Tracking the Moral Truth:

Debunking Streets Darwinian Dilemma

Gerald L. Hull
Creative ocus! "o# $%&! Chenango "ridge! '( )*+,$
ghull@stny.rr.com
-&+.-,%.,&%/
0cknowledgements
1 would like to e#2ress m3 gratitude to Dr. Ste2hen 4. Schwart5 6or his un6lagging
su22ort and ine#haustible su22l3 o6 hel26ul comments and good advice.
)
Tracking the Moral Truth:
Debunking Streets Darwinian Dilemma
0bstract
Sharon Streets /&&- article 70 Darwinian Dilemma 6or 8ealist Theories o6 9alue:
challenges the e2istemological 2retensions o6 the moral realist! o6 the nonnaturalist in
2articular. Given that 7;volutionar3 6orces have 2la3ed a tremendous role in sha2ing the
content o6 human evaluative attitudes: < wh3 should one su22ose such attitudes and
concomitant belie6s would track an inde2endent moral realit3= ;s2eciall3 since! on a
nonnaturalist view! moral truth is causall3 inert. 1 abstract a logical skeleton o6 Streets
argument and! with its aid! 6ocus on 2roblematic assum2tions regarding the >a?causalit3
o6 moral truth. 1t emerges that there are acquired causal 2owers that com2ensate 6or the
intrinsic im2otence o6 moral truth! as well as two distinct levels at which truth.tracking
might occur. 1 argue that while evolutions selective 6orces do not track moral truth! that
does not im2l3 individual organisms could not have evolved that ca2abilit3.
@e3words
;volutionar3 debunking arguments! ;D0s! Sharon Street! Darwinian Dilemma! moral
realism! nonnaturalism! naturalism! truth.tracking! moral truth! causal 2owers.
/
Tracking the Moral Truth:
Debunking Streets Darwinian Dilemma
Sharon Streets /&&- article 70 Darwinian Dilemma 6or 8ealist Theories o6 9alue:
>hence6orth Dilemma?
)
challenges the e2istemological 2retensions o6 the moral realist! o6
the nonnaturalist in 2articular. Given that 7;volutionar3 6orces have 2la3ed a tremendous
role in sha2ing the content o6 human evaluative attitudes: >))&?! wh3 should one su22ose
such attitudes and concomitant belie6s would track an inde2endent moral realit3=
;s2eciall3 since! on a nonnaturalist view! moral truth is causall3 inert.
/
1n what 6ollows! 1
2ro2ose to abstract a logical skeleton o6 Streets argument and! with its aid! 6ocus on
2roblematic assum2tions regarding the >a?causalit3 o6 moral truth.
Ather commentators on Streets Darwinian Dilemma 2rovide able outlines and
summaries o6 her 2osition.
*
Here we will a22roach things somewhat more abstractl3! and
begin instead with a Buasi.s3llogistic la3out o6 the overall course o6 her attack on moral
realist e2istemolog3. 0n e#2osition o6 those ste2s will hel2 clari63 the structure o6 her
reasoning as well as antici2ate 2otential vulnerabilities. The 6ollowing argument is
assumed to be valid < its soundness is u2 6or grabs.
Streets Darwinian 0rgument
). ;ither there is an evolutionaril3.e#2licable tracking relation >;T8? between the
moral truth >MT? and what the nonnaturalist realist believes to be true >'"T?! or
there is not.
/. "ecause evolution is the 2redominant in6luence on evaluative belie6s! without an
;T8 there is no basis 6or su22osing an3 correlation between MT and '"T.
*. Su22osing an ;T8 between MT and '"T reBuires MT to 2la3 a causal role.
,. "ut >a? ever3 relevant causal role a66ecting evaluative belie6s has alread3 been
a22ro2riated b3 evolutionar3 in6luence! and an3wa3 >b? MT is causall3 inert and
inca2able o6 wielding causal in6luence.
$. 16 ,>a? and ,>b?! MT does not and cannot 2la3 a causal role.
-. There6ore! there is no ;T8 between MT and '"T.
)
4age re6erences are to Dilemma unless noted otherwise.
/
Graham Addie >/&&$? is a notable e#ce2tion.
*
or e#am2le: David Co22 >/&&%?! Street >/&&%?! Skarsaune >/&))?! "ehrends >/&)/?! Graber >/&)/?!
Co3ce >/&)*a? and Co3ce >/&)*b?.
*
+. There6ore! there is no basis 6or su22osing an3 correlation between the moral truth
and what the nonnaturalist realist believes to be true.
Ste2 )
1 have somewhat truncated the sco2e o6 Streets discussion to 6ocus on the argument
against nonnaturalist realism. She argues that it a22lies to naturalist realism as well! but
acknowledges that her central 6ocus is on the nonnaturalist: 7non.naturalist versions o6
value realism lie straight6orwardl3 within m3 target in this 2a2er: >))/?. Here we will be
2rimaril3 concerned with nonnaturalist realism.
That caveat aside! Ste2 ) essentiall3 2oses Streets Darwinian Dilemma. 0s she 2uts it!
the realist must decide whether or not 7natural selection 6avored ancestors who were able
to gras2 those Dinde2endent evaluativeE truths: >)&F?. 1 am glossing 76avored b3 natural
selection: as evolutionarily-explicable. 1n the 6ollowing! 7moral truth: should be
understood to be the inde2endent moral truth o6 the nonnaturalist realist.
Street s2eaks 2rimaril3 in terms o6 evaluative attitudes and judgements! while here 1 will
e#2ress things in terms o6 evaluative judgements and beliefs. This assumes that attitudes
can be adeBuatel3 re2resented as evaluative belie6s! not 2retending thereb3 to resolve an3
substantive Humean concerns regarding the res2ective roles o6 reason and 2assion. 1
regard 7evaluative: as more general than 7moral:! but will use those terms indi66erentl3
save in conte#ts where moralit3 and moral truth s2eci6icall3 are at issue.
The im2licit assum2tion is that the nonnaturalists evaluative belie6s can constitute moral
knowledge onl3 i6 there is a tracking relation between moral truth and the belie6 in it.
02art 6rom a nod to 8obert 'o5ick >)/$ note /-? and the 2resum2tion o6 some kind o6
reliabilit3! Street makes no attem2t to detail the 2articular logic o6 the tracking relationG 1
shall 6ollow suit.
ST0THS: Logicall3 true.
Ste2 /
Ste2 / largel3 re2resents the 6irst horn o6 Streets Darwinian Dilemma. She argues that
without an evolutionarily-explicable tracking relation between moral truths and the
belie6s o6 the nonnaturalist there cannot be any tracking relation:
because it views these evaluative truths as ultimatel3 inde2endent o6 our
evaluative attitudes! the onl3 wa3 6or realism both to acce2t that those attitudes
have been dee2l3 in6luenced b3 evolutionar3 causes and to avoid seeing these
causes as distorting is 6or it to claim that these causes actuall3 in some wa3
tracked the alleged inde2endent truths. >)*,?.
,
0nd without the bene6it o6 a tracking relation! an3 correlation between the two would be
a 76luke o6 luck: >)//?. 1n other words! without such a tracking relation! there can be no
knowledge o6 moral truth. 1 gloss 7dee2 in6luence: as predominant influence.
,

8egardless! Ste2 / ma3 seem a bit sBuish3: 72redominant: >or 7dee2:? is not 7e#clusive:
< room has been le6t 6or other in6luences to enable tracking. However! she 2oints out
that reason or rationalit3! the most obvious alternative candidate! 2resumabl3 has itsel6
been sha2ed b3 evolution >)/*.)/$?.
$
Ather 2ossible in6luences < e.g. culture!
u2bringing! 2ersonal idios3ncrasies < ma3 seem no more guaranteed to underwrite a
trustworth3 >albeit evolution.6ree? correlation with moral truth.
-
Though this ste2 is clearl3 debatable! 1 regard it as eminentl3 2lausible that! i6
nonnaturalist moral realists have an3 talent at all 6or moral truth! it is through the grace o6
the evolutionar3 2rocess.
+

ST0THS: True.
Ste2 *
Here we are introduced to the second horn o6 Streets Darwinian Dilemma! the cru# o6
which 6ollows in Ste2 ,. The claim is that tracking relations are essentiall3 causal.
%
Ane
might think this 2rett3 much a priori. Humans are causal organismsG hence an3 tracking
the3 are involved in will 2resumabl3 involve causal states or 2rocesses o6 those
organisms. Still! this does not entail that moral truth as such need cause correlative
belie6s.
F
Street usuall3 s2eaks generall3 in terms o6 7scienti6ic: com2atibilit3 instead o6
s2eci6icall3 in terms o6 7causal: signi6icance! 3et her commitment to Ste2 * is clear in the
demand 6or the e#2lanator3 relevance o6 nonnaturalist truth and in the di66iculties she
6inds with its causal inertness. 0s we shall see! 2articularl3 in the discussion o6 Ste2 ,!
the reBuirement o6 causalit3 lies at the heart o6 her argument.
)&
,
Ie will not be concerned here with details regarding how that in6luence is e66ected. See 8ichard Co3ce
>/&)*c? 6or an e#amination o6 some o6 those issues.
$
@evin "rosnan >/&))G $-.$+? takes her to task on this 2oint.
-
C6. Gu3 @ahane >/&))G ))F?: 7whatever 6urther causal stor3 needs to be told J < a stor3 that will
2resumabl3 re6er to culture! histor3 or even 2ractical re6lection < that 6urther stor3 would do nothing to
salvage the e2istemic standing o6 those DevaluativeE belie6s.:
+
A6 course! some 2hiloso2hers 2in their ho2es instead on evading evolutions in6luence: e.g. Singer
>/&&$?! @ahane >/&))?! Sha6er.Landau >/&)/?! Co22 >/&&%? and "ehrends >/&)/?.
%
Certainl3 "rosnan >/&))? 2resu22oses that this is the case.
F
8onald Dworkin >)FF-?! 6or one! challenges a naturalist! causal account o6 moral knowledge.
)&
C6. >)/- note /F?: 7non.naturalist versions o6 value realism J are ultimatel3 6orced J to take a stand on
certain matters o6 scienti6ic e#2lanationJ. DTEhese realists are 6orced J to 2osit a causal role 6or
evaluative truths in the course o6 our s2ecies evolution.:
$
Ste2 * has been 2hrased somewhat art6ull3: 1 will argue that! although intrinsicall3
causall3 inert! moral truth nonetheless 72la3s a causal role:. Averlooking that 2ossibilit3
constitutes a 6undamental de6ect in Streets Dilemma.
ST0THS: True.
Ste2 ,
The soundness o6 Streets argument criticall3 de2ends u2on this ste2. 0nd indeed! it is
2lausible to argue that moral truth is not needed to e#2lain the natural selection o6
evaluative belie6s! and that the intrinsic causal inertness o6 nonnatural moral truth
distinguishes it 6rom natural sources o6 danger! e.g. 2redators or 6ires.
))
M3 counter.argument will be that! des2ite the intrinsic causal inertness o6 moral truth! it
can extrinsically acBuire legitimate causal 2owers. Such acquired causal powers are
su66icient 6or the causal role the tracking relation reBuires o6 moral truth. ConseBuentl3! 1
shall argue that both >a? and >b? in Ste2 , are mistaken.
)/
ST0THS: alseK
Ste2 $
The conditional in Ste2 $ is true! but becomes moot given the 6alsit3 o6 both >a? and >b?.
That is! the 2ossibilit3 o6 a causal role 6or moral truth has not been ruled out.
ST0THS: 1rrelevantl3 true.
Ste2s - and +
The conclusions drawn in Ste2s - and + are unsound because o6 the 6alsit3 o6 Ste2 ,.
ST0THS: alse.
Levels o6 Tracking
))
A6 course! it is im2lausible that 2articular! e#2licit evaluative belie6s have been the target o6 ada2tive
selection. 1 2resume the standard account which su22oses that evolution is more directl3 res2onsible 6or
evaluative tendencies or dispositions! which can be re2resented in terms o6 andLor indirectl3 give rise to
s2eci6ic! articulable evaluative belie6s. C6. Dilemma! ))%.)/).
)/
Street actuall3 raises a third obMection in addition to those in >a? and >b?! but it is arguabl3 a swing.and.
miss. She 2oints out that re6erence to evaluative truth cannot account 6or Mudgements which are not morall3
true! e.g. giving 2re6erential treatment to members o6 ones 7in.grou2: >)*/.)**?. "ut realists hardl3 need
su22ose that evaluative truth can e#2lain the evolution o6 Mudgements that are not evaluativel3 true.
-
Lets take a 6resh look at evolutions involvement in human values. 4utting Streets
concerns aside 6or the moment! what seem to be 2lausible wa3s in which the 6orces o6
evolution might have aligned our evaluative belie6s with moral truth= There are two
obvious candidates. irst! 6or some range o6 circumstances! the evaluative belie6s that are
selectivel3 advantageous ma3 match u2 with >or overla2? those that are morall3 trueG call
this external involvement. Second! more directl3! there might be selective advantage in
an inborn abilit3 to determine the truth o6 moral belie6sG call this internal involvement.
These levels o6 involvement are clearl3 distinct: 6or e#am2le! e#ternal involvement is
unwitting in a wa3 that internal involvement is not.
)*
or the 2ur2oses o6 the 6ormer! a
2urel3 re6le#ive commitment to 2articular evaluative tendencies would su66iceG the latter!
b3 contrast! im2licates 6irst.2ersonal ca2abilities o6 deliberation and Mudgement >c6. )/+.
)/%?. 'ow the 6irst kind o6 involvement does naturall3 incline toward the second. That
is! inso6ar as it abets evolutionar3 6itness to believe moral truths! it will also abet 6itness
to have an abilit3 to determine what is morall3 true. Still! we have two di66erent levels at
which the 6orces o6 evolution might in6luence human evaluative belie6s in a morall3
relevant wa3: two di66erent o22ortunities 6or truth.tracking. 0s we shall see! Street
challenges the scienti6ic acce2tabilit3 o6 both o6 these 2ossibilities.
"ut! as we shall also see! she un6ortunatel3 doesnt clearl3 distinguish between them!
6reBuentl3 seeming to 2resume the3 amount to one and the same thing. The3 are
di66erent! o6 course. ;#ternal involvement < the intersection o6 selectivel3 advantageous
Mudgements and morall3 true Mudgements < raises the Buestion o6 whether evolution at the
level of natural selection tracks moral truth. Ihereas internal involvement Buestions the
ca2acit3 or abilit3 o6 a particular, evolved individual organism to track the moral truth.
),

1t is not an es2eciall3 notable kind o6 7emergence: 6or the evolutionar3 2rocess to gi6t
organisms with characteristics that 2rocess does not itsel6 2ossess. 'atural selection is
not sighted! heliotro2ic nor monogamous >etc.?! but that has not 2revented organisms
6rom evolving such characteristics. ;volution! in itsel6! is sim2l3 a fitness.tracking
2rocess.
)$
"ut should a chance mutation ha22en to im2rove moral truth 2erce2tion! an3
circumstantial advantageousness o6 that 2erce2tivit3 will augment the 6itness o6 the
genome involved. So even i6 evolution itsel6 does not track realist moral truth! that
would not mean it could not con6er such a truth.tracking abilit3 on 2articular organisms.
4ut another wa3! the conclusion o6 the 6ollowing s3llogism is a non-sequitor:
;volution does not track moral truth!
The moral 6acult3 is a 2roduct o6 evolution!
)*
Some reliabilists would seem to allow gras2ing the truth to be unwitting! however o#3moronic that ma3
a22ear. 0s best 1 can tell! Sha6er.Landau >/&&*G Cha2s. )).)/? 6or one seems willing to con6er
7knowledge: on belie6s individuals ma3 not think warranted and 2ossibl3 ma3 even think unwarranted! as
long as the3 have acBuired those belie6s via a reliable 2rocess.
),
;ven though these are both kinds o6 evolutionary involvement! 1 will in the seBuel distinguish between
the 7evolutionar3 level: and the 7individual level:. 16 that seems too con6using! re2lace the 6ormer with
7level at which selective 6orces o2erate:! or 7selective level: 6or short.
)$
C6. Sha6er.Landau >/&)/G )$?: 706ter all! such Devolutionar3E 6orces will be 2ushing us to do#astic
2ractices that are ada2tive! regardless o6 whether those 2ractices issue in true belie6s.: Singer >/&&$G *,/?
makes a similar remark: 7The direction o6 evolution neither 6ollows! nor has an3 necessar3 connection
with! the 2ath o6 moral 2rogress.:
+
There6ore! the moral 6acult3 does not track moral truth.
)-
So it is one thing to ask whether evolutionar3 6orces are in6luenced b3 moral truth! and
Buite another to ask whether 2articular >evolved? individuals are ca2able o6 gras2ing that
truth. To a22reciate Streets ambiguit3 on the to2ic! consider this 2assage:
1t is actuall3 Buite clear! the realist might sa3! how we should understand the
relation between selective 2ressures and inde2endent evaluative truths. The
answer is this: we ma3 understand these evolutionary causes as having tracked
the truthG we ma3 understand the relation in Buestion to be a tracking relation.
The realist might elaborate on this as 6ollows. Surel3! he or she might sa3! it is
advantageous to recognie evaluative truthsG surel3 it 2romotes one!s survival J.
>)/$G em2hasis added?.
The 2assage begins talking about evolutionar3 causes tracking the truth! and ends u2
talking about an individual realists recogni5ing the truth.
)+
'ow one might contend that
these are intimatel3 related! e.g. that re6erence to 7evolutionar3 causes: is Must an abstract
wa3 o6 alluding to abilities o6 the individual. However! that ma3 be a bit o6 a stretch!
es2eciall3 since im2osing that clari6ication undercuts Streets distinction between
tracking and ada2tive link accounts >see below?.
)%
8egardless! e#ternal and internal
involvement do raise se2arate Buestions regarding the relation between evolution and
moral truth. 1n 2articular! Streets concerns with regard to parsimony! e#2ressed in Ste2
,>a?! seem 2rimaril3 to raise truth.tracking issues at the evolutionar3 level! whereas
concerns in ,>b? with regard to what she calls clarity < the 2roblematic relevance o6
causall3 inert moral truth < a22ear to 6ocus largel3 on the individual level. Ie shall 6ind
that the di66iculties with her argument derive in no small wa3 6rom the 6ailure to clari63
which level o6 tracking is at issue.
Ste2 ,>a? and ;#ternal 1nvolvement
)-
0rguabl3! this is the reasoning in Co3ce >/&)/a?. Taking 7intuition: to be a truth.tracking 6acult3! the
same holds 6or the 7general schema 6or debunking arguments: in @ahane >/&))G )))?.
)+
Street is not the onl3 one guilt3 o6 such a con6lation. Com2are Clarke.Doane >/&)/G *)F?: 7The second
claim that 6alls out o6 the 2remise that our moral belie6s are the 2roducts o6 Nnon.truth.tracking
evolutionar3 6orces is that we were not selected to have true moral belie6s >or selected to have cognitive
mechanisms that entail dis2ositions to 6orm reliable 2rimitive belie6.like re2resentations o6 moral states o6
a66airs?.: 0gain! 6rom the 6act that evolution itsel6 is non.truth.tracking it hardl3 6ollows that the cognitive
mechanisms individual organisms thereb3 acBuire cannot track moral truth. 1n addition to Street and
Clarke.Doane! con6lation o6 truth.tracking levels can be 6ound in Co3ce >/&)/a?! @ahane >/&))?! and
Sha6er.Landau >/&)/?.
)%
1n this res2ect! it is revealing that Street 6inds a 7dee2 analog3: between re6le#ive res2onses and
evaluative Mudgements >)/%? < is recognition o6 moral truth something 2ossibl3 reflexive= The 6unctional
similarit3 on which she remarks is relevant onl3 on a level in which the overla2 o6 selective advantage and
moral truth is more im2ortant than the manner in which it has been achieved.
%
Ste2 ,>a? claims that 7ever3 relevant causal role a66ecting evaluative belie6s has alread3
been a22ro2riated b3 evolutionar3 in6luence.: Street e#2licitl3 acknowledges e#ternal
causal involvement:
06ter all! we think that a lot o6 our evaluative Mudgments are true. Ie also think
that the content o6 man3 o6 these same evaluative Mudgments has been in6luenced
b3 natural selection. This degree o6 overlap between the content o6 evaluative
truth and the content o6 the Mudgments that natural selection 2ushed us in the
direction o6 making begs 6or an e#2lanation. >)/$G em2hasis added?.
1ndeed! this 2oint is essentiall3 a restatement o6 what she regards as the 76irst 2remise: o6
her Darwinian Dilemma: 7the 6orces o6 natural selection have had a tremendous
in6luence on the content o6 human evaluative Mudgements: >))*?.
)F
1t constitutes as well
her initial characteri5ation o6 the realists tracking account: 7the evaluative Mudgments
that it 2roved most selectivel3 advantageous to make are! in general! 2recisel3 those
evaluative Mudgments which are true: >)/-?. However! she soon u2s the ante and
understands the realists account to reBuire! not Must an overla2 between advantageousness
and moral truth! but that the moral truth cause that overla2: 7it is 2recisel3 these
Dinde2endent evaluativeE truths that the tracking account invokes to e#2lain wh3 making
certain evaluative Mudgments rather than others con6erred advantages in the struggle to
survive and re2roduce: >)/F?. 0braham Graber >/&)/G $F*? considers this additional
reBuirement a 7dialectical sli2: but 1 would chalk it u2 instead to awkward e#2osition.
or Street elsewhere makes clear she believes that what distinguishes the realist view is
not the 2osit o6 overla2 as such but a mistaken view about its genesis:
"oth accounts o66er an e#2lanation o6 wh3 it is no coincidence that there is
signi6icant overla2 between evaluative truths and the kinds o6 evaluative
Mudgments that natural selection would have 2ushed us in the direction o6. The
di66erence is that the antirealist account o6 the overla2 is consistent with science.
>)$,?.
She su22oses that on the realists account moral truth must somehow be invoked to
e#2lain wh3 natural selection 72ushed us: in its direction. However! natural selection
alread3 accounts 6or that direction! with no need 6or an3 assistG that is! the evaluative
belie6s in Buestion were not selected because the3 re2resent moral truths but because the3
were 6itness.enhancing. 7Thus! the ada2tive link account e#2lains the wides2read
2resence o6 certain values in the human 2o2ulation more 2arsimoniousl3! without an3
need to 2osit a role 6or evaluative truth: >)/F?.
Des2ite the 2ossibl3 misleading lead.in! 1 believe Street has a 2oint. or mere overla2
a22ears to 6all 6ar short o6 tracking. Iere it caused b3 and there6ore res2onsive to moral
truth! thats another thing entirel3 < that might indeed lend credence to the claim that
tracking was taking 2lace. "ut surel3 she is correct in believing that this is not the case.
'onnaturalist moral truth is intrinsicall3 inert: in itself it cannot 7e#2lain wh3 making
certain evaluative Mudgments rather than others con6erred advantages in the struggle to
)F
Streets 6irst 2remise shows u2 as a 2resu22osition in Ste2 / above.
F
survive and re2roduce: >)/F?. Ihile moral truth might 7e#2lain: wh3 one evaluative
Mudgement is right rather than another! as such it doesnt e#2lain an3thing that ha22ens in
the worldG in 0ristotelian terms! moral truth re2resents a formal rather than an efficient
cause. 1t can characteri5e or identi63 such ha22enings in terms o6 evaluative
characteristics! but to do so is not to >e66icientl3? cause those ha22enings. To claim that
in certain circumstances moral belie6s 2ossess selective advantage is not unlike sa3ing
that in certain circumstances a sto22ed clock tells the right time >i.e.! the two times a da3
it ha22ens to be right?. Cust as we would discount such trivial 7time tracking:! it is
reasonable that we should also be sus2icious o6 the idea that e#ternal involvement as such
re2resents a kind o6 moral truth.tracking.
However! some authors < e.g. ;noch >/&)&?! Iielenberg >/&)&? and "rosnan >/&))? <
have suggested a 7third 6actor: a22roach 6or getting around the intrinsic causal inertness
o6 moral truth. 1t doesnt matter that moral truths themselves are inca2able o6 bringing
about correlative belie6s! the3 argue! i6 both truths and matching belie6s are brought about
b3 a common third 6actor.
/&
David ;noch dubs this 72re.established harmon3: >/&)&G
,)*?. There are di66erences as to how this works out! but the3 are irrelevant to the
general 2roblem with any such account: vi5. the idea that a natural 6actor can cause a
moral truth. or! Must as moral truths are causall3 inert! mutatis mutandis causal truths are
normatively inert. To see this! lets look more closel3 at "rosnans version o6 the stor3.
1n a diagram >/&))G -&? he indicates that
The 6itness o6 the belie6 that 7Coo2eration is morall3 good:
< his third 6actor < causes both
" The belie6 that 7Coo2eration is morall3 good:
and its >de6lationar3? truth:
T Coo2eration is morall3 good.
/)

>The labels are mine.? 0nd the 6itness o6 the belie6 that coo2eration is morall3 good does
lead! via natural selection! to the 2o2ularit3 o6 that belie6G that is! does indeed cause ".
"ut does not cause T! the moral goodness o6 coo2eration. 1n 6act! onl3 causes >the
de6lationar3 truth o6?
C Coo2eration 2romotes wellbeing.
/&
See Co3ce >/&)/a? 6or a discussion o6 this a22roach.
/)
1 have altered "rosnans e#am2le to eliminate a reliance on grou2 selection! something both controversial
>see Ste2hen 4inker >/&)/?? and seemingl3 unnecessar3. 1nstead o6 7causing: "rosnan s2eaks o6
72robabilit3 raising:! but since that raising o6 2robabilit3 is 2resumabl3 caused! it amounts to the same
thing.
)&
or C to im2licate T reBuires an additional! substantive normative assum2tion! vi5.
"rosnans 6undamental 2rinci2le: 7whats morall3 good has to do with behaviors that
2romote rather than hinder wellbeing: >/&))G -&?! i.e. >sim2li63ing?
4" The 2romotion o6 wellbeing is morall3 good.
So we need C and 4" to get T. 0nd! o6 course! normative claims like 4" are the ver3
nub o6 the issue. 'o one is seriousl3 dis2uting C! whether coo2eration can augment
wellbeing. However! there are dis2utes regarding the substance o6 moral truthG as Street
notes! there is a 7huge universe o6 logicall3 2ossible evaluative Mudgements and truths:
>)//?. So the crucial 6actor in bringing about T < 7Coo2eration is morall3 good: < is
4". "ut unless we have stumbled u2on some new wa3 around Humes stricture against
deriving oughts 6rom iss! natural 6actors like are inca2able o6 causing the truth o6
substantive moral 2rinci2les like 4". Since T de2ends on 4"! is conseBuentl3
inca2able o6 bringing about T. ;ver3 2ro2osed third 6actor e#2lanation will run u2
against the same 2roblem: causal e#2lanations in themselves are normativel3 inert! and
do not and cannot im2l3 an3thing o6 moral substance. ConseBuentl3! there is no 2re.
established harmon3: there is no >e66icient? cause o6 moral truthG there6ore! there is no
common cause o6 both moral truths and belief in moral truthsG and there6ore! there is no
third 6actor causall3 securing a reliable correlation between the two.
'omologicall3 0cBuired Causal 4owers
ConseBuentl3! Street has legitimate grounds 6or doubting that e#ternal involvement < the
overla2 o6 selectivel3 advantageous evaluative belie6s with those that are morall3 correct
< reveals a 6orm o6 truth.tracking. "ut it does not 6ollow that the nonnaturalists
inde2endent evaluative truths have no causal relevance 6or the 2rocess o6 evolutionK or
it can be claimed that in some circumstances doing what is right is selectivel3
advantageous! a claim that ascribes doing what is right the causal 2ower o6 evolutionar3
6itness. To see this reBuires e#2osing a common misconce2tion regarding the di66erence
between naturalism and nonnaturalism when it comes to the causal signi6icance o6 moral
value. Street argues that 7Since value naturalists construe evaluative 6acts as natural 6acts
with causal 2owers! it is much more com2rehensible how gras2ing such 6acts could have
had an im2act on re2roductive success: >)*)?.
//
1n other words! on a naturalist account it
seems clear how moral attributes can have causal e66ects: the3 are logicall3 identi6ied
with natural attributes! which have causal 2owers as such. "ut nonnaturalists also
su22ose a necessar3 correlation with natural attributes. 1t is Must that on their account the
necessit3 is synthetic rather than analytic.
/*

Ie can re2resent the! or a! undamental 4rinci2le o6 a realist moral view as 6ollows:
//
Co3ce >/&&-G Cha2. -? also subscribes to that misconce2tion! as well as ;noch >/&)&G ,//? and Sha6er.
Landau >/&&*G %,! )&$.)&-?! although the latter e66ectivel3 undercuts it with the notion o6 inherited causal
2owers.
/*
C6. Sha6er.Landau >/&)/G *&.*)? on the im2ortance o6 7s3nthetic a 2riori: moral knowledge.
))
4 " O #!
where 7": is a moral attribute! 7#: a natural attribute! and 7O: re2resents some kind o6
law.like relation between the two.
/,
or the naturalist! 7O: can be understood as 7Pd6:.
/$

or the nonnaturalist! it can be understood as re2resenting a nomological relation! i.e. a
nonlogical counter6actual.su22orting relationG 6or e#am2le! i6 it had been " it would have
been #! or had it not been "! it wouldnt have been #.
/-
The 2resum2tion here is that! as
the s3mbol 7O: suggests! the nomologicalit3 in 4 is bidirectionalG that is! # is both
su66icient and necessar3 6or ".
/+
Hence6orth! we will inter2ret 7O: to connote such a
nomological relation.
/%
Causal claims are 2aradigmatic e#am2les o6 nomological
relations! 3et o6 course 4 6or the nonnaturalist is not causal.
/F
or the latter! " does not
re2resent some es2eciall3 subtle natural in6luence but a characteristic o6 an utterl3
di66erent kind! e.g. one im2uting action.guiding or reason.giving relevance. or the
nonnaturalist! there6ore! 4 re2resents neither a natural nor an anal3tic truth but a truth
that is nomologically necessary.
So on either realist view! whether naturalist or nonnaturalist! there is a necessary
connection between moral and natural attributes. ConseBuentl3! it is a misconce2tion to
su22ose that the nonnaturalist! unlike the naturalist! is 2recluded 6rom claiming causal
2owers 6or moral attributes. or the nonnaturalist! however! these are not intrinsic
2owers but extrinsic: moral attributes! though in themselves causall3 inert! can acquire
causal 2owers through their nomological relations with natural attributes. 0s we shall
see! this is a sim2le conseBuence o6 the transitivit3 o6 the nomological relation. Take! 6or
e#am2le! a nonnaturalism that 2osits this 6undamental nomological truth:
4) 8ightness O coo2erativeness.
1n this instance o6 4! the moral attribute " P 7rightness: and the natural attribute
# P 7coo2erativeness:. 1n less a66ected ;nglish one might sa3 7Coo2erativeness is >what
is? right.: ;#actl3 what coo2erativeness is! is something we need not concern ourselves
with! so long as it can be e#2licated naturalisticall3.
*&
16 4) seems insu66icientl3
2lausible a version o6 moral realism! readers ma3 substitute whatever natural limning
/,
4 is not that di66erent 6rom Co3ces 4/ >/&&-G )$$?! though he sees 4/ as essentiall3 naturalistic.
/$
Street calls this a 7natural.normative identit3: in Dilemma and >/&&%?.
/-
@im >)FF/G )).)/? adds 72roMectibilit3: as a test 6or nomologicalit3. "ut that gets into what counts as
evidence 6or such relations! and 1 am not concerned to e#2lain how to establish nomological claims like 4.
0 worth3 to2ic! but here given a b3e. 1 onl3 assume some such moral.natural correlations are essential to
realist moral views.
/+
The nomological relation 2osited here seems Buite similar to @ims >)FF/? 7nomological coe#tensivit3:
and Sha6er.Landaus 7necessar3 coe#tension: >/&&*G Cha2. ,? . 'aturalists! o6 course! would 2re6er a
one.man3 relation between moral and natural characteristics as a bulwark against reductionism >not so 6ast!
sa3s @im?G but the construal o6 4 suggested here! albeit one.one! hardl3 raises the 2ossibilit3 o6 a
nonnatural 2ro2ert3 being reduced to a natural one. Such attribute correlations hardl3 2ur2ort attribute
identities.
/%
There are alternative inter2retations 6or the nonnaturalist! and 6or the naturalist as well.
/F
1n addition to an3thing else! causal relations have an as3mmetric tem2oral ordering which nomological
relations as such do not.
*&
Michael Huemer >/&&$G /)%./)F? has a nice account o6 coo2erativeness in terms o6 6airness.
)/
the3 6ind 2re6erable. 4resumabl3! an3 substantive ethics will have some natural content!
otherwise it would be inca2able o6 non.tendentiousl3 identi63ing instances o6 right and
wrong.
'ow! given the >lets su22ose? truth o6 evolutionar3 science that
4) Coo2erativeness in certain circumstances is selectivel3 advantageous!
we can derive! 6rom 4) and 4)!
C) 8ightness in certain circumstances is selectivel3 advantageous.
That is to sa3! the nomological relation between rightness and coo2erativeness 2ostulated
b3 4) warrants ascribing the 6ormer the causal ca2abilities o6 the latter. ormall3! i6
0 O " and " Q C! then 0 Q C. or: i6 it would be " i6 and onl3 i6 it were 0 and i6 it
were " then it would be C! then i6 it were 0 then it would be C. More generall3!
nomological relations are transitive.
C) ascribes to doing what is right the causal 2ower o6 selective advantageK
*)
0nd this
conclusion! that rightness can con6er 6itness! is not a mistaken or misleading attribution.
0ll the cards are on the table: its clear that natural characteristics do all the causal workG
moral characteristics add no e#tra Rtiological 7oom2h:. $s such the3 do not causall3
7overdetermine: < the3 do not causally determine anything. This contrasts with 8uss
Sha6er.Landaus >/&&*? account o6 a similar kind o6 acBuired causal abilit3! deriving 6rom
Caegwon @ims >)FF/? treatment o6 causal 2owers in the conte#t o6 the mindLbod3
relation. @im 2ro2oses a 7Causal 1nheritance 4rinci2le: according to which the causal
2owers inherited b3 mental 2ro2erties 7are identical with: the 2owers o6 the 2h3sical
2ro2erties with which the3 are correlated. 16 7scienti6ic kinds: are onl3 those with their
own causal 2owers >the 74rinci2le o6 Causal 1ndividuation o6 @inds:?! then this e#cludes
mental 2ro2erties 6rom scienti6ic kinds. Sha6er.Landau analogi5es the moralLnatural
relation with the mindLbod3 relation! but to avoid e2i2henomenal conseBuences 6or moral
>as well as mental? 2ro2erties! he 2osits the3 inherit their own causal 2owers! leading to
an overdetermination he is willing to tolerate. "ut that seems an unnecessar3 >and
irrelevant? du2lication o6 causal 2owers. 0ccording to the view here! a moral attribute "
is not able to bring about an3 2h3sical outcome all by itselfG
*/
it is onl3 on assum2tion o6
a nomological relation with a natural attribute # that " is able to share the causal 2owers
o6 #. This is not so much an inheritance as it is a marriage in which each 2art3 acBuires
legitimate access to the others assets: the natural attribute gains moral signi6icance and
the moral attribute gains natural >causal? signi6icance. 0s an account o6 acBuired causal
2ower! inheritance 2lus overdetermination seems somewhat convoluted com2ared with
the sim2le transitivit3 o6 nomological relations. 16 rightness is related to coo2erativeness
and coo2erativeness is related to selective advantage! then rightness is related to selective
*)
Com2are with 'icholas Sturgeon >)F%,? and Sha6er.Landau >/&&*?.
*/
C6. Sha6er.Landau >/&&*G )&F?: 7it can and o6ten will be true that a given mental event! all b3 itsel6! is
su66icient to cause whatever 2h3sical outcome it does.: He does Buali63 this in a 6ootnote < 7all b3 itsel6 J
constituted as it is: >his em2hasis? < which seems to come down to what the 2resent account considers
e#trinsic! as o22osed to intrinsic! ca2abilit3.
)*
advantage. 1t is because %oan does what is right! in such.and.such circumstances! that
gives her selective advantage over cons2eci6ics who do not.
**
Had she not done what is
right >vi5.! had she not coo2erated?! she would not have enMo3ed that bene6it.
*,

Counter6actual Conditions
0s the 2revious sentence shows! nomological relations automaticall3 2ass some o6 the
subMunctive tests o6 relevance! reliabilit3! sensitivit3! etc. < counter6actualit3 is built into
the relation. 'onetheless! it still seems relevant to ask what it would be like were there
no overlap between belie6s that are selectivel3 advantageous and belie6s that are morall3
true. There are two relevant cases: 6irst! what is selectively advantageous to believe
might be di66erentG and second! what is morally true might be di66erent.
*$
1n the 6irst case
we are su22osing that the course o6 evolution takes a di66erent 2ath. Street raises this
2ossibilit3 >)/&?:
1magine! 6or instance! that we had evolved more along the lines o6 lions! so that
males in relativel3 6reBuent circumstances had a strong unre6lective evaluative
tendenc3 to e#2erience the killing o6 o66s2ring that were not his own as
7demanded: b3 the circumstances! and so that 6emales! in turn! e#2erienced no
strong unre6lective tendenc3 to 7hold it against: a male when he killed her
o66s2ring in such circumstances! on the contrar3 becoming rece2tive to his
advances soon a6terwards.
1n this case! 1 believe the realist has no alternative but to admit that in these
circumstances we could have evolved evaluative tendencies ver3 much in variance 6rom
the moral truth.
*-
"ut so what= 0s Ialter Sinnott.0rmstrong >/&&-G ,,? 2oints out! the
unreliabilit3 o6 evaluative belie6s in im2ossible 7counter6actual worlds: is dubiousl3
relevant to their reliabilit3 in the actual world:
i6 we live in a world with moral 6acts! and our moral belie6s are actuall3 reliable
in this world! then the 6act that our moral belie6s would be 6alse in a ver3 di66erent
2ossible world without moral 6acts need not make our moral belie6s unMusti6ied in
this world.
Ie are 6ortunate enough in this world to rea2 the bene6its o6 the overla2 o6 selective
advantageousness and moral truthG the 2roblems o6 2ossible worlds are not our own.
**
There has been much debate over the legitimac3 o6 claims like this! es2eciall3 in terms o6 when or
whether natural su2ervenience base 2ro2erties >e.g. coo2erativeness? render moral su2ervening 2ro2erties
>e.g. rightness? e2i2henomenalG see Loeb >/&&$?. 1 regard that a22roach as misdirected! com2ared with
nomologicalit3! but wont tr3 to de6end that o2inion here.
*,
@arl Scha6ers >/&)&G *.)? treatment o6 the relation between normative and non.normative 2ro2erties is
not unsimilar to m3 treatment o6 the relation between natural and moral attributesG his indirect sensitivity
seems akin to acquired nomological powers.
*$
A6 course! both might be di66erent! but that raises no se2arate issues on its own.
*-
1ndeed! Street regards this as a test o6 true moral realism >)*+?G she sa3s this s2eci6icall3 o6 naturalism!
but the argument with minor changes would seem to a22l3 eBuall3 to nonnaturalism.
),
1n the second case! however! we are su22osing that the course o6 evolution continues to
bring about e.g. the belie6 that 8ightness O Coo2erativeness! but that the moral truth
instead >im2ossibl3? is 8ightness O #&! where #& is e.g. lion.ethics or 2s3cho2athic
cruelt3 >the 7ideall3 coherent Caligula:?. Street a22ears to raise this 2ossibilit3 with
res2ect to the 7tracking account: she ascribes to the realist >discussed in more detail later
on?: 7how does the tracking account e#2lain the remarkable coincidence that so man3 o6
the truths it 2osits turn out to be J the ver3 same Mudgments we would e#2ect to see i6
our Mudgments had been selected on those Devolutionar3E grounds alone! regardless o6
their truth=: >)*/?.
*+
Iere coo2eration not right! wouldnt it still be Must as
advantageous= The immediate res2onse! su22osing the nonnaturalism o6 4)! is that it is
not nomologically possible 6or coo2erativeness not to be right. The im2ossibilit3 o6 the
antecedents in such claims would a22ear to render them irrelevant i6 not incoherent.
*%

Custin Clarke.Doane >/&)/? has suggested that this res2onse is 2remature! that at least
some su22osed kinds o6 im2ossibilit3 arent automaticall3 unintelligible. "ut even a
tolerance o6 im2ossibilities seems o6 no hel2. Su22osing that coo2erativeness is wrong
sim2l3 begs the Buestion with res2ect to 4) realismG it is no argument against it.
'evertheless! there does seem to be a 2lausible sense in which one can claim 7had the
moral truths been ver3 di66erent! our moral belie6s would have been the same: >Clarke.
Doane >/&)/G */,??. Since the nomological connection o6 moral attributes to natural
attributes has no relevance 6or the causal 2rocesses o6 evolution! it does not matter where
the3 connect u2 or whether the3 connect u2 at all < we would still evolve the same
evaluative belie6s. This does show that evolutionar3 6orces do not track moral truthG but!
as we shall see! it does not show that individual organisms cannot evolve the abilit3 to
track moral truth < so long as there actuall3 is overla2.
The Signi6icance o6 'omological 4owers
The nomologicall3 acBuired causal relevance we have discussed de2ends on the
assum2tion o6 normative realism: given some version o6 nonnaturalism! we have
trans2arent grounds 6or ascribing acBuired causal 2owers to moral attributes. 0nd what
holds 6or moral attributes holds 6or moral truths. 16 Coans rightness has acBuired causal
2ower then the 6act or truth that Coan did what is right has acBuired causal 2ower! e.g. in a
situation in which her coo2erativeness wins the da3. A6 course the3 are not intrinsic
2owers! but the3 are legitimatel3 2ossessed nonetheless. 1n other words! while moral
truth does not bring about the overla2 between what is moral and what is selectivel3
advantageous! on the realists view that overla2 does lead to moral attributes and truths
acBuiring causal 2owers. 16 one rules out ever3 instantiation o6 4 then indeed there is no
causal role 6or moral truth! but that sim2l3 begs the Buestion against the nonnaturalist.
An the other hand! i6 one allows e.g. 4)! then the relevance o6 evolutionar3 in6luences
on human evaluative belie6s does not e#clude the relevance o6 moral value but rather
embodies it: as demonstrated b3 the in6erence o6 C) 6rom 4). There6ore! while Street
*+
C6. Michael 8use and ;dward A. Iilson >)F%-G )%+?: 7even i6 e#ternal ethical 2remises did not e#ist! we
would go on thinking about right and wrong the wa3 that we do.:
*%
See 6or e#am2le Iielenberg >/&)&?! Sha6er.Landau >/&)/?! Sturgeon >)F%,? and Derek 4ar6it! >/&&-?.
)$
ma3 be correct in reMecting e#ternal involvement as a kind o6 moral truth.tracking! it does
not 6ollow that on the realists view there is no causal relevance to moral value.
ConseBuentl3! >a? in Ste2 , < that moral truth cannot 2la3 a causal role because ever3
relevant causal role regarding evaluative belie6s has alread3 been a22ro2riated b3
evolutionar3 in6luence < is 6alse.
1t is im2ortant to reSm2hasi5e that these nomologicall3 acBuired causal 2owers are all
de2endent u2on the assum2tion o6 something like 4)! vi5. a nomological connection
between moral and natural attributes. Such normativel3 substantive assum2tions are
2ermissible in the second horn o6 Streets Dilemma < indeed it is 2recisel3 to avoid
ske2ticism in that regard that she sees horn two as 7the more 2lausible route 6or the realist
to take: >)/$?. "ut the3 remain com2letel3 irrelevant to evolutionar3 science.
*F
The
scientist is looking 6or nomological relations with naturalistic relataG relations with moral
2ro2erties or attributes are irrelevant to that task. So in that res2ect a 2urel3 scienti6ic
account is indeed more 2arsimonious: it can 2roceed without an3 assum2tions as to the
substance o6 moral truth. Iith res2ect to some normative view o6 the 6orm 7" O #:
science is onl3 concerned with the natural attribute #. That there is a moral attribute "
nomologicall3 related to # lies entirel3 outside its dominion: it cannot have the least
e66ect on the natural 2ro2erties or behavior o6 #. An the nonnaturalists view! the
6unction o6 moral truth is not to 2rovide a scientific explanation o6 moral belie6s! but
rather a normative justification o6 them.
,&
"ut being given e.g. 4) < should the realist be
in 6act correct < legitimi5es a kind o6 evaluative overlay 6or characteri5ations o6 the
causal 2rocess: again! as seen in the in6erence o6 C) 6rom 4). So this view o6 the causal
signi6icance o6 moral attributes and 6acts amounts to a double.edged sword. irst! it is
conceded that the3 are intrinsically causall3 ine66icacious! causall3 inert: irrelevant to the
scienti6ic account o6 the genealog3 o6 evaluative belie6s!
,)
and indeed deliberatel3 so.
"ut second! unless the Buestion is begged against realism! some claim like 4) ma3 be
assumed to be true! in which case moral attributes and truths extrinsically acBuire causal
signi6icance. 1n which case what is wrong can hurt youG the signi6icance o6 this will
become clear in the ne#t section.
Ste2 ,>b? and 1nternal 1nvolvement

0ccording to Ste2 ,>b?! 7moral truth is causall3 inert and inca2able o6 wielding causal
in6luence.: 1n our 2revious discussion we have alread3 seen that this is technically 6alse.
"ut we have also seen that the nomologicall3 acBuired causal 2owers 2osited there do not
su66ice 6or the task o6 moral truth.tracking. So i6 we inter2ret ,>b? as claiming that moral
truth is inca2able o6 wielding the kind of causal influence needed for truth-tracking! then
*F
1 would argue that Sturgeon >)F%,G +/.+*? con6lates the Buestion o6 whether >given some instance o6 4?
one can rel3 u2on moral attributes in causal e#2lanations! with the Buestion o6 whether one need rel3 u2on
those attributes. Ane can but one needntG scienti6icall3 the3 are dis2ensable and irrelevant.
,&
C6. 'agel >)F%&G )), note $?: 7The claim that certain reasons e#ist is a normative claim! not a claim
about the best e#2lanation o6 an3thing.: 1 see this as 2rett3 much the essence o6 nonnaturalism.
,)
This more or less s2lits the di66erence on the Buestion o6 whether moral 6acts are causall3 e66icacious.
See e.g. Harman >)F++?! Sturgeon >)F%,?! Sha6er.Landau >/&&*?! Loeb >/&&$?! Addie >/&&$? and Co3ce
>/&&-?. The answer here: intrinsicall3 no! e#trinsicall3 3es.
)-
the Mur3s still out. Street argues that the causal inertness o6 nonnaturalist moral truth
renders it irrelevant and intangible to evolutionar3 6orces. She asks! 7;#actl3 wh3 would
it 2romote an organisms re2roductive success to gras2 the inde2endent evaluative truths
2osited b3 the realist=: >)*&?. Ane might naivel3 su22ose an3 truths to be inherentl3
use6ul! but Street e#2lains there are truths and then there are truths. An the one hand!
there are
truths about a creatures mani6est surroundings < 6or e#am2le! that there is a 6ire
raging in 6ront o6 it! or a 2redator rushing toward it. 1t is 2er6ectl3 clear wh3 it
tends to 2romote re2roductive success 6or a creature to gras2 such truths: the 6ire
might burn it to a cris2G the 2redator might eat it u2. >)*&?.
"ut! on the other hand! there can be e#tremel3 recondite truths! e.g. 7about the 2resence
or absence o6 electromagnetic wavelengths o6 the lowest 6reBuencies:! which might be
so 6ar 6rom use6ul as to make their acBuisition 72ositivel3 disadvantageous: >)*&?.
So where on the advantageousness scale 6all the moral truths o6 the nonnaturalist realist:
71n what wa3 then would it have 2romoted the re2roductive success o6 our ancestors to
gras2 them=: >)*&.)*)?. Streets assessment:
To sa3 that these truths could kill 3ou or maim 3ou! like a 2redator or 6ire! would
be one kind o6 answer! since it makes it clear how recogni5ing them could be
advantageous. "ut such an answer is clearl3 not available in the case o6 the
inde2endent irreducibl3 normative truths 2osited b3 the non.naturalist realists.
>)*)?.
'ote that it is because moral truth is in itsel6 causall3 inert that she believes recogni5ing
it is pro tanto causall3 irrelevant: she evidentl3 believes the latter 6ollows 6rom the
6ormer. Ane cons2icuous oddit3! however! is her analogi5ing o6 moral truth with li6e.
endangering things like 2redators or raging 6ires. 1s the 2roblem with moral truth that it
doesnt su66icientl3 threaten to kill or maim= Given the overla2 between selectivel3
advantageous and morall3 true! surel3 the 2roblem is with moral untruth or moral
ignorance. 1t is not obvious whether this is a dialectical sli2! or 2erha2s even a reudian
sli2. "ut it is worth noting that correcting it 2rett3 much hollows out the 2lausibilit3 o6
her argument:
To sa3 that moral untruths could kill 3ou or maim 3ou! like a 2redator or 6ire!
would be one kind o6 answer! since it makes it clear how recogni5ing moral truth
could be advantageous.
Iould an3 nonnaturalist realist be reluctant to make this kind o6 answer= Consider! 6or
e#am2le! the moral untruth 71 am so virtuous that beasts and 6lames cannot harm me.:
Might not this untruth maim or kill its believer= 'or need we contrive e#am2les: Street
has conceded the overla2 between selective advantage and moral truth! at least 6or some
)+
belie6s in some circumstances. 1t 6ollows logicall3 that there is a corres2onding selective
disadvantage to morall3 ignorant belie6s in those circumstances.
,/

Let us go through this in a little more detail. 1t has been noted that the 2resum2tion o6
some realist normative view! 6or e#am2le 4)! legitimi5es a kind o6 evaluative overla3:
the substitution o6 evaluative attributes 6or natural attributes without loss o6 causal
relevance. 0gain! this is e#em2li6ied b3 the derivation o6 C): 78ightness in certain
circumstances is selectivel3 advantageous.: 1n addition to things like menacing 2redators
or raging 6ires in ones 7mani6est surroundings:! there are also social circumstances!
which is to sa3! situations involving interactions with others < i.e. in which the nature o6
ones coo2erativeness can bear conseBuences 6or ones ada2tive 6itness. 1magine! 6or
e#am2le! a situation in which 6ailure to abide b3 certain standards o6 decorum a66ects
ones abilit3 to strike an advantageous deal. Ar! i6 thats not vivid enough! imagine that
re6using to bow to the king results in being beheaded. 8e6using to bow in that
circumstance is certainl3 a 6ailure to 7coo2erate: in some senseG lets su22ose 6or the sake
o6 argument that this is 7coo2eration: in the same sense as 4). 'ow a22l3 the
evaluative overla3: is it not now 72er6ectl3 clear wh3 it tends to 2romote re2roductive
success: to do what is right when led be6ore the king= Given 4)! or an3 2lausible
realist normative view! o22ortunities 6or doing wrong in social circumstances are Must as
much 2art o6 ones mani6est surroundings as tigers and wild6ires! and 2otentiall3 no less
threatening to ones re2roductive 6itness. Having untrue moral belie6s! and conseBuentl3
doing what is wrong! can hurt 3ou. 1n res2onse to Streets challenge to the realist: this is
7why it is advantageous to a22rehend such truths: >)*&?.
022rehensivel3 0cBuired Causal 4owers
Ihere has her argument gone astra3= 8ecall that Street seemed to in6er the causal
insigni6icance o6 grasping moral truth >or a22rehending! recogni5ing! 2erceiving! etc.?
6rom the intrinsic causal inertness o6 moral truth. 4erha2s it seemed to her: what
2ossible use are im2otent truths= "ut 1 submit she has the logic e#actl3 backwards:
rather! it is because gras2ing moral truth is not intrinsicall3 causall3 inert that moral truth
acBuires causal relevance! vi5. as a necessar3 condition o6 its being gras2ed. Call this
apprehensively acquired causal 2ower! in distinction 6rom the nomologically acquired
causal 2ower discussed earlier. 16 one grants that there ma3 be such a thing as the
inde2endent moral truth envisaged b3 the nonnaturalist and that it ma3 be gras2ed! then
one has granted all that moral truth needs to be able to 2la3 an essential role in the
worlds goings.on. These graspings are states or 2rocesses >or 7mechanisms:? o6 causal
organisms! and the 2ossible im2act on evolutionar3 6itness o6 an abilit3 to have or make
such gras2ings is no more 2u55ling than is the im2act o6 the abilit3 to recogni5e 2redators
or raging 6ires.
,/
$ la Street >)), note )*?! here and elsewhere 1 avail m3sel6 o6 a kind o6 internalism.o6.convenience b3
colla2sing the distinction between having a belie6 and acting on it. 1 do not 2resume such a distinction ma3
not otherwise 2rove use6ul.
)%
0nd! in the second horn o6 her Darwinian Dilemma! Street does indeed grant the
2ossibilit3 o6 gras2ing moral truth: her argument there is not that it cant ha22en but that
such gras2ings 2la3 no legitimate scienti6ic role. Man3 commentaries on Dilemma 6ocus
on the issues it raises regarding the 2ossibilit3 o6 moral knowledge!
,*
and indeed that is
the 6ocus o6 horn one. "ut her 2resum2tion is that moral truth ma3 conceivabl3 be
tracked i6 the realist concedes a relation with evolutionar3 6orces

.
,,
So horn two takes
gras2ing >a.k.a. 2erceiving! a22rehending! recogni5ing! discerning! being aware o6! etc.?
6or granted!
,$!,-
and instead Buestions whether there is an3 2lace 6or it in 7the game o6
scienti6ic e#2lanation: >)$$?:
The realists other o2tion is to claim that there is a relation between evolutionar3
in6luences and inde2endent evaluative truths! namel3 that natural selection
6avored ancestors who were able to gras2 those truths. "ut this account! 1 argue! is
unacce2table on scienti6ic grounds. >)&F?.
An the contrar3! 1 submit! given the e#istence o6 moral truth and the 2ossibilit3 o6
gras2ing it! the nonnaturalist has a 2er6ectl3 straight.6orward scienti6ic e#2lanation o6
wh3 evolution might con6er such a ca2abilit3 on humans. 'ot to 2ut too 6ine a 2oint on
it: i6 morall3 true evaluative belie6s are selectivel3 advantageous! then the abilit3 to
gras2 moral truth will also be selectivel3 advantageous. Street concedes the 6ormerG she
must also concede the latter.
'ow 6rom conte#t it seems 2rett3 clear that Street takes 7gras2ing: >etc.? to im2l3
7tracking:G a6ter all! she calls the view that 2osits gras2ing the 7tracking account:. This
makes Dilemmas second horn a kind o6 ad absurdum argument against tracking:
assuming humans are able to track moral truth Must to demonstrate the scienti6ic
inadeBuac3 and irrelevance o6 that assum2tion. "ut Must in case thats not her intent! in
what 6ollows 7tracking: ma3 be taken to mean no more than 7gras2ing:! allowing that the
latter ma3 6all short o6 what Street might acce2t as genuine tracking. 1t is enough! on our
account! that the e#istence o6 moral truth be essential: vi5.! 3ou cant track >gras2? what
doesnt e#ist. 16 moral truth is logicall3 necessar3 6or gras2ing moral truth and gras2ing
moral truth is causall3 su66icient 6or bene6iting 6rom its 6itness! then moral truth becomes
an essential contributor in rea2ing those bene6its.
,+
That such a gras2ing abilit3 might
,*
or e#am2le! Sha6er.Landau >/&)/?! ;noch >/&)&?! Iielenberg >/&)&? and Scha6er >/&)&?.
,,
Hnlike Streets argument in >/&&+?! where it is no longer su22osed that coo2eration with evolution might
shield one 6rom 2roblems o6 identi63ing moral truth.
,$
1t ma3 be thought nonetheless that this swee2s a 6undamental m3ster3 under the rug: vi5.! the ver3
2ossibilit3 o6 a causal being gras2ing a causall3 inert truth. 0 2ro2er answer would take a book! but the
short answer is this. Consider the ubiBuitous com2uter. 1t is a 2aradigmaticall3 causal entit3! 3et has no
trouble assessing 2urel3 6ormal truths like 7$ T + P )/:. 16 com2uters can do maths surel3 humans can do
ethics.
,-
0lso unlike the 6irst horn >and unlike Street >/&&+??! the second horn does not challenge the 2resum2tion
o6 standard 2rosocial moralit3.
,+
;rik Iielenberg >/&)&? makes a dece2tivel3 similar argument: 7DCertain cognitive 6acultiesE are
res2onsible 6or the 2resence o6 moral rights in that the 2resence o6 the relevant entails the 2resence o6
rights. Thus the connection between the cognitive 6aculties and moral rights is logical. The connection
between cognitive 6aculties and belie6s about moral rights is causal.: However! what he regards as an
7entailment: is not a truth o6 logic but rather a substantive normative claim! vi5. $nybody with the requisite
cognitive faculties has rights. 1 am not tr3ing to establish an3 such claimsG 1 am rather e#2loring the
)F
e#ist 6or moral truth seems pro tanto no more im2lausible than the e#istence o6 like
abilities 6or logic or mathematics >also involving causall3 inert truths?.
,%
8egardless! 1
will assume! as does Street 6or the sake o6 argument! that indeed it can e#ist. 1nso6ar as
acting in accordance with moral truth is selectivel3 advantageous and inso6ar as an abilit3
to track moral truth is 2ossible! then of course that abilit3 will be selectivel3
advantageous. The Buali6ication 7all other things being eBual: is im2licit: overall 6itness
im2oses trade.o66s on di66erent intrinsicall3 desirable traits. "ut we need not get down
into the weeds to a22reciate the Darwinian 2lausibilit3 o6 moral truth.tracking abilities in
organisms that can bene6it 6rom those truths.
Street hersel6 s2eaks o6 the 7Nmechanism o6 evaluative Mudgement: wherein
the link between circumstance and res2onse is 6orged b3 our taking o6 one thing
to be a reason counting in 6avor o6 the other < that is! b3 the e#2erience o6
normativit3 or value. >)/%?.
"ut surel3 there is a di66erence between mere evaluative judgement < taking one thing as
a reason 6or another >2erha2s 2urel3 unre6lectivel3? < and recogniing the moral validity
of taking one thing as a reason 6or another. (et! while 6or the sake o6 argument she grants
the nonnaturalist both morall3 true evaluative Mudgements and the recognition o6 moral
truths! she seemingl3 never entertains the 2ossibilit3 o6 a 7mechanism: 6or the latter.
Ih3 should such a thing not also e#ist= 1ronicall3! in a note Street comes ever.so.close
to outlining a moral recognition mechanism:
wh3 did we evolve this 7normative ca2acit3: as a means o6 6orging links between
circumstance and res2onse instead o6! 6or instance! having such links 6orged
solel3 b3 brute re6le# mechanisms= The answer 2resumabl3 has to do with the
incredible 6le#ibilit3 and 2lasticit3 o6 the 6ormer ca2acit3 as o22osed to re6le#
mechanisms J. >)/% note */?.
'ow how best to achieve that 6le#ibilit3= Su22ose that there is signi6icant overla2
between morall3 true evaluative belie6s and selectivel3 advantageous evaluative belie6s!
and that 2ersons are ca2able o6 2erceiving moral truth. 'ould not that perceptive ability
provide an ideally flexible means of effecting adaptive circumstance-response pairings(
0las! Street never attains this 6inal a2erUu < she is alread3 convinced that neither real
moral truth nor its gras2 can have an3 role to 2la3.
"ut i6 a 7mechanism: 6or 2erceiving moral truth is 2ossible! and i6 genot32es 6avoring the
develo2ment o6 such a mechanism are 2ossible >wh3 not=?! and i6 there is some selective
advantage to morall3 true Mudgements >given?! then ceteris paribus biological beings are
likel3 to develo2 such mechanisms. "oth nomologicall3 acBuired and a22rehensivel3
acBuired causal 2owers 2la3 a role in 6acilitating these moral truth.tracking abilities. The
conseBuences o6 su22osing some such claim is true.
,%
Sha6er.Landau >/&)/G *)? also s2eaks o6 7kinds o6 6acts! such as modal! arithmetic and 2hiloso2hical
ones! J that lack causal 2owers! but are nevertheless knowable:. Street >/&&+! note **? seems willing to
throw mathematical truth under the bus along with moral truth! but one wonders whether she would draw
the line at logical truth.
/&
overla2 between evaluative belie6s that are 6it and evaluative belie6s that are true
>e#ternal involvement? con6ers nomological 2owers on nonnaturalist attributes and truths:
e.g.! rightness in some circumstances becomes selectivel3 advantageous >C) above?.
That advantageousness means that in some circumstances an abilit3 to recogni5e
evaluative truths >internal involvement? will also be selectivel3 advantageous. 'atural
selection will do the rest.
Tracking and 0da2tive Link Com2atibilit3
"ut this is precisely the view that Street believes she has debunkedK 0ccording to her! the
tracking account
o66ers a s2eci6ic h32othesis as to how the course o6 natural selection 2roceeded
and what e#2lains the wides2read 2resence o6 some evaluative Mudgments rather
than others in the human 2o2ulation. 1n 2articular! it sa3s that the 2resence o6
these Mudgments is e#2lained b3 the 6act that these Mudgments are true! and that
the capacity to discern such truths 2roved advantageous 6or the 2ur2oses o6
survival and re2roduction. >)/-G em2hasis added?.
Ih3 does she not take the 2ossibilit3 o6 a ca2acit3 >or 7mechanism:? 6or discerning
moral truth more seriousl3= 1t seems a conseBuence o6 6ailing to distinguish e#ternal
6rom internal involvement! i.e. 6ailing to distinguish whether the truth.tracking in
Buestion is at the evolutionar3 level or at the individual level. or while it is now obvious
that in itsel6 the truth o6 moral Mudgements has no e66ect on natural selection! it is hardl3
obvious that a ca2acit3 to discern such truths will be useless in circumstances in which
true moral Mudgements are selectivel3 advantageous.
Ie have alread3 seen a 2ossible reason wh3 Street elides the distinction between truth.
tracking levels: namel3! the su22osition that the ca2acit3 to discern moral truth must be
causall3 im2otent because moral truth itsel6 is im2otent. 1 have advanced the o22osite: it
is because discerning moral truth is not causall3 im2otent < is in 6act a state or 2rocess or
7mechanism: o6 a causal being < that moral truth! as a necessar3 condition o6 that
discernment! acBuires causal 2otenc3. Her contrar3 su22osition ma3 e#2lain a 6ailure to
recogni5e that! given a ca2abilit3 6or discerning moral truth! the tracking and ada2tive
link accounts become 2er6ectl3 com2atible. Here is Streets descri2tion o6 the di66erence
between the realists tracking account and her 2re6erred stor3:
0ccording to what 1 shall call the adaptive link account! tendencies to make
certain kinds o6 evaluative Mudgments rather than others contributed to our
ancestors re2roductive success not because the3 constituted 2erce2tions o6
inde2endent evaluative truths! but rather because the3 6orged ada2tive links
between our ancestors circumstances and their res2onses to those
circumstancesJ. >)/+G latter em2hases addedG c6. )), note )*?
/)
She 2ur2orts to o66er an incom2atible e#2lanation < but in 6act the two accounts can be
seen as com2lementar3 2arts o6 the same scienti6ic stor3.
,F
;valuative Mudgements can
contribute to re2roductive success because the3 are 2erceived to be true and because that
6orges ada2tive links. Moral truth is so 6ar 6rom being e2i2henomenal! on the realists
view! that on occasion it is the ver3 2erce2tion o6 moral truth that establishes the linkage
between circumstance and behavioral res2onse. Thus! it is the ability to perceive )grasp*
evaluative truth that reconciles the tracking and ada2tive link accounts. The e#istence o6
moral truth is a logicall3 necessar3 condition o6 the abilit3 to 2erceive it! while the abilit3
to 2erceive it can be a causall3 su66icient condition 6or the 6orging o6 a22ro2riate links
between circumstance and res2onse.
There6ore! 2art >b? o6 Ste2 , < that moral truth is causall3 inert and inca2able o6 wielding
causal in6luence < is also 6alse. Ihile intrinsicall3 inert! with nomologicall3 and
a22rehensivel3 acBuired 2owers moral truth has the e#trinsic causal signi6icance reBuisite
6or tracking. 4ut sim2l3: it is because o6 the 6itness o6 morall3 true evaluative belie6s
that the 2erce2tion o6 moral truth becomes selectivel3 advantageous.
Conclusion
The sco2e o6 this essa3 ma3 a22ear disa22ointingl3 narrow. 1 have taken advantage o6
the dialectic in the second horn o6 Streets Dilemma to sim2l3 assume the e#istence o6
realist normative truth and the abilit3 to gras2 it. "ut 6or man3 realists! the crucial
signi6icance o6 her Darwinian Dilemma lies in the horn one concern with the ability to
grasp moral truth: es2eciall3 the reliabilit3 o6 the 2ur2orted correlation between the
moral truth and what is believed to be morall3 true. 1 agree. The realist needs to 2rovide
a convincing! consensus.ins2iring account o6 the substance o6 normative truth and the
manner in which it can be determined < a consummation devoutl3 to be wished. or
those who have embraced this challenge! however! the results do not a22ear uni6orml3
im2ressive. ;noch! 6or e#am2le! wishes to build moral realism on the basis o6 7Survival
is good: >/&)&G ,*&?! "rosnan! as we have seen! de6ends 74romote wellbeing:! while
"ehrends suggests 716 moral realism is true! then we have reason to 2ursue our own
e#istence: >/&)/G F?.
$&
1t seems to me that these are barel3 more than 2ious truisms. 0nd
what is 2articularl3 moral about 2ursuing ones own survival or wellbeing! or 2ursuing
the means to ones ends= Such concerns a22ear more practical than 2rosociall3
normative.
$)
The 6act that the im2licit universal Buanti6ication in these 2rinci2les can be
,F
Co22 >/&&%G )F$?! though he 6ails to clearl3 disentangle the evolutionar3 and individual levels o6 truth.
tracking! also claims com2atibilit3 between tracking and ada2tive link accounts and argues 6or the 6itness o6
a 7gras2ing: abilit3! vi5. a 7ca2acit3 to detect moral truths:. Streets >/&&%? critiBue o6 the latter 6ounders
>as above? on the 6ailure to take into account the non.ada2tive conseBuences o6 moral ignorance.
$&
@nut Ala6 Skarsaune >who idios3ncraticall3 reverses Streets order and calls her second horn 718ST
HA8': and vice versa? o66ers 74leasure is usuall3 good and 2ain is usuall3 bad: >/&))G /*/?. The same
critiBue a22lies.
$)
1t was onl3 a6ter this essa3 was essentiall3 com2lete that 1 read Scott M. Cames >/&&F?! 7The Cavemans
Conscience: ;volution and Moral 8ealism:! which has 2roven a welcome e#ce2tion to the rule. 0s 1
understand it! Cames 6ills in some o6 the normative blanks b3 2osing as a necessar3 condition 6or a realist
4 that it be eBuall3 acce2table to ever3one! where 7acce2table: is determined b3 some rational standard
and need not im2l3 7acce2ted: >i.e.! 2ersons can be unreasonable in their demands?. Ihile this is still
//
e#2ressed using 7we: hardl3 guarantees that the good involved 2ertains to the grou2
instead o6 the individual. 1n short! we seem to have little to com2are with the normative
heft o6 e.g. Hume! @ant! 8awls or Singer. 1t is because the issue o6 the nature o6 moral
truth is so im2ortant in its own right that 1 scant it here. 1t deserves being considered on
its own terms! and not Must as a wa3 around Streets Darwinian Dilemma. 1 have
contented m3sel6 here with tr3ing to clear awa3 some o6 the brush and bracken obscuring
the issue! to make it easier to see what is and what is not at stake in gras2ing moral
truth.
$/
16 this essa3 has been at all success6ul! then normative realists! in 2articular
nonnaturalists! can 2roceed with e66orts to illuminate the nature o6 moral truth without
6earing that! even were the3 to succeed! that accom2lishment would 6all short o6 scienti6ic
res2ectabilit3. or the nonce! that seems sco2e enough.
Clarke.Doane 2oses the 2roblem thus: 7the challenge 6or the moral realist is to e#2lain
our having man3 true moral belie6s! given that those belie6s are the 2roduct o6
evolutionar3 6orces that would be indi66erent to the moral truth: >/&)/G *)*?. The
res2onse here has 6allen into two 2arts. The first part candidl3 admits a res2ect in which
evolution >or indeed an3 2lausible genealogical 2rocess? is undeniabl3 indi66erent to
moral truth. ;ven assuming some realist moral 2rinci2le a la 4! its clear that such a
2rinci2le 2la3s no role in the course o6 evolution. Ihile a natural attribute # ma3 turn
out to be selectivel3 advantageous in some circumstances! the 6act that it ma3 be
nomologicall3 related to moral attribute " does not! and cannot! make an3 di66erence to
the 2rocess o6 evolution.
$*
1n this res2ect moral truth is indeed com2letel3 and utterl3
im2otent. "ut the second part o6 our res2onse 2oints out that the selective
advantageousness o6 # in some circumstances >what 1 have called 7e#ternal
involvement:? im2lies that the belie6 in the 4 >assuming it is a22ro2riatel3 acted u2on?
will have selective advantage. That in turn im2lies that an3 ca2abilit3 an organism
2ossesses 6or determining or gras2ing the 4s truth >what has been called 7internal
involvement:? will also bene6it re2roductive 6itness in those circumstances! as a source o6
a22ro2riate belie6s. This 6inall3 im2lies that! all other things being eBual! organisms will
evolve that ca2abilit3. ;volution is not indi66erent to the moral truth in this 2art o6 the
res2onse. Moral truth does 2la3 a role < but as an essential condition! not as a cause. The
moral truth cannot be gras2ed i6 there is no moral truth to gras2. This is not to su22ose
that the moral truth >e66icientl3? causes its gras2G it cannot < it is intrinsicall3 inert.
$,

Still! given that moral 2rinci2les are true and that 2ersons are able to gras2 them! the
moral nonnaturalist realist has a 2lausible! natural.science.com2atible account o6 how the
e#istence o6 that abilit3 could arise via intrinsicall3 o66.track evolutionar3 6orces.
abstract < we want an account o6 7acce2tabilit3: < it at least entails an essentiall3 prosocial normativit3.
52
1n the words o6 Cohn Locke! 7it is ambition enough to be em2lo3ed as an under.labourer in
clearing ground a little! and removing some o6 the rubbish that lies in the wa3 to knowledge: >7;2istle to
the 8eader:! $n +ssay ,oncerning -uman .nderstanding?.
$*
1nterestingl3! the naturalist a22ears to be in the same boat. The mere 6act that " is logically identi6ied
with # also has no e66ect on the causal behavior or ca2abilit3 o6 #. This again suggests that di66erences
between naturalism and nonnaturalism have been signi6icantl3 overestimatedG alas! a 2oint that cannot be
2ursued 6urther here.
$,
C6. Don Loeb >/&&$G /&-?: 7i6 there are moral 6acts! it could be that we believe that the3 are 6acts
because the3 are 6acts! even i6 the3 do not cause us to believe in them.:
/*
0t the heart o6 Streets Darwinian Dilemma is the relation between evolutionar3 6orces
and the realists inde2endent evaluative truths. An the one hand! i6 3ou 2icture those
truths as essentiall3 se2arate 6rom the evolutionar3 2rocess < inde2endent in that sense <
then it becomes Buestionable what 2ossible in6luence the3 could have on evolution.
Evolutionary forces Evaluative beliefs
Moral truth ?
or the evolutionar3 2rocess is alread3 su66icient to account 6or human evaluative
MudgementsG it needs no assistance 6rom moral truth. Su22osing that that truth
nonetheless contributes a kind o6 overdetermination! as Sha6er.Landau suggests! onl3
la3s bare its un2arsimoniousness. 0nd to22ing it o66! moral truth is intrinsicall3 causall3
inert! so as such it clearl3 couldnt make a di66erence even had it the o22ortunit3.
An the other hand! given that it is 2ossible to gras2 moral truth! a ver3 di66erent 2icture
becomes available.
Evolutionary forces Grasping moral truth Evaluative beliefs
That is! 6or the realist! gras2ing moral truth is an essential 2art o6 the 2rocess whereb3 >at
least some? evaluative belie6s are bestowed b3 evolution. 1nstead o6 com2eting with the
evolutionar3 2rocess! moral truth becomes 2art o6 it. The attitude-independence >stance.
inde2endence! mind.inde2endence! etc.? o6 real moral truth does not entail independence
from the evolutionary process! an3 more than the attitude.inde2endence o6 natural truth
2revents it 6rom 2la3ing an evolutionar3 role.
The bottom line: with the 6alsit3 o6 2arts >a? and >b? o6 Ste2 , o6 Streets argument! there
is no in6erence via Ste2 $ to the lack o6 a causal role 6or moral truth. Ie have 6ound that!
while lacking intrinsic causal 2owers! moral truth does have e#trinsic! acBuired causal
2owers! enough to do the Mob. So the conclusions in Ste2s - and + do not 6ollow: her
Darwinian Dilemma is debunked. There is no scienti6ic reason to discount the relevance
o6 nonnaturalist truth.tracking or the e#istence o6 realist moral knowledge. Still! we have
seen that Street is 2artl3 correct: the overla2 between moral truth and selective advantage
as such does 6all short o6 truth.tracking. Moral truth has nothing to do with creating that
overla2! aside 6rom hel2ing identi63 it. ;volution can lead to moral untruths >e.g.! s2ecial
2rivileges 6or in.grou2 members? as well as moral truths >e.g.! reci2rocal altruism?. 1ts
not es2eciall3 reliable that wa3. Iith evaluative belie6s! sometimes Darwinian 6itness
lines u2 with moralit3 and sometimes it doesnt.
$$
;volutionar3 6orces do not so much
track moral truth as sometimes run across it >c6. )*,?. So 6ar as e#ternal involvement is
concerned! then! Street gets it right < there is no truth.tracking there. 'onetheless! that
does not 2reclude tracking qua internal involvement: vi5.! moral truth.tracking abilities
beBueathed b3 evolution u2on individual organisms. Her argument with regard to the
latter 6ounders on the acquired causal signi6icance o6 moral truth. Su22osing some
$$
C6. @itcher >/&&-G )+)?: 7we have ca2acities 6or 6ellow.6eeling that enable us to assort in J mi#ed.adult
grou2s! but those ca2acities are alwa3s vulnerable in situations where social de6ection would bring an
evident reward.:
/,
nonnaturalist version o6 moralit3! there are evolutionaril3.e#2licable relations that
su22ort truth.tracking! Must not ones dreamt o6 in her 2hiloso2h3. 1n sum! her
e2istemological argument against evaluative realism is unsound: Streets Darwinian
Dilemma 2rovides no good reason to believe the nonnaturalist realist >along with
ever3bod3 else? has not evolved to track the moral truth.
/$
8e6erences
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moral knowledge= 2iology 3 1hilosophy! /->)?! $).-,.
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Co22! David. >/&&%?. Darwinian Ske2ticism 0bout Moral 8ealism. 1hilosophical
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/-
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