POLITICAL LAW

2009

NICASIO BOLOS, JR. v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and REY ANGELES
CINCONIEGUE
G.R. No. 184082, March 17, 2009
J. Peralta

The rule on the three-term limit shows the clear intent of the framers of the Constitution
to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation of office.

After three consecutive terms, an elective local official cannot seek immediate re-election for a
fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same office
following the end of the third consecutive term.


JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG v. COMELEC
G.R. Nos. 178831-32/G.R. No. 179120/G.R. Nos. 179132-33/G.R. Nos. 179240-41, April 1,
2009
J. Peralta

Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
Member of the House of Representatives, the jurisdiction of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal begins over election contests relating to his election, returns, and
qualifications, and mere allegation as to the invalidity of her proclamation does not divest the
Electoral Tribunal of its jurisdiction.


LAND BANK OF THE PHILLIPINESv.CAROLINA B. VDA. DE ABELLO AND HEIRS OF
ELISEO ABELLO
G.R. No. 168631, April 7, 2009
J. Peralta

Seizure of property would take effect on the payment of just compensation and not upon
the taking of the property. The value of the property at the time of payment is controlling in
determining the just amount of compensation not the value at the time of taking.


JOSE PEPITO M. AMORES, M.D. v. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION
G.R. No. 170093, April 29, 2009
J. Peralta

The mere fact that a particular position belongs to the career service does not
automatically confer security of tenure on its occupant. Such right will have to depend on the
nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or lack of it. A person who
does not have the requisite qualifications for the position cannot be appointed to it in the first
place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be appointed to it in an acting capacity in the
absence of appropriate eligibles.






OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v.FERNANDO J. BELTRAN
G.R. No. 168039, June 5, 2009
J. Peralta

The Office of the Ombudsman, in the exercise of its administrative disciplinary authority,
is vested by the Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 with the power to impose the penalty of
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public officer or employee
found to be at fault.

In administrative cases, substantial evidence is required to support any findings.
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. The requirement is satisfied where there is reasonable ground to
believe that the respondent is guilty of misconduct, even if the evidence might not be
overwhelming.


CARMELO LAZATIN, ET AL. v. HON. ANIANO A. DISIERTO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 147097, June 5, 2009
J. Peralta

The doctrine of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial precedents. It requires courts
in a country to follow the rule established in a decision of the Supreme Court thereof. That
decision becomes a judicial precedent to be followed in subsequent cases by all courts in the
land. The doctrine of stare decisis is based on the principle that once a question of law has
been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.

In this case, petitioners have not shown any strong, compelling reason to convince the
Court that the doctrine of stare decisis should not be applied to this case. They have not
successfully demonstrated how or why it would be grave abuse of discretion for the
Ombudsman, who has been validly conferred by law with the power of control and supervision
over the OSP, to disapprove or overturn any resolution issued by the latter.


LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINESv.RENE RALLA BELISTA
G.R. No. 164631, June 26, 2009
J. Peralta

RTC, sitting as SAC, can act over all petitions for determination of just compensation to
landowners in accordance with Section 57 of RA No. 6657.The appeal to the DARAB of the
decision of adjudicator before a party can resort to the RTC is not necessary.


HEIRS OF EMILIANO SAN PEDROv.PABLITO GARCIA and JOSE CALDERON
G.R. No. 166988, July 3, 2009
J. Peralta

Litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an
effective administration of justice that once a judgment has become final, the issue or cause
involved therein should be laid to rest.



The noble purpose is to write finis to disputes once and for all. This is a fundamental
principle in our justice system, without which there could be no end to litigations. Utmost respect
and adherence to this principle must always be maintained by those who wield the power of
adjudication. Any act which violates such principle must be struck down.


PETRONILA MAYLEM v. CARMELITA ELLANO AND ANTONIA MORCIENTO
G.R. No. 162721, July 13, 2009
J. Peralta

As found by the Court of Appeals, it is thus implausible that the surrender of the land by
Abad could be interpreted as abandonment in contemplation of the law, in view of the
understanding between him and petitioner that the surrender of possession would be merely
temporary. Suffice it to say that the allegation of abandonment is negated by the undisputed fact
that Abad actually demanded the return of the property to him after the lapse of the one-year
period. Indeed, petitioners act of dispossessing Abad of the land awarded to him was merely
calculated to impair the latters vested right of ownership.

Abandonment or neglect, as a ground for the cancellation of an emancipation patent or
certificate of land award requires a clear and absolute intention to renounce a right or a claim, or
to abandon a right or property coupled with an external act by which that intention is expressed
or carried into effect.


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION v.SPOUSES RUPERTO LIBUNAO AND SONIA P. SANOPO & HEIRS OF
BENITA DOMINGO
G.R. No. 166553, July 30, 2009
J. Peralta

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its
owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the owners loss. The word
"just" is used to intensify the meaning of the word "compensation" and to convey thereby the
idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full
and ample.


LIMKAICHONG v. COMELEC/ BIRAOGO v. NOGRALES, ET AL./ PARAS v. NOGRALES,
ET AL./ VILLANDO v. COMELEC, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. 178831-32/G.R. No. 179120/G.R. Nos. 179132-33/G.R. Nos. 179240-41 July 30,
2009
J. Peralta

Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a
Member of the House of Representatives, the COMELEC's jurisdiction over election contests
relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HRET's own jurisdiction begins.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM (DAR)v.CARMEN S. TONGSON
G.R. No. 171674, August 4, 2009


J. Peralta

In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of
the like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax
declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered.


FRANCIS F. YENKO, ET AL. v. RAUL NESTOR C. GUNGON/
RAUL NESTOR C. GUNGON v. FRANCIS F. YENKO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 165450/G.R .No. 165452, August 13, 2009
J. Peralta

Reassignments involving a reduction in rank, status or salary violate an employees
security of tenure, which is assured by the Constitution, the Administrative Code of 1987, and
the Omnibus Civil Service Rules and Regulations. Security of tenure covers not only employees
removed without cause, but also cases of unconsented transfers and reassignments, which are
tantamount to illegal/constructive removal.


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESv.SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) AND VICTORIA
AMANTE
G.R. No. 167304, August 25, 2009
J. Peralta

Public officials enumerated in Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only
be charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other offenses or felonies in relation
to their office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are limited only to
those that are committed in relation to the public official or employee's office.


CAROLINA R. JAVIER v. THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN and the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 147026-27, September 11, 2009
J. Peralta

Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector to sit as a member of the
NBDB, the law invested her with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, so
that the purpose of the government is achieved. In this case, the government aimed to enhance
the book publishing industry as it has a significant role in the national development. Hence, the
fact that she was appointed from the public sector and not from the other branches or agencies
of the government does not take her position outside the meaning of a public office.

A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for
a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.

NATIONAL HOME MORTGAGE FINANCE CORPORATIONv.MARIO BAYARI ET. AL.,
G.R. No. 166508, October 2, 2009


J. Peralta

The COA, as one of the three independent constitutional commissions, is specifically
vested with the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to
the revenue and receipts of, and expenditures or uses of funds and property owned or held in
trust by the government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, including
government-owned and controlled corporations.


CARMELINDA C. BARRO v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 186201, October 9, 2009
J. Peralta

The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in two divisions, and shall promulgate
its rules of procedure in order to expedite disposition of election cases, including pre-
proclamation controversies. All such election cases shall be heard and decided in division,
provided that motions for reconsideration of decisions shall be decided by the Commission en
banc.


HON. VICENTE P. EUSEBIO, LORNA A. BERNARDO, VICTOR ENDRIGA, and the CITY OF
PASIGv.JOVITO M. LUIS ET AL.,
G.R. No. 162474, October 13, 2009
J. Peralta

Recovery of possession of the property by the landowner can no longer be allowed on
the grounds of estoppel and, more importantly, of public policy which imposes upon the public
utility the obligation to continue its services to the public. The non-filing of the case for
expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of the property to the landowner. What is left
to the landowner is the right of compensation.


PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. CAYETANO A. TEJANO, JR.,
G.R. No. 173615, October 16, 2009
J. Peralta

The CSC shall have jurisdiction over appeals in administrative disciplinary cases
involving the imposition of the penalty of suspension for more than thirty days; or fine in an
amount exceeding thirty days salary; demotion in rank or salary or transfer, removal or
dismissal from office.


OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, REPRESENTED BY HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO
v. HEIRS OF MARGARITA VDA. DE VENTURA REPRESENTED BY PACITA V. PASCUAL,
ET AL.
G.R. No. 151800, November 5, 2009
J. Peralta

The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over orders, directives and decisions of the Office
of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only. It cannot, therefore, review the


orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrative
cases.


THE HEIRS OF AURELIO REYESv.HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO ET AL.
G.R. No. 136466, November 25, 2009
J. Peralta

The power of administrative officials to promulgate rules and regulations in the
implementation of a statute is necessarily limited only to carrying into effect what is provided in
the legislative enactment.


JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES v. HON. MANUEL B. GAITE, ET AL.
G.R. No. 165276, November 25, 2009
J. Peralta

Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, department secretaries are alter egos or
assistants of the President and their acts are presumed to be those of the latter unless
disapproved or reprobated by him. Thus, as a rule, an aggrieved party affected by the decision
of a cabinet secretary need not appeal to the OP and may file a petition for certiorari directly in
the Court of Appeals assailing the act of the said secretary.


LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINESv. TERESITA PANLILIO LUCIANO
G.R. No. 165428, November 25, 2009
J. Peralta

In determining just compensation, the cost of acquisition of the land, the current value of
like properties, its nature, actual use and income, the sworn valuation by the owner, the tax
declarations, and the assessment made by government assessors shall be considered. The
social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the
Government to the property, as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any
government financing institution on the said land, shall be considered as additional factors to
determine its valuation.


GOVERNOR ORLANDO A. FUA, JR. v. THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT AND ELIZABETH S.
ZOSA
G.R. No. 175803, December 4, 2009
J. Peralta

The general rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should
first avail himself of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The non-
observance of the doctrine results in the petition having no cause of action, thus, justifying its
dismissal.


PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY ET. AL. v.PEARL CITY MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION


G.R. No. 168668, December 16, 2009
J. Peralta

In administrative proceedings, a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain ones side
suffices to meet the requirements of due process. The essence of procedural due process is
embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. "To be heard"
does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also thru pleadings. Where
opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no
denial of procedural due process.


BARANGAY SANGALANG v. BARANGAY MAGUIHAN
G.R. No. 159792, December 23, 2009
J. Peralta

The jurisdictional responsibility for settlement of boundary disputes between and among
local government units is to be lodged before the proper Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan concerned, if it involves two or more barangays in the same city or
municipality. If there is a failure of amicable settlement, the dispute shall be formally tried by the
sanggunian concerned and shall decide the same within (60) days from the date of the
certification referred to.


LILY O. ORBASEv.OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN and ADORACION MENDOZA-BOLOS
G.R. No. 175115, December 23, 2009
J. Peralta

In administrative cases, substantial evidence is required to support any findings.
Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate
to support a conclusion. The requirement is satisfied where there is reasonable ground to
believe that the petitioner is guilty of the act or omission complained of, even if the evidence
might not be overwhelming.


2010

ALVIN B. GARCIA v.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND TOMAS R. OSMEA
G.R. No. 170256, January 25, 2010
J. Peralta

Paragraph 6, Section 2, Article IX of the Constitution empowers the COMELEC to
"investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases for violation of election laws, including
acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses and malpractices. The Court will not
interfere with the finding of probable cause by the COMELEC absent a clear showing of grave
abuse of discretion. This principle emanates from the COMELEC's exclusive power to conduct
preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the election laws and to
prosecute the same, except as may otherwise be provided by law.




NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION
v.CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND PEDRO RAMOS
G.R. No. 149497, January 25, 2010
J. Peralta

Government officials and employees are prohibited under Section 7 (a) of RA No. 6713
from having direct or indirect financial or material interest in any transaction requiring the
approval of their office, since personal interest would be involved. Nonetheless, in the instant
case, when the NEA Administrator, subject to the confirmation of the Board, designates a NEA
personnel to an electric cooperative where a vacancy in a certain position occurs and/or when
the interest of the cooperative or the program so requires, such designation is primarily geared
to protect the interest of the government and the loans it extended to the cooperative. Thus, any
NEA personnel so designated in the electric cooperative cannot be considered as having direct
or indirect interest in the cooperative for its own personal interest, but only for the purpose of
protecting the interest of NEA as the primary source of funds for the electric cooperative.

On the other hand, Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution provides that no elective or
appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation,
unless specifically authorized by law.


ABDUL GAFFAR P.M. DIBARATUN
v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND ABDUL CARIM MALA ABUBAKAR
G.R. No. 170365,February 2, 2010
J. Peralta

The following are the three instances when a failure of elections may be declared by the
Commission: (1) the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed on account
of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; (2) the election in any
polling place had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting on
account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes; or (3) after the
voting and during the preparation and transmission of the election returns or in the custody or
canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect on account of force majeure, violence,
terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes.

In the instant case, the elections in Precinct No. 6A/7A were suspended before the hour
fixed by law for the closing of the voting due to violence. Only 10 voters were able to cast their
votes out of 151 registered voters; hence, the votes not cast would have affected the result of
the elections. The concurrence of these two conditions caused the COMELEC en banc to
declare a failure of elections. When there is failure of elections, the COMELEC is empowered to
annul the elections and to call for special elections.


RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, VICTOR F. BERNAL, AND RENE O. MEDINA
v.EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 180050, February 10, 2010
J. Peralta



A province may be created if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of not less than Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) based on 1991
constant prices and either of the following requisites: (i) a contiguous territory of at least two
thousand (2,000) square kilometers, as certified by the Lands Management Bureau; or (ii) a
population of not less than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) inhabitants as certified by the
National Statistics Office: Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area,
population, and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the
minimum requirements prescribed herein. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises
two (2) or more islands or is separated by a chartered city or cities which do not contribute to
the income of the province. The average annual income shall include the income accruing to
the general fund, exclusive of special funds, trust funds, transfers, and non-recurring income. In
the instant case, R.A. No. 9355 failed to comply with either the territorial or the population
requirement for the creation of the Province of Dinagat Islands.


REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED ON THE BOOKS OF ACCOUNTS OF
THE MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT, MONDRAGON-SAN ROQUE, NORTHERN
SAMAR.
A.M. No. P-09-2721, February 16, 2010
J. Peralta

Delayed remittance of cash collections by the clerk of court or cash clerk constitutes
gross neglect of duty and imposed the supreme penalty of dismissal. Hence, the imposable
penalty upon Gimena should be dismissal from the service. However, subsequent remittance of
the subject amounts, as shown by the attached disbursement vouchers and acknowledgment
receipts, with no outstanding accountabilities, can be taken as mitigating circumstances which
warrant the imposition of the lower penalty of suspension of one (1) month without pay.


ATTY. LUCKY M. DAMASEN v. OSCAR G. TUMAMAO
G.R. No. 173165, February 17, 2010
J. Peralta

Quite clearly, from the tenor of the letter, it appears that the membership of Damasen
still had to be approved by the LDP National Council. Thus, notwithstanding Damasens
procurement of a Certificate of Membership from LDP Provincial Chairman Balauag, the same
merely started the process of his membership in the LDP, and it did not mean automatic
membership thereto. While it may be argued that Damasen was already a member upon receipt
of a Certificate of Membership from LDP Provincial Chairman Balauag, the Court cannot impose
such view on the LDP. If the LDP leadership says that the membership of Damasen still had to
be endorsed to the National Council for approval, then the Court cannot question such
requirement in the absence of evidence to the contrary. It is well settled that the discretion of
accepting members to a political party is a right and a privilege, a purely internal matter, which
this Court cannot meddle in.


NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION v. VAL L. VILLANUEVA


G.R. No. 168203, March 9, 2010
J. Peralta

Considering that the President has the power to review on appeal the orders or acts of
petitioner NEA, the failure of respondent to undertake such an appeal bars him from resorting to
a judicial suit. It is settled that under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,
recourse through court action cannot prosper until after all such administrative remedies have
first been exhausted. If remedy is available within the administrative machinery, this should be
resorted to before recourse can be made to courts. The party with an administrative remedy
must not only initiate the prescribed administrative procedure to obtain relief but also pursue it to
its appropriate conclusion before seeking judicial intervention in order to give the administrative
agency an opportunity to decide the matter itself correctly and prevent unnecessary and
premature resort to the court. The non-observance of the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies results in lack of cause of action, which is one of the grounds in the
Rules of Court justifying the dismissal of the complaint.


OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR v. ATTY. MARY ANN PADUGANAN-
PEARANDA, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF COURT, MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT IN CITIES,
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, MISAMIS ORIENTAL AND MS, JOCELYN MEDIANTE
A.M. No. P-07-2355, March 19, 2010
J. Peralta

Court personnel tasked with collections of court funds, such as Clerks of Courts and
cash clerks, should deposit immediately with authorized government depositories the various
funds they have collected, because they are not authorized to keep funds in their custody. In
this case, respondents violated Supreme Court (SC) Circular No. 50-95, which commands that
all fiduciary collections shall be deposited immediately by the Clerk of Court concerned, upon
receipt thereof, with an authorized government depositary bank.


THE MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY, BULACAN, REPRESENTED BY THE HON. FELIX V.
OPLE, MUNICIPAL MAYOR, AND FELIX V. OPLE, IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY v. HON.
SIMEON P. DUMDUM, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 7, CEBU CITY
G.R. No. 168289, March 22, 2010

Consent is implied when the government enters into a business contract, as it then
descends to the level of the other contracting party, or it may be embodied in a general or
special law such as that found in Book I, Title I, Chapter 2, Section 22 of the Local Government
Code of 1991, which vests local government units with certain corporate powersone of them
is the power to sue and be sued.The general rule spelled out in Section 3, Article XVI of the
Constitution is that the state and its political subdivisions may not be sued without their consent.
Otherwise put, they are open to suit but only when they consent to it.

Be that as it may, a difference lies between suability and liability. Where the suability of
the state is conceded and by which liability is ascertained judicially, the state is at liberty to
determine for itself whether to satisfy the judgment or not. Execution may not issue upon such


judgment, because statutes waiving non-suability do not authorize the seizure of property to
satisfy judgments recovered from the action. These statutes only convey an implication that the
legislature will recognize such judgment as final and make provisions for its full satisfaction.
Thus, where consent to be sued is given by general or special law, the implication thereof is
limited only to the resultant verdict on the action before execution of the judgment.




ATTY. REYNANTE B. ORCEO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G. R. No. 190779, March 26, 2010
J. Peralta

The COMELEC had the authority to promulgate Resolution No. 8714 pursuant to
Section 35 of R.A. No. 7166. It was granted the power to issue the implementing rules and
regulations of Sections 32 and 33 of R.A. No. 7166. Under this broad power, the COMELEC
was mandated to provide the details of who may bear, carry or transport firearms or other
deadly weapons, as well as the definition of firearms, among others. These details are left to
the discretion of the COMELEC, which is a constitutional body that possesses special
knowledge and expertise on election matters, with the objective of ensuring the holding of free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.

The COMELECs intent in the inclusion of airsoft guns in the term firearm and their
resultant coverage by the election gun ban is to avoid the possible use of recreational guns in
sowing fear, intimidation or terror during the election period. An ordinary citizen may not be able
to distinguish between a real gun and an airsoft gun. However, the replicas and imitations of
airsoft guns and airguns are excluded from the term firearm in Resolution No. 8714.


NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. ALAN OLANDESCA
G.R. No. 171434, April 23, 2010
J. Peralta

When an employee is dismissed or suspended it is but logical that since he is barred
from reporting to work the same negates his right to be paid backwages. He has no opportunity
to work during the period he was dismissed or suspended and, therefore, he has no salary to
expect. However, the same does not hold true for an employee who is reprimanded. A
reprimand usually carries a warning that a repetition of the same or similar act will be dealt with
more severely. Under normal circumstances, an employee who is reprimanded is never
prevented from reporting to work. He continues to work despite the warning. Thus, in the case
at bar, since respondents penalty should only be a reprimand, this Court deems it proper and
equitable to affirm the CAs award of backwages.


HENRY JUNE DUEAS, JR. v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL,
ET. AL.


G.R. No. 191550 May 4, 2010
J. Peralta

It is hornbook principle that the Courts jurisdiction to review decisions and orders of
electoral tribunals is exercised only upon showing of grave abuse of discretion committed by the
tribunal; otherwise, the Court shall not interfere with the electoral tribunals exercise of its
discretion or jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as the capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment, the exercise of power in an arbitrary manner, where the abuse
is so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty.




RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, ET. AL. v. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO ERMITA, ET.
AL.
G.R. No. 180050, May 12, 2010
J. Peralta

Section 7, Chapter 2 of the Local Government Code provided that as a general rule, the
creation of a local government unit or its conversion from one level to another level shall be
based on verifiable indicators of viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:(a)
Income. It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all essential
government facilities and services and special functions commensurate with the size of its
population, as expected of the local government unit concerned; (b) Population. It shall be
determined as the total number of inhabitants within the territorial jurisdiction of the local
government unit concerned; and (c) Land area. It must be contiguous, unless it comprises
two (2) or more islands, or is separated by a local government unit independent of the others;
properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide for
such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.

It must be emphasized that Section 7 above, which provides for the general rule in the
creation of a local government unit, states in paragraph (c) thereof that the land area must be
contiguous and sufficient to provide for such basic services and facilities to meet the
requirements of its populace.Therefore, there are two requirements for land area: (1) the land
area must be contiguous; and (2) the land area must be sufficient to provide for such basic
services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace. A sufficient land area in the
creation of a province is at least 2,000 square kilometers, as provided by Section 461 of the
Local Government Code.The requirement of a contiguous territory and the requirement of a land
area of at least 2,000 square kilometers are distinct and separate requirements for land area
under paragraph (a) (i) of Section 461 and Section 7 (c) of the Local Government Code.


A.Z. ARNAIZ REALTY, INC. REPRESENTED BY CARMEN Z. ARNAIZ v. OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT
G.R. No. 170623, July 7, 2010


J. Peralta

Due process, as a constitutional precept, does not always, and in all situations, require a
trial-type proceeding. Litigants may be heard through pleadings, written explanations, position
papers, memoranda or oral arguments. The standard of due process that must be met in
administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not ignored. It
is, therefore, not legally objectionable for being violative of due process for an administrative
agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers, affidavits or documentary evidence
submitted by the parties.


GABRIEL C. SINGSON, ET. AL. v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 159355, August 9, 2010
J. Peralta

The RATA is distinct from salary (as a form of compensation). Unlike salary which is
paid for services rendered, the RATA is a form of allowance intended to defray expenses
deemed unavoidable in the discharge of office. Hence, the RATA is paid only to certain officials
who, by the nature of their offices, incur representation and transportation expenses.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. PEDRO DELIJERO, JR.
G.R. No. 172635, October 20, 2010
J. Peralta

While petitioner has concurrent administrative disciplinary authority with the DECS over
public school teachers, Section 23 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 provides that the
Ombudsman may refer a complaint to the proper disciplinary authority. Under the
circumstances, it would have been more prudent for petitioner to have referred the complaint to
the DECS given that it would have been in a better position to serve the interest of justice
considering the nature of the controversy. Respondent is a public school teacher and is covered
by RA 4670, therefore, the proceedings before the DECS would have been the more
appropriate venue to resolve the dispute.


LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO v. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010/ REP.
EDCEL LAGMAN, ET. AL. v. EXEC. SEC. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., ET. AL.
G.R. No. 192935 & G.R. No. 193036, December 7, 2010
J. Peralta Separate Concurring Opinion

Albeit the President has the power to create ad hoc committees to investigate or inquire
into matters for the guidance of the President to ensure that the laws be faithfully executed, the
Truth Commission was not created in the nature of the aforementioned ad hoc
investigating/fact-finding bodies. The Truth Commission was created more in the nature of a
public office.

In this case, the members of the Truth Commission are not officials from existing
government offices. Moreover, the Truth Commission has been granted powers of an
independent office as follows: 1) Engage or contract the services of resource persons,


professionals and other personnel determined by it as necessary to carry out its mandate;
2) Promulgate its rules and regulations or rules of procedure it deems necessary to effectively
and efficiently carry out the objectives of this Executive Order and to ensure the orderly conduct
of its investigations, proceedings and hearings, including the presentation of evidence. 3) The
Truth Commission shall have the power to engage the services of experts as consultants or
advisers as it may deem necessary to accomplish its mission.

A valid classification must rest upon material differences between the persons, or
activities or thing included and excluded. Reasonable grounds must exist for making a
distinction between those who fall within the class and those who do not. There is no substantial
distinction cited between public officers who may be involved in reported cases of graft and
corruption during the previous administration and public officers who may be involved in
reported cases of graft and corruption during prior administrations in relation to the purpose of
ending graft and corruption. To limit the investigation to public officers of the previous
administration is violative of the equal protection clause.


2011

MOISES TINIO, JR. AND FRANCIS TINIO vs. NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION/NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. MOISES TINIO, JR. AND FRANCIS
TINIO
G.R. No. 160923/G.R. No. 161093. January 24, 2011
J. Peralta

It is settled that the nature and character of the land at the time of its taking is the
principal criterion for determining how much just compensation should be given to the
landowner. Hence, the argument of the Tinios that the subject property should benefit from the
subsequent classification of its adjoining properties as industrial lands is, likewise, untenable.
The Court, in a number of cases, has enunciated the principle that it would be injustice on the
part of the expropriator where the owner would be given undue incremental advantages arising
from the use to which the government devotes the property expropriated.


RE: ANONYMOUS COMPLAINT AGAINTS MS. HERMOGENA F. BAYANI FOR
DISHONESTY
A.M. No. 2007-22-SC, February 1, 2011
J. Peralta

Dishonesty is defined as intentionally making a false statement in any material fact, or
practicing or attempting to practice any deception or fraud in securing his examination,
registration, appointment or promotion. Thus, dishonesty, like bad faith, is not simply bad
judgment or negligence. Dishonesty is a question of intention. In ascertaining the intention of a
person accused of dishonesty, consideration must be taken not only of the facts and
circumstances which gave rise to the act committed by the respondent, but also of his state of
mind at the time the offense was committed, the time he might have had at his disposal for the
purpose of meditating on the consequences of his act, and the degree of reasoning he could
have had at that moment.




BENIGNO B. REAS v.CARLOS M. RELACION
A.M. No. P-05-2095, February 9, 2011
J. Peralta

Relacions failure to immediately return Reas salary check was improper and constituted
misconduct. According to jurisprudence, misconduct is a transgression of some established rule
of action, an unlawful behavior, or gross negligence by a public officer. The misconduct is grave
if it involves any of the additional elements of corruption, willful intent to violate the law, or
disregard of long-standing rules, which must be established by substantial evidence. Otherwise,
the misconduct is only simple. That Relacion did not maliciously or deliberately take Reas
salary check rendered him liable only for simple misconduct.






ANGELINA C. LIM AND VIVIAN M. GABUANG v. MARIBETH G. AROMIN, RECORDS
OFFICER I, OCC, MTC, MECAUAYAN, BULACAN
A.M. No. P-09-2677, March 9, 2011
J. Peralta

The SC has emphasized that court personnel must devote every moment of official time
to public service. The conduct and behavior of court personnel should be characterized by a
high degree of professionalism and responsibility, as they mirror the image of the court.
Specifically, court personnel must strictly observe official time to inspire public respect for the
justice system. Section 1, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel mandates that
court personnel shall commit themselves exclusively to the business and responsibilities of their
office during working hours.


ABC (ALLIANCE FOR BARANGAY CONCERNS) PARTY LIST, REPRESENTED BY ITS
CHAIRMAN, JAMES MARTY LIM v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND MELANIO
MAURICIO, JR.
G.R. No. 193256, March 22, 2011
J. Peralta

Since the representative of the elected party-list organization becomes a member of the
House of Representatives, contests relating to the qualifications of the said party-list
representative is within the jurisdiction of the HRET, as Section 17, Article VI of the Constitution
provides: Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal, which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Party-list nominees are elected members of the
House of Representatives no less than the district representatives are, the HRET has
jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their qualifications. By analogy with the cases of district
representatives, once the party or organization of the party-list nominee has been proclaimed
and the nominee has taken his oath and assumed office as member of the House of


Representatives, the COMELECs jurisdiction over election contests relating to his qualifications
ends and the HRETs own jurisdiction begins.


LUCIANO VELOSO, ABRAHAM CABOCHAN, JOCELYN DAWIS-ASUNCION AND MARLON
M. LACSON v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 193677, September 6, 2011
J. Peralta

The COAs assailed decisions were made in faithful compliance with its mandate and in
judicious exercise of its general audit power as conferred on it by the Constitution. The COA
adheres to the policy that government funds and property should be fully protected and
conserved and that irregular, unnecessary, excessive or extravagant expenditures or uses of
such funds and property should be prevented.Thus, LGUs, though granted local fiscal
autonomy, are still within the audit jurisdiction of the COA.


CITY OF MANILA v. MELBA TAN TE
G.R. No. 169263, September 21, 2011
J. Peralta

The concept of socialized housing, whereby housing units are distributed and/or sold to
qualified beneficiaries on much easier terms, has already been included in the expanded
definition of public use or purpose in the context of the States exercise of the power of
eminent domain. The term public use has acquired a more comprehensive coverage to the
literal import of the term signifying strict use or employment by the public has been added the
broader notion of indirect public benefit or advantage.


ENRIQUE U. BETOY v. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
G.R. Nos. 156556-57, October 4, 2011
J. Peralta

The privatization and restructuring of the NPC was done in good faith as its primary
purpose was for economy and to make the bureaucracy more efficient.


2012

GONZALO PUYAT & SONS, INC. v. RUBEN ALCAIDE (deceased), substituted by GLORIA
ALCAIDE, representative of the Farmer-Beneficiaries
G.R. No. 167952, February 1, 2012
J. Peralta

The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, but merely a statutory
privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of the
law.Time and again, it has been held that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of


due process, but merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must
comply with the requirements of the rules, failing in which the right to appeal is lost.


SAMAR II ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. (SAMELCO II) AND ITS BOARD OF
DIRECTORS, composed of DEBORAH T. MARCO (Immediate Past President), ATTY.
MEDINO L. ACUBA, ENGR. MANUEL C. OREJOLA, ALFONSO F. QUILAPIO, RAUL DE
GUZMAN and PONCIANO R. ROSALES (General Manager and Ex Officio Director) v.
ANANIAS D. SELUDO, JR.
G.R. No. 173840, April 25, 2012
J. Peralta

While the RTC has jurisdiction over the petition for prohibition filed by respondent, the
NEA, in the exercise of its power of supervision and control, has primary jurisdiction to
determine the issue of the validity of the subject resolution.

It may not be amiss to reiterate the prevailing rule that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
applies where a claim is originally cognizable in the courts and comes into play whenever
enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme,
has been placed within the special competence of an administrative agency.

ARCHBISHOP FERNANDO R. CAPALLA, OMAR SOLITARIO ALI and MARY ANNE L.
SUSANO v. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 201112, June 13, 2012
J. Peralta

Considering that the AES contract is not an ordinary contract as it involves procurement
by a government agency, the rights and obligations of the parties are governed not only by the
Civil Code but also by RA 9184. A winning bidder is not precluded from modifying or amending
certain provisions of the contract bidded upon. However, such changes must not constitute
substantial or material amendments that would alter the basic parameters of the contract and
would constitute a denial to the other bidders of the opportunity to bid on the same terms.

HILARION F. DIMAGIBA, IRMA MENDOZA, and ELLEN RASCO
v. JULITA ESPARTERO, MA. BERNARDITA L. CARREON and MELINA SAN PEDRO
G.R. No. 154952, July 16, 2012
J. Peralta

The only exception for an employee to receive additional, double and indirect
compensation is where the law allows him to receive extra compensation for services rendered
in another position which is an extension or is connected with his basic work. The prohibition
against additional or double compensation, except when specifically authorized by law, is
considered a constitutional curb on the spending power of the government. In this case, when
petitioners were separated from LIVECOR, they were given separation pay which also included


gratuity pay for all the years they worked thereat and concurrently in HSDC/SIDCOR. Granting
them another gratuity pay for the works done in HSDC under the trust agreement would be
indirectly giving them additional compensation for services rendered in another position which is
an extension or is connected with his basic work which is prohibited. This can only be allowed if
there is a law which specifically authorizes them to receive an additional payment of gratuity.


JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice; HON.
SIXTO BRILLANTES, .JR., in his capacity as Chairperson of the Commission on
Elections; and the JOINT DOJ-COMELEC PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE
and FACT-FINDING TEAM
G.R. No. 199082. September 18, 2012
J. Peralta


Constitutionality of J oint-Order No. 001-2011

A. Equal Protection Clause

The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended
to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of
real differences among men, it does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all
persons under like circumstances and conditions shall be treated alike both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced.

Joint Order No. 001-2011 cannot be nullified on the ground that it singles out the officials
of the Arroyo Administration and, therefore, it infringes the equal protection clause. The Joint
Committee was created for the purpose of conducting preliminary investigation of election
offenses during the 2004 and 2007 elections. While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those
subjected to preliminary investigation, not all respondents therein were linked to GMA as there
were public officers who were investigated upon in connection with their acts in the performance
of their official duties. Private individuals were also subjected to the investigation by the Joint
Committee.



B. Due Process

It is settled that the conduct of preliminary investigation is, like court proceedings,
subject to the requirements of both substantive and procedural due process. Preliminary
investigation is considered as a judicial proceeding wherein the prosecutor or investigating
officer, by the nature of his functions, acts as a quasi-judicial officer. The authority of a
prosecutor or investigating officer duly empowered to preside over or to conduct a preliminary
investigation is no less than that of a municipal judge or even an
RTC Judge.

In the case, it must be emphasized that Joint Order No. 001-2011 created two bodies,
namely: (1) the Fact-Finding Team tasked to gather real, documentary and testimonial evidence
which can be utilized in the preliminary investigation to be conducted by the Joint Committee;
and (2) the Joint Committee mandated to conduct preliminary investigation. It is, therefore,
inaccurate to say that there is only one body which acted as evidence-gatherer, prosecutor and
judge. More importantly, there was no proof or even an allegation that the Joint Committee
itself, tasked to conduct the requisite preliminary investigation against petitioners, made biased
statements that would convey to the public that the members were favoring a particular party.

1. As clearly explained above, the Comelec is granted the power to investigate, and where
appropriate, prosecute cases of election offenses. This is necessary in ensuring free,
orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections. On the other hand, the DOJ is mandated to
administer the criminal justice system in accordance with the accepted processes thereof
consisting in the investigation of the crimes, prosecution of offenders and administration of
the correctional system. It is specifically empowered to investigate the commission of
crimes, prosecute offenders and administer the probation and correction system. Also, the
provincial or city prosecutors and their assistants, as well as the national and regional state
prosecutors, are specifically named as the officers authorized to conduct preliminary
investigation. Recently, the Comelec, through its duly authorized legal offices, is given the
power, concurrent with the other prosecuting arms of the government such as the DOJ, to
conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses.

Section 1, Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution expressly describes all the Constitutional
Commissions as independent. Although essentially executive in nature, they are not under the
control of the President of the Philippines in the discharge of their respective functions. The
Constitution envisions a truly independent Comelec committed to ensure free, orderly, honest,
peaceful, and credible elections and to serve as the guardian of the peoples sacred right of


suffrage the citizenrys vital weapon in effecting a peaceful change of government and in
achieving and promoting political stability.

Although in recent years, the Comelec recognized the need to delegate to the
prosecutors the power to conduct preliminary investigation. Otherwise, the prompt resolution of
alleged election offenses will not be attained. This delegation of power, otherwise known as
deputation, has long been recognized and, in fact, been utilized as an effective means of
disposing of various election offense cases. It doesn't follow that since there was deputation
then Comelec ceases to become an independent body anymore.










CRISPINO PANGILINAN v. JOCELYN N. BALATBAT substituted by her heirs, namely,
VICENTE BALATBAT, ANA LUCIA N. BALATBAT, JOSE VICENTE N. BALATBAT,
ANTONIO BENIGNO N. BALATBAT, JOCELYN BEUNA B. DE GUZMAN, GERVACIO
AFREDO N. BALATBAT, PIO ROMULO N. BALATBAT and JUNIOPERO PEDRO N.
BALATBAT
G.R. No. 170787, September 12, 2012
J. Peralta

LOI No. 474 provides for a restrictive condition on the exercise of the right of retention,
specifically disqualifying landowners who "own other agricultural lands of more than seven
hectares in aggregate areas, or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban
purposes from which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families. The
restrictive condition in LOI No. 474 is essentially the same one contained in Administrative
Order No. 4, series of 1991.

Further, in one case, the Court ruled that there is no conflict between R.A. No. 6675 and
LOI No. 474, as both can be given a reasonable construction so as to give them effect. Withal,
the Court concluded that while RA No. 6675 is the law of general application, LOI No. 474 may
still be applied to the latter. Hence, landowners under RA No. 6675 are entitled to retain five
hectares of their landholding; however, if they too own other "lands used for residential,
commercial, industrial or other urban purposes from which they derive adequate income to
support themselves and their families," they are disqualified from exercising their right of
retention.


ARCHBISHOP FERNANDO R. CAPALLA, OMAR SOLITARIO ALI and MARY ANNE L.
SUSANO v. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
G.R. No. 201112, 201121, 201127 and 201413, October 23, 2012
J. Peralta

A winning bidder is not precluded from modifying or amending certain provisions of the
contract bidded upon. However, such changes must not constitute substantial or material
amendments that would alter the basic parameters of the contract and would constitute a denial
to the other bidders of the opportunity to bid on the same terms.


LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPOUSES ROSA and PEDRO COSTO


G.R. No. 174647, December 5, 2012
J. Peralta

The determination of just compensation is the exclusive domain of the courts and that
the executive and legislative acts of fixing just compensation are not conclusive or binding upon
the court, but should only be regarded as an initial valuation. Thus, in determining just
compensation, the RTC is required to consider the following factors: (1) the acquisition cost of
the land; (2) the current value of the properties; (3) its nature, actual use, and income; (4) the
sworn valuation by the owner; (5) the tax declarations; (6) the assessment made by government
assessors; (7) the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the
farmworkers, and by the government to the property; and (8) the non-payment of taxes or loans
secured from any government financing institution on the said land, if any. If this was not the
rule, LBP or another agency like DAR might impermissibly usurp the essentially judicial function
of determination of just compensation.

2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS
v. TETRO ENTERPRISES, INC.
G.R. No. 183015. January 15, 2014
J. Peralta

In expropriation cases, the owner of the private property should be compensated only for
what he actually loses; it is not intended that his compensation shall extend beyond his loss or
injury. And what he loses is only the actual value of his property at the time it is taken. This is
the only way that compensation to be paid can be truly just; i.e., just not only to the individual
whose property is taken,but to the public, which is to pay for it. Thus, the trial court committed
an error when it admitted respondent's amended complaint which increased the amount claimed
as back rentals.


RALPH P. TUA v. HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG, PRESIDING JUDGE, BRANCH 22,
RTC, IMUS, CAVITE AND ROSSAN HONRADO-TUA
G.R. No. 170701. January 22, 2014
J. Peralta

Section 15 of RA 9262 or the Anti- Violence Against Women and Children Act of 2004 is
valid and constitutional. The issuance of Protection Order ex parte doesn't infringe the
constitutional precept of due process of law. Nor it is an invalid delegation of legislative power to
the court and to barangay officials.


LUIS R. VILLAFUERTA v. COMELEC and MIGUEL VILLAFUERTE
G.R. No. 206698. February 25, 2014
J. Peralta

Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code states that the false representation in the
contents of the Certificate of Candidacy (COC) must refer to material matters in order to justify
the cancellation of the COC.




PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HENRY T. GO
G.R. No. 168539. March 25, 2014
J. Peralta

The avowed policy of the State and the legislative intent to repress acts of public
officers and private persons alike, which constitute graft or corrupt practices, would be
frustrated if the death of a public officer would bar the prosecution of a private person who
conspired with such public officer in violating the Anti-Graft Law.





LABOR LAW
2009

HERMINIGILDO INGUILLOM, ET AL. v. FIRST PHILIPPINE SCALES, INC., ET AL.
G.R. No. 165407, June 5, 2009
J. Peralta

In the case at bar, the required two notices that must be given to herein petitioners
Bergante and Inguillo were lacking. The records are bereft of any notice that would have given a
semblance of substantial compliance on the part of herein respondents. Respondents, however,
aver that they had furnished the employees concerned, including petitioners, with a copy of
FPSILU's "Petisyon." We cannot consider that as compliance with the requirement of either the
first notice or the second notice. While the "Petisyon" enumerated the several grounds that
would justify the termination of the employees mentioned therein, yet such document is only a
recommendation by the Union upon which the employer may base its decision. It cannot be
considered a notice of termination. For as agreed upon by FPSI and FPSILU in their CBA, the
latter may only recommend to the former a Union member's suspension or dismissal. Nowhere
in the controverted Union Security Clause was there a mention that once the union gives a
recommendation, the employer is bound outright to proceed with the termination.


RODOLFO B. ARCEO v. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS)
G.R. No. 162374, June 18, 2009
J. Peralta

Petitioner is claiming benefits for the services he had render to the Government Service
Insurance System for almost 28 years, claiming adenoma as disability caused by the stress he
suffered from being a Prosecutor. The GSIS, however, denied such claim as such ailment is a
non-compensable disease. Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioner now alleges that he
aliment was not only adrenal but also cardiovascular disease. SC denies the petition stating that
Clearly, petitioner's failure to emphasize before the GSIS and the ECC the issue of whether he


may be compensated for his alleged cardiovascular disease is fatal to his case, for by this
omission, he is deemed to have waived such issue.

"J" MARKETING CORPORATION REPRESENTED BY ITS BRANCH MANAGER ELMUNDO
DADOR v. CESAR L. TARAN
G.R. No. 163924, June 18, 2009
J. Peralta

J Marketing Corporation claims that Cesar Taran is not entitled to any separation pay
and other benefits as the latter resigned from the corporation. However, the SC ruled in favor of
Taran.

As a general rule, separation pay need not be paid to an employee who voluntarily
resigns. However, an employer who agrees to expend such benefit as an incident of the
resignation should not be allowed to renege on the fulfillment of such commitment. In this case,
Caludac, as OIC Branch Manager in Tacloban City, represented petitioner and was responsible
for overseeing respondent's work in pursuance of the company's goal of an increase in sales
and customer satisfaction. Such control was manifested through the communications of
Caludac to respondent regarding the latter's performance. Corollarily, SC cannot fault Taran for
relying on Caludac's representations and promises, as in fact it was to him that he first verbally
relayed his plan to resign from the company.

EMCOR INCORPORATED v. MA. LOURDES D. SIENES
G.R. No. 152101, September 8, 2009
J. Peralta

Emcor Incorporated claims valid dismissal due to retrenchment against Ma. Lourdes
Sienes. SC, however, dismiss such claim as the burden of proving the validity of retrenchment
is on the petitioner. Evidence does not sufficiently establish that petitioner had incurred losses
that would justify retrenchment to prevent further losses. The Comparative Income Statement
for the year 1996 and for the months of February to June 1997 which petitioner submitted did
not conclusively show that petitioner had suffered financial losses. In fact, records show that
from January to July 1997, petitioner hired a total of 114 new employees assigned in the
petitioner's stores located in the different places of the country.

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION v. EDUARDO L. TEODOSIO
G.R. No. 163033. October 2, 2009
J. Peralta

The nature of respondents work is necessary in the business in which SMC is engaged.
SMC is primarily engaged in the manufacture and marketing of beer products, for which
purpose, it specifically maintains a brewery in Bacolod City. Respondent, on the other hand,
was engaged as a forklift operator tasked to lift and transfer pallets and pile them from the
bottling section to the piling area. SMC admitted that it hired respondent as a forklift operator
since the third quarter of 1991 when, in the absence of fully automated palletizers, manual
transfers of beer cases and empties would be extensive within the brewery and its premises.



Undoubtedly, respondent is a regular employee of SMC. Consequently, the employment
contract with a fixed period which SMC had respondent execute was meant only to circumvent
respondents right to security of tenure and is, therefore, invalid.


BARON REPUBLIC THEATRICAL MAJOR CINEMA, ET AL. v. NORMITA P. PERALTA AND
EDILBERTO H. AGUILAR
G.R. No. 170525, October 2, 2009
J. Peralta

Petitioner Pascual consistently denies that Aguilar was terminated from his employment
and that, instead, he abandoned his work and never returned after his request for salary
increase was rejected. However, denial, in this case, does not suffice; it should be coupled with
evidence to support it. In the instant case, the Court finds no error in the ruling of the CA that
petitioners failed to adduce evidence to prove abandonment and rebut Aguilar's claim of
dismissal.







CELEBES JAPAN FOODS CORP. (ETC.) v. SUSAN YERMO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 175855, October 2, 2009
J. Peralta

Petitioner seeks the application of the former ruling of this Court in Agabon and Jaka.
Jaka has presented its audited financial statement to show that it was in such serious financial
distress as to justify the retrenchment of the employees concerned. As its retrenchment
program was undertaken in 1997, its deficit had ballooned to 123.61% of the stockholders
equity; thus, a capital deficiency or impairment of equity ensued; in 1998, the deficit grew
to P355,794,897.00 or 177% of the stockholder's equity. The deficit was shown to prove the
ground for the employees' dismissal, but it was not the sole basis of the court in fixing the
nominal damages in the amount of P50,000.00 for each employee for Jaka's failure to comply
with the notice requirement. In the same manner, while petitioner in this case incurred a capital
impairment which was much higher than its stockholders' equity, the same should not be the
only basis for determining the amount of nominal damages that should be awarded. The gravity
of the due-process violation should be taken into special consideration; and, just like in Jaka,
the sanction should be stiffer, because the dismissal process was initiated by the employers
exercise of its management prerogative.

Significantly, there was no bona fide attempt on the part of petitioner to comply with the
notice requirements under Article 283 of the Labor Code. Records show that on November 7,
2000, respondents were refused entrance by the guards manning the gate of the Davao Fish
Port Complex, based on a memorandum of even date issued by Romero, petitioner's Office


Manager, stating that respondents had been terminated effective November 1, 2000.
Respondents learned of the existence of such memorandum, which was posted only in the
guardhouse on the day they were refused entrance to the gate. There was indeed no notice at
all to respondents. Notably, there was not even any reason stated in the memorandum why they
were being terminated. We cannot overemphasize the importance of the requirement of the
notice of termination, for we have ruled in a number of cases that non-compliance therewith is
tantamount to deprivation of the employees right to due process.


EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. v. FERRER D. ANTONIO
G.R. No. 171587, October 13, 2009
J. Peralta

In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement benefits
as he may have earned under existing laws and any collective bargaining agreement and other
agreements: Provided, however, that an employees retirement benefits under any collective
bargaining and other agreements shall not be less than those provided herein.

Clearly, the age of retirement is primarily determined by the existing agreement or
employment contract. In the absence of such agreement, the retirement age shall be fixed by
law. Under the aforecited law, the mandated compulsory retirement age is set at 65 years, while
the minimum age for optional retirement is set at 60 years.

Records show that respondent was only 41 years old when he applied for optional
retirement, which was 19 years short of the required eligibility age. Thus, he cannot claim
optional retirement benefits as a matter of right.


PATRICIA HALAGUEA, ET AL. v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.
G.R. NO. 172013, October 2, 2009
J. Peralta

Not every controversy or money claim by an employee against the employer or vice-
versa is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor arbiter. Actions between employees and
employer where the employer-employee relationship is merely incidental and the cause of
action precedes from a different source of obligation is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
regular court. Here, the employer-employee relationship between the parties is merely incidental
and the cause of action ultimately arose from different sources of obligation, i.e., the
Constitution and CEDAW.

Thus, where the principal relief sought is to be resolved not by reference to the Labor
Code or other labor relations statute or a collective bargaining agreement but by the general
civil law, the jurisdiction over the dispute belongs to the regular courts of justice and not to the
labor arbiter and the NLRC. In such situations, resolution of the dispute requires expertise, not
in labor management relations nor in wage structures and other terms and conditions of
employment, but rather in the application of the general civil law. Clearly, such claims fall


outside the area of competence or expertise ordinarily ascribed to labor arbiters and the NLRC
and the rationale for granting jurisdiction over such claims to these agencies disappears.

REYNALDO G. CABIGTING v. SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INC.
G.R. No. 167706. November 5, 2009
J. Peralta

As to ruling whether there has already been strained relations between the petitioner
and respondent, Court upholds the ruling of the NLRC finding the doctrine of strained relations
inapplicable to the factual circumstances of the case at bar, to wit:

Finally, it is noted that the position of warehouseman and inventory controller is still
existing up to date. The nature of the controversy where the parties to this case were engaged
is not of such nature that would spawn a situation where the relations are severely strained
between them as would bar the complainant to his continued employment. Neither may it be
said that his position entails a constant communion with the respondent such that hostilities may
bar smooth interactions between them. Accordingly, We find no basis for an award of separation
pay in lieu of reinstatement.

RAMON B. FORMANTES v. DUNCAN PHARMACEUTICAL, PHILIS., INC.
G.R. No. 170661, December 4, 2009
J. Peralta

In the case at bar, petitioner, while still employed with the respondent, was compelled to
resign and forced to go on leave. He was not allowed to participate in the activities of the
company. His salary was no longer remitted to him. His subordinates were directed not to report
to him and the company directed one of its district managers to take over his position and do his
functions without prior notice to him.

These discriminatory acts were calculated to make petitioner feel that he is no longer
welcome nor needed in respondent company short of sending him an actual notice of
termination. We, therefore, hold that respondent constructively dismissed petitioner from the
service.



2010

SARGASSO CONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. NATIONAL
LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (4
TH
DIVISION) AND GORGONIO MONGCAL
G.R. No. 164118, February 9, 2010
J. Peralta

There was a dearth of evidence directly linking respondent Mongcal to the commission
of the crime of theft, as his mere act of loading the dump truck with aggregates did not show
that he knew of Rasote's plan to deliver the load to a place other than petitioner's construction
site. The only conclusion, therefore, is that petitioner illegally dismissed respondent Mongcal.

Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, an illegally dismissed employee "shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages,
inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from
the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement." In
addition to full backwages, the Court has also repeatedly ruled that in cases where
reinstatement is no longer feasible due to strained relations, then separation pay may be
awarded instead of reinstatement. The separation pay, as an alternative to reinstatement,
should be equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service.

PNCC SKYWAY TRAFFIC AND SECURITY DIVISION WORKERS ORGANIZATION
(PSTMSWDO), REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, RENE SORIANO v. PNCC SKYWAY
COPORATION
G.R. No. 171231, February 17, 2010
J. Peralta

The words of the CBA were unequivocal when it provided that "the company shall
schedule the vacation leave of employees during the year taking into consideration the request
of preference of the employees." The word shall in this instance connotes an imperative
command, there being nothing to show a different intention. The only concession given under
the subject clause was that the company should take into consideration the preferences of the
employees in scheduling the vacations; but certainly, the concession never diminished the
positive right of management to schedule the vacation leaves in accordance with what had been
agreed and stipulated upon in the CBA.

SOLIDBANK CORPORATION v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 165951, March 30, 2010
J. Peralta

As a general rule, an employee who has been dismissed for any of the just causes
enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code is not entitled to separation pay. Although by
way of exception, the grant of separation pay or some other financial assistance may be allowed
to an employee dismissed for just causes on the basis of equity. The reason that the law does
not statutorily grant separation pay or financial assistance in instances of termination due to a
just cause is precisely because the cause for termination is due to the acts of the employee. In
such instances, however, this Court, inspired by compassionate and social justice, has in the


past awarded financial assistance to dismissed employees when circumstances warranted such
an award.

DIVERSIFIED SECURITY, INC. v. ALICIA V. BAUTISTA
G.R. No. 152234, April 15, 2010
J. Peralta

Having firmly established that petitioner dismissed respondent without just cause, and
without notice and hearing, then it is only proper to apply Article 279 of the Labor Code which
provides that an illegally dismissed employee "shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his
other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement." In addition to full backwages, the
Court has also repeatedly ruled that in cases where reinstatement is no longer feasible due to
strained relations, then separation pay may be awarded instead of reinstatement. In Mt. Carmel
College v. Resuena,the Court reiterated that the separation pay, as an alternative to
reinstatement, should be equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service.

LIMA LAND, INC., LEANDRO JAVIER, SYLVIA DUQUE AND PREMY ANN BELOY
v. MARLYN CUAVAS
G.R. No. 169523, June 16, 2010
J. Peralta

Marlyn Cuevas was dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence relating to
the irregularity of funds. The Court finds as unsubstantiated petitioners' allegation regarding the
supposed failure of respondent to institute sufficient accounting standards leading to
irregularities committed in handling the companys Petty Cash Fund. The Court agrees with
respondent that in the six years that she rendered service to petitioners, her attention was never
called to any insufficient accounting standards that supposedly exist in the company. On the
contrary, respondent was able to present evidence to show that certain procedures were
followed with respect to cash and check disbursements and collections. In fact, the Executive
Vice-President and Chief Operating Officer of petitioner company who preceded herein
petitioner Javier and with whom respondent worked with for six years, executed an affidavit
attesting to the competence, integrity and honesty of respondent as Manager and Finance
Officer of petitioner company.

DANSART SECURITY FORCE & ALLIED SERVICES COMPANY AND DANILO A.
SARTE v. MS. JEAN O. BAGOY
G.R. No. 168495, July 2, 2010
J. Peralta

Petitioners do not deny that said DOLE reports and Order are the only evidence they
presented to prove payment of respondent's money claims. Petitioners only assail the weight
ascribed by the Labor Arbiter and the CA to the evidence, asseverating that such documents
from the DOLE must be given greater importance as the NLRC did.

The Court has repeatedly ruled that any doubt arising from the evaluation of evidence as
between the employer and the employee must be resolved in favor of the latter. Moreover, it is


settled jurisprudence that the burden of proving payment of monetary claims rests on the
employer.





ERECTOR ADVERTISING SIGN GROUP, INC. AND ARCH JIMY C. AMOROTO
v. EXPEDITO CLOMA
G.R. No. 167218, J uly 2, 2010
J . Peralta

The validity of an employees dismissal from service hinges on the satisfaction of due
process, the basic components of which are the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself
and the dismissal is for any of the causes provided in the Labor Code of the Philippines. The
petitioners contend that Cloma was validly dismissed and with due process of law. However,
nowhere in the records does it appear that Cloma attempted to deny allegations, yet it is equally
certain that the records do not contain any suggestion that petitioner, with respect to these three
grounds with which Cloma is charged, has tried to notify the latter of the said charges. Indeed,
we find that petitioner has not complied with the basic requirement of serving a pre-dismissal
notice on Cloma. What is clear from the records is that the only notice that was given to Cloma
prior to his termination is the May 20, 2000 notice of termination informing him that his
employment in the company has been severed for the causes mentioned. Therefore, no due
process accorded to him.

ELPIDIO CALIPAY v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 166411, August 3, 2010
J. Peralta

Calipay and the other complainants failed to sufficiently refute the findings of the Labor
Arbiter in their appeal filed with the NLRC. They simply insisted that they did not report for work,
because they were already terminated. However, they did not present any evidence to prove
their allegation. On the other hand, as held by the Labor Arbiter, private respondents were able
to present the DTRs and Salary Vouchers of Calipay and the other complainants showing that
they indeed reported for work even after their alleged termination from employment. Calipay and
the other complainants also failed to present evidence to prove their allegation that they were
forced to sign blank forms of their DTRs and Salary Vouchers. Abandonment is totally
inconsistent with the immediate filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal, more so if the same is
accompanied by a prayer for reinstatement. In the present case, however, petitioner filed his
complaint more than one year after his alleged termination from employment.

D.M. CONSUNJI, INC. v. ANTONIO GOBRES, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 169170, August 8, 2010
J. Peralta

Dismissal based on just causes contemplates acts or omissions attributable to the
employee. Instead, respondents were terminated due to the completion of the phases of work
for which their services were engaged. Hence, prior or advance notice of termination is not part
of procedural due process if the termination is brought about by the completion of the contract
or phase thereof for which the employee was engaged. Petitioner, therefore, did not violate any
requirement of procedural due process by failing to give respondents advance notice of their
termination; thus, there is no basis for the payment of nominal damages.



In sum, absent the requirement of prior notice of termination when the termination is
brought about by the completion of the contract or phase thereof for which the worker was hired,
respondents are not entitled to nominal damages for lack of advance notice of their termination.




CENTURY CANNING CORPORATION, RICARDO T. PO, JR., ET. AL. v. VICENTE RANDY
R. RAMIL
G.R. No. 171630, August 8, 2010
J. Peralta

While employers are allowed a wider latitude of discretion in terminating the services of
employees who perform functions which by their nature require the employers' full trust and
confidence and the mere existence of basis for believing that the employee has breached the
trust of the employer is sufficient, this does not mean that the said basis may be arbitrary and
unfounded. The burden of proving the validity of the termination of employment rests with the
employer. Failure to discharge this evidentiary burden would necessarily mean that the
dismissal was not justified and, therefore, illegal. In the case at bar, there is neither direct
evidence nor substantial documentary evidence pointing to respondent as the one liable for the
forgery of the signature of Po.

PICOP RESOURCES INCORPORATED (PRI) v. ANACLETO L. TAECA, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 160828, August 9, 2010
J. Peralta

While it is incumbent for the employer to continue to recognize the majority status of the
incumbent bargaining agent even after the expiration of the freedom period, they could only do
so when no petition for certification election was filed. The reason is, with a pending petition for
certification, any such agreement entered into by management with a labor organization is
fraught with the risk that such a labor union may not be chosen thereafter as the collective
bargaining representative. The provision for status quo is conditioned on the fact that no
certification election was filed during the freedom period. Any other view would render nugatory
the clear statutory policy to favor certification election as the means of ascertaining the true
expression of the will of the workers as to which labor organization would represent them.

An "authorization letter to file a petition for certification election" is different from an
actual "Petition for Certification Election." What is prohibited is the filing of a petition for
certification election outside the 60-day freedom period. This is not the situation in this case. If
at all, the signing of the authorization to file a certification election was merely preparatory to the
filing of the petition for certification election, or an exercise of respondents right to self-
organization.

PHARMACIA AND UPJOHN, INC., ET. AL. v. RICARDO P. ALBAYDA, JR.
G.R. No. 172724, August 23, 2010
J. Peralta

This Court finds that petitioners had complied with the requirements of law in effecting
the dismissal of respondent. Petitioners sent respondent a first notice in the form of a
memorandum dated June 26, 2000, warning him that the same would serve as a final notice for
him to report to work in Manila within 5 working days from receipt thereof, otherwise, his
services would be terminated on the basis of AWOL. After receiving the memorandum,
respondent could have requested for a conference with the assistance of counsel, if he so


desired. Like in Solid, had respondent found the time too short, he should have responded to
the memorandum asking for more time. It, however, appears to this Court that respondent made
no such requests. On July 13, 2000, petitioners sent another memorandum notifying respondent
that they are terminating his services effective July 19, 2000, after he repeatedly refused to
report to work despite due notice. Even if no actual hearing was conducted, this Court is of the
opinion that petitioners had complied with the requirements of due process as all that the law
requires is an ample opportunity to be heard.

INSULAR HOTEL EMPLOYEES UNION-NFL v. WATERFRONT INSULAR HOTEL
DAVAO
G.R. No. 174040-41, September 22, 2010
J. Peralta

The prohibition against elimination or diminution of benefits set out in Article 100 of the
Labor Code is specifically concerned with benefits already enjoyed at the time of the
promulgation of the Labor Code. Article 100 does not, in other words, purport to apply to
situations arising after the promulgation date of the Labor Code. Even assuming arguendo that
Article 100 applies to the case at bar, this Court agrees with respondent that the same does not
prohibit a union from offering and agreeing to reduce wages and benefits of the employees. In
Rivera v. Espiritu, this Court ruled that the right to free collective bargaining, after all, includes
the right to suspend it.

While the terms of the MOA undoubtedly reduced the salaries and certain benefits
previously enjoyed by the members of the Union, it cannot escape this Court's attention that it
was the execution of the MOA which paved the way for the re-opening of the hotel,
notwithstanding its financial distress. More importantly, the execution of the MOA allowed
respondents to keep their jobs. It would certainly be iniquitous for the members of the Union to
sign new contracts prompting the re-opening of the hotel only to later on renege on their
agreement on the fact of the non-ratification of the MOA.

NFD INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS, INC./BARBER SHIP MANAGEMENT LTD. v.
ERMERALDO C. ILLESCAS
G.R. No. 183054, September 29, 2010
J. Peralta

The Court holds that the snap on the back of respondent was not an accident, but an
injury sustained by respondent from carrying the heavy basketful of fire hydrant caps, which
injury resulted in his disability. The injury cannot be said to be the result of an accident, that is,
an unlooked for mishap, occurrence, or fortuitous event, because the injury resulted from the
performance of a duty. Although respondent may not have expected the injury, yet, it is common
knowledge that carrying heavy objects can cause back injury, as what happened in this case.
Hence, the injury cannot be viewed as unusual under the circumstances, and is not
synonymous with the term "accident" as defined.

VARORIENT SHIPPING CO., INC., ET. AL. v. GIL FLORES
G.R. No. 161934, October 6, 2010
J. Peralta



Varorient Shipping Co., Inc. were remiss in providing continuous treatment for
respondent in accordance with the recommendation of their company physician that respondent
should undergo a two-week confinement and physical therapy and, if his condition does not
improve, then he would have to be subjected to surgical decompression to alleviate the pain on
his right foot. Respondent's ailment required urgent medical response, thereby necessitating
him to seek immediate medical attention, even at his own expense.

ST. LUKES MEDICAL CENTER, INC. AND ROBERT KUAN v. ESTRELITO NOTARIO
G.R. No. 152166, October 20, 2010
J. Peralta

Under Article 282 (b) of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate an employee for
gross and habitual neglect of duties. Neglect of duty, to be a ground for dismissal, must be both
gross and habitual. Gross negligence connotes want of care in the performance of ones duties.
Habitual neglect implies repeated failure to perform ones duties for a period of time, depending
upon the circumstances. A single or isolated act of negligence does not constitute a just cause
for the dismissal of the employee. Under the prevailing circumstances, respondent exercised his
best judgment in monitoring the CCTV cameras so as to ensure the security within the hospital
premises. Verily, assuming arguendo that respondent was negligent, although this Court finds
otherwise, the lapse or inaction could only be regarded as a single or isolated act of negligence
that cannot be categorized as habitual and, hence, not a just cause for his dismissal.

PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE COMPANT v. JOEY B. TEVES
G.R. No. 143511, November 15, 2010
J. Peralta

Assuming that respondent's absenteeism constitutes willful disobedience, such offense
does not warrant respondent's dismissal. Not every case of insubordination or willful
disobedience by an employee reasonably deserves the penalty of dismissal. There must be a
reasonable proportionality between the offense and the penalty.

HEIRS OF JOSE BARREDO, NAMELY, LOLITA BARREDO, ET. AL. v. LAVOISER
BESAES
G.R. No. 164695, December 13, 2010
J. Peralta

The existence of a tenancy relationship cannot be presumed and allegations that one is
a tenant do not automatically give rise to security of tenure. Occupancy and continued
possession of the land will not ipso facto make one a de jure tenant. Based on the evidence as
presented by Barredo, he has failed to discharge his burden of proving that all the essential
elements of tenancy exist. It bears to stress that this Court has ruled time and again that all the
requisites of an agricultural tenancy must be proved by substantial evidence and the absence of
one will not make an alleged tenant a de jure tenant.




2011

PRINCE TRANSPORT, INC., et al. v. DIOSDADO GARCIA, et al.
G.R. No. 167291, January 12, 2011
J. Peralta
In declaring PTI guilty of unfair labor practice, the Court ruled that evidence of petitioners'
unfair labor practice is shown by the established fact that, after respondents' transfer to Lubas,
petitioners left them high and dry insofar as the operations of Lubas was concerned.
HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. MEDICAL CENTER MANILAv.. HOSPITAL
MANAGEMENT SERVICES, INC. MEDICAL CENTER MANILA EMPLOYEES
ASSOCIATION AFW, et al.
G.R. No. 176287, January 31, 2011
J. Peralta
A single or isolated act of negligence does not constitute a just cause for the dismissal of
the employee. Despite the finding of culpability against De Castro; however, there is no wrongful
intent, deliberate refusal, or bad faith on her part when, instead of personally attending to patient
Causaren, she requested Nursing Assistant Tatad and ward-clerk orientee Guillergan to see the
patient, as she was then attending to a newly-admitted patient at Room 710. It was her
judgment call, albeit an error of judgment, being the staff nurse with presumably more work
experience and better learning curve, to send Nursing Assistant Tatad and ward-clerk orientee
Guillergan to check on the health condition of the patient, as she deemed it best, under the
given situation, to attend to a newly-admitted patient who had more concerns that needed to be
addressed accordingly. Being her first offense, respondent De Castro cannot be said to be
grossly negligent so as to justify her termination of employment.
ROMEO VILLARUELv. YEO HAN GUAN
G.R. No. 169191, June 1, 2011
J. Peralta
The following circumstances are proof that Guan did not terminate Villaruel's
employment: first, the only cause of action in Villaruel's original complaint is that he wasoffered
a very low separation pay; second, there was no allegation of illegal dismissal, both in Villaruel's
original and amended complaints and position paper; and, third, there was no prayer for
reinstatement. In consonance therewith, the Court finds that Villaruel was the one who initiated
the severance of his employment relations with Guan. It is evident from the various pleadings
filed by Villaruel that he never intended to return to his employment with Guan on the ground
that his health is failing. Indeed, Villaruel did not ask for reinstatement.

SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES PHILIPPINES, INC.
v. GWENDELLYN ROSE S. GUCABAN
G.R. No. 153982, July 18, 2011
J. Peralta
Shortly prior to and at the time of Gucabans alleged resignation, there was actually no
genuine corporate restructuring plan in place as yet. In other words, although the company
might have been suffering from losses due to market decline as alleged, there was still no
concrete plan for a corporate reorganization at the time Gonzalez presented to Gucaban the
seemingly last available alternative options of voluntary resignation and termination by abolition
of her office. Certainly, inasmuch as the necessity of corporate reorganization generally lies
within the exclusive prerogative of management, Gucaban at that point had no facility to


ascertain the truth behind it, and neither was she in a position to question it right then and
there. Indeed, she could not have chosen to file for resignation had SMPI not broached to her
the possibility of her being terminated from service on account of the supposed reorganization.

SAN MIGUEL FOODS, INCORPORATEDv.
SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION SUPERVISORS AND EXEMPT UNION
G.R. No. 146206, August 1, 2011
J. Peralta
Certain factors, such as specific line of work, working conditions, location of work, mode
of compensation, and other relevant conditions do not affect or impede their commonality of
interest. Although they seem separate and distinct from each other, the specific tasks of each
division are actually interrelated and there exists mutuality of interests which warrants the
formation of a single bargaining unit.
A confidential employee is one entrusted with confidence on delicate, or with the
custody, handling or care and protection of the employers property. Confidential employees,
such as accounting personnel, should be excluded from the bargaining unit, as their access to
confidential information may become the source of undue advantage. However, such fact does
not apply to the position of Payroll Master and the whole gamut of employees who, as perceived
by petitioner, has access to salary and compensation data.

ATOK BIG WEDGE COMPANY, INC. v. JESUS P. GISON
G.R. No. 169510, August 8, 2011
J. Peralta
An employer-employee relationship is apparently absent in the case at bar. Among other
things, respondent was not required to report everyday during regular office hours of petitioner.
Respondent's monthly retainer fees were paid to him either at his residence or a local
restaurant. More importantly, petitioner did not prescribe the manner in which respondent would
accomplish any of the tasks in which his expertise as a liaison officer was needed; respondent
was left alone and given the freedom to accomplish the tasks using his own means and method.
Respondent was assigned tasks to perform, but petitioner did not control the manner and
methods by which respondent performed these tasks. Verily, the absence of the element of
control on the part of the petitioner engenders a conclusion that he is not an employee of the
petitioner.
ST. PAUL COLLEGE QUEZON CITY, et al. v.
REMIGIO MICHAEL A. ANCHETAII AND CYNTHIA A. ANCHETA
G.R. No. 169905, September 7, 2011
J . Peralta
In school institutions, it is the prerogative of the school to set high standards of efficiency
for its teachers since quality education is a mandate of the Constitution. As long as the
standards fixed are reasonable and not arbitrary, courts are not at liberty to set them
aside. Schools cannot be required to adopt standards which barely satisfy criteria set for
government recognition. The same academic freedom grants the school the autonomy to decide
for itself the terms and conditions for hiring its teacher, subject of course to the overarching
limitations under the Labor Code.

NISSAN MOTORS PHILS., INC. v. VICTORINO ANGELO
G.R. No. 164181. September 14, 2011
J. Peralta


The Court held that Angelos employment was validly terminated. This Court found
evidence to support the allegation of serious misconduct or insubordination. Petitioner claims
that the language used by respondent in his Letter-Explanation is akin to a manifest refusal to
cooperate with company officers, and resorted to conduct which smacks of outright disrespect
and willful defiance of authority or insubordination. The misconduct to be serious within the
meaning of the Labor Code must be of such a grave and aggravated character and not merely
trivial or unimportant.

MARITIME FACTORS INC. v. BIENVENIDO R. HINDANG
G.R. No. 151993, October 19, 2011
J. Peralta
SC agrees with the finding of the LA, the NLRC and the CA that Danilo died of Asphyxia
by strangulation as proved by the NBI post-mortem findings and certification issued by the
medico-legal officer. These three tribunals did not consider the photocopy of the fax
transmission of the purported English translation of Dr. Hameed's medical report to prove that
Danilo committed suicide, since the medical report's genuineness and due execution were
unverifiable.
Moreover, the identity of the person who made the translation and whether the translator
has the recognized competence in both English and the language the medical report was
originally written are not established. Thus, there is no clear assurance that the translated words
are the accurate translation of the original medical report of Dr. Hameed.
More importantly, the alleged translated medical report was not even signed by Dr.
Hameed which creates doubt as to its authenticity. The unsigned translated medical report is
nothing but a self-serving document which ought to be treated as a mere scrap of paper devoid
of any evidentiary value even in administrative proceedings.
Thus, based on the foregoing, the photocopy of the fax transmission of an alleged
translated medical report was correctly denied consideration, since it is required that there be
some proof of authenticity or reliability as condition for the admission of documents.

ENRIQUE U. BETOYv.
THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
G.R. Nos. 156556-57, October 4, 2011
J. Peralta
In view of the fact that separation pay and retirement benefits are different entitlements,
as they have different legal bases, different sources of funds, and different intents, the
"exclusiveness of benefits" rule provided under R.A. No. 8291 is not applicable. Section 55 of
R.A. No. 8291 states: "Whenever other laws provide similar benefits for the same contingencies
covered by this Act, the member who qualifies to the benefits shall have the option to choose
which benefits will be paid to him."
Accordingly, the Court declares that separated, displaced, retiring, and retired
employees of NPC are legally entitled to the retirement benefits pursuant to the intent of
Congress and as guaranteed by the GSIS laws.

DUP SOUND PHILS. and/or MANUEL TANv.
COURT OF APPEALS and CIRILO A. PIAL
G.R. No. 168317, November 21, 2011
J. Peralta
The settled rule in labor cases is that the employer has the burden of proving that the
employee was not dismissed, or, if dismissed, that the dismissal was not illegal, and failure to
discharge the same would mean that the dismissal is not justified and, therefore, illegal. In the


instant case, what betrays DUP's claim that Pial was not dismissed from his employment but
instead abandoned his job is their failure to prove that the latter indeed stopped reporting for
work without any justifiable cause or a valid leave of absence. Petitioners merely presented the
affidavits of their office secretary which narrated their version of the facts. These affidavits,
however, are not only insufficient to prove their defense but also undeserving of credence
because they are self-serving.

CESAR C. LIRIO, DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE OF CELKOR AD
SONICMIX, v. WILMER D. GENOVIA
G.R. No. 169757, November 23, 2011
J. Peralta
In this case, the documentary evidence presented by Genovia to prove that he was an
employee of petitioner are as follows: (a) a document denominated as "payroll" (dated July 31,
2001 to March 15, 2002) certified correct by petitioner, which showed that respondent received
a monthly salary of P7,000.00 (P3,500.00 every 15th of the month and another P3,500.00 every
30th of the month) with the corresponding deductions due to absences incurred by respondent;
and (2) copies of petty cash vouchers, showing the amounts he received and signed for in the
payrolls.
The said documents showed that Lirio hired Genovia as an employee and he was paid
monthly wages of P7,000.00. The former wielded the power to dismiss as the latter stated that
he was verbally dismissed by Lirio, and Genovia, thereafter, filed an action for illegal dismissal
against Lirio. The power of control refers merely to the existence of the power. It is not essential
for the employer to actually supervise the performance of duties of the employee, as it is
sufficient that the former has a right to wield the power. Nevertheless, Lirio stated in his
Position Paper that it was agreed that he would help and teach Genovia how to use the studio
equipment. In such case, Lirio certainly had the power to check on the progress and work of
respondent.

2012

WUERTH PHILIPPINES, INC. v. RODANTE YNSON
G.R. No. 175932, February 15, 2012
J. Peralta

Despite notices sent by the petitioner, i.e., letter dated June 12, 2003, requiring
respondent to attend an investigation set on July 14, 2003; letter dated July 4, 2003, requiring
respondent to appear on July 25, 2003 for investigation; and letter dated July 31, 2003,
requiring respondent to appear for the hearing and investigation on August 18, 2003,
respondent refused to report to his office, either to resume work or attend the investigations set
by the petitioner. Even considering the directive of respondent's doctor to continue with his
present regimen for at least another month and a half, it could be safely deduced that, counted
from June 4, 2003, respondent's rehabilitation regimen ended on July 19, 2003. Despite the
completion of his treatment, respondent failed to attend the investigations set on July 25, 2003
and August 18, 2003. Thus, his unexplained absence in the proceedings should be construed


as waiver of his right to be present therein in order to adduce evidence that would have justified
his continued absence from work.

BRIGHT MARITIME CORPORATION (BMC)/DESIREE P. TENORIO v. RICARDO B.
FANTONIAL
G.R. No. 165935, February 8, 2012
J. Peralta

An employment contract, like any other contract, is perfected at the moment (1) the
parties come to agree upon its terms; and (2) concur in the essential elements thereof: (a)
consent of the contracting parties, (b) object certain which is the subject matter of the contract,
and (c) cause of the obligation. The object of the contract was the rendition of service by
respondent on board the vessel for which service he would be paid the salary agreed upon.

Hence, in this case, the employment contract was perfected on January 15, 2000 when
it was signed by the parties, respondent and petitioners, who entered into the contract in behalf
of their principal, Ranger Marine S.A., thereby signifying their consent to the terms and
conditions of employment embodied in the contract, and the contract was approved by the
POEA on January 17, 2000. However, the employment contract did not commence, since
petitioners did not allow respondent to leave on January 17, 2000 to embark the vessel M/V
AUK in Germany on the ground that he was not yet declared fit to work on the day of departure,
although his Medical Certificate dated January 17, 2000 proved that respondent was fit to work.


C. ALCANTARA & SONS, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS,et al.
G.R. No. 155109, March 14, 2012
J. Peralta

The LA found the strike illegal and sustained the dismissal of the Union officers, but
ordered the reinstatement of the striking Union members for lack of evidence showing that they
committed illegal acts during the illegal strike. This decision, however, was later reversed by the
NLRC. Pursuant to Article 223 of the Labor Code and well-established jurisprudence, the
decision of the LA reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement
aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, pending appeal. The employee shall either
be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal
or separation, or, at the option of the employee, merely reinstated in the payroll. It is obligatory
on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of the dismissed employee during
the period of appeal until reversal by the higher court. If the employer fails to exercise the option
of re-admitting the employee to work or to reinstate him in the payroll, the employer must pay
the employees salaries during the period between the LAs order of reinstatement pending
appeal and the resolution of the higher court overturning that of the LA. In this case, CASI is
liable to pay the striking Union members their accrued wages for four months and nine days,


which is the period from the notice of the LAs order of reinstatement until the reversal thereof
by the NLRC.


FELICIDAD STA. MARIA VILLARAN, WILFREDO STA. MARIA VILLARAN, DEOGRACIAS
STA. MARIA AND ROLANDO STA. MARIA v. DEPARTMENT OF AGARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD And LORENZO MARIANO
G.R. No. 160882, March 7, 2012
J. Peralta

The findings contained in the BARC Report indisputably place the present controversy
within the class of disputes over which the DAR exercises primary jurisdiction as provided in
Section 50 of R.A. No. 6657. Agrarian disputes refer to any controversy relating to tenancy over
lands devoted to agriculture, among others. The statutory vesture of power in the DAR is to be
read in conjunction with Section 3 (d) of R.A. No. 6657, which defines an agrarian dispute as
any controversy relating to tenurial arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or
otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including disputes concerning farmworkers
associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing or
seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements. It includes any
controversy relating to compensation of lands acquired under this Act and other terms and
conditions of transfer of ownership from landowner to farmworkers, tenants and other agrarian
reform beneficiaries, whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of farm operator and
beneficiary, landowner and tenant, or lessor and lessee. It refers to any controversy relating
to, interalia, tenancy over lands devoted to agriculture.

WILFREDO ARO, RONILO TIROL, JOSE PACALDO, PRIMITIVO CASQUEJO AND
MARCIAL ABGO v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, FOURTH DIVISION
and BENTHEL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 174792, March 7, 2012
J. Peralta

This Court agrees with the findings of the CA that petitioners were project employees. It
is not disputed that petitioners were hired for the construction of the Cordova Reef Village
Resort in Cordova, Cebu. By the nature of the contract alone, it is clear that petitioners'
employment was to carry out a specific project. Hence, the CA did not commit grave abuse of
discretion when it affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter.


INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT SERVICES/MARILYN C. PASCUAL v. ROEL P.
LOGARTA
G.R. No. 163657, April 18, 2012
J. Peralta



It is clearly shown that there was a drastic reduction in Petrocons 1998 work allocation
from 250,000 man-hours to only 80,000 man-hours. Under these circumstances over which
respondents principal, Petrocon had no control, it was clearly a valid exercise of management
prerogative to reduce personnel particularly those without projects to work on. To force
Petrocon to continue maintaining all its workers even those without projects is tantamount to
oppression. "The determination to cease operation is a prerogative of management which the
state does not usually interfere with as no business or undertaking must be required to continue
at a loss simply because it has to maintain its employees in employment. Such an act would be
tantamount to a taking of property without due process of law.


ESTATE OF NELSON R. DULAY, represented by his wife MERRIDY JANE P. DULAY v.
ABOITIZ JEBSEN MARITIME, INC. and GENERAL CHARTERERS, INC.
G.R. No. 172642, June 13, 2012
J. Peralta

In ruling that the Labor Arbiter does not have jurisdiction over the case, the Court
emphasized that it is clear that the parties, in the first place, really intended to bring to
conciliation or voluntary arbitration any dispute or conflict in the interpretation or application of
the provisions of their CBA. It is settled that when the parties have validly agreed on a
procedure for resolving grievances and to submit a dispute to voluntary arbitration then that
procedure should be strictly observed.

POLYFOAM-RGC INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION AND PRECILLA A. GRAMAJE
v. EDUARDO CONCEPCION.
G.R. 172349, JUNE 13, 2012
J. Peralta

Petitioners failed to show any valid or authorized cause under the Labor Code which allowed it
to terminate the services of respondent. Neither was it shown that respondent was given ample
opportunity to contest the legality if his dismissal. No notice of termination as given to him.
Clearly, the respondent was not afforded due process. Having failed to establish compliance
with the requirements of termination of employment under the Labor Code, the dismissal of
respondent was tainted with illegality.

PARK HOTEL, J'S PLAYHOUSE BURGOS CORP. INC., AND/OR GREGG
HARBUTT, GENERAL MANAGER, ATTY. ROBERTO ENRIQUEZ, PRESIDENT, AND BILL
PERCY v. MANOLO SORIANO, LESTER GONZALES AND YOLANDA BADILLA. G.R.
171118. SEPTEMBER 10, 2012
J. PERALTA

Anent the unfair labor practice, Article 248(a) of the Labor Code considers it an unfair
labor practice when an employer interferes, restrains or coerces employees in the exercise of
their right to self-organization or the right to form an association. In order to show that the
employer committed unfair labor practice under the Labor Code, substantial evidence is


required to support the claim. In the case at bar, respondents were indeed unceremoniously
dismissed from work by reason of their intent to form and organize a union.


CREWLINK, INC. AND/OR GULF MARINE SERVICES v. EDITHA TERINGTERING,
FOR HER BEHALF AND IN BEHALF OF MINOR EIMAREACH ROSE DE GARCIA
TERINGTERING.
G.R. 166803, OCTOBER 11, 2012
J. PERALTA

Jacinto Teringtering died out of drowning while still in the terms of the contract of
employment. The Court, however, did not grant the respondents death benefits because in
order to avail of death benefits, the death of the employee should occur during the effectivity of
the employment contract. The death of a seaman during the term if employment makes the
employer liable to his heirs for death compensation benefits. This rule, however, is not absolute.
The employer may be exempt from liability if it can successfully prove that the seaman's death
was caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act.


CECILIA T. MANESE, JULIETES E. CRUZ AND EUFEMIO PEANO II v. JOLLIBEE
FOODS CORPORATION, TONY TAN CAKTIONG, ELIZABETH DELA CRUZ, DIVINA
EVANGELISTA, AND SYLVIA MARIANO.
G.R. 170454. OCTOBER 11, 2012
J. PERALTA

Petitioners contend they were illegally dismissed by Jollibee based on loss of trust and
confidence being a managerial employee. The Court ruled that the mere existence of a basis for
loss of trust and confidence justifies the dismissal of the managerial employee because when
an employee accepts a promotion to a managerial position or to an office requiring full trust and
confidence, such employee gives up some of the rigid guaranties available to ordinary workers.
Infractions, which if committed by others would be overlooked or condoned or penalties
mitigated, may be visited with more severe disciplinary action. Proof beyond reasonable doubt
is not required provided there is a valid reason for the loss of trust and confidence, such as
when the employer has a reasonable ground to believe that the managerial employee
concerned is responsible for the purported misconduct and the nature if his participation renders
him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by the position.


2013

NELSON B. GAN v. GALDERMA PHILIPPINES, INC. AND ROSENDO C. VENERACION
G.R. No. 177167, January 17, 2013
J. Peralta

After several years of employment in the company, Gan had misunderstanding with the
company which forced him to resign. However, the Court viewed that Gan's resignation is NOT
"a case of adherence, not of choice," but was a product of a mutually beneficial arrangement.
We agree with respondents that the result of the negotiation leading to Gan's resignation is a
"win-win" solution for both parties. On one hand, Gan was able to obtain a favorable severance
pay while getting flexible working hours to implement his post-resignation career options. On the


other hand, Galderma was able to cut its relation with an employee perceived to be unwilling to
perform additional product responsibilities while being given ample time to look for an alternative
to hire and train. Indeed, Gan voluntarily resigned from Galderma for a valuable consideration.
He negotiated for an improvement of the resignation package offered and he managed to obtain
an acceptable one.

GOYA, INC. v. GOYA, INC., EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW
G.R. 170054, January 21, 2013
J. Peralta

To emphasize, declaring that a particular act falls within the concept of management
prerogative is significantly different from acknowledging that such act is a valid exercise thereof.
What the VA and the CA correctly ruled was that the Companys act of contracting
out/outsourcing is within the purview of management prerogative. Both did not say, however,
that such act is a valid exercise thereof. Obviously, this is due to the recognition that the CBA
provisions agreed upon by the Company and the Union delimit the free exercise of management
prerogative pertaining to the hiring of contractual employees.

SUSANA R. SY v. PHILIPPINE TRANSMARINE CARRIERS, INC., AND/OR SSC SHIP
MANAGEMENT PTE., LTD.
G.R. No. 191740, February 11, 2013
J. Peralta

At the time of the accident, Sy was on shore leave and there was no showing that he
was doing an act in relation to his duty as a seaman or engaged in the performance of any act
incidental thereto. It was not also established that, at the time of the accident, he was doing
work which was ordered by his superior ship officers to be done for the advancement of his
employer's interest. On the contrary, it was established that he was on shore leave when he
drowned and because of the 20% alcohol found in his urine upon autopsy of his body, it can be
safely presumed that he just came from a personal social function which was not related at all to
his job as a seaman. Consequently, his death could not be considered work-related to be
compensable.

ROWENA DE LEON CRUZ v. BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS
G.R. No. 173357, February 13, 2013
J. Peralta

Cruz was remiss in the performance of her duty to approve the pre-termination of
certificates of deposits by legitimate depositors or their duly-authorized representatives,
resulting in prejudice to the bank, which reimbursed the monetary loss suffered by the affected
clients. Hence, respondent was justified in dismissing petitioner on the ground of breach of trust.
As long as there is some basis for such loss of confidence, such as when the employer has
reasonable ground to believe that the employee concerned is responsible for the purported
misconduct, and the nature of his participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust and
confidence demanded of his position, a managerial employee may be dismissed.


ALILEM CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC. now known as ALILEM MULITPURPOSE
COOPERATIVE, INC. v. SALVADOR M. BANDIOLA, JR.
G.R. No. 173489. February 25, 2013


J. Peralta

An employer is free to regulate all aspects of employment. It may make reasonable rules
and regulations for the government of its employees which become part of the contract of
employment provided they are made known to the employee. In the event of a violation, an
employee may be validly terminated from employment on the ground that an employer cannot
rationally be expected to retain the employment of a person whose lack of morals, respect and
loyalty to his employer, regard for his employers rules and application of the dignity and
responsibility, has so plainly and completely been bared.

RAMON G. NAZARENO v. MAERSK FILIPINAS CREWING INC.,
AND ELITE SHIPPING A/S
G.R. No. 168703, February 26, 2013
J. Peralta

From the findings and prognosis of the rest of petitioners doctors who attended and
treated him, petitioner already established that he is entitled to disability benefits. Indeed, the
fact remains that petitioner injured his right shoulder while on board the vessel of Elite; that he
received treatment and was repatriated due to the said injury; and was declared unfit for duty
several times by the doctors who attended and treated petitioner abroad and in Manila. Clearly,
the medical certificate issued by Dr. Campana cannot be given much weight and consideration
against the overwhelming findings and diagnoses of different doctors, here and abroad, that
petitioner was not fit for work and can no longer perform his duties as a seafarer.



RICARDO E. VERGARA, JR. v. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC.,
G.R. No. 176985, April 1, 2013
J.Peralta

The principle against diminution of benefits is applicable only if the grant or benefit is
founded on an express policy or has ripened into a practice over a long period of time which is
consistent and deliberate. It presupposes that a company practice, policy and tradition favorable
to the employees has been clearly established; and that the payments made by the company
pursuant to it have ripened into benefits enjoyed by them. Company practice, just like any other
fact, habits, customs, usage or patterns of conduct, must be proven by the offering party who
must allege and establish specific, repetitive conduct that might constitute evidence of habit or
company practice. Certainly, a practice or custom is, as a general rule, not a source of a legally
demandable or enforceable right.


Concrete Solutions, Inc. v. Arthur Cabusas
G.R. No. 177812, June 19, 2013
J. Peralta

To constitute abandonment, two elements must concur, to wit: (1) the failure to report for
work or absence without valid or justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever the
employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and
being manifested by some overt acts. Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot lightly


be presumed from certain equivocal acts. To be a valid cause for dismissal for abandonment,
there must be clear proof of deliberate and unjustified intent to sever the employer employee
relationship. Clearly, the operative act is still the employee's ultimate act of putting an end to his
employment.

THE HEIRS OF SPOUSES DOMINGO TRIA AND CONSORCIA CAMANO TRIA v. LAND
BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES AND DEPARTMENT OF AGRARAIAN REFORM
G.R. No. 170245, July 1, 2013
J. Peralta

When the government takes property pursuant to PD No. 27, but does not pay the
landowner his just compensation until after RA No. 6657 has taken effect in 1998, it becomes
more equitable to determine just compensation using RA No. 6657 and not EO No. 228. Hence,
the valuation of the GSP of palay should be based on its value at the time it was ordered paid
by the SAC.

UNIVAC DEVELOPMENT, INC., v. WILLIAM M. SORIANO
G.R. No. 182072, June 19, 2013
J. Peralta

The power of the employer to terminate a probationary employee is subject to three
limitations, namely: (1) it must be exercised in accordance with the specific requirements of the
contract; (2) the dissatisfaction on the part of the employer must be real and in good faith, not
feigned so as to circumvent the contract or the law; and (3) there must be no unlawful
discrimination in the dismissal. In this case, not only did petitioner fail to show that respondent
was apprised of the standards for regularization but it was likewise not shown how these
standards had been applied in his case. Pursuant to well-settled doctrine, petitioners failure to
specify the reasonable standards by which respondents alleged poor performance was
evaluated as well as to prove that such standards were made known to him at the start of his
employment, makes respondent a regular employee. In other words, because of this omission
on the part of petitioner, respondent is deemed to have been hired from day one as a regular
employee.


FIRST PHILIPPINE INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION v. RAQUEL M. CALIMBAS AND LUISA P.
MAHILOM
G.R. NO. 179256, JULY 10, 2013
J. PERALTA

The test to determine the existence of independent contractorship is whether one
claiming to be an independent contractor has contracted to do the work according to his own
methods and without being subjected to the control of the employer, except only to the results of
the work.. Petitioner cannot rightly claim that DGMS was an independent job contractor
inasmuch as respondents were subjected to the control and supervision of petitioner while they
were performing their job.

HOLY CHILD CATHOLIC SCHOOL v. HON. PATRICIA STO. TOMAS, ETC., et al.
G.R. No. 179146 July 23, 2013
J. Peralta



A certification election is the sole concern of the workers, except when the employer
itself has to file the petition pursuant to Article 259 of the Labor Code, as amended, but even
after such filing its role in the certification process ceases and becomes merely a bystander.
The employer clearly lacks the personality to dispute the election and has no right to interfere at
all therein.

Inclusion of supervisory employees in a labor organization seeking to represent the
bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees does not divest it of its status as a legitimate labor
organization.


MANILA POLO CLUB EMPLOYEES UNION (MPCEU) FUR-TUCP v. MANILA POLO CLUB,
INC.
G.R. No. 172846, July 24, 2013
J. Peralta

This case involves a closure of business undertaking, not retrenchment. Unlike
retrenchment, closure or cessation of business, as an authorized cause of termination of
employment, need not depend for validity on evidence of actual or imminent reversal of the
employer's fortune. Article 283 authorizes termination of employment due to business closure,


CIRILA MANOTA, for herself and in behalf of her children, CLAIRE, et al.v. AVANTGARDE
SHIPPING CORPORATION, et al.
G.R. No. 179607, July 24, 2013
J. Peralta

The employment of seafarers, including claims for death and disability benefits, is
governed by the contracts they sign every time they are hired or rehired, and as long as the
stipulations therein are not contrary to law, morals, public order, or public policy, they have the
force of law between the parties. Since the mandatory reporting is a requirement for a disability
claim to prosper, seafarer's non-compliance thereto forfeits his right to claim the benefits.


NUBE v. PEMA And PNB
G.R. No. 174287, August 12, 2013
J. Peralta

A local union may disaffiliate at any time from its mother federation, absent any showing
that the same is prohibited under its constitution or rule. Such, however, does not result in it
losing its legal personality altogether.

In the case at bar, there is nothing shown in the records that the union was expressly
forbidden to disaffiliate from the federation nor were there any conditions imposed for a valid
breakaway. This being so, PEMA is not precluded to disaffiliate from NUBE after acquiring the
status of an independent labor organization duly registered before the DOLE.

DARIO NACAR v. GALLERY FRAMES AND/OR FELIPE BORDEY, JR.
G.R. No. 189871. August 13, 2013


J. Peralta

The recomputation of the consequences of illegal dismissal upon execution of the
decision does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final decision being
implemented. The illegal dismissal ruling stands; only the computation of monetary
consequences of this dismissal is affected, and this is not a violation of the principle of
immutability of final judgments.

ROLANDO E. CAWALING, PEDRO L. LABAYO, et. al.v. NAPOLEON M. MENESE (Retired
Commissioner, Nlrc-Second Division), RAUL T. AQUINO (Presiding Commissioner, Nlrc-
Second Division) and TERESITA D. CASTILLON-LORA (Commissioner, Nlrc-Second
Division)
A.C. No. 9698, November 13, 2013
J. Peralta

After being informed of the expired accreditation of Intra Strata, respondents should
have refrained from allowing Intra Strata to transact business or to post a bond in favor of
Bacman. It is not within respondents' discretion to allow the filing of the appeal bond issued by a
bonding company with expired accreditation regardless of its pending application for renewal of
accreditation. Respondents cannot extend Intra Strata's authority or accreditation. Neither can it
validate an invalid bond issued by a bonding company with expired accreditation, or give a
semblance of validity to it pending this Court's approval of the application for renewal of
accreditation.

WELLER JOPSON v. FABIAN O. MENDEZ, JR. AND DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 191538, December 11, 2013
J. Peralta

Petitioner claims tenancy relationship between him and DBP, however it must be
emphasized that in order for a tenancy agreement to arise, it is essential to establish all its
indispensable elements, viz.: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee; (2) the subject matter of the relationship is an agricultural land; (3) there is consent
between the parties to the relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about
agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
lessee; and (6) the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee. All these requisites are necessary to create a tenancy relationship, and the absence of
one or more requisites will not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant.


PHILIPPINE CARPET MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, PACIFIC CARPET
MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, MR. PATRICIO LIM AND MR. DAVID LIM
v. IGNACIO B. TAGYAMON,PABLITO L. LUNA, FE B. BADA YOS, GRACE B. MARCOS,
ROGELIO C. NEMIS, ROBERTO B. ILAO, ANICIA D. DELA CRUZ AND CYNTHIA L.
COMANDAO
G.R. No. 191475, December 11, 2013
J. Peralta

The respondents were dismissed by the petitioner following a retrenchment and
voluntary retirement program of the latter. Having similar instances with the Philcea Case, the


Court applied Stare Decisis stating that just like the union members in the Philcea case,
respondents Tagyamon, Luna, Badayos, Dela Cruz, and Comandao received similarly worded
memorandum of dismissal effective April 15, 2004 based on the same ground of slump in the
market demand for the companys products. As such, they are similarly situated in all aspects
as the union members. With respect to respondents Marcos, Nemis and Ilao, although they
applied for voluntary retirement, the same was not accepted by petitioner. Instead, it issued
notice of termination dated March 6, 2004 to these same employees. And while it is true that
petitioner paid them separation pay, the payment was in the nature of separation and not
retirement pay. In other words, payment was made because of the implementation of the
retrenchment program and not because of retirement. As their application for availing of the
companys voluntary retirement program was based on the wrong premise, the intent to retire
was not clearly established, or rather that the retirement is involuntary. Thus, they shall be
considered discharged from employment. Consequently, they shall be treated as if they are in
the same footing as the other respondents herein and the union members in the Philcea case.


2014

ANTONIO E. UNICA v. ANSCOR SWIRE SHIP MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 184318, February 12, 2014
J. Peralta

Where the petitioner was repatriated twenty days after the expiration of his contract of
employment, there is no automatic renewal of the contract. It is a settled rule that seafarers are
considered contractual employees. Their employment is governed by the contracts they sign
everytime they are rehired and their employment is terminated when the contract expires. Their
employment is contractually fixed for a certain period of time. Thus, when petitioner's contract
ended on October 25, 2000, his employment is deemed automatically terminated, there being
no mutually-agreed renewal or extension of the expired contract.

EMMANUEL OLORES v. MANILA DOCTORS COLLEGE AND/OR TERESITA TURLA
G.R. No. 201663, March 31, 2014
J. Peralta

The posting of a bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving
monetary awards from the decisions of the Labor Arbiter. Moreover, the filing of the bond is not
only mandatory, but a jurisdictional requirement as well, that must be complied with in order to
confer jurisdiction upon the NLRC. Non-compliance therewith renders the decision of the Labor
Arbiter final and executory.

It is undisputed that respondents appeal was not accompanied by any appeal bond
despite the clear monetary obligation to pay petitioner his separation pay in the amount of
P100,000.00. Since the posting of a bond for the perfection of an appeal is both mandatory and
jurisdictional, the decision of the Labor Arbiter sought to be appealed before the NLRC had
already become final and executory.
PERALTA

TAXATION LAW
2009

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. 172359; October 2, 2009
J. Peralta

Whether or not Special Savings Deposit is subject to documentary stamp tax is
dependent on the nature and specific features thereof. If the SSDs are more akin to a time
deposit account, then the same would be subject to documentary stamp tax. However, if the
SSDs are more akin to a regular savings deposit account then the same would not be subject to
documentary stamp tax.


SPOUSES EDUARDO AND LETICIA MONTAO v. ROSALINA FRANCISCO, ET.AL
G.R. No. 160380; July 30, 2009
J. Peralta

For purposes of the collection of real property taxes, the registered owner of the property
is considered the taxpayer. Hence, only the registered owner is entitled to a notice of tax
delinquency and other proceedings relative to the tax sale.


2010


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. PHILIPPIN AIRLINES, INC.
G.R. No. 179800, February 4, 2010
J. Peralta

Presidential Decree 1590, an act granting franchise to Philippine Airlines, grants to PAL
an option to pay the lower of two alternatives: (a) the basic corporate income tax based on
PALs annual net taxable income computed in accordance with the provisions of the National
Internal Revenue Code or (b) a franchise tax of two percent of gross revenues.

The phrase in lieu of all other taxes under Section 13 of PD 1590 is not a mere
incentive that applies only when PAL actually pays something. PD 1590 intended to give PAL
the option to avail itself of Subsection (a) or (b) as consideration for its franchise. Either option
excludes the payment of other taxes and dues imposed or collected by the national or the local
government. It is not the fact of tax payment that exempts it, but the exercise of its option.


COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. AQUA FRESH SEAFOODS, INC.
G.R. No. 170389, October 20, 2010
J. Peralta

For purposes of determining Capital Gainst Tax and Documentary Stamp Tax, if at the
time of the sale of a parcel of land the same was classified as residential based on the
PERALTA

Revised Zonal Value of Real Properties, the CIR cannot unilaterally change its zonal value to
commercial without first conducting a re-evaluation of the zonal values as mandated under
Section 6 (E) of the NIRC.
2012

LASCONA LAND CO., INC. v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 171251, March 5, 2012
J. Peralta

In case of the inaction of the CIR on the protested assessment, the taxpayer has two
options, either: (1) file a petition for review with the CTA within 30 days after the expiration of the
180-day period; or (2) await the final decision of the Commissioner on the disputed assessment
and appeal such final decision to the CTA within 30 days after the receipt of a copy of such
decision. These options are mutually exclusive and resort to one bars the application of the
other.

SM LAND, INC. AND WATSONS PERSONAL CARE STORES PHILS.INC. v. CITY OF
MANILA, et al.
G.R. No. 197151, October 22, 2012
J. Peralta

To appeal an adverse decision or ruling of the RTC to the CTA, the taxpayer must file a
Petition for Review with the CTA within 30 days from receipt of said adverse decision or ruling of
the RTC. The 30-day original period for filing a Petition for Review with the CTA under Section
11 of Republic Act No. 9282 may be extended for a period of 15 days. No further extension shall
be allowed thereafter, except only for the most compelling reasons, in which case the extended
period shall not exceed 15 days.


UNITED INTERNATIONAL PICTURES AB v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 168331, October 11, 2012
J. Peralta

Once a corporation exercises the option to carry-over, such option is irrevocable for
that taxable period. The controlling factor for the operation of the irrevocability rule is that the
taxpayer chose an option; and once it had already done so, it could no longer make another
one. Section 76 of the NIRC of 1997 is explicit in stating that once the option to carry over
has been made, no application for tax refund or issuance of a tax credit certificate shall be
allowed therefor.

2014

TEAM ENERGY CORPORATION v. COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 190928; January 13, 2014
J. Peralta

San Roque ponencia firmly enunciates that the taxpayer can file his administrative claim
for refund or credit at any time within the two-year prescriptive period. What is only required of
him is to file his judicial claim within thirty (30) days after denial of his claim by CIR or after the
expiration of the 120-day period within which the CIR can decide on its claim
PERALTA



TEAM ENERGY CORPORATION (FORMERLY MIRANT PAGBILAO CORPORATION) v. CIR
G.R. No. 197760; January 13, 2014
J. Peralta

Pursuant to ruling in CIR v. San Roque Power Corporation, the mandatory and
jurisdictional nature of the 120-30-day rule does not apply on claims for refund that were
prematurely filed during the interim period from the issuance of Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) Ruling No. DA-489-03 on December 10, 2003 to October 6, 2010 when the Aichi doctrine
was adopted. The exemption is premised on the fact that prior to the promulgation of the Aichi
decision, there is an existing interpretation laid down in BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 where the
BIR expressly ruled that the taxpayer need not wait for the expiration of the 120-day period
before it could seek judicial relief with the CTA. Thus, where the taxpayer filed its judicial claim
for refund or issuance of tax credit certificate prior to the date where the Aichi case was
promulgated, even though the claim was prematurely filed without waiting for the expiration of
the 120-day mandatory period, the CTA may still take cognizance of the same as it was filed
within the period exempted from the 120-30-day mandatory period.


COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE v. TOLEDO POWER, INC.
G.R. No. 183880; January 20, 2014
J. Peralta

Strict compliance with the 120+30 day mandatory and jurisdictional periods can be
dispensed with when the judicial claims are filed between December 10, 2003 (issuance of BIR
Ruling No. DA-489-03 which states that the taxpayer need not wait for the 120-day period to
expire before it could seek judicial relief) to October 6, 2010 (promulgation of the Aichi doctrine).


THE CITY OF MANILA v. HON. CARIDAD GRECIA-CUERDO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 175723; February 4, 2014
J. Peralta

The Court of Tax Appeals has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions, orders or
resolutions of the RTCs in local tax cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise
of their original or appellate jurisdiction. Although there is no categorical statement under RA
1125 as well as the amendatory RA 9282, which provides that the Court of Tax Appeals has
jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari assailing interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in local
tax cases, it can be fairly interpreted under Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that
the power of the Court of Tax Appeals include that of determining whether or not there has been
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in
issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax
court.

CIVIL LAW
2009


PERALTA

CRISTINA F. REILLO, ET AL. v. HEIRS OF QUITERIO SAN JOSE AND ANTONINA
ESPIRITU SANTO
G.R. No. 166393, June 18, 2009
J. Peralta

When petitioners admitted that respondents Galicano, Victoria, Catalina and Maribeth
are the children and grandchild, respectively, of the spouses Quiterio and Antonina, they
impliedly admitted that they are not the sole heirs of Quiterio and Antonina. Under the rules, no
extrajudicial settlement shall be binding upon any person who has not participated therein or
had no notice thereof. The respondents were not notified since the petitioners misrepresented
themselves as legitimate descendants and sole heirs of the deceased spouses Quiterio and
Antonina in the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement. As such, it is only proper for the court to annul
the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement.


SPOUSES JOSE T. VALENZUELA AND GLORIA VALENZUELA v. KALAYAAN
DEVELOPMENT & INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION
G.R. No. 163244, June 22, 2009
J. Peralta

The parties in the case executed a Contract to Sell. Under a contract to sell, the seller
retains title to the thing to be sold until the purchaser fully pays the agreed purchase price. The
full payment is a positive suspensive condition, the non-fulfillment of which is not a breach of
contract, but merely an event that prevents the seller from conveying title to the purchaser. The
non-fulfillment by petitioners of their obligation to pay the balance of the purchase price to
Kalayaan, which is a suspensive condition for the obligation of Kalayaan to sell and deliver the
title to the property, rendered the Contract to Sell ineffective and without force and effect.


DIGNA A. NAJERA v. EDUARDO J. NAJERA
G.R. No. 164817, July 03, 2009
J. Peralta

The conclusion of the psychologist saying that respondent was psychologically
incapacitated, although appreciated and given weight in the petition for the annulment of
marriage with the Matrimonial Tribunal of the Diocese, cannot be afforded the same weight in
the present case for annulment. For one, the root cause of respondent's alleged psychological
incapacity was not sufficiently proven by experts or shown to be medically or clinically
permanent or incurable. Another, petitioner failed to prove with certainty that the alleged
personality disorder of respondent was incurable.

Moreover, the decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal concluding that
the husband-respondent upon contracting marriage suffered from grave lack of due discretion of
judgment, thereby rendering nugatory his marital contract, cannot be afforded with great weight.
The ruling of the trial court was based on a different set of evidence from that of the ruling of the
National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal. It is an elementary rule that judgments must be based
on the evidence presented before the court. With the petitioner failing to sufficiently establish
that respondent was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage, the Court has no reason to reverse the RTC ruling that granted only the legal
separation of the petitioner and respondent, but not the annulment of their marriage.

PERALTA


GLORIA OCAMPO AND TERESITA TAN v. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES,
URDANETA, PANGASINAN BRANCH AND EX OFFICIO PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF
PANGASINAN
G.R. No. 164968. July 03, 2009
J. Peralta

Article 1338 of the New Civil Code provides that there is fraud when, through insidious
words or machinations of one of the contracting parties, the other is induced to enter into a
contract which, without them, he would not have agreed to.

Ocampo was unable to establish clearly and precisely how the Land Bank committed the
alleged fraud. She failed to convince the Court that she was deceived, through
misrepresentations and/or insidious actions, into signing a blank form for use as security to her
previous loan.


PRIVATIZATION AND MANAGEMENT OFFICE v. LEGASPI TOWERS 300, INC.
G.R. No. 147957, July 22, 2009
J. Peralta

Article 624 of the New Civil Code provides that when the owner of two properties
alienates one of them and an apparent sign of easement exists between the two estates,
entitlement to it continues, unless there is a contrary agreement, or the indication that the
easement exists is removed before the execution of the deed. When the subject property was
assigned to the National Government thru the APT, no easement arose or was voluntarily
created from the transfer of ownership, considering that the parties, more particularly, Caruff,
pledged that it was assigning, transferring, and conveying the subject property in favor of the
National Government thru the APT "free from any and all liens and encumbrances.


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION v. SPOUSES RUPERTO LIBUNAO AND SONIA P. SANOPO & HEIRS OF
BENITA DOMINGO
G.R. No. 166553, July 30, 2009
J. Peralta

Petitioner sought authority to enter and take possession and control over the subject
properties, together with the improvements, and to demolish all improvements existing thereon
to commence and undertake the construction of its transmission line project. In fact, petitioner
had already taken possession of the subject properties and had demolished the plants, trees
and crops found in the subject properties as evidenced by checks payments for the damaged
improvements. The overhead transmission lines, which traverse respondents properties, could
be considered indefinite in nature. Moreover, the high-tension electric current passing through
the transmission line would expose respondents' lives and limbs to danger. Thus, the
expropriation would in fact not be limited to an easement of right-of-way only. The nature and
the effect of the installation of power lines, the limitations on the use of the land for an indefinite
period would deprive respondent of normal use of the property.


PERALTA

MARIA SOLEDAD TOMIMBANG v. ATTY. JOSE TOMIMBANG
G.R. No. 165116. August 04, 2009
J. Peralta

Novation may either be extinctive or modificatory. Novation is modificatory where the
change brought about by any subsequent agreement is merely incidental to the main obligation
(e.g., a change in interest rates or an extension of time to pay); in this instance, the new
agreement will not have the effect of extinguishing the first but would merely supplement it or
supplant some but not all of its provisions.

Petitioner and respondent agreed that petitioner shall start paying the loan upon the
completion of the renovation. However, evidence show that after renovation of seven out of the
eight apartment units had been completed, petitioner and respondent agreed that the former
shall already start making monthly payments on the loan even if renovation on the last unit (Unit
A) was still pending. A subsequent meeting was held among petitioner, respondent, himself and
their eldest sister Maricion, wherein respondent demanded payment of the loan, and petitioner
agreed to pay. Thereafter, petitioner made payments from June to October. By virtue of the
subsequent agreement, the parties mutually dispensed with the condition that petitioner shall
only begin paying after the completion of all renovations. There was, in effect, a modificatory or
partial novation, of petitioner's obligation.

Thus, petitioners partial performance of her obligation is unmistakable proof that indeed
the original agreement between her and respondent had been novated by the deletion of the
condition that payments shall be made only after completion of renovations. Hence, by her very
own admission and partial performance of her obligation, there can be no other conclusion but
that under the novated agreement, petitioner's obligation is already due and demandable.


JULITA V. IMUAN, ET AL. v. JUANITO CERENO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 167995, September 11, 2009
J. Peralta

Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary
acquisitive prescription requires possession in good faith and with just title for ten years. In
extraordinary prescription, ownership and other real rights over immovable property are
acquired through uninterrupted adverse possession for thirty years without need of title or of
good faith. The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person
from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership. For
purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of
the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or
other real rights, but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.

When Juana sold the property to respondents Spouses Cereno in 1970, the latter
immediately took possession of the property. Since then, respondents possessed the property
continuously, openly, peacefully, in the concept of an owner, exclusively and in good faith with
just title, to the exclusion of the petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest until the filing of
the complaint in 1999 which is the subject of this present petition. The Spouses Cerena had the
reasonable belief that Juana, from whom they received the property, was the owner thereof, and
could transmit her ownership ownership.

PERALTA


AMPARO ROBLES CABREZA v. CEFERINO S. CABREZA, JR., JUDGE PABLITO ROXAS,
SHERIFF RONBERTO VALINO, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 70 PASIG CITY
G.R. No. 171260, September 11, 2009
J. Peralta

Petitioner cannot hide from the fact that the May 26, 2003 Order of the RTC is already
final and executory as a necessary consequence of the Entry of Judgment dated July 23, 2004.
Said Order categorically authorized the sale of the family home. Thus, being final and
executory, petitioner could no longer question such. As a result, the family home should not be
given to petitioner, as the buyer, BJD Holdings Corporation, validly acquired the property.


R TRANSPORT CORPORATION, REPRESENTED BY ITS OWNER/PRESIDENT RIZALINA
LAMZON v. EDUARDO PANTE
G.R. NO. 162104, SEPTEMBER 15, 2009
J. PERALTA

Petitioner, through its bus driver, failed to observe extraordinary diligence, and was,
therefore, negligent in transporting the passengers of the bus safely to Gapan, Nueva Ecija on
January 27, 1995, since the bus bumped a tree and a house, and caused physical injuries to
respondent. Article 1759 of the Civil Code explicitly states that the common carrier is liable for
the death or injury to passengers through the negligence or willful acts of its employees, and
that such liability does not cease upon proof that the common carrier exercised all the diligence
of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees. Hence, even if
petitioner was able to prove that it exercised the diligence of a good father of the family in the
selection and supervision of its bus driver, it is still liable to respondent for the physical injuries
he sustained due to the vehicular accident.


CRESENCIA ACHEVARA, ALFREDO ACHEVARA, AND BENIGNO VALDEZ v. ELVIRA
RAMOS, JOHN ARNEL RAMOS, AND KHRISTINE CAMILLE RAMOS
G.R. No. 175172, September 29, 2009
J. Peralta

Seeing that the owner-type jeep was wiggling and running fast in a zigzag manner as it
travelled on the opposite side of the highway, Benigno Valdez was made aware of the danger
ahead if he met the owner-type jeep on the road. Yet he failed to take precaution by
immediately veering to the rightmost portion of the road or by stopping the passenger jeep at
the right shoulder of the road and letting the owner-type jeep pass before proceeding
southward; hence, the collision occurred. Arnulfo Ramos, on the other hand, is also guilty of
gross negligence for knowingly driving a defective jeep on the highway. An ordinarily prudent
man would know that he would be putting himself and other vehicles he would encounter on the
road at risk for driving a mechanically defective vehicle.

Both Arnulfo Ramos and Benigno Valdez failed to exercise reasonable care and caution
that an ordinarily prudent man would have taken to prevent the vehicular accident. Since the
gross negligence of Arnulfo Ramos and the inexcusable negligence of Benigno Valdez were the
proximate cause of the vehicular accident, respondents cannot recover damages pursuant to
Article 2179 of the Civil Code.

PERALTA


BICOL AGRO-INDUSTRIAL PRODUCERS COOPERATIVE, INC. (BAPCI) v. EDMUNDO O.
OBIAS, ET AL
G.R. No. 172077, October 09, 2009
J. Peralta

It was incumbent upon petitioner to show its right by title or by an agreement with the
owners of the lands that said road traversed. Hence, the absence of proof that there has been
an agreement between BISUDECO and the respondents for the construction of the road leads
to the conclusion that no easement has been acquired by the petitioner.

Moreover, petitioners assertion that they acquired the disputed road through
prescription is without merit. Article 622 of the New Civil Code provides that continuous non-
apparent easements, and discontinuous ones, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only
by virtue of a title. The road in dispute is a discontinuous easement notwithstanding that the
same may be apparent. Easements are either continuous or discontinuous according to the
manner they are exercised, not according to the presence of apparent signs or physical
indications of the existence of such easements. Hence, even if the road in dispute has been
improved and maintained over a number of years, it will not change its discontinuous nature but
simply make the same apparent. To stress, Article 622 of the New Civil Code states that
discontinuous easements, whether apparent or not, may be acquired only by virtue of a title.


HEIRS OF THE LATE JOAQUIN LIMENSE v. RITA VDA. DE RAMOS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 152319, October 28, 2009
J. Peralta

The easement of right of way is discontinuous and apparent. It is discontinuous, as the
use depends upon the acts of respondents and other persons passing through the property.
Being an alley that shows a permanent path going to and from Beata Street, the same is
apparent. Being a discontinuous and apparent easement, the same can be acquired only by
virtue of a title as provided for under Article 622 of the New Civil Code.

It has been shown that Lot No. 12-C has been used as an alley ever since Dalmacio
Lozada donated it to his heirs. Also, it is undisputed that prior to and after the registration of
TCT No. 96886, Lot No. 12-C has served as a right of way in favor of respondents and the
public in general. Thus, petitioners are bound by the easement of right of way over Lot No. 12-
C, even though no registration of the servitude has been made on TCT No. 96886.


EUFEMIA BALATICO VDA. DE AGATEP v. ROBERTA* L. RODRIGUEZ AND NATALIA
AGUINALDO VDA. DE LIM
G.R. No. 170540, October 28, 2009
J . Peralta

Pursuant to Article 2126 of the Civil Code, the mortgage directly and immediately
subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor may be, to the fulfillment
of the obligation for whose security it was constituted. It is inseparable from the property
mortgaged as it is a right in rem - a lien on the property whoever its owner may be. It subsists
notwithstanding a change in ownership; in short, the personality of the owner is disregarded.
PERALTA


Lim mortgaged the subject property to PNB prior to selling the same to petitioner's
husband. Thus, when petitioners bought the subject property from Lim, they only stepped into
the shoes of Lim as mortgagor. Even if they did not know about such mortgage, the fact is that
the mortgage was registered and annotated on the certificate of title covering the subject
property and registration in the public registry is notice to the whole world.


ROGELIO DIZON v. PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK
G.R. No. 165938, November 25, 2009
J . Peralta

PVB's petition for the issuance of an owner's duplicate certificate of title already arises
from its right as the owner of the subject properties and no longer as a mortgagee. The
mortgage contract respondent entered into with petitioner had already been foreclosed, the
properties sold and the sale in favor of PVB registered with the Register of Deeds of the
Province of Cagayan. Hence, since the petition filed by PVB is not a mortgage action, Article
1142 of the New Civil Code providing for the prescriptive period of the 10 years for an action to
enforce a right arising from a mortgage, does not apply. What governs petitions for the
replacement of lost duplicate certificates of title is PD 1529. It does not provide for any limitation
or period for filing the said petition, hence, to be construed as to mean that the action is
imprescriptible.

Moreover, the petitioner cannot claim that the titles, which he presented to the bank as
evidence that the subject properties were used as security for the loan he and his wife incurred
with the said bank, were genuine but were later on altered by the bank's officials and employees
with whom he allegedly entered a deal in order to have his loan approved. Petitioner may not
renege on his own acts and representations to the prejudice of respondent bank, which has
relied on them. Further, Article 1431 of the New Civil Code states that through estoppel, an
admission or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and such cannot
be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. In fine, petitioner is estopped from
questioning the validity and/or genuineness of the documents he himself presented to the bank.


ANGELINA SORIENTE AND ALL OTHER PERSONS CLAIMING RIGHTS UNDER HER v.
THE ESTATE OF THE LATE ARSENIO E. CONCEPCION, REPRESENTED BY NENITA S.
CONCEPCION
G.R. No. 160239, November 25, 2009
J. Peralta

Respondent owns the property on the basis of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 12892,
which was "issued in the name of Arsenio E. Concepcion, x x x married to Nenita L. Songco." It
is settled rule that the person who has a Torrens title over a land is entitled to possession
thereof. Hence, as the registered owner of the subject property, respondent is preferred to
possess it. The validity of certificate of title cannot be collaterally attacked in the present case of
unlawful detainer, pursuant to Section 48 of PD 1529.


SOTERO ROY LEONERO ET AL. v. SPOUSES MARCELINO B. BARBA AND FORTUNA
MARCOS-BARBA, REPRESENTED BY IMELDA N. FORONDO, AND REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF QUEZON CITY
PERALTA

G.R. No. 159788, December 23, 2009
J. Peralta

Petitioners admit that they are mere possessors of the parcels of land in question and
have been ordered by the MeTC to vacate the same. Their claim in the action for quieting of title
is that the MeTC Decision in the ejectment case against them should not be implemented
because respondents' TCTs are spurious. Section 48 of PD 1529 prohibits the collateral attack
of a certificate of title. Thus, petitioners action must fail.


2010


CELESTINO BALUS v.
SATURNINO BALUS AND LEONARDA BALUS VDA. DE CALUNOD
G.R. No. 168970, January 15, 2010
J. Peralta

The rights to a person's succession are transmitted from the moment of his death.In
addition, the inheritance of a person consists of the property and transmissible rights and
obligations existing at the time of his death, as well as those, which have accrued thereto since
the opening of the succession.

Since Rufo lost ownership of the subject property during his lifetime, it only follows that
at the time of his death, the disputed parcel of land no longer formed part of his estate to which
his heirs may lay claim. Stated differently, petitioner and respondents never inherited the subject
lot from their father. Therefore, petitioner and respondent never became co-owners of the
property.
With such and add the fact that there is no indication of any agreement between the petitioner
and respondent in the Extrajudicial Settlement that they will continue to be co-owners of the
contested lot, such co-ownership cannot be said to be existent, more so continued. Thus,
petitioner does not have the right to enforce his right to claim a portion of the disputed lot bought
by respondents.


PHILIPPINE HAWK CORPORATION v. VIVIAN TAN LEE
G.R. No. 166869, February 16, 2010
J. Peralta

Petitioner's bus driver, Margarito Avila, was guilty of simple negligence. He was driving
on the right side of the road and already saw the motorcycle on the left side of the road before
the collision. However, he did not take the necessary precaution to slow down, but drove on and
bumped the motorcycle, and also the passenger jeep parked on the left side of the road,
showing that the bus was negligent in veering to the left lane, causing it to hit the motorcycle
and the passenger jeep.

Petitioner should be liable because whenever an employee's negligence causes damage
or injury to another, there instantly arises a presumption that the employer failed to exercise the
due diligence of a good father of the family in the selection or supervision of its employees.
Petitioner failed to exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and
PERALTA

supervision of its bus driver, Margarito Avila, for having failed to sufficiently inculcate in him
discipline and correct behavior on the road. Indeed, petitioner's tests were concentrated on the
ability to drive and physical fitness to do so. It also did not know that Avila had been previously
involved in sideswiping incidents.


ELAND PHILIPPINES, INC. v. AZUCENA GARCIA, ELINO FAJARDO, AND HEIR OF
TIBURCIO MALABANAN NAMED TERESA MALABANAN
G.R. No. 173289, February 17, 2010
J. Peralta

OCT No. 0-660 of petitioner was issued on August 29, 1997 pursuant to a Decree issued
on August 20, 1997, while the complaint for the quieting of title in Civil Case No. TG-1784 was
filed and docketed on March 5, 1998.Since the one-year period before the Torrens title
becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible has not yet expired, respondents should have filed a
Petition for Review under Sec. 32 of P.D. No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree and not
an action for quieting of title.


UNITED PLANTERS SUGAR MILLING CO., INC. (UPSUMCO) v. THE HONORABLE COURT
OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK (PNB) AND ASSET PRIVATIZATION TRUST
(APT), AS TRUSTEE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 126890, March 09, 2010
J. Peralta

The Deed of Assignment expressly stipulated the particular loan agreements, which
were covered therein. The Deed of Assignment condoned petitioners takeoff loans, not the
operational loans. As such, respondent APT was entitled to have the funds from petitioner's
savings accounts with respondent PNB transferred to its own account, to the extent of
petitioner's remaining obligations under the operational loans, less the amount condoned in the
Deed of Assignment and the P450,000,000.00 proceeds of the foreclosure. Respondent APT
had a right to go after the bank deposits of petitioner, in its capacity as the creditor of the latter.
Likewise, respondent PNB had the right to apply the proceeds of the sale of petitioner's sugar
and molasses, in satisfaction of petitioner's obligations.


MANUEL T. DE GUIA, FOR HIMSELF AND AS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT OF FE DAVIS
MARAMBA, ET. AL. v. HON. PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 12,
MALOLOS BULACAN, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 161074, March 22, 2010
J. Peralta

Article 1335 of the New Civil Code provides that a threat to enforce one's claim through
competent authority, if the claim is just or legal, does not vitiate consent. Hence, petitioner
Renato's claim that he and his mother were threatened of foreclosure of the subject property if
his mother would not sign Exhibit "A," and therefore their consent were vitiated, does not stand.

In addition, Petitioner Renato, an instrumental witness to the Kasulatan ng
Pagpapabuwis ng Palaisdaan, admitted that he read and understood and was satisfied with the
explanation of Notary Public Abao regarding the contents of Kasulatan ng Pagpapabuwis ng
PERALTA

Palaisdaan before he and his mother affixed their signatures on the documents. Hence, there is
no reason why the court should not rule that Primitiva validly executed document in favor of the
respondents Spouses.


THE MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY, BULACAN, REPRESENTED BY THE HON. FELIX V.
OPLE, MUNICIPAL MAYOR, AND FELIX V. OPLE, IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY v. HON.
SIMEON P. DUMDUM, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 7, CEBU CITY, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 168289, March 22, 2010
J. Peralta

The Statute of Frauds found in paragraph (2), Article 1403 of the Civil Code, requires for
enforceability certain contracts enumerated therein to be evidenced by some note or
memorandum. However, when there has been performance of the obligation by either party in
the contract, the case is excluded from the coverage of the rule on dismissals based on
unenforceability under the statute of frauds, and either party may then enforce its claims against
the other.

Private respondent maintains that she entered into a contract with petitioners. For her
part, she already performed her obligation under the agreement by undertaking the delivery of
the 21 motor vehicles contracted for by Ople in the name of petitioner municipality. This claim is
well substantiated by copies of the bills of lading attached to the complaint, naming petitioner
municipality as consignee of the shipment. Thus, the case is excluded from the coverage of the
rule on dismissals based on unenforceability under the statute of frauds.


VICTORIA S. JARILLO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 164435, June 29, 2010
J. Peralta

Article 40, which is a rule of procedure, should be applied retroactively because Article
256 of the Family Code itself provides that said "Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it
does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights."


LIRIO A. DEANON, REPRESENTED BY ATTORNEY-IN-FACT JOCELYN D. ASOR v.
MARFELINA C. MAG-ABO
G.R. No. 179549, June 29, 2010
J. Peralta

Petitioner cannot be considered a buyer in good faith, because respondent was already
in possession of the subject property at the time Ma. Imelda Eloisa Galvan conveyed her rights
over the property to petitioner. It is settled rule that a buyer of real property that is in the
possession of a person other than the seller must be wary and should investigate the rights of
the person in possession. Otherwise, without such inquiry, the buyer can hardly be regarded as
a buyer in good faith.



REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HANOVER WORLWIDE TRADING CORPORATION
PERALTA

G.R. No. 172102, July 02, 2010
J. Peralta

Applicants for registration of title must prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain, and (2) that they have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide
claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.

Hanover's President and General Manager testified only with respect to his claim that he
was the former owner of the subject property and that he acquired the same from the heirs of a
certain Damiano Bontoyan; that he caused the payment of realty taxes due on the property; that
a tax declaration was issued in favor of Hanover; that Hanover caused a survey of the subject
lot, duly approved by the Bureau of Lands; and that his and Hanover's possession of the
property started in 1990. The pieces of documentary evidence submitted by respondent neither
show that its predecessor's possession and occupation of the subject land is for the period or
duration required by law. The pieces of evidence presented by respondent do not constitute the
"well-nigh incontrovertible" proof necessary in cases of this nature.


OMC CARRIERS, INC. AND JERRY AALUCAS Y PITALINO v.
SPOUSES ROBERTO C. NABUA AND ROSARIO T. NABUA
G.R. No. 148974, July 2, 2010
J. Peralta

When an injury is caused by the negligence of an employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of the law that there was negligence on the part of the employer, either in the
selection of his employee or in the supervision over him after such selection. However, the
presumption may be overcome by a clear showing on the part of the employer that he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
his employee.

Petitioners attempt to prove its "deligentissimi patris familias" in the selection and
supervision of employees through oral evidence must fail as it was unable to buttress the same
with any other evidence, object or documentary, which might obviate the apparent biased nature
of the testimony.


SPOUSES T. FERNANDEZ, SR. AND LOURDES FERNANDEZ v. SPOUSES MARTINES CO
AND ERLINDA S. CO
G.R. No. 167390, July 26, 2010
J. Peralta

In unlawful detainer and forcible entry cases, the only issue to be determined is who
between the contending parties has the better right to possess the contested property,
independent of any claim of ownership. However, where the issue of ownership is so intertwined
with the issue of possession, the courts may pass upon the issue of ownership if only to
determine who has the better right to possess the property. The evidence on record shows that
respondents and their predecessors-in--interest have been in continuous and actual physical
possession of the subject property, and are the registered owners thereof.
PERALTA



SPOUSES EDMUNDO AND LOURDES SARROSA v. WILLY O. DIZON
G.R. No. 183027, July 26, 2010
J. Peralta

The right of the purchaser to the possession of the foreclosed property becomes
absolute upon the expiration of the redemption period. The basis of this right to possession is
the purchaser's ownership of the property. After the consolidation of title in the buyer's name for
failure of the mortgagor to redeem, the writ of possession becomes a matter of right and its
issuance to a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure is merely a ministerial function.


GOLDEN APPLE REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND ROSVIBON REALTY
CORPORATION v. SIERRA GRANDE REALTY CORPORATION, MANPHIL INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, RENAN V. SANTOS AND PATRICIO MAMARIL
G.R. No. 119857, July 28, 2010
J. Peralta

The amortizations paid by Elmer Tan to Manphil was for a loan incurred by Hayari and
not by respondent Sierra Grande; thus, any payment of the amortizations on the loan of Hayari
cannot be considered as part of the consideration for the sale of the land owned by respondent
Sierra Grande. It is then safe to declare that respondent Sierra Grande did not benefit from the
loan or from its pre-termination.


EMILIA MICKING VDA. DE CORONEL, ET. AL. v. MIGUEL TANJANGCO, JR.
G.R. No. 170693, August 8, 2010
J. Peralta

In order to ensure the tenant-farmer's continued enjoyment and possession of the
property, the explicit terms of P.D. No. 27 prohibit the transfer by the tenant of the ownership,
rights or possession of a landholding to other persons, or the surrender of the same to the
former landowner. In other words, a tenant-farmer may not transfer his ownership or possession
of, or his rights to the property, except only in favor of the government or by hereditary
succession in favor of his successors. Any other transfer of the land grant is a violation of this
proscription and is, therefore, null and void following Memorandum Circular No. 7, series of
1979.


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ZENAIDA GUINTO, IN HER OWN BEHALF AND AS
ATTORNYE-IN-FACT OF MA. AURORA GUINTO-COMISO, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 175578, August 11, 2010
J. Peralta

Land registration proceedings are governed by the rule that while tax declarations and
realty tax payment are not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they are a good
indication of possession in the concept of owner. These documents constitute at least proof that
the holder has a claim of title over the property, for no one in his right mind would be paying
taxes for a property that is not in his actual or at least constructive possession. The voluntary
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declaration of a piece of property for taxation purposes manifests not only ones sincere and
honest desire to obtain title to the property. It also announces his adverse claim against the
state and all other parties who may be in conflict with his interest. More importantly, it signifies
an unfeigned intention to contribute to government revenuesan act that strengthens ones
bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.


EQUITABLE PCI BANK v. ARCELITO B. TAN
G.R. No. 165339, August 23, 2010
J. Peralta

Actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in order to compensate a party for
an injury or loss he suffered. They arise out of a sense of natural justice and are aimed at
repairing the wrong done. Except as provided by law or by stipulation, a party is entitled to an
adequate compensation only for such pecuniary loss as he has duly proven. To recover actual
damages, not only must the amount of loss be capable of proof; it must also be actually proven
with a reasonable degree of certainty, premised upon competent proof or the best evidence
obtainable.

Respondent's claim for damages was based on purchase orders from various customers
which were allegedly not met due to the disruption of the operation of his sawmills. However,
aside from the purchase orders and his testimony, respondent failed to present competent proof
on the specific amount of actual damages he suffered during the entire period his power was cut
off.


NFD INTERNATIONAL MANNING AGENTS, INC./BARBER SHIP MANAGEMENT LTD. v.
ESMERALDO C. ILLESCAS
G.R. No. 183054, September 29, 2010
J. Peralta

This case involves the propriety of the award of disability compensation under the CBA
to respondent, who worked as a seaman in the foreign vessel of petitioner Barber Ship
Management Ltd. The award of attorneys fees is justified under Article 2208 (2) of the Civil
Code. Even if petitioners did not withhold payment of a smaller disability benefit, respondent
was compelled to litigate to be entitled to a higher disability benefit.


ANAMER SALAZAR v. J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 171998, October 20, 2010
J. Peralta

In this case, respondents acceptance of the Solid Bank check, which replaced the
dishonored Prudential Bank check, did not result to novation as there was no express
agreement to establish that petitioner was already discharged from his liability to pay
respondent the amount of P214,000.00 as payment for the 300 bags of rice. As we said,
novation is never presumed, there must be an express intention to novate. In fact, when the
Solid Bank check was delivered to respondent, the same was also indorsed by petitioner which
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shows petitioners recognition of the existing obligation to respondent to pay P214,000.00
subject of the replaced Prudential Bank check.



REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. AVELINO R. DELA PAZ, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 171631, November 15, 2010
J. Peralta

In the present case, the only evidence to prove the character of the subject lands as
required by law is the notation appearing in the Advance Plan stating in effect that the said
properties are alienable and disposable. However, this is hardly the kind of proof required by
law. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government, such as a presidential
proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action, investigation reports of Bureau of
Lands investigators, and a legislative act or statute.


HYATT ELEVATORS AND ESCALATORS CORPORATION v. CATHEDRAL
HEIGHTSBUILDING COMPLEX ASSOCIATION, INC.
G.R. No. 173881, December 1, 2010
J. Peralta

A definite agreement as to the price is an essential element of a binding agreement to
sell personal or real property because it seriously affects the rights and obligations of the
parties. Price is an essential element in the formation of a binding and enforceable contract of
sale. The fixing of the price can never be left to the decision of one of the contracting parties.
But a price fixed by one of the contracting parties, if accepted by the other, gives rise to a
perfected sale. There would have been a perfected contract of sale had respondent accepted
the price dictated by petitioner even if such assent was given after the services were rendered.
There is, however, no proof of such acceptance on the part of respondent.


SPOUSES JOSE CHUA AND MARGARITA CHUA v. THE HON. PEDRO GUTIERREZ, ET.
AL.
G.R. No. 172316, December 8, 2010
J. Peralta

The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or affect the land insofar as
third persons are concerned, and in all cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made
in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or the city where the land lies. The
preference given to a duly registered levy on attachment or execution over a prior unregistered
sale is well settled in our jurisdiction. This is because registration is the operative act that binds
or affects the land insofar as third persons are concerned. It is upon registration that there is
notice to the whole world.


FRANCISCO TAYCO, SUBSTITUTED BY LECRESIA TAYCO AND NOEL TAYCO v. HEIRS
OF CONCEPCION TAYCO-FLORES, NAMELY LUCELI F. DIAZ, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 168692, December 13, 2010
PERALTA

J. Peralta

An extrajudicial settlement is a contract and it is a well-entrenched doctrine that the
law does not relieve a party from the effects of a contract, entered into with all the required
formalities and with full awareness of what he was doing, simply because the contract turned
out to be a foolish or unwise investment. However, in the construction or interpretation of an
instrument, the intention of the parties is primordial and is to be pursued.


SPOUSES MARCOS R. ESMAQUEL AND VICTORIA SORDEVILLA v. MARIA COPRADA
G.R. No. 152423, December 15, 2010
J. Peralta

The sole issue for resolution in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material
possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any of the
parties. Where the issue of ownership is raised by any of the parties, the courts may pass upon
the same in order to determine who has the right to possess the property. The adjudication is,
however, merely provisional and would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties
involving title to the property. Since the issue of ownership was raised in the unlawful detainer
case, its resolution boils down to which of the parties' respective evidence deserves more
weight. In the present case, respondent failed to present evidence to substantiate her allegation
that a portion of the land was sold to her in 1962.


RAMON B. BRITO, SR. v. SEVERINO D. DIANALA, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 171717, December 15, 2010
J. Peralta

An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce
prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of very
recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well settled that an action for
reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from the
issuance of the Torrens title over the property.

In the present case, there is no dispute that respondents are in possession of the
subject property as evidenced by the fact that petitioner and his co-heirs filed a separate action
against respondents for recovery of possession thereof. Thus, owing to respondents'
possession of the disputed property, it follows that their complaint for reconveyance is, in fact,
imprescriptible.


2011


MANUEL CATINDIG, REPRESENTED BY HIS LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE EMILIANO
CANTIDIG-RODRIGO v. AURORA IRENE VDA. DE MENESES/SILVINO ROXAS, SR.
REPRESENTED BY FELICISIMA VILLAFUERTE ROXAS
vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 165851/G.R. No. 168875, February 2, 2011
J. Peralta

PERALTA

It is a well-entrenched rule that where the deed of sale states that the purchase price
has been paid but in fact has never been paid, the deed of sale is null and void ab initio for lack
of consideration. Moreover, Article 1471 of the Civil Code, provides that "if the price is
simulated, the sale is void," which applies to the instant case, since the price purportedly paid as
indicated in the contract of sale was simulated for no payment was actually made.

Since it was well established that the Deed of Sale is simulated and, therefore void,
petitioners claim that respondent's cause of action is one for annulment of contract, which
already prescribed, is unavailing, because only voidable contracts may be annulled. On the
other hand, respondent's defense for the declaration of the inexistence of the contract does not
prescribe.


CAROLINA HERNANDEZ NIEVERA, et al. v. WILFREDO HERNANDEZ, et al.
G.R. No. 171165, February 14, 2011
J. Peralta

Firmly settled is the jurisprudential rule that forgery cannot be presumed from a mere
allegation but rather must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence by the party
alleging the same The burden to prove the allegation of forgery in this case has not been
conclusively discharged by petitioners because first, nothing in the records supports the
allegation except only perhaps Demetrios explicit self-serving disavowal of his signature in
open court. Second, while in fact Demetrio at the trial of the case had committed to have the
subject signature examined by an expert, nevertheless, the trial had terminated without the
results of the examination being submitted in evidence. Third, the claim of forgery,
unsubstantiated as it is, becomes even more unremarkable in light of the fact that the DAC
involved in this case is a notarized deed guaranteed by public attestation in accordance with
law, such that the execution thereof enjoys the legal presumption of regularity in the absence of
compelling proof to the contrary.


FILIPINAS SYNTHETIC FIBER CORPORATION v. WILFREDO DE LOS SANTOS, ET AL.,
G.R. No. 152033, March 16, 2011
J. Peralta

In order that the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision of employees
may be deemed sufficient and plausible, it is not enough to emptily invoke the existence of said
company guidelines and policies on hiring and supervision. As the negligence of the employee
gives rise to the presumption of negligence on the part of the employer, the latter has the
burden of proving that it has been diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the
actual supervision of their work. The mere allegation of the existence of hiring procedures and
supervisory policies, without anything more, is decidedly not sufficient to overcome such
presumption. In the present case, Filsyn merely presented evidence on the alleged care it took
in the selection or hiring of Mejia way back in 1974 or ten years before the fatal accident.


ANITA MONASTERIO-PE, ET AL. v. JOSE JUAN TONG, HEREIN
REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, JOSE Y. ONG
G.R. No. 151369, March 23, 2011
J. Peralta
PERALTA


Article 1498 of the Civil Code provides that when the sale is made through a public
instrument, the execution thereof shall be equivalent to the delivery of the thing which is the
object of the contract, if from the deed the contrary does not appear or cannot clearly be
inferred. In the instant case, petitioners failed to present any evidence to show that they had no
intention of delivering the subject lots to respondent when they executed the said deed of sale.
Hence, petitioners' execution of the deed of sale is tantamount to a delivery of the subject lots to
respondent. The fact that petitioners remained in possession of the disputed properties does not
prove that there was no delivery, because as found by the lower courts, such possession is only
by respondent's mere tolerance.


MARIA LOURDES TAMANI, ET AL. v. RAMON SALVADOR, ET AL.
G.R. No. 171497, April 4, 2011
J. Peralta

A purchaser in good faith is one who buys the property of another, without notice that some
other person has a right to, or interest in, such property, and pays the full and fair price for it at
the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other persons
in the property. He buys the property with the belief that the person from whom he receives the
thing was the owner and could convey title to the property. He cannot close his eyes to facts
that should put a reasonable man on his guard and still claim he acted in good faith.


DANILO A. AURELIO v. VIDA MA. CORAZON P. AURELIO
G.R. No. 175367, June 6, 2011
J.Peralta

It bears to stress that whether or not petitioner and respondent are psychologically
incapacitated to fulfill their marital obligations is a matter for the RTC to decide at the first
instance. A perusal of the Molina guidelines would show that the same contemplate a situation
wherein the parties have presented their evidence, witnesses have testified, and that a decision
has been reached by the court after due hearing.

Let it be remembered that each case involving the application of Article 36 must be
treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or
generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on
a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.


VICTORIA CLARAVALL, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND, LORETO CLARAVALL
v. RICHARD LIM, ET AL.
G.R. No. 152695, July 25, 2011
J. Peralta

Article 1606 is intended to cover suits where the seller claims that the real intention was
a loan with equitable mortgage but decides otherwise. The seller, however, must entertain a
good faith belief that the contract is an equitable mortgage.No error in the conclusions reached
by both the CA and the RTC that the unmistakable and definite intention of petitioner and
respondents was that the transaction they entered into is one of sale with right of repurchase.
PERALTA

Hence, petitioner is not entitled to the reprieve provided for under the third paragraph of Article
1606 of the Civil Code.


CORNELIO DEL FIERRO, ET AL. v. RENE SAGUIRAN
G.R. No. 152141, August 8, 2011
J. Peralta

Article 434 of the Civil Code provides that to successfully maintain an action to recover
the ownership of a real property, the person who claims a better right to it must prove two (2)
things: first, the identity of the land claimed; and second, his title thereto.In this case, petitioners
failed to prove the identity of the parcels of land sought to be recovered and their title thereto.


AMERICAN HOME INSURANCE CO. OF NEW YORK v. F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC.
G.R. No. 174926, August 10, 2011
J. Peralta

A contract of suretyship is an agreement whereby a party called the surety, guarantees
the performance by another party, called the principal or obligor, of an obligation or undertaking
in favor of another party called the obligee. By its very nature, under the laws regulating
suretyship, the liability of the surety is joint and several but is limited to the amount of the bond,
and its terms are determined strictly by the terms of the contract of suretyship in relation to the
principal contract between the obligor and the obligee. The surety is considered in law as
possessed of the identity of the debtor in relation to whatever is adjudged touching upon the
obligation of the latter. Their liabilities are so interwoven as to be inseparable. Although the
contract of suretyship is, in essence, secondary only to a valid principal obligation, the suretys
liability to the creditor is direct, primary, and absolute; he becomes liable for the debt and duty of
another although he possesses no direct or personal interest over the obligations nor does he
receive any benefit therefrom.


METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, SUBSTITUTED BY MERIDIAN
CORPORATION v. INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE BANK/CHUAYUCO STEEL
MANUFACTURING vs. INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE BANK
G.R. No. 176008/G.R. No. 176131, August 10, 2011
J.Peralta

The following successive measures must be taken by a creditor before he may bring an
action for rescission of an allegedly fraudulent contract: (1) exhaust the properties of the debtor
through levying by attachment and execution upon all the property of the debtor, except such as
are exempt by law from execution; (2) exercise all the rights and actions of the debtor, save
those personal to him (accion subrogatoria); and (3) seek rescission of the contracts executed
by the debtor in fraud of their rights (accion pauliana).

It does not appear that Metrobank sought other properties of SSC other than the subject
lots alleged to have been transferred in fraud of creditors. Neither is there any showing that
Metrobank subrogated itself in SSC's transmissible rights and actions. Without availing of the
first and second remedies, Metrobank simply undertook the third measure and filed an action for
annulment of the chattel mortgages. This cannot be done. Article 1383 of the New Civil Code is
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very explicit that the right or remedy of the creditor to impugn the acts which the debtor may
have done to defraud them is subsidiary in nature. It can only be availed of in the absence of
any other legal remedy to obtain reparation for the injury.


ESTATE OF MARGARITA D. CABACUNGAN, REPRESENTED BY LUZ LAIGO-ALI v.
MARILOU LAIGO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 175073, August 15, 2011
J.Peralta

Resulting trusts arise from the nature or circumstances of the consideration involved in a
transaction whereby one person becomes invested with legal title but is obligated in equity to
hold his title for the benefit of another. This is based on the equitable doctrine that valuable
consideration and not legal title is determinative of equitable title or interest and is always
presumed to have been contemplated by the parties.Such intent is presumed as it is not
expressed in the instrument or deed of conveyance and is to be found in the nature of their
transaction. Implied trusts of this nature are hence describable as "intention-enforcing trusts."

As a trustee of a resulting trust, therefore, Roberto, like the trustee of an express passive
trust, is merely a depositary of legal title having no duties as to the management, control or
disposition of the property except to make a conveyance when called upon by the cestui que
trust. Hence, the sales he entered into with respondents are a wrongful conversion of the trust
property and a breach of the trust.


SPOUSES NELSON AND MYRA VILLANUEVA
v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 163433, August 22, 2011
J. Peralta

Petitioners bound themselves to pay the stipulated penalty charge of 6% per annum "of
the principal amount of loan as penalty for inexcusable neglect to pay any amount of t[he] loan
when due." Since petitioners failed to present evidence that their failure to perform their
obligation was due to either force majeure or the acts of respondent Bank or to any justifiable or
excusable cause, they are obliged to pay the penalty charge as agreed upon.


HEIRS OF ANTONIO FERAREN, REP. BY ANTONIO FERAREN, JR.
v. COURT OF APPEALS AND CECILIA TADIAR
G.R. No. 159328, October 5, 2011
J. Peralta

Under Article 1678, the lessor has the option of paying one-half of the value of the
improvements that the lessee made in good faith, which are suitable to the use for which the
lease is intended, and which have not altered the form and substance of the land. On the other
hand, the lessee may remove the improvements should the lessor refuse to reimburse.

It appears, nonetheless, that in her Complaint, private respondent prayed for the
demolition of petitioners' residential house constructed on the subject lot. It is, thus, clear that
private respondent does not want to appropriate the improvements. As such, petitioners cannot
compel her to reimburse to them one-half of the value of their house. The sole right of
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petitioners under Article 1678 then is to remove the improvements without causing any more
damage upon the property leased than is necessary.


ADELAIDA MENESES (DECEASED), SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIR MARILYN M.
CARBONEL-GARCIA v. ROSARIO G. VENTUROZO
G.R. No. 172196, October 19, 2011
J. Peralta

The necessity of a public document for contracts which transmit or extinguish real rights
over immovable property, as mandated by Article 1358 of the Civil Code, is only for
convenience; it is not essential for validity or enforceability. As notarized documents, Deeds of
Absolute Sale carry evidentiary weight conferred upon them with respect to their due execution
and enjoy the presumption of regularity which may only be rebutted by evidence so clear, strong
and convincing as to exclude all controversy as to falsity.In this case, it should be pointed out
that contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, the Deed of Sale dated June 20, 1966 did
not comply with the formalities required by law, specifically Act No. 496, otherwise known as
The Land Registration Act.


PACIFIO M. VALIAO, ET AL. v. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL.
G.R. No. 170757, November 28, 2011
J. Peralta

Petitioners failed to prove that (1) the subject property was classified as part of the
disposable and alienable land of the public domain; and (2) they and their predecessors-in-
interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation
thereof under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier, their application for
confirmation and registration of the subject property under PD 1529 should be denied.


ALFONSO T. YUCHENGCO v. THE MANILA CHRONICLE PUBLISHING CORPORATION,
ET AL.
SEPARATE CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION
J. VELASCO, JR.
G.R. No. 184315, November 28, 2011
J. Peralta

The case against respondent was one for damages based on the publication of libelous
articles against petitioner; hence, only civil in nature. The rule is that a party who has the burden
of proof in a civil case must establish his cause of action by a preponderance of evidence. The
question of whether or not the principle of abuse of rights has been violated resulting in
damages under Article 20 or other applicable provision of law, depends on the circumstances of
each case. In the present case, it was found that Coyiuto, Jr. indeed abused his rights as
Chairman of The Manila Chronicle, which led to the publication of the libelous articles in the said
newspaper, thus, entitling petitioner to damages under Article 19, in relation to Article 20.


JAIME ABALOS AND SPOUSES FELIX SALAZAR AND CONSUELO SALAZAR, ET AL. v.
HEIRS OF VICENTE TORIO, NAMELY: PUBLIO TORIO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 175444, December 14, 2011
PERALTA

J. Peralta

Possession "in good faith" consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom the
thing is received has been the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership. There is "just
title" when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through one of the modes
recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but the grantor was not
the owner or could not transmit any right.In the present case, the Court finds no error on the part
of the CA in holding that petitioners failed to present competent evidence to prove their alleged
good faith in neither possessing the subject lot nor their adverse claim thereon. Instead, the
records would show that petitioners' possession was by mere tolerance of respondents and
their predecessors-in-interest.


2012


GEORGE S. TOLENTINO, et al. v. PACIFICO S. LAUREL, HEIRS OF ILUMINADA LAUREL-
ASCALON, et al.
G.R. No. 181368. February 22, 2012
J. Peralta

As registered owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to eject
any person illegally occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed
that they were aware of the petitioners' occupation of the property, and regardless of the length
of that possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any
time as long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never
barred by laches.


MANILA INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. AVIA FILIPINAS INTERNATIONAL,
INC.
G.R. No. 180168, February 27, 2012
J. Peralta

In the instant case, it is clear that petitioner failed to maintain respondent in the peaceful
and adequate enjoyment of the leased premises by unjustifiably preventing the latter access
thereto. Consequently, in accordance with Article 1658 of the Civil Code, respondent had no
duty to make rent payments. Despite that, respondent still continued to pay the rental fees
agreed upon in the original contract. Thus, it would be the height of inequity and injustice as well
as unjust enrichment on the part of petitioner if the rental fees paid by respondent during the
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time that it was denied access to and prevented from using the leased premises be not returned
to it.


WUERTH PHILIPPINES, INC. v. RODANTE YNSON
G.R. No. 175932, February 15, 2012
J. Peralta

Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate or moderate damages are more than
nominal but less than compensatory, and may be recovered when the court finds that some
pecuniary loss has been suffered, but the amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be
proved with certainty. The records failed to show that he presented proof of the actual amount of
expenses therein, which served as the basis for the CA to award temperate damages in the
amount of P100,000.00.

INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA v. ASIAN TERMINALS, INC.
G.R. No. 180784, February 15, 2012
J. Peralta

The carrier and the ship may put up the defense of prescription if the action for damages
is not brought within one year after the delivery of the goods or the date when the goods should
have been delivered. It has been held that not only the shipper, but also the consignee or legal
holder of the bill may invoke the prescriptive period. However, the COGSA does not mention
that an arrastre operator may invoke the prescriptive period of one year; hence, it does not
cover the arrastre operator.


R.S. TOMAS, INC. v. RIZAL CEMENT COMPANY, INC.
G.R. No. 173155, March 21, 2012
J. Peralta

Considering that petitioner was already in delay and in breach of contract, it is liable for
damages that are the natural and probable consequences of its breach of obligation. Since
advanced payments had been made by respondent, petitioner is bound to return the excess vis-
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-vis its work accomplishments. In order to finish the projects, respondent had to contract the
services of another contractor. The Court, therefore, finds no reason to depart from the CA
conclusion requiring the return of the excess payments as well as the payment of the cost of
contracting Geostar, in addition to liquidated damages.


LEONCIA MANUEL & MARINA S. MUDLONG v. LEONOR SARMIENTO
G.R. No. 173857, March 21, 2012
J. Peralta

The authority to sell executed by Marina in favor of Leonor was validly executed. In the
absence of clear and convincing evidence that Marina and Leonor had an agreement different
from that appearing in the signed authority to sell, it is presumed that the signed contract
embodies their complete and true agreement. The presumption of regularity, the evidentiary
weight conferred upon public documents with respect to its execution, as well as the statements
and the authenticity of the signatures thereon, therefore, stand.


SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY v. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND
SUBIC INTERNATIONAL HOTEL CORPORATION
G.R. No. 192885, July 4, 2012
J. Peralta

It is apparent that the questioned provisions of the contract are reciprocal in nature.
Reciprocal obligations are those which arise from the same cause, and in which each party is a
debtor and a creditor of the other, such that the obligation of one is dependent upon the
obligation of the other. They are to be performed simultaneously such that the performance of
one is conditioned upon the simultaneous fulfillment of the other. For one party to demand the
performance of the obligation of the other party, the former must also perform its own obligation.
Accordingly, petitioner, not having provided the services that would require the payment of
service fees as stipulated in the Lease Development Agreement, is not entitled to collect the
same.
VSD REALTY & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. UNIWIDE SALES, INC. ND DOLORES
BAELLO TEJADA
G.R. No. 170677, October 24, 2012
J. Peralta

PERALTA

In a plethora of cases, this Court has held that Articles 448 of the Civil Code, in relation
to Article 546 of the same Code, which allows full reimbursement of useful improvements and
retention of the premises until reimbursement is made, applies only to a possessor in good faith,
i.e., one who builds on land with the belief that he is the owner thereof. It does not apply where
ones only interest is that of a lessee under a rental contract; otherwise, it would always be in
the power of the tenant to "improve" his landlord out of his property.


MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAES v. LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO
G.R. No. 181089, October 22, 2012
J. Peralta

The subsequent judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage would not change the
fact that respondent contracted the second marriage during the subsistence of the first
marriage. Thus, respondent was properly charged of the crime of bigamy, since the essential
elements of the offense charged were sufficiently alleged. Furthermore, parties to the marriage
should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be
held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage
exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.


PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. v. FRANCISCO LAO LIM, THE HEIRS OF HENRY GO,
MANUEL LIMTONG AND RAINBOW TOURS AND TRAVEL, INC.
G.R. No. 168987. October 17, 2012
J. Peralta

There is no contribution between joint tortfeasors whose liability is solidary since both of
them are liable for the total damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or
omissions of two or more persons, although acting independently, are in combination the direct
and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to determine in what
proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury.
Where their concurring negligence resulted in injury or damage to a third party, they become
joint tortfeasors and are solidarily liable for the resulting damage under Article 2194 of the Civil
Code.

PERALTA


ROBERT PASCUA, doing business under the name and style TRI-WEB CONSTRUCTION
v. G & G REAL TV CORPORATION
G.R. No. 196383, October 15, 2012
J. Peralta

Petitioner completed the construction of the four-storey commercial building and two-
storey kitchen with dining hall. Thus, this Court finds no legal basis for respondent to not comply
with its obligation to pay the balance of the contract price due the petitioner.It would be the
height of injustice to allow respondent to enjoy the fruits of petitioner's labor without paying the
contract price.


ATLANTIC ERECTORS, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS ANDHERBAL COVE REALTY
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 170732, October 11, 2012
J. Peralta

The parties to a contract are allowed to stipulate on liquidated damages to be paid in
case of breach. It is attached to an obligation in order to ensure performance and has a double
function: (1) to provide for liquidated damages, and (2) to strengthen the coercive force of the
obligation by the threat of greater responsibility in the event of breach. The amount agreed upon
answers for damages suffered by the owner due to delays in the completion of the project. As a
pre-condition to such award, however, there must be proof of the fact of delay in the
performance of the obligation.


SPOUSES MINIANO B. DELA CRUZ AND LETA L. DELA CRUZ v. ANA MARIE
CONCEPCION
G.R. No. 172825, October 11, 2012
J. Peralta

In general, a payment in order to be effective to discharge an obligation, must be made
to the proper person. Thus, payment must be made to the obligee himself or to an agent having
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authority, express or implied, to receive the particular payment. Payment made to one having
apparent authority to receive the money will, as a rule, be treated as though actual authority had
been given for its receipt. Likewise, if payment is made to one who by law is authorized to act
for the creditor, it will work a discharge. The receipt of money due on a judgment by an officer
authorized by law to accept it will, therefore, satisfy the debt.


FILINVEST LAND, INC., EFREN C. GUTIERRE AND LINA DE GUZMAN-FERRER v. ABDUL
BACKY, ABEHERA, BAIYA, EDRIS, HADJI GULAM, JAMELLA, KIRAM, LUCAYA, MONER,
OMAR, RAMIR, ROBAYCA, SATAR, TAYBA ALL SURNAMED NGILAY, EDMER ANDONG,
UNOS BANTANGAN AND NADJER ESQUIVEL
G.R. No. 174715, October 11, 2012
J. Peralta

The conveyance of a homestead before the expiration of the five-year prohibitory period
following the issuance of the homestead patent is null and void and cannot be enforced, for it is
not within the competence of any citizen to barter away what public policy by law seeks to
preserve.


SPOUSES CRISANTO ALCAZAR AND SUSANA VILLAMAYOR v. EVELYN ARANTE
G.R. No. 177042, December 10, 2012
J. Peralta

Petitioners admit that they entrusted the subject TCT to respondent. There is, thus, no
dispute that the TCT in the possession of respondent is the genuine owner's duplicate copy of
the TCT covering the subject property. The fact remains, then, that the owner's duplicate copy
of the certificate of title has not been lost but is in fact in the possession of respondent, with the
knowledge of petitioners.Granting that respondent obtained possession of the subject TCT
through fraud or deceit, the same is not sufficient justification for the court to issue an order
declaring the same to be null and void and directing the issuance of a new copy.


2013


MONDRAGON PERSONAL SALES,INC. v. VICTORIANO S. SOLA, JR.
G.R. No. 174882, January 21, 2013
J. Peralta

Compensation is a mode of extinguishing to the concurrent amount the obligations of
persons who in their own right and as principals are reciprocally debtors and creditors of each
other. Legal compensation takes place by operation of law when all the requisites are present,
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as opposed to conventional compensation which takes place when the parties agree to
compensate their mutual obligations even in the absence of some requisites. As legal
compensation took place in this case, there is no basis for respondent to ask for rescission
since he was the first to breach their contract when he suddenly closed and padlocked his
bodega cum office in General Santos City occupied by petitioner.


JUANITA ERMITAO, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT, ISABELO
ERMITAO v. LAILANIE M. PAGLAS
G.R. No. 174436, January 23, 2013
J. Peralta

The purchaser in a foreclosure sale has, during the redemption period, only an inchoate
right and not the absolute right to the property with all the accompanying incidents. He only
becomes an absolute owner of the property if it is not redeemed during the redemption period.
As a consequence, petitioner's ejectment suit filed against respondent was rendered moot when
the period of redemption expired on February 23, 2001 without petitioner having redeemed the
subject property, for upon expiration of such period petitioner lost his possessory right over the
same. Hence, the only remaining right that petitioner can enforce is his right to the rentals
during the time that he was still entitled to physical possession of the subject property that is
from May 2000 until February 23, 2001.


PADILLA MERCADO, ZULUETA MERCADO, BONIFACIA MERCADO, DAMIAN MERCADO
AND EMMANUEL MERCADO-BASCUG v. SPOUSES AGUEDO ESPINA AND LOURDES
ESPINA
G.R. No. 173987, February 25, 2013
J. Peralta

From the time that petitioners' predecessor-in-interest was supposedly deprived of
ownership of the subject lot through an alleged fraudulent sale, the same had already been sold
thrice. Moreover, since the subject property was already covered by a Torrens title at the time
that respondents bought the same, the law does not require them to go beyond what appears
on the face of the title. The lot has, thus, passed to respondents, who are presumed innocent
purchasers for value, in the absence of any allegation to the contrary.


RAMON G. NAZARENO v. MAERSK FILIPINAS CREWING, INC. AND ELITE SHIPPING A/S
G.R. No. 168703. February 26, 2013
J. Peralta

Petitioner is entitled to attorney's fees following Article 2208 of the New Civil Code,
which allows its recovery in actions for recovery of wages of laborers and actions for indemnity
under the employers liability laws. Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, petitioner is entitled to
attorney's fees of ten percent (10%) of the monetary award.


PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. RAMON DUMADAG, RONALDO BACABAC, ET
AL.
PERALTA

G.R. No. 194336, March 11, 2013
J. Peralta

Petitioners right of ownership and possession has been limited by law with respect to
the 3-meter strip/zone along the banks of Mahabang Ilog Creek. The Court cannot agree with
the trial courts opinion, that respondents have a better right to possess the subject portion of
the land because they are occupying an area reserved for public easement purposes. Similar to
petitioner, respondents have no right or title over it precisely because it is public land. Squatters
have no possessory rights over the land intruded upon. The length of time that they may have
physically occupied the land is immaterial; they are deemed to have entered the same in bad
faith, such that the nature of their possession is presumed to have retained the same character
throughout their occupancy.

Certainly, in the case of residential subdivisions, the allocation of the 3-meter strip along
the banks of a stream, like the Mahabang Ilog Creek in this case, is required and shall be
considered as forming part of the open space requirement pursuant to P.D. 1216 dated October
14, 1977. Said law is explicit: open spaces are "for public use and are, therefore, beyond the
commerce of men" and that "[the] areas reserved for parks, playgrounds and recreational use
shall be non-alienable public lands, and non-buildable."


PURIFICACION ESTANISLAO AND RUPERTO ESTANISLAO v. SPOUSES NORMA
GUDITO AND DAMIANO GUDITO
G.R. No. 173166, March 13, 2013
J. Peralta

Petitioners have failed to prove that the transfer of the subject property was merely a
ploy designed to defeat and circumvent their right of first refusal under the law. The Deed of
Donation executed in favor of respondents was signed by the parties and their witnesses, and
was even notarized by a notary public. It is a settled rule in our jurisdiction that a notarized
document has in its favor the presumption of regularity and it carries the evidentiary weight
conferred upon it with respect to its due execution. It is admissible in evidence and is entitled to
full faith and credit upon its face. The donation made by the Vasquez couple is a valid exercise
of their right as owners of the subject property and respondents are legally entitled to the said
property as donees.


REY CASTIGADOR CATEDRILLA v. MARIO AND MARGIE LAURON
G.R. No. 179011, April 15, 2013
J. Peralta

In suits to recover properties, all co-owners are real parties in interest. However,
pursuant to Article 487 of the Civil Code and the relevant jurisprudence, any one of them may
bring an action, any kind of action for the recovery of co-owned properties. Therefore, only one
of the co-owners, namely the co-owner who filed the suit for the recovery of the co-owned
property, is an indispensable party thereto. The other co-owners are not indispensable parties.
They are not even necessary parties, for a complete relief can be afforded in the suit even
without their participation, since the suit is presumed to have been filed for the benefit of all co-
owners.
PERALTA



SPOUSES DEO AGNER AND MARICON AGNER v. BPI FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, INC.
G.R. No. 182963, June 3, 2013
J. Peralta

Settled is the principle, which this Court has affirmed in a number of cases that
stipulated interest rates of three percent (3%) per month and higher are excessive, iniquitous,
unconscionable, and exorbitant. Since the stipulation on the interest rate is void for being
contrary to morals, if not against the law, it is as if there was no express contract on said interest
rate; thus, the interest rate may be reduced as reason and equity demand.


SPOUSES FLORENTINO T. MALLARI AND AUREA V. MALLARI v. PRUDENTIAL BANK
(now BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS)
G.R. No. 197861, June 5, 2013
J. Peralta

Petitioners defaulted in the payment of their loan obligation with respondent bank and
their contract provided for the payment of 12% p.a. penalty charge, and since there was no
showing that petitioners' failure to perform their obligation was due to force majeure or to
respondent bank's acts, petitioners cannot now back out on their obligation to pay the penalty
charge. A contract is the law between the parties and they are bound by the stipulations therein.


JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO-
CAPILI
G.R. No. 183805, July 3, 2013
J. Peralta

The court ruled that what makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he
contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid first marriage. It
further held that the parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its
nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the
nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such
declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second
marriage before the judicial declaration of the first marriage assumes the risk of being
prosecuted for bigamy.


JOYCE V. ARIDENTE v. SPOUSES JAVIER AND MA. THERESA PASTORFIDE, CAGAYAN
DE ORO WATER DISTRICT, AND GASPAR GONZALEZ, JR.
G.R. No. 161921, July 17, 2013
J. Peralta

Article 20 provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes
damage to another shall indemnify the latter for the same." It speaks of the general sanctions of
all other provisions of law which do not especially provide for its own sanction. When a right is
exercised in a manner which does not conform to the standards set forth in the said provision
and results in damage to another, a legal wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer
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must be responsible. Thus, if the provision does not provide a remedy for its violation, an action
for damages under either Article 20 or Article 21 of the Civil Code would be proper.

In the present case, intention to harm was evident on the part of petitioner when she
requested for the disconnection of respondent spouses water supply without warning or
informing the latter of such request


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN
G.R. No. 191566, July. 17, 2013
J. Peralta

The Family Code has settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter.
A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of
action or a ground for defense. It has been held in a number of cases that a judicial declaration
of nullity is required before a valid subsequent marriage can be contracted; or else, what
transpires is a bigamous marriage, reprehensible and immoral


2014


DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES (DBP) v. GUARIA AGRICULTURAL AND
REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 160758. January 15, 2014
J. Bersamin

The foreclosure of a mortgage prior to the mortgagor's default on the principal obligation
is premature, and should be undone for being void and ineffectual. The mortgagee who has
been meanwhile given possession of the mortgaged property by virtue of a writ of possession
issued to it as the purchaser at the foreclosure sale may be required to restore the possession
of the property to the mortgagor and to pay reasonable rent for the use of the property
during the intervening period.


ROBERTO R. DAVID v. EDUARDO C. DAVID
G.R. No. 162365. January 15, 2014
J. Bersamin

In a sale with right to repurchase, title and ownership of the property sold are
immediately vested in the vendee, subject to the resolutory condition of repurchase by the
vendor within the stipulated period. Accordingly, the ownership of the affected properties
reverted to the respondent once he complied with the condition for the repurchase, thereby
entitling him to the possession of the other motor vehicle with trailer.


FIRST UNITED CONSTRUCTORS CORPORATION, ET AL. v. BAYANIHAN AUTOMOTIVE
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 164985. January 15, 2014
J. Bersamin
PERALTA


It was improper for petitioners to set up their claim for repair expenses and other spare
parts of the dump truck against their remaining balance on the price of the prime mover and the
transit mixer they owed to respondent. Recoupment must arise out of the contract or transaction
upon which the plaintiffs claim is founded. To be entitled to recoupment, therefore, the claim
must arise from the same transaction.


DOMINGO GONZALO v, JOHN TARNATE, JR.
G.R. No. 160600. January 15, 2014
J. Bersamin

The doctrine of in pari delicto, which stipulates that the guilty parties to an illegal
contract are not entitled to any relief, cannot prevent a recovery if doing so violates the public
policy against unjust enrichment.


THELMA N. ARANAS v. TERESITA V. MERCADO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 156407. January 15, 2014
J. Bersamin

The probate court is authorized to determine the issue of ownership of properties for
purposes of their inclusion or exclusion from the inventory to be submitted by the
administrator, but its determination shall only be provisional unless the interested parties are all
heirs of the decedent, or the question is one of collation or advancement, or the parties
consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of third parties are
not impaired. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and
distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the status of each heir and whether
property included in the inventory is the conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased
spouse.


PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. SPS. ENRIQUE MANALO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 174433. February 24, 2014
J. Bersamin

Although banks are free to determine the rate of interest they could impose on
their borrowers, they can do so only reasonably, not arbitrarily. They may not take
advantage of the ordinary borrowers' lack of familiarity with banking procedures and jargon.
Hence, any stipulation on interest unilaterally imposed and increased by them shall be struck
down as violative of the principle of mutuality of contracts.


DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 192123. March 10, 2014
J. Bersamin

This appeal is taken by a physician-anesthesiologist who has been pronounced
guilty of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) and the Court of Appeals (CA). He had been part of the team of
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anesthesiologists during the surgical pull-through operation conducted on a three-year old
patient born with an imperforate anus. The court ruled that the Prosecution did not prove the
elements of reckless imprudence beyond reasonable doubt because the circumstances were
insufficient to establish that petitioner had been guilty of inexcusable lack of precaution in
monitoring the administration of the anesthetic agent to patient.


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROSARIO DE GUZMAN VDA. DE JOSON
G.R. No. 163767. March10, 2014
J. Bersamin

Land of the public domain, to be the subject of appropriation, must be declared alienable
and disposable either by the President or the Secretary of the DENR. This doctrine means that
the mere certification issued by the CENRO or PENRO did not suffice to support the application
for registration, because the applicant must also submit a copy of the original classification of
the land as alienable and disposable as approved by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true
copy by the legal custodian of the official records.


METROPOLITAN FABRICS, ET AL. v. PROSPERITY CREDIT RESOURCES, ET AL
G.R. No. 154390. March 17, 2014
J. Bersamin

The genuineness and due execution of a deed of real estate mortgage that has been
acknowledged before a notary public are presumed. Any allegation of fraud and forgery
against the deed must be established by clear and competent evidence.


BJDC CONSTRUCTION, REPRESENTED BY ITS MANAGER/PROPRIETO JANET S. DELA
CRUZ v. NENA E. LANUZO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 161151. March 24, 2014
J. Bersamin

The party alleging the negligence of the other as the cause of injury has the burden to
establish the allegation with competent evidence. If the action based on negligence is civil in
nature, the proof required is preponderance of evidence.


RAUL H. SESBREO v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 160689. March 26, 2014
J. Bersamin

This case concerns the claim for damages of petitioner Raul H.Sesbreo founded on
abuse of rights. Sesbreo accused the violation of contract (VOC) inspection team dispatched
by the Visayan Electric Company (VECO) to check his electric meter with conducting an
unreasonable search in his residential premises. But the Supreme Court denies the petition for
review and affirms the denial of the claim.

LEONORA A. PASCUAL v. JOSEFINO L. DAQUIOAG, ET AL.
PERALTA

G.R. No. 162063. March 31, 2014
J. Bersamin

The writ of execution issued upon a final judgment adjudicating the ownership of land to
a party may authorize putting her in possession although the judgment does not specifically
direct such act.





MERCANTILE LAW
2009

ALLIED BANKING CORPORATION v. RUPERTO JOSE H. MATEO, REPRESENTED BY
WARLITO MATEO, AS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
G.R. No. 167420, June 5, 2009
J. Peralta

The general rule in redemption is that it is not sufficient that a person offering to redeem
manifests his desire to do so. The statement of intention must be accompanied by an actual and
simultaneous tender of payment. This constitutes the exercise of the right to repurchase.

When the redemption period is about to expire and the redemption cannot take place on
account of disagreement over the redemption price, the redemptioner may preserve his right of
redemption through judicial action which in every case must be filed within the one-year period
of redemption. The filing of the court action to enforce redemption, being equivalent to a formal
offer to redeem, would have the effect of preserving his redemptive rights and freezing the
expiration of the one-year period. Stated otherwise, the foregoing interpretation, has three
critical dimensions: (1) timely redemption or redemption by expiration date; (2) good faith as
always, meaning, the filing of the action must have been for the sole purpose of determining the
redemption price and not to stretch the redemptive period indefinitely; and (3) once the
redemption price is determined within a reasonable time, the redemptioner must make prompt
payment in full.


KEI MARIE AND BIANCA ANGELICA BOTH SURNAMED ABRERA, MINORS,
REPRESENTED BY THEIR PARENTS EVELYN C. ABRERA, ET AL. v. HON. ROMEO F.
BARZA, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 61, MAKATI CITY AND COLLEGE ASSURANCE PLAN PHILIPPINES, INC.
G.R. No. 171681, September 11, 2009
J. Peralta

Under the Interim Rules of Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation of 2000 which took
effect on December 15, 2000, any debtor who foresees the impossibility of meeting its debts
when they respectively fall due, or any creditor or creditors holding at least twenty-five percent
(25%) of the debtors total liabilities, may petition the proper Regional Trial Court to have the
debtor placed under rehabilitation. The term debtor shall mean any corporation, partnership,
or association, whether supervised or regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission or
PERALTA

other government agencies, on whose behalf a petition for rehabilitation has been filed under
these Rules. The Interim Rules does not distinguish whether a pre-need corporation like CAP
cannot file a petition for rehabilitation before the RTC. Moreover, under the Interim Rules,
claim shall include all claims or demands of whatever nature or character against a debtor or
its property, whether for money or otherwise. Creditor shall mean any holder of a claim.
Hence, the claim of petitioners for payment of tuition fees from CAP is included in the definition
of claims under the Interim Rules which can be stayed by virtue of the issuance of a Stay
Order because of a petition for rehabilitation.



.
R TRANSPORT CORPORATION v. EDUARDO PANTE
G.R. No. 162104, September 15, 2009
J. Peralta

Common carriers from the nature of their business and for reasons of public policy, are
bound to observe extraordinary diligence for the safety of the passengers transported by them.
They are bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can
provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the
circumstances. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed by Articles 1733 and 1755. Further, Article 1759 of the
Civil Code provides that Common carriers are liable for the death or injury to passengers
through the negligence or willful acts of the former's employees, although such employees may
have acted beyond the scope of their authority or in violation of the orders of the common
carriers. This liability of the common carriers does not cease upon proof that they exercised all
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of their employees.


SAN MIGUEL BUKID HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., ET AL.
v. CITY OF MADALUYONG, ET AL.
G.R. No. 153653. October 2, 2009
J. Peralta

If the real party-in-interest is a corporate body, an officer of the corporation can sign the
certification against forum shopping so long as he has been duly authorized by a resolution of
its board of directors. Hence, the Court committed no grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the petition for lack of authority of the officer who signed the Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping in representation of petitioner corporation.


CHINA BANKING CORPORATION v. THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE
G.R. No. 172359, October 2, 2009
J. Peralta

A "certificate of deposit" is defined as a receipt issued by a bank for an interest-bearing
time deposit coming due at a specified future date. The certificates of time deposit are subject to
PERALTA

documentary stamp tax and that the same are but a type of a certificate of deposit drawing
interest. Hence, whether or not Special Savings Deposit (SSDs) are subject to documentary
stamp tax is dependent on the nature and specific features thereof. It is thus conceded that if
the SSDs are more akin to a time deposit account then the same would be subject to
documentary stamp tax. However, if the SSDs are more akin to a regular savings deposit
account then the same would not be subject to documentary stamp tax.


EASTERN SHIPPING LINES, INC. v. PRUDENTIAL GUARANTEE AND ASSURANCE, INC.
G.R. No. 174116, September 11, 2009
J. Peralta

The insurer, upon happening of the risk "insured" against and after payment to the
insured, is subrogated to the rights and cause of action of the latter. As such, the insurer has the
right to seek reimbursement for all the expenses paid. However, in a contract of carriage
involving the shipment of knock-down auto parts of Nissan motor vehicles which were allegedly
lost and destroyed, the insurer was not properly subrogated because of the non-presentation of
any marine insurance policy. The submission of a marine risk note instead of the insurance
policy doesn't satisfy the requirement for subrogation. The marine risk note is not an insurance
policy. It is only an acknowledgment or declaration of the insurer confirming the specific
shipment covered by its marine open policy, the evaluation of the cargo and the chargeable
premium.


EQUITABLE PCI BANK, INC. v. HON. SALVADOR Y APURILLO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 168746, November 5, 2009
J. Peralta

A writ of preliminary injunction may be issued only upon clear showing of an actual
existing right to be protected during the pendency of the principal action. The twin requirements
of a valid injunction are the existence of a right and its actual or threatened violations. In the
case, all the requisites for the issuance of an injunctive writ are attendant. First, it was well
established that YKS had a clear and unmistakable right over the mortgaged properties.
Evidently, as owner of the subject properties that stand to be foreclosed, YKS is entitled to the
possession and protection thereof when the threat to its foreclosure was apparent even before
the respective rights of the parties are determined and the issues threshed out in the main
action before the RTC are resolved. Second, there clearly exists an urgent and paramount
necessity to prevent serious injury on the part of YKS . To be sure, to allow the foreclosure
proceedings to continue even before determination of the issues that were brought to the RTC
would place YKS in an oppressively unjust situation where it would be tied up in litigation for the
recovery of its properties should the RTC later conclude that YKS is entitled to the reliefs prayed
for in the main action.



2010

BSB GROUP, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, MR. RICARDO BANGAYAN v.
SALLY GO A.K.A. SALLY GO-BANGAYAN
G.R. No. 168644, February 16, 2010
J. Peralta
PERALTA


The inquiry into bank deposits allowable under R.A. No. 1405 must be premised on the
fact that the money deposited in the account is itself the subject of the action. In the case, the
criminal Information filed with the trial court unqualifiedly and in plain language, charged
respondent with qualified theft by abusing petitioners trust and confidence by way of stealing
cash in the amount of P1,534,135.50. In other words, it can hardly be inferred from the
indictment itself that the Security Bank account is the ostensible subject of the prosecutions
inquiry. It comes clear that the admission of testimonial and documentary evidence relative to
respondents Security Bank account serves no other purpose than to establish the existence of
such account, its nature and the amount kept in it. It constitutes an attempt by the prosecution
at an impermissible inquiry into a bank deposit account the privacy and confidentiality of which
is protected by law.

PNCC SKYWAY TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AND SECURITY DIVISION WORKERS
ORGANIZATION (PSTMSWDO), REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT RENE SORIANO v.
PNCC SKYWAY CORPORATION
G.R. No. 171231, February 17, 2010
J. Peralta

The following officials or employees of the company can sign the verification and
certification without need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of Directors, (2)
the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or Acting General Manager, (4)
Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment Specialist in a labor case. The rationale applied in
the foregoing cases is to justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the
corporation to sign the verification or certificate against forum shopping, being in a position to
verify the truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition. In the case at bar, the
Court ruled that Rene Soriano has sufficient authority to sign the verification and certification
against forum shopping; for being the president of the union, he is in a position to verify the
truthfulness and correctness of the allegations in the petition.


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. COALBRINE INTERNATIONAL PHILIPPINES, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 161838, April 7, 2010
J. Peralta

A corporation has no power, except those expressly conferred on it by the Corporation
Code and those that are implied or incidental to its existence. In turn, a corporation exercises
said powers through its board of directors and/or its duly authorized officers and agents. Thus, it
has been observed that the power of a corporation to sue and be sued in any court is lodged
with the board of directors that exercises its corporate powers. The physical acts of the
corporation, like the signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly
authorized for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a specific act of the board of directors.

Applying the foregoing provision, only individuals vested with authority by a valid board
resolution may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping on behalf of a corporation. The proof
of such authority must be attached. Failure to comply with this requirement subjects the petition
to dismissal.

PERALTA


RICARDO V. CASTILLO v. UNIWIDE WAREHOUSE CLUB, INC.
AND/OR JIMMY GOW
G.R. No. 169725, April 30, 2010
J. Peralta

Corporate rehabilitation connotes the restoration of the debtor to a position of successful
operation and solvency, if it is shown that its continued operation is economically feasible and
its creditors can recover by way of the present value of payments projected in the rehabilitation
plan, more if the corporation continues as a going concern than if it is immediately liquidated. An
essential function of corporate rehabilitation is the mechanism of suspension of all actions and
claims against the distressed corporation, which operates upon the due appointment of a
management committee or rehabilitation receiver. Jurisprudence is settled that the suspension
of proceedings referred to in the law uniformly applies to all actions for claims filed against a
corporation, partnership or association under management or receivership, without distinction,
except only those expenses incurred in the ordinary course of business. The Court noted that
aside from the given exception, the law is clear and makes no distinction as to the claims that
are suspended once a management committee is created or a rehabilitation receiver is
appointed.


WALLEM PHILIPPINES SHIPPING, INC. v. S.R. FARMS, INC.
G.R. No. 161849, July 9, 2010
J. Peralta

Under Section 3 (6) of the COGSA, notice of loss or damages must be filed within three
days of delivery. Under the same provision, however, a failure to file a notice of claim within
three days will not bar recovery if a suit is nonetheless filed within one year from delivery of the
goods or from the date when the goods should have been delivered. In the case, the records
would show, petitioner was not impleaded as a defendant in the original complaint filed on
March 11, 1993. It was only on June 7, 1993 that the Amended Complaint, impleading petitioner
as defendant, was filed. Considering this circumstances, clearly, the suit was beyond the
prescriptive period of the filing of claims as provided in the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act.


RPRP VENTURES MANAGEMENT AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. HON.
TEOFILO L. GUADIZ, JR., ET. AL.
G.R. No. 152236, July 28, 2010
J. Peralta

Administrative Matter No. 99-10-05-0, which prescribes the rules in cases of extrajudicial
foreclosure of mortgage and requires the payment of filing fees and the raffling of all notices of
public auction in all extrajudicial foreclosures of mortgage, was issued on December 14, 1999
and took effect on January 15, 2000, while the petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate
mortgage in this case was filed on October 29,1999. Consequently, the petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgage filed with the notary public was not yet governed by the said
administrative matter when the former was filed. In addition, neither the provisions of Section 2
of P.D. 1079, as amended, regarding the appointment of the executive judge of the Court of
First Instance of qualified newspapers for the publication of Notices of Sale in extrajudicial
foreclosure apply in the case because the said law was applicable only to the publication of
PERALTA

Notices of Sale in extrajudicial foreclosures of mortgage conducted by a Sheriff and not by a
Notary public.


EQUITABLE PCI BANK, INC. v. DNG REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 168672, August 8, 2010
J. Peralta

Issuance and implementation of a writ of possession are not suspended if foreclosure of
mortgage and issuance of new certificate of title in purchaser's name preceded the issuance of
a Stay Order and appointment of Rehabilitation Receiver.






GABRIEL SINGSON, ET. AL. v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 159355, August 9, 2010
J. Peralta

Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution provides that no elective or appointive public
officer or employee shall receive additional, double or indirect compensation, unless specifically
authorized by law. The provision, however, does not apply in the case as there was no double
compensation to the petitioners. The questioned resolutions of the Monetary Board are valid
corporate acts of petitioners that became the bases for granting them additional monthly
representation and transportation allowance (RATA), as members of the Board of Directors of
Philippine International Convention Center Inc. (PICCI), a government corporation whose sole
stockholder is the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas. Indeed, aside from the RATA that they have
been receiving from the BSP, the grant of RATA to each of the petitioners for every board
meeting they attended, in their capacity as members of the Board of Directors of PICCI, in
addition to their per diem, does not violate the constitutional proscription against double
compensation.

EQUITABLE PCI BANK v. ARCELITO B. TAN
G.R. No. 165339, August 23, 2010
J. Peralta

The diligence required of banks is more than that of a good father of a family. In every
case, the depositor expects the bank to treat his account with the utmost fidelity, whether such
account consists only of a few hundred pesos or of millions. The bank must record every single
transaction accurately, down to the last centavo, and as promptly as possible. This has to be
done if the account is to reflect at any given time the amount of money the depositor can
dispose of as he sees fit, confident that the bank will deliver it as and to whomever he directs.
The premature debiting of the postdated check by the bank which resulted to insufficiency of
funds that brought about the dishonor of two checks causing the electric supply to be cut-off and
affected business operations indicates the negligence of the bank. For its failure to exercise
extra-ordinary diligence, it should be made liable in the case.

ANAMER SALAZAR v, J.Y. BROTHERS MARKETING CORP.
G.R. No. 171998, October 20, 2010
PERALTA

J. Peralta

There are only two ways which indicate the presence of novation and thereby produce
the effect of extinguishing an obligation by another which substitutes the same. First, novation
must be explicitly stated and declared in unequivocal terms as novation is never presumed.
Secondly, the old and the new obligations must be incompatible on every point.

In the instant case, there was no express agreement that J.Y. Brothers Marketing
Corporation's acceptance of the Solid Bank check will discharge Anamer Salazar from liability.
Neither is there incompatibility because both checks were given precisely to terminate a single
obligation arising from Salazar's purchase of cavans of rice. Further, the acceptance of the Solid
Bank check, a non-negotiable check being a crossed check, which replaced the dishonored
Prudential Bank check, a negotiable check, is not a new obligation that would justify novation.
The Court has taken judicial cognizance of the practice that a check with two parallel lines in the
upper left hand corner means that it could only be deposited and could not be converted into
cash. Thus, the effect of crossing a check relates to the mode of payment, meaning that the
drawer had intended the check for deposit only by the rightful person. The change in the mode
of paying the obligation was not a change in any of the objects or principal condition of the
contract for novation to take place.

PHIL. PHARMAWEALTH, INC. v. PFIZER, INC. AND PFIZER (PHIL.) INC.
G.R. No. 167715, November 17, 2010
J. Peralta

A patentee shall have the exclusive right to make, use and sell the patented machine,
article or product, and to use the patented process for the purpose of industry or commerce,
throughout the territory of the Philippines for the term of the patent; and such making, using, or
selling by any person without the authorization of the patentee constitutes infringement of the
patent. It is clear from the provision of law that the exclusive right of a patentee to make, use
and sell a patented product, article or process exists only during the term of the patent. After the
lapse of such period as allowed by law then the right also ceases.

Since the IP Code and the Rules and Regulations are bereft of any remedy regarding
interlocutory orders of the IPO-BLA, the only remedy available to Pfizer is to apply the Rules
and Regulations suppletorily. Under the Rules, a petition for certiorari to the CA is the proper
remedy. This is consistent with the Rules of Court. Thus, the CA had jurisdiction.


2011

PRINCE TRANSPORT, INC. AND MR. RENATO CLAROS
v. DIOSDADO GARCIA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 167291. January 12, 2011
J. Peralta

A settled formulation of the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil is that when two
business enterprises are owned, conducted and controlled by the same parties, both law and
equity will, when necessary to protect the rights of third parties, disregard the legal fiction that
these two entities are distinct and treat them as identical or as one and the same. In the present
case, it may be true that Lubas is a single proprietorship and not a corporation. However,
PERALTA

petitioners attempt to isolate themselves from and hide behind the supposed separate and
distinct personality of Lubas so as to evade their liabilities is precisely what the classical
doctrine of piercing the veil of corporate entity seeks to prevent and remedy.

JOSE MARCEL PANLILIO, ET AL.
v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ETC., PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SOCIAL
SECURITY SYSTEM
G.R. No. 173846. February 2, 2011
J. Peralta

A principal feature of corporate rehabilitation is the suspension of claims against the
distressed corporation. The term "claim" has been construed to refer to debts or demands of a
pecuniary nature, or the assertion to have money paid. Consequently, the filing of the case for
violation of Section 28 (h) of the SSS law, in relation to Article 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal
Code, or Estafa is not a "claim" that can be enjoined within the purview of P.D. No. 902-A. This
is becausethe prosecution of the officers of the corporation has no bearing on the pending
rehabilitation of the corporation, especially since they are charged in their individual capacities.
Such being the case, the purpose of the law for the issuance of the stay order is not
compromised, since the appointed rehabilitation receiver can still fully discharge his functions as
mandated by law.

SKECHERS U.S.A., INC. v. INTER PACIFIC INDUSTRIAL TRADING CORP., ET AL.
G.R. No. 164321, March 28, 2011
J. Peralta

The essential element of infringement under R.A. No. 8293 is that the infringing mark is
likely to cause confusion. In determining similarity and likelihood of confusion, jurisprudence has
developed tests- the Dominancy Test and the Holistic or Totality Test. The Dominancy Test
focuses on the similarity of the prevalent or dominant features of the competing trademarks that
might cause confusion, mistake, and deception in the mind of the purchasing public. In contrast,
the Holistic or Totality Test necessitates a consideration of the entirety of the marks as applied
to the products, including the labels and packaging, in determining confusing similarity. The
discerning eye of the observer must focus not only on the predominant words, but also on the
other features appearing on both labels.
Even if not all the details are identical, as long as the general appearance of the two
products are such that any ordinary purchaser would be deceived, the imitator should be liable.
While there may be dissimilarities between the appearances of the shoes, to this Courts mind
such dissimilarities do not outweigh the stark and blatant similarities in their general features.

MEGAN SUGAR CORPORATION v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOILO, BR. 68,
DUMANGAS, ILOILO; NEW FRONTIER SUGAR CORP., ET AL.
G.R. NO. 170352, June 1, 2011
J. Peralta
PERALTA


As a rule, acts of a corporate officer in behalf of the corporation as authorized by the
BOD bind the corporation. In the same vein, lack of proof of any authority given doesn't affect
the corporation. However this rule admits of an exception which is the rule on apparent
authority, or what is sometimes referred to as the "holding out" theory, or doctrine of ostensible
agency. The liability is imposed not as the result of the reality of a contractual relationship, but
rather because of the actions of a principal or an employer in somehow misleading the public
into believing that the relationship or the authority exists. With the case of MEGAN, it had all the
opportunity to repudiate the authority of Atty. Sabig since all motions, pleadings and court
orders were sent to MEGANs office. However, MEGAN never questioned the acts of Atty.
Sabig and even took time and effort to forward all the court documents to him. Hence, applying
the doctrine of apparent authority MEGAN is now estopped in denying Atty. Sabig's authority.

2012

LISAM ENTERPRISES, INC. represented by LOLITA A. SORIANO, and LOLITA A.
SORIANO v. BANCO DE ORO UNIBANK, INC. (formerly PHILIPPINE COMMERCIAL
INTERNATIONAL BANK),
*
LILIAN S. SORIANO, ESTATE OF LEANDRO A. SORIANO, JR.,
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF LEGASPI CITY, and JESUS L. SARTE
G.R. No. 143264, April 23, 2012
J. Peralta

A complaint for the annulment of mortgage was filed but failed to state a cause of action.
The admission of the amended complaint was sought before trial commencement. Amendments
are generally favored, it would have been more fitting for the trial court to extend such liberality
towards LEI by admitting the amended complaint which was filed before the order dismissing
the original complaint became final and executory.

The complaint is for annulment of mortgage with the mortgagee bank as one of the
defendants, thus jurisdiction over said complaint is lodged with the regular courts because the
mortgagee bank has no intra-corporate relationship with the stockholders. There can also be no
forum shopping, because there is no identity of issues. The issue being threshed out in the SEC
case is the due execution, authenticity or validity of board resolutions and other documents
used to facilitate the execution of the mortgage, while the issue in the case filed by LEI with the
RTC is the validity of the mortgage itself executed between the bank and the corporation,
purportedly represented by the spouses Leandro and Lilian Soriano, the President and
Treasurer of petitioner LEI, respectively. Thus, there is no reason to dismiss the complaint in
this case.
PERALTA



AGRIPINO V. MOLINA v. PACIFIC PLANS, INC.
G.R. No. 165476, August 15, 2011
J. Peralta

Upon finality of the Court's decision, a writ of execution as a matter of right will be
issued. The payment of legal interest becomes a necessary consequence of the finality of the
Court's Decision, because reckoned from that time, the said Decision becomes a judgment for
money which, under established jurisprudence, earns interest at the rate of 12% per annum.
However, as exception to the rule, a writ of execution by virtue of a final and executory judgment
cannot be implemented against a corporation undergoing rehabilitation proceedings. The Court
finds that all pending actions, including the execution of the judgment in favor of petitioner,
should be suspended pending termination of the rehabilitation proceedings. An essential
function of corporate rehabilitation is the mechanism of suspension of all actions and claims
against the distressed corporation, which operates upon the due appointment of a management
committee or rehabilitation receiver. To allow execution would be contrary to the purpose of
rehabilitation proceeding which is to restore the corporation to its previous position.


LEGASPI TOWERS 300, INC., LILIA MARQUINEZ PALANCA, ROSANNA D. IMAI, GLORIA
DOMINGO AND RAY VINCENTv. AMELIA P. MUER, SAMUEL M. TANCHOCO, ROMEO
TANKIANG, RUDEL PANGANIBAN, DOLORES AGBAYANI, ARLENEDAL A. YASUMA,
GODOFREDO M. CAGUIOA AND EDGARDO M. SALANDANAN
G.R. No. 170783, June 18, 2012
J. Peralta

Petitioners seek the nullification of the election of the BOD for the years 2004-2005,
composed of herein respondents, who pushed through with the election even if petitioners had
adjourned the meeting allegedly due to lack of quorum. Petitioners are the injured party, whose
rights to vote and to be voted were directly affected by the election of the new set of BOD. The
cause of action devolves on the petitioners, not the condominium corporation, which did not
have the right to vote. Hence, the complaint for nullification of the election is a direct action by
petitioners, who were the members of the BOD of the corporation before the election, against
respondents, who are the newly elected BOD. Under the circumstances, the derivative suit filed
by petitioners in behalf of the condominium corporation in the Second Amended Complaint is
improper.


PARK HOTEL, J'S PLAYHOUSE BURGOS CORP., INC., AND/OR GREGG HARBUTT,
GENERAL MANAGER, ATTY. ROBERTO ENRIQUEZ, PRESIDENT, AND BILL PERCY v.
MANOLO SORIANO, LESTER GONZALES, AND YOLANDA BADILLA
G.R. No. 171118, September 10, 2012
J. Peralta

While a corporation may exist for any lawful purpose, the law will regard it as an
association of persons or, in case of two corporations, merge them into one, when its corporate
legal entity is used as a cloak for fraud or illegality. This is the doctrine of piercing the veil of
corporate fiction. Nonetheless, although the corporate veil between two corporations cannot be
PERALTA

pierced, it does not necessarily mean that the corporate officers of such corporations are
exempt from liability. Verily, a corporation, being a juridical entity, may act only through its
directors, officers and employees. Obligations incurred by them, while acting as corporate
agents, are not their personal liability but the direct accountability of the corporation they
represent. However, corporate officers may be deemed solidarily liable with the corporation for
the termination of employees if they acted with malice or bad faith.


PARAMOUNT INSURANCE CORPORATION v. SPOUSES YVES AND MARIA TERESA
REMONDEULAZ
G.R. No. 173773, November 28, 2012
J. Peralta

The theft clause of a comprehensive motor vehicle insurance policy has been
interpreted by the Court in several cases to cover situations like (1) when one takes the motor
vehicle of another without the latters consent even if the motor vehicle is later returned, there is
theft there being intent to gain as the use of the thing unlawfully taken constitutes gain or (2)
when there is taking of a vehicle by another person without the permission or authority from the
owner thereof.

However, theft and estafa are sometimes used interchangeably. The principal distinction
between the two crimes is that in theft the thing is taken while in estafa the accused receives the
property and converts it to his own use or benefit. Nonetheless, there may be theft even if the
accused has possession of the property. If he was entrusted only with the material or physical
(natural) or de facto possession of the thing, his misappropriation of the same constitutes theft,
but if he has the juridical possession of the thing, his conversion of the same constitutes
embezzlement or estafa.


2013

ALPHA INSURANCE AND SURETY CO. v. ARSENIA SONIA CASTOR
G.R. No. 198174, September 02, 2013
J. Peralta

Contracts of insurance, like other contracts, are to be construed according to the sense
and meaning of the terms which the parties themselves have used. If such terms are clear and
unambiguous, they must be taken and understood in their plain, ordinary and popular sense.
PERALTA

Accordingly, in interpreting the exclusions in an insurance contract, the terms used specifying
the excluded classes therein are to be given their meaning as understood in common speech.

A contract of insurance is a contract of adhesion. So, when the terms of the insurance
contract contain limitations on liability, courts should construe them in such a way as to preclude
the insurer from non-compliance with his obligation.


REPUBLIC GAS CORPORATION (REGASCO), et al.v. PETRON CORPORATION,
PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION AND SHELL INTERNATIONAL
PETROLEUM COMPANY, LIMITED
G.R. No. 194062, June 17, 2013
J. Peralta

The mere unauthorized use of a container bearing a registered trademark in connection
with the sale, distribution or advertising of goods or services which is likely to cause confusion
among the buyers or consumers can be considered as trademark infringement. On the other
hand, the gravamen of the offense of unfair competition is the passing off (or palming off) of
goods by using imitative devices on the general appearance of the goods which misleads
prospective purchasers. Petitioners, who are the officers of REGACO Corporation, being in
direct control and supervision in the management and conduct of the affairs of the corporation,
must have known or are aware that the corporation is engaged in the act of refilling LPG
cylinders bearing the marks of the respondents without authority from the latter which, under the
circumstances, could probably constitute the crimes of trademark infringement and unfair
competition. The existence of the corporate entity does not shield from prosecution the
corporate agent who knowingly and intentionally caused the corporation to commit a crime.


MEDICAL PLAZA MAKATI CONDOMINIUM CORPORATION v. ROBERT CULLEN
G.R. No. 181416, November 11, 2013
J. Peralta

A dispute between a condominium corporation and a registered condominium owner
involving non-payment of association dues and assessments and the subsequent filing of
damages by the latter against the former is an intra-corporate controversy as it obviously arose
from the intra-corporate relations between the parties, and the questions involved pertain to
their rights and obligations under the Corporation Code and matters relating to the regulation of
the corporation. Jurisdiction over this kind of controversy is lodged with the RTC acting as a
special commercial court.




CENTURY CHINESE MEDICINE CO., et al.v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND LING NA
NAU
G.R. No. 188526, November 11, 2013
J. Peralta

Where the Search and Seizure Warrants are applied for in anticipation of criminal
actions for violation of the intellectual property rights under RA 8293, otherwise known as the
Intellectual Property Code, the Rules on the Issuance of the Search and Seizure in Civil Actions
PERALTA

for Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights does not apply. What is applicable is the rules as
provided under Rule 126 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. A core requisite before a warrant
shall validly issue is the existence of a probable cause, meaning the existence of such facts
and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in
the place to be searched."


WESTWIND SHIPPING CORPORATION v. UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC./
ORIENT FREIGHT INTERNATIONAL INC. v. UCPB GENERAL INSURANCE CO., INC.
G.R. No. 2002289/G.R. No. 200314, November 25, 2013
J. Peralta

The liability of a common carrier does not cease by mere transfer of custody of the cargo
to the arrastre operator. Like the duty of seaworthiness, the duty of care of the cargo is non-
delegable, and the carrier is accordingly responsible for the acts of the master, the crew, the
stevedore, and his other agents. The fact that a consignee is required to furnish persons to
assist in unloading a shipment may not relieve the carrier of its duty as to such unloading. It is
settled in maritime law jurisprudence that cargoes while being unloaded generally remain under
the custody of the carrier. In the same vein, a customs broker cannot escape liability by claiming
that it cannot be considered a common carrier. With transportation of goods being an integral
part of its business, a customs broker may be regarded as a common carrier. Article 1732 which
defines what a common carrier does not distinguish between one whose principal business
activity is the carrying of goods and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity.


REMEDIAL LAW
2009

RODOLFO B. GARCIA ET AL. v. PRIMO C. MIRO ETC., ET AL
G.R. No. 167409,March 20, 2009
J. Peralta

Information was filed against Judge Rodolfo Garcia charging him with reckless
Imprudence resulting to homicide before MCTC.

The supervision over all inferior courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of
the Court of Appeals to the lowest ranked court employee, is vested by the Constitution in the
Supreme Court.However, that prerogative only extends to administrative supervision. As such,
the Ombudsman cannot encroach upon this Courts task to oversee judges and court personnel
and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of
the land.

The criminal case filed against petitioner was in no way related to the performance of his
duties as a judge. The filing of the criminal charges against the petitioner before the MCTC was
warranted by the above circumstances.

CAYETANO A. TEJANO, JR. v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN
PERALTA

G.R. No. 161778, April 7, 2009,
J. Peralta

On March 17, 2003, Respondent Sandiganbayan rendered a decision finding the
petitioner guilty of violating Sec 3 (e) of RA3019. On March 25, 2003, petitioner filed a motion
for reconsideration which was however, denied by the Sandiganbayan on a resolution dated
September 24, 2003. On October 13, 2003, instead of filing an appeal petitioner filed a Motion
for New Trial.

Section 1, Rule 121 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that "the remedies of
motion for reconsideration and motion for new trial may be availed of at any time before a
judgment of conviction becomes final, which is within fifteen (15) days from the promulgation of
the judgment."
Petitioner had already availed of a motion for reconsideration, which was denied by respondent
Sandiganbayan. His next remedy is set forth under Section 7 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by
R.A. No. 8249, which provides that decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be
appealable to the Supreme Court by petition for review on certiorari raising pure questions of
law in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOVEN DE GRANO ET AL.
G.R. No. 167710 ,June 5, 2009
J. Peralta

Verification and certification portion of the petition was signed only by counsel and not by
the aggrieved party. The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping
requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same. To merit the Courts
consideration, petitioners here must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the
certification. The petitioners must convince the court that the outright dismissal of the petition
would defeat the administration of justice.

Thus, petitioner need only show that there was reasonable cause for the failure to sign
the certification against forum shopping, and that the outright dismissal of the petition would
defeat the administration of justice. , it was out of extreme fear that private complainant failed to
personally sign the certification. It is to be noted that when Armando and Joven were acquitted,
Teresita was already out of the witness protection program and was in hiding in the Visayas. As
such, she could not travel to Manila to personally sign the petition


CARMELO LAZATIN, ET AL. v. HON. ANIANO A. DISIERTO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 147097. June 5, 2009,
J. Peralta

A complaint-affidavit was filed charging Petitioners with Illegal use of public funds. The
Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau (EPIB) recommended the filing twenty-eight
(28) Informations against the petitioner. However, upon reconsideration the OSP ordered the
dismissal of the complaint against the petitioners The Ombudsman, however, ordered the Office
of the Legal Affairs (OLA) to review the OSP Resolution. The Ombudsman adopted the OLA
Memorandum and ordered to proceed with the trial of the cases against petitioners.

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In their petition for certiorari to the SC, petitioners claimed that Ombudsman's
disapproval of the OSP Resolution recommending dismissal of the cases is based on
misapprehension of facts, speculations, surmises and conjectures. The question is really
whether the Ombudsman correctly ruled that there was enough evidence to support a finding of
probable cause. That issue, however, pertains to a mere error of judgment. It must be stressed
that certiorari is a remedy meant to correct only errors of jurisdiction, not errors of judgment. The
issue of whether the evidence indeed supports a finding of probable cause would necessitate an
examination and re-evaluation of the evidence upon which the Ombudsman based its
disapproval of the OSP Resolution. Hence, the Petition for Certiorari should not be given due
course.

ENRIQUE V. VIUDEZ v. HON BASILIO R. GABO, JR. ETC., ET AL.
G.R. No. 152889,June 5, 2009
J. Peralta

Petitioner filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the trial court, including the
implementation of a warrant of arrest, pending resolution of a petition for review filed with the
Secretary of Justice concerning a finding of probable cause.

The function of the judge to issue a warrant of arrest upon the determination of probable
cause is exclusive; thus, the consequent implementation of a warrant of arrest cannot be
deferred pending the resolution of a petition for review by the Secretary of Justice as to the
finding of probable cause, a function that is executive in nature. To defer the implementation of
the warrant of arrest would be an encroachment on the exclusive prerogative of the judge.

JESSE Y YAP v. HON. MONICO G. CABALES, ET AL.
G.R. No. 159186. June 5, 2009
J. Peralta

Spouses Mirabueno and Dimalanta filed separate civil actions for collection of sum of
money, damages against the petitioner with the RTC. Likewise, the Office of the City Prosecutor
filed several informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against the petitioner with the MTCC.
Petitioner prayed that the proceedings in the criminal cases be suspended until the civil cases
pending before the RTC were finally resolved.

Prejudicial question has two essential elements: (i) the civil action involves an issue
similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (ii) the resolution of
such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may proceed. The issue in the criminal
cases is whether the petitioner is guilty of violating B.P. 22, while in the civil case, it is whether
the private respondents are entitled to collect from the petitioner the sum or the value of the
checks that they have rediscounted from Evelyn. The resolution of the issue raised in the civil
action is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal cases against
him, and there is no necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the
criminal cases.

GLEN PASCUAL, ET AL. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 162286, June 5, 2009,
J. Peralta
PERALTA


The petitioners were found guilty of homicide by the RTC, when their motion for
reconsideration was denied by the RTC they filed a notice of appeal. The CA required the
counsel of the petitioners to file the appellants brief. However, the counsel of the petitioners
failed to file required brief. Thus, the appeal of the petitioners was deemed abandoned and
dismissed, pursuant to Section 8, Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, by the
CA. As a consequence an Entry of Judgment was made.

It is a well-settled rule that the client is bound by the counsel's conduct, negligence, and
mistakes in handling the case; and the client cannot be heard to complain that the result might
have been different had his lawyer proceeded differently. Although there is no doubt that
petitioners' counsel was negligent, such negligence was not so gross because it still afforded
petitioners the necessary remedy, provided that they themselves were not negligent. Hence, the
negligence of their counsel binds them.

RODOLFO B. ARCEO v. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM
G.R. No. 162374, June 18, 2009
J. Peralta

Petitioner claimed for disability benefits under PD 626, he insisted that his adenoma was
caused by the stress he suffered from being a Prosecutor. GSIS however denied his claim for
benefit. When the case was elevated to the Employees' Compensation Commission, it upheld
the denial of the benefits of the petitioner. On appeal to the CA, petitioner put forth the allegation
that his claimed ailment was not only adrenal adenoma, but also cardiovascular disease.

It is hornbook principle that new issues cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.
Petitioners failure to emphasize before the GSIS and the ECC the issue of whether he may be
compensated for his alleged cardiovascular disease is fatal to his case, for by this omission, he
is deemed to have waived such issue.

CRISTINA F. REILLO, ET AL. v. GALICANO E. SAN JOSE
G.R. No. 166393, June 18, 2009
J. Peralta

Respondent filed an action for the annulment of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of
Estate Among Heirs with Waiver of Rights executed by petitioners and annulment of title on the
ground that petitioners stated in the said Deed that they are the legitimate descendants and sole
heirs of the spouses Quiterio and Antonina. Petitioners denied in their Answer that the Deed
was falsified, they, however, admitted respondents allegation that spouses Quiterio and
Antonina had 5 children, thus, supporting respondents claim that petitioners are not the sole
heirs of the deceased spouses. Respondents filed a motion for judgment on pleadings.

Where a motion for judgment on the pleadings is filed, the essential question is whether
there are issues generated by the pleadings. In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings,
there is no ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the defending partys answer to raise
an issue. The answer would fail to tender an issue, of course, if it does not deny the material
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allegations in the complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse partys pleadings
by confessing the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all.

Considering that petitioners already admitted that respondents Galicano, Victoria,
Catalina and Maribeth are the children and grandchild, respectively, of the spouses Quiterio and
Antonina, who were the original registered owners of the subject property, and thus excluding
respondents from the deed of settlement of the subject property, there is no more genuine issue
between the parties generated by the pleadings, thus, the RTC committed no reversible error in
rendering the judgment on the pleadings.

LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RENE RALLA BELISTA
G.R. No. 164631, June 26, 2009
J. Peralta

Unsatisfied with the valuation of just compensation over the agricultural lands by the
DAR and RARAD-V. LBP filed a petition for determination of just compensation with the RTC.
The RTC, however, dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies as
provided under the 2003 DARAB Rules of Procedure.

Under Section 50, DAR has primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian
reform matters and exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the DA and the DENR.
Further exception to the DAR's original and exclusive jurisdiction are all petitions for the
determination of just compensation to landowners and the prosecution of all criminal offenses
under RA No. 6657, which are within the jurisdiction of the RTC sitting as a Special Agrarian
Court. Thus, jurisdiction on just compensation cases for the taking of lands under RA No. 6657
is vested in the courts.

VALERIANO F. NUES v. JUDGE FRANCISCO B. IBAY, ETC.
AM. No. RTJ-06-1984 ,June 30, 2009.
J. Peralta

Respondent Judge Ibay cited the Valeriano Nunez in contempt and ordered him to be
detained because the latter parked at the parking space allotted to the respondent judge.

Respondent Judge failed to substantiate his allegation, the Court does not see how the
improper parking by complainant, or by a certain Oscar dela Cruz, could, even in the remotest
manner, disrupt the speedy administration of justice. At most, it would cause respondent Judge
Inconvenience or annoyance, but still, this does not fall under any of the aforementioned acts for
which a person could be cited for contempt. Neither does it appear from the records, nor from
the evidence presented, that complainant intended any disrespect toward respondent Judge. In
fact, upon being summoned, complainant immediately apologized for his mistake.

ARTHUR ZARATE v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BR. GINGOOG CITY, MISAMIS ORIENTAL
G.R. No. 152263. July 3, 2009
J. Peralta

PERALTA

On April 1, 1994 at 10 am, Guiritan was stabbed by Zarate. On April 2 at 12:40 am
,Guiritan was brought to the hospital and regained consciousness the following morning after
the operation. In the morning of April 2, SP01 Alecha took the ante-mortem of Guiritan. Guiritan
stated that it was Zarate who stabbed him.

A declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is deemed as part of the
res gestae when (1) the principal act, the res gestae is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements
were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements concern
the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.

SPO1 Alecha testified that he had to put his ear near Guiritans mouth so that he could
hear Guiritans answers as he was catching his breath. The foregoing circumstances reveal that
the statement was taken a few hours after the operation when he regained consciousness. His
statements were still the reflex product of immediate sensual impressions so that it was the
shocking event speaking through him, and he did not have the opportunity to concoct or contrive
the story. Thus, his statement is admissible as part of the res gestae.

MANDY COMMODITIES CO., INC. v. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL BANK OF
CHINA
G.R. No. 166734, July 3, 2009
J. Peralta

The RTC granted the Ex parte petition for the issuance of a writ of possession. The RTC
granted the petition and issued a writ possession. Petitioner sought the annulment of the orders
of the trial court through Rule 47.

The remedy of annulment was not the proper remedy to set aside the orders of the trial
court. To start with, the remedy of petition for annulment of judgment, final order or resolution
under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is an extraordinary one inasmuch as it is available only
where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other remedies can no
longer be availed of through no fault of the petitioner. The relief it affords is equitable in
character as it strikes at the core of finality of such judgments and orders.

HEIRS OF EMILIANO SAN PEDRO, ET AL. v. PABLITO GARCIA AND JOSE CALDERON
G.R. No. 166988 ,July 3, 2009
J. Peralta

The Provincial Adjudicator rendered a decision on September 20, 1995. Notwithstanding
that petitioners filed a motion for extension of time, no motion for reconsideration or an appeal
was filed by them. Petitioners only filed their Notice of Appeal on February 5, 1997. Thus, said
appeal was filed approximately after the lapse of one year and five months from the date of the
Decision of the Provincial Adjudicator.

This Court has not in the past allowed a liberal application of the rules of appeal.
However, the same applies only in exceptionally meritorious cases. In the case at bar, there is
no showing of a factual setting which warrants a liberal application of the rules on the period of
appeal. To stress, petitioners filed their Notice of Appeal only after one year and five months
from the time the Provincial Adjudicator rendered its Decision. Such a delay is unacceptable.
PERALTA

Moreover, what makes matters worse is that petitioners offered no explanation or excuse for
this Court to consider as to why it took them so long to file their appeal.

PETRONILA MAYLEM v. CARMELITA ELLANO AND ANTONIA MORCIENTO
G.R. No. 162721,July 13, 2009
J. Peralta

Abad was issued emancipation patents in his name on December 18, 1987. Abad
agreed to allow the Petitioner to have the possession of the property for one (1) year but after
the lapse of the period, petitioner refused to surrender possession despite repeated
demands. Abad filed on December 5, 1997 a Complaint for recovery of possession with the
Provincial Adjudicator of the DAR.

As to petitioners claim that respondents cause of action had prescribed, let it be
stressed that since respondents have been issued Emancipation Patent No. A-042463 and TCT
No. ET-5184 as early as December 18, 1987, they can no longer be considered tenants or
lessees, but owners of the subject landholding. Obviously, Section 38 of R.A. No. 3844 on
prescription finds no application to their case.

ANA DE GUIA SAN PEDRO, ET AL. v. HON. FATIMA G. ASDALA ET AL.
G.R. No. 164560, July 22, 2009
J. Peralta

Private respondents filed with the MeTC of Quezon City a complaint for Accion
Reivindicatoria, Quieting of Title and Damaged, with Prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
against the petitioners. The property involved is in Quezon City and with an assessed value not
exceeding 50,000 pesos.

R.A. No. 7691 expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts to include
"all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein
where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not
exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,
attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs." Thus, under the present law, original jurisdiction
over cases the subject matter of which involves "title to, possession of, real property or any
interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between the first and second level
courts, with the assessed value of the real property involved as the benchmark. This
amendment was introduced to "unclog the overloaded dockets of the RTCs which would result
in the speedier administration of justice."

ERNA CASALS, ET AL. v. TAYUD GOLF AND COUNTRY CLUB, ET AL.
G.R. No. 183105,July 22, 2009
J. Peralta

Defendant is the registered owner of at least twenty-seven (27) properties included in
the Affidavit of Quitclaim and Waiver. The rationale for treating all the co-owners of a property
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as indispensable parties in a suit involving the co-owned property is explained in Arcelona v.
Court of Appeals:

As held by the Supreme Court, were the courts to permit an action in ejectment to be
maintained by a person having merely an undivided interest in any given tract of land, a
judgment in favor of the defendants would not be conclusive as against the other co-owners not
parties to the suit, and thus, the defendant in possession of the property might be harassed by
as many succeeding actions of ejectment, as there might be co-owners of the title asserted
against him. The purpose of this provision was to prevent multiplicity of suits by requiring the
person asserting a right against the defendant to include with him, either as co-plaintiffs or as
co-defendants, all persons standing in the same position, so that the whole matter in dispute
may be determined once and for all in one litigation.

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. SPS. LORENZO L. LAOHOO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 151973 ,July 23, 2009
J. Peralta

Petitioner failed to timely file a notice of appeal. Since the appeal was not filed within the
reglementary period of 15 days as provided by the Rules, the appeal is dismissible for having
been filed out of time. The approval of a notice of appeal becomes the ministerial duty of the
lower court, provided the appeal is filed on time. If the notice of appeal is, however, filed beyond
the reglementary period, the trial court may exercise its power to refuse or disallow the same in
accordance with Section 13 of Rule 41 of the Rules. Let it not be overlooked that the timeliness
of an appeal is a jurisdictional caveat that not even this Court can trifle with.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES REPRESENTED BY THE NATIONAL POWER
CORPORATION, v. SPOUSES RUPERTO LIBUNAO ET AL.
G.R. No. 166553.July 30, 2009
Peralta, J.

Petitioner's claim that it should not be ordered to pay interest to be reckoned from the
date of taking until the full payment of the value of the subject property.

Section 10, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 10. Rights of plaintiff after judgment and payment. - Upon payment by the plaintiff
to the defendant of the compensation fixed by the judgment, with legal interest thereon
from the taking of the possession of the property, or after tender to him of the amount so
fixed and payment of the costs, the plaintiff shall have the right to enter upon the
property expropriated and to appropriate it for the public use or purpose defined in the
judgment, or to retain it should he have taken immediate possession thereof under the
provision of section 2 hereof. x x x

Clearly, respondents are entitled to the payment of legal interest on the compensation
for the subject lands from the time of the taking of their possession up to the time that full
payment is made by petitioner. In accordance with jurisprudence, the legal interest allowed in
payment of just compensation for lands expropriated for public use is six percent (6%) per
annum.
PERALTA


ATTY. ROGELIO E. SARSABA v. FE VDA DE TE, REPRESENTED BY HER ATTORNEY-IN-
FACT FAUSTINO CASTAEDA
G.R. No. 175910 ,July 30, 2009
Peralta, J.

Fe Vda. de Te, represented by her attorney-in-fact, Faustino Castaeda, filed with the
RTC a Complaint for recovery of motor vehicle, damages with prayer for the delivery of the truck
pendente lite against petitioner, Sereno, Lavarez and the NLRC of Davao City. During the
pendency of the case before the RTC , Fe vda. De Te passed away.

When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the Rules of
Court require a substitution of the deceased. The rule on substitution of parties is governed by
Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended. The rule on substitution
by heirs is not a matter of jurisdiction, but a requirement of due process. The rule on substitution
was crafted to protect every party's right to due process. It was designed to ensure that the
deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit through his heirs or the
duly appointed legal representative of his estate. Moreover, non-compliance with the Rules
results in the denial of the right to due process for the heirs who, though not duly notified of the
proceedings, would be substantially affected by the decision rendered therein. Thus, it is only
when there is a denial of due process, as when the deceased is not represented by any legal
representative or heir, that the court nullifies the trial proceedings and the resulting judgment
therein.

In the case before us, it appears that respondent's counsel did not make any
manifestation before the RTC as to her death. In fact, he had actively participated in the
proceedings. Neither had he shown any proof that he had been retained by respondent's legal
representative or any one who succeeded her. However, such failure of counsel would not lead
us to invalidate the proceedings that have long taken place before the RTC.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ELEGIO AN
G.R. No. 169870,August 4, 2009
J. Peralta

Elegio An raped Conchita Maranan, a 21 year old woman with no formal education. The
RTC found that Conchita is a mental retardate and Elegio guilty of rape. Hence, he was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

While it is a settled rule that mental retardation can be proved by evidence other than
clinical evidence, it is, however, an equally settled doctrine that clinical evidence is necessary in
borderline cases when it is difficult to ascertain whether the victim is of a normal mind or is
suffering from a mild mental retardation. To Our mind, such clinical evidence is indispensable in
the present case considering that there is a difficulty in ascertaining the mental condition of
private complainant. To be sure, the mere fact that private complainant does not know how to
read and write, or to cook rice, or that she acts like a child are not conclusive indication that she
is a mental retardate. There are people who manifest the same behavior despite being perfectly
normal. In fact, even Dr. Artos recommended that private complainant be made to undergo
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further examination by a psychiatrist in order to come up with a better assessment of her mental
condition. To reiterate, knowledge by the appellant of the fact that private complainant is a
mental retardate would make him liable for qualified rape. Such being the case, the prosecution
must likewise prove beyond reasonable doubt that (1) private complainant is a mental retardate,
and (2) appellant knew of such mental condition. The failure of the prosecution to establish the
first renders the second immaterial. Therefore, in the absence of sufficient evidence to prove
that private complainant is a mental retardate, appellant cannot be convicted of qualified rape.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FERDINAND R. MARCOS II AND IMELDA R. MARCOS
G.R. Nos. 130371 &130855 , August 4, 2009,
J. Peralta

The RTC of Pasig granted letters of testamentary to respondents. Petitioner anchored its
opposition to the grant of letters testamentary to respondents, specifically on the following
grounds: (1) want of integrity, and (2) conviction of an offense involving moral turpitude.
Petitioner contends that respondents have been convicted of a number of cases and, hence,
should be characterized as one without integrity, or at the least, with questionable integrity.

There were eight cases filed against respondent Ferdinand Marcos II , four charges for
violation of Section 45 (failure to file income tax returns) and four charges for violation of Section
50 (non-payment of deficiency taxes) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 .The CA
acquitted respondent Ferdinand Marcos II of all the four charges for violation of Section 50 and
sustained his conviction for all the four charges for violation of Section 45. It, however, bears to
stress, that the CA only ordered respondent Marcos II to pay a fine for his failure to file his
income tax return. Moreover, and as admitted by petitioner, said decision is still pending appeal.

The "failure to file an income tax return" is not a crime involving moral turpitude as the mere
omission is already a violation regardless of the fraudulent intent or willfulness of the individual.
This conclusion is supported by the provisions of the NIRC as well as previous Court decisions
which show that with regard to the filing of an income tax return, the NIRC considers three
distinct violations: (1) a false return, (2) a fraudulent return with intent to evade tax, and (3)
failure to file a return.

ANTONIO NAVARRO v. METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY
G.R. No. 165697,August 4, 2009,
J. Peralta

In 1998, the properties of Antonio Navarro was judicially foreclosed by MBTC.MBTC
appeared to be the lone bidder hence a certificate of sale was issued in its favor. Eleven (11)
years later, Clarita Navarro filed before the RTC an action for the declaration of nullity of the real
estate mortgage and the foreclosure sale which was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-177.

The RTC dismissed on the ground of laches. MBTC elevated the case to the CA which
was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 55780.The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. The decision
attained finality because to reconsideration or appeal was filed. Subsequently, Clarita filed an
action for declaration of nullity of the TCTs covering the same properties and for reconveyance.

The principle of res judicata denotes that a final judgment or decree on the merits by a
court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies in all later
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suits on all points and matters determined in their former suit. It obtains where a court of
competent jurisdiction has rendered a final judgment or order on the merits of the case, which
operates as an absolute bar against a subsequent action for the same cause. A substantial
identity is necessary to warrant the application of the rule, and the addition or elimination of
some parties or the difference in form and nature of the two actions would not alter the
situation. In other words, when material facts or questions in issue in a former action were
conclusively settled by a judgment rendered therein, such facts or questions constitute res
judicata and may not be again litigated in a subsequent action between the same parties or their
privies regardless of the form of the latter.

The two cases successively instituted by Clarita were founded on the same claim and
would have called for the same set of or similar evidence to support them, then Civil Case No.
02-079 which is the subject of the present petitions may well be deemed already barred by the
dismissal of Civil Case No. 99-177.

RODRIGO SUMIRAN v. SPOUSES GENEROSO DAMASO AND EVA DAMASO
G.R. No. 162518, August 19, 2009
J. Peralta

On February 21, 2003, the RTC rendered a decision acquitting Generoso in the criminal
cases filed against him. but in the civil case against him he was ordered to pay Rodrigo
Sumiran. On March 6, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. On May 9, 2003, RTC
denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal
dated May 29, 2003, but it was denied for being filed out of time.

As early as 2005, the Court categorically declared in Neypes v. Court of Appeals that by
virtue of the power of the Supreme Court to amend, repeal and create new procedural rules in
all courts, the Court is allowing a fresh period of 15 days within which to file a notice of appeal in
the RTC, counted from receipt of the order dismissing or denying a motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration.

The "fresh period" rule announced in Neypes could retroactively apply in cases where
the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 14 September 2005 when Neypes was promulgated.
The general rule is that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and
undetermined at the time of their passage, there being no vested rights in the rules of
procedure. Amendments to procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as they do
not create new or remove vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or
confirmation of rights already existing.

Since this case was already pending in this Court at the time of promulgation of Neypes,
then, ineluctably, the Court must also apply the foregoing rulings to the present case. Petitioner
is entitled to a "fresh period" of 15 days counted from May 19, 2003, the date of petitioners
receipt of the Order denying his motion for reconsideration of the RTC Decision within which
to file his notice of appeal. Therefore, when he filed said notice on May 29, 2003, or only ten
(10) days after receipt of the Order denying his motion for reconsideration, his period to appeal
had not yet lapsed.

PERALTA

HENRY CHING TIU, ET AL. v. PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS
G.R. No. 151932, August 19, 2009
J. Peralta

PBCOM filed a complaint for collection against petitioners. Petitioners pointed out the
surety agreement attached to the complaint as Annexes A to A-2 were falsified because the
words In his personal capacity did not appear in the document went they signed the same and
were merely intercalated thereon. PBCOM then filed a Reply and Answer to Counterclaim with
Motion for Leave of Court to Substitute Annex "A" of the Complaint, wherein it attached the
duplicate original copy retrieved from the file of the notary public.

With respect to PBCOMs right to amend its complaint, including the documents
annexed thereto, after petitioners have filed their answer, Section 3, Rule 10 of the Rules of
Court specifically allows amendment by leave of court. The said Section states:
SECTION 3. Amendments by leave of court. Except as provided in the next preceding section,
substantial amendments may be made only upon leave of court. But such leave may be refused
if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to delay. Orders of the court upon
the matters provided in this section shall be made upon motion filed in court, and after notice to
the adverse party, and an opportunity to be heard.

In the present case, there was no fraudulent intent on the part of PBCOM in submitting
the altered surety agreement. In fact, the bank admitted that it was a mistake on their part to
have submitted it in the first place instead of the original agreement. It also admitted that,
through inadvertence, the copy that was attached to the complaint was the copy wherein the
words "IN HIS PERSONAL CAPACITY" were inserted to conform to the banks standard
practice. This alteration was made without the knowledge of the notary public. PBCOMs
counsel had no idea that what it submitted was the altered document, thereby necessitating the
substitution of the surety agreement with the original thereof, in order that the case would be
judiciously resolved

EMCOR, INCORPORATED v. MA. LOURDES D. SIENES
G.R. No. 152101,September 8, 2009,
J. Peralta

On May 27, 1998, the Labor Arbiter dismissed case for illegal dismissal filed by the
respondent. Respondent filed an appeal with the NLRC. In a Decision dated November 16,
1998, the NLRC dismissed the appeal and affirmed the Labor Arbiters decision. Respondent
received the NLRC decision on December 2, 1998.Respondent received the NLRC decision on
December 2, 1998 and filed her motion for reconsideration on December 8, 1998. The NLRC
denied the motion for reconsideration, which respondent received on January 25, 1999. Thus,
she had only 54 days, i.e., until March 20, 1999, to file the petition for certiorari with the CA, in
consonance with Circular No. 39-98, which contained the amendments to Section 4, Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which was in effect when the petition was filed.

PERALTA

Respondent filed the petition on March 25, 1999 thus, the petition was indeed filed out of
time. However, on September 1, 2000, A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC took effect, amending Section 4,
Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, whereby the 60-day period within which to file the
petition shall be counted from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration, if one is
filed. We ruled that A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, being a curative statute, should be applied
retroactively. Thus, the petition, which was filed on March 25, 1999, was timely filed as provided
under A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC. Although the CA erroneously found that the petition was filed only
on March 29, 1999 and thus the same was not timely filed even under A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC, it
nonetheless gave due course to the petition based on the merit of the case. We have held that
the application of technical rules of procedure may be relaxed to serve the demands of
substantial justice, particularly in labor cases, because they must be decided according to
justice and equity and the substantial merits of the controversy. However, as we have discussed
above, the petition was timely filed under A.M. No. 00-2-03-SC.

CAROLINA R. JAVIER v. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. 147026-27 ,September 11, 2009
J. Peralta

RA 8047 otherwise known as Book Publishing Industry Development Act", provide for
the creation of National Book Development Board (NBDB), which shall be under the
administration and supervision of the Office of the President .Petitioner was appointed to the
NBDB as a private sector representative. Two (2) information were filed before the
Sandiganbayan charging the petitioner with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 and for
Malversation of public funds.

Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector to sit as a member of the
NBDB, the law invested her with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, so
that the purpose of the government is achieved. In this case, the government aimed to enhance
the book publishing industry as it has a significant role in the national development. Hence, the
fact that she was appointed from the public sector and not from the other branches or agencies
of the government does not take her position outside the meaning of a public office.

AMPARO ROBLES CABREZA v. CEFERINO S. CABREZA JR., ET AL.
G.R. No. 171260,September 11, 2009
J. Peralta

While there is no prohibition for private parties to file a petition on their own behalf, it
necessarily follows that they take the risk of not having a lawyer who is well-versed in appellate
practice. After her failed petition in the CA, petitioner already had the opportunity to rectify the
situation by engaging the services of a lawyer when she filed her petition before this Court; yet
for some reason, she chose not to do so. Thus, she has no one else to blame but herself.

SIMEON M. VALDEZ v. FINANCIERA MANILA INC.
G.R. No. 183387,September 29, 2009
J. Peralta

RTC entered a decision finding Financiera liable to plaintiffs. On appeal, the CA affirmed
the RTC decision but with modification. Subsequently, a compromise was entered into by
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petitioner and respondent. The parties agreed that Financiera will pay the Spouses Valdez and
other plaintiffs and the latter will withdraw their complaint. Likewise, the petitioners agreed to lift
the writ of preliminary attachment issued by the RTC by virtue of which they had levied on,
garnished and attached certain real and personal properties of respondent Financiera.

Respondent Financiera moved for the execution of the Compromise Agreement. On the
other hand, Petitioner Valdez filed a motion for the execution of the Decision of RTC as modified
by the CA because he and the other plaintiffs had not received the cash value of the assigned
SPPI Investments.

The non-fulfillment of the terms and conditions of a compromise agreement approved by
the court justifies execution thereof, and the issuance of a writ for the said purpose is the courts
ministerial duty enforceable by mandamus. In this particular case, since the Compromise
Agreement's enforceability depends on the maturity of the subject SPPI shares, the RTC could
not compel SPPI to deliver the cash value of the said investment accounts, simply because the
latter was not a party to the Compromise Agreement. Hence, the RTC did not commit any grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction when it granted petitioner
Valdez's motion for execution in its Decision dated May 22, 2000.

In short, as the stipulations in the Compromise Agreement remain unfulfilled, respondent
Financiera is still obligated to pay its original indebtedness.

SAN MIGUEL BUKID HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC. ET AL. v. CITY OF
MANDALUYONG, ET AL.
G.R. No. 153653,October 2, 2009
J. Peralta

On November 7 1999, Petitioner SMBHA issued a board resolution authorizing its
President, Evelio Barata, to initiate, sign, file and prosecute the Complaint for specific
performance .The case was latter on elevated to the Court of Appeals via petition for certiorari.
The CA dismissed the petition outright because the person who signed the
Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping thereof did not appear to be authorized by
petitioner.

Certiorari, as a special civil action, is an original action invoking the original jurisdiction of
a court to annul or modify the proceedings of a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions. It is an original and independent action that is not part of the trial or the
proceedings on the complaint filed before the trial court. The petition for certiorari before the CA
is, therefore, a separate and distinct action from the action for specific performance instituted
before the RTC, as the writ of certiorari being prayed for is directed against the judicial or quasi-
judicial body, not against the private parties in the original action for specific performance. Such
being the case, the November 7 1999 Resolution of the Board of Directors of petitioner
association is not and cannot be considered as an authorization for its President, Evelio Barata,
to initiate, sign, file and prosecute another case for the special civil action of certiorari. The CA
was, thus, correct in dismissing the petition for lack of authority of Evelio Barata to sign the
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping in representation of petitioner.

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HOME MORTGAGE FINANCE CORPORATION v. MARIO ABAYARI, ET AL.
G.R. No. 166508, October 2, 2009
J. Peralta

Respondents filed a petition for mandamus to compel petitioner to pay them the benefits
pursuant to RA 6758. In its April 27, 2001 Decision, the trial court ordered petitioner to pay
respondents. Subsequently, the decision attained finality. Respondents moved for execution of
the RTC decision. The trial court issued a Writ of Execution/Garnishment. Respondents then
sought the garnishment of its funds under the custody of the Land Bank of the Philippines.

While the April 17, 2001 Decision of the trial court ordered petitioner to pay the benefits
claimed by respondents, it by no means ordered the payment of a specific sum of money and
instead merely directed petitioner to extend to respondents the benefits under R.A. No. 6758
and its implementing rules. Being a special judgment, the decision may not be executed in the
same way as a judgment for money handed down in an ordinary civil case governed by Section
9, Rule 39 of the Rules Court which sanctions garnishment of debts and credits to satisfy a
monetary award. Garnishment is proper only when the judgment to be enforced is one for
payment of a sum of money. It cannot be employed to implement a special judgment such as
that rendered in a special civil action for mandamus.

Be that as it may, assuming for the sake of argument that execution by garnishment
could proceed in this case against the funds of petitioner, it must bear stress that the latter is a
government-owned or controlled corporation with a charter of its own. The matter of allowing or
disallowing a money claim against petitioner is within the primary power of the COA to decide.
This no doubt includes money claims arising from the implementation of R.A. No.
6758.Respondents claim against petitioner, although it has already been validated by the trial
courts final decision, likewise belongs to that class of claims; hence, it must first be filed with
the COA before execution could proceed. And from the decision therein, the aggrieved party is
afforded a remedy by elevating the matter to this Court via a petition for certiorari in accordance
with Section 1 Rule XI, of the COA Rules of Procedure.

VICENTE FOZ JR. AND DANNY G. FAJARDO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 167764. October 9, 2009,
J. Peralta

An Information was filed before the RTC of Iloilo City charging petitioners Vicente Foz,
Jr. and Danny G. Fajardo with the crime of libel for publishing an article with libelous content
against Dr. Protigo.

Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction. Settled is the rule that
jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations of the complaint or
information, and the offense must have been committed or any one of its essential ingredients
took place within the territorial jurisdiction of the court. The allegations in the Information that
"Panay News, a daily publication with a considerable circulation in the City of Iloilo and
throughout the region" only showed that Iloilo was the place where Panay News was in
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considerable circulation but did not establish that the said publication was printed and first
published in Iloilo City.

Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code as amended provides that a private individual
may also file the libel case in the RTC of the province where he actually resided at the time of
the commission of the offense. The Information filed against petitioners failed to allege the
residence of Dr. Portigo. While the Information alleges that "Dr. Edgar Portigo is a physician and
medical practitioner in Iloilo City," such allegation did not clearly and positively indicate that he
was actually residing in Iloilo City at the time of the commission of the offense. It is possible that
Dr. Portigo was actually residing in another place. Considering that the Information failed to
allege the venue requirements for a libel case under Article 360, the Court finds that the RTC of
Iloilo City had no jurisdiction to hear this case. Thus, its decision convicting petitioners of the
crime of libel should be set aside for want of jurisdiction without prejudice to its filing with the
court of competent jurisdiction.

BICOL AGRO-INDUSTRIAL PRODUCERS COOPERATIVE, INC. (BAPCI) v. EDMUNDO O.
OBIAS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 172077. October 9, 2009
J. Peralta

Petitioner argues that estoppel and laches bar respondents from exercising ownership
rights over the properties traversed by the road in dispute. In support of said argument,
petitioner posits that BISUDECO had been peacefully and continuously using the road without
any complaint or opposition on the part of the respondents for almost twenty years.
Respondents, on the other hand, claim that they merely tolerated the use of their land as
BISUDECO was a government-owned and controlled corporation and considering that the
disputed road was constructed during the time of Martial Law.

To our mind, settled jurisprudence on the application of the principle of estoppel by
laches militates against the acquisition of an easement of right of way by laches. Laches is a
doctrine in equity and our courts are basically courts of law and not courts of equity; equity,
which has been aptly described as "justice outside legality," should be applied only in the
absence of, and never against, statutory law; Aeguetas nunguam contravenit legis. Based on
this principle, we find that the positive mandate of Article 622 of the Civil Code the statutory
provision requiring title as basis for the acquisition of an easement of a right of way precludes
the application of the equitable principle of laches.

CARMELINDA C. BARROR v. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 186201 ,October 9, 2009
J. Peralta

Petitioner appealed the decision of the trial court to the COMELEC. The First Division of
the COMELEC dismissed petitioners appeal for failure to pay the appeal fee. Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration was likewise dismissed.Petitioner elevated the case via petition for
certiorari to the Supreme Court.

It is settled that under Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution, what may be brought to
this Court on certiorari is the decision, order or ruling of the COMELEC en banc. However, this
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rule should not apply when a division of the COMELEC arrogates unto itself and deprives the en
banc of the authority to rule on a motion for reconsideration, like in this case. In this case, the
First Division of the COMELEC violated the cited provisions of the Constitution and the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure when it resolved petitioners motion for reconsideration of its
final Order dated November 25, 2008, which dismissed petitioners appeal. By arrogating unto
itself a power constitutionally lodged in the Commission en banc, the First Division of the
COMELEC exercised judgment in excess of, or without, jurisdiction. Hence, the Order issued by
the First Division of the COMELEC dated January 9, 2009, denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration, is null and void.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK v. CAYETANO A. TEJANO, JR.
G.R. No. 173615. October 16, 2009
Peralta, J.

Vice President and Manager of PNB appealed to the Civil Service Commission
(CSC) the decision of the PNB Board of Directors. In the meantime, the PNB had ceased to be
a government-owned and controlled corporation, and in view of its conversion into a private
banking institution by virtue of E.O. No. 80.

The rule is that where a court has already obtained and is exercising jurisdiction over a
controversy, its jurisdiction to proceed to the final determination of the cause is not affected by
new legislation placing jurisdiction over such proceedings in another tribunal. The exception to
the rule is where the statute expressly provides, or is construed to the effect that it is intended to
operate as to actions pending before its enactment. Where a statute changing the jurisdiction of
a court has no retroactive effect, it cannot be applied to a case that was pending prior to the
enactment of the statute.

The provisions in Section 6 of E.O. No. 80 are too clear and unambiguous to be
interpreted in such a way as to abort the continued exercise by the CSC of its appellate
jurisdiction over the appeal filed before the privatization of PNB became effective. Suffice it to
say that nowhere in the said Section can we find even the slightest indication that indeed it
expressly authorizes the transfer of jurisdiction from the CSC to another tribunal over
disciplinary and administrative cases already pending with the said Commission even prior to
the enactment of the law.

NIEVA M. MANEBO v. SPO1 ROEL D. ACOSTA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 169554. October 28, 2009
J. Peralta

The DOJ Secretary reversed the resolution of the State Prosecutor and ordered the
withdrawal of the information filed against the respondents.

The conduct of a preliminary investigation is executive in nature. The Court may not be
compelled to pass upon the correctness of the exercise of the public prosecutors function,
unless there is a showing of grave abuse of discretion or manifest error in his findings. Grave
abuse of discretion implies a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment tantamount to lack
or excess of jurisdiction. The exercise of power must have been done in an arbitrary or a
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despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It must have been so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
In this case, we find that the DOJ committed a manifest error in finding no probable cause to
charge respondents with the crime of murder.

PATRICIA HALAGUEA, ET AL. v. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.
G.R. No. 172013. October 2, 2009
J. Peralta

Petitioners filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC questioning the constitutionality
of Section 144 of PAL-FASAP CBA for being discriminatory.

The petitioners' primary relief in Civil Case No. 04-886 is the annulment of Section 144, Part A
of the PAL-FASAP CBA. The subject of litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation,
exclusively cognizable by the RTC, pursuant to Section 19 (1) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as
amended. Being an ordinary civil action, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of labor tribunals.

The said issue cannot be resolved solely by applying the Labor Code. Rather, it requires the
application of the Constitution, labor statutes, law on contracts and the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, and the power to apply and interpret
the constitution and CEDAW is within the jurisdiction of trial courts, a court of general
jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of labor arbiters and the NLRC under Article 217 of the Labor Code
is limited to disputes arising from an employer-employee relationship which can only be
resolved by reference to the Labor Code, other labor statutes, or their collective bargaining
agreement.

ROMEO SAMONTE v. S.F. NAGUIAT, INC.
G.R. No. 165544. October 2, 2009
J. Peralta

In his Petition for Relief from Judgment filed before the RTC, petitioner alleged that the
petition was filed on the ground that the RTC made serious and prejudicial mistakes in
appreciating the evidence presented. The mistake contemplated by Rule 38 of the Rules of
Court pertains generally to mistake of fact, not of law, which relates to the case. The word
"mistake" which grants relief from judgment, does not apply and was never intended to apply to
a judicial error which the court might have committed in the trial. Such error may be corrected by
means of an appeal.

The alleged errors committed by the RTC could also be corrected by means of an
appeal from the RTC decision. Petitioner did not also file an appeal causing the RTC decision to
become final and executory and the subsequent issuance of a writ of execution. Notably,
petitioner never made any allegation in his petition for relief from judgment that the RTC
decision was entered against him through fraud, accident, mistake, or excusable negligence.
The petition for relief did not also show any reason for petitioner's failure to file an appeal after
the receipt of the RTC decision which the CA correctly observed in its assailed decision.
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EUFEMIA VDA. DE AGATEP v. ROBERTA L. RODRIGUEZ, ET AL.
G.R. No. 170540. October 28, 2009
J. Peralta

Petitioner filed a Complaint for "reconveyance and/or damages" with the RTC against
herein respondents. Later, the complaint was amended to implead PNB as a party-defendant.
The RTC dismissed the amended complaint for failure of herein petitioner (then plaintiff) to file
her Pre-Trial Brief.

If an amended complaint is filed for the purpose of impleading another party as
defendant, where no additional cause of action was alleged and the impleaded defendants
merely adopted and repleaded all the pleadings of the original defendants another pre-trial is
not required and a second pre-trial brief need not be filed.

In the present case, petitioner had a separate cause of action against PNB. A separate
cause of action necessarily means additional cause of action. Moreover, the defenses adopted
by PNB are completely different from the defenses of Lim and Rodriguez, necessitating a
separate determination of the matters enumerated under Section 6, Rule 18 of the Rules of
Court insofar as PNB and petitioner are concerned.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, REPRESENTED BY HON. ANIANO A. DESIERTO v. HEIRS
OF MARGARITA VDA. DE VENTURA REPRESENTED BY PACITA V. PASCUAL, ET AL.
G.R. No. 151800. November 5, 2009
J. Peralta

Respondent assailed the recommendation of DAR officers, Edilberto Darang and
Ombudsman for dismissing the charge for falsification of public documents and provisionally
dismissing charge against respondents for Violation of Section 3, par. (e) of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended before the Supreme Court but it was referred to the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over orders, directives and decisions of the Office
of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases only. It cannot, therefore, review the
orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in criminal or non-administrative
cases. A judgment rendered by a court without jurisdiction over the subject matter is void. Since
the Court of Appeals therefore has no jurisdiction over decisions and orders of the Ombudsman
in criminal cases, its ruling on the same is void.

EQUITABLE PCI BANK, INC. v. HON. SALVADOR Y APURILLO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 168746. November 5, 2009,
J. Peralta

The only issue that needs to be determined in the case at bar is whether or not the RTC
acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the
foreclosure and public auction of YKS property during the proceedings and pending
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determination of the main cause of action for annulment of foreclosure in Civil Case No. 2001-
06-93.

Section 3, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court provides that:

SEC. 3. Grounds for issuance of preliminary injunctions. A preliminary injunction may be
granted when it is established:

(a) That the applicant is entitled to the relief demanded, and the whole or part of such relief
consists in restraining the commission or continuance of the act or acts complained of, or in
requiring the performance of an act or acts, either for a limited period or perpetually;

(b) That the commission, continuance or non-performance of the act or acts complained of
during the litigation would probably work injustice to the applicant; or

(c) That a party, court, agency or a person is doing, threatening, or is attempting to do, or is
procuring or suffering to be done, some act or acts probably in violation of the rights of the
applicant respecting the subject of the action or proceeding, and tending to render the judgment
ineffectual.

ANGELINA S. SORIENTE, ET AL. v. THE ESTATE OF THE LATE ARSENIO E.
CONCEPCION, ET AL.
G.R. No. 160239, November 25, 2009
J. Peralta

A complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by the respondents against petitioner
Angelina Soriente. The Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 17973. Instead of filing a
separate answer, she merely affixed her signature in to the Answer filed by defendant Alfredo
Caballero in another ejectment case, docketed as Civil Case No. 17974, which was filed by
respondent against Caballero.

Under Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, if a sole defendant
shall fail to appear in the preliminary conference, the plaintiff shall be entitled to judgment in
accordance with Section 6 of the Rule, that is, the court shall render judgment as may be
warranted by the facts alleged in the Complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein.
However, "[t]his Rule (Sec. 7) shall not apply where one of two or more defendants sued under
a common cause of action, who had pleaded a common defense, shall appear at the
preliminary conference." Petitioner claims that the preceding provision applies to her as a
defendant, since the ejectment cases were consolidated by the trial court, and she and
Caballero filed the same Answer to the Complaint; hence, the trial court should not have
rendered judgment against her when she failed to appear in the preliminary conference.

The ejectment case filed by respondent against petitioner was docketed in the trial court
as Civil Case No. 17973, the case against Alfredo Caballero was docketed as Civil Case No.
17974, while the case against Severina Sadol was docketed as Civil Case No. 17932. These
cases were consolidated by the trial court. Considering that petitioner was sued in a separate
case for ejectment from that of Caballero and Sadol, petitioners failure to appear in the
preliminary conference entitled respondent to the rendition of judgment by the trial court on the
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ejectment case filed against petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. 17973, in accordance with
Section 7 of the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure.

SOFIA TORRES, ET AL. v. NICANOR SATSATIN, ET AL.
G.R. No. 166759. November 25, 2009
J. Peralta

The writ of attachment was served prior to the service of summons to the respondents. A
belated service of summons on respondents cannot be deemed to have cured the fatal defect in
the enforcement of the writ. The trial court cannot enforce such a coercive process on
respondents without first obtaining jurisdiction over their person. The preliminary writ of
attachment mustbe served after or simultaneous with the service of summons on the defendant
whether by personal service, substituted service or by publication as warranted by the
circumstances of the case.

CONSTANTINO A. PASCUAL v. LOURDES S. PASCUAL
G.R. No. 171916.December 4, 2009
J. Peralta

The process server attempted three (3) times to personally serve the summons upon the
respondent but no to avail. On his fourth attempt, defendant was out and only her housemaid
was present. The undersigned left a copy of the same to the latter, who is at the age of reason
but refused to sign the same.

In a case where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines,
personal service of summons should and always be the first option, and it is only when the said
summons cannot be served within a reasonable time can the process server resort to
substituted service. The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that
defendant cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service.The Return of
Summons shows no effort was actually exerted and no positive step taken by either the process
server or petitioners to locate and serve the summons personally on respondents. At best, the
Return merely states the alleged whereabouts of respondents without indicating that such
information was verified from a person who had knowledge thereof. Certainly, without specifying
the details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to serve the summons, a
general statement that such efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of complying with
the rules of substituted service of summons.

PHILIPPINE ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY (PEZA), ET AL. v. PEARL CITY
MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, ET AL.
G.R. No. 168668. December 16, 2009
J. Peralta

Respondent filed a petition for review on certiorari to the Supreme Court alleging it was
denied due process of law. It is already a well-settled rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in
cases brought before it from the Court of Appeals by virtue of Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of
Court is limited to reviewing errors of law. Findings of fact of the CA are conclusive upon this
Court. There are, however, recognized exceptions to the foregoing rule, namely: (1) when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the
interference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse
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of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the
findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when, in making its findings, the Court of Appeals went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to those of the trial court; (8)
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioners main and reply briefs are
not disputed by the respondent; and (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record.

The present case falls under the seventh exception considering that the PEZA Board
and the OP, on one hand, and the CA, on the other, arrived at conflicting findings of fact. This
necessitates a review of the evidence on record which leads the Court to the conclusion, as
earlier discussed, that the OP did not err in ruling that the PCMC was not denied its right to due
process of law.

SOTERO ROY LEONERO, ET AL. v. SPOUSES MARCELINO B. BARBA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 159788. December 23, 2009
J. Peralta

Petitioners filed a complaint against respondents for Quieting of Title and Preliminary
Injunction before praying that TCTs in the name of respondents, be declared null and void for
having emanated from OCT No. 614. Petitioners alleged that said OCT No. 614 had been
declared void in a Partial Decision on Defaulted Private Respondents in Civil Case No. Q-
35672. After the parties submitted their respective memoranda. The RTC dismissed the
complaint.

It is not correct to say that petitioners were deprived of their day in court when the RTC
dismissed the complaint even before conducting trial on the merits. As held in Luzon
Development Bank v. Conquilla,the court, motu proprio, may render judgment on the pleadings
based on the parties' admissions in their pleadings and even without introduction of evidence, if
and when these amply establish that there is insufficiency of factual basis for the action.

In this case, petitioners admit that they are mere possessors of the parcels of land in
question and have been ordered by the MeTC to vacate the same. The gist of their claim in the
action for quieting of title with preliminary injunction is that the MeTC Decision in the ejectment
case against them should not be implemented, because respondents' TCTs are spurious,
having emanated from OCT No. 614, which has been declared null and void in a Partial
Decision rendered in Civil Case No. Q-35672. Petitioners' main prayer is for the nullification of
respondents' TCTs.

BARANGAY SANGALANG, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN DANTE C.
MARCELLANA v. BARANGAY MAGUIHAN, REPRESENTED BY ITS CHAIRMAN ARNULFO
VILLAREZ
G.R. No. 159792 .December 23, 2009
J. Peralta

The petitioner appealed the resolution of the Sanggunian to the RTC. After, receiving an
unfavorable decision from the RTC . Petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal assailing the RTC
Decision, petitioner has availed itself of the remedy provided for under Rule 41 of the Rules of
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Court. The CA, however, considered petitioners choice to be the wrong remedy and, forthwith,
dismissed the petition.

It is apparent that petitioner has availed itself of the wrong remedy. Since the RTC tried
the case in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction, petitioner should have filed a petition for
review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court, instead of an ordinary appeal under Rule 41. The
law is clear in this respect.

The court has the discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss an appellant's appeal. It is a
power conferred on the court, not a duty. The "discretion must be a sound one, to be exercised
in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances
obtaining in each case." Thus, notwithstanding petitioners wrong mode of appeal, the CA
should not have so easily dismissed the petition, considering that the parties involved are local
government units and that what is involved is the determination of their respective territorial
jurisdictions.

LILY O. ORBASE v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN AND ADORACION MENDOZA-BOLOS
G.R. No. 175115 .December 23, 2009
J. Peralta

A complaint was filed against the petitioner Lily Orbase before the Ombudsman for the
acts she committed before entering government service. It was alleged in the complaint that
Orbase she committed act of dishonesty/misrepresentation in her biodata which to her
application for the position of Assistant Director of the National Library.

R.A. No. 6770 provides for the functional and structural organization of the Office of the
Ombudsman. In passing R.A. No. 6770, Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with
the power to prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees to make him a
more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public office. Thus,
Section 21 thereof provides:

SEC. 21. Officials Subject to Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of
the Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members
of the Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over
Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.

At the time of the filing of the case against petitioner, she was the Assistant Director of
the National Library; as such, as an appointive employee of the government, the jurisdiction of
the Office of the Ombudsman to take cognizance of the action against the petitioner was
beyond contestation.

2010


JAIME T. TORRES v. CHINA BANKING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 165408, January 15, 2010
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J. Peralta

It is settled rule that the mistake of a counsel binds the client. It is only in case of gross
or palpable negligence of counsel when the courts must step in and accord relief to a client who
suffered thereby. in this case, petitioner was not deprived of his day in court, because both
parties were heard in a full-blown trial and, thereafter, a decision was rendered by the trial court,
which decision was appealed by petitioner to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
modified the decision of the trial court, correctly holding that Article 78 of the General Banking
Act applies in the determination of the redemption price; thus, petitioner was ordered to pay the
deficient amount due to respondent.

The failure to file an appeal from the decision rendering it final and executory is not a
denial of due process. The right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process; it is
merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with
the provisions of the law.

FLOR MARTINEZ, REPRESENTED BY MACARIO MARTINEZ, AUTHORIZED
REPRESENTATIVE AND ATTORNEY-IN-FACT v. ERNESTO GARCIA AND EDILBERTO M.
BRUA
G.R. No. 166536, February 4, 2010
J. Peralta

Respondent Garcia's adverse claim, which refers to the deed of mortgage executed by
respondent Brua in his favor, was annotated on respondent Brua's title registered with the Registry of
Deeds of Rizal on June 23, 1980 as Entry No. 49853. The adverse claim was already existing when the
Notice of Levy on Execution, as well as the Certificate of Sale in favor of petitioner, was inscribed on July
11, 1988 and September 2, 1988, respectively; and, hence, the adverse claim is sufficient to constitute
constructive notice to petitioner regarding the subject property. When petitioner registered her Notice of
Levy on Execution on the title of the subject property, she was charged with the knowledge that the
subject property sought to be levied upon on execution was encumbered by an interest the same as or
better than that of the registered owner thereof.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EGAP MADSALI, SAJIRON LAJIM AND MARON LAJIM
G.R. No. 179570, February 4, 2010
J. Peralta

Delay in reporting an incident of rape due to death threats does not affect the credibility
of the complainant, nor can it be taken against her. The charge of rape is rendered doubtful only
if the delay was unreasonable and unexplained. BBB explained that she did not immediately
report the abduction, rape and detention of her daughter to the authorities, because Egap
threatened to kill AAA,who was then in his custody. Further, BBB testified that, on another
occasion, Egap threatened to kill her if she dared to report the matter to the authorities. True
enough, when Egap learned that she did what he forbade her to do, he made good his threat
and shot her at the back. Thus, BBB's delay in reporting the incident for five months should not
be taken against her.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FERNANDO VILLAMIN Y SAN JOSE ALIAS ANDOY
G.R. No. 175590, February 9, 2010
J. Peralta

PERALTA

It must be remembered that the accused-appellant was the subject of a buy-bust
operation, the main goal of which was to catch him in flagrante selling shabu, and from the
evidence for the prosecution, he was arrested while committing a crime -- peddling of illegal
drugs, a circumstance where warrantless arrest is justified under Rule 113, Section 5(a) of the
Rules of Court, which states that a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.

A buy-bust operation is a form of entrapment which in recent years has been accepted
as a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. In a buy-bust operation, the idea
to commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to
commit the offense. If carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-
bust operation deserves judicial sanction. Thus, from the very nature of a buy-bust operation,
the absence of a warrant does not make the arrest illegal.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DENR) v. TECHNOLOGICAL ADVOCATES FOR AGRO-
FOREST PROGRAMS ASSOCIATION, INC. (TAFPA, INC.)
G.R. No. 165333, February 9, 2010
J. Peralta

It is a well-settled principle that the acts of the authorized Deputy bind the principal
counsel. Thus, service on the Deputy is service to the OSG. Since Atty. Julie had the authority
to represent the DENR before the RTC, notices of decision, orders, and other court processes
to him as counsel on record and the duly deputized counsel of the OSG were sufficient to bind
petitioner, and both the counsel and the OSGs failure to appeal the decision and to avail
themselves of the other remedies provided by the Rules was likewise binding upon petitioner.

LOLITA REYES DOING BUSINESS UNDER THE NAME AND STYLE, SOLID BROTHERS
WEST MARKETING v. CENTURY CANNING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 165377, February 16, 2010
J. Peralta

In her petition for review on certiorari, petitioner raised the issue whether the Court of
Appeals correctly ruled on her liability to pay the respondent. The Court is not a trier of facts, its
jurisdiction being limited to reviewing only errors of law that may have been committed by the
lower courts. As a general rule, petitions for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure filed before this Court may only raise questions of law. However, jurisprudence has
recognized several exceptions to this rule. In this case, the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals are contrary to those of the RTC; thus, it is proper to review the evidence.

BSB GROUP, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, MR. RICARDO BANGAYAN v.
SALLY GO A.K.A. SALLY GO-BANGAYAN
G.R. No. 168644, February 16, 2010
J. Peralta

In a qualified theft case, a subpoena duces tecum/ad testificandum was issued against
the respective managers or records custodians of Security Banks Divisoria Branch, as well as
of the Asian Savings. It comes clear that the admission of testimonial and documentary
PERALTA

evidence relative to respondents Security Bank account serves no other purpose than to
establish the existence of such account, its nature and the amount kept in it. It constitutes an
attempt by the prosecution at an impermissible inquiry into a bank deposit account the privacy
and confidentiality of which is protected by law. On this score alone, the objection posed by
respondent in her motion to suppress should have indeed put an end to the controversy at the
very first instance it was raised before the trial court.

In sum, the testimony of Marasigan on the particulars of respondents supposed bank
account with Security Bank and the documentary evidence represented by the checks adduced
in support thereof, are not only incompetent for being excluded by operation of R.A. No. 1405.
They are likewise irrelevant to the case, inasmuch as they do not appear to have any logical
and reasonable connection to the prosecution of respondent for qualified theft.

NELSON LAGAZO v. GERALD B. SORIANO AND GALILEO B. SORIANO
G.R. No. 170864, February 16, 2010
J. Peralta

Ejectment proceedings are summary proceedings intended to provide an expeditious
means of protecting actual possession or right to possession of property. Title is not involved.
The sole issue to be resolved is who is entitled to the physical or material possession of the
premises or possession de facto.

PNCC SKYWAY TRAFFIC MANAGEMENT AND SECURITY DIVISION WORKERS
ORGANIZATION (PSTMSWDO), REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, RENE SORIANO v.
PNCC SKYWAY CORPORATION
G.R. No. 171231, February 17, 2010
J. Peralta

Being the president of the union, Rene Soriano is in a position to verify the truthfulness
and correctness of the allegations in the petition. Even assuming that Mr. Soriano has no
authority to file the petition on February 27, 2006, the passing on June 30, 2006 of a Board
Resolution authorizing him to represent the union is deemed a ratification of his prior execution,
on February 27, 2006, of the verification and certificate of non-forum shopping, thus curing any
defects thereof.

FRANCISCO APARIS Y SANTOS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 169195, February 17, 2010
J. Peralta

The jurisdiction of a court over a criminal case is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information. Once these are shown, the court may validly take cognizance of the
case. In the instant case, the Information clearly alleged that the crime was committed in Makati.
The allegation in the Information was sufficiently proven by the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. Moreover, the Court finds no cogent reason to depart from the findings of the CA and
the RTC that the defense failed to present sufficient evidence to substantiate its allegation that
the place where the buy-bust operation took place was within the territorial jurisdiction of Manila
and not of Makati. While the defense referred to a certification issued by a certain Magdiwang
Recato from the Office of the City Engineer of Manila, to the effect that the place where the buy-
PERALTA

bust operation was conducted was within the territorial jurisdiction of the city of Manila, the
same was not offered in evidence and, hence, cannot be given evidentiary value.

UNITED PLANTERS SUGAR MILLING CO., INC. (UPSUMCO) v. THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK (PNB) AND ASSET
PRIVATIZATION TRUST (APT), AS TRUSTEE OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 126890, March 9, 2010
J. Peralta

Under Section 3 of the Courts Circular No. 2-89, effective March 1, 1989, the referral to
the Court en banc of cases assigned to a Division is to be denied on the ground that the Court
en banc is not an Appellate Court to which decisions or resolutions of a Division may be
appealed. Moreover, a second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final resolution shall
not be entertained for being a prohibited pleading under Section 2, Rule 52, in relation to
Section 4, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, except for extraordinarily persuasive reasons and only
after an express leave shall have first been obtained. Accordingly, the Court, in the exercise of
its sound discretion, determines the issues which are of transcendental importance, as in the
present case, which necessitates it to accept the referral of a Division case before it and the
grant of a second motion for reconsideration.

The doctrine of stare decisis et no quieta movere or principle of adherence to precedents does
not apply to the present case so as to bar the Court en banc from taking cognizance over the case which
rectified the disposition of the case and reversed and set aside the Decision rendered by a Division
thereof.

NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION ADMINISTRATION v. VAL L. VILLANUEVA
G.R. No. 168203, March 9, 2010
J. Peralta

The respondent should have first exhausted the administrative remedies
still available to him by appealing the challenged order of the NEA to the Office
of the President, which exercises the power of supervision over it. It is settled
that under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, recourse
through court action cannot prosper until after all such administrative remedies
have first been exhausted. If remedy is available within the administrative
machinery, this should be resorted to before recourse can be made to courts.

Under Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a judge may issue a
temporary restraining order within a limited life of twenty (20) days from date of
issue. If before the expiration of the twenty (20)-day period the application for
preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary restraining order would be
deemed automatically vacated. If no action is taken by the judge on the
application for preliminary injunction within the said twenty (20) days, the
temporary restraining order would automatically expire on the 20th day by the
sheer force of law, no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary and the
courts having no discretion to extend the same. The rule against the non-
extendibility of the twenty (20)-day limited period of effectivity of a temporary
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restraining order is absolute if issued by a regional trial court.

REPRESENTATIVE ALVIN S. SANDOVAL (LONE DISTRICT OF NAVOTAS-MALABON)
v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL, JOSEPHINE VERONIQUE R.
LACSON-NOEL, AND HON. SPEAKER PROSPERO NOGRALES
G.R. No. 190067, March 9, 2010
J. Peralta

The essence of due process is the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit
evidence in support of ones defense. To be heard does not mean verbal arguments in court;
one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of due process. Procedural rules in
election cases are designed to achieve not only a correct but also an expeditious determination
of the popular will of the electorate. Thus, the time limit set by the rules is not something to be
taken lightly, for it was stressed in the same case that the observance of the HRET Rules in
conjunction with our own Rules of Court, must be taken seriously.

J OSEPH BERNARDEZ v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND
AVELINO TOLEAN
G.R. No. 190382, March 9, 2010
J. Peralta

Since it has been ruled that the Notice of Appeal was rightfully dismissed and the ruling has
become final and executory, it follows then that the right sought to be protected and the irreparable injury
sought to be prevented by the private respondent through injunction or prohibition has already been
rendered fait accompli.

LEAH PALMA v. HON. DANILO P. GALVEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF ILOILO CITY, BRANCH 24; AND PSYCHE ELENA
AGUDO
G.R. No. 165273, March 10, 2010
J. Peralta

Other methods of service of summons allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the
serving officer on a defendant-resident who is temporarily out of the Philippines. Thus, if a resident
defendant is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be resorted to: (1)
substituted service set forth in section 7, Rule 14; (2) personal service outside the country, with leave of
court; (3) service by publication, also with leave of court; or (4) in any other manner the court may deem
sufficient.

SPOUSES FERNANDO TORRES AND IRMA TORRES v.AMPARO MEDINA AND
THE EX-OFFICIO SHERIFF OF THE RTC OF QUEZON CITY
G.R. No. 166730, March 10, 2010
J. Peralta

Res judicata literally means "a matter adjudged; a thing judicially acted
upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment." Res judicata lays the
rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the merits, and
PERALTA

without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter
within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in
all other actions or suits in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent
jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit.

JOSE ANTONIO LEVISTE v. THE COURT OF APPEALS AND
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 189122, March 17, 2010
J. Peralta Dissenting Opinion

Section 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, clearly mandates that no person
charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua
or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong.
The provision distinctly refers to the crime charged and not the crime proven.
The failure then of the prosecution to prove the existence of the circumstances
to qualify the crime committed to murder, the crime charged, necessarily means
that the evidence of his guilt of the said crime is not strong.

THE MUNICIPALITY OF HAGONOY, BULACAN, REPRESENTED BY THE HON.
FELIX V. OPLE, MUNICIPAL MAYOR, AND FELIX V. OPLE, IN HIS PERSONAL
CAPACITY v. HON. SIMEON P. DUMDUM, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE
PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 7, CEBU CITY,
ET. AL.
G.R. No. 168289, March 22, 2010
J. Peralta

Where the suability of the state is conceded and by which liability is
ascertained judicially, the state is at liberty to determine for itself whether to
satisfy the judgment or not. Execution may not issue upon such judgment,
because statutes waiving non-suability do not authorize the seizure of property
to satisfy judgments recovered from the action.

BAI SANDRA S.A. SEMA v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL AND DIDAGEN P. DILANGALEN
G.R. No. 190734, March 26, 2010
J. Peralta

If what is being questioned is the correctness of the number of votes for
each candidate, the best and most conclusive evidence is the ballots
themselves. However, this rule applies only if the ballots are available and their
integrity has been preserved from the day of elections until revision. When the
ballots are unavailable or cannot be produced, then recourse can be made to
untampered and unaltered election returns or other election documents as
evidence.

ROMANITA CONCHA, ET. AL. v. PAULINO RUBIO, ET. AL.
PERALTA

G.R. No. 162446, March 29, 2010
J. Peralta

No other agency of government is empowered or authorized by law in the
selection and designation of farmer beneficiaries except the DAR being purely
an administrative function. The Adjudication Board is not clothed with power
and authority to rule on the selection of farmer beneficiaries. To do so would be
an ultra vires act of said Board, being administrative in character.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY DANTE QUINDOZA, IN HIS
CAPACITY AS ZONE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE BATAAN ECONOMIC ZONE v.
COALBRINE INTERNATIONAL PHILIPPINES, INC. AND SHEILA F. NERI
G.R. No. 161838, April 7, 2010
J. Peralta

An action shall be prosecuted in the name of the party who, by the
substantive law, has the right sought to be enforced. The power of a corporation
to sue and be sued in any court is lodged with the board of directors that
exercises its corporate powers. In turn, physical acts of the corporation, like the
signing of documents, can be performed only by natural persons duly authorized
for the purpose by corporate by-laws or by a specific act of the board of
directors. In this case, respondent Coalbrine is a corporation. However, when
respondent Neri filed the complaint in the RTC, there was no proof that she was
authorized to sign the verification and the certification against non-forum
shopping.

ENGR. CARLITO PENTECOSTES, JR. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 167766, April 7, 2010
J. Peralta

When the testimony of a witness meets the test of credibility, that alone is
sufficient to convict the accused. As regards petitioners defense of alibi, well
settled is the rule that alibi is an inherently weak defense which cannot prevail
over the positive identification of the accused by the victim. Moreover, in order
for the defense of alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove that the petitioner
was somewhere else when the offense was committed, but it must likewise be
demonstrated that he was so far away that it was not possible for him to have
been physically present at the place of the crime or its immediate vicinity at the
time of its commission.

ALEJANDRA S. LAZARO, ASSISTED BY HER HUSBAND, ISAURO M. LAZARO, ET.
AL. v. MODESTA AGUSTIN, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 152364, April 15, 2010
J. Peralta

Admissions against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by
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one in privity with or identified in legal interest with such party, and are
admissible whether or not the declarant is available as a witness. Declarations
against interest are those made by a person who is neither a party nor in privity
with a party to the suit, are secondary evidence, and constitute an exception to
the hearsay rule. They are admissible only when the declarant is unavailable as a
witness.

On the other hand, the fact that a deed is notarized is not a guarantee of
the validity of its contents. In the present case, the regularity in the execution of
the sworn statement was challenged in the proceedings below where its prima
facie validity was overthrown by the highly questionable circumstances under
which it was supposedly executed, as well as the testimonies of witnesses who
testified on the improbability of execution of the sworn statement, as well as on
the physical condition of the signatory, at the time the questioned document was
supposedly executed.

ROBERTO B. KALALO v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, ERNESTO M. DE
CHAVEZ AND MARCELO L. AGUSTIN
G.R. No. 158189, April 23, 2010
J. Peralta

As a general rule, courts do not interfere with the discretion of the
Ombudsman to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe
that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof
and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts.
This Court has consistently held that the Ombudsman has discretion to
determine whether a criminal case, given its facts and circumstances, should be
filed or not. It is basically his call. He may dismiss the complaint forthwith
should he find it to be insufficient in form and substance, or should he find it
otherwise, to continue with the inquiry; or he may proceed with the investigation
if, in his view, the complaint is in due and proper form and substance.

ROBERTO S. BENEDICTO AND TRADERS ROYAL BANK v. MANUEL LACSON, ET.
AL.
G.R. No. 141508, May 5, 2010
J. Peralta

The essence of forum shopping is the act of filing of multiple suits
involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. Since a party
resorts to forum shopping in order to increase his chances of obtaining a
favorable decision or action, it has been held that a party cannot be said to have
sought to improve his chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action where
no unfavorable decision has even been rendered against him in any of the cases
he has brought before the courts.Thus, an omission in the certificate of non-
forum shopping about any event that would not constitute res judicata and litis
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pendencia as in the case at bar, is not fatal as to merit the dismissal and
nullification of the entire proceedings considering that the evils sought to be
prevented by the said certificate are not present.


The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not
allowed to vex another more than once regarding the same subject matter and
for the same cause of action. This theory is founded on the public policy that the
same subject matter should not be the subject of controversy in courts more
than once, in order that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided for the
sake of the stability of the rights and status of persons.

HICOBLO M. CATLY (DECEASED), SUBSTITUTED BY HIS WIFE, LOURDES A.
CATLY v. WILLIAM NAVARRO, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 167239, May 5, 2010
J. Peralta

Clearly, when petitioner sought to assail the decision and order of the trial
court, an appeal to the Court of Appeals was the adequate remedy which he
should have availed of, instead of filing a petition directly with this Court. It was
held that where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the action for
certiorari will not be entertained. Remedies of appeal (including petitions for
review) and certiorari are mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive.

SPOUSES TEOFILO CARPIO AND TEODORA CARPIO v.
ANA SEBASTIAN, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 166108, June 16, 2010
J. Peralta

The Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) is
vested with primary and exclusive jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate
agrarian reform matters, including all matters involving the implementation of
the agrarian reform program. The case is merely an incident involving the
implementation of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP), as it is
founded on the question of who is the actual tenant and eventual beneficiary of
the subject land. Hence, jurisdiction should remain with the DARAB and not the
regular courts.

SPOUSES OSCAR ARCENAS AND DOLORES ARCENAS
v. QUEEN CITY DEVELOPMENT BANK AND COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 166819, June 16, 2010
J. Peralta

Section 1, Rule 47 provides that it does not allow a direct recourse to a
petition for annulment of judgment if other appropriate remedies are available,
such as a petition for new trial, appeal or a petition for relief. If petitioner fails to
PERALTA

avail of these remedies without sufficient justification, she cannot resort to the
action for annulment of judgment under Rule 47, for otherwise, she would
benefit from her inaction or negligence.

ARTISTICA CERAMICA, INC., CERALINDA, INC., CYBER CERAMICS, INC. AND
MILLENNIUM, INC. v. CIUDAD DEL CARMEN HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION, INC.
and BUKLURAN PUROK II RESIDENTS ASSOCIATION
G.R. Nos. 167583-84, June 16, 2010
J. Peralta

The proper remedy of the party aggrieved by a decision of the Court of
Appeals is a petition for review under Rule 45, which is not identical with a
petition for review under Rule 65. Under Rule 45, decisions, final orders or
resolutions of the Court of Appeals in any case, i.e., regardless of the nature of
the action or proceedings involved, may be appealed to us by filing a petition for
review, which would be but a continuation of the appellate process over the
original case. On the other hand, a special civil action under Rule 65 is an
independent action based on the specific ground therein provided and, as a
general rule, cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an
ordinary appeal, including that to be taken under Rule 45.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (VISAYAS) v. RODOLFO ZALDARRIAGA
G.R. No. 175349, June 22, 2010
J. Peralta

In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be
deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence. It does not
necessarily mean preponderant proof as required in ordinary civil cases, but
such kind of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate
to support a conclusion or evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent
men in the conduct of their affairs. In the present case, the evidence upon which
respondents administrative liability would be anchored lacked that degree of
certainty required in administrative cases, because the entries found in the two
separate audit conducted by the COA yielded conflicting results.

RUDOLFO I. BELUSO v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND GABRIELA WOMEN'S
PARTY
G.R. No. 180711, June 22, 2010
J. Peralta

A petition for certiorari will prosper only if grave abuse of discretion is
alleged and proved to exist. "Grave abuse of discretion," under Rule 65, has a
specific meaning. It is the arbitrary or despotic exercise of power due to passion,
prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or capricious exercise
of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law. The arguments in the
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petition and the issues alleged are only possible errors of judgment, questioning
the correctness of the COMELECs rulings. Where the real issue involves the
wisdom or legal soundness of the decision not the jurisdiction of the court to
render said decision the same is beyond the province of a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. REYNALDO BAYON Y RAMOS
G.R. No. 168627, July 2, 2010
J. Peralta

Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict an accused only if the circumstances proved
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to
the accused, to the exclusion of all others as the guilty person; the circumstances proved must
be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at
the same time inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilty. The Court finds that
the pieces of circumstantial evidence relied upon by the appellate court are insufficient to
convict appellant of the crime of qualified theft. In the first circumstance, the Court notes that
appellant was not the only stay-in helper of Atty. Limoso, as the latter testified that he had two
housemaids. The Court finds the circumstantial evidence relied upon by the trial and appellate
courts in convicting appellant to be insufficient in proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
absent any substantial evidence of unlawful taking by appellant.

PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, REPRESENTED BY GOVERNOR LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE
v. HEIRS OF AGUSTIN PATO, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 151084, July 2, 2010
J. Peralta

From the time Atty. Torallo paid the corresponding docket fees,
approximately 15 months had already lapsed from the time the notice of appeal
was filed by petitioners former counsel Atty. Catangui. The Court held that the
mere filing of the Notice of Appeal is not enough, for it must be accompanied by
the payment of the correct appellate docket fees. Payment in full of docket fees
within the prescribed period is mandatory. It is an essential requirement without
which the decision appealed from would become final and executory as if no
appeal had been filed. Failure to perfect an appeal within the prescribed period is
not a mere technicality but jurisdictional and failure to perfect an appeal renders
the judgment final and executory.

J. CASIM CONSTRUCTION SUPPLIES, INC. v. REGISTRAR OF DEEDS OF LAS
PIAS; INTESTATE ESTATE OF BRUNEO F. CASIM, (PURPORTED) INTERVENOR
G.R. No. 168655, July 2, 2010
J. Peralta

PERALTA

Lis pendens which literally means pending suit refers to the
jurisdiction, power or control which a court acquires over the property involved
in a suit, pending the continuance of the action, and until final judgment.
Clearly, the action for cancellation of the notice of lis pendens in this case must
have been filed not before the court a quo via an original action but rather,
before the RTC of Makati City, Branch as an incident of the annulment case in
relation to which its registration was sought. Thus, it is the latter court that has
jurisdiction over the main case referred to in the notice and it is that same court
which exercises power and control over the real property subject of the notice.

GERALDINE GAW GUY AND GRACE GUY CHEU v. ALVIN AGUSTIN T. IGNACIO
G.R. No. 167824, July 2, 2010
GERALDINE GAW GUY AND GRACE GUY CHEU v. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF
THE BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 168622, July 2, 2010
J. Peralta

Corollary to the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction. Courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which
is within the jurisdiction of the administrative tribunal prior to the resolution of that question by
the administrative tribunal, where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative
discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience and services of the administrative
tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. The Bureau of Immigration has the
exclusive authority and jurisdiction to try and hear cases against an alleged alien, and in the
process, determine also their citizenship. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction of petitioners
Board of Commissioners over deportation proceedings is not without exception. Judicial
intervention, however, should be granted in cases where the claim of citizenship is so
substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct. In other words,
the remedy should be allowed only on sound discretion of a competent court in a proper
proceeding. It appearing from the records that respondent's claim of citizenship is substantial,
judicial intervention should be allowed.

WALLEM PHILIPPINES SHIPPING, INC. v. S.R. FARMS, INC.
G.R. No. 161849, July 9, 2010
J. Peralta

The settled rule is that the filing of an amended pleading does not retroact to the date of
the filing of the original; hence, the statute of limitation runs until the submission of the
amendment. It is true that, as an exception, this Court has held that an amendment which
merely supplements and amplifies facts originally alleged in the complaint relates back to the
date of the commencement of the action and is not barred by the statute of limitations which
expired after the service of the original complaint. The exception, however, would not apply to
the party impleaded for the first time in the amended complaint.

SPOUSES ADOLFO FERNANDEZ, SR., AND LOURDES FERNANDEZ
v. SPOUSES MARTINES CO AND ERLINDA CO
G.R. No. 167390, July 26, 2010
J. Peralta
PERALTA


The Court of Appeals is not obliged to inform the parties that the petition will be given due course
based on the Comment and Reply of the parties. It has the discretion to resolve the case after the
Comment and Reply have been filed, or it may still require the parties to submit a Memorandum before
resolution of the case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DANTE TAN
G.R. No. 167526, July 26, 2010
J. Peralta

The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution
had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced
by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a
dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused." Such dismissal of a
criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place
the accused in double jeopardy. The verdict being one of acquittal, the case ends there.

The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the RTC acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, while certiorari may be availed of to
correct an erroneous acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly
demonstrate that the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very
power to dispense justice.

SPOUSES EDMUNDO AND LOURDES SARROSA v. WILLY O. DIZON
G.R. No. 183027, July 26, 2010
J. Peralta

Under Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, failure to comply with the
requirements stated therein, such as the statement of material dates, is sufficient ground to dismiss the
petition. Being an extraordinary remedy, the party who seeks to avail of the special civil action of
certiorari must strictly observe the rule laid down by law. The failure to state the date when the petitioners
received the RTC Order they are assailing, which consequently resulted in the Court of Appeals inability
to determine whether the petition for certiorari was filed on time, was sufficient ground to dismiss the
petition.

RPRP VENTURES MANAGEMENT & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
v. HON. TEOFILO L. GUADIZ, JR., PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MAKATI
CITY, BRANCH 147, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 152236, July 28, 2010
J. Peralta

Section 7 (c), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court requires the payment of docket fees when filing
Petitions for Extrajudicial Foreclosure of real and chattel mortgages. However, the said provisions of the
law pertain to petitions for foreclosure filed before the Office of the Ex-Officio Sheriff. In the present case,
Section 7 (c), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court is inapplicable, because the petition for extrajudicial
foreclosure of real property mortgage was filed before a notary public. Moreover, P.D. 1079, as
amended, did not apply to the publication of Notices of Sale in extrajudicial foreclosures conducted by
notaries public, because the said law was applicable to the publication of Notices of Sale in extrajudicial
foreclosures of mortgage conducted by a Sheriff.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO
ZUO, ET. AL. v. HON. BASILIO R. GABO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF MALOLOS, BULACAN, BRANCH II, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 161083, August 3, 2010
J. Peralta
PERALTA


Under the equipoise rule, where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise, or there is doubt
on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of proof loses. The equipoise rule
finds application if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one
of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, for then
the evidence does not suffice to produce a conviction. While the use of the equipoise rule was not proper
under the circumstances of the case at bar, the same, however, does not equate to an abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC, but at most, merely an error of judgment.

The judge is required to personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its supporting
evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause. The RTC had complied with its duty of personally evaluating the supporting evidence of
the prosecution before arriving at its decision of dismissing the case against respondents.

ELPIDIO CALIPAY v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION,
TRIANGLE ACE CORPORATION and JOSE LEE
G.R. No. 166411, August 3, 2010
J. Peralta

The timely perfection of an appeal is a mandatory requirement, which cannot be trifled with as a
"mere technicality" to suit the interest of a party. The rules on periods for filing appeals are to be observed
religiously, and parties who seek to avail themselves of the privilege must comply with the rules.
Nonetheless, procedural rules may be waived or dispensed with in the interest of substantial justice and
upon meritorious grounds. However, in the case at bar, petitioner cannot fault the withdrawal of his former
counsel for being unable to file the appeal within the time required by the law when it was shown that the
petitioner himself assented to such withdrawal. Such instance is not a meritorious ground that would call
for the relaxation of the procedural rules.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALEJANDRO RELLOTA Y TADEO
G.R. No. 168103, August 3, 2010
J. Peralta

Following the variance doctrine embodied in Section 4, in relation to Section 5, Rule 120,
Rules of Criminal Procedure, appellant can be found guilty of the lesser crime of acts of
lasciviousness. Said provisions provided that when there is a variance between the offense
charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included
in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense
proved which is included in the offense charged, or of the offense charged which is included in
the offense proved. An offense charged necessarily includes the offense proved when some of
the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information,
constitutes the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved
when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form part of those constituting the
latter.

RAMON TORRES AND JESSIE BELARMINO
v. SPOUSES VIHINZKY ALAMAG AND AIDA A. NGOJU
G.R. No. 169569, August 3, 2010
J. Peralta

Real property sold in a foreclosure sale may be redeemed by a creditor having a lien by virtue of
an attachment, judgment or mortgage on the property sold, or on some part thereof, subsequent to the
lien under which the property was sold. Such redeeming creditor is termed a redemptioner. Petitioner
PERALTA

Torres had a right to redeem the properties sold at public auction. He is a creditor who had lien on the
disputed lots by virtue of the Notice of Levy annotated on the respective titles of the properties as a result
of a final and executory judgment for rental arrearages and attorney's fees against respondent Alamag.

BERNARDO DE LEON v. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY, SUBSTITUTED BY THE CITY OF
PARAAQUE, RAMON ARELLANO, JR., RICARDO PENA AND REYMUNDO ORPILLA
G.R. No. 181970 & G.R. No. 182678, August 3, 2010
J. Peralta

The settled general principle is that a writ of execution must conform strictly to every essential
particular of the judgment promulgated, and may not vary the terms of the judgment it seeks to enforce,
nor may it go beyond the terms of the judgment sought to be executed. However, it is equally settled that
possession is an essential attribute of ownership. Where the ownership of a parcel of land was decreed in
the judgment, the delivery of the possession of the land should be considered included in the decision, it
appearing that the defeated partys claim to the possession thereof is based on his claim of ownership.
The Court had already declared the disputed property as owned by the State and that De Leon does not
have any right to possess the land independent of his claim of ownership.

HEIRS OF ANTONIO SANTOS AND LUISA ESGUERRA SANTOS v. HEIRS OF CRISPULO
BERAMO, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 151454, August 8, 2010
J. Peralta

In a motion to dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the truth of the material allegations of
the plaintiffs complaint for the purpose of resolving the motion. The general rule is that the allegations in
a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendant, if, admitting the facts
alleged, the court can render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. To
sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the complaint must show that the claim for relief
does not exist.

EQUITABLE PCI BANK, INC. v. DNG REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 168672, August 8, 2010
J. Peralta

A writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus will only be issued if there is neither appeal nor any
plain, speedy or adequate relief in the ordinary course of law. Section 8 of Act 3135 provides the plain,
speedy, and adequate remedy in opposing the issuance of a writ of possession. A party may file a
petition to set aside the foreclosure sale and to cancel the writ of possession in the same proceedings
where the writ of possession was requested. The aggrieved party may thereafter appeal from any
disposition by the court on the matter. In this case, respondent DNG did not file such petition and,
instead, filed the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with the CA. Hence, they were barred
from filing such petition from the RTC Order and the writ of possession issued by it.

FILEMON A. VERZANO, JR. v. FRANCIS VICTOR D. PARO, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 171643, August 8, 2010
J. Peralta

The clear import of Section 3, paragraph (b), of Rule 112 is that the Investigating Prosecutor may
issue subpoenas if he finds grounds to continue with the investigation. However, the continuance of the
investigation does not necessarily mean that the result will be an automatic conclusion of a finding of
probable cause. To subscribe to such a theory would defeat the very purpose of a counter-affidavit which
is to honor due process and to provide respondents an opportunity to refute the allegations made against
them.

PERALTA

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LEONITO AMATORIO
G.R. No. 175837, August 8, 2010
J. Peralta

It is basic that the filiation or kinship with the accused must be alleged in the information
as part of the constitutional right of the accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him. The failure to accurately allege the relationship between appellant and
his victim in the information bars his conviction of rape in its qualified form. Thus, since
Amatorios relationship to AAA was not alleged in the Information, he is thus auspiciously
spared from being convicted of qualified rape.

WILLIAM GOLANGCO CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION
v. RAY BURTON DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 163582, August 9, 2010
J. Peralta

The subject matter of petitioner's claims arose from differences in interpretation of the contract,
and under the terms thereof, such disputes are subject to voluntary arbitration. Since, under Section 4 of
Executive Order No. 1008 the CIAC shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over disputes arising
from, or connected with, contracts entered into by parties involved in construction in the Philippines and
all that is needed for the CIAC to acquire jurisdiction is for the parties to agree to submit the same to
voluntary arbitration, there can be no other conclusion but that the CIAC had jurisdiction over petitioner's
complaint

CHINA BANKING CORPORATION v. CEBU PRINTING AND PACKAGING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 172880, August 11, 2010
J. Peralta

When it is mentioned in paragraph 4 (c) of A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC that in case a petition appealing
or assailing the decision and/or final order is filed directly with the Court of Appeals within the
reglementary period, such petition shall be considered a petition for review under Rule 43, it is presumed
that the mode of appeal resorted to was an ordinary appeal and not a special civil action. Otherwise, the
Resolution should have categorically included certiorari under Rule 65 as among those that should be
considered as a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.

JERRY ONG v. PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORP.
G.R. No. 175116, August 18, 2010
J. Peralta

The appeal to the Court of Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal with the court which rendered the
judgment or final order appealed from and serving a copy thereof upon the adverse party. No record on
appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals
where the law or these Rules so require.

A petition for liquidation of an insolvent corporation is classified as a special proceeding. The RTC
decision, which petitioner sought to appeal from, was rendered in the special proceeding for the
liquidation of RBO's assets; thus, an appeal in a special proceeding requires both the filing of a notice of
appeal and the record on appeal within thirty days from receipt of the notice of judgment or final order.

LA CAMPANA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION v. ARTURO LEDESMA, HON. JUDGE ESTRELLA T.
ESTRADA, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 83,
QUEZON CITY AND THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 154152, August 25, 2010
PERALTA

J. Peralta

Where supervening events (occurring subsequent to the judgment) bring about a material change
in the situation of the parties which makes the execution inequitable, or where there is no compelling
urgency for the execution because it is not justified by the prevailing circumstances, the court may stay
immediate execution of the judgment.

In the present case, there also exists a material change in the situation of the parties. The CA
properly took into serious consideration the fact that in its Decision in CA-G.R. CV No. 34856 entitled La
Campana Food Products, Inc. v. Development Bank of the Philippines, which has become final and
executory, it ordered herein petitioner, formerly known as La Campana Food Products, Inc., to surrender
possession of subject properties to the Development Bank of the Philippines. Evidently, a serious cloud of
doubt has been cast on petitioners right of possession, making it questionable whether the RTC
Decision, ordering private respondent to surrender possession of subject premises to petitioner, should
be immediately implemented.

CHANG IK JIN, REPRESENTED BY HIS ATTORNEY-IN-FACT KIMAN CHANG, AND KOREAN
CHRISTIAN BUSINESSMEN ASSOCIATION, INC. v. CHOI SUNG BONG
G.R. No. 166358, September 8, 2010
J. Peralta

When the motion to dismiss has not yet been decided upon by the trial court, there can be no
error committed by the Court of Appeals for not ruling on the issues of prescription, failure to state a
cause of action and improper venue, all of which were the grounds raised in the said motion.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION) AND ROLANDO PLAZA
G.R. No. 169004, September 15, 2010
J. Peralta

The present case definitely falls under Section 4 (b) where other offenses and felonies committed
by public officials or employees in relation to their office are involved where the said provision, contains
no exception. Therefore, what applies in the present case is the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to
try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the
commission of the offense. The present case having been instituted on March 25, 2004, the provisions of
R.A. 8249 shall govern. Clearly, by simple application of the pertinent provisions of the law, respondent
Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod during the alleged commission of an offense in relation
to his office, necessarily falls within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

DIMSON (MANILA), INC. AND PHESCO, INC. v. LOCAL WATER UTILITIES ADMINISTRATION
G.R. No. 168656, September 22, 2010
J. Peralta

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that when an administrative
remedy is provided by law, relief must be sought by exhausting this remedy before judicial intervention
may be availed of. No recourse can be had until all such remedies have been exhausted, and the special
civil actions against administrative officers should not be entertained if there are superior administrative
officers who could grant relief.
PUBLIC HEARING COMMITTEE OF THE LAGUNA LAKE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY AND HON.
GENERAL MANAGER CALIXTO CATAQUIZ
v. SM PRIME HOLDINGS, INC.
G.R. No. 170599, September 22, 2010
J. Peralta

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of
PERALTA

administrative processes afforded him or her. Hence, if resort to a remedy within the administrative
machinery can still be made by giving the administrative officer concerned every opportunity to decide on
a matter that comes within his or her jurisdiction, then such remedy should be exhausted first before the
courts judicial power can be sought. The premature invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to
ones cause of action.

SPOUSES CONRADO ANTONIO and AVELYN ANTONIO
v. JULITA SAYMAN VDA. DE MONJE, SUBSTITUTED BY HER HEIRS, NAMELY: ANGELINA
MONJE-VILLAMOR, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 149624, September 29, 2010
J. Peralta

According to the doctrine of res judicata, an existing final judgment or decree rendered on the
merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon any matter within its
jurisdiction, is conclusive of the rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same
or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and matters in issue in the first suit. To
state simply, a final judgment or decree on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of
the rights of the parties or their privies in all later suits on all points and matters determined in the former
suit.

In the present case, there is no question that there is identity of parties in Civil Case No. 007-125
and Civil Case No. 506. However, there is no identity of issues as it is shown that the issue raised in Civil
Case No. 007-125 is whether the sale to petitioners being contested by respondents is valid. On the other
hand, in Civil Case No. 506, the issues are whether petitioners were deprived of possession of Lot No. 1
which was validly sold to them and whether they are entitled to an accounting of the proceeds of the
copra harvested from their property which was supposedly appropriated by respondents. Moreover, the
cause of action in these cases are not identical. Hence, there is no res judicata in the present case.

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS) v. HEIRS OF FERNANDO F. CABALLERO,
REPRESENTED BY HIS DAUGHTER, JOCELYN G. CABALLERO
G.R. Nos. 158090, October 4, 2010
J. Peralta

To determine whether a counterclaim is compulsory or not, the Court has devised the following
tests: (a) Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and by the counterclaim largely the same? (b)
Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendants claims, absent the compulsory counterclaim
rule? (c) Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs claim as well as the defendants
counterclaim? and (d) Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim? A positive
answer to all four questions would indicate that the counterclaim is compulsory.

The evidence needed by Fernando to cause the annulment of the bid award, deed of absolute
sale and TCT is different from that required to establish petitioner's claim for the recovery of rentals. The
latter is in the nature of a permissive counterclaim, which, for the trial court to acquire jurisdiction, the
counterclaimant is bound to pay the prescribed docket fees. In view of the non-payment of docket fees,
the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the counterclaim.

JORGE L. TIANGCO, ET. AL. v. LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 153998, October 6, 2010
J. Peralta

Section 7, Rule 44 of the Rules of Court requires the appellant to serve two copies of the
appellant's brief to the appellee. However, the failure to serve the required number of copies does not
automatically result in the dismissal of the appeal. The CA has, under the said provision of the Rules of
PERALTA

Court, discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss respondents appeal. Although said discretion must be a
sound one, to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the
circumstances obtaining in each case, the presumption is that it has been so exercised.

Furthermore, the failure of an appellant to file his brief within the time prescribed does not have
the effect of dismissing the appeal automatically. The court has discretion to dismiss or not to dismiss an
appellant's appeal. It is a power conferred on the court, not a duty. The discretion must be a sound one,
to be exercised in accordance with the tenets of justice and fair play, having in mind the circumstances
obtaining in each case.

BANK OF COMMERCE v. HON. ESTELA PERLAS-BERNABE, IN HER CAPACITY AS PRESIDING
JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL OF MAKATI CITY, BRANCH 142; BANCAPITAL DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION; AND EXCHANGE CAPITAL CORPORATION
G.R. No. 172393, October 20, 2010
J. Peralta

It is well recognized that consolidation of cases avoids multiplicity of suits, guards against
oppression and abuse, prevents delay, clears congested court dockets, simplifies the work of the courts
and seeks to attain justice with the least expense and vexation to litigants. Generally, consolidation
applies only to cases pending before the same judge and not to cases pending in different branches of
the same court or in different courts.

Yet in appropriate instances and in the interest of justice, cases pending in different branches of
the court or in different courts may be consolidated, consistent with the rule in our jurisdiction that leans
towards permitting consolidation of cases whenever possible and irrespective of the diversity of the
issues for resolution. Hence, consolidation of cases is proper when the actions involve the same reliefs or
the same parties and basically the same issues, or when there is real need to forestall the possibility of
conflicting decisions being rendered in the cases, provided that the measure will not give one party an
undue advantage over the other, or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties.

SHINRYO (PHILIPPINES) COMPANY, INC. v. RRN INCORPORATED
G.R. No. 172525, October 20, 2010
J. Peralta

It is settled that findings of fact of quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because
their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but also finality,
especially when affirmed by the Court of Appeals. In particular, factual findings of construction arbitrators
are final and conclusive and not reviewable by this Court on appeal. Although, such rule admits of certain
exceptions, the Court has ruled that none of such exceptions is present in the instant case.

SPOUSES ALFREDO AND ENCARNACION CHING v. FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, AND SHERIFF OF
MANILA
G.R. No. 167835 & G.R. No. 188480, November 15, 2010
J. Peralta

It is settled that execution is enforced by the fact of levy and sale. The result of such execution
was that title over the subject property was vested immediately in the purchaser subject only to the
Spouses Chings right to redeem the property within the period provided for by law. The right acquired by
the purchaser at an execution sale is inchoate and does not become absolute until after the expiration of
the redemption period without the right of redemption having been exercised. But inchoate though it be, it
is, like any other right, entitled to protection and must be respected until extinguished by redemption.
Since, the Spouses Ching failed to redeem the subject property within the period allowed by law, they
have been divested of their rights over the property.

PERALTA

The doctrine of res judicata is a rule which pervades every well-regulated system of jurisprudence
and is founded upon two grounds embodied in various maxims of the common law, namely: (1) public
policy and necessity, which makes it to the interest of the State that there should be an end to litigation -
republicae ut sit litium, and (2) the hardship on the individual that he should be vexed twice for the same
cause - nemo debet bis vexari et eadem causa. A contrary doctrine would certainly subject the public
peace and quiet to the will and neglect of individuals and prefer the gratification of the litigious disposition
on the part of suitors to the preservation of the public tranquility and happiness.

Moreover, it is settled that the issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in a public auction
is a ministerial act. After the consolidation of title in the buyers name for failure of the mortgagor to
redeem the property, entitlement to the writ of possession becomes a matter of right. To be sure,
regardless of whether or not there is a pending action for nullification of the sale at public auction, the
purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession without prejudice to the outcome of such action.

PHIL PHARMAWEALTH, INC. v. PFIZER, INC. AND PFIZER (PHIL.) INC.
G.R. No. 167715, November 17, 2010
J. Peralta

Pertinent portions of Section 5, Rule 58 of the same Rules provide that if the matter is of extreme
urgency and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable injury, a temporary restraining order
may be issued ex parte. From the foregoing, it can be inferred that two requisites must exist to warrant
the issuance of an injunctive relief, namely: (1) the existence of a clear and unmistakable right that must
be protected; and (2) an urgent and paramount necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage. In the
instant case, it is clear that when the CA issued its January 18, 2005 Resolution approving the bond filed
by respondents, the latter no longer had a right that must be protected, considering that Philippine Letters
Patent No. 21116 which was issued to them already expired on July 16, 2004. Hence, the issuance by
the CA of a temporary restraining order in favor of the respondents is not proper.

On the other hand, there is no question as to the identity of parties in the complaints filed with the
IPO and the RTC. In the instant case, respondents' cause of action in their complaint filed with the IPO is
the alleged act of petitioner in importing, distributing, selling or offering for sale Sulbactam Ampicillin
products, acts that are supposedly violative of respondents' right to the exclusive sale of the said products
which are covered by the latter's patent. Respondents have the same cause of action in their Complaint
before the RTC as in their complaint filed with the IPO. It does not matter that the patents upon which the
complaints were based are different. The fact remains that in both complaints the rights violated and the
acts violative of such rights are identical. Hence, forum shopping exists.

FROILAN DEJURAS v. HON. RENE C. VILLA, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS SECRETARY OF
AGRARIAN REFORM, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 173428, November 22, 2010
J. Peralta

A writ of mandamus generally lies to compel the performance of a ministerial duty, but not the
performance of an official act or duty which necessarily involves the exercise of judgment. Thus, when
the act sought to be performed involves the exercise of discretion, the respondent may only be directed
by mandamus to act but not to act in one way or the other. It is, nonetheless, also available to compel
action, when refused, in matters involving judgment and discretion, but not to direct the exercise of
judgment in a particular manner. Clearly, the grant of an injunctive relief in this case is not properly
compellable by mandamus inasmuch as it requires discretion and judgment on the part of both the DAR
and the DARAB to find whether petitioner has a clear legal right that needs to be protected and that the
acts of SMPHI are violative of such right.

ARRA REALTY CORPORATION, ET. AL. v. PACES INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION
G.R. No. 169761, December 1, 2010
J. Peralta
PERALTA


The doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on fundamental considerations of public policy
and sound practice. Nothing is more settled in law than that once a judgment attains finality it thereby
becomes immutable and unalterable. The finality of decision is a jurisdictional event which cannot be
made to depend on the convenience of the party. To rule otherwise would completely negate the purpose
of the rule on completeness of service, which is to place the date of receipt of pleadings, judgment and
processes beyond the power of the party being served to determine at his pleasure. In the instant case,
the filing of a notice of forwarding address with the Office of the Postmaster can never be a substitute to
filing a notice of change of address with the court. Since petitioners failed to file a timely motion for
reconsideration, the CA Decision had become final and executory and, thus, immutable.

BEATRIZ SIOK PING TANG v. SUBIC BAY DISTRIBUTION, INC.
G.R. No. 162575, December 15, 2010
J. Peralta

The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sine qua non for the filing of a
petition for certiorari. Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived
error attributed to it by the re-examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. The rule is,
however, circumscribed by well-defined exceptions such as: x x x; (b) where the questions raised in the
certiorari proceeding have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as
those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution
of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner
or the subject matter of the action is perishable; x x x; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law
or where public interest is involved.

ROMER SY TAN v. SY TIONG GUE, ET. AL.
G.R. No. 174570, December 15, 2010
J. Peralta

A search warrant may be issued only if there is probable cause in connection with only one
specific offense alleged in an application on the basis of the applicants personal knowledge and his or
her witnesses.

IN THE MATTER OF THE HEIRSHIP (INTESTATE ESTATES) OF THE LATE HERMOGENES
RODRIGUEZ, ANTONIO RODRIGUEZ, MACARIO J. RODRIGUEZ, DELFIN RODRIGUEZ, AND
CONSUELO M. RODRIGUEZ AND SETTLEMENT OF THEIR ESTATES
RENE B. PASCUAL v. JAIME M. ROBLES
G.R. No. 182645, December 15, 2010
J. Peralta

The failure to perfect an appeal as required by the rules has the effect of defeating the right to
appeal of a party and precluding the appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. The right to
appeal is not a natural right nor a part of due process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be
exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law

An indispensable party is a party-in-interest without whom no final determination can be had of an
action, and who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is
mandatory. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court with jurisdiction, which is
"the authority to hear and determine a cause, the right to act in a case."

2011

PRINCE TRANSPORT, Inc. and Mr. RENATO CLAROS v. DIOSDADO GARCIA, LUISITO
GARCIA, RODANTE ROMERO, REX BARTOLOME, FELICIANO GASCO, JR., DANILO
ROJO, EDGAR SANFUEGO, AMADO GALANTO, EUTIQUIO LUGTU, JOEL GRAMATICA,
PERALTA

MIEL CERVANTES, TERESITA CABANES, ROE DELA CRUZ, RICHELO BALIDOY, VILMA
PORRAS, MIGUELITO SALCEDO, CRISTINA GARCIA, MARIO NAZARENO, DINDO
TORRES, ESMAEL RAMBOYONG, ROBETO* MANO, ROGELIO BAGAWISAN, ARIEL
SNACHEZ, ESTAQULO VILLAREAL, NELSON MONTERO, GLORIA ORANTE, HARRY
TOCA, PABLITO MACASAET and RONALD GARCITA
G.R. No. 167291, January 12, 2011
J. Peralta

Equally settled is the rule that factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have
acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect
but even finality by the courts when supported by substantial evidence, i.e., the amount of
relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
But these findings are not infallible. When there is a showing that they were arrived at arbitrarily
or in disregard of the evidence on record, they may be examined by the courts.

HEIRS OF SANTIAGO C. DIVINAGRACIA
v. HON. J. CEDRICK O. RUIZ, Presiding Judge, Branch 39, Regional Trial Court, Iloilo
City; GERRY D. SUMACULUB, as Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court; BOMBO
RADYO HOLDINGS, INC., and ROGELIO M. FLORETE, SR.
G.R. No. 172508, January 12, 2011
J. Peralta

Indisputably, the amendment of Section 4, Rule 1 of the Interim Rules is procedural in
character. Well-settled is the rule that procedural laws are construed to be applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, and are deemed retroactive in that
sense and to that extent. Procedural laws do not fall under the general rule against retroactive
operation of statutes. Further, the retroactive application of procedural laws does not violate any
personal rights because no vested right has yet attached or arisen from them. Clearly, the
amended Section 4, Rule 1 of the Interim Rules must be applied retroactively to the present
case. Therefore, the trial courts award of exemplary damages and attorneys fees in favor of
private respondents is not immediately executory.

CARGILL PHILIPPINES, INC. v. SAN FERNANDO REGALA TRADING, INC.
G.R. No. 175404, January 31, 2011
J. Peralta

It had been held that as long as a court acts within its jurisdiction and does not gravely
abuse its discretion in the exercise thereof, any supposed error committed by it will amount to
nothing more than an error of judgment reviewable by a timely appeal and not assailable by a
special civil action of certiorari.

ADELIA C. MENDOZA and as ATTORNEY-IN-FACT OF ALICE MALLETA v. UNITED
COCONUT PLANTERS BANK, INC.
G.R. No. 165575, February 02, 2011
J. Peralta

PERALTA

When a partys Appellants Brief has no assignment of errors and page references, it is a
ground for dismissal of the appeal. The right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due
process; it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in
accordance with the provisions of law. An appeal being a purely statutory right, an appealing
party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.

MANUEL CATINDIG, represented by his legal representative EMILIANO CATINDIG-
RODRIGO v. AURORA IRENE VDA. DE MENESES/SILVINO ROXAS, SR. represented by
FELICISIMA VILLAFUERTE ROXAS v. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL.
G.R. No. 165851/G.R. No. 168875, February 02, 2011
J. Peralta

When a party is assailing the decision of the CA before the SC, the correct recourse
should be to file a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and not a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65. Settled is the rule that where appeal is available to the aggrieved party, the
special civil action for certiorari will not be entertained remedies of appeal and certiorari are
mutually exclusive, not alternative or successive. One of the requisites of certiorari is that there
be no available appeal or any plain, speedy and adequate remedy. Where an appeal is
available, certiorari will not prosper, even if the ground therefor is grave abuse of discretion.
Accordingly, when a party adopts an improper remedy, his petition may be dismissed outright.

MACTAN-CEBU INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT AUTHORITY v. HEIRS OF ESTANISLAO
MIOZA, namely: THE HEIRS OF FILOMENO T. MIOZA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 186045, February 02, 2011
J . Peralta

If a party wishes to intervene in a proceeding before a court, he must show that he has a
direct and immediate legal interest in the matter of litigation. However, if he also intends to
simultaneously have his legal interest be determined in the same case, the court shall not grant
his motion to intervene. The remedy of intervention is not proper where it will have the effect of
retarding the principal suit or delaying the trial of the action.

FILIPINAS PALMOIL PROCESSING, INC. and DENNIS T. VILLAREAL v. JOEL P. DEJAPA,
represented by his ATTORNEY-IN-FACT MYRNA MANZANO
G.R. No. 167332, February 07, 2011
J. Peralta
PERALTA


When the CA renders a nunc pro tunc order, which is an exception to the rule of
immutability of judgments, it does not mean that the decisions are no longer characterized as
final and executory. Instead, a nunc pro tunc order has for its purpose to place in proper form on
the record, the judgment that had been previously rendered, to make it speak the truth, so as to
make it show what the judicial action really was. The order is not entered to correct judicial
errors, such as to render a judgment which the court ought to have rendered, in place of the one
it did erroneously render, nor to supply nonaction by the court, however erroneous the judgment
may have been.

RUBEN REYNA, ET AL. v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 167219, February 08, 2011
J. Peralta

When there is no grave abuse of discretion committed by the lower court, questions of
fact cannot be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court. The office of
the petition for certiorari is not to correct simple errors of judgment; any resort to the said
petition under Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to
the resolution of jurisdictional issues.

INSURANCE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS CORPORATION v. SPOUSES VIDAL S.
GREGORIO AND JULIA GREGORIO
G.R. No. 174104, February 14, 2011
J. Peralta

The essence of laches or stale demands is the failure or neglect for an unreasonable
and unexplained length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should
have been done earlier, thus, giving rise to a presumption that the party entitled to assert it
either has abandoned or declined to assert it. There is no absolute rule as to what
constitutes laches or staleness of demand; each case is to be determined according to its
particular circumstances.

When a party discovers that a fraud was committed on the registration of titles by
another party, the former has four years to file an action against the latter. However, the
reckoning point of the four year prescriptive period shall begin from the time of discovery of the
fraud, not from the dates of registration which are indicated in said titles.

DAVID LU v. PATERNO LU YM, SR. ET AL./PATERNO LU YM, SR., ET AL.V. DAVID
LU/JOHN LU YM, ET AL.v. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS OF CEBU CITY, ET AL.
G.R. No. 153690/G.R. No. 157381/G.R. No. 170889, February 15, 2011
PERALTA

J. Peralta

When a party has actively participated in the proceedings and belatedly raises the issue
of payment of insufficient docket fees through a motion for reconsideration, he is considered to
be estopped. Furthermore, a partys inquiry from the Office of the Court Administrator cannot be
deemed as an act of raising the jurisdictional question prior to the rendition of the trial courts
decision.

UNIVERSITY OF MINDANAO, INC. et al.v. COURT OF APPEALS and PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT
INSURANCE CORPORATION
G.R. No. 181201, February 21, 2011
J. Peralta

Failure of a party to submit copies of the approved record on appeal will not be fatal to
its appeal. Also, there will be no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the court for not
dismissing the case despite non-submission of the same. Hence, the remedy of certiorari is
improper to correct this kind of error of procedure.

FESTO R. GALANG, JR. V. HON. RAMIRO R. GERONIMO, as PRES. JUDGE OF THE RTC
OF ROMBLON, BRANCH 81 and NICASIO M. RAMOS
G.R. No. 192793, February 22, 2011
J. Peralta

In an election case, when the petitioner wishes to file a petition for certiorari, he must not
raise it before the Supreme Court but with the COMELEC. Since it is the COMELEC which has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of an appeal from the decision of the regional trial court in
election contests involving elective municipal officials, then it is also the COMELEC which has
jurisdiction to issue a writ of certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODRIGO SALCEDO alias DIGOL
G.R. No. 178272, March 14, 2011
J. Peralta

When the declaration of a dying person is presented before the court, the same is
allowed, pursuant to Section 37, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. Generally, witnesses can testify
only to those facts derived from their own perception. However, a report in open court of a dying
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person's declaration made under the consciousness of an impending death that is the subject of
inquiry in the case is admissible.

In order for a dying declaration to be held admissible, four requisites must concur: first,
the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's
death; second, at the time the declaration was made, the declarant must be under the
consciousness of an impending death; third, the declarant is competent as a witness; and
fourth, the declaration must be offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder, or parricide, in
which the declarant is the victim.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE v. ARMANDO CHINGH y PARCIA
G.R. No. 178323, March 16, 2011
J. Peralta

When a rape victim is a child, her testimony must be lent credence and that even if such
is the only testimony in said case, if nonetheless credible, it is enough to sustain a conviction. A
young girl would not usually concoct a tale of defloration; publicly admit having been ravished
and her honor tainted; allow the examination of her private parts; and undergo all the trouble
and inconvenience, not to mention the trauma and scandal of a public trial, had she not in fact
been raped and been truly moved to protect and preserve her honor, and motivated by the
desire to obtain justice for the wicked acts committed against her.

ANITA MONASTERIO-PE, et al.v. JOSE JUAN TONG, herein represented by his
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT JOSE Y. ONG
G.R. No. 151369, March 23, 2011
J. Peralta

Even if it was the attorney-in-fact who executed a certificate against forum shopping and
not the principal party, there is still substantial compliance with the rules. Although the first
paragraph of Section5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court requires that the certification should be
signed by the petitioner or principal party himself, the execution of the certification against
forum shopping by the attorney-in-fact is not a violation of the requirement that the parties must
personally sign the same. The attorney-in-fact, who has authority to file, and who actually filed
the complaint as the representative of the plaintiff, is a party to the (ejectment) suit.

A person who occupies the land of another at the latter's tolerance or permission,
without any contract between them, is necessarily bound by an implied promise that he will
vacate upon demand, failing which a summary action for ejectment is the proper remedy against
him. Under Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the one-year period within which a
complaint for unlawful detainer can be filed should be counted from the date of demand,
because only upon the lapse of that period does the possession become unlawful.
PERALTA


JUDGE ADORACION G. ANGELES v. HON. MANUEL B. GAITE, DEPUTY EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS, et al.
G.R. No. 176596, March 23, 2011
J. Peralta

When a party is left with no more appeal or other remedy available in the ordinary
course of law, her remedy is to file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court on
the ground of grave abuse of discretion. However, she must file the petition for certiorari within
60 days from receipt of the DOJ resolution denying her motion for reconsideration, otherwise
the DOJ resolutions become final and executory after the lapse of the period for assailing the
same.

MARIA LOURDES TAMANI, ET AL.v. RAMON SALVADOR, ET AL.
G.R. No. 171497, April 04, 2011
J. Peralta

When a party assails the authenticity of a signature in the document and raises the issue
of forgery, the opinion of a handwriting expert must be given credence. The value of the opinion
of a handwriting expert depends not upon his mere statements of whether a writing is genuine
or false, but upon the assistance he may afford in pointing out distinguishing marks,
characteristics and discrepancies in and between genuine and false specimens of writing which
would ordinarily escape notice or detection from an unpracticed observer. However, the judge
must also conduct his own independent examination of the signatures under scrutiny.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DIMA MONTANIR, et al.
G.R. No. 187534, April 04, 2011
J. Peralta

If there are minor inconsistencies in the testimony of the witness, this will not affect the
veracity and weight of the same. What really prevails is the consistency of the testimonies of the
witnesses in relating the principal occurrence and positive identification of the appellants. Slight
contradictions in fact even serve to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses and prove that
their testimonies are not rehearsed. They are thus safeguards against memorized perjury.

HEIRS OF FRANCISCO RETUYA, ET AL.v. COURT OF APPEALS, NICOLAS RETUYA, ET
AL.
G.R. No. 163039, April 06, 2011
J. Peralta
PERALTA


When the party fails to comply with the rules of substitution of counsel, there can be no
valid substitution and the substituting counsel has no right to represent in court. Under Section
26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and established jurisprudence, a valid substitution of counsel
has the following requirements: (1) the filing of a written application for substitution; (2) the
clients written consent; (3) the consent of the substituted lawyer if such consent can be
obtained; and, in case such written consent cannot be procured, (4) a proof of service of notice
of such motion on the attorney to be substituted in the manner required by the Rules.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. GREGORIO FELIPE CALINGANGAN
G.R. No. 191754, April 11, 2011
J. Peralta

When the witnesses for prosecution in a case involving violations of the Dangerous
Drugs Act are police officers, their testimonies are given credence for it is presumed that they
have performed their duties in a regular manner. However, this presumption can only be
overturned through clear and convincing evidence that show either of two things: (1) that they
were not properly performing their duty; or (2) that they were inspired by any improper motive

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOEL BALUYA y NOTARTE
G.R. No. 181822, April 13, 2011
J. Peralta

Factual findings of the trial court as regards its assessment of the witnesses' credibility
are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court, particularly when the CA affirms the said
findings, and will not be disturbed absent any showing that the trial court overlooked certain
facts and circumstances which could substantially affect the outcome of the case. When the
appellant failed to present sufficient evidence to prove that the RTC and the CA overlooked
certain facts and circumstances which, if considered, might affect the result of the case, said
findings of the lower courts will not be disturbed. Also, denial is an inherently weak defense,
which cannot prevail over the positive and credible testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. Denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of prosecution witnesses who
were not shown to have any ill motive to testify against petitioner.


PERALTA

CELIA S. VDA. DE HERRERA v. EMELIA BERNARDO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 170251, June 01, 2011
J. Peralta

When a land dispute is raised before the COSLAP, it does not automatically mean that it
has jurisdiction over such case. In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to
refer the same to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP has to consider the nature or
classification of the land involved, the parties to the case, the nature of the questions raised,
and the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injuries to persons and
damage or destruction to property. The law does not vest jurisdiction on the COSLAP over any
land dispute or problem.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. IRENO BONAAGUA y BERCE
G.R. No. 188897, June 06, 2011
J. Peralta

When the offended parties in rape cases are young and immature girls, courts are
inclined to lend credence to their version of what transpired, considering not only their relative
vulnerability, but also the shame and embarrassment to which they would be exposed if the
matter about which they testified were not true. The Court has consistently held that in rape
cases, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is best addressed to the sound discretion of
the trial judge whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight and respect because the judge
had the direct opportunity to observe them on the stand and ascertain if they were telling the
truth or not.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALBERTO ANTICAMARA y CABILLO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 178771, June 08, 2011
J. Peralta

When no one directly saw the crime committed, the prosecution may nonetheless paint a
clear picture of what happened through circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence
consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main fact
may be inferred according to reason and common experience. Circumstantial evidence is
sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as
to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

IN THE MATTER OF HEIRSHIP (INTESTATE ESTATES) OF THE LATE HERMOGENES
RODRIGUEZ, et al.v. JAIME M. ROBLES
G.R. No. 182645, June 22, 2011
PERALTA

J. Peralta

A person not a party to the proceedings in the trial court or in the CA cannot maintain an
action for certiorari in the Supreme Court to have the judgment reviewed. Stated differently, if a
petition for certiorari or prohibition is filed by one who was not a party in the lower court, he has
no standing to question the assailed order.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. URBAN SALCEDO, et al., ACCUSED-APPELLANTS,
KHADAFFY JANJALANI, et al.
G.R. No. 186523, June 22, 2011
J. Peralta

When the accused-appellants failed to present convincing evidence that it was physically
impossible for them to have been present at the crime scene at the time of the commission
thereof, their denial and alibi cannot prevail over the witnesses positive identification of the
former. It is settled in this jurisdiction that the defense of alibi, being inherently weak, cannot
prevail over the clear and positive identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime.

FELICISIMA R. DIAZ v. JUDGE GERARDO E. GESTOPA, JR., MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT,
NAGA, CEBU
A.M. No. MTJ-11-1786, June 22, 2011
J. Peralta

When a party files an unlawful detainer case, there is no need to refer the same to the
lupon for amicable settlement. A case of unlawful detainer is covered by the Revised Rules on
Summary Procedure and the Rules was promulgated for the purpose of achieving "an
expeditious and inexpensive determination of cases." The fact that unlawful detainer cases fall
under summary procedure, speedy resolution thereof is thus deemed a matter of public policy.

DATU KIRAM SAMPACO, substituted by HADJI SORAYA S. MACABANDO v. HADJI
SERAD MINGCA LANTUD
G.R. No. 163551, July 18, 2011
J. Peralta

When a party wishes to attack on a title, as when he wants to nullify the same, he may
do so directly through a counterclaim. A counterclaim can be considered a direct attack on the
title, only this time, it is the original defendant who becomes the plaintiff. It stands on the same
footing and is to be tested by the same rules as if it were an independent action.

BIENVENIDO BARRIENTOS v. MARIO RAPAL
PERALTA

G.R. No. 169594, July 20, 2011
J. Peralta

When a party files a case for unlawful detainer, the sole question to be resolved therein
is who is entitled to physical possession of the premises. The case need not dwell on the claim
of ownership by any of the parties. However, where the issue of ownership is raised by any of
the parties, the courts may pass upon the same in order to determine who has the right to
possess the property. The adjudication is, however, merely provisional and would not bar or
prejudice an action between the same parties involving title to the property.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALLEN UDTOJAN MANTALABA
G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011
J. Peralta

When a buy-bust team fails to comply with rule on custody and disposition of confiscated
dangerous drugs, this will not render an accuseds arrest illegal or the items seized/confiscated
as inadmissible. As ruled by the Court, what is crucial in the chain of custody is the marking of
the confiscated item immediately after they are seized from the accused. The marking of the
evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from the corpus of all other similar or related
evidence from the time they are seized from the accused until they are disposed of at the end of
criminal proceedings, obviating switching, "planting," or contamination of evidence.

CEFERINA DE UNGRIA (deceased) substituted by her heirs, LOLITA UNGRIA SAN JUAN-
JAVIER and RHODORA R. PELOMIDA v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 165777, July 25, 2011
J. Peralta

When the subject matter of the controversy is not susceptible of pecuniary estimation,
the party should fie the same within the jurisdiction of the RTC and that the docket fee shall be
P400.00, pursuant to Section 7(b)(1) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. The payment of the
prescribed docket fee is important because it vests a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject
matter or nature of the action.

MINDA VILLAMOR v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES/GLICERIO VIOS, JR. v. PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 172110/G.R. No. 181804, August 01, 2011
J. Peralta

If the appellant fails to file his brief on time, his case will be dismissed. Under the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure (Section 3, Rule 124), the appellant must file his brief
within thirty (30) days from receipt by the appellant or his counsel of the notice from the clerk of
court of this Court that evidence, oral and documentary, is already attached to the record.

PERALTA

ATTY. EMELIA H. GARAYBLAS and ATTY. RENATO G. DELA CRUZ v. THE HON.
GREGORY ONG, et al.
G.R. No. 174507-30, August 03, 2011
J. Peralta

When the counsel fails to appear during a pre-trial conference, the court may penalize
him pursuant to Section 3, Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Under the
Rules, the court may sanction or penalize counsel for the accused if the following concur: (1)
counsel does not appear at the pre-trial conference and (2) counsel does not offer an
acceptable excuse.

AUGUSTUS GONZALES and SPOUSES NESTOR VICTOR and MA. LOURDES
RODRIGUEZ v. QUIRICO PE
G.R. No.167398, August 08, 2011
J. Peralta

A partys non-payment of docket and other lawful fees should not be treated as mistake
and excusable negligence. This is clearly negligence of respondent's counsel, which is not
excusable. Negligence to be excusable must be one which ordinary diligence and
prudence could not have guarded against. The Court has ruled that therein counsels failure
to file the appeal in due time does not amount to excusable negligence. The non-perfection of
the appeal on time is not a mere technicality.

METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, substituted by MERIDIAN
CORPORATION v. INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE BANK/CHUAYUCO STEEL
MANUFACTURING v. INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE BANK
G.R. No.176008/G.R. No. 176131, August 10, 2011
J. Peralta

Forum shopping exists when two or more actions involve the same transactions,
essential facts and circumstances, and raise identical causes of action, subject matter, and
issues. Still another test of forum shopping is when the elements of litis pendencia are present
or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another whether in the two
or more pending cases, there is an identity of (a) parties (or at least such parties as represent
the same interests in both actions); (b) rights or causes of action, and (c) reliefs sought.

When a party only assails an issue which is purely of law, there is no need to file a
motion for reconsideration before certiorari may be availed of. Although the general rules is that
before certiorari may be availed of, petitioner must have filed a motion for reconsideration of the
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act or order complained of, there are exceptions such as when: (i) the issue raised is one purely
of law; (ii) public interest is involved; (iii) there is urgency; (iv) a question of jurisdiction is
squarely raised before and decided by the lower court; and (v) the order is a patent nullity.

The purpose of intervention is to enable a stranger to an action to become a party in
order for him to protect his interest and for the court to settle all conflicting claims. Intervention is
allowed to avoid multiplicity of suits more than on due process considerations.To warrant
intervention under Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, two requisites must concur: (1) the movant has
a legal interest on the matter in litigation; and (2) intervention must not unduly delay or prejudice
the adjudication of the rights of the parties, nor should the claim of the intervenor be capable of
being properly decided in a separate proceeding.

STEPHEN SY y TIBAGONG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 182178, August 15, 2011
J. Peralta

When the accused is arrested in flagrante delicto as he was then committing a crime,
violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act, within the view of the police officers, his arrest, even
without a warrant, is valid. Consequently, the results of the ensuing search and seizure were
admissible in evidence to prove his guilt of the offense charged.

SPOUSES NELSON AND MYRNA VILLANUEVA v. THE COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 163433, August 22, 2011
J. Peralta

When a party files a new action involving identity of parties, identity of rights asserted
and reliefs prayed for and identity of two preceding particulars amounting to res judicata in the
action under consideration, he shall be liable for forum shopping. The Court has ruled that the
other case need not be pending in order that the rule on forum shopping may apply because
shopping may still be committed if one files multiple cases involving the same parties causes of
action and prayer and the previous case has already been finally resolved.

ABRAHAM MICLAT, JR. y CERBO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 176077, August 31, 2011
J. Peralta

When the accused is arrested without an arrest warrant, the same may still be
considered reasonable and valid. Under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure states that an arrest without warrant is lawful when two (2) elements are
present: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
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committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDGAR EVANGELIO y GALLO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 181902, August 31, 2011
J. Peralta

When the victim did not exactly witness the rape because she was unconscious at the
time, circumstantial evidence may nevertheless be sufficient to convict the accused of the crime.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if (a) there is more than one
circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; (c) the
combination of all circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.


JESUS TORRES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 175074, August 31, 2011
J. Peralta

When a party committed an error in filing an appeal to the proper court, the designation
of the wrong court does not necessarily affect the validity of the appeal. However, the
designation of the proper court should be made within the 15-day period to appeal. Once made
within the said period, the designation of the correct appellate court may be allowed even if the
records of the case are forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Otherwise, the case will be
dismissed outright.

LANDOIL RESOURCES CORPORATION v. AL RABIAH LIGHTING COMPANY
G.R. No. 174270, September 07, 2011
J. Peralta

If the party adjudged liable under the foreign arbitral award was a different entity from it
was only raised for the first time in petitioner's motion for reconsideration filed with it; thus, could
not be entertained.

A party may make judicial admissions in (a) the pleadings; (b) during the trial, either by
verbal or written manifestations or stipulations; or (c) in other stages of the judicial proceeding. It
is well-settled that judicial admissions cannot be contradicted by the admitter who is the party
himself and binds the person who makes the same, and absent any showing that this was made
thru palpable mistake, no amount of rationalization can offset it.

JOSEPH ANTHONY M. ALEJANDRO, FIRDAUSI I.Y. ABBAS, et al. v. ATTY. JOSE A.
BERNAS, et al.
G.R. No. 179243, September 07, 2011
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J. Peralta

When filing a criminal information, it must be established that there was probable cause
for the institution of such action. Probable cause is defined as such facts as are sufficient to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed and the respondent is probably
guilty thereof, and should be held for trial.

CHURCHILLE V. MARI AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. HON. ROLANDO L.
GONZALES, PRESIDING JUDGE, RTC, BR. 39, SOGO, SOUTHERN LEYTE AND PO1
RUDYARD PALOMA y TORRES
G.R. No. 187728, September 12, 2011
J. Peralta

Mere pendency of a petition for transfer of venue cannot interrupt proceedings before
the trial court. The Court ruled that delay resulting from extraordinary remedies against
interlocutory orders must be read in harmony with Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
which provides that the petition shall not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public
respondent from further proceeding in the case.

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNANCE v. SANDIGANBAYAN (SECOND
DIVISION) et al.
G.R. No. 152500, September 14, 2011
J. Peralta

The provisional remedy of injunction, like any other interlocutory order, cannot survive
without the main case of which it is but an incident. The findings of fact and opinion of a court
when issuing (or denying) the writ of preliminary injunction are interlocutory in nature and made
even before the trial on the merits is commenced or terminated. Thus, an interlocutory order of
the Court dies with the dismissal of the main case.

CITY OF MANILA v. MELBA TAN TE
G.R. No. 169263, September 21, 2011
J. Peralta

Expropriation is a two-pronged proceeding: first, the determination of the authority of the
plaintiff to exercise the power and the propriety of its exercise in the context of the facts which
terminates in an order of dismissal or an order of condemnation affirming the plaintiff's lawful
right to take the property for the public use or purpose described in the complaint
and second, the determination by the court of the just compensation for the property sought to
be expropriated.

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When the defendant in an expropriation case who has objections to the taking of his
property, he must file an answer and in it raise all his available defenses against the allegations
in the complaint for eminent domain. While the answer is bound by the omnibus motion rule
under Section 8, Rule 15, much leeway is nevertheless afforded to the defendant because
amendments may be made in the answer within 10 days from its filing.

REBECCA T. ARQUERO v. COURT OF APPEALS, et al.
G.R. No. 168053, September 21, 2011
J. Peralta

A defendant declared in default retains the right to appeal from the judgment by default
on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of the complaint, or that
the decision is contrary to law, even without need of the prior filing of a motion to set aside the
order of default except that he does not regain his right to adduce evidence. The appellate
court, in turn, can review the assailed decision and is not precluded from reversing the same
based solely on the evidence submitted by the plaintiff.

RAUL DAVID v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 181861, October 17, 2011
J. Peralta

When the prosecution witnesses in a case involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs
Act are police offers, their testimonies are given credence. It must be emphasized that their
testimonies in open court are considered in line with the presumption that law enforcement
officers have performed their duties in a regular manner. In the absence of proof of motive to
impute falsely a crime as serious as violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty, as well as the findings of the trial
court on the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, shall prevail over petitioners self-serving
and uncorroborated denial.

HEIRS OF ANTONIO FERAREN, represented by ANTONIO FERAREN, JR. v. COURT OF
APPEALS and CECILIA TADIAR
G.R. No. 159328, October 04, 2011
J. Peralta

When a party fails to file his Position Paper and affidavits of its witnesses within the 10-
day reglementary period, the same shall not be considered by the trial courts pursuant to
Section 10, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court and Section 9 of the Revised Rule on Summary
Procedure. The Court has repeatedly held that while the rules of procedure are liberally
construed, the provisions on reglementary periods are strictly applied, indispensable as they are
to the prevention of needless delays, and are necessary to the orderly and speedy discharge of
judicial business.
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ENRIQUE U. BETOY v. THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS, NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION
G.R. No. 156556-57, October 04, 2011
J. Peralta

When a party raises an issue before the Supreme Court, it shall be for the reason that
the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, or where exceptional and
compelling circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and call for the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction. The Court's jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari,
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus, while concurrent with that of the
Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, does not give litigants unrestrained freedom of
choice of forum from which to seek such relief

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARCIANO DOLLANO, JR.
G.R. No. 188851, October 19, 2011
J. Peralta

When the complainants recant their testimonies, this does not mean that the same are
not to be given full weight and credence by the trial court. Recantations are frowned upon by the
courts. A recantation of a testimony is exceedingly unreliable, for there is always the probability
that such recantation may later on be itself repudiated. A retraction does not necessarily negate
an earlier declaration.


ADELAIDA MENESES (deceased), substituted by her heir MARILYN M. CARBONEL-
GARCIA v. ROSARIO G. VENTUROZO
G.R. No. 172196, October 19, 2011
J. Peralta

When the subject of the controversy is a private document, the evidentiary standard of
its validity shall only be based on preponderance of evidence. Section 20, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court provides that before any private document offered as authentic is received in
evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) by anyone who saw the
document executed or written; or (b) by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or
handwriting of the maker.


SPOUSES BENJAMIN AND NORMA GARCIA v. ESTER GARCIA, AMADO GARCIA,
ADELA GARCIA, et al.
PERALTA

G.R. No. 169157, November 14, 2011
J. Peralta

An indispensable party is a party who has such an interest in the controversy or subject
matter that a final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that
interest. A person who was not impleaded in the complaint cannot be bound by the decision
rendered therein, for no man shall be affected by a proceeding in which he is a stranger.
Otherwise stated, things done between strangers ought not to injure those who are not parties
to them.


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SPOUSES LEON GUILALAS and EULALIA SELLERA
GUILALAS
G.R. No. 159564, November 16, 2011
J. Peralta

When the subject of the controversy is a real property, the petitioner must institute the
action in the proper court that has jurisdiction over the area where the property is. This is
pursuant to the rule mandated in Section 1, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which
provides that actions affecting title to or possession of real property or an interest therein (real
actions) shall be commenced and tried in the proper court that has territorial jurisdiction over the
area where the real property or any part thereof is situated. Failure to file the case before the
proper court results to the dismissal of the case.


SEVERINO S. CAPIRAL v. SIMEONA CAPIRAL ROBLES and VICENTE CAPIRAL
G.R. No. 173628, November 16, 2011
J. Peralta

When the petitioner files a Motion to Dismiss a case for Partition on the ground that he
has been openly, continuously and exclusively possessing the subject property in the concept of
an owner for more than ten years and that he has explicitly repudiated his co-ownership of the
subject property with his co-heir, there is a need to show evidence to establish such fact through
a trial-type hearing. Section 2, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court allows not only a hearing on the
motion to dismiss, but also for the parties to submit their evidence on the questions of fact
involved, which may be litigated extensively at the hearing or hearings on the motion.


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BERNABE PANGILINAN y CRISOSTOMO
G.R. No. 183090, November 14, 2011
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J. Peralta

In a criminal case, an appeal throws the whole case open for review, and it becomes the
duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment appealed
from, whether they are made the subject of assignment of errors or not.

A reading of the allegations in the Information would show the insufficiency of the
averments of the acts alleged to have been committed by appellant. It does not contain the
essential facts constituting the offense, but a statement of a conclusion of law. Thus, appellant
cannot be convicted of sexual abuse under such Information. The right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against an accused cannot be waived for reasons of public
policy. Hence, it is imperative that the complaint or information filed against the accused be
complete to meet its objectives. As such, an indictment must fully state the elements of the
specific offense alleged to have been committed.


CESAR C. LIRIO, doing business under the name and style of CELKOR AD SONIMIX v.
WILMER D. GENOVIA
G.R. No. 169757, November 23, 2011
J. Peralta

When a party is aggrieved by the decision of the NLRC and consequently appeals the
same through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, the action is not improper. The general rule
is that in petitions for review, only errors of law are generally reviewed by the Supreme Court.
However, where the issue is shrouded by a conflict of factual perceptions by the lower court or
the lower administrative body, the SC is constrained to review the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals.


DELIA D. ROMERO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ROMULO PADLAN AND ARTURO
SIAPNO
G.R. No. 171644, November 23, 2011
J. Peralta

In illegal recruitment cases, when the party fails to present receipts for money that was
paid in connection with the recruitment process, this does not affect the strength of the evidence
actually present as long as payment can be proved through clear and convincing testimonies of
credible witnesses.


EDITO PAGADORA v. JULIETA S. LIAO
PERALTA

G.R. No. 165769, December 12, 2011
J. Peralta

When a party serves and files his pleadings and other papers, he must do so personally.
If made through other modes, the party concerned must provide a written explanation as to why
service or filing was done otherwise. Personal service is preferred because it is seen to
expedite the action or resolution on a pleading, motion or other paper; and conversely,
minimize, if not eliminate, delays likely to be incurred if service is done by mail, considering the
inefficiency of the postal service.

ELLERY MARCH G. TORRES v. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORP.
represented by ATTY. CARLOS R. BAUTISTA, JR.
G.R. No. 193531, December 14, 2011
J. Peralta
When a party files a motion for reconsideration through a facsimile transmission, such
will not toll the period to appeal. This is because a facsimile transmission is not sanctioned by
the Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in Civil Service. The law only allows that a motion
for reconsideration may either be filed by mail or personal delivery.

JAIME ABALOS and SPOUSES FELIX SALAZAR and CONSUELO SALAZAR, et al. v.
HEIRS OF VICENTE TORIO, namely: PUBLIO TORIO, et al.
G.R. No. 175444, December 14, 2011
J. Peralta

When the petitioner wishes to raise an issue which is factual in nature, he cannot file it
before the Supreme Court under a petition for review on certiorari. Section 1 of Rule 45 states
that petitions for review on certiorari shall raise only questions of law which must be distinctly
set forth. Nonetheless, the Court has allowed exceptions to the said rule, such as when there
are conflicting findings of facts by the lower courts.

RUBEN DEL CASTILLO @BOY CASTILO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012
J. Peralta

When the place where the evidence was found is not included or described to be the
place to be searched in the search warrant, the same shall be considered as fruits of an invalid
warrantless search. The presentation of confiscated items, having found in a place other than
the one described in the search warrant is a violation of the accuseds constitutional guaranty
against unreasonable searches and seizure.

2012

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RUBEN DEL CASTILLO @BOY CASTILO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012
J. Peralta

When the place where the evidence was found is not included or described to be the
place to be searched in the search warrant, the same shall be considered as fruits of an invalid
warrantless search. The presentation of confiscated items, having found in a place other than
the one described in the search warrant is a violation of the accuseds constitutional guaranty
against unreasonable searches and seizure.

SOLEDAD TUCKER, joined by her husband DELMER TUCKERv.SPOUSES MANUEL P.
OPPUS AND MARIA PAZ M. OPPUS, and CARLOS OPPUS
G.R. No. 166858, January 18, 2012
J. Peralta

It is an oft-repeated principle that in the exercise of the Supreme Court's power of
review, the Court is not a trier of facts and does not normally undertake the re-examination of
the evidence presented by the contending parties during the trial of the case, considering that
the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals, if supported by evidence, are conclusive and
binding upon this Court. As found by the Court of Appeals, the trial court considered the
evidence submitted by the parties, and summarized in its decision the testimonial evidence
given by witnesses Soledad Tucker, Maria Paz Oppus and Carlos M. Oppus.

GEORGIA T. ESTEL v.RECAREDO P. DIEGO, SR. and RECAREDO R. DIEGO, JR.
G.R. No. 174082, January 16, 2012
J. Peralta

A Complaint for Forcible Entry was assailed for its failure to allege facts constitutive of
forcible entry and for a defective verification and certification. It is settled that in actions for
forcible entry, two allegations are mandatory for the municipal court to acquire jurisdiction. First,
the plaintiff must allege his prior physical possession of the property. Second, he must also
allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided for in Section 1,
Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court, namely, force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth.

In the present case, it is clear that Diego, Sr. and Diego, Jr sufficiently alleged in their
Complaint the material facts constituting forcible entry, as they explicitly claimed that they had
prior physical possession of the subject property since its purchase from Estel, who voluntarily
delivered the same to them. They also particularly described in their complaint how Estel,
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together with her two sons and five other persons, encroached upon the subject property and
dispossessed them of the same.

The addition of the words "to the best" before the phrase "of our own personal knowledge" did
not violate the requirement under Section 4, Rule 7, it being sufficient that the Diego, Sr. and
Diego, Jr declared that the allegations in the complaint are true and correct based on their
personal knowledge.

ANTONIO CHUA v.TOTAL OFFICE PRODUCTS AND SERVICES (TOPROS), INC.
G.R. No. 172455, February 1, 2012
J. Peralta

The trial court declared Chua in default after he, through counsel, failed to file his answer
within the period allowed by the Rules of Court. It is a well-entrenched rule that generally, the
client is bound by the mistakes of his lawyer. The exception is when the negligence of counsel
is so gross, reckless and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court. If the
incompetence, ignorance or inexperience of counsel is so great and the error committed as a
result thereof is so serious that the client, who otherwise has a good cause, is prejudiced and
denied his day in court, the litigation may be reopened to give the client another chance to
present his case.

GONZALO PUYAT & SONS, INC. v. RUBEN ALCAIDE (deceased), substituted by GLORIA
ALCAIDE, representative of the Farmer-Beneficiaries
G.R. No. 167952, February 1, 2012
J. Peralta

Appeals from judgments and final orders of quasi-judicial agencies are now required to
be brought to the CA, under the requirements and conditions set forth in Rule 43. Under the
rule, appeals from their judgments and final orders are now brought to the CA on a verified
petition for review. The Office of the President dismissed the petition based on the premise that
Alcaide, et al. failed to file a motion for reconsideration or an appeal within the 15-day
reglementary period, thereby rendering the August 8, 2003 Decision final and
executory. Thus, Alcaide, et al. availed of the proper remedy when it sought recourse to the
CA via a petition for review.

MANUEL A. LUMAYOG v.SPOUSES LEONARD PITCOCK and CORAZON PITCOCK
G.R. No. 169628, March 14, 2012
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J. Peralta

Further, the supervening event which was the grant of the Certificate of Land Ownership
Award to Lumayog does not exempt him from the coverage of Rule 70 (Forcible Entry and
Unlawful Detainer) of the Rules of Court, as the premises involved in this case is
the barn/stable of the racehorses of Spouses Pitcock being occupied, illegally, by Lumayog.

FELICIDAD STA. MARIA VILLARAN, WILFREDO STA. MARIA VILLARAN, DEOGRACIAS
STA. MARIA and ROLANDO STA. MARIA v.DEPARTMENT OF AGARIAN REFORM
ADJUDICATION BOARD and LORENZO MARIANO
G.R. No. 160882, March 7, 2012
J. Peralta

The Rules direct that it is Rule 43 that must govern the procedure for judicial review of
decisions, orders, or resolutions of the DAR as in this case. Under Supreme Court Circular No.
2-90, moreover, an appeal taken to the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals by a wrong or
inappropriate mode warrants a dismissal. Thus, Villaran, et al. should have assailed
the January 16, 2001 decision and the June 25, 2002 resolution of the DARAB before the
appellate court via a petition for review under Rule 43. By filing a special civil action
for certiorari under Rule 65 rather than the mandatory petition for review, Villaran, et al. has
clearly taken an inappropriate recourse.

ISABELO ESPERIDA, LORENZO HIPOLITO, and ROMEO DE BELEN v.FRANCO K.
JURADO, JR.
G.R. No. 172538, April 25, 2012
J. Peralta

The Supreme Court finds that the CA erred in considering the case deemed submitted
for resolution sans the answer of Esperida, et al. without setting and conducting a hearing on a
fixed date and time on which Esperida, et al. may personally, or through counsel, answer the
charges against them.

PERALTA

In contempt proceedings, the prescribed procedure must be followed. To be sure, since
an indirect contempt charge partakes the nature of a criminal charge, conviction cannot be had
merely on the basis of written pleadings. A respondent in a contempt charge must be served
with a copy of the motion/petition. Unlike in civil actions, the Court does not issue summons on
the respondent. While the respondent is not required to file a formal answer similar to that in
ordinary civil actions, the court must set the contempt charge for hearing on a fixed date and
time on which the respondent must make his appearance to answer the charge. On the date
and time of the hearing, the court shall proceed to investigate the charges and consider such
answer or testimony as the respondent may make or offer. The mode of procedure and rules of
evidence therein are assimilated to criminal prosecutions. If he fails to appear on that date after
due notice without justifiable reason, the court may order his arrest, just like the accused in a
criminal case who fails to appear when so required. The court does not declare the respondent
in a contempt charge in default.

COSCO PHILIPPINES SHIPPING, INC. v. KEMPER INSURANCE COMPANY
G.R. No. 179488, April 23, 2012
J. Peralta

KIC, a foreign corporation, filed a complaint with a defective certification of non-forum
shopping due to the lack of authorization of Atty. Lat to represent it from its Board of Directors.
Since KIC is a corporation, the certification must be executed by an officer or member of the
board of directors or by one who is duly authorized by a resolution of the board of directors;
otherwise, the complaint will have to be dismissed. The lack of certification against forum
shopping is generally not curable by mere amendment of the complaint, but shall be a cause for
the dismissal of the case without prejudice. The same rule applies to certifications against forum
shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are unaccompanied by proof that
said signatory is authorized to file the complaint on behalf of the corporation.

Courts acquire jurisdiction over the plaintiffs upon the filing of the complaint, and to be
bound by a decision, a party should first be subjected to the courts jurisdiction. Since the court
has no jurisdiction over the complaint and CPS, CPS is not estopped from challenging the trial
courts jurisdiction, even at the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. This is so because the issue
of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal, and is not lost by
waiver or by estoppel.

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PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EXCELSA INDUSTRIES, INC.
G.R. No. 173820, April 16, 2012
J. Peralta

EII committed a procedural blunder when it filed a separate petition for certiorari before
the CA, because when the two cases were consolidated and a joint decision was rendered, the
cases lost their identities; and a petition for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail a
decision granting the issuance of a writ of possession.

In this case, there was a joint hearing and the RTC eventually rendered a Joint Decision
disposing of the cases both as to the validity of the foreclosure and the propriety of the issuance
of a writ of possession. This being so, the two cases ceased to be separate and the parties are
left with a single remedy to elevate the issues to the appellate court.

DUTY FREE PHILIPPINES SERVICES, INC. v. MANOLITO Q. TRIA
G.R. No. 174809, June 27, 2012
J. Peralta

On appeal to the CA, DFPSI denied for the first time the existence of an employer-
employee relationship. The review of labor cases is confined to questions of jurisdiction or grave
abuse of discretion. The alleged absence of employer-employee relationship cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal. The resolution of this issue requires the admission and calibration of
evidence and the LA and the NLRC did not pass upon it in their decisions.

SALVADOR YAPYUCO y ENRIQUEZ v. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012

Indeed, the extrajudicial confession or admission of one accused is admissible only
against said accused, but is inadmissible against the other accused. But if the declarant or
admitter repeats in court his extrajudicial admission, as Yapyuco did in this case, during the trial
and the other accused is accorded the opportunity to cross-examine the admitter, the admission
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is admissible against both accused because then, it is transposed into a judicial admission. It is
thus perplexing why, despite the extrajudicial statements of Cunanan, Puno and Yapyuco, as
well as the latters testimony implicating them in the incident, they still had chosen to waive their
right to present evidence when, in fact, they could have shown detailed proof of their
participation or non-participation in the offenses charged. The Court, therefore, rejects their
claim that they had been denied due process in this regard, as they opted not to testify and be
cross-examined by the prosecution as to the truthfulness in their affidavits and, accordingly,
disprove the inculpatory admissions of their co-accused.

OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN v. ROMEO A. LIGGAYU
G.R. No. 174297, June 20, 2012
J. Peralta

The government party that can appeal is not the disciplining authority or tribunal which
previously heard the case and imposed the penalty of dismissal from the service. The
government party appealing must be one that is prosecuting the administrative case against the
Atty. Liggayu. It is the PCSO which is deemed the prosecuting government party which can
appeal the CA decision exonerating respondent of the administrative charge.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARISTEO E. ATIENZA, RODRIGO D. MANONGSONG,
CRISPIN M. EGARQUE, and THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION)
G.R. No. 171671, June 18, 2012
J. Peralta

After the prosecution rested its case, Atienza, Manongsong, and Egarque filed Demurrer
to Evidence which the Sandiganbayan granted. In criminal cases, the grant of demurrer is
tantamount to an acquittal and the dismissal order may not be appealed because this would
place the accused in double jeopardy. Although the dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it is
still reviewable but only through certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. For the writ to
issue, the trial court must be shown to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to
present its case or where the trial was a sham, thus, rendering the assailed judgment void.

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ROMULO TRINIDAD @ ROMY v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 192241, June 13, 2012
J. Peralta

The testimonies show a positive identification of Romulo as the last person seen with
Lourdes. That, and the series of circumstances proven during the trial form an unbroken chain
of events leading to the conclusion that petitioner was one of the assailants. Direct evidence of
the commission of a crime is not the only basis on which a court draws its finding of guilt.
Established facts that form a chain of circumstances can lead the mind intuitively or impel a
conscious process of reasoning towards a conviction.

Motive becomes material when the evidence is circumstantial or inconclusive, and there
is some doubt on whether a crime has been committed or whether the accused has committed
it.

MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA, AFP (RET.) v.THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
representing the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN; THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, GEN. EDUARDO SL. OBAN, JR., and LT. GEN. GAUDENCIO S.
PANGILINAN, AFP (RET.), DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS
G.R. No. 198554, July 30, 2012
J. Peralta

It is indisputable that Garcia was an officer in the active service of the AFP in March
2003 and 2004, when the alleged violations were committed. The charges were filed on October
27, 2004 and he was arraigned on November 16, 2004. Clearly, from the time the violations
were committed until the time Garcia was arraigned, the General Court Martial had jurisdiction
over the case. Well-settled is the rule that jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the
instance of the parties but continues until the case is terminated. Therefore, Garcia's retirement
on November 18, 2004 did not divest the General Court Martial of its jurisdiction.

That court-martial cases are criminal cases within the meaning of Section 17, Article VI,
of the Constitution is also evident, because the crimes and misdemeanors forbidden or
punished by the Articles of War are offenses against the Republic of the Philippines. According
to section 1, Rule 106, of the Rules of Court, a criminal action or case is one which involves a
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wrong or injury done to the Republic, for the punishment of which the offender is prosecuted in
the name of the People of the Philippines; and pursuant to Article of War 17, "the trial advocate
of a general or special court-martial shall prosecute (the accused) in the name of the People of
the Philippines."

The General Court Martial is a court within the strictest sense of the word and acts as a
criminal court. On that premise, certain provisions of the Revised Penal Code, insofar as those
that are not provided in the Articles of War and the Manual for Courts-Martial, can be
supplementary.

SPOUSES RAMON VILLUGA and MERCEDITA VILLUGA v. KELLY HARDWARE AND
CONSTRUCTION SUPPLY INC., represented by ERNESTO V. YU, Executive Vice-
President and General Manager
G.R. No. 176570, July 18, 2012
J. Peralta

KHCS Request for Admission is not deemed abandoned or withdrawn by the filing of the
Second Amended Complaint. A careful examination of the said Request for Admission shows
that the matters of fact set forth therein are simply a reiteration of KHCS' main allegation in its
Amended Complaint and that Spouses Villuga had already set up the affirmative defense of
partial payment with respect to the above allegation in their previous pleadings.

This Court has ruled that if the factual allegations in the complaint are the very same
allegations set forth in the request for admission and have already been specifically denied, the
required party cannot be compelled to deny them anew. A request for admission that merely
reiterates the allegations in an earlier pleading is inappropriate under Rule 26 of the Rules of
Court, which as a mode of discovery, contemplates of interrogatories that would clarify and tend
to shed light on the truth or falsity of the allegations in the pleading. Rule 26 does not refer to a
mere reiteration of what has already been alleged in the pleadings. Nonetheless, consistent with
the abovementioned Rule, the party being requested should file an objection to the effect that
the request for admission is improper and that there is no longer any need to deny anew the
allegations contained therein considering that these matters have already been previously
denied.

ROSA H. FENEQUITO, CORAZON E. HERNANDEZ, and LAURO H. RODRIGUEZ v.
BERNARDO VERGARA, JR.
G.R. No. 172829, July 18, 2012
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J. Peralta

Section 1, Rule 42 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended contemplate of an
appeal from a final decision or order of the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
Thus, the remedy of appeal under Rule 42 resorted to by Fenequito, et al. is improper. To
repeat, the RTC Decision is not final, but interlocutory in nature.

Unless otherwise ordered, an Assistant City Prosecutor or a State Prosecutor may file
an appeal with the RTC, questioning the dismissal by the MeTC of a case for lack of probable
cause, even without prior authority or approval of the City Prosecutor or the Chief State
Prosecutor.

HILARION F. DIMAGIBA, IRMA MENDOZA, and ELLEN RASCO v.JULITA ESPARTERO,
MA. BERNARDITA L. CARREON and MELINA SAN PEDRO
G.R. No. 154952, July 16, 2012
J. Peralta

In this case, Espartero, et al. filed with the CA their motion for extension of time to file
petition for review under Rule 43 on September 11, 2000, i.e., on the 15th day from receipt of
the Ombudsman order denying their motion for reconsideration, and filed the petition on
September 19, 2000. At the time the petition was filed, the matter of which reglementary period
must apply, whether 10 days under Section 27 of RA 6770 or 15 days under Section 4, Rule 43
of the Rules of Court, had not been established with definiteness until the Barata case was
decided later. Considering that the Fabian ruling stated that Rule 43 of the Rules of Court
should be the proper mode of appeal from an Ombudsman decision in administrative cases,
and Section 4 of Rule 43 provides for 15 days from receipt of the order appealed from, the
motion for extension to file petition which was filed on the 15
th
day from receipt of the
Ombudsman order is considered timely filed.

NEMESIO V. SAYCON (deceased), substituted by his heirs, JOVEN V. SAYCON and
SPOUSE EILLEN G. SAYCON; REY V. SAYCON and SPOUSE PACITA S. SAYCON;
ARNOLD V. SAYCON and SPOUSE EVANGELINE D. SAYCON; JEOFFREY V. SAYCON
and SPOUSE ROCHEL M. SAYCON; and CHARLIE V. SAYCON v. ANACLETA BAROT
VDA. DE TULABING, DIONISIO B. TULABING, ARCADIA B. TULABING, BALDOMERO B.
TULABING, CARMEN TULABING, JULIA B. TULABING, HILARION BELIDA, JOEL B.
TULABING, PACITA TULABING, NICOLAS B. TULABING, . HENIA TULABING, VICTORIA
B. TULABING, ARMANDO DEVIRA and BENITA B. TULABING
G.R. No. 172418, July 9, 2012
J. Peralta
PERALTA


The Supreme Court cannot review the same issues raised by the Heirs of Saycon in
their Omnibus Motion as the same was not passed upon by the Court of Appeals, since it had
no jurisdiction over the Omnibus Motion.

The Court granted the Heirs of Saycons first and second motions for extension of time
to file their petition, which extension of time totaled 45 days from the expiration of the
reglementary period, and the extension was reckoned from April 14, 2006 (not April 17, 2006),
with a warning that no further extension would be given. Counting the given 45-day extension
from April 14, 2006, the last day for filing this petition fell on May 29, 2006, a Monday. However,
the Heirs of Saycon filed their petition one day late on May 30, 2006.

PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL AIR TERMINALS CO., INC. v. TAKENAKA CORPORATION
and ASAHIKOSAN CORPORATION
G.R. No. 180245, July 4, 2012
J. Peralta

In this case, there is no showing of such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment or
arbitrary and despotic exercise of power committed by the trial court. In fact, records reveal that
both parties were given ample opportunity to be heard. A hearing on the Motion to Dismiss
was, in fact, held on April 7, 2006. Thereafter, both parties submitted their pleadings setting
forth their claims, arguments and supporting evidence. PIATCo points out that at the April 7,
2006 hearing, the parties were only allowed to file their pleadings, and no actual hearing, or
presentation of evidence, was conducted. It is an oft-repeated principle that where opportunity
to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of due
process. Moreover, the issues that PIATCo seeks to tackle in the requested hearing on the
motion to dismiss, i.e., novation, payment, extinguishment or abandonment of the obligation, are
the meat of their defense and would require the presentation of voluminous evidence. Such
issues are better threshed out during trial proper. Thus, the trial court was not amiss in ruling
that PIATCo already had the opportunity to be heard and there was no longer any need to set
another hearing on the motion to dismiss.

PERALTA

Lastly, on the issue of the Verification/Certification, the court has the power to give due
course to the complaint even with the supposed defect, if special circumstances warrant. Even
assuming arguendo, that the form used to show Mr. Kurebayashi's authority to execute the
Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping is defective, PIATCo should bear in mind
that this Court may relax the application of procedural rules for the greater interest of substantial
justice.

FIRST LEVERAGE AND SERVICES GROUP, INC. v. SOLID BUILDERS, INC.
G.R. No. 155680, July 2, 2012
J. Peralta

A genuine issue is such issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence as
distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. There can be no summary
judgment where questions of fact are in issue or where material allegations of the pleadings are
in dispute. A party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly
the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is so patently
unsubstantial as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial, and any doubt as to the existence of
such an issue is resolved against the movant.

In the present case, the Court agrees with the CA that genuine issues exist which call for
a full blown trial. The CA held as that FLGSI asserted in its amended complaint that there was
no such valid perfected contract to sell. PNB, however, insisted in its answer that the LARBC,
duly authorized by the Bank's board of directors, validly approved the award of the properties to
SBI, and that even assuming that the LARBC was not fully authorized to approve the sale, the
said action of LARBC was subsequently duly ratified and confirmed by the board of directors. Its
co-defendant, SBI, maintained also in its answer that the perfection, approval and execution of
the deed of promise to sell in its favor were legal and not ultra vires. Thus, PNB's and SBIs
respective answers to the complaint tendered an issue.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RAUL BERIBER y FUENTES @ JERRY FUENTES y
IGNACIO @ GERRY BERIBER @ BONG @ RAUL FUENTES
G.R. No. 195243, August 29, 2012

Beriber was convicted of Robbery with Homicide based on circumstantial evidence
comprising of testimonial evidence. Admittedly, there was no direct evidence to establish
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Beriber's commission of the crime charged. However, direct evidence is not the only matrix
wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and finding of guilt. At times, resort to
circumstantial evidence is imperative since to insist on direct testimony would, in many cases,
result in setting felons free and deny proper protection to the community.

Although Beribers silence and refusal to testify, let alone refusal to present evidence,
cannot be construed as evidence of guilt, the Court has consistently held that the fact that an
accused never testified in his defense even in the face of accusations against him goes against
the principle that "the first impulse of an innocent man when accused of wrongdoing is to
express his innocence at the first opportune time."

BELLE CORPORATION v. ERLINDA DE LEON-BANKS, RHODORA DE LEON-TIATCO,
BETTY DE LEON-TORRES, GREGORIO DE LEON, ALBERTO DE LEON, EUFRONIO DE
LEON,
*
and MARIA ELIZA DE LEON-DE GRANO
G.R. No. 174669, September 19, 2012
J. Peralta

The RTC dismissed Banks, et al.s Complaint on the ground that it did not state a cause
of action despite its filing an Amended Complaint. In determining whether a complaint states a
cause of action, the RTC can consider all the pleadings filed, including annexes, motions, and
the evidence on record. The focus is on the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material
allegations. Moreover, the complaint does not have to establish facts proving the existence of a
cause of action at the outset; this will have to be done at the trial on the merits of the case. It is
evident from the above allegations in the Amended Complaint that Banks, et al. specifically
alleged that they are owners of the subject property being held in trust by their sister, Nelia
Alleje, and that Belle acted in bad faith when it bought the property from their sister, through her
company, Nelfred, knowing that Banks, et al. claim ownership over it.

The determination of whether or not Belle is guilty of bad faith cannot be made in a mere
motion to dismiss. An issue that requires the contravention of the allegations of the complaint,
as well as the full ventilation, in effect, of the main merits of the case, should not be within the
province of a mere motion to dismiss.

JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO v. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE; COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS;
HON. LEILA DE LIMA, in her capacity as Secretary of the Department of Justice; HON.
SIXTO BRILLANTES, .JR., in his capacity as Chairperson of the Commission on
Elections; and the JOINT DOJ-COMELEC PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE
and FACT-FINDING TEAM
G.R. No. 199082, September 18, 2012
PERALTA

J. Peralta

The COMELEC and the DOJ themselves agreed that they would exercise their
concurrent jurisdiction jointly. Although the preliminary investigation was conducted on the basis
of two complaints the initial report of the Fact-Finding Team and the complaint of Senator
Pimentel both complaints were filed with the Joint Committee. Consequently, the complaints
were filed with and the preliminary investigation was conducted by only one investigative body.
Thus, the Court finds no reason to disallow the exercise of concurrent jurisdiction jointly by
those given such authority. This is especially true in this case given the magnitude of the crimes
allegedly committed by petitioners. The joint preliminary investigation also serves to maximize
the resources and manpower of both the COMELEC and the DOJ for the prompt disposition of
the cases.

Notwithstanding the grant of concurrent jurisdiction, the COMELEC and the DOJ
nevertheless included a provision in the assailed Joint Order whereby the resolutions of the
Joint Committee finding probable cause for election offenses shall still be approved by the
COMELEC in accordance with the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. With more reason, therefore,
that we cannot consider the creation of the Joint Committee as an abdication of the
COMELECs independence enshrined in the 1987 Constitution.

In this case, GMA claimed that she could not submit her counteraffidavit within the
prescribed period because she needed to examine documents mentioned in Senator Pimentels
complaint-affidavit. It appeared, however, that said documents were not submitted to the Joint
Committee and the only supporting documents available were those attached to the Initial
Report of the Fact-Finding Team. Admittedly, GMA was furnished those documents. Thus, at
the time she asked for the extension of time within which to file her counter-affidavit, she very
well knew that the documents she was asking were not in the record of the case. Obviously, she
was not furnished those documents because they were not submitted to the Joint Committee.
Logically, she has no right to examine said documents. The Court cannot, therefore, fault the
Joint Committee in consequently denying her motion for extension to file counter-affidavit as
there was no compelling justification for the non-observance of the period she was earlier
required to follow.

DANILO R. QUERIJERO, JOHNNY P. LILANG and IVENE D. REYES v. LINA PALMES-
LIMITAR, ISAGANI G. PALMES and THE COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 166467, September 17, 2012
J. Peralta

PERALTA

The trial court denied a Motion to Quash the Information prompting Querijero, et al. to
file Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. A special civil action for certiorari is not
the proper remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash an information. The established rule
is that, when such an adverse interlocutory order is rendered, the remedy is not to resort
forthwith to certiorari, but to continue with the case in due course and, when an unfavorable
verdict is handed down, to take an appeal in the manner authorized by law.

CRISPINO PANGILINAN v. JOCELYN N. BALATBAT substituted by her heirs, namely,
VICENTE BALATBAT, ANA LUCIA N. BALATBAT, JOSE VICENTE N. BALATBAT,
ANTONIO BENIGNO N. BALATBAT, JOCELYN BEUNA B. DE GUZMAN, GERVACIO
AFREDO N. BALATBAT, PIO ROMULO N. BALATBAT and JUNIOPERO PEDRO N.
BALATBAT
G.R. No. 170787, September 12, 2012
J. Peralta

The jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasi-judicial officer or government agency,
over the nature and subject matter of a petition or complaint is determined by the material
allegations therein and the character of the relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the
petitioner or complainant is entitled to any or all such reliefs.

If the issues between the parties are intertwined with the resolution of an issue within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the DARAB, such dispute must be addressed and resolved by the
DARAB.

ATTY. FE Q. PALMIANO-SALVADOR v.CONSTANTINO ANGELES, substituted by LUZ G.
ANGELES
G.R. No. 171219, September 3, 2012
J. Peralta

The complaint was filed in the name of Angeles, but it was one Rosauro Diaz who
executed the verification and certification alleging that he was Angeles' attorney-in-fact but
without proof of authorization. In Tamondong v. Court of Appeals, the Court categorically stated
that "if a complaint is filed for and in behalf of the plaintiff by one who is not authorized to do so,
the complaint is not deemed filed. An unauthorized complaint does not produce any legal effect.
PERALTA

Hence, the court should dismiss the complaint on the ground that it has no jurisdiction over the
complaint and the plaintiff."

LITO BAUTISTA and JIMMY ALCANTARA v. SHARON G. CUNETA-PANGILINAN
G.R. No. 189754, October 24, 2012
J. Peralta

The RTC granted Bautista and Alcantaras Demurrer to Evidence and dismissed the
case. Pangilinan appealed the Decision and the RTC was reversed by the CA. The Supreme
Court has definitively ruled that in a criminal case in which the offended party is the State, the
interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability
arising therefrom. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an
appeal of the criminal aspect may be undertaken, whenever legally feasible, only by the State
through the solicitor general. As a rule, only the Solicitor General may represent the People of
the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not undertake such
appeal.

Not only did the CA materially err in entertaining the petition, it should be stressed that
the granting of Bautista and Alcantaras Demurrer to Evidence already amounted to a dismissal
of the case on the merits and a review of the order granting the demurrer to evidence will place
the accused in double jeopardy.

SM LAND, INC. (Formerly Shoemart, Inc.) and WATSONS PERSONAL CARE STORES,
PHILS., INC., v.CITY OF MANILA, LIBERTY TOLEDO, in her official capacity as the City
Treasurer of Manila and JOSEPH SANTIAGO, in his official capacity as the Chief of
License Division of the City of Manila
G.R. No. 197151, October 22, 2012
J. Peralta

After the RTC granted SM Land and Watsons tax refunds/credits, the CTA modified the
RTCs ruling and denied their claims on the ground that the 30-day period to appeal is non-
extendible. RA 9282 provides that appeals from the RTC to the CTA shall follow a procedure
analogous to that provided for under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court. Rule 42 of the said Rules, in
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turn, provides that the court may grant an extension of fifteen (15) days within which to file the
petition for review.

ATLANTIC ERECTORS, INC. v. COURT OF APPEALS and HERBAL COVE REALTY
CORPORATION
G.R. No. 170732, October 11, 2012
J. Peralta

AEI was held by the CIAC liable for damages against HCRC in accordance with their
Construction Agreement. As a general rule, contracts constitute the law between the parties,
and they are bound by its stipulations. For as long as they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order, or public policy, the contracting parties may establish such stipulations,
clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient.

A perusal of the significant provisions of the Construction Contract as quoted above and
the relevant construction documents would show that the CA did not err in concluding that the
rights to liquidated damages and to terminate the contract are distinct remedies that are
available to HCRC.

SPOUSES MINIANO B. DELA CRUZ and LETA L. DELA CRUZ v. ANA MARIE
CONCEPCION
G.R. No. 172825, October 11, 2012
J. Peralta

When the issue is tried without the objection of the parties, it should be treated in all
respects as if it had been raised in the pleadings. On the other hand, when there is an objection,
the evidence may be admitted where its admission will not prejudice him.

Thus, while Concepcion judicially admitted in her Answer that she only paid P2 million
and that she still owed petitioners P200,000.00, Concepcion claimed later and, in fact,
submitted an evidence to show that she already paid the whole amount of her unpaid obligation.
It is noteworthy that when Concepcion presented the evidence of payment, Spouses Dela Cruz
did not object thereto.

PERALTA

THE HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES LAURA YADNO and PUGSONG MAT-AN, namely,
LAURO MAT-AN, FE MAT-AN LAOYAN, JULIA MAT-AN KITANI, ANA MAT-AN MALANI,
DARIO MAT-AN and VICTOR MAT-AN, who are represented by their co-petitioner NENA
MAT-AN CLEMENT v. THE HEIRS OF THE LATE SPOUSES MAURO and ELISA
ANCHALES, namely, JOHNNY S. ANCHALES, BELMORE S. ANCHALES, BENSON S.
ANCHALES, BRIGETTE S. HARASYMUK, RITA A. KAWA, and NENITA S. ANCHALES
G.R. No. 174582, October 11, 2012
J. Peralta

The Baguio RTC denied the Heirs of Yadno and Mat-ans petition to revive an injunction
case against the final order of the Urdaneta RTC. No court has the power to interfere by
injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction. The
various trial courts of a province or city, having the same or equal authority, should not, cannot,
and are not permitted to interfere with their respective cases, much less with their orders or
judgments. A contrary rule would obviously lead to confusion and seriously hamper the
administration of justice.

HECTOR HERNANDEZ v. SUSAN SAN PEDRO AGONCILLO
G.R. No. 194122, October 11, 2012
J. Peralta

The MeTC found it proper not to admit Hernandezs Answer and to subsequently declare
him in default, because Hernandezs Ex Parte Motion for Extension of Time to File His Answer
was filed out of time; that Hernandez filed his Answer beyond the period requested in the Motion
for Extension; and that Hernandez failed to appear during the scheduled hearing on Agoncillo's
Motion to declare him in default.

Procedural rules are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants
alike are enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. While in certain instances, the Court allows a
relaxation in the application of the rules, there is no intention to forge a weapon for erring
litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberal interpretation and application of rules apply
only in proper cases of demonstrable merit and under justifiable causes and circumstances.

JACK ARROYO v.BOCAGO INLAND DEV'T. CORP. (BIDECO), represented by CARLITO
BOCAGO and/or the HEIRS OF THE DECEASED RAMON BOCAGO, namely, BASILISA
VDA. DE BOCAGO, CARLITO BOCAGO, SANNIE BOCAGO ARRENGO, and INDAY
BUENO
PERALTA

G.R. No. 167880, November 14, 2012
J. Peralta

Arroyo filed a complaint for recovery of possession against BIDECO but his complaint
was dismissed by the CA on the ground that his complaint was barred by laches. As registered
owners of the lots in question, the private respondents have a right to eject any person illegally
occupying their property. This right is imprescriptible. Even if it be supposed that they were
aware of the petitioners' occupation of the property, and regardless of the length of that
possession, the lawful owners have a right to demand the return of their property at any time as
long as the possession was unauthorized or merely tolerated, if at all. This right is never barred
by laches.

RODOLFO BELBIS, JR. y COMPETENTE and ALBERTO BRUCALES v. PEOLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 181052, November 14, 2012
J. Peralta

The fact that Bahillo was stabbed on December 9, 1997 and died only on January 8,
1998 does not prove that the victim made the statement or declaration under the consciousness
of an impending death. The rule is that, in order to make a dying declaration admissible, a fixed
belief in inevitable and imminent death must be entered by the declarant. The test is whether
the declarant has abandoned all hopes of survival and looked on death as certainly
impending. As such, the CA incorrectly ruled that there were dying declarations.

All that is required for the admissibility of a given statement as part of the res gestae, is
that it be made under the influence of a startling event witnessed by the person who made the
declaration before he had time to think and make up a story, or to concoct or contrive a
falsehood, or to fabricate an account, and without any undue influence in obtaining it, aside from
referring to the event in question or its immediate attending circumstances. In sum, there are
three requisites to admit evidence as part of the res gestae: (1) that the principal act, the res
gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had the
time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence
in question and its immediate attending circumstances. Clearly, the statement made by Bahillo
identifying his assailants was made immediately after a startling occurrence which is his being
stabbed, precluding any chance to concoct a lie.

PERALTA

CMTC INTERNATIONAL MARKETING CORPORATION v.BHAGIS INTERNATIONAL
TRADING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 170488, December 10, 2012
J. Peralta

Ergo, where strong considerations of substantive justice are manifest in the petition, the
strict application of the rules of procedure may be relaxed, in the exercise of its equity
jurisdiction. Thus, a rigid application of the rules of procedure will not be entertained if it will
obstruct rather than serve the broader interests of justice in the light of the prevailing
circumstances in the case under consideration.

When CMTC filed its motion attaching therewith its appellants brief, there was a clear
intention on the part of CMTC not to abandon his appeal. As a matter of fact, were it not for its
counsels act of inadvertently misplacing the Notice to File Brief in another file, CMTC could
have seasonably filed its appellants brief as its counsel had already prepared the same even
way before the receipt of the Notice to File Brief.

SPOUSES CRISANTO ALCAZAR and SUSANA VILLAMAYOR v.EVELYN ARANTE
G.R. No. 177042, December 10, 2012
J. Peralta

The RTC granted Alcarazs petition for reconstitution of title but was opposed by Arante
claiming that the title was in her possession and not lost. As early as the case of Strait Times,
Inc. v. CA, this Court has held that when the owners duplicate certificate of title has not been
lost, but is in fact in the possession of another person, then the reconstituted certificate is void,
because the court that rendered the decision had no jurisdiction. Reconstitution can validly be
made only in case of loss of the original certificate. This rule was later reiterated in the cases
of Rexlon Realty Group, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, Eastworld Motor Industries Corporation v.
Skunac Corporation, Rodriguez v. Lim, Villanueva v. Viloriaand Camitan v. Fidelity Investment
Corporation. Thus, with proof and with the admission of Spouses Alcaraz that the owners
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duplicate copy of the TCT was actually in the possession of Arante, the RTC Decision was
properly annulled for lack of jurisdiction.

BURGUNDY REALTY CORPORATION v.JOSEFA "JING" C. REYES and SECRETARY
RAUL GONZALEZ of the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 181021, December 10, 2012
J. Peralta

The Secretary of Justice withdrew the charge against Reyes finding that the elements of
estafa were not present. The Supreme Court need not overemphasize that in a preliminary
investigation, the public prosecutor merely determines whether there is probable cause or
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that
the respondent is probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not call for the
application of rules and standards of proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on
the merits. The complainant need not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. A
preliminary investigation does not require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties'
evidence. Precisely, there is a trial to allow the reception of evidence for both parties to
substantiate their respective claims.

A review of the records would show that the investigating prosecutor was correct in
finding the existence of all the elements of the crime of estafa.

LAGRIMAS DE JESUS ZAMORA v. SPOUSES BEATRIZ ZAMORA HIDALGO MIRANDA
and ARTURO MIRANDA, ROSE MARIE MIRANDA GUANIO, MARY JULIE CRISTINA S.
ANG, JESSIE JAY S. ANG, JASPER JOHN S. ANG and the REGISTER OF DEEDS for
Davao City
G.R. No. 162930, December 5, 2012
J. Peralta

The receipt dated October 23, 1972 cannot prove ownership over the subject property
as Beatriz Miranda's signature on the receipt, as vendor, has been found to be forged by the
NBI handwriting expert, the trial court and the Court of Appeals. It is a settled rule that the
factual findings of the Court of Appeals affirming those of the trial court are final and conclusive
and may not be reviewed on appeal, except under any of the following circumstances: (1) the
conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based
on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) there is no citation of
specific evidence on which the factual findings are based; (7) the finding of absence of facts is
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contradicted by the presence of evidence on record; (8) the findings of the CA are contrary to
those of the trial court; (9) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts
that, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the CA are
beyond the issues of the case; and ( 11) such findings are contrary to the admissions of both
parties.

Considering that the aforementioned exceptions are not present in this case, the factual
finding of the Court of Appeals that the signature of respondent Beatriz Miranda on the receipt
dated October 23, 1972 is forged is final and conclusive upon this Court. Consequently, the
complaint of Zamora has no leg to stand on and was properly dismissed by the trial court.

BUILDING CARE CORPORATION / LEOPARD SECURITY & INVESTIGATION AGENCY
and/or RUPERTO PROTACIO v.MYRNA MACARAEG
G.R. No. 198357, December 10, 2012
J. Peralta

The Labor Arbiters decision against Macaraeg became final and executory after she
failed to file a timely appeal with the NLRC. The Court will not override the finality and
immutability of a judgment based only on the negligence of a partys counsel in timely taking all
the proper recourses from the judgment. To justify an override, the counsels negligence must
not only be gross but must also be shown to have deprived the party the right to due process.

SUGAR REGULATORY ADMINISTRATION, represented by its Administrator
v.ENCARNACION B. TORMON, EDGARDO B. ALISAJE, LOURDES M. DOBLE, TERESITA
Q. LIM, EDMUNDO R. JORNADAL, JIMMY C. VILLANUEVA , DEANNA M. JANCE, HENRY
G. DOBLE, REYNALDO D. LUZANA, MEDELYN P. TOQUILLO, SEVERINO A. ORLIDO,
RHODERICK V. ALIPOON, JONATHAN CORDERO, DANILO B. BISCOCHO, BELLO C.
LUCASAN, LUBERT V. TIVE, and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT
G.R. No. 195640, December 4, 2012
J. Peralta

Well settled also is the rule that a receipt of payment is the best evidence of the fact of
payment. In Monfort v. Aguinaldo, the receipts of payment, although not exclusive, were
deemed to be the best evidence. Tormon, et al., however, could not present any receipt since
they alleged that their payments were made through salary deductions and the payrolls which
supposedly contained such deductions were in SRA's possession which had not been
produced. In order to prove their allegations of refund, Tormon, et al. submitted the affidavits of
Messrs. Cordova and Meneses, Jr. There was nothing on record to show that Messrs. Cordova
and Meneses, Jr. were actuated with any ill motive in the execution of their affidavits attesting to
the fact of refund.

PERALTA

The general rule is that administrative agencies are not bound by the technical rules of
evidence. It can accept documents which cannot be admitted in a judicial proceeding where the
Rules of Court are strictly observed. It can choose to give weight or disregard such evidence,
depending on its trustworthiness.

2014

DENNIS T. VILLAREAL v.CONSUELO C. ALIGA
G.R. No 166995, January 13, 2014
J. Peralta

A judgment of acquittal may be assailed by the People in a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court without placing the accused in double jeopardy. However, in such
case, the People is burdened to establish that the court a quo, acted without jurisdiction or
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion
generally refers to capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a duty imposed by law, or to act in contemplation of
law or where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion
and hostility. No grave abuse of discretion may be attributed to a court simply because of its
alleged misapplication of facts and evidence, and erroneous conclusions based on said
evidence. Certiorari will issue only to correct errors of jurisdiction, and not errors or mistakes in
the findings and conclusions of the trial court.

Indeed, a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final,
unappealable, and immediately executory upon its promulgation. The fundamental philosophy
highlighting the finality of an acquittal by the trial court cuts deep into "the humanity of the laws
and in a jealous watchfulness over the rights of the citizen, when brought in unequal contest
with the State. This interest encompasses his right to have his guilt or innocence determined in
a single proceeding by the initial jury empanelled to try him, for societys awareness of the
heavy personal strain which the criminal trial represents for the individual defendant is
manifested in the willingness to limit Government to a single criminal proceeding to vindicate its
very vital interest in enforcement of criminal laws. The ultimate goal is prevention of government
oppression; the goal finds its voice in the finality of the initial proceeding. Because the
innocence of the accused has been confirmed by a final judgment, the Constitution conclusively
presumes that a second trial would be unfair.

However, the rule against double jeopardy is not without exceptions, which are: (1) Where there
has been deprivation of due process and where there is a finding of a mistrial, or (2) Where
there has been a grave abuse of discretion under exceptional circumstances. In the case, there
is no deprivation of due process or a mistrial committed against petitioner, and that no grave
abuse of discretion could be attributed to the CA, hence the rule against double jeopardy
operates making the judgment of acquittal final and no longer appealable.

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANKv.SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION
G.R. No. 186063, January 15, 2014
J. Peralta

Section 4, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court provides that "in an action against several defendants,
the court may, when a several judgment is proper, render judgment against one or more of
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them, leaving the action to proceed against the others." In addition, Section 5 of the same Rule
states that "when more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, the court at any stage,
upon a determination of the issues material to a particular claim and all counterclaims arising
out of the transaction or occurrence which is the subject matter of the claim may render a
separate judgment disposing of such claim." Further, the same provision provides that "the
judgment shall terminate the action with respect to the claim so disposed of and the action shall
proceed as to the remaining claims." Thus, the appeal of Goroza, assailing the judgment of the
RTC finding him liable, will not prevent the continuation of the ongoing trial between SMC and
PNB. The RTC retains jurisdiction insofar as PNB is concerned, because the appeal made by
Goroza was only with respect to his own liability.

The propriety of a several judgment is borne by the fact that SMC's cause of action against PNB
stems from the latter's alleged liability under the letters of credit which it issued. On the other
hand, SMC's cause of action against Goroza is the latter's failure to pay his obligation to the
former.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v.TETRO ENTERPRISES, INCORPORATED
G.R. No. 183015, January 15, 2014
J. Peralta

Clearly, the only thing the RTC was asked to do when the case was remanded to it by the CA
was to determine the damages respondent is entitled to for the loss of the use and enjoyment of
the property when the property was taken from it in 1974. Thus, when the case was remanded
to the RTC for the purpose of computing the damages, the case was not considered a new case
where an amendment of the complaint may still be allowed. Rather, it is merely a continuation of
the trial of the original complaint filed in 1992 only for the purpose of receiving the evidence of
the damages which respondent allegedly suffered as alleged in the original complaint, since no
evidence proving damages was received and passed upon when the RTC issued its Order
dated March 29, 1996. Therefore, the Section 2 and 3, Rule 10, Rules of Civil Procedure on
amendments of pleading find no applicability in this case.

RALPH P. TUAv.HON. CESAR A. MANGROBANG
G.R. No. 170701, January 22, 2014
J. Peralta

The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the
petitioner thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation therein.
Since "time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented," the court
is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life,
limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to believe that the
order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent danger of VAWC or to
prevent such violence, which is about to recur.

It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order that
notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within five (5)
days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition and TPO be
served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially effective for
thirty (30) days from service on the respondent.

PERALTA

Clearly, the court is authorized to issue a TPO on the date of the filing of the application after ex
parte determination that there is basis for the issuance thereof. Thus, it is within the courts
discretion, based on the petition and the affidavit attached thereto, to determine that the violent
acts against women and their children for the issuance of a TPO have been committed.

THE CITY OF MANILA v. HON. CARIDAD H. GRECIA-CUERDO
G.R. No. 175723 , February 4, 2014
J. Peralta

There is no dispute that the assailed Resolutions of the CA are in the nature of a final order as
they disposed of the petition completely. It is settled that in cases where an assailed judgment
or order is considered final, the remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal. Hence, in the instant
case, petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which is a
continuation of the appellate process over the original case.

A perusal of RA 9282 amending RA 1125 would show that, while it is clearly stated that the CTA
has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over decisions, orders or resolutions of the RTCs in local tax
cases originally decided or resolved by them in the exercise of their original or appellate
jurisdiction, there is no categorical statement under RA 1125 as well as the amendatory RA
9282, which provides that the CTA has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari assailing
interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in local tax cases filed before it.

The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the exercise of
original jurisdiction which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot
be implied from the mere existence of appellate jurisdiction.

On the strength of the constitutional provisions under Article VIII, it can be fairly interpreted that
the power of the CTA includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an
interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It,
thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with jurisdiction to issue writs of
certiorari in these cases.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR
G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014
J. Peralta

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in
the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is
clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status,
citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is
adversary. It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be
dispensed with, and the remedy is granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special
proceeding is not always summary.

In this case, the wife claims that her signature was forged and she was not the one who
contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words, she claims that no such
marriage was entered into or if there was, she was not the one who entered into such contract.
A petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an
action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
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substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC and other related laws. Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was
presented to show the existence of marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming
evidence that no marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence.
Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak
of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the
evidence.

CAPITOL HILLS GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC. and PABLO B. ROMAN, JR.
v.MANUEL O. SANCHEZ
G.R. No. 182738, February 24, 2014
J. Peralta

A person guilty of disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order of a court or commits any
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the
administration of justice may be punished for indirect contempt.

In all other cases, charges for indirect contempt shall be commenced by a verified petition with
supporting particulars and certified true copies of documents or papers involved therein, and
upon full compliance with the requirements for filing initiatory pleadings for civil actions in the
court concerned. If the contempt charges arose out of or are related to a principal action
pending in the court, the petition for contempt shall allege that fact but said petition shall be
docketed, heard and decided separately, unless the court in its discretion orders the
consolidation of the contempt charge and the principal action for joint hearing and decision. But
in indirect contempt proceedings initiated motu proprio by the court, the above rules do not
necessarily apply. First, since the court itself motu proprio initiates the proceedings, there can
be no verified petition to speak of. Instead, the court has the duty to inform the respondent in
writing, in accordance with his or her right to due process.

Second, when the court issues motu proprio a show-cause order, the duty of the court (1) to
docket and (2) to hear and decide the case separately from the main case does not arise, much
less to exercise the discretion to order the consolidation of the cases. What remains in any
case, whether the proceedings are initiated by a verified petition or by the court motu proprio, is
the duty of the court to ensure that the proceedings are conducted respecting the right to due
process of the party being cited in contempt.

In this case, the proceedings for indirect contempt have not been initiated. The court resolution
reiterating the earliers inspection order is not yet a "judgment or final order of a court in a case
of indirect contempt" as contemplated under the Rules. The penalty mentioned therein only
serves as a reminder to caution petitioners of the consequence of possible non-observance of
the long-overdue order to produce and make available for inspection and photocopying of the
requested records/documents.

CORAZON MACAPAGALv. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 19321, February 26, 2014
J. Peralta

Sections 2 and 3, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lay down the rules on
where, how and when appeal is taken. Consequently, the disallowance of the notice of appeal
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signifies the disallowance of the appeal itself. A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court is a mode of appeal of a lower courts decision or final order direct to the Supreme Court.
However, the questioned Order denying her notice of appeal is not a decision or final order from
which an appeal may be taken. The Rules of Court specifically provides that no appeal shall be
taken from an order disallowing or dismissing an appeal. Rather, the aggrieved party can
elevate the matter through a special civil action under Rule 65. Thus, in availing of the wrong
mode of appeal in this petition under Rule 45 instead of the appropriate remedy of Rule 65, the
petition merits an outright dismissal.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESv.HENRY T. GO
G.R. No. 168539, March 25, 2014
J. Peralta

It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with
whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that
the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged
conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is
his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the
charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent.

The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy
with a public officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all instances,
be indicted together with the public officer. Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-
conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy.

The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking
affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. When
a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant of
arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he
must raise the question of the courts jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity.
If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he
thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person. Moreover, "where the appearance is by
motion for the purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, it must be for
the sole and separate purpose of objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any other
purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
Such an appearance gives the court jurisdiction over the person."

Verily, petitioners participation in the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan was not confined
to his opposition to the issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which
called for respondent courts exercise of its jurisdiction.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESv. SONNY GATARIN y CABALLERO @ "JAY-R" and
EDUARDO QUISAYAS, EDUARDO QUISAYAS
G.R. No. 198022, April 7, 2014
J. Peralta

PERALTA

A dying declaration, although generally inadmissible as evidence due to its hearsay character,
may nonetheless be admitted when the following requisites concur, namely: (a) the declaration
concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; (b) it is made
when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is under a consciousness of impending
death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to testify had he or she survived; and (d)
the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the subject of inquiry involves the declarant's
death.

In the case at bar, it appears that not all the requisites of a dying declaration are present. From
the records, no questions relative to the second requisite was propounded to Januario. It does
not appear that the declarant was under the consciousness of his impending death when he
made the statements.

Even if Januarios utterances could not be appreciated as a dying declaration, his statements
may still be appreciated as part of the res gestae. Res gestae refers to the circumstances, facts,
and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character and are so
spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and
fabrication. The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether
the act, declaration, or exclamation, is so interwoven or connected with the principal fact or
event that it characterizes as to be regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether
it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to manufacture testimony.

When Januario gave the identity of the assailants to SPO3 Mendoza, he was referring to a
startling occurrence which is the stabbing by appellant and his co-accused. His utterance about
appellant and his co-accused having stabbed him, in answer to the question of SPO3 Mendoza,
was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence.

MAYOR GAMAL S. HAYUDINIv. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and MUSTAPHA J. OMAR
G.R. No. 207900, April 22, 2014
J. Peralta

A special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an independent action based on the specific
grounds and available only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. It will only prosper if grave abuse of discretion is alleged
and is actually proved to exist. Grave abuse of discretion has been defined as the arbitrary
exercise of power due to passion, prejudice or personal hostility; or the whimsical, arbitrary, or
capricious exercise of power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a positive duty
enjoined by law or to act at all in contemplation of law.

Here, Hayudini miserably failed to prove that the COMELEC rendered its assailed Resolutions
with grave abuse of discretion. Under the COMELEC Rules, a Petition to Deny Due Course or
Cancel CoC must be filed within five days from the last day for filing a certificate of candidacy,
but not later than twenty-five days from the time of filing of the CoC subject of the petition.
Clearly, Omars petition was filed way beyond the prescribed period.

RODOLFO V. FRANCISCOv. EMILIANA M. ROJAS, AND THE LEGITIMATE HEIRS OF
JOSE A. ROJAS
G.R. No. 167120, April 23, 2014
J. Peralta

PERALTA

Unlike ordinary civil actions, the adjudication of land in a cadastral or land registration
proceeding does not become final, in the sense of incontrovertibility until after the expiration of
one (1) year from the entry of the final decree of registration. As long as a final decree has not
yet been entered by the LRA and the period of one (1) year has not elapsed from date of entry,
the title is not finally adjudicated and the decision in the registration proceeding continues to be
under the control and sound discretion of the court rendering it. In this case, the subject parcels
of land were eventually registered in the names of petitioner and his sisters but less than a year
later, respondents already filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA. Therefore,
the principle that a Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked does not apply.

The principle of stare decisis et non quieta movere embodies the legal maxim that a principle or
rule of law which has been established by the decision of a court of controlling jurisdiction will be
followed in other cases involving a similar situation. It is founded on the necessity for securing
certainty and stability in the law and does not require identity of or privity of parties.

The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by
the Supreme Court in its final decisions. Thus, a ruling of a particular division of the CA, while
may be taken cognizance of in some cases, cannot bind or prejudice a ruling of another division
thereof, the former being a co-ordinate authority and, relative to Us, is still considered as a lower
court albeit empowered with an appellate jurisdiction.

A land registration court has no jurisdiction to order the registration of land already decreed in
the name of another in an earlier land registration case. Issuance of another decree covering
the same land is, therefore, null and void. It has been invariably stated that the real purpose of
the Torrens System is to quiet title to land and to stop forever any question as to its legality.
Once a title is registered, the owner may rest secure, without the necessity of waiting in the
portals of the court, or sitting on the "mirador su casa" to avoid the possibility of losing his land.
It is clear that the March 23, 1998 Order of the RTC Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 69, which
purports to merely enforce the September 15, 1977 Decision of the CFI, disturbs the stability of
TCT No. M-2095, a collateral attack that is impermissible under Section 48 of PD 1529 and well-
entrenched jurisprudence.

SKUNAC CORPORATION and ALFONSO F. ENRIQUEZv. ROBERTO S. SYLIANTENG and
CAESAR S. SYLIANTENG
G.R. No. 205879, April 23, 2014
J. Peralta

It is settled that, as a rule, in petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, only questions of law may be put in issue. Questions of fact cannot be entertained. There
are, however, recognized exceptions to this rule. In the instant case, the findings of the CA and
the RTC are conflicting. It, thus, behooves this Court to entertain the questions of fact raised by
petitioners and review the records of this case to resolve these conflicting findings.

The best evidence rule applies only when the content of such document is the subject of the
inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually executed, or exists,
or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does
not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise
admissible without need to account for the original. In the instant case, what is being questioned
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is the authenticity and due execution of the subject deed of sale. There is no real issue as to its
contents.

In any case, going to the matter of authenticity and due execution of the assailed document,
petitioners do not dispute that the copy of the deed of sale that respondents submitted as part of
their evidence is a duplicate of the original deed of sale dated June 20, 1958. Moreover, Section
4 (b), Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that "[w]hen a document is in two or more copies
executed at or about the same time, with identical contents, all such copies are equally
regarded as originals."

LITO CORPUZv. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014
J. Peralta

An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the
offense and the acts or omissions constitutive thereof. Then Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court provides that a complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused;
the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting
the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the
offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.

In the case at bar, the time of the commission of the offense was stated as " on or about the fifth
day of July, 1991" is not likewise fatal to the prosecution's cause considering that Section 11 of
the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time only when the same is a material
ingredient of the offense. The gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1
(b) of the Revised Penal Code is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received
to the prejudice of the offender.


LEGAL ETHICS
2009

RODOLFO B. GARCIA ETC. v. PRIMO C. MIRO ETC., ET AL
GR. No. 167409, March 20, 2009
J. Peralta

In the case at bar, the criminal caseof RECKLESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING TO
HOMICIDE filed against petitioner was in no way related to the performance of his duties as a
judge. The case filed against petitioner before the MCTC is a criminal case under its own
jurisdiction as prescribed by law and not an administrative case. To be sure, trial courts retain
jurisdiction over the criminal aspect of offenses committed by judges of the lower courts.

JUDGE DIVINA LUZ P. AQUINO-SIMBULAN v. PRESIDING JUDGE NICASIO BARTOLOME,
ET AL.
A.M. No. MTJ-05-1588, June 5, 2009
J. Peralta

PERALTA

The Clerk of Courts admission of negligence cannot excuse respondent Judge from
liability in the irregular processing of the bail bond. Respondent judge is tasked with
administrative supervision over his or her personnel. It is the responsibility of the judge to
always see to it that his/her orders are properly and promptly enforced, and that case records
are properly stored and kept. Thus, in the present case, respondent Judge himself should have
verified that the documents for bail were complete and correct instead of relying on the
representations of his clerk of court.

VALERIANO F. NUES v. JUDGE FRANCISCO B. IBAY, ET AL.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1984, June 30, 2009
J. Peralta

Respondent Judge failed to substantiate his allegation, the Court does not see how the
improper parking by complainant, or by a certain Oscar dela Cruz, could, even in the remotest
manner, disrupt the speedy administration of justice. At most, it would cause respondent Judge
inconvenience or annoyance, but still, this does not fall under any of the aforementioned acts for
which a person could be cited for contempt. Neither does it appear from the records, nor from
the evidence presented, that complainant intended any disrespect toward respondent Judge. In
fact, upon being summoned, complainant immediately apologized for his mistake. Such abusive
behavior on the part of respondent Judge fails to show his integrity, which is essential not only
to the proper discharge of the judicial office, but also to his personal demeanor. Respondent
Judge acted with grave abuse of authority for citing complainant for contempt without legal
basis.

ROBERT BERNHARD BUEHS v. ATTY. INOCENCIO T. BACATAN
A.C. No. 6674, June 30, 2009
J. Peralta

The Court cannot accept the contention of respondent that the phrase "counsel for the
complainants," found in the Indorsement, was a mere misprint. For if it were so, he could have
easily crossed out the phrase or prepared another Indorsement deleting said phrase. His claim
of misprint, therefore, is a last futile attempt based on the clearly established evidence that he
was acting in both capacities as counsel and arbitrator at the same time, an act which was
clearly reprehensible and violative of the principle of conflict of interests. Respondent remains
liable for representing conflicting interests.

GERONIMO FRANCISCO v. SEBASTIAN BOLIVAR, ET AL.
A.M. No. P-06-2212, July 14, 2009
J. Peralta

Respondent has undoubtedly violated Section 4, Canon I of the Code of Conduct for
Court Personnel, which provides that court personnel shall not accept any fee or remuneration
beyond what they receive or are entitled to in their official capacity. Respondent failed to
substantiate that the expenses amounting to P9,500.00, without receipts to qualify the same,
was actually incurred and duly accounted for.

Respondents discourtesy and braggadocio in dealing with complainant and his wife with
regard to an official matter should not be tolerated. The Court will not allow respondent to use
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his position to throw his weight around when dealing with party-litigants like herein complainant.
Respondent failed to abide by Section 2, Canon IV of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel,
which states that court personnel shall carry out their responsibilities as public servants in as
courteous a manner as possible.

CONCERNED EMPLOYEES OF THE MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURT OF MEYCAUAYAN,
BULACAN v. LARIZZA PAGUIO-BACANI, BRANCH COC II, MTC, MEYCAUAYAN,
BULACAN
A.M. No. P-06-2217. July 30, 2009
J. Peralta

Respondent indeed made it appear that she rendered service on the dates in question.
The discovery of a discrepancy in the attendance records of respondent gave rise to a
presumption that the latter falsified her attendance and/or leave records and, therefore, the
burden to overcome this presumption fell upon respondent. However, respondent was not able
to adequately explain how such discrepancy occurred. She merely denied the contents of said
Certification without clarifying how the Leave Division could have issued information different
from that of her DTR and the attendance logbook when, in fact, it was respondents office which
supplied the Leave Division with their attendance and leave records. As Clerk of Court,
respondent must be reminded of the constitutional provision that a public office is a public trust,
and all public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them
with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency.

ALFREDO FAVOR v. JUDGE CESAR O. UNTALAN, RTC, BRANCH 149, MAKATI CITY
A.M. No. RTJ-08-2158, July 30, 2009
J. Peralta

By using his position to help private persons settle a legal dispute, respondent Judge is
administratively liable under Rule 2.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. His intentions may have
been noble as he sought to make complainant realize that he had been occupying by mistake
the property subject of the dispute, but respondent Judge should be mindful to conduct himself
in a manner that gives no ground for reproach. The Court held in Miranda v. Judge Mangrobang
that a judges private life cannot be dissociated from his public life and it is, thus, important that
his behavior both on and off the bench be free from any appearance of impropriety.

ADELPHA E. MALABED v. JUDGE ENRIQUE C. ASIS, RTC, BR. 16, NAVAL BILIRAN
A.M. No. RTJ-07-2031, August 4, 2009
J. Peralta

Respondent Judge must bear in mind that membership in the judiciary circumscribes
ones personal conduct and imposes upon him certain restrictions, the faithful observance of
which is the price one has to pay for holding such a distinguished position. A magistrate of the
law must comport himself in a manner that his conduct must be free of a whiff of impropriety, not
only with respect to the performance of his official duties, but also to his behavior outside of his
sala and as a private individual. His conduct must be able to withstand the most searching
public scrutiny, for the ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the
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preservation of the peoples faith in the judicial system lest public confidence in the judiciary
would be eroded by the incompetent, irresponsible and negligent conduct of judges. In this
case, respondent Judge should have been more cautious in his close associations with
members of the Bar that led complainant to believe that the former had already been
predisposed to the opposing party and, hence, renders his impartiality questionable.

JOHN CHRISTEN S. HEGNA v. ATTY. GOERING G.C. PADERANGA
A.C. No. 5955. September 8, 2009
J. Peralta

The Court is more inclined to believe that when complainant and defendants-spouses
failed to reach an agreement, respondent came forward as a third-party claimant to prevent the
levy and execution of said properties. He, therefore, violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which provides that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Under this rule, conduct has been construed not to
pertain exclusively to the performance of a lawyers professional duties. In previous cases, the
Court has held that a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty,
probity and good demeanor; or unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

JUDGE RENE B. BACULI v. CLEMENTE U. UGALE
A.M. No. P-08-2569, October 30, 2009
J. Peralta

Clearly, respondent has shown his utter lack of dedication to the function of his office.
Undeniably, respondents failure to perform his duties, his unauthorized disappearances and
habitual drunkenness during office hours, hamper his efficiency as a court interpreter.
Consequently, respondents reprehensible conduct should not go unheeded for his actuations
are clearly inimical to the service and prejudicial to the interest of litigants and the general
public. He, therefore, deserves to be sanctioned.

2010

REQUEST OF JUDGE NIO A. BATINGANA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 6, MATI,
DAVAO ORIENTAL, FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO DECIDE CRIMINAL CASE NO. 4745-05
A.M. No. 08-2-107-RTC, February 1, 2010
J. Peralta

The Court granted Judge Batingana an extension of 90 days, or until February 11, 2008,
to decide Criminal Case No. 4745-05. However, he decided the case only on July 8, 2009, or
after one year and almost five months from the extension granted. Rule 3.05 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct states that a judge shall dispose of the courts business promptly and decide
the cases within the required periods.

PERALTA

REQUEST OF JUDGE NIO A. BATINGANA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 6, MATI,
DAVAO ORIENTAL, FOR EXTENSION OF TIME TO DECIDE CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 2063
and 1756
A.M. No. 05-8-463-RTC, February 17, 2010
J. Peralta

Respondent judge despite the numerous extensions granted to him by the Court in
deciding the cases submitted before him, have failed to render a decision within the
reglementary period. The Code of Judicial Conduct states that a judge shall dispose of the
courts business promptly and decide the cases within the required periods. Delay in the
disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of the people in the judiciary, lowers its
standards, and brings it to disrepute. Judges should not abuse the grant of an extension to
decide a case, and strive to decide the case within the extended period granted by the Court.

REYNARIA BARCENAS v. ATTY. ANORLITO A. ALVERO
A.C. No. 8159, April 23, 2010
J. Peralta

When a lawyer receives money from a client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is
bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for a particular
purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the lawyer must
immediately return the money to his client. Atty. Alveros failure to immediately account for and
return the money when due and upon demand violated the trust reposed in him, demonstrated
his lack of integrity and moral soundness, and warranted the imposition of disciplinary action. It
gave rise to the presumption that he converted the money for his own use, and this act
constituted a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the
legal profession. They constitute gross misconduct and gross unethical behavior for which he
may be suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

HADJA SOHURAH DIPATUAN v. JUDGE MAMINDIARA P. MANGOTARA
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2190, April 23, 2010
J. Peralta

Mere suspicion of partiality is not enough. There must be sufficient evidence to prove the
same, as well as a manifest showing of bias and partiality stemming from an extrajudicial source
or some other basis. A judge's conduct must be clearly indicative of arbitrariness and prejudice
before it can be stigmatized as biased and partial. As there was no substantial evidence to hold
respondent Mangotara liable on this point, the Investigating Justice correctly recommended the
dismissal of this charge against him.

ATTY. ALBERTO III BORBON REYES v. CLERK OF COURT V RICHARD C. JAMORA, ET.
AL.
A.M. No. P-06-2224, April 30, 2010
J. Peralta

A review of the records shows that no evidence was presented during the investigation
to prove that the acts of respondents amounted to usurpation of authority and grave abuse of
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authority. Reyes failed to substantiate his accusations. In the absence of proof, complainants
bare assertions cannot overturn the presumption of regularity in the performance of official
duties by court officials and personnel.The Court cannot give credence to charges based on
mere suspicion and speculation.

A-1 FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC. v. ATTY. LAARNI N. VALERIO
A.C. No. 8390, July 2, 2010
J. Peralta

Atty. Valerios conduct in the course of the IBP and court proceedings is also a matter of
serious concern. She failed to answer the complaint against her. Despite due notice, she failed
to attend the disciplinary hearings set by the IBP. She also ignored the proceedings before the
court as she likewise failed to both answer the complaint against her and appear during her
arraignment, despite orders and notices from the court. Clearly, this conduct runs counter to the
precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility and violates the lawyers oath which
imposes upon every member of the Bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. Atty.
Valerio has failed to live up to the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

ROLANDO E. MARCOS v. JUDGE OFELIA T. PINTO
A.M. No. RTJ-09-2180, July 26, 2010
J. Peralta

Respondent judge has failed to live up to rigorous standards. Her act of solemnizing the
marriage of accuseds son in the residence of the accused speaks for itself. It is improper and
highly unethical for a judge to actively participate in such social affairs, considering that the
accused is a party in a case pending before her own sala. What she should have done was
courteously deny the parties request. Her claim that she was unaware that the parties were
related to the accused fails to convince. In pending or prospective litigations before them,
judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid anything that may tend to awaken the suspicion
that their personal, social or sundry relations could influence their objectivity. Not only must
judges possess proficiency in law, they must also act and behave in such manner that would
assure litigants and their counsel of the judges competence, integrity and independence.

ATTY. JOSABETH V. ALONSO, ET. AL. v. ATTY. IBARO B. RELAMINDA, JR.
A.C. No. 8481, August 3, 2010
J. Peralta

The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation of the
doctrine of res judicata, runs contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
which requires a lawyer to exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and
efficient administration of justice. By his actuations, respondent also violated Rule 12.02 and
Rule 12.04 of the Code, as well as a lawyers mandate "to delay no man for money or malice."

The Court has, time and again, warned lawyers not to resort to forum shopping for this
practice clogs the court dockets. Their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration
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of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration of justice
contravenes such lawyers duty. This we will not tolerate.

ANTONIO T. RAMAS-UYPITCHING v. VINCENT HORACE U. MAGALONA
A.M. No. P-07-2379, November 17, 2010
J. Peralta

Sheriffs play an important role in the administration of justice and they should always
hold inviolate and invigorate the tenet that a public office is a public trust. Being in the
grassroots of our judicial machinery, sheriffs and deputy sheriffs are in close contact with the
litigants; hence, their conduct should all the more maintain the prestige and integrity of the court.
By the very nature of their functions, sheriffs must conduct themselves with propriety and
decorum, so as to be above suspicion. As such, they must discharge their duties with due care
and utmost diligence, because in serving the court's writs and processes and in implementing
the orders of the court, they cannot afford to err without affecting the efficiency of the process of
the administration of justice and, as agents of the law, high standards are expected of them.
Respondent was remiss in the performance of his duty as an officer of the court as he failed to
abide by what was ordained in the alias writ.

FERNANDO P. CHAN v. JOVEN T. OLEGARIO, PROCESS SERVER, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 6, ILIGAN CITY
A.M. No. P-09-2714, December 6, 2010
J. Peralta

It was respondent Olegario's pronouncement that he is a court employee which induced
Chan to trust him and extend a loan to him. Thus, Olegario's non-payment of his debt for more
than 7 years not only tainted his name but the court's image as well. This we will not tolerate.
We cannot overlook the fact that Olegario's unethical conduct has diminished the honor and
integrity of his office and stained the image of the judiciary. Certainly, to preserve decency
within the judiciary, court personnel must comply with just contractual obligations, act fairly and
adhere to high ethical standards. Like all other court personnel, Olegario is expected to be a
paragon of uprightness, fairness and honesty not only in all his official conduct but also in his
personal actuations, including business and commercial transactions, so as to avoid becoming
his courts albatross of infamy. The penalty imposed by the law is not directed at Olegarios
private life, but at his actuation unbecoming a public official.

2011

FLORENDA V. TOBIAS v. JUDGE MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR.
A.M. No. MTJ-09-1734, January 19, 2011
J. Peralta
The investigation revealed that respondent committed acts unbecoming of a judge, in
particular, talking to a prospective litigant in his court, recommending a lawyer to the litigant, and
preparing the Motion to Withdraw as Counsel of Atty. Robert Juanillo, which pleading was filed
in his court and was acted upon by him. The conduct of a judge should be beyond reproach and
reflective of the integrity of his office. Indeed, as stated by the OCA, the said acts of respondent
violate Section 1 of Canon 2 (Integrity), Section 2 of Canon 3 (Impartiality), and Section 1 of
Canon 4 (Propriety) of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
PERALTA

DANIEL G. SEVILLA v. JUDGE FRANCISCO S. LINDO
A.M. No. MTJ-08-1714, February 9, 2011
J. Peralta
Respondent Judge Lindo made or allowed too many unreasonable postponements that
inevitably delayed the proceedings and prevented the prompt disposition of Criminal Case No.
J-L00-4260 out of manifest bias in favor of the accused, to the prejudice of Sevilla as the
complainant in Criminal Case No. J-L00-4260. Thus, he flagrantly violated the letter and spirit
both of Rule 1.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which enjoined all judges to administer
justice impartially and without delay; and of Canon 6 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which
required him as a trial judge "to be prompt in disposing of all matters submitted to him,
remembering that justice delayed is often justice denied."
RE: REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BR. 56, MANDAUE CITY, CEBU
A.M. No. 09-7-284-RTC, February 16, 2011
J. Peralta
The Court knew the heavy caseloads heaped on the shoulders of every trial judge. But such
cannot excuse him from doing his mandated duty to resolve cases with diligence and dispatch.
Judges burdened with heavy caseloads should request the Court for an extension of the
reglementary period within which to decide their cases if they think they cannot comply with their
judicial duty. This, respondent Judge Vestil failed to do. Corollarily, a heavy caseload may
excuse a judges failure to decide cases within the reglementary period but not their failure to
request an extension of time within which to decide the case on time. Hence, all that respondent
judge needs to do is request for an extension of time over which the Court has, almost
customarily, been considerate.
FERDINAND C. BACOLOT v. HON. FRANCISCO D. PAO
A.M. No. RTJ-10-2241, March 9, 2011
J. Peralta
Respondent Judge Pao cannot be excused for the two-year delay in the resolution of a
mere motion to recall witness. His staff's or plaintiffs' failure to inform him sooner that the
plaintiffs have yet to receive the copy of the order will not shield him from liability. The proper
and efficient court management is the responsibility of the judge, and he is the one directly
responsible for the proper discharge of his official functions. He cannot take refuge behind the
inefficiency or mismanagement of his court personnel since the latter are not the guardians of a
judges responsibilities. A judge should be the master of his own domain and take responsibility
for the mistakes of his subordinates. The delay may be unintentional as Judge Pao would like
us to believe, however, the fact remains that he was remiss in the performance of his duties in
so far as resolving pending motions expeditiously.
FLORENCE E. DEL MAR SCHUCHMAN v. JUDGE EFREN M. CACATIAN
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2279, April 6, 2011
J. Peralta
PERALTA

Respondent judge is guilty of violating Canon 5, Rule 5.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
for his act of transacting with complainant in facilitating the transfer of the titles of the properties
from complainant's mother to complainant and her siblings during the conference in respondent
judge's chamber. Respondent Judge Cacatian, in proposing to facilitate the transfer of titles of
the properties, in effect engaged in a commercial transaction that gave him an appearance of
impropriety. In Agustin v. Mercado, We declared that employees of the court should have no
business meeting with litigants or their representatives under any circumstance. This prohibition
is more compelling when it involves a judge who, because of his position, must strictly adhere to
the highest tenets of judicial conduct; a judge must be the embodiment of competence, integrity
and independence.
ATTY. CONRADO B. GANDEZ, JR. vs. JUDGE MARIA CLARITA C. TABIN
A.M. No. MTJ-09-1736, July 25, 2011
J. Peralta
In the collision of two vehicles where one of the parties is the nephew of the respondent
judge, it was inappropriate for respondent judge to direct that a second alcohol test be
conducted on complainant's driver when the first test resulted in a "negative." Respondent judge
cannot interfere in the conduct of the investigation. Inevitably, as a result of her interference,
complainant suspected that she was influencing the outcome of the investigation. While
respondent Judge's concern over the safety of her nephew and the outcome of his criminal case
is understandable, she should not have disregarded the rules on proper decorum at the
expense of the integrity of the court. Although concern for family members is deeply ingrained in
the Filipino culture, respondent, being a judge, should bear in mind that he is also called upon to
serve the higher interest of preserving the integrity of the entire Judiciary. Canon 2 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only impropriety but also the mere appearance
of impropriety in all activities.
LEONARDO S. UMALE, SUBSTITUTED BY CLARISSA VICTORIA UMALE v.
ATTY. ALFREDO VILLAMOR
G.R. No. 171634, August 17, 2011
J. Peralta
The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors and the Commission on Bar Discipline
that there was no misrepresentation on the part of respondent. Petitioner was not able to
substantiate his right to the subject checks as the beneficial owner thereof. Thus, respondent
finds support in the said waiver to assert that petitioner is not entitled to the checks and
proceeds from MC Home Depot, Inc. and that whatever rights PPC had under the Option to
Lease the MC Home Depot property were subject of "waiver, assignment and transfer" in his
favor, acting as counsel for an undisclosed client.
WILFRIED ERDENBERGER v. JOHN V. AQUINO
A.M. No. P-10-2739, August 24, 2011
J. Peralta
Thus, in the instant case, the failure of respondent to issue the final deed of sale for more
than three (3) years clearly shows that he had been remiss in the performance of his duties. The
fact that a Writ of Mandamus was issued likewise showed that the act of issuing the final deed
of sale was ministerial, therefore, respondent could not exercise discretion as to whether to
issue the same or not; it is not for him to decide the propriety or impropriety of the issuance of
the final deed of sale; more so, considering that no temporary restraining order or injunctive
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order was issued to prevent the issuance of the final deed of sale. It is well settled that a
sheriffs functions are purely ministerial, not discretionary.
LINA LAURIA LIBERATO v. NESTOR M. LELINA
A.M. No. P-09-2703, September 5, 2011
J. Peralta
Exacting standard applies not only to the court employee's norm of conduct pertaining to
the discharge of his official duties, but also to his personal dealings, which must be within the
parameters of morality, propriety, and decency. As Clerk of Court II, respondents act of
executing an Affidavit of Relinquishment, dated October 3, 1997, which stated that Candido
Lauria, who earlier died on December 13, 1974, personally appeared before the Deputy Public
Land Inspector of the Bureau of Lands in Ilagan, Isabela and relinquished his rights, in favor of
respondent, as owner-claimant of Lot No. 4213 Cad-389-D, was a willful perversion of the truth
that greatly prejudiced the rights and interests of the heirs of the deceased as the rightful
claimants. To compound the defraudation, respondent presented the said affidavit to the Bureau
of Lands in support of his application for free patent over the subject parcel of land that
eventually led to the issuance of OCT No. P-72874 in his name and, later, three other titles, also
under his name. Although the execution of the document was done in his personal capacity, and
not in any way related to his duties as Clerk of Court II, being a court personnel, the act of
defraudation he perpetrated, which caused damage and prejudice of the heirs of the deceased,
amounted to grave misconduct and clearly degraded the integrity of the Judiciary as a
respectable institution. His reprehensible act should be sanctioned, and he should be purged
from the Judiciary.
VALENTIN C. MIRANDA v. ATTY. MACARIO D. CARPIO
A.C. No. 6281, September 21, 2011
J. Peralta
Respondent's unjustified act of holding on to complainant's title with the obvious aim of
forcing complainant to agree to the amount of attorney's fees sought is an alarming abuse by
respondent of the exercise of an attorney's retaining lien, which by no means is an absolute
right, and cannot at all justify inordinate delay in the delivery of money and property to his client
when due or upon demand. Respondent failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer by unlawfully
withholding and failing to deliver the title of the complainant, despite repeated demands, in the
guise of an alleged entitlement to additional professional fees. He has breached Rule 1.01 of
Canon 1 and Rule 16.03 of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Further, in collecting from complainant exorbitant fees, respondent violated Canon 20 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates that "a lawyer shall charge only fair and
reasonable fees." It is highly improper for a lawyer to impose additional professional fees upon
his client which were never mentioned nor agreed upon at the time of the engagement of his
services. At the outset, respondent should have informed the complainant of all the fees or
possible fees that he would charge before handling the case and not towards the near
conclusion of the case. This is essential in order for the complainant to determine if he has the
financial capacity to pay respondent before engaging his services.
ERNESTO Z. OBRE v. JUDGE MANOLITO Y. GUMARANG
A.M. No. MTJ-11-1792, September 21, 2011
J. Peralta
PERALTA

In the instant case, it is noteworthy to mention that the postponements were not
attributed to any of the parties to the case. The numerous postponements, which in some
instances were upon respondent's initiative, were uncalled for and unjustified, considering that it
was already established that all efforts for amicable settlement were futile. Thus, the
postponements were clear violation of the Rule and defeat the very essence of the Rule.
SC cannot countenance undue delay in the disposition of cases or motions, especially
now when there is an all-out effort to minimize if not totally eradicate the problem of congestion
long plaguing our courts. The requirement that cases be decided within the reglementary period
is designed to prevent delay in the administration of justice. For obviously, justice delayed is
justice denied. Delay in the disposition of cases erodes the faith and confidence of our people in
the judiciary, lowers its standards, and brings it into disrepute.
ATTY. FLORITA S. LINCO vs. ATTY. JIMMY D. LACEBAL
A.C. No. 7241, October 17, 2011
J. Peralta
The records sufficiently established that Atty. Linco was already dead when respondent
notarized the deed of donation on July 30, 2003. Respondent likewise admitted that he knew
that Atty. Linco died a day before he notarized the deed of donation. However, respondent
chose to ignore the basics of notarial procedure in order to accommodate the alleged need of a
colleague. The fact that respondent previously appeared before him in person does not justify
his act of notarizing the deed of donation, considering the affiant's absence on the very day the
document was notarized. In the notarial acknowledgment of the deed of donation, respondent
attested that Atty. Linco personally came and appeared before him on July 30, 2003. Yet
obviously, Atty. Linco could not have appeared before him on July 30, 2003, because the latter
died on July 29, 2003. Clearly, respondent made a false statement and violated Rule 10.01 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility and his oath as a lawyer.
2012

LUIS P. PINEDA v. NEIL T. TORRES, Sheriff III, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 2,
Angeles City
A.M. No. P-12-302, January 30, 2012
[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 11-3584-P]
J. Peralta

Indeed, Administrative Circular No. 12 is explicit as to the rules to be followed in the
implementation of writs. Guided by the above-mentioned Circular, it is clear that respondent's
act of implementing the subject writs in San Fernando City, when his territorial jurisdiction is
confined only to Angeles City, is a violation of the Circular and tantamount to abuse of authority.
While respondent claimed that he personally informed the OCC of San Fernando City, he,
however, failed to prove that he made written notice as required by Administrative Circular No.
12. A mere submission of the copies of the court processes to the OCC will not suffice as to the
written notice requirement.

PERALTA

EVELYN V. JALLORINA v. RICHELLE TANEO-REGNER, Data Entry Machine Operator II,
Regional Trial Court, Office of the Clerk of Court, San Mateo, Rizal
A.M. No. P-11-2948 April 23, 2012
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 09-3049-P)
J. Peralta

There is no doubt that engaging in sexual relations with a married man is not only a
violation of the moral standards expected of employees of the judiciary, but is also a desecration
of the sanctity of the institution of marriage which this Court abhors and is, thus, punishable.

JUDGE AMADO S. CAGUIOA (RET.) v. ELIZABETH G. AUCENA, COURT LEGAL
RESEARCHER II, Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, Baguio City
A.M. No. P-09-2646, June 18, 2012
(Formerly Oca I.P.I. No. 08-2911-P)
J. Peralta

Respondent, a Court Legal Researcher, committed dishonesty by causing the
unauthorized insertion of an additional sentence in the trial court's order. Dishonesty has been
defined as a disposition to lie, cheat, deceive or defraud. It implies untrustworthiness, lack of
integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle on the part of the individual who failed to
exercise fairness and straightforwardness in his or her dealings. By her act, she has
compromised and undermined the public's faith in the records of the court below and, ultimately,
the integrity of the Judiciary. To tolerate such act would open the floodgates to fraud by court
personnel.

JUDGE ARMANDO S. ADLAWAN, PRESIDING JUDGE, 6TH MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL
COURT, BONIFACIO-DON MARIANO MARCOS, MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL v. ESTRELLA P.
CAPILITAN, COURT STENOGRAPHER, 6TH MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURT,
BONIFACIO-DON MARIANO MARCOS, MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL
A.M. No. P-12-3080, August 29, 2012
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 10-3543-P)
J. Peralta

In all instances, respondent admitted the allegation that she is pregnant by a man
married to another woman. Indeed, while she initially claimed that the man who impregnated her
represented to be separated from his wife, the fact remains that the man is still married. Thus,
there is no doubt that respondent engaged in sexual relations with a married man which not only
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violate the moral standards expected of employees of the Judiciary but is also a desecration of
the sanctity of the institution of marriage. The exacting standards of morality and decency have
been strictly adhered to and laid down by the Court to those in the service of the Judiciary.
Respondent, as a court stenographer, did not live up to her commitment to lead a moral life.

LUCIA O. MAGTIBAY v. JUDGE CADER P. INDAR, AI HAJ., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 14, COTABATO CITY
A.M. No. Rtj-11-2271 September 24, 2012
(Formerly Oca I.P.I. No. 09-3239-Rtj)
J. Peralta

Even assuming that respondent judge did not find the motion to be meritorious, he could
have simply acted on the said motions and indicated the supposed defects in his resolutions
instead of just leaving them unresolved. A judge's delay in resolving, within the prescribed
period, pending motions and incidents constitutes a violation of Rule 3.05 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct requiring judges to dispose of court business promptly.

MARITES FLORES-TUMBAGA v. JOSELITO S. TUMBAGA, SHERIFF IV, OFFICE OF THE
CLERK OF COURT, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, LA TRINIDAD, BENGUET
A.M. No. P-06-2196 October 22, 2012
(Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 05-2272-P)
J. Peralta

Respondent's admission, coupled with the testimonies of the witnesses, satisfies the
standard of substantial evidence required in administrative proceedings that there is reasonable
ground to believe that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such
evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant.

Immoral conduct is conduct which is "willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a
moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community." In
several cases, we have ruled that abandonment of ones wife and children, and cohabitation
with a woman not his wife, constitutes immoral conduct that is subject to disciplinary action.
2013

PATROCINO V. AGBULOS v. ATTY. ROSELLER A. VIRAY
A.C. No. 7350, February 18, 2013
J. Peralta

Respondents failure to perform his duty as a notary public resulted not only damage to
those directly affected by the notarized document but also in undermining the integrity of a
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notary public and in degrading the function of notarization. He should, thus, be held liable for
such negligence not only as a notary public but also as a lawyer. The responsibility to faithfully
observe and respect the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment or jurat is more
pronounced when the notary public is a lawyer because of his solemn oath under the Code of
Professional Responsibility to obey the laws and to do no falsehood or consent to the doing of
any. Lawyers commissioned as notaries public are mandated to discharge with fidelity the
duties of their offices, such duties being dictated by public policy and impressed with public
interest.

AUGUSTO P. BALDADO v. ATTY. AQUILINO A. MEJICA
A.C. No. 9120, March 11, 2013
J. Peralta

Respondent sought the dismissal of the quo warranto case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction. Even if the trial court denied the motion to dismiss, respondent could still have
raised the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the trial court in the appeal of the trial court's decision to
the COMELEC; however, no such appeal was filed. Hence, respondent's negligence in
protecting the interest of his client was the failure to appeal the trial court's decision in the quo
warranto case before the COMELEC. The circumstances of this case show violation of Canon
18: Rules 18.01, 18.02 and 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

ANNA LIZA VALMORES-SALINAS v. JUDGE CRISOLOGO S. BITAS, REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 7, TACLOBAN CITY.
A.M. No. RTJ-12-2335, March 18, 2013
J. Peralta

It appears that Roy Salinas did not file a verified complaint, but instead initiated the
indirect contempt through his Comment/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration with
Motion to Cite Defendant for Indirect Contempt. Regardless of this fact, however, respondent
Judge still issued an order peremptorily holding petitioner in contempt of court. Moreover,
assuming that the contempt charge was initiated motu proprio by the Court, respondent Judge
still failed to abide by the rules when he did not require petitioner to show cause why she should
not be punished for contempt. Plainly, respondent Judge's obstinate disregard of established
rules of procedure amounts to gross ignorance of the law or procedure, since he disregarded
the basic procedural requirements in instituting an indirect contempt charge

ANTIOCO BONONO, JR. AND VICTORIA RAVELO-CAMINGUE v. JAIME DELA PEA
SUNIT, SHERIFF IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 29, SURIGAO CITY
A.M. No. P-12-3073. April 3, 2013
J. Peralta

In the case at bar, the respondent failed to meet the exacting standards required of
employees of the judiciary by his provocative attitude towards the complainants by challenging
complainant Bonono, Jr. to a fight and assaulting complainant Camingue. The respondent's
unruly attitude is further shown by the fact that when a police officer tried to pacify him, he
bragged that he is an officer of the court, brandished his badge as a sheriff, and was only
pacified and subdued upon the arrival of a team of heavily armed policemen. The behavior of
the respondent is tantamount to an arrogant and disrespectful officer of the court which should
not be countenanced.

PERALTA

JUDGE ANASTACIO C. RUFON vs. MANUELITO P. GENITA, LEGAL RESEARCHER II,
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 52, BACOLOD CITY
A.M. No. P-12-3044, April 8, 2013
J. Peralta

We take judicial notice of the fact that in government offices where there are no bundy
clocks, it is a matter of practice for employees of these offices that upon arrival at work and
before proceeding to their respective workstations, they first sign their names at the attendance
logbook and at the end of each month, the employees fill up their DTR reflecting therein the
entries earlier made in the logbook. Falsification of time records constitutes dishonesty.

AUXENCIO JOSEPH B. CLEMENTE, CLERK OF COURT, METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT,
BRANCH 48, PASAY CITY v. ERWIN BAUTISTA, CLERK III, METROPOLITAN TRIAL
COURT BRANCH 48, PASAY CITY
A.M. NO. P-10-2879. June 3, 2013
J. Peralta

We would like to stress that all directives coming from the Court Administrator and his
deputies are issued in the exercise of this Courts administrative supervision of trial courts and
their personnel, hence, should be respected. These directives are not mere requests but should
be complied with promptly and completely. Clearly, respondents indefensible disregard of the
orders of the OCA, as well as of the complainant and Judge Manodon, for him to comment on
the complaint and to explain his infractions, shows his disrespect for and contempt, not just for
the OCA, but also for the Court, which exercises direct administrative supervision over trial court
officers and employees through the OCA. His indifference to, and disregard of, the directives
issued to him clearly constituted insubordination.

DR. TERESITA LEE v. ATTY. AMADOR L. SIMANDO
A.C. No. 9537, June 10, 2013
J. Peralta

Clearly, it is improper for respondent to appear as counsel for one party (complainant as
creditor) against the adverse party (Mejorado as debtor) who is also his client, since a lawyer is
prohibited from representing conflicting interests. He may not, without being guilty of
professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflict with that of his
present or former client.

Respondent is likewise guilty of violating Rule 21.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. In his last-ditch effort to impeach the credibility of complainant, he divulged
information which he acquired in confidence during the existence of their lawyer-client
relationship. We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez that the termination of the relation of attorney
and client provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict
with that of the former client. The reason for the rule is that the clients confidence once reposed
cannot be divested by the expiration of the professional employment. Consequently, a lawyer
should not, even after the severance of the relation with his client, do anything which will
injuriously affect his former client in any matter in which he previously represented him nor
should he disclose or use any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation.

SONIC STEEL INDUSTRIES, INC. vs. ATTY. NONNATUS P. CHUA
PERALTA

A.C. No. 6942, July 17, 2013
J. Peralta

It appears that respondent lawyer claimed or made to appear that STEELCORP was the
licensee of the technical information and the patent on Hot Dip Coating of Ferrous Strands or
Philippine Patent No. 16269. However, an extensive investigation made by the IBPs
Commission on Bar Discipline showed that STEELCORP only has rights as a licensee of the
technical information and not the rights as a licensee of the patent. It is clear that respondent
violated his duties as a lawyer to avoid dishonest and deceitful conduct, (Rule 1.01, Canon 1)
and to act with candor, fairness and good faith (Rule 10.01, Canon 10). Also, respondent
desecrated the solemn oath he took before this Court when he sought admission to the bar, i.e.,
not to do any falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court. Thus, even at the risk of
jeopardizing the probability of prevailing on STEELCORPs application for a search warrant,
respondent should have informed the court of the patents expiration so as to allow the latter to
make an informed decision given all available and pertinent facts.

ROLANDO E. CAWALING, PEDRO L. LABAYO, WENCESLAO Q. ARROYO, JR.,
CLEMENTE B. BUEN, RAMON D. DERIT, DWIGHT B. DURAN, FELIZARDO R.
FRANCISCO, JR., SUSANA G. HABOC, ARNOLD C. PEREZ, VERLAND E. VERGARA,
AMELIA L. ESPINOSA, NOEL P. BOLA, VENERANDO A. PADUA, JR., LAURENCE
ALBERT D. AYO, WILLY B. AQUINO, EDUARDO A. REMPIS, JIMMY A. BUTAC, EDUARDO
D. DOCTAMA, AND ANTONIO T. REODIQUE v. NAPOLEON M. MENESE ( RETIRED
COMMISSIONER, NLRC-SECOND DIVISION), RAUL T. AQUINO (PRESIDING
COMMISSIONER, NLRC-SECOND DIVISION) AND TERESITA D. CASTILLON-LORA
(COMMISSIONER, NLRC-SECOND DIVISION)
A.C. No. 9698, Novemeber 13, 2013
J. Peralta

It is not within respondents' discretion to allow the filing of the appeal bond issued by a
bonding company with expired accreditation regardless of its pending application for renewal of
accreditation. Respondents cannot extend Intra Strata's authority or accreditation. Neither can it
validate an invalid bond issued by a bonding company with expired accreditation, or give a
semblance of validity to it pending this Court's approval of the application for renewal of
accreditation. It must be the emphasized that it is only the Supreme Court, through the Office of
the Court Administrator, which can give authority and accreditation to surety companies to be
able to transact business involving judicial bonds.

2014

MA. LIZA M. JORDA, CITY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE, TACLOBAN CITY v. JUDGE
CRISOLOGO S. BITAS, RTC, BRANCH 7, TACLOBAN CITY / PROSECUTOR LEO C.
TABAO v. JUDGE CRISOLOGO S. BITAS, RTC, BRANCH 7, TACLOBAN CITY
A.M. No. RTJ-14-2376/A.M. No. RTJ-14-2377, March 5, 2014
J. Peralta

The Court notes the improper language of respondent judge directed towards
complainants in his Answers and Comments where he criticized them for their incompetence in
handling the subject case. The use of intemperate language is included in the proscription
provided by Section 1, Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, thus: "Judges shall avoid
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impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all the activities of a judge." It bears stressing
that as a dispenser of justice, respondent should exercise judicial temperament at all times,
avoiding vulgar and insulting language. He must maintain composure and equanimity.










CRIMINAL LAW
2009


CAYETANO A. TEJANO, JR. v. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN AND THE PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 161778, April 7, 2009
J . Peralta

In cases where the accused avails of the remedy of new trial, the accused has the burden of
showing that the new evidence he seeks to present has complied with the requisites to justify
the holding of a new trial.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOVEN DE GRANO, ET AL.
G.R. No. 167710 ,June 5, 2009
J. Peralta

Verification and certification portion of the petition was signed only by counsel and not by
the aggrieved party. The attestation contained in the certification on non-forum shopping
requires personal knowledge by the party who executed the same. To merit the Courts
consideration, petitioners here must show reasonable cause for failure to personally sign the
certification. The petitioners must convince the court that the outright dismissal of the petition
would defeat the administration of justice.

Thus, petitioner need only show that there was reasonable cause for the failure to sign
the certification against forum shopping, and that the outright dismissal of the petition would
defeat the administration of justice. , it was out of extreme fear that private complainant failed to
personally sign the certification. It is to be noted that when Armando and Joven were acquitted,
Teresita was already out of the witness protection program and was in hiding in the Visayas. As
such, she could not travel to Manila to personally sign the petition

JESSE Y YAP v. HON. MONICO G. CABALES, ET AL.
G.R. No. 159186. June 5, 2009
J. Peralta

PERALTA

The resolution of the issue raised in the civil action is not determinative of the guilt or
innocence of the accused in the criminal cases against him, and there is no necessity that the
civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal cases.

The prejudicial question under determination was whether the daily interest rate of 5%
was void, such that the checks issued by respondents to cover said interest were likewise void
for being contra bonos mores, and thus the cases for B.P. Blg. 22 will no longer prosper. In
resolving the issue, We ruled that whether or not the interest rate imposed by petitioners is
eventually declared void for being contra bonos mores will not affect the outcome of the BP Blg.
22 cases because what will ultimately be penalized is the mere issuance of bouncing checks. In
fact, the primordial question posed before the court hearing the B.P. Blg. 22 cases is whether
the law has been breached; that is, if a bouncing check has been issued.

GLEN PASCUAL Y MALUMBAY, ET AL. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 162286. June 5, 2009
J. Peralta

Petitioners insist that they relied on the supposed professionalism of their
counsel. According to them, having received the notice from the Court of Appeals to file a brief,
their counsel was supposed to know his duty, not only as their counsel but also as an officer of
the court; and they conclude that they should not be blamed and penalized if the conduct of
their counsel fell way short of what was expected of him. This reasoning of petitioners merits no
consideration.

It is a well-settled rule that the client is bound by the counsel's conduct, negligence, and
mistakes in handling the case; and the client cannot be heard to complain that the result might
have been different had his lawyer proceeded differently.

WILMA TABANIAG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 165411. June 18, 2009
J. Peralta

The agents to whom personal property was entrusted for sale, conclusively proves the
inability to return the same is solely due to malfeasance of a sub-agent to whom the first agent
had actually entrusted the property in good faith, and for the same purpose for which it was
received; there being no prohibition to do so and the chattel being delivered to the sub-
agent before the owner demands its return or before such return becomes due, we hold that
the first agent cannot be held guilty of estafa by either misappropriation or conversion. The
abuse of confidence that is characteristic of this offense is missing under the circumstances.

In cases of estafa, the profit or gain must be obtained by the accused personally,
through his own acts, and his mere negligence in permitting another to take advantage or
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benefit from the entrusted chattel cannot constitute estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1-b, of
the Revised Penal Code; unless of course the evidence should disclose that the agent acted
in conspiracy or connivance with the one who carried out the actual misappropriation, then the
accused would be answerable for the acts of his co-conspirators. If there is no such evidence,
direct or circumstantial, and if the proof is clear that the accused herself was the innocent victim
of her sub-agents faithlessness, her acquittal is in order.

EDGAR ESQUEDA v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 170222. June 18, 2009
J. Peralta

There is treachery when the following essential elements are present, viz.: (a) at the time
of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously
and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods or forms of attack employed by
him. The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an aggressor on the
unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring
its commission without risk of himself.

In the present case, treachery in the commission of the crime was sufficiently proven by
the prosecution. When Gaudencio opened the door and went outside, Venancia tailed
him. There they found two persons at the porch, one sitting at the bench and the other
standing. Without warning, the unidentified man stood up and stabbed Gaudencio in the
chest. Upon seeing this, Venancia shouted Watch out, Dong! She then turned her back, but
was stabbed by petitioner and fell on the ground. While in this position, petitioner continued
hitting her on different parts of her body. Clearly, the hapless Venancia was stabbed
immediately after the unidentified person stabbed her live-in partner, thus, giving her no
opportunity to retaliate or defend herself.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARLON ALBERT DE LEON Y HOMO
G.R. No. 179943. June 26, 2009
J. Peralta

In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to
commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The
intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place
before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction
as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the
crime that has to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide
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through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime,
namely, robbery with homicide, must be consummated.

It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of
homicide is other than the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that aside
from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by
reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of
homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide
is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with
homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are
integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word homicide is used
in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.


ARTHUR ZARATE v. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BR. GINGOOG CITY, MISAMIS ORIENTAL
G.R. No. 152263. July 3, 2009
J. Peralta

It is well settled that positive identification, where categorical and consistent and not
attended by any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter,
prevails over alibi and denial which, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence,
are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving weight in law. For this reason, the defense
of alibi and denial cannot prosper in the light of the positive identification by complainant
Guiritan that it was petitioner who stabbed him.

GEMMA T. JACINTO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 162540, July 13, 2009
J. Peralta

Under this article, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an offense against
persons or property because: (1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of
accomplishment; or (2) the means employed is either (a) inadequate or (b) ineffectual.

That the offense cannot be produced because the commission of the offense is
inherently impossible of accomplishment is the focus of this petition. To be impossible under
this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of
accomplishment. There must be either (1) legal impossibility, or (2) physical impossibility of
accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act as an impossible crime.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ELEGIO AN
G.R. No. 169870. August 4, 2009
PERALTA

J. Peralta


In reviewing rape cases, this Court has constantly been guided by three principles, to
wit: (1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more difficult
for the person accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the intrinsic nature of the
crime of rape where only two persons are usually involved, the testimony of the complainant
must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (3) the evidence for the prosecution must stand
or fall on its own merits and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the
defense. And as a result of these guiding principles, credibility of the complainant becomes the
single most important issue. If the testimony of the victim is credible, convincing and consistent
with human nature, and the normal course of things, the accused may be convicted solely on
the basis thereof.

CAROLINA R. JAVIER v. SANDIGANBAYAN, ET AL.
G.R. Nos. 147026-27. September 11, 2009
J. Peralta

A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which,
for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an
individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be
exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.

Thus, pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, one is a public officer if one has been elected or
appointed to a public office. Petitioner was appointed by the President to the Governing Board
of the NDBD. Though her term is only for a year that does not make her private person
exercising a public function. The fact that she is not receiving a monthly salary is also of no
moment. Section 7, R.A. No. 8047 provides that members of the Governing Board shall receive
per diem and such allowances as may be authorized for every meeting actually attended and
subject to pertinent laws, rules and regulations. Also, under the Anti-Graft Law, the nature of
one's appointment, and whether the compensation one receives from the government is only
nominal, is immaterial because the person so elected or appointed is still considered a public
officer.

EDGAR MERCADO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 161902. September 11, 2009
J. Peralta

PERALTA

To prevent any undue suggestiveness in the identification process, it was held that the
correct way is to: first, present a series of photographs to the witness, not solely the photograph
of the suspect; and second, when showing a group of pictures to the witness, the
arrangement and display of said photographs should give no suggestion whatsoever which one
of the pictures belongs to the suspect. The photographic identification must be free from any
impermissible suggestions that would single out a person to the attention of the witness making
the identification. However, as held in Teehankee, Jr., the burden to prove that the out-of-court
identification was unduly suggestive rests on the accused.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ERNESTO CRUZ, JR. Y CONCEPCION, ET AL.
G.R. No. 168446. September 18, 2009
J. Peralta

Conspiracy as a mode of incurring criminal liability must be proven separately from and
with the same quantum of proof as the crime itself. Conspiracy need not be proven by direct
evidence. After all, secrecy and concealment are essential features of a successful conspiracy.
Conspiracies are clandestine in nature. It may be inferred from the conduct of the accused
before, during and after the commission of the crime, showing that they had acted with a
common purpose and design. Paraphrasing the decision of the English Court in Regina v.
Murphy, conspiracy may be implied if it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts
towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each doing a part so that their
combined acts, though apparently independent of each other, were, in fact, connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment.To
hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason of conspiracy, he must be shown to have
performed an overt act in pursuance or furtherance of the complicity.There must be intentional
participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and
purpose.

VICTORIA S. JARILLO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 164435. September 29, 2009
J. Peralta

The subsequent judicial declaration of the nullity of the first marriage was immaterial
because prior to the declaration of nullity, the crime had already been consummated. Moreover,
petitioners assertion would only delay the prosecution of bigamy cases considering that an
accused could simply file a petition to declare his previous marriage void and invoke the
pendency of that action as a prejudicial question in the criminal case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARMANDO PADILLA Y NICOLAS
G.R. No. 167955. September 30, 2009
J. Peralta

When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances: 1. By using force or intimidation; 2. When the
woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and 3. When the woman is under
twelve years of age or is demented.
PERALTA


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RODOLFO LOPEZ
G.R. No. 179714. October 2, 2009
J. Peralta

It must be remembered that under the law and prevailing jurisprudence, the gravamen of
the offense of statutory rape as provided under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code is the
carnal knowledge of a woman below twelve years old. The only elements of statutory rape are:
(1) that the offender had carnal knowledge of a woman; and (2) that such woman is under
twelve (12) years of age. It is not necessary to prove that the victim was intimidated or that
force was used against her, because in statutory rape the law presumes that the victim, on
account of her tender age, does not and cannot have a will of her own.

VICENTE,JR. AND DANNY G. FAJARDO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 167764. October 9, 2009
J. Peralta

The criminal action and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations, as
provided for in this chapter shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first
instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published or where
any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission of the
offense: Provided, however, That where one of the offended parties is a public officer whose
office is in the City of Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action shall be
filed in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila or of the city or province where the
libelous article is printed and first published, and in case such public officer does not hold office
in the City of Manila, the action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city
where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous article is
printed and first published and in case one of the offended parties is a private individual, the
action shall be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he actually
resides at the time of the commission of the offense or where the libelous matter is printed and
first published.

NIEVA M. MANEBO v. SPO1 ROEL D. ACOSTA, ET AL.
G.R. No. 169554. October 28, 2009
J. Peralta

Probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances
as would lead a person of ordinary caution and prudence to entertain an honest and strong
suspicion that the person charged is guilty of the crime subject of the investigation. Being based
merely on opinion and reasonable belief, it does not import absolute certainty. Probable cause
need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, as the investigating officer acts
upon reasonable belief. Probable cause implies probability of guilt and requires more than bare
suspicion but less than evidence to justify a conviction.
PERALTA


To determine the existence of probable cause, there is a need to conduct a preliminary
investigation. A preliminary investigation constitutes a realistic judicial appraisal of the
merits of a case. Its purpose is to determine whether (a) a crime has been committed; and
(b) there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, is a means of
discovering which person or persons may be reasonably charged with a crime.


2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EGAP MADSALI, SAJIRON LAJIM AND MARON LAJIM
G.R. No. 179570, February 4, 2010
J. Peralta

The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code are: (1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains
another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; (3) the act of detention or
kidnapping is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of the following
circumstances are present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days; or (b) it is
committed by simulating public authority; or (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon
the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or
detained is a minor, female, or a public officer. R.A. No. 7659 amended Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code by adding thereto this provision: "When the victim is killed or dies as a
consequence of the detention, or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the
maximum penalty shall be imposed; and that this provision gives rise to
a special complex crime.

The elements of the crime abovementioned were present in the case. After AAA, a
female and a minor, was raped, she was brought to and detained and forced to cohabit with the
accused.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. FERNANDO VILLAMIN Y SAN JOSE ALIAS ANDOY
G.R. No. 175590, February 9, 2010
J. Peralta

The elements necessary for the prosecution of the illegal sale of drugs are: (1) the
identities of the buyer and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of
the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material to the prosecution for the illegal sale
of dangerous drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti. The first element has been complied with: the
poseur-buyer positively identified the seller of shabu and the money used for the sale of the
same. The second and crucial element, which is the proof that a transaction indeed transpired
between the buyer and the seller, was categorically testified to by SPO4 Taruc.

PERALTA

FRANCISCO APARIS Y SANTOS v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 169195, February 17, 2010
J. Peralta

To secure a conviction for illegal sale of shabu, the following essential elements must be
established: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment thereof. In prosecutions for
illegal sale of shabu, what is material is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.

In the case before the Court, the prosecution was able to establish the said elements.
PO3 Labrador, who acted as the poseur-buyer, categorically testified about the buy-bust
operation from the time he and the confidential informant waited for petitioner to arrive, to the
time when petitioner met them and asked them if they had money, to the actual exchange of the
marked money with the plastic bag containing a white substance, which was later proved to
be shabu; until the apprehension of petitioner.

ENGR. CARLITO PENTECOSTES, JR. v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 167766, April 7, 2010
J. Peralta

The principal and essential element of attempted or frustrated murder is the intent on the
part of the assailant to take the life of the person attacked. Such intent must be proved in a
clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the homicidal intent of the
aggressor. In the present case, intent to kill the victim could not be inferred from the
surrounding circumstances. Petitioner only shot the victim once and did not hit any vital part of
the latters body. If he intended to kill him, petitioner could have shot the victim multiple times or
even ran him over with the car. Favorably to petitioner, the inference that intent to kill existed
should not be drawn in the absence of circumstances sufficient to prove this fact beyond
reasonable doubt. When such intent is lacking but wounds are inflicted upon the victim, the
crime is not attempted murder but physical injuries only.

In treachery, the perpetrator intentionally and purposely employs ways and means to
commit the crime. There was no evidence, however, to show that petitioner employed such
means of execution that would ensure the commission of the crime without harm to his person.
Thus, treachery did not attend the commission of the crime.


FELIZARDO S. OBANDO AND JUAN S. OBANDO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 138696, July 7, 2010
J. Peralta

PERALTA

Essentially, the elements of the crime of Falsification of Public Document under Article
172 (1) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are: (1) that the offender is a private individual; (2)
that the offender committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated under Article 171; and (3)
that the act of falsification is committed in a public document. Under paragraph 2 of Article 171,
a person may commit falsification of a public document by causing it to appear in a document
that a person or persons participated in an act or proceeding, when such person or persons did
not, in fact, so participate in the act or proceeding.

The crime of falsification of public document was the means for petitioners to commit
estafa. The elements of estafa under Article 315, par. 1 (b) of the RPC are as follows: (1) that
money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission,
or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to
return the same; (2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by
the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; and (3) that such misappropriation or
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALEJANDRO RELLOTA Y TADEO
G.R. No. 168103, August 3, 2010
J. Peralta

Attempted rape requires that the offender commence the commission of rape directly by
overt acts, but does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of some cause or accident
other than his own spontaneous desistance. On the other hand, lascivious conduct, is defined
as the intentional touching, either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin,
breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or
mouth, of any person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate,
harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality, masturbation,
lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.

The actions of appellant on January 31, 1994, i.e., laying AAA on the sofa and kissing
and touching her private parts are, by definition, lascivious or lewd, and based on AAA's
testimony, the intimidation from appellant was in existence and apparent. Section 5 of R.A. No.
7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child being abused for profit, but also one in which a
child engages in any lascivious conduct through coercion or intimidation.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. VENANCIO ROXAS Y ARGUELLES
G.R. No. 172604, August 17, 2010
J. Peralta

Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provided that any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death: 1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more
than three days; 2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority; 3. If any serious
PERALTA

physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained, or if threats to
kill him shall have been made; 4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except
when the accused is any of the parents, female or a public officer. The penalty shall be death
where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting ransom from the
victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in
the commission of the offense. When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the
detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty
shall be imposed. (As amended by Sec. 8, Republic Act No. 7659)

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. NONOY EBET
G.R. No. 181635, November 15, 2010
J. Peralta

In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to
commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The
intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. The homicide may take place
before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction
as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the
crime that has to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with homicide
through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime,
namely, robbery and homicide, must be consummated.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EVANGELINE V. LASCANO
G.R. No. 172605, November 22, 2010
J. Peralta

The essential elements to be established in the prosecution of illegal sale of marijuana
are as follows: (1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and the
consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. What is material
is the proof that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti as evidence.

On the other hand, the essential elements to be established in the prosecution of illegal
possession of marijuana are as follows: (1) that the accused is in possession of the object
identified as prohibited or regulated drug; (2) that such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) that the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RODRIGO SALCEDO ALIAS "DIGOL"
G.R. No. 178272, March 14, 2011
J . Peralta

PERALTA

Geraldino positively identified the appellant as the author of the crime. He testified that
with the aid of the light cast by the torch carried by the women near him, he was able to see the
appellant stab Analyn twice while she was lying on her back. Thus, even if the crime was
committed during the night, it was not totally dark, as a torch illuminated the place where Analyn
was stabbed by the appellant. The Court has consistently held that the illumination produced by
a kerosene lamp, a flashlight, a wick lamp, moonlight, or starlight in proper situations is
considered sufficient to allow the identification of persons.

Moreover, it has been established that Analyn indeed uttered the name of her assailant.
The question to be resolved is whether her statement can be considered as a dying declaration.
All the requisites for a dying declaration were sufficiently met. Thus, Analyn's condemnatory
ante mortem statement naming appellant as her assailant deserves full faith and credit and is
admissible in evidence as a dying declaration.


PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARMANDO CHINGH Y PARCIA
G.R. No. 178323, March 16, 2011
J. Peralta

Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or
due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual
abuse. Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335,
paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code,
for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That the penalty for lascivious
conduct when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its
medium period.

In this case, Armando tendered nothing but his bare denial and contention that he was
elsewhere when the crime was committed. Aside from this, he presented no more evidence to
substantiate his claims. Jurisprudence dictates that denial and alibi are the common defenses in
rape cases. Sexual abuse is denied on the allegation that the accused was somewhere else
and could not have physically committed the crime.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DIMA MONTANIR, et al.
G.R. No. 187534, April 4, 2011
J. Peralta

After the amendment of the Revised Penal Code on December 31, 1993 by Republic Act
No. 7659, Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code provides that Any private individual who shall
kidnap or detain another, or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. x x x When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence
of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or dehumanizing acts, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed.

PERALTA

The appellants, therefore, were correctly punished under Article 267 as the evidence
presented during the trial, in its entirety, undoubtedly proves that the death of Rafael Mendoza,
although of natural causes, occurred on the occasion of the kidnapping

In convicting the appellants, the trial court, based on the evidence presented, naturally
found the existence of conspiracy among the perpetrators. Conspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOEL BALUYA y NOTARTE
G.R. No. 181822, April 13, 2011
J. Peralta

The elements of kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) are: 1. The offender is a private individual; 2. The kidnaps or
detains another or in any other manner deprives the latter of his liberty; 3. The act of detention
or kidnapping is illegal; and 4. In the commission of the offense, any of the following
circumstances are present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than 3 days; or (b) it is
committed by simulating public authority; or (c) any serious physical injuries are inflicted upon
the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or
detained is a minor, female, or a public officer.

In this case, there is no doubt that the appellant is a private individual. As to the second
element of the crime, the deprivation required by Article 267 of the RPC means not only the
imprisonment of a person, but also the deprivation of his liberty in whatever form and for
whatever length of time. Glodil was in the control of appellant as he was kept in a place strange
and unfamiliar to him. Because of his tender age and the fact that he did not know the way back
home, he was then and there deprived of his liberty. With respect to the third element of the
offense charged, the prosecution proved that appellant's act of detaining the victim was without
lawful cause. As to the last element, the victim's minority was alleged by the prosecution in the
information and was not disputed. During his direct examination, the victim testified as to his
minority claiming that, at the time that he was presented at the witness stand, he was only 10
years old. This fact was affirmed by his mother who also testified as to his minority at the time
that he was abducted.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RICKY LADIANA Y DAVAO, ANTONIO MANUEL UY
G.R. No. 181822, April 13, 2011
J. Peralta

To sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the
following elements: (1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation
against persons; (2) the property belongs to another; (3) the taking is animo lucrandi or with
intent to gain; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as
used in the generic sense, was committed. A conviction needs certainty that the robbery is the
central purpose and objective of the malefactor and the killing is merely incidental to the
PERALTA

robbery. The intent to rob must precede the taking of human life, but the killing may occur
before, during or after the robbery.

In this case, the Supreme Court found that the evidence presented by the prosecution
had established beyond reasonable doubt that the crime of robbery with homicide was indeed
committed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. IRENO BONAAGUA Y BERCE
G.R. No. 188897, June 6, 2011
J. Peralta

Rape is no longer a crime against chastity for it is now classified as a crime against
persons. Consequently, rape is no longer considered a private crime or that, which cannot be
prosecuted, except upon a complaint filed by the aggrieved party. Hence, pardon by the
offended party of the offender in the crime of rape will not extinguish the offenders criminal
liability. Moreover, an Affidavit of Desistance even when construed as a pardon in the erstwhile
private crime of rape is not a ground for the dismissal of the criminal cases, since the actions
have already been instituted. To justify the dismissal of the complaints, the pardon should have
been made prior to the institution of the criminal actions. As correctly concluded by the CA, the
said affidavit was executed in connection with another accusation of rape, which Ireno
committed against AAA in Candelaria, Quezon and not the four cases of rape subject of this
appeal.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALBERTO ANTICAMARA Y CABILLO, et al.
G.R. No. 178771, June 8, 2011
J. Peralta

Under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code, there is conspiracy when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning a felony and decide to commit it. It may be inferred
from the acts of the accused before, during or after the commission of the crime which, when
taken together, would be enough to reveal a community of criminal design, as the proof of
conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of a chain of circumstances. To be a conspirator,
one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even take part in every act
or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the
conspiracy. Each conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks, which may appear
unrelated to one another but, in fact, constitute a whole collective effort to achieve their common
criminal objective. Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.
The precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the
conspirators are principals.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. URBAN SALCEDO, ET AL. and KHADAFFY JANJALANI,
et al.
PERALTA

G.R. No. 186523, June 22, 2011
J. Peralta

Some of the accused-appellants maintained that they were merely forced to join the
ASG. However, the trial court did not find their stories persuasive. The trial court's evaluation
of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is conclusive on this Court as it is the trial
court which had the opportunity to closely observe the demeanor of witnesses.

As oft repeated by this Court, the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of witnesses is
viewed as correct and entitled to the highest respect because it is more competent to so
conclude, having had the opportunity to observe the witnesses' demeanor and deportment on
the stand, and the manner in which they gave their testimonies. The trial judge therefore can
better determine if such witnesses were telling the truth, being in the ideal position to weigh
conflicting testimonies. Further, factual findings of the trial court as regards its assessment of
the witnesses' credibility are entitled to great weight and respect by this Court, particularly when
the Court of Appeals affirms the said findings, and will not be disturbed absent any showing that
the trial court overlooked certain facts and circumstances which could substantially affect the
outcome of the case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ALLEN UDTOJAN MANTALABA
G.R. No. 186227, July 20, 2011
J. Peralta

What determines if there was, indeed, a sale of dangerous drugs in a buy-bust operation
is proof of the concurrence of all the elements of the offense, to wit: (1) the identity of the buyer
and the seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefor.

The presented testimony of the prosecution witness showed that the
elements have been satisfactorily met. The seller and the poseur-buyer were properly
identified. The subject dangerous drug as well as the marked money used was also
satisfactorily presented. The testimony was also clear as to the manner in which the buy-bust
operation was conducted.

STEPHEN SY y TIBAGONG v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 182178, August 15, 2011
J. Peralta

For conviction of illegal possession of a prohibited drug to lie, the following elements
must be established: (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a
prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused
was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. Based on the evidence
submitted by the prosecution, the above elements were duly established in the present
case. Mere possession of a regulated drug per seconstitutes prima facie evidence of
knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a satisfactory
PERALTA

explanation of such possession - the onus probandi is shifted to the accused, to explain the
absence of knowledge or animus possidendi.

ABRAHAM MICLAT, JR. Y CERBO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 176077, August 31, 2011
J. Peralta

For conviction of illegal possession of a prohibited drug to lie, the following elements
must be established: (1) the accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a
prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused
was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the drug. Based on the evidence
submitted by the prosecution, the above elements were duly established in the present
case. Mere possession of a regulated drug per seconstitutes prima facie evidence of
knowledge or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent a satisfactory
explanation of such possession the onus probandi is shifted to the accused, to explain the
absence of knowledge or animus possidendi.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDGAR EVANGELIO Y GALLO, et al.
G.R. No. 181902, August 31, 2011
J. Peralta

To be convicted of robbery with rape, the following elements must concur: (1) the taking
of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property
taken belongs to another; (3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi;
and (4) the robbery is accompanied by rape.

The prosecution established that appellant and his three co-accused took the pieces of
jewelry and valuables of the spouses BBB and CCC by means of violence and intimidation.
Appellant and his co-accused barged into the house of the victims armed with a handgun and
knives and tied the hands and feet of the members of the household. The perpetrators then
asked for the location of the pieces of jewelry and valuables. BBB was also tied and was struck
in the head with a gun causing him to fall face down on the floor with blood oozing from his left
eyebrow. He was able to see the perpetrators going out of the house carrying bags and the
jewelry box of his wife. Lastly, circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution, when
analyzed and taken together, lead to the inescapable conclusion that the appellant raped AAA

JESUS TORRES v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 175074, August 31, 2011
J. Peralta

Malversation may be committed either through a positive act of misappropriation of
public funds or property, or passively through negligence. To sustain a charge of malversation,
PERALTA

there must either be criminal intent or criminal negligence, and while the prevailing facts of a
case may not show that deceit attended the commission of the offense, it will not preclude the
reception of evidence to prove the existence of negligence because both are equally
punishable under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, even on the putative
assumption that the evidence against petitioner yielded a case of malversation by negligence,
but the information was for intentional malversation, under the circumstances of this case, his
conviction under the first mode of misappropriation would still be in order.

JOSEPH ANTHONY M. ALEJANDRO, FIRDAUSI I.Y. ABBAS, et al. v. ATTY. JOSE A.
BERNAS, et al.
G.R. No. 179243, September 7, 2011
J. Peralta

For grave coercion to lie, the following elements must be present: 1. That a person is
prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something
against his will, be it right or wrong; 2. That the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence,
threats or intimidation; and 3. That the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has
no right to do so, or in other words, that the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the
exercise of any lawful right.

Hence, the actions of the respondents when they padlocked the Unit and cut off the
electricity, water and telephone facilities prevented the petitioners from occupying the Unit and
using it for the purpose for which it was intended, that is, to be used as a law office. At the time
of the padlocking and cutting off of facilities, there was already a case for the determination of
the rights and obligations of both Alejandro, as lessee and OPI as lessor, pending before the
MeTC. There was in fact an order for the respondents to remove the padlock.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JERRY JACALNE
G.R. No. 168552, October 3, 2011
J. Peralta


The crime of kidnapping has the following elements: (1) the offender is a private
individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another, or in any manner deprives the latter of his liberty;
(3) the act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the offense, any of
the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three
days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) any serious physical injuries are
inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to kill him are made; or (d) the person
kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public official.

All of the mentioned elements were duly established. Appellant is a private individual.
Appellant dragged Jomarie, a minor, to his house after the latter refused to go with him. Upon
reaching the house, he tied her hands. When Jomarie pleaded that she be allowed to go home,
he refused. Although Jomarie only stayed outside the house, it was inside the gate of a fenced
property, which is high enough such that people outside could not see what happens inside. For
PERALTA

there to be kidnapping, it is enough that the victim is restrained from going home. Because of
her tender age, and because she did not know her way back home, she was then and there
deprived of her liberty. This is irrespective of the length of time that she stayed in such a
situation.

SALVADOR D. VIOLAGO, SR. v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOAN V. ALARILLA
G.R. No. 194143, October 4, 2011
J. Peralta

An election contest, unlike an ordinary civil action, is clothed with a public interest. The
purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed by the board of
canvassers is the lawful choice of the people. What is sought is the correction of the canvass of
votes, which was the basis of proclamation of the winning candidate. An election contest
therefore involves not only the adjudication of private and pecuniary interests of rival candidates
but paramount to their claims is the deep public concern involved and the need of dispelling the
uncertainty over the real choice of the electorate. And the court has the corresponding duty to
ascertain, by all means within its command, who is the real candidate elected by the people.

ROBERT TAGUINOD v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 185833, October 12, 2011
J. Peralta

What really governs this particular case is that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt
of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The elements of the crime of malicious mischief under
Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) That the offender deliberately caused damage
to the property of another; (2) That such act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving
destruction; (3) That the act of damaging another's property be committed merely for the sake
of damaging it.

RAUL DAVID vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 181861, October 17, 2011
J . Peralta

It is a settled rule that in cases involving violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act,
credence is given to prosecution witnesses who are police officers for they are presumed to
have performed their duties in a regular manner, unless there is evidence to the contrary. It
must be emphasized that their testimonies in open court are considered in line with the
presumption that law enforcement officers have performed their duties in a regular manner. In
the absence of proof of motive to impute falsely a crime as serious as violation of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act, the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty, as well as the findings of the trial court on the credibility of the prosecution
witnesses, shall prevail over petitioners self-serving and uncorroborated denial. Moreover, the
PERALTA

factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive and
binding on this Court.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. MARCIANO DOLLANO, JR.
G.R. No. 188851, October 19, 2011
J. Peralta

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides that Rape is committed by having
carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances: 1) By using force or
intimidation; 2) When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and 3)
When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

Rape under paragraph 3 of the above-mentioned article is termed statutory rape as it
departs from the usual modes of committing rape. What the law punishes is carnal knowledge
of a woman below 12 years of age. Thus, the only subject of inquiry is the age of the woman
and whether carnal knowledge took place. The law presumes that the victim does not and
cannot have a will of her own on account of her tender years. As clearly shown in the narration
of facts above, the prosecution was able to establish that appellant succeeded in having carnal
knowledge with AAA in 1995, or three months after the death of her mother. The incident was
repeated in 1997. AAAs testimony was corroborated by the medical findings of the MHO. It
was also established through AAAs birth certificate that she was born on September 10, 1987.
Thus, at the time of the commission of the first rape incident in 1995, AAA was only eight (8)
years old; and at the time of the second rape incident in 1997, she was only 10 years old.
Statutory rape was, therefore, committed in 1995 and 1997.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. BERNABE PANGILINAN Y CRISOSTOMO
G.R. No. 183090, November 14, 2011
J. Peralta

A finding that the accused is guilty of rape may be based solely on the victim's testimony
if such testimony meets the test of credibility. We held that no woman, much less a child of such
tender age, would willingly submit herself to the rigors, the humiliation and the stigma attendant
upon the prosecution of rape, if she were not motivated by an earnest desire to put the culprit
behind bars.

Appellant argues that he could not be convicted of rape since based on the medical
examination report, AAA's genitalia had no hymenal laceration which corroborated AAA's
testimony that appellant merely kissed her and touched her breast.

Proof of hymenal laceration is not an element of rape. An intact hymen does not negate
a finding that the victim was raped. Penetration of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina,
PERALTA

even without laceration of the hymen, is enough to constitute rape, and even the briefest of
contact is deemed rape.

DELIA D. ROMERO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ROMULO PADLAN AND
ARUTURO SIAPNO
G.R. No. 171644, November 23, 2011
J. Peralta

The crime of illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur, namely: (1) the
offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable one to lawfully engage in
recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) he undertakes either any activity within the
meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under Article 13 (b), or any prohibited practices
enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code.

The elements of illegal recruitment were duly established since there is a certification
from the DOLE Dagupan District Office that petitioner does not have the necessary licence to
recruit workers for abroad and petitioner was able to convince the private respondents to apply
for work in Israel after parting with their money in exchange for the services she would
render. The said act of the petitioner, without a doubt, falls within the meaning of recruitment
and placement as defined in Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LINO L. DUAVIS
G.R. No. 190861, December 7, 2011
J. Peralta

The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act must be
preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal intent
during a space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. For it to be appreciated, the
following must be proven beyond reasonable doubt: (1) the time when the accused determined
to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the accused clung to his determination;
and (3) sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to reflect
upon the circumstances of his act. On the other hand, to appreciate treachery, two (2)
conditions must be present, namely, (a) the employment of means of execution that gives the
person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate, and (b) the means of execution
were deliberately or consciously adopted.

The element of evident premeditation is manifested by the careful planning and
preparation undertaken by the offender prior to the commission of the crime. A perusal of the
evidence on record shows that the altercation between appellant Duavis and Dante Largado,
Sr. took place at around 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon of May 2, 2003, and the hacking incident
took place at around 5:30 in the afternoon of the same day. To the mind of the Court, the lapse
of time between the decision and the execution is not sufficient to allow appellant to fully reflect
upon the consequences of his act and to effectively and efficiently prepare and plan his actions
prior to the commission of the crime. Although it may be argued that there was some kind of
premeditation on the part of appellant Duavis, it was not proved to be evident.
PERALTA


ARNEL COLINARES v.PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 182748, December 13, 2011
J. Abad

In homicide, whether consummated, frustrated, or attempted, self-defense requires (1)
that the person whom the offender killed or injured committed unlawful aggression; (2) that the
offender employed means that is reasonably necessary to prevent or repel the unlawful
aggression; and (3) that the person defending himself did not act with sufficient provocation.

If the victim did not commit unlawful aggression against the accused, the latter has
nothing to prevent or repel and the other two requisites of self-defense would have no basis for
being appreciated. Unlawful aggression contemplates an actual, sudden, and unexpected
attack or an imminent danger of such attack. A mere threatening or intimidating attitude is not
enough. The victim must attack the accused with actual physical force or with a weapon.

The main element of attempted or frustrated homicide is the accuseds intent to take his
victims life. The prosecution has to prove this clearly and convincingly to exclude every
possible doubt regarding homicidal intent. And the intent to kill is often inferred from, among
other things, the means the offender used and the nature, location, and number of wounds he
inflicted on his victim.

The Probation Law never intended to deny an accused his right to probation through no
fault of his. The underlying philosophy of probation is one of liberality towards the
accused. Such philosophy is not served by a harsh and stringent interpretation of the statutory
provisions. As Justice Vicente V. Mendoza said in his dissent in Francisco, the Probation Law
must not be regarded as a mere privilege to be given to the accused only where it clearly
appears he comes within its letter; to do so would be to disregard the teaching in many cases
that the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the accused not because it is a criminal law
but to achieve its beneficent purpose.

2012

RUBEN DEL CASTILLO @ BOY CASTILLO v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 185128, January 30, 2012
J. Peralta

PERALTA

It must be put into emphasis that this present case is about the violation of Section 16 of
R.A. 6425. In every prosecution for the illegal possession of shabu, the following essential
elements must be established: (a) the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b)
the person is not authorized by law or by duly constituted authorities; and (c) the accused has
knowledge that the said drug is a regulated drug.

SALVADOR YAPYUCO y ENRIQUEZ v. HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 120744-46, June 25, 2012
J. Peralta

The availability of the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or lawful exercise of a
right or office under Article 11 (5) of the Revised Penal Code rests on proof that (a) the accused
acted in the performance of his duty or in the lawful exercise of his right or office, and (b) the
injury caused or the offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance
of such duty or the lawful exercise of such right or office.
[106]
The justification is based on the
complete absence of intent and negligence on the part of the accused, inasmuch as guilt of a
felony connotes that it was committed with criminal intent or with fault or negligence.
[107]
Where
invoked, this ground for non-liability amounts to an acknowledgment that the accused has
caused the injury or has committed the offense charged for which, however, he may not be
penalized because the resulting injury or offense is a necessary consequence of the due
performance of his duty or the lawful exercise of his right or office. Thus, it must be shown that
the acts of the accused relative to the crime charged were indeed lawfully or duly performed; the
burden necessarily shifts on him to prove such hypothesis.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ARISTEO E. ATIENZA, RODRIGO D. MANONGSONG,
CRISPIN M. EGARQUE, and THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 171671 June 18, 2012
J. Peralta

This crime has the following essential elements: 1.The accused must be a public officer
discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2. He must have acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and 3. His action caused any
undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his functions.

CECILIA U. LEGRAMA v. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 178626 June 13, 2012
J. Peralta

Malversation may be committed by appropriating public funds or property; by taking or
misappropriating the same; by consenting, or through abandonment or negligence, by
permitting any other person to take such public funds or property; or by being otherwise guilty of
the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property.
[
The essential elements
common to all acts of malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code are: (a) That
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the offender be a public officer; (b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by
reason of the duties of his office; (c) That those funds or property were public funds or property
for which he was accountable; and (d) That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or
consented, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.

More importantly, in malversation of public funds, the prosecution is burdened to prove
beyond reasonable doubt, either by direct or circumstantial evidence, that the public officer
appropriated, misappropriated or consented, or through abandonment or negligence, permitted
another person to take public property or public funds under his custody. Absent such
evidence, the public officer cannot be held criminally liable for malversation. Mere absence of
funds is not sufficient proof of conversion; neither is the mere failure of the public officer to turn
over the funds at any given time sufficient to make even the prima facie case. In fine,
conversion must be proved. However, an accountable officer may be convicted of malversation
even in the absence of direct proof of misappropriation so long as there is evidence of shortage
in his account which he is unable to explain.

MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA, AFP (RET.) v. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY,
representing the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL
DEFENSE VOLTAIRE T. GAZMIN; THE CHIEF OF STAFF, ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES, GEN. EDUARDO SL. OBAN, JR., and LT. GEN. GAUDENCIO S.
PANGILINAN, AFP (RET.), DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS
G.R. No. 198554 July 30, 2012
J. Peralta

A special law is defined as a penal law which punishes acts not defined and penalized
by the Revised Penal Code.
34
In the present case, petitioner was charged with and convicted of
Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and Gentleman (96th Article of War) and Violation of the 97th
Article of War, or Conduct Prejudicial to Good Order and Military Discipline, both of which are
not defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code. The corresponding penalty imposed
by the General Court Martial, which is two (2) years of confinement at hard labor is penal in
nature. Therefore, absent any provision as to the application of a criminal concept in the
implementation and execution of the General Court Martial's decision, the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, specifically Article 29 should be applied.

ROSA H. FENEQUITO, CORAZON E. HERNANDEZ, and LAURO H. RODRIGUEZ v.
BERNARDO VERGARA, JR.
G.R. No. 172829 July 18, 2012
J. Peralta

It is axiomatic that an order denying a motion to quash on the ground that the allegations
in the Informations do not constitute an offense cannot be challenged by an appeal. This Court
generally frowns upon this remedial measure as regards interlocutory orders. The evident
reason for such rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action. To tolerate the practice
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of allowing appeals from interlocutory orders would not only delay the administration of justice
but also would unduly burden the courts.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RAUL BERIBER y FUENTES @ JERRY FUENTES y
IGNACIO @ GERRY BERIBER @ BONG @ RAUL FUENTES
G.R. No. 195243, August 29, 2012
J. Peralta

Robbery with homicide exists when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on
occasion, of the robbery. In charging Robbery with Homicide, the onus probandi is to establish:
(a) the taking of personal property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (b)
the property belongs to another; (c) the taking is characterized with animus lucrandi or with
intent to gain; and (d) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, which
is used in the generic sense, was committed.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DINA DULAY y PASCUAL
G.R. No. 193854, September 24, 2012
J. Peralta

Under the Revised Penal Code, an accused may be considered a principal by direct
participation, by inducement, or by indispensable cooperation. To be a principal by
indispensable cooperation, one must participate in the criminal resolution, a conspiracy or unity
in criminal purpose and cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act
without which it would not have been accomplished.Nothing in the evidence presented by the
prosecution does it show that the acts committed by appellant are indispensable in the
commission of the crime of rape. The events narrated by the CA, from the time appellant
convinced AAA to go with her until appellant received money from the man who allegedly raped
AAA, are not indispensable in the crime of rape. Anyone could have accompanied AAA and
offered the latter's services in exchange for money and AAA could still have been raped. Even
AAA could have offered her own services in exchange for monetary consideration and still end
up being raped. Thus, this disproves the indispensable aspect of the appellant in the crime of
rape. It must be remembered that in the Information, as well as in the testimony of AAA, she
was delivered and offered for a fee by appellant, thereafter, she was raped by "Speed."

MERLINDA CIPRIANO MONTAEZ v. LOURDES TAJOLOSA CIPRIANO
G.R. No. 181089, October 22, 2012
J. Peralta

Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the
same must be submitted to the judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the
marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the
presumption is that the marriage exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before
the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for
bigamy.

FE V. RAPSING, TITA C. VILLANUEVA AND ANNIE F. APAREJADO, REPRESENTED BY
EDGAR APAREJADO v. HON. JUDGE MAXIMINO R. ABLES, OF RTC-BRANCH 47,
MASBATE CITY; SSGT. EDISON RURAL, CAA JOSE MATU, CAA MORIE FLORES, CAA
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GUILLIEN TOPAS, CAA DANDY FLORES, CAA LEONARDO CALIMUTAN AND CAA RENE
ROM
G.R. No. 171855, October 15, 2012
J. Peralta

The second paragraph of Section 1 of R.A. 7055 explicitly specifies what are considered
service-connected crimes or offenses under Commonwealth Act No. 408 (CA 408), as
amended.The said law is very clear that the jurisdiction to try members of the AFP who commit
crimes or offenses covered by the RPC, and which are not service-connected, lies with the civil
courts. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean exactly what it says
and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed.

RODOLFO BELBIS, J R. Y COMPETENTE AND ALBERTO BRUCALES v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 181052. November 14, 2012
J . Peralta

The four stab wounds that are the product of direct thrusting of the bladed weapon are
not necessary to prevent what the petitioners claim to be the continuous unlawful aggression
from the victim as the latter was already without any weapon. The means employed by a person
claiming self-defense must be commensurate to the nature and the extent of the attack sought
to be averted, and must be rationally necessary to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression.

Proximate cause has been defined as "that cause, which, in natural and continuous
sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which
the result would not have occurred." The autopsy report indicated that the cause of the victim's
death is multiple organ failure. However, it can be said that the four stab wounds are the
proximate cause of the death of the victim. Without the stab wounds, the victim could not have
been afflicted with an infection that later on caused multiple organ failure that caused his death.

The essence of voluntary surrender is spontaneity and the intent of the accused to give
himself up and submit himself to the authorities either because he acknowledges his guilt or he
wishes to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and
capture. When the petitioners reported the incident and allegedly surrendered the bladed
weapon used in the stabbing, such cannot be considered as voluntary surrender within the
contemplation of the law. In addition, there was no spontaneity, because they only surrendered
after a warrant of their arrest had already been issued.

LILY SY v. HON. SECRETARY OF J USTICE MA. MERCEDITAS N. GUTIERREZ, BENITO
FERNANDEZ GO, BERTHOLD LIM, J ENNIFER SY, GLENN BEN TIAK SY AND MERRY SY
G.R. No. 171579. November 14, 2012
J . Peralta

Where respondents believed in good faith that they and the corporation own not only the
subject unit but also the properties found inside and, if at all, they took them openly and
avowedly under that claim of ownership, robbery could not have taken place.

Taking as an element of robbery means depriving the offended party of ownership of the
thing taken with the character of permanency. The taking should not be under a claim of
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ownership. Thus, one who takes the property openly and avowedly under claim of title offered in
good faith is not guilty of robbery even though the claim of ownership is untenable.

2013

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ERNESTO GANI Y TUPAS
G.R. No. 195523. June 05, 2013
J. Peralta

A rape victim who testified three years after the crime has been committed is still a
credible witness. It has long been established that the testimony of a rape victim, especially a
child of tender years, is given full weight and credit.

Moreover, the accuseds defense of alibi deserves scant consideration. Accuseds claim
that he was in Quezon City when the victim was raped is hardly credible because he failed to
prove the physical impossibility of his presence at the scene of the crime when it was
committed. On the contrary, he admitted, when he was cross-examined, that he was, in fact, in
the same locality when the victim was raped.

LUCILLE DOMINGO v. MERLINDA COLINA
G.R. No. 173330. June 17, 2013
J. Peralta

Where the court dismissed the criminal case on the ground that the prosecution failed to
prove the second and third elements of BP 22, i.e., (2) the check is applied on account or for
value and (3) the person issuing the check knows at the time of its issuance that he does not
have sufficient funds in or credit with the bank for the full payment of the check upon its
presentment, the dismissal is due to the prosecutions failure to prove the accuseds guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.

However, the lack of evidence to prove the aforesaid elements of the offense charged
does not mean that petitioner has no existing debt with respondent, a civil aspect which is
proven by another quantum of evidence, a mere preponderance of evidence. Culling from the
pronouncement of the MTCC that the prosecution failed to prove the second and third elements
of the offense charged, it can be deduced that the prosecution was able to establish the
presence of the first and fourth elements. The fact that petitioner was proven to have drawn and
issued a check and that the same was subsequently dishonored for inadequate funds leads to
the logical conclusion that the fact from which her civil liability might arise, indeed, exists.

JAMES WALTER P. CAPILI v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND SHIRLEY TISMO-
CAPILI
G.R. No. 183805, July 03, 2013
J. Peralta

It is undisputed that a second marriage between petitioner and private respondent was
contracted during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between petitioner and Karla Y.
Medina-Capili contracted. As such, even if petitioners second marriage is subsequently
declared null and void while the bigamy case filed against him is pending, the fact that he
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entered into such marriage while his first marriage was valid and existing amounts to the
commission of the crime of bigamy.

The criminal culpability attaches to the offender upon the commission of the offense, and
from that instant, liability appends to him until extinguished as provided by law. It is clear then
that the crime of bigamy was committed by petitioner from the time he contracted the second
marriage with private respondent. Thus, the finality of the judicial declaration of nullity of
petitioners second marriage does not impede the filing of a criminal charge for bigamy against
him.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. EDGARDO V. ODTUHAN
G.R. No. 191566. July 17, 2013
J. Peralta

When respondent married Alagon while his marriage with Modina is valid and existing,
he has already committed the crime of bigamy. The subsequent declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Modina, even if prior to the institution of the criminal case of bigamy against him,
is immaterial in determining his culpability.

What makes a person criminally liable for bigamy is when he contracts a second or
subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid marriage. Parties to the marriage should
not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the
judgment of competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be
held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration, the presumption is that the marriage
exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of
the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. SONNY GATARIN Y CABALLERO @ JAY-R AND
EDUARDO QUISAYAS AND EDUARDO QUISAYAS
G.R. No. 198022, April 07, 2014
J. Peralta

Robbery with Homicide, as a complex crime, has the following elements: (1) the taking
of personal property belonging to another; (2) with intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or
intimidation against a person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of
homicide, as used in the generic sense, was committed.

The prosecutions failure to present evidence to prove that a robbery took place leads to
the conclusion that Juanarios killing would either be simple homicide or murder and not
Robbery with Homicide.

LITO CORPUZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 180016. April 29, 2014
J. Peralta

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The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods
or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return
the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the
offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or conversion or
denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party
on the offender.

Private complainant gave petitioner the pieces of jewelry in trust, or on commission
basis. There was misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of those pieces
of jewelry sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return the same pieces of jewelry within or after
the agreed period despite demand from the private complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.





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