial products leave behind.
Nature then is always a political asset. Still, its fungiblization, its liquidification, its capitalization, and
eco-managerialism cannot occur without the work of experts whose resourcifying activities prep it,
produce it, and then provide it in the global marketplace. The trick in natural resources or environmental
affairs education is to appear to be conservationist, while moving in fact, many times, very fast to
help fungiblize, liquefy, or capitalize natural resources for a more thorough, rapid, and perhaps
intensive utilization.

The modernist epistemology of the Aff assumes ecology as a passive entity
Bednarz 11 (Dan, philosopher and writer, author of articles on healthcare, ecology, As Healthcare
Fails, 5/12/11, http://www.resilience.org/stories/2011-05-12/health-care-fails-part-i-power-
knowledge-and-resistance) Mana-T
I now regard risk assessment as a form of question begging because it presumes that the status
quo, of the health sciences and the larger society, is sustainable. Most important, at a philosophical
level risk assessment stems from what Foucault terms the dominant Modernist episteme, which
assumes that humans possess agency, that is, they have the capacity to control the social world and
biosphere (Pickard 2010). Complementarily, this episteme assumes that Nature -non-human life
forms, the environment, ecosystems and the biosphere- is passive and under human control. This
simply means that humans are in charge of nature, either to protect it a la the National Parks and
environmental laws- or to exploit it no examples necessary. It follows that the resources of the
earth are meant to propel perpetual economic growth and technological progress. Peak oil, and
now the larger issues of social-ecological sustainability, undermines this anthropocentric version of
agency.

Contemporary governments view ecology through a neoliberal lense- root cause of
environmental destruction
Bednarz 13 (Dan, senior lecturer, philosopher, thinker, currently working on a book, Foucault, Power,
Truth and Ecology, 8/14/13, http://ecologicalsociology.blogspot.com/2013/08/foucault-power-truth-
and-ecology.html)Mana-T
Almost all contemporary governments are ignoring or misinterpreting economic contraction, resource
scarcities and biophysical crises and dilemmas by intensifying their servility to the neoliberal[xi]
model of society which operates in terms of debt-based economic growth; class exploitation; and ,
fundamentalist faith in The Market, where individuals are told theres no such thing as society
and, therefore, they are free to be entrepreneurs of *themselves]
[xii][xiii]
and are personally to
]. Those cognizant of ecological blame if they fail to climb an economic ladder of opportunity
[xiv
dilemmas realize this system cannot be resuscitated and is in fact beginning to break apart. They
realize that modern culture remains captive to the neoliberal[xv]political/economic/cultural paradigm
as it produces further ecological destruction, increasing socioeconomic inequality allegedly to revive
the economy, a side benefit is the spoils of class warfare- and proceeds with the temporarily
successful privatization of public goods and services, social control measures of secrecy in government
policy[xvi] making[xvii] and embracing embryonic[xviii] totalitarianism[xix] in the guise[xx] of
protecting[xxi] the homeland.
[xxii]
Simultaneously, neoliberal governments delude themselves
[xxiii]
and
propagandize their citizens that this corporatocracy
[xxiv]
is not just the best option, but also the only
feasible model of governance in the modern world. Since they believe the status quo offers the only
way forward, corporatocracy members regard themselves
[xxv]
as the select evolutionary elite
[xxvi]
to
manage
[xxvii]
21
st
century society.
[xxviii]
The opposite is the case;
[xxix]
and this will become manifest
the power of climate change, water scarcity, ocean acidification, even to them as, for example,
nuclear disaster[xxx], bee population die-off, peak oil (immediately and directly through its impact on
the economy and finance), etc. mounts and proceeds to undermine neoliberal shibboleths as well as
the neoliberal Masters of the Universe collective identity- about how the world works. Neoliberal
ideological hubris is built upon the modernist mythology that humans ability to fashion the social
world is infinite, the earths resources are essentially limitless and its biophysical systems are passive
and resilient vassals absorbing industrial societys wastes and toxins. This is a colossal conceit as the
further we go into overshoot and hit against resource limitations the more inept, desperate and
downright socially and ecologically destructive neoliberal policies become[
xxxi]
and the fewer options
modern culture has to reconcile its practices with ecological realities
Renewables
Renewables manage the environment as a self sustaining source
Luke 99 (Timothy, Executive Director of the Institute for Distance and Distributed Learning, the
Director of Graduate Studies in the Department of Political Science, and Co-Director of the Center for
Digital Discourse and Culture in the College of Arts and Sciences at Virginia Polytechnic., Book Eco-
Managerialism: Environmental Studies as a Power/Knowledge Formation., interview about the book, 06/1999,
http://aurora.icaap.org/index.php/aurora/article/view/79/91) Mana-T

Once you've got that "carrying capacity" then maybe you have to realize that environments can be
almost entirely destroyed. Which means that special efforts to rehabilitate them for continuing
productive use or restoring them to some idealized condition of pre-existing stability are not enough.
Older images of nature as a storehouse of goods that can be exhausted, and therefore one must manage their
exhaustion for maintaining the greatest good for the greatest number at the maximum duration, begin to drift towards other less static and
more dynamic images. For renewables management, nature becomes a more open-ended, self-renewing
source of benefits, which comes with the vision of nature as a vast cybernetic system. This brings the
engagement with renewability. The sustained yield metaphors of nature as a static depletable storehouse now shift towards a
dynamic, self-regulating system. Recognizing these responsibilities and then mastering their macro management for optimal performance, both
as the producers of raw material and conservers of systemic services, becomes the engagement of renewables managerialism. These
commitments have pushed the thoughts and actions of many people away from sustained yield and more toward sustainability in the overall
management of natural resources. Here the root commitment to resourcification has not been abandoned in
the renewables project. Instead, it simply has been re-specified to meet other long-range, larger scale
requirements. That is, sustained yield focuses on outputs, and views resource conditions as
constraints on maximum production. Sustainability, however, makes resource conditions the goal and
the pre-condition for meeting human needs over time. Outputs then are interest on resource capital.
Three integrated themes begin to emerge: a concern for the health of ecosystems, a preference for a landscape scale and decentralized
management, and a new kind of public participation that might integrate some civic discourse into decision making. These changes often are
positive. The resourcification - in outline and tone - does not break all of its' links with meeting output
goals, but still this is an interesting development. Renewables managerialism moves towards
monitoring the level of outputs, the rate of meeting the goals, and the scale of sustainable use. In many
ways, it transforms sustainability into another style of sustained yield, so that the evolution from the original vision of sustained yield into
today's notion of sustainability is a "win-win situation," both for economic and ecological interests. Renewables management only departs
perhaps modestly from the original credo of sustained yield as it was spun up in the early 20th century. Nonetheless, there are some
enlightened qualities of eco-managerialism, yet it is not a radical revolutionary reinvention of everything. Instead, what one then often sees is
risk managerialism in the eco-managerial project.
Ocean
The Ocean is viewed as a resource to exploit as technology advances
Van Tilberg 04( Hans, , Book report on Steinbergs The social construction of the ocean , 03/04,
http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/journal_of_world_history/v015/15.1tilburg.pdf) Mana-T

Steinberg the geographer focuses on the uses and conceptions of space. In categorizing the sea he
shows how ocean space serves multi- ple functions, such as a resource area, a transportation surface,
a bat- tleground, buffer zones or force elds, and even as a Foucaultian heterotopia, a space for
the creation of experimentation and alter- nate social models. The most immediate and obvious
dichotomy stems from the fact that most of the worlds oceans lie outside of nations and Book Reviews
89 national histories. Steinberg attempts to go beyond what he terms the with more than simply the
elucida- tion of maritime space. It explores the limitations of the nation-state model by setting out on
the high seas. Maritime history and literature is the natural area for this exploration. But is there a
historiography of ocean space? In America, this is a eld relegated almost entirely out of the
universities and into the naval and merchant marine academies. Steinberg points out the ways the
ocean has been left out of his- torical discourse, hidden behind perspectives that attempt to render
ocean space as a smooth, frictionless void, the perfect transportation surface. Representations of the
sea as a wild space, a mystery, an uncon- querable force of nature, all play into this idealization. Law of
the Sea (UNCLOS). These are conicts of differing social constructions of ocean space.
Climate change= securitization
Attempts to preempt the threat of global warming feed into securitizing logic
Dibley & Neilson 10 (Ben Dibley, research associate at the Institute for Culture and Society, Doctor of
Philosophy, Australian National University/ Brett Neilson, PhD, 1994, English, Yale University, USA ,MA, MPhil,
1990, English, Yale University, USA; Climate Crisis and the Actuarial Imaginary: the War On Global Warming;
2010; This essay is an output from the Australian Research Council funded Linkage project; http://www.unigaia-
brasil.org/pdfs/mudancasClimaticas/Climate_Crisis_And_The_Actuarial-libre.pdf)JFIII

secondly, however, to take seriously the claims of the necessity of a mobilisation as if for war requires the acknowledgement
that the complexity of social relations identified in the processes of financialisation is not something to be excised as the
excess of global modernity but rather as integral to it.63 the question that looms then is what does the war footing targeting
climate change entail given that it is a war to be fought in the age of financialisation? in this context, it is not the model of the
war economy of the 1940s, but that of terror that is most suggestive. indeed, this is already identified as so in as much as the
recommended logic for the execution of the war on global warming is the logic of pre-emption that undergirds the long
War. in 2003 the Pentagons Office of net assessment argued climate change should be elevated beyond a scientific debate
to a us national security concern64 and lent its weight to a chorus of international risk assessments that intoned global
warming was a greater threat than terrorism.65 even, perhaps, finding an unlikely ally in greenpeace, who stated: if you
were willing to launch a pre-emptive war on enemies wouldnt it seem prudent to take pre-emptive action against climate
change?66 this proposition was given full voice in the foreign policy journal, New Perspectives Quarterly, which
argued: rather than wait until it is too late - when floods, droughts, rising sea levels, melted glaciers and new diseases
abound - why not take the wise course and preempt that possibility by acting now like military
preemption in the war on terror, the responsible thing to do is try to prevent the worst from
happening even if all the evidence is not in.67 it is this logic, then, that comes to inform the risk management
strategies of security and securitisation mobilised in the war on global warming. in the shift to this new
context preemptive strategies operate with inherent uncertainty with regard to the effects and
consequences of climate change and also in the recognition of its dire potentiality. the response is not only to
imagine the unthinkable68 but to actively pre-empt the emerging catastrophe in strategies of mitigation
and adaptation.69 in the Pentagon report, for instance, the art of the pre-emptive strike is advanced in the advocacy of
geo-engineering options for intervening in the earths biosphere.70 similarly, pre-emption is also the logic of
strategies underwriting climate security. here, environmental threats, in being translated into present financial risk,
bring the future into the present as an opportunity for profit. in their speculative and biotechnological strategies of pre-
emption,71 these responses to climate threats exceed the calculus and the techniques of prediction and
prevention, in as much as the latter assumes an objectively knowable world where uncertainty is a lack of information.
rather, in imagining the unthinkable in the form of future scenarios, worst case narratives and disaster rehearsals, pre-emptive
strategies are also exercises in premediation: that is, mediations of resonating fiction*s+ of a disastrous future about to
unfold.72 richard grusin has argued that premediation is the cultural logic of pre-emption.73 this logic insists that the
future be mediated before it happens so to preclude the possibility and trauma of an unmediated
future, an unmediated real.74 Premediations in the form of multiple unfoldings of ecological potentialities no doubt come
to undergird the affective economy of protection and profit. What the actuarial imaginary of the war on global warming effects
is not only the prevention of the trauma of the unmediated future, but of the trauma of a future that does not have its
resolution in protection and profit.


Climate Change
The Affirmative attempts to take an intentional attitude, they say We want to stop
ecological Armageddon. This attitude however, doesnt take into account the
functional attitude, the realization that actions have unintended results. The plans
utopia vision doesnt account for the functional result of eco-fascism, but instead
reinforces University Discourse and intentional attitudes.
Bryant, Levi. 13 (Professor of Philosophy at Collin College. He is a modern philosopher who is
the author of Difference and Givenness: Deleuzes Transcendental Empiricism and the Ontology of
Immanence, co-editor of the forthcoming The Speculative Turn with Nick Srnicek and Graham Harman,
and author of a number of articles on Deleuze, Badiou, Zizek, Lacan, and political theory) September 18t
2013. The Intentional Stance and the Functional Stance
http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2013/09/18/the-intentional-stance-and-the-functional-stance/
Do we need to believe in anthropogenic climate change? I pose this question, of course, to be
provocative as I do think its useful to believe in things like anthropogenic climate change. However,
the point of posing the question is to draw attention to how a lot of us academics think and what
intellectual movements such as actor-network theory and the new materialisms and realisms might
bring to the table at the level of political strategy. A lot of us seem to think that our political work
consists in persuading others to believe certain things. People must be persuaded to believe that
neoliberal economic philosophy pervades all aspects of contemporary life (true). People must be
persuaded to believe that current climate change is caused by human activity (true). Etc., etc., etc. The
idea seems to be that if people have the right theory about the world or the correct set of
propositional attitudes, then theyll modify their action accordingly and do the right thing. Lets call
this the intentional attitude. The premise of the intentional attitude or intentionalism is that since
action is based on belief or propositional attitudes, persuasion is a key component of political activism.
The intentional attitude can be contrasted with the functional attitude. The functional attitude doesnt
deny that people have intentions and that these intentions play a significant role in why they do what
they do, but it notes that functionally much of what our action produces has very little to do with
what we intend in our action. For example, as I write this post I intend to persuade and convey certain
ideas; however, functionally I am also contributing to the reproduction of the English language (and am
probably making it worse!). When I go to the supermarket to get food for dinner I do so because I intend
to feed myself, but I am also contributing to the reproduction of agrocapitalism. A lot of work in
Continental political thought is undertaken for the sake of various emancipatory projects (intentional
stance), but because it ends up accessible only to other expert level academics it functionally just
reproduces university discourse, the tenure system, and contributes to the publication of new journal
issues. In Latours famous example, we slow down for the cement speed bump not because of any
particular belief we have about speed laws, but because of how the speed bump functions. Things that
happen at the level of functionality are independent of beliefs and intentions, but contribute to why
we act as we do all the same.
Nature must be turned into resources by discursive processes before it can be used
Luke 99 (Timothy, Executive Director of the Institute for Distance and Distributed Learning, the
Director of Graduate Studies in the Department of Political Science, and Co-Director of the Center for
Digital Discourse and Culture in the College of Arts and Sciences at Virginia Polytechnic., Book Eco-
Managerialism: Environmental Studies as a Power/Knowledge Formation., interview about the book, 06/1999,
http://aurora.icaap.org/index.php/aurora/article/view/79/91) Mana-T

Before scientific disciplines and industrial technologies turn its' matter and energy into products,
nature must be transformed by discursive processes into natural resources. Once nature is rendered
intelligible through such practices, it is used to legitimize many political projects. I think one site for
generating, accumulating, and circulating such knowledge about nature, as well as determining which human beings will be to society, is the
modern research university, where we sit. As a primary structure for credentialing individual learners and legitimating collective teaching,
universities help to construct our understanding of the natural world. Over the past generation, advanced study in environmental
sciences on many university campuses, especially in the United States, has become a key source of key
representations for the environment, as well as the home base of those scientific disciplines that generate analyses of nature's
meanings. These educational operations also produce eco-managerialists, or those professional technical
workers with specific knowledge as it has been scientifically or organizationally validated, and the
operational power as it is institutionally constructed in governments at various levels, to cope with
"environmental problems" on what are believed to be sound scientific and technical grounds. Professional
technical experts working on and off campus create disciplinary articulations of various knowledge to generate performative techniques of
power over, but also within and through, what is worked up as nature in the managerial structures of modern economies and societies.
These institutionalized attempts to capture and contain the forces of nature underpin the strategies of
eco-managerialism. Techno-scientific knowledge about the environment, however, is and always has
been evolving with changing interpretive fashions, shifting political agendas, developing scientific
advances. Such variations, as Foucault asserts designate a will to knowledge that is anonymous,
polymorphous, and susceptible to regular transformations, and determined by the play of identifiable
dependencies. What are some of these dependencies and perhaps some of these transformations? In this polymorphous
combination of anonymous scientific environmental knowledge, with organized market and state
power, as Foucault indicates, we find that it traverses and produces things. It needs to be considered as a
productive network which runs through the whole social body, much more than a negative instance, whose function is repression. Schools of
environmental studies and colleges of natural resources often provide the networks in which the relations of this productive power set the
categories of knowledge and the limits of professional practice through the training of eco-managerialism. In accord with the prevailing regimes
of truth within science, academic centres of environmental studies reproduce these bodies of practice and types of discourse, which in turn the
executive personnel managing contemporary state and social institutions, what they regard as objective, valid, or useful, to facilitate economic
growth. From these discourses, one can define, as Foucault suggests, the way in which individuals or groups represent words to themselves,
utilize their forms and meanings, compose real discourse, reveal and conceal it in what they are thinking or saying, perhaps unknown to
themselves, more or less than they wish, but in any case leaving massive verbal traces of those thoughts which must be deciphered and
restored as far as possible in their representative vivacity. So given these tendencies, might we look at the workings of eco-managerialism?
Where life, labour, and language can join in a discourse of environmental studies, one finds another
formation of power knowledge which shows how man and his being can be concerned with the things
he knows, and know the things that in positivity determine his mode of being in highly vocalized
academic constructions of "the environment." Instead, the environment emerges in part as a historical
artifact of expert management that is constructed by these kinds of scientific interventions. And in this
network of interventions, there is a simulation of spaces and intensification of resources and incitement of discoveries, and a formation of
special knowledges that strengthen the control that can be linked to one another as the impericities of nature for academic environmental
sciences and studies. And probably in many ways, the key impericity here I would say, is the process of what I call the
resourcification of nature. How does nature get turned into resources? The new impericities behind
eco-managerialism more or less presumes that the role of nature is one of a rough and ready
resourcification for the global economy and national society. That is, the earth must be re-imagined to
be little more than a standing reserve, a resource supply centre, a waste reception site. Once
presented in this fashion, nature then provides human markets with many different environmental
sites for the productive use of resourcified flows of energy, information, and matter, as well as the
sinks, dumps, and wastelands for all of the by-products that commercial products leave behind.
Nature then is always a political asset. Still, its fungiblization, its liquidification, its capitalization, and
eco-managerialism cannot occur without the work of experts whose resourcifying activities prep it,
produce it, and then provide it in the global marketplace. The trick in natural resources or environmental
affairs education is to appear to be conservationist, while moving in fact, many times, very fast to
help fungiblize, liquefy, or capitalize natural resources for a more thorough, rapid, and perhaps
intensive utilization.
The affs impacts, framing and management of the climate change crisis justifies and
obscures the biopolitical securitization of their representations
Dibley & Neilson 10 (Ben Dibley, research associate at the Institute for Culture and Society, Doctor of
Philosophy, Australian National University/ Brett Neilson, PhD, 1994, English, Yale University, USA ,MA, MPhil,
1990, English, Yale University, USA; Climate Crisis and the Actuarial Imaginary: the War On Global Warming;
2010; This essay is an output from the Australian Research Council funded Linkage project; http://www.unigaia-
brasil.org/pdfs/mudancasClimaticas/Climate_Crisis_And_The_Actuarial-libre.pdf)JFIII

recently lauren berlant has proposed the notion of the actuarial imaginary.15 We turn to her formulation because it affords
the occasion to hold in a single optic the calculative rationalities of risk and the affect they generate. she deploys the term in
her analysis of the politics of public emotion associated with the war on terror and obesity in the us. significantly, for our
purposes, berlant proposes this formulation as a means to reflect on how a mathematical anti-sublime - that constantly
calibrates and re-calibrates the contingencies of ordinary life - orchestrates public politically related emotion.16 so, for
example, in relation to the war on terror, berlant notes how the us state departments issuance of a colour code (Code red,
Code yellow, etc.) tells us how intense our terror of terror should be on any given day.17 and with regard to the obesity
epidemic and its statistical production, berlant writes: social justice activists engage in the actuarial imaginary
of biopolitics, turning what seem like cool facts of suffering into hot weapons in arguments about
agency and urgency that extend from imperilled bodies.18 berlants formulation can be brought to the scene
of the climate crisis in as much as it shares in what she identifies as the dialectic between whats
frighteningly formless [an unimaginable ecological catastrophe] and the statistical production of
quasi-already normative reality [the calculus of climate crisis that establishes its dangers and
opportunities in various regimes of risks+.19 the actuarial imaginary, then, is not intended to be restricted to
actuarial metrology and its excess: uncertainty, contingency, speculation. rather it is to hold together the calculative and the
emotive as they pattern the politics of risk. in this sense the actuarial imaginary can be read as a corrective to
accounts of governance. such notions effect a certain depoliticisation by which - in their preoccupation with the
mechanisms of regulation to the exclusion of those of communication - they ignore the modes of persuasion and of
politics more generally that motivate citizens or other actors to support, or endure, particular policy
measures.20 it is to this end that we build on berlants notion to examine how strategies of security and
securitisation and the affective economy that they constitute and construct come to produce the oscillating
political subject of the climate crisis. For writers like beck, who hypothesise the exhaustion of first modernity and a
passage to a new or second modernity, this situation signals the becoming-incalculable of risk. What this perspective
obscures are the discourses, technologies, techniques and ethics in which specific calculations of risk
are assembled. Writers drawing on the theme of governmentality emphasise the particular ways risk is
conceptualised and operationalised as a means to manage individuals and extended populations .21
Franois ewald contends: nothing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in reality. but on the other hand, anything can be a risk; it
all depends on how one analyses the danger, considers the event.22 in this account risk is not the ontological entity it
is for beck in that it designates material hazards and threats. rather, it is a way of ordering reality, making its
contingencies calculable and so governable. it is a technique - more accurately, a set of techniques - for the
assurance of the life of the population. as such its significance lies not in risk itself but to what risk becomes
attached - that is, the programmes, the subjectivities and the social imaginaries in which it is imbricated.
Compare, for example, the risk regimes associated with forms of insurance that became central to the social security
measures of the welfare state and its provision of social rights,23 with those associated with advanced liberal forms of rule.
Over recent decades a new prudentialism has rolled back these provisions, individualising and dispersing risk as the burden
of the responsible subject.24 at the same time, catastrophe risk has socialised previously uninsurable, low
probability, high impact calamities facing populations and rendered them governable in the form of
sophisticated financial techniques.25 risk in these new regimes adheres to a neo-liberal technology that reorganizes
connections among the governing, the self-governed, and political spaces, optimising conditions for responding technically
and ethically to globalised uncertainty and threat.26 under these conditions there is a multiplication of risk as a way to
life.27 this is a life of security, securitisation and responsibilisation . Or rather these are the current
technologies and techniques for the assurance of a populations life. it is in regimes of security and securitisation
that the climate crisis comes to be managed for protection and profit and it is in these regimes that subjects
are differentially brought into the fold of a financialised climate crisis. in regimes of security the ecological comes
to be discursively framed and institutionally managed as the terrestrial infrastructure for global
capital.28 ecological threats and their associated economic and political disruptions are viewed as contingencies
that need to be pre-empted to ensure the desired circulation of people, commodities, finance and so on. here
strategies of climate mitigation and adaptation advanced by the international Panel on Climate Change and other
transnational organisations render planetary the biopolitical practices of security that Foucault first diagnosed in
relation to modern urban administration. these practices he described as organising circulation, eliminating its dangers,
making a division between good and bad circulation, and maximising the good circulation by eliminating the bad.29 Climate
change is precisely a biopolitical concern for global security because it threatens good circulation
with bad. this is clear enough in the risk assessments of security analysts and policy advisors who
predict that unchecked climate change will result in water and food shortages , growing disparities
of income, widespread outbreaks of infectious diseases , waves of migration, threatening
international stability , military confrontations over distribution of the worlds wealth and the
proliferation of terrorism or transnational crime.30 in short a vision of bad circulation - but one that is
designed to secure through techniques of prediction and prevention, pre-emption and pre-mediation, a
future continuous with the present order of things and people.31

Climate Change Link
The affs impacts, framing and management of the climate change crisis justifies and
obscures the biopolitical securitization of their representations
Dibley & Neilson 10 (Ben Dibley, research associate at the Institute for Culture and Society, Doctor of
Philosophy, Australian National University/ Brett Neilson, PhD, 1994, English, Yale University, USA ,MA, MPhil,
1990, English, Yale University, USA; Climate Crisis and the Actuarial Imaginary: the War On Global Warming;
2010; This essay is an output from the Australian Research Council funded Linkage project; http://www.unigaia-
brasil.org/pdfs/mudancasClimaticas/Climate_Crisis_And_The_Actuarial-libre.pdf)JFIII

recently lauren berlant has proposed the notion of the actuarial imaginary.15 We turn to her formulation because it affords
the occasion to hold in a single optic the calculative rationalities of risk and the affect they generate. she deploys the term
in her analysis of the politics of public emotion associated with the war on terror and obesity in the us. significantly, for our
purposes, berlant proposes this formulation as a means to reflect on how a mathematical anti-sublime - that constantly
calibrates and re-calibrates the contingencies of ordinary life - orchestrates public politically related emotion.16 so, for
example, in relation to the war on terror, berlant notes how the us state departments issuance of a colour code (Code red,
Code yellow, etc.) tells us how intense our terror of terror should be on any given day.17 and with regard to the obesity
epidemic and its statistical production, berlant writes: social justice activists engage in the actuarial imaginary
of biopolitics, turning what seem like cool facts of suffering into hot weapons in arguments about
agency and urgency that extend from imperilled bodies.18 berlants formulation can be brought to the scene
of the climate crisis in as much as it shares in what she identifies as the dialectic between whats
frighteningly formless [an unimaginable ecological catastrophe] and the statistical production of
quasi-already normative reality [the calculus of climate crisis that establishes its dangers and
opportunities in various regimes of risks+.19 the actuarial imaginary, then, is not intended to be restricted to
actuarial metrology and its excess: uncertainty, contingency, speculation. rather it is to hold together the calculative and the
emotive as they pattern the politics of risk. in this sense the actuarial imaginary can be read as a corrective to
accounts of governance. such notions effect a certain depoliticisation by which - in their preoccupation with the
mechanisms of regulation to the exclusion of those of communication - they ignore the modes of persuasion and of
politics more generally that motivate citizens or other actors to support, or endure, particular policy
measures.20 it is to this end that we build on berlants notion to examine how strategies of security and
securitisation and the affective economy that they constitute and construct come to produce the oscillating
political subject of the climate crisis. For writers like beck, who hypothesise the exhaustion of first modernity and a
passage to a new or second modernity, this situation signals the becoming-incalculable of risk. What this perspective
obscures are the discourses, technologies, techniques and ethics in which specific calculations of risk
are assembled. Writers drawing on the theme of governmentality emphasise the particular ways risk is
conceptualised and operationalised as a means to manage individuals and extended populations .21
Franois ewald contends: nothing is a risk in itself; there is no risk in reality. but on the other hand, anything can be a risk; it
all depends on how one analyses the danger, considers the event.22 in this account risk is not the ontological entity
it is for beck in that it designates material hazards and threats. rather, it is a way of ordering reality, making its
contingencies calculable and so governable. it is a technique - more accurately, a set of techniques - for the
assurance of the life of the population. as such its significance lies not in risk itself but to what risk becomes
attached - that is, the programmes, the subjectivities and the social imaginaries in which it is imbricated.
Compare, for example, the risk regimes associated with forms of insurance that became central to the social security
measures of the welfare state and its provision of social rights,23 with those associated with advanced liberal forms of rule.
Over recent decades a new prudentialism has rolled back these provisions, individualising and dispersing risk as the burden
of the responsible subject.24 at the same time, catastrophe risk has socialised previously uninsurable, low
probability, high impact calamities facing populations and rendered them governable in the form of
sophisticated financial techniques.25 risk in these new regimes adheres to a neo-liberal technology that reorganizes
connections among the governing, the self-governed, and political spaces, optimising conditions for responding technically
and ethically to globalised uncertainty and threat.26 under these conditions there is a multiplication of risk as a way to
life.27 this is a life of security, securitisation and responsibilisation . Or rather these are the current
technologies and techniques for the assurance of a populations life. it is in regimes of security and securitisation
that the climate crisis comes to be managed for protection and profit and it is in these regimes that subjects
are differentially brought into the fold of a financialised climate crisis. in regimes of security the ecological comes
to be discursively framed and institutionally managed as the terrestrial infrastructure for global
capital.28 ecological threats and their associated economic and political disruptions are viewed as contingencies
that need to be pre-empted to ensure the desired circulation of people, commodities, finance and so on. here
strategies of climate mitigation and adaptation advanced by the international Panel on Climate Change and other
transnational organisations render planetary the biopolitical practices of security that Foucault first diagnosed
in relation to modern urban administration. these practices he described as organising circulation, eliminating its dangers,
making a division between good and bad circulation, and maximising the good circulation by eliminating the bad.29 Climate
change is precisely a biopolitical concern for global security because it threatens good circulation
with bad. this is clear enough in the risk assessments of security analysts and policy advisors who
predict that unchecked climate change will result in water and food shortages , growing disparities
of income, widespread outbreaks of infectious diseases , waves of migration, threatening
international stability , military confrontations over distribution of the worlds wealth and the
proliferation of terrorism or transnational crime.30 in short a vision of bad circulation - but one that is
designed to secure through techniques of prediction and prevention, pre-emption and pre-mediation, a
future continuous with the present order of things and people.31

Conservation
Attempting to rebuild the environment introduces a managerial view of nature
Luke 99 (Timothy, Executive Director of the Institute for Distance and Distributed Learning, the
Director of Graduate Studies in the Department of Political Science, and Co-Director of the Center for
Digital Discourse and Culture in the College of Arts and Sciences at Virginia Polytechnic., Book Eco-
Managerialism: Environmental Studies as a Power/Knowledge Formation., nterview about
the book, 06/1999, http://aurora.icaap.org/index.php/aurora/article/view/79/91) Mana-T

So a restoration managerialism is a recognition that lies at the root of many environmental problems
that has sparked a reaction so intense that many called for going beyond rehabilitation and returning
to some status quo anti. The call is first stop exploiting nature's endowments, and then move towards restoring those sites in systems
that have been most abused. Ecological restoration, however, is a very tricky proposition, because what is to
be restored? How will it be reclaimed? Who must revive what has been damaged, and exactly which
prior state of existence is to be privileged as the state of restoration? Most appeals for restoration are
made on aesthetic grounds. But restoration management has also developed more macrological engagements for maintaining the
integrity of the earth's carrying capacity. In this respect, restoration managerialism focuses upon mobilizing all of the
biological, physical, and social sciences to address the major economic and political affects of current
environmental problems. Their resourcifications allow ecosystem managers to infrastructuralize all of
the earth's ecologies in the name of an almost complete restoration for some biomes, bioregions or
biosystems. The earth becomes, if only in terms of contemporary technoscience, an immense
terrestrial engine. Serving as the human race's ecological support system, it has, with only the
occasional localized failures (as restorationists like to say), provided services upon which human
society depends consistently and without charge. As the environmental infrastructure of
technoscientific production, the earth then can continue to generate these ecosystem services or their
derivative products of natural systems, but only if they are restored. So this complex system of systems is what must
survive, and its outputs include of course what we know: the generation of soils, the regeneration of plant nutrients, the capture of solar
energy, the conversion of that solar energy into biomass, the accumulation, purification and distribution of water, the control of pests, the
provision of a genetic library, the maintenance of breathable air, the control of micro and macro climates, pollination of plants, diversification
of animal species, development of buffering mechanisms in eco-catastrophes. And, at the end of the day, some aesthetic enrichment to make it
all seem worthwhile. Because it is the true capital stock of trans-national enterprise, the planet's ecology
requires such highly disciplined treatment in order to restore some of its original capacities, and then
guide perhaps its subsequent sustainable use. Restoring as much or as many as possible of these ecosystems is very
important, because it might even bring back some almost extinct ecosystems to enlarge our existing carrying capacity. That in turn leads to
another engagement, which is renewables managerialism
Impact
Relational perspective is key for the continued existence of humyns
Seegerts 98 ( Alfred, Graduate Teaching Student, for his Masters of Science, Ontology Recapitulates
Ecology: The Relational Real in Evolution and Ecophilosophy, 08/1998,
http://www.alfseegert.com/uploads/1/0/2/4/10241785/alf_seegert--philosophy_ms_thesis_final.pdf)
Mana-T
In this chapter, I hope to clear up some of the confusion surrounding these issues by examining
evolution and natural selection first from the perspective of Darwin himself and then from that of neo-
Darwinism, ecology and systems theory. I hope to demonstrate that the units of selection controversy
in biology is ultimately not a biological debate at all, but rather a it means to be an individual unit of
selection in the first place. I hope to demonstrate that since in all instances the survival of an organism
(or of a population or species) ultimately depends on how it relatesor fits in with its ecological
context, units of selection should be construed in terms of whole contexts of interaction. I contend
that such a relational perspective is relevant both ontologically and ethically, and is urgently
important for the continued survival of both the human and the more-than-human world.
metaphysical dispute because it turns on fundamental questions about what
Racist biopolitics relegates populations of color to a state of disposability, which robs
value to life and sanctions structural violence
Giroux 6 (Henry Giroux, Global TV Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University;
The Politics of Disposability; September 1, 2006; the Toronto Star;
http://www.dissidentvoice.org/Sept06/Giroux01.htm)JFIII

The bodies that repeatedly appeared all over New Orleans days and weeks after it was struck by Hurricane Katrina
also revealed the emergence of a new kind of politics, one in which entire populations are now
considered disposable, an unnecessary burden on state coffers, and consigned to fend for themselves. The
deeply existential and material questions regarding who is going to die and who is going to live in this society
are now centrally determined by race and class. Katrina lays bare what many people in the United States do not
want to see: large numbers of poor black and brown people struggling to make ends meet, benefiting
very little from a social system that makes it difficult to obtain health insurance, child care, social assistance, cars,
savings, and minimum-wage jobs, if lucky, and instead offers to black and brown youth bad schools, poor public
services, and no future , except a possible stint in the penitentiary. As Janet Pelz in the Sept. 19, 2005 Seattle Post-
Intelligencer rightly insisted, "These are the people the Republicans have been teaching us to disdain, if not
hate, since President Reagan decried the moral laxness of the welfare mom." While Pelz's comments provide a crucial
context for much of the death and devastation of Katrina, I think to more fully understand this calamity it is important to grasp
how the confluence of race and poverty has become part of a new and more insidious set of forces.
These forces are based on a revised set of biopolitical commitments that have largely given up on the
sanctity of human life for those populations rendered "at risk" by global neoliberal economies and which have
instead embraced an emergent security state founded on cultural homogeneity . This is a state that no
longer provides Americans with dreams; instead, it has been reduced largely to protecting its citizens from a range of possible
nightmares. As the social state is hollowed out, entire groups of people become disposable, as the category
"waste" includes no longer simply material goods but also human beings, particularly those rendered redundant
in the new global economy; that is, those who are no longer capable of making a living, who are unable to consume
goods, and who depend upon others for the most basic needs. Defined primarily through the combined discourses of
character, personal responsibility, and cultural homogeneity, entire populations expelled from the benefits of the
marketplace are reified as products without any value and are disposed of -- as Zygmunt Bauman describes in
his brilliant study, Wasted Lives -- like "leftovers in the most radical and effective way: we make them invisible by not looking
and unthinkable by not thinking." Even when young black and brown youth try to escape the biopolitics of disposability by
joining the military, the seduction of economic security is quickly negated by the horror of senseless violence compounded daily
in the streets, roads, and battlefields of Iraq and Afghanistan and made concrete in the form of body bags, mangled bodies, and
amputated limbs -- rarely to be seen in the narrow ocular field of the dominant media. With the social state in retreat, and
thanks to the rapacious dynamics of a market fundamentalism unchecked by government regulations, the public and private
policies of investing in the public good are dismissed as bad business, just as the notion of protecting people from the
dire misfortunes of poverty, sickness, or the random blows of fate is viewed as an act of bad faith.
Weakness is now a sin, punishable by social exclusion. This is especially true for those racial groups and immigrant
populations who have always been at risk economically and politically. Increasingly, such groups have become
part of an ever-growing army of the impoverished and disenfranchised -- removed from the prospect of a decent job,
productive education, adequate health care, acceptable child care services, and satisfactory shelter. As the state is transformed
into the primary agent of terror and corporate concerns displace democratic values, Bauman observes that dominant "power is
measured by the speed with which responsibilities can be escaped." With its pathological disdain for social values and public
life, and its celebration of an unbridled individualism and acquisitiveness, the Bush administration does more than
undermine the nature of social obligation and civic responsibility; it also sends a message to unwanted
populations: Society neither wants, cares about, or needs you. Katrina revealed with startling and disturbing
clarity who these unwanted are: African-Americans who occupy the poorest sections of New Orleans,
those ghettoized frontier zones created by racism coupled with economic inequality. Cut out of any long-term
goals and a decent vision of the future, these are the populations, as Bauman points out, who have been rendered
redundant and disposable in the age of neoliberal global capitalism. Katrina reveals that we are living in dark times.
One of its most obvious lessons -- that race and racism still matter in America -- is fully operational through a
biopolitics not unlike the kind described by scholar Achille Mbembe as "necropolitics", in which "sovereignty resides in
the power and capacity to dictate who may live and who may die." Those poor minorities of color and class,
unable to contribute to the prevailing consumerist ethic, are vanishing into the sinkhole of poverty in desolate and abandoned
enclaves of decaying cities and rural spaces, or in America's ever-expanding prison empire.

Environmental Destruction
This view of the environment as a storehouse allows for indiscriminant destruction of
the environment
Once you've got that "carrying capacity" then maybe you have to realize that environments can be
almost entirely destroyed. Which means that special efforts to rehabilitate them for continuing
productive use or restoring them to some idealized condition of pre-existing stability are not enough.
Older images of nature as a storehouse of goods that can be exhausted, and therefore one must
manage their exhaustion for maintaining the greatest good for the greatest number at the maximum
duration, begin to drift towards other less static and more dynamic images. For renewables
management, nature becomes a more open-ended, self-renewing source of benefits, which comes
with the vision of nature as a vast cybernetic system. This brings the engagement with renewability.
The sustained yield metaphors of nature as a static depletable storehouse now shift towards a dynamic,
self-regulating system. Recognizing these responsibilities and then mastering their macro management
for optimal performance, both as the producers of raw material and conservers of systemic services,
becomes the engagement of renewables managerialism. These commitments have pushed the thoughts
and actions of many people away from sustained yield and more toward sustainability in the overall
management of natural resources. Here the root commitment to resourcification has not been
abandoned in the renewables project. Instead, it simply has been re-specified to meet other long-
range, larger scale requirements. That is, sustained yield focuses on outputs, and views resource
conditions as constraints on maximum production. Sustainability, however, makes resource
conditions the goal and the pre-condition for meeting human needs over time. Outputs then are
interest on resource capital. Three integrated themes begin to emerge: a concern for the health of
ecosystems, a preference for a landscape scale and decentralized management, and a new kind of public
participation that might integrate some civic discourse into decision making. These changes often are
positive. The resourcification - in outline and tone - does not break all of its' links with meeting output
goals, but still this is an interesting development. Renewables managerialism moves towards
monitoring the level of outputs, the rate of meeting the goals, and the scale of sustainable use. In
many ways, it transforms sustainability into another style of sustained yield, so that the evolution from
the original vision of sustained yield into today's notion of sustainability is a "win-win situation," both for
economic and ecological interests. Renewables management only departs perhaps modestly from the
original credo of sustained yield as it was spun up in the early 20th century. Nonetheless, there are some
enlightened qualities of eco-managerialism, yet it is not a radical revolutionary reinvention of
everything. Instead, what one then often sees is risk managerialism in the eco-managerial project.
They view the environment as being enveloped by capitalism and production-which
inevitably leads to environment contamination
Luke 96 (Timothy, Executive Director of the Institute for Distance and Distributed Learning, the
Director of Graduate Studies in the Department of Political Science, and Co-Director of the Center for
Digital Discourse and Culture in the College of Arts and Sciences at Virginia Polytechnic., Book,
Generating Green Governmentality: A Cultural Critique of Environmental Studies as a
Power/Knowledge Formation,1996, http://www.cddc.vt.edu/tim/tims/Tim514a.pdf) Mana-T
These visions of environmental science recapitulate the logic of technical networks as they already are
given in the states and markets of the existing world-system. Rather than the environment surrounding
humanity, the friction-free global marketplace of transnational capital is what envelopes Nature. Out
of its metabolisms are produced ecotoxins, biohazards, hydrocontaminants, aeroparticulates, and
enviropoisons whose impacts generate inexorable risks. These policy problematics unfold now on the
global scale, because fast capitalism has colonized so many more sites on the planet as part and parcel
of its own unique regime for sustainable development. As Yale's Dean Cohon asserts: The challenge we
all face now, as you know, is not limited to one resource in one nation, but extends to the protection of
the environment worldwide. The fabric of natural and human communities is currently torn or tattered
in many places. There is hardly a place on earth where human activity does not influence the
environment's current condition or its prospects for the future.36 In turn, well-trained environmental
professionals must measure, monitor or manage these risks, leaving the rational operations of global
fast capitalism wholly intact as "risks won" for their owners and beneficiaries, while risk analyses
performed by each environmental school's practitioners and programs deal with the victims of "risks
lost."
Resource War
Ecomanagerialism causes war due to the perception of nature as resources to own
war
Luke 99 (Timothy, Executive Director of the Institute for Distance and Distributed Learning, the
Director of Graduate Studies in the Department of Political Science, and Co-Director of the Center for
Digital Discourse and Culture in the College of Arts and Sciences at Virginia Polytechnic., Book Eco-
Managerialism: Environmental Studies as a Power/Knowledge Formation.Interview about
the book, 06/1999, http://aurora.icaap.org/index.php/aurora/article/view/79/91) Mana-T
Possibly. On the one hand, I think, and I'm probably not standing with a lot of other people in saying
this, but in many ways its useful to think about the political in fairly stark Schmidtian terms. The
political is who are your friends and who are your enemies. What creates those associations and
disassociation, disengagements and engagements? Increasingly it would appear, if you look at
carrying capacity calculations - which I think are always rough and largely based upon modeling, but
let's say we let them have some quiddity - Some people would say that carrying capacity of the earth
has been pretty much exceeded, probably as early as 1978. If you want to look at ecological footprint
analysis, it takes about one hectare to support one relatively low consuming person in a developing
country. Again, these are models, but it gives you some comparison whereas it takes maybe 10
hectares to support somebody in the United States. Somebody who lives on 10 hectares lives a long
time, lives a lot better, and lives. Someone who lives on one hectare lives very shortly, lives worse,
and dies. In many ways, the environment is a veil over life chances. If carrying capacity is exceeded,
then who is carried first and who is carried best is a highly political question. Reaching a point perhaps
of being made a military question by states, because wars are only engaged in by states. Your friends
or foes, enemies or allies within states. About one fifth of humanity lives in one state, China. A lot of
what China is doing is having tremendous ecological impact. Maybe two or three percent of humanity
lives in another state, the United States. That has tremendous ecological impact. Lots of other
societies are having to deal with that. We are perhaps beginning to see ecological conflicts going to be
militarized in a way we haven't seen before. The political re-emerges in the ecological. Some people
would argue the reason why we're so upset about Saddam Hussein is not because of Saddam Hussein,
but because it's the oil, stupid. That's what it's always been about. Global oil production has
probably peaked in the '90s. We're using more oil than we're finding. The Cornucopians would say,
"Don't worry, cool out, it'll be fine. We'll discover more oil somewhere." Perhaps. But right now
we're not. In the meantime, transnational enterprise has been much more successful selling cars
and trucks to all kinds of people, and that's creating resource scarcity and causing resource
problems. So the political, who's friend and who's enemy, re-emerges in the ecological. A lot of what
has been going on in environmental affairs has been the tradition liberal confusion of that. How can
you overlay the economic, the social, the cultural, and aesthetic over these kinds of conflicts? That's
one thing that I think is emerging in the dynamics of the ecological that very few people talk about. If
resources are getting scarce, then that leads to conflict. And conflict may lead to military problems, or
at least lead to all kinds of quasi neo para crypto imperialist acts. The last great superpower of the
world is going around poking his nose in everybody's business, with the purpose of "fight
terrorism", or is it doing other things? That's one worry people have. Another worry that gets at the
managerial question is to not accept managerialism and, in fact, to popularize or socialize the
processes of production. Did things begin to go wrong when we surrendered control over your
everyday economic and ecological activities to large corporations and experts? Experts who told you
what to do, corporations who provided the goods to do what you'd been told to do by experts. So,
relocalizing, repopularizing ecological processes, which would be less energy intensive, less material
intensive, less ecologically destructive, but at the same time non-consumerist, more craft oriented,
is another way of getting at the environmental problem. The difficulty with that is how many people
remember that kind of life? How can one survive not going to the mall? How can one survive not
relying upon corporations? About the only example that you've seen lately for doing that sort of
thing that's become widely known around the country is Ted Kushinsky. Move up to the woods,
build a hut, and then design bombs. That's not an option for a lot of people. It's a craft oriented way
of life, but it's not a very attractive one. What is the alternative that one would follow to create and
live in a more green fashion? Developing that vision of the environment or ecological action is also
critical. In the meantime, most people just sort of satisfy us. The corporations give us the goodies,
they can redesign a lot of what they do and make it less destructive. I personally think there's
tremendous space here for more corporations to improve what they do. The natural capitalists
have a lot to contribute in this regard. There's an incredible amount of waste and still an incredible
amount of inefficiency in engineering because engineers are not often enjoined to optimize for
environmental impact. They're asked to optimize for economic impact, or they just want to get out
of work on Friday so they just throw any slap doodle thing down, and that becomes a product.
Improving things in that way, there's also a space of change. But short of that, the managerial
problem is very difficult because, as you were alluding, we don't have a real experience with nature.
We don't have perhaps a real sense of what its utility is. So in that inability to know it and in that
under appreciation of what it is, we accept what the eco-managerialists give us. So there's all kinds of
things to do that are not tied to eco-managerialism, that largely haven't been done but remain to be
done. In that respect, I think there's room for quite a bit of hope. With the recognition, however,
that if the global modelers are right, and carrying capacity has been exceeded. Then things are
going to get pretty nasty pretty soon in a lot of dimensions.


Ecomanagerialism is the root cause of war due to the perception of nature as
resources to own
Luke 99 (Timothy, Executive Director of the Institute for Distance and Distributed Learning, the
Director of Graduate Studies in the Department of Political Science, and Co-Director of the Center for
Digital Discourse and Culture in the College of Arts and Sciences at Virginia Polytechnic., Book Eco-
Managerialism: Environmental Studies as a Power/Knowledge Formation.Interview about the book, 06/1999,
http://aurora.icaap.org/index.php/aurora/article/view/79/91) Mana-T
Possibly. On the one hand, I think, and I'm probably not standing with a lot of other people in saying this, but in many ways its useful to think
about the political in fairly stark Schmidtian terms. The political is who are your friends and who are your enemies. What creates those
associations and disassociation, disengagements and engagements? Increasingly it would appear, if you look at carrying
capacity calculations - which I think are always rough and largely based upon modeling, but let's say
we let them have some quiddity - Some people would say that carrying capacity of the earth has been
pretty much exceeded, probably as early as 1978. If you want to look at ecological footprint analysis,
it takes about one hectare to support one relatively low consuming person in a developing country.
Again, these are models, but it gives you some comparison whereas it takes maybe 10 hectares to
support somebody in the United States. Somebody who lives on 10 hectares lives a long time, lives a
lot better, and lives. Someone who lives on one hectare lives very shortly, lives worse, and dies. In
many ways, the environment is a veil over life chances. If carrying capacity is exceeded, then who is
carried first and who is carried best is a highly political question. Reaching a point perhaps of being
made a military question by states, because wars are only engaged in by states. Your friends or foes,
enemies or allies within states. About one fifth of humanity lives in one state, China. A lot of what
China is doing is having tremendous ecological impact. Maybe two or three percent of humanity lives
in another state, the United States. That has tremendous ecological impact. Lots of other societies are
having to deal with that. We are perhaps beginning to see ecological conflicts going to be militarized
in a way we haven't seen before. The political re-emerges in the ecological. Some people would argue
the reason why we're so upset about Saddam Hussein is not because of Saddam Hussein, but because
it's the oil, stupid. That's what it's always been about. Global oil production has probably peaked in the '90s. We're using more oil than
we're finding. The Cornucopians would say, "Don't worry, cool out, it'll be fine. We'll discover more oil somewhere." Perhaps. But right now
we're not. In the meantime, transnational enterprise has been much more successful selling cars and trucks to all kinds of people, and that's
creating resource scarcity and causing resource problems. So the political, who's friend and who's enemy, re-emerges
in the ecological. A lot of what has been going on in environmental affairs has been the tradition
liberal confusion of that. How can you overlay the economic, the social, the cultural, and aesthetic
over these kinds of conflicts? That's one thing that I think is emerging in the dynamics of the
ecological that very few people talk about. If resources are getting scarce, then that leads to conflict.
And conflict may lead to military problems, or at least lead to all kinds of quasi neo para crypto
imperialist acts. The last great superpower of the world is going around poking his nose in everybody's business, with the purpose of
"fight terrorism", or is it doing other things? That's one worry people have. Another worry that gets at the managerial question is to not accept
managerialism and, in fact, to popularize or socialize the processes of production. Did things begin to go wrong when we
surrendered control over your everyday economic and ecological activities to large corporations and
experts? Experts who told you what to do, corporations who provided the goods to do what you'd
been told to do by experts. So, relocalizing, repopularizing ecological processes, which would be less energy intensive, less material
intensive, less ecologically destructive, but at the same time non-consumerist, more craft oriented, is another way of getting at the
environmental problem. The difficulty with that is how many people remember that kind of life? How can one survive not going to the mall?
How can one survive not relying upon corporations? About the only example that you've seen lately for doing that sort of thing that's become
widely known around the country is Ted Kushinsky. Move up to the woods, build a hut, and then design bombs. That's not an option for a lot of
people. It's a craft oriented way of life, but it's not a very attractive one. What is the alternative that one would follow to create and live in a
more green fashion? Developing that vision of the environment or ecological action is also critical. In the meantime, most people just sort of
satisfy us. The corporations give us the goodies, they can redesign a lot of what they do and make it less destructive. I personally think there's
tremendous space here for more corporations to improve what they do. The natural capitalists have a lot to contribute in this regard. There's
an incredible amount of waste and still an incredible amount of inefficiency in engineering because engineers are not often enjoined to
optimize for environmental impact. They're asked to optimize for economic impact, or they just want to get out of work on Friday so they just
throw any slap doodle thing down, and that becomes a product. Improving things in that way, there's also a space of change. But short of that,
the managerial problem is very difficult because, as you were alluding, we don't have a real experience with nature. We don't have perhaps a
real sense of what its utility is. So in that inability to know it and in that under appreciation of what it is, we
accept what the eco-managerialists give us. So there's all kinds of things to do that are not tied to eco-
managerialism, that largely haven't been done but remain to be done. In that respect, I think there's room for quite a bit of hope. With
the recognition, however, that if the global modelers are right, and carrying capacity has been exceeded. Then things are going to get pretty
nasty pretty soon in a lot of dimensions.


Relational perspective is key for the continued existence of humyns
Seegerts 98 ( Alfred, Graduate Teaching Student, for his Masters of Science, Ontology Recapitulates
Ecology: The Relational Real in Evolution and Ecophilosophy, 08/1998,
http://www.alfseegert.com/uploads/1/0/2/4/10241785/alf_seegert--philosophy_ms_thesis_final.pdf)
Mana-T
In this chapter, I hope to clear up some of the confusion surrounding these issues by examining
evolution and natural selection first from the perspective of Darwin himself and then from that of neo-
Darwinism, ecology and systems theory. I hope to demonstrate that the units of selection controversy
in biology is ultimately not a biological debate at all, but rather a it means to be an individual unit of
selection in the first place. I hope to demonstrate that since in all instances the survival of an organism
(or of a population or species) ultimately depends on how it relatesor fits in with its ecological
context, units of selection should be construed in terms of whole contexts of interaction. I contend
that such a relational perspective is relevant both ontologically and ethically, and is urgently
important for the continued survival of both the human and the more-than-human world.
metaphysical dispute because it turns on fundamental questions about what
Alt
The alternative is to reject the ecomanagerialistic conception of nature
Luke 99 (Timothy, Executive Director of the Institute for Distance and Distributed Learning, the
Director of Graduate Studies in the Department of Political Science, and Co-Director of the Center for
Digital Discourse and Culture in the College of Arts and Sciences at Virginia Polytechnic., Book Eco-
Managerialism: Environmental Studies as a Power/Knowledge Formation., Interview about the book 06/1999,
http://aurora.icaap.org/index.php/aurora/article/view/79/91) Mana-T

Everybody has to come to their own conclusions about this. If you agree with me, that these have been problems and they have to be
addressed, I think one place to begin is to not accept the antinomies of nature/society and
economy/culture, state/society as they've come to us from the 19th century. The environmental
sciences and studies usually sort of say, "We're all about green stuff." Green stuff is in turn basically
about everything we haven't sullied. We want to protect the not yet built environment or reclaim
perhaps some of the built environment to be more like the not yet built environment. But there's
always this division between built environment and not yet built environment, or never to be built
environment. I think that's a mistake. They have to all be seen together. Why is what is done within society and
economy not natural? In some register, if you talk about, well whatever happens on the earth we say
is natural, because nature is the earth. But whatever human beings do on the earth is unnatural,
because human beings do it. Does that make sense? Is that a lingering presence of the kind of deistically inspired notion
that man is the crown of creation, endowed or directed by God to do good things on the earth? If it is, then is it time to either bring God back
into it more, or to just forget talking about it in that way at all and see everything as natural. Which allows one then to talk about the green and
the gray together. To crawl all the way back up the pipes into the productive process. Why should environmental resistance
stop where the factory begins? Why should the fight be fought only out in the woods chaining
yourself to trees? Why is resource managerialism seen as a process whereby you try to prevent the
over-exploitation of resources by preventing new mining, as opposed to coming forward with highly
rationalized ways of redoing engineering that would reduce the need to do that to begin with. There's
a need to crawl into the artificial ecologies, the industrial ecologies, in order to protect the natural
ecologies. Rather than saying, well that's engineering and that's not what I do. By the same token, there's a
need politically to politicize these processes that are often considered sub-political. Our political conception accepts Aristotelian definitions of
labour. The citizen is the free property, wharf making man, who has the leisure to do politics. He has the leisure to do that politics because the
metic, the mechanic, the slave and the woman stay at home or in the marketplace to produce the wealth that makes all that happen. That's
kind of a dumb division of labour that probably didn't exist in classical Hellenic civilization as cleanly as political theorists pretend today. But
now it's really kind of stupid. Many important decisions are not taken by people sitting in Ottawa or Washington. They're made in corporations
or in design studios in the design construction creation of goods and services. The sub-political decisions are where a lot of
things that really affect our lives, are made. Then out of the factory door they pollute, they degrade
things. The state comes along and tries to bottle that up with regulation, environmental controls, etc.
It's kind of dumb. Getting into that sub-political level of decision making, and politicizing what goes on behind the veil of
expertise: "Oh you can't talk about that, because you're not an engineer." Or behind the veil of
property: "Oh, you can't talk about that, because you don't have shares in the company or you don't
own the business." That probably needs to be changed. The affects of these sub-political decisions affect our public life. Recognizing that
ecology is a public enterprise that affects all of us is another thing that conceivably should be done. Then I guess the last thing I'd probably
recommend that we think about, "is this nature that we think is so pristine and pure even around much anymore?" How much of it has been
degraded to the point where it is not protectable. As a result, many people are coming along and saying, "Well why don't we just have artificial
nature? What's wrong with pigs that grow human ears? What's wrong with strawberries that glow in the dark? This is better living through
science." So the genetic reengineering of animals and plants in the name of profit is again something I think a lot of environmental programs
are dealing with, but a lot of other ones are not dealing with, because it is not natural. Instead it's being consigned off to ethicists, or it's not
even being looked at, at all because it's considered to be not all that pervasive. When in fact it's becoming quite pervasive, because these are
new ways of making animal production and plant production more profitable. That's where I'd begin, right off the top of my head, thinking
about how the environment ought to be expanded, the separation between environment and society maybe ought
to be torn down. It should look at the gray and the brown as much as the green. I think it needs to be
a lot more political than it's been. And much less focused on science. Because it's the scientific that
gets you into a monitoring, measuring, regulating regime, which is right now the best that we've got, but I think there's
more to it than that that can be done.
The alternative is to view nature as a whole and include ourselves into Natures framework
Luke 99 (Timothy, Executive Director of the Institute for Distance and Distributed Learning, the
Director of Graduate Studies in the Department of Political Science, and Co-Director of the Center for
Digital Discourse and Culture in the College of Arts and Sciences at Virginia Polytechnic., Book Eco-
Managerialism: Environmental Studies as a Power/Knowledge Formation., Interview about the book
06/1999, http://aurora.icaap.org/index.php/aurora/article/view/79/91)
Everybody has to come to their own conclusions about this. If you agree with me, that these have been problems and they have to be
addressed, I think one place to begin is to not accept the antinomies of nature/society and economy/culture, state/society as they've come to
us from the 19th century. The environmental sciences and studies usually sort of say, "We're all about green stuff." Green stuff is in turn
basically about everything we haven't sullied. We want to protect the not yet built environment or reclaim perhaps
some of the built environment to be more like the not yet built environment. But there's always this
division between built environment and not yet built environment, or never to be built environment. I
think that's a mistake. They have to all be seen together. Why is what is done within society and economy not
natural? In some register, if you talk about, well whatever happens on the earth we say is natural, because nature is the earth.
But whatever human beings do on the earth is unnatural, because human beings do it. Does that make sense? Is that a lingering
presence of the kind of deistically inspired notion that man is the crown of creation, endowed or directed by God to do good
things on the earth? If it is, then is it time to either bring God back into it more, or to just forget talking about it in that
way at all and see everything as natural. Which allows one then to talk about the green and the gray
together. To crawl all the way back up the pipes into the productive process. Why should environmental
resistance stop where the factory begins? Why should the fight be fought only out in the woods chaining
yourself to trees? Why is resource managerialism seen as a process whereby you try to prevent the
over-exploitation of resources by preventing new mining, as opposed to coming forward with highly
rationalized ways of redoing engineering that would reduce the need to do that to begin with. There's
a need to crawl into the artificial ecologies, the industrial ecologies, in order to protect the natural
ecologies. Rather than saying, well that's engineering and that's not what I do. By the same token,
there's a need politically to politicize these processes that are often considered sub-political. Our
political conception accepts Aristotelian definitions of labour. The citizen is the free property, wharf
making man, who has the leisure to do politics. He has the leisure to do that politics because the metic,
the mechanic, the slave and the woman stay at home or in the marketplace to produce the wealth that
makes all that happen. That's kind of a dumb division of labour that probably didn't exist in classical
Hellenic civilization as cleanly as political theorists pretend today. But now it's really kind of stupid.
Many important decisions are not taken by people sitting in Ottawa or Washington. They're made in
corporations or in design studios in the design construction creation of goods and services. The sub-
political decisions are where a lot of things that really affect our lives, are made. Then out of the factory
door they pollute, they degrade things. The state comes along and tries to bottle that up with
regulation, environmental controls, etc. It's kind of dumb. Getting into that sub-political level of decision
making, and politicizing what goes on behind the veil of expertise: "Oh you can't talk about that,
because you're not an engineer." Or behind the veil of property: "Oh, you can't talk about that, because
you don't have shares in the company or you don't own the business." That probably needs to be
changed. The affects of these sub-political decisions affect our public life. Recognizing that ecology is a
public enterprise that affects all of us is another thing that conceivably should be done. Then I guess the
last thing I'd probably recommend that we think about, "is this nature that we think is so pristine and
pure even around much anymore?" How much of it has been degraded to the point where it is not
protectable. As a result, many people are coming along and saying, "Well why don't we just have
artificial nature? What's wrong with pigs that grow human ears? What's wrong with strawberries that
glow in the dark? This is better living through science." So the genetic reengineering of animals and
plants in the name of profit is again something I think a lot of environmental programs are dealing with,
but a lot of other ones are not dealing with, because it is not natural. Instead it's being consigned off to
ethicists, or it's not even being looked at, at all because it's considered to be not all that pervasive.
When in fact it's becoming quite pervasive, because these are new ways of making animal production
and plant production more profitable. That's where I'd begin, right off the top of my head, thinking
about how the environment ought to be expanded, the separation between environment and society
maybe ought to be torn down. It should look at the gray and the brown as much as the green. I think it
needs to be a lot more political than it's been. And much less focused on science. Because it's the
scientific that gets you into a monitoring, measuring, regulating regime, which is right now the best that
we've got, but I think there's more to it than that that can be done.




Localism solves violent and destructive relationships towards the environment, and is
exclusive with managerial certainty and rationality
Igoe 8 (Jim Igoe; Dartmouth College, Department of Anthropology; How to Build an Eco-Functional Planet:
the Paradoxical Assumptions Behind the Pervasive Belief that Market-Driven Managerialism is the Key to Our
Ecological Future; London: International Institute for Environment and Development; 2008)JFIII

In our 'economy of appearances' the total web of relationships embodied in our ways of thinking and acting about the
environment is nearly impossible to discern (Harries-Jones 1995). Thus it is equally difficult to understand how the choices
that we make impact on the material environment and other people's lives. As such it is possible, if not inevitable, for
people to have 'green sensibilities' and a strong commitment to social justice while consistently doing
things that are bad for the environment and that perpetuate inequality and human suffering on a
global scale. This reality also makes it nearly impossible to see and understand the connection of our
relationships in ways that would make it possible to learn from our mistakes. Unfortunately, this
worldview also informs interventions that are rapidly displacing other value systems and other ways of
knowing and interacting with the world. These displaced knowledge and value systems are often grounded in
more embodied and reciprocal relationships to the environment. This is not to say they exist perfect harmony
with nature or hold the secret key to resolving our environmental problems. However, it is certainly the case that they are
connected to ways of knowing and interacting with the world that have largely been lost in the
global economy of appearances. Should we ever come to understand that managerial/market-driven
approaches to socio-environmental problems often paradoxically exacerbate the kinds of problems they
are meant to resolve, these other way of knowing and valuing the world will be essential to finding
alternative approaches . Creating contexts in which many ways of knowing and valuing the world can thrive will
require much more democratic approaches to conservation and development than is currently the case. True democracy
and diversity of values presents a level of uncertainty beyond what most managerial/market-driven
world making projects are able to accommodate . As Charles Besanon, head of the protected area program for
the UN Monitoring Center, recently opined about user-friendly databases, "companies are always talking about wanting
certainty. We expect that these tools as they evolve and are continually updated will become the standard" (Kanter 2008).
There is no question that knowing more about the ecology of our planet and how it works is indispensable to finding viable
solutions to our current socio-environmental dilemmas. However we must always be mindful of the difference
between knowing the world and seeking to render it wholly predictable for the purposes of profit
and centralized management. World making projects informed by the managerial/market-driven worldview
continuously displace and transform diverse forms of human-environmental relationships in the name of producing a more
predictable, profitable, and eco-viable planet. As the growing movement for bio-cultural diversity reminds us, diverse ways of
knowing and valuing the environment are embedded in human-environmental relationships and cannot be maintained ex-
situ. They are displaced, erased, and transformed along with local food production systems and other systems of human-
environmental interaction in which they are embedded. Thus we appear to be making yet another exchange,
though one that is rarely acknowledged: perceived certainty for the accumulated stock of human ways of
knowing and interacting with the environment. In asking ourselves whether this is a fair exchange there are two
things that are important to keep in mind: 1) the appearance of certainty is achieved through techniques and
technologies that commodify culture and nature, while systematically concealing the considerable
socio-ecological costs of these processes; and 2) healthy ecosystems are defined by diversity and
complexity, and hence uncertainty. This applies to the human systems to which ecosystems are integrally and
inextricably linked. In continuously drawing our attention away from this singularly important relationship, the
managerial/market-driven worldview allows us to believe that it is possible and desirable to save the
world through consumerism and capitalist expansion. Paying closer attention to the unstated
assumptions of this worldview, and their inherent paradoxes, will allow us to make more informed and
efficacious decisions about our relationships to the environment, as well as our relationships to other people and
their relationships to the environment. This essay hopefully represents a small step in that direction.
The alternative is to tear down the wall between humans and nature to create a true
ecology
Luke 99 (Timothy, Executive Director of the Institute for Distance and Distributed Learning, the
Director of Graduate Studies in the Department of Political Science, and Co-Director of the Center for
Digital Discourse and Culture in the College of Arts and Sciences at Virginia Polytechnic., Book Eco-
Managerialism: Environmental Studies as a Power/Knowledge Formation., Interview about
the book 06/1999, http://aurora.icaap.org/index.php/aurora/article/view/79/91) Mana-T

Everybody has to come to their own conclusions about this. If you agree with me, that these have been problems and they have to be
addressed, I think one place to begin is to not accept the antinomies of nature/society and
economy/culture, state/society as they've come to us from the 19th century. The environmental
sciences and studies usually sort of say, "We're all about green stuff." Green stuff is in turn basically
about everything we haven't sullied. We want to protect the not yet built environment or reclaim
perhaps some of the built environment to be more like the not yet built environment. But there's
always this division between built environment and not yet built environment, or never to be built
environment. I think that's a mistake. They have to all be seen together. Why is what is done within society and
economy not natural? In some register, if you talk about, well whatever happens on the earth we say
is natural, because nature is the earth. But whatever human beings do on the earth is unnatural,
because human beings do it. Does that make sense? Is that a lingering presence of the kind of deistically inspired notion
that man is the crown of creation, endowed or directed by God to do good things on the earth? If it is, then is it time to either bring God back
into it more, or to just forget talking about it in that way at all and see everything as natural. Which allows one then to talk about the green and
the gray together. To crawl all the way back up the pipes into the productive process. Why should environmental resistance
stop where the factory begins? Why should the fight be fought only out in the woods chaining
yourself to trees? Why is resource managerialism seen as a process whereby you try to prevent the
over-exploitation of resources by preventing new mining, as opposed to coming forward with highly
rationalized ways of redoing engineering that would reduce the need to do that to begin with. There's
a need to crawl into the artificial ecologies, the industrial ecologies, in order to protect the natural
ecologies. Rather than saying, well that's engineering and that's not what I do. By the same token, there's a
need politically to politicize these processes that are often considered sub-political. Our political conception accepts Aristotelian definitions of
labour. The citizen is the free property, wharf making man, who has the leisure to do politics. He has the leisure to do that politics because the
metic, the mechanic, the slave and the woman stay at home or in the marketplace to produce the wealth that makes all that happen. That's
kind of a dumb division of labour that probably didn't exist in classical Hellenic civilization as cleanly as political theorists pretend today. But
now it's really kind of stupid. Many important decisions are not taken by people sitting in Ottawa or Washington. They're made in corporations
or in design studios in the design construction creation of goods and services. The sub-political decisions are where a lot of
things that really affect our lives, are made. Then out of the factory door they pollute, they degrade
things. The state comes along and tries to bottle that up with regulation, environmental controls, etc.
It's kind of dumb. Getting into that sub-political level of decision making, and politicizing what goes on behind the veil of
expertise: "Oh you can't talk about that, because you're not an engineer." Or behind the veil of
property: "Oh, you can't talk about that, because you don't have shares in the company or you don't
own the business." That probably needs to be changed. The affects of these sub-political decisions affect our public life. Recognizing that
ecology is a public enterprise that affects all of us is another thing that conceivably should be done. Then I guess the last thing I'd probably
recommend that we think about, "is this nature that we think is so pristine and pure even around much anymore?" How much of it has been
degraded to the point where it is not protectable. As a result, many people are coming along and saying, "Well why don't we just have artificial
nature? What's wrong with pigs that grow human ears? What's wrong with strawberries that glow in the dark? This is better living through
science." So the genetic reengineering of animals and plants in the name of profit is again something I think a lot of environmental programs
are dealing with, but a lot of other ones are not dealing with, because it is not natural. Instead it's being consigned off to ethicists, or it's not
even being looked at, at all because it's considered to be not all that pervasive. When in fact it's becoming quite pervasive, because these are
new ways of making animal production and plant production more profitable. That's where I'd begin, right off the top of my head, thinking
about how the environment ought to be expanded, the separation between environment and society maybe ought
to be torn down. It should look at the gray and the brown as much as the green. I think it needs to be
a lot more political than it's been. And much less focused on science. Because it's the scientific that
gets you into a monitoring, measuring, regulating regime, which is right now the best that we've got, but I think there's
more to it than that that can be done.

Alt Solvency
The alternative lets us view the land as both a means and an ends
Seegert 98 ( Alfred, Graduate Teaching Student, for his Masters of Science, Ontology Recapitulates
Ecology: The Relational Real in Evolution and Ecophilosophy, 08/1998,
http://www.alfseegert.com/uploads/1/0/2/4/10241785/alf_seegert--philosophy_ms_thesis_final.pdf)
Mana-T

Although in moral extensionism and traditional ethical theory only indirect duties may apply to
things of instrumental value (for instance to my neighbors car), in the land ethic the possession of
instrumental value is 122 122122122 understood as an end-in-itself. One need not be the ultimate
goal (if such a thing even exists!) to still be an object of direct moral concern. This was my point in
arguing that Aristotles great chain of being simply does not map onto the territory. In Leopolds
view all things belonging to the land community can be construed simultaneously as both means and
ends
Viewing nature as part of community is ethical
Seegert 98 ( Alfred, Graduate Teaching Student, for his Masters of Science, Ontology Recapitulates
Ecology: The Relational Real in Evolution and Ecophilosophy, 08/1998,
http://www.alfseegert.com/uploads/1/0/2/4/10241785/alf_seegert--philosophy_ms_thesis_final.pdf)
Mana-T

The term land ethic comes from A Sand County Almanac, a collection of nature and conservation
essays written by forester and naturalist Aldo 120 120120120 Leopold. Published in 1949, the volume
is considered to be almost a holy book in conservation circles.39 Although the work predates the
conventional beginnings of the environmental movement by about twenty years, in it one finds Leopold
propounding a radical, holistic, ecologically grounded ethic which has resulted in him being revered by
his followers as an American Isaiah.40 To better understand Leopolds project, here is how he begins
The Land Ethic: When god-like Odysseus returned from the wars in Troy, he hanged all on one rope a
dozen slave-girls of his household whom he suspected of misbehavior during his absence. This
involved no question of propriety. The girls were property. The disposal of property was then, as now,
a matter of expedience, not of right and wrong.41 Leopolds point is that in exactly this way, land
meaning collectively soils, waters, plants and animalsis viewed by society solely as property. As such
it is governed in terms of expediency (which reduces to economic utility) rather than in terms of right
and wrong (the domain of ethical obligation). Leopolds goal was for society to stop perceiving land use
as entirely an economic problem. At first glance, Leopold reads like a moral extensionist. Take for
instance his characterization of the land ethic in the following: All ethics so far evolved rest upon a
single premise that the individual is a member of a community of interdependent parts.... The land
ethic simply enlarges the boundaries of the 121 121121121 community to include soils, waters, plants,
and animals, or collectively: the land.42 This expansion of the moral community sounds very much like
the project of moral extensionism widely applied. There are, however, at least four crucial differences
between moral extensionism and the land ethic Leopold puts forth.



Framework
Morality is defined by the ecological community
Seegert 98 ( Alfred, Graduate Teaching Student, for his Masters of Science, Ontology Recapitulates
Ecology: The Relational Real in Evolution and Ecophilosophy, 08/1998,
http://www.alfseegert.com/uploads/1/0/2/4/10241785/alf_seegert--philosophy_ms_thesis_final.pdf)
Mana-T
Although respect for fellow members of the land community fits in well with an individualistic paradigm
of moral considerability, the land ethics respect for the community as such represents the third
divergence from moral extensionism. The broad conception of community found in the land ethic
extends direct duties not only to non-sentient beings, but also to entities conventionally deemed to
be nonliving (e.g., soils and waters). Since interrelations are valued more than internally possessed
properties, a more encompassing conception of moral relevance goes to work here than one finds
even in a biocentric ethic: natural systems (organic and inorganic, biotic and abiotic) become proper
objects of moral concern, not just individual organisms. The atomistic individualism endemic to
extensionism and so lamented by Goodpaster is foreign to the land ethic. Although natural systems
cannot easily make claims of standing in moral extensionism for the simple reason that wholes so
conceived have no experiences,45 the land ethic roots moral relevance ontologically rather than
psychologically. For Leopold the ethical upshot is that biotic wholes such as ecosystems are the final
arbiter with respect to what qualifies as moral action. A thing is right when it tends to preserve the
integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise.46
Our advocacy comes first- educational spaces like debate should be an open space-
the affs attempts to exclude and regulate our kritik enforces a prison culture and
social death for minorities the debate space
Giroux 11 (Henry A. Giroux, Global TV Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University;
Shattered Bonds: Youth in the Suspect Society and the Politics of Disposability; 2011; PowerPlay Journal of
Educational Justice; pg. 6-7)JFIII

The hard war is more serious and dangerous for young people. It refers to the harshest elements, values, and
dictates of a growing youth-crime complex that increasingly governs poor minority youth through a
logic of punishment, surveillance, and control. For example, the imprint of the youth-crime complex is evident
in the increasingly popular practice of organizing schools through disciplinary practices that subject
them to constant surveillance through high tech security technologies while imposing upon them harsh and often
thoughtless zero tolerance policies that closely resemble the culture of prisons . In this instance, even
as the corporate state is in financial turmoil, it is transformed into a punishing state, and certain segments of the
youth population become the object of a new mode of governance based on the crudest forms of
disciplinary control. Poor minority youth have not just been excluded from the American dream but have
become utterly redundant and disposable, waste products of a society that no longer considers them of any value.
Such youth subjected to a form of racial and class dumping now experience a kind of social death as
they are pushed out of schools , denied job training opportunities, subjected to rigorous modes of surveillance and
criminal sanctions, viewed less as disadvantaged than as flawed consumers and civic felons. Under such circumstances,
matters of survival and disposability become central to how we think about and imagine not just
politics but the everyday existence of poor white and minority youth. As the social safety net and
protections unraveled in the last 30 years, the culture and administrative apparatus of the prison, operating
within the narrow registers of punishment and crime management, has become a core institution of American
society. In part, this is evident in the fact that over 7,000,000 people are now under the jurisdiction of some element of the
criminal justice system. Within this regime of harsh disciplinary control, there is no political or moral vocabulary for either
recognizing the systemic economic, social, and educational problems that young people face or for addressing what it means
for American society to invest seriously in the future of young people, especially poor minority and white youth. Instead of
being viewed as impoverished, minority youth are seen as lazy and shiftless; instead of being understood in terms
of how badly they are served by failing schools, many poor minority youth are labeled as uneducable and pushed
out of schools. Against the idealistic rhetoric of a nation that claims it venerates young people lies the reality of a society
that increasingly views youth through the optic of law and order, and is all too willing to treat them as criminals and when
necessary make them disappear into the farthest reaches of the carceral state.

The affs attempt to exclude us extends the racist securitization of schools into the
debate space and trades critical pedagogies for the logic of exclusion and securitization-
reject them for it
Giroux 11 (Henry A. Giroux, Global TV Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University;
Shattered Bonds: Youth in the Suspect Society and the Politics of Disposability; 2011; PowerPlay Journal of
Educational Justice; pg. 12-4)JFIII

The alarming physical and psychological violence directed at youth is also increasingly visible in many
public schools. As the logic of the market and the governing through crime complex frame a number of school policies,
students are now subjected to zero tolerance laws that are used primarily to humiliate, punish,
repress, and exclude them.1 For instance, according to the 2005 report Education on Lockdown, in Chicago in
February 2003, a 7-year-old boy was cuffed, shackled, and forced to lie face down for more than an hour while being
restrained by a security officer at Parker Community Academy on the Southwest Side. Neither the principal nor the assistant
principal came to the aid of the first grader, who was so traumatized by the event he was not able to return to school
(Education on Lockdown, 2003, p. 13). In another widely distributed news story accompanied by a disturbing video, a school-
based police officer brutally beat a 15-year-old special needs student because his shirt was not tucked into his pants. A few
months later, the same cop was charged with raping a young woman (Giroux, 2009). As the culture of fear, crime,
and repression embrace American public schools, especially inner city schools, the culture of
schooling is reconfigured through the allocation of resources used primarily to hire more police, security
staff, and purchase more technologies of control and surveillance. In some cases, schools such as those in the
Palm Beach County system have established their own police departments. Under such circumstances, schools begin to
take on the obscene and violent contours one associates with the all *too+ familiar procedures of
efficient prison management (Bauman, 2004, p. 82), including unannounced locker searches, armed police patrolling
the corridors, mandatory drug testing, and the ever present phalanx of lock-down security devices such as metal detectors,
X-ray machines, surveillance cameras, and other technologies of fear and control. The sociologist Randall Beger (2002) is right
in suggesting that the new security culture in public schools *has+ turned them into learning
prisons where the students unwittingly become guinea pigs to test the latest security devices (p.
120). Saturating schools with police and security personnel has created a host of problems for schools, teachers, and
studentsnot to mention that such practices tap into financial resources otherwise used for actually enhancing learning.
Trust and respect now give way to fear, disdain, and suspicion, creating an environment in which
critical pedagogical practices wither, while pedagogies of punishment, surveillance, and testing
flourish. Moreover, the combination of school punishments and criminal penalties has proven a lethal mix
for many poor and minority youth and has transformed too many schools from spaces of youth advocacy,
protection, hope, and equity to military fortresses, increasingly well-positioned to mete out injustice and
humiliation. Unfortunately, such policies and practices make it easier for young people to look upon their society and their
futures with suspicion and despair, rather than anticipation and hope.



Policy action is the only way to actually address issues of structural violence and
inequality
Giroux 11 (Henry A. Giroux, Global TV Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University;
Shattered Bonds: Youth in the Suspect Society and the Politics of Disposability; 2011; PowerPlay Journal of
Educational Justice; pg. 15-16)JFIII

One way of addressing our collapsing intellectual and moral visions regarding young people is to
imagine those policies, values, opportunities, and social relations that both invoke adult responsibility and
reinforce the ethical imperative to provide young people, especially those marginalized by race and class
with the economic, social, and educational conditions that make life livable and the future sustainable.
Clearly, the issue at stake here is not a one-off bailout or temporary fix but real structural reforms. At the very least, as
Dorothy Roberts (2008) has argued, this suggests fighting for a child welfare system that would reduce
family poverty by increasing the minimum wage, and mobilizing for legislation that would institute a guaranteed
income, provide high-quality subsidized child care, preschool education, and paid parental leaves for all families. (p. 268).
Young people need a federally funded jobs creation program and wage subsidy that would provide year round
employment for out-of-school youth and summer jobs that target in-school low income youth. Public and higher
education, increasingly shaped by corporate and instrumentalist values, must be reclaimed as democratic public
spheres committed to teaching young people about how to govern rather than merely be
governed . Incarceration should be the last resort not the first strategy for dealing with our children. Any viable notion of
educational reform must include equitable funding schemes for schools, reinforced by the recognition that
the problems facing public schools cannot be solved with corporate solutions or with law enforcement strategies. We need
to get the police out of public schools, greatly reduce spending for prisons and military expenditures and hire more
teachers, support staff, and community people in order to eliminate the school to prison pipeline.
In order to make life livable for young people and others, basic supports must be put in place such as a system of national
health insurance that covers everybody along with provisions for affordable housing. At the very least, we need to lower the
age of eligibility for Medicare to 55 in order to keep poor families from going bankrupt. And, of course, none of this will
take place unless the institutions, social relations, and values that legitimate and reproduce current
levels of inequality, power, and human suffering are dismantled. The widening gap between the rich and the
poor has to be addressed if young people are to have a viable future. And that requires pervasive structural reforms that
constitute a real shift in both power and politics away from a market driven system that views too many children as
disposable. We need to re-imagine what liberty, equality, and freedom might mean as truly democratic values and practices.

Solvency Deficit
Their ecomanagerialist methodology fails to solve due to the variability of Nature
Fairweather 93 (P.G., Graduate student at Macquarie University in Australia, now at the University of
Sydney, published many articles in scientific journals, Link between Ecology and Ecophilosophy, Ethics
and Requirements of Environmental Management, 1993,
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1442-9993.1993.tb00432.x/pdf) Mana-T

Krieger (1973) stated that our responses to natu- ral change ranged, in terms of increasing human
intervention, from using it (as an event), through manipulating it (to show natural phenomena) and to
stopping it (nature as a monument). It is also possible to accept it as part of the dynamism of nature.
Accepting natural change should be (i) a boost to ecology because more study is required for a thorough
understanding; (ii) a stimulus for scien- tists because unexpected phenomena are more likely; and (iii) a
challenge to ecophilosophy be- cause nature isn't static and predictable; it is instead a richer, more
complex and interesting case altogether. If we ignore change we will be wrong about the nature of
nature and we'll never be able to discriminate between acceptable and unaccept- able human
perturbations (Botkin 1990), nor dis- tinguish these from natural, albeit perhaps uncom- mon, events.
There is an ontological dimension to studying variability as opposed to assuming a balance, just as Sober
(1988) points out that our methods of induc- tion, parsimony and correlation presuppose that nature is
uniform, simple and run by common causes, respectively. Sober also pointed out that historical
processes that destroy information are very hard to infer about; many ecological processes are of this
sort. Lacking a background understand- ing of natural variation, we must then rely on assumptions
and expectations about how nature should be. All change is somewhat or somehow bad in a constant
world ruled by ideas of balance, there- fore such assumptions are important and we should explicate
and explore them. For example, our atti- tudes to the crown-of-thorns starfish consuming coral on the
Great Barrier Reef are largely deter- mined by how we view this phenomenon fitting 'into' our
conception of nature. Different assump- tions about how ecosystems act tend to decide whether this
is a natural phenomenon manifesting stochastic disturbance within a dynamic com- munity, or that it
is a human-induced imposition upon a balanced, orderly and predictable (either invariant or cyclic)
nature. Under the former view we would be reluctant to act because the starfish plague phenomenon
would be seen as part of nature. If we hold the latter view then our willing- ness to act to 'correct' this
'problem' is justified, even if we run the risk of assuming that every un- usual event is a human-
induced disaster.


Answers To
AT: green capitalism

Their claims of green capitalism is simply a performance to frame elitists as central
in the struggle to save the environment- this hides an inherent contradiction within
their agenda that requires the destruction of the environment to temporarily sustain
their constant capitalist expansion
Prudham 9 (Scott Prudham; Department of Geography and Centre for Environment, University of Toronto,
Toronto; Pimping climate change: Richard Branson, global warming, and the performance of green capitalism;
Environment and Planning A; April 9, 2009; pgs. 2-3;
http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/students/envs_4800/prudham_2009.pdf)JFIII

The paper features two interrelated arguments. First, Branson's announcements (particularly the first one) point to a
central contradiction in the green capitalist agenda . This agenda pivots in large measure on the
problematic suggestion that more sustainable futures can be secured via capitalist investment and
entrepreneurial innova- tion. Whatever truth there may be in particular cases, this obscures the relentless,
restless, and growth-dependent character of capitalism's distinct metabolism, an argu- ment most closely
associated with the work of Bellamy Foster (Clark and York, 2005; Foster, 2000), but which draws in turn on Karl Marx. The
metabolism critique right- fully identifies a tendency in capitalist political economies for aggregate throughput
of material and energy to grow, outstripping any efficiency gains (ie the so-called `Jevons paradox'). But
accumulation for accumulation's sake also entails dynamic confronta- tion, transformation, and redefinition of material, social,
and cultural conditions in ways that confound coherent articulation of any notion of fixed `limits' (including
ecological ones) to continued expansion. This essentially qualitative problem originates in the microeconomics of the
entrepreneurial subject who is compelled to accumulate on an expanded scale if only to reproduce himself or herself. What
results is a systemic logic of the production of new natures integrally connected to the production of space and uneven
development more generally (Smith, 2008 [1984]) the anarchic, restless drive to accumulate capital as an end
in and of itself. Thus, I argue that, when thinking of capitalism's so-called `biospheric rift' (Clark and York, 2005), it is
crucial to attend not only to quantities of aggregate material and energy throughput, but also to issues of quality. Secondly,
focus on the elite entrepreneurial or bourgeois subject points to the need for a politico-cultural
perspective on green capitalism as a sort of `drama' which must be performed . That is, the viability of
green capitalism is not only an `objective' question of whether or not entrepreneurial energy, unleashed by neoliberalized
green markets, can give rise to sustainable technoeconomic trajectories. Rather, it is also a political agenda whose
viability turns on whether or not capitalism and environmen- talism are seen subjectively to be
compatible. Seen in this way, green capitalism has interwoven material ^ semiotic dimensions (Haraway, 1997), one
central facet of which is the `performance' of the entrepreneurial subject as environmental crusader.
Perform- ances such as Branson's not only stage the political and cultural fusion of capitalism and environmentalism as green
capitalism; they also act to augment the economic foundations of bourgeois power by making the
entrepreneur a central figure in climate policy, and, by extension, environmentalism.
Managing the environment has inherent capitalist connotations
Luke 99 (Timothy, Executive Director of the Institute for Distance and Distributed Learning, the
Director of Graduate Studies in the Department of Political Science, and Co-Director of the Center for
Digital Discourse and Culture in the College of Arts and Sciences at Virginia Polytechnic., Book Eco-
Managerialism: Environmental Studies as a Power/Knowledge Formation., Interview about
the book 06/1999, http://aurora.icaap.org/index.php/aurora/article/view/79/91)

What is an economic impact? Ecological management and ecological engineering are exciting in a
lot of places. I don't know if you have an engineering school here, do you? Well we have an
engineering program in our engineer school, at the Polytechnic Institute. One of the big things in the
engineering schools, we have a "Green" engineering program. If you look at the green engineering
program, you kind of wonder, what is the green in engineering that you're worried about? Is the
green the nature of the environment - grass, trees, leaves and algae, all that kind of stuff? Or is the
green money? What is going on? In many ways, green engineering and ecological engineering is about
efficiency. It is the recognition that all kinds of things that we do now that are supposedly high
science and technology are in fact stuff that's been in place for a long time. They didn't think about
efficiency that much. What they instead thought about was getting it done. As it got done, it was
done very inefficiently. So finding new efficiencies in production is in fact a good thing. It has both
economic benefits and ecological benefits. Here I guess I would say yes, it would be nice if a
revolution occurred. And yes, it would be nice if, when the revolution occurred, everything got
better. But I'm getting up there in years, and the revolution's not occurring. One wonders if it will.
In the meantime, it's quite clearly the case that many things that are irrational in the economy have
deleterious ecological impact. Is it better to train people to be green engineers and engineer this
ecological damage out of the existing capital structure of this society, and try to reduce those kinds of
bad environmental impacts? Is that more desirable than letting it continue? An interesting choice. If
it is more desirable to engineer it out, then to educate people to do that would seem to be a good
thing. If it is less desirable to do, and that in turn promotes a revolution, well I don't know. Maybe it
does. But an orthodox Marxist would say, you're not going to get the real revolution until the final
rationalization of the means of production has totally occurred. You have a complete
revolutionization of the means of production, where it is no longer necessary for any human being to
work simply to reproduce their life energies, because things have become so productive, so
rational, that really just represents political exploitation. So maybe you're back to that position of
pushing the full rationalization of the capitalist means of production to the point of its completion
before you get the revolution. To me, a great Marxist text is Star Trek. When we have a point
where, oh I'm hungry so I'm going to go down there and punch in a couple of codes on the
replicator panel. No money's involved, and I get whatever I want, the total rationalization of the
means of production. You just punch a couple of buttons and get anything you want. You get a
steak, you get a guitar, you get a book. Pretty cool. The total rationalization of the means of
production. Nobody's exploited that we see. Maybe somebody behind the panel is producing this,
but it happens pretty fast. That is the full rationalization of the means of production. We're not
there yet. Anything you do to get there, is that good? Does that promote better ecological living? I
don't know. That is a political choice. I see a lot of merit in making things less destructive and more
efficient, because it's not going to destroy more of the earth. But, you do remain caught within this
mode of production. But when you do that, does it invite you to think about why you're doing it and
how you're doing it? Do we even need this? That's an interesting problem. Today in the National
Post on the Op Ed page there was a thing in there celebrating some local carpet maker who'd read
Hawkin's book, Natural Capitalism. He's a good guy. What he did was has rationalized the
production of carpet, that he's producing less waste, he's producing less pollution, he's making
better carpets, his workers are happier and healthier, and everything is better. Because he
recognized, unlike most other capitalists, that what he did was really inefficient, anti-ecological, and
destructive of how the workers were doing things. Is that a good place to start, because in the
meantime what it does is make perhaps everybody's life slightly better. It takes these deleterious
ecological impacts out of the production cycle, and maybe moves us closer to the point where the
replicator panel becomes real. And then maybe even to the point where people say, why do I need
carpet anyway? We pump out oil to produce something to put on the floor that just gets dirty and
does all kinds of weird stuff. I've always thought carpet was a weird thing. But why do we need to
live with wall-to-wall carpet? All of those kinds of things are interesting questions. I sympathize with
what you're saying. The bigger question here is kind of the reproduction of the global economy. But
to ask that question is the meta-economic question. To live in another mode of production, we all
know, this is happening in your lifetime, that capitalism has triumphed and that there is no other
way to live. This is the best it's going to be. This is the ultimate. This is the end of history. This is
numero uno. There's nothing better than this. That's the current discourse. Challenging that kind of
thing is in some sense what would have to be done if you're going to get this kind of ecological
transformation. Or making this mode of production as ecological as it can be, so that it doesn't
destroy the carrying capacity that even sustains this pretty flawed mode of production. Because
that seems to be what we're getting, if you believe the global modeller types, that capitalism is so
successful at producing goods, that it's destroying the wherewithal that make the goods productive.
AT: Impact D/turns OR epistemology framing
Their impact claims are unverifiable- the basis of the evidence comes from
managerialized experts that offer no external accountability
Igoe 8 (Jim Igoe; Dartmouth College, Department of Anthropology; How to Build an Eco-Functional Planet: the
Paradoxical Assumptions Behind the Pervasive Belief that Market-Driven Managerialism is the Key to Our
Ecological Future; London: International Institute for Environment and Development; 2008)JFIII

Another aspect of the managerial/market-driven worldview is that most of what it tells us is
unverifiable. People buying fair trade coffee, conservation salsa, or carbon offsets have no way of
making sure that the relationships and processes that the products promise actually operate in real
life as promised by product marketing. The matter becomes even more complex when dealing with large-
scale interventions. Thus World Bank experts assured an audience at the World Conservation Congress that the Nam
Theun Hydroelectric Project was planned and executed according to expert understandings of the world, and thus on the
whole a very positive thing. Economic experts had determined that the best way to bring economic growth to Laos was by
building hydroelectric dams. These dams flooded rainforest ecosystems, but the bank made sure that new protected areas
were created as an environmental mitigation. People were obviously displaced by both the dams and the protected areas, but
they were resettled in new villages where their basic needs have been met and they are being absorbed by new livelihood
activities such as commercial agriculture, agro-forestry, and basket weaving. According to World Bank social
mitigation experts, all the relocated people were satisfied. If people in the audience knew a relocated
person who was dissatisfied then they should contact the World Bank right away. Similarly, my work in
Tanzania revolves around an African Wildlife Foundation's Heartland's Initiative, which has used experts to identify key
conservation landscapes and determine the needs of key species within those landscapes. The organization has partnered
with African Governments to manage these landscapes in to ensure that 'the needs of people and landscapes are balanced.'
This entails getting people to move out of areas that are essential to wildlife migration while helping to foster new types of
ownership and enterprise that will allow them to prosper from wildlife conservation. Media representations claim that
these interventions will transform these landscapes so that they function 'ecologically and
economically' (Igoe forthcoming). While such claims fit seamlessly with the logic of the managerial/market-
driven worldview, they are ultimately unverifiable. For western consumers a purchase or donation is
the only verifiable act in the complex web of socio-ecological relationships and processes in which they are
participating. More concretely, interventions like Nam Theun and African Heartlands have all of sorts socio-
ecological impacts that do not register in the ways that they are ultimately represented to the world.
We currently lack any sort of systematic mechanisms for understanding their aggregate socio-ecological effects beyond what
we are shown by the managerial/marketdriven worldview. This is an especially alarming development, since
interventions such as these come in all shapes and sizes and are proliferating on a global scale. Their socio-ecological effects
are also proliferating on a global scale, and thus need to be understood.

AT: Perm
Non-western environmentalisms are crushed by the colonialist eco-managerialist view
Luke 99 (Timothy, Executive Director of the Institute for Distance and Distributed Learning, the
Director of Graduate Studies in the Department of Political Science, and Co-Director of the Center for
Digital Discourse and Culture in the College of Arts and Sciences at Virginia Polytechnic., Book Eco-
Managerialism: Environmental Studies as a Power/Knowledge Formation., interview about the book, 06/1999,
http://aurora.icaap.org/index.php/aurora/article/view/79/91) Mana-T
To me that's a really interesting question. Because I think it's not addressed at all in most environmental programs. There are
environmentalisms that are non-western, non-North American, indigenous, that really presume a
different (and this is an odd word but it's the only way I know how to express it), a different kind of
meta-economy. An economy, which is not tied to the production and consumption of commodities.
It's tied to the production and consumption of use values. If one looked at it anthropologically, it
would be feudalistic, hunter/gathering, it's just a different engagement materially with the earth that
non-western colonized peoples had and have in the confrontation with colonialism. Given the choice, how
would you choose to live? Well, when I was younger, I thought, "I'd really like to go follow the buffalo." That would be a great way to live. You
just follow around your food source, your shelter source, your clothing source. That would be a great way to live. But there aren't very many
buffalo left these days. But those kinds of issues are other economies or ecologies have been crushed by
colonialism. There are other ways of engaging with the earth that have been destroyed in the mono-
productive qualities of the global economy, which is where we're at now. I think some, whatever you want to call
them, environmentalisms in developing countries, underdeveloped states, whatever, raise those kinds of questions. How might we live
otherwise with the earth? Yet in turn they would be seen as essentially quaint or anachronistic, because it would be very difficult to live that
way at this level of population for most societies. But they present that challenge. I think the other thing that is raised by that is just a different
vision of nature or a different vision of divinity, a different vision of humanity together that is not shared by global transnational capitalism.
That also rests in the experience of colonized peoples. Finally, of course, there's the environmental racism question, that
colonized peoples are poor, powerless, and it's pretty convenient to dump stuff that nobody else
wants on them. The environmental justice movements in a lot of places have raised those issues. But the problem with them
often is, and while I see what they're doing and one must respect it, it sometimes becomes a "where's
my share" sort of thing. It accepts the existing system and it basically says, "I want to be in the
existing system and I want to be at the top of the chain instead of the bottom of the chain." That's
how the system presents justice. It's who does it to whom and who gets stuck with the cost, which is the power of the existing
mode of production. And yes, I think an environmental studies curriculum for the 21st century must bring those kinds of issues into the study of
environmental affairs, because they largely have not been in it in many places. I haven't thought about that as much as I could, because it leads
you to re-examine everything, colonialism, western expansion, how everything works together. It's very complex, but even when you start
getting into it a little bit you see that that's a very unifying thread for a lot of these problems.
AT:Perm w/ colonialism
The alternative is mutually exclusive with the colonialist domination of the 1AC, and is
uniquely good for education
Luke 99 (Timothy, Executive Director of the Institute for Distance and Distributed Learning, the Director of
Graduate Studies in the Department of Political Science, and Co-Director of the Center for Digital Discourse and
Culture in the College of Arts and Sciences at Virginia Polytechnic., Book Eco-Managerialism: Environmental
Studies as a Power/Knowledge Formation., interview about the book,
06/1999, http://aurora.icaap.org/index.php/aurora/article/view/79/91) JFIII
To me that's a really interesting question. Because I think it's not addressed at all in most environmental programs. There are
environmentalisms that are non-western, non-North American, indigenous, that really presume a
different (and this is an odd word but it's the only way I know how to express it), a different kind of meta-economy. An
economy, which is not tied to the production and consumption of commodities. It's tied to the production and
consumption of use values. If one looked at it anthropologically, it would be feudalistic, hunter/gathering, it's just a
different engagement materially with the earth that non-western colonized peoples had and have in
the confrontation with colonialism. Given the choice, how would you choose to live? Well, when I was younger, I
thought, "I'd really like to go follow the buffalo." That would be a great way to live. You just follow around your food source,
your shelter source, your clothing source. That would be a great way to live. But there aren't very many buffalo left these days.
But those kinds of issues are other economies or ecologies have been crushed by colonialism. There are
other ways of engaging with the earth that have been destroyed in the mono-productive qualities of the
global economy, which is where we're at now. I think some, whatever you want to call them, environmentalisms in
developing countries, underdeveloped states, whatever, raise those kinds of questions. How might we live
otherwise with the earth? Yet in turn they would be seen as essentially quaint or anachronistic, because it would be very
difficult to live that way at this level of population for most societies. But they present that challenge. I think the other thing
that is raised by that is just a different vision of nature or a different vision of divinity, a different vision of
humanity together that is not shared by global transnational capitalism. That also rests in the experience of
colonized peoples. Finally, of course, there's the environmental racism question, that colonized peoples
are poor, powerless, and it's pretty convenient to dump stuff that nobody else wants on them. The
environmental justice movements in a lot of places have raised those issues. But the problem with them often is,
and while I see what they're doing and one must respect it, it sometimes becomes a "where's my share" sort of
thing. It accepts the existing system and it basically says, "I want to be in the existing system and I want to be at the top of the
chain instead of the bottom of the chain." That's how the system presents justice. It's who does it to whom and who gets stuck
with the cost, which is the power of the existing mode of production. And yes, I think an environmental studies
curriculum for the 21st century must bring those kinds of issues into the study of environmental affairs,
because they largely have not been in it in many places. I haven't thought about that as much as I could,
because it leads you to re-examine everything, colonialism, western expansion, how everything works
together. It's very complex, but even when you start getting into it a little bit you see that that's a very unifying thread for a
lot of these problems.


Your impacts disrupt the managerial ecoconomy
Luke 99 (Timothy, Executive Director of the Institute for Distance and Distributed Learning, the
Director of Graduate Studies in the Department of Political Science, and Co-Director of the Center for
Digital Discourse and Culture in the College of Arts and Sciences at Virginia Polytechnic., Book Eco-
Managerialism: Environmental Studies as a Power/Knowledge Formation., Interview about the book
06/1999, http://aurora.icaap.org/index.php/aurora/article/view/79/91)

I don't know about that. I think we can get out of it. The question is, how do you get out of it? You
could have a nuclear war. You could have a big bio-terrorist accident or attack. You could have an
asteroid hit things and mess it up. There's a lot of ways to disrupt the global economy globally, which
would get you out of it. You'd have to start back at some previous state. But making a conscious
choice to get from where we're at now to whatever would seem to be a more "rational, ecological"
way of doing things, will basically require, sadly enough, a value change. People have to value doing
things differently. I think over time, in the past what, 50 years there has been a radical value change in
terms of how we deal with the environment. There's far more environmental awareness now than
there was 50 years ago. Are things better environmentally now than they were 50 years ago? In some
ways they are. So in some sense, keeping on this general track of self-reflection and change is not an
inconsiderable development. But what really needs to be done is, as we probably know, a complete
new reconstitution of the way we live. Which gets us back to not thinking about environmental issues
solely as environment. In many ways, the problems with how we live are right there in front of you
with the urban structure of this city. It's miles across, and to do things in your day you might have to
consume a lot of hydrocarbon energy to do things. You buy stuff that comes here from all over the
world, much of which could maybe be made or produced pretty much closer to here. But that doesn't
happen, because all of us are encouraged not to make or produce things close to where you live,
because that's what losers do. You don't want to be a loser, you want to be a winner. The whole script
and package of everyday life contains the environmental crisis within it. How do you get people to see
that and then decide to live differently, and make it their problem, not somebody else's problem, i.e.
"Oh that's good for somebody else to do, but not for me. I've got mine jack and stick it where the sun
don't shine for you, because I'm not going to change." Which has been the traditional problem of
environmental change. I'm on top and I'm going stay there. Maybe my children or your children can
live a life where everybody rides a bicycle, eats granola, and has no TV. But right now, this is pretty
good. So that's a big problem. It's a value change and if it's going to start it starts here, it starts in
North America.
AT: Neoliberalism
Conflicting conceptions of neoliberalism makes resistance impossible
Barnett 05 (Clive Barnett; Professor of Geography and Social Theory at Exeter University; Ph.D. Philosophy,
Geography, Oxford University; The consolations of neoliberalism; 1 January 2005; Geoforum Volume 36,
Issue 1)JFIII

Judging by recent conference papers, journal articles, and the like, it seems that a reconciliation of a political-
economy analysis of neoliberalism with a poststructuralist analysis of advanced liberalism is well under
way. Commenting on this trend, Larner (2003) suggests that poststructuralist accounts that draw upon Foucaults scattered
ruminations on governmentality can usefully supplement the prevalent Marxist analysis of neoliberalism and neoliberalization.
The Foucauldian approach is recommended because it is more attuned to the contingency and unanticipated consequences of
neoliberal agendas. However, at the risk of re-opening a set of debates that may or may not be hackneyed, I want to
suggest that the Marxist and Foucauldian approaches are not necessarily as easily reconciled as it might
seem. They imply different models of the nature of explanatory concepts; different models of causality and
determination; different models of social relations and agency; and different normative understandings
of political power. We should not finesse these differences away by presuming that the two
approaches converge around a common real-world referent, so-called neoliberalism. By consolidating the
taken-for-granted reference to neoliberalism, this convergence between Marxist and Foucauldian approaches installs a
narrative that is even more disabling than stories about globalization. The common usage of neoliberalism as a descriptive
concept and of neoliberalization as an explanatory concept reproduces a narrative in which recent history is understood in
terms of a motivated shift away from public-collective values to private-individualistic values. Stories about
neoliberalism thereby succeed only in finessing a set of interminable conflicts between equally
compelling values of individualism and collectivism, autonomy and responsibility, freedom and obligation. They do so by
aligning themselves with a one-sided picture of what liberalism is concerned with. Liberalism has its roots in the affirmation of
the moral sovereignty of the individual, expressed in the principle of equality. Historically, liberalisms commitment to equality
as a political principle generates a tendency to use the power of the state to extend equality and oppose inequality. Herein lies
the source of the apparent incongruity noted by Nagel above, whereby liberalism names both the defence of liberty
against undue state intervention as well as the opposite doctrine, according to which state power
should be deployed to ensure the conditions of equal liberty. This incongruity in meaning points to a set of
conflicts of value which are not easily resolvable, unless one is happy to accept the idea that any and all political conflict is really
an expression of the seamless unfolding of the latent contradictions of capitalism. Liberalism is one tradition of thought,
amongst others, that is concerned with elucidating the conditions for living peaceably with interminable conflicts of value,
guided by the hope of progress but without the fantasy of transcendence. It seems entirely plausible to suppose that some of
Foucaults later writings might throw new light upon the established dilemmas of liberal thought. But whatever potential
Foucaults ideas might have in this respect is likely to be annulled if those ideas are instrumentalized for the purposes of shoring
up the holes in Marxist narratives of neoliberalism.











Aff Answers
Systems of sustainable development through market management practices are
already being implemented and solve the environment and poverty- the alt risks a
turn away from existing sustainable trends
Huberman and Gallagher 7 (David Huberman is a Deputy manager and Coordinator of the Green
Economy at the IUCN, studied at Duke and the University of Geneva / Ms. Louise Gallagher (Ph.D.),
Consultant, UNEP Chemicals Branch; Developing International Payments for Ecosystem Services
Towards a greener world economy; The United Nations Environment Programme; 2007)JFIII

The unifying language of ecosystem services Talk of ecosystem services has recently risen to the forefront of environmental
discussions. Studied extensively in the recently completed Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA), this increasingly popular topic offers
an enhanced perspective on the many ways in which the natural environment sustains and fulfills human life. Some typical
examples of ecosystem services are the provision of genetic resources for medicine and
biotechnology, plant pollination, carbon sequestration, and soil formation. Biodiversity, which is an
integral component of ecosystem functioning, plays a fundamental role in determining the delivery of these
services. The MA reported that 60 to 70% of our worlds ecosystem services are deteriorating, with dramatic consequences for
those who are most dependent on their steady provision, such as subsistence farmers. Throughout the MA, the ecosystem services
concept is used to highlight the relationship between human welfare and natural wealth. The attractiveness of the
ecosystem services concept is also largely due to its capacity to provide a unifying language
between the economic, business and environmental communities; as beneficiaries of valuable services are
identified, previously uninvolved actors are recognizing that they have a stake in conserving the
environment. This offers a strategic opportunity to further engage economic policy makers and the private sector in conservation
efforts. Services are a large and increasingly important sector of all economies. Ecosystem services, however, are hardly comparable to a
haircut or a car wash. Most significantly, ecosystem services are hard to put a price on. Indeed, when dealing with natural phenomena
that are often considered to be free or public goods, it is not always easy to define exactly what an ecosystem service is, who benefits
from it, and who should be rewarded for its provision. Despite its novelty, the concept of ecosystem services is
already shaping environmental policies and actions. Researchers and practitioners have
developed considerable expertise and experience on the theory and practice of payments for ecosystem
services (PES). The next challenge is to develop and extend this knowledge to a wider range of environmental challenges and
contexts. The privatization of Nature? By offering economic incentives for maintaining ecosystem services,
PES operates on the basis that market forces can offer an efficient and effective means of
supporting sustainable development objectives. One of the key advantages of PES is its potential to tap additional
sources of funding by creating new demand for environmental goods and services. The idea of creating
markets for ecosystems is hard for some to accept. Understandably so; it is indeed unusual to conceive of Mother
Nature as a marketable asset. Yet nature is an asset. Its values may be difficult to quantify, but they are
definitely real. By considering the global ecosystem as the provider of indispensable goods and services (i.e. natural capital), we are
just one step away from creating markets for the flows of services that nature provides. If doing so can yield positive results
for both people and nature, why hold back? The question is whether the establishment of PES will provide
additional social and environmental benefits at an acceptable cost. We need to remain focused on the larger picture. The end goal is
not market creation, but sustainable development. Consequently, PES should not be seen as an end in itself, but rather as a
specific policy tool to be handled with care and applied where it can deliver the desired results. By valuing the economic
benefits of ecosystems, PES is achieving more than simply creating new markets; it is highlighting the critical
importance of natural capital in our global economy. Natural resources are indeed becoming increasingly limited by
urbanization and economic growth. PES schemes can serve as a catalyst for the major behavioral shifts that are
necessary for our descendants to inherit a healthy and viable planet. Taking it global One of the most
widespread and easily understood forms of PES is a transaction between downstream water users and upstream landowners to secure
the water-related benefits of a sustainably managed watershed (e.g. flow regulation, filtration, and erosion control) (see figure 1). But
the PES model has a much wider application. The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) under the Kyoto Protocol is an
example of a truly international PES scheme, whereby carbon sequestration projects in developing countries are
paid for by polluters in developed countries. While the CDM has attracted criticism, there is hope that the basic
idea of channeling sustainable investments from North to South can be reinforced through
other international PES (IPES) systems. The IPES concept can be apprehended at two distinct levels, depending on
whether we are considering (i) ecosystem services of global significance (e.g. provision of genetic information, climate regulation, etc.),
or (ii) ecosystem services that have more regional effects (e.g. watershed protection, storm buffering, etc.). Fitting both into a common
framework capable of integrating a variety of PES schemes will inevitably imply a multi-scale approach.
The ecosystem services beneficiary-provider connection can also be framed in the context of global
poverty reduction. Thus, IPES could help to redress the balance of inequitable and unsustainable economic
relations in an increasingly integrated global economy. The international scaling-up of PES from downstream-
upstream payments would translate to North-South or core-periphery payments. Such payments
could help support the sustainable development of communities currently marginalized by the process
of globalization. The potential scope of IPES is very broad and it is easy to get lost in alternative definitions and objectives. From
a practical perspective, it can be helpful to think in terms of when, where, and how IPES has the most potential. As previously mentioned,
PES is a specific policy tool, not a one-size-fits-all model for sustainable development. This begs the question: what types of situations are
most suitable for an IPES fix? Conservation for sustainable development The primary objective of PES is to correct
market failures that have negative effects on ecosystems. Biodiversity conservation can be considered
an implicit objective of this approach. Biodiversity not only defines a natural or cultural landscape, but also offers a vital
contribution to the productivity of ecosystems. Moreover, by maintaining and strengthening the capacity of an ecosystem to cope with
changes, biodiversity holds a tremendous insurance value, especially to those societies most
vulnerable to environmental degradation and disasters. By promoting a greater appreciation of the values of
biodiversity, IPES can help finance ecosystem restoration and conservation in many places. The main objective of IPES
would thus be to support sustainable development through biodiversity conservation at a global
scale. Such an effort will need to be wary of eventual trade-offs: conservation projects that support the delivery of a given ecosystem
service may conflict with the provision of other ecosystem services, or may hinder other development activities. Consequently, it is
important to consider the use of PES not just as an incentive for conservation, but more generally as an incentive for more sustainable
land-use in inhabited landscapes. In other words, communities living in areas considered sources of ecosystem
services should be better off with IPES than without it.
Biodiversity conservation solves multiple scenarios for extinction
Department of Environment 93 (Austrialian Department of Environment; Biodiversity and its value;
1993; Biodiversity Series, paper no. 1)JFIII *blocks= warrants for extinction

The sheer diversity of life is of inestimable value. It provides a foundation for the continued existence of a
healthy planet and our own well-being. Many biologists now believe that ecosystems rich in diversity gain greater resilience and
are therefore able to recover more readily from stresses such as drought or human induced habitat
degradation. When ecosystems are diverse, there is a range of pathways for primary production and ecological
processes such as nutrient cycling, so that if one is damaged or destroyed, an alternative pathway may be used and the ecosystem
can continue functioning at its normal level. If biological diversity is greatly diminished, the functioning of
ecosystems is put at risk. Possibly the greatest value of the variety of life may be the opportunities it gives us
for adapting to change. The unknown potential of genes, species and ecosystems is of inestimable but certainly high value. Genetic
diversity will enable breeders to tailor crops to new climatic conditions, while the Earth's biota is likely to
hold still undiscovered cures for known and emerging diseases. A multiplicity of genes, species, and ecosystems is a
resource that can be tapped as human needs change. There is possibly no single particular argument which on its own, provides sufficient
grounds for attempting to maintain all existing biological diversity. A more general and pragmatic approach, however, recognises that different
but equally valid arguments resource values, precautionary values, ethics and aesthetics, and simple self-interest apply in different
cases, and between them provide an overwhelmingly powerful and convincing case for the conservation of
biological diversity. The many values of biological diversity and its importance for development indicate why biological diversity
conservation differs from traditional nature conservation. Biological diversity conservation entails a shift from a
reactive posture protecting nature from the impacts of development to a proactive effort seeking to meet peoples'
needs from biological resources while ensuring the long-term ecological sustainability of Earth's biotic
wealth. On a global level it thus involves not only the protection of wild species and their habitats but also the safeguarding of the genetic
diversity of cultivated and domesticated species and their wild relatives. The conservation of biological diversity seeks to maintain the
life-support system provided by nature in all its variety, and the living resources essential for
ecologically sustainable development.
Restoration management of the Earth is key
Luke 99 (Timothy, Executive Director of the Institute for Distance and Distributed Learning, the
Director of Graduate Studies in the Department of Political Science, and Co-Director of the Center for
Digital Discourse and Culture in the College of Arts and Sciences at Virginia Polytechnic., Book Eco-
Managerialism: Environmental Studies as a Power/Knowledge Formation., nterview about the book,
06/1999, http://aurora.icaap.org/index.php/aurora/article/view/79/91) Mana-T

So a restoration managerialism is a recognition that lies at the root of many environmental problems
that has sparked a reaction so intense that many called for going beyond rehabilitation and returning to
some status quo anti. The call is first stop exploiting nature's endowments, and then move towards
restoring those sites in systems that have been most abused. Ecological restoration, however, is a very
tricky proposition, because what is to be restored? How will it be reclaimed? Who must revive what has
been damaged, and exactly which prior state of existence is to be privileged as the state of
restoration? Most appeals for restoration are made on aesthetic grounds. But restoration management
has also developed more macrological engagements for maintaining the integrity of the earth's
carrying capacity. In this respect, restoration managerialism focuses upon mobilizing all of the
biological, physical, and social sciences to address the major economic and political affects of current
environmental problems. Their resourcifications allow ecosystem managers to infrastructuralize all of
the earth's ecologies in the name of an almost complete restoration for some biomes, bioregions or
biosystems. The earth becomes, if only in terms of contemporary technoscience, an immense terrestrial
engine. Serving as the human race's ecological support system, it has, with only the occasional
localized failures (as restorationists like to say), provided services upon which human society depends
consistently and without charge. As the environmental infrastructure of technoscientific production,
the earth then can continue to generate these ecosystem services or their derivative products of
natural systems, but only if they are restored. So this complex system of systems is what must survive,
and its outputs include of course what we know: the generation of soils, the regeneration of plant
nutrients, the capture of solar energy, the conversion of that solar energy into biomass, the
accumulation, purification and distribution of water, the control of pests, the provision of a genetic
library, the maintenance of breathable air, the control of micro and macro climates, pollination of
plants, diversification of animal species, development of buffering mechanisms in eco-catastrophes.
And, at the end of the day, some aesthetic enrichment to make it all seem worthwhile. Because it is
the true capital stock of trans-national enterprise, the planet's ecology requires such highly disciplined
treatment in order to restore some of its original capacities, and then guide perhaps its subsequent
sustainable use. Restoring as much or as many as possible of these ecosystems is very important,
because it might even bring back some almost extinct ecosystems to enlarge our existing carrying
capacity. That in turn leads to another engagement, which is renewables managerialism

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