1
Bitonio vs. COA
Post under case digests, Political Law at Friday, March 09, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: In 1994, petitioner Benedicto Ernesto
R. Bitonio, Jr. was appointed Director IV of
the Bureau of Labor Relations in the
Department of Labor and Employment. As
representative of the Secretary of Labor to
the PEZA Board, he was receiving a per
diem for every board meeting he attended
during the years 1995 to 1997.
After a post audit of the PEZAs
disbursement transactions, the COA
disallowed the payment of per diems to Mr.
Bitonio pursuant to the Supreme Court ruling
declaring unconstitutional the holding of
other offices by the cabinet members, their
deputies and assistants in addition to their
primary office and the receipt of
compensation therefore, and, to COA
Memorandum No. 97-038 dated September
19, 1997, implementing Senate Committee
Reports No. 509.
In his motion for reconsideration to the COA,
he contended that the Supreme Court
modified its earlier ruling in the Civil Liberties
Union case which limits the prohibition to
Cabinet Secretaries, Undersecretaries and
their Assistants. Officials given the rank
equivalent to a Secretary, Undersecretary or
Assistant Secretary and other appointive
officials below the rank of Assistant
Secretary are not covered by the prohibition.
He further stated that the PEZA Charter (RA
7916), enacted four years after the Civil
Liberties Union case became final,
authorized the payment of per diems; in
expressly authorizing per diems, Congress
should be conclusively presumed to have
been aware of the parameters of the
constitutional prohibition as interpreted in the
Civil Liberties Union case.
COA rendered the assailed decision denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
2
Issue: Whether COA correctly disallowed
the per diems received by the petitioner for
his attendance in the PEZA Board of
Directors meetings as representative of the
Secretary of Labor.
Held: The assailed decision of the COA is
affirmed.
The petitioner is, indeed, not entitled to
receive per diem for his board meetings
sitting as representative of the Secretary of
Labor in the Board of Directors of the PEZA.
The petitioners presence in the PEZA Board
meetings is solely by virtue of his capacity as
representative of the Secretary of Labor.
Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited
from receiving compensation for his
additional office or employment, such
prohibition likewise applies to the petitioner
who sat in the Board only in behalf of the
Secretary of Labor. The Supreme Court
cannot allow the petitioner who sat as
representative of the Secretary of Labor in
the PEZA Board to have a better right than
his principal.
Moreover, it is a basic tenet that any
legislative enactment must not be repugnant
to the Constitution. No law can render it
nugatory because the Constitution is more
superior to a statute. The framers of R.A. No.
7916 must have realized the flaw in the law
which is the reason why the law was later
amended by R.A. No. 8748 to cure such
defect. The option of designating
representative to the Board by the different
Cabinet Secretaries was deleted. Likewise,
the paragraph as to payment of per diems to
the members of the Board of Directors was
also deleted, considering that such
stipulation was clearly in conflict with the
proscription set by the Constitution.
3
Dennis B. Funa vs. Executive Secretary
Eduardo R. Ermita, Office of the
President,G.R. No. 184740, February 11, 2010.
Post under Political Law, villarama doctrines at Monday, November 28, 2011 Posted
by Schizophrenic Mind
Judicial review; requisites. The
courts power of judicial review, like almost
all other powers conferred by the
Constitution, is subject to several limitations,
namely: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (2) the person challenging the act
must have standing to challenge; he must
have a personal and substantial interest in
the case, such that he has sustained or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its
enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
possible opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota of
the case. Respondents assert that the
second requisite is absent in this case.
Generally, a party will be allowed
to litigate only when (1) he can
show that he has personally
suffered some actual or
threatened injury because of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the
government; (2) the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action;
and (3) the injury is likely to be
redressed by a favorable action.
The question on standing is
whether such parties have
alleged such a personal stake in
the outcome of the controversy
as to assure that concrete
adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon
which the court so largely
4
depends for illumination of
difficult constitutional questions.
In David v. Macapagal-Arroyo,
summarizing the rules culled from
jurisprudence, the Supreme
Court held that taxpayers, voters,
concerned citizens, and
legislators may be accorded
standing to sue, provided that the
following requirements are met:
(1) cases involve constitutional
issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a
claim of illegal disbursement of
public funds or that the tax
measure is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a
showing of obvious interest in the
validity of the election law in
question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there
must be a showing that the
issues raised are of transcendental
importance which must be settled
early; and for legislators, there
must be a claim that the official
action complained of infringes
upon their prerogatives as
legislators.
5
Petitioner having alleged a grave
violation of the constitutional
prohibition against Members of
the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants holding two (2) or
more positions in government, the fact
that he filed this suit as a
concerned citizen sufficiently
confers him with standing to sue
for redress of such illegal act by
public officials.
Public officials; multiple
office. The prohibition against holding
dual or multiple offices or employment under
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution was held inapplicable to posts
occupied by the Executive officials specified
therein, without additional compensation in
an ex-officio capacity as provided by law and
as required by the primary functions of said
office. The reason is that these posts do not
comprise any other office within the
contemplation of the constitutional
prohibition but are properly an imposition of
additional duties and functions on said
officials. Apart from their bare assertion that
respondent Bautista did not receive any
compensation when she was OIC of
MARINA, respondents failed to demonstrate
clearly that her designation as such OIC was
in an ex-officio capacity as required by the
primary functions of her office as DOTC
Undersecretary for Maritime Transport.
Given the vast responsibilities
and scope of administration of
the MARINA, we are hardly
persuaded by respondents
submission that respondent
Bautistas designation as OIC of
6
MARINA was merely an
imposition of additional duties
related to her primary position as
DOTC Undersecretary for
Maritime Transport. It appears
that the DOTC Undersecretary
for Maritime Transport is not even
a member of the Maritime
Industry Board, which includes
the DOTC Secretary as
Chairman, the MARINA
Administrator as Vice-Chairman,
and the following as members:
Executive Secretary (Office of the
President), Philippine Ports
Authority General Manager,
Department of National Defense
Secretary, Development Bank of
the Philippines General Manager,
and the Department of Trade and
Industry Secretary.
It must be stressed though that
while the designation was in the
nature of an acting and
temporary capacity, the words
hold the office were employed.
Such holding of office pertains to
both appointment and
designation because the
appointee or designate performs
the duties and functions of the
office. The 1987 Constitution in
prohibiting dual or multiple offices,
as well as incompatible offices,
refers to the holding of the office,
and not to the nature of the
appointment or designation,
7
words which were not even found
in Section 13, Article VII nor in
Section 7, paragraph 2, Article
IX-B. To hold an office means to
possess or occupy the same, or
to be in possession and administration,
which implies nothing less than
the actual discharge of the
functions and duties of the office.
The disqualification laid down in
Section 13, Article VII is aimed
at preventing the concentration of
powers in the Executive
Department officials, specifically
the President, Vice-President,
Members of the Cabinet and their
deputies and assistants.Civil
Liberties Union traced the history of
the times and the conditions
under which the Constitution was
framed, and construed the
Constitution consistent with the
object sought to be accomplished
by adoption of such provision,
and the evils sought to be
avoided or remedied. We recalled
the practice, during the Marcos
regime, of designating members
of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants as members of the
governing bodies or boards of
various government agencies
and instrumentalities, including
government-owned or controlled
corporations. This practice of
holding multiple offices
or positions in the government
8
led to abuses by unscrupulous
public officials, who took
advantage of this scheme for
purposes of self-enrichment. The
blatant betrayal of public trust
evolved into one of the serious
causes of discontent with the
Marcos regime. It was therefore
quite inevitable and in
consonance with the
overwhelming sentiment of the
people that the 1986
Constitutional Commission would
draft into the proposed
Constitution the provisions under
consideration, which were
envisioned to remedy, if not
correct, the evils that flow from
the holding of multiple
governmental offices and
employment.Dennis B. Funa vs.
Executive Secretary Eduardo R.
Ermita, Office of the
President,G.R. No. 184740,
February 11, 2010.
G. R. No. 85468, September 07, 1989
DOROMA VS. SANDIGANBAYAN, Om
budsman and Special Prosecutor
FACTS:
Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of the Presidential Commission
on Good Government (PCGG), for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (RA 3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection with his shareholdings and
position as president and director of the Doromal International Trading
Corporation (DITC) which submitted bids to supply P61 million worth of
electronic, electrical, automotive, mechanical and airconditioning equipment
to the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (or DECS) and the
National Manpower and Youth Council (or NMYC).
An information was then filed by the Tanodbayan against Doromal for the
said violation and a preliminary investigation was conducted.
The petitioner then filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition questioning
the jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan to file the information without the
approval of the Ombudsman.
The Supreme Court held that the incumbent Tanodbayan (called Special
Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution and who is supposed to retain
powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly without
authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of
criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the
9
Ombudsman. Subsequently annulling the information filed by the
Tanodbayan.
A new information, duly approved by the Ombudsman, was filed in the
Sandiganbayan, alleging that the Doromal, a public officer, being then a
Commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government, did
then and there wilfully and unlawfully, participate in a business through the
Doromal International Trading Corporation, a family corporation of which he
is the President, and which company participated in the biddings conducted
by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the National
Manpower & Youth Council, which act or participation is prohibited by law
and the constitution.
The petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that it
was invalid since there had been no preliminary investigation for the new
information that was filed against him.
The motion was denied by Sandiganbayan claiming that another preliminary
investigation is unnecessary because both old and new informations involve
the same subject matter.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the act of Doromal would constitute a violation of the Constitution.
Whether or not preliminary investigation is necessary even if both informations
involve the same subject matter.
Whether or not the information shall be effected as invalid due to the absence of
preliminary investigation.
HELD:
Yes, as to the first and second issuses. No, as to the third issue. Petition was
granted by the Supreme Court.
RATIO:
(1) The presence of a signed document bearing the signature of Doromal as
part of the application to bid shows that he can rightfully be charged with
having participated in a business which act is absolutely prohibited by
Section 13 of Article VII of the Constitution" because "the DITC remained a
family corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect interest."
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that "the President,
Vice-President, the members of the Cabinet and their deputies or assistants
shall not... during (their) tenure, ...directly or indirectly... participate in any
business.
(2) The right of the accused to a preliminary investigation is "a substantial
one." Its denial over his opposition is a "prejudicial error, in that it subjects
the accused to the loss of life, liberty, or property without due process of law"
provided by the Constitution.
Since the first information was annulled, the preliminary investigation
conducted at that time shall also be considered as void. Due to that fact, a
new preliminary investigation must be conducted.
(3) The absence of preliminary investigation does not affect the court's
jurisdiction over the case. Nor do they impair the validity of the information or
otherwise render it defective; but, if there were no preliminary investigations
and the defendants, before entering their plea, invite the attention of the
court to their absence, the court, instead of dismissing the information should
conduct such investigation, order the fiscal to conduct it or remand the case
to the inferior court so that the preliminary investigation may be conducted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is granted. The
Sandiganbayan shall immediately remand Criminal Case No. 12893 to the
Office of the Ombudsman for preliminary investigation and shall hold in
abeyance the proceedings before it pending the result of such investigation.
ARTURO M. DE CASTRO vs.
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL (JBC)
G. R. No. 191002. March 17, 2010.
FACTS:
This case is based on multiple cases field with dealt with the
controversy that has arisen from the forthcoming compulsory
requirement of Chief Justice Puno on May 17, 2010 or seven days
after the presidential election. On December 22, 2009,
Congressman Matias V. Defensor, an ex officio member of the
JBC, addressed a letter to the JBC, requesting that the process
for nominations to the office of the Chief Justice be commenced
10
immediately. In its January 18, 2010 meeting en banc, the JBC
passed a resolution which stated that they have unanimously
agreed to start the process of filling up the position of Chief
Justice to be vacated on May 17, 2010 upon the retirement of the
incumbent Chief Justice. As a result, the JBC opened the position
of Chief Justice for application or recommendation, and published
for that purpose its announcement in the Philippine Daily Inquirer
and the Philippine Star. In its meeting of February 8, 2010, the
JBC resolved to proceed to the next step of announcing the
names of the following candidates to invite to the public to file their
sworn complaint, written report, or opposition, if any, not later than
February 22, 2010. Although it has already begun the process for
the filling of the position of Chief Justice Puno in accordance with
its rules, the JBC is not yet decided on when to submit to the
President its list of nominees for the position due to the
controversy in this case being unresolved. The compiled cases
which led to this case and the petitions of intervenors called for
either the prohibition of the JBC to pass the shortlist, mandamus
for the JBC to pass the shortlist, or that the act of appointing the
next Chief Justice by GMA is a midnight appointment. A precedent
frequently cited by the parties is the In Re Appointments Dated
March 30, 1998 of Hon. Mateo A. Valenzuela and Hon. Placido B.
Vallarta as Judges of the RTC of Branch 62, Bago City and of
Branch 24, Cabanatuan City, respectively, shortly referred to here
as the Valenzuela case, by which the Court held that Section 15,
Article VII prohibited the exercise by the President of the power to
appoint to judicial positions during the period therein fixed.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing.
2. Whether or not there is justiciable controversy that is ripe for
judicial determination.
3. Whether or not the incumbent President can appoint the next
Chief Justice.
4. Whether or not mandamus and prohibition will lie to compel the
submission of the shortlist of nominees by the JBC.
HELD:
1.Petitioners have legal standing because such requirement for
this case was waived by the Court. Legal standing is a peculiar
concept in constitutional law because in some cases, suits are not
brought by parties who have been personally injured by the
operation of a law or any other government act but by concerned
citizens, taxpayers or voters who actually sue in the public
interest. But even if, strictly speaking, the petitioners are not
covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the
Court to waive the requirement and so remove the impediment to
its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional questions
raised.
11
2. There is a justiciable issue. The court holds that the petitions
set forth an actual case or controversy that is ripe for judicial
determination. The reality is that the JBC already commenced the
proceedings for the selection of the nominees to be included in a
short list to be submitted to the President for consideration of
which of them will succeed Chief Justice Puno as the next Chief
Justice. Although the position is not yet vacant, the fact that the
JBC began the process of nomination pursuant to its rules and
practices, although it has yet to decide whether to submit the list
of nominees to the incumbent outgoing President or to the next
President, makes the situation ripe for judicial determination,
because the next steps are the public interview of the candidates,
the preparation of the short list of candidates, and the interview of
constitutional experts, as may be needed. The resolution of the
controversy will surely settle with finality the nagging questions
that are preventing the JBC from moving on with the process that
it already began, or that are reasons persuading the JBC to desist
from the rest of the process.
3.Prohibition under section 15, Article VII does not apply to
appointments to fill a vacancy in the Supreme Court or to other
appointments to the judiciary. The records of the deliberations of
the Constitutional Commission reveal that the framers devoted
time to meticulously drafting, styling, and arranging the
Constitution. Such meticulousness indicates that the organization
and arrangement of the provisions of the Constitution were not
arbitrarily or whimsically done by the framers, but purposely made
to reflect their intention and manifest their vision of what the
Constitution should contain. As can be seen, Article VII is devoted
to the Executive Department, and, among others, it lists the
powers vested by the Constitution in the President. The
presidential power of appointment is dealt with in Sections 14, 15
and 16 of the Article. Had the framers intended to extend the
prohibition contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment
of Members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly done
so. They could not have ignored the meticulous ordering of the
provisions. They would have easily and surely written the
prohibition made explicit in Section 15, Article VII as being equally
applicable to the appointment of Members of the Supreme Court
in Article VIII itself, most likely in Section 4 (1), Article VIII.
4.Writ of mandamus does not lie against the JBC. Mandamus
shall issue when any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act that the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or
station. It is proper when the act against which it is directed is one
addressed to the discretion of the tribunal or officer. Mandamus is
not available to direct the exercise of a judgment or discretion in a
particular way. For mandamus to lie, the following requisites must
be complied with: (a) the plaintiff has a clear legal right to the act
demanded; (b) it must be the duty of the defendant to perform the
act, because it is mandated by law; (c) the defendant unlawfully
neglects the performance of the duty enjoined by law; (d) the act
to be performed is ministerial, not discretionary; and (e) there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
12
Bermudez vs Torres
2 Comments
GR No. 131429, August 4, 1999
FACTS:
The vacancy in the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Tarlac impelled the
main contestants in this case, petitioner Oscar Bermudez and respondent Conrado
Quiaoit, to take contrasting views on the proper interpretation of a provision in
the 1987 Revised Administrative Code. Bermudez was a recommendee of then
Justice Secretary Teofisto Guingona, Jr., for the position of Provincial Prosecutor.
Quiaoit, on the other hand, had the support of then Representative Jose Yap. On
30 June 1997, President Ramos appointed Quiaoit to the coveted office. Quiaoit
received a certified xerox copy of his appointment and, on 21 July 1997, took his
oath of office before Executive Judge Angel Parazo of the Regional Trial Court
(Branch 65) of Tarlac, Tarlac. On 23 July 1997, Quiaoit assumed office and
immediately informed the President, as well as the Secretary of Justice and the
Civil Service Commission, of that assumption.
On 10 October 1997, Bermudez filed with the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac, a
petition for prohibition and/or injunction, and mandamus, with a prayer for the
issuance of a writ of injunction/temporary restraining order, against herein
respondents, challenging the appointment of Quiaoit primarily on the ground that
the appointment lacks the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice prescribed
under the Revised Administrative Code of 1987. After hearing, the trial court
considered the petition submitted for resolution and, in due time, issued its now
assailed order dismissing the petition. The subsequent move by petitioners to
have the order reconsidered met with a denial.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the absence of a recommendation of the Secretary of Justice to
the President can be held fatal to the appointment of respondent Conrado Quiaoit.
HELD:
The petition is denied. An appointment to a public office is the unequivocal act
of designating or selecting by one having the authority therefor of an individual
to discharge and perform the duties and functions of an office or trust. The
appointment is deemed complete once the last act required of the appointing
authority has been complied with and its acceptance thereafter by the appointee
in order to render it effective.
Indeed, it may rightly be said that the right of choice is the heart of the power to
appoint. In the exercise of the power of appointment, discretion is an integral part
thereof.
When the Constitution or the law clothes the President with the power to appoint
a subordinate officer, such conferment must be understood as necessarily
carrying with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. It should be here
pertinent to state that the President is the head of government whose authority
includes the power of control over all executive departments, bureaus and
offices.
It is the considered view of the Court that the phrase upon recommendation of
the Secretary, found in Section 9, Chapter II, Title III, Book IV, of the Revised
Administrative Code, should be interpreted to be a mere advise, exhortation or
indorsement, which is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or
obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The President, being the head of
the Executive Department, could very well disregard or do away with the action
of the departments, bureaus or offices even in the exercise of discretionary
authority, and in so opting, he cannot be said as having acted beyond the scope of
his authority.
13
Pimentel vs. Ermita
Post under case digests, Political Law at Friday, March 09, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Facts: This is a petition to declare
unconstitutional the appointments issued by
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(President Arroyo) through Executive
Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita (Secretary
Ermita) to Florencio B. Abad, Avelino J.
Cruz, Jr., Michael T. Defensor, Joseph H.
Durano, Raul M. Gonzalez, Alberto G.
Romulo, Rene C. Villa, and Arthur C. Yap
(respondents) as acting secretaries of their
respective departments.
On August 2004, Arroyo issued
appointments to respondents as acting
secretaries of their respective departments.
Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004.
On 23 September 2004, President Arroyo
issued ad interim appointments to
respondents as secretaries of the
departments to which they were previously
appointed in an acting capacity.
Issue: Is President Arroyos appointment of
respondents as acting secretaries without
the consent of the Commission on
Appointments while Congress is in session,
constitutional?
Held: Yes. The power to appoint is
essentially executive in nature, and the
legislature may not interfere with the
exercise of this executive power except in
those instances when the Constitution
expressly allows it to interfere. Limitations on
the executive power to appoint are construed
strictly against the legislature. The scope of
the legislatures interference in the
executives power to appoint is limited to the
power to prescribe the qualifications to an
appointive office. Congress cannot appoint a
person to an office in the guise of prescribing
qualifications to that office. Neither may
Congress impose on the President the duty
to appoint any particular person to an office.
14
However, even if the Commission on
Appointments is composed of members of
Congress, the exercise of its powers is
executive and not legislative. The
Commission on Appointments does not
legislate when it exercises its power to give
or withhold consent to presidential
appointments.
Petitioners contend that President Arroyo
should not have appointed respondents as
acting secretaries because in case of a
vacancy in the Office of a Secretary, it is only
an Undersecretary who can be designated
as Acting Secretary.
The essence of an appointment in an acting
capacity is its temporary nature. It is a stop-
gap measure intended to fill an office for a
limited time until the appointment of a
permanent occupant to the office. In case of
vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego
of the President, such as the office of a
department secretary, the President must
necessarily appoint an alter ego of her
choice as acting secretary before the
permanent appointee of her choice could
assume office.
Congress, through a law, cannot impose on
the President the obligation to appoint
automatically the undersecretary as her
temporary alter ego. An alter ego, whether
temporary or permanent, holds a position of
great trust and confidence. Congress, in the
guise of prescribing qualifications to an office,
cannot impose on the President who her
alter ego should be.
The office of a department secretary may
become vacant while Congress is in session.
Since a department secretary is the alter ego
of the President, the acting appointee to the
office must necessarily have the Presidents
confidence. Thus, by the very nature of the
office of a department secretary, the
President must appoint in an acting capacity
a person of her choice even while Congress
15
is in session. That person may or may not be
the permanent appointee, but practical
reasons may make it expedient that the
acting appointee will also be the permanent
appointee.
The law expressly allows the President to
make such acting appointment. Section 17,
Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of EO 292 states
that [t]he President may temporarily
designate an officer already in the
government service or any other competent
person to perform the functions of an office
in the executive branch. Thus, the President
may even appoint in an acting capacity a
person not yet in the government service, as
long as the President deems that person
competent.
Finally, petitioners claim that the issuance of
appointments in an acting capacity is
susceptible to abuse. Petitioners fail to
consider that acting appointments cannot
exceed one year as expressly provided in
Section 17(3), Chapter 5, Title I, Book III of
EO 292. The law has incorporated this
safeguard to prevent abuses, like the use of
acting appointments as a way to circumvent
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
Ad-interim appointments must be
distinguished from appointments in an acting
capacity. Both of them are effective upon
acceptance. But ad-interim appointments are
extended only during a recess of Congress,
whereas acting appointments may be
extended any time there is a vacancy.
Moreover ad-interim appointments are
submitted to the Commission on
Appointments for confirmation or rejection;
acting appointments are not submitted to the
Commission on Appointments. Acting
appointments are a way of temporarily filling
important offices but, if abused, they can
also be a way of circumventing the need for
confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments.
16
However, we find no abuse in the present
case. The absence of abuse is readily
apparent from President Arroyos issuance
of ad interim appointments to respondents
immediately upon the recess of Congress,
way before the lapse of one year.
Flores v Drilon (223 SCRA 568)
Posted by Evelyn
FACTS:
The constitutionality of Sec. 13, par. (d), of R.A. 7227,
otherwise known as the "Bases
Conversion and Development Act of 1992," under which respondent Mayor Richard J.
Gordon of Olongapo City was appointed Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the
Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority (SBMA), is challenged with prayer for prohibition,
preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order. Said provision provides the
President the power to appoint an administrator of the SBMA provided that in the first
year of its operation, the Olongapo mayor shall be appointed as chairman and chief of
executive of the Subic Authority. Petitioners maintain that such infringes to the
constitutional provision of Sec. 7, first par., Art. IX-B, of the Constitution, which states
that "no elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity
to any public officer or position during his tenure," The petitioners also contend that
Congress encroaches upon the discretionary power of the President to appoint.
ISSUE:
Whether or not said provision of the RA 7227 violates the constitutional prescription
against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts.
RULING:
The court held the Constitution seeks to prevent a public officer to hold multiple
functions since they are accorded with a public office that is a full time job to let them
function without the distraction of other governmental duties.
The Congress gives the President the appointing authority which it cannot limit by
providing the condition that in the first year of the operation the Mayor of Olongapo
City shall assume the Chairmanship. The court points out that the appointing authority
the congress gives to the President is no power at all as it curtails the right of the
President to exercise discretion of whom to appoint by limiting his choice.
DENR VS DENR EMPLOYEES
Posted by kaye lee on 12:43 PM
G.R. No. 149724 [Alter ego of the President, Qualified Political Agency Doctrine]
FACTS:
DENR Reg 12 Employees filed a petition for nullity of the memorandum order issued by
the Regional Exec. Director of DENR, directing the immediate transfer of the DENR 12
Regional Offices from Cotabato to Koronadal City. The memorandum was issued
pursuant to DENR Executive Order issued by the DENR Secretary.
Issue:
Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR Region 12
Office.
17
RULING: The qualified political agency doctrine, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, and the acts of the Secretaries of
such departments, performed and promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of
the Chief Executive. It is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for
under Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution: "The President shall have control of all
the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed."
In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by ordering the
transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal, South
Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR Secretary, as an alter ego, is
presumed to be the acts of the President for the latter had not expressly repudiated the
same.
Categories: Constitutional Law 1, G.R. No. 149724
Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited (HPPL) v Subic Bay Metropolitan
Authority
Facts
Petition to suspend or hold in abeyance the conduct of SBMA of a rebidding.
SBMA advertised an invitation offering to the private sector the opportunity to
develop andoperate a modern marine container terminal within Subic Bay
Freeport Zone.
Out of 7 bidders, 3 were declared as qualified: 1) ICTSI 2) RPSI and 3) HPPL
SBMA-PBAC first awarded to HPPL. However, ICTSI filed an appeal with SBMA
and alsobefore the Office of the President.
In a memorandum, the President ordered SBMA Chairman Gordon to revaluate
thefinancial bids together with the COA.
Again, the SBMA Board issued another reso declaring that HPPL is selected as
winner,since it has a realistic business plan offering the greatest financial return
to SBMA and themost advantageous to the government.
Nothwithstanding the SBMAs board recommendations, then Exec Sec Reuben
Torressubmitted a memorandum to the Office of President recommending
another rebidding.Consequently, the Office of Pres. Issued a memorandum to
conduct a rebidding.
On July 7, 1997, HPPL filed a complaint against SBMA before the RTC and
alleged that abinding and legally enforeceable contract had been established
between HPPL and SBMAunder Article 1305 of the civil code, considering that
SBMA had repeatedly declared andconfirmed that HPPL was the winning bidder.
During the pre-trial hearing, one of the issues raised and submitted for reso was
whetheror not the Office of the President can set aside the award made by
SBMA in favor of HPPLand if so, can the Office of the President direct the SBMA
to conduct re-bidding of theproposed
project.Issue: Can the President set aside the award made by SBMA in favor of H
PPL? If so, canthe Office of the President direct SBMA to conduct rebidding of
the proposedproject?Held:
Yes
HPPL has not sufficiently shown that it a has a clear and unmistakable right to be
declaredthe winning bidder. Though SBMA Board of Directors may have
declared them as winner,said award is not final and unassailable.
The SBMA Board of Directors are subject to the control and supervision of the
President.All projects undertaken by SBMA require the approval of the President
under Letters of Instruction No. 620
Letters of Instruction No. 620 mandates that the approval of the President is
required in allcontracts of the national government offices, agencies and
instrumentalities includingGOCCS involving P2M and above, awarded through
public bidding or negotiation.
The President may, within his authority, overturn or reverse any award made by
the SBMABoard of Directors for justifiable reasons.
When the President issued the memorandum setting a side the award previously
declaredby SBMA in favor of HPPL, the same was within authority of the
President and was a validexercise of his prerogative.
18
The petition is dismissed for lack of merit.
KMU vs. NEDA GR no. 167798
April 19, 2006
KMU vs. NEDA , GR no. 167798 , April 19, 2006
FACTS:
In April 13, 2005, President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Executive
Order 420 requiring all government agencies and government-owned
corporations to streamline and harmonize their Identification Systems.
The purposes of the uniform ID data collection and ID format are to
reduce costs, achieve efficiency and reliability and ensure compatibility
and provide convenience to the people served by government entities.
Petitioners allege that EO420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes
usurpation of legislative functions by the executive branch of the
government. Furthermore, they allege that EO420 infringes on the
citizens rights to privacy.
ISSUE: In issuing EO 420, did the president make, alter or repeal any
laws?
RULING:
Legislative power is the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal them.
In issuing EO 420, the President did not make, alter or repeal any law but
merely implemented and executed existing laws. EO 420 reduces costs, as
well as insures efficiency, reliability, compatibility and user-friendliness
in the implementation of current ID systems of government entities under
existing laws. Thus, EO 420 is simply an executive issuance and not an act
of legislation.
Angeles vs. Gaite
Facts
1. Petitioner was given custody of her grand niece, Maria Mercedes Vistan, to take
care and provide for as she grew up. Petitioner became attached to such child and
took care of her as her own. Petitioner also gave the same attention to the half-
brother of the grand niece. The latter would seek petitioners financial support
ranging from daily subsistence to hospitalization expenses.
2. After one incident wherein the half-brother of the grand niece, Michael Vistan,
failed to do an important task, the petitioner and the Michael Vistan had a falling
out. Since no more support was given to the latter, he took his half-sister away. He
brought her to different provinces while asked the help of certain individuals to
mislead the petitioner and the police.
3. The police was able to apprehend Michael Vistan through a dragnet operation.
4. The petitioner filed a complaint against Michael Vistan before the Office of the
Provincial Prosecutor in Malolos, Bulacan for five counts of Violation of Section 10
(a), Article VI of RA 7610, otherwise known as the Child Abuse Act, and for four
counts of Violation of Sec. 1 (e) of PD 1829. She likewise filed a complaint for Libel
against Maria Cristina Vistan, aunt of Michael and Maria Mercedes.
5. The Investigating prosecutor issued a resolution to continue with the filing of the
case. This was however denied by the provincial prosecutor who also issued a
decision to dismiss the case. Petitioner filed a petition for review with USEC.
Teehankee but was denied. Petitioner then filed a petition for review with SEC
Perez and was also denied
6. She tried appealing to the Office of the President but was dismissed by such on the
ground of Memorandum Circular No. 58 which bars an appeal or a petition for
review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice except those
involving offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua or death
7. Petitioner went to the CA which sustained the dismissal
8. Petitioner contends that such Memo Circular was unconstitutional since t
diminishes the power of control of the President and bestows upon the Secretary
of Justice, a subordinate officer, almost unfettered power.
Issue
W/N Memorandum Circular No. 58 is unconstitutional since it diminishes the power of
the President?
Ruling
NO, it does not diminish the power of the President
The President's act of delegating authority to the Secretary of Justice by virtue of said
Memorandum Circular is well within the purview of the doctrine of qualified political agency, long
been established in our jurisdiction.
Under this doctrine, which primarily recognizes the establishment of a single executive, "all
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department; the heads
of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive; and, except
in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or the
exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the multifarious executive and
administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and through the executive
departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated in
the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,
presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive."The CA cannot be deemed to have committed any
error in upholding the Office of the President's reliance on the Memorandum Circular as it merely
interpreted and applied the law as it should be.
19
Memorandum Circular No. 58, promulgated by the Office of the President on June 30, 1993 reads:
In the interest of the speedy administration of justice, the guidelines
enunciated in Memorandum Circular No. 1266 (4 November 1983) on the
review by the Office of the President of resolutions/orders/decisions issued by
the Secretary of Justice concerning preliminary investigations of criminal cases
are reiterated and clarified.
No appeal from or petition for review of decisions/orders/resolutions of the
Secretary of Justice on preliminary investigations of criminal cases shall be
entertained by the Office of the President, except those involving offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death x x x.
Henceforth, if an appeal or petition for review does not clearly fall within the
jurisdiction of the Office of the President, as set forth in the immediately
preceding paragraph, it shall be dismissed outright x x x.
It is quite evident from the foregoing that the President himself set the limits of his power to
review decisions/orders/resolutions of the Secretary of Justice in order to expedite the disposition
of cases. Petitioner's argument that the Memorandum Circular unduly expands the power of the
Secretary of Justice to the extent of rendering even the Chief Executive helpless to rectify
whatever errors or abuses the former may commit in the exercise of his discretion is purely
speculative to say the least. Petitioner cannot second- guess the President's power and the
President's own judgment to delegate whatever it is he deems necessary to delegate in order to
achieve proper and speedy administration of justice, especially that such delegation is upon a
cabinet secretary his own alter ego.
BUT THERE ARE LIMITATIONS:
Justice Jose P. Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena, makes this clear that
There are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the
Chief Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in person and
no amount of approval or ratification will validate the exercise of any of those
powers by any other person. Such, for instance, is his power to suspend the
writ of habeas corpus and proclaim martial law (par. 3, sec. 11, Art. VII) and
the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of mercy (par. 6, sec. 11, idem).
These restrictions hold true to this day as they remain embodied in our fundamental law.
There are certain presidential powers which arise out of exceptional circumstances, and if
exercised, would involve the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for the
supersedence of executive prerogatives over those exercised by co-equal branches of government.
The declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, and the exercise of
the pardoning power, notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the accused, all fall
within this special class that demands the exclusive exercise by the President of the
constitutionally vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there must be a showing that
the executive power in question is of similar gravitas and exceptional import.
In the case at bar, the power of the President to review the Decision of the Secretary of
Justice dealing with the preliminary investigation of cases cannot be considered as falling within
the same exceptional class which cannot be delegated. Besides, the President has not fully
abdicated his power of control as Memorandum Circular No. 58 allows an appeal if the imposable
penalty is reclusion perpetua or higher. Certainly, it would be unreasonable to impose upon the
President the task of reviewing all preliminary investigations decided by the Secretary of Justice.
To do so will unduly hamper the other important duties of the President by having to scrutinize
each and every decision of the Secretary of Justice notwithstanding the latters expertise in said
matter.
The Constitutional interpretation of the petitioner would negate the very existence of
cabinet positions and the respective expertise which the holders thereof are accorded and
would unduly hamper the Presidents effectivity in running the government.
Boy Scouts of the Philippines vs.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 177131. June
7, 2011.
Post under Political Law at Sunday, October 16, 2011 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind
Commission on Audit; jurisdiction over
Boy Scouts. (J . Abad)
The issue was whether or not the Boy
Scouts of the Philippines (BSP) fall under
the jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit.
The BSP contends that it is not a
government-owned or controlled corporation;
neither is it an instrumentality, agency, or
subdivision of the government. The Supreme
Court, however, held that not all corporations,
which are not government owned or
20
controlled, are ipso facto to be considered
private corporations as there exists another
distinct class of corporations or chartered
institutions which are otherwise known as
public corporations. These corporations are
treated by law as agencies or
instrumentalities of the government which
are not subject to the tests of ownership or
control and economic viability but to a
different criteria relating to their public
purposes/interests or constitutional policies
and objectives and their administrative
relationship to the government or any of its
departments or offices. As presently
constituted, the BSP is a public corporation
created by law for a public purpose, attached
to the Department of Education Culture and
Sports pursuant to its Charter and the
Administrative Code of 1987. It is not a
private corporation which is required to be
owned or controlled by the government and
be economically viable to justify its existence
under a special law. The economic viability
test would only apply if the corporation is
engaged in some economic activity or
business function for the government, which
is not the case for BSP. Therefore, being a
public corporation, the funds of the BSP fall
under the jurisdiction of the Commission on
Audit.
Drilon vs Lim
Leave a comment
GR No. 112497, August 4, 1994
FACTS:
Pursuant to Section 187 of the Local Government Code, the Secretary of Justice
had, on appeal to him of four oil companies and a taxpayer, declared Ordinance
No. 7794, otherwise known as the Manila Revenue Code, null and void for non-
compliance with the prescribed procedure in the enactment of tax ordinances and
for containing certain provisions contrary to law and public policy.
In a petition for certiorari filed by the City of Manila, the Regional Trial Court of
Manila revoked the Secretarys resolution and sustained the ordinance, holding
inter alia that the procedural requirements had been observed. More importantly,
it declared Section 187 of the Local Government Code as unconstitutional
because of its vesture in the Secretary of Justice of the power of control over
local governments in violation of the policy of local autonomy mandated in the
Constitution and of the specific provision therein conferring on the President of
the Philippines only the power of supervision over local governments. The court
cited the familiar distinction between control and supervision, the first being the
power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had
done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former
for the latter, while the second is the power of a superior officer to see to it that
lower officers perform their functions is accordance with law.
ISSUES:
The issues in this case are
21
(1) whether or not Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional;
and
(2) whether or not the Secretary of Justice can exercise control, rather than
supervision, over the local government
HELD:
The judgment of the lower court is reversed in so far as its declaration that
Section 187 of the Local Government Code is unconstitutional but affirmed the
said lower courts finding that the procedural requirements in the enactment of
the Manila Revenue Code have been observed.
Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice to review only the
constitutionality or legality of the tax ordinance and, if warranted, to revoke it on
either or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies or sets aside a tax
ordinance, he is not also permitted to substitute his own judgment for the
judgment of the local government that enacted the measure. Secretary Drilon did
set aside the Manila Revenue Code, but he did not replace it with his own version
of what the Code should be.
An officer in control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. It they are not
followed, he may, in his discretion, order the act undone or re-done by his
subordinate or he may even decide to do it himself. Supervision does not cover
such authority. The supervisor or superintendent merely sees to it that the rules
are followed, but he himself does not lay down such rules, nor does he have the
discretion to modify or replace them. In the opinion of the Court, Secretary
Drilon did precisely this, and no more nor less than this, and so performed an act
not of control but of mere supervision.
Regarding the issue on the non-compliance with the prescribed procedure in the
enactment of the Manila Revenue Code, the Court carefully examined every
exhibit and agree with the trial court that the procedural requirements have
indeed been observed. The only exceptions are the posting of the ordinance as
approved but this omission does not affect its validity, considering that its
publication in three successive issues of a newspaper of general circulation will
satisfy due process.
Aberca vs. Ver Case Digest L-69866
April 15, 1988
FACTS:
This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations
of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by various intelligence units of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by
General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-
terrorist (CT) underground houses in view of increasing reports about CT plans to
sow disturbances in Metro Manila," Plaintiffs allege, among others, that
complying with said order, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing
in most cases defectively issued judicial search warrants; that during these raids,
certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal
items belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants
issued by the courts; that for some period after their arrest, they were denied
visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their
rights to silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed
threats, tortures and other forms of violence on them in order to obtain
incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all
violations of plaintiffs constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate
plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory statements from plaintiffs
and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously known to
and sanctioned by defendants.
Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the respondents postulate
the view that as public officers they are covered by the mantle of state immunity
from suit for acts done in the performance of official duties or function
22
ISSUE:whether the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars
a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel
and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. If
such action for damages may be maintained, who can be held liable for such
violations: only the military personnel directly involved and/or their superiors as
well.
RATIO DICIDENDI:
SC: We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit
totally misplaced. The cases invoked by respondents actually involved acts done
by officers in the performance of official duties written the ambit of their powers.
It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, were merely responding to their duty, as they claim, "to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in accordance
with Proclamation No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law
on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of such objective, to launch pre- emptive
strikes against alleged communist terrorist underground houses. But this cannot
be construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any
constitutional restraint, to disregard or transgress upon the rights and liberties of
the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The
Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low,
civilian or military, owe obedience and allegiance at all times.
Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any
private individual liable in damages for violating the Constitutional rights and
liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents
from responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article,
provided their acts or omissions do not constitute a violation of the Penal Code or
other penal statute.
We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does not destroy petitioners' right and
cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations
of their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise
illegal arrest or detention. What is suspended is merely the right of the individual
to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a speedy
means of obtaining his liberty.
Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for damages 5 Section 1, Article 19. to
'acts of alleged physical violence" which constituted delict or wrong. Article 32
clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or in any manner impeding or
impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties enumerated therein, among
others
The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and
details, how plaintiffs' constitutional rights and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of
the Civil Code were violated and impaired by defendants. The complaint speaks
of, among others, searches made without search warrants or based on irregularly
issued or substantially defective warrants; seizures and confiscation, without
proper receipts, of cash and personal effects belonging to plaintiffs and other
items of property which were not subversive and illegal nor covered by the
search warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffs without warrant or under
irregular, improper and illegal circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at several
undisclosed places of 'safehouses" where they were kept incommunicado and
subjected to physical and psychological torture and other inhuman, degrading
and brutal treatment for the purpose of extracting incriminatory statements. The
complaint contains a detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs
violative of their constitutional rights.
Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated
"directly" should be held liable. Article 32 of the Civil Code encompasses within
the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its
violation.
The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth
in the complaint. It is well established in our law and jurisprudence that a motion
to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action must be
based on what appears on the face of the complaint.
6
To determine the
sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no
others, should be considered.
7
For this purpose, the motion to dismiss
must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint.
8
IBP VS ZAMORA
Posted by kaye lee on 11:27 PM
G.R. No. 141284 August 15 2000 [Judicial Review; Civilian supremacy clause]
23
FACTS:
Invoking his powers as Commander-in-Chief under Sec 18, Art. VII of the Constitution,
President Estrada, in verbal directive, directed the AFP Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to
coordinate with each other for the proper deployment and campaign for a temporary
period only. The IBP questioned the validity of the deployment and utilization of the
Marines to assist the PNP in law enforcement.
ISSUE:
1. WoN the President's factual determination of the necessity of calling the armed forces
is subject to judicial review.
2. WoN the calling of AFP to assist the PNP in joint visibility patrols violate the
constitutional provisions on civilian supremacy over the military.
RULING:
1. The power of judicial review is set forth in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution,
to wit:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether
or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
When questions of constitutional significance are raised, the Court can exercise its power
of judicial review only if the following requisites are complied with, namely: (1) the
existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the
party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at
the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis mota of the case.
2. The deployment of the Marines does not constitute a breach of the civilian supremacy
clause. The calling of the Marines in this case constitutes permissible use of military
assets for civilian law enforcement. The participation of the Marines in the conduct of
joint visibility patrols is appropriately circumscribed. It is their responsibility to direct
and manage the deployment of the Marines. It is, likewise, their duty to provide the
necessary equipment to the Marines and render logistical support to these soldiers. In
view of the foregoing, it cannot be properly argued that military authority is supreme
over civilian authority. Moreover, the deployment of the Marines to assist the PNP does
not unmake the civilian character of the police force. Neither does it amount to an
insidious incursion of the military in the task of law enforcement in violation of Section
5(4), Article XVI of the Constitution.
Lacson Vs. Perez Case Digest
Lacson Vs. Perez
357 SCRA 756 G.R. No. 147780
May 10, 2001
24
Facts: President Macapagal-Arroyo declared a State of Rebellion (Proclamation
No. 38) on May 1, 2001 as well as General Order No. 1 ordering the AFP and the
PNP to suppress the rebellion in the NCR. Warrantless arrests of several alleged
leaders and promoters of the rebellion were thereafter effected. Petitioner filed
for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus with an application for
the issuance of temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.
Petitioners assail the declaration of Proc. No. 38 and the warrantless arrests
allegedly effected by virtue thereof. Petitioners furthermore pray that the
appropriate court, wherein the information against them were filed, would desist
arraignment and trial until this instant petition is resolved. They also contend that
they are allegedly faced with impending warrantless arrests and unlawful
restraint being that hold departure orders were issued against them.
Issue: Whether or Not Proclamation No. 38 is valid, along with the warrantless
arrests and hold departure orders allegedly effected by the same.
Held: President Macapagal-Arroyo ordered the lifting of Proc. No. 38 on May 6,
2006, accordingly the instant petition has been rendered moot and academic.
Respondents have declared that the Justice Department and the police
authorities intend to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts
committed prior to and until May 1, 2001. Under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules
of Court, authorities may only resort to warrantless arrests of persons suspected
of rebellion in suppressing the rebellion if the circumstances so warrant, thus the
warrantless arrests are not based on Proc. No. 38. Petitioners prayer for
mandamus and prohibition is improper at this time because an individual
warrantlessly arrested has adequate remedies in law: Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court, providing for preliminary investigation, Article 125 of the Revised Penal
Code, providing for the period in which a warrantlessly arrested person must be
delivered to the proper judicial authorities, otherwise the officer responsible for
such may be penalized for the delay of the same. If the detention should have no
legal ground, the arresting officer can be charged with arbitrary detention, not
prejudicial to claim of damages under Article 32 of the Civil Code. Petitioners
were neither assailing the validity of the subject hold departure orders, nor were
they expressing any intention to leave the country in the near future. To declare
the hold departure orders null and void ab initio must be made in the proper
proceedings initiated for that purpose. Petitioners prayer for relief regarding their
alleged impending warrantless arrests is premature being that no complaints
have been filed against them for any crime, furthermore, the writ of habeas
corpus is uncalled for since its purpose is to relieve unlawful restraint which
Petitioners are not subjected to.
Petition is dismissed. Respondents, consistent and congruent with their
undertaking earlier adverted to, together with their agents, representatives, and
all persons acting in their behalf, are hereby enjoined from arresting Petitioners
without the required judicial warrants for all acts committed in relation to or in
connection with the May 1, 2001 siege of Malacaang.
ARTHUR D. LIM vs. HON. EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY (G.R. No. 151445) Case Digest
Facts:
Arthur D. Lim and Paulino P. Ersando filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition
attacking the constitutionality of Balikatan-02-1. They were subsequently joined
by SANLAKAS and PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA, both party-list organizations,
who filed a petition-in-intervention. Lim and Ersando filed suits in their capacities
as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers. SANLAKAS and PARTIDO on the other hand,
claimed that certain members of their organization are residents of Zamboanga
and Sulu, and hence will be directly affected by the operations being conducted
in Mindanao.
The petitioners alleged that Balikatan-02-1 is not covered by the Mutual
Defense Treaty (MDT) between the Philippines and the United States. Petitioners
posited that the MDT only provides for mutual military assistance in case of
armed attack by an external aggressor against the Philippines or the US.
Petitioners also claim that the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) does not
authorize American Soldiers to engage in combat operations in Philippine
Territory.
25
Issue:
Is the Balikatan-02-1 inconsistent with the Philippine Constitution?
Ruling:
The MDT is the core of the defense relationship between the Philippines and the
US and it is the VFA which gives continued relevance to it. Moreover, it is the
VFA that gave legitimacy to the current Balikatan exercise.
The constitution leaves us no doubt that US Forces are prohibited from engaging
war on Philippine territory. This limitation is explicitly provided for in the Terms of
Reference of the Balikatan exercise. The issues that were raised by the
petitioners was only based on fear of future violation of the Terms of Reference.
Based on the facts obtaining, the Supreme court find that the holding of
Balikatan-02-1 joint military exercise has not intruded into that penumbra of
error that would otherwise call for the correction on its part.
The petition and the petition-in-intervention is DISMISSED.
SANLAKAS Vs. Executive Secretary Case Digest
SANLAKAS Vs. Executive Secretary
421 SCRA 656 G.R. No. 159085
February 3, 2004
Facts: During the wee hours of July 27, 2003, some three-hundred junior officers
and enlisted men of the AFP, acting upon instigation, command and direction of
known and unknown leaders have seized the Oakwood Building in Makati.
Publicly, they complained of the corruption in the AFP and declared their
withdrawal of support for the government, demanding the resignation of the
President, Secretary of Defense and the PNP Chief. These acts constitute a
violation of Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, and by virtue of Proclamation
No. 427 and General Order No. 4, the Philippines was declared under the State
of Rebellion. Negotiations took place and the officers went back to their barracks
in the evening of the same day. On August 1, 2003, both the Proclamation and
General Orders were lifted, and Proclamation No. 435, declaring the Cessation of
the State of Rebellion was issued.
In the interim, however, the following petitions were filed: (1) SANLAKAS AND
PARTIDO NG MANGGAGAWA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, petitioners
contending that Sec. 18 Article VII of the Constitution does not require the
declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the AFP, and that there is no factual
basis for such proclamation. (2)SJS Officers/Members v. Hon. Executive
Secretary, et al, petitioners contending that the proclamation is a circumvention
of the report requirement under the same Section 18, Article VII, commanding
the President to submit a report to Congress within 48 hours from the
proclamation of martial law. Finally, they contend that the presidential issuances
cannot be construed as an exercise of emergency powers as Congress has not
delegated any such power to the President. (3) Rep. Suplico et al. v. President
Macapagal-Arroyo and Executive Secretary Romulo, petitioners contending that
there was usurpation of the power of Congress granted by Section 23 (2), Article
VI of the Constitution. (4) Pimentel v. Romulo, et al, petitioner fears that the
declaration of a state of rebellion "opens the door to the unconstitutional
implementation of warrantless arrests" for the crime of rebellion.
26
Issue:
Whether or Not Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4 are
constitutional?
Whether or Not the petitioners have a legal standing or locus standi to bring
suit?
Held: The Court rendered that the both the Proclamation No. 427 and General
Order No. 4 are constitutional. Section 18, Article VII does not expressly prohibit
declaring state or rebellion. The President in addition to its Commander-in-Chief
Powers is conferred by the Constitution executive powers. It is not disputed that
the President has full discretionary power to call out the armed forces and to
determine the necessity for the exercise of such power. While the Court may
examine whether the power was exercised within constitutional limits or in a
manner constituting grave abuse of discretion, none of the petitioners here have,
by way of proof, supported their assertion that the President acted without factual
basis. The issue of the circumvention of the report is of no merit as there was no
indication that military tribunals have replaced civil courts or that military
authorities have taken over the functions of Civil Courts. The issue of usurpation
of the legislative power of the Congress is of no moment since the President, in
declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely
exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers.
These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and
18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by
Section 23 (2), Article VI. The fear on warrantless arrest is unreasonable, since
any person may be subject to this whether there is rebellion or not as this is a
crime punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and as long as a valid
warrantless arrest is present.
Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury
as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. The gist of the
question of standing is whether a party alleges "such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of Issue upon which the court depends for illumination
of difficult constitutional questions. Based on the foregoing, petitioners Sanlakas
and PM, and SJS Officers/Members have no legal standing to sue. Only
petitioners Rep. Suplico et al. and Sen. Pimentel, as Members of Congress, have
standing to challenge the subject issuances. It sustained its decision in Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez, that the extent the powers of Congress are
impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a right
to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.
0001003
DAVID V. ARROYO
489 SCRA 160 Political Law The Executive Branch Presidential
Proclamation 1017 Take Care Clause Take Over Power Calling Out
Power
Bill of Rights - Freedom of Speech Overbreadth
In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the
discovery of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then
president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation
1017 (PP1017) and is to be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5).
The said law was aimed to suppress lawlessness and the connivance of
extremists to bring down the government.
Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the
same time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public
organization/meeting. Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit,
Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU) head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led
to his arrest.
Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was
raided by the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and
write ups. Later still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was
raided and seized. On the same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also
arrested. His arrest was however grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way
back in 1985 for his actions against Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him
in jail because of the current imposition of PP 1017 and GO 5.
In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national
emergency ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen
averred that PP1017 is unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it
27
cannot be validly declared by the president for such power is reposed in
Congress. Also such declaration is actually a declaration of martial law.
Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency contemplated in the
Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an overbreadth.
Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches upon
protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has
become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of
the declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the
presidents calling out power, take care power and take over power.
ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.
HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly
unconstitutional.
The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the
lifting of the questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are
parties still affected due to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the
SC can take cognition of the case at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is
constitutional in part and at the same time some provisions of which are
unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;
Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration
The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in
issuing PP 1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated
Comment and Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading
to the issuance of PP 1017, with supporting reports forming part of the
records. Mentioned are the escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious
threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the defections in the military, particularly in the
Philippine Marines, and the reproving statements from the communist
leaders. There was also the Minutes of the Intelligence Report and Security
Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing alliance between the NPA
and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute such events. Thus,
absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the President
was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the
seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms
and do nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty
must not stifle liberty.
Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory
First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed
for testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated
cases at bar are not primarily freedom of speech cases. Also, a plain
reading of PP 1017 shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even
speech-related conduct. It is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or
suppress all forms of lawless violence. Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is
not intended for testing the validity of a law that reflects legitimate state
interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally
unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence, insurrection and
rebellion are considered harmful and constitutionally unprotected conduct.
Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving statutes
which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and again, that
overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked
against ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected
conduct. Here, the incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a
spectrum of conduct, not free speech, which is manifestly subject to state
regulation.
Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine
On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP
1017. The SC considered the Presidents calling-out power as a
discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not
prevent an examination of whether such power was exercised within
permissible constitutional limits or whether it was exercised in a manner
constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA has validly
declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as Commander-
in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least
benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only
criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes
necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. And such criterion has been met.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine
Pursuant to the 2
nd
sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017.
David et al averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the
Constitution for it arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is
vested in Congress. They assail the clause to enforce obedience to all the
laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction. The SC noted that such provision is similar
to the power that granted former President Marcos legislative powers (as
provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed PP 1017 is
unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate
decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the
Legislature. Sec 1, Article 6 categorically states that [t]he legislative power
28
shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a
Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law
nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify GMA[s exercise
of legislative power by issuing decrees. The president can only take care of
the carrying out of laws but cannot create or enact laws.
Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine
The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or
institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress.
On the other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is
not limited to natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC
made a distinction; the president can declare the state of national emergency
but her exercise of emergency powers does not come automatically after it
for such exercise needs authority from Congress. The authority from
Congress must be based on the following:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.
(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy
declared by Congress.
Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law
Declaration
The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not
tantamount to it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president
by the president.
AMPATUAN v. PUNO
October 26, 2012 Leave a comment
June 7, 2011 (G.R. No. 190259)
PARTIES:
Petitioners: DATU ZALDY UY AMPATUAN, ANSARUDDIN ADIONG, REGIE SAHALI-
GENERALE
Respondents : HON. RONALDO PUNO, ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES,
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
FACTS:
On November 24, 2009, the day after the gruesome massacre of 57 men and
women, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Proclamation 1946,
placing the Provinces of Maguindanao and Sultan Kudarat and the City of
Cotabato under a state of emergency. She directed the AFP and the PNP to
undertake such measures as may be allowed by the Constitution and by law to
prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in the named places. Under
AO 273, she also delegated to the DILG the supervision of the ARMM.
The petitioners claimed that the Presidents issuances encroached the ARMMs
autonomy, that it constitutes an invalid exercise of emergency powers, and that
the President had no factual basis for declaring a state of emergency, especially in
the Province of Sultan Kudarat and the City of Cotabato, where no critical violent
incidents occurred. They want Proc. 1946 and AO 273 be declared
unconstitutional.
The respondents, however, said that its purpose was not to deprive the ARMM of
its autonomy, but to restore peace and order in subject places. It is pursuant to
her calling out power as Commander-in-Chief. The determination of the need
to exercise this power rests solely on her wisdom.
29
The President merely delegated her supervisory powers over the ARMM to the
DILG Secretary who was her alter ego any way. The delegation was necessary to
facilitate the investigation of the mass killings
ISSUE:
WON President Arroyo invalidly exercised emergency powers when she called out
the AFP and the PNP to prevent and suppress all incidents of lawless violence in
Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, and Cotabato City
HELD: NO. The President did not proclaim a national emergency, only a state of
emergency in the three places mentioned. And she did not act pursuant to any
law enacted by Congress that authorized her to exercise extraordinary powers.
The calling out of the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence in
such places is a power that the Constitution directly vests in the President. She
did not need a congressional authority to exercise the same.
ISSUE (2): WON there is factual basis on the calling out of the Armed Forces.
HELD: Yes. The Presidents call on the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence springs from the power vested in her under Section 18, Article VII
of the Constitution. While it is true that the Court may inquire into the factual
bases for the Presidents exercise of the above power, unless it is shown that
such determination was attended by grave abuse of discretion, the Court will
accord respect to the Presidents judgment.
LLAMAS v. EXEC. SEC. ORBOS,
OCAMPO III
October 26, 2012 Leave a comment
October 15, 1991 (G.R. No. 99031)
PARTIES:
Petitioner: RODOLFO D. LLAMAS
Respondent: EXECUTIVE SECRETARY OSCAR ORBOS and MARIANO UN OCAMPO III
FACTS:
Ocampo III was the governor of Tarlac Province. Llamas together with some other
complainants filed an administrative case against Ocampo III for alleged acts
constituting graft and corruption. Ocampo III was found guilty. He was suspended
for office for 90 days hence his vice governor, Llamas, assumed office. In not less
than 30 days however, Ocampo III returned with an AO showing that he was
pardoned hence he can resume office without completing the 90 day suspension
imposed upon him.
The petitioner argues that President may grant executive clemency only in
criminal cases. They say that the qualifying phrase after conviction by final
judgment applies solely to criminal cases, and no other law allows the grant of
executive clemency or pardon to anyone who has been convicted in an
administrative case, allegedly because the word conviction refers only to
30
criminal cases.
ISSUE: WON the President of the Philippines has the power to grant executive
clemency in administrative cases.
HELD:
Yes. It is not specified in the constitution whether it may be considered under
criminal or administrative cases. , if the law does not distinguish, so we must not
distinguish. The Constitution does not distinguish between which cases executive
clemency may be exercised by the President, with the sole exclusion of
impeachment cases. By the same token, if executive clemency may be exercised
only in criminal cases, it would indeed be unnecessary to provide for the
exclusion of impeachment cases from the coverage of Article VII, Section 19 of
the Constitution. Cases of impeachment are automatically excluded inasmuch as
the same do not necessarily involve criminal offenses.
The do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason why the President cannot
grant executive clemency in administrative cases. It is the courts considered view
that if the President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons, and remit
fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with much more reason can she grant
executive clemency in administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than
criminal offenses.
The court stressed, however, that when we say the President can grant executive
clemency in administrative cases, we refer only to all administrative cases in the
Executive branch, not in the Judicial or Legislative branches of the government.
In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict an individual is
proof beyond reasonable doubt. On the other hand, in administrative cases, the
quantum of evidence required is mere substantial evidence to support a decision.
People vs. Salle
Post under Pardon , Political Law Case Digests
Where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and has not yet
therefore attained finality, as in the instant case, executive clemency may
not yet be granted to the appellant.
The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as anabandonment or
waiver of the appeal.
Facts:
On November 1991, Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote were
convicted of the compound crime of murder and destructive arson
before the RTC of Quezon City. Salle and Mengote filed their Notice of
Appeal which was accepted by the Supreme Court on March 24, 1993.
31
In 1994, Salle filed an Urgent Motion to Withdraw Appeal. The Court
required Salle's counsel, Atty. Ida May La'o of the Free Legal
Assistance Group (FLAG) to verify the voluntariness of the motion.
Atty. La'o manifested that Salle signed the motion without the
assistance of counsel on his misimpression that the motion was
necessary for hisearly release from the New Bilibid Prison following the
grant of a conditional pardon by the President on December 9, 1993.
She also stated that Mengote was also granted conditional pardon and
that he immediately left for his province without consulting her. She
prayed that the Court grant Salle's motion to withdraw his appeal.
On March 23, 1994, the Court granted Salle's motion.
After taking into consideration Section 19, Article VII of the
Constitution which provides that the President may, except in cases
of impeachment or as otherwise provided in the Constitution, grant
pardon after conviction by final judgment, the Court required (1)
the Solicitor General and the counsel for accused-appellants to submit
their memoranda on the issue of the enforceability of the conditional
pardon and (2) the Presidential Committee for the Grant of Bail,
Release or Pardon to inform the Court why it recommended to the
President the grant of the conditional pardon despite the pendency of
the appeal.
In its Memorandum, the Office of the Solicitor General maintains that
the conditional pardon granted to appellant Mengote is unenforceable
because the judgment of conviction is not yet final in view of the
pendency in this Court of his appeal.
On the other hand, the FLAG, through Atty. La'o, submits that the
conditional pardon extended to Mengote is valid and enforceable.
Citing Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., it argues that although Mengote did
not file a motion to withdraw the appeal, he was deemed to have
abandoned the appeal by his acceptance of the conditional pardon
which resulted in the finality of his conviction.
Issue:
Whether or not a pardon granted to an accused during the pendency
of his appeal from a judgment of conviction by the trial court is
enforceable.
Held:
Section 19, Article VII thereof reads as follows:
32
Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations, and
pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of
a majority of all the Members of the Congress.
Where the pardoning power is subject to the limitation of conviction, it
may be exercised at any time after conviction even if the judgment is
on appeal. It is, of course, entirely different where the requirement is
" final conviction, " as was mandated in the original provision of
Section 14, Article IX of the 1973 Constitution, or "conviction by final
judgment," as presently prescribed in Section 19, Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution. In such a case, no pardon may be extended
before a judgment of conviction becomes final.
A judgment of conviction becomes final (a) when no appeal is
seasonably perfected, (b) when the accused commences to serve the
sentence, (c) when the right to appeal is expressly waived in writing,
except where the death penalty was imposed by the trial court, and (d)
when the accused applies for probation, thereby waiving his right to
appeal. Where the judgment of conviction is still pending appeal and
has not yet therefore attained finality, as in the instant case, executive
clemency may not yet be granted to the appellant.
The "conviction by final judgment" limitation under Section 19, Article
VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant of pardon, whether
full or conditional, to an accused during the pendency of his appeal
from his conviction by the trial court. Any application therefor, if one is
made, should not be acted upon or the process toward its grant should
not be begun unless the appeal is withdrawn. Accordingly, the
agencies or instrumentalities of the Government concerned must
require proof from the accused that he has not appealed from his
conviction or that he has withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may be in
the form of a certificationissued by the trial court or the appellate
court, as the case may be.
The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an abandonment or
waiver of the appeal, and the release of an accused by virtue of a
pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole before the withdrawal of
an appeal shall render those responsible therefor administratively
liable. Accordingly, those in custody of the accused must not solely
rely on the pardon as a basis for the release of the accused
from confinement.
WHEREFORE, counsel for accused-appellant Ricky Mengote y Cuntado
is hereby given thirty (30) days from notice hereof within which to
secure from the latter the withdrawal of his appeal and to submit it to
this Court. The conditional pardon granted the said appellant shall be
deemed to take effect only upon the grant of such withdrawal. In case
of non-compliance with this Resolution, the Director of the Bureau of
Corrections must exert every possible effort to take back into his
custody the said appellant, for which purpose he may seek the
assistance of the Philippine National Police or the National Bureau of
Investigation. (People vs. Francisco Salle, Jr. and Ricky Mengote,
G.R. No. 103567, December 4, 1995)
People vs. Bacang
Post under case digests, Political Law at Tuesday, March 27, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic
Mind
33
Facts: RTC of Negros Orietal ruled on
a Criminal case finding accused Casido,
Alcorin and Francisco Palacios guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder
and sentencing them to reclusion perpetua
and to pay 200k and 25k as actual damages
and funeral expenses respectively. Accused
Casido and Alcorin appealed to the courts.
But the accused later filed motion to
withdraw appeal without stating the reason
for their actions. The SC later received an
endorsement form Superintendent Tesoro
informing the court that both Casido and
Alcorin were released on Conditional pardon.
Thus, following the necessary procedures of
submitting certified true copies of the
conditional pardons and their certificates of
discharge signed by the president, Alcorin
and Casido were released for confinement. It
was evident that the pardon was issued
during the pendency of their instant appeal,
which is the controversy of this case
Issue: Whether or not the pardon is valid
given that it was granted during the
pendency of the instant appeal
Held: No it is not valid. This is because
Article VII of the present constitution
prohibits the grants of pardon whether full or
conditional to an accused during the
pendency of his appeal from his conviction
by TC. (Note: Endorsement of pardon was
given earlier than the motion to withdraw the
appeal was made hence, it was still appeal
was still pending during the pardon grant).
Thus, pardon can only be granted or process
for pardon shouldnt have begun when the
appeal has yet to be withdrawn. The
acceptance of the pardon shall not operate
as anabandonment or waiver of the appeal
and the release of an accused by virtue of a
pardon, commutation of sentence, or parole
before the withdrawal of an appeal shall
render those responsible administratively
liable.
34
The conditional pardons granted in this case
of Casido and Alcorin are void hor having
been extended during the pendency of their
instant appeal.
TORRES v. GONZALES
October 26, 2012 Leave a comment
July 23, 1987 (G.R. No. 76872)
PARTIES:
Petitioner: WILFREDO TORRES Y SUMULONG
Respondents: HON. NEPTALI A. GONZALES, THE CHAIRMAN, BOARD OF PARDONS
AND PAROLE, and THE DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF PRISONS
FACTS:
1978, Torres was convicted of estafa. In 1979, he was pardoned by the president
w/ the condition that he shall not violate any penal laws again. Should this
condition be violated, he will be proceeded against in the manner prescribed by
law. Petitioner accepted the conditional pardon and was consequently released
from confinement. In 1982, Torres was charged with multiple crimes of estafa. In
1986, Gonzales petitioned for the cancellation of Torres pardon. Hence, the
president cancelled the pardon. Torres appealed the issue before the SC averring
that the Exec Dept erred in convicting him for violating the conditions of his
pardon because the estafa charges against him were not yet final and executory
as they were still on appeal.
ISSUE: whether or not conviction of a crime by final judgment of a court is
necessary before the petitioner can be validly rearrested and recommitted for
violation of the terms of his conditional pardon and accordingly to serve the
balance of his original sentence.
HELD: In proceeding against a convict who has been conditionally pardoned and
who is alleged to have breached the conditions of his pardon, the Executive
Department has two options: (1) Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code,
a purely executive act, not subject to judicial scrutiny, or (2) Article 159 of the
Revised Penal Code, a judicial act consisting of trial for and conviction of violation
of a conditional pardon.
Where the President opts to proceed under Section 64 (i) of the Revised
Administrative Code, no judicial pronouncement of guilt of a subsequent crime is
necessary, much less conviction therefor by final judgment of a court, in order
that a convict may be recommended for the violation of his conditional pardon.
Under art. 159 of the RPC, parolee or convict who is regarded as having violated
the provisions thereof must be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final
35
judgment before he can be made to suffer the penalty prescribed.
In the case at bar, President has chosen to proceed against the petitioner under
Section 64 (i) of the Revised Administrative Code. That choice is an exercise of
the Presidents executive prerogative and is not subject to judicial scrutiny.
*Who determines if violated? The PRESIDENT. When the person was conditionally
pardoned it was a generous exercise by the Chief Executive of his constitutional
prerogative. The acceptance thereof by the convict or prisoner carrie[d] with it the
authority or power of the Executive to determine whether a condition or
conditions of the pardon has or have been violated. To no other department of
the Government [has] such power been intrusted.
People vs. Casido G.R. No. 116512, March 7, 1997
Sunday, January 25, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: In an effort to seek their release at the soonest
possible time, accused-appellants William Casido and Franklin
Alcorin applied for pardon before the Presidential Committee on
the Grant of Bail, Release or Pardon (PCGBRP), as well as for
amnesty before the National Amnesty Commission (NAC). The
PCGBRP was constituted in line with the confidence-building
measures of the government. Thereafter, accused-appellants
were granted conditional pardon. But the Court ruled in
resolution that the conditional pardon granted to accused-
appellants is void for having been extended during the pendency
of their appeal. Prior to the resolution, the NAC favorably acted
on the applications for amnesty of accused-appellants.
Issue: Whether or not the release of accused-appellants is
valid
Held: The release of accused-appellants was valid solely
on the ground of the amnesty granted them and not by the
pardon.
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a
private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person
pardoned because the courts take no notice thereof; while
amnesty by theProclamation of the Chief Executive with the
concurrence of Congress, and it is a public act of which the
courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after
conviction; while amnesty is to classes of persons or
communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally
before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and
sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves
the offender from the consequences of an offense of which he
has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the
punishment, and for that reason it does not work the restoration
of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless
such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,
36
and it in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the
civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence. While
amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion
the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates theoffense with
which he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands
before the law precisely as though he had committed no offense.
While the pardon in this case was void for having been extended
during the pendency of the appeal or before conviction by final
judgment and, therefore, in violation of the first paragraph of
Sec. 19, Art. VII of the Constitution, the grant of amnesty, for
which accused-appellants voluntarily applied
under Proclamation No. 347 was valid. This Proclamation was
concurred in by both Houses of Congress.
GONZALES V. HECHANOVA
9 SCRA 230 Political Law Constitutional Law Treaty vs Executive
Agreements Statutes Can Repeal Executive Agreements
During the term of President Diosdado Macapagal, he entered into two
executive agreements with Vietnam and Burma for the importation of rice
without complying with the requisite of securing a certification from the
National Economic Council showing that there is a shortage in cereals or rice.
Hence, the then Executive Secretary, Rufino Hechanova, authorized the
importation of 67,000 tons of rice from abroad to the detriment of our local
planters. Ramon Gonzales, then president of the Iloilo Palay and Corn
Planters Association assailed the executive agreements. Gonzales averred
that Hechanova is without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, because
Republic Act 3452 prohibits the importation of rice and corn by the Rice and
Corn Administration or any other government agency.
ISSUE: Whether or not RA 3452 prevails over the 2 executive agreements
entered into by Macapagal.
HELD: Yes. Under the Constitution, the main function of the Executive is to
enforce laws enacted by Congress. The former may not interfere in the
performance of the legislative powers of the latter, except in the exercise of
his veto power. He may not defeat legislative enactments that have acquired
the status of laws, by indirectly repealing the same through an executive
agreement providing for the performance of the very act prohibited by said
laws. In the event of conflict between a treaty and a statute, the one which is
latest in point of time shall prevail, is not applicable to the case at bar,
Hechanova not only admits, but, also, insists that the contracts adverted to
are not treaties. No such justification can be given as regards executive
agreements not authorized by previous legislation, without completely
upsetting the principle of separation of powers and the system of checks and
balances which are fundamental in our constitutional set up.
As regards the question whether an executive or an international agreement
may be invalidated by our courts, suffice it to say that the Constitution of the
Philippines has clearly settled it in the affirmative, by providing that the SC
may not be deprived of its jurisdiction to review, revise, reverse, modify, or
affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the rules of court
may provide, final judgments and decrees of inferior courts in All cases in
which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance, or
executive order or regulation is in question. In other words, our Constitution
authorizes the nullification of a treaty, not only when it conflicts with the
fundamental law, but, also, when it runs counter to an act of Congress.
USAFFE v. Treasurer of the Philippines (1959)
USAFFE VETERANS ASSOCIATION, INC. v TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES,
ET. AL. (June 30, 1959) Appeal from a judgment of the CFI of Manila
FACTS:
Romulo-Snyder Agreement (1950): RP Govt undertook to return to the
US Govt in 10 annual installments, a total of about $35M advanced by
the US to, but unexpended by, the Natl Defense Forces of the RP.
Oct 1954: The Usaffe Veterans Associations Inc prayed in its complaint
before the CFI that said Agreement be annulled; that payments
thereunder be declared illegal; & that defendants as officers of RP be
37
restrained from disbursing any funds in the Natl Treasury in pursuance
of said Agreement.
Usaffe Veterans further asked that the moneys available, instead of
being remitted to the US, should be turned over to the Finance Service
of the AFP for the payment of all pending claims of the veterans
represented by plaintiff.
3 PROPOSITIONS OF PLAINTIFF IN COMPLAINT: 1) that the funds to be
returned under the Agreement were funds appropriated by the US
Congress for the RP Army, actually delivered to the RP Govt & actually
owned by the said Government; 2) that U.S Secretary Snyder of the
Treasury, had no authority to retake such funds from the RP Govt; 3)
The RP Foreign Secretary Carlos P. Romulo had no authority to return or
promise to return the aforesaid sums of money through the Agreement.
The court eventually upheld the validity of the Agreement. Plaintiff
appealed.
July 26, 1941: Foreseeing the War in the Pacific, Pres Roosevelt,
called into the service of the US Armed Forces, for the duration of the
emergency, all organized mil forces of the Commonwealth. (His order
was published here by Proc No 740 of Pres Quezon on Aug 10, 1941)
October 1941: By 2 special orders, MacArthur, Commanding Gen of
USAFFE, placed under his command all the RP Army units including Phil
Constabulary.
Thus, US Congress provided in its Appropriation Act of Dec 17, 1941
(Public Law No. 353): For all expenses necessary for the mobilization,
operation & maintenance of the RP Army, including expenses connected
w/ calling into the service RP mil forces$269,000.00; to remain
available til June 30, 1943, w/c shall be available for payment to the
Commonwealth upon its written request, either in advance of or in
reimbursement for all or any part of the estimated or actual costs, as
authorized by the USAFFE Commanding Gen, of the necessary expenses
for the purposes aforesaid.
Pursuant to the power reserved to him under Public Law 353,
Roosevelt issued EO 9011: 2(a) Necessary expenditures from funds in
the Phil Treasury for the purposes authorized by Public Law 353, will be
made by disbursing officers of the RP Army on the approval of authority
of the Commandign General, USAFFE, & such purposes as he may deem
proper
P570,863,000.00 was transferred directly to the AFP by means of
vouchers w/c stated Advance of Funds under Public Law 353 & EO 9011
This was used mostly to discharge in RP the monetary obligations
assumed by the US as a result of the induction of the AFP into the US
Army, & its operations beginning in 1941.
There remained unexpended & uncommitted $35M in the possession of
the AFP as of Dec 31, 1949. Bec the RP Govt then badly needed funds,
Pres Quirino, through CB Gov Cuaderno, proposed to US officials the
retention of the $35M as a loan, & for its repayment in 10 annual
installments. This was the Romulo-Snyder Agreement, signed in
Washington on Nov 6, 1950 by RP Foreign Affairs Sec Romulo, & US Sec
of Treasury, John Snyder.
PRESENT ACTION: Usaffes arguments 1) the money delivered by the
US to the AFP were straight payments for mil services; ownership thus
vested in RP Govt upon delivery, & consequently, there was nothing to
return, nothing to consider as a loan; 2) the Agreement was void bec
there was no loan to be repaid & bec it was not binding on the RP Govt
for lack of authority of the officers who concluded it.
38
ISSUES
Basic issue: Validity of the Romulo-Snyder Agreement Court cant
pass judgment
1. WON there is obligation to repay - YES
2. WON the officers who promised to repay had authority to bind this
Govt YES
RATIO:
1. YES
Note that the $269M appropriated in Public Law 353 (see 8th bullet)
expressly said that the money is to be handed to the RP Govt either in
advance of or in reimbursement thereof.
In any system of accounting, advances of funds for expenditures
contemplate disbursements to be reported, & credited if approved,
against such advances, the unexpended sums to be returned later.
Congressional law itself required accounting in the manner prescribed
by US Pres - & said Pres in EO 9011, outlined the procedure whereby
advanced funds shall be accounted for.
It also requires as a condition sine qua non that all expenditures shall
first be approved by the USAFFE Commanding Gen.
These ideas of funds advanced to meet expenditures of the Phil
Army as may be approved by the USAFFE Comm-Gen, in connection w/
the accounting requirement, evidently contradict appellants thesis that
the moneys represented straight payments to RP Govt for its armed
services, & passed into the absolute control of such Govt
Instead of returning such amount into one lump sum, our Exec Dept
arranged for its repayment in 10 annual installments. Prima facie such
arrangement should raise no valid objection, given the obligation to
return.
2. YES (They have authority to bind Govt even w/o Senate concurrence)
There is no doubt Pres Quirino approved the negotiations. And he had
the power to contract budgetary loans under RA 213, amending RA 16.
The most impt argument, however, rests on the lack of ratification of
the Agreement by RP Senate to make it binding on the Govt.
The ff explanation of the defendant was considered persuasive by the
Court
The agreement is not a treaty as that term is used in CONSTI.
However, a treaty is not the only form that an intl agreement may
assume. For the grant of treatymaking power to the Executive & the
Senate does not exhaust the power of the govt over intl relations.
Executive agreements may be entered into w/ other states & are
effective even w/o concurrence of Senate.
In intl law, theres no difference betn treaties & executive
agreements in their binding effect upon states concerned as long as the
negotiating functionaries have remained w/n their powers.
The distinction betn executive agreements & treaties is purely a
constl one & has not intl legal significance.
Altman v. US: An intl compact negotiated betn the reps of 2
sovereign nations & made in the name or behalf of the contracting
parties & dealing w/ impt commercial relns betn the 2 countries, is a
treaty both internationally although as an executive agreement it is not
technically a treaty requiring the advice & consent of the Senate
2 classes of Executive Agreements: 1) agreements made purely as
executive acts affecting external relations & independent of or w/o
39
legislative authorization, w/c may be termed as presl agreements; 2)
agreements entered into in pursuance of acts of Cong, w/c have been
designated as Congressional-Executive Agreements
The Romulo-Snyder Agreement may fall under any of these 2 classes
for on Sept 18, 1946, RP Congress authorized the RP Pres to obtain such
loans or incur such indebtedness w/ the US.
Even granting theres no leg authorization, the Agreement was legally
& validly entered into to conform to the 2nd category, namely, as
agreements entered into purely as executive acts w/o leg authorization,
w/c usu includes money agreements.
The Agreement was not submitted to the US Senate either. But the
Phil Senates Resolution No. 15 practically admits the validity & binding
force of such Agreement.
Further, the acts of Congress appropriating funds for the yearly
installments necessary to comply w/ such Agreement constitute a
ratification thereof, W/C PLACES THE QUESTION OF VALIDITY OUT OF
THE COURTS REACH, NO CONSTL PRINCIPLE HAVING BEEN INVOKED TO
RESTRICT CONGRESS PLENARY POEWR TO APPROPRIATE FUNDS LOAN
OR NO LOAN.
HELD: Plaintiff failed to make a clear case for the relief demanded.
Petition DENIED.
Tanada vs Angara
272 SCRA 18 May 2, 1997
Facts:
On April 15, 1994, the Philippine Government represented by the Secretary of the
Department of Trade and Industry signed the final act binding the Philippine
Government to submit to its respective competent authorities the WTO (World Trade
Organization) Agreements to seek approval for such. On December 14, 1994, Resolution
No. 97 was adopted by the Philippine Senate ratifying such WTO Agreement.The present
petition was filed assailing the constitutionality of the WTO agreement as it violates
Section 19, Article II of the Constitution, providing for the development of a self reliant
and independent national economy, and Sections 10 and 12 of Article XII thereof,
providing for the Filipino first policy.
Issue:
Whether or not Resolution No. 97 ratifying the WTO Agreement is unconstitutional.
Ruling:
The Supreme Court ruled that Resolution No. 97 is not unconstitutional. While the
constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises,
at the same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the
world on the bases of equality and reciprocity, and limits protection of Filipino interests
only against foreign competition and trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the
Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationalist policy. Furthermore, the
constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national economy does not
necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and services. It
contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the international
community.The Senate, after deliberation and voting, gave its consent to the WTO
Agreement, thereby making it a part of the law of the land. The Supreme Court must
give due respect to an equal department in government. It presumes its actions as
regular and done in good faith unless there is convincing proof and persuasive
agreements to the contrary. As a result, the ratification of the WTO Agreement limits or
restricts the absoluteness of sovereignty. A treaty engagement is not a mere obligation
but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties. A state which has contracted
valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations such modifications as
may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.
40
BAYAN v. ZAMORA
October 26, 2012 Leave a comment
BAYAN v. ZAMORA
G. R. No. 138570
October 10, 2000
Facts:
The United States panel met with the Philippine panel to discussed, among others,
the possible elements of the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). This resulted to a
series of conferences and negotiations which culminated on January 12 and 13,
1998. Thereafter, President Fidel Ramos approved the VFA, which was
respectively signed by Secretary Siazon and United States Ambassador Thomas
Hubbard.
Pres. Joseph Estrada ratified the VFA on October 5, 1998 and on May 27, 1999,
the senate approved it by (2/3) votes.
Cause of Action:
Petitioners, among others, assert that Sec. 25, Art XVIII of the 1987 constitution is
applicable and not Section 21, Article VII.
Following the argument of the petitioner, under they provision cited, the foreign
military bases, troops, or facilities may be allowed in the Philippines unless the
following conditions are sufficiently met:
a) it must be a treaty,
b) it must be duly concurred in by the senate, ratified by a majority of the votes
cast in a national referendum held for that purpose if so required by congress,
and
c) recognized as such by the other contracting state.
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that Section 21 Article VII is applicable so
that, what is requires for such treaty to be valid and effective is the concurrence
in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the senate.
ISSUE: Is the VFA governed by the provisions of Section 21, Art VII or of Section 25,
Article XVIII of the Constitution?
HELD:
Section 25, Article XVIII, which specifically deals with treaties involving foreign
military bases, troops or facilities should apply in the instant case. To a certain
extent and in a limited sense, however, the provisions of section 21, Article VII
will find applicability with regard to the issue and for the sole purpose of
determining the number of votes required to obtain the valid concurrence of the
senate.
41
The Constitution, makes no distinction between transient and permanent. We
find nothing in section 25, Article XVIII that requires foreign troops or facilities to
be stationed or placed permanently in the Philippines.
It is inconsequential whether the United States treats the VFA only as an executive
agreement because, under international law, an executive agreement is as
binding as a treaty.
Plaridel M. Abaya vs. Hon. Secretary Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr.
FACTS:
On May 7, 2004 Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) of the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) issued a Resolution No. PJHL-A-04-012. It was
approved by DPWH Acting Secretary Florante Soriquez. This resolution
recommended the award to China Road & Bridge Corporation of the contract for
the implementation of civil works for Contract Package No. I (CP I), which
consists of the improvement/rehabilitation of the San Andres-Virac-Jct. Bago-
Viga road, with the lengt of 79.818 kilometers, in the island province of
Catanduanes.
This Loan Agreement No. PH-204 was executed by and between the JBIC and the
Philippine Government pursuant to the exchange of Notes executed by and
between Mr. Yoshihisa Ara, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of
Japan to the Philippines, and then Foreign Affairs Secretary Siazon, in behalf of
their respective governments.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Loan Agreement No. PH-204 between the JBIC and the
Philippine Government is a kind of a treaty.
HELD:
The Loan Agreement No. PH-204 taken in conjunction with the Exchange of
Notes dated December 27, 1999 between the Japanese Government and the
Philippine Government is an executive agreement.
An exchange of notes is a record of a routine agreement that has many
similarities with the private law contract. The agreement consists of the exchange
of two documents, each of the parties being in the possession of the one signed by
the representative of the other.
treaties, agreements, conventions, charters, protocols, declarations,
memoranda of understanding, modus vivendi and exchange of notes all are refer
to international instruments binding at international law.
Although these instruments differ from each other by title, they all have common
features and international law has applied basically the same rules to all these
instruments. These rules are the result of long practice among the States, which
have accepted them as binding norms in their mutual relations. Therefore, they
are regarded as international customary law.
That case was dismissed by the SCORP last Feb. 14 2007.
What the petitioners wanted was that Foreign funded projects also undergo the
procurement process.
The dismissal of the case somehow gave justification for the delay of the
implementing rules for foreign funded projects (IRR-B) of the procurement law
If we recall the decision of the Abaya vs Ebdane was used by the DOJ when the
DOTC Secretary was asking for an opinion from the former, during the ZTE
controversy.
as ruled by the Supreme Court in Abaya v. Ebdane, an
exchange of notes is considered a form of an executive agreement, which
becomes binding through executive action without need of a vote by the
Senate and that (like treaties and conventions, it is an international
42
instrument binding at international law,
The second issue involves an examination of the coverage of
Republic Act No. 9184, otherwise known as the Government
Procurement Reform Act. Section 4 of the said Act provides that it shall
apply to:
the Procurement of infrastructure Projects, Goods and
Consulting Services, regardless of source of funds, whether local
or foreign, by all branches and instrumentalities of government, its
departments, offices and agencies, including government-owned
and/or -controlled corporations and local government units,
subject to the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 138. Any
treaty or international or executive agreement affecting the
subject matter of this Act to which the Philippine government is a
signatory shall be observed.
Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines vs. Duque
Named as respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and
Assistant Secretaries of the Department of Health (DOH). For purposes of herein
petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since respondents
issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive
agency.1Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon
Aquino on October 28, 1986 by virtue of the legislative powers granted to the
president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the preambular clauses of the
Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the
International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code
adopted by the World Health Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the
WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that breastfeeding should be
supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition
and health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.In 1990, the
Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article
24 of said instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate
measures to diminish infant and child mortality, and ensure that all segments of
society, specially parents and children, are informed of the advantages of
breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which
was to take effect on July 7, 2006.
Issue: . Whether Administrative Order or the Revised Implementing Rules and
Regulations (RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is not
constitutional;
Held: YES
under Article 23, recommendations of the WHA do not come into force for
members,in the same way that conventions or agreements under Article 19 and
regulations under Article 21 come into force. Article 23 of the WHO Constitution
reads:
Article 23. The Health Assembly shall have authority to make recommendations
to Members with respect to any matter within the competence of the Organization
for an international rule to be considered as customary law, it must be
established that such rule is being followed by states because they consider it
obligatory to comply with such rules
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of
domestic law either
By transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an
international law be transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional
mechanism such as local legislation. The incorporation method applies when, by
mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have the force of
domestic law.
Consequently, legislation is necessary to transform the provisions of the WHA
Resolutions into domestic law. The provisions of the WHA Resolutions cannot be
considered as part of the law of the land that can be implemented by executive
agencies without the need of a law enacted by the legislature
VINUYA VS. SEC. ROMULO Leave a comment
ISABELITA C. VINUYA, VICTORIA C. DELA PEA, HERMINIHILDA,
MANIMBO, LEONOR H. SUMAWANG, CANDELARIA L. SOLIMAN, MARIA
43
L. QUILANTANG, MARIA L. MAGISA, NATALIA M. ALONZO, LOURDES M.
NAVARO, FRANCISCA M. ATENCIO, ERLINDA MANALASTAS, TARCILA M.
SAMPANG, ESTER M. PALACIO MAXIMA R. DELA CRUZ, BELEN A.
SAGUM, FELICIDAD TURLA, FLORENCIA M. DELA PEA, FRANCIA A.
BUCO, PASTORA C. GUEVARRA, VICTORIA M. DELA CRUZ, PETRONILA
O. DELA CRUZ, ZENAIDA P. DELA CRUZ, CORAZON M. SUBA,
EMERINCIANA A. VINUYA, LYDIA A. SANCHEZ, ROSALINA M.BUCO,
PATRICIA A. ERNARDO, LUCILA H. PAYAWAL, MAGDALENA LIWAG,
ESTER C. BALINGIT, JOVITA A. DAVID, EMILIA C. MANGILIT,
VERGINIA M. BANGIT, GUILLERMA S. BALINGIT, TERECITA
PANGILINAN, MAMERTA C. PUNO, CRISENCIANA C. GULAPA,
SEFERINA S. TURLA, MAXIMA B. TURLA, LEONICIA G. GUEVARRA,
ROSALINA M. CULALA, CATALINA Y. MANIO, MAMERTA T. SAGUM,
CARIDAD L. TURLA, et al.
In their capacity and as members of the Malaya Lolas Organization,
versus -
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO G. ROMULO, THE
HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGNAFFAIRS DELIA DOMINGO-
ALBERT, THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE MERCEDITAS N.
GUTIERREZ, and THE HONORABLE SOLICITOR GENERAL ALFREDO L.
BENIPAYO
G.R. No. 162230, April 28, 2010
FACTS:
This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
with an application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of the
DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit
organization registered with the SEC, established for the purpose of providing
aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the Philippines during
the Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive
Department through the DOJ, DFA, and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a
claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who ordered the
establishment of the comfort women stations in the Philippines. But officials
of the Executive Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the
position that the individual claims of the comfort women for compensation had
already been fully satisfied by Japans compliance with the Peace Treaty
between the Philippines and Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that
respondents committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the crimes against
humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the
respondents to espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of
reparations against Japan before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and
other international tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals
relative to the war were dealt with in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951
and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Womens Fund and the Philippine government
signed a Memorandum of Understanding for medical and welfare support
programs for former comfort women. Over the next five years, these were
implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
ISSUE:
WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not
espousing petitioners claims for official apology and other forms of reparations
against Japan.
RULING:
Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive
Department has the exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse
petitioners claims against Japan.
Political questions refer to those questions which, under the Constitution, are
to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which
full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the
wisdom, not legality of a particular measure.
One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations.
It is well-established that the conduct of the foreign relations of our
government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and legislative
the politicaldepartments of the government, and the propriety of what may
be done in the exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry
44
or decision. are delicate, complex, and involve large elements of prophecy.
They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible to the
people whose welfare they advance or imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and
courts certainly possess the authority to construe or invalidate treaties and
executive agreements. However, the question whether the Philippine
government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign
government is a foreign relations matter, the authority for which is
demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but to the
political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided
that it is to the best interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals
for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of Peace of 1951. The wisdom of
such decision is not for the courts to question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the
conditions which prevail in foreign countries, and especially is this true in time
of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has his agents in the
form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners cause
would be inimical to our countrys foreign policy interests, and could disrupt
our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious implications for stability in
this region. For the to overturn the Executive Departments determination
would mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate
political branch to which authority to make that judgment has been
constitutionally committed.
From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle,
where such an extraordinary length of time has lapsed between the treatys
conclusion and our consideration the Executive must be given ample
discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim
against Japan, from the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and
those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if apologies are sufficient, and
whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for
individuals to bring a claim within the international legal system has been
when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim on the
individuals behalf. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by
resorting to diplomatic action or international judicial proceedings on his behalf,
a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in the person of its
subjects, respect for the rules of international law.
Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise
diplomatic protection by whatever means and to whatever extent it thinks fit,
for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural or legal
person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not
adequately protected, they have no remedy in international law. All they can
do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a view to furthering
their cause or obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the
province of municipal law and do not affect the position internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not
alter this analysis. Petitioners have not shown that the crimes committed by
the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the time the Treaty of
Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international
crimes is an erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has
been used as a legal term describing obligations owed by States towards the
community of states as a whole. Essential distinction should be drawn between
the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and
those arising vis--vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By
their very nature, the former are the concern of all States. In view of the
importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a legal
interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
The term jus cogens (literally, compelling law) refers to norms that
command peremptory authority, superseding conflicting treaties and custom.
Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense that they are
mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general
international norms of equivalent authority
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
45
CRISTOBAL V. LABRADOR
Pardon Restoration of Civil & Political Rights
Santos was convicted of the crime of estafa. He was given pardon by the
president but even prior to his pardon he was already holding the position as
the municipality president of Malabon notwithstanding his conviction.
Cristobal, on the other hand, averred that Santos should be excluded from
the list of electors in Malabon because he was already convicted of final
judgment for any crime against property. This is pursuant to CA 357 of the
New Election Code. The lower court presided by Labrador ruled that Santos
is exempt from the provision of the law by virtue of the pardon restoring the
respondent to his full civil and political rights, except that with respect to the
right to hold public office or employment, he will be eligible for appointment
only to positions which are clerical or manual in nature and involving no
money or property responsibility.
ISSUE: Whether or not Santos should not be excluded as an elector.
HELD: It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the exercise
of this constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive, namely: (a) that the
power be exercised after conviction; and (b) that such power does not extend
cases of impeachment. Subject to the limitations imposed by the Constitution,
the pardoning power cannot be restricted or controlled by legislative action. It
must remain where the sovereign authority has placed it and must be
exercised by the highest authority to whom it is entrusted. An absolute
pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all disabilities
resulting from the conviction. In the present case, the disability is the result of
conviction without which there would be no basis for disqualification from
voting. Imprisonment is not the only punishment which the law imposes upon
those who violate its command. There are accessory and resultant
disabilities, and the pardoning power likewise extends to such disabilities.
When granted after the term of imprisonment has expired, absolute pardon
removes all that is left of the consequences Of conviction. In the present
case, while the pardon extended to respondent Santos is conditional in the
sense that he will be eligible for appointment only to positions which a e
clerical or manual in nature involving no money or property responsibility, it
is absolute insofar as it restores the respondent to full civil and political rights.
Upon other hand, the suggestion that the disqualification imposed in par (b)
of sec 94 of CA 357, does not fall within the purview of the pardoning power
of the president, would lead to the impairment of the pardoning power of the
president, not contemplated in the Constitution, and would lead furthermore
to the result that there would be no way of restoring the political privilege in a
case of this nature except through legislative action.
MONSANTO V. FACTORAN
Pardon Does not Extinguish Civil Liabilities & It is Prospective
Monsanto was the Asst Treasurer of Calbayug City. She was charged for the
crime of Estafa through Falsification of Public Documents. She was found
guilty and was sentenced to jail. She was however granted pardon by Marcos.
She then wrote a letter to the Minister of Finance for her to be reinstated to
her former position since it was still vacant. She was also requesting for back
pays. The Minister of Finance referred the issue to the Office of the President
and Factoran denied Monsantos request averring that Monsanto must first
seek appointment and that the pardon does not reinstate her former position.
Also, Monsanto avers that by reason of the pardon, she should no longer be
compelled to answer for the civil liabilities brought about by her acts.
ISSUE: Whether or not Monsanto should be reinstated to her former post.
HELD: A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no
amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered by the
offender. It does not impose upon the government any obligation to make
reparation for what has been suffered. Since the offense has been
established by judicial proceedings, that which has been done or suffered
while they were in force is presumed to have been rightfully done and justly
suffered, and no satisfaction for it can be required. This would explain why
petitioner, though pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost
earnings and benefits. On the other hand, civil liability arising from crime is
governed by the RPC. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, or for
any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or commutation of
sentence. Petitioners civil liability may only be extinguished by the same
causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely: payment, loss of the thing due,
46
remission of the debt, merger of the rights of creditor and debtor,
compensation and novation.
GARCIA v. COA
October 26, 2012 Leave a comment
September 14, 1993 (G.R. No. 75025)
PARTIES:
Petitioner: VICENTE GARCIA
Respondents: THE HONORABLE CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, THE
HONORABLE MINISTER, LAND TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATIONS, THE
REGIONAL DIRECTOR, TELECOM REGIONAL OFFICE NO. IV
FACTS:
Petitioner was a supervising lineman in the Region IV Station of the Bureau of
Telecommunications in Lucena City. A criminal case of qualified theft was filed
against him. The president grated him an executive clemency. The petitioner filed
a claim for back payment of salaries. The petitioner was later recalled to the
service on 12 March 1984 but the records do not show whether petitioners
reinstatement was to the same position of Supervising Lineman.
ISSUE: Whether Garcia is entitled to the payment of back wages after having been
reinstated pursuant to the grant of executive clemency.
HELD:
The pardoned offender regains his eligibility for appointment to public office
which was forfeited by reason of the conviction of the offense. But since pardon
does not generally result in automatic reinstatement because the offender has to
apply for reappointment, he is not entitled to back wages.
If the pardon is based on the innocence of the individual, it affirms this innocence
and makes him a new man and as innocent; as if he had not been found guilty of
the offense charged. 7 When a person is given pardon because he did not truly
commit the offense, the pardon relieves the party from all punitive consequences
of his criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good reputation and
unstained character prior to the finding of guilt.
In the case at bar, the acquittal of petitioner by the trial court was founded not on
lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt but on the fact that petitioner did not
commit the offense imputed to him. Aside from finding him innocent of the
charge, the trial court commended petitioner for his concern and dedication as a
public servant. Verily, petitioners innocence is the primary reason behind the
grant of executive clemency to him, bolstered by the favorable recommendations
for his reinstatement. This signifies that petitioner need no longer apply to be
reinstated to his former employment; he is restored to his office ipso facto upon
the issuance of the clemency.
Petitioners automatic reinstatement to the government service entitles him to
back wages. This is meant to afford relief to petitioner who is innocent from the
start and to make reparation for what he has suffered as a result of his unjust
dismissal from the service. The right to back wages is afforded to those with have
been illegally dismissed and were thus ordered reinstated or to those otherwise
acquitted of the charges against them.
Therefore, the court ordered the full back wages from April 1 1975 (date when he
was illegally dismissed) to March 12 1984 (reinstated) to the petitioner.
47
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