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Polithon was developed as a broad innovative model for change based on the initial idea of
trying to hack a potential solution to the blockade of Gaza. We were of course met with
skepticism at first just given the sheer complexity of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the
controversial nature of any issue related to it, but we knew we had to try. It is probably one of
the most intractable conflicts our generation will ever witness, and if even part of a solution
could be developed by Millennial PolicyMakers (PMs) coming together, aided by experts, and
then bought into by the public and those negotiating, we have stumbled upon something big.

In the pages that follow, our idealistic, yet realistic, PMs developed the best solution they could
come up with in two days. The process was remarkable and began with experts briefing the
group on the background to the conflict. The PMs then went to work on a massive wall to wall,
floor to ceiling, white board, pouring out their ideas, listening to one another, and going through
each concept to see where there were holes they needed to fill. The group was mostly
progressive, but given their diverse backgrounds tech, policy, law, business, government, and
nonprofit they each brought different perspectives. They also made an effort to see the issue
from every angle possible so that they could determine what would actually be acceptable to
both sides in order to find the middle ground.

On the second day of Polithon, the PMs worked collaboratively on the Policy Outcome via a
Google Doc, each meticulously working through a section, inputting language, and working out
issues that arose guided by an expert who stayed on hand to answer questions. The group did
everything they could to try to work out the complexities of the issue and find a solution that
anyone who stands firmly on one side or the other may not be fully comfortable with, but one
that could be acceptable and move the needle.

The solution is by no means perfect, but it is a serious step. The intent of it was not to trade the
development of Gaza for Israels definition of security, but to get to a workable and agreeable
solution to alleviate the long suffering of innocent Palestinians in Gaza as a direct result of the
blockade. We took on this issue because the situation in Gaza struck a personal chord with us
particularly Julia, who spent last year living and working there and because it was one
everyone seemed to be saying needed an end, but no one was offering a way to actually do it.
Here is one way.

We hope this is the start of a movement much greater than just one solution to one policy issue.
We are crowd-sourcing Millennial ideas to hack the policy system and create lasting change,
and the beta-test was the first step. Please share this document and help us turn words into
action.

Thank you!
Julia + Evanna
www.polithon.org

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POLITHON: Proposal to End the Blockade in Gaza

I. Introduction

The latest conflict has brought into stark reality, the need for the Israeli and Palestinian people
to break from the status quo. A tradition of periodic and escalated confrontations between Israel
and Hamas in and upon the Gaza Strip is unsustainable for the future of these two populations.
These routine engagements achieve little for either side, but the losses are extreme for both.
Conditions in the Gaza Strip today are the epitome of a humanitarian crisis: resources are
scarce; homes, workplaces, and schools are destroyed; poverty is rampant; and medical
services are more than necessary. While this summers war led to the largest scale of
destruction since the formal inception of the blockade in 2007, deterioration of living conditions
in the Strip have been a result of hardline economic and social restrictions on Palestinian life by
the Israeli government for years. Israels security strategy has practically safeguarded its people
and its state from various uncertainties, risks, and threats, but only for the short term and has
not improved conditions for those impacted by the conflict on either side. The tendency of both
sides to engage in the offensive through military aggression is an indication that a new strategy
must be brought to the table to create an opportunity for change and a chance at peace. Ending
the blockade on Gaza represents a formidable first step in a greater strategy to achieve Israeli-
Palestinian peace, security, and prosperity.

We believe there is a way forward that, while not a cure-all, provides a substantial step forward,
beyond the frustrating quagmire many have felt stuck in. The blockade of Gaza is one discrete
piece that, if addressed, can have a positive ripple effect. We believe that economic benefit and
genuine security are not mutually exclusive. Throughout the latest conflict, international
attention has been brought to bear, with the increasing conclusion that it is in the interests of
both the Israelis and Palestinians to lift the blockade.

The following is the presentation of a multi-faceted agreement to gradually end the blockade of
Gaza over the course of twenty-four (24) months. The imperative first step is the commitment to
a permanent ceasefire; but essential to the success of this agreement is the resumption of the
movement of people and goods to and from the Gaza Strip, qualified and provided for by
several details as outlined throughout this agreement. A timeframe of twenty-four (24) months is
what we considered an appropriate duration to address certain immediate needs and demands
of both sides, while also laying the foundations for long-term development of the Gaza Strip and
Israeli/Palestinian relations regarding this blockade. As agreed to, it outlines steps that must be
taken by various parties to ensure a secure and economically beneficial way forward. We
crafted this to be a comprehensive document, yet we acknowledge that this is only a starting
point.

A. Considerations and Limitations
Throughout this process, we consulted experts across the political spectrum, providing valuable
insight on various aspects of the issue, including security concerns, Israeli public opinion,
previous negotiations, etc. We also reviewed previously agreed upon language by the parties,
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including the Oslo Accords and Quartet Principles, as well as other, similar international
agreements such as the Good Friday peace accords and the Interim Joint Plan of Action.

In addition, we made several key assumptions to guide our policy making. First and foremost is
the idea that the lifting of the blockade would be linked to an ongoing and permanent ceasefire
actively upheld by all parties. A ceasefire must be agreed to in conjunction with the adoption of
this document, and enacted concurrently. We also focused our efforts on Gazas political,
physical, and humanitarian relationship with Israel, as the primary and most stable actor with
security influence and a stake in the reconstruction of Gaza. In contrast, while we considered
the request to internationalize the Rafah Border Crossing with Egypt, included in Hamas Ten
Point proposal to Israel, it has specifically been left unaddressed by this proposal. The
reasoning is two-fold: first, as this agreement moves forward, it anticipates a greater fluidity of
people and goods to and from Gaza into the West Bank, Israel, and neighboring countries (not
including Egypt at this time). Second, the current rise of extremist and terrorist organizations
combined with political, social, and economic instability in the region is cause for concern when
considering any potential openings of the Rafah Border Crossing. Both Israel and the
Palestinian Consensus Government (PCG) have vested interests in maintaining the political,
social, and physical security and stability of all borders. Other regional players, including Jordan,
Iran, Saudi Arabia, and others, are components of the ongoing conversation, but in the interests
of scope and focus, we limited their involvement. An additional key assumption is that all
relevant actors would be present at the negotiation table without requiring preconditions, and
that international donor funding would be made available through appropriate means for the
points outlined.

We recognize that this proposal is not a comprehensive assessment of all issues raised by
interested parties, many of which we agree are crucial to a broader discussion of Israeli-
Palestinian relations. For example, the issue of de-militarization has not been addressed in this
proposal. While our research and understanding of the current conflict, from both sides,
included a discussion on the issue of the demilitarization of Gaza, we believe that as a collective
we are ill-prepared to produce a strategy or set of compromises to address the interests and
demands from both parties on this matter. However, we have not completely ignored the issue
of state security on behalf of the Israelis or the Palestinians; instead, where possible, our
proposal includes specific language to address certain security concerns and tailored steps to
risks. In addition, we chose not to address any final status questions, including any potential
land swaps, as we believe they are best addressed in a comprehensive peace agreement. We
believe that this document resolves the issues necessary to end the blockade on Gaza. Our
hope is that lifting the blockade will propel future negotiations on a broader host of concerns.

This agreement is made in accordance with the tenets and principles of international law. This
agreement incorporates and adopts the terms, provisions and responsibilities of the parties as
established by previous actions, initiatives agreements, accords, treaties and resolutions signed
by the Israelis and Palestinians at the time such documents were effectuated. Where such
agreements conflict in purpose or in specific detail to this agreement, this agreement will serve
to supersede those provisions to represent the current state of affairs and present day
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conditions of this conflict and party relations; similarly, where quantities or figures conflict, the
greater of two numbers will be chosen to represent the figure by which the related provision
adopts moving forward.

II. Plan of Action

A. Zero (0) to Six (6) Months

The following activities and actions are to be implemented and administered by the parties of
this agreement at various dates and deadlines within the first six (6) months from the signing of
this agreement. Any additional conduct or steps by third party entities are described generally
below, and specific details regarding such a course of conduct will be outlined and described in
separate agreements but incorporated in whole into this agreement.

The release of tax revenues collected on behalf of the Palestinians to the Palestinian
Consensus Government (PCG) within thirty (30) days of signing this agreement and
the distribution of which shall be managed by the governing authority. The PCG agrees
to and is committed to complying and participating with an annual audit to be conducted
by an independent third party as agreed upon by both parties subject to this agreement
regarding the transfer and subsequent distribution of these funds.
The import of construction materials into Gaza is to be allowed for the purpose of
reconstruction and development. Construction materials will be imported, exported,
monitored and distributed under the direct supervision of the United Nations (UN). The
UN is responsible for the selection of contracts and contractors which shall receive such
materials, and shall oversee and monitor related projects from start to completion. (This
term reflects the purpose and terms of an existing agreement entered into by the parties
with the UN as of September 16, 2014).
Expansion of the fishing zone off the coast of Gaza to six (6) nautical miles within two
(2) weeks of parties signatures of this agreement, with the expansion to ten (10) miles
after six (6) months period, contingent upon compliance with the ceasefire during that
time period. Israel commits itself to a principle of non-aggression, withholding random
artillery fire within the six (6) mile range unless there is a sufficient basis of evidence to
conclude that activity, not in the course of business or leisure, is occurring and which
directly represents a threat or act of equal aggression.
Israeli forces will withdraw to one hundred (100) meters within the Gaza border and will
not operate at any point more than one hundred (100) meters within the border. Israeli
forces will withhold artillery fire from this station at the border unless and until specifically
provoked by individuals acting to threaten the safety and security of Israelis beyond the
border. Within one month after signing, an international monitor, such as the US,
European Union (EU), or North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), will monitor the
border with around the clock with unarmed drones to ensure no Israeli incursions into
Gaza. This monitoring mission will continue for three (3) years, with the option for an
extension of up to two (2) to be exercised by the monitoring authority in consultation with
Israelis and Palestinians.
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The opening of the Kerem Shalom border crossing to the import and export of goods
and services between Gaza, the West Bank, and Israel subject to a monitoring system
and security check point administered by the United Nations. There shall be an
unrestricted flow of civilian trucks to and from the strip to enable, support, and promote
recovery and development. Civilian trucks shall carry all consumer goods not related to
construction or for the purpose of construction. All goods imported will derive in source
from Israeli-approved vendors for the first twelve months of this agreement. This will
mean that Israel may approve the vendors who provide goods and services for import
into Gaza, but will not restrict the types of goods and services that are imported, unless
they are materials related to, or for the purpose of, construction. UN or other
humanitarian aid trucks carrying supplies and services to Gaza will have unfettered and
unrestricted access through Kerem Shalom, but will be subject to the same security and
monitoring procedures.
The UN commits to the monitoring of all current border crossings (Kerem Shalom) for
import and export purposes... Monitoring is defined as:
Manning scanner donated by government of the Netherlands to conduct
thorough security investigations of imports and exports at border crossings.
Monitoring party compliance to the import and export of goods and services.
Reviewing business permits/documentation/licensing.
All border crossing facilities will be open to unannounced inspection by UN approved
non-governmental organizations to ensure compliance with international standards,
methods, and practices. Border crossing administrations will create online and physical
hot-lines for reporting corruption and violations of agreed goods, allegations will be
subject to an investigation, the results of which will be made public on a quarterly basis.
In addition, a formal arbitration body will be created, overseen by the UN, to resolve
disputes between the parties and to hear appeals from vendors whose goods were not
allowed passage into or out of Gaza.
Fuel, electricity, water: The following provisions are designed to meet current and
future needs of water, electricity, and fuel in Gaza during the period of time envisioned
by this agreement and beyond. Israels ability to meet the following demand figures will
be subject to current and developing capacity in Gaza, such that efficient, safe, and
best-use practices are adhered to by local industrial facilities.
Fuel:
Fuel supplies to Gaza will be delivered through Israeli approved vendors.
Trucks containing fuel or transporting fuel to and from deposit stations
within Gaza shall be under the direct supervision of the Israeli
Government. The Israeli Government will not have the authority to alter
the amounts of fuel delivered or to make changes to the schedule of
delivery.
Palestinian fuel stations, vendors, and distribution centers will supply
proper documentation and licensing agreements in coordination and
cooperation with Israeli governmental agencies and vendors regarding
frequent sales, points of distribution within Gaza, and regular inventories
on supply.
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Prices and rates shall be agreed to by the Palestinian Authority and
Israeli fuel and gas companies as parties to a separate, negotiated sales
agreement.
Electricity:
Israel commits to supplying 200 MW
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to Gaza within three (3) months of
signing (Israel will supply 200 MW or as much as the Gazan electrical grid
can safely handle).
International donors will absorb existing Palestinian debts to
Israeli power companies; offer no-interest loans to PCG to help
address new energy costs until domestic production is restored.
International donors will offer loans to Israeli government to create
incentives and assistance to Israeli power companies to expand
production and capacity.
The authorization of the permits and licensing for the set-up of an off-
shore power generator, as proposed and offered by Turkey, to serve as a
short to medium term source of energy and electricity as the
reconstruction of Gazas electrical and power facilities are rebuilt. This
facility will be subject to the monitoring mechanisms and facilities of an
international coalition, group, or third-party.
Israel will continue to honor its agreement with the Palestinians on
supplying gas from its Leviathan gas field. Gas supplies from this should
be used to build gas-powered power plants in Gaza which would be more
sustainable and economical considering the extensive gas fields
discovered in Israel and the neighboring countries.
Water:
Israel commits to supplying water to the Gaza Strip in the amount of 6
million cubic meters per year.
Well-drilling activity in Gaza shall cease in an effort to reduce cross-
border contamination of sewage and consumable water in the nearby
Ashkelon region.
Sanitation
Construction materials related to the repair, reconstruction, and
improvement of sanitation and sewage facilities in Gaza are subject to the
monitoring activities of the UN, in accordance with current agreements.


II. Six (6) to Twelve (12) Months

Subsequent stages of this agreement incorporate previously initiated activities. Specifically, any
activity, initiative, effort, release, or progress made on behalf of both parties shall continue into

1
http://electronicintifada.net/content/how-gaza-gets-power/7844 - In 2008, Israel was supplying
approximately 120MW to Gaza. While current supply is low because of damage done to power lines
crossing the border, with the right international financial assistance, we expect 200MW to be reasonable
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the subsequent stages of this plan, so long as both parties continue to adhere to the stated
terms and mutually respect the terms of a related, permanent ceasefire agreement.

Six months from the signing of this agreement, the Erez Crossing will be opened to
enable the greater movement of people to and from Gaza.
The border crossing will permit the movement of up to five hundred (500)
humanitarian and medical cases and 500 other cases as allowed by individual
permits, totaling one thousand (1000) permits total per day. Twelve (12) months
after the signing of the agreement, assuming all previous security agreements
have been upheld, the border crossing will expand to permit two thousand (2000)
cases, without distinction between humanitarian and other.
Individuals crossing the border will be subjected to the application and approval
of permits for related travel. The intended permit system will be a replication of
the system currently in place to facilitate cross-border travel between Israel and
the West Bank.
Israel will ease restrictions and facilitate travel for members, officials, and
representatives of the PCG of a certain career-level ranking and seniority, after
undergoing certain security clearance and background investigations.
For the purpose of human travel and movement, the Erez Crossing will be monitored by
a coalition of forces previously volunteered from the European Union that will conduct
cross-border checkpoints. The PCG is obligated to cooperate fully with requests for
information and data sharing regarding the movement of its people between various
locations in and out of the Gaza Strip, such that transit permits are fulfilled at best
efforts.
Independent of other increases in daily pass-through quotas:
Israel authorizes an additional one hundred (100), twelve (12) month permits
each year for up to five years from the signing of this agreement to be provided
Palestinian merchants/vendors/entrepreneurs for the purpose of developing
business and economy in Gaza; this will increase to two hundred fifty (250)
additional permits per year from year six (6) until year ten (10).
Israel allows for business and personal travel for stays of up to sixty (60)
hours in Israel proper (with a return and stay-period of seventy-two (72)
hours to Gaza in between visits). Visits to the West Bank will not be
subject to time limits or visit restrictions.
If sponsored by Israeli business, permit holders can stay in Israel for
extended periods, defined as a duration of two (2) weeks per visit but with
two (2) weeks in between visits.
Israel will add an additional five hundred (500), 4-use entry permits every
year for five (5) years for postsecondary students attending outside of
Israel [students re-applying for this visa to continue school will be given
preference].
A special permitting process will be created by Israel for at least five (5) firms and up to
twenty (20) private industry firms to begin importing renewable-energy technology to
Gaza for pilot-projects that collectively produce at most five (5) per cent of Gazas
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electrical needs. Materials will be tied to specific projects; projects will be reviewed by
US monitoring teams.
A recognition by both parties that the others territorial sovereignty must be honored,
necessarily leading to the cessation of any tunnel construction beyond Gazas borders. If
any tunnel is discovered, EU monitoring mechanism will serve as an intermediary
between both parties to communicate information and ensure its destruction.

The items in the subsequent list are subject to the successful completion of the previous steps,
but also represent steps that can be taken with each side acting in good faith toward a long-term
peaceful end of the blockade. The following items are broader in scale, and target the long term
wellbeing of both Gaza and Israel.

III. Twelve (12) to Twenty-Four (24) Months

Israel withdraws its troops and security forces from the one hundred (100) meter point
within the Gaza border back to the original green-line border demarcation.
The border crossing at Karni shall be opened to permit the transfer and transport of
goods and services to and from Gaza. This border crossing will be subject to the same
processes and UN monitoring and security mechanisms as designed for the Kerem
Shalom border crossing (referenced above).
Increasing the number of people crossing from and into Gaza at the Erez border
crossing to 5,000 people per day eighteen (18) months from the signing of this
agreement.
PCG Security Forces:
Development of a joint program between US and European military to train local,
Palestinian police forces, under the supervision of the PCG, to promote the terms
of the ceasefire, to promote security across the territories as well as between
Israel, and to reduce local and trans-border crimes.
Development of a police recruitment, vetting and security clearance system to
prevent infiltration of the PCG security apparatus. Jordan and the US will develop
a joint program to train and build the capacity of PCG for intelligence collection
on militant and terrorist groups operating in its territories.
A coalition of actors, including the PCG, Israel, the US and the EU, shall form a
committee with a rotating chair to begin developing a seaport in Gaza. The coalition will
solicit evaluations from experts to determine the scope and approach for the seaport,
which will be used to develop a thorough request for proposals to determine the cost and
timeline for the project. Upon evaluation of the proposals, an independent contractor will
be selected to undertake the work, which will be overseen by the coalition. The coalition
will also create a security plan for the oversight of the port, including imports and exports
into Gaza via the seaport.
Israel increases the number of permits provided to technology, environmental, and
development firms, lifting restrictions as to the types of contracts and activities
conducted. Projects will be subject to independent US monitoring teams and any
requests for required construction materials will be subject to the authorization,
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supervision, and investigation of UN monitoring groups. Such projects and programs can
be financed by international donors to address the high upfront cost of these
technologies, either in the form of loans or grants.
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An ease on restrictions for credit/financing to small and medium enterprises (SMEs).
Backed by coalition of international donors, World Bank, IMF, IFC and various NGOs,
this group will create mechanisms to develop the economic system of Palestine. This will
include affordable loans and grants to small businesses, entrepreneurs and farmers.
The US pledges to provide funding to increase Iron Dome capacity, from nine (9) to
twelve (12) batteries, at cost of approximately $300 million. Pledges to fund the use of
up to one thousand (1,000) Iron Dome Missiles, up to $50 million. This pledge expires
after five (5) years unless Congressional extension.
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2
http://www.desertec.org/downloads/proposal_gaza.pdf - We were encouraged by the costs evaluations
of various sources, and with the continuing decrease in cost of solar technology, this represents an
increasingly viable path to move Gaza away from expensive fuel consumption.
3
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-morris-iron-dome-disastrous-for-israel-20140822-story.html
- outlines cost for Iron Dome batteries and missiles.
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Appendix A:
Glossary of Terms Used in Agreement
Ceasefire: the end of active hostilities between the Government of Israel and the Palestinian
Consensus Government.
Violation of the Ceasefire (Palestinian): A Palestinian violation of the ceasefire is defined as a
deliberate, authorized action by the senior leadership of any element of the PCG, Hamas,
and/or Islamic Jihad, all signatories to this agreement. A violation is not defined as a random
act of terror conducted by marginal, extremist, or terrorist element including but not limited to:
isolated missile firing(s), shooting at settlements, kidnappings or attempted kidnappings of
Israeli civilians or soldiers; Israel agrees to a high bar of proof in any allegations.
Violation of the Ceasefire (Israeli): An Israeli violation of the ceasefire is defined as a
deliberate, authorized action by the Israeli Defense Forces against targets in Gaza. The IDF is
expected to work with Palestinian counterparts to address security concerns as they emerge,
however Israel does not waive its right to defend itself in proportion to the threat. Examples of
potential violations include but are not limited to: targeted assassinations, airstrikes against
civilian targets, shooting at fisherman within the expanded fishing zone, arbitrary aggression
conducted within the borders of Gaza or outside of restrictive zones and areas as defined in this
agreement.
Palestinian Consensus Government: Refers to the unity government announced in June and
all subsequent governments which may form between the Palestinian Authority, Hamas, and
any additional Palestinian parties governing both the West Bank and Gaza.
EU Coalition Forces: This group is envisioned as a group of military individuals and leaders
working together for the purpose of stabilizing Gaza and supporting the aims of this agreements
and any related cease-fire agreement. The composition of this group is made up of one of four
possible alternative sources: 1) European Union forces; 2) Western forces--including the US,
EU, Australia, and Great Britain; 3) NATO forces; or a 4) UN force. The scope of this groups
power and authority are defined within a proposal to the Israeli Ministry, dated August 21,
2014
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. The parameters of this agreement have not been finalized and have not been signed into
final agreement by Israelis and Palestinian authorities.
Quartet principles: 1) A Palestinian state must recognize the state of Israel without prejudging
what various grievances or claims are appropriate, 2) Abide by previous diplomatic agreements,
and 3) Renounce violence as a means of achieving goals.

4
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.614455.