Natural Resources and Environmental Law

Case Digest



Submitted by:
AMURAO, Catherine
ESPIQUE, Daniel Jr O.
ESNARA, Jonathan
JIMENEZ, Fredda
NAPA-EG, Milagros P.
VILLARUEL, Joriel



Submitted to:
Atty. Cleo Sabado Andrada



October 04, 2014









1. Oh Cho vs Director of Lands 75 Phil 890
G.R. No. L-48321 August 31, 1946
OH CHO, applicant-appellee,
vs.THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, oppositor-appellant.

Facts: Oh Cho, a Chinese citizen, purchased from the Lagdameos a
parcel of land in Tayabas, which they openly, continuously and adversely
possessed since 1880. On January 17, 1940, Oh Cho applied for
registration of this land. The Solicitor General opposed the registration
on the ground that Oh Cho lacked title to said land and also because he
was an alien disqualified from acquiring lands of the public domain .

Issue: Whether or not Oh Cho is entitled to a decree of registration.

Ruling: No. Petitioner failed to show that he has title to the lot, which
may be confirmed under the Land Registration Act. All lands that were
not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant,
belong to the public domain. An exception to the rule would be any land
that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession
would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the
public domain or that it had been a private property even before the
Spanish conquest. The applicant does not come under the exception, for
the earliest possession of the lot by his first predecessor in interest
began in 1880.Under the Public Land Act, Oh Cho is not entitled to
a decree of registration of the lot, because he is an alien disqualified from
acquiring lands of the public domain. Oh Cho predecessors in interest
would have been entitled to a decree of registration had they applied for
the same. The application for the registration of the land was a condition
precedent, which was not complied with by the Lagmeos who was not
able. Hence, the most they had was mere possessory right, not title. This
possessory right was what was transferred to Oh Cho, but since the
latter is an alien, the possessory right could never ripen to ownership by
prescription. As an alien, Oh Cho is disqualified from acquiring title over
public land by prescription.



2. Director of Lands vs. IAC and ACME 146 SCRA 509

G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC.,
ETC., respondents.

Facts: Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr.
Rodolfo Nazario, acquired 5 parcels of land measuring 481, 390 sqm.,
from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the indigenous Dumagat Tribe
and owners of the lots-in-question from time immemorial, on October 29,
1962. This was accordingly only registered on July 17.

Land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872
granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on
land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the
alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain.
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth
of improvements. The government and the Municipal Officials of
Maconacon, Isabela also recognized ownership and possession of the
land sought to be registered ,Acme also donated part of the land as the
townsite of Maconacon Isabela.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the land is already a private land ?
2. Whether or not the constitutional prohibition against their
acquisition by private corporations or associations applies?

Ruling:
YES the land is already a private land. Lands already acquired, by
operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be
issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an
application therefore is sufficient.
It had already ceased to be of the public domain and had become private
property, at least by presumption
The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which
does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by
the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said
patent.The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but
simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier
law
2. NO. The constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private
corporations or associations does not apply. The land was already private
land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and transferable title on
October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also
be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition.The
only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold
or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024 hectares



3. Meralco vs. Castro Bartolome 114 SCRA 799
G.R. No. L-49623 June 29, 1982
MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY, petitioner-appellant,
vs. JUDGE FLORENLIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati
Branch XV, and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent-appellees.
Facts: The Manila Electric Company purchased two lots (165 sqm.) at
Tanay, Rizal on August13, 1976 from Piguing spouses. After acquisition,
they subsequently filed for judicial confirmation of imperfect title on
Dec. 1, 1976. However, the court denied the petition and the
corresponding appeal was likewise rejected. It elevates its appeal
with the following arguments; firstly, the land in question had
essentially been converted to private land by virtue of acquisitive
prescription as a result of open continuous and notorious
possession and occupation for more than thirty years by the original
owner, Olimpia Ramos and his predecessor in interest, Piguing
spouses, whom Meralcoacqui red the di sputed l and, and fi nal l
y, the substanti al ri ghts acqui red by Ramos spouses and
Peguing spouses for judicial confirmation of imperfect title,
extend to Meralco by virtue of the provision of the Public Land Law.

Issues:
1. Whether or not Meralco as a juridical person, allowed under the
law to hold lands of public domain and apply for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title.
2. Does the possession tacked to predecessor Private
Corporation automatically guarantee its rights to possession and title of
the land.
3. Whether or not it is contingent for a judicial confirmation of title
before any grant would be extended to a juridical person.

Ruling:
1. No. Private corporation or juridical person is prohibited and not
allowed under thelaw to hold land of public domain. Article XIV Sec.
14 of the 1973 Constitution prohibits private corporations from
holding alienable lands of the public domain except for lease of lands
not exceeding one thousand hectares.

2 .No. The presumption that since they bought the property
from the person who occupied the land in open, continuous and
notorious possession of the public land for more than thirty
years, does not automatically amount to rights and possession.
It would cease to be public only upon the issuance of the
certificateof ti tl e t o any Fi l i pi no ci ti zen cl ai mi ng i t under t
he l aw. Thi s concl usi on i sanchored on the pri nci pl e that "
a l l l a nds t ha t we r e not a c q ui r e d f r om t he Government,
either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain.
The exception to the rule is only when the occupant and his
predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial, for such possession
would justify the presumption that the land had never been part of the
public domain or that it had been a private property even before the
Spanish conquest."


4. Suzi vs. Razon and Director of Lands 48 Phil 427
G.R. No. L-24066 December 9, 1925
VALENTIN SUSI, plaintiff-appellee,
vs. ANGELA RAZON and THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, defendants. THE DIRECTOR OF
LANDS, appellant.
Facts: On December 18, 1880, Nemesio Pinlac sold the land in question,
then a fish pond, to Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza for the sum of
P12, reserving the right to repurchase the same . After having been in
possession thereof for about eight years, and the fish pond having been
destroyed, Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, on September 5, 1899,
sold it to Valentin Susi for the sum of P12, reserving the right to
repurchase it. Before the execution of the deed of sale, Valentin Susi had
already paid its price and sown "bacawan" on said land, availing himself
of the firewood gathered thereon, with the proceeds of the sale of which
he had paid the price of the property. The possession and occupation of
the land in question, first, by Apolonio Garcia and Basilio Mendoza, and
then by Valentin Susi has been open, continuous, adverse and public,
without any interruption, except during the revolution, or disturbance,
except when Angela Razon, on September 13, 1913, commenced an
action in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga to recover the
possession of said land. The court rendered judgment in favor of
Valentin Susi and against Angela Razon. Angela Razon applied to the
Director of Lands for the purchase thereof on August 15, 1914. Having
learned of said application, Valentin Susi filed and opposition thereto on
December 6, 1915, asserting his possession of the land for twenty-five
years. After making the proper administrative investigation, the Director
of Lands overruled the opposition of Valentin Susi and sold the land to
Angela Razon. By virtue of said grant the register of deeds of Pampanga,
on August 31, 1921, issued the proper certificate of title to Angela Razon.
Armed with said document, Angela Razon required Valentin Susi to
vacate the land in question, and as he refused to do so, she brought and
action for forcible entry and detainer.
After trial, whereat evidence was introduced by both parties, the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga rendered judgment declaring the Valentin
Suzi entitled to the possession of the land, annulling the sale made by
the Director of Lands in favor of Angela Razon, and ordering the
cancellation of the certificate of title issued to her, with the costs against
Angela Razon. From this judgment the Director of Lands took made an
appeal.
Issue: Whether or not Valentin Suzi is entitled to recover the possession
of said parcel of land and annul the sale made by the Director of Lands to
Angela Razon.
Ruling: It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been
in possession of the land in question openly, continuously, adversely, and
publicly, personally and through his predecessors, since the year 1880,
that is, for about forty-five years. When Angela Razon applied for the
purchase of said land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession
thereof personally and through his predecessors for thirty-four years.
And if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made said
land a fish pond when he sold it on December 18, 1880, it can hardly be
estimated when he began to possess and occupy it, the period of time
being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory. These being the
facts, the doctrine laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States
in the case of Cario vs. Government of the Philippine Islands (212 U. S.,
449
1
), is applicable here. In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the
presumption juris et de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of
Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements
for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in
actual and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors,
of an agricultural land of the public domain openly, continuously,
exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a right to a certificate of
title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So that
when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had
already acquired, by operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a
grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title
should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the
courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of
section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had
acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already
ceased to be the public domain and had become private property, at least
by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of
Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question to Angela Razon, the
Director of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any
title or control, and the sale thus made was void and of no effect, and
Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right.

5. Mc Daniel vs. Apcible and Cuisia 42 Phil 749
G.R. No. L-17597 December 29, 1922
E. W. McDANIEL, petitioner,
vs. GALICANO APACIBLE, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and JUAN
CUISIA, respondents.
Facts: On June 7, 1916, the plaintiff and his associates located, in
accordance with the provisions of the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902,
and Act No. 624 of the Philippine Commission, three association
petroleum placer claims, each of an area of 64 hectares on the public
domain in the Philippine Islands, and that such locations were duly
recorded in the office of the Mining Recorder as "Maglihi No. 1," "Maglihi
No. 2" and "Maglihi No. 3." Also, that the plaintiff and his associates
remained in the open and continuous possession of the three petroleum
placer claims from June 7, 1916, until the 17th day of October, 1917, at
which time his associates conveyed their respective interests in the
claims to the plaintiff. That ever since October 17, 1917, the plaintiff has
remained in the open and continuous possession of the claims and that
in the year 1917 and each year thereafter, he has performed not less than
P200 worth of labor on each of them.
It is stipulated that on October 17, 1917, the plaintiff's associates
conveyed their interests in the claims to him for P100. The pleadings
admit that the locations by plaintiff and his associates of the petroleum
placer claims were made in accord with the provisions of the Act of
Congress of July 1, 1902, and Act No. 624 of the Philippine Commission.
Such acts specify and point out how and by whom and the conditions
under which a mineral location can be made, and, hence, it must follow
that any mineral location made in accord with those provisions is a valid
location. This legally carries with it the existence of every element,
prerequisite and condition necessary or required for the making of a
mineral location. Hence, we must assume that the plaintiff and his
associates made a good and valid mineral location upon the public
domain of the Philippine Islands.
Section 2 of the Act No. 2932 provides that "All such lands may be leased
by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources in the manner and
subject to the rules prescribed by the Council of State.
Under the provisions of this Act, the authority of the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources to make such a lease is confined to
lands "containing petroleum and other mineral oils and gas in the
Philippine Islands."
In the instant case, the stipulation shows that the mining claims are
situated in a comparatively uninhabited district four miles from any port,
and that they can only be reached over mountain trails which have been
maintained at the expense of the plaintiff. If it be a fact that the claims
do contain petroleum in paying quantities, it would be of immense value
to the commercial interests of the Philippine Islands. As evidence of his
good faith, the plaintiff has expended P12,000 in the development of the
property, and has found evidence tending to show that the claims do
contain petroleum and other mineral oils. At this time and under such
circumstances, it would be a gross injustice to deprive him of his
property rights through forms and technicalities. The locations were
made upon the unappropriated public domain, and to maintain them,
and as evidence of good faith, the law requires the performance of the
annual assessment work, and that question is not disputed or presented
in the record.
In the instant case, we hold that, even though a valid mineral location
was made prior to the passage of Act No. 2932 and the annual
assessment work had not been performed since the passage of the Act,
and that question is raised and presented by an appropriate plea and
sustained by the proof, any prior rights under the location would then be
forfeited, and such lands would then be subject to, and come under, the
provisions of Act No. 2932.

6. Reavis vs. Fianza 40 Phil 1017
JOHN F. REAVIS, Appt., v. JOSE FIANZA et als.
215 U.S. 16 (30 S.Ct. 1, 54 L.Ed. 72)
Decided: November 1, 1909.

Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opinion of the court:
This is a bill in equity, brought by the appellees to restrain the appellant
from setting up title to certain gold mines in the province of Benguet, or
interfering with the same, and to obtain an account of the gold heretofore
taken from the mines. The trial court rendered a judgment or decree
granting an injunction as prayed. Then the case was brought here by
appeal.
The appellees are Igorrots, and it is found that, for fifty years, and
probably for many more, Fianza and his ancestors have held possession
of these mines. He now claims title under the Philippine act of July 1,
1902, chap. 1369, 45, 32 Stat. at L. 691. This section reads as follows:
that where such person or association, they and their grantors, have
held and worked their claims for a period equal to the time prescribed by
the statute of limitations of the Philippine Islands, evidence of such
possession and working of the claims for such period shall be sufficient
to establish a right to a patent thereto under this act, in the absence of
any adverse claim; but nothing in this act shall be deemed to impair any
lien which may have attached in any way whatever prior to the issuance
of a patent.
Fianza testified, that his grandfather and father had owned the mines in
question, and that he and the other appellees owned them in their turn;
that they had all worked the mines, that no one else had claimed them,
and that the appellant had interfered with his possession, and, when he
put up a sign, had torn it down. No doubt his working of the mines was
slight and superficial according to our notions, and the possession may
not have been sharply asserted as it would have been with us, whether
from Igorrot habits or from the absence of legal title under Spanish law.
But it sufficiently appears that the appellee's family had held the place in
Igorrot fashion, and to deny them possession in favor of Western
intruders probably would be to say that the natives had no rights under
the section that an American was bound to respect. Whatever vagueness
there may have been in the boundaries, it is plain that the appellant
attempted to locate a claim within them, and Fianza testified that the
plan to which we have referred followed the boundaries that his father
showed to him. It is said that the claim is larger than is allowed by 22.
But the limitation of that section applies only to claims 'located after the
passage of this act.'
It is to be assumed, then, that the appellees and their ancestors had held
possession and had worked their claims for much more than the period
required by 45, before the moment when the statute went into effect. It
is to be assumed that the possession and working continued down to
within two months of that moment. The bill, to be sure, alleges that
Reavis, in 1900, illegally entered and deprived the appellees of their
mines, and that he still continues to maintain his unjust claim. But
further on it alleges that, in the spring of 1902, Reavis was directed by
the governor of Benguet not to molest the appellees; that he then waited
in Manila, and, after the promulgation of the law, 'again entered,' set
stakes, and filed a notice of location. So that the bill does not mean that
he was continuously in possession, or that he was in possession when the
law took effect. We are of opinion that there was no adverse claim that
would have prevented the appellees from getting a patent under 45.
It is suggested that the possession of Fianza was not under a claim of
title, since he could have no title under Spanish law. But, whatever may be
the construction of Rev. Stat. 2332, the corresponding 45 of the
Philippine act cannot be taken to adopt from the local law any other
requirement as to the possession than the length of time for which it
must be maintained. Otherwise, in view of the Spanish and American law
before July 1, 1902, no rights could be acquired, and the section would be
empty words; whereas, as we have said before, another section of the act,
16, still further shows the intention of Congress to respect native
occupation of public lands.

7. Abaoag vs. Director of Lands 45 Phil 518

G.R. No. L-20875 December 13, 1923
VICENTE ABAOAG, ET AL., applicants-appellants,
vs.THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, ET AL., opponents-appellees.
Facts: On February 28, 1919, appellants presented a petition in the Court
of First Instance of the Province of Pangasinan to have parcel of land of
more than 77 hectares registered under the Torrens system.
Accompanying said petition there was an official plan prepared by the
Bureau of Lands presented. Various oppositions were presented to the
registration of said parcel of land.
The record shows that at the time of the delivery of said parcel of land to
the petitioners, it was unoccupied and unimproved public land; that since
their entry upon the possession of the land in the year 1884, they and
their ancestors have been in the open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the same, believing in good faith
that they were the owners; that the petitioners had cleared, improved,
and cultivated the land and have constructed and maintained their
homes thereon, exercising every requisite act of ownership, for a period
of more than thirty-nine years, in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation, without any interruption
whatsoever; that the land in question was never partitioned among the
petitioners because it was the custom of the Bagos, Igorots, or non-
Christians to occupy and possess their land in common; that the
petitioners believed, and had a right to believe, from the fact that the
land was given by the gobernadorcillo and principalia of the municipality,
that they thereby became the owners, to the exclusion of all others, and
are now justified in their petition to have the said land registered under
the Torrens system in their names, as the owners in fee simple, pro
indiviso.
Issue: Whether or not the registration of the land be granted.

Ruling: The Supreme Court held that the judgment entered dismissing
the petition of the applicants, should be reversed and the record
remanded to the court a quo, with permission on the part of the
petitioners to make such amendment to their petition as they may deem
wise and necessary and to present such additional evidence as they may
desire; and that the oppositors be permitted to present whatever
evidence they may have in opposition, with the understanding that the
evidence which has heretofore been adduced shall stand as a part of the
evidence of the main trial.
The present case is not altogether unlike the case of Cario vs. Insular
Government (7 Phil., 132). In the course of that decision, Mr. Justice
Holmes, speaking for the court, said: We hesitate to suppose that it
was intended to declare every native, who had not a paper title, a
trespasser and to set the claims of all the wilder tribes afloat. Whatever
the law upon these points may be, every presumption is and ought to be
against the government in the case like the present." Mr. Justice Holmes
adds: "If there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to give
the applicant the benefit of the doubt."
In the Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754, we find the following: "Where
such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be
sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession as a valid title by
prescription." We may add that every presumption of ownership under
the public land laws of the Philippine Islands is in favor of one actually
occupying the land for many years, and against the Government which
seeks to deprive him of it, for failure to comply with provisions of
subsequently enacted registration land act.
In view of the doctrine announced by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the case of Cario vs. Insular Government, we are forced to the
conclusion that the lower court committed the errors complained of by
the appellants in dismissing the petition. As was said by this court in the
case of Rodriguez vs. Director of Lands (31 Phil., 272, 279): ". . . only
under exceptional circumstances should an application for registry in the
court of land registration be dismissed over the objection of the
applicant, and without giving him an opportunity by the grant of new
trial, or otherwise . . . to submit additional evidence in support of his
claim of title, when there are strong or reasonable grounds to believe that
he is the owner of all or any part of the land described in his application.
This is specially true when the only ground for the dismissal of the
application is the lack of formal or perhaps even substantial proof as to
the chain to title upon which applicant relies, etc."

8. Carino vs. Insular Government 441 SCRA 3

MATEO CARINO, Plff. in Error v. INSULAR GOVERNMENT February 23, 1909.

Facts: On June 23, 1903, Mateo Carino, an Igorot from the Province of
Benguet, went to the Court of Land Registration to petition his inscription
as the owner of a 146 hectare land hes been possessing in the then
municipality of Baguio. Mateo only presented possessory information and
no other documentation. The State opposed the petition averring that the
land is part of the US military reservation. The CLR ruled in favor of
Mateo. The State appealed. Mateo lost. Mateo averred that a grant should
be given to him by reason of immemorial use and occupation. Mateo
Carino, contests dismissal of application of registration of their ancestral
land through writ of error. Carinos ancestors maintained fences for
cattle, cultivated some parts, and pastured parts for cattle for more than
50 years before the Treaty of Paris (April 11, 1899). This land is also
used for inheritance in accordance to Igorot custom. Although the
plaintiff applied in 1893-1894 and 1896-1897, no document of title was
issued by Spanish Crown. In 1901, plaintiff alleged ownership under
mortgage law and the lands were registered to him but it only established
possessory title.
The lower court granted the application of land registration on March 4,
1904.

An appeal was filed in behalf of Government of the Philippines and as US
having taken possession of property for military and public purposes.
Thus the application of registration was dismissed.

Respondents argues that given that Spain assumed and asserted that they
had title to all the land in the Philippines except to permit private lands
to be acquired. No prescription against the Spanish Crown. Decree of
June 25, 1880 required registration within a limited time to make the title
good and US succeeded the title of Spain (through Treaty of Paris).
Plaintiffs land not registered and he had lost all rights and a mere
trespasser. Also, Benguet never brought under civil or military
government of the Spanish Crown, so it is not certain whether
registration granted was under Spanish laws. Plaintiff argues that it
seems to amount to denial of native titles throughout an important
Island of Luzon.

Issue: Whether Or Not Carino owns the land.

Ruling: YES. Plaintiff Carino should be granted what he seeks and should
not be deprived of what by the practice and belief of those among whom
he lived, was his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost
forgotten law of Spain.

The grant to the plaintiff was the result of the principle of Prescription as
mentioned in the royal cedula of 1754 states: Where such possessors
shall not be able to produce title deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall
show that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription.
Moreover, the Decree of June 25, 1880 states that possessors for certain
times shall be deemed owners; if a cultivated land 20 years, if
uncultivated 30 years. Here, plaintiffs father was the owner of the land
by the very terms of this decree.- By Organic Act of July 1, 1902, all the
property and rights acquired there by the United States are to be
administered for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof. Obiter Writ of
error is the general method of bringing cases to this court (Federal SC),
and appeal the exception, confined to equity in the main.
Every presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case
like present.

The court said that the reason for taking over the Philippines was
different (compared to occupation of white race against Native
Americans). Our first object in the internal administration of the islands
is to do justice to the natives not to exploit their country for private gain.
The effect of proof was not to confer title but simply to establish it, as
already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law.

9. Director of Lands vs. Funtilar 142 SCRA 57

G.R. No. L-68533 May 23, 1986
DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT, petitioners,
vs.MARIANO FUNTILAR, MAGDALENA FUNTILAR, HEIRS OF FELIPE ROCETE and INTERMEDIATE
APPELLATE COURT (Third Civil Cases Division), respondents.
Facts: In 1972, Mariano Funtilar, Magdalena Funtilar, and the Heirs of
Felipe Rocete applied for the registration of a parcel of land, originally
belonging to one Candida Fernandez whose ownership and possession
began sometime during her lifetime and extended until 1936 when she
died. The present applicants are the grandchildren of Candida Fernandez.
In 1936, after the death of Candida Fernandez, her real property was
declared in the name of the "Heirs of Candida Fernandez under Tax
Declaration No. 9622, with an area of thirty (30) hectares.
Sometime in 1940 or 1941, the parcel of land was forfeited in favor of the
government for failure to pay real estate taxes. However, the same was
redeemed in 1942 by Vitaliano Aguirre, one of the three children of
Candida Fernandez, who was then the administrator of the property. A
final deed of sale was executed by the Provincial Treasurer of Tayabas in
1944 in favor of Vitaliano Aguirre. It had been agreed among the heirs
that the property would first be held by Vitaliano in trust for the others
until such time that partition among them was effected. The heirs of
Candida Fernandez later partitioned the property among themselves. The
particular lot now disputed in this petition was adjudicated in favor of
the applicants-respondents.
The Director of Lands and Director of Forest Development filed an
opposition alleging that neither applicants nor their predecessor-in-
interest possessed sufficient title to the land, not having acquired the
same under any of the recognized Spanish titles under the Royal Decree
of February 13, 1894; that neither applicants, nor their predecessors have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land for at least thirty (30) years immediately
preceding the filing of the application; and that the land is a portion of
the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines.
Donaciano Pumarada, with three others also filed an opposition alleging
that they have registrable title on account of their possession since time
immemorial.
Rafael M. Morales filed a separate opposition, alleging that there was no
actual survey of the land applied for; and that he is entitled to
registration on account of his occupation and that of his predecessor.
On November 26, 1982, the trial court rendered its decision adjudicating
the land to applicants. The IAC affirmed said decision.
Issue: Whether or not the IAC is correct in granting the land registration.
Ruling: Yes. The land sought to be registered was declared alienable and
disposable 33 years ago. It is not forest land. It has been possessed and
cultivated by the applicants and their predecessors for at least three
generations. The attempts of humble people to have disposable lands
they have been tilling for generations titled in their names should not
only be viewed with an understanding attitude but should, as a matter of
policy, be encouraged.
The fact of possession is bolstered by the forfeiture in 1940 of the land
in favor of the government. It would be rather absurd under the
circumstances of this case to rule that the government would order the
forfeiture of property for non-payment of real estate taxes if the property
is forest land. It is also reasonable to rule that the heirs of Candida
Fernandez redeemed the property because they wanted to keep the land
of the deceased in the possession of their family, thus continuing prior
possession. From 1936 and earlier up to 1972 is more than the required
period. As a matter of fact, the applicants' witnesses testified to their
personal knowledge of more than 50 years possession.
More important is the petitioners' allegation that the property sought to
be registered was unclassified public forest until September 15, 1953
when L C Project No. 16-0, L C Map No. 1634 declared it alienable and
disposable.
It was rather sweeping for the appellate court to rule that after an
applicant files his application for registration, the burden shifts totally to
the government to prove that the land forms part of the unclassified
forest zone. The ruling inHeirs of Amunategui vs. Director of
Forestry (126 SCRA 69) governs applications for confirmation of
imperfect title. The applicant shoulders the burden of overcoming the
presumption that the land sought to be registered forms part of the
public domain.
The Regalian doctrine which forms the basis of our land laws and, in fact,
all laws governing natural resources is a revered and long standing
principle. It must, however, be applied together with the constitutional
provisions on social justice and land reform and must be interpreted in a
way as to avoid manifest unfairness and injustice.
10. Oposa vs. Factoran 224 SCRA 792
Oposa et.al , petitioners v. Fulgencio s. Factoran, Jr., in his capacity as the Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, and HON. Eriberto u. Rosario, Presiding
Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Facts: The principal plaintiffs therein, are all minors duly represented
and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional
plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-
stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia,
engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our
environment and natural resources. The complaint

was instituted as a
taxpayers' class suit

and alleges that the plaintiffs are all citizens of the
Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use
and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's
virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that continued
deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological
balance and have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. Plaintiffs
prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all
existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and
desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new
TLAs.

On 22 June 1990, the defendant Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to
Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the
plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by
the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of Government.

The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruled that
granting of the relief prayed for would result in the impairment of
contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution. Plaintiffs thus filed the
instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind
and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC
Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.

Issues:

(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the
impairment of contracts.

Ruling:
The instant petition is granted, and the challenged order of
respondent Judge dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is set aside.

1.) Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their
complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for
which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this.
The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right -- the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16
Article II of the Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to
refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among many other
things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's
forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly mandates the DENR to be the
primary government agency responsible for the governing and
supervising the exploration, utilization, development and conservation of
the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also
substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of 1987 have set the
objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have
defined the powers and functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the
petitioners to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as DENR's duty
to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the
correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect or respect the same
gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of
the TLA, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion,
violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full
protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed or
granted. After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the
Court finds it to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed
violation of their rights.

2.) Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution
provides for the expanded jurisdiction vested upon the Supreme Court. It
allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the
Executive and Legislature and to declare their acts as invalid for lack or
excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

3.) The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an
instrument by which the state regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a
contract within the purview of the due process clause thus, the non-
impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw
whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case. The
granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it
property or property rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of
obligations of contract is limit by the exercise by the police power of the
State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the
State.

11. Miners Association vs. Secretary Factoran 240 SCRA 100
MINERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner,
vs. HON. FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, and
JOEL D. MUYCO, Director of Mines and Geosciences Bureau, respondents.
Facts: On July 10, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of
her then legislative powers under Article II, Section 1 of the Provisional
Constitution and Article XIII, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution,
promulgated Executive Order No. 211 prescribing the interim procedures
in the processing and approval of applications for the exploration,
development and utilization of minerals pursuant to the 1987
Constitution in order to ensure the continuity of mining operations and
activities and to hasten the development of mineral resources.
On July 25, 1987, President Aquino likewise promulgated Executive Order
No. 279 authorizing the DENR Secretary to negotiate and conclude joint
venture, co-production, or production-sharing agreements for the
exploration, development and utilization of mineral resources, and
prescribing the guidelines for such agreements and those agreements
involving technical or financial assistance by foreign-owned corporations
for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals.
Pursuant to Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279, the DENR Secretary
issued on June 23, 1989 DENR Administrative Order No. 57, series of
1989, captioned "Guidelines of Mineral Production Sharing Agreement
under Executive Order No. 279." Under the transitory provision of said
DENR Administrative Order No. 57, embodied in its Article 9, all existing
mining leases or agreements which were granted after the effectivity of
the 1987 Constitution pursuant to Executive Order No. 211, except small
scale mining leases and those pertaining to sand and gravel and quarry
resources covering an area of twenty (20) hectares or less, shall be
converted into production-sharing agreements within one (1) year from
the effectivity of these guidelines. On November 20, 1980, the Secretary
of the DENR Administrative Order No. 82, series of 1990, laying down the
"Procedural Guidelines on the Award of Mineral Production Sharing
Agreement (MPSA) through Negotiation."

Section 3 of the aforementioned DENR Administrative Order No. 82
enumerates the persons or entities required to submit Letter of Intent
(LOIs) and Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSAs) within two (2)
years from the effectivity of DENR Administrative Order No. 57 or until
July 17, 1991. Failure to do so within the prescribed period shall cause
the abandonment of mining, quarry and sand and gravel claims. The
issuance and the impeding implementation by the DENR of
Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 after their respective effectivity
dates compelled the Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. to file the
instant petition assailing their validity and constitutionality before the
SC.

In a petition for certiorari, petitioner Miners Association of the
Philippines, Inc. mainly contends that respondent Secretary of DENR
issued both Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 in excess of his rule-
making power under Section 6 of Executive Order No. 279. On the
assumption that the questioned administrative orders do not conform
with Executive Order Nos. 211 and 279, petitioner contends that both
orders violate the non-impairment of contract provision under Article III,
Section 10 of the 1987 Constitution on the ground that Administrative
Order No. 57 unduly pre-terminates existing mining agreements and
automatically converts them into production-sharing agreements within
one (1) year from its effectivity date. On the other hand, Administrative
Order No. 82 declares that failure to submit Letters of Intent and Mineral
Production-Sharing Agreements within two (2) years from the date of
effectivity of said guideline or on July 17, 1991 shall cause the
abandonment of their mining, quarry and sand gravel permits.
Issue: Whether or not the Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 issued by
the DENR Secretary in the exercise of his rule-making power are tainted
with invalidity

Ruling: The petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
The SC ruled that the questioned administrative orders are reasonably
directed to the accomplishment of the purposes of the law under which
they were issued and were intended to secure the paramount interest of
the public, their economic growth and welfare. The validity and
constitutionality of Administrative Order Nos. 57 and 82 must be
sustained, and their force and effect upheld.
Nowhere in Administrative Order No. 57 is there any provision which
would lead to conclude that the questioned order authorizes the
automatic conversion of mining leases and agreements granted after the
effectivity of the 1987 Constitution, pursuant to Executive Order No. 211,
to production-sharing agreements. The provision in Article 9 of
Administrative Order No. 57 that "all such leases or agreements shall be
converted into production sharing agreements within one (1) year from
the effectivity of these guidelines" could not possibility contemplate a
unilateral declaration on the part of the Government that all existing
mining leases and agreements are automatically converted
into production-sharing agreements. On the contrary, the use of the term
"production-sharing agreement" if they are so minded. Negotiation
negates compulsion or automatic conversion as suggested by petitioner
in the instant petition. A mineral production-sharing agreement (MPSA)
requires a meeting of the minds of the parties after negotiations arrived
at in good faith and in accordance with the procedure laid down in the
subsequent Administrative Order No. 82.


12. Sunbeam Convenience Foods Inc. vs. Court of Appeals 181 SCRA
445
Sunbeam Convenience Foods inc., Coral Beach Development Corp., and the Register of Deeds of
Bataan, petitioners,
vs. Court of Appeals and the Republic of the Philippines, respondents.
Facts: On April 29, 1963, the Director of Lands caused the issuance of a
Sales Patent in favor of defendant Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc., over
the parcels of land both situated in Mariveles, Bataan and more
particularly described and bounded as Lot 1-Sgs-2409 (area 3,113,695 sq.
m ) and Lot 2-Sgs-2409 area 1,401,855 sq. m. On May 3, 1963, the
aforesaid Sales Patent was registered with the defendant Register of
Deeds of Bataan who in turn issued OCT No. Sp-24 in favor of defendant
Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc., for the two parcels of land above-
described. Subsequently, OCT No. Sp-24 was cancelled and TCT No. T-
12421 was issued over Lot 1, Sgs-2409, while TCT No. 12422 was issued
over Lot 2, Sgs-2409, both in favor of defendant Coral Beach
Development Corporation. On May 11, 1976, the Solicitor General
instituted before the Court of First Instance of Bataan, an action for
reversion docketed as Civil Case No. 4062. SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH
filed a Motion to Dismiss on the action for reversion. The then CFI of
Bataan dismissed the complaint adopting mainly the theory that since the
titles sought to be cancelled emanated from the administrative act of the
Bureau of Lands Director, the latter, not the courts, had jurisdiction over
the disposition of the land.
In the CA, it gave due course to the petition for certiorari by the Republic,
set aside the Order of Dismissal rendered by the Court of First Instance,
and ordered the presiding judge Hon. Pedro T. Santiago to receive the
answers of the private respondents SUNBEAM and CORAL BEACH in the
action for reversion. Hence, Sunbeam and Coral Beach filed a petition for
review.
Issue: Whether or not he CA is correct in setting aside the order of
dismissal by the CFI Bataan
Ruling: The petition is denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals is
affirmed.
The SC finds nothing disagreeable with the action of the Court of Appeals
to give due course to the petition considering that the issue affected a
matter of public concern which is the disposition of the lands of our
matrimony No less than the Constitution protects its policy. Also, it
agreed with the Court of Appeals' granting of the petition filed by the
Republic charging the then CFI with grave abuse of discretion. The filing
of the Motion to Dismiss the complaint for reversion by SUNBEAM and
CORAL BEACH on the ground of lack of cause of action, necessarily
carried with it the admission, for purposes of the motion, of the truth of
all material facts pleaded in the complaint instituted by the Republic.
An important factual issue raised in the complaint was the classification
of the lands as forest lands. This material allegation stated in the
Republic's complaint' was never denied specifically by the petitioners
Sunbeam and Coral Beach. If it is true that the lands are forest lands,
then all these proceedings become moot and academic. Land remains
unclassified land until it is released therefrom and rendered open to
disposition.


The adherence to the Regalian doctrine subjects all agricultural, timber,
and mineral lands to the dominion of the State.

Thus, before any land
may be declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or
disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a
positive act from the government. Even rules on the confirmation of
imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest
land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public domain.
The mere fact that a title was issued by the Director of Lands does not
confer any validity on such title if the property covered by the title or
patent is part of the public forest. The only way to resolve this question
of fact as to the classification of the land is by remanding the case to the
lower court for a full- dress trial on the issues involved.

13. Republic vs. Court of Appeals 160 SCRA 228

G.R. No. L-43938 April 15, 1988
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (DIRECTOR OF FOREST DEVELOPMENT), petitioner,
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION) and JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-44081 April 15, 1988
BENGUET CONSOLIDATED, INC., petitioner,
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORIA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all
surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.

G.R. No. L-44092 April 15, 1988
ATOK-BIG WEDGE MINING COMPANY, petitioner,
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, VICTORlA, BENJAMIN and EDUARDO, all
surnamed DE LA ROSA, represented by their father, JOSE Y. DE LA ROSA, respondents.
Facts: Jose de la Rosa filed an application for registration of a parcel of
land on February 11, 1965 on his own behalf and on behalf of his three
children, Victoria, Benjamin and Eduardo. The land, situated in Tuding,
Itogon, Benguet Province, was divided into 9 lots and covered by plan
Psu-225009. According to the application, Lots 1-5 were sold to Jose de la
Rosa and Lots 6-9 to his children by Mamaya Balbalio and Jaime Alberto,
respectively, in 1964. Both Balbalio and Alberto testified that they had
acquired the subject land by virtue of prescription Balbalio claimed to
have received Lots 1-5 from her father shortly after the Liberation.
The application was separately opposed by Benguet Consolidated, Inc. as
to Lots 1-5, Atok Big Wedge Corporation, as to Portions of Lots 1-5 and all
of Lots 6-9, and by the Republic of the Philippines, through the Bureau of
Forestry Development, as to lots 1-9.
3

Benguet opposed on the ground that the June Bug mineral claim covering
Lots 1-5 was sold to it on September 22, 1934, by the successors-in-
interest of James Kelly, who located the claim in September 1909 and
recorded it on October 14, 1909. From the date of its purchase, Benguet
had been in actual, continuous and exclusive possession of the land in
concept of owner, as evidenced by its construction of adits, its affidavits
of annual assessment, its geological mappings, geological samplings and
trench side cuts, and its payment of taxes on the land.
For its part, Atok alleged that a portion of Lots 1-5 and all of Lots 6-9
were covered by the Emma and Fredia mineral claims located by Harrison
and Reynolds on December 25, 1930, and recorded on January 2, 1931, in
the office of the mining recorder of Baguio. These claims were purchased
from these locators on November 2, 1931, by Atok, which has since then
been in open, continuous and exclusive possession of the said lots as
evidenced by its annual assessment work on the claims, such as the
boring of tunnels, and its payment of annual taxes thereon.
The Bureau of Forestry Development also interposed its objection,
arguing that the land sought to be registered was covered by the Central
Cordillera Forest Reserve under Proclamation No. 217 dated February 16,
1929. Moreover, by reason of its nature, it was not subject to alienation
under the Constitutions of 1935 and 1973.
Issue: Whether or not the application for registration of de la Rosa
granted by the CA is correct.
Ruling: No. Benguet and Atok have exclusive rights to the property in
question by virtue of their respective mining claims which they validly
acquired before the Constitution of 1935 prohibited the alienation of all
lands of the public domain except agricultural lands, subject to vested
rights existing at the time of its adoption. The land was not and could not
have been transferred to the private respondents by virtue of acquisitive
prescription, nor could its use be shared simultaneously by them and the
mining companies for agricultural and mineral purposes.
This is an application of the Regalian doctrine which, as its name implies,
is intended for the benefit of the State, not of private persons. The rule
simply reserves to the State all minerals that may be found in public and
even private land devoted to "agricultural, industrial, commercial,
residential or (for) any purpose other than mining." Thus, if a person is
the owner of agricultural land in which minerals are discovered, his
ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize
the said minerals without the permission of the State to which such
minerals belong.
The flaw in the reasoning of the respondent court is in supposing that
the rights over the land could be used for both mining and non-mining
purposes simultaneously. The correct interpretation is that once minerals
are discovered in the land, whatever the use to which it is being devoted
at the time, such use may be discontinued by the State to enable it to
extract the minerals therein in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative.
The land is thus converted to mineral land and may not be used by any
private party, including the registered owner thereof, for any other
purpose that will impede the mining operations to be undertaken therein,
For the loss sustained by such owner, he is of course entitled to just
compensation under the Mining Laws or in appropriate expropriation
proceedings.

14. Republic vs. Court of Appeals 201 SCRA 3
G.R. No. 48327 August 21, 1991
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, DIRECTOR OF LANDS and DIRECTOR OF FORESTRY, petitioners
vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, PAULINA PARAN, ELISA PARAN MAITIM and SINA
PARAN, respondents.

Facts: Private respondents are applicants for registration of a parcel of
land situated in Beckel La Trinidad, Benguet, containing an area of 34,178
square meters claiming to have acquired the land from their father
Dayotao Paran and by actual, physical, exclusive and open possession
thereof since time immemorial.
On 18 November 1970, the Office of the Solicitor General filed on behalf
of the Director of Lands an Opposition contending that: (1) private
respondents have no registrable title; (2) the parcel of land sought to be
registered is part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the
Philippines; and (3) the application for registration was filed after
expiration of the period provided for in R.A. No. 2061, hence the land
registration court did not acquire jurisdiction over the case.
The Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Baguio and Benguet, on the other
hand, filed a Motion to Dismiss based solely on the ground that the
application made by private respondents was filed beyond 31 December
1968, the extended period for filing of applications for registration
provided for by R.A. No. 2061. The Office of the Provincial Fiscal of
Baguio and Benguet later filed another Opposition first time in
representation of the Director of Forestry, stating that the parcel of land
sought to be registered is within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve
covered by Proclamation No. 217 dated 16 February 1929.
On 7 August 1974, the land registration court rendered a
Decision granting the application for registration of the petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the granting of the application for land registration
is valid.

Ruling: Yes. Petitioners are entitled to judicial confirmation of their
imperfect title.

The applicants in the instant case are natives of Benguet and members of
the Ibaloi tribe. They are members of a cultural minority whose
application for registration of land should be considered as falling under
Section 48(c) of C.A. No. 141. At the time private respondents filed their
application, the text of Section 48 read:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying
lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed,
may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate
of title thereafter, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Members of the national cultural minoritieswho by themselves or
through their predecessors- in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public
domain suitable to agriculture whether disposable or not, under a bona
fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights
granted in subsection (b) hereof.

It is clear to the Court that the addition of subsection (c) was intended to
create a distinction between applications for judicial confirmation of
imperfect titles by members of national cultural minorities and
applications by other qualified persons in general. Members of cultural
minorities may apply for confirmation of their title to lands of the public
domain, whether disposable or not; they may therefore apply for public
lands even though such lands are legally forest lands or mineral lands of
the public domain, so long as such lands are in fact suitable for
agriculture. The rest of the community, however, "Christians" or members
of mainstream society may apply only in respect of "agricultural lands of
the public domain," that is, "disposable lands of the public domain" which
would of course exclude lands embraced within forest reservations or
mineral land reservations.

It is important to note that private respondents' application for judicial
confirmation of their imperfect title was filed in 1970 and that the land
registration court rendered its decision confirming their long-continued
possession of the lands here involved in 1974, that is, during the time
when Section 48(c) was in legal effect. Private respondents' imperfect title
was, in other words, perfected or vested by the completion of the
required period of possession prior to the issuance of P.D. No. 1073.
Private respondents' right in respect of the land they had possessed for
thirty (30) years could not be divested by P.D. No. 1073.
The Court stressed in Director of Lands vs. Funtilarsupra):
The Regalian doctrine which forms the basis of our land laws and, in fact,
all laws governing natural resources is a revered and long standing
principle. It must, however, be applied together with the constitutional
provisions on social justice and land reform and must be interpreted in a
way as to avoid manifest unfairness and injustice.

15. Ankron vs. Government of the Philippines 40 Phil 10
G.R. No. L-14213 August 23, 1919
J. H. ANKRON, petitioner-appellee,
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, objector-appellant.

Facts: A certain piece or parcel of land situated is sought to be registered
under the Torrens system.
The only opposition which was presented was on the part of the Director
of Lands alleging that the land in question was the property of the
Government of the United States under the control and administration of
the Government of the Philippine Islands.
After hearing and considering the evidence, the lower court ordered and
decreed that said parcel of land be registered in the name of the said
applicant, J. H. Ankron, subject, however, to the right of the Government
of the Philippine Islands to open a road thereon in the manner and
conditions mentioned in said decision.
From that decree the Director of Lands appealed to this court.
The appellant argues, first, that the applicant did not sufficiently identify
the land in question; second, contends that the appellant failed to prove
his possession and occupation in accordance with the provisions of
paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926; third, contends that portions of
said land cannot be registered in accordance with the existing Land
Registration Law for the reason that they are manglares.
Issue: Whether or not the granting of registration of the land was valid.
Ruling: Yes. The Government under the provisions of Act No. 1148, may,
by reservation, decide for itself what portions of public land shall be
considered forestry land, unless private interests have intervened before
such reservation is made. In the latter case, whether the land is
agricultural, forestry, or mineral, is a question of proof. Until private
interests have intervened, the Government, by virtue of the terms of said
Act (No. 1148), may decide for itself what portions of the "public domain"
shall be set aside and reserved as forestry or mineral land. (Ramos vs.
Director of Lands (39 Phil. Rep., 175; Jocson vs. Director of
Forestry, supra.)
The important prerequisites for registration of land imposed by said
section 54, paragraph 6, are (a) that the land shall be agricultural
public land as defined by the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902; (b) that the
petitioner, by himself or his predecessors in interest, shall have been in
the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation
of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership for a period of ten
years next preceding the taking effect of said Act. In the present case the
applicant proved, and there was no effort to dispute said proof, that the
land in question was agricultural land and that he and his predecessors
in interest had occupied the same as owners in good faith for a period of
more than forty years prior to the commencement of the present action.
Section 3 of Act No. 1148 provides that "the public forests shall include
all unreserved lands covered with trees of whatever age." Said section
1820 (Act No. 2711) provides that "for the purpose of this chapter 'public
forest' includes, except as otherwise specially indicated, all unreserved
public land, including nipa and mangrove swamps, and all forest reserves
of whatever character."
The fact that the land is a manglar [mangrove swamp] is not sufficient
for the courts to decide whether it is agricultural, forestry, or mineral
land. It may perchance belong to one or the other of said classes of land.