Gago v.

Mamuyac
49:902| Saranillo

FACTS:
Miguel Mamuyac died on January 2, 1922. It appears from the record that Miguel executed a last will and
testament on July 27, 1918. Gago presented such will for probate which was opposed by Cornelio Mamuyac et. al. Said
petition for probate was denied on the ground that the deceased executed another will on April 16, 1919. Gago
presented the April 16 will for probate which was again opposed by Cornelio et. al. alleging that the will presented by
Gago is a carbon copy of the original April 16 will; such will was cancelled during the lifetime of the deceased; and that
said will was not the last will and testament of the deceased. The RTC found that the deceased executed another will on
December 30, 1920.

ISSUE:

W/N the April 16 will was cancelled.

HELD:
YES. With reference to the said cancellation, it may be stated that there is positive proof, not denied, which was
accepted by the lower court, that will in question had been cancelled in 1920. The law does not require any evidence of
the revocation or cancellation of a will to be preserved. It therefore becomes difficult at times to prove the revocation or
cancellation of wills. The fact that such cancellation or revocation has taken place must either remain unproved of be
inferred from evidence showing that after due search the original will cannot be found. Where a will which cannot be
found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of
other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown
that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will
has been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator. The force of the presumption
of cancellation or revocation by the testator, while varying greatly, being weak or strong according to the circumstances,
is never conclusive, but may be overcome by proof that the will was not destroyed by the testator with intent to revoke it.
In view of the fact that the original will of 1919 could not be found after the death of the testator Miguel Mamuyac and in
view of the positive proof that the same had been cancelled, we are forced to the conclusion that the conclusions of the
lower court are in accordance with the weight of the evidence. In a proceeding to probate a will the burden of proofs is
upon the proponent clearly to establish not only its execution but its existence. Having proved its execution by the
proponents, the burden is on the contestant to show that it has been revoked. In a great majority of instances in which
wills are destroyed for the purpose of revoking them there is no witness to the act of cancellation or destruction and all
evidence of its cancellation perishes with the testator. Copies of wills should be admitted by the courts with great
caution. When it is proven, however, by proper testimony that a will was executed in duplicate and each copy was
executed with all the formalities and requirements of the law, then the duplicate may be admitted in evidence when it is
made to appear that the original has been lost and was not cancelled or destroyed by the testator


Casiano v. CA
158 SCRA 451 | Sia

FACTS:
On October 20, 1963, Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs her niece and nephews, the petitioners Aldina
Maloto-Casiano and Constancio, Maloto, and the private respondents Panfilo Maloto and Felino Maloto. Believing that
the deceased did not leave behind a last will and testament, these four heirs commenced on November 4, 1963 an
intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunt's estate in the CFI of Iloilo. While the case was still pending the
parties Aldina, Constancio, Panfilo, and Felino executed an agreement of extrajudicial settlement of Adriana's
estate. The agreement provided for the division of the estate into four equal parts among the parties. The Malotos then
presented the extrajudicial settlement agreement to the trial court for approval which the court did on March 21, 1964.
3 years later, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former associate of Adriana's counsel, the late Atty. Eliseo Hervas, discovered a
document entitled "KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento)," dated January 3,1940, and purporting to be
the last will and testament of Adriana. Atty. Palma claimed to have found the testament, the original copy, while he was
going through some materials inside the cabinet drawer formerly used by Atty. Hervas. The document was submitted to
the clerk of court of the Iloilo CFI. Incidentally, while Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in the said will, Aldina
and Constancio are bequeathed much bigger and more valuable shares in the estate of Adriana than what they
received by virtue of the agreement of extrajudicial settlement they had earlier signed. The will likewise gives devises
and legacies to other parties, among them being the petitioners Asilo de Molo, the Roman Catholic Church of Molo, and
Purificacion Miraflor.
Aldina and Constancio, joined by the other devisees and legatees named in the will, filed in the same court
which approved the EJ settelement a motion for reconsideration and annulment of the proceedings therein and for the
allowance of the will which was denied by the CFI. Upon petition to the SC for certiorari and mandamus, the SC
dismissed that petition and advised that a separate proceeding for the probate of the alleged will would be the
appropriate vehicle to thresh out the matters raised by the petitioners. The CFI and CA found that the will to be
probated had been revoked by the burning thereof by the housemaid upon instruction of the testatrix.

ISSUE:
W/N the will was revoked by Adriana.

HELD:
No. The provisions of the new Civil Code pertinent to the issue can be found in Article 830.
The physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se constitute an effective
revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not imperative that
the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be performed by another person but under the express
direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without saying that the document destroyed must be the
will itself.
"Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will and
testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or
cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another person in his presence and under his express direction.
There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one, the document or papers
burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana
Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana. And then,
the burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in stating that they were the only
ones present at the place where the stove (presumably in the kitchen) was located in which the papers proffered as a
will were burned.
The two witnesses were illiterate and does not appear to be unequivocably positive that the document burned
was indeed Adriana's will. Guadalupe believed that the papers she destroyed was the will only because, according to
her, Adriana told her so. Eladio, on the other hand, obtained his information that the burned document was the will
because Guadalupe told him so, thus, his testimony on this point is double hearsay.
It is an important matter of public interest that a purported win is not denied legalization on dubious grounds. Otherwise,
the very institution of testamentary succession will be shaken to its very foundations.


Molo v. Molo

- Mariano Molo died and was survived by his herein petitioner wife and his herein oppositors nieces and nephews. He
left two wills one dated 1918 and the other 1939. The 2
nd
will contains a clause which expressly revokes the former
will.
- Upon death, his wife filed a petition for probate of the 1939 will which was later on admitted. However, oppositors
eventually filed a petition which resulted to the denial of probate of the said will. Petitioner wife then filed a petition for
probate of the 1918 will, which was likewise denied by the oppositors in this case.

Whether or not petitioner voluntarily and deliberately frustrated the probate of the 1939 will.
- SC held that she did not because if it was indeed her intention, she could have accomplished her desire by merely
suppressing the will or tearing or destroying it, and then take steps in leading to the probate of the 1918 will.
- Had the oppositors in this case not filed an opposition and had limited their objection to the intrinsic validity of the will,
their plan to defeat the will and secure the intestacy of the deceased would have been accomplished.
- If the said will was denied probate, it is due to oppositors fault and is unfair to impute bad faith to petitioner simply
because she exerted effort to protect her own interest and prevent the intestacy of the deceased.

WON, notwithstanding the disallowance of the 1939 will, the revocatory clause is valid and still nullifies the 1918 will.
- SC held that the clause is likewise void because:
- The Court held in Samson v. Naval that it cannot produce the effect of annulling the previous will since said revocatory
clause is void.
- If it was really the intention of the deceased to revoke the first will, with the assumption that he in fact destroyed the
original copy of the 1918 will since it cannot be found at present, he should also destroyed the duplicate copy of the
said will which he had given to his wife. But he did not do so. Hence, it is possible that because of the long lapse of 21
yrs since the 1
st
will was executed, the original will had been misplaced or lost and forgetting there was a copy, he
deemed it wise to execute another.
- Granting that he did destroy the 1
st
will, the 1918 will can still be admitted under the principle of dependent relative
revocation, which is predicated on the theory that the testator did not intend to die intestate.
- The doctrine of dependent relative revocation is established where the act of destruction is connected with the making
of another will so as fairly to raise the inference that the testator meant the revocation of the old to depend upon the
efficacy of the new disposition intended to be substituted, the revocation will be conditional and dependent upon the
efficacy of the new disposition; and if, for any reason, the new will intended to be made as a substitute is inoperative,
the revocation fails and the original will remains in full force.


Diaz v. De Leon

- In this case, Diaz, the petitioner, denies that the will executed by the decedent Jesus de Leon.
- However, the contestant says otherwise and alleging that the testator revoked his will by destroying it, and by
executing another will expressly revoking the former.
- Hence, this appeal.

WON, the will executed by the Jesus de Leon, now deceased, was revoked by him.
- The court finds that the will executed by the deceased is not clothed with all the necessary requisites to constitute a
sufficient revocation.
- But according to the statute governing the subject in this jurisdiction, the destruction of a will with animo revocandi
constitutes, in itself, a sufficient revocation.
- From the evidence presented, the decedent asked that the same be returned to him.
- The instrument was returned to the testator who ordered his servant to tear the document. This was done in his
presence and before a nurse who testified to this effect.
- The intention of revoking the will is manifest from the established fact that the testator was anxious to withdraw or
change the provisions he has made in his first will.
- The original will herein presented for probate having been destroyed with animo revocandi cannot now be probated as
the will and last testament of Jesus de Leon.
- Judgment affirmed.
- The destruction of a will with animo revocandi constitutes, in itself, a sufficient revocation.


Gallanosa v. Arcangel
83 SCRA 676 | JEN SUCCESSION REVIEWER

FACTS:
Florentino Hitosis was a childless widower and was survived by his brother Lito. In his will, Florentino
bequeathed his share in the conjugal estate to his second wife, Tecla, and, should Tecla predecease him, as was the
case, his share would be assigned to spouses Gallanosa. Pedro Gallanosa was Teclas son by her first marriage who
grew up under the care of Florentino. His other properties were bequeathed to his protg Adolfo Fortajada.
Upon his death, a petition for the probate of his will was wile. Opposition was registered by Florentinos brother,
nephews and nieces.
After a hearing, where the oppositors did not present any evidence, the Judge admitted the will to probate.
The testators legal heirs did not appeal from the decree of probate and from the order of partition and
distribution.
Later, the legal heirs filed a case for recovery of 61 parcels of land against Pedro alleging that they had been in
continuous possession of those lands and praying that they be declared owners thereof.
Pedro moved for a dismissal which was later granted by the Judge on the ground of res judicata.
The legal heirs did not appeal from the order of dismissal.
15 years after the dismissal of the first civil case and 28 years after the probate of the will, the legal heirs filed a
case for annulment of the will alleging fraud and deceit.
The court dismissed said action. However, the court set aside the dismissal after the heirs filed a motion for
reconsideration. Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE:
Whether the legal heirs have a cause of action for the annulment of the will of Florentino and for the recovery of the 61
parcels of land adjudicated under that will to the petitioners.

HELD:
NO. The SC held that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion in setting aside its order of
dismissal and ignoring the testamentary case and the first civil case which is the same as the instant case. It is evident
that second civil case is barred by res judicata and by prescription.
The decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of the will. That means that the
testator was of sound and disposing mind at the time he executed the will and was not acting under duress, menace,
fraud, or undue influence; that the will was signed by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses, and that
the will is genuine.
Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a subsequent proceeding, not even in a criminal action
for the forgery of the will.
After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its execution cannot be raised
anymore.
The SC also held that the decree of adjudication, having rendered in a proceeding in rem, is binding upon the
whole world. Moreover, the dismissal of the first civil case, which is a judgment in personam, was an adjudication on the
merits. Thus. It constitutes a bar by former judgment under the Rules of Court.
The SC also held that the lower court erred in saying that the action for the recovery of the lands had not
prescribed. The SC ruled that the Art. 1410 of NCC (the action or defense for the declaration of the inexistence of a
contract does not prescribe) cannot apply to last wills and testaments.
The Rules of Court does not sanction an action for annulment of a will.
A final decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution of the will.
A decree of adjudication in a testate proceeding is binding on the whole world.After the period for seeking relief
from a final order or judgment under Rule 38 of the Rules of court has expired, a final judgment or order can be set
aside only on the grounds of: (a) lack of jurisdiction or lack of due process of law or (b) that the judgment was obtained
by means of extrinsic or collateral fraud. In the latter case, the period for annulling the judgment is four (4) years from
the discovery of fraud.
The Civil Law rule that an action for declaration of inexistence of a contract does not prescribe cannot be applied to last
wills and testaments


Paula DE LA CERNA, et al., petitioners, vs.
Manuela REBACA-POTOT, et al., and the HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-20234, December 23, 1964
FACTS:
Spouses Bernabe de la Serna and Gervasia Rebaca, executed a joint last will and testament whereby they willed
that their two parcels of land acquired during their marriage together with all improvements thereon shall be given to
Manuela Rebaca, their niece. Bernabe died and the will was probated in 1939 after due publication as required by law
and there being no opposition. Upon the death of Gervasia Rebaca, another petition for the probate of the same will
insofar as Gervasia was concerned was filed by Manuela but the court dismissed it for failure of Manuela to appear.
Paula de la Cerna questioned for the nullity of the joint will of Bernabe being prohibited in the Philippine law. The
Court of First Instance ordered the petition heard and declared the testament null and void, for being executed contrary
to the prohibition of joint wills in the Civil Code but on appeal by the testamentary heir, the Court of Appeals reversed,
on the ground that the decree of probate in 1939 was issued by a court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive on the due
execution of the testament. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not an error of law affects the conclusive effect of its decision.
2. Whether or not the joint will is valid as to the share of Gervasia who died later than Bernabe.
RULING:
The appealed decision correctly held that the final decree of probate, entered in 1939 by the Court of First Instance
of Cebu (when the testator, Bernabe de la Cerna, died), has conclusive effect as to his last will and testament despite
the fact that even then the Civil Code already decreed the invalidity of joint wills, whether in favor of the joint testators,
reciprocally, or in favor of a third party (Art. 669, old Civil Code). A final judgment rendered on a petition for the probate
of a will is binding upon the whole world.
The probate decree in 1989 could only affect the share of the deceased husband, Bernabe de la Cerna. It could not
include the disposition of the share of the wife, Gervasia Rebaca, who was then still alive, and over whose interest in the
conjugal properties the probate court acquired no jurisdiction, precisely because her estate could not then be in issue.
Be it remembered that prior to the new Civil Code, a will could not be probated during the testator's lifetime. It follows
that the validity of the joint will, in so far as the estate of the wife was concerned, must be, on her death, reexamined
and adjudicated de novo, since a joint will is considered a separate will of each testator. Therefore, the undivided
interest of Gervasia Rebaca should pass upon her death to her heirs intestate, and not exclusively to the testamentary
heir, unless some other valid will in her favor is shown to exist, or unless she be the only heir intestate of said Gervasia.

Nepomuceno v. CA
139 SCRA 206 | Sumagaysay

FACTS:
Martin Jugo left a duly executed and notarized Last Will and Testament before he died. Petitioner was named
as sole executor. It is clearly stated in the Will that he was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had
two legitimate children, but he had been estranged from his lawful wife. In fact, the testator Martin Jugo and the
petitioner were married despite the subsisting first marriage. The testator devised the free portion of his estate to
petitioner. On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for probate. On May 13, 1975, Rufina Gomez and her
children filed an opposition alleging undue and improper influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the
execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage
with the testator.
The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator admitted in his Will to
cohabiting with the petitioner. Petitioner appealed to CA. On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal denying the probate of the will. The respondent court declared the Will to be valid
except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void.

ISSUE:
W/N the CA acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin
Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision.

HELD:
No. The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly drawn, it went on
to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void. The general
rule is that in probate proceedings, the court's area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic
validity of the Will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court
is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will.
The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where
practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court
should meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid)
The Will is void under Article 739. The following donations shall be void: (1) Those made between persons who
were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation; and Article 1028. The prohibitions mentioned in
Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions.
There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage when Martin Jugo executed his
Will. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties
to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage.


GUEVARRA vs. GUEVARRA
January 31, 1956
(not related to Article 814)

HELD: Under section 1 of Rule 74, in relation to Rule 76, if the decedent left a will and no debts and the heirs and
legatees desire to make an extrajudicial partition of the estate, they must first present that will to the court for
probate and divide the estate in accordance with the will. They may not disregard the provisions of the will unless
those provisions are contrary to law. Neither may they do away with the presentation of the will to the court for probate,
because such suppression of the will is contrary to law and public policy.