What is the distinction between the Presidents authority to declare a state of national emergency and her

authority to exercise emergency powers?

Declare a State of National Emergency Exercise Emergency Powers



Callingout powers
Call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. The only criterion for the
exercise of this power is that whenever it becomes necessary.

Note: The declaration of a state of emergency is merely a description of a situation which authorizes her to call
out the Armed Forces to help the police maintain law and order. It gives no new power to her, nor to the police.
Certainly, it does not authorize warrantless arrests or control of media. (David v. Ermita, G.R. No. 171409, May 3,
2006)
The Constitution does not require the President to declare a state of rebellion to exercise her calling out power
grants. Section 18, Article VII grants the President, as CommanderinChief a sequence of graduated powers.
(Sanlakas v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 159085, Feb. 3, 2004)
Randolf David, et al. vs. GMA, et al. (2006)
Petitioners failed to rebut the assertion that GMA acted with grave abuse of discretion
SC uphold the constitutionality of PP1017 insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to
prevent or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Sec. 18, Art. VII and other relevant
jurisprudence. However, PP 1017's extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to
issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as
well as decrees promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior
restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Sec. 17, Art. XII, the
president, in the absence of legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business
affected with public interest.

ultra-vires acts and unconstitutional:
a. warrantless arrest of petitioners David and Llamas;
b. the dispersal of the rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members;
c. imposition of standards on media or any prior restraint on the press;
d. warrantless search of the Tribune offices and the whimsical seizures of some articles for publication and other
materials

What is the take care power of the President of the Philippines?
-It is the power of the President under Section 17, Art. VII which provides that The President shall have
control of all the executive departments , bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully
executed (RANDY DAVID VS. ARROYO, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006).

The president may declare a state of emergency but cannot exercise emergency powers without
authorization from Congress. (David vs. ARROYO, GR No. 171396 (PP 1017, 1021) National Emergency)




Grantedby the Constitution, no legitimate
objection can be raised.
Requires a delegation from Congress. (David, et
al. v. Gloria MacapagalArroyo, et al., G.R. No.
171396, May 3, 2006)
The Role of the Supreme Court

The Supreme Court may review, in an appropriate proceeding filled by any citizen, the sufficiency of the factual
basis of (a) the proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ, or (b) the extension
thereof. It must promulgate its decision thereon within
30 days from its filing. (Art. VII, Sec. 18 par. 3)
This is because judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government. (Art. VIII, Sec. 1, par. 2)
The jurisdiction of the SC may be invoked in a proper case. A petition for habeas corpus is one such case.
When a person is arrested without a warrant for complicity in the rebellion or invasion, he or someone else in
his behalf has the standing to question the validity of the proclamation or suspension. But before the SC can
decide on the legality of his detention, it must first pass upon the validity of the proclamation or suspension.
The test to be used by the Supreme Court in so reviewing the act of the President in proclaiming or
suspending, or the act of Congress in extending, is the test of arbitrariness which seeks to determine the
sufficiency of the factual basis of the measure. The question is not whether the President or Congress acted
correctly, but whether he acted arbitrarily in that the action had no basis in fact.
Deciding on whether the act was arbitrary amounts to a determination of whether or not there was
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, which is now made part of judicial power
by Art. VIII, Sec. 1, par. 2. This curbs radically the application of the political question doctrine.

Lansang v Garcia, 42 SCRA 446 (1971).

This test was taken from the case of Lansang v Garcia, 42 SCRA 446 (1971). The issue there raised was whether
in suspending the privilege of the writ in 1971, Marcos had a basis for doing so. The SC, in considering the fact
that the President based his decision on (a) the Senate report on the condition in Central Luzon and (b) a closed
door briefing by the military showing the extent of subversion, concluded that the President did not act
arbitrarily. One may disagree with his appreciation of the facts, but one cannot say that it is without basis.
[In this case of Lansang vs. Garcia, the SC held unanimously that it has the authority to inquire into the existence
of the factual basis in order to determine the constitutional sufficiency thereof. This holding of the SC is now
found in Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 3.]

Can the Supreme Court inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus?
A: Yes. The Supreme Court declared that it had the power to inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of
the privilege of the writ and to annul the same if no legal ground could be established. Hence, the suspension of
the privilege of the writ is no longer a political question to be resolved solely by the President. (Lansang v.
Garcia, G.R. No. L33964, Dec. 11, 1971)
Note: Also applies to the proclamation of martial law.

Lansang v Garcia,
> The issue there raised was whether in suspending the privilege of the writ in 1971, Marcos had a basis for
doing so.
The SC, in considering the fact that the President based his decision on (a) the Senate report on the condition in
Central Luzon and (b) a closed door briefing by the military showing the extent of subversion, concluded that the
President did not act arbitrarily. One may disagree with his appreciation of the facts, but one cannot say that it is
without basis.
>2 conditions must concur for the valid exercise of authority to suspend the privilege:
(a) there must be an actual invasion, insurrection, rebellion or imminent danger and
(b) public safety must require the suspension of the privilege. This holding of the SC is now found in Art. VII, Sec.
18, par. 3.] The function of the court is to check and not supplant the executive or to ascertain merely whether
he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of jurisdiction. The proper standard is not correctness but
arbitrariness.


There are 4 ways, then, for the proclamation or suspension to be lifted:
1) Lifting by the President himself
2) Revocation by Congress
3) Nullification by the Supreme Court
4) Operation of law after 60 days

With this test and the new provisions in the 1987 Constitution, the case of Garcia-Padilla v Ponce Enrile,
121 SCRA 472 (1983), is, at last, overruled, and may it be so always. In that case, the SC held that the President's
proclamation of martial law is beyond judicial review, and that the citizen can only trust that the President acts
in good faith. The cases of Barcelon v Baker and Montenegro v Castaneda, which ruled that the validity of the
suspension of the privilege was a political question, are likewise buried in the grave of judicial history.

Morales v. Enrile
That the suspension of the privilege of the writ does not carry with it the suspension of the right to bail. When
the privilege of the writ is suspended, the arrest and detention remain illegal, but the remedy afforded by law to
the victim is not available.
Under the 1987 Constitution, though the effect of the suspension has been considerably lessened to the need to
file a case within 72 hours from the illegal arrest, otherwise the detainee is to be released.
> The conduct of petitioner in applying for bail indicated that he had waived his objection whatever defect, if
any, in the preliminary examination conducted by respondent judge [Luna v. Plaza]

Olaguer vs Military Commission:
Military Trial of Civilians Void Even Under Martial Law, If Civil Courts Are Open. (Art. VII, Sec. 18, par. 5.).

In the case of Olaguer vs Military Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144, the Aquino vs. Military
Commission No. 2 decision was reversed. According to the SC, civilians who are placed on trial for civil offenses
under general law are entitled to trial by judicial process. Since we are not enemy-occupied territory nor are we
under a military govt. and even on the premise that martial law continues in force, the military tribunals cannot
try and exercise jurisdiction over civilians for civil offenses committed by them which are properly cognizable by
the civil courts that have remained open and have been regularly functioning. The assertion of military authority
over civilians cannot rest on the President's power as Commander in Chief or on any theory of martial law. As
long as civil courts remain open and are regularly functioning, military tribunals cannot try and exercise
jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them and which are properly cognizable by civil courts. To
hold otherwise is a violation of the right to due process.

Olaguer doctrineaka OPEN COURT DOCTRINEcivilians cannot be tried by military courts if the civil
courts are open and functioning (Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34, G.R. No. L-54448, May 22, 1987)

4 ways for the proclamation or suspension to be lifted:
1. Lifting by the President himself;
2. Revocation by Congress;
3. Nullification by the SC;
4. Operation of law after 60 days.

Civilians cannot be tried by military courts if the civil courts are open and functioning. (Olaguer v. Military
Commission No. 34, G.R. No. L54558, May 22, 1987).

"The presiding officer at a court martial is not a judge whose objectivity and independence are protected by
tenure and undiminished salary and nurtured by the judicial tradition, but is a military officer. Substantially
different rules of evidence and procedure apply in military trials. Apart from these differences, the suggestion of
the possibility of influence on the actions of the court-martial by the officer who convenes it, selects its
members and the counsel on both sides, and who usually has direct command and authority over its members is
a pervasive one in military laws, despite strenuous efforts to eliminate the danger.

It does not mean, however, that the political question doctrine has been completely abrogated by the
Constitution, such that if those cases where the SC invoked the doctrine were decided now it would have to
decide the case on its merits. It is submitted that what the
Constitution overrules is only the ruling in Garcia Padilla v Ponce-Enrile, supra, where the SC held that the
question on the validity of the proclamation of martial law is beyond judicial review, so that when the President
says that there is a need for such proclamation, his words are binding on the Courts, and all that the citizen can
do is trust in the good faith of the President.

Indeed, as already noted in the Commander-in-Chief power of the President above, Art. VII, Sec. 18 authorizes
the SC to review, in an appropriate proceeding (like a habeas corpus petition), filed by a citizen (who, under the
Rules of Court, could be the detainee himself, or anyone else in his behalf), the sufficiency of the factual basis of
the proclamation or suspension.

Aquino vs Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546
The SC upheld the power of the President to create military tribunals authorized to try not only military
personnel but also civilians even if at that time civil courts were open and functioning, thus rejecting the "open
court" theory. The SC there held: "Martial law creates an exception to the general rule of exclusive subjection to
the civil jurisdiction, and renders offenses against the laws of war, as well as those of a civil character, triable by
military tribunals. Public danger warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial process. The
immunity of civilians from military jurisdiction, must, however, give way in areas governed by martial law. Xxx

If the accused has the right to be present during the trial of his case, can he also refuse to appear during the
hearings of his case?
No. During arraignment, promulgation of the decision and when he is to be identified by the witnesses
for the prosecution, he must be present. However, he can validly waive his presence after arraignment when he
state in open court or in an affidavit that whenever a witness mentions his name during the presentation of the
prosecutions evidence, he admits that he is the one being referred to.

Barrioquinto et al v. Fernandez 82 Phil 642

F: Petitioners Jimenez and Barrioquinto were charged with murder. Jimenez was sentenced to life
imprisonment. Before the period for perfecting an appeal had expired, Jimenez became aware of Procl. No.
8 which grants amnesty in favor of all persons who may be charged with an act penalized under the RPC in
furtherance of resistance to the enemy or against persons aiding in the war efforts of the enemy, and
committed during the period Dec. 8, 1941 to the date when each particular area of the Phil. where the offense
was actually committed was liberated from enemy control and occupation. The petitioners submitted their
cases to the Guerrilla Amnesty Commission (GAC).
The GAC returned their cases to the CFI-Zamboanga w/o deciding whether or not they are entitled to the
benefits of the Amnesty Proclamation, on the ground that inasmuch as neither of the petitioners have admitted
to committing the offense, they cannot invoke the benefits of the amnesty.
***************
HELD: Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be
pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while
Amnesty is by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of
which the courts should take judicial notice.

Pardon is granted to one after conviction; while Amnesty is granted to classes of persons or communities who
may be guilty of political offenses, generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and
sometimes after conviction.

Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been
convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for that reason it does "not work the restoration
of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms
of the pardon," and it "in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him
by the sentence" (Art 36 RPC).

Pardon is complete with the act of the President while Amnesty is valid only with the concurrence of the
majority of the members of all the members of Congress.

While Amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and
obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands before the law
precisely as though he had committed no offense.
----------
ISSUE: W/N in order to entitle a person to the benefits of the Amnesty Procl. of Sept. 7, 1946, it is necessary as a
condition precedent that he should admit having committed the criminal act with w/c he is charged and allege
the amnesty as a defense.

HELD: NO. It is sufficient that the evidence, either of the complainant or of the accused, shows that the offense
committed comes w/n the terms of said Amnesty Procl.

Vera vs. People, 7 SCRA 152 (1963)
Amnesty cannot be invoked, where the accused actually denies the commission of the offense charged.

Is it required for the person applying for amnesty to admit his guilt before his amnesty application can be
considered?
Yes as held in VERA VS. PEOPLE, 7 SCRA 152. Before one may validly apply for executive clemency
(pardon or amnesty) he MUST ADMIT HAVING COMMITTED THE ACTS WHICH RESULTED IN HIS IMPRISONMENT.
This rule abandoned the contrary ruling in Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez.

F: In the CFI-Quezon, petitioners Vera, among others, were charged w/ the complex crime of kidnapping w/
murder of Amadeo Lozanes. Upon petitioners' motion, invoking the benefits of Amnesty Procl. of the Pres, s. of
1946, the case was referred to the Eight Guerrilla Amnesty Commission, w/c actually tried it. During the hearing,
none of the petitioners admitted having committed the crime charged.

In fact, Vera, the only def. who took the witness stand, instead of admitting the killing of the deceased Lozanes,
categorically denied it. Hence, the Commission, in its decision held that it could not take cognizance of the case,
on the ground that the benefits of the Amnesty Procl., could be invoked only by defs. in a criminal case who,
admitting the commission of the crime, plead that said commission was in pursuance of the resistance
movement and perpetrated against persons who aided the enemy during the Japanese occupation.
Consequently, the Commission ordered that the case be remanded to the court of origin for trial. A MFR was
filed by petitioners but was denied. From this order of the Commission, petitioners appealed to the CA w/c
certified the appeal to us, in view of the legal issue involved.

ISSUE: W/n persons invoking the benefit of amnesty should first admit having committed the crime of w/c they
are accused.
Petitioners contend that to be entitled to the benefits of Amnesty Procl. No. 8, it is not necessary for them to
admit the commission of the crime charged, citing in support of their submission, among others, the case of
Barrioquinto, et. al vs. Fernandez, et, al. (82 P642.) to the effect that "in order to entitle a person to the
benefits of Amnesty Procl., it is not necessary that he should, as a condition precedent, admit having committed
the criminal act or offense w/ w/c he is charged, and allege the amnesty as a defense; it is sufficient that the
evidence, either of the complainant or the accused, shows that the offense committed comes w/in the terms of
said Amnesty Procl.

HELD: But said cases have been superseded and deemed overruled by the subsequent cases of Peo. vs. Llanita,
et. al. (86 P 219), etc. wherein we held that--

"It is rank inconsistency for appellant to justify an act or seek forgiveness for an act, according to him, he has not
committed. Amnesty presupposes the commission of a crime, and when an accused maintains that he has not
committed a crime, he cannot have any use for amnesty. Where an amnesty procl. imposes certain conditions,
as in this case, it is incumbent upon the accused to prove the existence of such conditions. The invocation of
amnesty is in the nature of a plea of confession and avoidance, which means that the pleader admits the
allegations against him but disclaims liability therefor on account of intervening facts which, if proved, would
bring the crime charged within the scope of the amnesty proclamation." (italics supplied.)

At any rate, the facts established bef. the Commission do not bring the case w/in the terms of the Amnesty
Procl. xxx As found by the Commission, the killing of the deceased (Lozanes) was not in furtherance of the
resistance movement, but due to the rivalry bet. The Hunter's Guerrilla, to w/c he belonged, and the Vera's
Guerrilla of petitioners. RAM.

Pardon distinguished from Amnesty

1. Pardon is usually granted for common crimes; amnesty, for political crimes.
2. Pardon is granted to individuals; amnesty, to a group, class, or community generally.
3. Pardon can only be granted after conviction; amnesty may be granted even before trial.
4. Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has been
convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment; amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into
oblivion the offense itself, that is, it overlooks and obliterates the offense with which the convict is charged that
the person released stands precisely as though he had committed no offense. (Barrioquinto v Fernandez, infra.)
5. Pardon is a private act of the President w/c must be pleaded and proved by the person bec. the courts do not
take judicial notice of it; amnesty is a public act of w/c the courts take judicial notice. (Cruz, Philippine Political
Law, 1991 ed.)
6. Pardon does not require the concurrence of the Congress; amnesty requires such concurrence. (id.)

Effects of Pardon

In Cristobal v Labrador, 71 Phil 34 (1940), the voter whose right to vote was challenged in an exclusion
proceeding because he had been convicted of estafa which carried the accessory penalty of disqualification from
the right of suffrage, and in Pellobello v Palatino, 72 Phil 441 (1941), the mayor-elect who was not allowed to
take his oath because of a previous conviction, for falsification of a private document which likewise carried the
accessory penalty of disqualification, were both allowed to exercise their political right in view of the
subsequent pardon granted them. [There would be no problem if they were pardoned beforehand, for then
they would be restored to their political right(s) right away.]

Cristobal v Labrador, 71 Phil 34 (1940)

F: On 3/15/30, Teofilo Santos was found guilty of estafa and sentenced to 6 months of arresto mayor.
Upon appeal, his conviction was affirmed. He was confined in jail from 3/14/9/32 to 8/18/32.
Notwithstanding his conviction, Santos continued to be a registered elector in Malabon, Rizal and was municipal
pres. from 1934 to 1937. Subsequently, The Election Code was approved. Sec. 94, par. (b) of said law disqualifies
the resp. from voting for having been declared by final judgment guilty of any crime against prop." Bec. of this
provision, Santos petitioned the Chief Executive for absolute pardon. The Pres. granted his petition restoring
him to his "full civil and political rights, except that with respect to the right to hold public office or employment,
he will be appointed for appointments only to positions w/c are clerical or manual in nature and involving no
money or prop. responsibility. On 11/40, Cristobal filed a petition for the exclusion of Santos' name in from the
list of voters in Malabon on the ground that the latter is disqualified under par. (b), Sec. 94 of CA 357. LC denied
Cristobal's petition holding that Santos' pardon had the effect of excluding him from the disqualification created
by par. (b) of Sec. 94. Hence, this petition for ceritorari.

HELD: There are 2 limitations upon the exercise of the constitutional prerogative of the Pres. To grant pardon:
(1) that the power be exercised after conviction; (2) that such power does not extend to cases of impeachment.
xxx An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed but it also removes all disabilities resulting from
conviction. In the present case, the disability is the result of conviction w/o w/c there would be no basis for the
disqualification from voting.
xxx
In the present case, while the pardon extended is conditional in the sense that "he will be eligible for
appointment only to positions w/c are clerical or manual in nature involving no money or prop. resp., " it is
absolute insofar as it "restores the resp. to full civil and political rights." Adapted.

Cristobal v Labrador
There are 2 limitations upon the exercise of the constitutional prerogative of the Pres. to grant pardon:
(1) that the power be exercised after conviction;
(2) that such power does not extend to cases of impeachment.
Pelobello v. Palatino 72 Phil 441

F: Pelobello alleges that Palatino is disqualified from voting and being voted upon. It appears that Palatino was
convicted by final judgment in 1912 of atentado contra la autoridad y sus agentes and sentenced to
imprisonment. He was later elected mayor of Torrijos, Marinduque in 1940. It is admitted that Palatino was
granted by the Gov. Gen. a conditional pardon in 1915. It is also proven that on Dec. 25, 1940, the President
granted him absolute pardon and restored him to the enjoyment of full civil and political rights.

ISSUE: W/N the absolute pardon had the effect of removing the disqualification incident to criminal conviction
under the then Election Code, the pardon having been granted after the election but before the date fixed by
law for assuming office.

HELD: YES. The SC adopts the broad view in Cristobal v. Labrador that subject to the limitations imposed by the
Constitution, the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislation; an absolute pardon not only
blots out the crime committed but removes all disabilities resulting from the conviction; and that when granted
after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon removes all that is left of the consequences of
conviction. Thus the better view is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power of the Chief Executive who,
after inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of law to the extent of
relieving completely the party or parties concerned from the accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal
conviction. Under the circumstances of the case, it is evident that the purpose in granting him absolute pardon
was to enable him to assume the position in deference to the popular will; and the pardon was thus extended
after the election but before the date fixed by the Election Code for assuming office.

Pelobello v. Palatino
Absolute pardon has the effect of removing the disqualification from voting and being elected incident
to criminal conviction under Sec 94(a) of the Election Code.
The Chief Executive, after inquiry into the environmental facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity
of the law to the extent of relieving completely the party or parties concerned from the accessory and resultant
disabilities of criminal conviction.
Monsanto vs Factoran
Pardon implies guilt and does not erase the fact of the commission of the crime and the conviction
thereof. It does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to a public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by
reason of the conviction although

*Notes: "Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties and legal disabilities and
restores him to all his civil rights. But unless expressly grounded on the person's innocence (w/c is rare), it
cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. This must be constantly kept in mind
lest we lose track of the true character and purpose of the privilege.

Llamas v. Orbos, G.R. No. 99031, Oct. 15, 1991
Application of Pardoning Powers to Administrative Cases

If the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures in
criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant executive clemency in administrative cases, which are
clearly less serious than criminal offenses. However, the power of the President to grant executive clemency in
administrative cases refers only to administrative cases in the Executive branch and not in the Judicial or
Legislative branches of the govt.

If the President can grant pardons in criminal cases, with more reason he can grant executive clemency in
administrative cases, which are less serious.


Sanctions for violations of conditional pardon
Torres vs Gonzales 152 SCRA 272

Is the mere filing of a criminal case against a recipient of a conditional pardon with the condition "not again
violate any of the penal laws of the Philippines and this condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in
the manner prescribed by law" sufficient to revoke such conditional pardon without first securing conviction
against the grantee?
Yes. As held in TORRES VS. GONZALES, 152 SCRA 272, the determination of whether the conditions of a
convicts pardon had been breached rests exclusively in the sound judgment of the President and that such
determination would not be reviewed by the courts. As held in Tesoro vs. Director of Prisons, in accepting the
terms under which the parole had been granted, Tesoro had in effect agreed that the Governor-General's
determination (rather than that of the regular courts of law) that he had breached one of the conditions of his
parole by committing adultery while he was conditionally at liberty, was binding and conclusive upon him.

In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and who is alleged to have breached the
conditions of his pardon, the Executive Dept. has 2 options: (i) to proceed against him under Sec. 64(i), RAC; or
(ii) to proceed against him under Art. 159, RPC which imposes the penalty of prision correccional minimum
period, upon a convict who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive, shall violate any of
the conditions of such pardon. Here, the President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under the RAC.
That choice is an exercise of the executive prerogative and not subject to judicial scrutiny.

F: Before 1979, Torres was convicted of the crime of estafa (2 counts) and was sentenced to imprisonment and
to pay an indemnity. The maximum sentence would expire on Nov. 2, 2000.
On April 18, 1979, a conditional pardon was granted the petitioner by the President on condition that
petitioner would "not again violate any of the penal laws of the Phil. Should this condition be violated, he will be
proceeded against in the manner prescribed by law. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was
released.
On Sept. 8, 1986, the President cancelled the conditional pardon of the petitioner upon
recommendation of the Board of Pardons. The record before the Board showed that petitioner had been
charged with 20 counts of estafa, convicted of sedition w/c is the subject of an appeal, and a letter report from
the NBI showing a long list of charges brought against the petitioner. The petitioner was subsequently arrested
and confined in Muntinlupa to serve the unexpired portion of his sentence.
Petitioner claims he did not violate his conditional pardon since he has not been convicted by final judgment of
the 20 counts of estafa nor of the crime of sedition. He also contends that he was not given an opportunity to be
heard before he was arrested and recommitted to prison and thus deprived of due process.

ISSUE: W/N conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is necessary before the petitioner can be validly
rearrested and recommitted for violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the
balance of his original sentence.
HELD: NO. The Court cited 3 cases: Espuelas v. Prov'l Warden of Bohol; Tesoro v. Dir. Of Prisons and Sales v. Dir.
of Prisons.
The grant of pardon and the determination of the terms and conditions of a conditional pardon are
purely executive acts which are not subject to judicial scrutiny.

The determination of the occurrence of a breach of a condition of a pardon, and the proper
consequences of such breach, may be either a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny under Sec. 64
(i) of the Rev. Adm. Code; or it may be a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation of a
conditional pardon under Art. 159 of the RPC. Where the President opts to proceed under Sec. 64 (i), RAC, no
judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is necessary, much less conviction therefor by final
judgment of a court, in order that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.

Because due process is not semper et ubique judicial process, and because the conditionally pardoned
convict had already been accorded judicial due process in his trial and conviction for the offense for w/c he was
conditionally pardoned, sec. 64 (i), RAC, is not afflicted with a constitutional vice.

What are the kinds of pardon? What makes them different from each other?
1. Absolute pardon one extended without any conditions
2. Conditional pardon one under which the convict is required to comply with certain requirements
3. Plenary pardon extinguishes all the penalties imposed upon the offender, including accessory disabilities
partial pardon does not extinguish all penalties
4. Partial pardon does not extinguish all the penalties
Note: A judicial pronouncement that a convict who was granted a pardon subject to the condition that he
should not again violate any penal law is not necessary before he can be declared to have violated the condition
of her pardon. (Torres v. Gonzales, G.R. No. L76872, July 23, 1987) 54