G.R. No.

143944 July 11, 2002

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
BASHER BONGCARAWAN y MACARAMBON, accused-appellant.
PUNO, J.:
This is an appeal from the Decision
1
dated December 27, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 06, in Criminal Case No. 06-7542,
finding accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No.
6425
2
as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.1wphi1.nt
Accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon was charged in an Information which reads, thus:
"That on or about March 13, 1999, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
without authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control eight (8) packs of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug commonly known as Shabu, weighing approximately 400 grams, without the
corresponding license or prescription.
Contrary to and in violation of Section 16, Article III of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended by RA
7659."
3

During the arraignment, the accused pleaded not guilty. Trial ensued.
Evidence for the prosecution shows that on March 11, 1999, an interisland passenger ship, M/V Super Ferry 5, sailed from Manila to Iligan City. At
about 3:00 a.m. on March 13, 1999, the vessel was about to dock at the port of Iligan City when its security officer, Mark Diesmo, received a
complaint from passenger Lorena Canoy about her missing jewelry. Canoy suspected one of her co-passengers at cabin no. 106 as the culprit.
Diesmo and four (4) other members of the vessel security force accompanied Canoy to search for the suspect whom they later found at the economy
section.
4
The suspect was identified as the accused, Basher Bongcarawan. The accused was informed of the complaint and was invited to go back
to cabin no. 106. With his consent, he was bodily searched, but no jewelry was found. He was then escorted by two (2) security agents back to the
economy section to get his baggage. The accused took a Samsonite suitcase and brought this back to the cabin. When requested by the security,
the accused opened the suitcase, revealing a brown bag and small plastic packs containing white crystalline substance. Suspecting the substance to
be "shabu," the security personnel immediately reported the matter to the ship captain and took pictures of the accused beside the suitcase and its
contents. They also called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance.
5
At about 6:00 a.m., Lt. Robert Patrimonio, YN Aurelio Estoque, CD2
Phoudinie Lantao and RM3 Merchardo De Guzman of the Philippine Coast Guard arrived and took custody of the accused and the seized items--the
Samsonite suitcase, a brown bag
6
and eight (8) small plastic packs of white crystalline substance.
7
When asked about the contraband articles, the
accused explained that he was just requested by a certain Alican "Alex" Macapudi to bring the suitcase to the latter's brother in Iligan City.
8
The
accused and the seized items were later turned over by the coast guard to the Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF). Chief
Inspector Graciano Mijares and his men brought the accused to the PAOCTF Headquarters,
9
while the packs of white crystalline substance were
sent to the NBI Regional Office in Cagayan de Oro City for laboratory examination. NBI Forensic Chemist Nicanor Cruz later confirmed the
substance to be methamphetamine hydrochloride, commonly known as "shabu," weighing 399.3266 grams.
10

The accused testified and proffered his own version. On March 11, 1999, at about 10:00 p.m., he was in Quiapo, Manila where he met Alican "Alex"
Macapudi, a neighbor who has a store in Marawi City. He was requested by Macapudi to bring a Samsonite suitcase containing sunglasses and
watches to Iligan City, and to give it to Macapudi's brother at the Iligan port. He boarded the M/V Super Ferry 5 on the same night, carrying a big
luggage full of clothes, a small luggage or "maleta" containing the sunglasses and brushes he bought from Manila, and the Samsonite suitcase of
Macapudi.
11
He stayed at cabin no. 106. At about 4:00 a.m of March 13, 1999, as the vessel was about to dock at the Iligan port, he took his
baggage and positioned himself at the economy section to be able to disembark ahead of the other passengers. There, he met a friend, Ansari
Ambor. While they were conversing, five (5) members of the vessel security force and a woman whom he recognized as his co-passenger at cabin
no. 106 came and told him that he was suspected of stealing jewelry. He voluntarily went with the group back to cabin no. 106 where he was frisked.
Subsequently, he was asked to get his baggage, so he went back to the economy section and took the big luggage and Macapudi's Samsonite
suitcase. He left the small "maleta" containing sunglasses and brushes for fear that they would be confiscated by the security personnel. When
requested, he voluntarily opened the big luggage, but refused to do the same to the Samsonite suitcase which he claimed was not his and had a
secret combination lock. The security personnel forcibly opened the suitcase and found packs of white crystalline substance inside which they
suspected to be "shabu." They took pictures of him with the merchandise, and asked him to sign a turn over receipt which was later given to the
Philippine Coast Guard, then to the PAOCTF.
12

On December 27, 1999, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Basher Bongcarawan y Macarambon GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the
offense of violation of Section 16, Art. III, R.A. No. 6425 as amended by R.A. No. 7659 and hereby imposes upon him the penalty of
RECLUSION PERPETUA and a fine of FIVE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P500,000.00) PESOS, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
Having been under preventive imprisonment since March 13, 1999 until the present, the period of such preventive detention shall be
credited in full in favor of the accused in the service of his sentence.
The 399.3266 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu is hereby ordered delivered to the National Bureau of Investigation for
proper disposition.
SO ORDERED."
13

Hence, this appeal where the accused raises the following assignment of errors:
"I.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE DRUG CONFISCATED IS ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST THE
ACCUSED/APPELLANT.
II.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO HOLDING THAT THE APPELLANT OWNED THE CONFISCATED EVIDENCE AND THEREFORE
ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST HIM."
14

On the first assignment of error, the accused-appellant contends that the Samsonite suitcase containing the methamphetamine hydrochloride or
"shabu" was forcibly opened and searched without his consent, and hence, in violation of his constitutional right against unreasonable search and
seizure. Any evidence acquired pursuant to such unlawful search and seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in evidence against him. He also contends
thatPeople v. Marti
15
is not applicable in this case because a vessel security personnel is deemed to perform the duties of a policeman.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
The right against unreasonable search and seizure is a fundamental right protected by the Constitution.
16
Evidence acquired in violation of this right
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
17
Whenever this right is challenged, an individual may choose between invoking the
constitutional protection or waiving his right by giving consent to the search and seizure. It should be stressed, however, that protection is against
transgression committed by the government or its agent. As held by this Court in the case of People v. Marti,
18
"[i]n the absence of governmental
interference, liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State."
19
The constitutional proscription against unlawful
searches and seizures applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it
could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
20

In the case before us, the baggage of the accused-appellant was searched by the vessel security personnel. It was only after they found "shabu"
inside the suitcase that they called the Philippine Coast Guard for assistance. The search and seizure of the suitcase and the contraband items was
therefore carried out without government intervention, and hence, the constitutional protection against unreasonable search and seizure does not
apply.
There is no merit in the contention of the accused-appellant that the search and seizure performed by the vessel security personnel should be
considered as one conducted by the police authorities for like the latter, the former are armed and tasked to maintain peace and order. The vessel
security officer in the case at bar is a private employee and does not discharge any governmental function. In contrast, police officers are agents of
the state tasked with the sovereign function of enforcement of the law. Historically and until now, it is against them and other agents of the state that
the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures may be invoked.
On the second assignment of error, the accused-appellant contends that he is not the owner of the Samsonite suitcase and he had no knowledge
that the same contained "shabu." He submits that without knowledge or intent to possess the dangerous drug, he cannot be convicted of the crime
charged.
21

We are not persuaded.
In a prosecution for illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the following facts must be proven beyond reasonable doubt, viz: (1) that the accused is
in possession of the object identified as a prohibited or a regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) that the accused
freely and consciously possessed the said drug.
22
The first two elements were sufficiently proven in this case, and were in fact undisputed. We are
left with the third.
As early as 1910 in the case of United States v. Tan Misa,
23
this Court has ruled that to warrant conviction, the possession of dangerous drugs
must be with knowledge of the accused, or that animus possidendi existed together with the possession or control of such articles.
24
It has been
ruled, however, that possession of dangerous drugs constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an
accused in the absence of a satisfactory explanation of such possession.
25
Hence, the burden of evidence is shifted to the accused to explain the
absence of knowledge or animus possidendi.
26

In this respect, the accused-appellant has utterly failed. His testimony, uncorroborated, self-serving and incredulous, was not given credence by the
trial court. We find no reason to disagree. Well-settled is the rule that in the absence of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial judge, the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed on appeal.
27
Moreover, evidence must be credible in itself to
deserve credence and weight in law. In this case, the accused-appellant admits that when he was asked to get his baggage, he knew it would be
inspected.
28
Why he got the Samsonite suitcase allegedly not owned by him and which had a combination lock known only to the owner remains
unclear. He also claims that he did not present his small "maleta" for inspection for fear that its contents consisting of expensive sunglasses and
brushes would be confiscated,
29
but he brought the Samsonite suitcase which is not his and also contained expensive sunglasses, and even
watches.
30

The things in possession of a person are presumed by law to be owned by him.
31
To overcome this presumption, it is necessary to present clear and
convincing evidence to the contrary. In this case, the accused points to a certain Alican "Alex" Macapudi as the owner of the contraband, but
presented no evidence to support his claim. As aptly observed by the trial judge:
"First, who is Alex Macap[u]di aka Ali[c]an Macap[u]di? Does he really exist or simply a figment of the imagination? He says that Alex
Macap[u]di is a friend and a fellow businessman who has a stall selling sunglasses in Marawi City. But no witnesses were presented to
prove that there is such a living, breathing, flesh and blood person named Alex Macap[u]di who entrusted the Samsonite to the accused.
Surely, if he does exist, he has friends, fellow businessmen and acquaintances who could testify and support the claim of the accused."
32

Mere denial of ownership will not suffice especially if, as in the case at bar, it is the keystone of the defense of the accused-appellant. Stories can
easily be fabricated. It will take more than bare-bone allegations to convince this Court that a courier of dangerous drugs is not its owner and has no
knowledge or intent to possess the same.1wphi1.nt
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch 06, in Criminal Case No. 06-7542, convicting accused-appellant Basher
Bongcarawan of violation of Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of Reclusion
Perpetua and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the accused-appellant.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104879 May 6, 1994
ELIZALDE MALALOAN and MARLON LUAREZ, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS; HON. ANTONIO J. FINEZA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 131, Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City;
HON. TIRSO D.C. VELASCO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 88, Regional Trial Court of Quezon City; and PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Alexander A. Padilla for petitioners. The Solicitor General for the People of the Philippines.
REGALADO, J.:
Creative legal advocacy has provided this Court with another primae impressionis case through the present petition wherein the parties have
formulated and now pose for resolution the following issue: Whether or not a court may take cognizance of an application for a search warrant in
connection with an offense committed outside its territorial boundary and, thereafter, issue the warrant to conduct a search on a place outside the
court's supposed territorial jurisdiction.
1

The factual background and judicial antecedents of this case are best taken from the findings of respondent Court of Appeals
2
on which there does
not appear to be any dispute, to wit:
From the pleadings and supporting documents before the Court, it can be gathered that on March 22, 1990, 1st Lt. Absalon V.
Salboro of the CAPCOM Northern Sector (now Central Sector) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City an application
for search warrant. The search warrant was sought for in connection with an alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of
Firearms and Ammunitions) perpetrated at No. 25 Newport St., corner Marlboro St., Fairview, Quezon City. On March 23, 1990,
respondent RTC Judge of Kalookan City issued Search Warrant No. 95-90. On the same day, at around 2:30 p.m., members of
the CAPCOM, armed with subject search warrant, proceeded to the situs of the offense alluded to, where a labor seminar of the
Ecumenical Institute for Labor Education and Research (EILER) was then taking place. According to CAPCOM's "Inventory of
Property Seized," firearms, explosive materials and subversive documents, among others, were seized and taken during the
search. And all the sixty-one (61) persons found within the premises searched were brought to Camp Karingal, Quezon City but
most of them were later released, with the exception of the herein petitioners, EILER Instructors, who were indicated for violation
of P.D. 1866 in Criminal Case No. Q-90-11757 before Branch 88 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided over by
respondent Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco.
On July 10, 1990, petitioners presented a "Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and For the Suppression of All
Illegally Acquired Evidence" before the Quezon City court; and a "Supplemental Motion to the Motion for Consolidation, Quashal
of Search Warrant and Exclusion of Evidence Illegally Obtained.
On September 21, 1990, the respondent Quezon City Judge issued the challenged order, consolidating subject cases but
denying the prayer for the quashal of the search warrant under attack, the validity of which warrant was upheld; opining that the
same falls under the category of Writs and Processes, within the contemplation of paragraph 3(b) of the Interim Rules and
Guidelines, and can be served not only within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court but anywhere in the judicial region of
the issuing court (National Capital Judicial Region);. . .
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the said Order under challenge, having been denied by the assailed Order of October 5,
1990, petitioners have come to this Court via the instant petition, raising the sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT A COURT MAY TAKE COGNIZANCE OF AN APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH
WARRANT IN CONNECTION WITH AN OFFENSE ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED OUTSIDE ITS
TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION AND TO ISSUE A WARRANT TO CONDUCT A SEARCH ON A PLACE
LIKEWISE OUTSIDE ITS TERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment,
3
in effect affirming that of the trial court, by denying due course to the petition for certiorari and
lifting the temporary restraining order it had issued on November 29, 1990 in connection therewith. This judgment of respondent court is now
impugned in and sought to be reversed through the present recourse before us.
We are not favorably impressed by the arguments adduced by petitioners in support of their submissions. Their disquisitions postulate interpretative
theories contrary to the letter and intent of the rules on search warrants and which could pose legal obstacles, if not dangerous doctrines, in the area
of law enforcement. Further, they fail to validly distinguish, hence they do not convincingly delineate the difference, between the matter of (1) the
court which has the competence to issue a search warrant under a given set of facts, and (2) the permissible jurisdictional range in the enforcement
of such search warrant vis-a-vis the court's territorial jurisdiction. These issues while effectively cognate are essentially discrete since the resolution
of one does not necessarily affect or preempt the other. Accordingly, to avoid compounding the seeming confusion, these questions shall be
discussedseriatim.
I
Petitioners invoke the jurisdictional rules in the institution of criminal actions to invalidate the search warrant issued by the Regional Trial Court of
Kalookan City because it is directed toward the seizure of firearms and ammunition allegedly cached illegally in Quezon City. This theory is sought to
be buttressed by the fact that the criminal case against petitioners for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 was subsequently filed in the latter
court. The application for the search warrant, it is claimed, was accordingly filed in a court of improper venue and since venue in criminal actions
involves the territorial jurisdiction of the court, such warrant is void for having been issued by a court without jurisdiction to do so.
The basic flaw in this reasoning is in erroneously equating the application for and the obtention of a search warrant with the institution and
prosecution of a criminal action in a trial court. It would thus categorize what is only a special criminal process, the power to issue which is inherent in
all courts, as equivalent to a criminal action, jurisdiction over which is reposed in specific courts of indicated competence. It ignores the fact that the
requisites, procedure and purpose for the issuance of a search warrant are completely different from those for the institution of a criminal action.
For, indeed, a warrant, such as a warrant of arrest or a search warrant, merely constitutes process.
4
A search warrant is defined in our jurisdiction as
an order in writing issued in the name of the People of the Philippines signed by a judge and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search
for personal property and bring it before the court.
5
A search warrant is in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery. It is a special
and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity.
6

In American jurisdictions, from which we have taken our jural concept and provisions on search warrants,
7
such warrant is definitively considered
merely as a process, generally issued by a court in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction, and not a criminal action to be entertained by a court
pursuant to its original jurisdiction. We emphasize this fact for purposes of both issues as formulated in this opinion, with the catalogue of authorities
herein.
Invariably, a judicial process is defined as a writ, warrant, subpoena, or other formal writing issued by authority of law; also the means of
accomplishing an end, including judicial proceedings,
8
or all writs, warrants, summonses, and orders of courts of justice or judicial officers.
9
It is
likewise held to include a writ, summons, or order issued in a judicial proceeding to acquire jurisdiction of a person or his property, to expedite the
cause or enforce the judgment,
10
or a writ, warrant, mandate, or other process issuing from a court of justice.
11

2. It is clear, therefore, that a search warrant is merely a judicial process designed by the Rules to respond only to an incident in the main case, if
one has already been instituted, or in anticipation thereof. In the latter contingency, as in the case at bar, it would involve some judicial clairvoyance
to require observance of the rules as to where a criminal case may eventually be filed where, in the first place, no such action having as yet been
instituted, it may ultimately be filed in a territorial jurisdiction other than that wherein the illegal articles sought to be seized are then located. This is
aside from the consideration that a criminal action may be filed in different venues under the rules for delitos continuados or in those instances where
different trial courts have concurrent original jurisdiction over the same criminal offense.
In fact, to illustrate the gravity of the problem which petitioners' implausible position may create, we need not stray far from the provisions of Section
15, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court on the venue of criminal actions and which we quote:
Sec. 15. Place where action to be instituted.
(a) Subject to existing laws, in all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the municipality or
territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place.
(b) Where an offense is committed on a railroad train, in an aircraft, or any other public or private vehicle while in the course of its
trip, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in the court of any municipality or territory where such train, aircraft or other
vehicle passed during such trip, including the place of departure and arrival.
(c) Where an offense is committed on board a vessel in the course of its voyage, the criminal action may be instituted and tried in
the proper court of the first port of entry or of any municipality or territory through which the vessel passed during such voyage,
subject to the generally accepted principles of international law.
(d) Other crimes committed outside of the Philippines but punishable therein under Article 2 of the Revised Penal Code shall be
cognizable by the proper court in which the charge is first filed. (14a)
It would be an exacting imposition upon the law enforcement authorities or the prosecutorial agencies to unerringly determine where they should
apply for a search warrant in view of the uncertainties and possibilities as to the ultimate venue of a case under the foregoing rules. It would be
doubly so if compliance with that requirement would be under pain of nullification of said warrant should they file their application therefor in and
obtain the same from what may later turn out to be a court not within the ambit of the aforequoted Section 15.
Our Rules of Court, whether of the 1940, 1964 or the present vintage, and, for that matter, the Judiciary Act of 1948
12
or the recent Judiciary
Reorganization Act,
13
have never required the jurisdictional strictures that the petitioners' thesis would seek to be inferentially drawn from the silence
of the reglementary provisions. On the contrary, we are of the view that said statutory omission was both deliberate and significant. It cannot but
mean that the formulators of the Rules of Court, and even Congress itself, did not consider it proper or correct, on considerations of national policy
and the pragmatics of experience, to clamp a legal manacle on those who would ferret out the evidence of a crime. For us to now impose such
conditions or restrictions, under the guise of judicial interpretation, may instead be reasonably construed as trenching on judicial legislation. It would
be tantamount to a judicial act of engrafting upon a law something that has been omitted but which someone believes ought to have been embraced
therein.
14

Concededly, the problem of venue would be relatively easier to resolve if a criminal case has already been filed in a particular court and a search
warrant is needed to secure evidence to be presented therein. Obviously, the court trying the criminal case may properly issue the warrant, upon
proper application and due compliance with the requisites therefor, since such application would only be an incident in that case and which it can
resolve in the exercise of its ancillary jurisdiction. If the contraband articles are within its territorial jurisdiction, there would appear to be no further
complications. The jurisdictional problem would resurrect, however, where such articles are outside its territorial jurisdiction, which aspect will be
addressed hereafter.
3. Coming back to the first issue now under consideration, petitioners, after discoursing on the respective territorial jurisdictions of the thirteen
Regional Trial Courts which correspond to the thirteen judicial regions,
15
invite our attention to the fact that this Court, pursuant to its authority
granted by
law,
16
has defined the territorial jurisdiction of each branch of a Regional Trial Court
17
over which the particular branch concerned shall exercise its
authority.
18
From this, it is theorized that "only the branch of a Regional Trial Court which has jurisdiction over the place to be searched could grant
an application for and issue a warrant to search that place." Support for such position is sought to be drawn from issuances of this Court, that is,
Circular No. 13 issued on October 1, 1985, as amended by Circular No. 19 on August 4, 1987.
We reject that proposition. Firstly, it is evident that both circulars were not intended to be of general application to all instances involving search
warrants and in all courts as would be the case if they had been adopted as part of the Rules of Court. These circulars were issued by the Court to
meet a particular exigency, that is, as emergency guidelines on applications for search warrants filed only in the courts of Metropolitan Manila and
other courts with multiple salas and only with respect to violations of the Anti-Subversion Act, crimes against public order under the Revised Penal
Code, illegal possession of firearms and/or ammunitions, and violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. In other words, the aforesaid theory on the
court's jurisdiction to issue search warrants would not apply tosingle-sala courts and other crimes. Accordingly, the rule sought by petitioners to be
adopted by the Court would actually result in a bifurcated procedure which would be vulnerable to legal and constitutional objections.
For that matter, neither can we subscribe to petitioners' contention that Administrative Order No. 3 of this Court, supposedly "defining the limits of the
territorial jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts," was the source of thesubject matter jurisdiction of, as distinguished from the exercise of
jurisdiction by, the courts. As earlier observed, this administrative order was issued pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, the pertinent portion of which states:
Sec. 18. Authority to define territory appurtenant to each branch. The Supreme Court shall define the territory over which
a branch of the Regional Trial Court shall exercise its authority. The territory thus defined shall be deemed to be the territorial
area of the branch concerned for purposes of determining the venue of all writs, proceedings or actions, whether civil or criminal,
. . . . (Emphasis ours.)
Jurisdiction is conferred by substantive law, in this case Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, not by a procedural law and, much less, by an administrative
order or circular. The jurisdiction conferred by said Act on regional trial courts and their judges is basically regional in scope. Thus, Section 17
thereof provides that "(e)very Regional Trial Judge shall be appointed to a region which shall be his permanent station," and he "may be assigned by
the Supreme Court to any branch or city or municipality within the same region as public interest may require, and such assignment shall not be
deemed an assignment to another station . . ." which, otherwise, would necessitate a new appointment for the judge.
In fine, Administrative Order No. 3 and, in like manner, Circulars Nos. 13 and 19, did not per se confer jurisdiction on the covered regional trial court
or its branches, such that non-observance thereof would nullify their judicial acts. The administrative order merely defines the limits of
the administrative area within which a branch of the court may exercise its authority pursuant to the jurisdiction conferred by Batas Pambansa Blg.
129. The circulars only allocated to the three executive judges the administrative areas for which they may respectively issue search warrants under
the special circumstance contemplated therein, but likewise pursuant to the jurisdiction vested in them by Batas Pambansa Blg, 129.
Secondly, and more importantly, we definitely cannot accept the conclusion that the grant of power to the courts mentioned therein, to entertain and
issue search warrants where the place to be searched is within their territorial jurisdiction, was intended to exclude other courts from exercising the
same power. It will readily be noted that Circular No. 19 was basically intended to provide prompt action on applications for search warrants. Its
predecessor, Administrative Circular No. 13, had a number of requirements, principally a raffle of the applications for search warrants, if they had
been filed with the executive judge, among the judges within his administrative area. Circular No. 19 eliminated, by amendment, that required raffle
and ordered instead that such applications should immediately be "taken cognizance of and acted upon by the Executive Judges of the Regional
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, and Municipal Trial Court under whose jurisdiction the place to be searched is located," or by their substitutes
enumerated therein.
Evidently, that particular provision of Circular No. 19 was never intended to confer exclusive jurisdiction on said executive judges. In view of the fact,
however, that they were themselves directed to personally act on the applications, instead of farming out the same among the other judges as was
the previous practice, it was but necessary and practical to require them to so act only on applications involving search of places located within their
respective territorial jurisdictions. The phrase above quoted was, therefore, in the nature of an allocation in the assignment of applications among
them, in recognition of human capabilities and limitations, and not a mandate for the exclusion of all other courts. In truth, Administrative Circular No.
13 even specifically envisaged and anticipated the non-exclusionary nature of that provision, thus:
4. If, in the implementation of the search warrant properties are seized thereunder and the corresponding case is filed in court,
said case shall be distributed conformably with Circular No. 7 dated September 23, 1974, of this Court, and thereupon tried and
decided by the judge to whom it has been assigned, and not necessarily by the judge who issued the search warrant. (Emphasis
supplied.)
It is, therefore, incorrect to say that only the court which has jurisdiction over the criminal case can issue the search warrant, as would be the
consequence of petitioners' position that only the branch of the court with jurisdiction over the place to be searched can issue a warrant to search the
same. It may be conceded, as a matter of policy, that where a criminal case is pending, the court wherein it was filed, or the assigned branch thereof,
has primary jurisdiction to issue the search warrant; and where no such criminal case has yet been filed, that the executive judges or their lawful
substitutes in the areas and for the offenses contemplated in Circular No. 19 shall have primary jurisdiction.
This should not, however, mean that a court whose territorial jurisdiction does not embrace the place to be searched cannot issue a search warrant
therefor, where the obtention of that search warrant is necessitated and justified by compelling considerations of urgency, subject, time and place.
Conversely, neither should a search warrant duly issued by a court which has jurisdiction over a pending criminal case, or one issued by an
executive judge or his lawful substitute under the situations provided for by Circular No. 19, be denied enforcement or nullified just because it was
implemented outside the court's territorial jurisdiction.
This brings us, accordingly, to the second issue on the permissible jurisdictional range of enforcement of search warrants.
II
As stated in limine, the affiliated issue raised in this case is whether a branch of a regional trial court has the authority to issue a warrant for the
search of a place outside its territorial jurisdiction. Petitioners insistently answer the query in the negative. We hold otherwise.
1. We repeat what we have earlier stressed: No law or rule imposes such a limitation on search warrants, in the same manner that no such
restriction is provided for warrants of arrest. Parenthetically, in certain states within the American jurisdiction, there were limitations of the time
wherein a warrant of arrest could be enforced. In our jurisdiction, no period is provided for the enforceability of warrants of arrest, and although within
ten days from the delivery of the warrant of arrest for execution a return thereon must be made to the issuing judge,
19
said warrant does not
become functus officio but is enforceable indefinitely until the same is enforced or recalled. On the other hand, the lifetime of a search warrant has
been expressly set in our Rules at ten days
20
but there is no provision as to the extent of the territory wherein it may be enforced, provided it is
implemented on and within the premises specifically described therein which may or may not be within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court.
We make the foregoing comparative advertence to emphasize the fact that when the law or rules would provide conditions, qualifications or
restrictions, they so state. Absent specific mention thereof, and the same not being inferable by necessary implication from the statutory provisions
which are presumed to be complete and expressive of the intendment of the framers, a contrary interpretation on whatever pretext should not be
countenanced.
A bit of legal history on this contestation will be helpful. The jurisdictional rule heretofore was that writs and processes of the so-called inferior courts
could be enforced outside the province only with the approval of the former court of first instance.
21
Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act, the
enforcement of such writs and processes no longer needs the approval of the regional trial court.
22
On the other hand, while, formerly, writs and
processes of the then courts of first instance were enforceable throughout the Philippines,
23
under the Interim or Transitional Rules and Guidelines,
certain specified writs issued by a regional trial court are now enforceable only within its judicial region. In the interest of clarity and contrast, it is
necessary that said provision be set out in full:
3. Writs and processes.
(a) Writs of certiorari, prohibition mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction issued by a regional trial court may be
enforced in any part of the region.
(b) All other processes, whether issued by a regional trial court or a metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court or municipal
circuit trial court may be served anywhere in the Philippines, and, in the last three cases, without a certification by the judge of
the regional trial court. (Emphasis ours.)
We feel that the foregoing provision is too clear to be further belabored or enmeshed in unwarranted polemics. The rule enumerates the writs and
processes which, even if issued by a regional trial court, are enforceable only within its judicial region. In contrast, it unqualifiedly provides that all
other writs and processes, regardless of which court issued the same, shall be enforceable anywhere in the Philippines. As earlier demonstrated, a
search warrant is but a judicial process, not a criminal action. No legal provision, statutory or reglementary, expressly or impliedly provides a
jurisdictional or territorial limit on its area of enforceability. On the contrary, the above-quoted provision of the interim Rules expressly authorizes its
enforcement anywhere in the country, since it is not among the processes specified in paragraph (a) and there is no distinction or exception made
regarding the processes contemplated in
paragraph (b).
2. This is but a necessary and inevitable consequence of the nature and purpose of a search warrant. The Court cannot be blind to the fact that it is
extremely difficult, as it undeniably is, to detect or elicit information regarding the existence and location of illegally possessed or prohibited articles.
The Court is accordingly convinced that it should not make the requisites for the apprehension of the culprits and the confiscation of such illicit items,
once detected, more onerous if not impossible by imposing further niceties of procedure or substantive rules of jurisdiction through decisional dicta.
For that matter, we are unaware of any instance wherein a search warrant was struck down on objections based on territorial jurisdiction. In the
landmark case of Stonehill, et al. vs. Diokno,et al.,
24
the searches in the corporate offices in Manila and the residences in Makati of therein
petitioners were conducted pursuant to search warrants issued by the Quezon City and Pasig branches of the Court of First Instance of Rizal and by
the Municipal Courts of Manila and Quezon City,
25
but the same were never challenged on jurisdictional grounds although they were subsequently
nullified for being general warrants.
3. A clarion call supposedly of libertarian import is further sounded by petitioners, dubiously invoking the constitutional proscription against illegal
searches and seizures. We do not believe that the enforcement of a search warrant issued by a court outside the territorial jurisdiction wherein the
place to be searched is located would create a constitutional question. Nor are we swayed by the professed apprehension that the law enforcement
authorities may resort to what could be a permutation of forum shopping, by filing an application for the warrant with a "friendly" court. It need merely
be recalled that a search warrant is only a process, not an action. Furthermore, the constitutional mandate is translated into specifically enumerated
safeguards in Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure for the issuance of a search warrant,
26
and all these have to be observed
regardless of whatever court in whichever region is importuned for or actually issues a search warrant. Said requirements, together with the ten-day
lifetime of the warrant
27
would discourage resort to a court in another judicial region, not only because of the distance but also the contingencies of
travel and the danger involved, unless there are really compelling reasons for the authorities to do so. Besides, it does seem odd that such
constitutional protests have not been made against warrants of arrest which are enforceable indefinitely and anywhere although they involve, not
only property and privacy, but persons and liberty.
On the other hand, it is a matter of judicial knowledge that the authorities have to contend now and then with local and national criminal syndicates of
considerable power and influence, political or financial in nature, and so pervasive as to render foolhardy any attempt to obtain a search warrant in
the very locale under their sphere of control. Nor should we overlook the fact that to do so will necessitate the transportation of applicant's witnesses
to and their examination in said places, with the attendant risk, danger and expense. Also, a further well-founded precaution, obviously born of
experience and verifiable data, is articulated by the court a quo, as quoted by respondent court:
This court is of the further belief that the possible leakage of information which is of utmost importance in the issuance of a
search warrant is secured (against) where the issuing magistrate within the region does not hold court sessions in the city or
municipality, within the region, where the place to be searched is located.
28

The foregoing situations may also have obtained and were taken into account in the foreign judicial pronouncement that, in the absence of statutory
restrictions, a justice of the peace in one district of the county may issue a search warrant to be served in another district of the county and made
returnable before the justice of still another district or another court having jurisdiction to deal with the matters involved.
29
In the present state of our
law on the matter, we find no such statutory restrictions both with respect to the court which can issue the search warrant and the enforcement
thereof anywhere in the Philippines.
III
Concern is expressed over possible conflicts of jurisdiction (or, more accurately, in the exercise of jurisdiction) where the criminal case is pending in
one court and the search warrant is issued by another court for the seizure of personal property intended to be used as evidence in said criminal
case. This arrangement is not unknown or without precedent in our jurisdiction. In fact, as hereinbefore noted, this very situation was anticipated in
Circular No. 13 of this Court under the limited scenario contemplated therein.
Nonetheless, to put such presentiments to rest, we lay down the following policy guidelines:
1. The court wherein the criminal case is pending shall have primary jurisdiction to issue search warrants necessitated by and for purposes of said
case. An application for a search warrant may be filed with another court only under extreme and compelling circumstances that the applicant must
prove to the satisfaction of the latter court which may or may not give due course to the application depending on the validity of the justification
offered for not filing the same in the court with primary jurisdiction thereover.
2. When the latter court issues the search warrant, a motion to quash the same may be filed in and shall be resolved by said court, without prejudice
to any proper recourse to the appropriate higher court by the party aggrieved by the resolution of the issuing court. All grounds and objections then
available, existent or known shall be raised in the original or subsequent proceedings for the quashal of the warrant, otherwise they shall be deemed
waived.
3. Where no motion to quash the search warrant was filed in or resolved by the issuing court, the interested party may move in the court where the
criminal case is pending for the suppression as evidence of the personal property seized under the warrant if the same is offered therein for said
purpose. Since two separate courts with different participations are involved in this situation, a motion to quash a search warrant and a motion to
suppress evidence are alternative and not cumulative remedies. In order to prevent forum shopping, a motion to quash shall consequently be
governed by the omnibus motion rule, provided, however, that objections not available, existent or known during the proceedings for the quashal of
the warrant may be raised in the hearing of the motion to suppress. The resolution of the court on the motion to suppress shall likewise be subject to
any proper remedy in the appropriate higher court.
4. Where the court which issued the search warrant denies the motion to quash the same and is not otherwise prevented from further proceeding
thereon, all personal property seized under the warrant shall forthwith be transmitted by it to the court wherein the criminal case is pending, with the
necessary safeguards and documentation therefor.
5. These guidelines shall likewise be observed where the same criminal offense is charged in different informations or complaints and filed in two or
more courts with concurrent original jurisdiction over the criminal action. Where the issue of which court will try the case shall have been resolved,
such court shall be considered as vested with primary jurisdiction to act on applications for search warrants incident to the criminal case.
WHEREFORE, on the foregoing premises, the instant petition is DENIED and the assailed judgment of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 23533 is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-19550 June 19, 1967
HARRY S. STONEHILL, ROBERT P. BROOKS, JOHN J. BROOKS and KARL BECK, petitioners,
vs.
HON. JOSE W. DIOKNO, in his capacity as SECRETARY OF JUSTICE; JOSE LUKBAN, in his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau
of Investigation; SPECIAL PROSECUTORS PEDRO D. CENZON, EFREN I. PLANA and MANUEL VILLAREAL, JR. and ASST. FISCAL
MANASES G. REYES; JUDGE AMADO ROAN, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE ROMAN CANSINO, Municipal Court of Manila; JUDGE
HERMOGENES CALUAG, Court of First Instance of Rizal-Quezon City Branch, and JUDGE DAMIAN JIMENEZ, Municipal Court of Quezon
City, respondents.
Paredes, Poblador, Cruz and Nazareno and Meer, Meer and Meer and Juan T. David for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, Assistant Solicitor General Pacifico P. de Castro, Assistant Solicitor General Frine C. Zaballero,
Solicitor Camilo D. Quiason and Solicitor C. Padua for respondents.
CONCEPCION, C.J.:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin
1
hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Prosecutors several
judges
2
hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges issued, on different dates,
3
a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners
herein
4
and/or the corporations of which they were officers,
5
directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or the
premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and
other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss
statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended to be used as the means of
committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code."
Alleging that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court because, inter alia:
(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were
actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the
searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that
issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with law on March 20, 1962, said petitioners filed with the Supreme Court this original action
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction, and prayed that, pending final disposition of the present case, a writ of preliminary injunction be
issued restraining Respondents-Prosecutors, their agents and /or representatives from using the effects seized as aforementioned or any copies
thereof, in the deportation cases already adverted to, and that, in due course, thereafter, decision be rendered quashing the contested search
warrants and declaring the same null and void, and commanding the respondents, their agents or representatives to return to petitioners herein, in
accordance with Section 3, Rule 67, of the Rules of Court, the documents, papers, things and cash moneys seized or confiscated under the search
warrants in question.
In their answer, respondents-prosecutors alleged,
6
(1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law;
(2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in
evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
On March 22, 1962, this Court issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. However, by resolution dated June 29, 1962, the writ
was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are
concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners
herein.
7

Thus, the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be split into two (2) major groups,
namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners
herein.
As regards the first group, we hold that petitioners herein have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures
made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from the
personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the
offices they hold therein may be.
8
Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been
impaired thereby,
9
and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third
parties.
10
Consequently, petitioners herein may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized
from the offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence
belongsexclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against
them in their individual capacity.
11
Indeed, it has been held:
. . . that the Government's action in gaining possession of papers belonging to the corporation did not relate to nor did it affect
the personal defendants. If these papers were unlawfully seized and thereby the constitutional rights of or any one were invaded, they
were the rights of the corporation and not the rights of the other defendants. Next, it is clear that a question of the lawfulness of a seizure
can be raised only by one whose rights have been invaded. Certainly, such a seizure, if unlawful, could not affect the constitutional rights
of defendants whose property had not been seized or the privacy of whose homes had not been disturbed; nor could they claim for
themselves the benefits of the Fourth Amendment, when its violation, if any, was with reference to the rights of another. Remus vs. United
States (C.C.A.)291 F. 501, 511. It follows, therefore, that the question of the admissibility of the evidence based on an alleged unlawful
search and seizure does not extend to the personal defendants but embraces only the corporation whose property was taken. . . . (A
Guckenheimer & Bros. Co. vs. United States, [1925] 3 F. 2d. 786, 789, Emphasis supplied.)
With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962,
lifted the writ of preliminary injunction previously issued by this Court,
12
thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-Prosecutors from using
them in evidence against petitioners herein.
In connection with said documents, papers and things, two (2) important questions need be settled, namely: (1) whether the search warrants in
question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid or not, and (2) if the answer to the preceding question is in the
negative, whether said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners herein.1wph1.t
Petitioners maintain that the aforementioned search warrants are in the nature of general warrants and that accordingly, the seizures effected upon
the authority there of are null and void. In this connection, the Constitution
13
provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be
violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be
seized.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be
determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued upon applications stating that the
natural and juridical person therein named had committed a "violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and
Revised Penal Code." In other words, nospecific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof with respect to the offense
committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable
cause, for the same presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or
committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the applications involved in this case do not allege
any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank
Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," as alleged in the aforementioned applications without
reference to any determinate provision of said laws or
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution,
for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of
peace officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted to outlaw the so-called general
warrants. It is not difficult to imagine what would happen, in times of keen political strife, when the party in power feels that the minority is likely to
wrest it, even though by legal means.
Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend
Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court
14
by providing in its counterpart, under the Revised Rules of Court
15
that "a search warrant shall
not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense." Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph,
directing that "no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense."
The grave violation of the Constitution made in the application for the contested search warrants was compounded by the description therein made
of the effects to be searched for and seized, to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, journals, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and
other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance sheets and related profit and
loss statements.
Thus, the warrants authorized the search for and seizure of records pertaining to all business transactions of petitioners herein, regardless of
whether the transactions were legal or illegal. The warrants sanctioned the seizure of all records of the petitioners and the aforementioned
corporations, whatever their nature, thus openly contravening the explicit command of our Bill of Rights that the things to be seized
be particularly described as well as tending to defeat its major objective: the elimination of general warrants.
Relying upon Moncado vs. People's Court (80 Phil. 1), Respondents-Prosecutors maintain that, even if the searches and seizures under
consideration were unconstitutional, the documents, papers and things thus seized are admissible in evidence against petitioners herein. Upon
mature deliberation, however, we are unanimously of the opinion that the position taken in the Moncado case must be abandoned. Said position was
in line with the American common law rule, that the criminal should not be allowed to go free merely "because the constable has blundered,"
16
upon
the theory that the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is protected by means other than the exclusion of evidence
unlawfully obtained,
17
such as the common-law action for damages against the searching officer, against the party who procured the issuance of the
search warrant and against those assisting in the execution of an illegal search, their criminal punishment, resistance, without liability to an unlawful
seizure, and such other legal remedies as may be provided by other laws.
However, most common law jurisdictions have already given up this approach and eventually adopted the exclusionary rule, realizing that this is the
only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. In the language of Judge Learned Hand:
As we understand it, the reason for the exclusion of evidence competent as such, which has been unlawfully acquired, is that exclusion is
the only practical way of enforcing the constitutional privilege. In earlier times the action of trespass against the offending official may have
been protection enough; but that is true no longer. Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it
cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed.
18

In fact, over thirty (30) years before, the Federal Supreme Court had already declared:
If letters and private documents can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the protection
of the 4th Amendment, declaring his rights to be secure against such searches and seizures, is of no value, and, so far as those thus
placed are concerned, might as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to
punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and
suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.
19

This view was, not only reiterated, but, also, broadened in subsequent decisions on the same Federal Court.
20
After reviewing previous decisions
thereon, said Court held, in Mapp vs. Ohio (supra.):
. . . Today we once again examine the Wolf's constitutional documentation of the right of privacy free from unreasonable state intrusion,
and after its dozen years on our books, are led by it to close the only courtroom door remaining open to evidence secured by official
lawlessness in flagrant abuse of that basic right, reserved to all persons as a specific guarantee against that very same unlawful conduct.
We hold that all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a
State.
Since the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth, it is enforceable against them by the same sanction of exclusion as it used against the Federal Government. Were it otherwise,
then just as without the Weeks rule the assurance against unreasonable federal searches and seizures would be "a form of words,"
valueless and underserving of mention in a perpetual charter of inestimable human liberties, so too, without that rule the freedom from
state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means
of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as a freedom "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." At the time that the
Court held in Wolf that the amendment was applicable to the States through the Due Process Clause, the cases of this Court as we have
seen, had steadfastly held that as to federal officers the Fourth Amendment included the exclusion of the evidence seized in violation of its
provisions. Even Wolf "stoutly adhered" to that proposition. The right to when conceded operatively enforceable against the States, was
not susceptible of destruction by avulsion of the sanction upon which its protection and enjoyment had always been deemed dependent
under the Boyd, Weeks and Silverthorne Cases. Therefore, in extending the substantive protections of due process to all constitutionally
unreasonable searches state or federal it was logically and constitutionally necessarily that the exclusion doctrine an essential part
of the right to privacy be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf Case. In short, the
admission of the new constitutional Right by Wolf could not tolerate denial of its most important constitutional privilege, namely, the
exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure. To hold otherwise is to grant the
right but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment. Only last year the Court itself recognized that the purpose of the exclusionary rule
to "is to deter to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way by removing the incentive to
disregard it" . . . .
The ignoble shortcut to conviction left open to the State tends to destroy the entire system of constitutional restraints on which the liberties
of the people rest. Having once recognized that the right to privacy embodied in the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the States,
and that the right to be secure against rude invasions of privacy by state officers is, therefore constitutional in origin, we can no longer
permit that right to remain an empty promise. Because it is enforceable in the same manner and to like effect as other basic rights secured
by its Due Process Clause, we can no longer permit it to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law
enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that
which the Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts,
that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice. (emphasis ours.)
Indeed, the non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable
searches and seizures. To be sure, if the applicant for a search warrant has competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a
given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of
the fundamental law. Upon the other hand, if he has no such competent evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable
cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity
of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable
cause.
Moreover, the theory that the criminal prosecution of those who secure an illegal search warrant and/or make unreasonable searches or seizures
would suffice to protect the constitutional guarantee under consideration, overlooks the fact that violations thereof are, in general, committed By
agents of the party in power, for, certainly, those belonging to the minority could not possibly abuse a power they do not have. Regardless of the
handicap under which the minority usually but, understandably finds itself in prosecuting agents of the majority, one must not lose sight of the
fact that the psychological and moral effect of the possibility
21
of securing their conviction, is watered down by the pardoning power of the party for
whose benefit the illegality had been committed.
In their Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of the Resolution of this Court dated June 29, 1962, petitioners allege that Rooms Nos. 81 and
91 of Carmen Apartments, House No. 2008, Dewey Boulevard, House No. 1436, Colorado Street, and Room No. 304 of the Army-Navy Club, should
be included among the premises considered in said Resolution as residences of herein petitioners, Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brook, John J.
Brooks and Karl Beck, respectively, and that, furthermore, the records, papers and other effects seized in the offices of the corporations above
referred to include personal belongings of said petitioners and other effects under their exclusive possession and control, for the exclusion of which
they have a standing under the latest rulings of the federal courts of federal courts of the United States.
22

We note, however, that petitioners' theory, regarding their alleged possession of and control over the aforementioned records, papers and effects,
and the alleged "personal" nature thereof, has Been Advanced, notin their petition or amended petition herein, but in the Motion for Reconsideration
and Amendment of the Resolution of June 29, 1962. In other words, said theory would appear to be readjustment of that followed in said petitions, to
suit the approach intimated in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered and amended. Then, too, some of the affidavits or copies of alleged
affidavits attached to said motion for reconsideration, or submitted in support thereof, contain either inconsistent allegations, or allegations
inconsistent with the theory now advanced by petitioners herein.
Upon the other hand, we are not satisfied that the allegations of said petitions said motion for reconsideration, and the contents of the
aforementioned affidavits and other papers submitted in support of said motion, have sufficiently established the facts or conditions contemplated in
the cases relied upon by the petitioners; to warrant application of the views therein expressed, should we agree thereto. At any rate, we do not deem
it necessary to express our opinion thereon, it being best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that the warrants for the search of three (3)
residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are
illegal; that the writ of preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects thus seized in said
residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects
so seized in the aforementioned residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should be, as it is
hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as regards the documents, papers and other effects seized
in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
It is so ordered.

G.R. No. 81561 January 18, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
vs.
ANDRE MARTI, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Reynaldo B. Tatoy and Abelardo E. Rogacion for accused-appellant.
BIDIN, J.:
This is an appeal from a decision * rendered by the Special Criminal Court of Manila (Regional Trial Court, Branch XLIX) convicting accused-
appellant of violation of Section 21 (b), Article IV in relation to Section 4, Article 11 and Section 2 (e) (i), Article 1 of Republic Act 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The facts as summarized in the brief of the prosecution are as follows:
On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00 a.m., the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of
the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex, Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift
wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. The appellant informed
Anita Reyes that he was sending the packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Appellant filled up the contract necessary for
the transaction, writing therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the consignee,
namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland" (Decision, p. 6)
Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she could examine and inspect the packages. Appellant, however, refused, assuring her
that the packages simply contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of appellant's
representation, Anita Reyes no longer insisted on inspecting the packages. The four (4) packages were then placed inside a
brown corrugated box one by two feet in size (1' x 2'). Styro-foam was placed at the bottom and on top of the packages before
the box was sealed with masking tape, thus making the box ready for shipment (Decision, p. 8).
Before delivery of appellant's box to the Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of
Anita (Reyes), following standard operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant's box, a
peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly containing gloves and felt
dried leaves inside. Opening one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the
gloves. He made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and took several grams of the contents thereof (tsn, pp. 29-30,
October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples
he extracted from the cellophane wrapper (tsn, pp. 5-6, October 6, 1987).
He brought the letter and a sample of appellant's shipment to the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI),
at about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon of that date, i.e., August 14, 1987. He was interviewed by the Chief of Narcotics Section.
Job Reyes informed the NBI that the rest of the shipment was still in his office. Therefore, Job Reyes and three (3) NBI agents,
and a photographer, went to the Reyes' office at Ermita, Manila (tsn, p. 30, October 6, 1987).
Job Reyes brought out the box in which appellant's packages were placed and, in the presence of the NBI agents, opened the
top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried marijuana leaves were
found to have been contained inside the cellophane wrappers (tsn, p. 38, October 6, 1987; Emphasis supplied).
The package which allegedly contained books was likewise opened by Job Reyes. He discovered that the package contained
bricks or cake-like dried marijuana leaves. The package which allegedly contained tabacalera cigars was also opened. It turned
out that dried marijuana leaves were neatly stocked underneath the cigars (tsn, p. 39, October 6, 1987).
The NBI agents made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt"
acknowledging custody of the said effects (tsn, pp. 2-3, October 7, 1987).
Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate appellant but to no avail. Appellant's stated address in his passport being the Manila Central Post Office,
the agents requested assistance from the latter's Chief Security. On August 27, 1987, appellant, while claiming his mail at the Central Post Office,
was invited by the NBI to shed light on the attempted shipment of the seized dried leaves. On the same day the Narcotics Section of the NBI
submitted the dried leaves to the Forensic Chemistry Section for laboratory examination. It turned out that the dried leaves were marijuana flowering
tops as certified by the forensic chemist. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 9-11, Rollo, pp. 132-134).
Thereafter, an Information was filed against appellant for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
After trial, the court a quo rendered the assailed decision.
In this appeal, accused/appellant assigns the following errors, to wit:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ILLEGALLY SEARCHED AND SEIZED OBJECTS
CONTAINED IN THE FOUR PARCELS.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING APPELLANT DESPITE THE UNDISPUTED FACT THAT HIS RIGHTS UNDER
THE CONSTITUTION WHILE UNDER CUSTODIAL PROCEEDINGS WERE NOT OBSERVED.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING CREDENCE TO THE EXPLANATION OF THE APPELLANT ON HOW THE
FOUR PARCELS CAME INTO HIS POSSESSION (Appellant's Brief, p. 1;Rollo, p. 55)
1. Appellant contends that the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against
unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and therefore argues that the same should be
held inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).
Sections 2 and 3, Article III of the Constitution provide:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when
public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in the 1935 Charter which, worded as
follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures
shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but uponprobable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized. (Sec. 1 [3], Article III)
was in turn derived almost verbatim from the Fourth Amendment ** to the United States Constitution. As such, the Court may turn to the
pronouncements of the United States Federal Supreme Court and State Appellate Courts which are considered doctrinal in this jurisdiction.
Thus, following the exclusionary rule laid down in Mapp v. Ohio by the US Federal Supreme Court (367 US 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed. 1081 [1961]),
this Court, in Stonehill v. Diokno (20 SCRA 383 [1967]), declared as inadmissible any evidence obtained by virtue of a defective search and seizure
warrant, abandoning in the process the ruling earlier adopted in Moncado v. People's Court (80 Phil. 1 [1948]) wherein the admissibility of evidence
was not affected by the illegality of its seizure. The 1973 Charter (Sec. 4 [2], Art. IV) constitutionalized the Stonehill ruling and is carried over up to
the present with the advent of the 1987 Constitution.
In a number of cases, the Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has struck down the admissibility of evidence obtained in violation of the
constitutional safeguard against unreasonable searches and seizures. (Bache & Co., (Phil.), Inc., v. Ruiz, 37 SCRA 823 [1971]; Lim v. Ponce de
Leon, 66 SCRA 299 [1975]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1 [1986]; Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 [1987]; See also Salazar v. Hon. Achacoso, et
al., GR No. 81510, March 14, 1990).
It must be noted, however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence so obtained were invariably procured by the State acting through the
medium of its law enforcers or other authorized government agencies.
On the other hand, the case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered and obtained by
a private person, acting in a private capacity and without the intervention and participation of State authorities. Under the circumstances, can
accused/appellant validly claim that his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizure has been violated? Stated otherwise, may an
act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of appellant's constitutional rights, be invoked against the State?
We hold in the negative. In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be invoked against the
State.
As this Court held in Villanueva v. Querubin (48 SCRA 345 [1972]:
1. This constitutional right (against unreasonable search and seizure) refers to the immunity of one's person, whether citizen or
alien, from interference by government, included in which is his residence, his papers, and other possessions. . . .
. . . There the state, however powerful, does not as such have the access except under the circumstances above noted, for in the
traditional formulation, his house, however humble, is his castle. Thus is outlawed any unwarranted intrusion by government,
which is called upon to refrain from any invasion of his dwelling and to respect the privacies of his life. . . . (Cf. Schermerber v.
California, 384 US 757 [1966] and Boyd v. United States, 116 US 616 [1886]; Emphasis supplied).
In Burdeau v. McDowell (256 US 465 (1921), 41 S Ct. 547; 65 L.Ed. 1048), the Court there in construing the right against unreasonable searches
and seizures declared that:
(t)he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and seizures, and as shown in previous cases, its protection
applies to governmental action. Its origin and history clearly show that it was intended as a restraint upon the activities of
sovereign authority, and was not intended to be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies; as against such authority it
was the purpose of the Fourth Amendment to secure the citizen in the right of unmolested occupation of his dwelling and the
possession of his property, subject to the right of seizure by process duly served.
The above ruling was reiterated in State v. Bryan (457 P.2d 661 [1968]) where a parking attendant who searched the automobile to ascertain the
owner thereof found marijuana instead, without the knowledge and participation of police authorities, was declared admissible in prosecution for
illegal possession of narcotics.
And again in the 1969 case of Walker v. State (429 S.W.2d 121), it was held that the search and seizure clauses are restraints upon the government
and its agents, not upon private individuals (citing People v. Potter, 240 Cal. App.2d 621, 49 Cap. Rptr, 892 (1966); State v. Brown, Mo., 391 S.W.2d
903 (1965); State v. Olsen, Or., 317 P.2d 938 (1957).
Likewise appropos is the case of Bernas v. US (373 F.2d 517 (1967). The Court there said:
The search of which appellant complains, however, was made by a private citizen the owner of a motel in which appellant
stayed overnight and in which he left behind a travel case containing the evidence***complained of. The search was made on the
motel owner's own initiative. Because of it, he became suspicious, called the local police, informed them of the bag's contents,
and made it available to the authorities.
The fourth amendment and the case law applying it do not require exclusion of evidence obtained through a search by a private
citizen. Rather, the amendment only proscribes governmental action."
The contraband in the case at bar having come into possession of the Government without the latter transgressing appellant's rights against
unreasonable search and seizure, the Court sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the
offense charged.
Appellant, however, would like this court to believe that NBI agents made an illegal search and seizure of the evidence later on used in prosecuting
the case which resulted in his conviction.
The postulate advanced by accused/appellant needs to be clarified in two days. In both instances, the argument stands to fall on its own weight, or
the lack of it.
First, the factual considerations of the case at bar readily foreclose the proposition that NBI agents conducted an illegal search and seizure of the
prohibited merchandise. Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made
search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary
measure before delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the Bureau of Posts (TSN, October 6 & 7, 1987, pp. 15-18; pp. 7-8; Original
Records, pp. 119-122; 167-168).
It will be recalled that after Reyes opened the box containing the illicit cargo, he took samples of the same to the NBI and later summoned the agents
to his place of business. Thereafter, he opened the parcel containing the rest of the shipment and entrusted the care and custody thereof to the NBI
agents. Clearly, the NBI agents made no search and seizure, much less an illegal one, contrary to the postulate of accused/appellant.
Second, the mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure
proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where
no trespass has been committed in aid thereof, is not search (Chadwick v. State, 429 SW2d 135). Where the contraband articles are identified
without a trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution (US v. Lee 274 US 559, 71 L.Ed.
1202 [1927]; Ker v. State of California 374 US 23, 10 L.Ed.2d. 726 [1963]; Moore v. State, 429 SW2d 122 [1968]).
In Gandy v. Watkins (237 F. Supp. 266 [1964]), it was likewise held that where the property was taken into custody of the police at the specific
request of the manager and where the search was initially made by the owner there is no unreasonable search and seizure within the constitutional
meaning of the term.
That the Bill of Rights embodied in the Constitution is not meant to be invoked against acts of private individuals finds support in the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission. True, the liberties guaranteed by the fundamental law of the land must always be subject to protection. But protection
against whom? Commissioner Bernas in his sponsorship speech in the Bill of Rights answers the query which he himself posed, as follows:
First, the general reflections. The protection of fundamental liberties in the essence of constitutional democracy. Protection
against whom? Protection against the state. The Bill of Rights governs the relationship between the individual and the state. Its
concern is not the relation between individuals, between a private individual and other individuals. What the Bill of Rights does is
to declare some forbidden zones in the private sphere inaccessible to any power holder. (Sponsorship Speech of Commissioner
Bernas , Record of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. 1, p. 674; July 17, 1986; Emphasis supplied)
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its
agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and
unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.
If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However,
if the search is made at the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as in the case at bar, and
without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private
individual, not the law enforcers, is involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the government.
Appellant argues, however, that since the provisions of the 1935 Constitution has been modified by the present phraseology found in the 1987
Charter, expressly declaring as inadmissible any evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional prohibition against illegal search and seizure, it
matters not whether the evidence was procured by police authorities or private individuals (Appellant's Brief, p. 8, Rollo, p. 62).
The argument is untenable. For one thing, the constitution, in laying down the principles of the government and fundamental liberties of the people,
does not govern relationships between individuals. Moreover, it must be emphasized that the modifications introduced in the 1987 Constitution (re:
Sec. 2, Art. III) relate to the issuance of either a search warrant or warrant of arrest vis-a-vis the responsibility of the judge in the issuance thereof
(SeeSoliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 [1988]; Circular No. 13 [October 1, 1985] and Circular No. 12 [June 30, 1987]. The modifications introduced
deviate in no manner as to whom the restriction or inhibition against unreasonable search and seizure is directed against. The restraint stayed with
the State and did not shift to anyone else.
Corolarilly, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by
the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed
as an act of the State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution.
Similarly, the admissibility of the evidence procured by an individual effected through private seizure equally applies, in pari passu, to the alleged
violation, non-governmental as it is, of appellant's constitutional rights to privacy and communication.
2. In his second assignment of error, appellant contends that the lower court erred in convicting him despite the undisputed fact that his rights under
the constitution while under custodial investigation were not observed.
Again, the contention is without merit, We have carefully examined the records of the case and found nothing to indicate, as an "undisputed fact",
that appellant was not informed of his constitutional rights or that he gave statements without the assistance of counsel. The law enforcers testified
that accused/appellant was informed of his constitutional rights. It is presumed that they have regularly performed their duties (See. 5(m), Rule 131)
and their testimonies should be given full faith and credence, there being no evidence to the contrary. What is clear from the records, on the other
hand, is that appellant refused to give any written statement while under investigation as testified by Atty. Lastimoso of the NBI, Thus:
Fiscal Formoso:
You said that you investigated Mr. and Mrs. Job Reyes. What about the accused here, did you investigate the accused together
with the girl?
WITNESS:
Yes, we have interviewed the accused together with the girl but the accused availed of his constitutional right not to give any
written statement, sir. (TSN, October 8, 1987, p. 62; Original Records, p. 240)
The above testimony of the witness for the prosecution was not contradicted by the defense on cross-examination. As borne out by the records,
neither was there any proof by the defense that appellant gave uncounselled confession while being investigated. What is more, we have examined
the assailed judgment of the trial court and nowhere is there any reference made to the testimony of appellant while under custodial investigation
which was utilized in the finding of conviction. Appellant's second assignment of error is therefore misplaced.
3. Coming now to appellant's third assignment of error, appellant would like us to believe that he was not the owner of the packages which contained
prohibited drugs but rather a certain Michael, a German national, whom appellant met in a pub along Ermita, Manila: that in the course of their 30-
minute conversation, Michael requested him to ship the packages and gave him P2,000.00 for the cost of the shipment since the German national
was about to leave the country the next day (October 15, 1987, TSN, pp. 2-10).
Rather than give the appearance of veracity, we find appellant's disclaimer as incredulous, self-serving and contrary to human experience. It can
easily be fabricated. An acquaintance with a complete stranger struck in half an hour could not have pushed a man to entrust the shipment of four (4)
parcels and shell out P2,000.00 for the purpose and for appellant to readily accede to comply with the undertaking without first ascertaining its
contents. As stated by the trial court, "(a) person would not simply entrust contraband and of considerable value at that as the marijuana flowering
tops, and the cash amount of P2,000.00 to a complete stranger like the Accused. The Accused, on the other hand, would not simply accept such
undertaking to take custody of the packages and ship the same from a complete stranger on his mere say-so" (Decision, p. 19, Rollo, p. 91). As to
why he readily agreed to do the errand, appellant failed to explain. Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative self-
serving evidence which deserve no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the testimony of credible witnesses who testify
on affirmative matters (People v. Esquillo, 171 SCRA 571 [1989]; People vs. Sariol, 174 SCRA 237 [1989]).
Appellant's bare denial is even made more suspect considering that, as per records of the Interpol, he was previously convicted of possession of
hashish by the Kleve Court in the Federal Republic of Germany on January 1, 1982 and that the consignee of the frustrated shipment, Walter Fierz,
also a Swiss national, was likewise convicted for drug abuse and is just about an hour's drive from appellant's residence in Zurich, Switzerland (TSN,
October 8, 1987, p. 66; Original Records, p. 244; Decision, p. 21; Rollo, p. 93).
Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience
and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances (People v. Alto, 26 SCRA 342 [1968], citing Daggers v. Van Dyke, 37
N.J. Eg. 130; see also People v. Sarda, 172 SCRA 651 [1989]; People v. Sunga, 123 SCRA 327 [1983]); Castaares v. CA, 92 SCRA 567 [1979]).
As records further show, appellant did not even bother to ask Michael's full name, his complete address or passport number. Furthermore, if indeed,
the German national was the owner of the merchandise, appellant should have so indicated in the contract of shipment (Exh. "B", Original Records,
p. 40). On the contrary, appellant signed the contract as the owner and shipper thereof giving more weight to the presumption that things which a
person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him (Sec. 5 [j], Rule 131). At this point, appellant is therefore estopped to
claim otherwise.
Premises considered, we see no error committed by the trial court in rendering the assailed judgment.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of conviction finding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED