Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-114783 December 8, 1994
ROBERT V. TOBIAS, RAMON M. GUZMAN, TERRY T. LIM, GREGORIO D. GABRIEL, and
ROBERTO R. TOBIAS, JR. petitioners,
vs.
HON. CITY MAYOR BENJAMIN S. ABALOS, CITY TREASURER WILLIAM MARCELINO, and
THE SANGGUNIANG PANLUNGSOD, all of the City of Mandaluyong, Metro
Manila, respondents.
Estrella, Bautista & Associates for petitioners.

BIDIN, J.:
Invoking their rights as taxpayers and as residents of Mandaluyong, herein petitioners assail the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Mandaluyong."
Prior to the enactment of the assailed statute, the municipalities of Mandaluyong and San Juan
belonged to only one legislative district. Hon. Ronaldo Zamora, the incumbent congressional
representative of this legislative district, sponsored the bill which eventually became R.A. No. 7675.
President Ramos signed R.A. No. 7675 into law on February 9, 1994.
Pursuant to the Local Government Code of 1991, a plebiscite was held on April 10, 1994. The people
of Mandaluyong were asked whether they approved of the conversion of the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city as provided under R.A. No. 7675. The turnout at the
plebiscite was only 14.41% of the voting population. Nevertheless, 18,621 voted "yes" whereas 7,911
voted "no." By virtue of these results, R.A. No. 7675 was deemed ratified and in effect.
Petitioners now come before this Court, contending that R.A. No. 7675, specifically Article VIII,
Section 49 thereof, is unconstitutional for being violative of three specific provisions of the
Constitution.
Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 provides:
As a highly-urbanized city, the City of Mandaluyong shall have its own legislative district
with the first representative to be elected in the next national elections after the passage
of this Act. The remainder of the former legislative district of San Juan/Mandaluyong
shall become the new legislative district of San Juan with its first representative to be
elected at the same election.
Petitioner's first objection to the aforequoted provision of R.A. No. 7675 is that it contravenes the "one
subject-one bill" rule, as enunciated in Article VI, Section 26(1) of the Constitution, to wit:
Sec. 26(1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which
shall be expressed in the title thereof.
Petitioners allege that the inclusion of the assailed Section 49 in the subject law resulted in the latter
embracing two principal subjects, namely: (1) the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized
city; and (2) the division of the congressional district of San Juan/Mandaluyong into two separate
districts.
Petitioners contend that the second aforestated subject is not germane to the subject matter of R.A.
No. 7675 since the said law treats of the conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city, as
expressed in the title of the law. Therefore, since Section 49 treats of a subject distinct from that
stated in the title of the law, the "one subject-one bill" rule has not been complied with.
Petitioners' second and third objections involve Article VI, Sections 5(1) and (4) of the Constitution,
which provide, to wit:
Sec. 5(1). The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two
hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from
legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila
area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of
a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations.
Sec. 5(4). Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall
make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standard provided in this
section.
Petitioners argue that the division of San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts
under Section 49 of the assailed law has resulted in an increase in the composition of the House of
Representatives beyond that provided in Article VI, Sec. 5(1) of the Constitution. Furthermore,
petitioners contend that said division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the subject
municipalities have attained the minimum population requirements. And finally, petitioners assert that
Section 49 has the effect of preempting the right of Congress to reapportion legislative districts
pursuant to Sec. 5(4) as aforecited.
The contentions are devoid of merit.
Anent the first issue, we agree with the observation of the Solicitor General that the statutory
conversion of Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city with a population of not less than two hundred
fifty thousand indubitably ordains compliance with the "one city-one representative" proviso in the
Constitution:
. . . Each city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province,
shall have at least one representative" (Article VI, Section 5(3), Constitution).
Hence, it is in compliance with the aforestated constitutional mandate that the creation of a separate
congressional district for the City of Mandaluyong is decreed under Article VIII, Section 49 of R.A. No.
7675.
Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong is
not a subject separate and distinct from the subject of its conversion into a highly urbanized city but is
a natural and logical consequence of its conversion into a highly urbanized city. Verily, the title of R.A.
No. 7675, "An Act Converting the Municipality of Mandaluyong Into a Highly Urbanized City of
Mandaluyong" necessarily includes and contemplates the subject treated under Section 49 regarding
the creation of a separate congressional district for Mandaluyong.
Moreover, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule has been invariably adopted by this
court so as not to cripple or impede legislation. Thus, in Sumulong v. Comelec (73 Phil. 288 [1941]),
we ruled that the constitutional requirement as now expressed in Article VI, Section 26(1) "should be
given a practical rather than a technical construction. It should be sufficient compliance with such
requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions are germane to that
general subject."
The liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule had been further elucidated in Lidasan v.
Comelec (21 SCRA 496 [1967]), to wit:
Of course, the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an
enactment, language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title should serve the purpose of
the constitutional demand that it inform the legislators, the persons interested in the
subject of the bill and the public, of the nature, scope and consequences of the
proposed law and its operation" (emphasis supplied).
Proceeding now to the other constitutional issues raised by petitioners to the effect that there is no
mention in the assailed law of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each
attained the minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two legislative
districts, the same does not suffice to strike down the validity of R.A. No. 7675. The said Act enjoys
the presumption of having passed through the regular congressional processes, including due
consideration by the members of Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of
separate legislative districts. At any rate, it is not required that all laws emanating from the legislature
must contain all relevant data considered by Congress in the enactment of said laws.
As to the contention that the assailed law violates the present limit on the number of representatives
as set forth in the Constitution, a reading of the applicable provision, Article VI, Section 5(1), as
aforequoted, shows that the present limit of 250 members is not absolute. The Constitution clearly
provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than 250 members,
"unless otherwise provided by law." The inescapable import of the latter clause is that the present
composition of Congress may be increased, if Congress itself so mandates through a legislative
enactment. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by R.A. No. 7675 is
not unconstitutional.
Thus, in the absence of proof that Mandaluyong and San Juan do not qualify to have separate
legislative districts, the assailed Section 49 of R.A.
No. 7675 must be allowed to stand.
As to the contention that Section 49 of R.A. No. 7675 in effect preempts the right of Congress to
reapportion legislative districts, the said argument borders on the absurd since petitioners overlook
the glaring fact that it was Congress itself which drafted, deliberated upon and enacted the assailed
law, including Section 49 thereof. Congress cannot possibly preempt itself on a right which pertains to
itself.
Aside from the constitutional objections to R.A. No. 7675, petitioners present further arguments
against the validity thereof.
Petitioners contend that the people of San Juan should have been made to participate in the
plebiscite on R.A. No. 7675 as the same involved a change in their legislative district. The contention
is bereft of merit since the principal subject involved in the plebiscite was the conversion of
Mandaluyong into a highly urbanized city. The matter of separate district representation was only
ancillary thereto. Thus, the inhabitants of San Juan were properly excluded from the said plebiscite as
they had nothing to do with the change of status of neighboring Mandaluyong.
Similarly, petitioners' additional argument that the subject law has resulted in "gerrymandering," which
is the practice of creating legislative districts to favor a particular candidate or party, is not worthy of
credence. As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, it should be noted that Rep. Ronaldo
Zamora, the author of the assailed law, is the incumbent representative of the former San
Juan/Mandaluyong district, having consistently won in both localities. By dividing San
Juan/Mandaluyong, Rep. Zamora's constituency has in fact been diminished, which development
could hardly be considered as favorable to him.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 118577 March 7, 1995
JUANITO MARIANO, JR. et al., petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY,
THE MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.
G.R. No. 118627 March 7, 1995
JOHN R. OSMEA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, HON. JEJOMAR BINAY,
MUNICIPAL TREASURER, AND SANGGUNIANG BAYAN OF MAKATI, respondents.

PUNO, J.:
At bench are two (2) petitions assailing certain provisions of Republic Act No. 7854 as
unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional. R.A. No. 7854 is entitled, "An Act Converting the
Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of Makati."
1

G.R. No. 118577 involves a petition for prohibition and declaratory relief. It was filed by petitioners
Juanito Mariano, Jr., Ligaya S. Bautista, Teresita Tibay, Camilo Santos, Frankie Cruz, Ricardo
Pascual, Teresita Abang, Valentina Pitalvero, Rufino Caldoza, Florante Alba, and Perfecto Alba. Of
the petitioners, only Mariano, Jr., is a resident of Makati. The others are residents of Ibayo Ususan,
Taguig, Metro Manila. Suing as taxpayers, they assail as unconstitutional sections 2, 51, and 52 of
R.A. No. 7854 on the following grounds:
1. Section 2 of R.A. No. 7854 did not properly identify the land area or territorial
jurisdiction of Makati by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions, in violation of
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, in relation to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code;
2. Section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 attempts to alter or restart the "three consecutive term"
limit for local elective officials, in violation of Section 8, Article X and Section 7, Article VI
of the Constitution.
3. Section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 is unconstitutional for:
(a) it increased the legislative district of Makati only by special law (the
Charter in violation of the constitutional provision requiring a general
reapportionment law to be passed by Congress within three (3) years
following the return of every census;
(b) the increase in legislative district was not expressed in the title of the
bill; and
(c) the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with
Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990
census), the population of Makati stands at only 450,000.
G.R. No. 118627 was filed by the petitioner John H. Osmea as senator, taxpayer, and concerned
citizen. Petitioner assails section 52 of R.A. No. 7854 as unconstitutional on the same grounds as
aforestated.
We find no merit in the petitions.
I
Section 2, Article I of R.A. No. 7854 delineated the land areas of the proposed city of Makati, thus:
Sec. 2. The City of Makati. The Municipality of Makati shall be converted into a highly
urbanized city to be known as the City of Makati, hereinafter referred to as the
City, which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Makati in
Metropolitan Manila Area over which it has jurisdiction bounded on the northeast by
Pasig River and beyond by the City of Mandaluyong and the Municipality of Pasig; on
the southeast by the municipalities of Pateros and Taguig; on the southwest by the City
of Pasay and the Municipality of Taguig; and, on the northwest, by the City of Manila.
The foregoing provision shall be without prejudice to the resolution by the appropriate
agency or forum of existing boundary disputes or cases involving questions of territorial
jurisdiction between the City of Makati and the adjoining local government units.
(Emphasis supplied)
In G.R. No. 118577, petitioners claim that this delineation violates sections 7 and 450 of the Local
Government Code which require that the area of a local government unit should be made by metes
and bounds with technical descriptions.
2

The importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of a local unit of government
cannot be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial
jurisdiction of a local government unit. It can legitimately exercise powers of government only within
the limits, its acts are ultra vires. Needless to state, any uncertainty in the boundaries of local
government units will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will
prejudice the people's welfare. This is the evil sought to avoided by the Local Government Code in
requiring that the land area of a local government unit must be spelled out in metes and bounds, with
technical descriptions.
Given the facts of the cases at bench, we cannot perceive how this evil can be brought about by the
description made in section 2 of R.A. No. 7854, Petitioners have not demonstrated that the
delineation of the land area of the proposed City of Makati will cause confusion as to its boundaries.
We note that said delineation did not change even by an inch the land area previously covered by
Makati as a municipality. Section 2 did not add, subtract, divide, or multiply the established land area
of Makati. In language that cannot be any clearer, section 2 stated that, the city's land area "shall
comprise the present territory of the municipality."
The deliberations of Congress will reveal that there is a legitimate reason why the land area of the
proposed City of Makati was not defined by metes and bounds, with technical descriptions. At the
time of the consideration of R.A. No. 7854, the territorial dispute between the municipalities of Makati
and Taguig over Fort Bonifacio was under court litigation. Out of a becoming sense of respect to co-
equal department of government, legislators felt that the dispute should be left to the courts to decide.
They did not want to foreclose the dispute by making a legislative finding of fact which could decide
the issue. This would have ensued if they defined the land area of the proposed city by its exact
metes and bounds, with technical descriptions.
3
We take judicial notice of the fact that Congress has
also refrained from using the metes and bounds description of land areas of other local government
units with unsettled boundary disputes.
4

We hold that the existence of a boundary dispute does not per se present an insurmountable difficulty
which will prevent Congress from defining with reasonable certitude the territorial jurisdiction of a local
government unit. In the cases at bench, Congress maintained the existing boundaries of the
proposed City of Makati but as an act of fairness, made them subject to the ultimate resolution by the
courts. Considering these peculiar circumstances, we are not prepared to hold that section 2 of R.A.
No. 7854 is unconstitutional. We sustain the submission of the Solicitor General in this regard, viz.:
Going now to Sections 7 and 450 of the Local Government Code, it is beyond cavil that
the requirement stated therein, viz.: "the territorial jurisdiction of newly created or
converted cities should be described by meted and bounds, with technical descriptions"
was made in order to provide a means by which the area of said cities may be
reasonably ascertained. In other words, the requirement on metes and bounds was
meant merely as tool in the establishment of local government units. It is not an end in
itself. Ergo, so long as the territorial jurisdiction of a city may be reasonably
ascertained, i.e., by referring to common boundaries with neighboring municipalities, as
in this case, then, it may be concluded that the legislative intent behind the law has
been sufficiently served.
Certainly, Congress did not intends that laws creating new cities must contain therein
detailed technical descriptions similar to those appearing in Torrens titles, as petitioners
seem to imply. To require such description in the law as a condition sine qua non for its
validity would be to defeat the very purpose which the Local Government Code to seeks
to serve. The manifest intent of the Code is to empower local government units and to
give them their rightful due. It seeks to make local governments more responsive to the
needs of their constituents while at the same time serving as a vital cog in national
development. To invalidate R.A. No. 7854 on the mere ground that no cadastral type of
description was used in the law would serve the letter but defeat the spirit of the Code. It
then becomes a case of the master serving the slave, instead of the other way around.
This could not be the intendment of the law.
Too well settled is the rule that laws must be enforced when ascertained, although it
may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter
of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would
otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. (Torres v.
Limjap, 56 Phil., 141; Taada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051; Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, 33 SCRA
1105). Legislation is an active instrument of government, which, for purposes of
interpretation, means that laws have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so
construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes (Bocolbo v.
Estanislao, 72 SCRA 520). The same rule must indubitably apply to the case at bar.
II
Petitioners in G.R. No. 118577 also assail the constitutionality of section 51, Article X of R.A. No.
7854. Section 51 states:
Sec. 51. Officials of the City of Makati. The represent elective officials of the
Municipality of Makati shall continue as the officials of the City of Makati and shall
exercise their powers and functions until such time that a new election is held and the
duly elected officials shall have already qualified and assume their
offices: Provided, The new city will acquire a new corporate existence. The appointive
officials and employees of the City shall likewise continues exercising their functions
and duties and they shall be automatically absorbed by the city government of the City
of Makati.
They contend that this section collides with section 8, Article X and section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution which provide:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall
be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than
three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for
which he was elected.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 7. The Members of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of
three years which shall begin, unless otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth
day of June next following their election.
No Member of the House of Representatives shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which
he was elected.
Petitioners stress that under these provisions, elective local officials, including Members of the House
of Representative, have a term of three (3) years and are prohibited from serving for more than
three (3) consecutive terms. They argue that by providing that the new city shall acquire a new
corporate existence, section 51 of R.A. No. 7854 restarts the term of the present municipal elective
officials of Makati and disregards the terms previously served by them. In particular, petitioners point
that section 51 favors the incumbent Makati Mayor, respondent Jejomar Binay, who has already
served for two (2) consecutive terms. They further argue that should Mayor Binay decide to run and
eventually win as city mayor in the coming elections, he can still run for the same position in 1998 and
seek another three-year consecutive term since his previous three-year consecutive term
as municipal mayor would not be counted. Thus, petitioners conclude that said section 51 has been
conveniently crafted to suit the political ambitions of respondent Mayor Binay.
We cannot entertain this challenge to the constitutionality of section 51. The requirements before a
litigant can challenge the constitutionality of a law are well delineated. They are: 1) there must be an
actual case or controversy; (2) the question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3)
the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (4) the decision on
the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself.
5

Petitioners have far from complied with these requirements. The petition is premised on the
occurrence of many contingent events, i.e., that Mayor Binay will run again in this coming mayoralty
elections; that he would be re-elected in said elections; and that he would seek re-election for the
same position in the 1998 elections. Considering that these contingencies may or may not happen,
petitioners merely pose a hypothetical issue which has yet to ripen to an actual case or controversy.
Petitioners who are residents of Taguig (except Mariano) are not also the proper parties to raise this
abstract issue. Worse, they hoist this futuristic issue in a petition for declaratory relief over which this
Court has no jurisdiction.
III
Finally, petitioners in the two (2) cases at bench assail the constitutionality of section 52, Article X of
R.A. No. 7854. Section 52 of the Charter provides:
Sec. 52. Legislative Districts. Upon its conversion into a highly-urbanized city, Makati
shall thereafter have at least two (2) legislative districts that shall initially correspond to
the two (2) existing districts created under Section 3(a) of Republic Act. No. 7166 as
implemented by the Commission on Elections to commence at the next national
elections to be held after the effectivity of this Act. Henceforth, barangays Magallanes,
Dasmarias and Forbes shall be with the first district, in lieu of Barangay Guadalupe-
Viejo which shall form part of the second district. (emphasis supplied)
They contend. that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is unconstitutional for: (1)
reapportionment
6
cannot made by a special law, (2) the addition of a legislative district is not
expressed in the title of the bill
7
and (3) Makati's population, as per the 1990 census, stands at only
four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).
These issues have been laid to rest in the recent case of Tobias v. Abalos.
8
In said case, we ruled
that reapportionment of legislative districts may be made through a special law, such as in the charter
of a new city. The Constitution
9
clearly provides that Congress shall be composed of not more than
two hundred fifty (250) members, unless otherwise fixed by law. As thus worded, the Constitution did
not preclude Congress from increasing its membership by passing a law, other than a general
reapportionment of the law. This is its exactly what was done by Congress in enacting R.A. No. 7854
and providing for an increase in Makati's legislative district. Moreover, to hold that reapportionment
can only be made through a general apportionment law, with a review of all the legislative districts
allotted to each local government unit nationwide, would create an inequitable situation where a new
city or province created by Congress will be denied legislative representation for an indeterminate
period of time.
10
The intolerable situations will deprive the people of a new city or province a particle
of their sovereignty.
11
Sovereignty cannot admit of any kind of subtraction. It is indivisible. It must be
forever whole or it is not sovereignty.
Petitioners cannot insist that the addition of another legislative district in Makati is not in accord with
section 5(3), Article VI
12
of the Constitution for as of the latest survey (1990 census), the population
of Makati stands at only four hundred fifty thousand (450,000).
13
Said section provides, inter alia, that
a city with a population of at least two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall have at least one
representative. Even granting that the population of Makati as of the 1990 census stood at four
hundred fifty thousand (450,000), its legislative district may still be increased since it has met the
minimum population requirement of two hundred fifty thousand (250,000). In fact, section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution provides that a city whose population has increased to more
than two hundred fifty thousand (250,000) shall be entitled to at least one congressional
representative.
14

Finally, we do not find merit in petitioners' contention that the creation of an additional legislative
district in Makati should have been expressly stated in the title of the bill. In the same case of Tobias
v. Abalos, op cit., we reiterated the policy of the Court favoring a liberal construction of the "one title-
one subject" rule so as not to impede legislation. To be sure, with Constitution does not command
that the title of a law should exactly mirror, fully index, or completely catalogue all its details. Hence,
we ruled that "it should be sufficient compliance if the title expresses the general subject and all the
provisions are germane to such general subject."
WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
DAVIDE, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in the well written opinion of Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno. I wish, however, to add a few
observations.
I.
Section 10, Article X of the Constitution provides that "[n]o province, city, municipality or barangay
may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in
accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to the approval by
a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected." These criteria are
now set forth in Section 7 of the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160). One of these is
that the territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit to be created or converted should be
properly identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions.
The omission of R.A. No. 7854 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a Highly Urbanized
City to be Known as the City of Makati) to describe the territorial boundaries of the city by metes and
bounds does not make R.A. No. 7854 unconstitutional or illegal. The Constitution does not provide for
a description by metes and bounds as a condition sine qua non for the creation of a local government
unit or its conversion from one level to another. The criteria provided for in Section 7 of R.A. No. 7854
are not absolute, for, as a matter of fact, the section starts with the clause "as a general rule." The
petitioners' reliance on Section 450 of R.A. No. 7160 is unavailing Said section only applies to the
conversion of a municipality or a cluster of barangays into a COMPONENT CITY, not a highly
urbanized city. It pertinently reads as follows:
Sec. 450. Requisite for creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be
converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, as certified by the
Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for the last
two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of the
following requisites:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly created city shall be properly identified by metes
and bounds. . . .
The constitution classifies cities as either highly urbanized or component. Section 12 of Article X
thereof provides:
Sec. 12. Cities that are highly urbanized, as determined by law, and component cities
whose charters prohibit their voters from voting for provincial elective officials, shall be
independent of the province. The voters of component cities within a province, whose
charters contain no such prohibition, shall not be deprived of their right to vote for
elective provincial officials.
And Section 451 of R.A. No. 7160 provides:
Sec. 451. Cities Classified. A city may either be component or highly
urbanized: Provided, however, That the criteria established in this Code shall not affect
the classification and corporate status of existing cities.
Independent component cities are those component cities whose charters prohibit their
voters from voting for provincial elective officials. Independent component cities shall be
independent of the province.
II.
Strictly speaking, the increase in the number of legislative seats for the City of Makati provided for in
R.A. No. 7854 is not an increase justified by the clause unless otherwise fixed by law in paragraph 1,
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution. That clause contemplates of the reapportionment mentioned
in the succeeding paragraph (4) of the said Section which reads in full as follows:
Within three years following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section.
In short, the clause refers to a general reapportionment law.
The increase under R.A. No. 7854 is a permissible increase under Sections 1 and 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution which reads:
Sec. 1. For purposes of the election of Members of the House of Representatives of the
First Congress of the Philippines under the Constitution proposed by the 1986
Constitutional Commissionand subsequent elections, and until otherwise provided by
law, the Members thereof shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among
the provinces, cities, and the Metropolitan Manila Area as follows:
METROPOLITAN MANILA AREA
xxx xxx xxx
MAKATI one (1)
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 3. Any province that may hereafter be created, or any city whose population may
hereafter increase to more than two hundred fifty thousand shall be entitled in the
immediately following election to at least one Member or such number of Members as it
may be entitled to on the basis of the number of its inhabitants and according to the
standards set forth in paragraph (3), Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution. The
number of Members apportioned to the province out of which such new province was
created, or where the city, whose population has so increased, is geographically located
shall be correspondingly adjusted by the Commission on Elections but such adjustment
shall not be made within one hundred and twenty days before the election. (Emphases
supplied)


N BANC
[G.R. No. 136781. October 6, 2000]
VETERANS FEDERATION PARTY, ALYANSANG BAYANIHAN NG MGA MAGSASAKA,
MANGGAGAWANG BUKID AT MANGINGISDA, ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG
ORDINARYONG TAO PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN, and LUZON
FARMERS PARTY, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PAG-ASA, SENIOR
CITIZENS, AKAP AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA,
OCW-UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS
OCW, WOMEN-POWER, INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP,
ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAKBAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL
COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA PILIPINAS -- All
Being Party-List Parties/Organizations -- and Hon. MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. in His
Capacity as Speaker of the House of Representatives, respondents.
[G.R. No. 136786. October 6, 2000]
AKBAYAN! (CITIZENS' ACTION PARTY), ADHIKAIN AT KILUSAN NG ORDINARYONG TAO
PARA SA LUPA, PABAHAY AT KAUNLARAN (AKO), and ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE
ELECTRIC COOPERATIVES (APEC), petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS
(COMELEC), HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES represented by Speaker Manuel B. Villar,
PAG-ASA, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP, AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN,
MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW,
ANG LAKAS OCW, WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, FOUR "L",
AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA,
MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP, PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, AABANTE KA
PILIPINAS, respondents.
[G.R. No. 136795. October 6, 2000]
ALAGAD (PARTIDO NG MARALITANG-LUNGSOD), NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF SMALL
COCONUT FARMERS' ORGANIZATIONS (NCSFCO), and LUZON FARMERS' PARTY
(BUTIL), petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENIOR CITIZENS, AKAP,
AKSYON, PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PAG-ASA, MAHARLIKA, OCW, UNIFIL, PCCI,
AMMA-KATIPUNAN, KAMPIL, BANTAY-BAYAN, AFW, ANG LAKAS OCW,
WOMENPOWER INC., FEJODAP, CUP, VETERANS CARE, 4L, AWATU, PMP, ATUCP,
NCWP, ALU, BIGAS, COPRA, GREEN, ANAK-BAYAN, ARBA, MINFA, AYOS, ALL COOP,
PDP-LABAN, KATIPUNAN, ONEWAY PRINT, and AABANTE KA PILIPINAS, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
*

Prologue
To determine the winners in a Philippine-style party-list election, the Constitution and Republic
Act (RA) No. 7941 mandate at least four inviolable parameters. These are:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall
not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those
elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of
the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to
shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.
Because the Comelec violated these legal parameters, the assailed Resolutions must be struck
down for having been issued in grave abuse of discretion. The poll body is mandated to enforce and
administer election-related laws. It has no power to contravene or amend them. Neither does it have
authority to decide the wisdom, propriety or rationality of the acts of Congress.
Its bounden duty is to craft rules, regulations, methods and formulas to implement election laws --
not to reject, ignore, defeat, obstruct or circumvent them.
In fine, the constitutional introduction of the party-list system - a normal feature of parliamentary
democracies - into our presidential form of government, modified by unique Filipino statutory
parameters, presents new paradigms and novel questions, which demand innovative legal solutions
convertible into mathematical formulations which are, in turn, anchored on time-tested jurisprudence.
The Case
Before the Court are three consolidated Petitions for Certiorari (with applications for the issuance
of a temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
assailing (1) the October 15, 1998 Resolution
[1]
of the Commission on Elections (Comelec), Second
Division, in Election Matter 98-065;
[2]
and (2) the January 7, 1999 Resolution
[3]
of the Comelec en
banc, affirming the said disposition. The assailed Resolutions ordered the proclamation of thirty-eight
(38) additional party-list representatives "to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of
Representatives as provided under Section 5, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941.
The Facts and the Antecedents
Our 1987 Constitution introduced a novel feature into our presidential system of government --
the party-list method of representation. Under this system, any national, regional or sectoral party or
organization registered with the Commission on Elections may participate in the election of party-list
representatives who, upon their election and proclamation, shall sit in the House of Representatives
as regular members.
[4]
In effect, a voter is given two (2) votes for the House -- one for a district
congressman and another for a party-list representative.
[5]

Specifically, this system of representation is mandated by Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution,
which provides:
Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one
half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election
from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Complying with its constitutional duty to provide by law the selection or election of party-list
representatives, Congress enacted RA 7941 on March 3, 1995. Under this statutes policy
declaration, the State shall "promote proportional representation in the election of representatives to
the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral
parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined
political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate
legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party
system in order to attain the broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in
the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for and win seats in the
legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible. (italics ours.)
The requirements for entitlement to a party-list seat in the House are prescribed by this law (RA
7941) in this wise:
Sec. 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. -- The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum (20%) of the total number of the members of the House of Representatives including those under the
party-list.
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be
entitled to participate in the party-list system.
In determining the allocation of seats for the second vote, the following procedure shall be observed:
(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the highest to the lowest based on the number
of votes they garnered during the elections.
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%)
of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally,
That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Pursuant to Section 18 of RA 7941, the Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No. 2847,
prescribing the rules and regulations governing the election of party-list representatives through the
party-list system.
Election of the Fourteen Party-List Representatives
On May 11, 1998, the first election for party-list representation was held simultaneously with the
national elections. A total of one hundred twenty-three (123) parties, organizations and coalitions
participated. On June 26, 1998, the Comelec en banc proclaimed thirteen (13) party-list
representatives from twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had obtained at least two percent of
the total number of votes cast for the party-list system. Two of the proclaimed representatives
belonged to Petitioner APEC, which obtained 5.5 percent of the votes. The proclaimed winners and
the votes cast in their favor were as follows:
[6]

Party/Organization/ Number of Percentage of Nominees
Coalition Votes Obtained Total Votes
1. APEC 503,487 5.5% Rene M. Silos
Melvyn D. Eballe
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% Leonardo Q. Montemayor
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% Diogenes S. Osabel
4. VETERANS 304,802 3.33% Eduardo P. Pilapil
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% Joy A.G. Young
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% Ariel A. Zartiga
7. NCSCFO 238,303 2.60% Gorgonio P. Unde
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 2.57% Patricia M. Sarenas
9. AKBAYAN 232,376 2.54% Loreta Ann P. Rosales
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% Benjamin A. Cruz
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% Renato B. Magtubo
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 2.07% Cresente C. Paez
After passing upon the results of the special elections held on July 4, 18, and 25, 1998, the
Comelec en banc further determined that COCOFED (Philippine Coconut Planters Federation, Inc.)
was entitled to one party-list seat for having garnered 186,388 votes, which were equivalent to 2.04
percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system. Thus, its first nominee, Emerito S. Calderon,
was proclaimed on September 8, 1998 as the 14th party-list representative.
[7]

On July 6, 1998, PAG-ASA (Peoples Progressive Alliance for Peace and Good Government
Towards Alleviation of Poverty and Social Advancement) filed with the Comelec a "Petition to
Proclaim [the] Full Number of Party-List Representatives provided by the Constitution." It alleged that
the filling up of the twenty percent membership of party-list representatives in the House of
Representatives, as provided under the Constitution, was mandatory. It further claimed that the literal
application of the two percent vote requirement and the three-seat limit under RA 7941 would defeat
this constitutional provision, for only 25 nominees would be declared winners, short of the 52 party-list
representatives who should actually sit in the House.
Thereafter, nine other party-list organizations
[8]
filed their respective Motions for Intervention,
seeking the same relief as that sought by PAG-ASA on substantially the same grounds. Likewise,
PAG-ASAs Petition was joined by other party-list organizations in a Manifestation they filed on
August 28, 1998. These organizations were COCOFED, Senior Citizens, AKAP, AKSYON,
PINATUBO, NUPA, PRP, AMIN, PCCI, AMMA-KATIPUNAN, OCW-UNIFIL, KAMPIL, MAHARLIKA,
AFW, Women Power, Inc., Ang Lakas OCW, FEJODAP, CUP, Veterans Care, Bantay Bayan, 4L,
AWATU, PMP, ATUCP, ALU and BIGAS.
On October 15, 1998, the Comelec Second Division promulgated the present assailed Resolution
granting PAG-ASA's Petition. It also ordered the proclamation of herein 38 respondents who, in
addition to the 14 already sitting, would thus total 52 party-list representatives. It held that "at all
times, the total number of congressional
[9]
seats must be filled up by eighty (80%) percent district
representatives and twenty (20%) percent party-list representatives." In allocating the 52 seats, it
disregarded the two percent-vote requirement prescribed under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941. Instead, it
identified three "elements of the party-list system," which should supposedly determine "how the 52
seats should be filled up." First, "the system was conceived to enable the marginalized sectors of the
Philippine society to be represented in the House of Representatives." Second, "the system should
represent the broadest sectors of the Philippine society." Third, "it should encourage [the] multi-
party system. (Boldface in the original.) Considering these elements, but ignoring the two percent
threshold requirement of RA 7941, it concluded that "the party-listgroups ranked Nos. 1 to 51 x x
x should have at least one representative. It thus disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, by virtue of the powers vested in it by the Constitution, the Omnibus Election Code (B.P.
881), Republic Act No. 7941 and other election laws, the Commission (Second Division) hereby resolves to
GRANT the instant petition and motions for intervention, to include those similarly situated.
ACCORDINGLY, the nominees from the party-list hereinbelow enumerated based on the list of names
submitted by their respective parties, organizations and coalitions are PROCLAIMED as party-list
representatives, to wit:
1. SENIOR CITIZENS
2. AKAP
3. AKSYON
4. PINATUBO
5. NUPA
6. PRP
7. AMIN
8. PAG-ASA
9. MAHARLIKA
10. OCW-UNIFIL
11. FCL
12. AMMA-KATIPUNAN
13. KAMPIL
14. BANTAY BAYAN
15. AFW
16. ANG LAKAS OCW
17. WOMENPOWER, INC.
18. FEJODAP
19. CUP
20. VETERANS CARE
21. 4L
22. AWATU
23. PMP
24. ATUCP
25. NCWP
26. ALU
27. BIGAS
28. COPRA
29. GREEN
30. ANAKBAYAN
31. ARBA
32. MINFA
33. AYOS
34. ALL COOP
35. PDP-LABAN
36. KATIPUNAN
37. ONEWAY PRINT
38. AABANTE KA PILIPINAS
to complete the full complement of 52 seats in the House of Representatives as provided in Section 5, Article VI
of the 1987 Constitution and R.A. 7941.
The foregoing disposition sums up a glaring bit of inconsistency and flip-flopping. In its Resolution
No. 2847 dated June 25, 1996, the Comelec en banc had unanimously promulgated a set of Rules
and Regulations Governing the Election of x x x Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List
System. Under these Rules and Regulations, one additional seat shall be given for every two percent
of the vote, a formula the Comelec illustrated in its Annex A. It apparently relied on this method
when it proclaimed the 14 incumbent party-list solons (two for APEC and one each for the 12 other
qualified parties). However, for inexplicable reasons, it abandoned said unanimous Resolution and
proclaimed, based on its three elements, the Group of 38 private respondents.
[10]

The twelve (12) parties and organizations, which had earlier been proclaimed winners on the
basis of having obtained at least two percent of the votes cast for the party-list system, objected to
the proclamation of the 38 parties and filed separate Motions for Reconsideration. They contended
that (1) under Section 11 (b) of RA 7941, only parties, organizations or coalitions garnering at least
two percent of the votes for the party-list system were entitled to seats in the House of
Representatives; and (2) additional seats, not exceeding two for each, should be allocated to those
which had garnered the two percent threshold in proportion to the number of votes cast for the
winning parties, as provided by said Section 11.
Ruling of the Comelec En Banc
Noting that all the parties -- movants and oppositors alike - had agreed that the twenty percent
membership of party-list representatives in the House "should be filled up, the Comelec en banc
resolved only the issue concerning the apportionment or allocation of the remaining seats. In other
words, the issue was: Should the remaining 38 unfilled seats allocated to party-list solons be given (1)
to the thirteen qualified parties that had each garnered at least two percent of the total votes, or (2) to
the Group of 38 - herein private respondents - even if they had not passed the two percent threshold?
The poll body held that to allocate the remaining seats only to those who had hurdled the two
percent vote requirement "will mean the concentration of representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives to thirteen organizations representing two political parties,
three coalitions and four sectors: urban poor, veterans, women and peasantry x x x. Such strict
application of the 2% 'threshold' does not serve the essence and object of the Constitution and the
legislature -- to develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives
x x x. Additionally, it "will also prevent this Commission from complying with the constitutional and
statutory decrees for party-list representatives to compose 20% of the House of Representatives.
Thus, in its Resolution dated January 7, 1999, the Comelec en banc, by a razor-thin majority --
with three commissioners concurring
[11]
and two members
[12]
dissenting -- affirmed the Resolution of
its Second Division. It, however, held in abeyance the proclamation of the 51
st
party (AABANTE KA
PILIPINAS), "pending the resolution of petitions for correction of manifest errors.
Without expressly declaring as unconstitutional or void the two percent vote requirement imposed
by RA 7941, the Commission blithely rejected and circumvented its application, holding that there
were more important considerations than this statutory threshold.
Consequently, several petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayers for the
issuance of temporary restraining orders or writs of preliminary injunction, were filed before this Court
by the parties and organizations that had obtained at least two per cent of the total votes cast for the
party-list system.
[13]
In the suits, made respondents together with the Comelec were the 38 parties,
organizations and coalitions that had been declared by the poll body as likewise entitled to party-list
seats in the House of Representatives. Collectively, petitioners sought the proclamation of additional
representatives from each of their parties and organizations, all of which had obtained at least two
percent of the total votes cast for the party-list system.
On January 12, 1999, this Court issued a Status Quo Order directing the Comelec to CEASE
and DESIST from constituting itself as a National Board of Canvassers on 13 January 1999 or on any
other date and proclaiming as winners the nominees of the parties, organizations and coalitions
enumerated in the dispositive portions of its 15 October 1998 Resolution or its 7 January 1999
Resolution, until further orders from this Court.
On July 1, 1999, oral arguments were heard from the parties. Atty. Jeremias U. Montemayor
appeared for petitioners in GR No. 136781; Atty. Gregorio A. Andolana, for petitioners in GR No.
136786; Atty. Rodante D. Marcoleta for petitioners in GR No. 136795; Attys. Ricardo Blancaflor and
Pete Quirino Quadra, for all the private respondents; Atty. Porfirio V. Sison for Intervenor NACUSIP;
and Atty. Jose P. Balbuena for Respondent Comelec. Upon invitation of the Court, retired Comelec
Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong acted as amicus curiae. Solicitor General Ricardo P. Galvez
appeared, not for any party but also as a friend of the Court.
Thereafter, the parties and the amici curiae were required to submit their respective Memoranda
in amplification of their verbal arguments.
[14]

The Issues
The Court believes, and so holds, that the main question of how to determine the winners of the
subject party-list election can be fully settled by addressing the following issues:
1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution, mandatory or is it merely a ceiling? In other words, should the twenty percent allocation for party-
list solons be filled up completely and all the time?
2. Are the two percent threshold requirement and the three-seat limit provided in Section 11 (b) of RA 7941
constitutional?
3. If the answer to Issue 2 is in the affirmative, how should the additional seats of a qualified party be
determined?
The Courts Ruling
The Petitions are partly meritorious. The Court agrees with petitioners that the assailed
Resolutions should be nullified, but disagrees that they should all be granted additional seats.
First Issue: Whether the Twenty Percent Constitutional Allocation Is Mandatory
The pertinent provision
[15]
of the Constitution on the composition of the House of Representatives
reads as follows:
Sec. 5. (1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members,
unless otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces,
cities, and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on
the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected by a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party-list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one
half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election
from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the religious sector.
Determination of the Total Number of Party-List Lawmakers
Clearly, the Constitution makes the number of district representatives the determinant in arriving
at the number of seats allocated for party-list lawmakers, who shall comprise "twenty per centum of
the total number of representatives including those under the party-list." We thus translate this legal
provision into a mathematical formula, as follows:
No. of district representatives
---------------------------------- x .20 = No. of party-list
.80 representatives
This formulation
[16]
means that any increase in the number of district representatives, as may be
provided by law, will necessarily result in a corresponding increase in the number of party-list
seats. To illustrate, considering that there were 208 district representatives to be elected during the
1998 national elections, the number of party-list seats would be 52, computed as follows:
208
-------- x .20 = 52
.80
The foregoing computation of seat allocation is easy enough to comprehend. The problematic
question, however, is this: Does the Constitution require all such allocated seats to be filled up all the
time and under all circumstances? Our short answer is No.
Twenty Percent Allocation a Mere Ceiling
The Constitution simply states that "[t]he party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those under the party-list.
According to petitioners, this percentage is a ceiling; the mechanics by which it is to be filled up
has been left to Congress. In the exercise of its prerogative, the legislature enacted RA 7941, by
which it prescribed that a party, organization or coalition participating in the party-list election must
obtain at least two percent of the total votes cast for the system in order to qualify for a seat in the
House of Representatives.
Petitioners further argue that the constitutional provision must be construed together with this
legislative requirement. If there is no sufficient number of participating parties, organizations or
coalitions which could hurdle the two percent vote threshold and thereby fill up the twenty percent
party-list allocation in the House, then naturally such allocation cannot be filled up completely. The
Comelec cannot be faulted for the "incompleteness," for ultimately the voters themselves are the
ones who, in the exercise of their right of suffrage, determine who and how many should represent
them.
On the other hand, Public Respondent Comelec, together with the respondent parties, avers that
the twenty percent allocation for party-list lawmakers is mandatory, and that the two percent vote
requirement in RA 7941 is unconstitutional, because its strict application would make it
mathematically impossible to fill up the House party-list complement.
We rule that a simple reading of Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, easily conveys the
equally simple message that Congress was vested with the broad power to define and prescribe the
mechanics of the party-list system of representation. The Constitution explicitly sets down only the
percentage of the total membership in the House of Representatives reserved for party-list
representatives.
In the exercise of its constitutional prerogative, Congress enacted RA 7941. As said earlier,
Congress declared therein a policy to promote "proportional representation" in the election of party-
list representatives in order to enable Filipinos belonging to the marginalized and underrepresented
sectors to contribute legislation that would benefit them. It however deemed it necessary to require
parties, organizations and coalitions participating in the system to obtain at least two percent of the
total votes cast for the party-list system in order to be entitled to a party-list seat.Those garnering
more than this percentage could have "additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes.
Furthermore, no winning party, organization or coalition can have more than three seats in the House
of Representatives. Thus the relevant portion of Section 11(b) of the law provides:
(b) The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the
party-list system shall be entitled to one seat each; Provided, That those garnering more than two percent (2%)
of the votes shall be entitled to additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes; Provided, finally,
That each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.
Considering the foregoing statutory requirements, it will be shown presently that Section 5 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution is not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for party-list seats in
Congress.
On the contention that a strict application of the two percent threshold may result in a
mathematical impossibility, suffice it to say that the prerogative to determine whether to adjust or
change this percentage requirement rests in Congress.
[17]
Our task now, as should have been the
Comelecs, is not to find fault in the wisdom of the law through highly unlikely scenarios of clinical
extremes, but to craft an innovative mathematical formula that can, as far as practicable, implement it
within the context of the actual election process.
Indeed, the function of the Supreme Court, as well as of all judicial and quasi-judicial agencies, is
to apply the law as we find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it. Unless declared unconstitutional,
ineffective, insufficient or otherwise void by the proper tribunal, a statute remains a valid command of
sovereignty that must be respected and obeyed at all times. This is the essence of the rule of law.
Second Issue: The Statutory Requirement and Limitation
The Two Percent Threshold
In imposing a two percent threshold, Congress wanted to ensure that only those parties,
organizations and coalitions having a sufficient number of constituents deserving of representation
are actually represented in Congress. This intent can be gleaned from the deliberations on the
proposed bill. We quote below a pertinent portion of the Senate discussion:
SENATOR GONZALES: For purposes of continuity, I would want to follow up a point that was raised by, I
think, Senator Osmea when he said that a political party must have obtained at least a minimum percentage to
be provided in this law in order to qualify for a seat under the party-list system.
They do that in many other countries. A party must obtain at least 2 percent of the votes cast, 5 percent or 10
percent of the votes cast. Otherwise, as I have said, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those
who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents and, in
turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the party-list system, Mr.
President."
[18]

A similar intent is clear from the statements of the bill sponsor in the House of Representatives,
as the following shows:
MR. ESPINOSA. There is a mathematical formula which this computation is based at, arriving at a five
percent ratio which would distribute equitably the number of seats among the different sectors. There is a
mathematical formula which is, I think, patterned after that of the party list of the other parliaments or
congresses, more particularly the Bundestag of Germany.
[19]

Moreover, even the framers of our Constitution had in mind a minimum-vote requirement, the
specification of which they left to Congress to properly determine. Constitutional Commissioner
Christian S. Monsod explained:
MR. MONSOD. x x x We are amenable to modifications in the minimum percentage of votes. Our proposal is
that anybody who has two-and-a-half percent of the votes gets a seat. There are about 20 million who cast their
votes in the last elections. Two-and-a-half percent would mean 500,000 votes. Anybody who has a constituency
of 500,000 votes nationwide deserves a seat in the Assembly. If we bring that down to two percent, we are
talking about 400,000 votes. The average vote per family is three. So, here we are talking about 134,000
families. We believe that there are many sectors who will be able to get seats in the Assembly because many of
them have memberships of over 10,000. In effect, that is the operational implication of our proposal. What we
are trying to avoid is this selection of sectors, the reserve seat system. We believe that it is our job to open up
the system and that we should not have within that system a reserve seat. We think that people should organize,
should work hard, and should earn their seats within that system.
[20]

The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of the framers of the Constitution
and the law, but with the very essence of "representation." Under a republican or representative state,
all government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by representatives chosen by
them.
[21]
But to have meaningful representation, the elected persons must have the mandate of a
sufficient number of people. Otherwise, in a legislature that features the party-list system, the result
might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of contributing significant legislation,
and which might even pose a threat to the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are
apportioned according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio"
[22]
to ensure meaningful local representation.
All in all, we hold that the statutory provision on this two percent requirement is precise and
crystalline. When the law is clear, the function of courts is simple application, not interpretation or
circumvention.
[23]

The Three-Seat-Per-Party Limit
An important consideration in adopting the party-list system is to promote and encourage a
multiparty system of representation. Again, we quote Commissioner Monsod:
MR. MONSOD. Madam President, I just want to say that we suggested or proposed the party list system
because we wanted to open up the political system to a pluralistic society through a multiparty system. But we
also wanted to avoid the problems of mechanics and operation in the implementation of a concept that has very
serious shortcomings of classification and of double or triple votes. We are for opening up the system, and we
would like very much for the sectors to be there. That is why one of the ways to do that is to put a ceiling on the
number of representatives from any single party that can sit within the 50 allocated under the party list
system.This way, we will open it up and enable sectoral groups, or maybe regional groups, to earn their seats
among the fifty. x x x.
[24]

Consistent with the Constitutional Commission's pronouncements, Congress set the seat-limit to
three (3) for each qualified party, organization or coalition. "Qualified" means having hurdled the two
percent vote threshold. Such three-seat limit ensures the entry of various interest-representations into
the legislature; thus, no single group, no matter how large its membership, would dominate the party-
list seats, if not the entire House.
We shall not belabor this point, because the validity of the three-seat limit is not seriously
challenged in these consolidated cases.
Third Issue: Method of Allocating Additional Seats
Having determined that the twenty percent seat allocation is merely a ceiling, and having upheld
the constitutionality of the two percent vote threshold and the three-seat limit imposed under RA
7941, we now proceed to the method of determining how many party-list seats the qualified parties,
organizations and coalitions are entitled to. The very first step - there is no dispute on this - is to rank
all the participating parties, organizations and coalitions (hereafter collectively referred to as "parties")
according to the votes they each obtained. The percentage of their respective votes as against the
total number of votes cast for the party-list system is then determined. All those that garnered at least
two percent of the total votes cast have an assured or guaranteed seat in the House of
Representatives. Thereafter, "those garnering more than two percent of the votes shall be entitled to
additional seats in proportion to their total number of votes." The problem is how to distribute
additional seats "proportionally," bearing in mind the three-seat limit further imposed by the law.
One Additional Seat Per Two Percent Increment
One proposed formula is to allocate one additional seat for every additional proportion of the
votes obtained equivalent to the two percent vote requirement for the first seat.
[25]
Translated in
figures, a party that wins at least six percent of the total votes cast will be entitled to three seats;
another party that gets four percent will be entitled to two seats; and one that gets two percent will be
entitled to one seat only. This proposal has the advantage of simplicity and ease of
comprehension. Problems arise, however, when the parties get very lop-sided votes -- for example,
when Party A receives 20 percent of the total votes cast; Party B, 10 percent; and Party C, 6
percent. Under the method just described, Party A would be entitled to 10 seats; Party B, to 5 seats
and Party C, to 3 seats. Considering the three-seat limit imposed by law, all the parties will each
uniformly have three seats only. We would then have the spectacle of a party garnering two or more
times the number of votes obtained by another, yet getting the same number of seats as the other
one with the much lesser votes. In effect, proportional representation will be contravened and the law
rendered nugatory by this suggested solution. Hence, the Court discarded it.
The Niemeyer Formula
Another suggestion that the Court considered was the Niemeyer formula, which was developed
by a German mathematician and adopted by Germany as its method of distributing party-list seats in
the Bundestag. Under this formula, the number of additional seats to which a qualified party would be
entitled is determined by multiplying the remaining number of seats to be allocated by the total
number of votes obtained by that party and dividing the product by the total number of votes garnered
by all the qualified parties. The integer portion of the resulting product will be the number of additional
seats that the party concerned is entitled to. Thus:
No. of remaining seats
to be allocated No. of additional
--------------------------- x No. of votes of = seats of party
Total no. of votes of party concerned concerned
qualified parties (Integer.decimal)
The next step is to distribute the extra seats left among the qualified parties in the descending
order of the decimal portions of the resulting products. Based on the 1998 election results, the
distribution of party-list seats under the Niemeyer method would be as follows:
Party Number of Guaranteed Additional Extra Total
Votes Seats Seats Seats
1. APEC 503,487 1 5.73 1 7
2. ABA 321,646 1 3.66 1 5
3. ALAGAD 312,500 1 3.55 4
4. VETERANS 304,802 1 3.47 4
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 1 2.90 1 4
6. AKO 239,042 1 2.72 1 4
7. NCSCFO 238,303 1 2.71 1 4
8. ABANSE! PINAY 235,548 1 2.68 1 4
9. AKBAYAN 232,376 1 2.64 1 4
10. BUTIL 215,643 1 2.45 3
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 1 2.21 3
12. COOP-NATCCO 189,802 1 2.16 3
13. COCOFED 186,388 1 2.12 3
Total 3,429,338 13 32 7 52
However, since Section 11 of RA 7941 sets a limit of three (3) seats for each party, those
obtaining more than the limit will have to give up their excess seats. Under our present set of facts,
the thirteen qualified parties will each be entitled to three seats, resulting in an overall total of 39. Note
that like the previous proposal, the Niemeyer formula would violate the principle of "proportional
representation," a basic tenet of our party-list system.
The Niemeyer formula, while no doubt suitable for Germany, finds no application in the Philippine
setting, because of our three-seat limit and the non-mandatory character of the twenty percent
allocation. True, both our Congress and the Bundestag have threshold requirements -- two percent
for us and five for them. There are marked differences between the two models, however. As ably
pointed out by private respondents,
[26]
one half of the German Parliament is filled up by party-list
members. More important, there are no seat limitations, because German law discourages the
proliferation of small parties. In contrast, RA 7941, as already mentioned, imposes a three-seat limit
to encourage the promotion of the multiparty system. This major statutory difference makes the
Niemeyer formula completely inapplicable to the Philippines.
Just as one cannot grow Washington apples in the Philippines or Guimaras mangoes in the Arctic
because of fundamental environmental differences, neither can the Niemeyer formula be transplanted
in toto here because of essential variances between the two party-list models.
The Legal and Logical Formula for the Philippines
It is now obvious that the Philippine style party-list system is a unique paradigm which demands
an equally unique formula. In crafting a legally defensible and logical solution to determine the
number of additional seats that a qualified party is entitled to, we need to review the parameters of
the Filipino party-list system.
As earlier mentioned in the Prologue, they are as follows:
First, the twenty percent allocation - the combined number of all party-list congressmen shall
not exceed twenty percent of the total membership of the House of Representatives, including those
elected under the party list.
Second, the two percent threshold - only those parties garnering a minimum of two percent of
the total valid votes cast for the party-list system are qualified to have a seat in the House of
Representatives;
Third, the three-seat limit - each qualified party, regardless of the number of votes it actually
obtained, is entitled to a maximum of three seats; that is, one qualifying and two additional seats.
Fourth, proportional representation - the additional seats which a qualified party is entitled to
shall be computed in proportion to their total number of votes.
The problem, as already stated, is to find a way to translate proportional representation into a
mathematical formula that will not contravene, circumvent or amend the above-mentioned
parameters.
After careful deliberation, we now explain such formula, step by step.
Step One. There is no dispute among the petitioners, the public and the private respondents, as
well as the members of this Court, that the initial step is to rank all the participating parties,
organizations and coalitions from the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they each
received. Then the ratio for each party is computed by dividing its votes by the total votes cast for all
the parties participating in the system. All parties with at least two percent of the total votes are
guaranteed one seat each. Only these parties shall be considered in the computation
ofadditional seats. The party receiving the highest number of votes shall thenceforth be referred to as
the first party.
Step Two. The next step is to determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to, in order
to be able to compute that for the other parties. Since the distribution is based on proportional
representation, the number of seats to be allotted to the other parties cannot possibly exceed that to
which the first party is entitled by virtue of its obtaining the most number of votes.
For example, the first party received 1,000,000 votes and is determined to be entitled to
two additional seats. Another qualified party which received 500,000 votes cannot be entitled to the
same number of seats, since it garnered only fifty percent of the votes won by the first
party. Depending on the proportion of its votes relative to that of the first party whose number of seats
has already been predetermined, the second party should be given less than that to which the first
one is entitled.
The other qualified parties will always be allotted less additional seats than the first party for two
reasons: (1) the ratio between said parties and the first party will always be less than 1:1, and (2) the
formula does not admit of mathematical rounding off, because there is no such thing as a fraction of a
seat. Verily, an arbitrary rounding off could result in a violation of the twenty percent allocation. An
academic mathematical demonstration of such incipient violation is not necessary because the
present set of facts, given the number of qualified parties and the voting percentages obtained, will
definitely not end up in such constitutional contravention.
The Court has previously ruled in Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales
[27]
that a fractional membership
cannot be converted into a whole membership of one when it would, in effect, deprive another party's
fractional membership. It would be a violation of the constitutional mandate of proportional
representation. We said further that "no party can claim more than what it is entitled to x x x.
In any case, the decision on whether to round off the fractions is better left to the
legislature. Since Congress did not provide for it in the present law, neither will this Court. The
Supreme Court does not make the law; it merely applies it to a given set of facts.
Formula for Determining Additional Seats for the First Party
Now, how do we determine the number of seats the first party is entitled to? The only basis given
by the law is that a party receiving at least two percent of the total votes shall be entitled to one
seat. Proportionally, if the first party were to receive twice the number of votes of the second party, it
should be entitled to twice the latter's number of seats and so on. The formula, therefore, for
computing the number of seats to which the first party is entitled is as follows:
Number of votes
of first party Proportion of votes of
-------------------- = first party relative to
Total votes for total votes for party-list system
party-list system
If the proportion of votes received by the first party without rounding it off is equal to at least six
percent of the total valid votes cast for all the party list groups, then the first party shall be entitled to
two additional seats or a total of three seats overall. If the proportion of votes without a rounding off is
equal to or greater than four percent, but less than six percent, then the first party shall have one
additional or a total of two seats. And if the proportion is less than four percent, then the first party
shall not be entitled to any additional seat.
We adopted this six percent bench mark, because the first party is not always entitled to the
maximum number of additional seats. Likewise, it would prevent the allotment of more than the total
number of available seats, such as in an extreme case wherein 18 or more parties tie for the highest
rank and are thus entitled to three seats each. In such scenario, the number of seats to which all the
parties are entitled may exceed the maximum number of party-list seats reserved in the House of
Representatives.
Applying the above formula, APEC, which received 5.5% of the total votes cast, is entitled to one
additional seat or a total of two seats.
Note that the above formula will be applicable only in determining the number of additional seats
the first party is entitled to. It cannot be used to determine the number of additional seats of the other
qualified parties. As explained earlier, the use of the same formula for all would contravene the
proportional representation parameter. For example, a second party obtains six percent of the total
number of votes cast. According to the above formula, the said party would be entitled to two
additional seats or a total of three seats overall. However, if the first party received a significantly
higher amount of votes -- say, twenty percent -- to grant it the same number of seats as the second
party would violate the statutory mandate of proportional representation, since a party getting only six
percent of the votes will have an equal number of representatives as the one obtaining twenty
percent. The proper solution, therefore, is to grant the first party a total of three seats; and the party
receiving six percent, additional seats in proportion to those of the first party.
Formula for Additional Seats of Other Qualified Parties
Step Three The next step is to solve for the number of additional seats that the other qualified
parties are entitled to, based on proportional representation. The formula is encompassed by the
following complex fraction:
No. of votes of
concerned party
------------------
Total no. of votes
Additional seats for party-list system No. of additional
for concerned = ----------------------- x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party
first party
------------------
Total no. of votes
for party list system
In simplified form, it is written as follows:
No. of votes of
Additional seats concerned party No. of additional
for concerned = ------------------ x seats allocated to
party No. of votes of the first party
first party
Thus, in the case of ABA, the additional number of seats it would be entitled to is computed as
follows:
No. of votes of
Additional seats ABA No. of additional
for concerned = -------------------- x seats allocated to
party (ABA) No. of votes of the first party
first party (APEC)
Substituting actual values would result in the following equation:
Additional seats 321,646
for concerned = ----------- x 1 = .64 or 0 additional seat, since
party (ABA) 503,487 rounding off is not to be applied
Applying the above formula, we find the outcome of the 1998 party-list election to be as follows:
Organization Votes %age of Initial No. Additional Total
Garnered Total Votes of Seats Seats
1. APEC 503,487 5.50% 1 1 2
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% 1 321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.64 1
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% 1 312,500 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.62 1
4. VETERANS 304,802 3.33% 1 304,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.61 1
FEDERATION
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% 1 255,184 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.51 1
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% 1 239,042 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1
7. NCSFO 238,303 2.60% 1 238,303 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1
8. ABANSE! 235,548 2.57% 1 321,646 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.47 1
PINAY
9. AKBAYAN! 232,376 2.54% 1 232,376 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.46 1
10. BUTIL 215,643 2.36% 1 215,643 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.43 1
11. SANLAKAS 194,617 2.13% 1 194,617 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.39 1
12. COOP- 189,802 2.07% 1 189,802 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.38 1
NATCCO
13. COCOFED 186,388 2.04% 1 186,388 / 503,487 * 1 = 0.37 1
Incidentally, if the first party is not entitled to any additional seat, then the ratio of the number of
votes for the other party to that for the first one is multiplied by zero. The end result would be zero
additional seat for each of the other qualified parties as well.
The above formula does not give an exact mathematical representation of the number of
additional seats to be awarded since, in order to be entitled to one additional seat, an exact whole
number is necessary. In fact, most of the actual mathematical proportions are not whole numbers and
are not rounded off for the reasons explained earlier. To repeat, rounding off may result in the
awarding of a number of seats in excess of that provided by the law. Furthermore, obtaining absolute
proportional representation is restricted by the three-seat-per-party limit to a maximum of
twoadditional slots. An increase in the maximum number of additional representatives a party may be
entitled to would result in a more accurate proportional representation. But the law itself has set the
limit: only two additional seats. Hence, we need to work within such extant parameter.
The net result of the foregoing formula for determining additional seats happily coincides with the
present number of incumbents; namely, two for the first party (APEC) and one each for the twelve
other qualified parties. Hence, we affirm the legality of the incumbencies of their nominees, albeit
through the use of a different formula and methodology.
In his Dissent, Justice Mendoza criticizes our methodology for being too strict. We say, however,
that our formula merely translated the Philippine legal parameters into a mathematical equation, no
more no less. If Congress in its wisdom decides to modify RA 7941 to make it less strict, then the
formula will also be modified to reflect the changes willed by the lawmakers.
Epilogue
In sum, we hold that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in ruling that the thirty-eight (38)
herein respondent parties, organizations and coalitions are each entitled to a party-list seat, because
it glaringly violated two requirements of RA 7941: the two percent threshold and proportional
representation.
In disregarding, rejecting and circumventing these statutory provisions, the Comelec effectively
arrogated unto itself what the Constitution expressly and wholly vested in the legislature: the power
and the discretion to define the mechanics for the enforcement of the system. The wisdom and the
propriety of these impositions, absent any clear transgression of the Constitution or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, are beyond judicial review.
[28]

Indeed, the Comelec and the other parties in these cases - both petitioners and respondents -
have failed to demonstrate that our lawmakers gravely abused their discretion in prescribing such
requirements. By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment equivalent to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
[29]

The Comelec, which is tasked merely to enforce and administer election-related laws,
[30]
cannot
simply disregard an act of Congress exercised within the bounds of its authority. As a mere
implementing body, it cannot judge the wisdom, propriety or rationality of such act. Its recourse is to
draft an amendment to the law and lobby for its approval and enactment by the legislature.
Furthermore, a reading of the entire Constitution reveals no violation of any of its provisions by
the strict enforcement of RA 7941. It is basic that to strike down a law or any of its provisions as
unconstitutional, there must be a clear and unequivocal showing that what the Constitution prohibits,
the statute permits.
[31]

Neither can we grant petitioners prayer that they each be given additional seats (for a total of
three each), because granting such plea would plainly and simply violate the proportional
representation mandated by Section 11 (b) of RA 7941.
The low turnout of the party-list votes during the 1998 elections should not be interpreted as a
total failure of the law in fulfilling the object of this new system of representation. It should not be
deemed a conclusive indication that the requirements imposed by RA 7941 wholly defeated the
implementation of the system. Be it remembered that the party-list system, though already popular in
parliamentary democracies, is still quite new in our presidential system. We should allow it some time
to take root in the consciousness of our people and in the heart of our tripartite form of
republicanism. Indeed, the Comelec and the defeated litigants should not despair.
Quite the contrary, the dismal result of the first election for party-list representatives should serve
as a challenge to our sectoral parties and organizations. It should stir them to be more active and
vigilant in their campaign for representation in the State's lawmaking body. It should also serve as a
clarion call for innovation and creativity in adopting this novel system of popular democracy.
With adequate information dissemination to the public and more active sectoral parties, we are
confident our people will be more responsive to future party-list elections. Armed with patience,
perseverance and perspicacity, our marginalized sectors, in time, will fulfill the Filipino dream of full
representation in Congress under the aegis of the party-list system, Philippine style.
WHEREFORE, the Petitions are hereby partially GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the
Comelec are SET ASIDE and NULLIFIED. The proclamations of the fourteen (14) sitting party-list
representatives - two for APEC and one each for the remaining twelve (12) qualified parties -
are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago, and De Leon Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, Melo, and Vitug, JJ., in the result.
Puno, J., see separate concurring opinion.
Mendoza, J., dissents.
Kapunan, and Quisumbing, JJ., join the opinion of J. Mendoza.

Consolidated Table
DISTRIBUTION OF SEATS

Group (1)
Actual
votes
received
1

(2)
Percentag
e of
votes cast
for
party-list
2

(3)
Guarantee
d
seat
3

(4)
Additiona
l
seats
4

(5)
Extra
seats
5

(6)
Total
6

(7)
Seats
in
exces
s of
3
(8)
Total
number
of seats
allowed
7

1. APEC 503,487 5.50% 1 5.73 1 7 4 3
2. ABA 321,646 3.51% 1 3.66 1 5 2 3
3. ALAGAD 312,500 3.41% 1 3.55 4 1 3
4.
VETERANS
FEDERATIO
N
304,902 3.33% 1 3.47 4 1 3
5. PROMDI 255,184 2.79% 1 2.90 1 4 1 3
6. AKO 239,042 2.61% 1 2.72 1 4 1 3
7. NCSFO 338,303 2.60% 1 2.71 1 4 1 3
8. ABANSE!
PINAY
235,548 2.57% 1 2.68 1 4 1 3
9. AKBAYAN! 232,376 2.54% 1 2.64 1 4 1 3
10 BUTIL 215,643 2.36% 1 2.45 3 - 3
11.
SANLAKAS
194,617 2.13% 1 2.21 3 - 3
12. COOP-
NATCCO
189,802 2.07% 1 2.16 3 - 3
13.
COCOFED
186,388 2.04% 1 2.12 3 - 3
14. SENIOR
CITIZENS
143,444 1.57%
15. Other
Parties
5,582,42
7
Each with
less than
2%

TOTAL 9,155,30
9
100% 13 32 7 52 13 39


EN BANC
[G.R. No. 147589. June 26, 2001]
ANG BAGONG BAYANI-OFW LABOR PARTY (under the acronym OFW), represented herein by its
secretary-general, MOHAMMAD OMAR FAJARDO,petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS; CITIZENS DRUG WATCH; MAMAMAYAN AYAW SA DROGA; GO! GO!
PHILIPPINES; THE TRUE MARCOS LOYALIST ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES;
PHILIPPINE LOCAL AUTONOMY; CITIZENS MOVEMENT FOR JUSTICE, ECONOMY,
ENVIRONMENT AND PEACE; CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE BUILDERS ASSOCIATION;
SPORTS & HEALTH ADVANCEMENT FOUNDATION, INC.; ANG LAKAS NG OVERSEAS
CONTRACT WORKERS (OCW); BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION and others under
Organizations/Coalitions of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785; PARTIDO NG MASANG
PILIPINO; LAKAS NUCD-UMDP; NATIONALIST PEOPLES COALITION; LABAN NG
DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO; AKSYON DEMOKRATIKO; PDP-LABAN; LIBERAL
PARTY; NACIONALISTA PARTY; ANG BUHAY HAYAANG YUMABONG; and others under
Political Parties of Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. respondents.
[G.R. No. 147613. June 26, 2001]
BAYAN MUNA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; NATIONALIST PEOPLES
COALITION (NPC); LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LDP); PARTIDO NG
MASANG PILIPINO (PMP); LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP; LIBERAL PARTY; MAMAMAYANG
AYAW SA DROGA; CREBA; NATIONAL FEDERATION OF SUGARCANE PLANTERS;
JEEP; and BAGONG BAYANI ORGANIZATION, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The party-list system is a social justice tool designed not only to give more law to the great masses of our
people who have less in life, but also to enable them to become veritable lawmakers themselves, empowered to
participate directly in the enactment of laws designed to benefit them. It intends to make the marginalized and
the underrepresented not merely passive recipients of the States benevolence, but active participants in the
mainstream of representative democracy. Thus, allowing all individuals and groups, including those which now
dominate district elections, to have the same opportunity to participate in party-list elections would desecrate
this lofty objective and mongrelize the social justice mechanism into an atrocious veneer for traditional politics.
The Case

Before us are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, challenging Omnibus Resolution No.
3785
[1]
issued by the Commission on Elections (Comelec) on March 26, 2001. This Resolution approved the
participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list
elections. Petitioners seek the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system
was intended to benefit the marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the non-
marginalized or overrepresented.
The Factual Antecedents

With the onset of the 2001 elections, the Comelec received several Petitions for registration filed by
sectoral parties, organizations and political parties. According to the Comelec, [v]erifications were made as to
the status and capacity of these parties and organizations and hearings were scheduled day and night until the
last party w[as] heard. With the number of these petitions and the observance of the legal and procedural
requirements, review of these petitions as well as deliberations takes a longer process in order to arrive at a
decision and as a result the two (2) divisions promulgated a separate Omnibus Resolution and individual
resolution on political parties. These numerous petitions and processes observed in the disposition of these
petition[s] hinder the early release of the Omnibus Resolutions of the Divisions which were promulgated only
on 10 February 2001.
[2]

Thereafter, before the February 12, 2001 deadline prescribed under Comelec Resolution No. 3426 dated
December 22, 2000, the registered parties and organizations filed their respective Manifestations, stating their
intention to participate in the party-list elections. Other sectoral and political parties and organizations whose
registrations were denied also filed Motions for Reconsideration, together with Manifestations of their intent to
participate in the party-list elections. Still other registered parties filed their Manifestations beyond the
deadline.
The Comelec gave due course or approved the Manifestations (or accreditations) of 154 parties and
organizations, but denied those of several others in its assailed March 26, 2001 Omnibus Resolution No. 3785,
which we quote:
We carefully deliberated the foregoing matters, having in mind that this system of proportional representation
scheme will encourage multi-partisan [sic] and enhance the inability of small, new or sectoral parties or
organization to directly participate in this electoral window.
It will be noted that as defined, the party-list system is a mechanism of proportional representation in the
election of representatives to the House of Representatives from national, regional, and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof registered with the Commission on Elections.
However, in the course of our review of the matters at bar, we must recognize the fact that there is a need to
keep the number of sectoral parties, organizations and coalitions, down to a manageable level, keeping only
those who substantially comply with the rules and regulations and more importantly the sufficiency of the
Manifestations or evidence on the Motions for Reconsiderations or Oppositions.
[3]

On April 10, 2001, Akbayan Citizens Action Party filed before the Comelec a Petition praying that the
names of [some of herein respondents] be deleted from the Certified List of Political Parties/Sectoral
Parties/Organizations/Coalitions Participating in the Party List System for the May 14, 2001 Elections and that
said certified list be accordingly amended. It also asked, as an alternative, that the votes cast for the said
respondents not be counted or canvassed, and that the latters nominees not be proclaimed.
[4]
On April 11, 2001,
Bayan Muna and Bayan Muna-Youth also filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration and Nomination
against some of herein respondents.
[5]

On April 18, 2001, the Comelec required the respondents in the two disqualification cases to file
Comments within three days from notice. It also set the date for hearing on April 26, 2001,
[6]
but subsequently
reset it to May 3, 2001.
[7]
During the hearing, however, Commissioner Ralph C. Lantion merely directed the
parties to submit their respective memoranda.
[8]

Meanwhile, dissatisfied with the pace of the Comelec, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party filed a
Petition
[9]
before this Court on April 16, 2001. This Petition, docketed as GR No. 147589, assailed Comelec
Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated April 17, 2001,
[10]
the Court directed respondents to
comment on the Petition within a non-extendible period of five days from notice.
[11]

On April 17, 2001, Petitioner Bayan Muna also filed before this Court a Petition,
[12]
docketed as GR No.
147613, also challenging Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. In its Resolution dated May 9, 2001,
[13]
the
Court ordered the consolidation of the two Petitions before it; directed respondents named in the second Petition
to file their respective Comments on or before noon of May 15, 2001; and called the parties to an Oral
Argument on May 17, 2001. It added that the Comelec may proceed with the counting and canvassing of votes
cast for the party-list elections, but barred the proclamation of any winner therein, until further orders of the
Court.
Thereafter, Comments
[14]
on the second Petition were received by the Court and, on May 17, 2001, the Oral
Argument was conducted as scheduled. In an Order given in open court, the parties were directed to submit
their respective Memoranda simultaneously within a non-extendible period of five days.
[15]

Issues:

During the hearing on May 17, 2001, the Court directed the parties to address the following issues:
1. Whether or not recourse under Rule 65 is proper under the premises. More specifically, is there no other
plain, speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law?
2. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party-list elections.
3. Whether or not the party-list system is exclusive to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and
organizations.
4. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating Omnibus Resolution No.
3785.
[16]

The Courts Ruling

The Petitions are partly meritorious. These cases should be remanded to the Comelec which will
determine, after summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations enumerated in the
assailed Omnibus Resolution satisfy the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941, as specified in this
Decision.
First Issue:

Recourse Under Rule 65

Respondents contend that the recourse of both petitioners under Rule 65 is improper because there are other
plain, speedy and adequate remedies in the ordinary course of law.
[17]
The Office of the Solicitor General argues
that petitioners should have filed before the Comelec a petition either for disqualification or for cancellation of
registration, pursuant to Sections 19, 20, 21 and 22 of Comelec Resolution No. 3307-A
[18]
dated November 9,
2000.
[19]

We disagree. At bottom, petitioners attack the validity of Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3785 for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion, insofar as it allowed respondents to participate in the party-list
elections of 2001. Indeed, under both the Constitution
[20]
and the Rules of Court, such challenge may be
brought before this Court in a verified petition for certiorari under Rule 65.
Moreover, the assailed Omnibus Resolution was promulgated by Respondent Commission en banc;
hence, no motion for reconsideration was possible, it being a prohibited pleading under Section 1 (d), Rule 13
of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
[21]

The Court also notes that Petitioner Bayan Muna had filed before the Comelec a Petition for Cancellation
of Registration and Nomination against some of herein respondents.
[22]
The Comelec, however, did not act on
that Petition. In view of the pendency of the elections, Petitioner Bayan Muna sought succor from this Court,
for there was no other adequate recourse at the time. Subsequent events have proven the urgency of petitioners
action; to this date, the Comelec has not yet formally resolved the Petition before it. But a resolution may just
be a formality because the Comelec, through the Office of the Solicitor General, has made its position on the
matter quite clear.
In any event, this case presents an exception to the rule that certiorari shall lie only in the absence of any
other plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
[23]
It has been held that certiorari is available, notwithstanding the
presence of other remedies, where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and
in case of urgency.
[24]
Indeed, the instant case is indubitably imbued with public interest and with extreme
urgency, for it potentially involves the composition of 20 percent of the House of Representatives.
Moreover, this case raises transcendental constitutional issues on the party-list system, which this Court
must urgently resolve, consistent with its duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional principles,
precepts, doctrines, or rules.
[25]

Finally, procedural requirements may be glossed over to prevent a miscarriage of justice, when the issue
involves the principle of social justice x x x when the decision sought to be set aside is a nullity, or when the
need for relief is extremely urgent and certiorari is the only adequate and speedy remedy available.
[26]

Second Issue:

Participation of Political Parties

In its Petition, Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party contends that the inclusion of political parties in the
party-list system is the most objectionable portion of the questioned Resolution.
[27]
For its part, Petitioner
Bayan Muna objects to the participation of major political parties.
[28]
On the other hand, the Office of the
Solicitor General, like the impleaded political parties, submits that the Constitution and RA No. 7941 allow
political parties to participate in the party-list elections. It argues that the party-list system is, in fact, open to all
registered national, regional and sectoral parties or organizations.
[29]

We now rule on this issue. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be
disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article
VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may be elected through a party-
list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
Furthermore, under Sections 7 and 8, Article IX (C) of the Constitution, political parties may be registered
under the party-list system.
Sec. 7. No votes cast in favor of a political party, organization, or coalition shall be valid, except for
those registered under the party-list system as provided in this Constitution.
Sec. 8. Political parties, or organizations or coalitions registered under the party-list system, shall not be
represented in the voters' registration boards, boards of election inspectors, boards of canvassers, or other
similar bodies. However, they shall be entitled to appoint poll watchers in accordance with law.
[30]

During the deliberations in the Constitutional Commission, Comm. Christian S. Monsod pointed out that
the participants in the party-list system may be a regional party, a sectoral party, a national party,
UNIDO,
[31]
Magsasaka, or a regional party in Mindanao."
[32]
This was also clear from the following exchange
between Comms. Jaime Tadeo and Blas Ople:
[33]

MR. TADEO. Naniniwala ba kayo na ang party list ay pwedeng paghati-hatian ng UNIDO, PDP-Laban,
PNP, Liberal at Nacionalista?
MR. OPLE. Maaari yan sapagkat bukas ang party list system sa lahat ng mga partido.
Indeed, Commissioner Monsod stated that the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the
system, in order to give a chance to parties that consistently place third or fourth in congressional district
elections to win a seat in Congress.
[34]
He explained: The purpose of this is to open the system. In the past
elections, we found out that there were certain groups or parties that, if we count their votes nationwide, have
about 1,000,000 or 1,500,000 votes. But they were always third or fourth place in each of the districts. So, they
have no voice in the Assembly. But this way, they would have five or six representatives in the Assembly even
if they would not win individually in legislative districts. So, that is essentially the mechanics, the purpose and
objectives of the party-list system.
For its part, Section 2 of RA 7941 also provides for a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, x x x. Section 3 expressly states that a party is either
a political party or a sectoral party or a coalition of parties. More to the point, the law defines political party
as an organized group of citizens advocating an ideology or platform, principles and policies for the general
conduct of government and which, as the most immediate means of securing their adoption, regularly nominates
and supports certain of its leaders and members as candidates for public office.
Furthermore, Section 11 of RA 7941 leaves no doubt as to the participation of political parties in the party-
list system. We quote the pertinent provision below:
x x x x x x x x x
For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political parties on the basis of party
representation in the House of Representatives at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be
entitled to participate in the party-list system.
x x x x x x x x x
Indubitably, therefore, political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections.
Third Issue:

Marginalized and Underrepresented

That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not mean, however, that any political
party -- or any organization or group for that matter -- may do so. The requisite character of these parties or
organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list system, as laid down in the Constitution and
RA 7941. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, provides as follows:
(1) The House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless
otherwise fixed by law, who shall be elected from legislative districts apportioned among the provinces, cities,
and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis
of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list
system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations.
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of representatives
including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this Constitution, one-
half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election
from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as
may be provided by law, except the religious sector. (Emphasis supplied.)
Notwithstanding the sparse language of the provision, a distinguished member of the Constitutional
Commission declared that the purpose of the party-list provision was to give genuine power to our people in
Congress. Hence, when the provision was discussed, he exultantly announced: On this first day of August
1986, we shall, hopefully, usher in a new chapter to our national history, by giving genuine power to our people
in the legislature.
[35]

The foregoing provision on the party-list system is not self-executory. It is, in fact, interspersed with
phrases like in accordance with law or as may be provided by law; it was thus up to Congress to sculpt in
granite the lofty objective of the Constitution. Hence, RA 7941 was enacted. It laid out the statutory policy in
this wise:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. -- The State shall promote proportional representation in the election of
representatives to the House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered national, regional and
sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives. Towards this end, the State
shall develop and guarantee a full, free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible
representation of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing their chances
to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme possible.
The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves

The foregoing provision mandates a state policy of promoting proportional representation by means of the
Filipino-style party-list system, which will enable the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino
citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit
the nation as a whole.
The key words in this policy are proportional representation, marginalized and underrepresented, and
lack [of] well-defined constituencies.
Proportional representation here does not refer to the number of people in a particular district, because
the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or
oppressed group. Rather, it refers to the representation of the marginalized and underrepresented as
exemplified by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely, labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals.
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the marginalized and
underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and to feign. The party-list organization or party must
factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies mentioned in Section
5.
[36]
Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list candidate-organization must be Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties.
Finally, lack of well-defined constituenc[y] refers to the absence of a traditionally identifiable electoral
group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit of government. Rather, it points again to those
with disparate interests identified with the marginalized or underrepresented.
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are marginalized and
underrepresented become members of Congress under the party-list system, Filipino-style.
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not only by giving more law to
those who have less in life, but more so by enabling them to become veritable lawmakers
themselves. Consistent with this intent, the policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: to
enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, x x
x, to become members of the House of Representatives. Where the language of the law is clear, it must be
applied according to its express terms.
[37]

The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under the party-list system are
enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941, which states:
SEC. 5. Registration. -- Any organized group of persons may register as a party, organization or coalition
for purposes of the party-list system by filing with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the
election a petition verified by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as
a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching
thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of officers, coalition agreement and
other relevant information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor,
peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals.
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is not exclusive, it demonstrates the
clear intent of the law that not all sectors can be represented under the party-list system. It is a fundamental
principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are interpreted in connection with, and their
meaning is ascertained by reference to, the words and the phrases with which they are associated or
related. Thus, the meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, qualified or specialized by those in immediate
association.
[38]

The Party-List System Desecrated by the OSG Contentions

Notwithstanding the unmistakable statutory policy, the Office of the Solicitor General submits that RA No.
7941 does not limit the participation in the party-list system to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors
of society.
[39]
In fact, it contends that any party or group that is not disqualified under Section 6
[40]
of RA 7941
may participate in the elections. Hence, it admitted during the Oral Argument that even an organization
representing the super rich of Forbes Park or Dasmarias Village could participate in the party-list elections.
[41]

The declared policy of RA 7941 contravenes the position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). We
stress that the party-list system seeks to enable certain Filipino citizens specifically those belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties to be elected to the House of
Representatives. The assertion of the OSG that the party-list system is not exclusive to the marginalized and
underrepresented disregards the clear statutory policy. Its claim that even the super-rich and overrepresented
can participate desecrates the spirit of the party-list system.
Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel dwellers cannot be
appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate;
hence, the OSGs position to treat them similarly defies reason and common sense. In contrast, and with
admirable candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan
[42]
admitted during the Oral Argument that a group of bankers,
industrialists and sugar planters could not join the party-list system as representatives of their respective
sectors.
[43]

While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny minority, they are neither
marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality is that their economic clout engenders political power
more awesome than their numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate
from the size of ones constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from the number and amount of
ones bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are the majority who wallow
in poverty, destitution and infirmity. It was for them that the party-list system was enacted -- to give them not
only genuine hope, but genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the specific
concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in Congress and in the larger affairs of
the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for
genuine change. Verily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past the farm hands, the
fisher folk, the urban poor, even those in the underground movement to come out and participate, as indeed
many of them came out and participated during the last elections. The State cannot now disappoint and
frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social justice vehicle.
Because the marginalized and underrepresented had not been able to win in the congressional district
elections normally dominated by traditional politicians and vested groups, 20 percent of the seats in the House
of Representatives were set aside for the party-list system. In arguing that even those sectors who normally
controlled 80 percent of the seats in the House could participate in the party-list elections for the remaining 20
percent, the OSG and the Comelec disregard the fundamental difference between the congressional district
elections and the party-list elections.
As earlier noted, the purpose of the party-list provision was to open up the system,
[44]
in order to enhance
the chance of sectoral groups and organizations to gain representation in the House of Representatives through
the simplest scheme possible.
[45]
Logic shows that the system has been opened to those who have never gotten a
foothold within it -- those who cannot otherwise win in regular elections and who therefore need the simplest
scheme possible to do so. Conversely, it would be illogical to open the system to those who have long been
within it -- those privileged sectors that have long dominated the congressional district elections.
The import of the open party-list system may be more vividly understood when compared to a student
dormitory open house, which by its nature allows outsiders to enter the facilities. Obviously, the open
house is for the benefit of outsiders only, not the dormers themselves who can enter the dormitory even
without such special privilege. In the same vein, the open party-list system is only for the outsiders who
cannot get elected through regular elections otherwise; it is not for the non-marginalized or overrepresented
who already fill the ranks of Congress.
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the remaining seats under the party-
list system would not only dilute, but also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented,
contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for the benefit of the
underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to others, to the prejudice of the intended
beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied and prostituted by those who are
neither marginalized nor underrepresented. It cannot let that flicker of hope be snuffed out. The clear state
policy must permeate every discussion of the qualification of political parties and other organizations under the
party-list system.
Refutation of the Separate Opinions

The Separate Opinions of our distinguished colleagues, Justices Jose C. Vitug and Vicente V. Mendoza, are
anchored mainly on the supposed intent of the framers of the Constitution as culled from their deliberations.
The fundamental principle in constitutional construction, however, is that the primary source from which to
ascertain constitutional intent or purpose is the language of the provision itself. The presumption is that the
words in which the constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained.
[46]
In other
words, verba legis still prevails. Only when the meaning of the words used is unclear and equivocal should
resort be made to extraneous aids of construction and interpretation, such as the proceedings of the
Constitutional Commission or Convention, in order to shed light on and ascertain the true intent or purpose of
the provision being construed.
[47]

Indeed, as cited in the Separate Opinion of Justice Mendoza, this Court stated in Civil Liberties Union v.
Executive Secretary
[48]
that the debates and proceedings of the constitutional convention [may be consulted] in
order to arrive at the reason and purpose of the resulting Constitution x x x only when other guides fail as said
proceedings are powerless to vary the terms of the Constitution when the meaning is clear. Debates in the
constitutional convention are of value as showing the views of the individual members, and as indicating the
reason for their votes, but they give us no light as to the views of the large majority who did not talk, much less
of the mass or our fellow citizens whose votes at the polls gave that instrument the force of fundamental
law. We think it safer to construe the constitution from what appears upon its face. The proper interpretation
therefore depends more on how it was understood by the people adopting it than in the framers understanding
thereof.
Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution, relative to the party-list system, is couched in clear terms: the
mechanics of the system shall be provided by law. Pursuant thereto, Congress enacted RA 7941. In
understanding and implementing party-list representation, we should therefore look at the law first. Only when
we find its provisions ambiguous should the use of extraneous aids of construction be resorted to.
But, as discussed earlier, the intent of the law is obvious and clear from its plain words. Section 2 thereof
unequivocally states that the party-list system of electing congressional representatives was designed to enable
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political constituencies but who
could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a
whole x x x. The criteria for participation is well defined. Thus, there is no need for recourse to constitutional
deliberations, not even to the proceedings of Congress. In any event, the framers deliberations merely express
their individual opinions and are, at best, only persuasive in construing the meaning and purpose of the
constitution or statute.
Be it remembered that the constitutionality or validity of Sections 2 and 5 of RA 7941 is not an issue
here. Hence, they remain parts of the law, which must be applied plainly and simply.
Fourth Issue:

Grave Abuse of Discretion

From its assailed Omnibus Resolution, it is manifest that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear
policy of the law and the Constitution. On the contrary, it seems to have ignored the facet of the party-list
system discussed above. The OSG as its counsel admitted before the Court that any group, even the non-
marginalized and overrepresented, could field candidates in the party-list elections.
When a lower court, or a quasi-judicial agency like the Commission on Elections, violates or ignores the
Constitution or the law, its action can be struck down by this Court on the ground of grave abuse of
discretion.
[49]
Indeed, the function of all judicial and quasi-judicial instrumentalities is to apply the law as they
find it, not to reinvent or second-guess it.
[50]

In its Memorandum, Petitioner Bayan Muna passionately pleads for the outright disqualification of the
major political parties Respondents Lakas-NUCD, LDP, NPC, LP and PMP on the ground that under
Comelec Resolution No. 4073, they have been accredited as the five (six, including PDP-Laban) major political
parties in the May 14, 2001 elections. It argues that because of this, they have the advantage of getting official
Comelec Election Returns, Certificates of Canvass, preferred poll watchers x x x. We note, however, that this
accreditation does not refer to the party-list election, but, inter alia, to the election of district representatives for
the purpose of determining which parties would be entitled to watchers under Section 26 of Republic Act No.
7166.
What is needed under the present circumstances, however, is a factual determination of whether
respondents herein and, for that matter, all the 154 previously approved groups, have the necessary
qualifications to participate in the party-list elections, pursuant to the Constitution and the law.
Bayan Muna also urges us to immediately rule out Respondent Mamamayan Ayaw sa Droga (MAD),
because it is a government entity using government resources and privileges. This Court, however, is not a
trier of facts.
[51]
It is not equipped to receive evidence and determine the truth of such factual allegations.
Basic rudiments of due process require that respondents should first be given an opportunity to show that
they qualify under the guidelines promulgated in this Decision, before they can be deprived of their right to
participate in and be elected under the party-list system.
Guidelines for Screening Party-List Participants

The Court, therefore, deems it proper to remand the case to the Comelec for the latter to determine, after
summary evidentiary hearings, whether the 154 parties and organizations allowed to participate in the party-list
elections comply with the requirements of the law. In this light, the Court finds it appropriate to lay down the
following guidelines, culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work.
First, the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and
underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941. In other words, it must show -- through its
constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record -- that it
represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors. Verily, majority of its membership
should belong to the marginalized and underrepresented. And it must demonstrate that in a conflict of interests,
it has chosen or is likely to choose the interest of such sectors.
Second, while even major political parties are expressly allowed by RA 7941 and the Constitution to
participate in the party-list system, they must comply with the declared statutory policy of enabling Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors x x x to be elected to the House of
Representatives. In other words, while they are not disqualified merely on the ground that they are political
parties, they must show, however, that they represent the interests of the marginalized and
underrepresented. The counsel of Aksyon Demokratiko and other similarly situated political parties admitted as
much during the Oral Argument, as the following quote shows:
JUSTICE PANGANIBAN: I am not disputing that in my question. All I am saying is, the political party
must claim to represent the marginalized and underrepresented sectors?
ATTY. KAPUNAN: Yes, Your Honor, the answer is yes.
[52]

Third, in view of the objections
[53]
directed against the registration of Ang Buhay Hayaang Yumabong,
which is allegedly a religious group, the Court notes the express constitutional provision that the religious sector
may not be represented in the party-list system. The extent of the constitutional proscription is demonstrated by
the following discussion during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission:
MR. OPLE. x x x
In the event that a certain religious sect with nationwide and even international networks of
members and supporters, in order to circumvent this prohibition, decides to form its own political party
in emulation of those parties I had mentioned earlier as deriving their inspiration and philosophies from
well-established religious faiths, will that also not fall within this prohibition?
MR. MONSOD. If the evidence shows that the intention is to go around the prohibition, then certainly the
Comelec can pierce through the legal fiction.
[54]

The following discussion is also pertinent:
MR. VILLACORTA. When the Commissioner proposed EXCEPT RELIGIOUS GROUPS, he is not, of
course, prohibiting priests, imams or pastors who may be elected by, say, the indigenous community
sector to represent their group.
REV. RIGOS. Not at all, but I am objecting to anybody who represents the Iglesia ni Kristo, the Catholic
Church, the Protestant Church et cetera.
[55]

Furthermore, the Constitution provides that religious denominations and sects shall not be
registered.
[56]
The prohibition was explained by a member
[57]
of the Constitutional Commission in this wise:
[T]he prohibition is on any religious organization registering as a political party. I do not see any prohibition
here against a priest running as a candidate. That is not prohibited here; it is the registration of a religious sect
as a political party.
[58]

Fourth, a party or an organization must not be disqualified under Section 6 of RA 7941, which enumerates
the grounds for disqualification as follows:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization;
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign political party, foundation,
organization, whether directly or through any of its officers or members or indirectly through third
parties for partisan election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or
(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails to obtain at least
two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list system in the two (2) preceding elections
for the constituency in which it has registered.
[59]

Note should be taken of paragraph 5, which disqualifies a party or group for violation of or failure to
comply with election laws and regulations. These laws include Section 2 of RA 7941, which states that the
party-list system seeks to enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties x x x to become members of the House of Representatives. A party or an
organization, therefore, that does not comply with this policy must be disqualified.
Fifth, the party or organization must not be an adjunct of, or a project organized or an entity funded or
assisted by, the government. By the very nature of the party-list system, the party or organization must be a
group of citizens, organized by citizens and operated by citizens. It must be independent of the
government. The participation of the government or its officials in the affairs of a party-list candidate is not
only illegal
[60]
and unfair to other parties, but also deleterious to the objective of the law: to enable citizens
belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors and organizations to be elected to the House of
Representatives.
Sixth, the party must not only comply with the requirements of the law; its nominees must likewise do
so. Section 9 of RA 7941 reads as follows:
SEC. 9. Qualifications of Party-List Nominees. No person shall be nominated as party-list representative
unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, a resident of the Philippines for a period
of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the day of the election, able to read and write, a bona
fide member of the party or organization which he seeks to represent for at least ninety (90) days preceding the
day of the election, and is at least twenty-five (25) years of age on the day of the election.
In case of a nominee of the youth sector, he must at least be twenty-five (25) but not more than thirty (30) years
of age on the day of the election. Any youth sectoral representative who attains the age of thirty (30) during his
term shall be allowed to continue in office until the expiration of his term.
Seventh, not only the candidate party or organization must represent marginalized and underrepresented
sectors; so also must its nominees. To repeat, under Section 2 of RA 7941, the nominees must be Filipino
citizens who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties. Surely, the
interests of the youth cannot be fully represented by a retiree; neither can those of the urban poor or the working
class, by an industrialist. To allow otherwise is to betray the State policy to give genuine representation to the
marginalized and underrepresented.
Eighth, as previously discussed, while lacking a well-defined political constituency, the nominee must
likewise be able to contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will benefit the
nation as a whole. Senator Jose Lina explained during the bicameral committee proceedings that the nominee
of a party, national or regional, is not going to represent a particular district x x x.
[61]

Epilogue

The linchpin of this case is the clear and plain policy of the law: to enable Filipino citizens belonging to
marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-defined political
constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
benefit the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of Representatives.
Crucial to the resolution of this case is the fundamental social justice principle that those who have less in
life should have more in law. The party-list system is one such tool intended to benefit those who have less in
life. It gives the great masses of our people genuine hope and genuine power. It is a message to the destitute
and the prejudiced, and even to those in the underground, that change is possible. It is an invitation for them to
come out of their limbo and seize the opportunity.
Clearly, therefore, the Court cannot accept the submissions of the Comelec and the other respondents that
the party-list system is, without any qualification, open to all. Such position does not only weaken the electoral
chances of the marginalized and underrepresented; it also prejudices them. It would gut the substance of the
party-list system. Instead of generating hope, it would create a mirage. Instead of enabling the marginalized, it
would further weaken them and aggravate their marginalization.
In effect, the Comelec would have us believe that the party-list provisions of the Constitution and RA 7941
are nothing more than a play on dubious words, a mockery of noble intentions, and an empty offering on the
altar of people empowerment. Surely, this could not have been the intention of the framers of the Constitution
and the makers of RA 7941.
WHEREFORE, this case is REMANDED to the Comelec, which is hereby DIRECTED to immediately
conduct summary evidentiary hearings on the qualifications of the party-list participants in the light of the
guidelines enunciated in this Decision. Considering the extreme urgency of determining the winners in the last
party-list elections, the Comelec is directed to begin its hearings for the parties and organizations that appear to
have garnered such number of votes as to qualify for seats in the House of Representatives. The Comelec is
further DIRECTED to submit to this Court its compliance report within 30 days from notice hereof.
The Resolution of this Court dated May 9, 2001, directing the Comelec to refrain from proclaiming any
winner during the last party-list election, shall remain in force until after the Comelec itself will have complied
and reported its compliance with the foregoing disposition.
This Decision is immediately executory upon the Commission on Elections receipt thereof. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan, Pardo, Buena, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.
Davide, Jr., C.J., in the result.
Vitug and Mendoza, JJ., see dissenting opinion.
Quisumbing, De Leon, Jr., and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., join the dissent of J. Vicente M. Mendoza.
Ynares-Santiago, J., abroad on official business.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 119976 September 18, 1995
IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and CIRILO ROY MONTEJO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
A constitutional provision should be construed as to give it effective operation and suppress the
mischief at which it is aimed.
1
The 1987 Constitution mandates that an aspirant for election to the
House of Representatives be "a registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a
resident thereof for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the election."
2
The
mischief which this provision reproduced verbatim from the 1973 Constitution seeks to prevent
is the possibility of a "stranger or newcomer unacquainted with the conditions and needs of a
community and not identified with the latter, from an elective office to serve that community."
3

Petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor on March 8, 1995,
providing the following information in item no. 8:
4

RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: __________ Years and seven Months.
On March 23, 1995, private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo, the incumbent Representative of the First
District of Leyte and a candidate for the same position, filed a "Petition for Cancellation and
Disqualification"
5
with the Commission on Elections alleging that petitioner did not meet the
constitutional requirement for residency. In his petition, private respondent contended that Mrs.
Marcos lacked the Constitution's one year residency requirement for candidates for the House of
Representatives on the evidence of declarations made by her in Voter Registration Record 94-No.
3349772
6
and in her Certificate of Candidacy. He prayed that "an order be issued declaring
(petitioner) disqualified and canceling the certificate of candidacy."
7

On March 29, 1995, petitioner filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy, changing the
entry "seven" months to "since childhood" in item no. 8 of the amended certificate.
8
On the same day,
the Provincial Election Supervisor of Leyte informed petitioner that:
[T]his office cannot receive or accept the aforementioned Certificate of Candidacy on
the ground that it is filed out of time, the deadline for the filing of the same having
already lapsed on March 20, 1995. The Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy
should have been filed on or before the March 20, 1995 deadline.
9

Consequently, petitioner filed the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy with the COMELEC's
Head Office in Intramuros, Manila on
March 31, 1995. Her Answer to private respondent's petition in SPA No. 95-009 was likewise filed
with the head office on the same day. In said Answer, petitioner averred that the entry of the word
"seven" in her original Certificate of Candidacy was the result of an "honest
misinterpretation"
10
which she sought to rectify by adding the words "since childhood" in her
Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy and that "she has always maintained Tacloban City as
her domicile or residence.
11
Impugning respondent's motive in filing the petition seeking her
disqualification, she noted that:
When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a
voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner
immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not
a resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. After respondent had
registered as a voter in Tolosa following completion of her six month actual residence
therein, petitioner filed a petition with the COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from
the First District to the Second District and pursued such a move up to the Supreme
Court, his purpose being to remove respondent as petitioner's opponent in the
congressional election in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte
Congressmen, seeking the creation of another legislative district to remove the town of
Tolosa out of the First District, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass
the Senate. Having failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition for the
same objective, as it is obvious that he is afraid to submit along with respondent for the
judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly,
peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995.
12

On April 24, 1995, the Second Division of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), by a vote of 2
to 1,
13
came up with a Resolution 1) finding private respondent's Petition for Disqualification in SPA
95-009 meritorious; 2) striking off petitioner's Corrected/Amended Certificate of Candidacy of March
31, 1995; and 3) canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy.
14
Dealing with two primary issues,
namely, the validity of amending the original Certificate of Candidacy after the lapse of the deadline
for filing certificates of candidacy, and petitioner's compliance with the one year residency
requirement, the Second Division held:
Respondent raised the affirmative defense in her Answer that the printed word "Seven"
(months) was a result of an "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake" on her part
and, therefore, an amendment should subsequently be allowed. She averred that she
thought that what was asked was her "actual and physical" presence in Tolosa and not
residence of origin or domicile in the First Legislative District, to which she could have
responded "since childhood." In an accompanying affidavit, she stated that her domicile
is Tacloban City, a component of the First District, to which she always intended to
return whenever absent and which she has never abandoned. Furthermore, in her
memorandum, she tried to discredit petitioner's theory of disqualification by alleging that
she has been a resident of the First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood,
although she only became a resident of the Municipality of Tolosa for seven months.
She asserts that she has always been a resident of Tacloban City, a component of the
First District, before coming to the Municipality of Tolosa.
Along this point, it is interesting to note that prior to her registration in Tolosa,
respondent announced that she would be registering in Tacloban City so that she can
be a candidate for the District. However, this intention was rebuffed when petitioner
wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban not to allow respondent since she is a resident of
Tolosa and not Tacloban. She never disputed this claim and instead implicitly acceded
to it by registering in Tolosa.
This incident belies respondent's claim of "honest misinterpretation or honest mistake."
Besides, the Certificate of Candidacy only asks for RESIDENCE. Since on the basis of
her Answer, she was quite aware of "residence of origin" which she interprets to be
Tacloban City, it is curious why she did not cite Tacloban City in her Certificate of
Candidacy. Her explanation that she thought what was asked was her actual and
physical presence in Tolosa is not easy to believe because there is none in the question
that insinuates about Tolosa. In fact, item no. 8 in the Certificate of Candidacy speaks
clearly of "Residency in the CONSTITUENCY where I seek to be elected immediately
preceding the election." Thus, the explanation of respondent fails to be persuasive.
From the foregoing, respondent's defense of an honest mistake or misinterpretation,
therefore, is devoid of merit.
To further buttress respondent's contention that an amendment may be made, she cited
the case ofAlialy v. COMELEC (2 SCRA 957). The reliance of respondent on the case
of Alialy is misplaced. The case only applies to the "inconsequential deviations which
cannot affect the result of the election, or deviations from provisions intended primarily
to secure timely and orderly conduct of elections." The Supreme Court in that case
considered the amendment only as a matter of form. But in the instant case, the
amendment cannot be considered as a matter of form or an inconsequential deviation.
The change in the number of years of residence in the place where respondent seeks to
be elected is a substantial matter which determines her qualification as a candidacy,
specially those intended to suppress, accurate material representation in the original
certificate which adversely affects the filer. To admit the amended certificate is to
condone the evils brought by the shifting minds of manipulating candidate, of the
detriment of the integrity of the election.
Moreover, to allow respondent to change the seven (7) month period of her residency in
order to prolong it by claiming it was "since childhood" is to allow an untruthfulness to be
committed before this Commission. The arithmetical accuracy of the 7 months
residency the respondent indicated in her certificate of candidacy can be gleaned from
her entry in her Voter's Registration Record accomplished on January 28, 1995 which
reflects that she is a resident of Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte for 6 months at the time of the
said registration (Annex A, Petition). Said accuracy is further buttressed by her letter to
the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, dated August 24, 1994, requesting for
the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent List of Voters thereat so that she
can be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. The dates of these
three (3) different documents show the respondent's consistent conviction that she has
transferred her residence to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte from Metro Manila only for such limited
period of time, starting in the last week of August 1994 which on March 8, 1995 will only
sum up to 7 months. The Commission, therefore, cannot be persuaded to believe in the
respondent's contention that it was an error.
xxx xxx xxx
Based on these reasons the Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy cannot be
admitted by this Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Anent the second issue, and based on the foregoing discussion, it is clear that
respondent has not complied with the one year residency requirement of the
Constitution.
In election cases, the term "residence" has always been considered as synonymous
with "domicile" which imports not only the intention to reside in a fixed place but also
personal presence in-that place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
Domicile denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business or
pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. (Perfecto Faypon vs. Eliseo Quirino,
96 Phil 294; Romualdez vs. RTC-Tacloban, 226 SCRA 408). In respondent's case,
when she returned to the Philippines in 1991, the residence she chose was not
Tacloban but San Juan, Metro Manila. Thus, her animus revertendi is pointed to Metro
Manila and not Tacloban.
This Division is aware that her claim that she has been a resident of the First District
since childhood is nothing more than to give her a color of qualification where she is
otherwise constitutionally disqualified. It cannot hold ground in the face of the facts
admitted by the respondent in her affidavit. Except for the time that she studied and
worked for some years after graduation in Tacloban City, she continuously lived in
Manila. In 1959, after her husband was elected Senator, she lived and resided in San
Juan, Metro Manila where she was a registered voter. In 1965, she lived in San Miguel,
Manila where she was again a registered voter. In 1978, she served as member of the
Batasang Pambansa as the representative of the City of Manila and later on served as
the Governor of Metro Manila. She could not have served these positions if she had not
been a resident of the City of Manila. Furthermore, when she filed her certificate of
candidacy for the office of the President in 1992, she claimed to be a resident of San
Juan, Metro Manila. As a matter of fact on August 24, 1994, respondent wrote a letter
with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila requesting for the cancellation of her
registration in the permanent list of voters that she may be re-registered or transferred
to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. These facts manifest that she could not have been a
resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of
candidacy because she became a resident of many places, including Metro Manila. This
debunks her claim that prior to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte, she was a resident of the
First Legislative District of Leyte since childhood.
In this case, respondent's conduct reveals her lack of intention to make Tacloban her
domicile. She registered as a voter in different places and on several occasions
declared that she was a resident of Manila. Although she spent her school days in
Tacloban, she is considered to have abandoned such place when she chose to stay
and reside in other different places. In the case of Romualdez vs. RTC(226 SCRA 408)
the Court explained how one acquires a new domicile by choice. There must concur: (1)
residence or bodily presence in the new locality; (2) intention to remain there; and (3)
intention to abandon the old domicile. In other words there must basically be animus
manendi with animus non revertendi. When respondent chose to stay in Ilocos and later
on in Manila, coupled with her intention to stay there by registering as a voter there and
expressly declaring that she is a resident of that place, she is deemed to have
abandoned Tacloban City, where she spent her childhood and school days, as her
place of domicile.
Pure intention to reside in that place is not sufficient, there must likewise be conduct
indicative of such intention. Respondent's statements to the effect that she has always
intended to return to Tacloban, without the accompanying conduct to prove that
intention, is not conclusive of her choice of residence. Respondent has not presented
any evidence to show that her conduct, one year prior the election, showed intention to
reside in Tacloban. Worse, what was evident was that prior to her residence in Tolosa,
she had been a resident of Manila.
It is evident from these circumstances that she was not a resident of the First District of
Leyte "since childhood."
To further support the assertion that she could have not been a resident of the First
District of Leyte for more than one year, petitioner correctly pointed out that on January
28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. In
doing so, she placed in her Voter Registration Record that she resided in the
municipality of Tolosa for a period of six months. This may be inconsequential as
argued by the respondent since it refers only to her residence in Tolosa, Leyte. But her
failure to prove that she was a resident of the First District of Leyte prior to her
residence in Tolosa leaves nothing but a convincing proof that she had been a resident
of the district for six months only.
15

In a Resolution promulgated a day before the May 8, 1995 elections, the COMELEC en banc denied
petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration
16
of the April 24, 1995 Resolution declaring her not qualified
to run for the position of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of
Leyte.
17
The Resolution tersely stated:
After deliberating on the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission RESOLVED to
DENY it, no new substantial matters having been raised therein to warrant re-
examination of the resolution granting the petition for disqualification.
18

On May 11, 1995, the COMELEC issued a Resolution allowing petitioner's proclamation should the
results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of votes in the congressional
elections in the First District of Leyte. On the same day, however, the COMELEC reversed itself and
issued a second Resolution directing that the proclamation of petitioner be suspended in the event
that she obtains the highest number of votes.
19

In a Supplemental Petition dated 25 May 1995, petitioner averred that she was the overwhelming
winner of the elections for the congressional seat in the First District of Leyte held May 8, 1995 based
on the canvass completed by the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May 14, 1995. Petitioner alleged
that the canvass showed that she obtained a total of 70,471 votes compared to the 36,833 votes
received by Respondent Montejo. A copy of said Certificate of Canvass was annexed to the
Supplemental Petition.
On account of the Resolutions disqualifying petitioner from running for the congressional seat of the
First District of Leyte and the public respondent's Resolution suspending her proclamation, petitioner
comes to this court for relief.
Petitioner raises several issues in her Original and Supplemental Petitions. The principal issues may
be classified into two general areas:
I. The issue of Petitioner's qualifications
Whether or not petitioner was a resident, for election purposes, of the First District of
Leyte for a period of one year at the time of the May 9, 1995 elections.
II. The Jurisdictional Issue
a) Prior to the elections
Whether or not the COMELEC properly exercised its jurisdiction in disqualifying
petitioner outside the period mandated by the Omnibus Election Code for
disqualification cases under Article 78 of the said Code.
b) After the Elections
Whether or not the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal assumed exclusive
jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995
elections.
I. Petitioner's qualification
A perusal of the Resolution of the COMELEC's Second Division reveals a startling confusion in the
application of settled concepts of "Domicile" and "Residence" in election law. While the COMELEC
seems to be in agreement with the general proposition that for the purposes of election law,
residence is synonymous with domicile, the Resolution reveals a tendency to substitute or mistake
the concept of domicile for actual residence, a conception not intended for the purpose of determining
a candidate's qualifications for election to the House of Representatives as required by the 1987
Constitution. As it were, residence, for the purpose of meeting the qualification for an elective
position, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
Article 50 of the Civil Code decrees that "[f]or the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil
obligations, the domicile of natural persons is their place of habitual residence." In Ong
vs. Republic
20
this court took the concept of domicile to mean an individual's "permanent home", "a
place to which, whenever absent for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on
facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent."
21
Based on the foregoing, domicile
includes the twin elements of "the fact of residing or physical presence in a fixed place" and animus
manendi, or the intention of returning there permanently.
Residence, in its ordinary conception, implies the factual relationship of an individual to a certain
place. It is the physical presence of a person in a given area, community or country. The essential
distinction between residence and domicile in law is that residence involves the intent to leave when
the purpose for which the resident has taken up his abode ends. One may seek a place for purposes
such as pleasure, business, or health. If a person's intent be to remain, it becomes his domicile; if his
intent is to leave as soon as his purpose is established it is residence.
22
It is thus, quite perfectly
normal for an individual to have different residences in various places. However, a person can only
have a single domicile, unless, for various reasons, he successfully abandons his domicile in favor of
another domicile of choice. In Uytengsu vs. Republic,
23
we laid this distinction quite clearly:
There is a difference between domicile and residence. "Residence" is used to indicate a
place of abode, whether permanent or temporary; "domicile" denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which, when absent, one has the intention of returning. A man may have a
residence in one place and a domicile in another. Residence is not domicile, but
domicile is residence coupled with the intention to remain for an unlimited time. A man
can have but one domicile for the same purpose at any time, but he may have
numerous places of residence. His place of residence is generally his place of domicile,
but it is not by any means necessarily so since no length of residence without intention
of remaining will constitute domicile.
For political purposes the concepts of residence and domicile are dictated by the peculiar criteria of
political laws. As these concepts have evolved in our election law, what has clearly and unequivocally
emerged is the fact that residence for election purposes is used synonymously with domicile.
In Nuval vs. Guray,
24
the Court held that "the term residence. . . is synonymous with domicile which
imports not only intention to reside in a fixed place, but also personal presence in that place, coupled
with conduct indicative of such intention."
25
Larena vs. Teves
26
reiterated the same doctrine in a
case involving the qualifications of the respondent therein to the post of Municipal President of
Dumaguete, Negros Oriental. Faypon vs. Quirino,
27
held that the absence from residence to pursue
studies or practice a profession or registration as a voter other than in the place where one is elected
does not constitute loss of residence.
28
So settled is the concept (of domicile) in our election law that
in these and other election law cases, this Court has stated that the mere absence of an individual
from his permanent residence without the intention to abandon it does not result in a loss or change
of domicile.
The deliberations of the 1987 Constitution on the residence qualification for certain elective positions
have placed beyond doubt the principle that when the Constitution speaks of "residence" in election
law, it actually means only "domicile" to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971 Constitutional
Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in the place not less than one
year immediately preceding the day of the elections. So my question is: What is the
Committee's concept of residence of a candidate for the legislature? Is it actual
residence or is it the concept of domicile or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the National
Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides, among others, "and a
resident thereof", that is, in the district for a period of not less than one year preceding
the day of the election. This was in effect lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the
interpretation given to it was domicile.
29

xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on Section 7, page 2. I think Commissioner
Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been interpreted at times as a
matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentleman consider at the proper time to go back
to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But we might encounter some difficulty especially considering that a
provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage says that Filipinos living abroad
may vote as enacted by law. So, we have to stick to the original concept that it should
be by domicile and not physical residence.
30

In Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives,
31
this Court concluded that the framers
of the 1987 Constitution obviously adhered to the definition given to the term residence in election
law, regarding it as having the same meaning as domicile.
32

In the light of the principles just discussed, has petitioner Imelda Romualdez Marcos satisfied the
residency requirement mandated by Article VI, Sec. 6 of the 1987 Constitution? Of what significance
is the questioned entry in petitioner's Certificate of Candidacy stating her residence in the First
Legislative District of Leyte as seven (7) months?
It is the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which ought to be decisive in
determining whether or not and individual has satisfied the constitution's residency qualification
requirement. The said statement becomes material only when there is or appears to be a deliberate
attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a candidate ineligible. It
would be plainly ridiculous for a candidate to deliberately and knowingly make a statement in a
certificate of candidacy which would lead to his or her disqualification.
It stands to reason therefore, that petitioner merely committed an honest mistake in jotting the word
"seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement. The circumstances leading
to her filing the questioned entry obviously resulted in the subsequent confusion which prompted
petitioner to write down the period of her actual stay in Tolosa, Leyte instead of her period of
residence in the First district, which was "since childhood" in the space provided. These
circumstances and events are amply detailed in the COMELEC's Second Division's questioned
resolution, albeit with a different interpretation. For instance, when herein petitioner announced that
she would be registering in Tacloban City to make her eligible to run in the First District, private
respondent Montejo opposed the same, claiming that petitioner was a resident of Tolosa, not
Tacloban City. Petitioner then registered in her place of actual residence in the First District, which is
Tolosa, Leyte, a fact which she subsequently noted down in her Certificate of Candidacy. A close look
at said certificate would reveal the possible source of the confusion: the entry for residence (Item No.
7) is followed immediately by the entry for residence in the constituency where a candidate seeks
election thus:
7. RESIDENCE (complete Address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
POST OFFICE ADDRESS FOR ELECTION PURPOSES: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:_________ Years
and Seven Months.
Having been forced by private respondent to register in her place of actual residence in Leyte instead
of petitioner's claimed domicile, it appears that petitioner had jotted down her period of stay in her
legal residence or domicile. The juxtaposition of entries in Item 7 and Item 8 the first requiring
actual residence and the second requiring domicile coupled with the circumstances surrounding
petitioner's registration as a voter in Tolosa obviously led to her writing down an unintended entry for
which she could be disqualified. This honest mistake should not, however, be allowed to negate the
fact of residence in the First District if such fact were established by means more convincing than a
mere entry on a piece of paper.
We now proceed to the matter of petitioner's domicile.
In support of its asseveration that petitioner's domicile could not possibly be in the First District of
Leyte, the Second Division of the COMELEC, in its assailed Resolution of April 24,1995 maintains
that "except for the time when (petitioner) studied and worked for some years after graduation in
Tacloban City, she continuously lived in Manila." The Resolution additionally cites certain facts as
indicative of the fact that petitioner's domicile ought to be any place where she lived in the last few
decades except Tacloban, Leyte. First, according to the Resolution, petitioner, in 1959, resided in
San Juan, Metro Manila where she was also registered voter. Then, in 1965, following the election of
her husband to the Philippine presidency, she lived in San Miguel, Manila where she as a voter. In
1978 and thereafter, she served as a member of the Batasang Pambansa and Governor of Metro
Manila. "She could not, have served these positions if she had not been a resident of Metro Manila,"
the COMELEC stressed. Here is where the confusion lies.
We have stated, many times in the past, that an individual does not lose his domicile even if he has
lived and maintained residences in different places. Residence, it bears repeating, implies a factual
relationship to a given place for various purposes. The absence from legal residence or domicile to
pursue a profession, to study or to do other things of a temporary or semi-permanent nature does not
constitute loss of residence. Thus, the assertion by the COMELEC that "she could not have been a
resident of Tacloban City since childhood up to the time she filed her certificate of candidacy because
she became a resident of many places" flies in the face of settled jurisprudence in which this Court
carefully made distinctions between (actual) residence and domicile for election law purposes.
In Larena vs. Teves,
33
supra, we stressed:
[T]his court is of the opinion and so holds that a person who has his own house wherein
he lives with his family in a municipality without having ever had the intention of
abandoning it, and without having lived either alone or with his family in another
municipality, has his residence in the former municipality, notwithstanding his having
registered as an elector in the other municipality in question and having been a
candidate for various insular and provincial positions, stating every time that he is a
resident of the latter municipality.
More significantly, in Faypon vs. Quirino,
34
We explained that:
A citizen may leave the place of his birth to look for "greener pastures," as the saying
goes, to improve his lot, and that, of course includes study in other places, practice of
his avocation, or engaging in business. When an election is to be held, the citizen who
left his birthplace to improve his lot may desire to return to his native town to cast his
ballot but for professional or business reasons, or for any other reason, he may not
absent himself from his professional or business activities; so there he registers himself
as voter as he has the qualifications to be one and is not willing to give up or lose the
opportunity to choose the officials who are to run the government especially in national
elections. Despite such registration, the animus revertendi to his home, to his domicile
or residence of origin has not forsaken him. This may be the explanation why the
registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin has not been deemed
sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such residence. It finds justification in the
natural desire and longing of every person to return to his place of birth. This strong
feeling of attachment to the place of one's birth must be overcome by positive proof of
abandonment for another.
From the foregoing, it can be concluded that in its above-cited statements supporting its proposition
that petitioner was ineligible to run for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte, the
COMELEC was obviously referring to petitioner's various places of (actual) residence, not her
domicile. In doing so, it not only ignored settled jurisprudence on residence in election law and the
deliberations of the constitutional commission but also the provisions of the Omnibus Election Code
(B.P. 881).
35

What is undeniable, however, are the following set of facts which establish the fact of petitioner's
domicile, which we lift verbatim from the COMELEC's Second Division's assailed Resolution:
36

In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her
domicile in Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in
Tacloban from 1938 to 1949 when she graduated from high school. She pursued her
college studies in St. Paul's College, now Divine Word University in Tacloban, where
she earned her degree in Education. Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese
School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went to Manila to work with her cousin, the
late speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the House of Representatives. In
1954, she married ex-President Ferdinand E. Marcos when he was still a congressman
of Ilocos Norte and registered there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator
of the Republic in 1959, she and her husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where
she registered as a voter. In 1965, when her husband was elected President of the
Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in Malacanang Palace and registered as
a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
[I]n February 1986 (she claimed that) she and her family were abducted and kidnapped
to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November 1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992, respondent
ran for election as President of the Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy
wherein she indicated that she is a resident and registered voter of San Juan, Metro
Manila.
Applying the principles discussed to the facts found by COMELEC, what is inescapable is that
petitioner held various residences for different purposes during the last four decades. None of these
purposes unequivocally point to an intention to abandon her domicile of origin in Tacloban, Leyte.
Moreover, while petitioner was born in Manila, as a minor she naturally followed the domicile of her
parents. She grew up in Tacloban, reached her adulthood there and eventually established residence
in different parts of the country for various reasons. Even during her husband's presidency, at the
height of the Marcos Regime's powers, petitioner kept her close ties to her domicile of origin by
establishing residences in Tacloban, celebrating her birthdays and other important personal
milestones in her home province, instituting well-publicized projects for the benefit of her province and
hometown, and establishing a political power base where her siblings and close relatives held
positions of power either through the ballot or by appointment, always with either her influence or
consent. These well-publicized ties to her domicile of origin are part of the history and lore of the
quarter century of Marcos power in our country. Either they were entirely ignored in the COMELEC'S
Resolutions, or the majority of the COMELEC did not know what the rest of the country always knew:
the fact of petitioner's domicile in Tacloban, Leyte.
Private respondent in his Comment, contends that Tacloban was not petitioner's domicile of origin
because she did not live there until she was eight years old. He avers that after leaving the place in
1952, she "abandoned her residency (sic) therein for many years and . . . (could not) re-establish her
domicile in said place by merely expressing her intention to live there again." We do not agree.
First, minor follows the domicile of his parents. As domicile, once acquired is retained until a new one
is gained, it follows that in spite of the fact of petitioner's being born in Manila, Tacloban, Leyte was
her domicile of origin by operation of law. This domicile was not established only when her father
brought his family back to Leyte contrary to private respondent's averments.
Second, domicile of origin is not easily lost. To successfully effect a change of domicile, one must
demonstrate:
37

1. An actual removal or an actual change of domicile;
2. A bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a
new one; and
3. Acts which correspond with the purpose.
In the absence of clear and positive proof based on these criteria, the residence of origin should be
deemed to continue. Only with evidence showing concurrence of all three requirements can the
presumption of continuity or residence be rebutted, for a change of residence requires an actual and
deliberate abandonment, and one cannot have two legal residences at the same time.
38
In the case
at bench, the evidence adduced by private respondent plainly lacks the degree of persuasiveness
required to convince this court that an abandonment of domicile of origin in favor of a domicile of
choice indeed occurred. To effect an abandonment requires the voluntary act of relinquishing
petitioner's former domicile with an intent to supplant the former domicile with one of her own
choosing (domicilium voluntarium).
In this connection, it cannot be correctly argued that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation
of law as a result of her marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952. For there is a
clearly established distinction between the Civil Code concepts of "domicile" and "residence."
39
The
presumption that the wife automatically gains the husband's domicile by operation of law upon
marriage cannot be inferred from the use of the term "residence" in Article 110 of the Civil Code
because the Civil Code is one area where the two concepts are well delineated. Dr. Arturo Tolentino,
writing on this specific area explains:
In the Civil Code, there is an obvious difference between domicile and residence. Both
terms imply relations between a person and a place; but in residence, the relation is one
of fact while in domicile it is legal or juridical, independent of the necessity of physical
presence.
40

Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt
the wife from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the
Republic.
A survey of jurisprudence relating to Article 110 or to the concepts of domicile or residence as they
affect the female spouse upon marriage yields nothing which would suggest that the female spouse
automatically loses her domicile of origin in favor of the husband's choice of residence upon marriage.
Article 110 is a virtual restatement of Article 58 of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 which states:
La mujer esta obligada a seguir a su marido donde quiera que fije su residencia. Los
Tribunales, sin embargo, podran con justa causa eximirla de esta obligacion cuando el
marido transende su residencia a ultramar o' a pais extranjero.
Note the use of the phrase "donde quiera su fije de residencia" in the aforequoted article, which
means wherever (the husband) wishes to establish residence. This part of the article clearly
contemplates only actual residence because it refers to a positive act of fixing a family home or
residence. Moreover, this interpretation is further strengthened by the phrase "cuando el marido
translade su residencia" in the same provision which means, "when the husband shall transfer his
residence," referring to another positive act of relocating the family to another home or place of actual
residence. The article obviously cannot be understood to refer to domicile which is a fixed,
fairly-permanent concept when it plainly connotes the possibility of transferring from one place to
another not only once, but as often as the husband may deem fit to move his family, a circumstance
more consistent with the concept of actual residence.
The right of the husband to fix the actual residence is in harmony with the intention of the law to
strengthen and unify the family, recognizing the fact that the husband and the wife bring into the
marriage different domiciles (of origin). This difference could, for the sake of family unity, be
reconciled only by allowing the husband to fix a single place of actual residence.
Very significantly, Article 110 of the Civil Code is found under Title V under the heading: RIGHTS
AND OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. Immediately preceding Article 110 is Article
109 which obliges the husband and wife to live together, thus:
Art. 109. The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual
respect and fidelity and render mutual help and support.
The duty to live together can only be fulfilled if the husband and wife are physically together. This
takes into account the situations where the couple has many residences (as in the case of the
petitioner). If the husband has to stay in or transfer to any one of their residences, the wife should
necessarily be with him in order that they may "live together." Hence, it is illogical to conclude that Art.
110 refers to "domicile" and not to "residence." Otherwise, we shall be faced with a situation where
the wife is left in the domicile while the husband, for professional or other reasons, stays in one of
their (various) residences. As Dr. Tolentino further explains:
Residence and Domicile Whether the word "residence" as used with reference to
particular matters is synonymous with "domicile" is a question of some difficulty, and the
ultimate decision must be made from a consideration of the purpose and intent with
which the word is used. Sometimes they are used synonymously, at other times they
are distinguished from one another.
xxx xxx xxx
Residence in the civil law is a material fact, referring to the physical presence of a
person in a place. A person can have two or more residences, such as a country
residence and a city residence. Residence is acquired by living in place; on the other
hand, domicile can exist without actually living in the place. The important thing for
domicile is that, once residence has been established in one place, there be an
intention to stay there permanently, even if residence is also established in some other
place.
41

In fact, even the matter of a common residence between the husband and the wife during the
marriage is not an iron-clad principle; In cases applying the Civil Code on the question of a common
matrimonial residence, our jurisprudence has recognized certain situations
42
where the spouses
could not be compelled to live with each other such that the wife is either allowed to maintain a
residence different from that of her husband or, for obviously practical reasons, revert to her original
domicile (apart from being allowed to opt for a new one). In De la Vina vs. Villareal
43
this Court held
that "[a] married woman may acquire a residence or domicile separate from that of her husband
during the existence of the marriage where the husband has given cause for divorce."
44
Note that the
Court allowed the wife either to obtain new residence or to choose a new domicile in such an event.
In instances where the wife actually opts, .under the Civil Code, to live separately from her husband
either by taking new residence or reverting to her domicile of origin, the Court has held that the wife
could not be compelled to live with her husband on pain of contempt. In Arroyo vs. Vasques de
Arroyo
45
the Court held that:
Upon examination of the authorities, we are convinced that it is not within the province
of the courts of this country to attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit with, and
render conjugal rights to, the other. Of course where the property rights of one of the
pair are invaded, an action for restitution of such rights can be maintained. But we are
disinclined to sanction the doctrine that an order, enforcible (sic) by process of
contempt, may be entered to compel the restitution of the purely personal right of
consortium. At best such an order can be effective for no other purpose than to compel
the spouses to live under the same roof; and he experience of those countries where
the courts of justice have assumed to compel the cohabitation of married people shows
that the policy of the practice is extremely questionable. Thus in England, formerly the
Ecclesiastical Court entertained suits for the restitution of conjugal rights at the instance
of either husband or wife; and if the facts were found to warrant it, that court would
make a mandatory decree, enforceable by process of contempt in case of
disobedience, requiring the delinquent party to live with the other and render conjugal
rights. Yet this practice was sometimes criticized even by the judges who felt bound to
enforce such orders, and in Weldon v. Weldon (9 P.D. 52), decided in 1883, Sir James
Hannen, President in the Probate, Divorce and Admiralty Division of the High Court of
Justice, expressed his regret that the English law on the subject was not the same as
that which prevailed in Scotland, where a decree of adherence, equivalent to the decree
for the restitution of conjugal rights in England, could be obtained by the injured spouse,
but could not be enforced by imprisonment. Accordingly, in obedience to the growing
sentiment against the practice, the Matrimonial Causes Act (1884) abolished the
remedy of imprisonment; though a decree for the restitution of conjugal rights can still
be procured, and in case of disobedience may serve in appropriate cases as the basis
of an order for the periodical payment of a stipend in the character of alimony.
In the voluminous jurisprudence of the United States, only one court, so far as we can
discover, has ever attempted to make a preemptory order requiring one of the spouses
to live with the other; and that was in a case where a wife was ordered to follow and live
with her husband, who had changed his domicile to the City of New Orleans. The
decision referred to (Bahn v. Darby, 36 La. Ann., 70) was based on a provision of the
Civil Code of Louisiana similar to article 56 of the Spanish Civil Code. It was decided
many years ago, and the doctrine evidently has not been fruitful even in the State of
Louisiana. In other states of the American Union the idea of enforcing cohabitation by
process of contempt is rejected. (21 Cyc., 1148).
In a decision of January 2, 1909, the Supreme Court of Spain appears to have affirmed
an order of the Audiencia Territorial de Valladolid requiring a wife to return to the marital
domicile, and in the alternative, upon her failure to do so, to make a particular
disposition of certain money and effects then in her possession and to deliver to her
husband, as administrator of the ganancial property, all income, rents, and interest
which might accrue to her from the property which she had brought to the marriage.
(113 Jur. Civ., pp. 1, 11) But it does not appear that this order for the return of the wife
to the marital domicile was sanctioned by any other penalty than the consequences that
would be visited upon her in respect to the use and control of her property; and it does
not appear that her disobedience to that order would necessarily have been followed by
imprisonment for contempt.
Parenthetically when Petitioner was married to then Congressman Marcos, in 1954, petitioner was
obliged by virtue of Article 110 of the Civil Code to follow her husband's actual place of
residence fixed by him. The problem here is that at that time, Mr. Marcos had several places of
residence, among which were San Juan, Rizal and Batac, Ilocos Norte. There is no showing which of
these places Mr. Marcos did fix as his family's residence. But assuming that Mr. Marcos had fixed any
of these places as the conjugal residence, what petitioner gained upon marriage was actual
residence. She did not lose her domicile of origin.
On the other hand, the common law concept of "matrimonial domicile" appears to have been
incorporated, as a result of our jurisprudential experiences after the drafting of the Civil Code of 1950,
into the New Family Code. To underscore the difference between the intentions of the Civil Code and
the Family Code drafters, the term residence has been supplanted by the term domicile in an entirely
new provision (Art. 69) distinctly different in meaning and spirit from that found in Article 110. The
provision recognizes revolutionary changes in the concept of women's rights in the intervening years
by making the choice of domicile a product of mutual agreement between the spouses.
46

Without as much belaboring the point, the term residence may mean one thing in civil law (or under
the Civil Code) and quite another thing in political law. What stands clear is that insofar as the Civil
Code is concerned-affecting the rights and obligations of husband and wife the term residence
should only be interpreted to mean "actual residence." The inescapable conclusion derived from this
unambiguous civil law delineation therefore, is that when petitioner married the former President in
1954, she kept her domicile of origin and merely gained a new home, not a domicilium necessarium.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner gained a new "domicile" after her marriage
and only acquired a right to choose a new one after her husband died, petitioner's acts following her
return to the country clearly indicate that she not only impliedly but expressly chose her domicile of
origin (assuming this was lost by operation of law) as her domicile. This "choice" was unequivocally
expressed in her letters to the Chairman of the PCGG when petitioner sought the PCGG's permission
to "rehabilitate (our) ancestral house in Tacloban and Farm in Olot, Leyte. . . to make them livable for
the Marcos family to have a home in our homeland."
47
Furthermore, petitioner obtained her
residence certificate in 1992 in Tacloban, Leyte, while living in her brother's house, an act which
supports the domiciliary intention clearly manifested in her letters to the PCGG Chairman. She could
not have gone straight to her home in San Juan, as it was in a state of disrepair, having been
previously looted by vandals. Her "homes" and "residences" following her arrival in various parts of
Metro Manila merely qualified as temporary or "actual residences," not domicile. Moreover, and
proceeding from our discussion pointing out specific situations where the female spouse either
reverts to her domicile of origin or chooses a new one during the subsistence of the marriage, it would
be highly illogical for us to assume that she cannot regain her original domicile upon the death of her
husband absent a positive act of selecting a new one where situations exist within the subsistence of
the marriage itself where the wife gains a domicile different from her husband.
In the light of all the principles relating to residence and domicile enunciated by this court up to this
point, we are persuaded that the facts established by the parties weigh heavily in favor of a
conclusion supporting petitioner's claim of legal residence or domicile in the First District of Leyte.
II. The jurisdictional issue
Petitioner alleges that the jurisdiction of the COMELEC had already lapsed considering that the
assailed resolutions were rendered on April 24, 1995, fourteen (14) days before the election in
violation of Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.
48
Moreover, petitioner contends that it is the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and not the COMELEC which has jurisdiction over the
election of members of the House of Representatives in accordance with Article VI Sec. 17 of the
Constitution. This is untenable.
It is a settled doctrine that a statute requiring rendition of judgment within a specified time is generally
construed to be merely directory,
49
"so that non-compliance with them does not invalidate the
judgment on the theory that if the statute had intended such result it would have clearly indicated
it."
50
The difference between a mandatory and a directory provision is often made on grounds of
necessity. Adopting the same view held by several American authorities, this court in Marcelino
vs. Cruz held that:
51

The difference between a mandatory and directory provision is often determined on
grounds of expediency, the reason being that less injury results to the general public by
disregarding than enforcing the letter of the law.
In Trapp v. Mc Cormick, a case calling for the interpretation of a statute containing a
limitation of thirty (30) days within which a decree may be entered without the consent
of counsel, it was held that "the statutory provisions which may be thus departed from
with impunity, without affecting the validity of statutory proceedings, are usually those
which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and
purpose of the Legislature or some incident of the essential act." Thus, in said case, the
statute under examination was construed merely to be directory.
The mischief in petitioner's contending that the COMELEC should have abstained from rendering a
decision after the period stated in the Omnibus Election Code because it lacked jurisdiction, lies in the
fact that our courts and other quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on
the ground of having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period.
In any event, with the enactment of Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Section 78 of B.P.
881,
52
it is evident that the respondent Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a
pending disqualification case under Section 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
As to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal's supposed assumption of jurisdiction over the
issue of petitioner's qualifications after the May 8, 1995 elections, suffice it to say that HRET's
jurisdiction as the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of
members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives.
53
Petitioner not being a member of the House of Representatives, it is obvious that
the HRET at this point has no jurisdiction over the question.
It would be an abdication of many of the ideals enshrined in the 1987 Constitution for us to either to
ignore or deliberately make distinctions in law solely on the basis of the personality of a petitioner in a
case. Obviously a distinction was made on such a ground here. Surely, many established principles
of law, even of election laws were flouted for the sake perpetuating power during the pre-EDSA
regime. We renege on these sacred ideals, including the meaning and spirit of EDSA ourselves
bending established principles of principles of law to deny an individual what he or she justly
deserves in law. Moreover, in doing so, we condemn ourselves to repeat the mistakes of the past.
WHEREFORE, having determined that petitioner possesses the necessary residence qualifications to
run for a seat in the House of Representatives in the First District of Leyte, the COMELEC's
questioned Resolutions dated April 24, May 7, May 11, and May 25, 1995 are hereby SET ASIDE.
Respondent COMELEC is hereby directed to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers to proclaim
petitioner as the duly elected Representative of the First District of Leyte.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.



Separate Opinions

PUNO, J., concurring:
It was Aristotle who taught mankind that things that are alike should be treated alike, while things that are
unalike should be treated unalike in proportion to their unalikeness.
1
Like other candidates, petitioner has
clearly met the residence requirement provided by Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.
2
We cannot
disqualify her and treat her unalike, for the Constitution guarantees equal protection of the law. I proceed from
the following factual and legal propositions:
First. There is no question that petitioner's original domicile is in Tacloban, Leyte. Her parents were domiciled
in Tacloban. Their ancestral house is in Tacloban. They have vast real estate in the place. Petitioner went to
school and thereafter worked there. I consider Tacloban as her initial domicile, both her domicile of origin and
her domicile of choice. Her domicile of origin as it was the domicile of her parents when she was a minor; and
her domicile of choice, as she continued living there even after reaching the age of majority.
Second. There is also no question that in May, 1954, petitioner married the late President Ferdinand E.
Marcos. By contracting marriage, her domicile became subject to change by law, and the right to change it was
given by Article 110 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife
from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the
Republic.
3
(Emphasis supplied)
In De la Via v. Villareal and Geopano,
4
this Court explained why the domicile of the wife ought to
follow that of the husband. We held: "The reason is founded upon the theoretic identity of person and
interest between the husband and the wife, and the presumption that, from the nature of the relation,
the home of one is the home of the other. It is intended to promote, strengthen, and secure their
interests in this relation, as it ordinarily exists, where union and harmony prevail."
5
In accord with this
objective, Article 109 of the Civil Code also obligated the husband and wife "to live together."
Third. The difficult issues start as we determine whether petitioner's marriage to former President Marcos ipso
facto resulted in the loss of her Tacloban domicile. I respectfully submit that her marriage by itself alone did not
cause her to lose her Tacloban domicile. Article 110 of the Civil Code merely gave the husband the right to fix
the domicile of the family. In the exercise of the right, the husband may explicitly choose the prior domicile of
his wife, in which case, the wife's domicile remains unchanged. The husband can also implicitly acquiesce to
his wife's prior domicile even if it is different. So we held in de la Via,
6

. . . . When married women as well as children subject to parental authority live, with the
acquiescence of their husbands or fathers, in a place distinct from where the latter live, they
have their ownindependent domicile. . . .
It is not, therefore, the mere fact of marriage but the deliberate choice of a different domicile by the
husband that will change the domicile of a wife from what it was prior to their marriage. The domiciliary
decision made by the husband in the exercise of the right conferred by Article 110 of the Civil Code
binds the wife. Any and all acts of a wife during her coverture contrary to the domiciliary choice of the
husband cannot change in any way the domicile legally fixed by the husband. These acts are void not
only because the wife lacks the capacity to choose her domicile but also because they are contrary to
law and public policy.
In the case at bench, it is not disputed that former President Marcos exercised his right to fix the family
domicile and established it in Batac, Ilocos Norte, where he was then the congressman. At that particular point
of time and throughout their married life, petitioner lost her domicile in Tacloban, Leyte. Since petitioner's Batac
domicile has been fixed by operation of law, it was not affected in 1959 when her husband was elected as
Senator, when they lived in San Juan, Rizal and where she registered as a voter. It was not also affected in
1965 when her husband was elected President, when they lived in Malacaang Palace, and when she
registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila. Nor was it affected when she served as a member of the Batasang
Pambansa, Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila during the incumbency of her
husband as President of the nation. Under Article 110 of the Civil Code, it was only her husband who could
change the family domicile in Batac and the evidence shows he did not effect any such change. To a large
degree, this follows the common law that "a woman on her marriage loses her own domicile and by operation
of law, acquires that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends."
7

Fourth. The more difficult task is how to interpret the effect of the death on September 28, 1989 of former
President Marcos on petitioner's Batac domicile. The issue is of first impression in our jurisdiction and two (2)
schools of thought contend for acceptance. One is espoused by our distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice
Davide, Jr., heavily relying on American authorities.
8
He echoes the theory that after the husband's death, the
wife retains the last domicile of her husband until she makes an actual change.
I do not subscribe to this submission. The American case law that the wife still retains her dead husband's
domicile is based on ancient common law which we can no longer apply in the Philippine setting today. The
common law identified the domicile of a wife as that of the husband and denied to her the power of acquiring a
domicile of her own separate and apart from him.
9
Legal scholars agree that two (2) reasons support this
common law doctrine. The first reason as pinpointed by the legendary Blackstone is derived from the view that
"the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband."
10
The second reason lies
in "the desirability of having the interests of each member of the family unit governed by the same
law."
11
The presumption that the wife retains the domicile of her deceased husband is an extension of this
common law concept. The concept and its extension have provided some of the most iniquitous jurisprudence
against women. It was under common law that the 1873 American case of Bradwell v. Illinois
12
was decided
where women were denied the right to practice law. It was unblushingly ruled that "the natural and proper
timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life .
. . This is the law of the Creator." Indeed, the rulings relied upon by Mr. Justice Davide in CJS
13
and AM JUR
2d
14
are American state court decisions handed down between the years 1917
15
and 1938,
16
or before the
time when women were accorded equality of rights with men. Undeniably, the women's liberation movement
resulted in far-ranging state legislations in the United States to eliminate gender inequality.
17
Starting in the
decade of the seventies, the courts likewise liberalized their rulings as they started invalidating laws infected
with gender-bias. It was in 1971 when the US Supreme Court in Reed v. Reed,
18
struck a big blow for women
equality when it declared as unconstitutional an Idaho law that required probate courts to choose male family
members over females as estate administrators. It held that mere administrative inconvenience cannot justify a
sex-based distinction. These significant changes both in law and in case law on the status of women virtually
obliterated the iniquitous common law surrendering the rights of married women to their husbands based on
the dubious theory of the parties' theoretic oneness. The Corpus Juris Secundum editors did not miss the
relevance of this revolution on women's right as they observed: "However, it has been declared that
under modern statutes changing the status of married women and departing from the common law theory of
marriage, there is no reason why a wife may not acquire a separate domicile for every purpose known to the
law."
19
In publishing in 1969 theRestatement of the Law, Second (Conflict of Laws 2d), the reputable American
Law Institute also categorically stated that the view of Blackstone ". . . is no longer held. As the result of
statutes and court decisions, a wife now possesses practically the same rights and powers as her unmarried
sister."
20

In the case at bench, we have to decide whether we should continue clinging to the anachronistic common
law that demeans women, especially married women. I submit that the Court has no choice except to break
away from this common law rule, the root of the many degradations of Filipino women. Before 1988, our laws
particularly the Civil Code, were full of gender discriminations against women. Our esteemed colleague,
Madam Justice Flerida Ruth Romero, cited a few of them as follows:
21

xxx xxx xxx
Legal Disabilities Suffered by Wives
Not generally known is the fact that under the Civil Code, wives suffer under certain restrictions
or disabilities. For instance, the wife cannot accept gifts from others, regardless of the sex of the
giver or the value of the gift, other than from her very close relatives, without her husband's
consent. She may accept only from, say, her parents, parents-in-law, brothers, sisters and the
relatives within the so-called fourth civil degree. She may not exercise her profession or
occupation or engage in business if her husband objects on serious grounds or if his income is
sufficient to support their family in accordance with their social standing. As to what constitutes
"serious grounds" for objecting, this is within the discretion of the husband.
xxx xxx xxx
Because of the present inequitable situation, the amendments to the Civil Law being proposed
by the University of the Philippines Law Center would allow absolute divorce which severes the
matrimonial ties, such that the divorced spouses are free to get married a year after the divorce
is decreed by the courts. However, in order to place the husband and wife on an equal footing
insofar as the bases for divorce are concerned, the following are specified as the grounds for
absolute divorce: (1) adultery or having a paramour committed by the respondent in any of the
ways specified in the Revised Penal Code or (2) an attempt by the respondent against the life of
the petitioner which amounts to attempted parricide under the Revised Penal Code; (3)
abandonment of the petitioner by the respondent without just cause for a period of three
consecutive years; or (4) habitual maltreatment.
With respect to property relations, the husband is automatically the administrator of the conjugal
property owned in common by the married couple even if the wife may be the more astute or
enterprising partner. The law does not leave it to the spouses to decide who shall act as such
administrator. Consequently, the husband is authorized to engage in acts and enter into
transactions beneficial to the conjugal partnership. The wife, however, cannot similarly bind the
partnership without the husband's consent.
And while both exercise joint parental authority over their children, it is the father whom the law
designates as the legal administrator of the property pertaining to the unemancipated child.
Taking the lead in Asia, our government exerted efforts, principally through legislations, to eliminate
inequality between men and women in our land. The watershed came on August 3, 1988 when our
Family Code took effect which, among others, terminated the unequal treatment of husband and wife
as to their rights and responsibilities.
22

The Family Code attained this elusive objective by giving new rights to married women and by abolishing sex-
based privileges of husbands. Among others, married women are now given the joint right to administer the
family property, whether in the absolute community system or in the system of conjugal partnership;
23
joint
parental authority over their minor children, both over their persons as well as their properties;
24
joint
responsibility for the support of the family;
25
the right to jointly manage the household;
26
and, the right to object
to their husband's exercise of profession, occupation, business or activity.
27
Of particular relevance to the case
at bench is Article 69 of the Family Code which took away the exclusive right of the husband to fix the family
domicile and gave it jointly to the husband and the wife, thus:
Art. 69. The husband and wife shall fix the family domicile. In case of disagreement, the court
shall decide.
The court may exempt one spouse from living with the other if the latter should live abroad or
there are other valid and compelling reasons for the exemption. However, such exemption shall
not apply if the same is not compatible with the solidarity of the family. (Emphasis supplied)
Article 69 repealed Article 110 of the Civil Code. Commenting on the duty of the husband and wife to
live together, former Madam Justice Alice Sempio-Diy of the Court of Appeals specified the instances
when a wife may now refuse to live with her husband, thus:
28

(2) The wife has the duty to live with her husband, but she may refuse to do so in certain cases
like:
(a) If the place chosen by the husband as family residence is dangerous to her
Life;
(b) If the husband subjects her to maltreatment or abusive conduct or insults,
making common life impossible;
(c) If the husband compels her to live with his parents, but she cannot get along
with her mother-in-law and they have constant quarrels (Del Rosario v. Del
Rosario, CA, 46 OG 6122);
(d) Where the husband has continuously carried illicit relations for 10 years with
different women and treated his wife roughly and without consideration. (Dadivas
v. Villanueva, 54 Phil. 92);
(e) Where the husband spent his time in gambling, giving no money to his family
for food and necessities, and at the same time insulting his wife and laying hands
on her. (Panuncio v. Sula, CA, 34 OG 129);
(f) If the husband has no fixed residence and lives a vagabond life as a tramp (1
Manresa 329);
(g) If the husband is carrying on a shameful business at home (Gahn v. Darby,
38 La. Ann. 70).
The inescapable conclusion is that our Family Code has completely emancipated the wife from the
control of the husband, thus abandoning the parties' theoretic identity of interest. No less than the late
revered Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes who chaired the Civil Code Revision Committee of the UP Law Center
gave this insightful view in one of his rare lectures after retirement:
29

xxx xxx xxx
The Family Code is primarily intended to reform the family law so as to emancipate the wife
from the exclusive control of the husband and to place her at parity with him insofar as the
family is concerned.The wife and the husband are now placed on equal standing by the Code.
They are now joint administrators of the family properties and exercise joint authority over the
persons and properties of their children. This means a dual authority in the family. The husband
will no longer prevail over the wife but she has to agree on all matters concerning the family.
(Emphasis supplied)
In light of the Family Code which abrogated the inequality between husband and wife as started and
perpetuated by the common law, there is no reason in espousing the anomalous rule that the wife still
retains the domicile of her dead husband. Article 110 of the Civil Code which provides the statutory
support for this stance has been repealed by Article 69 of the Family Code. By its repeal, it becomes a
dead-letter law, and we are not free to resurrect it by giving it further effect in any way or manner such
as by ruling that the petitioner is still bound by the domiciliary determination of her dead husband.
Aside from reckoning with the Family Code, we have to consider our Constitution and its firm guarantees of
due process and equal protection of
law.
30
It can hardly be doubted that the common law imposition on a married woman of her dead husband's
domicile even beyond his grave is patently discriminatory to women. It is a gender-based discrimination and is
not rationally related to the objective of promoting family solidarity. It cannot survive a constitutional challenge.
Indeed, compared with our previous fundamental laws, the 1987 Constitution is more concerned with equality
between sexes as it explicitly commands that the State ". . . shall ensure fundamental equality before the law
of women and men." To be exact, section 14, Article II provides: "The State recognizes the role of women in
nation building, and shall ensure fundamental equality before the law of women and men. We shall be
transgressing the sense and essence of this constitutional mandate if we insist on giving our women the
caveman's treatment.
Prescinding from these premises, I respectfully submit that the better stance is to rule that petitioner reacquired
her Tacloban domicile upon the death of her husband in 1989. This is the necessary consequence of the view
that petitioner's Batac dictated domicile did not continue after her husband's death; otherwise, she would have
no domicile and that will violate the universal rule that no person can be without a domicile at any point of time.
This stance also restores the right of petitioner to choose her domicile before it was taken away by Article 110
of the Civil Code, a right now recognized by the Family Code and protected by the Constitution. Likewise, I
cannot see the fairness of the common law requiring petitioner to choose again her Tacloban domicile before
she could be released from her Batac domicile. She lost her Tacloban domicile not through her act but through
the act of her deceased husband when he fixed their domicile in Batac. Her husband is dead and he cannot
rule her beyond the grave. The law disabling her to choose her own domicile has been repealed. Considering
all these, common law should not put the burden on petitioner to prove she has abandoned her dead
husband's domicile. There is neither rhyme nor reason for this gender-based burden.
But even assuming arguendo that there is need for convincing proof that petitioner chose to reacquire her
Tacloban domicile, still, the records reveal ample evidence to this effect. In her affidavit submitted to the
respondent COMELEC, petitioner averred:
xxx xxx xxx
36. In November, 1991, I came home to our beloved country, after several requests for my
return were denied by President Corazon C. Aquino, and after I filed suits for our Government to
issue me my passport.
37. But I came home without the mortal remains of my beloved husband, President Ferdinand
E. Marcos, which the Government considered a threat to the national security and welfare.
38. Upon my return to the country, I wanted to immediately live and reside in Tacloban City or in
Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, even if my residences there were not livable as they had been destroyed
and cannibalized. The PCGG, however, did not permit and allow me.
39. As a consequence, I had to live at various times in the Westin Philippine Plaza in Pasay
City, a friend's apartment on Ayala Avenue, a house in South Forbes Park which my daughter
rented, and Pacific Plaza, all in Makati.
40. After the 1992 Presidential Elections, I lived and resided in the residence of my brother in
San Jose, Tacloban City, and pursued my negotiations with PCGG to recover my sequestered
residences in Tacloban City and Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
40.1 In preparation for my observance of All Saints' Day and All Souls' Day that
year, I renovated my parents' burial grounds and entombed their bones which
had been excalvated, unearthed and scattered.
41. On November 29, 1993, I formally wrote PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for
permissions to
. . . rehabilitate . . . (o)ur ancestral house in Tacloban and farmhouse in Olot,
Leyte . . . to make them livable for us the Marcos family to have a home in our
own motherland.
xxx xxx xxx
42. It was only on 06 June 1994, however, when PCGG Chairman Gunigundo, in his letter to
Col. Simeon Kempis, Jr., PCGG Region 8 Representative, allowed me to repair and renovate
my Leyte residences. I quote part of his letter:
Dear Col. Kempis,
Upon representation by Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos to this Commission, that she
intends to visit our sequestered properties in Leyte, please allow her access
thereto. She may also cause repairs and renovation of the sequestered
properties, in which event, it shall be understood that her undertaking said
repairs is not authorization for her to take over said properties, and that all
expenses shall be for her account and not reimbursable. Please extend the
necessary courtesy to her.
xxx xxx xxx
43. I was not permitted, however, to live and stay in the Sto. Nio Shrine residence in Tacloban
City where I wanted to stay and reside, after repairs and renovations were completed. In August
1994, I transferred from San Jose, Tacloban City, to my residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte, when PCGG permitted me to stay and live there.
It is then clear that in 1992 petitioner reestablished her domicile in the First District of Leyte. It is not
disputed that in 1992, she first lived at the house of her brother in San Jose, Tacloban City and later, in
August 1994, she transferred her residence in Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. Both Tacloban City and
the municipality of Olot are within the First District of Leyte. Since petitioner reestablished her old
domicile in 1992 in the First District of Leyte, she more than complied with the constitutional
requirement of residence
". . . for a period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election," i.e., the May
8, 1995 elections.
The evidence presented by the private respondent to negate the Tacloban domicile of petitioner is nil. He
presented petitioner's Voter's Registration Record filed with the Board of Election Inspectors of Precinct 10-A
of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte wherein she stated that her period of residence in said barangay was six (6)
months as of the date of her filing of said Voter's Registration Record on January 28, 1995.
31
This statement in
petitioner's Voter's Registration Record is a non-prejudicial admission. The Constitution requires at least one
(1) year residence in thedistrict in which the candidate shall be elected. In the case at bench, the reference is
the First District of Leyte. Petitioner's statement proved that she resided in Olot six (6) months before January
28, 1995 but did not disprove that she has also resided in Tacloban City starting 1992. As aforestated, Olot
and Tacloban City are both within the First District of Leyte, hence, her six (6) months residence in Olot should
be counted not against, but in her favor. Private respondent also presented petitioner's Certificate of
Candidacy filed on March 8, 1995
32
where she placed seven (7) months after Item No. 8 which called for
information regarding "residence in the constituency where I seek to be elected immediately preceding the
election." Again, this original certificate of candidacy has no evidentiary value because an March 1, 1995 it was
corrected by petitioner. In her Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy,
33
petitioner wrote "since
childhood" after Item No. 8. The amendment of a certificate of candidacy to correct a bona fide mistake has
been allowed by this Court as a matter of course and as a matter of right. As we held in Alialy
v. COMELEC,
34
viz.:
xxx xxx xxx
The absence of the signature of the Secretary of the local chapter N.P in the original certificate
of candidacy presented before the deadline September 11, 1959, did not render the certificate
invalid.The amendment of the certificate, although at a date after the deadline, but before the
election, was substantial compliance with the law, and the defect was cured.
It goes without saying that petitioner's erroneous Certificate of Candidacy filed on March 8, 1995 cannot
be used as evidence against her. Private respondent's petition for the disqualification of petitioner
rested alone on these two (2) brittle pieces of documentary evidence petitioner's Voter's Registration
Record and her original Certificate of Candidacy. Ranged against the evidence of the petitioner
showing her ceaseless contacts with Tacloban, private respondent's two (2) pieces of evidence are too
insufficient to disqualify petitioner, more so, to deny her the right to represent the people of the First
District of Leyte who have overwhelmingly voted for her.
Fifth. Section 10, Article IX-C of the Constitution mandates that "bona fide candidates for any public office shall
be free from any form of harassment and discrimination."
35
A detached reading of the records of the case at
bench will show that all forms of legal and extra-legal obstacles have been thrown against petitioner to prevent
her from running as the people's representative in the First District of Leyte. In petitioner's Answer to the
petition to disqualify her, she averred:
36

xxx xxx xxx
10. Petitioner's (herein private respondent Montejo) motive in filing the instant petition is
devious. When respondent (petitioner herein) announced that she was intending to register as a
voter in Tacloban City and run for Congress in the First District of Leyte, petitioner (Montejo)
immediately opposed her intended registration by writing a letter stating that "she is not a
resident of said city but of Barangay Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." (Annex "2" of respondent's affidavit,
Annex "2"). After respondent (petitioner herein) had registered as a voter in Tolosa following
completion of her six-month actual residence therein, petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition with the
COMELEC to transfer the town of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District and
pursued such move up to the Supreme Court in G.R. No. 118702, his purpose being to remove
respondent (petitioner herein) as petitioner's (Montejo's) opponent in the congressional election
in the First District. He also filed a bill, along with other Leyte Congressmen, seeking to create
another legislative district, to remove the town of Tolosa out of the First District and to make it a
part of the new district, to achieve his purpose. However, such bill did not pass the Senate.
Having, failed on such moves, petitioner now filed the instant petition, for the same objective, as
it is obvious that he is afraid to submit himself along with respondent (petitioner herein) for the
judgment and verdict of the electorate of the First District of Leyte in an honest, orderly,
peaceful, free and clean elections on May 8, 1995.
These allegations which private respondent did not challenge were not lost
to the perceptive eye of Commissioner Maambong who in his Dissenting Opinion,
37
held:
xxx xxx xxx
Prior to the registration date January 28, 1995 the petitioner (herein private respondent
Montejo) wrote the Election Officer of Tacloban City not to allow respondent (petitioner herein)
to register thereat since she is a resident of Tolosa and not Tacloban City. The purpose of this
move of the petitioner (Montejo) is not lost to (sic) the Commission. In UND No. 95-001 (In the
matter of the Legislative Districts of the Provinces of Leyte, Iloilo, and South Cotabato, Out of
Which the New Provinces of Biliran, Guimaras and Saranggani Were Respectively Created), . . .
Hon. Cirilo Roy G. Montejo, Representative, First District of Leyte, wanted the Municipality of
Tolosa, in the First District of Leyte, transferred to the Second District of Leyte. The Hon. Sergio
A.F. Apostol, Representative of the Second District of Leyte, opposed the move of the petitioner
(Montejo). Under Comelec Resolution No. 2736 (December 29, 1994), the Commission on
Elections refused to make the proposed transfer. Petitioner (Montejo) filed "Motion for
Reconsideration of Resolution
No. 2736" which the Commission denied in a Resolution promulgated on February 1, 1995.
Petitioner (Montejo) filed a petition for certiorari before the Honorable Supreme Court (Cirilo Roy
G. Montejo vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 118702) questioning the resolution of the
Commission. Believing that he could get a favorable ruling from the Supreme Court, petitioner
(Montejo) tried to make sure that the respondent (petitioner herein) will register as a voter in
Tolosa so that she will be forced to run as Representative not in the First but in the Second
District.
It did not happen. On March 16, 1995, the Honorable Supreme Court unanimously promulgated
a "Decision," penned by Associate Justice Reynato S. Puno, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, Section 1 of Resolution No. 2736 insofar as it transferred
the municipality of Capoocan of the Second District and the municipality of
Palompon of the Fourth District to the Third District of the province of Leyte, is
annulled and set aside. We also deny the Petition praying for the transfer of the
municipality of Tolosa from the First District to the Second District of the province
of Leyte. No costs.
Petitioner's (Montejo's) plan did not work. But the respondent (petitioner herein) was
constrained to register in the Municipality of Tolosa where her house is instead of Tacloban City,
her domicile. In any case, both Tacloban City and Tolosa are in the First Legislative District.
All these attempts to misuse our laws and legal processes are forms of rank harassments and invidious
discriminations against petitioner to deny her equal access to a public office. We cannot commit any
hermeneutic violence to the Constitution by torturing the meaning of equality, the end result of which
will allow the harassment and discrimination of petitioner who has lived a controversial life, a past of
alternating light and shadow. There is but one Constitution for all Filipinos. Petitioner cannot be
adjudged by a "different" Constitution, and the worst way to interpret the Constitution is to inject in its
interpretation, bile and bitterness.
Sixth. In Gallego v. Vera,
38
we explained that the reason for this residence requirement is "to exclude a
stranger or newcomer, unacquainted, with the conditions and needs of a community and not identified with the
latter, from an elective office to serve that community . . . ." Petitioner's lifetime contacts with the First District of
Leyte cannot be contested. Nobody can claim that she is not acquainted with its problems because she is a
stranger to the place. None can argue she cannot satisfy the intent of the Constitution.
Seventh. In resolving election cases, a dominant consideration is the need to effectuate the will of the
electorate. The election results show that petitioner received Seventy Thousand Four Hundred Seventy-one
(70,471) votes, while private respondent got only Thirty-Six Thousand Eight Hundred Thirty-Three (36,833)
votes. Petitioner is clearly the overwhelming choice of the electorate of the First District of Leyte and this is not
a sleight of statistics. We cannot frustrate this sovereign will on highly arguable technical considerations. In
case of doubt, we should lean towards a rule that will give life to the people's political judgment.
A final point. The case at bench provides the Court with the rare opportunity to rectify the inequality of status
between women and men by rejecting the iniquitous common law precedents on the domicile of married
women and by redefining domicile in accord with our own culture, law, and Constitution. To rule that a married
woman is eternally tethered to the domicile dictated by her dead husband is to preserve the anachronistic and
anomalous balance of advantage of a husband over his wife. We should not allow the dead to govern the living
even if the glories of yesteryears seduce us to shout long live the dead! The Family Code buried this gender-
based discrimination against married women and we should not excavate what has been entombed. More
importantly, the Constitution forbids it.
I vote to grant the petition.
Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., concur.
FRANCISCO, J., concurring:
I concur with Mr. Justice Kapunan's ponencia finding petitioner qualified for the position of Representative of
the First Congressional District of Leyte. I wish, however, to express a few comments on the issue of
petitioner's domicile.
Domicile has been defined as that place in which a person's habitation is fixed, without any present intention of
removing therefrom, and that place is properly the domicile of a person in which he has voluntarily fixed his
abode, or habitation, not for a mere special or temporary purpose, but with a present intention of making it his
permanent home (28 C.J.S. 1). It denotes a fixed permanent residence to which when absent for business, or
pleasure, or for like reasons one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that
they disclose intent. (Ong Huan Tin v. Republic, 19 SCRA 966, 969)
Domicile is classified into domicile of origin and domicile of choice. The law attributes to every individual a
domicile of origin, which is the domicile of his parents, or of the head of his family, or of the person on whom he
is legally dependent at the time of his birth. While the domicile of origin is generally the place where one is born
or reared, it maybe elsewhere (28 C.J.S. 5). Domicile of choice, on the other hand, is the place which the
person has elected and chosen for himself to displace his previous domicile; it has for its true basis or
foundation the intention of the person (28 C.J.S. 6). In order to hold that a person has abandoned his domicile
and acquired a new one called domicile of choice, the following requisites must concur, namely, (a) residence
or bodily presence in the new locality, (b) intention to remain there or animus manendi, and (c) an intention to
abandon the old domicile oranimus non revertendi (Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, 226 SCRA 408,
415). A third classification is domicile by operation of law which attributes to a person a domicile independent
of his own intention or actual residence, ordinarily resulting from legal domestic relations, as that of the wife
arising from marriage, or the relation of a parent and a child (28 C.J.S. 7).
In election law, when our Constitution speaks of residence for election purposes it means domicile (Co v.
Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 713; Nuval v. Guray, 52 Phil. 645, 651). To
my mind, public respondent Commission on Elections misapplied this concept, of domicile which led to
petitioner's disqualification by ruling that petitioner failed to comply with the constitutionally mandated one-year
residence requirement. Apparently, public respondent Commission deemed as conclusive petitioner's stay and
registration as voter in many places as conduct disclosing her intent to abandon her established domicile of
origin in Tacloban, Leyte. In several decisions, though, the Court has laid down the rule that registration of a
voter in a place other than his place of origin is not sufficient to constitute abandonment or loss of such
residence (Faypon v. Quirino, 96 Phil. 294, 300). Respondent Commission offered no cogent reason to depart
from this rule except to surmise petitioner's intent of abandoning her domicile of origin.
It has been suggested that petitioner's domicile of origin was supplanted by a new domicile due to her
marriage, a domicile by operation of law. The proposition is that upon the death of her husband in 1989 she
retains her husband's domicile, i.e., Batac, Ilocos Norte, until she makes an actual change thereof. I find this
proposition quite untenable.
Tacloban, Leyte, is petitioner's domicile of origin which was involuntarily supplanted with another, i.e., Batac,
Ilocos Norte, upon her marriage in 1954 with then Congressman Marcos. By legal fiction she followed the
domicile of her husband. In my view, the reason for the law is for the spouses to fully and effectively perform
their marital duties and obligations to one another.
1
The question of domicile, however, is not affected by the
fact that it was the legal or moral duty of the individual to reside in a given place (28 C.J.S. 11). Thus, while
the wife retains her marital domicile so long as the marriage subsists, she automatically loses it upon the
latter's termination, for the reason behind the law then ceases. Otherwise, petitioner, after her marriage was
ended by the death of her husband, would be placed in a quite absurd and unfair situation of having been
freed from all wifely obligations yet made to hold on to one which no longer serves any meaningful purpose.
It is my view therefore that petitioner reverted to her original domicile of Tacloban, Leyte upon her husband's
death without even signifying her intention to that effect. It is for the private respondent to prove, not for
petitioner to disprove, that petitioner has effectively abandoned Tacloban, Leyte for Batac, Ilocos Norte or for
some other place/s. The clear rule is that it is the party (herein private respondent) claiming that a person has
abandoned or lost his residence of origin who must show and prove preponderantly such abandonment or loss
(Faypon v. Quirino, supra at 298; 28 C.J.S. 16), because the presumption is strongly in favor of an original or
former domicile, as against an acquired one (28 C.J.S. 16). Private respondent unfortunately failed to
discharge this burden as the record is devoid of convincing proof that petitioner has acquired whether
voluntarily or involuntarily, a new domicile to replace her domicile of origin.
The records, on the contrary, clearly show that petitioner has complied with the constitutional one-year
residence requirement. After her exile abroad, she returned to the Philippines in 1991 to reside in Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte, but the Presidential Commission on Good Government which sequestered her residential house and
other properties forbade her necessitating her transient stay in various places in Manila (Affidavit p.6, attached
as Annex I of the Petition). In 1992, she ran for the position of president writing in her certificate of candidacy
her residence as San Juan, Metro Manila. After her loss therein, she went back to Tacloban City, acquired her
residence certificate
2
and resided with her brother in San Jose. She resided in San Jose, Tacloban City until
August of 1994 when she was allowed by the PCGG to move and reside in her sequestered residential house
in Olot, Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 6).
3
It was in the same month of August when she applied for the
cancellation of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila in order to register anew as voter of Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte, which she did on January 28, 1995. From this sequence of events, I find it quite improper to use
as the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement the date when she applied for the cancellation
of her previous registration in San Juan, Metro Manila. The fact which private respondent never bothered to
disprove is that petitioner transferred her residence after the 1992 presidential election from San Juan, Metro
Manila to San Jose, Tacloban City, and resided therein until August of 1994. She later transferred to Olot,
Tolosa, Leyte (Annex I, p. 7). It appearing that both Tacloban City and Tolosa, Leyte are within the First
Congressional District of Leyte, it indubitably stands that she had more than a year of residence in the
constituency she sought to be elected. Petitioner, therefore, has satisfactorily complied with the one-year
qualification required by the 1987 Constitution.
I vote to grant the petition.
ROMERO, J., separate opinion:
Petitioner has appealed to this Court for relief after the COMELEC ruled that she was disqualified from running
for Representative of her District and that, in the event that she should, nevertheless, muster a majority vote,
her proclamation should be suspended. Not by a straightforward ruling did the COMELEC pronounce its
decision as has been its unvarying practice in the past, but by a startling succession of "reverse somersaults."
Indicative of its shifting stance vis-a-vis petitioner's certificate of candidacy were first, the action of its Second
Division disqualifying her and canceling her original Certificate of Candidacy by a vote of 2-1 on April 24, 1995;
then the denial by the COMELEC en banc of her Motion for Reconsideration on May 7, 1995, a day before the
election; then because she persisted in running, its decision on
May 11, 1995 or three days after the election, allowing her proclamation in the event that the results of the
canvass should show that she obtained the highest number of votes (obviously noting that petitioner had won
overwhelmingly over her opponent), but almost simultaneously reversing itself by directing that even if she
wins, her proclamation should nonetheless be suspended.
Crucial to the resolution of the disqualification issue presented by the case at bench is the interpretation to be
given to the one-year residency requirement imposed by the Constitution on aspirants for a Congressional
seat.
1

Bearing in mind that the term "resident" has been held to be synonymous with "domicile" for election purposes,
it is important to determine whether petitioner's domicile was in the First District of Leyte and if so, whether she
had resided there for at least a period of one year. Undisputed is her domicile of origin, Tacloban, where her
parents lived at the time of her birth. Depending on what theory one adopts, the same may have been changed
when she married Ferdinand E. Marcos, then domiciled in Batac, by operation of law. Assuming it did, his
death certainly released her from the obligation to live with him at the residence fixed by him during his lifetime.
What may confuse the layman at this point is the fact that the term "domicile" may refer to "domicile of origin,"
"domicile of choice," or "domicile by operation of law," which subject we shall not belabor since it has been
amply discussed by theponente and in the other separate opinions.
In any case, what assumes relevance is the divergence of legal opinion as to the effect of the husband's death
on the domicile of the widow. Some scholars opine that the widow's domicile remains unchanged; that the
deceased husband's wishes perforce still bind the wife he has left behind. Given this interpretation, the widow
cannot possibly go far enough to sever the domiciliary tie imposed by her husband.
It is bad enough to interpret the law as empowering the husband unilaterally to fix the residence or domicile of
the family, as laid down in the Civil Code,
2
but to continue giving obeisance to his wishes even after the
rationale underlying the mutual duty of the spouses to live together has ceased, is to close one's eyes to the
stark realities of the present.
At the other extreme is the position that the widow automatically reverts to her domicile of origin upon the
demise of her husband. Does the law so abhor a vacuum that the widow has to be endowed somehow with a
domicile? To answer this question which is far from rhetorical, one will have to keep in mind the basic
principles of domicile. Everyone must have a domicile. Then one must have only a single domicile for the same
purpose at any given time. Once established, a domicile remains until a new one is acquired, for no person
lives who has no domicile, as defined by the law be is subject to.
At this juncture, we are confronted with an unexplored legal terrain in this jurisdiction, rendered more murky by
the conflicting opinions of foreign legal authorities. This being the state of things, it is imperative as it is
opportune to illumine the darkness with the beacon light of truth, as dictated by experience and the necessity
of according petitioner her right to choose her domicile in keeping with the enlightened global trend to
recognize and protect the human rights of women, no less than men.
Admittedly, the notion of placing women at par with men, insofar as civil, political and social rights are
concerned, is a relatively recent phenomenon that took seed only in the middle of this century. It is a historical
fact that for over three centuries, the Philippines had been colonized by Spain, a conservative, Catholic country
which transplanted to our shores the Old World cultures, mores and attitudes and values. Through the
imposition on our government of the Spanish Civil Code in 1889, the people, both men and women, had no
choice but to accept such concepts as the husband's being the head of the family and the wife's subordination
to his authority. In such role, his was the right to make vital decisions for the family. Many instances come to
mind, foremost being what is related to the issue before us, namely, that "the husband shall fix the residence of
the family."
3
Because he is made responsible for the support of the wife and the rest of the family,
4
he is also
empowered to be the administrator of the conjugal property, with a few exceptions
5
and may, therefore,
dispose of the conjugal partnership property for the purposes specified under the law;
6
whereas, as a general
rule, the wife cannot bind the conjugal partnership without the husband's consent.
7
As regards the property
pertaining to the children under parental authority, the father is the legal administrator and only in his absence
may the mother assume his powers.
8
Demeaning to the wife's dignity are certain strictures on her personal
freedoms, practically relegating her to the position of minors and disabled persons. To illustrate a few: The wife
cannot, without the husband's consent, acquire any gratuitous title, except from her ascendants, descendants,
parents-in-law, and collateral relatives within the fourth degree.
9
With respect to her employment, the husband
wields a veto power in the case the wife exercises her profession or occupation or engages in business,
provided his income is sufficient for the family, according to its social standing and his opposition is founded on
serious and valid grounds.
10
Most offensive, if not repulsive, to the liberal-minded is the effective prohibition
upon a widow to get married till after three hundred days following the death of her husband, unless in the
meantime, she has given birth to a child.
11
The mother who contracts a subsequent marriage loses the
parental authority over her children, unless the deceased husband, father of the latter, has expressly provided
in his will that his widow might marry again, and has ordered that in such case she should keep and exercise
parental authority over their children.
12
Again, an instance of a husband's overarching influence from beyond
the grave.
All these indignities and disabilities suffered by Filipino wives for hundreds of years evoked no protest from
them until the concept of human rights and equality between and among nations and individuals found
hospitable lodgment in the United Nations Charter of which the Philippines was one of the original signatories.
By then, the Spanish "conquistadores" had been overthrown by the American forces at the turn of the century.
The bedrock of the U.N. Charter was firmly anchored on this credo: "to reaffirm faith in the fundamental human
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women." (Emphasis
supplied)
It took over thirty years before these egalitarian doctrines bore fruit, owing largely to the burgeoning of
the feminist movement. What may be regarded as the international bill of rights for women was
implanted in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women
(CEDAW) adopted by the U.N. General Assembly which entered into force as an international treaty on
September 3, 1981. In ratifying the instrument, the Philippines bound itself to implement its liberating
spirit and letter, for its Constitution, no less, declared that "The Philippines. . . adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of
peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations."
13
One such principle
embodied in the CEDAW is granting to men and women "the same rights with regard to the law relating
to the movement of persons and the freedom to choose their residence and domicile."
14
(Emphasis
supplied).
CEDAW's pro-women orientation which was not lost on Filipino women was reflected in the 1987 Constitution
of the Philippines and later, in the Family Code,
15
both of which were speedily approved by the first lady
President of the country, Corazon C. Aquino. Notable for its emphasis on the human rights of all individuals
and its bias for equality between the sexes are the following provisions: "The State values the dignity of every
human person and guarantees full respect for human rights"
16
and "The State recognizes the role of women in
nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men."
17

A major accomplishment of women in their quest for equality with men and the elimination of discriminatory
provisions of law was the deletion in the Family Code of almost all of the unreasonable strictures on wives and
the grant to them of personal rights equal to that of their husbands. Specifically, the husband and wife are now
giventhe right jointly to fix the family domicile;
18
concomitant to the spouses' being jointly responsible for the
support of the family is the right and duty of both spouses to manage the household;
19
the administration and
the enjoyment of the community property shall belong to both spouses jointly;
20
the father and mother shall
now jointly exercise legal guardianship over the property of their unemancipated common child
21
and several
others.
Aware of the hiatus and continuing gaps in the law, insofar as women's rights are concerned, Congress
passed a law popularly known as "Women in Development and Nation Building Act"
22
Among the rights given
to married women evidencing their capacity to act in contracts equal to that of men are:
(1) Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and execute security and credit arrangements
under the same conditions as men;
(2) Women shall have equal access to all government and private sector programs granting agricultural credit,
loans and non material resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian reform and land resettlement
programs;
(3) Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and enter into insurance contracts; and
(4) Married women shall have rights equal to those of married men in applying for passports, secure visas and
other travel documents, without need to secure the consent of their spouses.
As the world draws the curtain on the Fourth World Conference of Women in Beijing, let this Court now be the
first to respond to its clarion call that "Women's Rights are Human Rights" and that "All obstacles to women's
full participation in decision-making at all levels, including the family" should be removed. Having been herself
a Member of the Philippine Delegation to the International Women's Year Conference in Mexico in 1975, this
writer is only too keenly aware of the unremitting struggle being waged by women the world over, Filipino
women not excluded, to be accepted as equals of men and to tear down the walls of discrimination that hold
them back from their proper places under the sun.
In light of the inexorable sweep of events, local and global, legislative, executive and judicial, according more
rights to women hitherto denied them and eliminating whatever pockets of discrimination still exist in their civil,
political and social life, can it still be insisted that widows are not at liberty to choose their domicile upon the
death of their husbands but must retain the same, regardless?
I submit that a widow, like the petitioner and others similarly situated, can no longer be bound by the domicile
of the departed husband, if at all she was before. Neither does she automatically revert to her domicile of
origin, but exercising free will, she may opt to reestablish her domicile of origin. In returning to Tacloban and
subsequently, to Barangay Olot, Tolosa, both of which are located in the First District of Leyte, petitioner amply
demonstrated by overt acts, her election of a domicile of choice, in this case, a reversion to her domicile of
origin. Added together, the time when she set up her domicile in the two places sufficed to meet the one-year
requirement to run as Representative of the First District of Leyte.
In view of the foregoing expatiation, I vote to GRANT the petition.
VITUG, J., separate opinion:
The case at bench deals with explicit Constitutional mandates.
The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. It is a bedrock in our legal system that sets up ideals and
directions and render steady our strides hence. It only looks back so as to ensure that mistakes in the past are
not repeated. A compliant transience of a constitution belittles its basic function and weakens its goals. A
constitution may well become outdated by the realities of time. When it does, it must be changed but while it
remains, we owe it respect and allegiance. Anarchy, open or subtle, has never been, nor must it ever be, the
answer to perceived transitory needs, let alone societal attitudes, or the Constitution might lose its very
essence.
Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character unless, either by express statement or by
necessary implication, a different intention is manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121 SCRA 51).
The two provisions initially brought to focus are Section 6 and Section 17 of Article VI of the fundamental law.
These provisions read:
Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of
age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in the
district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than one year
immediately preceding the day of the election.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of
whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and the
remaining six shall be Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case
may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political
parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
The Commission on Election (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally bound to enforce and administer "all laws
and regulations relative to the conduct of election . . ." (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2, Constitution) that, there being nothing
said to the contrary, should include its authority to pass upon the qualification and disqualification prescribed
by law ofcandidates to an elective office. Indeed, pre-proclamation controversies are expressly placed under
the COMELEC's jurisdiction to hear and resolve (Art. IX, C, Sec. 3, Constitution).
The matter before us specifically calls for the observance of the constitutional one-year residency requirement.
The issue (whether or not there is here such compliance), to my mind, is basically a question of fact or at least
inextricably linked to such determination. The findings and judgment of the COMELEC, in accordance with the
long established rule and subject only to a number of exceptions under the basic heading of "grave abuse of
discretion," are not reviewable by this Court.
I do not find much need to do a complex exercise on what seems to me to be a plain matter. Generally, the
term "residence" has a broader connotation that may mean permanent (domicile), official (place where one's
official duties may require him to stay) or temporary (the place where he sojourns during a considerable length
of time). For civil law purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations,
the domicile of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence (see Article 50, Civil Code). In election
cases, the controlling rule is that heretofore announced by this Court in Romualdez vs. Regional Trial Court,
Branch 7, Tacloban City (226 SCRA 408, 409); thus:
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus: "(t)he
term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile," which imports not
only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention." "Domicile" denotes a fixed permanent residence to which
when absent for business or pleasure, or for like reasons, one intends to return. . . . . Residence
thus acquired, however, may be lost by adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to
acquire a new domicile by choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the
new locality, (2) an intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In
other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The
purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the
change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.
Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can charge the COMELEC with having committed
grave abuse of discretion in its assailed resolution.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction of the Electoral
Tribunal concerned begins. It signifies that the protestee must have theretofore been duly proclaimed and has
since become a "member" of the Senate or the House of Representatives. The question can be asked on
whether or not the proclamation of a candidate is just a ministerial function of the Commission on Elections
dictated solely on the number of votes cast in an election exercise. I believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an
obligation the performance of which, being adequately defined, does not allow the use of further judgment or
discretion. The COMELEC, in its particular case, is tasked with the full responsibility of ascertaining all the
facts and conditions such as may be required by law before a proclamation is properly done.
The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from any undue encroachment on the ultimate
exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunals on matters which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are
explicitly within their exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were otherwise, would be the effect of the
Court's peremptory pronouncement on the ability of the Electoral Tribunal to later come up with its own
judgment in a contest "relating to the election, returns and qualification" of its members.
Prescinding from all the foregoing, I should like to next touch base on the applicability to this case of Section 6
of Republic Act No. 6646, in relation to Section 72 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, each providing thusly:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the
Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order
the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is
strong.
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The Commission and the courts shall
give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to the end that a final
decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the election in which the
disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for,
and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any reason, a candidate is
not declared by final, judgment before an election to be disqualified, and he is voted for and
receives the winning number of votes in such election, his violation of the provisions of the
preceding sections shall not prevent his proclamation and assumption to office.
I realize that in considering the significance of the law, it may be preferable to look for not so much the specific
instances they ostensibly would cover as the principle they clearly convey. Thus, I will not scoff at the
argument that it should be sound to say that votes cast in favor of the disqualified candidate, whenever
ultimately declared as such, should not be counted in his or her favor and must accordingly be considered to
be stray votes. The argument, nevertheless, is far outweighed by the rationale of the now prevailing doctrine
first enunciated in the case of Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil. 238 [1912]) which, although later abandoned
in Ticzon vs. Comelec (103 SCRA 687 [1981]), and Santos vs. COMELEC (137 SCRA 740 [1985]), was
restored, along with the interim case of Geronimo vs. Ramos (136 SCRA 435 [1985]), by the Labo (176 SCRA
1 (1989]), Abella (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211 SCRA 297 [1992]) and, most recently, Benito (235 SCRA
436 [1994]) rulings. Benito vs.Comelec was a unanimous decision penned by Justice Kapunan and concurred
in by Chief Justice Narvasa, Justices Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Melo, Quiason,
Puno, Vitug and Mendoza (Justices Cruz and Bellosillo were on official leave). For easy reference, let me
quote from the first Labo decision:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo
warrantopetition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is that as
he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the
choice of the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections, (137 SCRA
740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was proclaimed elected
after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-
candidate, were all disregard as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default. That decision
was supported by eight members of the Court then, (Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar,
Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Alampay and Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with
three dissenting (Teehankee, Acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.) and another
two reserving their vote. (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.) One was on official leave.
(Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in favor of
the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435) which represents the more logical and
democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first announced in 1912 in Topacio
v.Paredes, (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members of the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente,
with Teehankee, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas
and Alampay, JJ., concurring) without any dissent, although one reserved his vote,
(Makasiar, J.) another took no part, (Aquino, J.) and two others were on leave. (Fernando, C.J.
and Concepcion, Jr., J.) There the Court held:
. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally
guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or
plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a
constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots
that they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have
received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a
fundamental idea in all republican forms of government that no one can be
declared elected and no measure can be declared carried unless he or it
receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the election. (20 Corpus
Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be
disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the
candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the
elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to
vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which
clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in
the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated
as stray, void or meaningless. (at pp. 20-21)
Considering all the foregoing, I am constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petition.
MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:
In my view the issue in this case is whether the Commission on Elections has the power to disqualify
candidates on the ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. I think that it
has none and that the qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event they are elected, by
filing a petition for quo warranto or an election protest in the appropriate forum, not necessarily in the
COMELEC but, as in this case, in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. That the parties in this
case took part in the proceedings in the COMELEC is of no moment. Such proceedings were unauthorized and
were not rendered valid by their agreement to submit their dispute to that body.
The various election laws will be searched in vain for authorized proceedings for determining a candidate's
qualifications for an office before his election. There are none in the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881), in
the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646), or in the law providing for synchronized elections (R.A. No.
7166). There are, in other words, no provisions for pre-proclamation contests but only election protests or quo
warrantoproceedings against winning candidates.
To be sure, there are provisions denominated for "disqualification," but they are not concerned with a
declaration of the ineligibility of a candidate. These provisions are concerned with the incapacity (due to
insanity, incompetence or conviction of an offense) of a person either to be a candidate or to continue as a
candidate for public office. There is also a provision for the denial or cancellation of certificates of candidacy,
but it applies only to cases involving false representations as to certain matters required by law to be stated in
the certificates.
These provisions are found in the following parts of the Omnibus Election Code:
12. Disqualifications. Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or
for any offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or
for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any
office, unless he has been given plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
The disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the
declaration by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or
after the expiration of a period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same
period he again becomes disqualified. (Emphasis added)
68. Disqualifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a party is
declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of having
(a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or
public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code;
(d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and
104; or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-
paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected,
from holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign
country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person
has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance
with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. (Emphasis added)
78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy. A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of
candidacy may be filed by any person exclusively on the ground that any material
representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may
be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before
the election. (Emphasis added)
the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646):
6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for
any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified
and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and; upon
motion for the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the
suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
(Emphasis added).
7. Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The procedure
hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of
candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
and the Local Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160):
40. Disqualifications. The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective
local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense
punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of on administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitive from justice in criminal or nonpolitical cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside
abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
The petition filed by private respondent Cirilo Roy Montejo in the COMELEC, while entitled "For Cancellation
and Disqualification," contained no allegation that private respondent Imelda Romualdez-Marcos made
material representations in her certificate of candidacy which were false, it sought her disqualification on the
ground that "on the basis of her Voter Registration Record and Certificate of Candidacy, [she] is disqualified
from running for the position of Representative, considering that on election day, May 8, 1995, [she] would
have resided less than ten (10) months in the district where she is seeking to be elected." For its part, the
COMELEC's Second Division, in its resolution of April 24, 1995, cancelled her certificate of candidacy and
corrected certificate of candidacy on the basis of its finding that petitioner is "not qualified to run for the position
of Member of the House of Representatives for the First Legislative District of Leyte" and not because of any
finding that she had made false representations as to material matters in her certificate of candidacy.
Montejo's petition before the COMELEC was therefore not a petition for cancellation of certificate of candidacy
under 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, but essentially a petition to declare private respondent ineligible. It is
important to note this, because, as will presently be explained, proceedings under 78 have for their purpose
to disqualify a person from being a candidate, whereas quo warranto proceedings have for their purpose to
disqualify a person from holding public office. Jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings involving members of
the House of Representatives is vested in the Electoral Tribunal of that body.
Indeed, in the only cases in which this Court dealt with petitions for the cancellation of certificates of candidacy,
the allegations were that the respondent candidates had made false representations in their certificates of
candidacy with regard to their citizenship,
1
age,
2
or residence.
3
But in the generality of cases in which this
Court passed upon the qualifications of respondents for office, this Court did so in the context of election
protests
4
or quo warranto proceedings
5
filed after the proclamation of the respondents or protestees as
winners.
Three reasons may be cited to explain the absence of an authorized proceeding for determining before
electionthe qualifications of a candidate.
First is the fact that unless a candidate wins and is proclaimed elected, there is no necessity for determining
his eligibility for the office. In contrast, whether an individual should be disqualified as a candidate for acts
constituting election offenses (e.g., vote buying, over spending, commission of prohibited acts) is a prejudicial
question which should be determined lest he wins because of the very acts for which his disqualification is
being sought. That is why it is provided that if the grounds for disqualification are established, a candidate will
not be voted for; if he has been voted for, the votes in his favor will not be counted; and if for some reason he
has been voted for and he has won, either he will not be proclaimed or his proclamation will be set aside.
6

Second is the fact that the determination of a candidate's eligibility, e.g., his citizenship or, as in this case, his
domicile, may take a long time to make, extending beyond the beginning of the term of the office. This is amply
demonstrated in the companion case (G.R. No. 120265, Agapito A. Aquino v. COMELEC) where the
determination of Aquino's residence was still pending in the COMELEC even after the elections of May 8,
1995. This is contrary to the summary character of proceedings relating to certificates of candidacy. That is
why the law makes the receipt of certificates of candidacy a ministerial duty of the COMELEC and its
officers.
7
The law is satisfied if candidates state in their certificates of candidacy that they are eligible for the
position which they seek to fill, leaving the determination of their qualifications to be made after the election
and only in the event they are elected. Only in cases involving charges of false representations made in
certificates of candidacy is the COMELEC given jurisdiction.
Third is the policy underlying the prohibition against pre-proclamation cases in elections for President, Vice
President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives. (R.A. No. 7166, 15) The purpose is to
preserve the prerogatives of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal and the other Tribunals as "sole
judges" under the Constitution of the election, returns and qualifications of members of Congress or of the
President and Vice President, as the case may be.
By providing in 253 for the remedy of quo warranto for determining an elected official's qualifications after the
results of elections are proclaimed, while being conspicuously silent about a pre-proclamation remedy based
on the same ground, the Omnibus Election Code, or OEC, by its silence underscores the policy of not
authorizing any inquiry into the qualifications of candidates unless they have been elected.
Apparently realizing the lack of an authorized proceeding for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, the
COMELEC amended its rules on February 15, 1993 so as to provide in Rule 25, 1 the following:
Grounds for disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess all the qualifications of a
candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or who commits any act
declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be disqualified from continuing as a
candidate.
The lack of provision for declaring the ineligibility of candidates, however, cannot be supplied by a mere rule.
Such an act is equivalent to the creation of a cause of action which is a substantive matter which the
COMELEC, in the exercise of its rulemaking power under Art. IX, A, 6 of the Constitution, cannot do. It is
noteworthy that the Constitution withholds from the COMELEC even the power to decide cases involving the
right to vote, which essentially involves an inquiry into qualifications based on age, residence and citizenship of
voters. (Art. IX, C, 2(3))
The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is
contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in their grounds but also in their consequences are
proceedings for "disqualification" different from those for a declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification"
proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified in 12 and 68 of the Omnibus Election Code
and in 40 of the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a
candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a
candidate from the race either from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to
the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the
purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office.
Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications for a public office does not imply that he is not
disqualified from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a public office and vice versa. We
have this sort of dichotomy in our Naturalization Law. (C.A. No. 473) That an alien has the qualifications
prescribed in 2 of the law does not imply that he does not suffer from any of disqualifications provided in 4.
Indeed, provisions for disqualifications on the ground that the candidate is guilty of prohibited election practices
or offenses, like other pre-proclamation remedies, are aimed at the detestable practice of "grabbing the
proclamation and prolonging the election protest,"
8
through the use of "manufactured" election returns or resort
to other trickery for the purpose of altering the results of the election. This rationale does not apply to cases for
determining a candidate's qualifications for office before the election. To the contrary, it is the candidate
against whom a proceeding for disqualification is brought who could be prejudiced because he could be
prevented from assuming office even though in end he prevails.
To summarize, the declaration of ineligibility of a candidate may only be sought in an election protest or action
forquo warranto filed pursuant to 253 of the Omnibus Election Code within 10 days after his proclamation.
With respect to elective local officials (e.g., Governor, Vice Governor, members of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan, etc.) such petition must be filed either with the COMELEC, the Regional Trial Courts, or
Municipal Trial Courts, as provided in Art. IX, C, 2(2) of the Constitution. In the case of the President and
Vice President, the petition must be filed with the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (Art. VII, 4, last paragraph),
and in the case of the Senators, with the Senate Electoral Tribunal, and in the case of Congressmen, with the
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal. (Art. VI, 17) There is greater reason for not allowing before the
election the filing of disqualification proceedings based on alleged ineligibility in the case of candidates for
President, Vice President, Senators and members of the House of Representatives, because of the same
policy prohibiting the filing of pre-proclamation cases against such candidates.
For these reasons, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over SPA No. 95-009; that its
proceedings in that case, including its questioned orders, are void; and that the eligibility of petitioner Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos for the office of Representative of the First District of Leyte may only be inquired into by
the HRET.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition and to annul the proceedings of the Commission on Elections in SPA
No. 95-009, including its questioned orders doted April 24, 1995, May 7, 1995, May 11, 1995 and May 25,
1995, declaring petitioner Imelda Romualdez-Marcos ineligible and ordering her proclamation as
Representative of the First District of Leyte suspended. To the extent that Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure authorizes proceedings for the disqualification of candidates on the ground of ineligibility for the
office, it should considered void.
The provincial board of canvassers should now proceed with the proclamation of petitioner.
Narvasa, C.J., concurs.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
I regret that I cannot join the majority opinion as expressed in the well-written ponencia of Mr. Justice Kapunan.
As in any controversy arising out of a Constitutional provision, the inquiry must begin and end with the
provision itself. The controversy should not be blurred by what, to me, are academic disquisitions. In this
particular controversy, the Constitutional provision on point states that "no person shall be a member of the
House of Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, and on the day of the election,
is at least twenty-five (25) years of age, able to read and write, and except the party list representatives, a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of not less than
one year immediately preceding the day of the election." (Article VI, section 6)
It has been argued that for purposes of our election laws, the term residence has been understood as
synonymous with domicile. This argument has been validated by no less than the Court in numerous
cases
1
where significantly the factual circumstances clearly and convincingly proved that a person does not
effectively lose his domicile of origin if the intention to reside therein is manifest with his personal presence in
the place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention.
With this basic thesis in mind, it would not be difficult to conceive of different modalities within which the phrase
"a resident thereof (meaning, the legislative district) for a period of not less than one year" would fit.
The first instance is where a person's residence and domicile coincide in which case a person only has to
prove that he has been domiciled in a permanent location for not less than a year before the election.
A second situation is where a person maintains a residence apart from his domicile in which case he would
have the luxury of district shopping, provided of course, he satisfies the one-year residence period in the
district as the minimum period for eligibility to the position of congressional representative for the district.
In either case, one would not be constitutionally disqualified for abandoning his residence in order to return to
his domicile of origin, or better still, domicile of choice; neither would one be disqualified for abandoning
altogether his domicile in favor of his residence in the district where he desires to be a candidate.
The most extreme circumstance would be a situation wherein a person maintains several residences in
different districts. Since his domicile of origin continues as an option as long as there is no effective
abandonment (animus non revertendi), he can practically choose the district most advantageous for him.
All these theoretical scenarios, however, are tempered by the unambiguous limitation that "for a period of not
less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election", he must be a resident in the district where
he desires to be elected.
To my mind, the one year residence period is crucial regardless of whether or not the term "residence" is to be
synonymous with "domicile." In other words, the candidate's intent and actual presence in one district must
in allsituations satisfy the length of time prescribed by the fundamental law. And this, because of a definite
Constitutional purpose. He must be familiar with the environment and problems of a district he intends to
represent in Congress and the one-year residence in said district would be the minimum period to acquire such
familiarity, if not versatility.
In the case of petitioner Imelda R. Marcos, the operative facts are distinctly set out in the now assailed decision
of the Comelec 2nd Division dated 24 April 1995 (as affirmed by the Comelec en banc)
In or about 1938 when respondent was a little over 8 years old, she established her domicile in
Tacloban, Leyte (Tacloban City). She studied in the Holy Infant Academy in Tacloban from 1938
to 1948 when she graduated from high school. She pursued her college studies in St. Paul's
College, now Divine Word University of Tacloban, where she earned her degree in Education.
Thereafter, she taught in the Leyte Chinese High School, still in Tacloban City. In 1952 she went
to Manila to work with her cousin, the late Speaker Daniel Z. Romualdez in his office in the
House of Representatives. In 1954, she married ex-president Ferdinand Marcos when he was
still a congressman of Ilocos Norte. She lived with him in Batac, Ilocos Norte and registered
there as a voter. When her husband was elected Senator of the Republic in 1959, she and her
husband lived together in San Juan, Rizal where she registered as a voter. In 1965 when her
husband was elected President of the Republic of the Philippines, she lived with him in
Malacanang Palace and registered as a voter in San Miguel, Manila.
During the Marcos presidency, respondent served as a Member of the Batasang Pambansa,
Minister of Human Settlements and Governor of Metro Manila. She claimed that in February
1986, she and her family were abducted and kidnapped to Honolulu, Hawaii. In November
1991, she came home to Manila. In 1992 respondent ran for election as President of the
Philippines and filed her Certificate of Candidacy wherein she indicated that she is a resident
and registered voter of San Juan, Metro Manila. On August 24, 1994, respondent filed a letter
with the election officer of San Juan, Metro Manila, requesting for cancellation of her registration
in the Permanent List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila, in order that she
may be re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte. (Annex 2-B, Answer). On
August 31, 1994, respondent filed her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous
Registration (Annex 2-C, Answer) stating that she is a duly registered voter in 157-A, Brgy.
Maytunas, San Juan, Metro that she intends to register at Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
On January 28, 1995 respondent registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte. She filed with the Board of Election Inspectors CE Form No. 1, Voter Registration Record
No. 94-3349772, wherein she alleged that she has resided in the municipality of Tolosa for a
period of 6 months (Annex A, Petition).
On March 8, 1995, respondent filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor, Leyte,
a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein
she also alleged that she has been a resident in the constituency where she seeks to be elected
for a period of 7 months. The pertinent entries therein are as follows:
7. PROFESSION OR OCCUPATION: House-wife/ Teacher/ Social
Worker
8. RESIDENCE (complete address): Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte
Post Office Address for election purposes: Brgy. Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte
9. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHEREIN I SEEK TO
BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING ELECTION:
________ Years Seven Months
10. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT
TO, A FOREIGN COUNTRY.
THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said office; That I will support and defend the Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; That I will obey
the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly-constituted authorities; That the
obligation imposed by my oath is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of
evasion; and That the facts stated herein are true to the best of my knowledge.
(Sgd.) Imelda Romualdez-Marcos
(Signature of Candidate)
2

Petitioner's aforestated certificate of candidacy filed on 8 March 1995 contains the decisive component or seed
of her disqualification. It is contained in her answer under oath of "seven months" to the query of "residence in
the constituency wherein I seek to be elected immediately preceding the election."
It follows from all the above that the Comelec committed no grave abuse of discretion in holding that petitioner
is disqualified from the position of representative for the 1st congressional district of Leyte in the elections of
8 May 1995, for failure to meet the "not less than one-year residence in the constituency (1st district, Leyte)
immediately preceding the day of election
(8 May 1995)."
Having arrived at petitioner's disqualification to be a representative of the first district of Leyte, the next
important issue to resolve is whether or not the Comelec can order the Board of Canvassers to determine and
proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates for representative in said district.
I am not unaware of the pronouncement made by this Court in the case of Labo vs. Comelec, G.R. 86564,
August 1, 1989, 176 SCRA 1 which gave the rationale as laid down in the early 1912 case of Topacio
vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. 238 that:
. . . . Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the
highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is a fundamental idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be
declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to be
disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily entitle the
candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the
elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may not be valid to
vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the absence of a statute which
clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in
the sincere belief that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be treated
as stray, void or meaningless.
Under Sec. 6 RA 6646, (An Act Introducing Additional Reforms in the Electoral System and for other purposes)
(84 O.G. 905, 22 February 1988) it is provided that:
. . . Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives
the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the
trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may, during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such
candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
There is no need to indulge in legal hermeneutics to sense the plain and unambiguous meaning of the
provision quoted above. As the law now stands, the legislative policy does not limit its concern with the effect
of a final judgement of disqualification only before the election, but even during or after the election. The law is
clear that in all situations, the votes cast for a disqualified candidate SHALL NOT BE COUNTED. The law has
also validated the jurisdiction of the Court or Commission on Election to continue hearing the petition for
disqualification in case a candidate is voted for and receives the highest number of votes, if for any reason, he
is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified.
Since the present case is an after election scenario, the power to suspend proclamation (when evidence of his
guilt is strong) is also explicit under the law. What happens then when after the elections are over, one is
declared disqualified? Then, votes cast for him "shall not be counted" and in legal contemplation, he no longer
received the highest number of votes.
It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the winner simply because a
"winning candidate is disqualified," but that the law considers him as the candidate who had obtained the
highest number of votes as a result of the votes cast for the disqualified candidate not being counted or
considered.
As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no reason why this Court should not
re-examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun Labo case. It has been stated that "the
qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as
expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility" most especially when it is mandated by no
less than the Constitution.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition and to order the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Leyte to
proclaim the candidate receiving the highest number of votes, from among the qualified candidates, as the duly
elected representative of the 1st district of Leyte.
Hermosisima, Jr. J., dissent.
REGALADO, J., dissenting:
While I agree with same of the factual bases of the majority opinion, I cannot arrive conjointly at the same
conclusion drawn therefrom Hence, this dissent which assuredly is not formulated "on the basis of the
personality of a petitioner in a case."
I go along with the majority in their narration of antecedent facts, insofar as the same are pertinent to this case,
and which I have simplified as follows:
1. Petitioner, although born in Manila, resided during her childhood in the present Tacloban City,
she being a legitimate daughter of parents who appear to have taken up permanent residence
therein. She also went to school there and, for a time, taught in one of the schools in that city.
2. When she married then Rep. Ferdinand E. Marcos who was then domiciled in Batac, Ilocos
Norte, by operation of law she acquired a new domicile in that place in 1954.
3. In the successive years and during the events that happened thereafter, her husband having
been elected as a Senator and then as President, she lived with him and their family in San
Juan, Rizal and then in Malacanang Palace in San Miguel, Manila.
4. Over those years, she registered as a voter and actually voted in Batac, Ilocos Norte, then in
San Juan, Rizal, and also in San Miguel, Manila, all these merely in the exercise of the right of
suffrage.
5. It does not appear that her husband, even after he had assumed those lofty positions
successively, ever abandoned his domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte where he maintained
his residence and invariably voted in all elections.
6. After the ouster of her husband from the presidency in 1986 and the sojourn of the Marcos
family in Honolulu, Hawaii, U.S.A., she eventually returned to the Philippines in 1991 and
resided in different places which she claimed to have been merely temporary residences.
7. In 1992, petitioner ran for election as President of the Philippines and in her certificate of
candidacy she indicated that she was then a registered voter and resident of San Juan, Metro
Manila.
8. On August 24, 1994, she filed a letter for the cancellation of her registration in the Permanent
List of Voters in Precinct No. 157 of San Juan, Metro Manila in order that she may "be re-
registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte." On August 31, 1994, she followed this up
with her Sworn Application for Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration wherein she stated
that she was a registered voter in Precinct No. 157-A, Brgy. Maytunas, San Juan, Metro Manila
and that she intended to register in Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte.
9. On January 28, 1995, petitioner registered as a voter at Precinct No. 18-A of Olot, Tolosa,
Leyte, for which purpose she filed with the therein Board of Election Inspectors a voter's
registration record form alleging that she had resided in that municipality for six months.
10. On March 8, 1995, petitioner filed her certificate of candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte wherein she alleged that she had been a resident for
"Seven Months" of the constituency where she sought to be elected.
11. On March 29, 1995, she filed an "Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy" wherein her
answer in the original certificate of candidacy to item "8. RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY
WHERE I SEEK, TO BE ELECTED IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION:" was
changed or replaced with a new entry reading "SINCE CHILDHOOD."
The sole issue for resolution is whether, for purposes of her candidacy, petitioner had complied with the
residency requirement of one year as mandated by no less than Section 6, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
I do not intend to impose upon the time of my colleagues with a dissertation on the difference between
residence and domicile. We have had enough of that and I understand that for purposes of political law and, for
that matter of international law, residence is understood to be synonymous with domicile. That is so
understood in our jurisprudence and in American Law, in contradistinction to the concept of residence for
purposes of civil, commercial and procedural laws whenever an issue thereon is relevant or controlling.
Consequently, since in the present case the question of petitioner's residence is integrated in and inseparable
from her domicile, I am addressing the issue from the standpoint of the concept of the latter term, specifically
its permutations into the domicile of origin, domicile of choice and domicile by operation of law, as understood
in American law from which for this case we have taken our jurisprudential bearings.
My readings inform me that the domicile of the parents at the time of birth, or what is termed the "domicile of
origin," constitutes the domicile of an infant until abandoned, or until the acquisition of a new domicile in a
different place.
1
In the instant case, we may grant that petitioner's domicile of origin,
2
at least as of 1938, was
what is now Tacloban City.
Now, as I have observed earlier, domicile is said to be of three kinds, that is, domicile by birth, domicile by
choice, and domicile by operation of law. The first is the common case of the place of birth or domicilium
originis, the second is that which is voluntarily acquired by a party or domicilium propio motu; the last which is
consequential, as that of a wife arising from marriage,
3
is sometimes called domicilium necesarium. There is
no debate that the domicile of origin can be lost or replaced by a domicile of choice or a domicile by operation
of law subsequently acquired by the party.
When petitioner contracted marriage in 1954 with then Rep. Marcos, by operation of law, not only international
or American but of our own enactment,
4
she acquired her husband's domicile of origin in Batac, Ilocos Norte
and correspondingly lost her own domicile of origin in Tacloban City.
Her subsequent changes of residence to San Juan, Rizal, then to San Miguel, Manila, thereafter to
Honolulu, Hawaii, and back to now San Juan, Metro Manila do not appear to have resulted in her thereby
acquiring new domiciles of choice. In fact, it appears that her having resided in those places was by reason of
the fortunes or misfortunes of her husband and his peregrinations in the assumption of new official positions or
the loss of them. Her residence in Honolulu and, of course, those after her return to the Philippines were, as
she claimed, against her will or only for transient purposes which could not have invested them with the status
of domiciles of choice.
5

After petitioner's return to the Philippines in 1991 and up to the present imbroglio over her requisite residency
in Tacloban City or Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, there is no showing that she ever attempted to acquire any other
domicile of choice which could have resulted in the abandonment of her legal domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte.
On that score, we note the majority's own submission
6
that, to successfully effect a change of domicile, one
must demonstrate (a) an actual removal or an actual change of domicile, (b) a bona fide intention of
abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one, and (c) acts which correspond with the
purpose.
We consequently have to also note that these requirements for the acquisition of a domicile of choice apply
whether what is sought to be changed or substituted is a domicile of origin (domicilium originis) or a domicile
by operation of law (domicilium necesarium). Since petitioner had lost her domicilium originis which had been
replaced by her domicilium necesarium, it is therefore her continuing domicile in Batac, Ilocos Norte which, if at
all, can be the object of legal change under the contingencies of the case at bar.
To get out of this quandary, the majority decision echoes the dissenting opinion of Commissioner Regalado E.
Maambong in SPA 95-009 of the Commission on Elections,
7
and advances this novel proposition.
It may be said that petitioner lost her domicile of origin by operation of law as a result of her
marriage to the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1952 (sic, 1954). By operation of law
(domicilium necesarium), her legal domicile at the time of her marriage became Batac, Ilocos
Norte although there were no indications of an intention on her part to abandon her domicile of
origin. Because of her husband's subsequent death and through the operation of the provisions
of the New Family Code already in force at the time, however, her legal domicile automatically
reverted to her domicile of origin. . . . (Emphasis supplied).
Firstly, I am puzzled why although it is conceded that petitioner had acquired a domicilium necesarium in
Batac, Ilocos Norte, the majority insists on making a qualification that she did not intend to abandon her
domicile of origin. I find this bewildering since, in this situation, it is the law that declares where petitioner's
domicile is at any given time, and not her self-serving or putative intent to hold on to her former domicile.
Otherwise, contrary to their own admission that one cannot have more than one domicile at a time,
8
the
majority would be suggesting that petitioner retained Tacloban City as (for lack of a term in law since it does
not exist therein) the equivalent of what is fancied as a reserved, dormant, potential, or residual domicile.
Secondly, domicile once lost in accordance with law can only be recovered likewise in accordance with law.
However, we are here being titillated with the possibility of an automatic reversion to or reacquisition of a
domicile of origin after the termination of the cause for its loss by operation of law. The majority agrees that
since petitioner lost her domicile of origin by her marriage, the termination of the marriage also terminates that
effect thereof. I am impressed by the ingeniousness of this theory which proves that, indeed, necessity is the
mother of inventions. Regretfully, I find some difficulty in accepting either the logic or the validity of this
argument.
If a party loses his domicile of origin by obtaining a new domicile of choice, he thereby voluntarily abandons the
former in favor of the latter. If, thereafter, he abandons that chosen domicile, he does not per se recover his
original domicile unless, by subsequent acts legally indicative thereof, he evinces his intent and desire to
establish the same as his new domicile, which is precisely what petitioner belatedly and, evidently just for
purposes of her candidacy, unsuccessfully tried to do.
One's subsequent abandonment of his domicile of choice cannot automatically restore his domicile of origin,
not only because there is no legal authority therefor but because it would be absurd Pursued to its logical
consequence, that theory of ipso jure reversion would rule out the fact that said party could already very well
have obtained another domicile, either of choice or by operation of law, other than his domicile of origin.
Significantly and obviously for this reason, the Family Code, which the majority inexplicably invokes, advisedly
does not regulate this contingency since it would impinge on one's freedom of choice.
Now, in the instant case, petitioner not only voluntarily abandoned her domicile of choice (unless we assume
that she entered into the marital state against her will) but, on top of that, such abandonment was further
affirmed through her acquisition of a new domicile by operation of law. In fact, this is even a case of
both voluntary andlegal abandonment of a domicile of origin. With much more reason, therefore, should we
reject the proposition that with the termination of her marriage in 1989, petitioner had supposedly per
se and ipso facto reacquired her domicile of origin which she lost in 1954. Otherwise, this would be tantamount
to saying that during the period of marital coverture, she was simultaneously in possession and enjoyment of a
domicile of origin which was only in a state of suspended animation.
Thus, the American rule is likewise to the effect that while after the husband's death the wife has the right to
elect her own domicile,
9
she nevertheless retains the last domicile of her deceased husband until she makes
an actual change.
10
In the absence of affirmative evidence, to the contrary, the presumption is that a wife's
domicile or legal residence follows that of her husband and will continue after his death.
11

I cannot appreciate the premises advanced in support of the majority's theory based on Articles 68 and 69 of
the Family Code. All that is of any relevance therein is that under this new code, the right and power to fix the
family domicile is now shared by the spouses. I cannot perceive how that joint right, which in the first place was
never exercised by the spouses, could affect the domicile fixed by the law for petitioner in 1954 and, for her
husband, long prior thereto. It is true that a wife now has the coordinate power to determine
the conjugal or family domicile, but that has no bearing on this case. With the death of her husband, and each
of her children having gotten married and established their own respective domiciles, the exercise of that joint
power was and is no longer called for or material in the present factual setting of this controversy. Instead,
what is of concern in petitioner's case was the matter of her having acquired or not her own domicile of choice.
I agree with the majority's discourse on the virtues of the growing and expanded participation of women in the
affairs of the nation, with equal rights and recognition by Constitution and statutory conferment. However, I
have searched in vain for a specific law or judicial pronouncement which either expressly or by necessary
implication supports the majority's desired theory of automatic reacquisition of or reversion to the domicilium
originis of petitioner. Definitely, as between the settled and desirable legal norms that should govern this issue,
there is a world of difference; and, unquestionably, this should be resolved by legislative articulation but not by
the eloquence of the well-turned phrase.
In sum, petitioner having lost Tacloban City as her domicile of origin since 1954 and not having automatically
reacquired any domicile therein, she cannot legally claim that her residency in the political constituency of
which it is a part continued since her birth up to the present. Respondent commission was, therefore, correct in
rejecting her pretension to that effect in her amended/corrected certificate of candidacy, and in holding her to
her admission in the original certificate that she had actually resided in that constituency for only seven months
prior to the election. These considerations render it unnecessary to further pass upon the procedural issues
raised by petitioner.
ON THE FOREGOING PREMISES, I vote to DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:
I respectfully dissent from the opinion of the majority written by Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan, more
particularly on the issue of the petitioner's qualification.
Under Section 7, Subdivision A, Article IX of the Constitution, decisions, orders, or rulings of the COMELEC
may be brought to this Court only by the special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
(Aratuc vs. COMELEC, 88 SCRA 251 [1979]; Dario vs. Mison, 176 SCRA 84 [1989]).
Accordingly, a writ of certiorari may be granted only if the COMELEC has acted without or in excess of
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion (Section 1, Rule 65, Rules of Court). Since the COMELEC has,
undoubtedly, jurisdiction over the private respondent's petition, the only issue left is whether it acted with grave
abuse of discretion in disqualifying the petitioner.
My careful and meticulous perusal of the challenged resolution of 24 April 1995 of the COMELEC Second
Division and the En Banc resolution of 7 May 1995 discloses total absence of abuse of discretion, much less
grave abuse thereof. The resolution of the Second Division dispassionately and objectively discussed in minute
details the facts which established beyond cavil that herein petitioner was disqualified as a candidate on the
ground of lack of residence in the First Congressional District of Leyte. It has not misapplied,
miscomprehended, or misunderstood facts or circumstances of substance pertinent to the issue of her
residence.
The majority opinion, however, overturned the COMELEC's findings of fact for lack of proof that the petitioner
has abandoned Tolosa as her domicile of origin, which is allegedly within the First Congressional District of
Leyte.
I respectfully submit that the petitioner herself has provided the COMELEC, either by admission or by
documentary evidence, overwhelming proof of the loss or abandonment of her domicile of origin, which is
Tacloban City and not Tolosa, Leyte. Assuming that she decided to live again in her domicile of origin, that
became her second domicile of choice, where her stay, unfortunately, was for only seven months before the
day of the election. She was then disqualified to be a candidate for the position of Representative of the First
Congressional District of Leyte. A holding to the contrary would be arbitrary.
It may indeed be conceded that the petitioner's domicile of choice was either Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte.
Nevertheless, she lost it by operation of law sometime in May 1954 upon her marriage to the then
Congressman (later, President) Ferdinand E. Marcos. A domicile by operation of law is that domicile which the
law attributes to a person, independently of his own intention or actual residence, as results from legal
domestic relations as that of the wife arising from marriage (28 C.J.S. Domicile 7, 11). Under the governing
law then, Article 110 of the Civil Code, her new domicile or her domicile of choice was the domicile of her
husband, which was Batac, Ilocos Norte. Said Article reads as follows:
Art. 110. The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife
from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the Republic.
Commenting thereon, civilist Arturo M. Tolentino states:
Although the duty of the spouses to live together is mutual, the husband has a predominant right
because he is empowered by law to fix the family residence. This right even predominates over
some rights recognized by law in the wife. For instance, under article 117 the wife may engage
in business or practice a profession or occupation. But because of the power of the husband to
fix the family domicile he may fix it at such a place as would make it impossible for the wife to
continue in business or in her profession. For justifiable reasons, however, the wife may be
exempted from living in the residence chosen by the husband. The husband cannot validly
allege desertion by the wife who refuses to follow him to a new place of residence, when it
appears that they have lived for years in a suitable home belonging to the wife, and that his
choice of a different home is not made in good faith. (Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the
Civil Code of the Philippines, vol. 1, 1985 ed., 339).
Under common law, a woman upon her marriage loses her own domicile and, by operation of law, acquires
that of her husband, no matter where the wife actually lives or what she believes or intends. Her domicile is
fixed in the sense that it is declared to be the same as his, and subject to certain limitations, he can change her
domicile by changing his own (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile 48, 37).
It must, however, be pointed out that under Article 69 of the Family Code, the fixing of the family domicile is no
longer the sole prerogative of the husband, but is now a joint decision of the spouses, and in case of
disagreement the court shall decide. The said article uses the term "family domicile," and not family residence,
as "the spouses may have multiple residences, and the wife may elect to remain in one of such residences,
which may destroy the duty of the spouses to live together and its corresponding benefits" (ALICIA V.
SEMPIO-DIY, Handbook on the Family Code of the Philippines, [1988], 102).
The theory of automatic restoration of a woman's domicile of origin upon the death of her husband, which the
majority opinion adopts to overcome the legal effect of the petitioner's marriage on her domicile, is
unsupported by law and by jurisprudence. The settled doctrine is that after the husband's death the wife has a
right to elect her own domicile, but she retains the last domicile of her husband until she makes an actual
change (28 C.J.S. Domicile 12, 27). Or, on the death of the husband, the power of the wife to acquire her
own domicile is revived, but until she exercises the power her domicile remains that of the husband at the time
of his death (25 Am Jur 2d Domicile 62, 45). Note that what is revived is not her domicile of origin but her
power to acquire her own domicile.
Clearly, even after the death of her husband, the petitioner's domicile was that of her husband at the time of his
death which was Batac, Ilocos Norte, since their residences in San Juan, Metro Manila, and San Miguel,
Manila, were their residences for convenience to enable her husband to effectively perform his official duties.
Their residence in San Juan was a conjugal home, and it was there to which she returned in 1991 when she
was already a widow. In her sworn certificate of candidacy for the Office of the President in the synchronized
elections of May 1992, she indicated therein that she was a resident of San Juan, Metro Manila. She also
voted in the said elections in that place.
On the basis of her evidence, it was only on 24 August 1994 when she exercised her right as a widow to
acquire her own domicile in Tolosa, Leyte, through her sworn statement requesting the Election Officer of San
Juan, Metro Manila, to cancel her registration in the permanent list of voters in Precinct 157 thereat and
praying that she be "re-registered or transferred to Brgy. Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, the place of [her] birth and
permanent residence" (photocopy of Exhibit "B," attached as Annex "2" of private respondent Montejo's
Comment). Notably, she contradicted this sworn statement regarding her place of birth when, in her Voter's
Affidavit sworn to on 15 March 1992 (photocopy of Exhibit "C," attached as Annex "3," Id.), her Voter
Registration Record sworn to on 28 January 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "E," attached as Annex "5," Id.), and
her Certificate of Candidacy sworn to on 8 March 1995 (photocopy of Exhibit "A," attached as Annex "1," Id.),
she solemnly declared that she was born in Manila.
The petitioner is even uncertain as to her domicile of origin. Is it Tacloban City or Tolosa, Leyte? In the affidavit
attached to her Answer to the petition for disqualification (Annex "I" of Petition), she declared under oath that
her "domicile or residence is Tacloban City." If she did intend to return to such domicile or residence of origin
why did she inform the Election Officer of San Juan that she would transfer to Olot, Tolosa, Leyte, and indicate
in her Voter's Registration Record and in her certificate of candidacy that her residence is Olot, Tolosa, Leyte?
While this uncertainty is not important insofar as residence in the congressional district is concerned, it
nevertheless proves that forty-one years had already lapsed since she had lost or abandoned her domicile of
origin by virtue of marriage and that such length of time diminished her power of recollection or blurred her
memory.
I find to be misplaced the reliance by the majority opinion on Faypon vs. Quirino (96 Phil. 294 [1954]), and the
subsequent cases which established the principle that absence from original residence or domicile of origin to
pursue studies, practice one's profession, or engage in business in other states does not constitute loss of
such residence or domicile. So is the reliance on Section 117 of the Omnibus Election Code which provides
that transfer of residence to any other place by reason of one's "occupation; profession; employment in private
and public service; educational activities; work in military or naval reservations; service in the army, navy or air
force, the constabulary or national police force; or confinement or detention in government institutions in
accordance with law" is not deemed as loss of original residence. Those cases and legal provision do not
include marriage of a woman. The reason for the exclusion is, of course, Article 110 of the Civil Code. If it were
the intention of this Court or of the legislature to consider the marriage of a woman as a circumstance which
would not operate as an abandonment of domicile (of origin or of choice), then such cases and legal provision
should have expressly mentioned the same.
This Court should not accept as gospel truth the self-serving claim of the petitioner in her affidavit (Annex "A"
of her Answer in COMELEC SPA No. 95-009; Annex "I" of Petition) that her "domicile or residence of origin is
Tacloban City," and that she "never intended to abandon this domicile or residence of origin to which [she]
always intended to return whenever absent." Such a claim of intention cannot prevail over the effect of Article
110 of the Civil Code. Besides, the facts and circumstances or the vicissitudes of the petitioner's life after her
marriage in 1954 conclusively establish that she had indeed abandoned her domicile of origin and had
acquired a new oneanimo et facto (KOSSUTH KENT KENNAN, A Treatise on Residence and Domicile, [1934],
214, 326).
Neither should this Court place complete trust on the petitioner's claim that she "merely committed an honest
mistake" in writing down the word "seven" in the space provided for the residency qualification requirement in
the certificate of candidacy. Such a claim is self-serving and, in the light of the foregoing disquisitions, would be
all sound and fury signifying nothing. To me, she did not commit any mistake, honest or otherwise; what she
stated was the truth.
The majority opinion also disregards a basic rule in evidence that he who asserts a fact or the affirmative of an
issue has the burden of proving it (Imperial Victory Shipping Agency vs. NLRC, 200 SCRA 178 [1991]; P.T.
Cerna Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 221 SCRA 19 [1993]). Having admitted marriage to the then Congressman
Marcos, the petitioner could not deny the legal consequence thereof on the change of her domicile to that of
her husband. The majority opinion rules or at least concludes that "[b]y operation of law (domicilium
necesarium), her legal domicile at the time of her marriage automatically became Batac, Ilocos Norte." That
conclusion is consistent with Article 110 of the Civil Code. Since she is presumed to retain her deceased
husband's domicile until she exercises her revived power to acquire her own domicile, the burden is upon her
to prove that she has exercised her right to acquire her own domicile. She miserably failed to discharge that
burden.
I vote to deny the petition.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 120265 September 18, 1995
AGAPITO A. AQUINO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MOVE MAKATI, MATEO BEDON and JUANITO
ICARO, respondents.

KAPUNAN, J.:
The sanctity of the people's will must be observed at all times if our nascent democracy is to be
preserved. In any challenge having the effect of reversing a democratic choice, expressed through
the ballot, this Court should be ever so vigilant in finding solutions which would give effect to the will
of the majority, for sound public policy dictates that all elective offices are filled by those who have
received the highest number of votes cast in an election. When a challenge to a winning candidate's
qualifications however becomes inevitable, the ineligibility ought to be so noxious to the Constitution
that giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately do harm to our democratic
institutions.
On March 20, 1995, petitioner Agapito A. Aquino filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative for the new Second Legislative District of Makati City. Among others, Aquino provided
the following information in his certificate of candidacy, viz:.
(7) RESIDENCE (Complete Address): 284 AMAPOLA COR. ADALLA STS., PALM
VILLAGE, MAKATI.
xxx xxx xxx
(8) RESIDENCE IN THE CONSTITUENCY WHERE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED
IMMEDIATELY PRECEDING THE ELECTION: ______ Years and 10 Months.
xxx xxx xxx
THAT I AM ELIGIBLE for said Office; That I will support and defend the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; That I
will obey the law, rules and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities;
That the obligation imposed to such is assumed voluntarily, without mental reservation
or purpose of evasion, and that the facts therein are true to the best of my knowledge.
1

On April 24, 1995, Move Makati, a duly registered political party, and Mateo Bedon, Chairman of the
LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP of Barangay Cembo, Makati City, filed a petition to disqualify Agapito A.
Aquino
2
on the ground that the latter lacked the residence qualification as a candidate for
congressman which, under Section 6, Art. VI of the 1987 the Constitution, should be for a period not
less than one (1) year immediately preceding the May 8, 1995 elections. The petition was docketed
as SPA No. 95-113 and was assigned to the Second Division of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC).
On April 25, 1995, a day after said petition for disqualification was filed, petitioner filed another
certificate of candidacy amending the certificate dated March 20, 1995. This time, petitioner stated in
Item 8 of his certificate that he had resided in the constituency where he sought to be elected for one
(l) year and thirteen (13) days.
3

On May 2, 1995, petitioner filed his Answer dated April 29, 1995 praying for the dismissal of the
disqualification case.
4

On the same day, May 2, 1995, a hearing was conducted by the COMELEC wherein petitioner
testified and presented in evidence, among others, his Affidavit dated May 2, 1995,
5
lease contract
between petitioner and Leonor Feliciano dated April 1, 1994,
6
Affidavit of Leonor Feliciano dated April
28,1995
7
and Affidavit of Daniel Galamay dated April 28, 1995.
8

After hearing of the petition for disqualification, the Second Division of the COMELEC promulgated a
Resolution dated May 6, 1995, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Commission (Second Division)
RESOLVES to DISMISS the instant: petition for Disqualification against respondent
AGAPITO AQUINO and declares him ELIGIBLE to run for the Office of Representative
in the Second Legislative District of Makati City.
SO ORDERED.
9

On May 7, 1995, Move Makati and Mateo Bedon filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the May 6,
1995 resolution with the COMELEC en banc.
Meanwhile, on May 8, 1995, elections were held. In Makati City where three (3) candidates vied for
the congressional seat in the Second District, petitioner garnered thirty eight thousand five hundred
forty seven (38,547) votes as against another candidate, Agusto Syjuco, who obtained thirty five
thousand nine hundred ten (35,910) votes.
10

On May 10, 1995, private respondents Move Makati and Bedon filed an Urgent Motion Ad
Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner. Thereafter, they filed an Omnibus Motion for
Reconsideration of the COMELEC's Second Division resolution dated May 6, 1995 and a 2nd Urgent
Motion Ad Cautelum to Suspend Proclamation of petitioner.
On May 15, 1995, COMELEC en banc issued an Order suspending petitioner's proclamation. The
dispositive portion of the order reads:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to the provisions of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, the
Board of Canvassers of the City of Makati is hereby directed to complete the
canvassing of election returns of the Second District of Makati, but to suspend the
proclamation of respondent Agapito A. Aquino should he obtain the winning number of
votes for the position of Representative of the Second District of the City of Makati, until
the motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners on May 7, 1995, shall have been
resolved by the Commission.
The Executive Director, this Commission, is directed to cause the immediate
implementation of this Order. The Clerk of Court of the Commission is likewise directed
to inform the parties by the fastest means available of this Order, and to calendar the
hearing of the Motion for Reconsideration on May 17, 1995, at 10:00 in the morning,
PICC Press Center, Pasay City.
SO ORDERED.
11

On May 16, 1995, petitioner filed his Comment/Opposition with urgent motion to lift order of
suspension of proclamation.
On June 1, 1995, petitioner filed a "Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and Motion to Resolve
Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation" wherein he manifested his
intention to raise, among others, the issue of whether of not the determination of the qualifications of
petitioner after the elections is lodged exclusively in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
pursuant to Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Resolving petitioner's motion to lift suspension of his proclamation, the COMELEC en banc issued an
Order on June 2, 1995, the decretal portion thereof residing:
Pursuant to the said provisions and considering the attendant circumstances of the
case, the Commission RESOLVED to proceed with the promulgation but to suspend its
rules, to accept the filing of the aforesaid motion, and to allow the parties to be heard
thereon because the issue of jurisdiction now before the Commission has to be studied
with more reflection and judiciousness.
12

On the same day, June 2, 1995, the COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution reversing the resolution
of the Second Division dated May 6, 1995. The fallo reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution of the Second Division, promulgated on May 6, 1995, is GRANTED.
Respondent Agapito A. Aquino is declared ineligible and thus disqualified as a
candidate for the Office of Representative of the Second Legislative District of Makati
City in the May 8, 1995 elections, for lack of the constitutional qualification of residence.
Consequently, the order of suspension of proclamation of the respondent should he
obtain the winning number of votes, issued by this Commission on May 15, 1995 is now
made permanent.
Upon the finality of this Resolution, the Board of Canvassers of the City of Makati shall
immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass of election returns,
determine the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates, who shall be
immediately be proclaimed.
SO ORDERED.
13

Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari
14
assailing the orders dated May 15, 1995 and June 2, 1995,
as well as the resolution dated June 2, 1995 issued by the COMELEC en banc. Petitioner's raises the
following errors for consideration, to wit:
A
THE COMELEC HAS NO JURISDICTION TO DETERMINE AND ADJUDGE THE
DISQUALIFICATION ISSUE INVOLVING CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES AFTER
THE MAY 8, 1995 ELECTIONS, SUCH DETERMINATION BEING RESERVED TO
AND LODGE EXCLUSIVELY WITH THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE
ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL
B
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION, SAID
JURISDICTION CEASED IN THE INSTANT CASE AFTER THE ELECTIONS, AND
THE REMEDY/IES AVAILABLE TO THE ADVERSE PARTIES LIE/S IN ANOTHER
FORUM WHICH, IT IS SUBMITTED, IS THE HRET CONSISTENT WITH SECTION 17,
ARTICLE VI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
C
THE COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT
PROCEEDED TO PROMULGATE ITS QUESTIONED DECISION (ANNEX "C",
PETITION) DESPITE IT OWN RECOGNITION THAT A THRESHOLD ISSUE OF
JURISDICTION HAS TO BE JUDICIOUSLY REVIEWED AGAIN,
ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE COMELEC HAS JURISDICTION, THE
COMELEC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, AND SERIOUS ERROR
IN DIRECTING WITHOUT NOTICE THE SUSPENSION OF THE PROCLAMATION OF
THE PETITIONER AS THE WINNING CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATE AND DESPITE
THE MINISTERIAL NATURE OF SUCH DUTY TO PROCLAIM (PENDING THE
FINALITY OF THE DISQUALIFICATION CASE AGAINST THE PETITIONER) IF ONLY
NOT TO THWART THE PEOPLE'S WILL.
D
THE COMELEC'S FINDING OF NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE RESIDENCY
REQUIREMENT OF ONE YEAR AGAINST THE PETITIONER IS CONTRARY TO
EVIDENCE AND TO APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE.
E
IN ANY CASE, THE COMELEC CRITICALLY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE
THE LEGAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF ENFORCING THE ONE YEAR RESIDENCY
REQUIREMENT OF CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES IN NEWLY CREATED
POLITICAL DISTRICTS WHICH WERE ONLY EXISTING FOR LESS THAN A YEAR
AT THE TIME OF THE ELECTION AND BARELY FOUR MONTHS IN THE CASE OF
PETITIONER'S DISTRICT IN MAKATI OF CONGRESSIONAL.
F
THE COMELEC COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT ORDERED THE BOARD OF CANVASSERS TO
"DETERMINE AND PROCLAIM THE WINNER OUT OF THE REMAINING QUALIFIED
CANDIDATES" AFTER THE ERRONEOUS DISQUALIFICATION OF YOUR
PETITIONER IN THAT SUCH DIRECTIVE IS IN TOTAL DISREGARD OF THE WELL
SETTLED DOCTRINE THAT A SECOND PLACE CANDIDATE OR PERSON WHO
WAS REPUDIATED BY THE ELECTORATE IS A LOSER AND CANNOT BE
PROCLAIMED AS SUBSTITUTE
WINNER.
15

I
In his first three assignments of error, petitioner vigorously contends that after the May 8, 1995
elections, the COMELEC lost its jurisdiction over the question of petitioner's qualifications to run for
member of the House of Representatives. He claims that jurisdiction over the petition for
disqualification is exclusively lodged with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET).
Given the yet unresolved question of jurisdiction, petitioner avers that the COMELEC committed
serious error and grave abuse of discretion in directing the suspension of his proclamation as the
winning candidate in the Second Congressional District of Makati City. We disagree.
Petitioner conveniently confuses the distinction between an unproclaimed candidate to the House of
Representatives and a member of the same. Obtaining the highest number of votes in an election
does not automatically vest the position in the winning candidate. Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution reads:
The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications
of their respective Members.
Under the above-stated provision, the electoral tribunal clearly assumes jurisdiction over all contests
relative to the election, returns and qualifications of candidates for either the Senate or the House
only when the latter becomemembers of either the Senate or the House of Representatives. A
candidate who has not been proclaimed
16
and who has not taken his oath of office cannot be said to
be a member of the House of Representatives subject to Section. 17 of the Constitution. While the
proclamation of a winning candidate in an election is ministerial, B.P. 881 in conjunction with Sec 6 of
R.A. 6646 allows suspension of proclamation under circumstances mentioned therein. Thus,
petitioner's contention that "after the conduct of the election and (petitioner) has been established the
winner of the electoral exercise from the moment of election, the COMELEC is automatically divested
of authority to pass upon the question of qualification" finds no basis, because even after the
elections the COMELEC is empowered by Section 6 (in relation to Section 7) of R.A. 6646 to continue
to hear and decide questions relating to qualifications of candidates Section 6 states:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate, who has been declared by
final judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall
not be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of guilt is strong.
Under the above-quoted provision, not only is a disqualification case against a candidate allowed to
continue after the election (and does not oust the COMELEC of its jurisdiction), but his obtaining the
highest number of votes will not result in the suspension or termination of the proceedings against
him when the evidence of guilt is strong. While the phrase "when the evidence of guilt is strong"
seems to suggest that the provisions of Section 6 ought to be applicable only to disqualification cases
under Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, Section 7 of R.A. 6646 allows the application of the
provisions of Section 6 to cases involving disqualification based on ineligibility under Section 78 of
B.P. 881. Section 7 states:
Sec. 7. Petition to Deny Due Course or to Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The
procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petition to deny due course to or cancel
a certificate of candidacy based on Sec. 78 of Batas Pambansa 881.
II
We agree with COMELEC's contention that in order that petitioner could qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City the latter "must prove that he has established not
just residence but domicileof choice.
17

The Constitution requires that a person seeking election to the House of Representatives should be
a resident of the district in which he seeks election for a period of not less than one (l) year prior to
the elections.
18
Residence, for election law purposes, has a settled meaning in our jurisdiction.
In Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives
19
this Court held that the term
"residence" has always been understood as synonymous with "domicile" not only under the previous
Constitutions but also under the 1987 Constitution. The Court there held:
20

The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission reveal that the meaning of
residence vis-a-vis the qualifications of a candidate for Congress continues to remain
the same as that of domicile, to wit:
Mr. Nolledo: With respect to Section 5, I remember that in the 1971
Constitutional Convention, there was an attempt to require residence in
the place not less than one year immediately preceding the day of
elections. So my question is: What is the Committee's concept of domicile
or constructive residence?
Mr. Davide: Madame President, insofar as the regular members of the
National Assembly are concerned, the proposed section merely provides,
among others, and a resident thereof', that is, in the district, for a period of
not less than one year preceding the day of the election. This was in effect
lifted from the 1973 Constitution, the interpretation given to it was
domicile (emphasis ours) Records of the 1987 Constitutional Convention,
Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 87).
xxx xxx xxx
Mrs. Rosario Braid: The next question is on section 7, page 2. I think
Commissioner Nolledo has raised the same point that "resident" has been
interpreted at times as a matter of intention rather than actual residence.
Mr. De Los Reyes: Domicile.
Ms. Rosario Braid: Yes, So, would the gentlemen consider at the proper
time to go back to actual residence rather than mere intention to reside?
Mr. De los Reyes: But We might encounter some difficulty especially
considering that the provision in the Constitution in the Article on Suffrage
says that Filipinos living abroad may vote as enacted by law. So, we have
to stick to the original concept that it should be by domicile and not
physical and actual residence. (Records of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission, Vol. II, July 22, 1986, p. 110).
The framers of the Constitution adhered to the earlier definition given to the word
"residence" which regarded it as having the same meaning as domicile.
Clearly, the place "where a party actually or constructively has his permanent home,"
21
where he, no
matter where he may be found at any given time, eventually intends to return and remain, i.e., his
domicile, is that to which the Constitution refers when it speaks of residence for the purposes of
election law. The manifest purpose of this deviation from the usual conceptions of residency in law as
explained in Gallego vs. Vera at
22
is "to exclude strangers or newcomers unfamiliar with the
conditions and needs of the community" from taking advantage of favorable circumstances existing in
that community for electoral gain. While there is nothing wrong with the practice of establishing
residence in a given area for meeting election law requirements, this nonetheless defeats the
essence of representation, which is to place through the assent of voters those most cognizant and
sensitive to the needs of a particular district, if a candidate falls short of the period of residency
mandated by law for him to qualify. That purpose could be obviously best met by individuals who
have either had actual residence in the area for a given period or who have been domiciled in the
same area either by origin or by choice. It would, therefore, be imperative for this Court to inquire into
the threshold question as to whether or not petitioner actually was a resident for a period of one year
in the area now encompassed by the Second Legislative District of Makati at the time of his election
or whether or not he was domiciled in the same.
As found by the COMELEC en banc petitioner in his Certificate of Candidacy for the May 11, 1992
elections, indicated not only that he was a resident of San Jose, Concepcion, Tarlac in 1992 but that
he was a resident of the same for 52 years immediately preceding that election.
23
At the time, his
certificate indicated that he was also a registered voter of the same district.
24
His birth certificate
places Concepcion, Tarlac as the birthplace of both of his parents Benigno and Aurora.
25
Thus, from
data furnished by petitioner himself to the COMELEC at various times during his political career, what
stands consistently clear and unassailable is that this domicile of origin of record up to the time of
filing of his most recent certificate of candidacy for the 1995 elections was Concepcion, Tarlac.
Petitioner's alleged connection with the Second District of Makati City is an alleged lease agreement
of condominium unit in the area. As the COMELEC, in its disputed Resolution noted:
The intention not to establish a permanent home in Makati City is evident in his leasing
a condominium unit instead of buying one. While a lease contract maybe indicative of
respondent's intention to reside in Makati City it does not engender the kind of
permanency required to prove abandonment of one's original domicile especially since,
by its terms, it is only for a period of two (2) years, and respondent Aquino himself
testified that his intention was really for only one (l) year because he has other
"residences" in Manila or Quezon City.
26

While property ownership is not and should never be an indicia of the right to vote or to be voted
upon, the fact that petitioner himself claims that he has other residences in Metro Manila coupled with
the short length of time he claims to be a resident of the condominium unit in Makati (and the fact, of
his stated domicile in Tarlac) "indicate that the sole purpose of (petitioner) in transferring his physical
residence"
27
is not to acquire's new residence ordomicile "but only to qualify as a candidate for
Representative of the Second District of Makati City."
28
The absence of clear and positive proof
showing a successful abandonment of domicile under the conditions stated above, the lack of
identification sentimental, actual or otherwise with the area, and the suspicious circumstances
under which the lease agreement was effected all belie petitioner's claim of residency for the period
required by the Constitution, in the Second District of Makati. As the COMELEC en banc emphatically
pointed out:
[T]he lease agreement was executed mainly to support the one year residence
requirement as a qualification for a candidate of Representative, by establishing a
commencement date of his residence. If a perfectly valid lease agreement cannot, by
itself establish; a domicile of choice, this particular lease agreement cannot do better.
29

Moreover, his assertion that he has transferred his domicile from Tarlac to Makati is a bare assertion
which is hardly supported by the facts in the case at bench. Domicile of origin is not easily lost. To
successfully effect a change of domicile, petitioner must prove an actual removal or an actual change
of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new
one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose.
30
These requirements are hardly met by
the evidence adduced in support of petitioner's claims of a change ofdomicile from Tarlac to the
Second District of Makati. In the absence of clear and positive proof, the domicile of origin be deemed
to continue requirements are hardly met by the evidence adduced in support of petitioner's claims of a
change of domicile from Tarlac to the Second District of Makati. In the absence of clear and positive
proof, the domicile of origin should be deemed to continue.
Finally, petitioner's submission that it would be legally impossible to impose the one year residency
requirement in a newly created political district is specious and lacks basis in logic. A new political
district is not created out of thin air. It is carved out from part of a real and existing geographic area, in
this case the old Municipality of Makati. That people actually lived or were domiciled in the area
encompassed by the new Second District cannot be denied. Modern-day carpetbaggers cannot be
allowed take advantage of the creation of new political districts by suddenly transplanting themselves
in such new districts, prejudicing their genuine residents in the process of taking advantage of
existing conditions in these areas. It will be noted, as COMELEC did in its assailed resolution, that
petitioner was disqualified from running in the Senate because of the constitutional two-term limit, and
had to shop around for a place where he could run for public office. Nothing wrong with that, but he
must first prove with reasonable certainty that he has effected a change of residence for election law
purposes for the period required by law. This he has not effectively done.
III
The next issue here is whether or not the COMELEC erred in issuing it Order instructing the Board of
Canvassers of Makati City to proclaim as winner the candidate receiving the next higher number of
votes. The answer must be in the negative.
To contend that Syjuco should be proclaimed because he was the "first" among the qualified
candidates in the May 8, 1995 elections is to misconstrue the nature of the democratic electoral
process and the sociological and psychological underpinnings behind voters' preferences. The result
suggested by private respondent would lead not only to our reversing the doctrines firmly entrenched
in the two cases of Labo vs. Comelec
31
but also to a massive disenfranchisement of the thousands of
voters who cast their vote in favor of a candidate they believed could be validly voted for during the
elections. Had petitioner been disqualified before the elections, the choice, moreover, would have
been different. The votes for Aquino given the acrimony which attended the campaign, would not
have automatically gone to second placer Syjuco. The nature of the playing field would have
substantially changed. To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other
votes would be to substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a
second placer. He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He
could not be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the
disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to
extrapolate the results under such circumstances.
In these cases, the pendulum of judicial opinion in our country has swung from one end to the other.
In the early case of Topacio v. Paredes.
32
we declared as valid, votes cast in favor of a disqualified,
ineligilble or dead candidate provided the people who voted for such candidate believed in good faith
that at the time of the elections said candidate was either qualified, eligible or alive. The votes cast in
favor of a disqualified, ineligible or dead candidate who obtained the next higher number of votes
cannot be proclaimed as winner. According to this Court in the said case, "there is not, strictly
speaking, a contest, that wreath of victory cannot be transferred from an ineligible candidate to any
other candidate when the sole question is the eligibility of the one receiving the plurality of the legally
cast ballots."
Then in Ticson v. Comelec,
33
this Court held that votes cast in favor of a non-candidate in view of his
unlawful change of party affiliation (which was then a ground for disqualification) cannot be
considered in the canvassing of election returns and the votes fall into the category of invalid and
nonexistent votes because a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all and is not a candidate in the
eyes of the law. As a result, this Court upheld the proclamation of the only candidate left in the
disputed position.
In Geronimo v. Ramos
34
we reiterated our ruling in Topacio v. Paredes that the candidate who lost in
an election cannot be proclaimed the winner in the event the candidate who ran for the portion is
ineligible. We held in Geronimo:
[I]t would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed
right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is
proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority
of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received
the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is fundamental idea
in all republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no
measure can be declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the
legal votes cast in the elections. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 243, p. 676.)
However, in Santos v. Comelec
35
we made a turnabout from our previous ruling in Geronimo
v. Ramos and pronounced that "votes cast for a disqualified candidate fall within the category of
invalid or non-existent votes because a disqualified candidate is no candidate at all in the eyes of the
law," reverting to our earlier ruling in Ticson v. Comelec.
In the more recent cases of Labo, Jr. v. Comelec
36
Abella v. Comelec;
37
and Benito
v. Comelec,
38
this Court reiterated and upheld the ruling in Topacio v. Paredes and Geronimo
v. Ramos to the effect that the ineligibility of a candidate receiving the next higher number of votes to
be declared elected, and that a minority or defeated candidate cannot be declared elected to the
office. In these cases, we put emphasis on our pronouncement in Geronimo v. Ramos that:
The fact that a candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is later declared to
be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he was elected does not necessarily
entitle the candidate who obtained the second highest number of votes to be declared
the winner of the elective office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible
person may be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However, in the
absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and legislative policy on
the matter, if the votes were cast in sincere belief that candidate was alive, qualified, or
eligible; they should not be treated as stray, void or meaningless.
Synthesizing these rulings we declared in the latest case of Labo, Jr. v. COMELEC that:
39

While Ortega may have garnered the second highest number of votes for the office of
city mayor, the fact remains that he was not the choice of the sovereign will. Petitioner
Labo was overwhelmingly voted by the electorate for the office of mayor in the belief
that he was then qualified to serve the people of Baguio City and his subsequent
disqualification does not make respondent Ortega the mayor-elect. This is the import of
the recent case of Abella v. Comelec (201 SCRA 253 [1991]), wherein we held that:
While it is true that SPC No. 88-546 was originally a petition to deny due
course to the certificate of candidacy of Larrazabal and was filed before
Larrazabal could be proclaimed the fact remains that the local elections of
Feb. 1, 1988 in the province of Leyte proceeded with Larrazabal
considered as a bona fide candidate. The voters of the province voted for
her in the sincere belief that she was a qualified candidate for the position
of governor. Her votes was counted and she obtained the highest number
of votes. The net effect is that petitioner lost in the election. He was
repudiated by the electorate. . . What matters is that in the event a
candidate for an elected position who is voted for and who obtains the
highest number of votes is disqualified for not possessing the eligibility,
requirements at the time of the election as provided by law, the candidate
who obtains the second highest number of votes for the same position
cannot assume the vacated position. (Emphasis supplied).
Our ruling in Abella applies squarely to the case at bar and we see no compelling
reason to depart therefrom. Like Abella, petitioner Ortega lost in the election. He was
repudiated by the electorate. He was obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio
City.
Thus, while respondent Ortega (G.R. No. 105111) originally filed a disqualification case
with the Comelec (docketed as SPA-92-029) seeking to deny due course to petitioner's
(Labo's) candidacy, the same did not deter the people of Baguio City from voting for
petitioner Labo, who, by then, was allowed by the respondent Comelec to be voted
upon, the resolution for his disqualification having yet to attain the degree of finality
(Sec. 78, Omnibus Election Code).
And in the earlier case of Labo v. Comelec. (supra), We held:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who
filed the quo warranto petition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He
cannot. The simple reason is that as he obtained only the second highest
number of votes in the election, he was obviously not the choice of the
people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court in this issue is Santos v. Commission on
Election, (137 SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate
who placed second was proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning
rival, who was disqualified as a turncoat and considered a non-candidate,
were all disregarded as stray. In effect, the second placer won by default.
That decision was supported by eight members of the Court then
(Cuevas J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De
la Fuente, Alampay, and Aquino, JJ., concurring) with three dissenting
(Teehankee, actingC.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera) and another
two reserving their votes (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr.). One was on official
leave (Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in
favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Santos (136 SCRA 435), which represents the
more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first
announced in 1912 in Topacio vs.Paredes (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten
members of the Court. . . .
The rule, therefore, is: the ineligibility of a candidate receiving majority votes does not
entitle the eligible candidate receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared
elected. A minority or defeated candidate cannot be deemed elected to the office.
Indeed, this has been the rule in the United States since 1849 (State ex rel. Dunning v.
Giles, 52 Am. Dec. 149).
It is therefore incorrect to argue that since a candidate has been disqualified, the votes
intended for the disqualified candidate should, in effect, be considered null and void.
This would amount to disenfranchising the electorate in whom, sovereignty resides. At
the risk of being repetitious, the people of Baguio City opted to elect petitioner
Labo bona fide without any intention to missapply their franchise, and in the honest
belief that Labo was then qualified to be the person to whom they would entrust the
exercise of the powers of the government. Unfortunately, petitioner Labo turned out to
be disqualified and cannot assume the office.
Whether or not the candidate whom the majority voted for can or cannot be installed,
under no circumstances can a minority or defeated candidate be deemed elected to the
office. Surely, the 12,602 votes cast for petitioner Ortega is not a larger number than the
27,471 votes cast for petitioner Labo (as certified by the Election Registrar of Baguio
City; rollo, p. 109; G.R. No. 105111).
This, it bears repeating, expresses the more logical and democratic view. We cannot, in another shift
of the pendulum, subscribe to the contention that the runner-up in an election in which the winner has
been disqualified is actually the winner among the remaining qualified candidates because this clearly
represents a minority view supported only by a scattered number of obscure American state and
English court decisions.
40
These decisions neglect the possibility that the runner-up, though
obviously qualified, could receive votes so measly and insignificant in number that the votes they
receive would be tantamount to rejection. Theoretically, the "second placer" could receive just one
vote. In such a case, it is absurd to proclaim the totally repudiated candidate as the voters' "choice."
Moreover, even in instances where the votes received by the second placer may not be considered
numerically insignificant, voters preferences are nonetheless so volatile and unpredictable that the
result among qualified candidates, should the equation change because of the disqualification of an
ineligible candidate, would not be self-evident. Absence of the apparent though ineligible winner
among the choices could lead to a shifting of votes to candidates other than the second placer. By
any mathematical formulation, the runner-up in an election cannot be construed to have obtained a
majority or plurality of votes cast where an "ineligible" candidate has garnered either a majority or
plurality of the votes.
In fine, we are left with no choice but to affirm the COMELEC's conclusion declaring herein petitioner
ineligible for the elective position of Representative of Makati City's Second District on the basis of
respondent commission's finding that petitioner lacks the one year residence in the district mandated
by the 1987 Constitution. A democratic government is necessarily a government of laws. In a
republican government those laws are themselves ordained by the people. Through their
representatives, they dictate the qualifications necessary for service in government positions. And as
petitioner clearly lacks one of the essential qualifications for running for membership in the House of
Representatives, not even the will of a majority or plurality of the voters of the Second District of
Makati City would substitute for a requirement mandated by the fundamental law itself.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Our Order
restraining respondent COMELEC from proclaiming the candidate garnering the next highest number
of votes in the congressional elections for the Second District of Makati City is made PERMANENT.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Melo, Puno and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., is on leave.



Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., concurring:
I agree with the conclusion reached by the majority that petitioner Aquino has not shown by clear and
convincing evidence that he had established his residence in the second district of Makati City for a
period of not less than one (1) year prior to the 8 May 1995 elections. However, I do not fully
subscribe to its proposition that petitioner's residence (in Makati) should be his "domicile of choice".
Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution provides that:
No person shall be a member of the House of Representatives unless he is a natural-
born citizen of the Philippines and on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years
of age, able to read and write, and, except the party list representatives, a registered
voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period of
not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election. (emphasis
supplied).
In G.R. No. 119976, Marcos vs. Comelec, I have maintained that the phrase "a resident thereof for a
period of not less than one year" means actual and physical presence in the legislative district of the
congressional candidate, and that said period of one year must be satisfied regardless of whether or
not a person's residence or domicile coincides.
To my mind, petitioner should be declared disqualified to run as representative in the 2nd district of
Makati City in the 8 May 1995 elections not because he failed to prove his residence therein as his
domicile of choice, but because he failed altogether to prove that he had actually and physically
resided therein for a period of not less than one (1) year immediately preceding the 8 May 1995
elections.
Noteworthy is the established fact before the Comelec that petitioner admits having maintained other
residences in Metro Manila apart from his leased condominium unit in Makati's 2nd district.
1
This
clear admission made by petitioner against his interest weakens his argument that "where a party
decides to transfer his legal residence so he can qualify for public office, he is free to do so." (see p.
20, Petition).
Petitioner evidently wants to impress the Court that his other residences in Metro Manila could never
have become his domicile of choice because it never entered his mind and suddenly, seemingly not
contented with these other residences, he rents a condominium unit in Makati, and calls it his
domicile of choice all these without adding clear and convincing evidence that he did actually live
and reside in Makati for at least one year prior to 8 May 1995 and that he no longer lived and
resided in his other residences during said one year period.
It follows, likewise, that the lease contract relied upon by petitioner, standing alone, established only
the alleged date (April 25, 1994) of its due execution. Stated otherwise, the lease contract tells us that
petitioner had been leasing a condominium unit in Makati City for more than a year prior to 8 May
1995, but it does not prove that petitioner actually and physically resided therein for the same period,
in the light of his admission that he maintained other residences in Metro Manila.
In light of petitioner's disqualification, the corrollary issue to be resolved is whether or not jurisdiction
continued to be vested in the Comelec to order the Makati Board of Canvassers" to determine and
proclaim the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates" after petitioner had been
declared post 8 May 1995 as disqualified.
I agree with the proposition advanced by the Solicitor General that sec. 6 of R.A. 6646 clearly
provides that votes cast for a disqualified candidate shall not be counted, thus:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
There can be no dispute that if a final judgment is rendered before the election, declaring a particular
candidate as disqualified, such disqualified candidate shall not be voted for and votes cast for him
shall not be counted, thus posing no problem in proclaiming the candidate who receives the highest
number of votes among the qualified candidates.
But what about after the election? Sec. 6 appears categorical enough in stating: "if any reason" no
final judgment of disqualification is rendered before the elections, and the candidate facing
disqualification is voted for and receives the winning number of votes, the Comelec or the Court is not
ousted of its jurisdiction to hear and try the case up to final judgment, hence, the power to even
suspend the proclamation of the erstwhile winning candidate when evidence of his guilt is strong.
It thus appears clear that the law does not dichotomize the effect of a final judgment of disqualification
in terms of time considerations. There is only one natural and logical effect: the disqualified candidate
shall not be voted and, if voted, the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Ubi lex non distinguit nec
nos distinguere debemus (where the law does not distinguish, we should not distinguish.)
At this point, what I said in Marcos, supra, follows:
What happens then when after the elections are over, one is declared disqualified?
Then, votes cast for him "shall not be counted" and in legal contemplation, he no longer
received the highest number of votes.
It stands to reason that Section 6 of RA 6646 does not make the second placer the
winner simply because a "winning candidate is disqualified," but that the law considers
him as the candidate who had obtained the highest number of votes as a result of the
votes cast for the disqualified candidate not being counted or considered.
As this law clearly reflects the legislative policy on the matter, then there is no reason
why this Court should not re-examine and consequently abandon the doctrine in the Jun
Labo case. It has been stated that "the qualifications prescribed for elective office
cannot be erased by the electorate alone. The will of the people as expressed through
the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility" most especially when it is mandated by no
less than the Constitution.
Therefore the candidate who received the highest number of votes from among the qualified
candidates, should be proclaimed
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

FRANCISCO, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the well written ponencia of my most esteemed colleague, Mr. Justice Kapunan. I wish,
however, to express my views on some issues raised by the petitioner, viz., (1) jurisdiction over the
disqualification suit, (2)domicile, (3) theory of legal impossibility, and (4) "second placer rule".
Petitioner emphatically maintains that only the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET)
can declare his disqualification, especially after the elections. To bolster this stand, the cases of Co
v. HRET, 199 SCRA 692 (1991); Robles v. HRET, 181 SCRA 780 (1990); Lazatin v. HRET, 168
SCRA 391 (1988); and Lachica v. Yap, 25 SCRA 140 (1968), have been cited as supporting
authorities. To my mind, this position is untenable. Section 17 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is
clear and unambiguous that HRET jurisdiction applies only to the members of the House of
Representatives. The operative acts necessary for an electoral candidate's rightful assumption of the
office for which he ran are his proclamation and his taking an oath of office. Petitioner cannot in
anyway be considered as a member of the House of Representatives for the purpose of divesting the
Commission on Elections of jurisdiction to declare his disqualification and invoking instead HRET's
jurisdiction, it indubitably appearing that he has yet to be proclaimed, much less has he taken an oath
of office. Clearly, petitioner's reliance on the aforecited cases which when perused involved
Congressional members, is totally misplaced, if not wholly inapplicable. That the jurisdiction conferred
upon HRET extends only to Congressional members is further established by judicial notice of HRET
Rules of procedure,
1
and HRET decisions
2
consistently holding that the proclamation the essential
requisite vesting jurisdiction on the HRET.
Moreover, a perusal of the records shows that the question on COMELEC's jurisdiction is now barred
by estoppel. It is to be noted that in his May 2, 1995 Answer, as well as in his Memorandum and
Supplemental Memorandum filed before the COMELEC's Second Division, petitioner never assailed
COMELEC's lacks of jurisdiction to rule on his qualification. On the contrary, he asked that the
disqualification suit against him be dismissed on the following grounds: that it was filed outside the
reglementary period; that the one year residence requirement of the 1987 Constitution is inapplicable
due to the recent conversion of the municipality of Makati into a city under R.A. No. 7854; that he
committed a simple inadvertence in filing up his certificate of candidacy; that the proper procedure to
attack his qualification is by a quo warranto proceeding; that he had actually and physically resided in
Makati for more than a year; and for lack of merit, the case should be outrightly dismissed. In a
hearing conducted by the COMELEC on May 2, 1995, petitioner even submitted his evidence (e.g.
affidavits, amended certificate of candidacy, copy of the lease contract) to prove that he is qualified
for the position. Subsequently, on May 16, 1995, in response to the COMELEC En Banc's May 15,
1995 Order suspending the proclamation of the winner, petitioner filed his Comment/Opposition with
Urgent Motion To Lift Order of Suspension of Proclamation asking for the lifting of the COMELEC's
order of suspension. On May 19, 1995, petitioner again filed a Memorandum and averred that the
recent conversion of Makati into a city made the one-year residence requirement inapplicable; that he
resided in Makati for more than a year; that quo warranto is the right remedy to question his
qualification. In passing, petitioner also alleged that the issue on his qualification should be "properly"
ventilated in a full-dress hearing before the HRET, albeit praying for the dismissal of the motion for
reconsideration for utter lack of merit (and not for lack of jurisdiction), and for lifting the suspension of
his proclamation. It was only on June 01, 1995, in his Motion to File Supplemental Memorandum and
Urgent Motion to Resolve Motion to Lift Suspension of Proclamation, when the petitioner raised
COMELEC's alleged lack of jurisdiction to resolve the question on his qualification. Clearly then,
petitioner has actively participated in the proceedings both before the COMELEC's Second Division
and the COMELEC En Banc asking therein affirmative reliefs. The settled rule is that a party who
objects to the jurisdiction of the court and alleges at the same time any non-jurisdictional ground for
dismissing the action is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
3
Where a
party voluntary submits to the jurisdiction of the court and thereafter loses on the merits, he may not
thereafter be heard to say that the court had no jurisdiction.
4
In Jimenez v. Macaraig,
5
the Court,
citing Crisostomo v. Court of Appeals, 32 SCRA 54, 60 (1970), elaborated on the rationale for this
doctrine in this wise:
The petitioners, to borrow the language of Mr. Justice Bautista Angelo (People vs.
Archilla, G.R. No. L-15632, February 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 699, 700-701), cannot adopt a
posture of double-dealing without running afoul of the doctrine of estoppel. The principle
of estoppel is in the interest of a sound administration of the laws. It should deter those
who are disposed to trifle with the courts by taking inconsistent positions contrary to the
elementary principles of right dealing and good faith (People v. Acierto, 92 Phil. 534,
541, [1953]).
6

It is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular
matter to secure an affirmative relief to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape an
adverse decision.
7
Perforce, petitioner's asseveration that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to
rule on his qualification must fail.
Petitioner insists that domicile is a matter of personal intention. Thus, petition asserts that if he
decides to transfer his legal residence so he can qualify for public office then he is entirely free to do
so. Thus argument to hold water, must be supported by a clear and convincing proofs that petitioner
has effectively abandoned his former domicile and that his intention is not doubtful. Indeed, domicile
once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established
(Co v. Electoral Tribunal House of Representatives, 199 SCRA 692, 711 [1991]). Petitioner from
childhood until his last election as senator has consistently maintained Concepcion, Tarlac, as his
domicile. He moved to Amapola Street, Palm Village, Makati, and thereafter claimed the same to be
his new domicile. This claim, however, is dismally unsupported by the records. The lease contract
entered into by petitioner for a period of two years on the third floor condominium unit in Palm Village,
Makati, in my view, does not prove his intent to abandon his domicile of origin. The intention to
establish domicile must be an intention to remain indefinitely or permanently in the new place.
8
This
element is lacking in this instance. Worse, public respondent Commission even found that
"respondent Aquino himself testified that his intention was really for only one (1) year because he has
other 'residences' in Manila or in Quezon City ([citing] TSN, May 2, 1995,
p. 92)".
9
Noting that petitioner is already barred from running for senator due to the constitutional
consecutive two-term limit, his search for a place where he could further and continue his political
career and sudden transfer thereto make his intent suspect. The best test of intention to establish
legal residence
comes from one's acts and not by mere declarations alone.
10
To acquire, or effect a change of
domicile, the intention must be bonafide and unequivocal (28 C.J.S. 11). Petitioner, in my view,
miserably failed to show a bonafide and unequivocal intention to effect the change of his domicile.
The theory of legal impossibility is advanced to justify non-compliance with the constitutional
qualification on residency. Petitioner explains his theory in this wise:
. . . THE COMELEC CRITICALLY ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE THE LEGAL
IMPOSSIBILITY OF ENFORCING THE ONE YEAR RESIDENCY REQUIREMENT OF
CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES IN NEWLY CREATED POLITICAL DISTRICTS
WHICH WERE ONLY EXISTING FOR LESS THAN A YEAR AT THE TIME OF THE
ELECTION AND BARELY FOUR MONTHS IN THE CASE OF PETITIONER'S
DISTRICT IN MAKATI.
11

Apparently, this theory is an offshoot of Republic Act. No. 7854, an act converting the
municipality of Makati into a highly urbanized city. This law enacted on January 2, 1995,
established a second Congressional district in Makati in which petitioner ran as a
Congressional candidate. Since the second district, according to petitioner, is barely four (4)
months old then the one (1) year residence qualification provided by the Constitution is
inapplicable. Petitioner's acts, however, as borne by the records, belie his own theory.
Originally, he placed in his certificate of candidacy an entry of ten (10) months residence in
Makati. Petitioner then had it amended to one (1) year and thirteen (13) days to correct what
claims as a mere inadvertent mistake. I doubt the sincerity of this representation. If petitioner is
indeed persuaded by his own theory, the ten months residence he initially wrote would have
more than sufficiently qualified him to run in the barely four-month old Makati district. The
amendment only reveals the true intent of petitioner to comply with one year constitutional
requirement for residence, adding an extra thirteen (13) days full measure. Petitioner
apparently wanted to argue one way (theory of legal impossibility), but at the same time played
it safe in the other (the constitutional one year residence requirement). And that is not all. If we
were to adhere to petitioner's theory of legal impossibility, then residents in that district shorn of
the constitutional six months residence requirement for prospective voters (Article V, Section 1
of the 1987 Constitution) would have certainly qualified to vote. That would have legitimized
the entry and electoral exercise of flying voters one of the historic nemeses of a clean and
honest election. Furthermore, to subscribe to petitioner's contention that the constitutional
qualification of candidates should be brushed aside in view of the enactment of R.A. No. 7854
will indubitably violate the manner and procedure for the amendment or revision of the
constitution outlined under Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. A legislative enactment, it has
to be emphasized, cannot render nugatory the constitution. The constitution is superior to a
statute. It is the fundamental and organic law of the land to which every statute must conform
and harmonize.
Finally, it has been contended that a second place candidate cannot be proclaimed a substitute
winner. I find the proposition quite unacceptable. A disqualified "candidate" is not a candidate and the
votes which may have been cast in his favor are nothing but stray votes of no legal consequence. A
disqualified person like the petitioner receives no vote or zero vote. In short,
no-candidate-no vote. Petitioner had therefore no right, in fact and in law, to claim first place for he
has nothing to base his right. The legislative intent is clear as provided by R.A. 6646, Section 6, in
that votes cast for a disqualified candidate shall not be counted as they are considered stray (Section
211, Rule 24, Omnibus Election Code). It is only from the ranks of qualified candidates can one be
chosen as first placer and not from without. Necessarily, petitioner, a disqualified candidate, cannot
be a first placer as he claims himself to be. To count the votes for a disqualified candidate would, in
my view, disenfranchise voters who voted for a qualified candidate. Legitimate votes cast for a
qualified candidate should not be penalized alongside a disqualified candidate. With this in mind, the
other qualified candidate who garnered the highest number of votes should be proclaimed the duly
elected representative of the district. I feel that the Labo doctrine ought to be abandoned.
I therefore vote to deny the petition and to lift the temporary restraining order issued by the Court
dated June 6, 1995.

DAVIDE, JR., J., dissenting:
In sustaining the COMELEC's acts of suspending the proclamation of petitioner Agapito A. Aquino
and of proceeding to hear the disqualification case against him, the majority opinion relies on Section
6 of R.A. No. 6646 which it claims to be applicable by virtue of Section 7 thereof to petitions to deny
due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code
(B.P. Blg. 881).
I disagree.
In the first place, the petition to disqualify the petitioner in SPA No. 95-113 is not a petition to deny
due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy under Section 78, which reads:
Sec. 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. A verified
petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed
by any personexclusively on the ground that any material representation contained
therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any
time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of
candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days
before the election. (emphasis supplied)
Nowhere in the petition in SPA No. 95-113 is it alleged by the private respondents that a material
representation contained in the petitioner's certificate of candidacy is false. What is being attacked
therein is the petitioner's lack of the one-year residence qualification in the new Second Legislative
District of Makati City where he sought to he elected for the office of Congressman.
The rule governing disqualification cases on the ground of ineligibility, which is also invoked by the
private respondents, is Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, as amended on 15 February
1993. The amendment allows the, filing of a petition to disqualify a candidate on the ground that he
does not possess all the qualifications provided for by the Constitution or by existing laws. In its
original form, the rule only applied to petitions for disqualification based on the commission of any act
declared by law to be a ground for disqualification. The rule as thus amended now reads as follows:
Rule 25 Disqualification of Candidates
Sec. 1. Grounds for Disqualification. Any candidate who does not possess all the
qualifications of a candidate as provided for by the Constitution or by existing law or
who commits any act declared by law to be grounds for disqualification may be
disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
Sec. 2. Who May File Petition for Disqualification. Any citizen of voting age, or duly
registered political party, organization or coalition of political parties may file with the
Law Department of the Commission a petition to disqualify a candidate on grounds
provided by law.
Sec. 3. Period to File Petition. The petition shall be filed any day after the last day for
filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation.
Sec. 4. Summary Proceeding. The petition shall be heard summarily after due notice.
Sec. 5. Effect of Petition if Unresolved Before Completion of Canvass. If the petition,
for reasons beyond the control of the Commission, cannot be decided before the
completion of the canvass, the votes cast for the respondent may be included in the
counting and in the canvassing; however, if the evidence of guilt is strong, his
proclamation shall be suspended notwithstanding the fact that he received the winning
number of votes in such election.
The underscored portion is the amendment to Rule 25, which the COMELEC must have
deemed necessary to fill up a procedural hiatus in cases of disqualifications based on other
grounds in the light of this Court's interpretation in Loong vs. Commission on Elections (216
SCRA 760 [1992]) that Rule 25 refers only to disqualifications under Sections 12 and 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code. This Court explicitly stated therein as follows:
We do not agree with private respondent Ututalum's contention that the petition for
disqualification, as in the case at bar, may be filed at any time after the last day for filing
a certificate of candidacy but not later than the date of proclamation, applying Section 3,
Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure.
Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure refers to Disqualification of Candidates; and
Section 1 of said rule provides that any candidate who commits any act declared by law
to be a ground for disqualification maybe disqualified from continuing as a candidate.
The grounds for disqualification as expressed in Sections 12 and 68 of the Code, are
the following:
Sec. 12. Disqualification. Any person who has been declared by
competent authority insane or incompetent, or has been sentenced by
final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any offense for
which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months
or for a crime involving moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a
candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given plenary pardon
or granted amnesty.
Sec. 63 DisquaIifications. Any candidate who, in an action or protest in
which he is a party is declared by final decision of 4 competent court guilty
of, or found by the Commission of having (a) given money or other
material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or public
officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to
enhance his candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in
excess of that allowed by this Code; (d) solicited, received or made any
contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104; or (e)
violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and
cc, sub-paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate,
or if he has been elected, from holding the office. Any person who is a
permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be
qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person
has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign
country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the
election laws.
The petition filed by private respondent Ututalum with the respondent Comelec to
disqualify petitioner Loong on the ground that the latter made a false representation in
his certificate of candidacy as to his age, clearly does not fall under the grounds of
disqualification as provided for in Rule 25 but is expressly covered by Rule 23 of the
Comelec Rules of Procedure governing petitions to cancel certificate of candidacy.
Moreover, Section 3, Rule 25 which allows the filing of the petition at any time after the
last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy but not later than the date of
proclamation, is merely a procedural rule issued by respondent Commission which,
although a constitutional body, has no legislative powers. Thus, it can not supersede
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code which is a legislative enactment.
Second, even if we assume for the sake of argument that the petition in SPA No. 95-113 fall under
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code, still Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 cannot be applied by virtue
of Section 7 thereof. Sections 6 and 7 reads:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Sec. 71 Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel a Certificate of Candidacy. The
procedure hereinabove provided shall apply to petitions to deny due course to or cancel
a certificate of candidacy as provided in Section 78 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881.
The "procedure hereinabove provided" mentioned in Section 7 cannot be construed to refer to
Section 6 whichdoes not provide for a procedure but for the EFFECTS of disqualification cases. It can
only refer to the procedureprovided in Section 5 of the said Act on nuisance candidates which reads
as follows:
Sec. 5. Procedure in Cases of Nuisance Candidates. A verified petition to declare a
duly registered candidate as a nuisance candidate under Section 69 .f Batas Pambansa
Blg. 881 shall be filed personally or through duly authorized representative with the
Commission by any registered candidate for the same office within five (5) days from
the last day for the filing of certificates of candidacy. Filing by mail shall not be allowed.
(b) Within three (3) days from the filing of the petition, the Commission shall issue
summons to the respondent candidate together with a copy of the petition and its
enclosures, if any.
(c) The respondent shall be given three (3) days from receipt of the summons within
which to file his verified answer (not a motion to dismiss) to the petition, serving copy
thereof upon the petitioner. Grounds for a motion to dismiss may be raised as
affirmative defenses.
(d) The Commission may designate any of its officials who are lawyers to hear the case
and receive evidence. The proceeding shall be summary in nature. In lieu of oral
testimonies, the parties may be required to submit position papers together with
affidavits or counter-affidavits and other documentary evidence. The hearing officer
shall immediately submit to the Commission his findings, reports, and recommendations
within five (5) days from the completion of such submission of evidence. The
Commission shall render its decision within five (5) days from receipt thereof.
(e) The decision, order, or ruling of the Commission shall, after five (5) days from receipt
of a copy thereof by the parties, be final and executory unless stayed by the Supreme
Court.
(f) The Commission shall within twenty-four hours, through the fastest available means,
disseminate its decision or the decision of the Supreme Court or the city or municipal
election registrars, boards of election inspectors, and the general public in the political
subdivision concerned.
and which is the only procedure that precedes Section 7 of the said Act. Heretofore, no law
provided for the procedure to govern cases under Section 78. Applying to such cases, through
Section 7 of R.A. No. 6646, the procedure applicable to cases of nuisance candidates is
prudent and wise, for both cases necessarily require that they be decided before the day of the
election; hence, only summary proceedings thereon can adequately respond to the urgency of
the matter.
Third, Section 6 merely supplements Section 72 of the Omnibus Election Code providing as follows:
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The Commission and the
courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to
the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the
election in which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any
reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his
proclamation and assumption to office.
by granting the COMELEC or the Court the authority to continue hearing the case and to
suspend the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong. As observed by this Court in its
majority "the phrase 'when the evidence of guilt is strong' seems to suggest that the provisions
of Section 6 ought to be applicable only to disqualification cases under Section 68 of the
Omnibus Election Code."
Fourth, the amended Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, which is the only rule governing
petitions filed before election or proclamation for the disqualification of a candidate on the ground that
he lacks the qualifications provided for by the Constitution or by law, does not, as can be gathered
from Section 5 thereof, authorize the COMELEC to continue hearing the case after the election.
Fifth, even assuming that the second sentence of Section 6 of R.A. to No. 6646 is applicable to
disqualification cases based on the ground of lack of qualification, it cannot be applied to a case does
not involve elective regional, provincial, and city officials, and where suspension of proclamation is
not warranted because of the absence of strong evidence of guilt or ineligibility. In such a case the
candidate sought to be disqualified but who obtains the highest number of votes has to be
proclaimed. Once he is proclaimed, the COMELEC cannot continue with the case, and the remedy of
the opponent is to contest the winning candidate's eligibility within ten days from proclamation in
a quo warranto proceeding which is within the jurisdiction of the metropolitan or municipal trial courts,
in the case of barangay officials; the regional trial courts, in case of municipal officials (Section 2(2),
Article IX-C, Constitution; Section 253, paragraph 2, B.P. Blg. 881); the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal, in the case of Congressmen; the Senate Electoral Tribunal, in the case of
Senators (Section 17, Article VI, Constitution); and the Supreme Court en banc, in the case of the
President or Vice-President (Section 4, Article VII, Constitution).
If what is involved is an elective regional, provincial, or city official, and the case cannot be decided
before the election, the COMELEC can, even after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be
disqualified, proceed with the case by treating it as a petition for quo warranto, since such a case
properly pertains to the exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC (Section 2(2), Article IX-C,
Constitution; Section 253, B.P. Blg. 881).
But even granting for the sake of argument that Sections 6 and 7 of R.A. No. 6646, in relation to
Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code and the amended Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure, are applicable, the order of suspension of the petitioner's proclamation issued on 15 May
1995 is null and void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. What was before the
COMELEC en banc at that stage was the decision of the Second Division of 6 May 1995 dismissing
the petition to disqualify the petitioner and declaring him qualified for the position. That decision is a
direct and positive rejection of any claim that the evidence of the petitioner's guilt is strong. Note that
it was only on 2 June 1995, when the COMELEC en banc reversed the decision of the Second
Division, that it was found that the evidence of the petitioner's ineligibility is strong. It would have been
otherwise if the Second Division had disqualified the petitioner.
Besides, at the time the questioned order was issued, there was no hearing yet on the private
respondents' motions for the suspension of the petitioner's proclamation. In fact, in that order the
COMELEC en banc admitted that the said motions could not be resolved without hearing, thus:
Pending the resolution of the petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration filed on May 7,
1995; Urgent Motion Ad Cautelam to Suspend Proclamation of Respondent (May 10,
1995) filed on May 10, 1995; and OMNIBUS MOTION (For Reconsideration of the
Honorable Commission's [Second Division] Resolution dated May 6, 1995, and 2nd
Urgent Motion Ad Cautelam to Suspend Proclamation of Respondent Aquino, which
cannot be resolved without hearing, without violating the right of the respondent to due
process. . . .
For being void from the beginning; it is as if the order of 15 May 1995 had not existed and could not,
therefore, be made permanent by the COMELEC en banc through its resolution of 2 June 1995
whose dispositive portion reads in part: [c]onsequently, the order of suspension of the respondent
should he obtain the winning number of votes, issued by this Commission on 15 May 1995 is now
made permanent."
Absent a valid finding before the election or after the canvass of election returns that the evidence of
the petitioner's guilt or ineligibility is strong, the COMELEC should not have suspended the
proclamation of the petitioner. After the completion of the canvass the petitioner should have been
proclaimed.
This case then must be distinguished from that of Imelda Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on
Elections, G.R. No. 119976, where the COMELEC en banc affirmed before the elections, or on 7 May
1995, the Second Division's resolution of 24 April 1995 disqualifying Mrs. Marcos.
Accordingly, the order of 15 May 1995 and the resolution of 2 June 1995 of the COMELEC en
banc must be annulled and set aside, and the COMELEC, through its City Board of Canvassers of
Makati, must be ordered to immediately proclaim the petitioner, without prejudice to the right of his
opponents to file a petition for quo warranto with the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,
which is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
Members of the House of Representatives (Section 17, Article VI, Constitution).
In view of the foregoing, a disquisition on the merits of the ground for the petitioner's disqualification
will no longer be proper.
I vote to GRANT the instant petition, to ANNUL and SET ASIDE the challenged order and resolution
of the Commission on Elections en banc, and to DIRECT the Board of Canvassers of Makati City to
reconvene and proclaim the petitioner as the winning candidate, without prejudice on the part of any
aggrieved party to file the appropriate action in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
Romero and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

VITUG, J., separate opinion:
I find what I would consider as the relevant issues in this petition as similar in almost all material
respects to those obtaining in G.R. No. 119976 (Imelda Romualdez-Marcos vs. Commission on
Elections and Cirilo Roy Montejo). Let me then here just reiterate what I have there said in my
separate opinion.
The case at bench deals with explicit Constitutional mandates.
The Constitution is not a pliable instrument. It is a bedrock in our legal system that sets up ideals and
directions and render steady our strides hence. It only looks back so as to ensure that mistakes in the
past are not repeated. A complaint transience of a constitution belittles its basic function and weakens
its goals. A constitution may well become outdated by the realities of time. When it does, it must be
changed but while it remains, we owe it respect and allegiance. Anarchy, open or subtle, has never
been, nor must it ever be, the answer to perceived transitory needs, let alone societal attitudes, or the
Constitution might lose its very essence.
Constitutional provisions must be taken to be mandatory in character unless, either by express
statement or by necessary implication, a different intention is manifest (see Marcelino vs. Cruz, 121
SCRA 51).
The two provisions initially brought to focus are Section 6 and Section 17 of Article VI of the
fundamental law. These provisions read:
Sec. 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives unless he is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at least twenty-
five years of age, able to read and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a
registered voter in the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a
period of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
Sec. 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be
composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to
be designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the
Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
The Commission on Election (the "COMELEC") is constitutionally bound to enforce and administer
"all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of election . . ." (Art. IX, C, Sec. 2, Constitution) that,
there being nothing said to the contrary, should include its authority to pass upon the qualification and
disqualification prescribed by law ofcandidates to an elective office. Indeed, pre-proclamation
controversies are expressly placed under the COMELEC's jurisdiction to hear and resolve (Art. IX, C,
Sec. 3, Constitution).
The matter before us specifically calls for the observance of the constitutional one-year residency
requirement. This issue (whether or not there is here such compliance), to my mind, is basically a
question of fact or at least inextricably linked to such determination. The findings and judgment of the
COMELEC, in accordance with the long established rule and subject only to a number of exceptions
under the basic heading of "grave abuse of discretion," are not reviewable by this Court.
I do not find much need to do a complex exercise on what seems to me to be a plain matter.
Generally, the term "residence" has a broader connotation that
mean permanent (domicile), official (place where one's official duties may require him to stay)
or temporary (the place where he sojourns during a considerable length of time). For Civil law
purposes, i.e., as regards the exercise of civil rights and the fulfillment of civil obligations, the domicile
of a natural person is the place of his habitual residence (see Article 50, Civil Code). In election
cases, the controlling rule is that heretofore announced by this Court in Romualdez vs. Regional Trial
Court, Branch 7, Tacloban City (226 SCRA 408, 409); thus:
In election cases, the Court treats domicile and residence as synonymous terms, thus:
"(t)he term "residence" as used in the election law is synonymous with "domicile," which
imports not only an intention to reside in a fixed place but also personal presence in that
place, coupled with conduct indicative of such intention." "Domicile" denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which when absent for business or pleasure, or for like
reasons, one intends to return. . . . Residence thus acquired, however, may be lost by
adopting another choice of domicile. In order, in turn, to acquire a new domicile by
choice, there must concur (1) residence or bodily presence in the new locality, (2) an
intention to remain there, and (3) an intention to abandon the old domicile. In other
words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.
The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of
time; the change of residence must be voluntary, and the residence at the place chosen
for the new domicile must be actual.
Using the above tests, I am not convinced that we can charge the COMELEC with having
committed grave abuse of discretion in its assailed resolution.
The COMELEC's jurisdiction, in the case of congressional elections, ends when the jurisdiction of the
Electoral Tribunal concerned begins. It signifies that the protestee must have theretofore been duly
proclaimed and has since become a "member" of the Senate or the House of Representatives. The
question can be asked on whether or not the proclamation of a candidate is just a ministerial function
of the Commission on Elections dictated solely on the number of votes cast in an election exercise. I
believe, it is not. A ministerial duty is an obligation the performance of which, being adequately
defined, does not allow the use of further judgment or discretion. The COMELEC; in its particular
case, is tasked with the full responsibility of ascertaining all the facts and conditions such as may be
required by law before a proclamation is properly done.
The Court, on its part, should, in my view at least, refrain from any undue encroachment on the
ultimate exercise of authority by the Electoral Tribunals on matters which, by no less than a
constitutional fiat, are explicitly within their exclusive domain. The nagging question, if it were
otherwise, would be the effect of the Court's peremptory pronouncement on the ability of the Electoral
Tribunal to later come up with its own judgment in a contest "relating to the election, returns and
qualification" of its members.
Prescinding from all the foregoing, I should like to next touch base on the applicability to this case of
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 6646, in relation to Section 72 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, each
providing thusly:
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6646
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case. Any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be
counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes
in such election, the Court or Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the
action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may
during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate
whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 881
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 72. Effects of disqualification cases and priority. The Commission and the
courts shall give priority to cases of disqualification by reason of violation of this Act to
the end that a final decision shall be rendered not later than seven days before the
election in which the disqualification is sought.
Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. Nevertheless, if for any
reason, a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be
disqualified, and he is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such
election, his violation of the provisions of the preceding sections shall not prevent his
proclamation and assumption to office.
I realize that in considering the significance of the law, it may be preferable to look for not so much
the specific instances they ostensibly would cover as the principle they clearly convey. Thus, I will not
scoff at the argument that it should be sound to say that votes cast in favor of the disqualified
candidate, whenever ultimately declared as such, should not be counted in his or her favor and must
accordingly be considered to be stray votes. The argument, nevertheless, is far outweighed by the
rationale of the now prevailing doctrine first enunciated in the case of Topacio vs. Paredes (23 Phil.
238 (1912]) which, although later abandoned in Ticzon vs. Comelec (103 SCRA 687 [1981]),
and Santos vs. COMELEC (137 SCRA 740 [1985]), was restored, along with the interim case
of Geronimo vs. Ramos (136 SCRA 435 [1985]), by the Labo (176 SCRA 1 [1989]), Abella (201
SCRA 253 [1991]), Labo (211 SCRA 297 [1992]) and, most recently, Benito (235 SCRA 436 (1994])
rulings. Benito vs.Comelec was a unanimous decision penned by Justice Kapunan and concurred in
by Chief Justice Narvasa, Justices Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Romero, Melo,
Quiason, Puno, Vitug and Mendoza (Justices Cruz and Bellosillo were on official leave). For easy
reference, let me quote from the first Labo decision:
Finally, there is the question of whether or not the private respondent, who filed the quo
warrantopetition, can replace the petitioner as mayor. He cannot. The simple reason is
that as he obtained only the second highest number of votes in the election, he was
obviously not the choice of the people of Baguio City.
The latest ruling of the Court on this issue is Santos v. Commission on Elections, (137
SCRA 740) decided in 1985. In that case, the candidate who placed second was
proclaimed elected after the votes for his winning rival, who was disqualified as a
turncoat and considered a non-candidate, were all disregard as stray. In effect, the
second placer won by default. That decision was supported by eight members of the
Court then, (Cuevas, J., ponente, with Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Escolin, Relova, De la
Fuente, Alampay and Aquino, JJ., concurring.) with three dissenting (Teehankee,
Acting C.J., Abad Santos and Melencio-Herrera, JJ.) and another two reserving their
vote. (Plana and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ.) One was on official leave. (Fernando, C.J.)
Re-examining that decision, the Court finds, and so holds, that it should be reversed in
favor of the earlier case of Geronimo v. Ramos, (136 SCRA 435) which represents the
more logical and democratic rule. That case, which reiterated the doctrine first
announced in 1912 in Topacio v.Paredes, (23 Phil. 238) was supported by ten members
of the Court, (Gutierrez, Jr., ponente, with Teehankee, Abad Santos, Melencio-Herrera,
Plana, Escolin, Relova, De la Fuente, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concurring) without
any dissent, although one reserved his vote,
(Makasiar, J.) another took no part, (Aquino, J.) and two others were on leave.
(Fernando, C.J. and Concepcion, Jr., J.) There the Court held:
. . . it would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the
constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not
acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and
imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which
have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him.
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who
have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for that
office, and it is a fundamental idea in all republican forms of government
that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be declared
carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes
cast in the election. (20 Corpus Juris 2nd, S 234, p. 676.)
The fact that the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is
later declared to be disqualified or not eligible for the office to which he
was elected does not necessarily entitle the candidate who obtained the
second highest number of votes to be declared the winner of the elective
office. The votes cast for a dead, disqualified, or non-eligible person may
not be valid to vote the winner into office or maintain him there. However,
in the absence of a statute which clearly asserts a contrary political and
legislative policy on the matter, if the votes were cast in the sincere belief
that the candidate was alive, qualified, or eligible, they should not be
treated as stray, void or meaningless. (at pp. 20-21)
Accordingly, I am constrained to vote for the dismissal of the petition.

MENDOZA, J., separate opinion:
For the reasons expressed in my separate opinion in the companion case. G.R. No. 119976. Imelda
Romualdez-Marcos v. Commission on Elections. I am of the opinion that the Commission on
Elections has no jurisdiction over petitions for disqualification of candidates based on alleged
ineligibility for the office to which they seek election.
The May 15, 1995 resolution of the COMELEC en banc, suspending he obtain the highest number of
votes of Representative of the Second District of Makati, Metro Manila, purports to have been issued
pursuant to 6 of R.A. No. 6646. This provision authorizes the COMELEC to order the suspension of
the proclamation "whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong." As explained in my separate opinion
in G.R. No. 119976, however, this provision refers to proceedings under 68 of the Omnibus Election
Code which provides for the disqualification of candidates found guilty of using what in political
parlance have been referred to as "guns goons or gold" to influence the outcome of elections. Since
the disqualification of petitioner in this case was not sought on this ground, the application of 6 of
R.A.. No. 6646 is clearly a grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC.
Nor may the petition to disqualify petitioner in the COMELEC be justified under 78 of the OEC which
authorizes the filing of a petition for the cancellation of certificates of candidacy since such a petition
maybe filed "exclusivelyon the ground that a material representation contained [in the certificate] as
required under section 74 is false." There was no allegation that in stating in his certificate of
candidacy that he is a resident of Amapola St., Palm Village, Guadalupe Viejo, Makati, Metro Manila,
petitioner made any false representation.
For this reason, I am of the opinion that the COMELEC had no jurisdiction over SPA No. 95-113; that
its proceedings in SPA No. 95-113, including the questioned orders, are void; and that the
qualifications of petitioner Agapito A. Aquino for the position of Representative of the Second District
of the City of Makati may only be inquired into by the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
This conclusion makes it unnecessary for me to express my view at this time on the question
whether, in the event the candidate who obtained the highest number of votes is declared ineligible,
the one who received the next highest number of votes is entitled to be declared the winner.
Accordingly, I vote (1) to grant the petition in this case and (2) to annul the proceedings of the
Commission on Elections in SPA No. 95-113, including the questioned orders, dated May 6, 1995.
May 15, 1995, and the two orders both dated June 2, 1995, so far as they declare petitioner Agapito
A. Aquino to be ineligible for the position of Representative of the Second District of the City of Makati
and direct the City Board of Canvassers of Makati to determine and proclaim the winner out of the
remaining qualified candidates.
Narvasa, J., concurs.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 96859 October 15, 1991
MOHAMMAD ALI DIMAPORO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., Speaker, House of Representatives, and (Hon. QUIRINO D. ABAD
SANTOS, JR.) HON. CAMILO L. SABIO Secretary, House of representatives, respondent.
Rilloraza, Africa, De Ocampo & Africa and Enrique M. Fernando for petitioner.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:p
Petitioner Mohamad Ali Dimaporo was elected Representative for the Second Legislative District of
Lanao del Sur during the 1987 congressional elections. He took his oath of office on 9 January 1987
and thereafter performed the duties and enjoyed the rights and privileges pertaining thereto.
On 15 January 1990, petitioner filed with the Commission on Elections a Certificate of Candidacy for
the position of Regional Governor of the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. The election was
scheduled for 17 February 1990.
Upon being informed of this development by the Commission on Elections, respondents Speaker and
Secretary of the House of Representatives excluded petitioner's name from the Roll of Members of
the House of Representatives pursuant to Section 67, Article IX of the Omnibus Election Code. As
reported by the Speaker in the session of 9 February 1990:
The Order of Business today carries a communication from the Commission on
Elections which states that the Honorable Mohammad Ali Dimaporo of the Second
District of Lanao del Sur filed a certificate of candidacy for the regional elections in
Muslim Mindanao on February 17, 1990. The House Secretariat, performing an
administrative act, did not include the name of the Honorable Ali Dimaporo in the Rolls
pursuant to the provision of the Election Code, Article IX, Section 67, which states: Any
elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one which
he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President shall be
considered ipso factoresigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.' The word 'ipso facto' is defined in Words and Phrases as by the very act
itself by the mere act. And therefore, by the very act of the (sic) filing his certificate of
candidacy, the Honorable Ali Dimaporo removed himself from the Rolls of the House of
Representatives; and, therefore, his name has not been carried in today's Roll and will
not be carried in the future Rolls of the House. ...
Having lost in the autonomous region elections, petitioner, in a letter dated 28 June 1990 and
addressed to respondent Speaker, expressed his intention "to resume performing my duties and
functions as elected Member of Congress." The record does not indicate what action was taken on
this communication, but it is apparent that petitioner failed in his bid to regain his seat in Congress
since this petition praying for such relief was subsequently filed on 31 January 1991.
In this petition, it is alleged that following the dropping of his name from the Roll, petitioner was
excluded from all proceedings of the House of Representatives; he was not paid the emoluments due
his office; his staff was dismissed and disbanded; and his office suites were occupied by other
persons. In effect, he was virtually barred and excluded from performing his duties and from
exercising his rights and privileges as the duly elected and qualified congressman from his district.
Petitioner admits that he filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of Regional Governor of
Muslim Mindanao. He, however, maintains that he did not thereby lose his seat as congressman
because Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not operative under the present Constitution, being
contrary thereto, and therefore not applicable to the present members of Congress.
In support of his contention, petitioner points out that the term of office of members of the House of
Representatives, as well as the grounds by which the incumbency of said members may be
shortened, are provided for in the Constitution. Section 2, Article XVIII thereof provides that "the
Senators, Members of the House of Representatives and the local officials first elected under this
Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992;" while Section 7, Article VI states: "The Members
of the House of Representatives shall be elected for a term of three years which shall begin, unless
otherwise provided by law, at noon on the thirtieth day of June next following their election." On the
other hand, the grounds by which such term may be shortened may be summarized as follows:
a) Section 13, Article VI: Forfeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment
in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or subsidiaries;
b) Section 16 (3): Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior;
c) Section 17: Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribunal in an
election contest; and,
d) Section 7, par. 2: Voluntary renunciation of office.
He asserts that under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius, Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg.
881 is repugnant to these constitutional provisions in that it provides for the shortening of a
congressman's term of office on a ground not provided for in the Constitution. For if it were the
intention of the framers to include the provisions of Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 as among
the means by which the term of a Congressman may be shortened, it would have been a very simple
matter to incorporate it in the present Constitution. They did not do so. On the contrary, the
Constitutional Commission only reaffirmed the grounds previously found in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions and deliberately omitted the ground provided in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881.
On the premise that the provision of law relied upon by respondents in excluding him from the Roll of
Members is contrary to the present Constitution, petitioner consequently concludes that respondents
acted without authority. He further maintains that respondents' so-called "administrative act" of
striking out his name is ineffective in terminating his term as Congressman. Neither can it be justified
as an interpretation of the Constitutional provision on voluntary renunciation of office as only the
courts may interpret laws. Moreover, he claims that he cannot be said to have forfeited his seat as it
is only when a congressman holds another office or employment that forfeiture is decreed. Filing a
certificate of candidacy is not equivalent to holding another office or employment.
In sum, petitioner's demand that his rights as a duly elected member of the House of Representatives
be recognized, is anchored on the negative view of the following issues raised in this petition:
A.
IS SECTION 67, ARTICLE IX, OF B.P. BLG. 881 OPERATIVE UNDER THE PRESENT
CONSTITUTION?
B.
COULD THE RESPONDENT SPEAKER AND/OR THE RESPONDENT SECRETARY,
'BY ADMINISTRATIVE ACT', EXCLUDE THE PETITIONER FROM THE ROLLS OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, THEREBY PREVENTING HIM FROM
EXERCISING HIS FUNCTIONS AS CONGRESSMAN, AND DEPRIVING HIM OF HIS
RIGHTS AND PRIVILEGES AS SUCH?
On the other hand, respondents through the Office of the Solicitor General contend that Section 67,
Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is still operative under the present Constitution, as the voluntary act of
resignation contemplated in said Section 67 falls within the term "voluntary renunciation" of office
enunciated in par. 2, Section 7, Article VI of the Constitution. That the ground provided in Section 67
is not included in the Constitution does not affect its validity as the grounds mentioned therein are not
exclusive. There are, in addition, other modes of shortening the tenure of office of Members of
Congress, among which are resignation, death and conviction of a crime which carries a penalty of
disqualification to hold public office.
Respondents assert that petitioner's filing of a Certificate of Candidacy is an act of resignation which
estops him from claiming otherwise as he is presumed to be aware of existing laws. They further
maintain that their questioned "administrative act" is a mere ministerial act which did not involve any
encroachment on judicial powers.
Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 reads:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one
which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
The precursor of this provision is the last paragraph of Section 2 of C.A. No. 666, which reads:
Any elective provincial, municipal, or city official running for an office, other than the one
for which he has been lastly elected, shall be considered resigned from his office from
the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Section 27 of Article II of Republic Act No. 180 reiterated this rule in this wise:
Sec. 27. Candidate holding office. Any elective provincial, municipal or city
official running for an office, other than the one which he is actually holding, shall be
considered resigned from office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
The 1971 Election Code imposed a similar proviso on local elective officials as follows:
Sec. 24. Candidate holding elective office. Any elective provincial, sub-provincial,
city, municipal or municipal district officer running for an office other than the one which
he is holding in a permanent capacity shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his
office from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
Every elected official shall take his oath of office on the day his term of office
commences, or within ten days after his proclamation if said proclamation takes place
after such day. His failure to take his oath of office as herein provided shall be
considered forfeiture of his right to the new office to which he has been elected unless
his failure is for a cause or causes beyond his control.
The 1978 Election Code provided a different rule, thus:
Sec. 30. Candidates holding political offices. Governors, mayors, members of various
sanggunians, or barangay officials, shall, upon filing of a certificate of candidacy, be
considered on forced leave of absence from office.
It must be noted that only in B.P. Blg. 881 are members of the legislature included in the enumeration
of elective public officials who are to be considered resigned from office from the moment of the filing
of their certificates of candidacy for another office, except for President and Vice-President. The
advocates of Cabinet Bill No. 2 (now Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881) elucidated on the
rationale of this inclusion, thus:
MR. PALMARES:
In the old Election Code, Your Honor, in the 1971 Election Code, the
provision seems to be different I think this is in Section 24 of Article III.
Any elective provincial, sub-provincial, city, municipal or municipal district
officer running for an office other than the one which he is holding in a
permanent capacity shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office
from the moment of the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
May I know, Your Honor, what is the reason of the Committee in departing
or changing these provisions of Section 24 of the old Election Code and
just adopting it en toto? Why do we have to change it? What could
possibly be the reason behind it, or the rationale behind it?
MR. PEREZ (L.):
I have already stated the rationale for this, Mr. Speaker, but I don't mind repeating
it. The purpose is that the people must be given the right to choose any official who
belongs to, let us say, to the Batasan if he wants to run for another office. However,
because of the practice in the past where members of the legislature ran for local
offices, but did not assume the office, because of that spectacle the impression is that
these officials were just trifling with the mandate of the people. They have already
obtained a mandate to be a member of the legislature, and they want to run for mayor
or for governor and yet when the people give them that mandate, they do not comply
with that latter mandate, but still preferred (sic) to remain in the earlier mandate. So we
believe, Mr. Speaker, that the people's latest mandate must be the one that will be given
due course. ...
Assemblyman Manuel M. Garcia, in answer to the query of Assemblyman Arturo Tolentino on the
constitutionality of Cabinet Bill No. 2, said:
MR. GARCIA (M.M.):
Thank you, Mr. Speaker.
Mr. Speaker, on the part of the Committee, we made this proposal based on
constitutional grounds. We did not propose this amendment mainly on the rationale as
stated by the Gentlemen from Manila that the officials running for office other than the
ones they are holding will be considered resignednot because of abuse of facilities of
power or the use of office facilities but primarily because under our Constitution, we
have this new chapter on accountability of public officers. Now, this was not in the 1935
Constitution. It states that (sic) Article XIII, Section 1 Public office is a public trust.
Public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility,
integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain accountable to the people.
Now, what is the significance of this new provision on accountability of public officers?
This only means that all elective public officials should honor the mandate they have
gotten from the people. Thus, under our Constitution, it says that: 'Members of the
Batasan shall serve for the term of 6 years, in the case of local officials and 6 years in
the case of barangay officials. Now, Mr. Speaker, we have precisely included this as
part of the Omnibus Election Code because a Batasan Member who hold (sic) himself
out with the people and seek (sic) their support and mandate should not be allowed to
deviate or allow himself to run for any other position unless he relinquishes or abandons
his office. Because his mandate to the people is to serve for 6 years. Now, if you allow a
Batasan or a governor or a mayor who was mandated to serve for 6 years to file for an
office other than the one he was elected to, then, that clearly shows that he has not (sic)
intention to service the mandate of the people which was placed upon him and therefore
he should be considered ipso facto resigned. I think more than anything that is the
accountability that the Constitution requires of elective public officials. It is not because
of the use or abuse of powers or facilities of his office, but it is because of the
Constitution itself which I said under the 1973 Constitution called and inserted this new
chapter on accountability.
Now, argument was said that the mere filing is not the intention to run. Now, what is it
for? If a Batasan Member files the certificate of candidacy, that means that he does not
want to serve, otherwise, why should he file for an office other than the one he was
elected to? The mere fact therefore of filing a certificate should be considered the overt
act of abandoning or relinquishing his mandate to the people and that he should
therefore resign if he wants to seek another position which he feels he could be of better
service.
As I said, Mr. Speaker, I disagree with the statements of the Gentleman from Manila
because the basis of this Section 62 is the constitutional provision not only of the fact
that Members of the Batasan and local officials should serve the entire 6-year term for
which we were elected, but because of this new chapter on the accountability of public
officers not only to the community which voted him to office, but primarily because
under this commentary on accountability of public officers, the elective public officers
must serve their principal, the people, not their own personal ambition. And that is the
reason, Mr. Speaker, why we opted to propose Section 62 where candidates or elective
public officers holding offices other than the one to which they were elected, should be
considered ipso factoresigned from their office upon the filing of the certificate of
candidacy."
It cannot be gainsaid that the same constitutional basis for Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881
remains written in the 1987 Constitution. In fact, Section 1 of Article XI on "Accountability of Public
Officers" is more emphatic in stating:
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and
efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
Obviously then, petitioner's assumption that the questioned statutory provision is no longer operative
does not hold water. He failed to discern that rather than cut short the term of office of elective public
officials, this statutory provision seeks to ensure that such officials serve out their entire term of office
by discouraging them from running for another public office and thereby cutting short their tenure by
making it clear that should they fail in their candidacy, they cannot go back to their former position.
This is consonant with the constitutional edict that all public officials must serve the people with
utmost loyalty and not trifle with the mandate which they have received from their constituents.
In theorizing that the provision under consideration cuts short the term of office of a Member of
Congress, petitioner seems to confuse "term" with "tenure" of office. As succinctly distinguished by
the Solicitor General:
The term of office prescribed by the Constitution may not be extended or shortened by
the legislature (22 R.C.L.), but the period during which an officer actually holds the
office (tenure) may be affected by circumstances within or beyond the power of said
officer. Tenure may be shorter than the term or it may not exist at all. These situations
will not change the duration of the term of office (see Topacio Nueno vs. Angeles, 76
Phil 12).
Under the questioned provision, when an elective official covered thereby files a certificate of
candidacy for another office, he is deemed to have voluntarily cut short his tenure, not his term. The
term remains and his successor, if any, is allowed to serve its unexpired portion.
That the ground cited in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881 is not mentioned in the Constitution
itself as a mode of shortening the tenure of office of members of Congress, does not preclude its
application to present members of Congress. Section 2 of Article XI provides that "(t)he President, the
Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions,
and the Ombudsman may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable
violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or betrayal of
public trust. All other public officers and employees may be removed from office as provided by law,
but not by impeachment. Such constitutional expression clearly recognizes that the four (4) grounds
found in Article VI of the Constitution by which the tenure of a Congressman may be shortened are
not exclusive. As held in the case of State ex rel. Berge vs. Lansing, the expression in the constitution
of the circumstances which shall bring about a vacancy does not necessarily exclude all others.
Neither does it preclude the legislature from prescribing other grounds. Events so enumerated in the
constitution or statutes are merely conditions the occurrence of any one of which the office shall
become vacant not as a penalty but simply as the legal effect of any one of the events. And would it
not be preposterous to say that a congressman cannot die and cut his tenure because death is not
one of the grounds provided for in the Constitution? The framers of our fundamental law never
intended such absurdity.
The basic principle which underlies the entire field of legal concepts pertaining to the validity of
legislation is that by enactment of legislation, a constitutional measure is presumed to be created.
This Court has enunciated the presumption in favor of constitutionality of legislative enactment. To
justify the nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not
a doubtful and argumentative implication. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice.
The maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius is not to be applied with the same rigor in construing
a constitution as a statute and only those things expressed in such positive affirmative terms as
plainly imply the negative of what is not mentioned will be considered as inhibiting the power of
legislature. The maxim is only a rule of interpretation and not a constitutional command. This maxim
expresses a rule of construction and serves only as an aid in discovering legislative intent where such
intent is not otherwise manifest.
Even then, the concept of voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7, Article VI of the
Constitution is broad enough to include the situation envisioned in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg.
881. As discussed by the Constitutional Commissioners:
MR. MAAMBONG:
Could I address the clarificatory question to the Committee? The term 'voluntary
renunciation' does not only appear in Section 3; it appears in Section 6.
MR. DAVIDE:
Yes.
MR. MAAMBONG:
It is also a recurring phrase all over the constitution. Could the Committee please
enlighten us exactly what 'voluntary renunciation' means? Is this akin to abandonment?
MR. DAVIDE:
Abandonment is voluntary. In other words, he cannot circumvent the restriction by
merely resigning at any given time on the second term.
MR. MAAMBONG:
Is the Committee saying that the term voluntary renunciation is more general than
abandonment and resignation?
MR. DAVIDE:
It is more general, more embracing.
That the act, contemplated in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881, of filing a certificate of candidacy
for another office constitutes an overt, concrete act of voluntary renunciation of the elective office
presently being held is evident from this exchange between then Members of Parliament Arturo
Tolentino and Jose Rono:
MR. RONO:
My reasonable ground is this: if you will make the person ... my, shall we say, basis is
that in one case the person is intending to run for an office which is different from his
own, and therefore it should be considered, at least from the legal significance, an
intention to relinquish his office.
MR. TOLENTINO:
Yes ...
MR. RONO:
And in the other, because he is running for the same position, it is otherwise.
MR. TOLENTINO:
Yes, but what I cannot see is why are you going to compel a person to quit an office
which he is only intending to leave? A relinquishment of office must be clear, must be
definite.
MR. RONO:
Yes, sir. That's precisely, Mr. Speaker, what I'm saying that while I do not disagree with
the conclusion that the intention cannot be enough, but I am saying that the filing of the
certificate of candidacy is an over act of such intention. It's not just an intention; it's
already there.
In Monroy vs. Court of Appeals, a case involving Section 27 of R.A. No. 180 above-quoted, this Court
categorically pronounced that "forfeiture (is) automatic and permanently effective upon the filing of the
certificate of candidacy for another office. Only the moment and act of filing are considered. Once the
certificate is filed, the seat is forever forfeited and nothing save a new election or appointment can
restore the ousted official. Thus, as We had occasion to remark, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes,
in Castro vs. Gatuslao:
... The wording of the law plainly indicates that only the date of filing of the certificate of
candidacy should be taken into account. The law does not make the forfeiture
dependent upon future contingencies, unforeseen and unforeseeable, since the
vacating is expressly made as of the moment of the filing of the certificate of candidacy.
...
As the mere act of filing the certificate of candidacy for another office produces automatically the
permanent forfeiture of the elective position being presently held, it is not necessary, as petitioner
opines, that the other position be actually held. The ground for forfeiture in Section 13, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution is different from the forfeiture decreed in Section 67, Article IX of B.P. Blg. 881,
which is actually a mode of voluntary renunciation of office under Section 7, par. 2 of Article VI of the
Constitution.
The legal effects of filing a certificate of candidacy for another office having been spelled out in
Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg. 881 itself, no statutory interpretation was indulged in by respondents
Speaker and Secretary of the House of Representatives in excluding petitioner's name from the Roll
of Members. The Speaker is the administrative head of the House of Representatives and he
exercises administrative powers and functions attached to his office. As administrative officers, both
the Speaker and House Secretary-General perform ministerial functions. It was their duty to remove
petitioner's name from the Roll considering the unequivocal tenor of Section 67, Article IX, B.P. Blg.
881. When the Commission on Elections communicated to the House of Representatives that
petitioner had filed his certificate of candidacy for regional governor of Muslim Mindanao, respondents
had no choice but to abide by the clear and unmistakable legal effect of Section 67, Article IX of B.P.
Blg. 881. It was their ministerial duty to do so. These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on
the ground of an alleged invalidity of the statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. It
might seriously hinder the transaction of public business if these officers were to be permitted in all
cases to question the constitutionality of statutes and ordinances imposing duties upon them and
which have not judicially been declared unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest
to the lowest are creatures of the law and are bound to obey it.
In conclusion, We reiterate the basic concept that a public office is a public trust. It is created for the
interest and benefit of the people. As such, the holder thereof is subject to such regulations and
conditions as the law may impose and he cannot complain of any restrictions which public policy may
dictate on his office.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Paras, Feleciano, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan, C.J., took no part.

Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
I am constrained to dissent from the majority opinion.
I believe that the Speaker and the Secretary of the House of Representatives have no power, in
purported implementation of an invalid statute, to erase from the Rolls of the House the name of a
member duly elected by his sovereign constituents to represent them in Congress.
The rejection of the bid of the Honorable Mohammad Ali Dimaporo to retain his seat in Congress may
appear logical, politically palatable, and and salutary to certain quarters. But I submit that it is in cases
like the present petition where the Court should be vigilant in preventing the erosion of fundamental
concepts of the Constitution. We must be particularly attentive to violations which are cloaked in
political respectability, seemingly defensible or arguably beneficial and attractive in the short run.
It is a fundamental priciple in Constitutional Law that Congress cannot add by statute or
administrative act to the causes for disqualification or removal of constitutional officers. Neither can
Congress provide a different procedure for disciplining Constitution. This is a true for the President
and the members of Congress itself. The causes and procedures for removal found in the
Constitution are not mere diciplinary measures. They are intended to protect constitutional officers in
the unhampered and indepedent discharge of their functions. It is for this reason that the court should
ensure that what the Constitution provides must be followed.
The Constitutuion provides how the tenure of members of Congress may be shortened:
A. Forefeiture of his seat by holding any other office or employment in the government
or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or subsidiaries (Art. VI, Section 13);
B. Expulsion as a disciplinary action for disorderly behavior (Art. VI, Sec. 16[3]);
C. Disqualification as determined by resolution of the Electoral Tribubal in an election
contest (Art. VI, Sec. 17);
D. Voluntary renunciation of office (Art. VI, Sec. 7, par. 2). (See Petition, p. 8)
The respondents would now add to the above provisions, an enactment of the defunct Batasang
Pambansa promulgated long before the present Constitution took effect. B.P. Blg. 881, Article IX,
Section 67 provides:
Any elective official whether national or local running for any office other than the one
which he is holding in a permanent capacity except for President and Vice-President
shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy. (Petition, p. 8)
I take exception to the Solicitor General's stand that the grounds for removal mentioned in the
Constitution are not exclusive. They are exclusive. The non-inclusion of physical causes like death,
being permanently comatose on a hospital bed, or disappearance in the sinking of a ship does not
justify in the slightest an act of Congress expelling one of its members for reasons other than those
found in the Constitution. Resignation is provided for by the Constitution. It is voluntary renunciation.
So is naturalization in a foreign country or express renunciation of Philippine citizenship. Conviction of
a crime carrying a penalty of disqualification is a disqualification against running for public office.
Whether or not the conviction for such a crime while the Congressman is in office may be a ground to
expel him from Congress is a matter which we cannot decide obiter. We must await the proper case
and controversy. My point is Congress cannot by statute or disciplinary action add to the causes
for disqualification or removal of its members. Only the Constitution can do it.
The citation of the precursors of B.P. 881 namely, Section 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 665,
Section 27 of Article II of Rep. Act No. 180, the 1971 Election Code, and the 1978 Election Code
does not help the respondents. On the contrary, they strengthen the case of the petitioner.
It may be noted that all the earlier statutes about elective officials being considered resigned upon the
filing of a certificate of candidacy refer to non-constitutional officers. Congress has not only the power
but also the duty to prescribe causes for the removal of provincial, city, and municipal officials. It has
no such power when it comes to constitutional officers.
It was not alone egoistic self-interest which led the legislature during Commonwealth days or
Congress in the pre-martial law period to exclude their members from the rule that the filing of a
certificate of candidacy for another office meant resignation from one's current position. It was also a
recognition that such a provision could not be validly enacted by statute. It has to be in the
constitution.
Does running for another elective office constitute voluntary renunciation of one's public office? In
other words, did the Speaker and the House Secretary correctly interpret the meaning of "voluntary
renunciation" as found in the Constitution?
From 1935 when the Constitution was promulgated up to 1985 when B.P. 881 was enacted or for fifty
long years, the filing of a certificate of candidacy by a Senator or member of the House was
not voluntary renunciation of his seat in Congress. I see no reason why the passage of a statute by
the Batasang Pambansa should suddenly change the meaning and implications of the act of filing
and equate it with voluntary renunciation. "Voluntary" refers to a state of the mind and in the context
of constitutional requirements should not be treated lightly. It is true that intentions may be deduced
from a person's acts. I must stress, however, that for fifty years of ourconstitutional history, running for
a local government position was not considered a voluntary renunciation. Congressman Dimaporo is
steeped in the traditions of earlier years. He has been engaged in politics even before some of his
present colleagues in Congress were born. Neither the respondents nor this Court can state that
he intended to renounce his seat in Congress when he decided to run for Regional Governor. I submit
that we should not deny to him the privilege of an existing interpretation of "voluntary renunciation"
and wrongly substitute the interpretation adopted by the respondents.
In interpreting the meaning of voluntary renunciation, the Court should also be guided by the principle
that all presumptions should be in favor of representation.
As aptly stated by the petitioner:
We should not lose sight of the fact that what we are dealing with here is not the mere
right of the petitioner to sit in the House of Representatives, but more important, we are
dealing with the political right of the people of the Second Legislative District of Lanao
del Sur to representation in Congress, as against their disenfranchisement by mere
'administrative act' of the respondents.
Such being the case, all presumptions should be strictly in favor of representation and strictly against
disenfranchisement.
And if disenfranchisement should there be, the same should only be by due process of law, both
substantive and procedural, and not by mere arbitrary, capricious, and ultra vires, administrative act'
of the respondents. (Reply to Comment, p. 5)
The invocation of the principle of accountability found in Article XI of the Constitution does not
empower the legislature to add to the grounds for dismissing its members. When Congressman
Dimaporo ran for Regional Governor, he was not trifling with the mandate of his people. He wanted to
serve a greater number in an autonomous, more direct, and intimate manner. He claims (a mistaken
claim according to the Commission on Elections sustained by this Court) that he was cheated of
victory during the elections for regional officers. He wants to continue serving his people. I fail to see
how the principle of accountability and faithfulness to a trust could be applied to this specific cause of
Congressman Dimaporo.
For the Foregoing reasons, I VOTE to GRANT the petition.
Padilla and Bidin, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-46267 November 28, 1938
FRANCISCO ZANDUETA, petitioner,
vs.
SIXTO DE LA COSTA, respondent.
Vicente J. Francisco and Francisco Zandueta for petitioner.
Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Ramon Diokno for respondent.

VILLA-REAL, J.:
This is a quo warranto proceeding instituted by the Honorable Francisco Zandueta against the
Honorable Sixto de la Costa to obtain from this court a judgment declaring the respondent to be
illegally occupying the office of Judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila,
Fourth Judicial District, ousting him from said office, and holding that the petitioner is entitled to
continue occupying the office in question by placing him in possession thereof, with costs to said
respondent.
Prior to the promulgation of Commonwealth Act No. 145, the petitioner, the Honorable Francisco
Zandueta was discharging the office of judge of first instance, Ninth Judicial District, comprising solely
the City of Manila, and was presiding over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of said city,
by virtue of an ad interim appointment issued by the President of the Philippines in his favor on June
2, 1936, and confirmed by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly on September
8th of the same year.
On November 7, 1936, the date on which Commonwealth Act No. 145, otherwise known as
the Judicial Reorganization Law, took effect, the petitioner received from the President of the
Commonwealth a new ad interimappointment as judge of first instance, this time of the Fourth Judicial
District, with authority to preside over the Courts of First Instance of Manila and Palawan, issued in
accordance with said Act. As the National Assembly adjourned on November 20, 1937,
without its Commission on Appointments having acted on said ad interim appointment, another ad
interim appointment to the same office was issued in favor of said petitioner, pursuant to which he
took a new oath on November 22, 1937, before discharging the duties thereof. After his
appointment and qualification as judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, the petitioner,
acting as executive judge, performed several executive acts, some of which consist in the designation
of the assistant clerk of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Ladislao Pasicolan, as administrative
officer, under the orders of the petitioner, as executive judge of said court, to take charge of all
matters pertaining to the Court of First Instance of Palawan, which are handled by said execute judge
in Manila (Exhibit 2); in the appointment of attorney Rufo M. San Juan as notary public for the
Province of Palawan, said appointment to expire on December 31, 1938 (Exhibit 3); in having
authorized justice of the peace Iigo R. Pea to defend a criminal case the hearing of which had
begun during the past sessions in Coron, Palawan (Exhibit 5); in having granted a leave of absence
of ten days to justice of the peace Abordo (of Puerto Princesa), Palawan (Exhibit 8); and in having
granted a leave of absence of thirteen days to the justice of the peace of Coron, Palawan (Exhibit 9).
On May 19, 1938, the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly disapproved the
aforesaid ad interim appointment of said petitioner, who was advised thereof by the Secretary of
Justice on the 20th of said month and year.
On August 1, 1938, the President of the Philippines appointed the herein respondent, Honorable
Sixto de la Costa, judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over
the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan,
and his appointment was approved by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly.
By virtue of said appointment, the respondent took the necessary oath and assumed office. On the
same date, August 1, 1938, the President of the Philippines, pursuant to said appointment of judge of
first instance of the Fourth Judicial District and after confirmation thereof, issued the corresponding
final appointment in favor of the respondent, Honorable Sixto de la Costa (Exhibit 11).
The respondent, in answer to the petition, admits some of the facts alleged therein and denies the
rest, and alleges, as one of his special defenses, that the petitioner is estopped from attacking the
constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 145, for having accepted his new appointment as judge of
first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, issued by virtue thereof, to preside over the Courts of First
Instance of Manila and Palawan, and for having taken the necessary oath, entering into the discharge
of the functions of his office and performing judicial as well as administrative acts.
The defense of estoppel being procedural, we shall discuss it first to determine whether or not the
petitioner may proceed to question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which the new ad
interim appointment of judge of first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, to preside over the Courts
of First Instance of Manila and Palawan, was issued in his favor.
As stated beforehand, while the petitioner Honorable Francisco Zandueta was presiding over the Fifth
Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila, Ninth Judicial District, by virtue of an appointment
issued to him on June 2, 1936, and confirmed by the National Assembly on September 8th of the
same year, he received, on November 7, 1936, a new ad interim appointment, issued in
accordance with the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 145, which took effect on the same date, to
discharge the office of judge of first instance, Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the
Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan, upon
which he immediately took the corresponding oath and entered into the discharge of his office. Under
his former appointment of June 2, 1936, the petitioner had authority preside solely over the Fifth
Branch of the Court of First Instance of Manila but not over the Court of First Instance of Palawan,
while, according to his new appointment of November 7, 1936, he had authority to preside not
only over said Fifth Branch of said Court of First Instance of Manila but also over the Court of First
Instance of Palawan. It should be noted that the territory over which the petitioner could exercise and
did exercise jurisdiction by virtue of his last appointment is wider than that over which he could
exercise and did exercise jurisdiction by virtue of the former. Hence, there is incompatibility between
the two appointments and, consequently, in the discharge of the office conferred by each of them,
resulting in the absorption of the former by the latter. In accepting this appointment and qualifying for
the exercise of the functions of the office conferred by it, by taking the necessary oath, and in
discharging the same, disposing of both judicial and administrative cases corresponding to the courts
of First Instance of Manila and of Palawan, the petitioner abandoned his appointment of June 2,
1936, and ceased in the exercise of the functions of the office occupied by him by virtue thereof.
The rule of equity, sanctioned by jurisprudence, is that when a public official voluntarily accepts an
appointment to an office newly created or reorganized by law, which new office is incompatible
with the one formerly occupied by him , qualifies for the discharge of the functions thereof by
taking the necessary oath, and enters into the performance of his duties by executing acts inherent in
said newly created or reorganized office and receiving the corresponding salary, he will be
considered to have abandoned the office he was occupying by virtue of his former appointment (46
Corpus Juris, 947, sec. 55), and he can not question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which
he was last appointed (11 American Jurisprudence, 166, par. 121; id., 767, par. 123). He is excepted
from said rule only when his non-acceptance of the new appointment may affect public interest or
when he is compelled to accept it by reason of legal exigencies (11 American Jurisprudence, 770,
par. 124). lawphi1.net
In the case under consideration, the petitioner was free to accept or not the ad interim appointment
issued by the President of the Commonwealth in his favor, in accordance with said Commonwealth
Act No. 145. Nothing or nobody compelled him to do so. While the office of judge of first instance of
public interest, being one of the means employed by the Government to carry out one of its purposes,
which is the administration of justice, considering the organization of the courts of justice in the
Philippines and the creation of the positions of judges-at-large or substitutes, the temporary disability
of a judge may be immediately remedied without detriment to the smooth running of the judicial
machinery. If the petitioner believed, as he now seems to believe, that Commonwealth Act No. 145 is
unconstitutional, he should have refused to accept the appointment offered him or, at least, he should
have accepted it with reservation, had he believed that his duty of obedience to the laws compelled
him to do so, and afterwards resort to the power entrusted with the final determination of the question
whether a law is unconstitutional or not. The petitioner, being aware of his constitutional and legal
rights and obligations, by implied order of the law (art. 2, Civil Code), accepted the office of judge of
first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Fifth Branch of the Court
of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan and entered into the
performance of the duties inherent therein, after taking the necessary oath, thereby acting with full
knowledge that if he voluntarily accepted the office to which he was appointed, he would later be
estopped from questioning the validity of said appointment by alleging that the law, by virtue of which
his appointment was issued, is unconstitutional. He likewise knew, or at least he should know, that
his ad interim appointment was subject to the approval of the Commission on Appointments of the
National Assembly and that if said commission were to disapprove the same, it would become
ineffective and he would cease discharging the office.
It appears from all the foregoing that the petitioner having voluntarily abandoned his appointment of
June 2, 1936, and, consequently, the office of judge of first instance of Manila, Ninth Judicial District,
whose Fifth Branch was being presided over by him by virtue thereof, upon accepting the ad
interim appointment of November 7, 1936, to the office of judge of first instance of the Fourth
Judicial District, with authority to preside over said Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of
Manila together with the Court of First Instance of Palawan, and entering into the discharge of the
functions of said office, he can not now claim to be entitled to repossess the office occupied by him
under his said appointment of June 2, 1936 (22 R. C. L., 560, par. 264), or question the
constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 145, by virtue of which he has been appointed judge of
first instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with authority to preside over the Fifth Branch of the Court
of First Instance of Manila and the Court of First Instance of Palawan, which appointment was
disapproved by the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly.
Having arrived at the conclusion that the petitioner is estopped by his own act from proceeding to
question the constitutionality of Commonwealth Act No. 145, by virtue of which he was appointed, by
accepting said appointment and entering into the performance of the duties appertaining to the office
conferred therein, and pursuant to the well settled doctrine established by both American and
Philippine jurisprudence relative to the consideration of constitutional questions, this court deems it
unnecessary to decide the questions constitutional law raised in the petition (Cruz vs. Youngberg, 56
Phil., 234; Walter E. Olsen and Co. vs. Aldanese and Trinidad, 43 Phil., 259; Yangco vs. Board of
Public Utility Commissioner, 36 Phil., 116; Government of the Philippine Islandsvs. Municipality of
Binagonan, 34 Phil., 518; McGirr vs. Hamilton and Abreu, 30 Phil., 563; 12 Corpus Juris, 699,
section 40; id., 780, section 212).
For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold when a judge of first instance,
presiding over a branch of a Court of First Instance of a judicial district by virtue of a legal and valid
appointment, accepts another appointment to preside over the same branch of the same Court of
First Instance, in addition to another court of the same category, both of which belong to a new
judicial district formed by the addition of another Court of First Instance to the old one, enters into the
discharge of the functions of his new office and receives the corresponding salary, he abandons his
old office and cannot claim to be to repossess it or question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of
which his new appointment has been issued; and, said new appointment having been disapproved by
the Commission on Appointments of the National Assembly, neither can he claim to continue
occupying the office conferred upon him by said new appointment, having ipso jure ceased in the
discharge of the functions thereof.
Wherefore, the petition for quo warranto instituted is denied and the same is dismissed with costs to
the petitioner. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Abad Santos, Imperial and Concepcion, JJ., concur.



Separate Opinions

LAUREL, J., concurring:
I do not subscribe to the application of the doctrine of estoppel in this case. The ratio decidendi of the
majority is found in the following paragraph of their opinion:
The rule of equity, sanctioned by jurisprudence, is that when a public official voluntarily accepts
an appointment to an office newly created or reorganized by a
law, which new office is incompatible with the one formerly occupied by him , qualifies for
the discharge of the functions thereof by taking the necessary oath, and enters into the
performance of his duties by executing acts inherent in said newly created or reorganized
office and receiving the corresponding salary, he will be considered to have abandoned the
office he was occupying by virtue of his former appointment (46 Corpus Juris, 947, sec. 55),
and he can not question the constitutionality of the law by virtue of which he was last appointed
(11 American Jurisprudence, 166, par. 121; id., 767, par. 123). He is excepted from said rule
only when his non-acceptance of the new appointment may affect public interest or when he is
compelled to accept it by reason of legal exigencies (11 American Jurisprudence, 770, par.
124).
To arrive at the conclusion reached, three important legal principles are invoked and applied: (a)
Incompatibility of public offices; (b) abandonment of public office; and (c) estoppel. As necessary
predicates for the application of the principle of estoppel reference has to be made to the doctrines
of incompatibility and abandonment of public offices: "Hence, there is incompatibility between the two
appointments and, consequently, in the discharge of the conferred by each of them, resulting in the
absorption of the former by the latter. In accepting this appointment and qualifying for the exercise of
the functions of the office conferred by it, taking the necessary oath, and in discharging the same,
disposing of both judicial and administrative cases corresponding to the Courts of First Instance of
Manila and of Palawan, the petitioner abandoned his appointment of June 2, 1936, and ceased in the
exercise of the functions of the office occupied by him by virtue thereof." (Underlining mine.) Thus
runs the decision of the majority of my brethren. Frankly, I do not see how the doctrine of
incompatibility of public offices could have any application here. If a judge of the Court of First
Instance may be a judge of one or more provinces, there can be no objection in principle to his being
judge of one or more districts, if the constitution or the law authorizes it. It should be observed that
incompatibility in law is not physical impossibility but inconsistency in the functions of the two public
offices concerned. In the language of Judge Folger, "where one office is not subordinate to the other,
nor the relations of the one to the other such as are inconsistent and repugnant, there is not that
incompatibility from which the law declares that the acceptance of the one is the vacation of the other.
The force of the word, in its application to this matter is, that from the nature and relations to each
other, of the two places, they ought not to be held by the same person, from the contrariety and
antagonism which would result in the attempt by one person to faithfully and impartially discharge the
duties of one, toward the incumbent of the other." (People vs. Green, 58 N. Y., 295, 304.) If the law as
an expression of public policy prohibits the acceptance by a public officer of any office other than that
which he holds, it is not a case of incompatibility but of legal prohibition. Acceptance of an
incompatible office should be distinguished from acceptance of a forbidden office. (Cf. sec. 18, Jones
Law; sec. 8, Art. VI, Philippine Constitution.) As to abandonment, in order that official relations may
be terminated thereby, the circumstances must be such as clearly indicate an absolute
relinquishment. I find nothing in the conduct of the petitioner indicative of clear intention to abandon
the particular office involved and its duties and emoluments. On the contrary, he appears to have
clung to the office, until forced to vacate it.
A fortiori, the doctrine of estoppel is inapplicable. The petitioner, before the approval of
Commonwealth Act No. 145, was judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, fifth sala, Ninth
Judicial District. On the same day that the Act was approved he received his ad interim appointment
for the new Fourth Judicial District established by Commonwealth Act No. 145, which district
comprises not only Manila but also the Provinces of Rizal and Palawan. The appointment was made
as well in the case of the petitioner as in other cases to avoid a break of continuity in the performance
of judicial functions. The petitioner accepted the appointment and proceeded to discharge his duties
as judge of the reorganized district in the honest belief that enlargement was all that was done to his
old district. I express the opinion that the conduct of the petitioner does not warrant the application of
the principle of estoppel or the invocation of the maxim that "He who hath committed iniquity shall not
have equity." I am not prepared to say of the petitioner that he has performed what Lord Coke would
call "an act which stoppeth or closeth up his mouth to allege or plead the truth." The doctrine of
estoppel is inherently founded on equity and its application should not be predicated on strictly legal
principles.
I do not see much utility in referring to adjudicated cases on this point as hardly any one of them
tallies with the facts of the present case. I should observe, however, that in applying the doctrine of
estoppel we should not overlook the significant fact that the principle originally arose almost entirely in
relation to transfers of property although it has now come to be applied to a variety of legal situations.
From the point of view of legal and somewhat arbitrary classification of the Anglo-American law, the
principle invoked and applied is the equitable estoppel, otherwise know as estoppel in pais. As such,
it is, according to Bigelow, estoppel by conduct, which is said to have its foundation in fraud,
considered in its general sense. (Bigelow, Estop., secs. 437-439.) Upon the other hand, I have a very
serious doubt as to whether the petitioner, on the hypothesis that the question involved is his
security of tenure under the Constitution could by acquiescence or consent be precluded from
raising a question of public interest. Security of tenure is certainly not a personal privilege of any
particular judge. From this point of view it cannot be said that his remaining silent when he ought to
have spoken debars the petitioner from speaking when conscience requires him to be silent (10 R. C.
L., par. 21).
The petitioner in his vigorous and impassioned plea asks us to vindicate the independence of the
judiciary and up-hold the constitutional mandate relative to the security of tenure of judges, embodied
in section 9 of Article VIII of the Constitution. He claims that "Commonwealth Act No. 145 is
unconstitutional because the regrouping of the provinces into nine judicial districts as therein provided
for was effected by the National Assembly without constitutional authority." Upon the other hand, the
Solicitor-General directs our attention to the power of the legislature over courts inferior to the
Supreme Court, conferred by section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution. I think the constitutional
issue thus squarely presented should be met courageously by the court, instead of applying to the
petitioner the doctrine of estoppel which, in my humble opinion, is entirely inapplicable. The life and
welfare of this government depends upon close and careful observance of constitutional mandates.
For this reason, in clear cases, this court should not hesitate to strike down legislative acts in conflict
with the fundamental law. This court is perhaps the last bulwark of constitutional government. It shall
not obstruct the popular will as manifested through proper organs. It will adapt itself to the needs of
an ever-expanding present and face the future with a clear insight into economic and social values. It
will keep itself alive to the dictates of national policy. But, in the same way that it cannot renounce the
life breathed into it by the Constitution, so may it not forego its obligation, in proper cases, to apply
the necessary corrective so that, in the very language of this court, the course of Government may be
directed along constitutional channels" (Angara vs. Electoral Commission [1936], 35 Off. Gaz., p. 23),
or its return to them may be accelerated.
I am of the opinion that Commonwealth Act No. 145 in so far as it reorganizes, among other judicial
districts, the Ninth Judicial District, and establishes an entirely new district comprising Manila and the
provinces of Rizal and Palawan, is valid and constitutional. This conclusion flows from the
fundamental proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and
therefore may reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and
comissions. Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to
define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to certain limitations in
the case of the Supreme Court. It is admitted that section 9 of the same article of the Constitution
provides for the security of tenure of all the judges. The principles embodied in these two sections of
the same article of the Constitution must be coordinated and harmonized. A mere enunciation of a
principle will not decide actual cases and controversies of every sort (Justice Holmes in
Lochner vs. New York, 198 U. S., 45, 49 Law. ed., 937).
I am not insensible to the argument that the National Assembly may abuse its power and move
deliberately to defeat the constitutional provision guaranteeing security of tenure to all judges. But, is
this the case? One need not share the view of Story, Miller and Tucker on the one hand, or the
opinion of Cooley, Watson and Baldwin on the other, to realize that the application of a legal or
constitutional principle is necessarily factual and circumstantial and that fixity of principle is the rigidity
of the dead and the unprogressive. I do say, and emphatically, however, that cases may arise where
the violation of the constitutional provision regarding security of judicial tenure is palpable and plain,
and that legislative power of reorganization may be sought to cIoak an unconstitutional and evil
purpose. When a case of that kind arises, it will be the time to make the hammer fall and heavily. But
not until then. I am satisfied that, as to the particular point here discussed, the purpose was the
fulfillment of what was considered a great public need by the legislative department and that
Commonwealth Act No. 145 was not enacted purposely to affect adversely the tenure of judges or of
any sustaining the power of the legislative department under the Constitution. To be sure, there was
greater necessity for reorganization consequent upon the establishment of the new government than
at the time Acts Nos. 2347 and 4007 were approved by the defunct Philippine Legislature, and
although in the case of these two Acts there was an express provision providing for the vacation by
the judges of their offices whereas in the case of Commonwealth Act No. 145 doubt is engendered by
i silence, this doubt should be resolved in favor of the valid exercise of the legislative power.
I, therefore, concur in the result.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-51122 March 25, 1982
EUGENIO J. PUYAT, ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN, EDGARDO P. REYES, ANTONIO G. PUYAT,
JAIME R. BLANCO, RAFAEL R. RECTO and REYNALDO L. LARDIZABAL, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SIXTO T. J. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Associate Commissioner of the Securities & Exchange
Commission, EUSTAQUIO T. C. ACERO, R. G. VILDZIUS, ENRIQUE M. BELO, MANUEL G.
ABELLO, SERVILLANO DOLINA, JUANITO MERCADO and ESTANISLAO A.
FERNANDEZ, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This suit for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction is poised against the Order of
respondent Associate Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) granting
Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747.
A question of novel import is in issue. For its resolution, the following dates and allegations are being
given and made:
a) May 14,1979. An election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries Corporation
(IPI) a private corporation, was held. Those in charge ruled that the following were elected as
Directors:
Eugenio J. Puyat Eustaquio T.C. Acero
Erwin L. Chiongbian R. G. Vildzius
Edgardo P. Reyes Enrique M. Belo
Antonio G. Puyat Servillano Dolina
Jaime R. Blanco Juanito Mercado
Rafael R. Recto
Those named on the left list may be called the Puyat Group; those on the right, the Acero Group.
Thus, the Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI.
b) May 25, 1979. The Acero Group instituted at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) quo
warrantoproceedings, docketed as Case No. 1747 (the SEC Case), questioning the election of May
14, 1979. The Acero Group claimed that the stockholders' votes were not properly counted.
c) May 25-31, 1979. The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the parties with respondent SEC
Commissioner de Guzman, Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the Puyat Group
objected on Constitutional grounds. Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then in force,
provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before ... any administrative body", and
SEC was an administrative body. Incidentally, the same prohibition was maintained by the April 7,
1981 plebiscite. The cited Constitutional prohibition being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not
continue his appearance for respondent Acero.
d) May 31, 1979. When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that:
(i) On May 15, 1979, Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez had purchased from
Augusto A. Morales ten (10) shares of stock of IPI for P200.00 upon request of
respondent Acero to qualify him to run for election as a Director.
(ii) The deed of sale, however, was notarized only on May 30, 1979 and was sought to
be registered on said date.
(iii) On May 31, 1979, the day following the notarization of Assemblyman Fernandez'
purchase, the latter had filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the SEC Case as the
owner of ten (10) IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in litigation.
e) July 17, 1979. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Atty. Fernandez' ownership of
the said ten shares.
1
It is this Order allowing intervention that precipitated the instant petition for
certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction.
f) July 3, 1979. Edgardo P. Reyes instituted a case before the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig),
Branch XXI, against N.V. Verenigde Bueinzenfabrieken Excelsior De Maas and respondent
Eustaquio T. C. Acero and others, to annul the sale of Excelsior's shares in the IPI to respondent
Acero (CC No. 33739). In that case, Assemblyman Fernandez appeared as counsel for defendant
Excelsior In L-51928, we ruled that Assemblyman Fernandez could not appear as counsel in a case
originally filed with a Court of First Instance as in such situation the Court would be one "without
appellate jurisdiction."
On September 4, 1979, the Court en banc issued a temporary Restraining Order enjoining
respondent SEC Associate Commissioner from allowing the participation as an intervenor, of
respondent Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez at the proceedings in the SEC Case.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment for respondent Commissioner, supports the stand of the latter
in allowing intervention. The Court en banc, on November 6, 1979, resolved to consider the Comment
as an Answer to the Petition.
The issue which will be resolved is whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then stockholder of
IPI may intervene in the SEC Case without violating Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution, which,
as amended, now reads:
SEC. 11.
No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court
without appellate jurisdiction.
before any court in any civil case wherein the Government, or any subdivision, agency,
or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party,
or in any criminal case wherein any officer or employee of the Government is accused
of an offense committed in relation to his office,
or before any administrative body.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly be interested financially in any contract with, or in
any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or controlled
corporation, during his term of office.
He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause or matter where he may be
called to act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
What really has to be resolved is whether or not, in intervening in the SEC Case, Assemblyman
Fernandez is, in effect, appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in
contravention of the Constitutional provision.
Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be
appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the
cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his
ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation and not for the protection of the
petitioners nor respondents who have their respective capable and respected counsel.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez
in the SEC Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten shares out
of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them "after the fact" that is, on May 30, 1979, after the
contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit had been filed on May
25, 1979 before SEC and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before the SEC on May
31, 1979. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to appear as
counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero,
2
but which was objected to by petitioners. Realizing,
perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal
interest in the matter under litigation. And it maybe noted that in the case filed before the Rizal Court
of First Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of
respondent Acero therein.
Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has been an indirect
"appearance as counsel before ... an administrative body" and, in our opinion, that is a circumvention
of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear
actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose, that is, to enable
him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an unfavorable outcome of the
SEC Case would be pure naivete. He would still appear as counsel indirectly.
A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an
Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal
participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the
Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which is
intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited.
3

In brief, we hold that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC. No. 1747 falls within the
ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Our resolution of this case should not be construed as, absent the question of the constitutional
prohibition against members of the Batasan, allowing any stockholder, or any number of
stockholders, in a corporation to intervene in any controversy before the SEC relating to intra-
corporate matters. A resolution of that question is not necessary in this case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Commissioner's Order granting Atty. Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to
intervene in SEC Case No. 1747 is hereby reversed and set aside. The temporary Restraining Order
heretofore issued is hereby made permanent.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De
Castro, Ericta, Plana and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Barredo, J., I reserve my vote.



EN BANC
[G.R. No. 134577. November 18, 1998]
SEN. MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO and SEN. FRANCISCO S. TATAD, petitioners, vs. SEN.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and SEN. MARCELO B. FERNAN, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The principle of separation of powers ordains that each of the three great branches of government has
exclusive cognizance of and is supreme in matters falling within its own constitutionally allocated sphere.
Constitutional respect and a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this
Court from prying into the internal workings of the Senate. Where no provision of the Constitution or the laws
or even the Rules of the Senate is clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse
of discretion cannot be imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority. This
Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and
majesty of the law.
The Case

On July 31, 1998, Senators Miriam Defensor Santiago and Francisco S. Tatad instituted an original petition
for quo warranto under Rule 66, Section 5, Rules of Court, seeking the ouster of Senator Teofisto T. Guingona
Jr. as minority leader of the Senate and the declaration of Senator Tatad as the rightful minority leader.
On August 4, 1998, the Court, upon receipt of the Petition, required the respondents and the solicitor
general to file COMMENT thereon within a non-extendible period of fifteen (15) days from notice. On
August 25, 1998, both respondents and the solicitor general submitted their respective Comments. In
compliance with a Resolution of the Court dated September 1, 1998, petitioners filed their Consolidated Reply
on September 23, 1998. Noting said pleading, this Court gave due course to the petition and deemed the
controversy submitted for decision, without need of memoranda, on September 29, 1998.
In the regular course, the regional trial courts and this Court have concurrent jurisdiction
[1]
to hear and
decide petitions for quo warranto (as well as certiorari, prohibition and mandamus), and a basic deference to
the hierarchy of courts impels a filing of such petitions in the lower tribunals.
[2]
However, for special and
important reasons or for exceptional and compelling circumstances, as in the present case, this Court has
allowed exceptions to this doctrine.
[3]
In fact, original petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo
warranto assailing acts of legislative officers like the Senate President
[4]
and the Speaker of the House
[5]
have
been recognized as exceptions to this rule.
The Facts

The Senate of the Philippines, with Sen. John Henry R. Osmea as presiding officer, convened on July 27, 1998
for the first regular session of the eleventh Congress. At the time, in terms of party affiliation, the composition
of the Senate was as follows:
[6]

10 members -Laban ng Masang Pilipino (LAMP)
7 members - Lakas-National Union of Christian Democrats-United Muslim Democrats of the
Philippines (Lakas-NUCD-UMDP)
1 member - Liberal Party (LP)
1 member - Aksyon Demokrasya
1 member - Peoples Reform Party (PRP)
1 member - Gabay Bayan
2 members - Independent
----------
23 - total number of senators
[7]
(The last six members are all classified by petitioners as independent.)
On the agenda for the day was the election of officers. Nominated by Sen. Blas F. Ople to the position of
Senate President was Sen. Marcelo B. Fernan. Sen. Francisco S. Tatad was also nominated to the same position
by Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago. By a vote of 20 to 2,
[8]
Senator Fernan was declared the duly elected
President of the Senate.
The following were likewise elected: Senator Ople as president pro tempore, and Sen. Franklin M. Drilon
as majority leader.
Senator Tatad thereafter manifested that, with the agreement of Senator Santiago, allegedly the only other
member of the minority, he was assuming the position of minority leader. He explained that those who
had voted for Senator Fernan comprised the majority, while only those who had voted for him, the
losing nominee, belonged to the minority.
During the discussion on who should constitute the Senate minority, Sen. Juan M. Flavier manifested that
the senators belonging to the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP Party -- numbering seven (7) and, thus, also a minority --
had chosen Senator Guingona as the minority leader. No consensus on the matter was arrived at. The
following session day, the debate on the question continued, with Senators Santiago and Tatad delivering
privilege speeches. On the third session day, the Senate met in caucus, but still failed to resolve the issue.
On July 30, 1998, the majority leader informed the body that he was in receipt of a letter signed by the
seven Lakas-NUCD-UMDP senators,
[9]
stating that they had elected Senator Guingona as the minority
leader. By virtue thereof, the Senate President formally recognized Senator Guingona as the minority leader of
the Senate.
The following day, Senators Santiago and Tatad filed before this Court the subject petition for quo
warranto, alleging in the main that Senator Guingona had been usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the
position of Senate minority leader, a position that, according to them, rightfully belonged to Senator Tatad.
Issues

From the parties pleadings, the Court formulated the following issues for resolution:
1. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the petition?
2. Was there an actual violation of the Constitution?
3. Was Respondent Guingona usurping, unlawfully holding and exercising the position of Senate minority
leader?
4. Did Respondent Fernan act with grave abuse of discretion in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the
minority leader?
The Courts Ruling

After a close perusal of the pleadings
[10]
and a careful deliberation on the arguments, pro and con, the Court
finds that no constitutional or legal infirmity or grave abuse of discretion attended the recognition of and the
assumption into office by Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader.
First Issue: The Courts Jurisdiction

Petitioners principally invoke Avelino v. Cuenco
[11]
in arguing that this Court has jurisdiction to settle the
issue of who is the lawful Senate minority leader. They submit that the definitions of majority and minority
involve an interpretation of the Constitution, specifically Section 16 (1), Article VI thereof, stating that [t]he
Senate shall elect its President and the House of Representatives its Speaker, by a majority vote of all its
respective Members.
Respondents and the solicitor general, in their separate Comments, contend in common that the issue of
who is the lawful Senate minority leader is an internal matter pertaining exclusively to the domain of the
legislature, over which the Court cannot exercise jurisdiction without transgressing the principle of separation
of powers. Allegedly, no constitutional issue is involved, as the fundamental law does not provide for the office
of a minority leader in the Senate. The legislature alone has the full discretion to provide for such office and, in
that event, to determine the procedure of selecting its occupant.
Respondents also maintain that Avelino cannot apply, because there exists no question involving an
interpretation or application of the Constitution, the laws or even the Rules of the Senate; neither are there
peculiar circumstances impelling the Court to assume jurisdiction over the petition. The solicitor general
adds that there is not even any legislative practice to support the petitioners theory that a senator who votes for
the winning Senate President is precluded from becoming the minority leader.
To resolve the issue of jurisdiction, this Court carefully reviewed and deliberated on the various important
cases involving this very important and basic question, which it has ruled upon in the past.
The early case Avelino v. Cuenco cautiously tackled the scope of the Courts power of judicial review; that
is, questions involving an interpretation or application of a provision of the Constitution or the law, including
the rules of either house of Congress. Within this scope falls the jurisdiction of the Court over questions on the
validity of legislative or executive acts that are political in nature, whenever the tribunal finds constitutionally
imposed limits on powers or functions conferred upon political bodies.
[12]

In the aforementioned case, the Court initially declined to resolve the question of who was the rightful
Senate President, since it was deemed a political controversy falling exclusively within the domain of the
Senate. Upon a motion for reconsideration, however, the Court ultimately assumed jurisdiction (1) in the light
of subsequent events which justify its intervention; and (2) because the resolution of the issue hinged on the
interpretation of the constitutional provision on the presence of a quorum to hold a session
[13]
and therein elect a
Senate President.
Justice Feria elucidated in his Concurring Opinion: [I] concur with the majority that this Court has
jurisdiction over cases like the present x x x so as to establish in this country the judicial supremacy, with the
Supreme Court as the final arbiter, to see that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the
Constitution, not only in justiceable but political questions as well.
[14]

Justice Perfecto, also concurring, said in part:
Indeed there is no denying that the situation, as obtaining in the upper chamber of Congress, is highly
explosive. It had echoed in the House of Representatives. It has already involved the President of the
Philippines. The situation has created a veritable national crisis, and it is apparent that solution cannot be
expected from any quarter other than this Supreme Court, upon which the hopes of the people for an effective
settlement are pinned.
[15]

x x x This case raises vital constitutional questions which no one can settle or decide if this Court should
refuse to decide them.
[16]

x x x The constitutional question of quorum should not be left unanswered.
[17]

In Taada v. Cuenco,
[18]
this Court endeavored to define political question. And we said that it refers to
those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in
regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the
government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom, not [the] legality, of a particular
measure.
[19]

The Court ruled that the validity of the selection of members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal by the
senators was not a political question. The choice of these members did not depend on the Senates full
discretionary authority, but was subject to mandatory constitutional limitations.
[20]
Thus, the Court held that
not only was it clearly within its jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the selection proceedings, but it was
also its duty to consider and determine the issue.
In another landmark case, Lansang v. Garcia,
[21]
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion wrote that the Court
had authority to and should inquire into the existence of the factual bases required by the Constitution for the
suspension of the privilege of the writ [of habeas corpus]. This ruling was made in spite of the previous
pronouncements in Barcelon v. Baker
[22]
and Montenegro v. Castaeda
[23]
that the authority to decide whether
the exigency has arisen requiring suspension (of the privilege x x x) belongs to the President and his decision
is final and conclusive upon the courts and upon all other persons. But the Chief Justice cautioned: the
function of the Court is merely to check -- not to supplant --- the Executive, or to ascertain merely whether he
has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction, not to exercise the power vested in himor to
determine the wisdom of his act.
The eminent Chief Justice aptly explained later in Javellana v. Executive Secretary:
[24]

The reason why the issue under consideration and other issues of similar character are justiciable, not political,
is plain and simple. One of the principal bases of the non-justiciability of so-called political questions is the
principle of separation of powers -- characteristic of the presidential system of government -- the functions of
which are classified or divided, by reason of their nature, into three (3) categories, namely, 1) those involving
the making of laws, which are allocated to the legislative department; 2) those concerning mainly with the
enforcement of such laws and of judicial decisions applying and/or interpreting the same, which belong to the
executive department; and 3) those dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving
rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable, which are apportioned to courts of
justice. Within its own sphere -- but only within such sphere each department is supreme and independent of
the others, and each is devoid of authority not only to encroach upon the powers or field of action assigned to
any of the other departments, but also to inquire into or pass upon the advisability or wisdom of the acts
performed, measures taken or decisions made by the other departments -- provided that such acts, measures or
decision are within the area allocated thereto by the Constitution."
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue of whether or
not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations respected is justiciable or non-
political, the crux of the problem being one of legality or validity of the contested act, not its
wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations -- particularly those prescribed by the
Constitution -- would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry into such issue and the settlement
thereof are the main functions of the courts of justice under the presidential form of government adopted in our
1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and balances, one of its basic predicates. As a consequence, we
have neither the authority nor the discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but are under the ineluctable
obligation -- made particularly more exacting and peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest Court of
the land, to support and defend the Constitution -- to settle it. This explains why, in Miller v. Johnson [92 Ky.
589, 18 SW 522, 523], it was held that courts have a duty, rather than a power, to determine whether another
branch of the government has kept within constitutional limits.
Unlike our previous constitutions, the 1987 Constitution is explicit in defining the scope of judicial
power. The present Constitution now fortifies the authority of the courts to determine in an appropriate action
the validity of the acts of the political departments. It speaks of judicial prerogative in terms of duty, viz.:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
[25]

This express definition has resulted in clearer and more resolute pronouncements of the Court. Daza v.
Singson,
[26]
Coseteng v. Mitra Jr.
[27]
and Guingona Jr. v. Gonzales
[28]
similarly resolved issues assailing the acts
of the leaders of both houses of Congress in apportioning among political parties the seats to which each
chamber was entitled in the Commission on Appointments. The Court held that the issue was justiciable, even
if the question were political in nature, since it involved the legality, not the wisdom, of the manner of filling
the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by [Section 18, Article VI of] the Constitution.
The same question of jurisdiction was raised in Taada v. Angara,
[29]
wherein the petitioners sought to
nullify the Senates concurrence in the ratification of the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement. The
Court ruled: Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it
becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the judiciary to settle the dispute. The Court en
bancunanimously stressed that in taking jurisdiction over petitions questioning an act of the political
departments of government, it will not review the wisdom, merits or propriety of such action, and will strike it
down only on either of two grounds: (1) unconstitutionality or illegality and (2) grave abuse of discretion.
Earlier in Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives
[30]
(HRET), the Court refused to reverse
a decision of the HRET, in the absence of a showing that said tribunal had committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The Court ruled that full authority had been conferred upon the electoral
tribunals of the House of Representatives and of the Senate as sole judges of all contests relating to
the election, the returns, and the qualifications of their respective members. Such jurisdiction is
original and exclusive.
[31]
The Court may inquire into a decision or resolution of said tribunals only if such
decision or resolution was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion.
[32]

Recently, the Court, in Arroyo v. De Venecia,
[33]
was asked to reexamine the enrolled bill doctrine and to
look beyond the certification of the Speaker of the House of Representatives that the bill, which was later
enacted as Republic Act 8240, was properly approved by the legislative body. Petitioners claimed that certain
procedural rules of the House had been breached in the passage of the bill. They averred further that a violation
of the constitutionally mandated House rules was a violation of the Constitution itself.
The Court, however, dismissed the petition, because the matter complained of concerned the internal
procedures of the House, with which the Court had no concern. It enucleated:
[34]

It would be an unwarranted invasion of the prerogative of a coequal department for this Court either to set
aside a legislative action as void because the Court thinks the House has disregarded its own rules of procedure,
or to allow those defeated in the political arena to seek a rematch in the judicial forum when petitioners can find
their remedy in that department itself. The Court has not been invested with a roving commission to inquire
into complaints, real or imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It would be acting in excess of its power and
would itself be guilty of grave abuse of discretion were it to do so. x x x In the absence of anything to the
contrary, the Court must assume that Congress or any House thereof acted in the good faith belief that its
conduct was permitted by its rules, and deference rather than disrespect is due the judgment of that body.
In the instant controversy, the petitioners -- one of whom is Senator Santiago, a well-known
constitutionalist -- try to hew closely to these jurisprudential parameters. They claim that Section 16 (1), Article
VI of the Constitution, has not been observed in the selection of the Senate minority leader. They also invoke
the Courts expanded judicial power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of respondents.
Dissenting in part, Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza submits that the Court has no jurisdiction over the
petition. Well-settled is the doctrine, however, that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is determined
by the allegations of the complaint or petition, regardless of whether the plaintiff or petitioner is entitled to the
relief asserted.
[35]
In light of the aforesaid allegations of petitioners, it is clear that this Court has jurisdiction
over the petition. It is well within the power and jurisdiction of the Court to inquire whether indeed the Senate
or its officials committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused their discretion in the exercise of
their functions and prerogatives.
Second Issue: Violation of the Constitution

Having assumed jurisdiction over the petition, we now go to the next crucial question: In recognizing
Respondent Guingona as the Senate minority leader, did the Senate or its officials, particularly Senate President
Fernan, violate the Constitution or the laws?
Petitioners answer the above question in the affirmative. They contend that the constitutional provision
requiring the election of the Senate President by majority vote of all its members carries with it a judicial duty
to determine the concepts of majority and minority, as well as who may elect a minority leader. They argue
that majority in the aforequoted constitutional provision refers to that group of senators who (1) voted for the
winning Senate President and (2) accepted committee chairmanships. Accordingly, those who voted for the
losing nominee and accepted no such chairmanships comprise the minority, to whom the right to determine the
minority leader belongs. As a result, petitioners assert, Respondent Guingona cannot be the legitimate minority
leader, since he voted for Respondent Fernan as Senate President. Furthermore, the members of the Lakas-
NUCD-UMDP cannot choose the minority leader, because they did not belong to the minority, having voted for
Fernan and accepted committee chairmanships.
We believe, however, that the interpretation proposed by petitioners finds no clear support from the
Constitution, the laws, the Rules of the Senate or even from practices of the Upper House.
The term majority has been judicially defined a number of times. When referring to a certain number out
of a total or aggregate, it simply means the number greater than half or more than half of any total.
[36]
The
plain and unambiguous words of the subject constitutional clause simply mean that the Senate President must
obtain the votes of more than one half of all the senators. Not by any construal does it thereby
delineate whocomprise the majority, much less the minority, in the said body. And there is no showing that
the framers of our Constitution had in mind other than the usual meanings of these terms.
In effect, while the Constitution mandates that the President of the Senate must be elected by a number
constituting more than one half of all the members thereof, it does not provide that the members who will not
vote for him shall ipso facto constitute the minority, who could thereby elect the minority leader. Verily, no
law or regulation states that the defeated candidate shall automatically become the minority leader.
The Comment
[37]
of Respondent Guingona furnishes some relevant precedents, which were not contested in
petitioners Reply. During the eighth Congress, which was the first to convene after the ratification of the 1987
Constitution, the nomination of Sen. Jovito R. Salonga as Senate President was seconded by a member of the
minority, then Sen. Joseph E. Estrada.
[38]
During the ninth regular session, when Sen. Edgardo J. Angara
assumed the Senate presidency in 1993, a consensus was reached to assign committee chairmanships to all
senators, including those belonging to the minority.
[39]
This practice continued during the tenth Congress, where
even the minority leader was allowed to chair a committee.
[40]
History would also show that the majority in
either house of Congress has referred to the political party to which the most number of lawmakers belonged,
while the minority normally referred to a party with a lesser number of members.
Let us go back to the definitions of the terms majority and minority. Majority may also refer to the
group, party, or faction with the larger number of votes,
[41]
not necessarily more than one half. This is
sometimes referred to as plurality. In contrast, minority is a group, party, or faction with a smaller number of
votes or adherents than the majority.
[42]
Between two unequal parts or numbers comprising a whole or totality,
the greater number would obviously be the majority, while the lesser would be the minority. But where there
are more than two unequal groupings, it is not as easy to say which is the minority entitled to select the leader
representing all the minorities. In a government with a multi-party system such as in the Philippines (as
pointed out by petitioners themselves), there could be several minority parties, one of which has to be identified
by the Comelec as the dominant minority party for purposes of the general elections. In the prevailing
composition of the present Senate, members either belong to different political parties or are independent. No
constitutional or statutory provision prescribe which of the many minority groups or the independents or a
combination thereof has the right to select the minority leader.
While the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing a Senate President and a House Speaker, it is,
however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other officers in both chambers of Congress. All that the
Charter says is that [e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem necessary.
[43]
To our mind,
the method of choosing who will be such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of the
prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be
prescribed by the Senate itself, not by this Court.
In this regard, the Constitution vests in each house of Congress the power to determine the rules of its
proceedings.
[44]
Pursuant thereto, the Senate formulated and adopted a set of rules to govern its internal
affairs.
[45]
Pertinent to the instant case are Rules I and II thereof, which provide:
Rule I
ELECTIVE OFFICERS
SECTION 1. The Senate shall elect, in the manner hereinafter provided, a President, a President Pro Tempore,
a Secretary, and a Sergeant-at-Arms.
These officers shall take their oath of office before entering into the discharge of their duties.
Rule II
ELECTION OF OFFICERS
SEC. 2. The officers of the Senate shall be elected by the majority vote of all its Members. Should there be
more than one candidate for the same office, a nominal vote shall be taken; otherwise, the elections shall be
byviva voce or by resolution.
Notably, the Rules of the Senate do not provide for the positions of majority and minority leaders. Neither
is there an open clause providing specifically for such offices and prescribing the manner of creating them or of
choosing the holders thereof. At any rate, such offices, by tradition and long practice, are actually extant. But,
in the absence of constitutional or statutory guidelines or specific rules, this Court is devoid of any basis upon
which to determine the legality of the acts of the Senate relative thereto. On grounds of respect for the basic
concept of separation of powers, courts may not intervene in the internal affairs of the legislature; it is not
within the province of courts to direct Congress how to do its work.
[46]
Paraphrasing the words of Justice
Florentino P. Feliciano, this Court is of the opinion that where no specific, operable norms and standards are
shown to exist, then the legislature must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and promulgate as
well as to implement them, before the courts may intervene.
[47]

Needless to state, legislative rules, unlike statutory laws, do not have the imprints of permanence and
obligatoriness during their effectivity. In fact, they are subject to revocation, modification or waiver
at the pleasure of the body adopting them.
[48]
Being merely matters of procedure, their observance are of no
concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body
[49]
at will, upon the
concurrence of a majority.
In view of the foregoing, Congress verily has the power and prerogative to provide for such officers as it
may deem. And it is certainly within its own jurisdiction and discretion to prescribe the
parameters for the exercise of this prerogative. This Court has no authority to interfere and
unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm, without running afoul of constitutional principles that it is
bound to protect and uphold -- the very duty that justifies the Courts being. Constitutional respect and
a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch prevents this Court from prying into the
internal workings of the Senate. To repeat, this Court will be neither a tyrant nor a wimp; rather, it will
remain steadfast and judicious in upholding the rule and majesty of the law.
To accede, then, to the interpretation of petitioners would practically amount to judicial legislation, a
clear breach of the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. If for this argument alone, the petition
would easily fail.
While no provision of the Constitution or the laws or the rules and even the practice of the Senate was
violated, and while the judiciary is without power to decide matters over which full discretionary authority has
been lodged in the legislative department, this Court may still inquire whether an act of Congress or its officials
has been made with grave abuse of discretion.
[50]
This is the plain implication of Section 1, Article VIII of the
Constitution, which expressly confers upon the judiciary the power and the duty not only to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but likewise to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
Explaining the above-quoted clause, former Chief Justice Concepcion, who was a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, said in part:
[51]

xxx the powers of government are generally considered divided into three branches: the Legislative, the
Executive and the Judiciary. Each one is supreme within its own sphere and independent of the
others. Because of that supremacy[, the] power to determine whether a given law is valid or not is vested in
courts of justice.
Briefly stated, courts of justice determine the limits of power of the agencies and offices of the government as
well as those of its officers. In other words, the judiciary is the final arbiter on the question whether or not a
branch of government or any of its officials has acted without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction or lack of
jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
This is the background of paragraph 2 of Section 1, which means that the courts cannot hereafter evade the
duty to settle matters of this nature, by claiming that such matters constitute a political question.
With this paradigm, we now examine the two other issues challenging the actions, first, of Respondent
Guingona and, second, of Respondent Fernan.
Third Issue: Usurpation of Office

Usurpation generally refers to unauthorized arbitrary assumption and exercise of power
[52]
by one without
color of title or who is not entitled by law thereto.
[53]
A quo warranto proceeding is the proper legal remedy to
determine the right or title to the contested public office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment.
[54]
The action
may be brought by the solicitor general or a public prosecutor
[55]
or any person claiming to be entitled to the
public office or position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.
[56]
The action shall be brought
against the person who allegedly usurped, intruded into or is unlawfully holding or exercising such office.
[57]

In order for a quo warranto proceeding to be successful, the person suing must show that he or she has
a clear right to the contested office or to use or exercise the functions of the office allegedly usurped or
unlawfully held by the respondent.
[58]
In this case, petitioners present no sufficient proof of a clear and
indubitable franchise to the office of the Senate minority leader.
As discussed earlier, the specific norms or standards that may be used in determining who may lawfully
occupy the disputed position has not been laid down by the Constitution, the statutes, or the Senate itself in
which the power has been vested. Absent any clear-cut guideline, in no way can it be said that illegality or
irregularity tainted Respondent Guingonas assumption and exercise of the powers of the office of Senate
minority leader. Furthermore, no grave abuse of discretion has been shown to characterize any of his specific
acts as minority leader.
Fourth Issue: Fernans Recognition of Guingona

The all-embracing and plenary power and duty of the Court to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality
of the Government is restricted only by the definition and confines of the term grave abuse of discretion.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law
as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.
[59]

By the above standard, we hold that Respondent Fernan did not gravely abuse his discretion as Senate
President in recognizing Respondent Guingona as the minority leader. Let us recall that the latter belongs to
one of the minority parties in the Senate, the Lakas-NUCD-UMDP. By unanimous resolution of the members
of this party that he be the minority leader, he was recognized as such by the Senate President. Such formal
recognition by Respondent Fernan came only after at least two Senate sessions and a caucus, wherein both sides
were liberally allowed to articulate their standpoints.
Under these circumstances, we believe that the Senate President cannot be accused of capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment or of an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or
hostility. Where no provision of the Constitution, the laws or even the rules of the Senate has been
clearly shown to have been violated, disregarded or overlooked, grave abuse of discretion cannot be
imputed to Senate officials for acts done within their competence and authority.
WHEREFORE, for the above reasons, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2821 March 4, 1949
JOSE AVELINO, petitioner,
vs.
MARIANO J. CUENCO, respondent.
Vicente J. Francisco for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Angelo Bautista, Ramon Diokno and Lorenzo M. Taada for
respondent.
Teehankee, Fernando, Sunico & Rodrigo; Vera, Montesines & Navarro; Felixberto M. Serrano and
Vicente del Rosario as amici curiae.
R E S O L U T I O N
In G.R. No. L-2821, Avelino vs. Cuenco, the Court by a vote of six justices against four resolved to
deny the petition.
Without prejudice to the promulgation of a more extended opinion, this is now written briefly to explain
the principal grounds for the denial.
The Court believes the following essential facts have been established:
In the session of the Senate of February 18, 1949, Senator Lorenzo M. Taadare quested that his
right to speak on the next session day, February 21, 1949, to formulate charges against the then
Senate President Jose Avelino be reserved. His request was approved.
On February 21, 1949, hours before the opening of the session Senator Taada and Senator Taada
and Senator Prospero Sanidad filed with the Secretary of the Senate a resolution enumerating
charges against the then Senate President and ordering the investigation thereof.
Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were at the Senate session hall at
the appointed time (10:00 A.M.), and the petitioner was already in his office, said petitioner delayed
his appearance at the session hall until about 11:35 A.M. When he finally ascended the rostrum, he
did not immediately open the session, but instead requested from the Secretary a copy of the
resolution submitted by Senators Taada and Sanidad and in the presence of the public he read
slowly and carefully said resolution, after which he called and conferred with his colleagues Senator
Francisco and Tirona.
Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the session be opened, the petitioner finally called the meeting to
order. Except Senator Sotto who was confined in a hospital and Senator Confesor who is in the
United States, all the Senator were present.
Senator Sanidad, following a long established practice, moved that the roll call be dispensed with, but
Senator Tirona opposed said motion, obviously in pursuance of a premeditated plan of petitioner and
his partisans to make use of dilatory tactics to prevent Senator Taada from delivering his privilege
speech. The roll was called.
Senator Sanidad next moved, as is the usual practice, to dispense with the reading of the minutes,
but this motion was likewise opposed by Senator Tirona and David, evidently, again, in pursuance of
the above-mentioned conspiracy.
Before and after the roll call and before and after the reading of the minutes, Senator Taada
repeatedly stood up to claim his right to deliver his one-hour privilege speech but the petitioner, then
presiding, continuosly ignored him; and when after the reading of the minutes, Senator Taada
instead on being recognized by the Chair, the petitioner announced that he would order the arrest of
any senator who would speak without being previously recognized by him, but all the while, tolerating
the actions of his follower, Senator Tirona, who was continuously shouting at Senator Sanidad "Out of
order!" everytime the latter would ask for recognition of Senator Taada.
At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery, as if by pre-arrangement. At
about this same time Senator Pablo Angeles David, one of the petitioner's followers, was recognized
by petitioner, and he moved for adjournment of session, evidently, again, in pursuance of the above-
mentioned conspiracy to muzzle Senator Taada.
Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the adjournment of the session and this opposition was
seconded by herein respondent who moved that the motion of adjournment be submitted to a vote.
Another commotion ensued.
Senator David reiterated his motion for adjournment and herein respondent also reiterated his
opposition to the adjournment and again moved that the motion of Senator David be submitted to a
vote.
Suddenly, the petitioner banged the gavel and abandoning the Chair hurriedly walked out of the
session hall followed by Senator David, Tirona, Francisco, Torres, Magalona and Clarin, while the
rest of the senators remained. Whereupon Senator Melencio Arranz, Senate President Pro-tempore,
urged by those senators present took the Chair and proceeded with the session.
Senator Cabili stood up, and asked that it be made of record it was so made that the deliberate
abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it incumbent upon Senate President Pro-tempore
Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to continue the session in order not to paralyze the
functions of the Senate.
Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested that respondent be designated to preside over
the session which suggestion was carried unanimously. the respondent thereupon took the Chair.
Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was approved Gregorio Abad was appointedActing Secretary,
because the Assistance Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed the petitioner
when the latter abandoned the session.
Senator Taada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege
speech. Thereafter Senator Sanidad read aloud the complete text of said Resolution (No. 68), and
submitted his motion for approval thereof and the same was unanimously approved.
With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the respondent had
yielded it to him, Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring vacant
the position of the President of the Senate and designated the Honorable Mariano Jesus Cuenco
Acting President of the Senate." Put to a vote, the said resolution was unanimously approved.
Senator Cuenco took the oath.
The next day the President of the Philippines recognized the respondent as acting president of the
Philippines Senate.
By his petition in this quo warranto proceeding petitioners asked the Court to declare him the rightful
President of the Philippines senate and oust respondent.
The Court has examined all principal angles of the controversy and believes that these are the crucial
points:
a. Does the Court have jurisdiction over the subject-matter?
b. If it is has, were resolution Nos. 68 and 67 validly approved?
c. Should the petition be granted?
To the first question, the answer is in the negative, in view of the separation of powers, the political
nature of the controversy (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192;
Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil., 1) and the constitutional grant to the Senate of the power to elect
its own president, which power should not be interfered with, nor taken over, by the judiciary. We
refused to take cognizance of the Vera case even if the rights of the electors of the suspended
senators were alleged affected without any immediate remedy. A fortiori we should abstain in this
case because the selection of the presiding officer affect only the Senators themselves who are at
liberty at any time to choose their officers, change or reinstate them. Anyway, if, as the petition must
imply to be acceptable, the majority of the Senators want petitioner to preside, his remedy lies in the
Senate Session Hall not in the Supreme Court.
The Court will not sally into the legitimate domain of the Senate on the plea that our refusal to
intercede might lead into a crisis, even a resolution. No state of things has been proved that might
change the temper of the Filipino people as a peaceful and law-abiding citizens. And we should not
allow ourselves to be stampeded into a rash action inconsistent with the calm that should
characterized judicial deliberations.
The precedent of Werts vs. Roger does not apply, because among other reasons, the situation is not
where two sets of senators have constituted themselves into two senates actually functioning as
such, (as in said Werts case), there being no question that there is presently one Philippines Senate
only. To their credit be it recorded that petitioner and his partisans have not erected themselves
into another Senate. The petitioner's claim is merely that respondent has not been duly elected in his
place in the same one Philippines Senate.
It is furthermore believed that the recognition accorded by the Chief Executive to the respondent
makes it advisable, more than ever, to adopt the hands-off policy wisely enunciated by this Court in
matters of similar nature.
The second question depends upon these sub-questions. (1) Was the session of the so-called rump
Senate a continuation of the session validly assembled with twenty two Senators in the morning of
February 21, 1949?; (2) Was there a quorum in that session? Mr. Justice Montemayor and Mr.
Justice Reyes deem it useless, for the present to pass on these questions once it is held, as they do,
that the Court has no jurisdiction over the case. What follows is the opinion of the other four on those
four on those sub-questions.
Supposing that the Court has jurisdiction, there is unanimity in the view that the session under
Senator Arranz was a continuation of the morning session and that a minority of ten senators may
not, by leaving the Hall, prevent the other twelve senators from passing a resolution that met with
their unanimous endorsement. The answer might be different had the resolution been approved only
by ten or less.
If the rump session was not a continuation of the morning session, was it validly constituted? In other
words, was there the majority required by the Constitution for the transaction of the business of the
Senate? Justice Paras, Feria, Pablo and Bengzon say there was, firstly because the minute say so,
secondly, because at the beginning of such session there were at least fourteen senators including
Senators Pendatun and Lopez, and thirdly because in view of the absence from the country of
Senator Tomas Confesor twelve senators constitute a majority of the Senate of twelve three senators.
When the Constitution declares that a majority of "each House" shall constitute aquorum, "the House:
does not mean "all" the members. Even a majority of all the members constitute "the House".
(Missouri Pac. vs. Kansas, 63 Law ed. [U. S.], p. 239). There is a difference between a majority of
"the House", the latter requiring less number than the first. Therefore an absolute majority (12) of all
the members of the Senate less one (23), constitutes constitutional majority of the Senate for the
purpose of a quorum. Mr. Justice Pablo believes furthermore than even if the twelve did not constitute
a quorum, they could have ordered the arrest of one, at least, of the absent members; if one had
been so arrested, there would be no doubt Quorum then, and Senator Cuenco would have been
elected just the same inasmuch as there would be eleven for Cuenco, one against and one
abstained.
In fine, all the four justice agree that the Court being confronted with the practical situation that of the
twenty three senators who may participate in the Senate deliberations in the days immediately after
this decision, twelve senators will support Senator Cuenco and, at most, eleven will side with Senator
Avelino, it would be most injudicious to declare the latter as the rightful President of the Senate, that
office being essentially one that depends exclusively upon the will of the majority of the senators, the
rule of the Senate about tenure of the President of that body being amenable at any time by that
majority. And at any session hereafter held with thirteen or more senators, in order to avoid all
controversy arising from the divergence of opinion here about quorum and for the benefit of all
concerned,the said twelve senators who approved the resolutions herein involved could ratify all their
acts and thereby place them beyond the shadow of a doubt.
As already stated, the six justices hereinabove mentioned voted to dismiss the petition. Without costs.
Separate Opinions
MORAN, C.J., concurring:
I believe that this Court has jurisdiction over the case.
1
The present crisis in the Senate is one that
imperatively calls for the intervention of the Court.
Respondent Cuenco cannot invoke the doctrine of non-interference by the courts with the Senate
because the legal capacity of his group of twelve senators to acts as a senate is being challenged by
petitioner on the groundof lack of quorum (Attorney General ex rel. Werts vs. Rogers et al., Atl. 726;
23 L. R. A., 352). If this group is found sufficient to constitute a quorum under the Constitution, then
its proceedings should be free from interference. But if it is not possessed of a valid quorum, then its
proceedings should be voided.
The issue as to the legal capacity of the Cuenco group to act as a senate cannot be considered a
political question the determination of which devolves exclusively upon the Senate. That issue
involves a constitutional question which cannot be validly decided either by the Cuenco group or by
the Avelino group separately, for, if the Cuenco group has no quorum, the Avelino has decidedly less.
And for obvious reasons, the two groups cannot act together inasmuch as the members of the
Avelino group, possibly to avoid trouble, do not attend the sessions presided by the respondent
believing as they do that the latter was illegally elected. Upon the other hand, the Cuenco group
believing itself as possessing the constitutional quorum and not desiring to make any semblance of
admission to the contrary, does not find it convenient to compel the attendance of any senator of the
Avelino group. Then the question arises--who will decide the conflict between the two groups? This
anomalous situation will continue while the conflict remains unsettled, and the conflict will remain
unsettled while this Court refuses to intervene. In the meantime the validity of all the laws, resolutions
and other measures which may be passed by the Cuenco group will be open to doubt because of an
alleged lack of quorum in the body which authored them. This doubt may extend, in diverse forms, to
the House of Representative and to the other agencies of the government such as the Auditor
General's Office. Thus, a general situation of uncertainty, pregnant with grave dangers, is developing
into confusion and chaos with severe harm to the nation. This situation may, to a large extent, be
stopped and constitutional processes may be restored in the Senate if only this Court, as the
guardian of the Constitutional, were to pronounce the final word on the constitutional mandate
governing the existing conflict between the two groups. And, in my opinion, under the present
circumstances, this Court has no other alternative but to meet challenge of the situation which
demands the utmost of judicial temper and judicial statesmanship. As hereinbefore stated, the
present crisis in the Senate is one that imperatively calls for the intervention of this Court.
As to the legality of respondent's election as acting President of the Senate,
2
I firmly believe that
although petitioner's adjournment of the session of February 21, 1949, was illegality cannot be
countered with another illegality. The session wherein respondent was elected as acting President of
the Senate was illegal because when Senator Mabanag raised the question of a quorum and the roll
was called, only twelve senators were present. In the Philippines there are twenty-four senators, and
therefore, the quorum must be thirteen. The authorities on the matter are clear.
The constitution of our state ordains that a majority of each house shall constitute a quorum.
the house of representative consist of 125 members; 63 is a majority and quorum. When a
majority or quorum are present, the house can do business; not otherwise.
A quorum possessed all the powers of the whole body, a majority of which quorum must, of
course, govern. (In re Gunn, 50 Kan., 155; 32 P., 470, 476; 19 L.R.A., 519.)
Quorum as used in U. S. C. A. Const. Art. 4 sec. 8, providing that a majority of each house
shall constitute aquorum to do business, is, for the purpose of the Assembly, not less than the
majority of the whole number of which the house may be composed. Vacancies from death,
resignation or failure to elect cannot be deducted in ascertaining the quorum. (Opinion of
Justice, 12 Fla. 653.)
The general rule is that a quorum is a majority of all the members and a majority of this
majority may legislate and do the work of the whole. (State vs. Ellington 117 N. C., 158; 23 S.
E. 250-252, 30 L.R.A., 532; 53 Am. SR., 580.)
. . . a majority of each House is necessary to transact business, and a minority cannot transact
business, this view being in keeping with the provision of the Constitution permitting a smaller
number than a quorumto adjourn from day to day merely. (Earp vs. Riley, 40 OKL., 340; p.
164; Ralls vs. Wyand, 40 OKL., 323; 138 P. 158.)
The Constitution provides that "a majority of each (house) shall constitute a quorum to do
business." In other words, when a majority are present the House is in a position to do
business. Its capacity to transact business is then established, created by the mere presence
of a majority, and depend upon the disposition or assent or action of any single member or
faction of the majority present. All that the Constitution required is the presence of a majority,
and when that majority are present, the power of the House arises. (U. S. vs.Ballin, Joseph &
Co., 36 Law ed. 321, 325.)
If all the members of the select body or committee, or if all the agents are assembled, or if all
have been duly notified, and the minority refuse, or neglect to meet with the other, a majority of
those present may act,provided those present constitute a majority of the whole number. In
other words, in such case, a major part of the whole is necessary to constitute a quorum, and a
majority of the quorum may act. If the major part withdraw so as to leave no quorum, the power
of the minority to act is, in general, considered to cease. (1 Dillon, Mun. Corp. 4th ed., sec.
283.)
3

Therefore, without prejudice to writing a more extensive opinion, if necessary, I believe that
respondent Mariano J. Cuenco has not been legally elected as acting President of the Senate. It is
true that respondent Cuenco, in fact, must be the Senate President because he represent the
majority of the members now present in Manila, and, at any new session with a quorum, upon the
present senatorial alignment, he will be elected to said office. But precisely he is now the master of
the situation, he must win his victory in accordance with the Constitution. It is absolutely essential in
the adolescent life of our Republic to insist, strictly and uncompromisingly, on thedemocratic
principles consecrated in our Constitution. By such efforts alone can we insure the future of our
political life as a republican form of government under the sovereignty of a Constitution from being a
mockery.
The situation now in this Court is this there are four members who believe that there was
no quorum in respondent's election as against four other member who believe that there was
such quorum. Two members declined to render their opinion on the matter because of their refusal to
assume jurisdiction. And, one member is absent from the Philippines. Thus, the question of whether
or not respondent has been legally elected is, to say the least, doubtful in this Court under the present
conditions. This doubt, which taint the validity of all the laws, resolutions and other measures that the
Cuenco group has passed and may pass in the future, can easily be dispelled by them by convening
a session wherein thirteen senators are present and by reiterating therein all that has been previously
done by them. This is a suggestion coming from a humble citizen who is watching with a happy heart
the movement of this gallant group of prominent leaders campaigning for a clean and honest
government in this dear country of ours.

PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
In these quo warranto proceedings the question as to who among the parties is entitled to hold the
position of President of the Senate is in issue.
There is no question that up to Monday, February 21, 1949, at the time the controversial incidents
took place, petitioner Jose Avelino was rightful occupant of the position. the litigation has arisen
because of the opposing contentions as to petitioner's outer and as to respondent's election as acting
President of the Senate, on February 21, 1949.
Petitioner contends that the proceedings in which a resolution was passed declaring the position of
President of the Senate vacant and electing respondent Mariano J. Cuenco as acting President of the
Senate were illegal because, at the time, the session for said day has been properly adjourned, and
the twelve Senators who remained in the session hall had no right to convene in a rump session, and
said rump session lacked quorum, while respondent contents that the session which was opened by
petitioner had not been legally adjournment, the Senators who remained in the session hall had only
continued the same session, and there was quorum when the position of the President of the Senate
was declared vacant and when respondent was elected as acting President of Senate, to fill the
vacate position.
Petitioner's version of the facts, as alleged in his petition, is to the effect that on Monday, February 21,
1949, at the time petitioner opened the session in the Senate session hall, there were twenty two
Senators present who answered the roll call; Vicente J. Francisco. Fernando Lopez, Emiliano
TriaTirona, Pablo Angeles David, Salipada Pendatun, Ramon Torres, Enrique Magalona, Carlos Tan,
Olegario Clarin, Melencio Arranz, Mariano Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad, Lorenzo Taada, Vicente
Madrigal, Geronima Pecson, Camilo Osias, Carlos Garcia, Ramon Diokno, Jose Vera, Tomas Cabili,
Alejo Mabanag, and the petitioner Jose Avelino. While the minutes of the preceding session was
being read the crowd of more than 1,000 people who entered the Senate hall to witness the session,
became unruly, the repeated efforts of petitioner as well as the sergeant-at-arms and other peace
officers to maintain peace and order notwithstanding. Fights and commotions ensued and several
shots were fired among the audience. The Senator who spoke could not be heard because the
spectators would either shout to drown their voices or would demeans that some other Senator
should take the floor and be recognized by petitioner. Pandemonium reigned and it was impossible
for the Senate to proceed with its deliberations free from undue pressure and without grave danger to
its integrity as a body and to the personal safety of the members thereof. Senator Pablo Angeles
David moved for adjournment until Thursday, February 24, 1949. There being no objection, petitioner
adjourned the session until February 24, 1949. Thereupon petitioner and nine other Senator namely,
Vicente J. Francisco, Fernando Lopez, Emiliano Tria Tirona, Pablo Angeles David, Sulipada
Pendatun, Ramon Torres, Enriquez Magalona, Carlos Tan, and Olegario Clarin left the session hall.
Senator Melencio Arranz, President Pro-Tempore of Senate, went up the rostrum and, assuming the
presidency of the chamber, convinced the remaining twelve Senators into a rump session, in which a
resolution was passed declaring vacant the position of the President of the Senate and electing
respondent as President of the Senate. Thereupon respondent pretended to assume the office of
president of the Senate and continues to pretend to assume said office.
Petitioner alleged five grounds to claim that respondent is usurping or illegally exercising the office of
the President of the Senate: 1. Petitioner had adjourned the session of the senate, the adjournment
having been properly moved and, without objection, favorably acted upon; 2. Petitioner had full power
to adjourn the session even without motion under chapter II, Section 8, paragraph (e) of the Rules of
the Senate; 3 The ordinary daily session having been adjourned, no other session could be called in
the Senate on the same day; 4 The President Pr-tempore had no authority to assume the presidency
except in the cases specified in Chapter I, section 4 of the Rule of the Senate, and none of the
conditions therein mentioned obtained at the time in question; and 5. The twelve Senators that
convened in the rump session did not constitute a quorum to do business under the Constitution and
the rule of the Senate, being less than one-half plus one of the twenty four members of the Senate.
Respondent's version of the events as follows:
(a) Since Friday, February 18, 1949, when Senator Lorenzo M. Taada announced and reserved in
open session of the Senate that on Monday, February 21, 1949, he would make use of his one-hour
privilege, it was known that formal charges would be filed against the then Senate President,
petitioner in this case, on said date. Hours before the opening of the session on Monday, February
21, 1949, Senators Lorenzo M. Taada and Prospero Sanidad registered in the Office of the
secretary of the Senates a resolution in which serious charges were preferred against the herein
petitioner. A certified copy of said resolution, marked as Exhibit "1" is hereto attacked and made an
integral part hereof:
(b) Although a sufficient number of senators to constitute a quorum were at the Senate session hall at
and before 10:00 A.M., schedule time for the session to begin, and in spite of the fact that the
petitioner was already in his office, said petitioner deliberately delayed his appearance at the session
hall until about 11:35 A.M.;
(c) When finally the petitioner ascended the rostrum, he did not immediately open the session, but
instead requested from the Secretary a copy of the resolution submitted by Senator Taada and
Sanidad and in the presence of the public the petitioner read slowly and carefully said resolution, after
which he called and conferred with his followers, Senators Francisco and Tirona;
(d) Shortly before 12:00 noon, due to the insistent requested of Senators Sanidad and Cuenco that
the session be opened, the petitioner finally called the meeting to order;
(e) Senator Sanidad, following a practice long established in the Senate, moved that the roll call be
dispensed with as it was evident that with the presence of all the 22 senator who could discharges
their functions, there could be no question of a quorum, but Senator Tirona opposed said motion,
evidently in pursuance of a premeditated plan and conspiracy of petitioner and his followers to make
use of all sorts of dilatory tactics to prevent Senator Taada from delivering his privilege speech on
the charges filed against petitioner. The roll call affirmatively showed the presence of the following 22
Senators; Vicente J. Francisco, Fernando Lopez, Emiliano Tria Tirona, Pablo Angeles David,
Salipada Pendatun, Ramon Torres, Enrique Magalona, Carlos tan, Olegario Clarin, Melencio Arranz,
M. Jesus Cuenco, Prospero Sanidad, Lorenzo M. Taada, Vicente Madrigal, Geronima Pecson,
Camilo Osias, Carlos Garcia, Ramon Diokno, Jose Vera, Tomas Cabili, Alejo Mabanag and Jose
Avelino;
(f) Senator Sanidad next moved, as in the usual practice, to dispense with the reading of the minute,
but this motion was likewise opposed by senator Tirona and David, evidently, again, in pursuance of
the above-mentioned conspiracy;
(g) Before and after the roll call before and after the reading of the minutes, Senator Taada
repeatedly took the floor to claim his right to deliver his one-hour privilege speech in support of the
charges against petitioner, but the latter, then presiding, continually ignored him; and when after the
reading of the minutes, Senator Taada instead on being recognized by the Chair, the petitioner
announced that he would being previously recognized by him, but all the while, tolerating the antics of
his follower, Senator Tirona, who was continuously and vociferously shouting at Senator Sanidad
"Out of order! Out of order! Out of order! . . .," everything the latter would ask the petitioner to
recognized the right of Senator Taada to speak.
(h) At this juncture, some disorderly conduct broke out in the Senate gallery, as if by prearrangement,
but the police officers present were able to maintain order. No shots were fired among the audience,
as alleged in the petition. It was at about this same time that Senator Pablo Angeles David, one of
petitioner's followers, was recognized by petitioner, and he moved for adjournment of the session,
evidently again, in pursuance of the above-mentioned conspiracy to prevent Senator Taada from
speaking;
(i) Senator Sanidad registered his opposition to the adjournment of the session and this opposition
was seconded by herein respondent who moved that the motion of adjournment be submitted to a
vote;
(j) Senator David reiterated his motion for adjournment and herein respondent also reiterated his
opposition to the adjournment and again moved that the motion of Senator David be submitted to a
vote;
(k) Suddenly, the petitioner abandoned the Chair and hurriedly walked out of the session hall.
(l) Without the session being adjournment, Senators David, Tirona, Francisco,Torres, Magalona, and
Clarin followed the petitioner out of the session hall, while the rest of the senators, as afore-named in
sub-paragraph (e) hereof, remained to continue the session abandoned by petitioner, whereupon
Senator Melencio Arranz, as Senate Pro-tempore, took the Chair and proceeded with the session.
(m) Senator Cabili took the floor and delivered a speech, whereby he asked that it be made of record
as it was in so made that the deliberate abandonment of the Chair by the petitioner, made it
incumbent upon SenatePresident Pro-tempore Arranz and the remaining members of the Senate to
continue the session in order not to impede and paralyze the functions of the Senate;
(n) Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz then suggested that respondent be designated to preside
over the session, which suggestion was carried unanimously. The respondent thereupon took the
Chair.
(o) Upon motion of Senator Arranz, which was carried unanimously, Gregorio Abad was appointed
Acting Secretary, as the Assistance Secretary, who was then acting as Secretary, had followed the
petitioner when the latter abandoned the session;
(p) Senator Taada, after being recognized by the Chair, was then finally able to deliver his privilege
speech, Which took more than hours, on the charges against the petitioner contained in the
Resolution, attacked hereto as Exhibit "1", and moved for the immediate consideration and approval
ofsaid Resolution. Senator Sanidad reiterated this motion, after having firstread aloud the complete
text of said Resolution, and thereafter the same was unanimously approved;
(q) With Senate President Pro-tempore Arranz again occupying the Chair, after the respondent had
yield edit to him, Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No. 67, entitled "Resolution declaring vacant
the position of the President of the Senate and designated the Honorable Mariano Jesus Cuenco
Acting President of the Senate," a copy of which is herewith attacked and made an integral part
hereof as Exhibit "2". Put a vote, the said Resolutionwas unanimously approved, respondent having
abstained from voting;
(r) The respondent having been duly elected as Acting President of the Senate, immediately took his
oath of Office in open session, before Senate President Pro-Tempore Melencio Arranz, and since
then, has been discharging the duties and exercising the rights and prerogatives appertaining to said
office;
(s) From the allegation of the petition, it clearly appears that the petitioner had only nine senators in
his favor and twelve, decidedly against him, which fact negates the petitioner's assertion that there
was no opposition to the motion for adjournment submitted by Senator David;
(t) From the beginning of the session of February 21, 1949, to the allegedadjournment, it was
evidently and manifestly the purpose of the petitioner to deprive Senator Taada of his right to take
the floor and to speak on the charges filed against said petitioner; that said petitioner resorted to all
means to deprive the Senate of its right and prerogative to deliberate on Senate Resolution No. 68,
Exhibit "1", and that when the petitioner realized that a majority of the Senator who were present in
the said session was ready to approved said resolution, the petitioner abandoned the session;
(u) The minute of the session held on February 21, Exhibit 1949, a copy of which is hereto attacked
and made an integral part hereof as Exhibit "3", show that the petitioner illegally abandoned the Chair
while the Senate was in session and that the respondent has been duly elected Acting Senate
President in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution.
Respondent alleges further that Senator David's motion for adjournment was objected to and not
submitted to a vote and, therefore, could not have been carried; that it is not true that petitioner had
the power to adjourn the session even without motion; that the session presided over, first by
petitioner and then by respondent, was orderly, no Senator having been threatened or intimidated by
anybody, and after petitioner abandoned the session continued peacefully until its adjournment at
4:40 P.M.; that there was only one session held on said date; that petitioner's abandonment of the
Chair in the face of an impending ouster therefrom constituted a temporaryincapacity entitling the
Senate President Pro-tempore to assume the Chair; that there was quorum as, with the absence of
Senator Tomas Confessor, whowas in the U. S. and of Senator Vicente Sotto, who was seriously ill
and confined in the Lourdes Hospital, the presence of at least twelve senators constitutes a quorum;
that, despite petitioner's claim that he adjourned the session to February 24, 1949, convinced that he
did not count with the majority of the Senators and not wanting to be investigated by the
specialinvestigation committee regarding the grave charges preferred against him, the petitioner
deliberately did not appear at the session hall on said date.
Three special defenses are advanced by respondent: (a) Lack of jurisdiction of the Supreme Court;
(b) No cause of action as there are only nine Senators who had recognized petitioner's claim against
twelve Senators or who have madepatent their loss of confidence in him by voting in favor of his out
ouster; and (c) The object of the action is to make the supreme Court a mere tool of a minority group
of ten Senators to impose petitioner's will over and above that of the twelve other members of the
Senate, to entrench petitionerin power.
In impugning the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, respondent contends that the present case is not
justiciable, because it involves a purely political question, the determination of which by the Senate is
binding and conclusiveupon the court (Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 43 Phil., 83; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil.,
192) respondent has been recognized as acting President of the Senate by the President of the
Philippines and said recognition is binding and conclusive on the courts (Barcelon vs. Baker, 5 Phil.,
87; Severino vs. Governor-General, 16 Phil., 366); the Senate is the only body that can determine
from time to time who shall be its President and petitioner's only recourse lies in said body; and this
Court's action in entertaining the petition would constitute an invasion and an encroachment upon the
powers, rights and prerogatives solely and exclusively appertaining to Congress, of which the Senate
is a branch.
Upon the conflicting claims of the parties as to the real events, this Court authorized the reception of
evidence. Before passing to consider and to weigh said evidence so as to determine the true events,
it is only logical that we should first pass upon the question of jurisdiction raised by respondent.
In attacking the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court respondent alleges, as first ground, that the present
controversy is not justiciable in nature, involving, as it does, a purely political question, the
determination of which by the political agency concerned, the Senate, is binding and conclusive on
the courts.
The contention is untenable. In the first place, it begs question. It assumes as premises that the
question has been determined by the Senate, when the two opposing parties claim that each one of
them represents the will of the Senate, and if the controversy should be allowed to remainunsettled, it
would be impossible to determine who is right and who is wrong, and who really represent the
Senate.
The question raised in the petition, although political in nature, are justiciable because they involve
the enforcement of legal precepts, such as the provisions of the Constitution and of the rules of the
Senate. Thepower and authority to decided such questions of law form part of the jurisdiction, not
only expressly conferred on the Supreme Court, but of which, by express prohibition of the
Constitution, it cannot be divested.
SEC. 2. The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction
of the various court, but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its original jurisdiction over
cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls, nor of its jurisdiction to
review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal, certiorari, or writ of error, as the law or the
rules of the court may provide, final judgment and decrees of inferior courts in
(1) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, law, ordinance or regulations
is in question.
(2) All case involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty
imposed in relation thereto.
(3) All cases in which the jurisdiction of any trial court is in issue.
(4) All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is death or life imprisonment.
(5) All cases in which an error or question of law is involved.
Because the legal questions raised in this case cannot be decided without decided also what is the
truth on the controversial facts, by the very natureof things, the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
reached the settlement of the conflict claims as to the real events.
Respondent alleges that he has been recognized by the President of the Philippines as acting
President of the Senate and that executive recognition is binding and conclusive on the courts. The
contention is erroneous. The actions of the President of the Philippines cannot deprive the Supreme
Court of the jurisdiction vested in it by the Constitution. If the Congress of the Philippines, in which the
Legislature power is vested, cannot deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction to decide questions
of law, much less canthe president of the Philippines, on whom is vested the Executive power, which
in the philosophical and political hierarchy is of subordinate category to the of the Legislative power,
do so. The power to enact laws is higher than the power to execute them.
The third argument of argument of respondent, although based on truth, has nothing to do with the
legal questions raised in this case. It is true that the Senate is the only body that can determine from
time who is and shall be its President, but when the legal questions are raised in a litigation likein the
present case, the proper court has the function, the province and the responsibility to decide them. To
shirk that responsibility is to commit a dereliction of official duty.
Finally, it is alleged that for this Court to entertain the petition, is invade and encroach upon the
powers, rights and prerogatives solely and exclusively appertaining to the Legislative Department, of
which the Senate is a branch. The contention is erroneous. The controversy as to thelegality of the
adjournment declared by petitioner, of petitioner's ousters, as a result of the resolution declaring
vacant the position of President of the Senate, or respondent's election as acting President of the
Senate, and as to whether or not the twelve Senators who remained in the session hall could
continue holding session and if they constitute quorum, are all legal question upon which courts of
justice have jurisdiction and the SupremeCourt is the final arbiter.
From the evidence, it appears that in the session of Friday, February 18, 1949, at the time the
resolution of confidence in favor of petitioner, introduced by the Senator Lopez, was being put to vote,
Senator Taada voted,Senator Taada voted in the negative, alleging as ground damaging facts,
supported by several checks, highly detrimental to the personal and officialhonesty of petitioner. At
the same time, Senator Taada announced his intention of filing in the next session, to be held on
Monday, February 21, 1949, formal charges against petitioner and of delivering during the so-called
privilege hour a speech in support of said charges.
On said Monday morning, hour before the opening of the ordinary daily session, Senator Taada and
Sanidad registered with the Secretary of the Senate a resolution for the appointment of a Committee
of three, composed of Senator Cuenco, Angeles David, and Mabanag, with instructed to proceed
immediately to investigate the serious charges against petitioner embodiedin the document.
Said resolution, marked as Exhibit 1 of the respondent's answer, is as follow:
RESOLUTION ORDERING THE INVESTIGATION OF CHARGES FILED AGAINST THE
SENATE PRESIDENT, JOSE AVELINO.
WHEREAS, Senate President Jose Avelino, in a caucus of high government officials of the
Philippines Government and leaders of the Liberal Partyheld at Malacaang palace on January
15, 1949, delivered a speech,wherein he advocated the protection, or, at least, tolerance, of
graft and corruption in the government, and placed the interest of grafters and corrupt officials
as supreme and above the welfare of the people, doctrine under which it is impossible for an
honest and clean governmentto exist;
WHEREAS, this speech of Senate President Jose Avelino was given wide publicity by the
press, especially the Chronicle Publication in their issues of January 16 and 18, 1949, as
follows:
The senate President defenses the abuses perpetrated by Liberal Party men. He called the
investigations of the surplus property commission irregularities and the immigration quota
scadal as acts of injustice he describe the probe as "criminal" and "odious." He flayed the
National Bureau of Investigation agents for persecuting Liberal party leaders.
"We are not angels", he said. "When we die we all go to hell. It is better to be in hell because in
that place are no investigations, no secretary of justice, no secretary of interior to go after us."
Avelino, who is the present President of the Liberal party, ensured the President for his
actuations which, he claimed, were mainly responsible for the division of the party into two
hostile camps.
Avelino asked the President to "tolerate" if he could not "permit", the abuse of the party in
power, because why should we be saints when in reality we are not?
He stressed that the present investigation being conducted by President Quirino on the surplus
property scandal and the immigration quota rackety has lowered the prestige of the Liberal
Party in the eyes of the people, and is a desecration to the memory of the late President
Manuel Roxas. "It is a crime against the Liberal Party", Avelino said.
Defining his attitude regarding rights and privileges of those who are in power in the
government, Avelino maintained that the Liberal Party men are entitled to more considerations
and should be given allowance to use the power and privilege. If they abuse their power as all
humans are prone to do, they will be given a certain measure of tolerance, Avelino said,
adding, "What are we in power for?"
Avelino cited the surplus property investigations as an attempt to besmear the memory of
Presidential Roxas. As a result of these investigations, the members of Congress are
subjected to unjust and embarrassing questioning by NBI, Avelino said. And what is worse is
the fact that these senators and representatives are being pilloried in public without formal
charges filed against them. (Manila Chronicle issue of Jan. 16, 1949).
At last Saturday night's caucus Senate President Avelino for two hours lectured to
President Quirino on Liberal Party discipline. At the same time he demanded "tolerance"
on the part of the Chief Executive by the party in power.
The investigations were conducted on vague charges, Avelino claimed. Nothing specific
has teen filed against atop Liberal Party man. And yet National Bureau of Investigation
agents have persecuted top leader of the LiberalParty. That is not justice. That is
injustice. . . . It isodious. . . . It is criminal.
Why did you have to order an investigation Honorable Mr. President? If you cannot
permit abuses, you must at leasttolerate them. What are we in power for? We are not
hypocrites. Why should we pretend to be saints when in realitywe are not? We are not
angels. And besides when we die we all go to hell. Anyway, it is preferable to go to hell
wherethere are no investigations, no Secretary of Justice, no Secretary of Interior to go
after us.
When Jesus died on the Cross. He made a distinction between a good crook and the
bad crooks. We can prepare to be good crooks.
Avelino related the story of St. Francis of Assisi. Athief sought sanctuary in St. Francis'
convent. When thesoldiers came to the convent and ordered St. Francis to produce the
wanted thief, St. Francis told the soldiers that thehunted man had gone the other way.
Avelino then pointed out that even a saint had condoned the sins of a thief.
x x x x x x x x x
The investigation ordered by President Quirino, Avelino said, was a desecration of the
memory of the late President Roxas. The probe has lowered, instead of enhanced, the
prestige of the Liberal Party and its leader in the eyes of the public.
If the present administration fails, it is Roxas and not Quirino that suffers by it, because
Quirino's administration is only a continuation of Roxas, Avelino said.
Avelino compared all political parties to business corporations, of which all members are
stockholders. Every year the Liberal Party makes an accounting of its loss profit. The
Liberal Party, he said, has practically no dividends at all. It has lost even its original
capital. Then he mentionedthe appointments to the government of Nacionalistas like:
Lino Castillejo,as governor of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, Nicanor Carag,
consulto Madrid; and Vicente Formoso, General Manager of the National Tabacco
Corporation."(Manila Chronicle issue of January 18, 1949.).
WHEREAS, after the first publication of the said speech in the Manila Chronicle issue of
January 16, 1949, the Senate President, in a letter to the said news report was a "maliciously
distorted presentation of my remarks at that caucus, under a tendentious headlines", and
threatened that "unless the proper redness is given to me, therefore, I shall feel compelled to
take the necessary steps to protect my reputation and good name";
WHEREAS, the Chronicle Publication not only refuse to retract or make the rectification
demanded by the Senate President, but on the contrary, in their issue of January 18, 1949,
challenged him to take his threatened action, stating that "in order to est abolished the truth,
we are inviting the Senate President to file a libel suit against the Chronicle" and further
repeated the publication of their reports on the Senate President speech in the same issue of
January 18, 1949 as quoted above;
WHEREAS, notwithstanding in the considerable length of time that has elapsed, the Senate
President has not carried out his threat of filing action against the Chronicle Publication,
thereby confirming, in effect, his doctrine of tolerance of graft and corruption;
WHEREAS, in open and public session of the Senate on February 18, 1949, there were
exhibited photostatic copies of four checks totalling P566,405.60, which appears to have come
into the possession and control of the Senate President, after he had assumed his office;
WHEREAS, the first of the aforesaid check, which is Manager's Check No. M5375 of the
National City Bank of the National City Bank of New York, drawn on September 24, 1946, in
favor of the Senate President in the amount of P312,500.00, was indorsed by him to his wife,
Mrs. Enriqueta C. Avelino, who deposited it in her current account with the Philippine National
Bank on October 26, 1946;
WHEREAS, the second of the aforesaid checks, which is Manager's Check No. 49706 of the
Nederlands Indische Handelsbank, drawn on October 21, 1946, in favor of the Senate
President in the amount of P196,905.60, was indorsedby him to his son, Mr. Jose Avelino, Jr.,
who cashed it October 22, 1946;
WHEREAS, the third of the aforesaid checks, which is Check No. 37262 of the Nederlandsch
Indische Handelsbank, drawn on October 23,1946 by Chung Liu Ching Long & Co., Ltd., a
Chinese concern, in favor of "cash", in the amount of P10,000.00, was indorsed by the Senate
President to his wife, Mrs. Enriqueta C. Avelino, who deposited it in her Saving Account No.
63436 with the Philippines National Bank on October 26, 1946;
WHEREAS, the fourth of the aforesaid checks, which is Check No. 37268 of the Nederlandsch
Indische Handelsbank, drawn by the aforementioned Chinese concern, Chiung Liu Ching Long
and Co., Ltd., in the amount of P47,500.00 in favor of the Senate President, was indorsed by
him to his wife, Mrs. Enriqueta C. Avelino, who deposited it in her current account with the
Philippines National Bank on October 26, 1946;
WHEREAS, of the four checks aforementioned, the one for P196,905.60 was cashed by the
Senate President's son, Jose Avelino, Jr., on October 22, 1946; while of the three other checks
totalling P370,000.00 which was deposited by the Senate President's wife, Mrs. Enriqueta C.
Avelino, in her saving and current accounts with the Philippines National Bank on October 26,
1946, P325,000.00 were withdraw by her on same day;
WHEREAS, in the course of the speech delivered by the Senate President on the floor of the
Senate on February 18, 1946, in an attempt to explain the foregoing checks, he refused to be
interpolated on the same, and his explanation lacked such details and definiteness that it left
many doubts unsettled;
WHEREAS, in the case of the check for P312,500.00 the Senate President explanation that
the same represented proceeds from the sale of surplus beer to cover party obligation is
directly contradicted by the source of the same, Ching Ban Yek, who declared under oath
before the Horilleno Investigating Committee that the said sum of P312,500.00 had been
loaned byhim to the Senate President, who repaid the same within ten days;
WHEREAS, it appears that during the period from December 29, 1945 to April 30, 1948,
deposits totalling P803,865.45 were made in the current account of the Senate President's wife
Mrs. Enriqueta C. Avelino, in the Philippine National Bank, of which amount P6,204.86 were
deposited before his election to office and the sum of P797,660.59 was deposited after his
election;
WHEREAS, the tax returns of the Senate President do not bear explanation madein his
speech of February 18, 1949 to the effect that he and his wife had made substantial amounts
in commercial transaction in shoes and liquor;
WHEREAS, in his said speech of February 18, 1949, the Senate President said that "en
politica todo vale", and that inasmuch as the Nacionalistas were prone to commit frauds, it was
right for the Liberals to commit frauds in the electionsto even up with frauds committed by the
opposition;
WHEREAS, the said speech of February 18, 1949 delivered by the SEnate President justified
the commission of electoral frauds, which justification is a direct attack on the sovereignty of
the people and may be a cause of unrest or resolution;
WHEREAS, the senate President, as ex-officio Chairman of the Commission on Appointments
which passes upon all Presidential appointment, including thoseto the judiciary, has abused
the prerogatives of his office by seeking in several instances to interfere with and influence
some judge in decidingcase pending before, thereby imperilling the independence of the
judiciaryand jeopardizing the impartial administration of justice;
WHEREAS, the honor, dignity and prestige of the people and of the membersof the Senate
demand a through, impartial and immediate investigation of allforegoing; Now, therefore,
1 Be it resolved, To appoint, as they are hereby appointed
2 Committee of three (3) members of this Senate, to be com
3 posed of Senator Cuenco, Angeles David and Mabanag, who
4 shall immediately proceed to investigate the charges mentioned
5 above, with full powers to compel the attendance of witnesses
6 and the production of books of account, documents, and other
7 evidence, and to utilized the facilities and the services of such
8 personnel of this Senate as it may deem necessary, with in
9 structions to render its report and recommendations to the
10 Senate on or before Friday, February 25, 1949.
Adopted, February 21, 1949.
Although a sufficient number of Senators to constitute quorum were already present in said morning
at and before 10:00 o'clock, the schedule time for the daily session to begin, the session was not then
opened, because petitioner failed to appear in the hall until about 11:35, the time petitioner ascended
the rostrum where, instead of calling the meeting to order, he asked for a copy of the resolution
introduced by the Senators Taada and Sanidad and, after reading it slowly, he called to his side
Senators Angeles David and Tirona and conferred with them.
Only after the insistent requests of Senators Sanidad and Cuenco that thesession be opened, that
petitioner called the meeting to order shortly before 12:00 o'clock noon.
Senator Sanidad moved that the roll call be dispensed with. Senator Tirona opposed the motion and
the roll call showed the presence of the following twenty two Senators: Vicente J. Francisco,
Fernando Lopez, Emiliano TriaTirona, Pablo Angeles David, Salipada Pendatun, Ramon Torres,
Enrique Magalona, Carlos Tan, Olegario Clarin, Melencio Arranz, Mariano Jesus Cuenco, Prospero
Sanidad, Lorenzo Taada, Vicente Madrigal, Geronima Pecson,Camilo Osias, Carlos Garcia, Ramon
Diokno, Jose Vera, Tomas Cabili, Alejo Manag and Jose Avelino.
Senator Sanidad again moved that the reading of the minutes be dispersed with, but the motion was
again opposed by Senator Tirona whose opposition was joined by Senator Angeles David, and the
reading of the minutes proceeded.
Senator Taada repeated took the floor to floor to claim his right to deliver his one-hour privilege
speech in support of the charges against petitioner,pursuant to the announcement he made in the
session of February 18, 1949; he did it before and after the roll call and the reading of the minutes. he
wasignored by the Chair and petitioner announced that he would order the arrestof any Senator who
speak without having been previously recognized by him.Senator Sanidad requested the Chair to
recognized the right of Senator Taada to speak, and every time he would make the request, Senator
Tirona would oppose him upon the ground that the requests were out of order.
Meanwhile, commotion and disorder took place in the Senate gallery. Shout were heard from
individuals of the audience, where two fist fight took place. The detonation of a gun shot was heard
from outside. Senator Angeles David, after being recognized by the Chair, moved for adjournment of
the session. The motion was objected by Senator Cuenco who, at the same time, moved thatthe
motion be submitted to vote. Petitioner, instead of submitting to vote the motion to adjourn, banged
the gavel and declared the session adjourned until next Thursday, February 24, 1949, and,
thereupon, left the session hall followed by the nine Senators (Vicente J. Francisco, Fernando Lopez,
Emiliano Tria Tirona, Pablo Angeles David, Salipada Pendatun, Ramon Torres, Enrique Magalona,
Carlos Tan, and Olegario Clarin), supporting him. Twelve SEnator, respondent and his eleven
supporters, remained in the session hall. Senator Arranz, President Pro-tempore of the SEnate,
ascended the rostrum,and called those Senators present to order. Senator Mabanag raised the
question of quorum and the question of quorum and the President Pro-tempore ordered a roll call, to
which all the twelve Senators remaining in the sessionhall answered.
The President Pro-tempore declared the presence of quorum and those presentproceeded to
continue transacting business. Senator Cabili took an made it of record that the deliberate
abandonment of the Chair by petitioner made it incumbent upon the Senate President Pro-tempore
and those remainingmembers of the Senate to continue the session in order not to impede and
paralyze the functions of the Senate. Senator Arranz suggested that respondent be designated to
preside over the session and the suggestion was carried unanimously and respondent took the Chair.
Senator Taada delivered his privilege speech, which took two hours on the charge against petitioner
contained in Resolution No. 68, Exhibit "1", and moved for the immediate consideration and approval
of said resolution, thecomplete text of which was read. The motion was seconded by Senator
Sanidad, and the resolution was unanimously approved. Respondent yielded the Chair to the
President Pro-tempore and Senator Sanidad introduced Resolution No.67, Exhibit "2", which read as
follows:
RESOLUTION DECLARING VACANT THE POSITION OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE AND
DESIGNATING THE HONORABLE MARIANO JESUS CUENCO ACTING PRESIDENT OFTHE
SENATE.
Resolved by the Senate in session assembled, That a quorum exists; that the Honorable Jose
Avelino, President of the Senate having abandoned the chair, his position is hereby declared
vacant; and that, the Honorable Mariano JesusCuenco of Cebu, designated Acting President
of the SEnate, until further orders from this Body.
Adopted, February 21, 1949.
The resolutions unanimously approved, with respondent abstaining from voting. Pursuant to said
resolution, respondent took his oath of office inopen session before President Pro-Tempore Arranz
and has started, since then,to discharge the duties, rights and privileges of acting President of
theSenate.
The above recital of facts is based on our findings on the evidence on record. From the said facts we
believe the following conclusions are unavoidable.
1. The adjournment declared by petitioner was arbitrary and illegal.
2. After petitioner and the 9 Senators supporting him had walked out from the session hall, the
Senate could not continue holding session and transact business for lack of quorum.
In the following discussion we will express the reasons in support of the above conclusions.
ILLEGAL ADJOURNMENT
A motion to adjourn has the highest precedence when a question is under debate and, with certain
restriction, it has the highest privilege under all other conditions. Under parliamentary practice, even
questions of privilege and the motion to reconsider yield to it. The motion to adjourn may be made
after the "yeas'' and "nays" are ordered and before the roll call has begun, before reading of the
journal. The motion is not debatable and, after the motion is made, neither another motion nor an
appeal may intervene before the taking of the vote.
The power to adjourn is one of the exclusive prerogatives of a legislative chamber. It cannot be
exercised by any single individual, without usurpation of the collective prerogatives. It is too
tremendous a power to be wieldedby a single individual. The functions of the Senate and its
opportunity to transact official business cannot be left to the discretion of a single individual without
jeopardizing the high purposes for which a legislative deliberative body is established in a democratic
social order. Single-handedindividual discretion on the matter may not mean anything other than
placing the legislative chamber under a unipersonal tyranny.
There is no provision in the present rules of the Senate which expressly or impliedly authorizes an
adjournment without the consent of the body or one which authorizes the presiding officer to
decree motu proprio said adjournment, and the sound parliamentary practice and experience in
thiscountry and in the United States of America, upon which ours is patterned, would not authorize
the existence of such a provision.
Petitioner alleges that he ordered the adjournment because the motion of Senator Angeles David to
said effect was properly made and met with no objection. If this version of the facts is true, then it was
right for petitioner to declare the adjournment, because the absence of anyobjection, provided the
motion was properly made and the other Senators after having been properly apprised of the motion,
did not object to it, was an evidence of an implied consent of all the members. The evidence,
however, fails to support petitioner's claim.
We are inclined to consider respondent's version to be more in consonance with truth. We are of
opinion that the motion to adjourn was actually objected to. Senator Taada was bent on delivering a
speech he had ready onthe charges embodied in a resolution fathered by himself and by Senator
Sanidad, which both filed early in the morning, long before the session was opened. The formulation
of said charges had been announced days before,since the session of Friday, February 18, 1949,
when he showed photostatic copies of some checks as basis of a part of the charges to be filed. In
said Friday session respondent's group suffered defeat on the approval of the resolution of
confidence fathered by Senator Lopez. And it is understandable that respondent's group of Senators,
believing themselves to constitute the majority, did not want to waste any time to give a showing of
said majority and must have decided to depose petitioner as soon as possible to wrestfrom him the
Senate leadership that upon democratic principles rightly belongs to them.
As a showing of eagerness to hurry up the unfolding events that would give them the control of the
Senate, Senator Sanidad moved to dispense with the roll call and the reading of the minutes, and had
been requesting that Senator Taada be recognized to take the floor. Senator Taada himself made
attempts to deliver his speech.
Evidently, petitioner and his supported decided to adopt a blocking strategyto obstruct the process
that would give due course to the investigationof the serious charges made in resolution No. 68,
Exhibit 1, and wouldeffect petitioner's ouster as President of the Senate.
This strategy is evidence by the belated appearance of petitioner and his supporters at the session
hall and petitioner's procrastination in opening the session, by taking all his time in reading first the
Taada and Sanidad resolution, formulating charges against him, and conferring with Senators
Angeles David and Tirona and in not calling to order the members of the Senate before Senator's
Cuenco and Sanidad began urging that the session beopened.
Petitioner's allegation that, even without motion from any member, he could adjourn the session
under the rules of the Senate, is not well taken. There is nothing in the rules of the Senate giving
petitioner such authority. Theprovisions quoted in the petition authorizes the Senate President to take
measures to stop disorder, but that power does not include the one to adjourn.
The circumstances lead us to the conclusion that illegal adjournment and the walk out of the
petitioner and his supporters from the session hall had the purpose of defeating or, at least, delaying,
action on the proposed investigation of the charges against petitioner and of his impedingouster, by
the decisive votes of respondent's group of Senators.
The adjournment decreed by petitioner was arbitrary and illegal.
QUORUM
There is no controversy that at the session in question there were present in the session hall only
twelve Senators, those composing respondent's group, and this fact had been ascertained by the roll
call ordered by President Pro-tempore Arranz, after Senator Mabanag had raised the question
of quorum.
The Constitution provides:
A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may
adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner
and under such penalties as such House may provide. (Sec. 10, Sub-sec. 2 Article VI.)
The majority mentioned in the above provision cannot be other than the majority of the actual
members of the Senate. The words "each House" in the above provision refer to the full membership
of each chamber of Congress.
The Senate was and actually is composed of 24 Senators, and a majority of them cannot be less than
thirteen. Twelve is only half of twenty-four. Nowhere and at no time has one-half even been the
majority. Majority necessarily has to be more than one-half.
We have heard with interest the arguments advanced by respondent's counsel, premised on the fact
that the above constitutional provision does not use the words "of the members" and the theory of
the amicus curiae that themajority mentioned in the Constitution refers only to the majority of the
members who can be reached by coercive processes. There is, however, nothing in said arguments
that can validly change the natural interpretation of theunmistakable wordings of the Constitution.
"Majority of each House" can mean only majority of the members of each House, and the number of
said members cannot be reduced upon any artificial or imaginary basis not authorized by the context
of the Constitution itself or by the sound processes of reason.
For all the foregoing, we conclude that:
1. The legal and constitutional issues raised by the petitioner in this case, notwithstanding their
political nature and implications, are justiciable and within the jurisdiction expressly conferred to the
Supreme Court, which cannot be divested from it by express prohibition of the Constitution. Should
there be analogous controversy between two claimants to the position of the President of the
Philippines, according to the Solicitor General, one of the attorneys for respondent, the Supreme
Court would have jurisdiction to decide the controversy, because it would raise a constitutional
question. Whether there was a quorum or not in the meeting of twelve Senators in whichrespondent
was elected acting President of the Senate, is a question that call for the interpretation, application
and enforcement of an express and specific provision of the Constitution. Should the two absent
Senators comeand attend the session and side with the petitioner's group, it is agreed that the Senate
will be kept at a stand still, because of the deadlock resulting from twelve Senators, each group
supporting petitioner's and respondent's opposing claims to the position of President of the Senate.
Admitting that pressure of public opinion may not break the impasse, it hasbeen suggested from
respondent's side that it may invite revolution. Between the two alternatives, jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court and revolution, there is only one choice possible, and that is the one in consonance
with the Constitution, which is complete enough to offer orderly remedies for any wrong committed
within the framework of democracy it established in this country. Should this Supreme Court refuse to
exercise jurisdiction in this case,such refusal can only be branded as judicial abdication, and such
shirking of official responsibility cannot expect acquittal in the judgment of history. The gravity of the
issues involved in this case, affecting not only the upper branch of Congress, but also the presidential
succession as provided by Republic Act No. 181, is a challenge to our sense of duty which we should
not fail to meet.
2. The adjournment decreed by petitioner of the Monday session, without the authority of the Senate,
was illegal and, therefore, null and void.
3. The rump session held by twelve Senators, the respondent and his supporters, after petitioner and
his nine supporters had walked out from the session hall, had no constitutional quorum to transact
business.
4. The resolution declaring vacant the position of the President of the Senate and choosing
respondent as acting President of the Senate, has been adopted in contravention of the Constitution
for lack of quorum. The fact that respondent has been designated only as acting President of the
Senate, a position not contemplated by the Constitution or by Republic Act No. 181 on presidential
succession, so much so that his position in acting capacity, according to his own counsel, would not
entitle respondent to Succeedto the position of the President of the Philippines, emphasizes the
invalidity of respondent's election.
Notwithstanding the importance of this case, the legal issues involved are very simple, and it would
not be hard to reach a prompt conclusion if we could view the controversies with the attitude of a
mathematician tacklingan algebraic equation. Many considerations which, from the point of view of
laymen, of the press, of public opinion in general and the people at large, may appear of great
importance, such as who will wield the power to control the Senate and whether or not petitioner is
guilty of the serious charges filed against him, are completely alien to the questions that this Court
must answer. The motives and motivations of petitioner and respondent of their respective supporters
in the Senate in taking the moves upon which this case has arisen are their exclusive business and
should not be minded for the purposes of our decision.
The members of the Senate were and are free to depose petitioner and to elect another Senator as
president of the Senate, and their freedom to make such change is subject only to the dictates of their
own conscience and to anyverdict that the people, through the electorate, may render at the polls,
and to the judgment of historians and posterity. But in making such changes of leadership, the Senate
and the Senators are bound to follow the orderlyprocesses set and outlined by the Constitution and
by the rules adopted by the Senate as authorized by the fundamental law. Any step beyond said legal
bounds may create a legal issue which, once submitted to the proper courts of justice, the latter
cannot simply wash their hands and ignore the issue upon the pretext of lack of jurisdiction, adopting
the indifferent attitude of a passerby who does not care whether the lashing of the wind may causea
live wire to ignite a neighboring house.
When a Senator or a number of Senators come to the Supreme Court, complaining that the President
of the Senate has adjourned or is adjourning the daily session of the Senate over and above
objections voiced from thefloor and without obtaining first the approval or consent of the majority, we
cannot close our eyes to the complaint or bury our heads in the sand in ostrich fashion: Otherwise,
we would be disregarding ours sworn duty and,with our abstention or inaction, we would be printing
the stamp of our approval to the existence and continuation of a unipersonal tyranny imposed upon
the upper chamber of Congress, a tyranny that may obstruct and defeat the functioning and
actuations of the Senate and, consequently, of the whole Congress, thus depriving the country of the
benefits of legislation.
When a member of the Senate comes to us complaining that he is being deprived of the powers and
prerogative of the position of President of the Senate, to which he has been duly elected because
twelve Senators, without constituting a quorum, have illegally convened and voted to depose him and
to elect another Senator in his place, he raises a constitutional question of momentous importance
which we should not fail to answer without betraying the official trust reposed on us. Such complaint
constitutes, in effect, an accusation of usurpation of authority by the twelve Senators, in utter violation
of the fundamental law. The situation would demand ready and noother agency of government can
offer that remedy than the Supreme Court itself with whom the complaint has been filed.
The existence of a quorum in a collective body is an indispensable condition for effective collective
action. Because a society or collective body is composed of separate and independent individual
units, it cannot exist without the moral annectent of proper of organization and can onlyact in
organized form. Every time it has to act, it has to an organic whole, and quorum here is the organizing
element without which the personality of the body cannot exist or be recognized. The importance of
such organizing element has been recognize by the members of our Constitutional Convention, and
that is the reason why they inserted in the Constitution the provision requiring the existence
of quorum for the former National Assembly to transact official business and that requirement was
also imposed by the National Assembly when, amending the Constitution, it voted itself out
ofexistence, to be replaced by a bicameral Congress. The requirement, both in the original text of the
Constitution and in the amendment, had been ratified by the sovereign will of the people.
When we required a majority of a legislative chamber to constitute a quorum we did it for mighty
reasons, such as that democracy is based on the rule of the majority and, to allow a quorum of less
than the majority of the members, one-half of them for example, as in the present controversy, is to
allow the anomalous and anarchic existence of two independent bodies where the Constitution
provides for only one. If the twelve Senators of respondent's group constitute quorum to transact
official business, what willpreclude the twelve remaining Senators from constituting themselves into
a quorum to transact official business? This is not impossible, should Senator Sotto decide to attend
the session, even if carried in a stretcher, and Senator Confesor returns from abroad and sides with
petitioner's group. Then there will be, in effect, two Senate and, according to respondent's theory the
Supreme Court will have no jurisdiction to decide the conflict, and noone decide it except public
opinion or, in its failure, revolution. Such absurd situation and catastrophic result should be avoided:
Lack of jurisdiction is sometimes a refuge behind which weak courts may take shelter when afraid to
displease the powerful.
Instead of disputing the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in this case, everybody must congratulate
himself because petitioner, instead of resorting to any high-handed mean to enforce his right to
continue holding the positionof the President of the Senate, has come to us for proper redress by the
orderly by the orderly processes of judicial settlement. Notwithstanding the fact that three year ago,
he impugned the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and won his case on that ground the injustice
then committedagainst the suspended Senators Vera, Diokno and Romero now being more generally
recognized petitioner came to this Court to submit his case to our jurisdiction.
The action taken by petitioner in filing his complaint with this Supreme Court is premised on this
sharing the conviction that said Tribunal is the last bulwark of the rights and liberties of the people,
the final arbiter on all constitutional conflicts, and the ultimate redoubt of the majesty of the law. That
conviction and faith should not be betrayed, but rather strengthened, and more imperatively
nowadays when the majesty of the law, the basic tenets of the Constitution, the principles of humanity
springing fromthe golden rule, which is the law of laws, are being the subject of bold onslaughts from
many elements of society, bent on taking justice in their own hands or on imposing their will through
fraud or violence. The malady is widespread enough to imperatively and urgently demand a more
complete respect and faith in the effectiveness of our system of administration of justice.
For the Supreme Court to renounce its jurisdiction in this case is to disappoint the believers in a
philosophy and social order based on constitutional processes and on legal juridical settlement of all
conflicts that may beset a democracy. It has been said in the hearing of this case that for this Court to
refuse cognizance of it may not have other alternative,if the pressure of public opinion may fail and
by experience we know that it had suffered many failures than revolution. This immeasurable
responsibilityof this Supreme Court if it should falter in the performance of its plain duty and should
dispose of this case with the indifference with which a beach vacationist would dismiss a gust of wind.
The principle of separation of powers, so often invoked, to bind the hands of justice into futility, should
not be understood as absolute. It is an apt rule of the tri-partite division of government as enunciated
by Aristotle and further developed by Montequieu, as the best scheme to put in practice the system of
check and balance considered necessary for a workable democracy. To make absolute that principle
is to open the doors irretrievable absurdity and to create three separate governments within a
government and three independent states within a state. Indeed, it is to avoid such a
teratologiccreature that the Constitutional Convention had not inserted among the principles
embodied in the fundamental law.
Judicial determination of all constitutional or legal controversies is the inherent function of courts. The
Constitution of the United States of America, unlike our own Constitution, is silent a to the power of
courts of justice to nullify an unconstitutional act of Congress. Notwithstanding the silence, when the
proper case arose, the United States Supreme Court, under the wise leadership of Chief Justice
Marshall, had not hesitated in declaring null and void a law enacted in contravention of constitutional
provisions. The Supreme Court of the Republic of the Philippines should not fail to match such and
outstanding evidence of evidence of judicial statesmanship.
To bolster the stand against our assumption of jurisdiction in this case the theory has been advanced
that, the President of the Philippines having recognized respondent as a duly elected acting President
of the Senate, that recognition is final and should bind this Court. The theory sprouts from the same
ideology under which a former king of England tried to order Lord Coke how the latter should dispose
of a pending litigation. Our answer is to paraphrase the great English judge by saying that nothing
should guide us except what in conscience we believe is becoming of our official functions,
disregarding completely what the President of the Philippines may say or feel about it.
As a matter of fact, two pretenders may dispute the office. As in the present case, Congress may split
into two groups after a presidential election and each group may proclaim a different candidate as the
duly elected Presidentof the Philippines. Because of a mistaken ideas to the scope of the principle of
separation of powers, if the case is brought to us for decision, shall we, as Pontious Pilate, wash our
hands and let the people bleed and be crucifiedin the Calvary of revolution?
There is absolutely no merit in invoking the unfortunate decision in the case of Vera vs. Avelino, (77
Phil., 1.92). No one now would regret more that such a decision had been rendered than petitioner
himself, the very one whowon it upon the pusillanimous judicial theory of lack of jurisdiction. The more
said decision is forgotten, the better, it being one of the blemishes without which the escutcheon of
the post-liberation Supreme Court would be spotless.
We vote to render judgment granting the petition and ordering respondent to relinquish the powers,
prerogative and privileges of the position of the President of the Senate in favor of petitioner who, on
the other side, should be restrained from putting any obstacle or obstruction by illegal adjournments
or otherwise, in the holding of the, regular daily session of the Senate. Said body should be allowed
to continue transacting official business unhampered by any procedure intended to impede the free
expressionof the will of the majority.

BRIONES, M., dissente:
Sin perjuicio de redactar una opinion mas extensa sobre mi voto en ese asunto, me permito
adelantar las siguientes observaciones:
(1) Esta Corte Suprema tiene jurisdiccion sobre el asunto. Reafirmo la posicion tomada por mi en
los asuntos de Vera contra Avelino (77 Phil., 192) y Mabanag contra Lopez Vito (78 Phil., 1). La
cuestion constitutional y legal aqui debatida no es de caracter puramente politico en el sentido de
que esta Corte deba inhibirse de enjuiciarla, sino que es perfectamente justiciable. Se plantea la
cuestion de si el grupo de senadores que eligio al recurrido como presidente interino del Senado
tenia facultad para hacerlo. Se alega y se sostiene que no existia dicha facultad, puesto que cuando
dicho grupo se reunio no habia un quorum presente de conformidad con los terminos de la
Constitucion y de los reglamentos del Senado. Esta cuestion es justiciable y puede y debe ser
enjuiciada, determinada y resuelta por esta Corte, ya que la parte agraviada ha venido a nosotros en
demanda de remedio. Esta Corte no puede lavarse las manos en un ademan de inhibicion pilatista;
no puede continuar con la politica de esconde-cabeza-en la arena-del-desierto estilo aveztruz. El
issue constitucional y legal discutido es importante, muy importante. Tiene repercusiones directas y
vitalisimas en la vida, libertad y hacienda de los ciudadanos. Es el negocio supremo de legislar lo
que esta en debate. Es, por tanto, una de las esencias de la misma republica el tema de la
controversia. La escaramuza politica es lo de menos; el meollo juridico-constitucional es lo esencial e
importante.
Es tanto mas urgente que esta Corte asuma jurisdiccion sobre el caso cuanto que el conflicto surgido
en el Senado entre los dos grupos politicos en guerra ha cobrado las proporciones de una tremenda
crisis nacional, preada de graves peligros para la estabilidad de nuestras instituciones politicas,
para el orden publico y para la integridad de la existencia de la nacion.
Tenemos un precedente tipico en la jurisprudencia del Estado de New Jersey, Estados Unidos de
America. Es el caso de Werts vs. Rogers, del ao 1894, Atlantic Reporter, Vol. 28, p. 728, N. J. La
analogia es completa. Tambien se disputaban la presidencia del Senado dos Senadores, cada cual
pretendiendo ser al legitimo. Tambien hubo dos facciones, cada cual reclamando ostentar la genuina
representacion popular. Un grupo se llamo "Adrian Senate" y el otro grupo "Rogers Senate", por los
nombres de los presidentes en disputa. Se arguyo igualmente que la Corte Suprema de New Jersey
no podia asumir jurisdiccion sobre el caso por tratarse de una cuestion eminentemente politica, por
tanto no justiciable. La Corte, sin embargo, conocio del caso y, por boca de su Presidente el
eminente jurisconsulto Mr. Beasley, hizo el siguiente categorico pronunciamiento:
. . . . That this court has the legal right to entertain jurisdiction in this case, displayed by this
record, we have no doubt; and we are further of opinion that it is scarcely possible to conceive
of any crisis in public affairs that would more imperatively than the present one call for the
intervention of such judicial authority. (supra, p. 758.)
Ademas de la justiciabilidad de la materia en controversia, una de las principales razones invocadas
por la Corte Suprema de New Jersey para asumir jurisdiccion sobre el caso fue la extrema necesidad
de resolver un dead lock que paralizaba la maquinaria legislativa, afectaba a la estabilidad del
gobierno y ponia en grave peligro los intereses publicos. Pregunto: no existe la misma razon de
extrema necesidad en el presunto caso? que duda cabe de que el conflicto entre las dos facciones
en nuestro Senado esta afectando seriamente a los intereses publicos? que duda cabe de que la
normalidad constitucional esta rota, con grave preocupacion de todo el mundo y con grave dao de
la tranquilidad publica?
(2) El levantamiento de la sesion ordenado por el presidente Avelino fue ilegal y arbitrario. Estimo
que el presidente Avelino obro ilegal y arbitrariamente al ordenar el levantamiento de la sesion frente
a la oposicion firme, energica y tenaz de algunos senadores adversos a el. En vista de esta
oposicion, el deber de la Mesa era someter a votacion la mocion de levantamiento de la sesion
presentada por el Senador Angeles David. Avelino no tenia el derecho, por si y ante si, de declarar
levantada la sesion. Solamente cuando no se formula ninguna objection es cuando rutinariamente el
presiding officer puede dar por aprobada una mocion de levantamiento de la sesion. Si la facultad de
levantar la sesion no estuviera sujeta a la expresa voluntad de la mayoria, seria un arma sumamente
peligrosa en manos de un presidente despotico y arbitrario.
La pretension de que el Senador Avelino ordeno el levantamiento de la sesion en uso de sus
facultades inherentes, en vista de que el mismo creia que habia un peligro inminente de desorden y
tumulto en la sala de sesiones, es completamente insostenible. Las circunstancias del caso no
justifican semejante pretension, a tenor de las pruebas obrantes en autos. Lo que debia haber hecho
el Senador Avelino era tratar de apaciguar al publico y prevenir todo conato de desorden. Tenia
medios para hacerlo. No lo hizo. En cambio, dejo la silla presidencial juntamente con los senadores
de su grupo. Esto equivalia a una desercion y los senadores del otro grupo tenian perfecto derecho a
proceder como procedieron, quedandose en el salo para continuar celebrando la sesion. Esta sesion
venia a ser una tacita reconduccion una simple prolongacion de la sesion que habia sido
declarada abierta por el presidente Avelino con un quorum presente de 22 miembros.
(3) Sin embargo, la sesion prolongada se convirtio en ilegal por falta de quorum. Es cosa
establecida y admitida por ambas partes que al reanudarse la sesion estaban presentes los 12
miembros del grupo llamado "Senado de Cuenco" mas tres senadores del grupo llamado "Senado de
Avelino". En esta coyuntura el Senador Mabanag, del grupo de Cuenco, suscito la cuestion
del quorum, de cuyas resultas se ordeno por el Senador Arranz, que entonces presidia la sesion, la
lectura de la lista. Tambien es cosa establecida en autos y admitida por ambas partes que al
comenzar el roll call o lectura de la lista, lot tres senadores del grupo de Avelino salieron del salon y
solamente respondieron al roll call los 12 senadores del grupo de Cuenco.
Resulta evidente de estos hechos que no habia quorum, por cuanto que componiendose el Senado
de 24 miembros debidamente elegidos y cualificados, el quorum para celebrar sesion valida debe ser
de 13 miembros. Tanto la jurisprudencia federal como la de los estados de la Union americana esta
repleta de decisiones en las que se ha sentado firmemente la doctrina de que la base para
determinar el quorum legislativo es el numero totalde miembros elegidos y debidamente cualificados
de cada camara.
1
En el presente caso, como se ha dicho, ese numero total es 24. Por tanto, el grupo
Cuenco no podia seguir celebrando validamente sesion, en vista de la falta de quorum. De acuerdo
con la Constitucion y los reglamentos, el grupo Cuenco tenia ante si dos caminos para actuar: (a)
suspender la sesion de dia en dia hasta obtener el necesario quorum; (b) o compeler la asistencia de
suficientes senadores del otro grupo para constituir dicho quorum, pudiendo a dicho efecto ordenar
inclusive el arresto de los huelguistas. (Constitucion de Filipinas, art. VI, sec. 10, ap. 2;
2
Reglamento
del Senado, Cap. VI, arts. 23 y 24.
3
) Asi que todos los procedimientos efectuados por el grupo
Cuenco en dicha sesion eran nulos e ilegales.
Se ha insinuado que el cambio de fraseologia en el precepto constitucional sobre quorum es
significativo. Efectivamente en el texto original de 1935 se decia lo siguiente: "A majority of all the
Members shall constitute aquorum to do business" . . . , mientras que en el texto enmendado de
1940 se dice: "A majority of each House shall constitute a qurrum to do business" . . . . De esto se
quiere deducir la consecuencia de que esta reforma habra sido por algo, y este algo acaso sea la
posibilidad de una base menor de la totalidad de miembros para determinar la existencia de
un quorum. El argumento, a mi juicio, es insostenible, por no llamarlo futil. Los autores de la
enmienda no han hecho mas que copiar literalmente la fraseologia de la Constitucion federal
americana; y ya hemos visto que esta se ha interpretado en el sentido de que seala, como base
para determinar el quorum, la totalidad de los miembros electos y cualificados de cada camara. Por
tanto, el cambio fraseologico, en vez de denotar cambio en el significado, refuerza el sentido
tradicional de que la base para la determinacion del quorumla totalidad de los miembros electos y
cualificados de cada camara. Aparte de que es elemental en hermeneutica legal que una misma
cosa puede expresarse en terminos diferentes.
Tambien se ha insinuado, con bastante ingenio, que en el caso que nos ocupa, la base mas racional
para elquorum es 23, excluyendo al Senador Confesor que se halla en America, pero incluyendo al
Senador Sotto, que si bien no pudo estar presente en la sesion de autos por estar gravemente
enfermo, hallabase, sin embargo, en Manila susceptible en cualquier momento de ser llamado por el
Senado. El fundamento de esta opinion es que para la determinacion del quorum no debe ser
contado un miembro que esta fuera de la accion coercitiva de la camara. La proposicion es
igualmente inaceptable. No solo no tiene ningun precedente en la jurisprudencia, sino que es
convencional, arbitraria, sometiendo el quorum, que debe ser algo permanente, a ciertas
eventualidades y contingencias. Hay que tener en cuenta que el precepto constitucional y la regla
pertinente no establecen ninguna salvedad. Donde la ley no distingue, no debemos distinguir.
(4) Cual es el remedio. No cabe duda de que una mayoria de Senadores tiene derecho a
reorganizar el Senado en la forma que les plazca, siempre que ello se sujete a las normas prescritas
por la Constitucion, las leyes y los reglamentos. En el presente caso el grupo Cuenco que al parecer
forma la mayoria, por lo menos hasta la fecha, tiene en sus manos los instrumentos constitucionales
y legales para efectuar una reorganizacion. Puede convocar una sesion y compeler la asistencia de
un numero suficiente de Senadores para formar quorum, ordenando el arresto si fuese necesario de
dichos senadores. Esto en el supuesto de que el Senador Avelino y su grupo sigan boicoteando las
sesiones del Senado para impedir la existencia de un quorum. Pero si el grupo Avelino acude
voluntariamente al Senado, entonces los dos grupos pueden buenamente restaurar la normalidad
constitucional, procediendo a efectuar la reorganizacion que desee y dicte la mayoria.
Hasta que esto se haga, el Senador Avelino es tecnicamente presidente del Senado. Es verdad que
Avelino cometio una grave arbitrariedad ordenando el levantamiento de la sesion sin derecho y
facultad para ello; pero una arbitrariedad no justifica otra arbitrariedad; la de destituirle por medios
anticonstitucionales, ilegales y antireglamentarios. Los motivos de la accion de Avelino y de la de sus
adversarios no nos interesan para nada ni caen dentro de nuestra provincia; lo unico que nos
concierne son sus repercusiones juridicas.
Es de suma importancia, sobre todo en estos momentos incipientes de la republica, el que
mantengamos rigida e implacablemente la integridad de la Constitucion y de los procedimientos que
prescribe. Solo de esta manera podremos evitar el ciego desbordamiento de las pasiones politicas y
personales, con todas sus funestas consecuencias. A toda costa hay que impedir la formacion de un
clima politico, social o moral que facilite las cuarteladas, los pronunciamientos, los golpes de mano y
de estado (coup d'main, coup d'etat) eso que caracteriza la historia azarosa de las llamadas
"banana republicas". Un 19 Brumario solamente se puede prevenir imponiendo con todo rigor, sin
blandas transigencias, la observancia de la Constitucion y de las leyes y reglamentos que la
implementan.
Voto, por tanto, en favor de la concesion del recurso interpuesto.

TUASON, J., dissenting:
I agree with Mr. Justice Briones' dissenting opinion, that the twelve senators who elected Senator
Cuenco Acting President of the Senate did not constitute a quorum and, consequently, that his
election was illegal.
It appears tome that the basis for computing a quorum of the Senate is thenumber of senators who
have been elected and duly qualified and who have not ceased to be senators by death or legal
disqualification. If this were not so, what is the standard of computation? No satisfactory, reasonable
alternative has been or can be offered.
Absence abroad cannot be a disqualification unless by such absence, under the Constitution, a
member of the Senate loses his office, emoluments, and other prerogatives, temporarily or
permanently. There is no claim that this happens when a senators' presence at the session be the
criterion, then serious illness or being in a remote island with which Manila has no regular means of
communication should operate to eliminate the sick or absent members from the counting for the
purpose of determining the presence of a majority.
The distinction made between absentees form legislative sessions who are in the Philippines and
absentees who are in a foreign country is, to my arbitrary and unreasonable. From both the
theoretical and the practical by members of Congress are sometimes found necessary to fulfill their
missions. If we test the interpretation by its consequences, its unsoundness and dangers become
more apparent. The interpretation would allow any number of legislators, no matter how small, to
transact business so long as it is a majority of the legislators present in the country. Nothing in my
opinion could have been farther from the minds of the authors of the Constitution than to permit,
under circumstances, less than a majority of the chosen and qualified representatives of the people to
approve measures that might vitally affect their lives, their liberty, happiness and property. The
necessity of arresting absent members to complete a quorum is too insignificant, compared with the
necessity of the attendance of an absolute majority, to make unamenability to arrest a factor for ruling
out absentees who are beyond the legislature's process. The Congress is eminently a law-making
body and is little concerned with jurisdiction over its members. The power to order arrest is an
emergency measure and is rarely resorted to. Viewed in this light, it is doubtful if the authority to
arrest could always afford a satisfactory remedy even in the cases of members who were inside the
Philippines territory. This is especially true in the United States of America, after whose form of
government ours is patterned and whose territorial possession extend to the other side of the globe.
This case is easily distinguishable from Vera vs. Avelino, (77 Phil., 192), and Mabanag vs. Lopez
Vito, (78 Phil., 1).
In those cases the petitions were directed against an action of a recognized Senate exercising
authority within it own domain. Here the process sought is to be issued against an appointee of a
senate that, it is alleged was not validly constituted to do business because, among other reasons
alleged, there was not quorum. The Court is not asked to interfere with an action of a coordinate
branch of the government so much as to test the legality of the appointment of the respondent.
Section 1, Rule 68, of the Rules of Court provides:
An action for usurpation of office of franchise may be brought in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercise a public office, or a
franchise, or an office in a corporation created by authority of law;
x x x x x x x x x
This provision by its terms extends to every office. Its scope does not exclude officers appointed by
the legislative branch of the government. Although this Court has no control over either branch of the
Congress, it does have the power to ascertain whether or not one who pretends to be its officer is
holding his office according to law or the Constitution. Political questions as a bar to jurisdiction can
only be raised by the supreme power, by the legislature, and not by one of its creatures.
(Luther vs. Border, 48 U.S. 7 How. 1, 12 Law ed., 581.) If there were two lesser officers of the Senate
appointed by different faction thereof and contesting each other's right to the office, it would not be
the Senate by the Court which would be called upon to decide the controversy. There is more reason
for the Court to intervene when the office of the President of the Senate is at stake. The interest of the
public are being greatly imperiled by the conflicting claims, and a speedy determination of the same is
imperatively demanded, in the interest of good government and public order.
Fundamentally this case is analogous to Attorney General, ex rel. Werts vs. Rogers, 23 Lawyers'
Reports, annotated, 354, to which I am indebted for much of the reasoning adduced in this dissent on
the question of this Court's jurisdiction.
March 14, 1949
R E S O L U T I O N
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner in case G.R. L-2821, Jose
Avelino vs. Mariano J. Cuenco, the court, without prejudice towriting later an extended opinion, has
resolved, by a majority of seven,to assume jurisdiction over the case in the light of subsequent events
whichjustify its intervention; and, partly for the reasons stated in the first resolution of this Court and
partly upon the grounds stated by Mr. JusticeFeria, Mr. Justice Perfecto, and Mr. Justice Briones in
their separate opinions, to declare that there was a quorum at the session where respondent Mariano
J. Cuenco was elected acting Senate President.
The Chief agrees with the result of the majority's pronouncement of the quorum upon the ground that,
under the peculiar circumstances of the case,the constitutional requirement in that regard has
become a mere formalism,it appearing from the evidence that any new session with
a quorum wouldresult in the respondent's election as Senate President, and that the Cuenco group,
taking cue from the dissenting opinions, has been trying to satisfy such formalism by issuing
compulsory processes against senators of the Avelino group, but to no avail, because of the latter's
persistent effortsto block all avenues to constitutional processes. For this reason, he believethat the
group has done enough to satisfy the requirements of the Constitutionand that the majority's ruling is
in conformity with substantial justice and with the requirements of public interest.
The judgment of the Court is, therefore, that respondent Mariano J. Cuencohas been legally elected
as Senate President and the petition is petition is dismissed, with costs against petitioner.
Mr. Justice Paras concurs in the result, Mr. Justice Bengzon dissents on the question of jurisdiction
but concurs on the question of quorum.
Mr. Justice Tuason concurs on the question of jurisdiction but dissents on that on that of quorum.
Mr. Justice Montemayor dissent s of the question of jurisdiction and reserves his vote on the question
of quorum.
Mr. Justice Reyes reserves the right to express the reasons for his vote.


FERIA, J., concurring:
In the case of Vera et al. vs. Avelino et al., (77 Phil., 192), the principal question raised was whether
this Supreme Court had jurisdiction to set aside the Pendatun resolution ordering that petitioners
Vera, Diokno and Romero shall not be sworn to nor seated as members of the Senate, and compel
the respondents had no power to pass said resolution, because it was contraryto the provisions of
Sec. 11, Article VI, of the Constitution, which createdthe Electoral Tribunal for the Senate as well as
for the House of Representative, and provided that said Tribunal shall be judge of all contestsrelating
to the election returns and qualifications of their respective members. Respondent Avelino et al., who
were represented by Senator Vicente Francisco and the Solicitor General, impugned the jurisdiction
of this Court to take this Court to take cognizance of said case on the ground that the question therein
involved was a political question, and petitioners Veraet al., who were represented by Attorney Jose
W. Diokno, who is now oneof the attorneys for respondents, who now contends that this Supreme
Court has no jurisdiction over the present case, then maintained that this Court had jurisdiction.
And in the case of Mabanag et al. vs. Jose Lopez Vito et al., 78 Phil., 1, the question involved was
whether it was within the jurisdiction of this Court to take cognizance of the case and prohibit the
respondents from enforcing the "Congressional Resolution of both Houses proposing an amendment
to the Philippines to be appended as an ordinance there", grantingcertain rights to the citizens of the
United states of American in the Philippines, on the ground that it was null and void because it was
not passedby the vote of three-fourths of the members of the Senate and House of Representatives,
voting separately, as required by Sec. 1, Art. XV, of the Constitution, since if the Members of
Congress who were not allowed to take part had been counted, the affirmative votes in favor of the
proposed amendment would have been short of the necessary three-fourths vote in either branch of
Congress. Petitioners Mabanag et al. contended that the Court had jurisdiction and the respondents
maintained the contrary on the ground that the question involved was apolitical one and within the
exclusive province of the Legislature.
The theory of Separation of Powers as evolved by the Courts of last resortfrom the State Constitution
of the United States of American, after which our owns is patterned, has given rise to the distinction
between justiceable question which fall within the province of the judiciary, and politicalquestions
which are not within the jurisdiction of the judiciary and are to be decided, under the Constitution, by
the People in their sovereign capacity or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been
delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government, except to the extent that the
power to deal with such question has been conferred upon the court byexpress or statutory provision.
Although it is difficult to define a politicalquestion as contradistinguished from a justiceable one, it has
been generally held that the first involves political rights which consist in the power to participate,
directly or indirectly, in the establishment or managementof the government of the government, while
justiceable questions are those which affect civil, personal or property rights accorded to every
member of the community or nation.
Under such theory of Separation of Power, the judicial Supremacy is the power of judicial review in
actual and appropriate case and controversies that present justiceable issues, which fall within the
jurisdiction or power allocated to the judiciary; but when the issue is a political one which comeswithin
the exclusive sphere of the legislative or executive department of the Government to decide, the
judicial department or Supreme Court has no powerto determine whether or not the act of the
Legislative or Chief Executiveis against the Constitution. What determines the jurisdiction of thecourts
is the issue involved, and not the law or constitutional provisionwhich may be applied. Divorced from
the remedy sought, the declaration of this Court on the matter of constitutionality or unconstitutionality
of alegislative or executive act, would be a mere advisory opinion, without a coercive force.
Relying on the ruling laid down in Severino vs. Governor General, 16 Phil.,336; Abueno vs. Wood, 45
Phil., 612; and Alejandrino vs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83, the Supreme Court upheld the contention of said
respondent in both casesthat the question involved was a political question and therefore this Court
had no jurisdiction. I was one of the three Justice who held that this Courthad jurisdiction, and
dissented from the decision of the majority.
When the present case was first submitted to us, I concurred with the majority, in view of the ruling of
the Court in said two cases, which constitutes a precedent which is applicable a fortiori to the present
case and must, therefore, be followed by the virtue of the doctrine or maxim of stare decisis, and in
order to escape the criticism voiced by Lord Bryce inAmerican Commonwealth when he said that
"The Supreme Court has changed its colori.e., its temper and tendencies, from time to time according
to the political proclivities of the men who composed it. . . . Their action flowed naturally from the
habits of though they had formed before their accession to the bench and from the sympathy they
could not but feel for the doctrineon whose behalf they had contended." (The ANNALS of the
American Academyof Political and Social Science, May, 1936, p. 50).
Now that the petitioner, who obtained a ruling favorable to his contention in the Vera-Avelino
case, supra, insist in his motion for reconsideration that this Court assume jurisdiction and decide
whether or not there was quorum in session of the Senate of February 21, 1949, and is willing to
abide by the decision of this Court (notwithstanding the aforementioned precedent),and several of the
Justices, who have held before that this Supreme Courthad no jurisdiction, now uphold the jurisdiction
of this Court, I gladly change my vote and concur with the majority in that this Court has jurisdiction
over cases like the present in accordance with my stand inthe above mentioned cases, so as to
establish in this country the judicial supremacy, with the Supreme Court as the final arbiter, to see
that no one branch or agency of the government transcends the Constitution, not only in justiceable
but political questions as well.
But I maintain my opinion and vote in the resolution sought to be reconsidered,that there was
a quorum in the session of the Senate of Senate of February 21,1949, for the following reasons:
Art. 3 (4) Title VI of the Constitution of 1935 provided that "the majority of all the members of the
National Assembly constitute a quorum to do business" and the fact that said provision was amended
in the Constitution of 1939,so as to read "a majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do
business," shows the intention of the framers of the Constitution to basethe majority, not on the
number fixed or provided for the Constitution,but on actual members or incumbents, and this must be
limited to actual members who are not incapacitated to discharge their duties by reason of death,
incapacity, or absence from the jurisdiction of the house or forother causes which make attendance of
the member concerned impossible, eventhrough coercive process which each house is empowered
to issue to compel itsmembers to attend the session in order to constitute a quorum. That the
amendment was intentional or made for some purpose, and not a mere oversight,or for considering
the use of the words "of all the members" as unnecessary, is evidenced by the fact that Sec. 5 (5)
Title VI of the original Constitution which required "concurrence of two-thirds of the members of the
National Assembly to expel a member" was amended by Sec. 10 (3) Article VI of the present
Constitutional, so as to require "the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members of each House".
Therefore, as Senator Confesor was in the United States and absent from the jurisdiction of the
Senate, the actual members of the SEnate at its session of February 21, 1949, were twenty-three
(23) and therefore 12 constituted a majority.
This conclusion is in consonance with the legislative and judicial precedent. In the Resolution of both
Houses proposing an amendment of the Constitution of the Philippines to be appended to the
Constitution, granting parity rightto American citizen in the Philippines out of which the case
of Mabanag vs. Lopez, supra arose, both Houses of Congress in computing the three-fourths of all
the members of the Senate and the House of Representative votingseparately, required by Sec. 1,
Article XV of the Constitution, the three-fourths of all the members was based, not on the number
fixed or provided for in the Constitution, but on the actual members who have qualifiedor were not
disqualified. And in the case of People vs. Fuentes, 46 Phil., 22the provision of Sec. 1, subsection 2,
of Act No. 3104, which requiredunanimity of vote of the Supreme Court in imposing death excepted
from the court those members of the Court who were legally disqualified from the case, this Court
held that the absence of the Chief Justice Avancea, authorized by resolution of the Court, was a
legal disqualification, and his vote was not necessary in the determination of the unanimity of the
decision imposing death penalty.


PABLO, J., concurrente:
Aungue los Sres. Magistrados Paras, Feria, Bengzon y yo, sosteniamos que este Tribunal no tenia
jurisdiccion sobre el asunto porque era de naturaleza eminentemente politico, emitimos, sin embargo,
nuestra opinion de que los doce senadores constituian quorum legal para tomar resoluciones. Desde
luego, la opinion no surtio el efecto deseado. La huelga en el Senado continua. Los recientes
acontecimientos pueden trascender a peores, con sus inevitables repercusiones dentro y fuera del
pais. Cuando las pasiones politicas no van por el cauce de la prudencia pueden desbordase y causar
fatales consecuencias. Es un sano estadismo judicial evirtarlo y, si es necesario, impedirlo.
El recurrente pide que se reconsideresa nuestra dividida opinion. alegando que las divisiones civiles
en varias naciones han producido sangrientes luchas fratricidas. Si no tuviera en cuenta mas que la
solitud original y los hechos probados, la mocion de reconsideracion debe ser denegada en cuanto a
mi voto sobre la falta de jurisdiccion. La jurisdiccion no se confiere por la simple solicitud de una
parte, ni por la anuencia de amas, sino por la ley o por la Constitucion.
La apelacion del recurrente de que este Tribunal asuma jurisdiccion para evitar derramamiento de
sangre llega al corazon. Como magistrado, no deben importante las consecuencias; pero como
ciudadano, me duele ver una lucha enconada entre dos grupos en el Senado sin fin practico. Al
pueblo interesa que la Legislatura reanude su funcionamiento normal. Fuerza es transigir, pues, para
que haya seis votos que sostengan que este Tribunal tiene jurisdiccion. Si insisto en mi opinion
anterior, fracasara todo esfuerzo de reajustre de nuestras opiniones para dar fin a la crisis en el
Senado.
El Sr. Presidente del Tribunal y los Sres. Magistrados Perfecto y briones opinian hoy que
hubo quorum en la continuacion de la sesion despues de la marcha del Senador Avelino y
compaeros. Con ellos, ya hay siete votos que sostienen que las resoluciones votadas por los doce
senadores son legales y validas. pero para dar fuerza legal a esta conclusion, es indispensable que
el tribunal la declare con jurisdiccion. Contribuyo mi grando de arena a la feliz conclusion de un
conflicto que esta minando el interes publico: voto hoy por que el Tribunal asuma jurisdiccion para
dar fuerza a mi opinion anterior de que los doce senadores formaban quorum.
De be denegarse la mocion de reconsideracion.


PERFECTO, J., concurring:
The problem of democracy must be faced not in the abstract but as practical question, as part of the
infinitely motley aspects of human life. They cannot be considered as scientific propositions or
hypothesis independently from the actual workings of the unpredictable flights of the spirit which seen
to elude the known laws of the external world. Experience appears to be the only reliable guide in
judging human conduct. Birth and death rates and incidence of illness are complied in statistics for
the study and determination of human behavior, and statistics are one of the means by which the
teaching may render their quota of contribution in finding the courses leading to the individual well-
being and collective happiness.
The way this case has been disposed of by the Supreme Court, upon the evidence coming from
many quarters and sectors, is provenly far from being conducive to democratic eudaemonia. We
intended to settle the controversy between petitioner and respondent, but actually we left hanging in
the air the important and, indeed, vital questions. They posed before us in quest of enlightenment and
reasonable and just in a quandary.
We can take judicial notice that legislative work has been at a standstill; the normal and ordinary
functioning of the Senate has been hampered by the non-attendance to sessions of about one-half of
the members; warrants of arrest have been issued, openly defied, and remained unexecuted like
mere scraps of paper, notwithstanding the fact that the persons to be arrested are prominent persons
with well-known addresses and residences and have been in daily contact with news reporters and
photographers. Farce and mockery have been interspersed with actions and movements provoking
conflicts which invite bloodshed.
It is highly complimentary to our Republic and to our people that, notwithstanding the overflow of
political passions and the irreconcilable attitude of warring factions, enough self-restraint has been
shown to avoid any clash of forces. Indeed there is no denying that the situation, as abstaining in the
upper chamber of congress, is highly explosive. It had echoed in the House of the Representatives. It
has already involved in the House of the Representatives. It has already involved the President of the
Philippines. The situation has created a veritable national crisis, and it is apparent that solution
cannot be expected from any quarter other then this Supreme Court, upon which the quarter other
than this Supreme Court, upon which the hopes of the people for an effective settlement are pinned.
The Avelino group, composed of eleven senators almost one-half of the entire body, are unanimous
in belief that this Court should take jurisdiction of the matter and decide the merits of the case one
way or another, and they are committed to abide by the decision regardless of whether they believe it
to be right or mistaken. Among the members of the so-called Cuenco group, there are several
Senators who in not remote past (see Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil., 192 and Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78
Phil., 1) have shown their conviction that in cases analogous to the present the Supreme Court has
and should exercise jurisdiction. If we include the former attitude of the senator who is at present
abroad, we will find out that they are in all eighteen (18) senators who at one time or another
recognized the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for the settlement of such momentous controversies
as the one now challenging our judicial statesmanship, our patriotism, our faith in democracy, the role
of this Court as the last bulwark of the Constitution.
In the House of Representatives unmistakable statements have been made supporting the stand of
the eighteen (18) senators, or of three-fourths (3/4) of the entire Upper Chamber, in support of the
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and of the contention that we should decide this case on the merits.
Judicial "hands-off" policy is, in effect, a showing of official inferiority complex. Consequently like its
parallel in the psychological field, it is premised on notions of reality fundamentally wrong. It is an
upshot of distorted past experience, warping the mind so as to become unable to have a healthy
appraisal of reality in its true form.
It is futile to invoke precedents in support of such an abnormal judicial abdication. The decision in the
Alejandrinovs. Quezon, 46 Phil., 83, is absolutely devoid of any authority. It was rendered by a
colonial Supreme Court to suit the imperialistic policies of the masters. That explains its glaring
inconsistencies.
Also frivolous is to invoke the decision in Vera vs. Avelino, (77 Phil., 192), and Mabanag vs. Lopez
Vito, (78 Phil., 1), both patterned after the colonial philosophy pervading the decision in
Alejandrino vs. Quezon, (46 Phil., 83.) Judicial emancipation must not lag behind the political
emancipation of our Republic. The judiciary ought to ripen into maturityif it has to be true to its role as
spokesman of the collective conscience, of the conscience of humanity.
For the Supreme Court to refuse to assume jurisdiction in the case is toviolate the Constitution.
Refusal to exercise the judicial power vested in it is to transgress the fundamental law. This case
raises vital constitutionalquestions which no one can settle or decide if this Court should refuse to
decide them. It would be the saddest commentary to the wisdom, foresight and statesmanship of our
Constitutional Convention to have drafted a document leaving such a glaring hiatus in the
organization of Philippine democracy ifit failed to entrusted to the Supreme Court the authority to
decide such constitutional questions.
Our refusal to exercise jurisdiction in this case is as unjustifiable as the refusal of senators on strike to
attend the sessions of the Senate and toperform their duties. A senatorial walkout defeats the
legislative powervested by the Constitution in Congress. Judicial walkouts are even more harmful
than a laborers' strike or a legislative impasse. Society may go on normally while laborers temporarily
stop to work. Society may not be disrupted by delay in the legislative machinery. But society is
menaced with dissolution in the absence of an effective administration of justice. Anarchy and chaos
are its alternatives.
There is nothing so subversive as official abdication or walkout by the highest organs and officers of
government. If they should fail to perform their functions and duties, what is the use for minor officials
and employeesto perform theirs? The constitutional question of quorum should not be
leftunanswered.
Respondent's theory that twelve (12) senators constitute the majority requiredfor the
Senate quorum is absolutely unacceptable. The verbal changes made in the constitutional
amendment, upon the creation of Congress to replace the National Assembly, have not affected the
substance of the constitutional concept of quorum in both the original and amended contexts. The
words "all the members" used in the original, for the determination of thequorum of the National
Assembly, have been eliminated in the amendment, as regards the house of Congress, because they
were a mere surplusage. The writer of this opinion, as Member of the Second National Assembly and
in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Third Reading, was the one who proposed the
elimination of said surplusage, because "majority of each House" can mean only the majority of the
members thereof, without excluding anyone, that is, of all the members.
The word majority is a mathematical word. It has, as such, a precise and exactmathematical
meaning. A majority means more than one-half (!). It can neverbe identified with one-half (!) or less
than one-half (!). It involved acomparative idea in which the antithesis between more and less is
etched in the background of reality as a metaphysical absolute as much as the antithesis of all
opposites, and in the same way that the affirmative cannot be confused with the negative, the
creation with nothingness, existence withnon-existence, truth with falsehood.
The Senate is composed of twelve four (24) senators. The majority of said senators cannot be less
than thirteen (13). Twelve (12) do not constitute the majority in a group composed of twelve four (24)
units. This is so evident that is not necessary to have the mathematical genius of Pythagoras, Euclid,
Newton and Pascal to see it. Any elementary school student may immediately perceive it.
No amount of mental gymnastic or juristic logodaedaly will convince anyone that one of the two equal
number constitute a majority part of the two numbers combined. The five (5) fingers of one hand
cannot be the majorityof the combined ten (10) fingers of the two hands. Majority is incompatiblewith
equality. It implies the idea of superiority.
Majority is a derivative of major which, in its turn, is a derivative of the Latin "magnus," meaning great.
Majority means the greater of two numbers that are regarded as part of a total: the number greater
than half. It implies a whole of which constitute the greater part or portion. It presupposes the
existence of a total and, in the present case, the total number of twelve four (24) senators composing
the Senate.
The above pronouncements notwithstanding, we are now inclined to conclude that for the purpose of
choosing respondent merely as Acting of the Senate, asan emergency measure to fill the vacuum
created by petitioner's desertion of the office of presiding officer by his walked in the session of
February 21, 1949, the presence of the twelve (12) senators was enough quorum.
The Constitution provides:
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number
may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent members in such
manner and under such penalties as such House may provide. (Sec. 10, Article VI.)
The "smaller number" referred to in the above provision has to act collectively and cannot act as
collective body to perform the function specially vested in it by the Constitution unless presided by
one among theirnumber. The collective body constituted by said "smaller number" has to take
measure to "compel the attendance of absent member in such manner and underpenalties as such
House may provide," so as to avoid disruption in the functions of the respective legislative chamber.
Said "smaller number" maybe twelve or even less than twelve senators to constitute a quorum for the
election of a temporary or acting president, who will have to act until normalcy is restored.
As events have developed after the decision in this case has been rendered on March 4, 1949, the
picture of the petitioner's attitude has acquired clearerand more definite form, and that picture brings
us to the conclusion that thiscase turned into a moot one.
At the hearing of this case for the reception of evidence before Mr. Justice Bengzon, Senator Mariano
J. Cuenco, the respondent, on cross-examination bySenator Vicente J. Francisco, counsel for
petitioner, manifested that he waslooking for an opportunity to renounce the position of Acting
President of the Senate, and that if Senator Jose Avelino, the petitioner, should attend the sessions.
He would only make of record his protest, and never resort to force or violence to stop petitioner from
presiding over said sessions.
The last statement as to allowing petitioner to preside over the sessions was made by respondent
under oath twice, and petitioner, although he refused to attend the hearing of this case, so much so
that, instead of testifying, he just signed an affidavit which, under the rules of procedure, is
inadmissible as incompetent and is as valueless as an empty gesture, could not fail to learn about
respondent's testimony, because it was given publicity, it is recorded in the transcript, and petitioner's
counsel, Senator Francisco, would certainly not have failed to inform him about it.
Notwithstanding respondent's testimony, petitioner failed to take advantage of it and continues to
refuse to attend the sessions of the Senate since he and his group of senators have walked out from
the historic Monday session of February 21, 1949.
If petitioner is sincere in his desire of presiding over the sessions of the Senate, for which reason he
has sought the help of the Supreme Court, why has he failed to take advantage of the commitment
made under oath by respondent since February 26, 1949? Why has he, since then, been not only
failing but refusing to attend the sessions and preside over them? Why is it that petitioner and his
group of Senators have given occasion, in fact, compelled the senators of the Cuenco group to issue
warrants of arrest to remedy the lack of quorum that has been hampering the sessions of the Senate?
Why is it that the Senate sergeant-at-arms, his subordinates and the peace officers helping him, have
to be hunting for the senators of the Avelino group in a, so far, fruitless if not farcical endeavor to
compel them to attend the sessions?
The events that have been unfolding before our eyes, played up everyday in screaming headlines in
all newspapers and of which, by their very nature, we cannot fail to take judicial notice, considered,
weighed and analyzed in relation with the happenings in the Friday and Monday sessions, February
18 and 21, 1949, have driven into our mind the conviction that, powers and prestige which command
the position of President of the Senate, he actually has no earnest desire to preside over the sessions
of the Senate, the most characteristic and important function of President of the Senate.
His refusal to attend the sessions, notwithstanding respondent's commitment to allow him to preside
over them, can and should logically be interpreted as an abandonment which entails forfeiture of
office. (Santiago vs. Agustin, 46 Phil., 14; Ortiz vs. De Guzman, 49 Phil., 371; 46 Corpus Juris p. 980-
981; Wilkinson vs. City of Birmingham, 68 So. 999; 43 American Jurisprudence p. 27).
What are petitioner's reasons for refusing to attend the Senate sessions? What are his group's
reason? They say that they want a square decision on the merits of this case, for which reason the
motion for reconsideration has been filed. Although we believe that the Supreme majority vote, to
exercise jurisdiction in this case, and the inconsistency in the position taken by some Members of the
majority has only increased public bewilderment, stronger reasons for petitioner and his group to
sabotage the sessions of the Senate.
If this Court had decided this case as the four dissenters would have it, there cannot be any doubt
that the Senate impasse would have been settled many days ago and, with it, the present national
crisis hampering and armstringing the legislative machinery. .
The gravity of the situation cannot be gainsaid. The showings of open defiance to warrants of arrest
are highly demoralizing. People are asking and wondering if senators are placed above the law that
they can simply ignore warrants of arrest and despite the authority of the officers entrusted with the
execution. Threats of violence pervade the air. Congress is neglecting the public interests that
demand remedial legislation. The present state of confusion, of alarm, of bewilderment, of strife would
have ended if, for the reasons we have stated in our dissenting opinion, the Supreme Court would
have ordered petitioner's reposition.
Once petitioner had been recognized to continue to be the President of the Senate, he would
certainly have attended the Senate sessions to preside over them. Then the sessions with senators of
the Avelino group attending, would have been held with the constitutional quorum. The twelve
senators of the Cuenco group would have the opportunity of voting solidly to ratify or to reenact all the
disputed actuations of the rump session of February 21, 1949, and there is no doubt that they would
have succeeded in ousting petitioner and electing respondent to the position of President of the
Senate.
Everything then would have followed the normal course. With the presence of a clear and
unquestionable quorum, petitioner and his followers would have no ground for any complaint, and
respondent could have assumed the Senate's presidency without any hitch.
Of course, petitioner and the senators of his group might have resorted again to the same strategy,
by quorum the rump session of February 21, 1949, but it is not probable that they would have taken
the same course of action after this Court, almost unanimously declared that petitioner's action in
adjourning the session of February 21, 1949, was arbitrary and illegal. At any rate, the Senators of
the Cuenco group would have been by then well prepared to have orders of arrest ready for
immediate execution before the striking senators could leave the building housing the session hall.
The abnormal situation in the Senate must be stopped at once. Legislation must go on. The serious
charges filed or may be filed against petitioner, respondent and other senators demand imperatively
investigation and action to acquit the innocent and to punish the guilty ones. Public interest cannot
demand less.
Under such circumstances, petitioner has lost all title to claim the position in controversy. This result
will not legally or practically close any door for him to again seek the position by attending the
sessions of the Senate and by securing a majority that would support him in his bid.
The motion for reconsideration should be denied.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-17931 February 28, 1963
CASCO PHILIPPINE CHEMICAL CO., INC., petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO GIMENEZ, in his capacity as Auditor General of the Philippines,
and HON. ISMAEL MATHAY, in his capacity as Auditor of the Central Bank, respondents.
Jalandoni & Jamir for petitioner.
Officer of the Solicitor General for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
This is a petition for review of a decision of the Auditor General denying a claim for refund of
petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.
The main facts are not disputed. Pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 2609, otherwise
known as the Foreign Exchange Margin Fee Law, the Central Bank of the Philippines issued on July
1, 1959, its Circular No. 95. fixing a uniform margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. To
supplement the circular, the Bank later promulgated a memorandum establishing the procedure for
applications for exemption from the payment of said fee, as provided in said Republic Act No. 2609.
Several times in November and December 1959, petitioner Casco Philippine Chemical Co., Inc.
which is engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues, used in bonding lumber and veneer by
plywood and hardwood producers bought foreign exchange for the importation of urea and
formaldehyde which are the main raw materials in the production of said glues and paid therefor
the aforementioned margin fee aggregating P33,765.42. In May, 1960, petitioner made another
purchase of foreign exchange and paid the sum of P6,345.72 as margin fee therefor.
Prior thereto, petitioner had sought the refund of the first sum of P33,765.42, relying upon Resolution
No. 1529 of the Monetary Board of said Bank, dated November 3, 1959, declaring that the separate
importation of urea and formaldehyde is exempt from said fee. Soon after the last importation of these
products, petitioner made a similar request for refund of the sum of P6,345.72 paid as margin fee
therefor. Although the Central Bank issued the corresponding margin fee vouchers for the refund of
said amounts, the Auditor of the Bank refused to pass in audit and approve said vouchers, upon the
ground that the exemption granted by the Monetary Board for petitioner's separate importations of
urea and formaldehyde is not in accord with the provisions of section 2, paragraph XVIII of Republic
Act No. 2609. On appeal taken by petitioner, the Auditor General subsequently affirmed said action of
the Auditor of the Bank. Hence, this petition for review.
The only question for determination in this case is whether or not "urea" and "formaldehyde" are
exempt by law from the payment of the aforesaid margin fee. The pertinent portion of Section 2 of
Republic Act No. 2609 reads:
The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the provision of section one hereof
shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign exchange for the importation of the following:.
x x x x x x x x x
XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard when imported by
and for the exclusive use of end-users.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and
approved by this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to
prove their case not covered by this stipulation of facts. 1wph1.t
Petitioner maintains that the term "urea formaldehyde" appearing in this provision should be
construed as "ureaand formaldehyde" (emphasis supplied) and that respondents herein, the Auditor
General and the Auditor of the Central Bank, have erred in holding otherwise. In this connection, it
should be noted that, whereas "urea" and "formaldehyde" are the principal raw materials in the
manufacture of synthetic resin glues, the National Institute of Science and Technology has
expressed, through its Commissioner, the view that:
Urea formaldehyde is not a chemical solution. It is the synthetic resin formed as a
condensation product from definite proportions of urea and formaldehyde under certain
conditions relating to temperature, acidity, and time of reaction. This produce when applied in
water solution and extended with inexpensive fillers constitutes a fairly low cost adhesive for
use in the manufacture of plywood.
Hence, "urea formaldehyde" is clearly a finished product, which is patently distinct and different from
urea" and "formaldehyde", as separate articles used in the manufacture of the synthetic resin known
as "urea formaldehyde". Petitioner contends, however, that the bill approved in Congress contained
the copulative conjunction "and" between the terms "urea" and "formaldehyde", and that the members
of Congress intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as essential elements in the
manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea" formaldehyde", not the latter as a finished
product, citing in support of this view the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the
consideration of the bill before said House, by members thereof. But, said individual statements do
not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the intent of the House of
Representatives (see Song Kiat Chocolate Factory vs. Central Bank, 54 Off. Gaz., 615; Mayon
Motors Inc. vs. Acting Commissioner of Internal Revenue, L-15000 [March 29, 1961]; Manila Jockey
Club, Inc. vs. Games & Amusement Board, L-12727 [February 29, 1960]). Furthermore, it is well
settled that the enrolled bill which uses the term "urea formaldehyde" instead of "urea and
formaldehyde" is conclusive upon the courts as regards the tenor of the measure passed by
Congress and approved by the President (Primicias vs. Paredes, 61 Phil. 118, 120; Mabanag vs.
Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1; Macias vs. Comm. on Elections, L-18684, September 14, 1961). If there has
been any mistake in the printing ofthe bill before it was certified by the officers of Congress and
approved by the Executive on which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of
separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our democratic system the
remedy is by amendment or curative legislation, not by judicial decree.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. It is
so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes, Dizon, Regala
and Makalintal, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 97710 September 26, 1991
DR. EMIGDIO A. BONDOC, petitioner,
vs.
REPRESENTATIVES MARCIANO M. PINEDA, MAGDALENO M. PALACOL, COL. JUANITO G.
CAMASURA, JR., or any other representative who may be appointed vice representative
Juanita G. Camasura, Jr., and THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL
TRIBUNAL, respondents.
Estelito P. Mendoza, Romulo C. Felixmera and Horacio S.J. Apostol for petitioner.
Nicanor S. Bautista for respondent Marciano M. Pineda.
Benedicto R. Palacol for respondent M.M. Palacol.

GRIO-AQUIO, J.:p
This case involves a question of power. May the House of Representatives, at the request of the
dominant political party therein, change that party's representation in the House Electoral Tribunal to
thwart the promulgation of a decision freely reached by the tribunal in an election contest pending
therein? May the Supreme Court review and annul that action of the House?
Even the Supreme Court of the United States over a century ago, in Marbury vs. Madison, 2 L. ed. 60
(1803), had hesitated to embark upon a legal investigation of the acts of the other two branches of the
Government, finding it "peculiarly irksome as well as delicate" because it could be considered by
some as "an attempt to intrude" into the affairs of the other two and to intermeddle with their
prerogatives.
In the past, the Supreme Court, as head of the third and weakest branch of our Government, was all
too willing to avoid a political confrontation with the other two branches by burying its head ostrich-like
in the sands of the "political question" doctrine, the accepted meaning of which is that 'where the
matter involved is left to a decision by the people acting in their sovereign capacity or to the sole
determination by either or both the legislative or executive branch of the government, it is beyond
judicial cognizance. Thus it was that in suits where the party proceeded against was either the
President or Congress, or any of its branches for that matter, the courts refused to act." (Aquino vs.
Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196.)
In time, however, the duty of the courts to look into the constitutionality and validity of legislative or
executive action, especially when private rights are affected came to be recognized. As we pointed
out in the celebrated Aquino case, a showing that plenary power is granted either department of
government may not be an obstacle to judicial inquiry, for the improvident exercise or the abuse
thereof may give rise to a justiciable controversy. Since "a constitutional grant of authority is not
usually unrestricted, limitations being provided for as to what may be done and how it is to be
accomplished, necessarily then, it becomes the responsibility of the courts to ascertain whether the
two coordinate branches have adhered to the mandate of the fundamental law. The question thus
posed is judicial rather than political. The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld" (Aquino vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196).
That duty is a part of the judicial power vested in the courts by an express grant under Section 1,
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution of the Philippines which defines judicial power as
both authority and duty of the courts 'to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
the Government."
The power and duty of the courts to nullify in appropriate cases, the actions of the executive and
legislative branches of the Government, does not mean that the courts are superior to the President
and the Legislature. It does mean though that the judiciary may not shirk "the irksome task" of
inquiring into the constitutionality and legality of legislative or executive action when a justiciable
controversy is brought before the courts by someone who has been aggrieved or prejudiced by such
action, as in this case. It is
a plain exercise of the judicial power, that power vested in courts to enable them to
administer justice according to law. ... It is simply a necessary concomitant of the power
to hear and dispose of a case or controversy properly before the court, to the
determination of which must be brought the test and measure of the law. (Vera vs.
Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, 203.)
In the local and congressional elections held on May 11, 1987, Marciano M. Pineda of the Laban ng
Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio A. Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party (NP) were rival
candidates for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of the province of Pampanga.
Each received the following votes in the canvass made by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of
Pampanga:
Marciano M. Pineda.................... 31,700 votes
Emigdio A. Bondoc..................... 28,400 votes
Difference...................................... 3,300 votes
On May 19, 1987, Pineda was proclaimed winner in the election. In due time, Bondoc filed a protest
(HRET Case No. 25) in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal ( for short) which is
composed of nine (9) members, three of whom are Justices of the Supreme Court and the remaining
six are members of the House of Representatives chosen on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and the parties or organizations registered under the party-list system
represented therein (Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) as follows:
AMEURFINA M. HERRERA Chairman
Associate Justice
Supreme Court
ISAGANI A. CRUZ Member
Associate Justice
Supreme Court
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO Member
Associate Justice
Supreme Court
HONORATO Y. AQUINO Member
Congressman
1st District
Benguet LDP
DAVID A. PONCE DE LEON Member
Congressman
1st District Palawan
LDP
SIMEON E. GARCIA, JR. Member
Congressman
2nd District Nueva Ecija
LDP
JUANITO G. CAMASURA, JR. Member
Congressman
1st District Davao del Sur
LDP
JOSE E. CALINGASAN Member
Congressman
4th District Batangas
LDP
ANTONIO H. CERILLES Member
Congressman
2nd District Zamboanga del Sur
(formerly GAD, now NP)
After the revision of the ballots, the presentation of evidence, and submission of memoranda,
Bondoc's protest was submitted for decision in July, 1989.
By October 1990, a decision had been reached in which Bondoc won over Pineda by a margin of
twenty-three (23) votes. At that point, the LDP members in the Tribunal insisted on a reappreciation
and recount of the ballots cast in some precincts, thereby delaying by at least four (4) months the
finalization of the decision in the case.
The reexamination and re-appreciation of the ballots resulted in increasing Bondoc's lead over Pineda
to 107 votes. Congressman Camasura voted with the Supreme Court Justices and Congressman
Cerilles to proclaim Bondoc the winner of the contest.
Moved by candor and honesty, Congressman Camasura revealed on March 4, 1991, to his 'Chief,"
Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr., LDP Secretary General, not only the final tally in the Bondoc
case but also that he voted for Bondoc "consistent with truth and justice and self- respect," and to
honor a "gentlemen's agreement" among the members of the HRET that they would "abide by the
result of the appreciation of the contested ballot
1
Congressman Camasura's revelation stirred a
hornets' nest in the LDP which went into a flurry of plotting appropriate moves to neutralize the pro-
Bondoc majority in the Tribunal.
On March 5, 1991, the HRET issued a Notice of Promulgation of Decision on March 14, 1991 at 2:30
P.M. in HRET Case No. 25. A copy of the notice was received by Bondoc's counsel on March 6,
1991.
On March 13, 1991, the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Congressman Cojuangco
informed Congressman Camasura by letter
2
that on February 28, 1991 yet, the LDP Davao del Sur
Chapter at Digos, Davao del Sur, by Resolution No. 03-91 had already expelled him and
Congressman Benjamin Bautista from the LDP for having allegedly helped to organize the Partido
Pilipino of Eduardo "Danding" Cojuangco, and for allegedly having invited LDP members in Davao del
Sur to join said political party; and that as those acts are "not only inimical uncalled for, unethical and
immoral, but also a complete betrayal to (sic) the cause and objectives, and loyalty to LDP," in a
meeting on March 12, 1991, the LDP Executive Committee unanimously confirmed the expulsions.
3

At the same time, Congressman Cojuangco notified Speaker Ramon V. Mitra about the ouster of the
two congressmen from the LDP, and asked the House of Representatives, through the Speaker, to
take note of it 'especially in matters where party membership is a prerequisite.
4

At 9:45 in the morning of March 4, 1991, the Chairman of the Tribunal, Mme. Justice Armeurfina M.
Herrera, received the following letter dated March 13, 1991, from the Office of the Secretary General
of the House of Representatives, informing the Tribunal that on the basis of the letter from the LDP,
the House of Representatives, during its plenary session on March 13, 1991, decided to withdraw the
nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura, Jr. to the House of Electoral
Tribunal. The letter reads as follows:
13 March 1991
Honorable Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera Chairman
House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal Constitution Hills Quezon City
Dear Honorable Justice Melencio-Herrera:
I have the honor to notify the House of Electoral Tribunal of the decision of the House of
Representatives during its plenary session on 13 March 1991, to withdraw the
nomination and to rescind the election of the Honorable Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. to the
House Electoral Tribunal on the basis of an LDP communication which is self-
explanatory and copies of which are hereto attached.
Thank you.
For the Secretary-General
(SGD.) Josefina D. Azarcon Officer-in-charge Operations Department (p. 10, Rollo.)
Justices Herrera, Cruz, and Feliciano promptly apprised the Chief Justice and Associate Justices of
the Supreme Court in writing, of this "distressing development' and asked to be relieved from their
assignments in the HRET because
By the above action (of the House) the promulgation of the decision of the Tribunal in
the electoral protest entitled "Bondoc v. Pineda" (HRET Case No. 25), previously
scheduled for 14 March 1991, is sought to be aborted (See the Consolidated Bank and
Trust Corporation v. Hon. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 73777-78
promulgated 12 September 1990). Even if there were no legal impediment to its
promulgation, the decision which was reached on a 5 to 4 vote may now be confidently
expected to be overturned on a motion for reconsideration by the party-litigant which
would have been defeated.
The decision in Bondoc v. Pineda was ready as early as October 1990 with a margin of
23 votes in favor of protestant Bondoc. Because some members of the Tribunal
requested re-appreciation of some ballots, the finalization of the decision had to be
deferred by at least 4 months.
With the re-appreciation completed, the decision, now with a margin of 107 votes in
favor of protestant Bondoc, and concurred in by Justices Ameurfina A. Melencio-
Herrera, Isagani A. Cruz and Florentino P. Feliciano, and Congressmen Juanita G.
Camasura and Antonio H. Cerilles, is set for promulgation on 14 March 1991, with
Congressmen Honorato Y. Aquino, David A. Ponce de Leon Simeon E. Garcia, Jr. and
Jose E. Calingasan, dissenting.
Congressman Casamura's vote in the Bondoc v. Pineda case was, in our view, a
conscience vote, for which he earned the respect of the Tribunal but also the loss of the
confidence of the leader of his party.
Under the above circumstances an untenable situation has come about. It is extremely
difficult to continue with membership in the Tribunal and for the Tribunal to preserve it. 8
integrity and credibility as a constitutional body charged with a judicial task. It is clear to
us that the unseating of an incumbent member of Congress is being prevented at all
costs. We believe that the Tribunal should not be hampered in the performance of its
constitutional function by factors which have nothing to do with the merits of the cases
before it.
In this connection, our own experience teaches that the provision for proportional
representation in the Tribunal found in Article VI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution,
should be amended to provide instead for a return to the composition mandated in the
1935 Constitution, that is: three (3) members chosen by the House or Senate upon
nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three (3) of the party
having the second largest number of votes: and a judicial component consisting of three
(3) justices from the Supreme Court. Thereby, no party or coalition of parties can
dominate the legislative component in the Tribunal.
In the alternative, the Senate Electoral Tribunal could perhaps sit as the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives. Similarly, the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal could sit as
the sole judge of all such contests involving members of the Senate. In this way, there
should be lesser chances of non-judicial elements playing a decisive role in the
resolution of election contests.
We suggest that there should also be a provision in the Constitution that upon
designation to membership in the Electoral Tribunal, those so designated should divest
themselves of affiliation with their respective political parties, to insure their
independence and objectivity as they sit in Tribunal deliberations.
There are only three (3) remaining cases for decision by the Tribunal. Bondoc should
have been promulgated today, 14 March 1991. Cabrera v. Apacible (HRET Case No.
21) is scheduled for promulgation on 31 March 1991 and Lucman v. Dimaporo (HRET
Case No. 45), after the Holy Week recess.
But political factors are blocking the accomplishment of the constitutionally mandated
task of the Tribunal well ahead of the completion of the present congressional term.
Under these circumstances, we are compelled to ask to be relieved from the
chairmanship and membership in the Tribunal.
xxx xxx xxx
At the open session of the HRET in the afternoon of the same day, the Tribunal issued Resolution
No. 91-0018 cancelling the promulgation of the decision in HRET Case No. 25. The resolution reads:
In view of the formal notice the Tribunal has received at 9:45 tills morning from the
House of Representatives that at its plenary session held on March 13, 1991, it had
voted to withdraw the nomination and rescind the election of Congressman Camasura
to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal,' the Tribunal Resolved to cancel the
promulgation of its Decision in Bondoc vs. Pineda (HRET Case No. 25) scheduled for
this afternoon. This is because, without Congressman Camasura's vote, the decision
lacks the concurrence of five members as required by Section 24 of the Rules of the
Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be validly promulgated.
The Tribunal noted that the three (3) Justices-members of the Supreme Court, being of
the opinion that this development undermines the independence of the Tribunal and
derails the orderly adjudication of electoral cases, they have asked the Chief Justice, in
a letter of even date, for their relief from membership in the Tribunal.
The Tribunal further Noted that Congressman Cerilles also manifested his intention to
resign as a member of the Tribunal.
The Tribunal further Noted that Congressmen Aquino, Ponce de Leon, Garcia, Jr., and
Calingasan also manifested a similar intention. (p. 37, Rollo.)
On March 19, 1991, this Court, after deliberating on the request for relief of Justices Herrera, Cruz
and Feliciano, resolved to direct them to return to their duties in the Tribunal. The Court observed
that:
... in view of the sensitive constitutional functions of the Electoral Tribunals as the 'sole
judge' of all contests relationship to the election, returns and qualifications of the
members of Congress, all members of these bodies are appropriately guided only by
purely legal considerations in the decision of the cases before them and that in the
contemplation of the Constitution the members-legislators, thereof, upon assumption of
their duties therein, sit in the Tribunal no longer as representatives of their respective
political parties but as impartial judges. The view was also submitted that, to further
bolster the independence of the Tribunals, the term of office of every member thereof
should be considered co-extensive with the corresponding legislative term and may not
be legally terminated except only by death, resignation, permanent disability, or removal
for valid cause, not including political disloyalty.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved: a) to DECLINE the request of justices Herrera,
Cruz, and Feliciano to be relieved from their membership in the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal and instead to DIRECT them to resume their duties
therein: b) to EXPRESS its concern over the intrusion of non-judicial factors in the
proceedings of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, which performs
functions purely judicial in character despite the inclusion of legislators in its
membership; and c) to NOTE the view that the term of all the members of the Electoral
Tribunals, including those from the legislature, is co-extensive with the corresponding
legislative term and cannot be terminated at will but only for valid legal cause, and to
REQUIRE the Justices-members of the Tribunal to submit the issue to the said Tribunal
in the first instance.
Paras J. filed this separate concurring opinion: 'I concur, but I wish to add that Rep.
Camasura should be allowed to cast his original vote in favor of protestant Bondoc,
otherwise a political and judicial travesty will take place.' Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and
Feliciano, JJ., took no part. Gancayco, J., is on leave.
On March 21, 1991, a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus was filed by Dr. Emigdio A.
Bondoc against Representatives Marciano M. Pineda, Magdaleno M. Palacol, Juanita G. Camasura,
Jr., or any other representative who may be appointed Vice Representative Juanita G. Camasura, Jr.,
and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, praying this Court to:
1. Annul the decision of the House of Representatives of March 13, 1991, 'to withdraw
the nomination and to rescind the nomination of Representative Juanita G. Camasura,
Jr. to the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;"
2. Issue a wilt of prohibition restraining respondent Palacol or whomsoever may be
designated in place of respondent Camasura from assuming, occupying and
discharging functions as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal;
3. Issue a writ of mandamus ordering respondent Camasura to immediately reassume
and discharge his functions as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal; and
4. Grant such other relief as may be just and equitable.
Upon receipt of the petition, the Court, without giving it due course, required the respondents to
comment
5
on the petition within ten days from notice and to enjoin the HRET 'from reorganizing and
allowing participation in its proceedings of Honorable Magdaleno M. Palacol or whoever is designated
to replace Honorable Juanita G. Camasura in said House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, until
the issue of the withdrawal of the nomination and rescission of the election of said Congressman
Camasura as member of the HRET by the House of Representatives is resolved by this Court, or until
otherwise ordered by the Court." (p. 39, Rollo.)
Congressman Juanito G. Camasura, Jr. did not oppose the petition.
Congressman Marciano M. Pineda's plea for the dismissal of the petition is centered on Congress'
being the sole authority that nominates and elects from its members. Upon recommendation by the
political parties therein, those who are to sit in the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (and
in the Commission on Appointments as well), hence, it allegedly has the sole power to remove any of
them whenever the ratio in the representation of the political parties in the House or Senate is
materially changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or expulsion from the political
party;
6
that a Tribunal member's term of office is not co-extensive with his legislative term,
7
for if a
member of the Tribunal who changes his party affiliation is not removed from the Tribunal, the
constitutional provision mandating representation based on political affiliation would be completely
nullified;
8
and that the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the LDP, is "purely a party affair" of
the LDP
9
and the decision to rescind his membership in the House Electoral Tribunal is the sole
prerogative of the House-of-Representative Representatives, hence, it is a purely political question
beyond the reach of judicial review.
10

In his comment, respondent Congressman Magdaleno M. Palacol alleged that the petitioner has no
cause of action against him because he has not yet been nominated by the LDP for membership in
the HRET.
11
Moreover, the petition failed to implead the House of Representatives as an
indispensable party for it was the House, not the HRET that withdrew and rescinded Congressman
Camasura's membership in the HRET.
12

The Solicitor General, as counsel for the Tribunal, argued in a similar vein; that the inclusion of the
HETH as a party respondent is erroneous because the petition states no cause of action against the
Tribunal. The petitioner does not question any act or order of the HRET in violation of his rights. What
he assails is the act of the House of Representatives of withdrawing the nomination, and rescinding
the election, of Congressman Juanita nito Camasura as a member of the HRET.
13

Replying to the Solicitor General's Manifestation, the petitioner argued that while the Tribunal indeed
had nothing to do with the assailed decision of the House of Representatives, it acknowledged that
decision by cancelling the promulgation of its decision in HRET Case No. 25 to his (Bondoc's)
prejudice.
14
Hence, although the Tribunal may not be an indispensable party, it is a necessary party
to the suit, to assure that complete relief is accorded to the petitioner for "in the ultimate, the Tribunal
would have to acknowledge, give recognition, and implement the Supreme Court's decision as to
whether the relief of respondent Congressman Camasura from the Office of the Electoral Tribunal is
valid."
15

In his reply to Congressman Palacol's Comment, the petitioner explained that Congressman Palacol
was impleaded as one of the respondents in this case because after the House of Representatives
had announced the termination of Congressman Camasura's membership in the HETH several
newspapers of general circulation reported that the House of Representatives would nominate and
elect Congressman Palacol to take Congressman Camasura's seat in the Tribunal.
16

Now, is the House of Representatives empowered by the Constitution to do that, i.e., to interfere with
the disposition of an election contest in the House Electoral Tribunal through the ruse of
"reorganizing" the representation in the tribunal of the majority party?
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution supplies the answer to that question. It provides:
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral
Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of their respective members, Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed
of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate
or House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on the basis of
proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman.
Section 17 reechoes Section 11, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, except the provision on the
representation of the main political parties in the tribunal which is now based
on proportional representation from all the political parties, instead of equal representation of three
members from each of the first and second largest political aggrupations in the Legislature. The 1935
constitutional provision reads as follows:
Sec. 11. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall have an Electoral Tribunal
which shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of their respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed
of nine Members, three of whom shall be Justices of the Supreme Court to be
designated by the Chief Justice, and the remaining six shall be Members of the Senate
or of the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen by each
House, three upon nomination of the party having the largest number of votes and three
of the party having the second largest member of votes therein. The senior Justice in
each Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman. (1 935 Constitution of the Philippines.)
Under the above provision, the Justices held the deciding votes, aid it was impossible for any political
party to control the voting in the tribunal.
The 1973 Constitution did not provide for an electoral tribunal in the Batasang Pambansa.
The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and Section 11 of the 1935
Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the House Electoral Tribunal as judge of
contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives (Robles vs. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 86647, February
5, 1990). The tribunal was created to function as a nonpartisan court although two-thirds of its
members are politicians. It is a non-political body in a sea of politicians. What this Court had earlier
said about the Electoral Commission applies as well to the electoral tribunals of the Senate and
House of Representatives:
The purpose of the constitutional convention creating the Electoral Commission was to
provide an independent and impartial tribunal for the determination of contests to
legislative office, devoid of partisan consideration, and to transfer to that tribunal all the
powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested
elections of its members.
The power granted to the electoral Commission to judge contests relating to the election
and qualification of members of the National Assembly is intended to be as complete
and unimpaired as if it had remained in the legislature.
The Electoral Tribunals of the Senate and the House were created by the Constitution
as special tribunals to be the sole judge of all contests relating to election returns and
qualifications of members of the legislative houses, and, as such, are independent
bodies which must be permitted to select their own employees, and to supervise and
control them, without any legislative interference. (Suanes vs. Chief Accountant of the
Senate, 81 Phil. 818.)
To be able to exercise exclusive jurisdiction, the House Electoral Tribunal must be independent. Its
jurisdiction to hear and decide congressional election contests is not to be shared by it with the
Legislature nor with the Courts.
The Electoral Commission is a body separate from and independent of the
legislature and though not a power in the tripartite scheme of government, it is to all
intents and purposes, when acting within the limits of its authority, an independent
organ; while composed of a majority of members of the legislature it is a body separate
from and independent of the legislature.
xxx xxx xxx
The Electoral Commission, a constitutional organ created for the specific purpose of
determining contests relating to election returns and qualifications of members of the
National Assembly may not be interfered with by the judiciary when and while acting
within the limits of its authority, but the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the Electoral
Commission for the purpose of determining the character, scope and extent of the
constitutional grant to the commission as sole judge of all contests relating to the
election and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly. (Angara vs.
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139.)
The independence of the electoral tribunal was preserved undiminished in the 1987 Constitution as
the following exchanges on the subject between Commissioners Maambong and Azcuna in the 1986
Constitutional Commission, attest:
MR. MAAMBONG. Thank you.
My questions will be very basic so we can go as fast as we can. In the
case of the electoral tribunal, either of the House or of the Senate, is it
correct to say that these tribunals are constitutional creations? I will
distinguish these with the case of the Tanodbayan and the
Sandiganbayan which are created by mandate of the Constitution but they
are not constitutional creations. Is that a good distinction?
MR. AZCUNA. That is an excellent statement.
MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, say that either the Senate
Electoral Tribunal or the House Electoral Tribunal is a constitutional
body.?
MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. If it is a constitutional body, is it then subject to
constitutional restrictions?
MR. AZCUNA It would be subject to constitutional restrictions intended for
that body.
MR. MAAMBONG. I see. But I want to find out if the ruling in the case of
Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192, will still be applicable to the present bodies
we are creating since it ruled that the electoral tribunals are not separate
departments of the government. Would that ruling still be valid?
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, they are not separate departments because the
separate departments are the legislative, the executive and the judiciary;
but they are constitutional bodies.
MR. MAAMBONG. Although they are not separate departments of
government, I would like to know again if the ruling in Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, 53 Phil. 139, would still be applicable to the present bodies
we are deciding on, when the Supreme court said that these electoral
tribunals are independent from Congress, devoid of partisan influence or
consideration and, therefore, Congress has no power to regulate
proceedings of these electoral tribunals.
MR. AZCUNA. I think that is correct. They are independent although they
are not a separate branch of government.
MR. MAAMBONG. There is a statement that in all parliaments of the
world, the invariable rule is to leave unto themselves the determination of
controversies with respect to the election and qualifications of their
members, and precisely they have this Committee on Privileges which
takes care of this particular controversy.
Would the Gentleman say that the creation of electoral tribunals is an
exception to this rule because apparently we have an independent
electoral tribunal?
MR. AZCUNA. To the extent that the electoral tribunals are independent,
but the Gentleman will notice that the wordings say: 'The Senate and the
House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal. 'It is still
the Senate Electoral Tribunal and the House Electoral Tribunal. So,
technically, it is the tribunal of the House and tribunal of the Senate
although they are independent.
MR. MAAMBONG. But both of them, as we have agreed on, are
independent from both bodies?
MR. AZCUNA. That is correct.
MR. MAAMBONG. This is the bottom line of my question. How can we say
that these bodies are independent when we still have six politicians sitting
in both tribunals?
MR. AZCUNA. Politicians can be independent, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. Madam President, when we discussed a portion of this
in the Committee on the Executive, there was a comment by Chief Justice
Concepcion-Commissioner Concepcion-that there seems to be some
incongruity in these electoral tribunals, considering that politicians still sit
in the tribunals in spite of the fact that in the ruling in the case of Sanidad
vs. Vera, Senate Electoral tribunal Case No. 1, they are supposed to act in
accordance with law and justice with complete detachment from an
political considerations. That is why I am asking now for the record how
we could achieve such detachment when there are six politicians sitting
there.
MR. AZCUNA. The same reason that the Gentleman, while chosen on
behalf of the opposition, has, with sterling competence, shown
independence in the proceedings of this Commission. I think we can also
trust that the members of the tribunals will be independent. (pp. 111-112,
Journal, Tuesday, July 22, 1986, Emphasis supplied.)
Resolution of the House of Representatives violates the independence of the HRET.
The independence of the House Electoral Tribunal so zealously guarded by the framers of our
Constitution, would, however, by a myth and its proceedings a farce if the House of Representatives,
or the majority party therein, may shuffle and manipulate the political (as distinguished from the
judicial) component of the electoral tribunal, to serve the interests of the party in power.
The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman Camasura from the House
Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista
Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House
Electoral Tribunal to be the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.
To sanction such interference by the House of Representatives in the work of the House Electoral
Tribunal would reduce the tribunal to a mere tool for the aggrandizement of the party in power (LDP)
which the three justices of the Supreme Court and the lone NP member would be powerless to stop.
A minority party candidate may as well abandon all hope at the threshold of the tribunal.
Disloyalty to party is not a valid cause for termination of membership in the HRET.
As judges, the members of the tribunal must be non-partisan. They must discharge their functions
with complete detachment, impartiality, and independence even independence from the political party
to which they belong. Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid
grounds for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal. In expelling Congressman Camasura from the
HRET for having cast a conscience vote" in favor of Bondoc, based strictly on the result of the
examination and appreciation of the ballots and the recount of the votes by the tribunal, the House of
Representatives committed a grave abuse of discretion, an injustice, and a violation of the
Constitution. Its resolution of expulsion against Congressman Camasura is, therefore, null and void.
Expulsion of Congressman Camasura violates his right to security of tenure.
Another reason for the nullity of the expulsion resolution of the House of Representatives is that it
violates Congressman Camasura's right to security of tenure. Members of the HRET as "sole judge"
of congressional election contests, are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary
enjoy security of tenure under our Constitution (Sec. 2, Art. VIII, 1987 Constitution). Therefore,
membership in the House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as,
the expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his death, permanent disability,
resignation from the political party he represents in the tribunal, formal affiliation with another political
party, or removal for other valid cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of
Representatives for "party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political
group. As the records of this case fail to show that Congressman Camasura has become a registered
member of another political party, his expulsion from the LDP and from the HRET was not for a valid
cause, hence, it violated his right to security of tenure.
There is nothing to the argument of respondent Pineda that members of the House Electoral Tribunal
are not entitled to security of tenure because, as a matter of fact, two Supreme Court Justices in the
Tribunal were changed before the end of the congressional term, namely: Chief Justice Marcelo B.
Fernan who, upon his elevation to the office of Chief Justice, was replaced by Justice Florentino P.
Feliciano, and the latter, who was temporarily replaced by Justice Emilio A. Gancayco, when he (J.
Feliciano) took a leave of absence to deliver a lecture in Yale University. It should be stressed,
however, that those changes in the judicial composition to the HRET had no political implications at
all unlike the present attempt to remove Congressman Camasura. No coercion was applied on Chief
Justice Fernan to resign from the tribunal, nor on Justice Feliciano to go on a leave of absence. They
acted on their own free will, for valid reasons, and with no covert design to derail the disposition of a
pending case in the HRET.
The case of Congressman Camasura is different. He was expelled from, and by, the LDP to punish
him for "party disloyalty" after he had revealed to the Secretary-General of the party how he voted in
the Bondoc case. The purpose of the expulsion of Congressman Camasura was to nullify his vote in
the Bondoc case so that the HRET's decision may not be promulgated, and so that the way could be
cleared for the LDP to nominate a replacement for Congressman Camasura in the Tribunal. That
stratagem of the LDP and the House of Representatives is clearly aimed to substitute Congressman
Camasura's vote and, in effect, to change the judgment of the HRET in the Bondoc case.
The judicial power of this Court has been invoked by Bondoc for the protection of his rights against
the strong arm of the majority party in the House of Representatives. The Court cannot be deaf to his
plea for relief, nor indifferent to his charge that the House of Representatives had acted with grave
abuse of discretion in removing Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal. He calls
upon the Court, as guardian of the Constitution, to exercise its judicial power and discharge its duty to
protect his rights as the party aggrieved by the action of the House. The Court must perform
its duty under the Constitution "even when the violator be the highest official of the land or the
Government itself" (Concurring opinion of J. Antonio Barredo in Aquino vs. Ponce-Enrile, 59 SCRA
183, 207).
Since the expulsion of Congressman Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal by the House of
Representatives was not for a lawful and valid cause, but to unjustly interfere with the tribunal's
disposition of the Bondoc case and to deprive Bondoc of the fruits of the Tribunal's decision in his
favor, the action of the House of Representatives is clearly violative of the constitutional mandate
(Sec. 17, Art. VI, 1987 Constitution) which created the House Electoral Tribunal to be the "sole judge"
of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc. We, therefore, declare null and void the
resolution dated March 13, 1991 of the House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination, and
rescinding the election, of Congressman Camasura as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal.
The petitioner, Dr. Emigdio Bondoc, is entitled to the reliefs he prays for in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus is granted. The decision of the
House of Representatives withdrawing the nomination and rescinding the election of Congressman
Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is hereby declared null and
void ab initio for being violative of the Constitution, and Congressman Juanita G. Camasura, Jr. is
ordered reinstated to his position as a member of the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal.
The HRET Resolution No. 91-0018 dated March 14, 1991, cancelling the promulgation of the decision
in HRET Case No. 25 ("Dr. Emigdio Bondoc vs. Marciano A. Pineda") is also set aside. Considering
the unconscionable delay incurred in the promulgation of that decision to the prejudice of the speedy
resolution of electoral cases, the Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction, and in the interest of
justice, hereby declares the said decision DULY PROMULGATED, effective upon service of copies
thereof on the parties, to be done immediately by the Tribunal. Costs against respondent Marciano A.
Pineda.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Paras, Bidin, Medialdea, Regalado and Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs as certified to by the Chief Justice.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz and Feliciano, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

PADILLA, J., dissenting:
Can the Supreme Court review and annul an act of the House of Representatives, assuming that said
act were politically motivated, but well within the constitutional parameters of its authority?
The majority would postulate that the Court is empowered to do so on the strength of the second
paragraph, Section 1 of Art. VIII of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
The majority would even go as far as annul the action of the House of Representatives in withdrawing
and rescinding its nomination to the House Electoral Tribunal of Congressman Juanito J. Camasura,
Jr. and order Camasura's reinstatement to said Tribunal. I regret I cannot join the majority's posture
which, I believe, is violative of the almost sacramental doctrine of separation of powers enshrined in
the Constitution. It is for this reason that I register my dissent.
A fundamental principle in our constitutional system is that the powers of government are distributed
among three (3) great departments: legislative, executive and judicial. Each of these departments is
separate from, yet coordinate and co-equal with the others each one deriving its authority directly
from the fundamental law.
1
As Mr. Justice Moreland summarized, "the three departments are not
only coordinate, they are co-equal and co-important. While interdependent, in the sense that each is
unable to perform its functions fully and adequately without the other, they are nevertheless in many
senses independent of each other. That is to say, one department may not control or even interfere
with another in the exercise of its particular functions.
2
(Emphasis supplied)
The completeness of their separation and mutual independence does not, however, extend to the
point that those in authority in one department can ignore and treat the acts of those in authority in
the others, done pursuant to the authority vested in them, as nugatory and not binding in every other
department.
3
In other words, one department must not encroach upon nor interfere with acts done
within the constitutional competence of the other where full discretionary authority has been
delegated by the Constitution to said department. That department alone, to the exclusion of the
others, has both right and duty to exercise it free from any encroachment or interference of
whomsoever.
4

This principle or doctrine of separation of powers is enforced by the judiciary through the exercise of
its power of judicial review and prudent refusal to assume jurisdiction over cases involving political
questions.
5

In the case at bar, one notes that the dispute emerged when the House of Representatives withdrew
and rended the nomination of Congressman Juanito J. Camasura, Jr. to the House Electoral Tribunal.
This act was, it seems, precipitated by a letter of Congressman Jose S. Cojuangco, Jr. informing the
Speaker of the House of Representatives of the expulsion of Congressman Juanito J. Camasura, Jr.
from the LDP for having allegedly helped to organize the Partido Pilipino of Mr. Eduardo Cojuangco,
Jr. and for allegedly having invited other LDP members to join the said political party. As a result of
this letter, the nomination of Camasura to the House Electoral Tribunal was withdrawn at a plenary
session of the House of Representatives and the House Electoral Tribunal was informed of such
action of the House.
Petitioner assails the propriety of said action of the House of Representatives as it is, he alleges, but
a employ to thwart the promulgation of a decision in the electoral protest lodged by him (petitioner
Bondoc) against Marciano M. Pineda, a member of the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP), and
which decision would be favorable to him (Bontoc). Petitioner contends that not only does the action
of the House of Representatives violate the independence of the House Electoral Tribunal but that it
also violates the security of tenure of Congressman Camasura, Jr. in said electoral tribunal.
Congressman (respondent) Pineda, on the other hand, submits that the House of Representatives
has the sole authority to nominate and select from among its members who are to sit in the House
Electoral Tribunal, upon recommendation of the political parties therein, hence, it also has the sole
power to remove any of them from the electoral tribunal whenever the ratio in the representation of
the political parties in the House is materially changed on account of death, incapacity, removal or
expulsion of a House member from a political party. A Tribunal member's term of office in said
electoral tribunal is not, Congressman Pineda argues, co-extensive with his legislative term. Were
that the fact, the constitutional provision mandating representation in the electoral tribunal based on
political affiliation may be completely nullified in the event that a member of the Tribunal changes
party affiliation.
As provided for in the Constitution, there are nine (9) members of the House Electoral Tribunal. Three
(3) of the members of the tribunal are Justices of the Supreme Court as designated by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court. The remaining six (6) members come from the members of the House
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or
organizations registered under the partylist system.
6
The House of Representatives has the power to
nominate the members of the House Electoral Tribunal (representing the House) provided, of course,
that the proportional representation of parties is maintained.
Can the House of Representatives withdraw the nomination extended to a member of the electoral
tribunal (representing the House of Representatives) after the majority party in the House has
expelled him from its ranks? I believe it can. The power to appoint or designate a member of the
House of Representatives to be a member of the House Electoral Tribunal must, to my mind,
necessarily include the power to remove said member. A withdrawal of the nomination of a member
of the Tribunal where such withdrawal will maintain the proportional representation of the political
parties, mandated by the Constitution, must be recognized and respected, no matter how politically
motivated it might be. Constitutional law, it is said, is concerned with power not with policy, wisdom or
expediency.
7
The question that must be asked in testing the validity of such legislative act is, does
the House of Representatives have the power to do what it has done and not whether the House of
Representatives should have done what it has done.
Corollary to the above is, can the Judiciary question a legislative act done within the constitutional
authority to the legislature? I believe not, in the same way that, for instance, the House cannot
question the act of the Chief Justice, should he deem it proper to change the Justices who sit as
members of the House Electoral Tribunal. Matters such as who will be designated or nominated as
members of the electoral tribunal, how they should vote surely are matters that not merely concern
political action as far as members of the House are concerned, but are the very essence of political
action, if political life has any connotation at all. To open courts of justice to such political
controversies would have courts sit in judgment over the manifold disputes engendered by political
manuevers and skirmishes. This would drag the courts into the political arena which in the long run
could undermine and destroy their independence.
The judicial department, in my opinion, has no power to review even the most arbitrary and unfair
action of the legislative department, taken in the exercise of power committed exclusively to it by the
Constitution.
8
It is not within the province of this Court to supervise legislation or oversee legislative
acts as to keep them within the bounds of propriety, fairness and common sense. Such acts, like the
one at bar, are exclusively of legislative concern.
9
To hold otherwise would be to invalidate the
principle of separation of powers. As Judge Learned Hand so aptly observed, "one cannot find among
the powers granted to courts any authority to pass upon the validity of the decisions of another
'Department' as to the scope of that 'Department's' powers. Indeed, it is to be understood that the
three (3), Departments' were separate and co-equal, each being, as it were, a Leibnizian monad,
looking up to the Heaven of the Electorate, but without any mutual dependence. What could be better
evidence of complete dependence than to subject the validity of the decision of one 'Department' as
to its authority on a given occasion to review and reversal by another? Such a doctrine makes
supreme the Department that has the last word. "
10
(Emphasis supplied)
The Court should not lose sight of the fact that "sometimes the division of power tacitly accepted by
society runs counter to its own Ideology and to the constitutional commandments. This may be
because the society is still unsure of what the best division of power would be and so temporarily
accepts the existing one, or because the society has vacated its decisionmaking function and special
interest groups have stepped in to fill the vacuum. In either case, the Court can neither validate a
clearly unconstitutional distribution, and thereby subject its role as guardian to claims of fraud, nor
invalidate a functioning system with an order which would be ignored. To do either would be to
sacrifice the popular prestige which is the Court's primarily source of power."
11

Even assuming that the act of the House of Representatives in withdrawing and rescinding the
nomination of Congressman Camasura, Jr. as a member of the House Electoral Tribunal is politically
motivated, precipitated as it is by the knowledge of how Camasura, Jr. is to vote in one of the
electoral protests before said Tribunal, this, to me, is not sufficient reason to invalidate said act of the
House of Representatives, since it is done within the limits of its constitutional power. Besides, what
other act of the House (or Senate) is there that is not politically motivated? After all, that branch of
government is a political branch and necessarily or pragmatically all of its acts are and will always be
politically motivated.
The environmental facts of this case do not, in my considered opinion, bring it within the Court's
power to strike down the legislative act in question, it is the people of this nation not this court
who should ultimately judge the act when they cast their ballots. The Court cannot arrogate unto itself
the power to institute what it perceives to be political reforms, for in the last analysis on which all else
depend, the vitality of a political system would be greatly weakened by reliance on the judiciary for
any and all political reforms and, in time, a complacent body politic will result. It is the responsibility of
the people and none other, to remain ever vigilant about their government to the end that they can
continue to live under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy. To leave this task to the Court,
would in the long run be inimical to and destructive of democratic government itself
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DISMISS the petition.

SARMIENTO, J., disssenting:
Like my distinguished colleague Justice Teodoro Padilla, I too am unable to agree with the majority. I
believe that the questions as Justice Padilla raised it can the Court annul an act of Congress,
revamping its House Electoral Tribunal? is a political question and a question in which the Court
can not intervene.
It is true that under the Charter, the jurisdiction of this Court includes the power to strike down
excesses of any agency of Government, but the Charter did not alter or discard the principle principle
of separation of powers.
Evidently, Congressman Camasura's ouster from the Tribunal was a result of political maneuvers
within the lower house. This Court, however, is above politics and Justices should be the last persons
to get involved in the "dirty" world of politics. If they do, they risk their independence.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 105323 July 3, 1992
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
R E S O L U T I O N

BIDIN, J.:
This case was originally an urgent petition ad cautelam praying, among others, for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order enjoining respondent Commission on Elections (Comelec) from
proclaiming the 24th highest senatorial candidate.
The antecedents facts are as follows:
On May 5, 1992, this Court issued a Resolution in G.R. No. 104704, entitled "Francisco Chavez v.
Comelec, et al.," disqualifying Melchor Chavez, private respondent therein, from running for the Office
of Senator in the May 11, 1992 elections.
The above-mentioned resolution was received by respondent Comelec on May 6, 1992. On the same
day, petitioner filed an urgent motion with the Comelec praying that it (1) disseminate through the
fastest available means this Court's Resolution dated May 5, 1992 to all regional election directors,
provincial election supervisors, city and municipal election registrars, boards of election inspectors,
the six (6) accredited political parties and the general public; and (2) order said election officials to
delete the name of Melchor Chavez as printed in the certified list of candidates tally sheets, election
returns and "to count all votes cast for the disqualified Melchor Chavez in favor of Francisco I. Chavez
. . . ."
On May 8, 1992, the Comelec issued Res. No. 92-1322 which resolved to delete the name of Melchor
Chavez from the list of qualified candidates. However, it failed to order the crediting of all "Chavez"
votes in favor of petitioner as well as the cancellation of Melchor Chavez' name in the list of qualified
candidates.
According to petitioner, the Comelec failed to perform its mandatory function under Sec. 7, RA 7166
which states that if a candidate has been disqualified, it shall be the duty of the Commission to
instruct without delay the deletion of the name of said candidate.
Thus, the name of Melchor Chavez remained undeleted in the list of qualified candidates on election
day.
Confusion arose, allegedly nationwide, as the "Chavez" votes were either declared stray or
invalidated by the Boards of Election Inspectors (BEIs).
On May 11, 1992, Commissioner Rama of respondent Comelec issued a directive over radio and TV
ordering all "Chavez" votes to be credited in favor of petitioner. Petitioner contends that the radio and
TV announcements did not reach the BEI at the 170,354 precincts nationwide. As a result, "Chavez"
votes were not credited in favor of petitioner.
On May 12, 1992, Comelec issued another Resolution directing all municipal and city election
registrars throughout the country to examine the minutes of voting submitted by the BEIs and to credit
all the "Chavez" votes, which have been declared stray or invalidated by the BEIs, in favor of
petitioner.
Petitioner maintains that the said resolution proved futile because it did not reach all the various BEIs
of the 170,354 election precincts throughout the country on time for implementation and that the
minutes of voting did not indicate the number of "Chavez" votes which were declared stray or
invalidated.
On May 14, 1992, petitioner sent a letter to the Comelec requesting the latter to devise ways and
means in crediting "Chavez" votes in his favor but the respondent Commission failed to act on said
letter/complaint.
On May 23, 1992, petitioner filed an urgent petition before the respondent Comelec praying the latter
to (1) implement its May 12, 1992 resolution with costs de officio; (2) to re-open the ballot boxes in 13
provinces including the National Capital Region involving some 80,348 precincts (p. 9 of petition) and
to scan for the "Chavez" votes for purposes of crediting the same in his favor; (3) make the
appropriate entries in the election returns/certificates of canvass; and (4) to suspend the proclamation
of the 24 winning candidates.
Dissatisfied with the failure of respondent Comelec to act on his petition, petitioner filed, as aforesaid,
this urgent petition for prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order, enjoining the Comelec from proclaiming the 24th highest senatorial candidate,
without first implementing respondent Comelec's resolution of May 12, 1992 and acting upon
petitioner's letter/complaint dated May 14, 1992 and urgent petition dated May 22, 1992.
It is the submission of petitioner that assuming only ten (10) "Chavez" votes were invalidated per
precinct, he would have lost at least 1.7 million votes (considering that there are more than 170,000
precincts nationwide); the result of which will affect the 24 ranking senatorial candidates.
Petitioner alleges that respondent Comelec acted capriciously and whimsically and with grave abuse
of discretion and therefore prays that the Comelec be enjoined from proclaiming the 24th winning
senatorial candidate until after his petition before the Commission is resolved.
On June 4, 1992, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondent Comelec
from proclaiming the 24th winning senatorial candidate and set the case for hearing on June 9, 1992.
On the same day (June 4, 1992), petitioner filed a manifestation stating that on May 30, 1992, his
urgent petition dated May 22, 1992 was dismissed by respondent Comelec and prayed that the
petition ad cautelam at bar be considered a regular petition.
On June 8, 1992, Senator Agapito Aquino ** filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene with Comment in
Intervention praying for the dismissal of the instant petition on the ground that the law does not allow
pre-proclamation controversy involving the election of members of the Senate.
After hearing the arguments of the parties on June 9, 1992, the Court resolved to lift the temporary
restraining order in the afternoon of the same day (June 9, 1992).
Coming now to the merits, We find the petition devoid of any.
As stated earlier, petitioner's urgent petition dated May 22, 1992 was dismissed by respondent
Comelec on May 30, 1992. Had it not been prayed that the proclamation of the 24th winning
senatorial candidate be suspended, which this Court granted on June 4, 1992, the instant petition
would have been dismissed outright for having become moot and academic. But even then, this Court
could not have acted favorably on petitioner's plaint.
The alleged inaction of respondent Comelec in ordering the deletion of Melchor Chavez's name in the
list of qualified candidates does not call for the exercise of the Court's function of judicial review. This
Court can review the decisions or orders of the Comelec only in cases of grave abuse of discretion
committed by it in the discharge of its quasi-judicial powers and not those arising from the exercise of
its administrative functions. Respondent Commission's alleged failure to implement its own resolution
is undoubtedly administrative in nature, hence, beyond judicial interference (See Filipinas
Engineering Co. v. Ferrer, 135 SCRA 25 [1985]; Aratuc v. Commission on Elections, 88 SCRA 251
[1979]; see also Pungutan v. Abubakar, 43 SCRA 1 [1972]). As aptly observed by the Solicitor
General, respondent Comelec can administratively undo what it has administratively left
undone(Manifestation, p. 2). Moreover, respondent Comelec has in fact, on May 6, 1992 to be exact,
ordered the deletion of Melchor Chavez's name not only on the official list of candidates, but also on
the election returns, tally sheet and certificate of canvass (Comment, p. 7). Hence, petitioner's
allegation that respondent Comelec failed to implement Res. No. 92-132 does not hold water.
Be that as it may, there are other compelling reasons why the instant petition is bound to fail.
A simple reading of the petition would readily show that petitioner has no cause of action, the
controversy presented being one in the nature of a
pre-proclamation. **
While the Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies involving local
elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election Code), nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not
allowed in elections for President, Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of
Representatives.
Sec. 15 of Republic Act 7166 provides:
Sec. 15. Pre-proclamation Cases Not Allowed in Elections for President, Vice-President,
Senator, and Member of the House of Representatives. For purposes of the elections
for President,
Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives, no pre-
proclamation cases shall be allowed on matters relating to the preparation,
transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns or the certificate
of canvass, as the case may be. However, this does not preclude the authority of the
appropriate canvassing body motu proprio or upon written complaint of an interested
person to correct manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns before
it. (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Any objection on the election returns before the city or municipal board of canvassers,
or on the municipal certificates of canvass before the provincial boards of canvassers or
district board of canvassers in Metro Manila Area, shall be specifically noted in the
minutes of their respective proceedings.
It is clear from the above-quoted provision of the law that
"pre-proclamation cases (are) not allowed in elections for President,
Vice-President, Senator and Member of the House of Representatives.'' What is allowed is the
correction of "manifest errors in the certificate of canvass or election returns." To be manifest, the
errors must appear on the face of the certificates of canvass or election returns sought to be
corrected and/or objections thereto must have been made before the board of canvassers and
specifically noted in the minutes of their respective proceedings.
In the case at bar, however, petitioner prays not only for a restraining order enjoining "the
proclamation of the 24th highest ranking senatorial candidate without first acting upon petitioner's
letter/complaint dated May 14, 1992 and urgent petition dated May 22, 1992" but also prays that
judgment be rendered requiring the Comelec to re-open the ballot boxes in 80,348 precincts in 13
provinces therein enumerated (Petition, p. 9) including Metro Manila, scan the ballots for "Chavez"
votes which were invalidated or declared stray and credit said scanned "Chavez" votes in favor of
petitioner.
It is quite obvious that petitioner's prayer does not call for the correction of "manifest errors in the
certificates of canvass or election returns" before the Comelec but for the re-opening of the ballot
boxes and appreciation of the ballots contained therein. Indeed, petitioner has not even pointed to
any "manifest error" in the certificates of canvass or election returns he desires to be rectified. There
being none, petitioner's proper recourse is to file a regular election protest which, under the
Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, exclusively pertains to the Senate Electoral Tribunal.
Thus, Sec. 17, Art. VI of the Constitution provides that "(t)he Senate and the House of
Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the sole judge of all contests
relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective Members. . . ." (emphasis
supplied). The word "sole" underscores the exclusivity of the Tribunals' jurisdiction over election
contests relating to their respective Members (Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives, 199 SCRA 692 [1991]; Lazatin v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 168
SCRA 391 [1988]; Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 [1936]). It is therefore crystal clear
that this Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the instant petition. It is the Senate Electoral Tribunal
which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the complaint of petitioner involving, as it does, contest
relating to the election of a member of the Senate. As aforesaid, petitioner's proper recourse is to file
a regular election protest before the Senate Electoral Tribunal after the winning senatorial candidates
have been proclaimed.
Petitioner argues, on the other hand, that a recount before the Senate Electoral Tribunal where he
would be forced to shell out the expenses imposes not only a property requirement for the enjoyment
of the right to be voted upon but also a price on the right of suffrage which would ultimately stifle the
sovereign will.
The argument, however, is beside the point. The law is very clear on the matter and it is not right for
petitioner to ask this Court to abandon settled jurisprudence, engage in judicial legislation, amend the
Constitution and alter the Omnibus Election Code. The mandatory procedures laid down by the
existing law in cases like the one at bar must be faithfully followed lest we allow anarchy to reign. The
proper recourse is for petitioner to ask not this Court but the Legislature to enact remedial measures.
Finally, the instant petition falls squarely with the case of Sanchez v. Commission on Elections (153
SCRA 67 [1987]) and the disposition arrived therein finds application in the case at bar, mutatis
mutandis:
Sanchez anchors his petition for recount and/or reappreciation on Section 243,
paragraph (b) of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to Section 234 thereof with
regard to material defects in canvassed election returns. He contends that the
canvassed returns discarding "Sanchez" votes as stray were "incomplete" and therefore
warrant a recount or reappreciation of the ballots under Section 234.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . The fact that some votes written solely as "Sanchez" were declared stray votes
because of the inspectors' erroneous belief that Gil Sanchez had not been disqualified
as a candidate, involves an erroneous appreciation of the ballots. It is established by the
law as well as jurisprudence . . . that errors in the appreciation of ballots by the board of
inspectors are proper subject for election protest and not for recount or reappreciation of
ballots.
2. The appreciation of the ballots cast in the precincts is not a "proceeding of the board
of canvassers" for purposes of
pre-proclamation proceedings under Section 241, Omnibus Election Code, but of the
boards of election inspectors who are called upon to count and appreciate the votes in
accordance with the rules of appreciation provided in Section 211, Omnibus Election
Code. Otherwise stated, the appreciation of ballots is not part of the proceedings of the
board of canvassers. The function of ballots appreciation is performed by the boards of
election inspectors at the precinct level. (Emphasis supplied)
3. The scope of pre-proclamation controversy is limited to the issues enumerated under
Sec. 243 of the Omnibus Election Code. The enumeration therein of the issues that may
be raised in pre-proclamation controversy is restrictive and exclusive. In the absence of
any clear showing or proof that the election returns canvassed are incomplete or
contain material defects (sec. 234), appear to have been tampered with, falsified or
prepared under duress (sec. 235) and/or contain discrepancies in the votes credited to
any candidate, the difference of which affects the result of the election (sec. 236), which
are the only instances where a
pre-proclamation recount may be resorted to, granted the preservation of the integrity of
the ballot box and its contents, Sanchez' petition must fail. The complete election
returns whose authenticity is not in question, must be prima facie considered valid for
the purpose of canvassing the same and proclamation of the winning candidates.
xxx xxx xxx
7. The ground for recount relied upon by Sanchez is clearly not among the issues that
may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy. His allegation of invalidation of
"Sanchez" votes intended for him bear no relation to the correctness and authenticity of
the election returns canvassed. Neither the Constitution nor statute has granted the
Comelec or the board of canvassers the power in the canvass of election returns to look
beyond the face thereof, once satisfied of their authenticity (Abes v. Comelec, 21 SCRA
1252, 1256).
In the case at bar, petitioner's allegation that "Chavez" votes were either invalidated or declared stray
has no relation to the correctness or authenticity of the election returns canvassed. Otherwise stated,
petitioner has not demonstrated any manifest error in the certificates of canvass or election returns
before the Comelec which would warrant their correction. As the authenticity of the certificates of
canvass or election returns are not questioned, they must be prima facie considered valid for
purposes of canvassing the same and proclamation of the winning candidates (Sanchez v.
Comelec, supra).
Premises considered, the Court Resolved to DISMISS the instant petition for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon and Bellosillo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 86344 December 21, 1989
REP. RAUL A. DAZA, petitioner,
vs.
REP. LUIS C. SINGSON and HON. RAOUL V. VICTORINO IN THE LATTER'S CAPACITY AS
SECRETARY OF THE COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENTS, respondent.

CRUZ, J.:
After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives proportionally
apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments among the several political parties
represented in that chamber, including the Lakas ng Bansa, the PDP-Laban, the NP-Unido, the
Liberal Party, and the KBL, in accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner
Raul A. Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal Party.
1

On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was reorganized, resulting in a
political realignment in the House of Representatives. Twenty four members of the Liberal Party
formally resigned from that party and joined the LDP, thereby swelling its number to 159 and
correspondingly reducing their former party to only 17 members.
2

On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its representation in the
Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat occupied by the petitioner and giving this to
the newly-formed LDP. On December 5, 1988, the chamber elected a new set of representatives
consisting of the original members except the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C.
Singson as the additional member from the LDP.
3

The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to challenge his removal from the Commission
on Appointments and the assumption of his seat by the respondent. Acting initially on his petition for
prohibition and injunction with preliminary injunction, we issued a temporary restraining order that
same day to prevent both the petitioner and the respondent from serving in the Commission on
Appointments.
4

Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be removed from the Commission on
Appointments because his election thereto is permanent under the doctrine announced in Cunanan v.
Tan.
5
His claim is that the reorganization of the House representation in the said body is not based
on a permanent political realignment because the LDP is not a duly registered political party and has
not yet attained political stability.
For his part, the respondent argues that the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and
so beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. He also maintains that he has been improperly impleaded, the
real party respondent being the House of Representatives which changed its representation in the
Commission on Appointments and removed the petitioner. Finally, he stresses that nowhere in the
Constitution is it required that the political party be registered to be entitled to proportional
representation in the Commission on Appointments.
In addition to the pleadings filed by the parties, a Comment was submitted by the Solicitor General as
amicus curiae in compliance with an order from the Court.
At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution providing as follows:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of
the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve Senators and twelve Members of the House
of Representatives, elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in
case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty
session days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a
majority vote of all the Members.
Ruling first on the jurisdictional issue, we hold that, contrary to the respondent's assertion, the Court
has the competence to act on the matter at bar. Our finding is that what is before us is not a
discretionary act of the House of Representatives that may not be reviewed by us because it is
political in nature. What is involved here is the legality, not the wisdom, of the act of that chamber in
removing the petitioner from the Commission on Appointments. That is not a political question
because, as Chief Justice Concepcion explained in Tanada v. Cuenco.
6

... the term "political question" connotes, in legal parlance, what it means in ordinary
parlance, namely, a question of policy. In other words, ... it refers "to those questions
which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people in their sovereign
capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislature or executive branch of the Government." It is concerned with issues
dependent upon the wisdom, not legality, of a particular measure.
In the aforementioned case, the Court was asked by the petitioners therein to annul the election of
two members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal of that chamber, on the ground that they had not been
validly nominated. The Senate then consisted of 23 members from the Nacionalista Party and the
petitioner as the lone member of the Citizens Party. Senator Lorenzo M. Tanada nominated only
himself as the minority representative in the Tribunal, whereupon the majority elected Senators
Mariano J. Cuenco. and Francisco Delgado, from its own ranks, to complete the nine-man
composition of the Tribunal as provided for in the 1935 Constitution. The petitioner came to this
Court, contending that under Article VI, Section 11, of that Charter, the six legislative members of the
Tribunal were to be chosen by the Senate, "three upon nomination of the party having the largest
number of votes and three of the party having the second largest number of votes therein." As the
majority party in the Senate, the Nacionalista Party could nominate only three members and could not
also fill the other two seats pertaining to the minority.
By way of special and affirmative defenses, the respondents contended inter alia that the subject of
the petition was an internal matter that only the Senate could resolve. The Court rejected this
argument, holding that what was involved was not the wisdom of the Senate in choosing the
respondents but the legality of the choice in light of the requirement of the Constitution. The
petitioners were questioning the manner of filling the Tribunal, not the discretion of the Senate in
doing so. The Court held that this was a justiciable and not a political question, thus:
Such is not the nature of the question for determination in the present case. Here, we
are called upon to decide whether the election of Senators Cuenco and Delgado by the
Senate, as members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal, upon nomination by Senator
Primicias-member and spokesman of the party having the largest number of votes in
the Senate-behalf of its Committee on Rules, contravenes the constitutional mandate
that said members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal shall be chosen "upon nomination ...
of the party having the second largest number of votes" in the Senate and hence, is null
and void. The Senate is not clothed with "full discretionary authority" in the choice of
members of the Senate Electoral Tribunal. The exercise of its power thereon is subject
to constitutional limitations which are claimed to be mandatory in nature. It is clearly
within the legitimate province of the judicial department to pass upon the validity of the
proceeding in connection therewith.
... whether an election of public officers has been in accordance with law is for the
judiciary. Moreover, where the legislative department has by statute prescribed election
procedure in a given situation, the judiciary may determine whether a particular election
has been in conformity with such statute, and particularly, whether such statute has
been applied in a way to deny or transgress on constitutional or statutory rights ...' (1 6
C.J.S., 439; emphasis supplied)
It is, therefore, our opinion that we have, not only jurisdiction but also the duty, to
consider and determine the principal issue raised by the parties herein."
Although not specifically discussed, the same disposition was made in Cunanan v. Tan as it likewise
involved the manner or legality of the organization of the Commission on Appointments, not the
wisdom or discretion of the House in the choice of its representatives.
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The
reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature,
we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us
that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution
clearly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower
courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
The respondent's contention that he has been improperly impleaded is even less persuasive. While
he may be technically correct in arguing that it is not he who caused the petitioner's removal, we feel
that this objection is also not an insuperable obstacle to the resolution of this controversy. We may,
for one thing, treat this proceeding as a petition for quo warranto as the petitioner is actually
questioning the respondent's right to sit as a member of the Commission on Appointments. For
another, we have held as early as in the Emergency Powers Cases
7
that where serious constitutional
questions are involved, "the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that
they be settled promptly and definitely brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure." The
same policy has since then been consistently followed by the Court, as in Gonzales v. Commission
on Elections,
8
where we held through Chief Justice Fernando:
In the course of the deliberations, a serious procedural objection was raised by five
members of the Court. It is their view that respondent Commission on Elections not
being sought to be restrained from performing any specific act, this suit cannot be
characterized as other than a mere request for an advisory opinion. Such a view, from
the remedial law standpoint, has much to recommend it. Nonetheless, a majority would
affirm the original stand that under the circumstances, it could still rightfully be treated
as a petition for prohibition.
The language of justice Laurel fits the case: "All await the decision of this Court on the
constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance which the instant case
has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy demand
that [its] constitutionality ... be now resolved.' It may likewise be added that the
exceptional character of the situation that confronts us, the paramount public interest,
and the undeniable necessity for ruling, the national elections being barely six months
away, reinforce our stand. It would appear undeniable, therefore, that before us is an
appropriate invocation of our jurisdiction to prevent the enforcement of an alleged
unconstitutional statute. We are left with no choice then; we must act on the matter.
Coming now to the more crucial question, the Court notes that both the petitioner and the respondent
are invoking the case of Cunanan v. Tan to support their respective positions. It is best, therefore, to
make a quick review of that case for a proper disposition of this one.
In the election for the House of Representatives held in 1961, 72 seats were won by the Nacionalista
Party, 29 by the Liberal Party and 1 by an independent. Accordingly, the representation of the
chamber in the Commission on Appointments was apportioned to 8 members from the Nacionalista
Party and 4 from the Liberal Party. Subsequently, 25 members of the Nacionalista Party, professing
discontent over the House leadership, made common cause with the Liberal Party and formed what
was called the Allied Majority to install a new Speaker and reorganize the chamber. Included in this
reorganization was the House representation in the Commission on appointments where three of the
Nacionalista congressmen originally chosen were displaced by three of their party colleagues who
had joined the Allied Majority.
Petitioner Carlos Cunanan's ad interim appointment as Deputy Administrator of the Reforestration
Administration was rejected by the Commission on Appointments as thus reorganized and
respondent Jorge Tan, Jr. was thereafter designated in his place. Cunanan then came to this Court,
contending that the rejection of his appointment was null and void because the Commission itself was
invalidly constituted.
The Court agreed. It noted that the Allied Majority was a merely temporary combination as the
Nacionalista defectors had not disaffiliated from their party and permanently joined the new political
group. Officially, they were still members of the Nacionalista Party. The reorganization of the
Commission on Appointments was invalid because it was not based on the proportional
representation of the political parties in the House of Representatives as required by the Constitution.
The Court held:
... In other words, a shifting of votes at a given time, even if du to arrangements of a
more or less temporary nature, like the one that has led to the formation of the so-called
"Allied Majority," does not suffice to authorize a reorganization of the membership of the
Commission for said House. Otherwise the Commission on Appointments may have to
be reorganized as often as votes shift from one side to another in the House. The
framers of our Constitution could not have intended to thus place a constitutional organ,
like the Commission on Appointments, at the mercy of each House of Congress.
The petitioner vigorously argues that the LDP is not the permanent political party contemplated in the
Constitution because it has not been registered in accordance with Article IX-B, Section 2(5), in
relation to the other provisions of the Constitution. He stresses that the so-called party has not yet
achieved stability and suggests it might be no different from several other political groups that have
died "a-bornin'," like the LINA, or have subsequently floundered, like the UNIDO.
The respondent also cites Cunanan but from a different viewpoint. According to him, that case
expressly allows reorganization at any time to reflect changes in the political alignments in Congress,
provided only that such changes are permanent. The creation of the LDP constituting the bulk of the
former PDP-Laban and to which no less than 24 Liberal congressmen had transferred was a
permanent change. That change fully justified his designation to the Commission on Appointments
after the reduction of the LP representation therein. Thus, the Court held:
Upon the other hand, the constitutional provision to the effect that "there shall be a
Commission on Appointments consisting of twelve (12) Senators and twelve (12)
members of the House of Representatives elected by each House, respectively, on the
basis of proportional REPRESENTATION OF THE POLITICAL PARTIES THEREIN,"
necessarily connotes the authority of each House of Congress to see to it that this
requirement is duly complied with. As a consequence, it may take appropriate
measures, not only upon the initial organization of the Commission, but also,
subsequently thereto. If by reason of successful election protests against members of a
House, or of their expulsion from the political party to which they belonged and/or of
their affiliation with another political party, the ratio in the representation of the political
parties in the House is materially changed, the House is clothed with authority to
declare vacant the necessary number of seats in the Commission on Appointments held
by members of said House belonging to the political party adversely affected by the
change and then fill said vacancies in conformity with the Constitution.
In the course of the spirited debate on this matter between the petitioner and the respondent (who
was supported by the Solicitor General) an important development has supervened to considerably
simplify the present controversy. The petitioner, to repeat, bases his argument heavily on the non-
registration of the LDP which, he claims has not provided the permanent political realignment to
justify the questioned reorganization. As he insists:
(c) Assuming that the so-called new coalesced majority is actually the LDP
itself, then the proposed reorganization is likewise illegal and ineffectual,
because the LDP, not being a duly registered political party, is not entitled
to the "rights and privileges granted by law to political parties' (See. 160,
BP No. 881), and therefore cannot legally claim the right to be considered
in determining the required proportional representation of political parties
in the House of Representatives.
9

xxx xxx xxx
... the clear constitutional intent behind Section 18, Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution,
is to give the right of representation in the Commission on Appointment only to political
parties who are duly registered with the Comelec.
10

On November 23, 1989, however, that argument boomeranged against the petitioner. On that date,
the Commission on Elections in an en banc resolution affirmed the resolution of its First Division
dated August 28, 1989, granting the petition of the LDP for registration as a political party.
11
This has
taken the wind out of the sails of the petitioner, so to speak, and he must now limp to shore as best
he can.
The petitioner's contention that, even if registered, the party must still pass the test of time to prove its
permanence is not acceptable. Under this theory, a registered party obtaining the majority of the
seats in the House of Representatives (or the Senate) would still not be entitled to representation in
the Commission on Appointments as long as it was organized only recently and has not yet "aged."
The Liberal Party itself would fall in such a category. That party was created in December 1945 by a
faction of the Nacionalista Party that seceded therefrom to support Manuel A. Roxas's bid for the
Presidency of the Philippines in the election held on April 23, 1946.
12
The Liberal Party won. At that
time it was only four months old. Yet no question was raised as to its right to be represented in the
Commission on Appointments and in the Electoral Tribunals by virtue of its status as the majority
party in both chambers of the Congress.
The LDP has been in existence for more than one year now. It now has 157 members in the House of
Representatives and 6 members in the Senate. Its titular head is no less than the President of the
Philippines and its President is Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, who took over recently from Speaker
Ramon V. Mitra. It is true that there have been, and there still are, some internal disagreements
among its members, but these are to be expected in any political organization, especially if it is
democratic in structure. In fact even the monolithic Communist Party in a number of socialist states
has undergone similar dissension, and even upheavals. But it surely cannot be considered still
temporary because of such discord.
If the petitioner's argument were to be pursued, the 157 members of the LDP in the House of
Representatives would have to be denied representation in the Commission on Appointments and, for
that matter, also the Electoral Tribunal. By the same token, the KBL, which the petitioner says is now
"history only," should also be written off. The independents also cannot be represented because they
belong to no political party. That would virtually leave the Liberal Party only with all of its seventeen
members to claim all the twelve seats of the House of Representatives in the Commission on
Appointments and the six legislative seats in the House Electoral Tribunal.
It is noteworthy that when with 41 members the Liberal Party was alloted two of the seats in the
Commission on Appointments, it did not express any objection.
13
Inconsistently, the petitioner is now
opposed to the withdrawal from it of one seat although its original number has been cut by more than
half.
As for the other condition suggested by the petitioner, to wit, that the party must survive in a general
congressional election, the LDP has doubtless also passed that test, if only vicariously. It may even
be said that as it now commands the biggest following in the House of Representatives, the party has
not only survived but in fact prevailed. At any rate, that test was never laid down in Cunanan.
To summarize, then, we hold, in view of the foregoing considerations, that the issue presented to us
is justiciable rather political, involving as it does the legality and not the wisdom of the act complained
of, or the manner of filling the Commission on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution. Even if
the question were political in nature, it would still come within our powers of review under the
expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes
the authority to determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction has been committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government. As for the
alleged technical flaw in the designation of the party respondent, assuming the existence of such a
defect, the same may be brushed aside, conformably to existing doctrine, so that the important
constitutional issue raised may be addressed. Lastly, we resolve that issue in favor of the authority of
the House of Representatives to change its representation in the Commission on Appointments to
reflect at any time the changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is
understood that such changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or
factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal disaffiliation and permanent
shifts of allegiance from one political party to another.
The Court would have preferred not to intervene in this matter, leaving it to be settled by the House of
Representatives or the Commission on Appointments as the bodies directly involved. But as our
jurisdiction has been invoked and, more importantly, because a constitutional stalemate had to be
resolved, there was no alternative for us except to act, and to act decisively. In doing so, of course,
we are not imposing our will upon the said agencies, or substituting our discretion for theirs, but
merely discharging our sworn responsibility to interpret and apply the Constitution. That is a duty we
do not evade, lest we ourselves betray our oath.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated January 13, 1989,
is LIFTED. The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a member of the
Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat in that body pursuant to Article VI,
Section 18, of the Constitution. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin,
Cows, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 86649 July 12, 1990
ANNA DOMINIQUE M.L. COSETENG and KABABAIHAN PARA SA INANG BAYAN, petitioners,
vs.
HON. RAMON V. MITRA, JR., as speaker of the House of Representatives of the Congress of
the Philippines; HON. FRANCISCO SUMULONG, as Majority Floor Leader of the House of
Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines; HON. JOVITO SALONGA, as Ex-Oficio
Chairman of the Commission on Appointments; HON. ROQUE R. ABLAN, JR., HON. LORNA L.
VERANO-YAP, HON. MIGUEL ROMERO, HON. ANTONIO V. CUENCO, HON. ROGACIANO M.
MERCADO, HON. ALAWADIN T. BANDON, JR., HON. JOSE L. CABOCHAN, HON. CARLOS R.
IMPERIAL, HON. MA. CLARA L. LOBREGAT, HON. NATALIO M. BELTRAN, JR., HON.
CARMELO J. LOCSIN & HON. LUIS C. SINGSON, as Members of the Commission on
Appointments for the House of Representatives of the CONGRESS OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
Perfecto V. Fernandez, Jose P. Fernandez and Cristobal P. Fernandez for petitioners.
Panganiban, Benitez, Barinaga & Bautista Law Offices for Lorna L. Verano-Yap.

GRIO-AQUINO, J.:
The congressional elections of May 11, 1987 resulted in the election to the House of Representatives
of the candidates of diverse political parties such as the PDP-Laban, Lakas ng Bansa (LB), Liberal
Party (LP), NP-Unido, Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan (KBL), Panaghiusa, Kababaihan Para sa Inang
Bayan (KAIBA), and some independents. Petitioner Anna Dominique M.L. Coseteng was the only
candidate elected under the banner of KAIBA.
On August 26, 1987, the House of Representatives, upon nomination by the Majority Floor Leader,
Cong. Francisco Sumulong, elected from the Coalesced Majority, eleven (11) out of twelve (12)
congressmen to represent the House in the Commission on Appointments. They were:
1. Hon. Miguel Romero LP (Liberal Party)
2. Hon. Antonio V. Cuenco LB-Panaghiusa
3. Hon. Rogaciano Mercado LB (Lakas ng Bayan)
4. Hon. Raul Daza LP
5. Hon. Alawadin T. Bandon Jr. PDP-Laban
6. Hon. Jose Cabochan PDP-Laban
7. Hon. Lorna L. Verano-Yap LP
8. Hon. Carlos R. Imperial IND
9. Hon. Ma. Clara L. Lobregat IND
10. Hon Natalio M. Beltran, Jr. LB/Unido/NP
11. Hon. Carmelo J. Locsin PDP-Laban/LB
(pp. 115-116, Rollo.)
On September 22, 1987, upon nomination of the Minority Floor Leader, the House elected Honorable
Roque Ablan, Jr., KBL, as the twelfth member of the Commission on Appointments, representing the
Coalesced Minority in the House.
A year later, on September 16, 1988, the "Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino" (LDP, for brevity) was
organized as a political party. As 158 out of 202 members of the House of Representatives formally
affiliated with the LDP, the House committees, including the House representation in the Commission
on Appointments, had to be reorganized.
On October 8, 1988, petitioner Coseteng wrote a letter to Speaker Ramon Mitra requesting that as
representative of KAIBA, she be appointed as a member of the Commission on Appointments and
House Electoral Tribunal (p. 15, Rollo). Her request was endorsed by nine (9) congressmen, namely,
Hon. Lally Laurel-Trinidad, Bonifacio Gillego, Luz Reyes Bakunawa, Gerardo Cabochan, Jose D.
Aspiras, Oscar Santos, Eduardo N. Joson, Antonio H. Cerilles and Isacio Pelaez.
On December 5, 1988, the House of Representatives, on motion of the Majority Floor Leader and
over the objection of Cong. Raul A. Daza, LP, revised the House majority membership in the
Commission on Appointments to conform with the new political alignments by replacing Rep. Raul A.
Daza, LP, with Rep. Luis C. Singson, LDP, as follows:
1. Hon. Miguel L. Romero LDP
2. Hon. Antonio V. Cuenco LDP
3. Hon. Rogaciano M. Mercado LDP
4. Hon. Alawadin T. Bandon, Jr. LDP
5. Hon. Jose L. Cabochan LDP
6. Hon. Carlos R. Imperial LDP
7. Hon. Maria Clara L. Lobregat LDP
8. Hon. Natalio M. Beltran, Jr. LDP
9. Hon. Carmelo J. Locsin LDP
10. Hon. Luis C. Singson LDP
11. Hon. Lorna L. Verano-Yap LP
(p. 122, Rollo.)
Congressman Ablan, KBL, was retained as the 12th member representing the House minority.
On February 1, 1989, Congresswoman Coseteng and her party, the KAIBA, filed this Petition for
Extraordinary Legal Writs (which may be considered as a petition for quo warranto and injunction)
praying this Court to declare as null and void the election of respondent Ablan, Verano-Yap, Romero,
Cuenco, Mercado, Bandon, Cabochan, Imperial, Lobregat, Beltran, Locsin, and Singson, as members
of the Commission on Appointments, to enjoin them from acting as such and to enjoin also the other
respondents from recognizing them as members of the Commission on Appointments on the theory
that their election to that Commission violated the constitutional mandate of proportional
representation because:
1) the New Majority (158 LDP members out of the 202 members of the House) is entitled to only nine
(9) seats out of the twelve to be filled by the House (p. 29, Rollo);
2) the members representing the political parties, or coalitions thereof, must be nominated by their
respective political parties or coalitions;
3) the nomination and election of respondent Verano-Yap by the respondents as representative of the
minority was clearly invalid (p. 31, Rollo); and
4) that similarly invalid was the retention of respondent Ablan as Minority member in the Commission
because he was neither nominated nor elected as such by the minority party or parties in the House
(p. 31, Rollo).
Petitioner Coseteng further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the Commission on Appointments as
a representative of the Minority because she has the support of nine (9) other congressmen and
congresswomen of the Minority (p. 31, Rollo).
In their collective Comment, the respondents House of Representatives, the Speaker, the Majority
Floor Leader, the members of the Commission on Appointments including Congressman Roque R.
Ablan, but excluding Congresswoman Lorna Verano-Yap (who filed a separate Comment), alleged:
(1) that the legality of the reorganization of the Commission on Appointments is a political question,
hence, outside the jurisdiction of this Court to decide, and (2) that in any case, the reorganization was
"strictly in consonance with Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution" i.e., on the basis of
proportional representation of the political parties, considering the majority coalition "as a form of a
political party" (pp. 115, 118, Rollo). They further alleged that as of March 3, 1989, 160 members of
the House (including 26 former Liberals) had expressly renounced in writing their respective political
party affiliations and formally affiliated with the LDP leaving only 15 Liberals in the House (p.
119, Rollo).itc-asl After its petition for registration as a political party was granted on August 28,
1989 by the First Division of the COMELEC) and affirmed on November 23, 1989 by the
COMELEC en banc, the LDP become the new Majority in the House. They finally argued that as
KAIBA is part of the Coalesced Majority which supports the administration of President Corazon C.
Aquino, not of the minority, petitioner is bound by the choice of the Coalesced Majority of the
members who would sit in the Commission on Appointments.
Representative Lorna Verano-Yap, in her comment alleged that the petitioner has no better light than
those already selected, to be chosen as a member of the Commission on Appointments because: (1)
the Constitution was not violated in electing Yap and eleven (11) other House members to the
Commission on Appointments; (2) respondent Yap is a rightful incumbent; and (3) petitioner's claim to
a seat on the Commission on Appointments is without legal and factual basis (pp. 217-218, Rollo).
The Commission on Appointments took a neutral stand on the petition as the issues involved may
touch on the validity of its organization and the legality of the entitlement of the LDP or the LP to
representation, which are raised in the case of Daza vs. Singson, G.R. No. 86344, then pending
before this Court (pp. 195-198, Rollo).
The issue here is whether the members of the House in the Commission on Appointments were
chosen on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties therein as provided in
Section 18, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which reads:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments consisting of the President of
the Senate, asex oficio Chairman, twelve Senators, and twelve Members of the House
of Representatives elected by each House on the basis of proportional representation
from the political parties and parties or organizations registered under the party-list
system represented therein. The chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in
case of a tie. The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty
session days of the Congress from their submission. The commission shall rule by a
majority vote of all the Members. (Art. VI, 1987 Constitution.)
After deliberating on the petition and the comments of the respondents, we hold that the petition
should be dismissed, not because it raises a political question, which it does not, but because the
revision of the House representation in the Commission on Appointments is based on proportional
representation of the political parties therein as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution.
The "political question" issue was settled in Daza vs. Singson, G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989,
where this Court ruled that "the legality, and not the wisdom, of the manner of filling the Commission
on Appointments as prescribed by the Constitution" is justiciable, and, "even if the question were
political in nature, it would still come within our powers of review under the expanded jurisdiction
conferred upon us by Article VIII, Section 1, of the Constitution, which includes the authority to
determine whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has been
committed by any branch or instrumentality of the government."
The composition of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments was based on
proportional representation of the political parties in the House. There are 160 members of the LDP in
the House. They represent 79% of the House membership (which may be rounded out to 80%).
Eighty percent (80%) of 12 members in the Commission on Appointments would equal 9.6 members,
which may be rounded out to ten (10) members from the LDP. The remaining two seats were
apportioned to the LP (respondent Lorna Verano-Yap) as the next largest party in the Coalesced
Majority and the KBL (respondent Roque Ablan) as the principal opposition party in the House. There
is no doubt that this apportionment of the House membership in the Commission on Appointments
was done "on the basis of proportional representation of the political parties therein."
The other political parties or groups in the House, such as petitioner's KAIBA (which is presumably a
member also of the Coalesced Majority), are bound by the majority's choices. Even if KAIBA were to
be considered as an opposition party, its lone member (petitioner Coseteng) represents only .4% or
less than 1% of the House membership, hence, she is not entitled to one of the 12 House seats in the
Commission on Appointments. To be able to claim proportional membership in the Commission on
Appointments, a political party should represent at least 8.4% of the House membership, i.e., it
should have been able to elect at least 17 congressmen or congresswomen.
The indorsements of the nine (9) congressmen and congresswomen in favor of the petitioner's
election to the Commission are inconsequential because they are not members of her party and they
signed identical indorsements in favor of her rival, respondent Congresswoman Verano-Yap.
There is no merit in the petitioner's contention that the House members in the Commission on
Appointments should have been nominated and elected by their respective political parties. The
petition itself shows that they were nominated by their respective floor leaders in the House. They
were elected by the House (not by their party) as provided in Section 18, Article VI of the Constitution.
The validity of their election to the Commission on Appointments eleven (11) from the Coalesced
Majority and one from the minority is unassailable.
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Cortes, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., took no part.
epublic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 89914 November 20, 1991
JOSE F.S. BENGZON JR., ABELARDO TERMULO, JOSE MANTECON, VICENTE MILLS JR.,
LEONARDO GAMBOA, KURT BACHMANN JR., JOSE V.E. JIMENEZ, ERNESTO CALUYA,
AGERICO UNGSON, SUSAN ROXAS, ELVIE CASTILLO, and CYNTHIA SABIDO
LIMJAP, petitioners,
vs.
THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND ITS MEMBERS, represented by and through
the CHAIRMAN, HON. WIGBERTO TAADA, respondents, JOSE S. SANDEJAS, intervenor.
Bengzon, Zarraga, Narciso, Cudala, Pecson & Bengson for petitioners.
Balgos & Perez for intervening petitioner.
Eddie Tamondong and Antonio T. Tagaro for respondents.

PADILLA, J.:p
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
injuective relief, to enjoin the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon committee from requiring the petitioners
to testify and produce evidence at its inquiry into the alleged sale of the equity of Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez to the Lopa Group in thirty-six (36) or thirty-nine (39) corporations.
On 30 July 1987, the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG), assisted by the Solicitor General, filed with the Sandiganbayan Civil
Case No. 0035 (PCGG Case No. 35) entitled "Republic of the Philippines vs. Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez, et al.", for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution and damages.
The complaint was amended several times by impleading new defendants and/or amplifying the
allegations therein. Under the Second Amended Complaint, 1 the herein petitioners were impleaded
as party defendants.
The complaint insofar as pertinent to herein petitioners, as defendants, alleges among others that:
14. Defendants Benjamin (Kokoy) Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez, acting
by themselves and/or in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and
Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue advantage of their relationship, influence and
connection with the latter Defendant spouses, engaged in devices, schemes and
strategems to unjuestly enrigh themselves at the expense of Plaintiff and the Filipino
people, among others:
(a) Obatained, with the active collaboration of Defendants Sene J.
Gabaldon, Mario D. Camacho, Mamerto Nepomuceno, Carlos J. Valdez,
Cesar C. Zalamea and Francisco Tantuico, Atty. Jose Bengzon, Jr. and
his law partners, namely: Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Jose Vicente E.
Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr., and Leonardo C. Cruz; Jose S.
Sandejas and his fellow senior managers of FMMC/PNI Holdings groups
of companies such as Leonardo Gamboa, Vicente T. Mills, Jr., Jose M.
Mantecon, Abelardo S. Termulo, Rex C. Drilon II and Kurt Bachmann, Jr.,
control of some of the biggest business enterprises in the Philippines,
such as the Manila Corporation (MERALCO), Benguet Consolidated and
the Philippine Commercial International Bank (PCI Bank) by employing
devious financial schemes and techniques calculated to require the
massive infusion and hemorrhage of government funds with minimum or
negligible "cashout" from Defendant Benjamin Romualdez...
xxx xxx xxx
(m) manipulated, with the support, assistance and collaboration of
Philgurantee officials led by chairman Cesar E.A. Virata and the Senior
managers of FMMC/PNI Holdings, Inc. led by Jose S. Sandejas, Jr., Jose
M. Mantecom and Kurt S. Bachmann, Jr., among others, the formation of
Erectors Holdings, Inc. without infusing additional capital solely for the
purpose of Erectors Incorporated with Philguarantee in the amount of
P527,387,440.71 with insufficient securities/collaterals just to enable
Erectors Inc, to appear viable and to borrow more capitals, so much so
that its obligation with Philgurantee has reached a total of more than P2
Billion as of June 30, 1987.
(n) at the onset of the present Administration and/or within the week
following the February 1986 People's Revolution, in conspiracy with,
supoort, assistance and collaboration of the abovenamed lawyers of the
Bengzon Law Offices, or specifically Defendants Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr.,
V.E. Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr., and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr.,
manipulated, shcemed, and/or executed a series of devices intended to
conceal and place, and/or for the purpose of concealing and placing,
beyond the inquiry and jurisdiction of the Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) herein Defendant's individual and collective
funds, properties, and assets subject of and/or suited int he instant
Complaint.
(o) manuevered, with the technical know-how and legalitic talents of the
FMMC senior manager and some of the Bengzon law partners, such as
Attys. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Amando V.
Faustino, Jose Vicente E. Jimenez and Leonardo C. Cruz, the purported
sale of defendant Benjamin Romualdez's interests in the (i) Professional
Managers, (ii) A & E International Corporation (A & E), (iii) First Manila
Managerment Corporation (FMMC), (iv) Philippine World Travel Inc.
(PWTI) and its subsidiaries consisting of 36 corporations in all, to PNI
Holdings, Inc. (wjose purported incorporations are all members of Atty.
Jose F.S. Bengzon's law firm) for only P5 million on March 3, 1986 or
three days after the creation of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government on February 28, 1986, for the sole purpose of deceiving and
preempting the Government, particularly the PCGG, and making it appear
that defendant Benjamin Romualdez had already divested himself of his
ownership of the same when in truth and in fact, his interests are well
intact and being protected by Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. and some of his
law partners, together with the FMMC senior managers who still control
and run the affiars of said corporations, and in order to entice the PCGG
to approve the said fictitious sale, the above-named defendants offered
P20 million as "donation" to the Government;
(p) misused, with the connivance, support and technical assitance of the
Bengzon law firm represented by Atty. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. as legal
counsel, together with defendants Cesar Zalamea, Antonio Ozaeta, Mario
D. Camacho amd Senen J. Gabaldon as members of the Board of
Directors of the Philippine Commercial International bank (PCIB), the
Meralco Pension Fund (Fund, for short) in the amount of P25 million by
cuasing it to be invested in the PCIB and through the Bank's TSG,
assigned to PCI Development and PCI Equity at 50% each, the Fund's (a)
8,028.011 common shares in the Bank and (b) "Deposit in Subscription" in
the amount of P4,929.972.50 but of the agreed consideration of P28
million for the said assignment, PCI Development and PCI Equity were
able to pay only P5,500.00 downpayment and the first amortization of
P3,937,500.00 thus prompting the Fund to rescind its assignment, and the
consequent reversion of the assigned brought the total shareholding of the
Fund to 11,470,555 voting shares or 36.8% of the voting stock of the
PCIB, and this development (which the defendants themselves
orchestrated or allowed to happen) was used by them as an excuse for
the unlawful dismantling or cancellation of the Fund's 10 million shares for
allegedly exceeding the 30-percent ceiling prescribed by Section 12-B of
the General Banking Act, although they know for a fact that what the law
declares as unlawful and void ab initio are the subscriptions in excess of
the 30% ceiling "to the extent of the excess over any of the ceilings
prescribed ..." and not the whole or entire stockholding which they allowed
to stay for six years (from June 30, 1980 to March 24, 1986);
(q) cleverly hid behind the veil of corporate entity, through the use of the
names and managerial expertise of the FMMC senior manager and
lawyers identified as Jose B. Sandejas, Leonardo Gamboa, Vicente T.
Mills, Abelardo S, Termulo, Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr., Jose M. Mantecon,
Rex C. Drilon II, Kurt Bachmann, Jr. together with the legal talents of
corporate lawyers, such as Attys. Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr., Jose V.E.
Jimenez, Amando V. Faustino, Jr., and Leonardo C. Cruz, the ill-gotten
wealth of Benjamin T. Romualdez including, among others, the 6,229,177
shares in PCIB registered in the names of Trans Middle East Phils.
Equities, Inc. and Edilberto S. Narciso, Jr. which they refused to surrender
to PCGG despite their disclosure as they tried and continue to exert efforts
in getting hold of the same as well as the shares in Benguet registered in
the names of Palm Avenue Holdings and Palm Avenue Realty
Development Corp. purportedly to be applied as payment for the claim of
P70 million of a "merger company of the First Manila Managerment Corp.
group" supposedly owned by them although the truth is that all the said
firms are still beneficially owned by defendants Benjamin Romualdez.
xxx xxx xxx
On 28 September 1988, petitioner (as defendants) filed their respective answers. 2 Meanwhile, from
2 to 6 August 1988, conflicting reports on the disposition by the PCGG of the "Romualdez
corporations" were carried in various metropolitan newspapers. Thus, one newspaper reported that
the Romuladez firms had not been sequestered because of the opposition of certain PCGG officials
who "had worked prviously as lawyers of the Marcos crony firms." Another daily reported otherwise,
while others declared that on 3 March 1986, or shortly after the EDSA February 1986 revolution, the
Romualdez companies" were sold for P5 million, without PCGG approval, to a holding company
controlled by Romualdez, and that Ricardo Lopa, the President's brother-in-law, had effectively taken
over the firms, even pending negotiations for the purchase of the corporations, for the same price of
P5 million which was reportedly way below the fair value of their assets. 3
On 13 September 1988, the Senate Minority Floor Leader, Hon. Juan Ponce Enrile delivered a
speech "on a matter of personal privilege" before the Senate on the alleged "take-over personal
privilege" before the Senate on the alleged "take-over of SOLOIL Incorporated, the flaship of the First
Manila Management of Companies (FMMC) by Ricardo Lopa" and called upon "the Senate to look
into the possible violation of the law in the case, particularly with regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." 4
On motion of Senator Orlando Mercado, the matter was referred by the Senate to the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers (Blue Ribbon Committee). 5 Thereafter, the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee started its investigation on the matter. Petitioners and Ricardo Lopa were subpoenaed by
the Committee to appear before it and testify on "what they know" regarding the "sale of thirty-six (36)
corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez."
At the hearing held on 23 May 1989, Ricardo Lopa declined to testify on the ground that his testimony
may "unduly prejudice" the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner
Jose F.S. Bengzon, Jr. likewise refused to testify involing his constitutional right to due process, and
averring that the publicity generated by respondents Committee's inquiry could adversely affect his
rights as well as those of the other petitioners who are his co-defendants in Civil Case No. 0035
before the Sandiganbayan.
The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, thereupon, suspended its inquiry and directed the petitioners to
file their memorandum on the constitutional issues raised, after which, it issued a resolution 6 dated 5
June 1989 rejecting the petitioner's plea to be excused from testifying, and the Committee voted to
pursue and continue its investigation of the matter. Senator Neptali Gonzales dissented. 7
Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and required their
attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and
legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave and
irreparable damager, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the petitioners filed the present petition for prohibition
with a prayer for temporary restraning order and/or injunctive relief.
Meanwhile, one of the defendants in Civil Case No. 0035 before the Sandiganbayan, Jose S.
Sandejas, filed with the Court of motion for intervention, 8 which the Court granted in the
resolution 9 of 21 December 1989, and required the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to
comment on the petition in intervention. In compliance, therewith, respondent Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee filed its comment 10 thereon.
Before discussing the issues raised by petitioner and intervenor, we will first tackle the jurisdictional
question raised by the respondent Committee.
In its comment, respondent Committee claims that this court cannot properly inquire into the motives
of the lawmakers in conducting legislative investigations, much less cna it enjoin the Congress or any
its regular and special commitees like what petitioners seek from making inquiries in aid of
legislation, under the doctrine of separation of powers, which obtaines in our present system of
government.
The contention is untenable. In Angara vs. Electoral Commission, 11 the Court held:
The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government. It
obtains not hrough express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each
department of the government has exclusive cognizance of matters wihtin its
jurisdiction, and is supreme within its own sphere. But it does not follow from the fact
that the three powers are to be kept separate and distinct that the Constitution intended
them to be absolutely unrestrained and independent of each other. The Constitution has
provided for an elaborate system of checks and balances to secure coordination in the
workings of the various departments of the government...
xxx xxx xxx
But in the main, the Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines,
allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the
government. The ovelapping and interlacing of funcstions and duties between the
several deaprtments, however, sometimes makes it hard to say just where the political
excitement, the great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if
not entirely obliterated, in cases of conflict, the judicial departments is the only
constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper allocation of
powers between the several departments and among the integral or constituent units
thereof.
xxx xxx xxx
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the
nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries; it does not assert any superiority over the other
departments; it does not inr eality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by tyhe Constitution to
determine conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to established for
the parties in an actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and
guarantess to them. This is in thruth all that is involved in what is termed "judicial
supremacy" which properly is the power of judicial review under the Constitution. Even
the, this power of judicial review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be
exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to the
constitutional question raised or the very lis mota presented. Any attempt at abstraction
could only lead to dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions
unrelated to actualities. Narrowed as its function is in this manner, the judiciary does not
pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation. More thatn that,
courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only
because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also becuase the
judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom
and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive
and legislative departments of the government.
The "allocation of constituional boundaries" is a task that this Court must perfomr under the
Constitution. Moreowever, as held in a recent case, 12 "(t)he political question doctrine neither
interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit
constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by
the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means does away with kthe applicability of the
principle in appropriate cases." 13
The Court is thus of the considered view that it has jurisdiction over the present controversy for the
purpose of determining the scope and extent of the power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to
conduct inquiries into private affirs in purported aid of legislation.
Coming to the specific issues raised in this case, petitioners contend that (1) the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee's inquiry has no valid legislative purpose, i.e., it is not done in aid of legislation; (2) the
sale or disposition of hte Romualdez corporations is a "purely private transaction" which is beyond the
power of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee to inquire into; and (3) the inquiry violates their right to
due process.
The 1987 Constition expressly recognizes the power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries
in aid of legislation. 14 Thus, Section 21, Article VI thereof provides:
The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committee may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be
respected. 15
The power of both houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not, therefore,
absolute or unlimited. Its exercise is circumscribed by the afore-quoted provision of the Constitution.
Thus, as provided therein, the investigation must be "in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly
published rules of procedure" and that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected." It follows then that the rights of persons under the Bill of Rights must be
respected, including the right to due process and the right not to be compelled to testify against one's
self.
The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations in specifically provided for in Sec. 1 of
the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation. Such inquiries may refer to
the implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any proposed legislation or the
formulation of future legislation. They may also extend to any and all matters vested by the
Constitution in Congress and/or in the Seante alone.
As held in Jean L. Arnault vs. Leon Nazareno, et al., 16 the inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the
legislative body making it, must be material or necessary to the exervise of a power in it vested by the
Constitution, such as to legislate or to expel a member.
Under Sec. 4 of the aforementioned Rules, the Senate may refer to any committee or committees any
speech or resolution filed by any Senator which in tis judgment requires an appropriate inquiry in aid
of legislation. In order therefore to ascertain the character or nature of an inquiry, resort must be had
to the speech or resolution under which such an inquiry is proposed to be made.
A perusal of the speech of Senator Enrile reveals that he (Senator Enrile) made a statement which
was published in various newspapers on 2 September 1988 accusing Mr. Ricardo "Baby" Lopa of
"having taken over the FMMC Group of Companies." As a consequence thereof, Mr. Lopa wrote a
letter to Senator Enrile on 4 September 1988 categorically denying that he had "taken over " the
FMMC Group of Companies; that former PCGG Chairman Ramon Diaz himself categorically stated in
a telecast interview by Mr. Luis Beltran on Channel 7 on 31 August 1988 that there has been no
takeover by him (Lopa); and that theses repeated allegations of a "takeover" on his (Lopa's) part of
FMMC are baseless as they are malicious.
The Lopa reply prompted Senator Enrile, during the session of the Senate on 13 September 1988, to
avail of the privilege hour, 17 so that he could repond to the said Lopa letter, and also to vindicate his
reputation as a Member of the Senate of the Philippines, considering the claim of Mr. Lopa that his
(Enrile's) charges that he (Lopa) had taken over the FMMC Group of Companies are "baseless" and
"malicious." Thus, in his speech, 18 Senator Enrile said, among others, as follows:
Mr. President, I rise this afternnon on a matter of personal privilege; the privilege being
that I received, Mr. President, a letter dated September 4, 1988, signed by Mr. ricardo
A. Lopa, a.k.a. or Baby Lopa, wherein he denied categorically that he has taken over
the First Manila Management Group of Companies which includes SOLOIL
Incorporated.
xxx xxxx xxx
In answer to Mr. Lopa, I will quote pertinent portions from an Official Memorandum to
the Presidential Commission of Good Government written and signed by former
Governor, now Congressman Jose Ramirez, in his capacity as head of the PCGG Task
Force for Region VIII. In his memorandum dated July 3, 1986, then Governor Ramirez
stated that when he and the members of his task force sought to serve a sequestration
order on the management of SOLOIL in Tanauan, Leyte, management officials assured
him that relatives of the President of the Philippines were personally discussing and
representing SOLOIL so that the order of sequestration would be lifted and that the new
owner was Mr. Ricardo A. Lopa.
I will quote the pertinent portions in the Ramire's memorandum.
The first paragraph of the memorandum reads as follows and I quote, Mr. President:
"Our sequestration work of SOLOIL in Tanauan, Leyte was not heeded by
management because they said another representation was being made
to this Commission for the ventual lifting of our sequestrationorder. They
even assured us that Mr. Ricardo Lopa and Peping Cojunangco were
personally discussing and representing SOLOIL, so the order of
sequestration will finally be lifted. While we attempted to carry on our
order, management refused to cooperate and vehemently turned down
our request to make available to us the records of the company. In fact it
was obviously clear that they will meet us with forcethe moment we insist
on doing normally our assigned task. In view of the impending threat, and
to avoid any untoward incident we decided to temporarily suspend our
work until there is a more categorical stand of this Commission in view of
the seemingly influential represetation being made by SOLOIL for us not
to continue our work."
Another pertinent portion of the same memorandum is paragraph five, which reads as
follows, and I quote Mr. President:
"The President, Mr. Gamboa, this is, I understand, the President of
SOLOIL, and the Plant Superintendent, Mr. Jimenez including their chief
counsel, Atty. Mandong Mendiola are now saying that there have been
divestment, and that the new owner is now Mr. Ricardo Lopa who
according to them, is the brother-in-law of the President. They even went
further by telling us that even Peping Cojuangco who we know is the
brother of her excellency is also interested in the ownership and
management of SOLOIL. When he demanded for supporting papers which
will indicate aforesaid divestment, Messrs. Gamboa, Jimenez and
Mendiola refused vehemently to submit these papers to us, instead they
said it will be submitted directly to this Commission. To our mind their
continuous dropping of names is not good for this Commission and even
to the President if our dersire is to achieve respectability and stability of
the government."
The contents of the memorandum of then Governor and now Congressman Jose
Ramirez were personally confirmed by him in a news interview last September 7, 1988.
xxx xxxx xxx
Also relevant to this case, Mr. President, is a letter of Mr. Ricardo Lopa himself in
August 11, 1988 issue of the newspaper Malaya headlined "On Alleged Takeover of
Romualdez Firms."
Mr. Lopa states in the last paragraph of the published letter and I quote him:
12. As of this writing, the sales agreement is under review by the PCGG
solely to determine the appropriate price. The sale of these companies
and our prior rigtht to requires them have never been at issue.
Perhaps I could not make it any clearer to Mr. Lopa that I was not really making
baseless and malicious statements.
Senator Enrile concluded his privilege speech in the following tenor:
Mr. President, it may be worthwhile for the Senate to look into the possible violation of
the law in the case particularly with regard to Republic Act No. 3019, the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Section 5 of which reads as follows and I quote:
Sec. 5. Prohibition on certain relatives. It shall be unlawful for the
spouse or for nay relative, by consanguinity or affinity, within the third civil
degree, of the President of the Philippines, the Vice-President of the
Philippines, the President of the Senate, or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, to intervene directly or indirectly, in any business,
transaction, contract or application with the Government: Provided, that
this section shall not apply to any person who prior to the assumption of
office of any of the above officials to whom he is related, has been already
dealing with the Government along the same line of business, nor to any
transaction, contract or application filed by him for approval of which is not
discretionary on the part of the officials concerned but depends upon
compliance with requisites provided by law, nor to any act lawfully
performed in an official capacity or in the exercise of a profession.
Mr. President, I have done duty to this Senate and to myself. I leave it to this august
Body to make its own conclusion.
Verily, the speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated legislation; he merely
called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as
"The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act." I other words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted
by respondent Blue Ribbon commitee was to find out whether or not the relatives of President
Aquino, particularly Mr. ricardo Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of the
36 or 39 corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopaa Group. There appears
to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved.
The Court is also not impressed with the respondent Committee's argument that the questioned
inquiry is to be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212. The said resolution was introduced
by Senator Jose D. Lina in view of the representaions made by leaders of school youth, community
groups and youth of non-governmental organizations to the Senate Committee on Youth and Sports
Development, to look into the charges against the PCGG filed by three (3) stockholders of Oriental
petroleum, i.e., that it has adopted a "get-rich-quick scheme" for its nominee-directors in a
sequestered oil exploration firm.The pertinent portion of Senate Resolution No. 212 reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREAS, recent developments have shown that no less than the Solicitor-General
has stated that the PCGG Chairman and at least three Commissioners should resign
and that the agency should rid itself of "ineptness, incompetence and corruption" and
that the Sandiganbayan has reportedly ordered the PCGG to answer charges filed by
three stockholders of Oriental Petroleum that it has adopted a "get-rich-quick scheme"
for its nominee-directors in a sequestered oil exploration firm;
WHEREAS, leaders of school youth, community groups and youth of non-governmental
organization had made representations to the Senate Committee on Youth and Sports
Development to look into the charges against the PCGG since said agency is a symbol
of the changes expected by the people when the EDSA revolution took place and that
the ill-gotten wealth to be recovered will fund priority projects which will benefit our
people such as CARP, free education in the elementary and secondary levels
reforestration, and employment generation for rural and urban workers;
WHEREAS, the government and the present leadeship must demonstrate in their public
and private lives integrity, honor and efficient management of government services lest
our youth become disillusioned and lose hope and return to an Idelogy and form of
government which is repugnant to true freedom, democratic participation and human
rights: Now, therefore, be it.
Resolved by the Senate, That the activities of the Presidential Commission on Good
Government be investigated by the appropriate Committee in connection with the
implementation of Section 26, Article XVIII of the Constitution. 19
Thus, the inquiry under Senate Resolution No. 212 is to look into the charges against the PCGG filed
by the three (3) stockholders of Oriental Petroleum in connection with the implementation of Section
26, Article XVIII of the Constitution.
It cannot, therefore, be said that the contemplated inquiry on the subject of the privilege speech of
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile, i.e., the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin
"Kokoy" Romualdez to the Lopa Group is to be conducted pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 212
because, firstly, Senator Enrile did not indict the PCGG, and, secondly, neither Mr. Ricardo Lopa nor
the herein petitioners are connected with the government but are private citizens.
It appeals, therefore, that the contemplated inquiry by respondent Committee is not really "in aid of
legislation" becuase it is not related to a purpose within the jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of
the investigation is to find out whether or not the ralatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had
violated Section 5 RA No. 3019, the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act", a matter that appears
more within the province of the courts rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take
judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa died during the pendency of this case. In John T. Watkins vs.
United States, 20 it was held held:
... The power of congress to conduct investigations in inherent in the legislative process.
That power is broad. it encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing
laws as well as proposed, or possibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in
our social,economic, or political system for the purpose of enabling Congress to remedy
them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Federal Government to expose
corruption, inefficiency or waste. But broad asis this power ofinquiry, it is not
unlimited. There is no general authority to expose the private affairs ofindividuals
without justification in terms of the functions of congress. This was freely conceded by
Solicitor General in his argument in this case. Nor is the Congress a law enforcement or
trial agency. These are functions of the executive and judicial departments of
government. No inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to and in furtherance of a
legitimate task of Congress. Investigations conducted soly for the personal
aggrandizement of the investigators or to "punish" those investigated are
indefensible. (emphasis supplied)
It can not be overlooked that when respondent Committee decide to conduct its investigation of the
petitioners, the complaint in Civil No. 0035 had already been filed with the Sandiganbayan. A perusal
of that complaint shows that one of its principal causes of action against herein petitioners, as
defendants therein, is the alleged sale of the 36 (or 39) corporations belonging to Benjamin "Kokoy"
Romualdez. Since the issues in said complaint had long been joined by the filing of petitioner's
respective answers thereto, the issue sought to be investigated by the respondent Commitee is one
over which jurisdiction had been acquired by the Sandiganbayan. In short, the issue had been pre-
empted by that court. To allow the respondent Committee to conduct its own investigation of an issue
already before the Sandiganbayan would not only pose the possibility of conflicting judgments
betweena legislative commitee and a judicial tribunal, but if the Committee's judgment were to be
reached before that of the Sandiganbayan, the possibility of its influence being made to bear on the
ultimate judgment of the Sandiganbayan can not be discounted.
In fine, for the rspondent Committee to probe and inquire into the same justiciable controversy
already before the Sandiganbayan, would be an encroachment into the exclusive domain of judicial
jurisdiction that had much earlier set in. In Baremblatt vs. United States, 21 it was held that:
Broad as it is, the power is not, howevern, without limitations. Since congress may only
investigate into those areas in which it may potentially legislate or appropriate, it cannot
inquire into matters which are within the exclusive province of one of the other branches
of the government. Lacking the judicial power given to the Judiciary, it cannot inquire
into mattes that are exclusively the concern of the Judiciary. Neither can it suplant the
Executive in what exclusively belongs to the Executive. ...
Now to another matter. It has been held that "a congressional committee's right to inquire is 'subject
to all relevant limitations placed by the Constitution on governmental action,' including "'the relevant
limitations of the Bill of Rights'." 22
In another case
... the mere semblance of legislative purpose would not justify an inquiry in the face of
the Bill of Rights. The critical element is the exeistence of, and the weight to be ascribed
to, the interest of the Congress in demanding disclosures from an unwilling witness. We
cannot simply assume, however, that every congressional investigation is justified by a
public need that over-balances any private rights affected. To do so would be to
abdicate the responsibility placed by the Constitution upon the judiciary to insure that
the Congress does not unjustifiably encroah upon an individual's right to privacy nor
abridge his liberty of speech, press, religion or assembly. 23
One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution to an individual is the right against self-
incrimination. 24 Thir right constured as the right to remain completely silent may be availed of by the
accused in a criminal case; but kit may be invoked by other witnesses only as questions are asked of
them.
This distinction was enunciated by the Court in Romeo Chavez vs. The Honorable Court of Appeals,
et al. 25 thus
Petitioner, as accused, occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness.
Whereas an ordinary witness may be compelled to take the witness stand and claim the
privilege as each question requiring an incriminating answer is hot at him, an accused
may altother refuse to take the witness stand and refuse to answer any all questions.
Moreover, this right of the accused is extended to respondents in administrative investigations but
only if they partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding or analogous to a criminal proceeding.
In Galman vs. Pamaran, 26the Court reiterated the doctrine in Cabal vs. Kapuanan (6 SCRA 1059) to
illustrate the right of witnesses to invoke the right against self-incrimination not only in criminal
proceedings but also in all other types of suit
It was held that:
We did not therein state that since he is not an accused and the case is not a criminal
case, Cabal cannot refuse to take the witness stand and testify, and that he can invoke
his right against self-incrimination only when a question which tends to elicit an answer
that will incriminate him is propounded to him. Clearly then, it is not the characeter of
the suit involved but the nature of the proceedings that controls. The privilege has
consistenly been held to extend to all proceedings sanctioned by law and to all cases in
which punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a party or not.
We do not here modify these doctrines. If we presently rule that petitioners may not be compelled by
the respondent Committee to appear, testify and produce evidenc before it, it is only becuase we hold
that the questioned inquiry is not in aid of legislation and, if pursued, would be violative of the
principle of separation of powers between the legislative and the judicial departments of government,
ordained by the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court holds that, under the facts, including the
circumtance that petitioners are presently impleaded as defendants in a case before the
Sandiganbayan, which involves issues intimately related to the subject of contemplated inquiry before
the respondet Committee, the respondent Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is hereby enjoined from
compelling the petitioners and intervenor to testify before it and produce evidence at the said inquiry.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado, Davide, Jr. and
Romero, JJ., concur.


Separate Opinions

PARAS, J., concurring:
I concur principally because any decision of the respondent committee may unduly influence the
Sandiganbayan
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
I regret that I must express a strong dissent the Court's opinion in this case.
The Court is asserting a power which I believe we do not possess. We are encroaching on the turf of
Congress. We are prohibiting the Senate from proceeding with a consitutionally vested function. We
are stopping the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee from exercising a legislative prerogative
investigations in aid of legislation. We do so becuase we somehow feel that the purported aim is not
the real purpose.
The Court has no power to second guess the motives behind an act of a House of Congress. Neither
can we substitute our judgment for its judgment on a matter specifically given to it by the Constitution.
The scope of the legislative power is broad. it emcompasses practically every aspect of human or
corporate behavior capable of regulation. How can this Court say that unraveling the tangled and
secret skeins behind the acquisition by Benjamin "Kokoy" Romualdez of 39 corporations under the
past regime and their sudden sale to the Lopa Group at the outset of the new dispensation will not
result in useful legislation?
The power of either House of Congress to conduct investigations is inherent. It needs no textual
grant. As stated inArnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 (1950)
Our form of government being patterned after the American system the framers of
our Constitution having drawn largely from American institutions and practices we
can, in this case, properly draw also from American precedents in interpreting
analogous provisions of our Constitution, as we have done in other cases in the past.
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of
Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may
exercise its legislative functions advisely and effectively, such power is so far incidental
to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with
process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change: and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information
which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it. ...
(At p. 45)
The framers of the present Constitution were not content to leave the power inherent, incidental or
implied. The power is now expressed as follows:
Sec. 21 The Senate or the House of Representatives or may of its respective
committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legialtion in accordance with its duly
published rules of precedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.
Apart from the formal requirement of publishing the rules of procedure, I agree that there are three
queries which, if answered in the affirmative, may give us cause to intervene.
First, is the matter being investigated one on which no valid legislation could possibly be enacted?
Second, is Congress encroaching on terrain which the Constitution has reserved as the exclusive
domain of another branch of government?
And third, is Congress violating the basic liberties of an individual?
The classic formulation of the power of the Court to interpret the meaning of "in aid of legislation" is
expressed inKilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1880).
The House of Representatives passed a resolution creating a committee to investigate the financial
relations between Jay Cooke and Co., a depositary of federal funds and a real estate pool. A debtor
of Jay Cooke and Co, Kilbourn, general manager of the pool refused to answer questions put to him
by the Committee and to produce certain book sna papers. Consequently, he was ordered jailed for
forty-five days. He brought an action for false imprisonment and the Supreme Court decided in his
favor.
Speaking through Justice Miller, the Court ruled:
The resolution adopted as a sequence of this preamble contains no hint of any intention
of final action by Congress on the subject, In all the argument of the case no suggestion
has been made of what the House of Respresentatives or the Congress could have
done in the way of remedying the wrong or securing the creditors of Jay Cooke and Co.,
or even the United States. Was it to be simply a fruitless investigation into the personal
affiars of individuals? If so the House of Representatives had no power or authority in
the matter more than any other equal number of gentlemen interested for the
government of their country. By fruitless we mean that it could result in no valid
legislation on the subject to which the inquiry referrred. (Kilbourn v. Thompson, Id. at
page 388)
The Kilbourn decision is, however, crica 1880. The world has turned over many times since that era.
The same court which validated separate but equal facilities against of racial discrimination and ruled
that a private contract may bar improved labor standards and social justice legislation has reversed
itslef on these and many other questions.
In McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135; 71 L. Ed. 580 [1927], the court went beyond the express
terms of the Senate resolution directing the investigation of a former Attorney General for non-
feasance, misfeasance, and malfeasance in office. It presumed that the action of the Senate was with
a legitimate object.
... Plainly the subject was one on which legislation could be had and would be materially
aided by the information which the investigation was calculated to elicit. This becomes
manifest when it is reflected that the functions of the Department of Justice, the powers
and duties of the Attorney-General and the duties of his assitants, are all subject to
regulation by congressional legislation, and that the department is maintained and its
activitites are carried on under such appropriations as in the judgment of Congress are
needed from year to year.
The only legitimate object the Senate could have in ordering the investigation was to aid
it in legislating, and we think the subject was the real object. An express avowal of the
object would have been better; but in view of the particular subject matter was not
indispenable. In People ex rel. Mc Donald v. Keeler, 99, N.Y. 463, 52 Am. Rep. 49, 2
N.E. 615, where the Court of Appeals of New york sustained an investigation order by
the House of Representatives of that state where the resolution contained no avowal,
but disclosed that it definitely related to the administrative of public office the duties of
which were subject to legislative regulation, the court said (pp. 485, 487): Where public
institutions under the control of the State are ordered to be investigated, it is generally
with the view of some legislative action respecting them, and the same may be said in
respect of public officers,' And again "We are bound to presume that the action of the
legislative body was with a legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and
we have no right to assume that the contrary was intended." (McGrain v. Daugherty Id.,
at page 594-595, Emphasis supplied)
The American Court was more categorical in United States v. Josephson, 333 U.S. 858 (1938). It
declared that declaration of legislative purpose was conclusive on the Courts:
Whatever may be said of the Committee on the un-American activities, its authorizing
resolution recites it is in aid of legislation and that fact is establshed for courts.
And since the matter before us in somethingwe inherited from the American constitutional system,
rulings from the decision of federal courts may be apropos. (Stamler v. Willis, 287 F. Supp. 734
[1968]
The Court cannot probe into the motives of the members of the Congress.
Barsky v. United States, 167 F. 2d 241 [1948]
The measure of the power of inquiry is the potentiality that constitutional legislation
might ensue from information derived from such inquiry.
The possibility that invalid as well as valid legislation might ensue from an inquiry does
not limit the power of inquiry, since invalid legislation might ensue from any inquiry.
United States v. Shelton, 148 F. Supp. 926 [1957]
The contention of the defendant that the hearing at which he testified and from which
the indictment arose was not in furtherance og a legislative purpose proceeds on the
assumption that a failure to have specific legislation in contemplation, or a failure to
show that legislation was in fact enacted, estabished an absence of legislative purpose.
This argument is patently unsound. The investigative power of Congress is not subject
to the limitation that hearings must result in legislation or recommendations for
legislation.
United States v. Deutch (147 F. Supp. 89 (1956)
Under the Constitution of the U.S., the Federal Government is a government of limited
powers. The Congress, being the legislative branch of the Federal Government, is also
clothed with limited legislative powers. In orders, however, to carry its legislative powers
into effect successfully, it has always been held that Congress has the power to secure
information concerning matters in respect to which it has the authority to legislate. In
fact, it would seem that Congress must secure information in order to legislate
intelligently. Beyond that, the Congress has the right secure information in order to
determine whether or not to legislate on a particular subject matter on which it is within
its constitutional powers to act. (Emphasis Supplied)
The even broader scope of legislative investigation in the Philippine context is explained by a member
of the Constitutional Commission.
The requirement that the investigation be "in aid of legislation" is an essential element
for establishing the jurisdiction of the legislative body. It is, however, a requirement
which is not difficult to satisfy becuase, unlike in the United States, where legislative
power is shared by the United State Congress and the states legislatures, the totality of
legislative power is possessed by the Congress nad its legislative field is well-nigh
unlimited. "It would be difficult to define any limits by which the subject matter of its
inquiry can be bounded." (Supra, at p. 46) Moreover, it is not necessary that every
question propounded to a witness must be material to a proposed legislation. "In other
words, the materiality of the question must be determined by its direct relation to the
subject of the inquiry and not by its indirect relation to any proposed or possible
legislation. The reason is that the necessity or lack of necessity for legislative action and
form and character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of the information
to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction to be gathered as a
result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such information elicited from a single
question. (Id., at 48)
On the basis of this interpretation of what "in aid of legislation" means, it can readily be
seen that the phrase contributes practically nothing towards protecting witnesses.
Practically any investigation can be in aid of the broad legislative power of Congress.
The limitation, therefore cannot effectively prevent what Kilbourn v. Thompson (103
U.S. 168 [1880]) characterized as "roving commissions" or what Watkins v. United
States (354 U.S. 178, 200 [1957] labeled as exposure for the sake of exposure.
(Bernas, Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1st Ed., page 132).
Applying the above principles to the present casem, it can readily be seen that the Senate is
investigating an area where it may potentially legislate. The ease with which relatives of the President
were allegedly able to amass great wealth under the past regime is a legitimate area of inquiry. And if
we tack on the alleged attempts o f relatives of a succeeding adminsitration to duplicate the feat, the
need for remedial legislation becomes more imperative.
Our second area of concern is congressional encroachment on matters reserved by the Constitution
for the Executive or the Judiciary.
The majority opinion cites the decision in Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936)
explaining our power to determined conflicting claims of authority. It is indeed the function on this
Court to allocate constitutional boundaries but in the exercise of this "umpire" function we have to
take care that we do not keep any of the three great departments of government from performing
functions peculiar to each department or specifically vested to it sby the Constitution. When a power
is vested, ti carries with is everything legitimately neede to exercise it.
It may be argued that the investigation into the Romualdez Lopa transactions is more appropriate
for the Department of Justice and the judiciary. This argument misses the point of legislative inquiry.
The prosecution of offenders by the Department of Justice or the Ombudsman and their trial before
courts of justice is intended to punish persons who violate the law. Legislative investigations go
further. The aim is to arrive at policy determinations which may or may not be enacted into legislation.
Referral to prosecutors or courts of justice is an added bonus. For sure, the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee knows it cannot sentence any offender, no matter how overwhelming the proof that it may
gatherm to a jail term. But certainly, the Committee can recommend to Congress how the situation
which enabled get-rich-quick schemes to flourish may be remedied. The fact that the subject of the
investigation may currently be undergoing trial does not restrict the power of Congress to investigate
for its own purposes. The legislative purpose is distinctly different from the judicial purpose.
In Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 73 L ed. 692 (1928), leases of naval reservations to oil
companies were investigated by the United States Senate. On a finding that certain leases were
fraudulent, court action was recommended. In other words, court action on one hand and legislation
on the other, are not mutually exclusive. They may complement each other.
... It may be conceded that Congress is without authority to compel disclosyres for the
purpose of aiding the prosecution of pending suits; but the authority of that body,
directly or through it Committees, to require pertinent disclosures in aid of its own
consitutional power is not abridged because the information sought to be elicited may
also be of use in such suits... It is plain that investigation of the matters involved in suits
brought or to be commenced under the Senate resolution directing the institution of
suits for the cancellation of the leases might directly aid in respect of legislative action...
(Sinclair v. United States, Id.at page 698).
In United States v. Orman, 207 F. 2d Ed. 148 (1953), the court declared that it was pertinent for a
legislative committee to seek facts indicating that a witness was linked to unlawful intestate gambling.
The power of a congressional committee to investigate matters cannot be challenged on
the ground that the Committee went beyond the scope of any contemplated legislative
and assumed the functions of a grand jury. Whre the genral subject of investigation is
one concerning which Congress can legislate, and the information sought might aid the
congressional consideration, in such a situation a legitimate legislative purpose must be
presumed...
I submit that the filing of indictments or informations or the trial of certain persons cannot, by
themselves, half the intitiation or stop the progress of legislative investigations.
The other ground which I consider the more important one is where the legislative investigation
violates the liberties of the witnesses.
The Constitution expressly provides that "the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.
It should be emphasized that the constitutional restriction does not call for the banning or prohibition
of investigations where a violation of a basis rights is claimed. It only requires that in the course of the
proceedings, the right of persons should be respected.
What the majority opinion mandates is a blanket prohibition against a witness testifying at all, simply
because he is already facing charges before the Sandiganbayan. To my mind, the Consitution allows
him to interpose objections whenever an incriminating question is posed or when he is compelled to
reveal his ocurt defenses, but not ot refuse to take the witness stand completely.
Arnault v. Nazareno, supra, illustrates the reticence, with which the court views petitions to curtail
legislative investigations even where an invocation of individual liberties is made.
In Arnault, the entire country already knew the name of the presidential realtive whom the Sentate
was trying to link to the Tambobong-Buenavista estate anomalies. Still, the Court did not interfere
when Arnault refused to answer specific questions directed at him and he was punished for hir
refusal. The Court did not restrain the Senate when Arnault was sent o the national penitentiary for an
indefinite visit until the name which the Senate wanted him to utter was extracted. Only when the
imprisonment became ureasonably prolonged and the situation in Congress had changed was he
released.
As pointed out by the respondents, not one question has been asked requiring an answer that would
incriminate the petitioners. The allegation that their basic rights are vilolated is not only without basis
but is also premature.
I agree with the respondents that the slae of 39 Romualdez corporations to Mr. Lopa is not a purely
private transaction into which the Senate may not inquire. if this were so, much of the work of the
Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) as it seeks to recover illegally acquired
wealth would be negated. Much of what PCGG is trying to recover is the product of arrangements
which are not only private but also secret and hidden.
I therefore, vote to DISMISS the petition.
Narvasa, J., dissents.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I regret I am unable to give my concurrence, I do not agree that the investigation being conducted by
the Blue Ribbon Committee is not in aid of legislation.
In Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29, this Court observed that "we are bound to presume that the action
of the legislative body was with a legitimate object if it is capable of being so construed, and we have
no right ot assume that the contrary was intended." (People ex rel. Mc Donald vs. Keeler, 99 N.Y.
463; 52 Am. Rep., 49; 2 N.E., 615, quoted with approval by the U.S. Supreme Court in McGrain vs.
Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135). As far as I know, that is still the rule today.
More importantly, the presumption is supported by the established facts. The inquiry is sustainable as
an implied of power the legislature and even as expressly limited by the Constitution.
The inquiry deals with alleged manipulations of public funds and illicit acquisitions of properties now
being claimed by the PCGG for the Republic of the Philippines. The purpose of the Committee is to
ascertain if and how such anomalies have been committed. It is settled that the legislature has a right
to investigate the disposition of the public funds it has appropriated; indeed, "an inquiry into the
expenditure of all public money is na indispensable duty of the legislature." Moreover, an investigation
of a possible violation of a law may be useful in the drafting of amendatory legislation to correct or
strengthen that law.
The ponencia quotes lengthily from Senator Enrile's speech and concludes that it "contained no
suggestions of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible
violation of section 5 of R.A. No. 3019." However, according to McGrain v. Daugherty, supra:
Primarily, the purpose for which legislative inquiry and investigation is pursued is to
serve as an aid in legislation. Through it, the legislature is able to obtain facts or data in
aid fo proposed legislation. However, it is not necessary that the resolution ordering an
investigation should in terms expressly state that the object of the inquiry is to obtain
data in aid of proposed legislation. It is enough that such purpose appears from a
consideration of the entire proceedings or one in which legislation could be had and
would be materially aided by the information which the investigation was calculated to
elicit. An express avowal of the object would be better, but such is not
indispensable. (Emphasis supplied).
The petitioner's contention that the questioned investigation would compel them to reveal their
defense in the cases now pending against them in the Sandigangbayan is untenable. They know or
should know that they cannot be compelled to answer incriminating questions. The case of Chavez v.
Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 663, where we held that an accused may refuse at the outset to take the
stand on the ground that the questions to be put by the prosecutor will tend to incriminate him is, of
course, not applicable to them. They are not facing criminal charges before the Blue Ribbon
Committee. Like any ordinary witness, they can invoke the right against self-incrimination only when
and as the incriminating question is propounded.
While it is true that the Court is now allowed more leeway in reviewing the traditionally political acts of
the legislative and executive departments, the power must be exercised with the utmost
circumspection lest we unduly trench on their prerogatives and disarrange the constitutional
separation of powers. That power is available to us only if there is a clear showing of a grave abuse
of discretion, which I do not see in the case at bar.
Guided by the presumption and the facts, I vote to DISMISS the petition.
Narvasa, J., dissents.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-3820 July 18, 1950
JEAN L. ARNAULT, petitioner,
vs.
LEON NAZARENO, Sergeant-at-arms, Philippine Senate, and EUSTAQUIO BALAGTAS,
Director of Prisons,respondents.
J.C. Orendain, Augusto Revilla, and Eduardo Arboleda for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo, Lorenzo Sumulong, Lorenzo Taada, and
Vicente J. Francisco for respondents.
OZAETA, J.:
This is an original petition for habeas corpus to relieve the petitioner from his confinement in the New
Bilibid Prison to which he has been committed by virtue of a resolution adopted by the Senate on May
15, 1950, which reads as follows:
Whereas, Jean L. Arnault refused to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions related to the said amount; Now,
therefore, be it.
Resolved, that for his refusal to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000
Jean L. Arnault be committed to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned in the
New Bilibid Prison, Muntinlupa, Rizal, until discharged by further order of the Senate or by the
special committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8, such discharge to be ordered when he
shall have purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate or to the said special committee the
name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent
questions in connection therewith.
The facts that gave rise to the adoption of said resolution, insofar as pertinent here, may be briefly
stated as follows:
In the latter part of October, 1949, the Philippine Government, through the Rural Progress
Administration, bought two estates known as Buenavista and Tambobong for the sums of P4,500,000
and P500,000, respectively. Of the first sum, P1,000,000 was paid to Ernest H. Burt, a nonresident
American, thru his attorney-in-fact in the Philippines, the Associated Estates, Inc., represented by
Jean L. Arnault, for alleged interest of the said Burt in the Buenavista Estate. The second sum of
P500,000 was all paid to the same Ernest H. Burt through his other attorney-in-fact, the North Manila
Development Co., Inc., also represented by Jean L. Arnault, for the alleged interest of the said Burt in
the Tambobong Estate.
The original owner of the Buenavista Estate was the San Juan de Dios Hospital. The Philippine
Government held a 25-year lease contract on said estate, with an option to purchase it for
P3,000,000 within the same period of 25 years counted from January 1, 1939. The occupation
Republic of the Philippines purported to exercise that option by tendering to the owner the sum of
P3,000,000 and, upon its rejection, by depositing it in court on June 21, 1944, together with the
accrued rentals amounting to P3224,000. Since 1939 the Government has remained in possession of
the estate.
On June 29, 1946, the San Juan de Dios Hospital sold the Buenavista Estate for P5,000,000 to
Ernest H. Burt, who made a down payment of P10,000 only and agreed to pay P5000,000 within one
year and the remainder in annual installments of P500,000 each, with the stipulation that failure on
his part to make any of said payments would cause the forfeiture of his down payment of P10,000
and would entitle the Hospital to rescind to sale to him. Aside from the down payment of P10,000,
Burt has made no other payment on account of the purchase price of said estate.
The original owner of the Tambobong Estate was the Philippine Trust Company. On May 14, 1946,
the Philippine Trust Company sold estate for the sum of P1,200,000 to Ernest H. Burt, who paid
P10,000 down and promise to pay P90,000 within nine months and the balance of P1,100,000 in ten
successive installments of P110,000 each. The nine-month period within which to pay the first
installment of P90,000 expired on February 14, 1947, without Burt's having paid the said or any other
amount then or afterwards. On September 4, 1947, the Philippine Trust Company sold, conveyed,
and delivered the Tambobong Estate to the Rural Progress Administration by an absolute deed of
sale in consideration of the sum of P750,000. On February 5, 1948, the Rural Progress
Administration made, under article 1504 of the Civil Code, a notarial demand upon Burt for the
resolution and cancellation of his contract of purchase with the Philippine Trust Company due to his
failure to pay the installment of P90,000 within the period of nine months. Subsequently the Court of
First Instance of Rizal ordered the cancellation of Burt's certificate of title and the issuance of a new
one in the name of the Rural Progress Administration, from which order he appealed to the Supreme
Court.
1

It was in the face of the antecedents sketched in the last three preceding paragraphs that the
Philippine Government, through the Secretary of Justice as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the
Rural Progress Administration and as Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Philippine National
Bank, from which the money was borrowed, accomplished the purchase of the two estates in the
latter part of October, 1949, as stated at the outset.
On February 27, 1950, the Senate adopted its Resolution No. 8, which reads as follows:
RESOLUTION CREATING A SPECIAL COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE BUENAVISTA
AND THE TAMBOBONG ESTATES DEAL.
WHEREAS, it is reported that the Philippine government, through the Rural Progress
Administration, has bought the Buenavista and the Tambobong Estates for the aggregate sum
of five million pesos;
WHEREAS, it is reported that under the decision of the Supreme Court dated October 31,
1949, the Buenavista Estate could have been bought for three million pesos by virtue of a
contract entered into between the San Juan de Dios Hospital and Philippine Government in
1939;
WHEREAS, it is even alleged that the Philippine Government did not have to purchase the
Buenavista Estate because the occupation government had made tender of payment in the
amount of three million pesos, Japanese currency, which fact is believed sufficient to vest title
of Ownership in the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to decisions of the Supreme Court
sustaining the validity of payments made in Japanese military notes during the occupation;
WHEREAS, it is reported that the Philippine Government did not have to pay a single centavo
for the Tambobong Estate as it was already practically owned by virtue of a deed of sale from
the Philippine Trust Company dated September 3, 194, for seven hundred and fifty thousand
pesos, and by virtue of the recission of the contract through which Ernest H. Burt had an
interest in the estate; Now, therefore, be it.
RESOLVED, That a Special Committee, be, as it hereby is, created, composed of five
members to be appointed by the President of the Senate to investigate the Buenavista and
Tambobong Estate deals. It shall be the duty of the said Committee to determine whether the
said purchase was honest, valid, and proper and whether the price involved in the deal was
fair and just, the parties responsible therefor, and any other facts the Committee may deem
proper in the premises. Said Committee shall have the power to conduct public hearings;
issue subpoena or subpoena duces tecum to compel the attendance of witnesses or the
production of documents before it; and may require any official or employee of any bureau,
office, branch, subdivision, agency, or instrumentality of the Government to assist or otherwise
cooperate with the Special Committee in the performance of its functions and duties. Said
Committee shall submit its report of findings and recommendations within two weeks from the
adoption of this Resolution.
The special committee created by the above resolution called and examined various witnesses,
among the most important of whom was the herein petitioner, Jean L. Arnault. An intriguing question
which the committee sought to resolve was that involved in the apparent unnecessariness and
irregularity of the Government's paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his alleged interest of
only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to have forfeited anyway long before October,
1949. The committee sought to determine who were responsible for and who benefited from the
transaction at the expense of the Government.
Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were delivered to him on the
afternoon of October 29, 1949; that on the same date he opened a new account in the name of
Ernest H. Burt with the Philippine National Bank in which he deposited the two checks aggregating
P1,500,000; and that on the same occasion he draw on said account two checks; one for P500,000,
which he transferred to the account of the Associated Agencies, Inc., with the Philippine National
Bank, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he himself cashed. It was the desire of the
committee to determine the ultimate recipient of this sum of P440,000 that gave rise to the present
case.
At first the petitioner claimed before the Committee:
Mr. ARNAULT (reading from a note). Mr. Chairman, for questions involving the disposition of
funds, I take the position that the transactions were legal, that no laws were being violated, and
that all requisites had been complied with. Here also I acted in a purely functional capacity of
representative. I beg to be excused from making answer which might later be used against me.
I have been assured that it is my constitutional right to refuse to incriminate myself, and I am
certain that the Honorable Members of this Committee, who, I understand, are lawyers, will
see the justness of my position.
At as subsequent session of the committee (March 16) Senator De Vera, a member of the committee,
interrogated him as follows:
Senator DE VERA. Now these transactions, according to your own typewritten statement, were
legal?
Mr. ARNAULT. I believe so.
Senator DE VERA. And the disposition of that fund involved, according to your own statement,
did not violate any law?
Mr. ARNAULT. I believe so.
x x x x x x x x x
Senator DE VERA. So that if the funds were disposed of in such a manner that no laws were
violated, how is it that when you were asked by the Committee to tell what steps you took to
have this money delivered to Burt, you refused to answer the questions, saying that it would
incriminate you?
Mr. ARNAULT. Because it violates the rights of a citizen to privacy in his dealings with other
people.
x x x x x x x x x
Senator DE VERA. Are you afraid to state how the money was disposed of because you would
be incriminated, or you would be incriminating somebody?
Mr. ARNAULT. I am not afraid; I simply stand on the privilege to dispose of the money that has
been paid to me as a result of a legal transaction without having to account for any use of it.
But when in the same session the chairman of the committee, Senator Sumulong, interrogated the
petitioner, the latter testified as follows:
The CHAIRMAN. The other check of P440,000 which you also made on October 29, 1949, is
payable to cash; and upon cashing this P440,000 on October 29, 1949, what did you do with
that amount?
Mr. ARNAULT. I turned it over to a certain person.
The CHAIRMAN. The whole amount of P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Who was that certain person to whom you delivered these P440,000 which
you cashed on October 29, 1949?
Mr. ARNAULT. I don't remember the name; he was a representative of Burt.
The CHAIRMAN. That representative of Burt to whom you delivered the P440,000 was a
Filipino?
Mr. ARNAULT. I don't know.
The CHAIRMAN. You do not remember the name of that representative of Burt to whom you
delivered this big amount of P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. I am not sure; I do not remember the name.
The CHAIRMAN. That certain person who represented Burt to whom you delivered the big
amount on October 29, 1949, gave you a receipt for the amount?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. Neither did you ask a receipt?
Mr. ARNAULT. I didn't ask.
The CHAIRMAN. And why did you give that certain person, representative of Burt, this big
amount of P440,000 which forms part of the P1-! million paid to Burt?
Mr. ARNAULT. Because I have instructions to that effect.
The CHAIRMAN. Who gave you the instruction?
Mr. ARNAULT. Burt.
The CHAIRMAN. Where is the instruction; was that in writing?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. By cable?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. In what form did you receive that instruction?
Mr. ARNAULT. Verbal instruction.
The CHAIRMAN. When did you receive this verbal instruction from Burt to deliver these
P440,000 to a certain person whose name you do not like to reveal?
Mr. ARNAULT. I have instruction to comply with the request of the person.
The CHAIRMAN. Now, you said that instruction given to you by Burt was verbal?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. When was that instruction given to you by Burt?
Mr. ARNAULT. Long time ago.
The CHAIRMAN. In what year did Burt give you that verbal instruction; when Burt was still here
in the Philippines?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. But at that time Burt already knew that he would receive the money?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. In what year was that when Burt while he was here in the Philippines gave
you the verbal instruction?
Mr. ARNAULT. In 1946.
The CHAIRMAN. And what has that certain person done for Burt to merit receiving these
P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. I absolutely do not know.
The CHAIRMAN. You do not know?
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not know.
The CHAIRMAN. Burt did not tell you when he gave you the verbal instruction why that certain
person should receive these P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. He did not tell me.
The CHAIRMAN. And Burt also authorized you to give this big amount to that certain person
without receipt?
Mr. ARNAULT. He told me that a certain person would represent him and where could I meet
him.
The CHAIRMAN. Did Burt know already that certain person as early as 1946?
Mr. ARNAULT. I presume much before that.
The CHAIRMAN. Did that certain person have any intervention in the prosecution of the two
cases involving the Buenavista and Tambobong estates?
Mr. ARNAULT. Not that I know of.
The CHAIRMAN. Is that certain person related to any high government official?
Mr. ARNAULT. No, I do not know.
The CHAIRMAN. Why can you not tell us the name of that certain person?
Mr. ARNAULT. Because I am not sure of his name; I cannot remember the name.
The CHAIRMAN. When gave that certain person that P440,000 on October 29, 1949, you
knew already that person?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes, I have seen him several times.
The CHAIRMAN. And the name of that certain person is a Filipino name?
Mr. ARNAULT. I would say Spanish name.
The CHAIRMAN. And how about his Christian name; is it also a Spanish name?
Mr. ARNAULT. I am not sure; I think the initial is J.
The CHAIRMAN. Did he have a middle name?
Mr. ARNAULT. I never knew it.
The CHAIRMAN. And how about his family name which according to your recollection is
Spanish; can you remember the first letter with which that family name begins?
Mr. ARNAULT. S, D or F.
The CHAIRMAN. And what was the last letter of the family name?
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not know.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you seen that person again after you have delivered this P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. Several times?
Mr. ARNAULT. Two or three times.
The CHAIRMAN. Here in Manila?
Mr. ARNAULT. Yes.
The CHAIRMAN. And in spite of the fact that you met that person two or three times, you
never were able to find out what was his name?
Mr. ARNAULT. If I knew, I would [have] taken it down. Mr. Peralta knows my name; of course,
we have not done business. Lots of people in Manila know me, but they don't know my name,
and I don't know them. They sa{ I am "chiflado" because I don't know their names.
The CHAIRMAN. That certain person is a male or female?
Mr. ARNAULT. He is a male.
The CHAIRMAN. You are sure that he is a male at least?
Mr. ARNAULT. Let us say 38 or 40 years, more or less.
The CHAIRMAN. Can you give us, more or less, a description of that certain person? What is
his complexion: light, dark or light brown?
Mr. ARNAULT. He is like the gentleman there (pointing to Senator Cabili), but smaller. He
walks very straight, with military bearing.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you know the residence of that certain person to whom you gave the
P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. No.
The CHAIRMAN. During these frequent times that you met that certain person, you never
came to know his residence?
Mr. ARNAULT. No, because he was coming to the office.
The CHAIRMAN. How tall is that certain person?
Mr. ARNAULT. Between 5-2 and 5-6.
On May 15, 1950, the petitioner was haled before the bar of the Senate, which approved and read to
him the following resolution:
Be it resolved by the Senate of the Philippines in Session assembled:
That Jean L. Arnault, now at the bar of the Senate, be arraigned for contempt consisting of
contumacious acts committed by him during the investigation conducted by the Special
Committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8 to probe the Tambobong and Buenavista
estates deal of October 21, 1949, and that the President of the Senate propounded to him the
following interrogatories:
1. What excuse have you for persistently refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom
you gave the P440,000 on October 29, 1949, a person whose name it is impossible for you not
to remember not only because of the big amount of money you gave to him without receipt, but
also by your own statements you knew him as early as 1946 when General Ernest H. Burt was
still in the Philippines, you made two other deliveries of money to him without receipt, and the
last time you saw him was in December 1949?
Thereupon petitioner's attorney, Mr. Orendain, submitted for him a written answer alleging that the
questions were incriminatory in nature and begging leave to be allowed to stand on his constitutional
right not to be compelled to be a witness against himself. Not satisfied with that written answer
Senator Sumulong, over the objection of counsel for the petitioner, propounded to the latter the
following question:
Sen. SUMULONG. During the investigation, when the Committee asked you for the name of
that person to whom you gave the P440,000, you said that you can [could] not remember his
name. That was the reason then for refusing to reveal the name of the person. Now, in the
answer that you have just cited, you are refusing to reveal the name of that person to whom
you gave the P440,000 on the ground that your answer will be self-incriminating. Now, do I
understand from you that you are abandoning your former claim that you cannot remember the
name of that person, and that your reason now for your refusal to reveal the name of that
person is that your answer might be self-incriminating? In other words, the question is this:
What is your real reason for refusing to reveal the name of that person to whom you gave the
P440,000: that you do not remember his name or that your answer would be self-
incriminating?
x x x x x x x x x
Mr. ORENDAIN. Mr. President, we are begging for the rules of procedure that the accused
should not be required to testify unless he so desires.
The PRESIDENT. It is the duty of the respondent to answer the question. The question is very
clear. It does not incriminate him.
x x x x x x x x x
Mr. ARNAULT. I stand by every statement that I have made before the Senate Committee on
the first, second, and third hearings to which I was made in my letter to this Senate of May 2,
1950, in which I gave all the reasons that were in my powers to give, as requested. I cannot
change anything in those statements that I made because they represent the best that I can do
, to the best of my ability.
The PRESIDENT. You are not answering the question. The answer has nothing to do with the
question.
Sen. SUMULONG. I would like to remind you , Mr. Arnault, that the reason that you gave
during the investigation for not revealing the name of the person to whom you gave the
P440,000 is not the same reason that you are now alleging because during the investigation
you told us: "I do not remember his name." But, now, you are now saying: "My answer might
incriminate me." What is your real position?
Mr. ARNAULT. I have just stated that I stand by my statements that I made at the first, second,
and third hearings. I said that I wanted to be excused from answering the question. I beg to be
excused from making any answer that might be incriminating in nature. However, in this
answer, if the detail of not remembering the name of the person has not been included, it is an
oversight.
Sen. SUMULONG. Mr. Arnault, will you kindly answer a simple question: Do you remember or
not the name of the person to whom you gave the P440,000?
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not remember .
Sen. SUMULONG. Now, if you do not remember the name of that person, how can you say
that your answer might be incriminating? If you do not remember his name, you cannot answer
the question; so how could your answer be self-incriminating? What do you say to that?
Mr. ARNAULT. This is too complicated for me to explain. Please, I do not see how to answer
those questions. That is why I asked for a lawyer, so he can help me. I have no means of
knowing what the situation is about. I have been in jail 13 days without communication with the
outside. How could I answer the question? I have no knowledge of legal procedure or rule, of
which I am completely ignorant.
x x x x x x x x x
Sen. SUMULONG. Mr. President, I ask that the question be answered.
The PRESIDENT. The witness is ordered to answer the question. It is very clear. It does not
incriminate the witness.
x x x x x x x x x
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not remember. I stand on my constitutional rights. I beg to be excused
from making further answer, please.
Sen. SUMULONG. In that mimeographed letter that you sent addressed to the President of the
Senate, dated May 2, 1950, you stated there that you cannot reveal the name of the person to
whom you gave the P440,000 because if he is a public official you might render yourself liable
for prosecution for bribery, and that if he is a private individual you might render yourself liable
for prosecution for slander. Why did you make those statements when you cannot even tell us
whether that person to whom you gave the P440,000 is a public official or a private individual ?
We are giving you this chance to convince the Senate that all these allegations of yours that
your answers might incriminate you are given by you honestly or you are just trying to make a
pretext for not revealing the information desired by the Senate.
The PRESIDENT. You are ordered to answer the question.
Mr. ARNAULT. I do not even understand the question. (The question is restated and
explained.)
Mr. ARNAULT. That letter of May 2, was prepared by a lawyer for me and signed it. That is all I
can say how I stand about this letter. I have no knowledge myself enough to write such a letter,
so I had to secure the help of a lawyer to help me in my period of distress.
In that same session of the Senate before which the petitioner was called to show cause why he
should not be adjudged guilty of contempt of the Senate, Senator Sumulong propounded to the
petitioner questions tending to elicit information from him as to the identity of the person to whom he
delivered the P440,000; but the petitioner refused to reveal it by saying that he did not remember.
The President of the Senate then propounded to him various questions concerning his past activities
dating as far back as when witness was seven years of age and ending as recently as the post
liberation period, all of which questions the witness answered satisfactorily. In view thereof, the
President of the Senate also made an attempt to illicit the desired information from the witness, as
follows:
The PRESIDENT. Now I am convinced that you have a good memory. Answer: Did you deliver
the P440,000 as a gift, or of any consideration?
Mr. ARNAULT. I have said that I had instructions to deliver it to that person, that is all.
The PRESIDENT. Was it the first time you saw that person?
Mr. ARNAULT. I saw him various times, I have already said.
The PRESIDENT. In spite of that, you do not have the least remembrance of the name of that
person?
Mr. ARNAULT. I cannot remember.
The PRESIDENT. How is it that you do not remember events that happened a short time ago
and, on the other hand, you remember events that occurred during your childhood?
Mr. ARNAULT. I cannot explain.
The Senate then deliberated and adopted the resolution of May 15 hereinabove quoted whereby the
petitioner was committed to the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms and imprisoned until "he shall have
purged the contempt by revealing to the Senate or to the aforesaid Special Committee the name of
the person to whom he gave the P440,000, as well as answer other pertinent questions in connection
therewith."
The Senate also adopted on the same date another resolution (No. 16) , to wit:
That the Special Committee created by Senate Resolution No. 8 be empowered and directed
to continue its investigation of the Tambobong and Buenavista Estates deal of October 21,
1949, more particularly to continue the examination of Jean L. Arnault regarding the name of
the person to whom he gave the P440,000 and other matters related therewith.
The first session of the Second Congress was adjourned at midnight on May 18, 1950.
The case was argued twice before us. We have given its earnest and prolonged consideration
because it is the first of its kind to arise since the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines was
adopted. For the first time this Court is called upon to define the power of either House of Congress to
punish a person not a member for contempt; and we are fully conscious that our pronouncements
here will set an important precedent for the future guidance of all concerned.
Before discussing the specific issues raised by the parties, we deem it necessary to lay down the
general principles of law which form the background of those issues.
Patterned after the American system, our Constitution vests the powers of the Government in three
independent but coordinate Departments Legislative, Executive, and Judicial. The legislative
power is vested in the Congress, which consists of the Senate and the House of Representatives.
(Section 1, Article VI.) Each house may determine the rules of its proceedings, punish its Members
for disorderly behavior, and, with the concurrence of two-thirds of all its Members, expel a Member.
(Section 10, Article VI.) The judicial power is vested in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts
as may be established by law. (Section 1, Article VIII.) Like the Constitution of the United States, ours
does not contain an express provision empowering either of the two Houses of Congress to punish
nonmembers for contempt. It may also be noted that whereas in the United States the legislative
power is shared by and between the Congress of the United States, on the one hand, and the
respective legislatures of the different States, on the other the powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution nor prohibited by it to States being reserved to the States, respectively, or
to the people in the Philippines, the legislative power is vested in the Congress of the Philippines
alone. It may therefore be said that the Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative
field than the Congress of the United States or any State Legislature. Our form of Government being
patterned after the American system the framers of our Constitution having drawn largely from
American institutions and practices we can, in this case, properly draw also from American
precedents in interpreting analogous provisions of our Constitution, as we have done in other cases
in the past. Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of
Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its
legislative functions as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it
is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislation is intended to effect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the
requisite information which is not infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do
possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and
also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of
compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. (McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273 U.S., 135; 71 L. ed.,
580; 50 A.L R., 1.) The fact that the Constitution expressly gives to Congress the power to punish its
Members for disorderly behavior, does not by necessary implication exclude the power to punish for
contempt any other person. (Anderson vs. Dunn, 6, Wheaton, 204; 5 L. ed., 242.) But no person can
be punished for contumacy as a witness before either House, unless his testimony is required in a
matter into which that House has jurisdiction to inquire. (Kilbourn vs.Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377.).
Since, as we have noted, the Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than
either the Congress of the United States or a State Legislature, we think it is correct to say that the
field of inquiry into which it may enter is also wider. It would be difficult to define any limits by which
the subject matter of its inquiry can be bounded. It is not necessary to do so in this case. Suffice it to
say that it must be coextensive with the range of the legislative power.
In the present case the jurisdiction of the Senate, thru the Special Committee created by it, to
investigate the Buenavista and Tambobong Estates deal is not challenged by the petitioner; and we
entertain no doubt as to the Senate's authority to do so and as to the validity of Resolution No. 8
hereinabove quoted. The transaction involved a questionable and allegedly unnecessary and
irregular expenditure of no less than P5,000,000 of public funds, of which Congress is the
constitutional guardian. It also involved government agencies created by Congress to regulate or
even abolish. As a result of the yet uncompleted investigation, the investigating committee has
recommended and the Senate approved three bills (1) prohibiting the Secretary of Justice or any
other department head from discharging functions and exercising powers other than those attached
to his own office, without ]previous congressional authorization; (2) prohibiting brothers and near
relatives of any President of the Philippines from intervening directly or indirectly and in whatever
capacity in transactions in which the Government is a party, more particularly where the decision lies
in the hands of executive or administrative officers who are appointees of the President; and (3)
providing that purchases of the Rural Progress Administration of big landed estates at a price of
P100,000 or more, shall not become effective without previous congressional confirmation.
2

We shall now consider and pass upon each of the questions raised by the petitioner in support of his
contention that his commitment is unlawful.
First He contends that the Senate has no power to punish him for contempt for refusing to reveal the
name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000, because such information is immaterial to, and
will not serve, any intended or purported legislation and his refusal to answer the question has not
embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the legislative process. It is argued that since the investigating
committee has already rendered its report and has made all its recommendations as to what
legislative measures should be taken pursuant to its findings, there is no necessity to force the
petitioner to give the information desired other than that mentioned in its report, to wit: "In justice to
Judge Quirino and to Secretary Nepomuceno, this atmosphere of suspicion that now pervades the
public mind must be dissipated, and it can only be done if appropriate steps are taken by the Senate
to compel Arnault to stop pretending that he cannot remember the name of the person to whom he
gave the P440,000 and answer the questions which will definitely establish the identity of that person
. . ." Senator Sumulong, Chairman of the Committee, who appeared and argued the case for the
respondents, denied that that was the only purpose of the Senate in seeking the information from the
witness. He said that the investigation had not been completed, because, due to the contumacy of the
witness, his committee had not yet determined the parties responsible for the anomalous transaction
as required by Resolution No. 8; that, by Resolution No. 16, his committee was empowered and
directed to continue its investigation, more particularly to continue its examination of the witness
regarding the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000 and other matters related therewith;
that the bills recommended by his committee had not been approved by the House and might not be
approved pending the completion of the investigation; and that those bills were not necessarily all the
measures that Congress might deem it necessary to pass after the investigation is finished.
Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a legislative body to make,
we think the investigating committee has the power to require a witness to answer any question
pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his constitutional right against self-incrimination. The
inquiry, to be within the jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to
the exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to expel a Member;
and every question which the investigator is empowered to coerce a witness to answer must be
material or pertinent to the subject of the inquiry or investigation. So a witness may not be coerced to
answer a question that obviously has no relation to the subject of the inquiry. But from this it does not
follow that every question that may be propounded to a witness must be material to any proposed or
possible legislation. In other words, the materiality of the question must be determined by its direct
relation to any proposed or possible legislation. The reason is, that the necessity or lack of necessity
for legislative action and the form and character of the action itself are determined by the sum total of
the information to be gathered as a result of the investigation, and not by a fraction of such
information elicited from a single question.
In this connection, it is suggested by counsel for the respondents that the power of the Court is limited
to determining whether the legislative body has jurisdiction to institute the inquiry or investigation; that
once that jurisdiction is conceded, this Court cannot control the exercise of that jurisdiction; and it is
insinuated, that the ruling of the Senate on the materiality of the question propounded to the witness
is not subject to review by this Court under the principle of the separation of powers. We have to
qualify this proposition. As was said by the Court of Appeals of New York: "We are bound to presume
that the action of the legislative body was with a legitimate object if it is capable of being so
construed, and we have no right to assume that the contrary was intended." (People ex
rel. McDonald vs. Keeler, 99 N.Y., 463; 52 Am. Rep., 49; 2 N.E., 615, quoted with approval by the
Supreme Court of the United States in the said case of McGrain vs. Daugherty, it is necessary
deduction from the decision in Re Chapman, 41 L. ed., 1154, that where the questions are not
pertinent to the matter under inquiry a witness rightfully may refuse to answer. So we are of the
opinion that where the alleged immateriality of the information sought by the legislative body from a
witness is relied upon to contest its jurisdiction, the court is in duty bound to pass upon the
contention. The fact that the legislative body has jurisdiction or the power to make the inquiry would
not preclude judicial intervention to correct a clear abuse of discretion in the exercise of that power.
Applying the criterion laid down in the last two preceding paragraphs to the resolution of the issue
under consideration, we find that the question for the refusal to answer which the petitioner was held
in contempt by the Senate is pertinent to the matter under inquiry. In fact, this is not and cannot be
disputed. Senate Resolution No. 8, the validity of which is not challenged by the petitioner, requires
the Special Committee, among other things, to determine the parties responsible for the Buenavista
and Tambobong estates deal, and it is obvious that the name of the person to whom the witness gave
the P440,000 involved in said deal is pertinent to that determination it is in fact the very thing
sought to be determined. The contention is not that the question is impertinent to the subject of the
inquiry but that it has no relation or materiality to any proposed legislation. We have already indicated
that it is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every question propounded to a witness is
material to any proposed or possible legislation; what is required is that is that it be pertinent to the
matter under inquiry.
It is said that the Senate has already approved the three bills recommended by the Committee as a
result of the uncompleted investigation and that there is no need for it to know the name of the person
to whom the witness gave the P440,000. But aside from the fact that those bills have not yet been
approved by the lower house and by the President and that they may be withdrawn or modified if after
the inquiry is completed they should be found unnecessary or inadequate, there is nothing to prevent
the Congress from approving other measures it may deem necessary after completing the
investigation. We are not called upon, nor is it within our province, to determine or imagine what those
measures may be. And our inability to do so is no reason for overruling the question propounded by
the Senate to the witness.
The case of Re Chapman , 166 U.S., 661; 41 L. ed., 1154, is in point here. The inquiry there in
question was conducted under a resolution of the Senate and related to charges, published in the
press, that senators were yielding to corrupt influences in considering a tariff bill then before the
Senate and were speculating in stocks the value of which would be affected by pending amendments
to the bill. Chapman, a member of a firm of stock brokers dealing in the stock of the American Sugar
Refining Company, appeared before the committee in response to a subpoena and asked, among
others, the following questions:
Had the firm, during the month of March, 1894, bought or sold any stock or securities, known
as sugar stocks, for or in the interest, directly or indirectly, of any United Senate senator?
Was the said firm at that time carrying any sugar stock for the benefit of, or in the interest,
directly or indirectly, of any United Senate senator?
He refused to answer the questions and was prosecuted under an Act of Congress for contempt of
the Senate. Upon being convicted and sent to jail he petitioned the Supreme Court of the United
States for a writ of habeas corpus. One of the questions decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States in that case was whether the committee had the right to compel the witness to answer said
questions, and the Court held that the committee did have such right, saying:
The questions were undoubtedly pertinent to the subject-matter of the inquiry. The resolution
directed the committee to inquire whether any senator has been, or is, speculating in what are
known as sugar stocks during the consideration of the tariff bill now before the Senate." What
the Senate might or might not do upon the facts when ascertained, we cannot say, nor are we
called upon to inquire whether such ventures might be defensible, as contended in argument,
but is plain that negative answers would have cleared that body of what the Senate regarded
as offensive imputations, while affirmative answers might have led to further action on the part
of the Senate within its constitutional powers. (Emphasis supplied.)
It may be contended that the determination of the parties responsible for the deal is incumbent upon
the judicial rather than upon the legislative branch. But we think there is no basis in fact or in law for
such assumption. The petitioner has not challenged the validity of Senate Resolution No. 8, and that
resolution expressly requires the committee to determine the parties responsible for the deal. We are
bound to presume that the Senate has acted in the due performance of its constitutional function in
instituting the inquiry, if the act is capable of being so construed. On the other hand, there is no
suggestion that the judiciary has instituted an inquiry to determine the parties responsible for the deal.
Under the circumstances of the case, it appearing that the questioned transaction was affected by the
head of the Department of Justice himself, it is not reasonable to expect that the Fiscal or the Court of
First Instance of Manila will take the initiative to investigate and prosecute the parties responsible for
the deal until and unless the Senate shall determined those parties are and shall taken such
measures as may be within its competence to take the redress the wrong that may have been
committed against the people as a result of the transaction. As we have said, the transaction involved
no less than P5,000,000 of public funds. That certainly is a matter of a public concern which it is the
duty of the constitutional guardian of the treasury to investigate.
If the subject of investigation before the committee is within the range of legitimate legislative
inquiry and the proposed testimony of the witness called relates to that subject, obedience, to its
process may be enforced by the committee by imprisonment. (Sullivan vs. Hill, 73 W. Va., 49; 79
S.E., 670; 40 Ann. Cas. [1916 B.], 1115.)
The decision in the case of Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 26 L. ed., 377, relied upon by the petitioner, is not
applicable here. In that case the inquiry instituted by the House of Representatives of the United
States related to a private real-estate pool or partnership in the District of Columbia. Jay Cook and
Company had had an interest in the pool but become bankrupts, and their estate was in course of
administration in a federal bankruptcy court in Pennsylvania. The United States was one of their
creditors. The trustee in the bankruptcy proceeding had effected a settlement of the bankrupts'
interest in the pool, and of course his action was subject to examination and approval or disapproval
by the bankruptcy court. Some of the creditors, including the United States, were dissatisfied with the
settlement. The resolution of the House directed the Committee "to inquire into the nature and history
of said real-estate pool and the character of said settlement, with the amount of property involve, in
which Jay Cooke and Co. were interested, and the amount paid or to be paid in said settlement, with
power to send for persons and papers, and report to this House." The Supreme Court of the United
States, speaking thru Mr. Justice Miller, pointed out that the resolution contained no suggestion of
contemplated legislation; that the matter was one in respect of which no valid legislation could be
had; that the bankrupts' estate and the trustee's settlement were still pending in the bankruptcy court;
and that the United States and other creditors were free to press their claims in that proceeding. And
on these grounds the court held that in undertaking the investigation "the House of Representatives
not only exceeded the limit of its own authority, but assumed a power which could only be properly
exercised by another branch of the government, because the power was in its nature clearly judicial."
The principles announced and applied in that case are: that neither House of Congress possesses a
"general power of making inquiry into the private affairs of the citizen"; that the power actually
possessed is limited to inquires relating to matters of which the particular House has jurisdiction, and
in respect of which it rightfully may take other action; that if the inquiry relates to a matter wherein
relief or redress could be had only by judicial proceeding, it is not within the range of this power , but
must be left to the court, conformably to the constitutional separation of government powers.
That case differs from the present case in two important respects: (1) There the court found that the
subject of the inquiry, which related to a private real-estate pool or partnership, was not within the
jurisdiction of either House of Congress; while here if it is not disputed that the subject of the inquiry,
which relates to a transaction involving a questionable expenditure by the Government of P5,000,000
of public funds, is within the jurisdiction of the Senate, (2) There the claim of the Government as a
creditor of Jay Cooke and Company, which had had an interest in the pool, was pending adjudication
by the court; while here the interposition of the judicial power on the subject of the inquiry cannot be
expected, as we have pointed out above, until after the Senate shall have determined who the parties
responsible are and shall have taken such measures as may be within its competence to take to
redress the wrong that may have been committed against the people as a result of the transaction.
It is interesting to note that the decision in the case of Killbourn vs. Thompson has evoked strong
criticisms from legal scholars. (See Potts, Power of Legislative Bodies to Punish for Contempt [1926],
74 U. Pa. L. Rev., 692-699; James L. Land is, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power
of Investigation [1926], 40 Harvard L. Rev., 153, 154, 214-220.) We quoted the following from
Professor Land is' criticism: "Mr. Justice Miller saw the case purely as an attempt by the House to
secure to the Government certain priority rights as creditor of the bankrupt concern. To him it
assumed the character of a lawsuit between the Government and Jay Cooke and Co., with the
Government, acting through the House, attempting to override the orderliness of established
procedure and thereby prefer a creditors' bill not before the courts but before Congress. That
bankruptcy proceedings had already been instituted against Jay Cooke and Co., in a federal court
gave added impetus to such a conception. The House was seeking to oust a court of prior acquired
jurisdiction by an extraordinary and unwarranted assumption of "judicial power"! The broader aspect
of the investigation had not been disclosed to the Court. That Jay Cooke and Co.'s indebtedness and
the particular funds in question were only part of the great administrative problem connected with the
use and disposition of public monies, that the particular failure was of consequence mainly in relation
to the security demanded for all government deposits, that the facts connected with one such default
revealed the possibility of other and greater maladministration, such considerations had not been put
before the Court. Nor had it been acquainted with the every-day nature of the particular investigation
and the powers there exerted by the House, powers whose exercise was customary and familiar in
legislative practice. Instead of assuming the character of an extraordinary judicial proceeding, the
inquiry, place in its proper background, should have been regarded as a normal and customary part
of the legislative process. Detailed definiteness of legislative purpose was thus made the demand of
the court in Killbourn vs. Thompson. But investigators cannot foretell the results that may be
achieved. The power of Congress to exercise control over a real-estate pool is not a matter for
abstract speculation but one to be determined only after an exhaustive examination of the problem.
Relationship, and not their possibilities, determine the extent of congressional power. Constitutionality
depends upon such disclosures. Their presence, whether determinative of legislative or judicial
power, cannot be relegated to guesswork. Neither Congress nor the Court can predict, prior to the
event, the result of the investigation."
The other case relied upon by the petitioner is Marshall vs. Gordon, 243 U.S., 521; 61. ed., 881. The
question there was whether the House of Representatives exceeded its power in punishing, as for
contempt of its authority, the District Attorney of the Southern District of New York, who had written,
published, and sent to the chairman of one of its committees an ill-tempered and irritating letter
respecting the action and purposes of the committee in interfering with the investigation by the grand
jury of alleged illegal activities of a member of the House of Representatives. Power to make inquires
and obtain evidence by compulsory process was not involved. The court recognized distinctly that the
House of Representatives had implied power to punish a person not a member for contempt, but held
that its action in this instance was without constitutional justification. The decision was put on the
ground that the letter, while offensive and vexatious, was not calculated or likely to affect the House in
any of its proceedings or in the exercise of any of its functions. This brief statement of the facts and
the issues decided in that case is sufficient to show the inapplicability thereof to the present case.
There the contempt involved consisted in the district attorney's writing to the chairman of the
committee an offensive and vexatious letter, while here the contempt involved consists in the refusal
of the witness to answer questions pertinent to the subject of an inquiry which the Senate has the
power and jurisdiction to make . But in that case, it was recognized that the House of Representatives
has implied power to punish a person not a member of contempt. In that respect the case is
applicable here in favor of the Senate's (and not of the Petitioner's ) contention.
Second. It is next contended for the petitioner that the Senate lacks authority to commit him for
contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session, which ended on May 18, 1950. This
contention is based on the opinion of Mr. Justice Malcolm, concurred in by Justices Street and Villa-
Real, in the case of Lopez vs. De los Reyes (1930), 55 Phil., 170. In that case it appears that on
October 23, 1929, Candido Lopez assaulted a member of the House of Representatives while the
latter was going to the hall of the House of Representatives to attend the session which was then
about to begin, as a result of which assault said representative was unable to attend the sessions on
that day and those of the two days next following by reason of the threats which Candido Lopez made
against him. By the resolution of the House adopted November 6, 1929, Lopez was declared guilty of
contempt of the House of Representatives and ordered punished by confinement in Bilibid Prison for
a period of twenty-four hours. That resolution was not complied with because the session of the
House of Representatives adjourned at midnight on November 8, 1929, and was reiterated at the
next session on September 16, 1930. Lopez was subsequently arrested, whereupon he applied for
the writ of habeas corpus in the Court of First Instance of Manila, which denied the application. Upon
appeal to the Supreme Court, six justices voted to grant the writ: Justice Malcolm, Street, and Villa-
real, on the ground that the term of imprisonment meted out to the petitioner could not legally be
extended beyond the session of the body in which the contempt occurred; and Justices Johns,
Villamor, and Ostrand, on the ground that the Philippine Legislature had no power to punish for
contempt because it was a creature merely of an Act of the Congress of the United States and not of
a Constitution adopted by the people. Chief Justice Avancea, Justice Johnson, and Justice
Romualdez wrote separate opinions, concurring with Justice Malcolm, Street, and Villa-Real, that the
Legislature had inherent power to punish for contempt but dissenting from the opinion that the order
of commitment could only be executed during the particular session in which the act of contempt was
committed.
Thus, on the question under consideration, the Court was equally divided and no decisive
pronouncement was made. The opinion of Mr. Justice Malcolm is based mainly on the following
passage in the case of Anderson vs.Dunn, supra:
And although the legislative power continues perpetual, the legislative body ceases to exist on
the moment of its adjournment or periodical dissolution. It follows that imprisonment must
terminate with that adjournment.
as well as on the following quotation from Marshall vs. Gordon, supra:
And the essential nature of the power also makes clear the cogency and application of the two
limitations which were expressly pointed out in Anderson vs. Dunn, supra, that is, that the
power even when applied to subjects which justified its exercise is limited to imprisonment and
such imprisonment may not be extended beyond the session of the body in which the
contempt occurred.
Interpreting the above quotations, Chief Justice Avancea held:
From this doctrine it follows, in my judgement, that the imposition of the penalty is limited to the
existence of the legislative body, which ceases to function upon its final periodical dissolution.
The doctrine refers to its existence and not to any particular session thereof. This must be so,
inasmuch as the basis of the power to impose such penalty is the right which the Legislature
has to self-preservation, and which right is enforceable during the existence of the legislative
body. Many causes might be conceived to constitute contempt to the Legislature, which would
continue to be a menace to its preservation during the existence of the legislative body against
which contempt was committed.
If the basis of the power of the legislature to punish for contempt exists while the legislative
body exercising it is in session, then that power and the exercise thereof must perforce
continue until the final adjournment and the election of its successor.
Mr. Justice Johnson's more elaborate opinion, supported by quotations from Cooley's Constitutional
Limitationsand from Jefferson's Manual, is to the same effect. Mr. Justice Romualdez said: "In my
opinion, where as in the case before us, the members composing the legislative body against which
the contempt was committed have not yet completed their three-year term, the House may take
action against the petitioner herein."
We note that the quotations from Anderson vs. Dunn and Marshall vs. Gordon relied upon by Justice
Malcolm areobiter dicta. Anderson vs. Dunn was an action of trespass against the Sergeant-at-Arms
of the House of Representatives of the United States for assault and battery and false imprisonment.
The plaintiff had been arrested for contempt of the House, brought before the bar of the House, and
reprimanded by the Speaker, and then discharged from custody. The question as to the duration of
the penalty was not involved in that case. The question there was "whether the House of
Representatives can take cognizance of contempt committed against themselves, under any
circumstances." The court there held that the House of Representatives had the power to punish for
contempt, and affirmed the judgment of the lower court in favor of the defendant. In
Marshall vs.Gordon, the question presented was whether the House had the power under the
Constitution to deal with the conduct of the district attorney in writing a vexatious letter as a contempt
of its authority, and to inflict punishment upon the writer for such contempt as a matter of legislative
power. The court held that the House had no such power because the writing of the letter did not
obstruct the performance of legislative duty and did not endanger the preservation of the power of the
House to carry out its legislative authority. Upon that ground alone, and not because the House had
adjourned, the court ordered the discharge of the petitioner from custody.
The case where the question was squarely decided is McGrain vs. Daugherty, supra. There it
appears that the Senate had adopted a resolution authorizing and directing a select committee of five
senators to investigate various charges of misfeasance and nonfeasance in the Department of
Justice after Attorney General Harry M. Daugherty became its supervising head. In the course of the
investigation the committee caused to be served on Mally S. Daugherty, brother of Harry M.
Daugherty and president of the Midland National Bank of Washington Court House, Ohio, a
subpoena commanding him to appear before it for the purpose of giving testimony relating to the
subject under consideration. The witness failed to appear without offering any excuse for his failure.
The committee reported the matter to the Senate and the latter adopted a resolution, "That the
President of the Senate pro tempore issue his warrant commanding the Sergeant-at-Arms or his
deputy to take into custody the body of the said M.S. Daugherty wherever found, and to bring the said
M.S. Daugherty before the bar of the Senate, then and there to answer such questions pertinent to
the matter under inquiry as the Senate may order the President of the Senate pro tempore to
propound; and to keep the said M.S. Daugherty in custody to await the further order of the Senate."
Upon being arrested, the witness petitioned the federal court in Cincinnati for a writ of habeas corpus.
The federal court granted the writ and discharged the witness on the ground that the Senate, in
directing the investigation and in ordering the arrest, exceeded its power under the Constitution. Upon
appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, one of the contentions of the witness was that the
case ha become moot because the investigation was ordered and the committee was appointed
during the Sixty-eighth Congress, which expired on March 4, 1926. In overruling the contention, the
court said:
. . . The resolution ordering the investigation in terms limited the committee's authority to the
period of the Sixty-eighth Congress; but this apparently was changed by a later and
amendatory resolution authorizing the committee to sit at such times and places as it might
deem advisable or necessary. It is said in Jefferson's Manual: "Neither House can continue
any portion of itself in any parliamentary function beyond the end of the session without the
consent of the other two branches. When done, it is by a bill constituting them commissioners
for the particular purpose." But the context shows that the reference is to the two houses of
Parliament when adjourned by prorogation or dissolution by the King. The rule may be the
same with the House of Representatives whose members are all elected for the period of a
single Congress: but it cannot well be the same with the Senate, which is a continuing body
whose members are elected for a term of six years and so divided into classes that the seats
of one third only become vacant at the end of each Congress, two thirds always continuing into
the next Congress, save as vacancies may occur through death or resignation.
Mr. Hinds in his collection of precedents, says: "The Senate, as a continuing body, may
continue its committees through the recess following the expiration of a Congress;" and, after
quoting the above statement from Jefferson's Manual, he says: "The Senate, however being a
continuing body, gives authority to its committees during the recess after the expiration of a
Congress." So far as we are advised the select committee having this investigation in charge
has neither made a final report nor been discharged; nor has been continued by an affirmative
order. Apparently its activities have been suspended pending the decision of this case. But, be
this as it may, it is certain that the committee may be continued or revived now by motion to
that effect, and if, continued or revived, will have all its original powers. This being so, and the
Senate being a continuing body, the case cannot be said to have become moot in the ordinary
sense. The situation is measurably like that in Southern P. Terminal Co. vs. Interstate
Commerce Commission, 219 U. S., 498, 514-516; 55 L. ed., 310, 315, 316; 31 Sup. Ct. Rep.,
279, where it was held that a suit to enjoin the enforcement of an order of the Interstate
Commerce Commission did not become moot through the expiration of the order where it was
capable of repetition by the Commission and was a matter of public interest. Our judgment
may yet be carried into effect and the investigation proceeded with from the point at which it
apparently was interrupted by reason of the habeas corpus proceedings. In these
circumstances we think a judgment should be rendered as was done in the case cited.
What has been said requires that the final order in the District Court discharging the witness
from custody be reversed.
Like the Senate of the United States , the Senate of the Philippines is a continuing body whose
members are elected for a term of six years and so divided that the seats of only one-third become
vacant every two years, two-thirds always continuing into the next Congress save as vacancies may
occur thru death or resignation. Members of the House of Representatives are all elected for a term
of four years; so that the term of every Congress is four years. The Second Congress of the
Philippines was constituted on December 30, 1949, and will expire on December 30, 1953. The
resolution of the Senate committing the Petitioner was adopted during the first session of the Second
Congress, which began on the fourth Monday of January and ended in May 18, 1950.
Had said resolution of commitment been adopted by the House of Representatives, we think it could
be enforced until the final adjournment of the last session of the Second Congress in 1953. We find
no sound reason to limit the power of the legislative body to punish for contempt to the end of every
session and not to the end of the last session terminating the existence of that body. The very reason
for the exercise of the power to punish for contempt is to enable the legislative body to perform its
constitutional function without impediment or obstruction. Legislative functions may be and in practice
are performed during recess by duly constituted committees charged with the duty of performing
investigations or conducting hearing relative to any proposed legislation. To deny to such committees
the power of inquiry with process to enforce it would be to defeat the very purpose for which that the
power is recognized in the legislative body as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to is legislative
function. It is but logical to say that the power of self-preservation is coexistent with the life to be
preserved.
But the resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate, which is a continuing
body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical dissolution of the Congress or of the House
of Representatives. There is no limit as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases
where that power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case.
Mere reflection upon the situation at hand convinces us of the soundness of this proposition. The
Senate has ordered an investigation of the Buenavista and Tambobong estates deal, which we have
found it is within its competence to make. That investigation has not been completed because of the
refusal of the petitioner as a witness to answer certain questions pertinent to the subject of the
inquiry. The Senate has empowered the committee to continue the investigation during the recess. By
refusing to answer the questions, the witness has obstructed the performance by the Senate of its
legislative function, and the Senate has the power to remove the obstruction by compelling the
witness to answer the questions thru restraint of his liberty until he shall have answered them. That
power subsists as long as the Senate, which is a continuing body, persists in performing the particular
legislative function involved. To hold that it may punish the witness for contempt only during the
session in which investigation was begun, would be to recognize the right of the Senate to perform its
function but at the same time to deny to it an essential and appropriate means for its performance.
Aside from this, if we should hold that the power to punish for contempt terminates upon the
adjournment of the session, the Senate would have to resume the investigation at the next and
succeeding sessions and repeat the contempt proceedings against the witness until the investigation
is completed-an absurd, unnecessary, and vexatious procedure, which should be avoided.
As against the foregoing conclusion it is argued for the petitioner that the power may be abusively
and oppressively exerted by the Senate which might keep the witness in prison for life. But we must
assume that the Senate will not be disposed to exert the power beyond its proper bounds. And if,
contrary to this assumption, proper limitations are disregarded, the portals of this Court are always
open to those whose rights might thus be transgressed.
Third. Lastly, the petitioner invokes the privilege against self-incrimination. He contends that he would
incriminate himself if he should reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the P440,000 if that
person be a public official be (witness) might be accused of bribery, and if that person be a private
individual the latter might accuse him of oral defamation.
The ground upon which the witness' claim is based is too shaky, in firm, and slippery to afford him
safety. At first he told the Committee that the transactions were legal, that no laws were violated, and
that all requisites had been replied with; but at the time he begged to be excused from making
answers "which might later be used against me." A little later he explained that although the
transactions were legal he refused to answer questions concerning them "because it violates the right
of a citizen to privacy in his dealings with other people . . . I simply stand on my privilege to dispose of
the money that has been paid to me as a result of a legal transaction without having to account for
the use of it." But after being apparently convinced by the Committee that his position was untenable,
the witness testified that, without securing any receipt, he turned over the P440,000 to a certain
person, a representative of Burt, in compliance with Burt's verbal instruction made in 1946; that as far
as he know, that certain person had nothing to do with the negotiations for the settlement of the
Buenavista and Tambobong cases; that he had seen that person several times before he gave him
the P440,000 on October 29, 1949, and that since then he had seen him again two or three times, the
last time being in December, 1949, in Manila; that the person was a male, 39 to 40 years of age,
between 5 feet, 2 inches and 5 feet, 6 inches in height. Butt the witness would not reveal the name of
that person on these pretexts: " I don't remember the name; he was a representative of Burt." "I am
not sure; I don't remember the name."
We are satisfied that those answers of the witness to the important question, what is the name of that
person to whom you gave the P440,000? were obviously false. His insistent claim before the bar of
the Senate that if he should reveal the name he would incriminate himself, necessarily implied that he
knew the name. Moreover, it is unbelievable that he gave the P440,000 to a person to him unknown.
"Testimony which is obviously false or evasive is equivalent to a refusal to testify and is punishable as
contempt, assuming that a refusal to testify would be so punishable." (12 Am. Jur., sec. 15,
Contempt, pp. 399-400.) In the case of Mason vs. U.S., 61 L. ed., 1198, it appears that Mason was
called to testify before a grand jury engaged in investigating a charge of gambling against six other
men. After stating that he was sitting at a table with said men when they were arrested, he refused to
answer two questions, claiming so to do might tend to incriminate him: (1) "Was there a game of
cards being played on this particular evening at the table at which you are sitting?" (2) "Was there a
game of cards being played at another table at this time?" The foreman of the grand jury reported the
matter to the judge, who ruled "that each and all of said questions are proper and that the answers
thereto would not tend to incriminate the witness." Mason was again called and refused to answer the
first question propounded to him, but, half yielding to frustration, he said in response to the second
question: "I don't know." In affirming the conviction for contempt, the Supreme Court of the United
States among other things said:
In the present case, the witness certainly were not relieved from answering merely because
they declared that so to do might incriminate them. The wisdom of the rule in this regard is well
illustrated by the enforced answer, "I don't know ," given by Mason to the second question,
after he had refused to reply under a claim of constitutional privilege.
Since according to the witness himself the transaction was legal, and that he gave the P440,000 to a
representative of Burt in compliance with the latter's verbal instruction, we find no basis upon which to
sustain his claim that to reveal the name of that person might incriminate him. There is no conflict of
authorities on the applicable rule, to wit:
Generally, the question whether testimony is privileged is for the determination of the Court. At
least, it is not enough for the witness to say that the answer will incriminate him. as he is not
the sole judge of his liability. The danger of self-incrimination must appear reasonable and real
to the court, from all the circumstances, and from the whole case, as well as from his general
conception of the relations of the witness. Upon the facts thus developed, it is the province of
the court to determine whether a direct answer to a question may criminate or not. . . . The fact
that the testimony of a witness may tend to show that he has violated the law is not sufficient to
entitle him to claim the protection of the constitutional provision against self-incrimination,
unless he is at the same time liable to prosecution and punishment for such violation. The
witness cannot assert his privilege by reason of some fanciful excuse, for protection against an
imaginary danger, or to secure immunity to a third person. ( 3 Wharton's Criminal Evidence,
11th ed., secs. 1135,1136.)
It is the province of the trial judge to determine from all the facts and circumstances of the case
whether the witness is justified in refusing to answer. (People vs. Gonzo, 23 N.E. [2d], 210 [Ill.
App., 1939].) A witness is not relieved from answering merely on his own declaration that an
answer might incriminate him, but rather it is for the trial judge to decide that question.
(Mason vs. U.S., 244 U. S., 362; 61 L. ed., 1193, 1200.)
As against witness's inconsistent and unjustified claim to a constitutional right, is his clear duty as a
citizen to give frank, sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent authority. The state has the
right to exact fulfillment of a citizen's obligation, consistent of course with his right under the
Constitution. The witness in this case has been vociferous and militant in claiming constitutional rights
and privileges but patently recreant to his duties and obligations to the Government which protects
those rights under the law. When a specific right and a specific obligation conflict with each other, and
one is doubtful or uncertain while the other is clear and imperative, the former must give way to the
latter. The right to life is one of the most sacred that the citizen may claim, and yet the state may
deprive him of it if he violates his corresponding obligation to respect the life of others. As Mr. Justice
Johnson said in Anderson vs. Dunn: "The wretch beneath the gallows may repine at the fate which
awaits him, and yet it is not certain that the laws under which he suffers were made for the security."
Paraphrasing and applying that pronouncement here, the petitioner may not relish the restraint of his
liberty pending the fulfillment by him of his duty, but it is no less certain that the laws under which his
liberty is restrained were made for his welfare.
From all the foregoing, it follows that the petition must be denied, and it is so ordered, with costs.
Paras, Pablo, Bengzon, Montemayor, and Reyes, JJ., concur.


Separate Opinions
TUASON, J., dissenting:
The estates deal which gave the petitioner's examination by a committee of the Senate was one that
aroused popular indignation as few cases of graft and corruption have. The investigation was greeted
with spontaneous outburst of applause by an outraged citizenry, and the Senate was rightly
commended for making the lead in getting at the bottom of an infamous transaction.
All the more necessary it is that we should approach the consideration of this case with
circumspection, lest the influence of strong public passions should get the batter of our judgment. It is
trite to say that public sentiment fades into insignificance before a proper observance of constitutional
processes, the maintenance of the constitutional structure, and the protection of individual rights.
Only thus can a government of laws, the foundation stone of human liberty, be strengthened and
made secure for that very public.
It is with these thoughts in mind that, with sincere regret, I am constrained to dissent.
The power of the legislative bodies under the American system of government to punish for contempt
was at the beginning totally denied by some courts and students of constitutional law, on the ground
that this power is judicial in nature and belongs to the judiciary branch of the government under the
constitutional scheme. The point however is now settled in favor of the existence of the power. This
rule is based on the necessity for the attainment of the ends for which legislative body is created. Nor
can the legitimacy of the purpose of the investigation which the Senate ordered in this case be
disputed. As a corollary, it was likewise legitimate and necessary for the committee to summon the
petitioner with a command to produce his books and documents, and to commit him to prison for his
refusal or failure to obey the subpoena. And, finally, there is no question that the arresting officers
were fully justified in using necessary bodily force to bring him before the bar of the Senate when he
feigned illness and stalled for time in the mistaken belief that after the closing of the then current
session of Congress he could go scot-free.
At the same time, there is also universal agreement that the power is not absolute. The disagreement
lies in the extent of the power, and such disagreement is to be found even between decisions of the
same court. Andersonvs. Dunn, 6 Wheat., No. 204, may be said to have taken the most liberal view
of the legislature's authority and Kilbourn vs. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, which partly overruled and
qualified the former, the strictest. By the most liberal standard the power is restricted "by
considerations as to the nature of the inquiry, occasion, or action in connection with which the
contemptuous conduct has occurred." Punishment must be resorted to for the efficient exercise of the
legislative function. Even Anderson vs. Dunn speaks of the power as "the least possible power
adequate to the end proposed."
Judged by any test, the question propounded to the witness does not, in my opinion, meet the
constitutional requirement. It is obvious, I think, that the query has nothing to do with any matter
within the cognizance of the Congress. There is, on the contrary, positive suggestion that the
question has no relation to the contemplated legislation. The statement of the committee in its report
that the information sought to be obtained would clear the names of the persons suspected of having
received the money, is, on the surface, the most or only plausible reason that can be advanced.
Assuming this to be the motive behind the question, yet little reflection will show that the same is
beyond the scope of legislative authority and prerogatives. It is outside the concern of the Congress
to protect the honor of particular citizens except that of its own members' as a means of preserving
respect and confidence in that body. Moreover, the purported good intention must assume, if it is to
materialize, that the persons under suspicion are really innocent; for if they are not and the witness
will tell the truth, the result will be to augment their disgrace rather than vindicate their honor. This is
all the more likely to happen because one of those persons, is judged from the committee's findings,
the most likely one, to say the least, who got the money.
If the process of deduction is pressed further, the reasonable conclusion seems to be that the object
of the question is, to mention only one, to prepare the way for a court action. The majority, decision
indirectly admits or insinuates this to be the case. It says, "It appearing that the questioned
transaction was affected by the head of the Department of Justice himself, it is not reasonable to
expect the fiscal or the Court of First Instance of Manila will take the initiative to investigate and
prosecute the parties responsible for the deal until and unless the Senate shall have determined who
those parties are and shall have taken such measures as may be within its competence to take, to
redress the wrong that may have been committed against the people as a result of the transaction."
So here is an admission, implied if not express, that the Senate wants the witness to give names
because the fiscal or the courts will not initiate an action against parties who should be prosecuted. It
is needless to say that the institution of a criminal or civil suit is a matter that devolves upon other
departments of the government, alien to the duties of the Congress to look after.
The Congress is at full liberty, of course, to make any investigation for the purpose of aiding the fiscal
or the courts, but this liberty does not carry with it the authority to imprison persons who refuse to
testify.
In the intricacy and complexity of an investigation it is often impossible to foretell before its close what
relation certain facts may bear on the final results, and experience has shown that investigators and
courts would do well to veer on the liberal side in the resolution of doubtful questions. But the Senate
is not now in the midst of an inquiry with the situation still in a fluid or tentative state. Now the facts
are no longer confused. The committee has finished its investigation and submitted its final report and
the Senate has approved a bill on the bases of the facts found. All the pertinent facts having been
gathered, as is to be inferred from that the report and the nature of the Senate's action, every
question, every fact, every bit of testimony has taken a distinct meaning susceptible of concrete and
definite evaluation; the task has been reduced to the simple process of sifting the grain from the
chaffs.
In the light of the committee's report and of the bill introduced and approved in the Senate, it seems
quite plain that the express naming of the recipient or recipients of the money is entirely unessential
to anything the Senate has a right or duty to do in premises. Names may be necessary for the
purpose of criminal prosecution, impeachment or civil suit. In such proceedings, identities are
essential. In some legislative investigations it is important to know the names of public officials
involved. But the particular disclosure sought of the petitioner here is immaterial to the proposed law.
It is enough for the Senate, for its own legitimate object, to learn how the Department of Justice had
in the purchase, and to have a moral conviction as to the identity of the person who benefited
thereby. The need for such legislation and translated into the bill approved by the Senate is met by an
insight into a broad outline of the deal. To paraphrase the U.S. Supreme Court in Anderson vs. Dunn,
although the passage was used in another connection, legislation is a science of experiment and the
relation between the legislator and the end does not have to be so direct as to strike the eye of the
former.
One of the proposed laws have prohibits brothers and near relatives of any president of the
Philippines from intervening directly or indirectly in transactions in which the Government is a party. It
is stated that this is subject to change depending on the answer Arnault may give. This statement is
wide open to challenge.
If Arnault should Antonio Quirino it must be admitted that the bill would not be altered. But let us
suppose that the witness will point to another man. Will the result be any different? Will the Senate
recall the bill? I can not perceive the slightest possibility of such eventuality. The pending bill was
framed on the assumption that Antonio Quirino was a party to the deal in question. As has been said,
the committee entertains a moral conviction that this brother of the President was the recipient of a
share of the proceeds of sale. No amount of assurance by Arnault to the contrary would be believed
for truth. And, I repeat, the proposed legislation does not need for its justification legal evidence of
Antonio Quirino's intervention in the transaction.
All this in the first place. In the second place, it is not to be assumed that the present bill is aimed
solely against Antonio Quirino whose relation to the Administration is but temporary. It is more
reasonable to presume that the proposed enactment is intended for all time and for all brothers of
future presidents, for in reality it is no more than an extension or enlargement of laws already found in
the statute book which guard against temptations to exploit official positions or influence to the
prejudice of public interests.
The disputed question is, in fact, not only irrelevant but moot. This is decisive of the irrelevancy of this
question. As has been noticed, the committee has submitted its final report and recommendation, and
a bill has been approved by the Senate calculated to prevent recurrence of the anomalies exposed.
For the purpose for which it was instituted the inquiry is over and the committee's mission
accomplished.
It is true that the committee continues to sit during the recess of Congress, but it is obvious from all
the circumstances that the sole and real object of the extension of the committee's sittings is to
receive the witness' answer in the event he capitulates. I am unable to see any new phase of the deal
which the Senate could legitimately wish to know, and the respondents and this Court have not
pointed out any. That the committee has not sat and nothing has been done so far except to wait for
Arnault's answer is a convincing manifestation of the above conclusion.
The order "to continue its investigation" contained in Senate Resolution No. 16 cannot disguise the
realities revealed by the Senate's actions already referred to and by the emphasis given to the
instruction "to continue its (committee's) examination of Jean L. Arnault regarding the name of the
person to whom he gave the P440,000." The instruction 'to continue the investigation' is not entitled to
the blind presumption that it embraces matters other than the revelation by the witness of the name of
the person who got the money. Jurisdiction to deprive a citizen of liberty outside the usual process is
not acquired by innuendoes or vague assertions of the facts on which jurisdiction is made to depend.
If the judgment of the court of law of limited jurisdiction does not enjoy the presumption of legality,
much less can the presumption of regularity be invoked for a resolution of a deliberative body whose
power to inflict punishment upon private citizens is wholly derived by implication and vehemently
contested by some judges. At any rate, "the stronger presumption of innocence attends accused at
the trial", "and it is incumbent" upon the respondents "to show that the question pertains to some
matter under investigation." (Sinclair vs. U. S., 73 L. ed., 693.) This rule stems from the fact that the
power is in derogation of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty,
or property without due process of law, which presupposes " a trial in which the rights of the parties
shall be decided by a tribunal appointed by law, which tribunal is to governed by rules of law
previously established." Powers so dangerous to the liberty of a citizen can not be allowed except
where the pertinence is clear. A Judge who abuses such power may be impeached and he acts at all
times under the sense of this accountability and responsibility. His victims may be reached by the
pardoning power. But if the Congress be allowed this unbounded jurisdiction of discretion, there is no
redress, The Congress may dispoil of a citizen's life, liberty or property and there is no power on earth
to stop its hand. There is, there can be, no such unlimited power in any department of the
government of the Republic. (Loan Associationvs. Topeka, 20 Wall, Nos. 662, 663; Taylor vs. Porter,
4 Hill No. N.Y. 140.)
The above rule and discussion apply with equal force to the instruction to the committee in the
original resolution, "to determine the parties responsible for the deal." It goes without saying that the
congress cannot authorize a committee to do what it itself cannot do. In other words, the` Senate
could not insist on the disclosure of Arnault's accomplice in the present state of the investigation if the
Senate were conducting the inquiry itself instead of through a committee.
Our attention is called to the fact that "in the Philippines, the legislative power is vested in the
Congress of the Philippines alone, and therefore that the Congress of the Philippines has a wider
range of legislative field than the Congress of the United States or any state legislature." From this
premise the inference is drawn that " the field of inquiry into it (Philippine Congress) may enter is also
wider."
This argument overlooks the important fact that congressional or legislative committees both here
and in the Unived States, do not embark upon fishing expeditions in search of information which by
chance may be useful to legislation. Inquiries entrusted to congressional committee, whether here or
in the United States, are necessarily for specific objects within the competence of the Congress to
look into. I do not believe any reason, rule or principle could be found which would sustain the theory
that just because the United States Congress or a state legislature could legislate on, say, only ten
subjects and the Philippine Congress on twenty, the latter's power to commit to prison for contempt is
proportionately as great as that of the former. In the consideration of the legality of an imprisonment
for the contempt by each House, the power is gauged not be the greater or lesser number of subject
matters that fall within its sphere of action, but by the answer to the question, has it jurisdiction over
the matter under investigation? Bearing this distinction in mind, it is apparent that the power of a
legislature to punish for contempt can be no greater nor less than that of any other. Were it possible
for the Philippine Senate and the United States Senate to undertake an investigation of exactly
identical anomalies in their respective departments of justice, could it be asserted with any support of
logic that one Senate has a wider authority to imprison for contempt in such investigation simply
because it has a "wider range of legislative field?"
It is said that the Senate bill has not been acted upon by the lower house and that even if it should
pass in that chamber it would still have the President's veto to hurdle. It has been expressly stated at
the oral argument, and there is insinuation in this Court's decision, that the revelation of the name or
names of the person or persons who received the money may help in convincing the House of
Representatives or the President of the wisdom of the pending measure. Entirely apart from the
discussion that the House of Representatives and the Chief Executive have their own idea of what
they need to guide them in the discharge of their respective duties, and they have the facilities of their
own for obtaining the requisite data.
There is another objection, more fundamental, to the Senate invoking the interest or convenience of
the other House or the President as ground of jurisdiction. The House of Representatives and the
President are absolutely independent of the Senate, in the conduct of legislative and administrative
inquiries, and the power of each House to imprison for contempt does not go beyond the necessity for
its own self-preservation or for making its express powers effective. Each House exercises this power
to protect or accomplish its own authority and not that of the other House or the President. Each
House and the President are supposed to take care of their respective affairs. The two Houses and
the Chief Executive act separately although the concurrence of the three is required in the passage of
legislation and of both Houses in the approval of resolutions. As the U.S. Supreme Court in
Kilbournvs. Thompson, said, "No general power of inflicting punishment by the Congress (as distinct
from a House is found in the Constitution." "An act of Congress it said which proposed to
adjudge a man guilty of a crime and inflict the punishment, will be considered by all thinking men to
be unauthorized by the Constitution."
Kilbourn vs. Thompson, supra, it is said can not be relied on in this case as a precedent because, so
it is also said, "the subject of the inquiry, which related to a private real-estate pool or partnership,
was not within the jurisdiction of either House of Congress; while here it is not disputed that the
subject of the inquiry, which relates to a transaction involving a questionable expenditure by the
Government of P5,000,000 of public funds, is within the Jurisdiction of the Senate." Yet the remarks
of Judge Land is which are quoted in the majority decision point out that the inquiry "was a normal
and customary part of the legislative process." Moreover, Kilbourn vs. Thompson is important, not for
the matter it treated but for the principles it enunciated.
It is also said that Kilbourn vs. Thompson did not meet with universal approval as Judge Land is'
article above mentioned shows. The jurist who delivered the opinion in that case, Mr. Justice Miller,
was one of the "giants" who have ever sat on the Supreme Federal Bench, venerated and eminent for
the width and depth of his learning. Subsequent decisions, as far as I have been able to ascertain,
have not rejected or criticized but have followed it, and it still stands as a landmark in this branch of
constitutional law.
If we can lean on private opinions and magazine articles for comfort, the petitioner can cite one by a
legal scholar and author no less reknown and respected than Judge Land is. I refer to Judge
Wigmore who, referring to an investigation of the U.S. Department of Justice said in an article
published in 19 (1925) Illinois Law Review, 452:
The senatorial debauch of investigations poking into political garbage cans and dragging
the sewers of political intrigue filled the winter of 1923-24 with a stench which has not yet
passed away. Instead of employing the constitutional, manly, fair procedure of impeachment,
the Senate flung self-respect and fairness to the winds. As a prosecutor, the Senate presented
a spectacle which cannot even be dignified by a comparison with the persecutive scoldings of
Coke and Scroggs and Jeffreys, but fell rather in popular estimate to the level of professional
searchers of the municipal dunghills.
It is far from my thought to subscribe to this vituperation as applied to our Senate. Certainly, this
august body said not only do the right thing but is entitled to the lasting gratitude of the people for
taking the courageous stand it did in probing into an anomaly that robbed a depleted treasury of a
huge amount. I have tried to make it clear that my disagreement with the majority lies not in the
propriety or constitutionality of the investigation but in the pertinence to that investigation of a single
question. The investigation, as had been said, was legal and commendable. My objection is that the
Senate having started within the bounds of its authority, has, in entire good faith, overstepped those
bounds and trespassed on a territory reserved to other branches of the government, when it
imprisoned a witness for contumacy on a point that is unimportant, useless, impertinent and
irrelevant, let alone moot.
Thus understood, this humble opinion does not conflict with the views of Judge Land is and all other
advocates of wide latitude for congressional investigations. All are agreed, and the majority accept
the proposition, that there is a limit to the legislative power to punish for contempt. The limit is set in
Anderson vs. Dunn which Judge Land is approved "the least possible power adequate to the end
proposed."

epublic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 169777
*
April 20, 2006
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as
Senate President, JUAN M. FLAVIER, in his capacity as Senate President Pro Tempore,
FRANCIS N. PANGILINAN, in his capacity as Majority Leader, AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., in
his capacity as Minority Leader, SENATORS RODOLFO G. BIAZON, "COMPANERA" PIA S.
CAYETANO, JINGGOY EJERCITO ESTRADA, LUISA "LOI" EJERCITO ESTRADA, JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, RICHARD J. GORDON, PANFILO M. LACSON, ALFREDO S.LIM, M. A.
MADRIGAL, SERGIO OSMENA III, RALPH G. RECTO, and MAR ROXAS,Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, and anyone acting in his stead and in behalf of the President of the
Philippines,Respondents.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 169659 April 20, 2006
BAYAN MUNA represented by DR. REYNALDO LESACA, JR., Rep. SATUR OCAMPO, Rep.
CRISPIN BELTRAN, Rep. RAFAEL MARIANO, Rep. LIZA MAZA, Rep. TEODORO CASINO, Rep.
JOEL VIRADOR, COURAGE represented by FERDINAND GAITE, and COUNSELS FOR THE
DEFENSE OF LIBERTIES (CODAL) represented by ATTY. REMEDIOS BALBIN, Petitioners,
vs.
EDUARDO ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo, Respondent.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 169660 April 20, 2006
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, AVELINO J. CRUZ, JR., in his
capacity as Secretary of Defense, and GENEROSO S. SENGA, in his capacity as AFP Chief of
Staff, Respondents.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 169667 April 20, 2006
ALTERNATIVE LAW GROUPS, INC. (ALG), Petitioner,
vs.
HON. EDUARDO R. ERMITA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Respondent.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 169834 April 20, 2006
PDP- LABAN, Petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Respondent.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 171246 April 20, 2006
JOSE ANSELMO I. CADIZ, FELICIANO M. BAUTISTA, ROMULO R. RIVERA, JOSE AMOR
AMORANDO, ALICIA A. RISOS-VIDAL, FILEMON C. ABELITA III, MANUEL P. LEGASPI, J. B.
JOVY C. BERNABE, BERNARD L. DAGCUTA, ROGELIO V. GARCIA, and the INTEGRATED
BAR FOR THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY EDUARDO R. ERMITA, Respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
A transparent government is one of the hallmarks of a truly republican state. Even in the early history
of republican thought, however, it has been recognized that the head of government may keep certain
information confidential in pursuit of the public interest. Explaining the reason for vesting executive
power in only one magistrate, a distinguished delegate to the U.S. Constitutional Convention said:
"Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man, in a
much more eminent degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in proportion as the
number is increased, these qualities will be diminished."
1

History has been witness, however, to the fact that the power to withhold information lends itself to
abuse, hence, the necessity to guard it zealously.
The present consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused
such power by issuing Executive Order No. 464 (E.O. 464) last September 28, 2005. They thus pray
for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In resolving the controversy, this Court shall proceed with the recognition that the issuance under
review has come from a co-equal branch of government, which thus entitles it to a strong
presumption of constitutionality. Once the challenged order is found to be indeed violative of the
Constitution, it is duty-bound to declare it so. For the Constitution, being the highest expression of the
sovereign will of the Filipino people, must prevail over any issuance of the government that
contravenes its mandates.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including
those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
On September 21 to 23, 2005, the Committee of the Senate as a whole issued invitations to various
officials of the Executive Department for them to appear on September 29, 2005 as resource
speakers in a public hearing on the railway project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation with the
China National Machinery and Equipment Group (hereinafter North Rail Project). The public hearing
was sparked by a privilege speech of Senator Juan Ponce Enrile urging the Senate to investigate the
alleged overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail Project.
The Senate Committee on National Defense and Security likewise issued invitations
2
dated
September 22, 2005 to the following officials of the AFP: the Commanding General of the Philippine
Army, Lt. Gen. Hermogenes C. Esperon; Inspector General of the AFP Vice Admiral Mateo M.
Mayuga; Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the AFP Rear Admiral Tirso R. Danga; Chief of the
Intelligence Service of the AFP Brig. Gen. Marlu Q. Quevedo; Assistant Superintendent of the
Philippine Military Academy (PMA) Brig. Gen. Francisco V. Gudani; and Assistant Commandant,
Corps of Cadets of the PMA, Col. Alexander F. Balutan, for them to attend as resource persons in a
public hearing scheduled on September 28, 2005 on the following: (1) Privilege Speech of Senator
Aquilino Q. Pimentel Jr., delivered on June 6, 2005 entitled "Bunye has Provided Smoking Gun or has
Opened a Can of Worms that Show Massive Electoral Fraud in the Presidential Election of May
2005"; (2) Privilege Speech of Senator Jinggoy E. Estrada delivered on July 26, 2005 entitled "The
Philippines as the Wire-Tapping Capital of the World"; (3) Privilege Speech of Senator Rodolfo
Biazon delivered on August 1, 2005 entitled "Clear and Present Danger"; (4) Senate Resolution No.
285 filed by Senator Maria Ana Consuelo Madrigal Resolution Directing the Committee on National
Defense and Security to Conduct an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, and in the National Interest, on the
Role of the Military in the So-called "Gloriagate Scandal"; and (5) Senate Resolution No. 295 filed by
Senator Biazon Resolution Directing the Committee on National Defense and Security to Conduct
an Inquiry, in Aid of Legislation, on the Wire-Tapping of the President of the Philippines.
Also invited to the above-said hearing scheduled on September 28 2005 was the AFP Chief of Staff,
General Generoso S. Senga who, by letter
3
dated September 27, 2005, requested for its
postponement "due to a pressing operational situation that demands [his utmost personal attention"
while "some of the invited AFP officers are currently attending to other urgent operational matters."
On September 28, 2005, Senate President Franklin M. Drilon received from Executive Secretary
Eduardo R. Ermita a letter
4
dated September 27, 2005 "respectfully request[ing] for the postponement
of the hearing [regarding the NorthRail project] to which various officials of the Executive Department
have been invited" in order to "afford said officials ample time and opportunity to study and prepare
for the various issues so that they may better enlighten the Senate Committee on its investigation."
Senate President Drilon, however, wrote
5
Executive Secretary Ermita that the Senators "are unable to
accede to [his request]" as it "was sent belatedly" and "[a]ll preparations and arrangements as well as
notices to all resource persons were completed [the previous] week."
Senate President Drilon likewise received on September 28, 2005 a letter
6
from the President of the
North Luzon Railways Corporation Jose L. Cortes, Jr. requesting that the hearing on the NorthRail
project be postponed or cancelled until a copy of the report of the UP Law Center on the contract
agreements relative to the project had been secured.
On September 28, 2005, the President issued E.O. 464, "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of
Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of
Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and For
Other Purposes,"
7
which, pursuant to Section 6 thereof, took effect immediately. The salient
provisions of the Order are as follows:
SECTION 1. Appearance by Heads of Departments Before Congress. In accordance with Article VI,
Section 22 of the Constitution and to implement the Constitutional provisions on the separation of
powers between co-equal branches of the government, all heads of departments of the Executive
Branch of the government shall secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either
House of Congress.
When the security of the State or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing,
the appearance shall only be conducted in executive session.
SECTION. 2. Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege.
(a) Nature and Scope. - The rule of confidentiality based on executive privilege is fundamental to the
operation of government and rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution (Almonte vs.
Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995). Further, Republic Act No. 6713 or the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees provides that Public Officials and Employees
shall not use or divulge confidential or classified information officially known to them by reason of their
office and not made available to the public to prejudice the public interest.
Executive privilege covers all confidential or classified information between the President and the
public officers covered by this executive order, including:
Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by this
executive order (Almonte vs. Vasquez G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority, G.R. No. 133250, 9 July 2002);
Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest of national security should
not be divulged (Almonte vs. Vasquez, G.R. No. 95367, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. Presidential
Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998).
Information between inter-government agencies prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive
agreements (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9
December 1998);
Discussion in close-door Cabinet meetings (Chavez v. Presidential Commission on Good
Government, G.R. No. 130716, 9 December 1998);
Matters affecting national security and public order (Chavez v. Public Estates Authority, G.R. No.
133250, 9 July 2002).
(b) Who are covered. The following are covered by this executive order:
Senior officials of executive departments who in the judgment of the department heads are covered
by the executive privilege;
Generals and flag officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and such other officers who in the
judgment of the Chief of Staff are covered by the executive privilege;
Philippine National Police (PNP) officers with rank of chief superintendent or higher and such other
officers who in the judgment of the Chief of the PNP are covered by the executive privilege;
Senior national security officials who in the judgment of the National Security Adviser are covered by
the executive privilege; and
Such other officers as may be determined by the President.
SECTION 3. Appearance of Other Public Officials Before Congress. All public officials enumerated
in Section 2 (b) hereof shall secure prior consent of the President prior to appearing before either
House of Congress to ensure the observance of the principle of separation of powers, adherence to
the rule on executive privilege and respect for the rights of public officials appearing in inquiries in aid
of legislation. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Also on September 28, 2005, Senate President Drilon received from Executive Secretary Ermita a
copy of E.O. 464, and another letter
8
informing him "that officials of the Executive Department invited
to appear at the meeting [regarding the NorthRail project] will not be able to attend the same without
the consent of the President, pursuant to [E.O. 464]" and that "said officials have not secured the
required consent from the President." On even date which was also the scheduled date of the hearing
on the alleged wiretapping, Gen. Senga sent a letter
9
to Senator Biazon, Chairperson of the
Committee on National Defense and Security, informing him "that per instruction of [President
Arroyo], thru the Secretary of National Defense, no officer of the [AFP] is authorized to appear before
any Senate or Congressional hearings without seeking a written approval from the President" and
"that no approval has been granted by the President to any AFP officer to appear before the public
hearing of the Senate Committee on National Defense and Security scheduled [on] 28 September
2005."
Despite the communications received from Executive Secretary Ermita and Gen. Senga, the
investigation scheduled by the Committee on National Defense and Security pushed through, with
only Col. Balutan and Brig. Gen. Gudani among all the AFP officials invited attending.
For defying President Arroyos order barring military personnel from testifying before legislative
inquiries without her approval, Brig. Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan were relieved from their military
posts and were made to face court martial proceedings.
As to the NorthRail project hearing scheduled on September 29, 2005, Executive Secretary Ermita,
citing E.O. 464, sent letter of regrets, in response to the invitations sent to the following government
officials: Light Railway Transit Authority Administrator Melquiades Robles, Metro Rail Transit
Authority Administrator Roberto Lastimoso, Department of Justice (DOJ) Chief State Counsel Ricardo
V. Perez, then Presidential Legal Counsel Merceditas Gutierrez, Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC) Undersecretary Guiling Mamonding, DOTC Secretary Leandro Mendoza,
Philippine National Railways General Manager Jose Serase II, Monetary Board Member Juanita
Amatong, Bases Conversion Development Authority Chairperson Gen. Narciso Abaya and Secretary
Romulo L. Neri.
10
NorthRail President Cortes sent personal regrets likewise citing E.O. 464.
11

On October 3, 2005, three petitions, docketed as G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660, and 169667, for
certiorari and prohibition, were filed before this Court challenging the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
In G.R. No. 169659, petitioners party-list Bayan Muna, House of Representatives Members Satur
Ocampo, Crispin Beltran, Rafael Mariano, Liza Maza, Joel Virador and Teodoro Casino, Courage, an
organization of government employees, and Counsels for the Defense of Liberties (CODAL), a group
of lawyers dedicated to the promotion of justice, democracy and peace, all claiming to have standing
to file the suit because of the transcendental importance of the issues they posed, pray, in their
petition that E.O. 464 be declared null and void for being unconstitutional; that respondent Executive
Secretary Ermita, in his capacity as Executive Secretary and alter-ego of President Arroyo, be
prohibited from imposing, and threatening to impose sanctions on officials who appear before
Congress due to congressional summons. Additionally, petitioners claim that E.O. 464 infringes on
their rights and impedes them from fulfilling their respective obligations. Thus, Bayan Muna alleges
that E.O. 464 infringes on its right as a political party entitled to participate in governance; Satur
Ocampo, et al. allege that E.O. 464 infringes on their rights and duties as members of Congress to
conduct investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of
laws; Courage alleges that the tenure of its members in public office is predicated on, and threatened
by, their submission to the requirements of E.O. 464 should they be summoned by Congress; and
CODAL alleges that its members have a sworn duty to uphold the rule of law, and their rights to
information and to transparent governance are threatened by the imposition of E.O. 464.
In G.R. No. 169660, petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, claiming that his constitutional rights as a citizen,
taxpayer and law practitioner, are affected by the enforcement of E.O. 464, prays in his petition that
E.O. 464 be declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
In G.R. No. 169667, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc.
12
(ALG), alleging that as a coalition of 17
legal resource non-governmental organizations engaged in developmental lawyering and work with
the poor and marginalized sectors in different parts of the country, and as an organization of citizens
of the Philippines and a part of the general public, it has legal standing to institute the petition to
enforce its constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, a right which was denied to
the public by E.O. 464,
13
prays, that said order be declared null and void for being unconstitutional
and that respondent Executive Secretary Ermita be ordered to cease from implementing it.
On October 11, 2005, Petitioner Senate of the Philippines, alleging that it has a vital interest in the
resolution of the issue of the validity of E.O. 464 for it stands to suffer imminent and material injury, as
it has already sustained the same with its continued enforcement since it directly interferes with and
impedes the valid exercise of the Senates powers and functions and conceals information of great
public interest and concern, filed its petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as G.R. No.
169777 and prays that E.O. 464 be declared unconstitutional.
On October 14, 2005, PDP-Laban, a registered political party with members duly elected into the
Philippine Senate and House of Representatives, filed a similar petition for certiorari and prohibition,
docketed as G.R. No. 169834, alleging that it is affected by the challenged E.O. 464 because it
hampers its legislative agenda to be implemented through its members in Congress, particularly in
the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation and transcendental issues need to be resolved to avert a
constitutional crisis between the executive and legislative branches of the government.
Meanwhile, by letter
14
dated February 6, 2006, Senator Biazon reiterated his invitation to Gen. Senga
for him and other military officers to attend the hearing on the alleged wiretapping scheduled on
February 10, 2005. Gen. Senga replied, however, by letter
15
dated February 8, 2006, that "[p]ursuant
to Executive Order No. 464, th[e] Headquarters requested for a clearance from the President to allow
[them] to appear before the public hearing" and that "they will attend once [their] request is approved
by the President." As none of those invited appeared, the hearing on February 10, 2006 was
cancelled.
16

In another investigation conducted jointly by the Senate Committee on Agriculture and Food and the
Blue Ribbon Committee on the alleged mismanagement and use of the fertilizer fund under the
Ginintuang Masaganang Ani program of the Department of Agriculture (DA), several Cabinet officials
were invited to the hearings scheduled on October 5 and 26, November 24 and December 12, 2005
but most of them failed to attend, DA Undersecretary Belinda Gonzales, DA Assistant Secretary Felix
Jose Montes, Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority Executive Director Norlito R. Gicana,
17
and those from
the Department of Budget and Management
18
having invoked E.O. 464.
In the budget hearings set by the Senate on February 8 and 13, 2006, Press Secretary and
Presidential Spokesperson Ignacio R. Bunye,
19
DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez
20
and Department
of Interior and Local Government Undersecretary Marius P. Corpus
21
communicated their inability to
attend due to lack of appropriate clearance from the President pursuant to E.O. 464. During the
February 13, 2005 budget hearing, however, Secretary Bunye was allowed to attend by Executive
Secretary Ermita.
On February 13, 2006, Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz and the incumbent members of the Board of
Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as taxpayers, and the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines as the official organization of all Philippine lawyers, all invoking their constitutional right to
be informed on matters of public interest, filed their petition for certiorari and prohibition, docketed as
G.R. No. 171246, and pray that E.O. 464 be declared null and void.
All the petitions pray for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order enjoining respondents from
implementing, enforcing, and observing E.O. 464.
In the oral arguments on the petitions conducted on February 21, 2006, the following substantive
issues were ventilated: (1) whether respondents committed grave abuse of discretion in implementing
E.O. 464 prior to its publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation; and (2)
whether E.O. 464 violates the following provisions of the Constitution: Art. II, Sec. 28, Art. III, Sec. 4,
Art. III, Sec. 7, Art. IV. Sec. 1, Art. VI, Sec. 21, Art. VI, Sec. 22, Art. XI, Sec. 1, and Art. XIII, Sec. 16.
The procedural issue of whether there is an actual case or controversy that calls for judicial review
was not taken up; instead, the parties were instructed to discuss it in their respective memoranda.
After the conclusion of the oral arguments, the parties were directed to submit their respective
memoranda, paying particular attention to the following propositions: (1) that E.O. 464 is, on its face,
unconstitutional; and (2) assuming that it is not, it is unconstitutional as applied in four instances,
namely: (a) the so called Fertilizer scam; (b) the NorthRail investigation (c) the Wiretapping activity of
the ISAFP; and (d) the investigation on the Venable contract.
22

Petitioners in G.R. No. 169660
23
and G.R. No. 169777
24
filed their memoranda on March 7, 2006,
while those in G.R. No. 169667
25
and G.R. No. 169834
26
filed theirs the next day or on March 8,
2006. Petitioners in G.R. No. 171246 did not file any memorandum.
Petitioners Bayan Muna et al. in G.R. No. 169659, after their motion for extension to file
memorandum
27
was granted, subsequently filed a manifestation
28
dated March 14, 2006 that it would
no longer file its memorandum in the interest of having the issues resolved soonest, prompting this
Court to issue a Resolution reprimanding them.
29

Petitioners submit that E.O. 464 violates the following constitutional provisions:
Art. VI, Sec. 21
30

Art. VI, Sec. 22
31

Art. VI, Sec. 1
32

Art. XI, Sec. 1
33

Art. III, Sec. 7
34

Art. III, Sec. 4
35

Art. XIII, Sec. 16
36

Art. II, Sec. 28
37

Respondents Executive Secretary Ermita et al., on the other hand, pray in their consolidated
memorandum
38
on March 13, 2006 for the dismissal of the petitions for lack of merit.
The Court synthesizes the issues to be resolved as follows:
1. Whether E.O. 464 contravenes the power of inquiry vested in Congress;
2. Whether E.O. 464 violates the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern; and
3. Whether respondents have committed grave abuse of discretion when they implemented
E.O. 464 prior to its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.
Essential requisites for judicial review
Before proceeding to resolve the issue of the constitutionality of E.O. 464, ascertainment of whether
the requisites for a valid exercise of the Courts power of judicial review are present is in order.
Like almost all powers conferred by the Constitution, the power of judicial review is subject to
limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
power; (2) the person challenging the act must have standing to challenge the validity of the subject
act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must
be the very lis mota of the case.
39

Except with respect to the requisites of standing and existence of an actual case or controversy
where the disagreement between the parties lies, discussion of the rest of the requisites shall be
omitted.
Standing
Respondents, through the Solicitor General, assert that the allegations in G.R. Nos. 169659, 169660
and 169667 make it clear that they, adverting to the non-appearance of several officials of the
executive department in the investigations called by the different committees of the Senate, were
brought to vindicate the constitutional duty of the Senate or its different committees to conduct inquiry
in aid of legislation or in the exercise of its oversight functions. They maintain that Representatives
Ocampo et al. have not shown any specific prerogative, power, and privilege of the House of
Representatives which had been effectively impaired by E.O. 464, there being no mention of any
investigation called by the House of Representatives or any of its committees which was aborted due
to the implementation of E.O. 464.
As for Bayan Munas alleged interest as a party-list representing the marginalized and
underrepresented, and that of the other petitioner groups and individuals who profess to have
standing as advocates and defenders of the Constitution, respondents contend that such interest falls
short of that required to confer standing on them as parties "injured-in-fact."
40

Respecting petitioner Chavez, respondents contend that Chavez may not claim an interest as a
taxpayer for the implementation of E.O. 464 does not involve the exercise of taxing or spending
power.
41

With regard to the petition filed by the Senate, respondents argue that in the absence of a personal or
direct injury by reason of the issuance of E.O. 464, the Senate and its individual members are not the
proper parties to assail the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
Invoking this Courts ruling in National Economic Protectionism Association v. Ongpin
42
and Valmonte
v. Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office,
43
respondents assert that to be considered a proper party,
one must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that he has sustained or will
sustain direct injury due to the enforcement of E.O. 464.
44

That the Senate of the Philippines has a fundamental right essential not only for intelligent public
decision-making in a democratic system, but more especially for sound legislation
45
is not disputed.
E.O. 464, however, allegedly stifles the ability of the members of Congress to access information that
is crucial to law-making.
46
Verily, the Senate, including its individual members, has a substantial and
direct interest over the outcome of the controversy and is the proper party to assail the
constitutionality of E.O. 464. Indeed, legislators have standing to maintain inviolate the prerogative,
powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in their office and are allowed to sue to question the
validity of any official action which they claim infringes their prerogatives as legislators.
47

In the same vein, party-list representatives Satur Ocampo (Bayan Muna), Teodoro Casino (Bayan
Muna), Joel Virador (Bayan Muna), Crispin Beltran (Anakpawis), Rafael Mariano (Anakpawis), and
Liza Maza (Gabriela) are allowed to sue to question the constitutionality of E.O. 464, the absence of
any claim that an investigation called by the House of Representatives or any of its committees was
aborted due to the implementation of E.O. 464 notwithstanding, it being sufficient that a claim is made
that E.O. 464 infringes on their constitutional rights and duties as members of Congress to conduct
investigation in aid of legislation and conduct oversight functions in the implementation of laws.
The national political party, Bayan Muna, likewise meets the standing requirement as it obtained three
seats in the House of Representatives in the 2004 elections and is, therefore, entitled to participate in
the legislative process consonant with the declared policy underlying the party list system of affording
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties who lack
well-defined political constituencies to contribute to the formulation and enactment of legislation that
will benefit the nation.
48

As Bayan Muna and Representatives Ocampo et al. have the standing to file their petitions, passing
on the standing of their co-petitioners Courage and Codal is rendered unnecessary.
49

In filing their respective petitions, Chavez, the ALG which claims to be an organization of citizens, and
the incumbent members of the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP in behalf of its lawyer
members,
50
invoke their constitutional right to information on matters of public concern, asserting that
the right to information, curtailed and violated by E.O. 464, is essential to the effective exercise of
other constitutional rights
51
and to the maintenance of the balance of power among the three
branches of the government through the principle of checks and balances.
52

It is well-settled that when suing as a citizen, the interest of the petitioner in assailing the
constitutionality of laws, presidential decrees, orders, and other regulations, must be direct and
personal. In Franciso v. House of Representatives,
53
this Court held that when the proceeding
involves the assertion of a public right, the mere fact that he is a citizen satisfies the requirement of
personal interest.
As for petitioner PDP-Laban, it asseverates that it is clothed with legal standing in view of the
transcendental issues raised in its petition which this Court needs to resolve in order to avert a
constitutional crisis. For it to be accorded standing on the ground of transcendental importance,
however, it must establish (1) the character of the funds (that it is public) or other assets involved in
the case, (2) the presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by
the public respondent agency or instrumentality of the government, and (3) the lack of any party with
a more direct and specific interest in raising the questions being raised.
54
The first and last
determinants not being present as no public funds or assets are involved and petitioners in G.R. Nos.
169777 and 169659 have direct and specific interests in the resolution of the controversy, petitioner
PDP-Laban is bereft of standing to file its petition. Its allegation that E.O. 464 hampers its legislative
agenda is vague and uncertain, and at best is only a "generalized interest" which it shares with the
rest of the political parties. Concrete injury, whether actual or threatened, is that indispensable
element of a dispute which serves in part to cast it in a form traditionally capable of judicial
resolution.
55
In fine, PDP-Labans alleged interest as a political party does not suffice to clothe it with
legal standing.
Actual Case or Controversy
Petitioners assert that an actual case exists, they citing the absence of the executive officials invited
by the Senate to its hearings after the issuance of E.O. 464, particularly those on the NorthRail
project and the wiretapping controversy.
Respondents counter that there is no case or controversy, there being no showing that President
Arroyo has actually withheld her consent or prohibited the appearance of the invited officials.
56
These
officials, they claim, merely communicated to the Senate that they have not yet secured the consent
of the President, not that the President prohibited their attendance.
57
Specifically with regard to the
AFP officers who did not attend the hearing on September 28, 2005, respondents claim that the
instruction not to attend without the Presidents consent was based on its role as Commander-in-
Chief of the Armed Forces, not on E.O. 464.
Respondents thus conclude that the petitions merely rest on an unfounded apprehension that the
President will abuse its power of preventing the appearance of officials before Congress, and that
such apprehension is not sufficient for challenging the validity of E.O. 464.
The Court finds respondents assertion that the President has not withheld her consent or prohibited
the appearance of the officials concerned immaterial in determining the existence of an actual case or
controversy insofar as E.O. 464 is concerned. For E.O. 464 does not require either a deliberate
withholding of consent or an express prohibition issuing from the President in order to bar officials
from appearing before Congress.
As the implementation of the challenged order has already resulted in the absence of officials invited
to the hearings of petitioner Senate of the Philippines, it would make no sense to wait for any further
event before considering the present case ripe for adjudication. Indeed, it would be sheer
abandonment of duty if this Court would now refrain from passing on the constitutionality of E.O. 464.
Constitutionality of E.O. 464
E.O. 464, to the extent that it bars the appearance of executive officials before Congress, deprives
Congress of the information in the possession of these officials. To resolve the question of whether
such withholding of information violates the Constitution, consideration of the general power of
Congress to obtain information, otherwise known as the power of inquiry, is in order.
The power of inquiry
The Congress power of inquiry is expressly recognized in Section 21 of Article VI of the Constitution
which reads:
SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The
rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Underscoring
supplied)
This provision is worded exactly as Section 8 of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution except that, in the
latter, it vests the power of inquiry in the unicameral legislature established therein the Batasang
Pambansa and its committees.
The 1935 Constitution did not contain a similar provision. Nonetheless, in Arnault v. Nazareno,
58
a
case decided in 1950 under that Constitution, the Court already recognized that the power of inquiry
is inherent in the power to legislate.
Arnault involved a Senate investigation of the reportedly anomalous purchase of the Buenavista and
Tambobong Estates by the Rural Progress Administration. Arnault, who was considered a leading
witness in the controversy, was called to testify thereon by the Senate. On account of his refusal to
answer the questions of the senators on an important point, he was, by resolution of the Senate,
detained for contempt. Upholding the Senates power to punish Arnault for contempt, this Court held:
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with
power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative
functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be
implied. In other words, the power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and
appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively
in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not
infrequently true recourse must be had to others who do possess it. Experience has shown that
mere requests for such information are often unavailing, and also that information which is
volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of compulsion is essential to obtain
what is needed.
59
. . . (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That this power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch may be deduced
from the same case. The power of inquiry, the Court therein ruled, is co-extensive with the power to
legislate.
60
The matters which may be a proper subject of legislation and those which may be a
proper subject of investigation are one. It follows that the operation of government, being a legitimate
subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation.
Thus, the Court found that the Senate investigation of the government transaction involved in Arnault
was a proper exercise of the power of inquiry. Besides being related to the expenditure of public
funds of which Congress is the guardian, the transaction, the Court held, "also involved government
agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions it is within the power of Congress to
regulate or even abolish."
Since Congress has authority to inquire into the operations of the executive branch, it would be
incongruous to hold that the power of inquiry does not extend to executive officials who are the most
familiar with and informed on executive operations.
As discussed in Arnault, the power of inquiry, "with process to enforce it," is grounded on the
necessity of information in the legislative process. If the information possessed by executive officials
on the operation of their offices is necessary for wise legislation on that subject, by parity of
reasoning, Congress has the right to that information and the power to compel the disclosure thereof.
As evidenced by the American experience during the so-called "McCarthy era," however, the right of
Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to abuse than
executive or judicial power. It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the Courts
certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.
For one, as noted in Bengzon v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee,
61
the inquiry itself might not properly
be in aid of legislation, and thus beyond the constitutional power of Congress. Such inquiry could not
usurp judicial functions. Parenthetically, one possible way for Congress to avoid such a result as
occurred in Bengzon is to indicate in its invitations to the public officials concerned, or to any person
for that matter, the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry. Given such
statement in its invitations, along with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions
relative to and in furtherance thereof, there would be less room for speculation on the part of the
person invited on whether the inquiry is in aid of legislation.
Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative power of
inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or Houses duly
published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an inquiry conducted
without duly published rules of procedure. Section 21 also mandates that the rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected, an imposition that obligates Congress to
adhere to the guarantees in the Bill of Rights.
These abuses are, of course, remediable before the courts, upon the proper suit filed by the persons
affected, even if they belong to the executive branch. Nonetheless, there may be exceptional
circumstances, none appearing to obtain at present, wherein a clear pattern of abuse of the
legislative power of inquiry might be established, resulting in palpable violations of the rights
guaranteed to members of the executive department under the Bill of Rights. In such instances,
depending on the particulars of each case, attempts by the Executive Branch to forestall these
abuses may be accorded judicial sanction.
Even where the inquiry is in aid of legislation, there are still recognized exemptions to the power of
inquiry, which exemptions fall under the rubric of "executive privilege." Since this term figures
prominently in the challenged order, it being mentioned in its provisions, its preambular clauses,
62
and
in its very title, a discussion of executive privilege is crucial for determining the constitutionality of
E.O. 464.
Executive privilege
The phrase "executive privilege" is not new in this jurisdiction. It has been used even prior to the
promulgation of the 1986 Constitution.
63
Being of American origin, it is best understood in light of how
it has been defined and used in the legal literature of the United States.
Schwartz defines executive privilege as "the power of the Government to withhold information from
the public, the courts, and the Congress."
64
Similarly, Rozell defines it as "the right of the President
and high-level executive branch officers to withhold information from Congress, the courts, and
ultimately the public."
65

Executive privilege is, nonetheless, not a clear or unitary concept.
66
It has encompassed claims of
varying kinds.
67
Tribe, in fact, comments that while it is customary to employ the phrase "executive
privilege," it may be more accurate to speak of executive privileges "since presidential refusals to
furnish information may be actuated by any of at least three distinct kinds of considerations, and may
be asserted, with differing degrees of success, in the context of either judicial or legislative
investigations."
One variety of the privilege, Tribe explains, is the state secrets privilege invoked by U.S. Presidents,
beginning with Washington, on the ground that the information is of such nature that its disclosure
would subvert crucial military or diplomatic objectives. Another variety is the informers privilege, or
the privilege of the Government not to disclose the identity of persons who furnish information of
violations of law to officers charged with the enforcement of that law. Finally, a generic privilege for
internal deliberations has been said to attach to intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory
opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a process by which governmental
decisions and policies are formulated.
68

Tribes comment is supported by the ruling in In re Sealed Case, thus:
Since the beginnings of our nation, executive officials have claimed a variety of privileges to resist
disclosure of information the confidentiality of which they felt was crucial to fulfillment of the unique
role and responsibilities of the executive branch of our government. Courts ruled early that the
executive had a right to withhold documents that might reveal military or state secrets. The courts
have also granted the executive a right to withhold the identity of government informers in some
circumstances and a qualified right to withhold information related to pending investigations. x x
x"
69
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The entry in Blacks Law Dictionary on "executive privilege" is similarly instructive regarding the scope
of the doctrine.
This privilege, based on the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, exempts the executive
from disclosure requirements applicable to the ordinary citizen or organization where such exemption
is necessary to the discharge of highly important executive responsibilities involved in maintaining
governmental operations, and extends not only to military and diplomatic secrets but also to
documents integral to an appropriate exercise of the executive domestic decisional and policy
making functions, that is, those documents reflecting the frank expression necessary in intra-
governmental advisory and deliberative communications.
70
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
That a type of information is recognized as privileged does not, however, necessarily mean that it
would be considered privileged in all instances. For in determining the validity of a claim of privilege,
the question that must be asked is not only whether the requested information falls within one of the
traditional privileges, but also whether that privilege should be honored in a given procedural
setting.
71

The leading case on executive privilege in the United States is U.S. v. Nixon,
72
decided in 1974. In
issue in that case was the validity of President Nixons claim of executive privilege against a
subpoena issued by a district court requiring the production of certain tapes and documents relating
to the Watergate investigations. The claim of privilege was based on the Presidents general interest
in the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondence. The U.S. Court held that while there is
no explicit reference to a privilege of confidentiality in the U.S. Constitution, it is constitutionally based
to the extent that it relates to the effective discharge of a Presidents powers. The Court, nonetheless,
rejected the Presidents claim of privilege, ruling that the privilege must be balanced against the
public interest in the fair administration of criminal justice. Notably, the Court was careful to clarify that
it was not there addressing the issue of claims of privilege in a civil litigation or against congressional
demands for information.
Cases in the U.S. which involve claims of executive privilege against Congress are rare.
73
Despite
frequent assertion of the privilege to deny information to Congress, beginning with President
Washingtons refusal to turn over treaty negotiation records to the House of Representatives, the U.S.
Supreme Court has never adjudicated the issue.
74
However, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit, in a case decided earlier in the same year as Nixon, recognized the Presidents
privilege over his conversations against a congressional subpoena.
75
Anticipating the balancing
approach adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Nixon, the Court of Appeals weighed the public
interest protected by the claim of privilege against the interest that would be served by disclosure to
the Committee. Ruling that the balance favored the President, the Court declined to enforce the
subpoena.
76

In this jurisdiction, the doctrine of executive privilege was recognized by this Court in Almonte v.
Vasquez.
77
Almonte used the term in reference to the same privilege subject of Nixon. It quoted the
following portion of the Nixon decision which explains the basis for the privilege:
"The expectation of a President to the confidentiality of his conversations and correspondences, like
the claim of confidentiality of judicial deliberations, for example, has all the values to which we accord
deference for the privacy of all citizens and, added to those values, is the necessity for protection of
the public interest in candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-
making. A President and those who assist him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of
shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express
except privately. These are the considerations justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential
communications. The privilege is fundamental to the operation of government and inextricably rooted
in the separation of powers under the Constitution x x x " (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Almonte involved a subpoena duces tecum issued by the Ombudsman against the therein petitioners.
It did not involve, as expressly stated in the decision, the right of the people to
information.
78
Nonetheless, the Court recognized that there are certain types of information which the
government may withhold from the public, thus acknowledging, in substance if not in name, that
executive privilege may be claimed against citizens demands for information.
In Chavez v. PCGG,
79
the Court held that this jurisdiction recognizes the common law holding that
there is a "governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state secrets regarding
military, diplomatic and other national security matters."
80
The same case held that closed-door
Cabinet meetings are also a recognized limitation on the right to information.
Similarly, in Chavez v. Public Estates Authority,
81
the Court ruled that the right to information does not
extend to matters recognized as "privileged information under the separation of powers,"
82
by which
the Court meant Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door
Cabinet meetings. It also held that information on military and diplomatic secrets and those affecting
national security, and information on investigations of crimes by law enforcement agencies before the
prosecution of the accused were exempted from the right to information.
From the above discussion on the meaning and scope of executive privilege, both in the United
States and in this jurisdiction, a clear principle emerges. Executive privilege, whether asserted
against Congress, the courts, or the public, is recognized only in relation to certain types of
information of a sensitive character. While executive privilege is a constitutional concept, a claim
thereof may be valid or not depending on the ground invoked to justify it and the context in which it is
made. Noticeably absent is any recognition that executive officials are exempt from the duty to
disclose information by the mere fact of being executive officials. Indeed, the extraordinary character
of the exemptions indicates that the presumption inclines heavily against executive secrecy and in
favor of disclosure.
Validity of Section 1
Section 1 is similar to Section 3 in that both require the officials covered by them to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before Congress. There are significant differences
between the two provisions, however, which constrain this Court to discuss the validity of these
provisions separately.
Section 1 specifically applies to department heads. It does not, unlike Section 3, require a prior
determination by any official whether they are covered by E.O. 464. The President herself has,
through the challenged order, made the determination that they are. Further, unlike also Section 3,
the coverage of department heads under Section 1 is not made to depend on the department heads
possession of any information which might be covered by executive privilege. In fact, in marked
contrast to Section 3 vis--vis Section 2, there is no reference to executive privilege at all. Rather, the
required prior consent under Section 1 is grounded on Article VI, Section 22 of the Constitution on
what has been referred to as the question hour.
SECTION 22. The heads of departments may upon their own initiative, with the consent of the
President, or upon the request of either House, as the rules of each House shall provide, appear
before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written questions
shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of Representatives at
least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be limited to written
questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the State or the public interest
so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be conducted in executive
session.
Determining the validity of Section 1 thus requires an examination of the meaning of Section 22 of
Article VI. Section 22 which provides for the question hour must be interpreted vis--vis Section 21
which provides for the power of either House of Congress to "conduct inquiries in aid of legislation."
As the following excerpt of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission shows, the framers
were aware that these two provisions involved distinct functions of Congress.
MR. MAAMBONG. x x x When we amended Section 20 [now Section 22 on the Question Hour]
yesterday, I noticed that members of the Cabinet cannot be compelled anymore to appear before the
House of Representatives or before the Senate. I have a particular problem in this regard, Madam
President, because in our experience in the Regular Batasang Pambansa as the Gentleman
himself has experienced in the interim Batasang Pambansa one of the most competent inputs that
we can put in our committee deliberations, either in aid of legislation or in congressional
investigations, is the testimonies of Cabinet ministers. We usually invite them, but if they do not come
and it is a congressional investigation, we usually issue subpoenas.
I want to be clarified on a statement made by Commissioner Suarez when he said that the fact that
the Cabinet ministers may refuse to come to the House of Representatives or the Senate [when
requested under Section 22] does not mean that they need not come when they are invited or
subpoenaed by the committee of either House when it comes to inquiries in aid of legislation or
congressional investigation. According to Commissioner Suarez, that is allowed and their presence
can be had under Section 21. Does the gentleman confirm this, Madam President?
MR. DAVIDE. We confirm that, Madam President, because Section 20 refers only to what was
originally the Question Hour, whereas, Section 21 would refer specifically to inquiries in aid of
legislation, under which anybody for that matter, may be summoned and if he refuses, he can be held
in contempt of the House.
83
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
A distinction was thus made between inquiries in aid of legislation and the question hour. While
attendance was meant to be discretionary in the question hour, it was compulsory in inquiries in aid of
legislation. The reference to Commissioner Suarez bears noting, he being one of the proponents of
the amendment to make the appearance of department heads discretionary in the question hour.
So clearly was this distinction conveyed to the members of the Commission that the Committee on
Style, precisely in recognition of this distinction, later moved the provision on question hour from its
original position as Section 20 in the original draft down to Section 31, far from the provision on
inquiries in aid of legislation. This gave rise to the following exchange during the deliberations:
MR. GUINGONA. [speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on Style] We now go, Mr.
Presiding Officer, to the Article on Legislative and may I request the chairperson of the Legislative
Department, Commissioner Davide, to give his reaction.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir). Commissioner Davide is recognized.|avvphi|.net
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer. I have only one reaction to the Question Hour. I
propose that instead of putting it as Section 31, it should follow Legislative Inquiries.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER. What does the committee say?
MR. GUINGONA. I ask Commissioner Maambong to reply, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. MAAMBONG. Actually, we considered that previously when we sequenced this but we reasoned
that in Section 21, which is Legislative Inquiry, it is actually a power of Congress in terms of its own
lawmaking; whereas, a Question Hour is not actually a power in terms of its own lawmaking power
because in Legislative Inquiry, it is in aid of legislation. And so we put Question Hour as Section 31. I
hope Commissioner Davide will consider this.
MR. DAVIDE. The Question Hour is closely related with the legislative power, and it is precisely as a
complement to or a supplement of the Legislative Inquiry. The appearance of the members of Cabinet
would be very, very essential not only in the application of check and balance but also, in effect, in aid
of legislation.
MR. MAAMBONG. After conferring with the committee, we find merit in the suggestion of
Commissioner Davide. In other words, we are accepting that and so this Section 31 would now
become Section 22. Would it be, Commissioner Davide?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
84
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Consistent with their statements earlier in the deliberations, Commissioners Davide and Maambong
proceeded from the same assumption that these provisions pertained to two different functions of the
legislature. Both Commissioners understood that the power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is
different from the power to conduct inquiries during the question hour. Commissioner Davides only
concern was that the two provisions on these distinct powers be placed closely together, they being
complementary to each other. Neither Commissioner considered them as identical functions of
Congress.
The foregoing opinion was not the two Commissioners alone. From the above-quoted exchange,
Commissioner Maambongs committee the Committee on Style shared the view that the two
provisions reflected distinct functions of Congress. Commissioner Davide, on the other hand, was
speaking in his capacity as Chairman of the Committee on the Legislative Department. His views may
thus be presumed as representing that of his Committee.
In the context of a parliamentary system of government, the "question hour" has a definite meaning. It
is a period of confrontation initiated by Parliament to hold the Prime Minister and the other ministers
accountable for their acts and the operation of the government,
85
corresponding to what is known in
Britain as the question period. There was a specific provision for a question hour in the 1973
Constitution
86
which made the appearance of ministers mandatory. The same perfectly conformed to
the parliamentary system established by that Constitution, where the ministers are also members of
the legislature and are directly accountable to it.
An essential feature of the parliamentary system of government is the immediate accountability of the
Prime Minister and the Cabinet to the National Assembly. They shall be responsible to the National
Assembly for the program of government and shall determine the guidelines of national policy. Unlike
in the presidential system where the tenure of office of all elected officials cannot be terminated
before their term expired, the Prime Minister and the Cabinet remain in office only as long as they
enjoy the confidence of the National Assembly. The moment this confidence is lost the Prime Minister
and the Cabinet may be changed.
87

The framers of the 1987 Constitution removed the mandatory nature of such appearance during the
question hour in the present Constitution so as to conform more fully to a system of separation of
powers.
88
To that extent, the question hour, as it is presently understood in this jurisdiction, departs
from the question period of the parliamentary system. That department heads may not be required to
appear in a question hour does not, however, mean that the legislature is rendered powerless to elicit
information from them in all circumstances. In fact, in light of the absence of a mandatory question
period, the need to enforce Congress right to executive information in the performance of its
legislative function becomes more imperative. As Schwartz observes:
Indeed, if the separation of powers has anything to tell us on the subject under discussion, it is that
the Congress has the right to obtain information from any source even from officials of departments
and agencies in the executive branch. In the United States there is, unlike the situation which prevails
in a parliamentary system such as that in Britain, a clear separation between the legislative and
executive branches. It is this very separation that makes the congressional right to obtain information
from the executive so essential, if the functions of the Congress as the elected representatives of the
people are adequately to be carried out. The absence of close rapport between the legislative and
executive branches in this country, comparable to those which exist under a parliamentary system,
and the nonexistence in the Congress of an institution such as the British question period have
perforce made reliance by the Congress upon its right to obtain information from the executive
essential, if it is intelligently to perform its legislative tasks. Unless the Congress possesses the right
to obtain executive information, its power of oversight of administration in a system such as ours
becomes a power devoid of most of its practical content, since it depends for its effectiveness solely
upon information parceled out ex gratia by the executive.
89
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Sections 21 and 22, therefore, while closely related and complementary to each other, should not be
considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. One specifically relates to the power to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation, the aim of which is to elicit information that may be used for
legislation, while the other pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is
to obtain information in pursuit of Congress oversight function.
When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing the
statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the President
to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their performance as a
matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of powers, states that
Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry in which Congress
requires their appearance is "in aid of legislation" under Section 21, the appearance is mandatory for
the same reasons stated in Arnault.
90

In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent
that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the intent discerned from the
deliberations of the Constitutional Commission.
Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 21
and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of powers. While the
executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the power of Congress to
legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information.
When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only way for department heads to exempt
themselves therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not exempt by the mere fact that they
are department heads. Only one executive official may be exempted from this power the President
on whom executive power is vested, hence, beyond the reach of Congress except through the power
of impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of the executive branch, and the due
respect accorded to a co-equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-standing custom.
By the same token, members of the Supreme Court are also exempt from this power of inquiry.
Unlike the Presidency, judicial power is vested in a collegial body; hence, each member thereof is
exempt on the basis not only of separation of powers but also on the fiscal autonomy and the
constitutional independence of the judiciary. This point is not in dispute, as even counsel for the
Senate, Sen. Joker Arroyo, admitted it during the oral argument upon interpellation of the Chief
Justice.
Having established the proper interpretation of Section 22, Article VI of the Constitution, the Court
now proceeds to pass on the constitutionality of Section 1 of E.O. 464.
Section 1, in view of its specific reference to Section 22 of Article VI of the Constitution and the
absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation, must be construed as limited in its
application to appearances of department heads in the question hour contemplated in the provision of
said Section 22 of Article VI. The reading is dictated by the basic rule of construction that issuances
must be interpreted, as much as possible, in a way that will render it constitutional.
The requirement then to secure presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to
appearances in the question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, Article VI of the
Constitution, the appearance of department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.
Section 1 cannot, however, be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in aid of
legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal of the department head to
appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege is subsequently made, either by the President
herself or by the Executive Secretary.
Validity of Sections 2 and 3
Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. The enumeration is
broad. It covers all senior officials of executive departments, all officers of the AFP and the PNP, and
all senior national security officials who, in the judgment of the heads of offices designated in the
same section (i.e. department heads, Chief of Staff of the AFP, Chief of the PNP, and the National
Security Adviser), are "covered by the executive privilege."
The enumeration also includes such other officers as may be determined by the President. Given the
title of Section 2 "Nature, Scope and Coverage of Executive Privilege" , it is evident that under
the rule of ejusdem generis, the determination by the President under this provision is intended to be
based on a similar finding of coverage under executive privilege.
En passant, the Court notes that Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 virtually states that executive privilege
actually covers persons. Such is a misuse of the doctrine. Executive privilege, as discussed above, is
properly invoked in relation to specific categories of information and not to categories of persons.
In light, however, of Sec 2(a) of E.O. 464 which deals with the nature, scope and coverage of
executive privilege, the reference to persons being "covered by the executive privilege" may be read
as an abbreviated way of saying that the person is in possession of information which is, in the
judgment of the head of office concerned, privileged as defined in Section 2(a). The Court shall thus
proceed on the assumption that this is the intention of the challenged order.
Upon a determination by the designated head of office or by the President that an official is "covered
by the executive privilege," such official is subjected to the requirement that he first secure the
consent of the President prior to appearing before Congress. This requirement effectively bars the
appearance of the official concerned unless the same is permitted by the President. The proviso
allowing the President to give its consent means nothing more than that the President may reverse a
prohibition which already exists by virtue of E.O. 464.
Thus, underlying this requirement of prior consent is the determination by a head of office, authorized
by the President under E.O. 464, or by the President herself, that such official is in possession of
information that is covered by executive privilege. This determination then becomes the basis for the
officials not showing up in the legislative investigation.
In view thereof, whenever an official invokes E.O. 464 to justify his failure to be present, such
invocation must be construed as a declaration to Congress that the President, or a head of office
authorized by the President, has determined that the requested information is privileged, and that the
President has not reversed such determination. Such declaration, however, even without mentioning
the term "executive privilege," amounts to an implied claim that the information is being withheld by
the executive branch, by authority of the President, on the basis of executive privilege. Verily, there is
an implied claim of privilege.
The letter dated September 28, 2005 of respondent Executive Secretary Ermita to Senate President
Drilon illustrates the implied nature of the claim of privilege authorized by E.O. 464. It reads:
In connection with the inquiry to be conducted by the Committee of the Whole regarding the Northrail
Project of the North Luzon Railways Corporation on 29 September 2005 at 10:00 a.m., please be
informed that officials of the Executive Department invited to appear at the meeting will not be able to
attend the same without the consent of the President, pursuant to Executive Order No. 464 (s. 2005),
entitled "Ensuring Observance Of The Principle Of Separation Of Powers, Adherence To The Rule
On Executive Privilege And Respect For The Rights Of Public Officials Appearing In Legislative
Inquiries In Aid Of Legislation Under The Constitution, And For Other Purposes". Said officials have
not secured the required consent from the President. (Underscoring supplied)
The letter does not explicitly invoke executive privilege or that the matter on which these officials are
being requested to be resource persons falls under the recognized grounds of the privilege to justify
their absence. Nor does it expressly state that in view of the lack of consent from the President under
E.O. 464, they cannot attend the hearing.
Significant premises in this letter, however, are left unstated, deliberately or not. The letter assumes
that the invited officials are covered by E.O. 464. As explained earlier, however, to be covered by the
order means that a determination has been made, by the designated head of office or the President,
that the invited official possesses information that is covered by executive privilege. Thus, although it
is not stated in the letter that such determination has been made, the same must be deemed implied.
Respecting the statement that the invited officials have not secured the consent of the President, it
only means that the President has not reversed the standing prohibition against their appearance
before Congress.
Inevitably, Executive Secretary Ermitas letter leads to the conclusion that the executive branch,
either through the President or the heads of offices authorized under E.O. 464, has made a
determination that the information required by the Senate is privileged, and that, at the time of writing,
there has been no contrary pronouncement from the President. In fine, an implied claim of privilege
has been made by the executive.
While there is no Philippine case that directly addresses the issue of whether executive privilege may
be invoked against Congress, it is gathered from Chavez v. PEA that certain information in the
possession of the executive may validly be claimed as privileged even against Congress. Thus, the
case holds:
There is no claim by PEA that the information demanded by petitioner is privileged information rooted
in the separation of powers. The information does not cover Presidential conversations,
correspondences, or discussions during closed-door Cabinet meetings which, like internal-
deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate courts, or executive sessions of either house
of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-
equal branch of government. A frank exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the
glare of publicity and pressure by interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of
decision-making of those tasked to exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. This is not
the situation in the instant case.
91
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Section 3 of E.O. 464, therefore, cannot be dismissed outright as invalid by the mere fact that it
sanctions claims of executive privilege. This Court must look further and assess the claim of privilege
authorized by the Order to determine whether it is valid.
While the validity of claims of privilege must be assessed on a case to case basis, examining the
ground invoked therefor and the particular circumstances surrounding it, there is, in an implied claim
of privilege, a defect that renders it invalid per se. By its very nature, and as demonstrated by the
letter of respondent Executive Secretary quoted above, the implied claim authorized by Section 3 of
E.O. 464 is not accompanied by any specific allegation of the basis thereof (e.g., whether the
information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door Cabinet meetings, etc.).
While Section 2(a) enumerates the types of information that are covered by the privilege under the
challenged order, Congress is left to speculate as to which among them is being referred to by the
executive. The enumeration is not even intended to be comprehensive, but a mere statement of what
is included in the phrase "confidential or classified information between the President and the public
officers covered by this executive order."
Certainly, Congress has the right to know why the executive considers the requested information
privileged. It does not suffice to merely declare that the President, or an authorized head of office, has
determined that it is so, and that the President has not overturned that determination. Such
declaration leaves Congress in the dark on how the requested information could be classified as
privileged. That the message is couched in terms that, on first impression, do not seem like a claim of
privilege only makes it more pernicious. It threatens to make Congress doubly blind to the question of
why the executive branch is not providing it with the information that it has requested.
A claim of privilege, being a claim of exemption from an obligation to disclose information, must,
therefore, be clearly asserted. As U.S. v. Reynolds teaches:
The privilege belongs to the government and must be asserted by it; it can neither be claimed nor
waived by a private party. It is not to be lightly invoked. There must be a formal claim of privilege,
lodged by the head of the department which has control over the matter, after actual personal
consideration by that officer. The court itself must determine whether the circumstances are
appropriate for the claim of privilege, and yet do so without forcing a disclosure of the very thing the
privilege is designed to protect.
92
(Underscoring supplied)
Absent then a statement of the specific basis of a claim of executive privilege, there is no way of
determining whether it falls under one of the traditional privileges, or whether, given the
circumstances in which it is made, it should be respected.
93
These, in substance, were the same
criteria in assessing the claim of privilege asserted against the Ombudsman in Almonte v.
Vasquez
94
and, more in point, against a committee of the Senate in Senate Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon.
95

A.O. Smith v. Federal Trade Commission is enlightening:
[T]he lack of specificity renders an assessment of the potential harm resulting from disclosure
impossible, thereby preventing the Court from balancing such harm against plaintiffs needs to
determine whether to override any claims of privilege.
96
(Underscoring supplied)
And so is U.S. v. Article of Drug:
97

On the present state of the record, this Court is not called upon to perform this balancing operation. In
stating its objection to claimants interrogatories, government asserts, and nothing more, that the
disclosures sought by claimant would inhibit the free expression of opinion that non-disclosure is
designed to protect. The government has not shown nor even alleged that those who evaluated
claimants product were involved in internal policymaking, generally, or in this particular instance.
Privilege cannot be set up by an unsupported claim. The facts upon which the privilege is based must
be established. To find these interrogatories objectionable, this Court would have to assume that the
evaluation and classification of claimants products was a matter of internal policy formulation, an
assumption in which this Court is unwilling to indulge sua sponte.
98
(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Department of Energy
99
similarly emphasizes that "an agency must provide precise
and certain reasons for preserving the confidentiality of requested information."
Black v. Sheraton Corp. of America
100
amplifies, thus:
A formal and proper claim of executive privilege requires a specific designation and description of the
documents within its scope as well as precise and certain reasons for preserving their confidentiality.
Without this specificity, it is impossible for a court to analyze the claim short of disclosure of the very
thing sought to be protected. As the affidavit now stands, the Court has little more than its sua sponte
speculation with which to weigh the applicability of the claim. An improperly asserted claim of
privilege is no claim of privilege. Therefore, despite the fact that a claim was made by the proper
executive as Reynolds requires, the Court can not recognize the claim in the instant case because it
is legally insufficient to allow the Court to make a just and reasonable determination as to its
applicability. To recognize such a broad claim in which the Defendant has given no precise or
compelling reasons to shield these documents from outside scrutiny, would make a farce of the whole
procedure.
101
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Due respect for a co-equal branch of government, moreover, demands no less than a claim of
privilege clearly stating the grounds therefor. Apropos is the following ruling in McPhaul v. U.S:
102

We think the Courts decision in United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 70 S. Ct. 724, is highly
relevant to these questions. For it is as true here as it was there, that if (petitioner) had legitimate
reasons for failing to produce the records of the association, a decent respect for the House of
Representatives, by whose authority the subpoenas issued, would have required that (he) state (his)
reasons for noncompliance upon the return of the writ. Such a statement would have given the
Subcommittee an opportunity to avoid the blocking of its inquiry by taking other appropriate steps to
obtain the records. To deny the Committee the opportunity to consider the objection or remedy is in
itself a contempt of its authority and an obstruction of its processes. His failure to make any such
statement was "a patent evasion of the duty of one summoned to produce papers before a
congressional committee[, and] cannot be condoned." (Emphasis and underscoring supplied;
citations omitted)
Upon the other hand, Congress must not require the executive to state the reasons for the claim with
such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege is meant to
protect.
103
A useful analogy in determining the requisite degree of particularity would be the privilege
against self-incrimination. Thus, Hoffman v. U.S.
104
declares:
The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he declares that in so doing he would
incriminate himself his say-so does not of itself establish the hazard of incrimination. It is for the
court to say whether his silence is justified, and to require him to answer if it clearly appears to the
court that he is mistaken. However, if the witness, upon interposing his claim, were required to prove
the hazard in the sense in which a claim is usually required to be established in court, he would be
compelled to surrender the very protection which the privilege is designed to guarantee. To sustain
the privilege, it need only be evident from the implications of the question, in the setting in which it is
asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why it cannot be answered
might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result." x x x (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
The claim of privilege under Section 3 of E.O. 464 in relation to Section 2(b) is thus invalid per se. It is
not asserted. It is merely implied. Instead of providing precise and certain reasons for the claim, it
merely invokes E.O. 464, coupled with an announcement that the President has not given her
consent. It is woefully insufficient for Congress to determine whether the withholding of information is
justified under the circumstances of each case. It severely frustrates the power of inquiry of
Congress.
In fine, Section 3 and Section 2(b) of E.O. 464 must be invalidated.
No infirmity, however, can be imputed to Section 2(a) as it merely provides guidelines, binding only
on the heads of office mentioned in Section 2(b), on what is covered by executive privilege. It does
not purport to be conclusive on the other branches of government. It may thus be construed as a
mere expression of opinion by the President regarding the nature and scope of executive privilege.
Petitioners, however, assert as another ground for invalidating the challenged order the alleged
unlawful delegation of authority to the heads of offices in Section 2(b). Petitioner Senate of the
Philippines, in particular, cites the case of the United States where, so it claims, only the President
can assert executive privilege to withhold information from Congress.
Section 2(b) in relation to Section 3 virtually provides that, once the head of office determines that a
certain information is privileged, such determination is presumed to bear the Presidents authority and
has the effect of prohibiting the official from appearing before Congress, subject only to the express
pronouncement of the President that it is allowing the appearance of such official. These provisions
thus allow the President to authorize claims of privilege by mere silence.
Such presumptive authorization, however, is contrary to the exceptional nature of the privilege.
Executive privilege, as already discussed, is recognized with respect to information the confidential
nature of which is crucial to the fulfillment of the unique role and responsibilities of the executive
branch,
105
or in those instances where exemption from disclosure is necessary to the discharge of
highly important executive responsibilities.
106
The doctrine of executive privilege is thus premised on
the fact that certain informations must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the
public interest. The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose
information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the
public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
In light of this highly exceptional nature of the privilege, the Court finds it essential to limit to the
President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course authorize the Executive Secretary to
invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority
is "By order of the President," which means that he personally consulted with her. The privilege being
an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the executive hierarchy. In
other words, the President may not authorize her subordinates to exercise such power. There is even
less reason to uphold such authorization in the instant case where the authorization is not explicit but
by mere silence. Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), is further invalid on this score.
It follows, therefore, that when an official is being summoned by Congress on a matter which, in his
own judgment, might be covered by executive privilege, he must be afforded reasonable time to
inform the President or the Executive Secretary of the possible need for invoking the privilege. This is
necessary in order to provide the President or the Executive Secretary with fair opportunity to
consider whether the matter indeed calls for a claim of executive privilege. If, after the lapse of that
reasonable time, neither the President nor the Executive Secretary invokes the privilege, Congress is
no longer bound to respect the failure of the official to appear before Congress and may then opt to
avail of the necessary legal means to compel his appearance.
The Court notes that one of the expressed purposes for requiring officials to secure the consent of the
President under Section 3 of E.O. 464 is to ensure "respect for the rights of public officials appearing
in inquiries in aid of legislation." That such rights must indeed be respected by Congress is an echo
from Article VI Section 21 of the Constitution mandating that "[t]he rights of persons appearing in or
affected by such inquiries shall be respected."
In light of the above discussion of Section 3, it is clear that it is essentially an authorization for implied
claims of executive privilege, for which reason it must be invalidated. That such authorization is partly
motivated by the need to ensure respect for such officials does not change the infirm nature of the
authorization itself.
Right to Information
E.O 464 is concerned only with the demands of Congress for the appearance of executive officials in
the hearings conducted by it, and not with the demands of citizens for information pursuant to their
right to information on matters of public concern. Petitioners are not amiss in claiming, however, that
what is involved in the present controversy is not merely the legislative power of inquiry, but the right
of the people to information.
There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which
underlies the power of inquiry and the right of the people to information on matters of public concern.
For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right to information
does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by Congress. Neither
does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from government officials.
These powers belong only to Congress and not to an individual citizen.
Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not follow,
except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the people are
exercising their right to information.
To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any
executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations
necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is
presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information
which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress opinions
which they can then communicate to their representatives and other government officials through the
various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression. Thus holds Valmonte v. Belmonte:
It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end
that the government may perceive and be responsive to the peoples will. Yet, this open dialogue can
be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will
intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to
information relating thereto can such bear fruit.
107
(Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The impairment of the right of the people to information as a consequence of E.O. 464 is, therefore, in
the sense explained above, just as direct as its violation of the legislatures power of inquiry.
Implementation of E.O. 464 prior to its publication
While E.O. 464 applies only to officials of the executive branch, it does not follow that the same is
exempt from the need for publication. On the need for publishing even those statutes that do not
directly apply to people in general, Taada v. Tuvera states:
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President
Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not
affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of
such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the
political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in courts of justice.
108
(Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
Although the above statement was made in reference to statutes, logic dictates that the challenged
order must be covered by the publication requirement. As explained above, E.O. 464 has a direct
effect on the right of the people to information on matters of public concern. It is, therefore, a matter of
public interest which members of the body politic may question before this Court. Due process thus
requires that the people should have been apprised of this issuance before it was implemented.
Conclusion
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is sought in
aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground that it is privileged,
it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional
requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its reasons
therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated. That is impermissible. For
[w]hat republican theory did accomplishwas to reverse the old presumption in favor of secrecy,
based on the divine right of kings and nobles, and replace it with a presumption in favor of publicity,
based on the doctrine of popular sovereignty. (Underscoring supplied)
109

Resort to any means then by which officials of the executive branch could refuse to divulge
information cannot be presumed valid. Otherwise, we shall not have merely nullified the power of our
legislature to inquire into the operations of government, but we shall have given up something of
much greater value our right as a people to take part in government.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTLY GRANTED. Sections 2(b) and 3 of Executive Order No.
464 (series of 2005), "Ensuring Observance of the Principle of Separation of Powers, Adherence to
the Rule on Executive
Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of
Legislation Under the Constitution, and For Other Purposes," are declared VOID. Sections 1 and 2(a)
are, however, VALID.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:


EN BANC

ROMULO L. NERI,
Petitioner,


- versus -


SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY
OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND
INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON
TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE
COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND
SECURITY,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 180643

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
REYES,
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and
BRION, JJ.

Promulgated:

March 25, 2008
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

At bar is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the show
cause Letter
[1]
dated November 22, 2007 and contempt Order
[2]
datedJanuary 30, 2008 concurrently issued
by respondent
Senate Committees on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,
[3]
Trade
and Commerce,
[4]
and National Defense and Security
[5]
against petitioner Romulo L.
Neri, former Director General of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA).

The facts, as culled from the pleadings, are as follows:

On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) entered into a
contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of equipment and services for
the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S. $ 329,481,290 (approximately P16
Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the Peoples Republic of China.

In connection with this NBN Project, various Resolutions were introduced in the Senate, as follows:

(1) P.S. Res. No. 127, introduced by Senator Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., entitled
RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE BLUE RIBBON COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE
ON TRADE AND INDUSTRY TO INVESTIGATE, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, THE
CIRCUMSTANCES LEADING TO THE APPROVAL OF THE BROADBAND CONTRACT
WITH ZTE AND THE ROLE PLAYED BY THE OFFICIALS CONCERNED IN GETTING IT
CONSUMMATED AND TO MAKE RECOMMENDATIONS TO HALE TO THE COURTS
OF LAW THE PERSONS RESPONSIBLE FOR ANY ANOMALY IN CONNECTION
THEREWITH AND TO PLUG THE LOOPHOLES, IF ANY IN THE BOT LAW AND
OTHER PERTINENT LEGISLATIONS.

(2) P.S. Res. No. 144, introduced by Senator Mar Roxas, entitled RESOLUTION
URGING PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL ARROYO TO DIRECT THE
CANCELLATION OF THE ZTE CONTRACT

(3) P.S. Res. No. 129, introduced by Senator Panfilo M. Lacson, entitled RESOLUTION
DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY TO
CONDUCT AN INQUIRY IN AID OF LEGISLATION INTO THE NATIONAL SECURITY
IMPLICATIONS OF AWARDING THE NATIONAL BROADBAND NETWORK
CONTRACT TO THE CHINESE FIRM ZHONG XING TELECOMMUNICATIONS
EQUIPMENT COMPANY LIMITED (ZTE CORPORATION) WITH THE END IN VIEW OF
PROVIDING REMEDIAL LEGISLATION THAT WILL PROTECT OUR NATIONAL
SOVEREIGNTY, SECURITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY.

(4) P.S. Res. No. 136, introduced by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, entitled
RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE PROPER SENATE COMMITTEE TO CONDUCT AN
INQUIRY, IN AID OF LEGISLATION, ON THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
JUSTIFICATION OF THE NATIONAL BROADBAND NETWORK (NBN) PROJECT OF
THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT.

At the same time, the investigation was claimed to be relevant to the consideration of three (3) pending
bills in the Senate, to wit:

1. Senate Bill No. 1793, introduced by Senator Mar Roxas, entitled AN ACT SUBJECTING
TREATIES, INTERNATIONAL OR EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS INVOLVING
FUNDING IN THE PROCUREMENT OF INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS, GOODS,
AND CONSULTING SERVICES TO BE INCLUDED IN THE SCOPE AND
APPLICATION OF PHILIPPINE PROCUREMENT LAWS, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9184, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE GOVERNMENT
PROCUREMENT REFORM ACT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES;

2. Senate Bill No. 1794, introduced by Senator Mar Roxas, entitled AN ACT IMPOSING
SAFEGUARDS IN CONTRACTING LOANS CLASSIFIED AS OFFICIAL
DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 8182, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8555, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS
THE OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE ACT OF 1996, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES; and

3. Senate Bill No. 1317, introduced by Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, entitled AN ACT
MANDATING CONCURRENCE TO INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND
EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS.


Respondent Committees initiated the investigation by sending invitations to certain personalities and
cabinet officials involved in the NBN Project. Petitioner was among those invited. He was summoned to
appear and testify on September 18, 20, and 26 and October 25, 2007. However, he attended only the
September 26 hearing, claiming he was out of town during the other dates.

In the September 18, 2007 hearing, businessman Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive
officials and power brokers were using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the
NEDA. It appeared that the Project was initially approved as a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) project but,
on March 29, 2007, the NEDA acquiesced to convert it into a government-to-government project, to be
financed through a loan from the Chinese Government.

On September 26, 2007, petitioner testified before respondent Committees for eleven (11) hours. He
disclosed that then Commission on Elections (COMELEC) Chairman Benjamin Abalos offered
him P200 Million in exchange for his approval of the NBN Project. He further narrated that he
informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she instructed him not to accept the
bribe. However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused to
answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on (a) whether or not
President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
[6]
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize
it,
[7]
and (c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
[8]


Unrelenting, respondent Committees issued a Subpoena Ad Testificandum to petitioner, requiring him to
appear and testify on November 20, 2007.

However, in the Letter dated November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita requested
respondent Committees to dispense with petitioners testimony on the ground of executive privilege. The
pertinent portion of the letter reads:

With reference to the subpoena ad testificandum issued to Secretary Romulo Neri to
appear and testify again on 20 November 2007 before the Joint Committees you chair, it will be
recalled that Sec. Neri had already testified and exhaustively discussed the ZTE / NBN project,
including his conversation with the President thereon last 26 September 2007.

Asked to elaborate further on his conversation with the President, Sec. Neri asked for
time to consult with his superiors in line with the ruling of the Supreme Court in Senate v.
Ermita, 488 SCRA 1 (2006).

Specifically, Sec. Neri sought guidance on the possible invocation of executive privilege
on the following questions, to wit:

a) Whether the President followed up the (NBN) project?
b) Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE?
c) Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the project after being
told about the alleged bribe?

Following the ruling in Senate v. Ermita, the foregoing questions fall under conversations
and correspondence between the President and public officials which are considered executive
privilege (Almonte v. Vasquez, G.R. 95637, 23 May 1995; Chavez v. PEA, G.R. 133250, July 9,
2002). Maintaining the confidentiality of conversations of the President is necessary in the
exercise of her executive and policy decision making process. The expectation of a President to
the confidentiality of her conversations and correspondences, like the value which we accord
deference for the privacy of all citizens, is the necessity for protection of the public interest in
candid, objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions in Presidential decision-making. Disclosure
of conversations of the President will have a chilling effect on the President, and will hamper her
in the effective discharge of her duties and responsibilities, if she is not protected by the
confidentiality of her conversations.

The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought
to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples
Republic of China. Given the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to
the President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations,
without disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.

In light of the above considerations, this Office is constrained to invoke the settled
doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri
accordingly.

Considering that Sec. Neri has been lengthily interrogated on the subject in an
unprecedented 11-hour hearing, wherein he has answered all questions propounded to him
except the foregoing questions involving executive privilege, we therefore request that his
testimony on 20 November 2007 on the ZTE / NBN project be dispensed with.


On November 20, 2007, petitioner did not appear before respondent Committees. Thus, on November 22,
2007, the latter issued the show cause Letter requiring him to explain why he should not be cited in contempt.
The Letter reads:

Since you have failed to appear in the said hearing, the Committees on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon), Trade and Commerce and National Defense and
Security require you to show cause why you should not be cited in contempt under Section 6,
Article 6 of the Rules of the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations
(Blue Ribbon).

The Senate expects your explanation on or before 2 December 2007.

On November 29, 2007, petitioner replied to respondent Committees, manifesting that it was not his
intention to ignore the Senate hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were those he claimed to
be covered by executive privilege, thus:

It was not my intention to snub the last Senate hearing. In fact, I have cooperated with
the task of the Senate in its inquiry in aid of legislation as shown by my almost 11 hours stay
during the hearing on 26 September 2007. During said hearing, I answered all the questions that
were asked of me, save for those which I thought was covered by executive privilege, and which
was confirmed by the Executive Secretary in his Letter 15 November 2007. In good faith, after
that exhaustive testimony, I thought that what remained were only the three questions, where the
Executive Secretary claimed executive privilege. Hence, his request that my presence be
dispensed with.

Be that as it may, should there be new matters that were not yet taken up during the 26
September 2007 hearing, may I be furnished in advance as to what else I need to clarify, so that
as a resource person, I may adequately prepare myself.


In addition, petitioner submitted a letter prepared by his counsel, Atty. Antonio R. Bautista, stating,
among others that: (1) his (petitioner) non-appearance was upon the order of the President; and (2) his
conversation with President Arroyo dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic matters
relating to the impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials and the possible loss of
confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines. The letter ended with a reiteration of petitioners
request that he be furnished in advance as to what else he needs to clarify so that he may adequately prepare
for the hearing.

In the interim, on December 7, 2007, petitioner filed with this Court the present petition
for certiorari assailing the show cause Letter dated November 22, 2007.

Respondent Committees found petitioners explanations unsatisfactory. Without responding to his
request for advance notice of the matters that he should still clarify, they issued the Order dated January 30,
2008, citing him in contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of
the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. The said Order
states:

ORDER

For failure to appear and testify in the Committees hearing on Tuesday, September 18,
2007; Thursday, September 20, 2007; Thursday, October 25, 2007; and Tuesday, November 20,
2007, despite personal notice and Subpoenas Ad Testificandum sent to and received by him,
which thereby delays, impedes and obstructs, as it has in fact delayed, impeded and obstructed
the inquiry into the subject reported irregularities, AND for failure to explain satisfactorily why
he should not be cited for contempt (Neri letter of 29 November 2007), herein
attached) ROMULO L. NERI is hereby cited in contempt of this (sic) Committees and
ordered arrested and detained in the Office of the Senate Sergeant-At-Arms until such time
that he will appear and give his testimony.

The Sergeant-At-Arms is hereby directed to carry out and implement this Order and
make a return hereof within twenty four (24) hours from its enforcement.

SO ORDERED.


On the same date, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the above Order.
[9]
He insisted that he has
not shown any contemptible conduct worthy of contempt and arrest. He emphasized his willingness to testify
on new matters, however, respondent Committees did not respond to his request for advance notice of
questions. He also mentioned the petition for certiorari he filed on December 7, 2007. According to him, this
should restrain respondent Committees from enforcing the show cause Letter through the issuance of
declaration of contempt and arrest.

In view of respondent Committees issuance of the contempt Order, petitioner filed on February 1,
2008 a Supplemental Petition for Certiorari (With Urgent Application for TRO/Preliminary
Injunction), seeking to restrain the implementation of the said contempt Order.

On February 5, 2008, the Court issued a Status Quo Ante Order (a) enjoining respondent Committees
from implementing their contempt Order, (b) requiring the parties to observe the status quo prevailing
prior to the issuance of the assailed order, and (c) requiring respondent Committees to file their comment.

Petitioner contends that respondent Committees show cause Letter and
contempt Order were issued with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. He stresses that his conversations with President Arroyo are
candid discussions meant to explore options in making policy decisions. According to him, these
discussions dwelt on the impact of the bribery scandal involving high government officials on the
countrys diplomatic relations and economic and military affairs and the possible loss of confidence of
foreign investors and lenders in the Philippines. He also emphasizes that his claim of executive privilege is
upon the order of the President and within the parameters laid down in Senate v. Ermita
[10]
and United States v.
Reynolds.
[11]
Lastly, he argues that he is precluded from disclosing communications made
to him in official confidence under Section 7
[12]
of Republic Act No. 6713,
otherwise known as Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, and Section
24
[13]
(e) of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.

Respondent Committees assert the contrary. They argue that (1) petitioners testimony is
material and pertinent in the investigation conducted in aid of legislation;(2) there is no valid justification for
petitioner to claim executive privilege; (3) there is no abuse of their authority to order petitioners arrest;
and (4) petitioner has not come to court with clean hands.

In the oral argument held last March 4, 2008, the following issues were ventilated:

1. What communications between the President and petitioner Neri are covered by the
principle of executive privilege?

1.a Did Executive Secretary Ermita correctly invoke the principle of executive privilege, by
order of the President, to cover (i) conversations of the President in the
exercise of her executive and policy decision-making and (ii) information, which might
impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China?

1.b. Did petitioner Neri correctly invoke executive privilege to avoid testifying on his
conversations with the President on the NBN contract on his assertions that the said
conversations dealt with delicate and sensitive national security and diplomatic
matters relating to the impact of bribery scandal involving high government
officials and the possible loss of confidence of foreign investors and lenders in the
Philippines x x x within the principles laid down in Senate v. Ermita (488 SCRA 1
[2006])?

1.c Will the claim of executive privilege in this case violate the following provisions of the
Constitution:

Sec. 28, Art. II (Full public disclosure of all transactions involving public interest)

Sec. 7, Art. III (The right of the people to information on matters of public concern)

Sec. 1, Art. XI (Public office is a public trust)

Sec. 17, Art. VII (The President shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed)

and the due process clause and the principle of separation of powers?

2. What is the proper procedure to be followed in invoking executive privilege?

3. Did the Senate Committees gravely abuse their discretion in ordering the arrest of
petitioner for non-compliance with the subpoena?


After the oral argument, the parties were directed to manifest to the Court within twenty-four (24) hours
if they are amenable to the Courts proposal of allowing petitioner to immediately resume his testimony before
the Senate Committees to answer the other questions of the Senators without prejudice to the decision on the
merits of this pending petition. It was understood that petitioner may invoke executive privilege in the course
of the Senate Committees proceedings, and if the respondent Committees disagree thereto, the unanswered
questions will be the subject of a supplemental pleading to be resolved along with the three (3) questions
subject of the present petition.
[14]
At the same time, respondent Committees were directed to submit several
pertinent documents.
[15]


The Senate did not agree with the proposal for the reasons stated in the Manifestation dated March 5,
2008. As to the required documents, the Senate and respondent Committees manifested that they would not be
able to submit the latters Minutes of all meetings and the Minute Book because it has never been the
historical and traditional legislative practice to keep them.
[16]
They instead submitted the Transcript of
Stenographic Notes of respondent Committees joint public hearings.

On March 17, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene and
to Admit Attached Memorandum, founded on the following arguments:

(1) The communications between petitioner and the President are covered by the principle of
executive privilege.

(2) Petitioner was not summoned by respondent Senate Committees in accordance with the
law-making bodys power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation as laid down in Section
21, Article VI of the Constitution and Senate v. Ermita.

(3) Respondent Senate Committees gravely abused its discretion for alleged non-compliance
with the Subpoena dated November 13, 2007.

The Court granted the OSGs motion the next day, March 18, 2008.

As the foregoing facts unfold, related events transpired.

On March 6, 2008, President Arroyo issued Memorandum Circular No. 151, revoking Executive Order
No. 464 and Memorandum Circular No. 108. She advised executive officials and employees to follow and
abide by the Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v.
Ermita
[17]
when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.

At the core of this controversy are the two (2) crucial queries, to wit:

First, are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?

And second, did respondent Committees commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the
contempt Order?

We grant the petition.

At the outset, a glimpse at the landmark case of Senate v. Ermita
[18]
becomes imperative. Senate draws
in bold strokes the distinction between the legislative andoversight powers of the Congress, as embodied under
Sections 21 and 22, respectively, of Article VI of the Constitution, to wit:

SECTION 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of
its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.

SECTION 22. The heads of department may upon their own initiative, with the consent
of the President, or upon the request of either House, or as the rules of each House shall provide,
appear before and be heard by such House on any matter pertaining to their departments. Written
questions shall be submitted to the President of the Senate or the Speaker of the House of
Representatives at least three days before their scheduled appearance. Interpellations shall not be
limited to written questions, but may cover matters related thereto. When the security of the state
or the public interest so requires and the President so states in writing, the appearance shall be
conducted in executive session.

Senate cautions that while the above provisions are closely related and complementary to each other,
they should not be considered as pertaining to the same power of Congress. Section 21 relates to the power to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. Its aim is to elicit information that may be used for legislation. On the
other hand, Section 22 pertains to the power to conduct a question hour, the objective of which is to obtain
information in pursuit of Congress oversight function.
[19]
Simply stated, while both powers allow Congress or
any of its committees to conduct inquiry, their objectives are different.

This distinction gives birth to another distinction with regard to the use of compulsory process. Unlike in
Section 21, Congress cannot compel the appearance of executive officials under Section 22. The Courts
pronouncement in Senate v. Ermita
[20]
is clear:

When Congress merely seeks to be informed on how department heads are implementing
the statutes which it has issued, its right to such information is not as imperative as that of the
President to whom, as Chief Executive, such department heads must give a report of their
performance as a matter of duty. In such instances, Section 22, in keeping with the separation of
powers, states that Congress may only request their appearance. Nonetheless, when the inquiry
in which Congress requires their appearance is in aid of legislation under Section 21, the
appearance is mandatory for the same reasons stated in Arnault.

In fine, the oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process
only to the extent that it is performed in pursuit of legislation. This is consistent with the
intent discerned from the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission

Ultimately, the power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials under
section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis in the principle of separation of
powers. While the executive branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the
power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its demands for information. (Emphasis
supplied.)


The availability of the power of judicial review to resolve the issues raised in this case has also been
settled in Senate v. Ermita, when it held:

As evidenced by the American experience during the so-called McCarthy era, however,
the right of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is, in theory, no less susceptible to
abuse than executive or judicial power. It may thus be subjected to judicial review pursuant to the
Courts certiorari powers under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution.


Hence, this decision.

I
The Communications Elicited by the Three (3) Questions are Covered by
Executive Privilege


We start with the basic premises where the parties have conceded.

The power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is broad. This is based on the
proposition that a legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting
the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change.
[21]
Inevitably, adjunct thereto is the
compulsory process to enforce it. But, the power, broad as it is, has limitations. To be valid, it is imperative that
it is done in accordance with the Senate or House duly published rules of procedure and that the rights of the
persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries be respected.

The power extends even to executive officials and the only way for them to be exempted is through a
valid claim of executive privilege.
[22]
This directs us to the consideration of the question -- is there a
recognized claim of executive privilege despite the revocation of E.O. 464?

A- There is a Recognized Claim
of Executive Privilege Despite the
Revocation of E.O. 464

At this juncture, it must be stressed that the revocation of E.O. 464 does not in any way diminish our
concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional underpinnings. Unlike
the United States which has further accorded the concept with statutory status by enacting the Freedom of
Information Act
[23]
and theFederal Advisory Committee Act,
[24]
the Philippines has retained its constitutional
origination, occasionally interpreted only by this Court in various cases. The most recent of these is the case
of Senate v. Ermita where this Court declared unconstitutional substantial portions of E.O. 464. In this regard,
it is worthy to note that Executive Ermitas Letter dated November 15, 2007 limits its bases for the claim of
executive privilege to Senate v. Ermita, Almonte v. Vasquez,
[25]
and Chavez v. PEA.
[26]
There was never a
mention of E.O. 464.

While these cases, especially Senate v. Ermita,
[27]
have comprehensively discussed the concept of
executive privilege, we deem it imperative to explore it once more in view of the clamor for this Court to
clearly define the communications covered by executive privilege.

The Nixon and post-Watergate cases established the broad contours of the presidential
communications privilege.
[28]
In United States v. Nixon,
[29]
the U.S. Courtrecognized a great public interest
in preserving the confidentiality of conversations that take place in the Presidents performance of his
official duties. It thus considered presidential communications as presumptively privileged. Apparently,
the presumption is founded on the Presidents generalized interest in confidentiality. The privilege is said
to be necessary to guarantee the candor of presidential advisors and to provide the President and those
who assist him with freedom to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making
decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately.

In In Re: Sealed Case,
[30]
the U.S. Court of Appeals delved deeper. It ruled that there are two (2) kinds
of executive privilege; one is the presidential communications privilege and, the other is the deliberative
process privilege. The former pertains to communications, documents or other materials that reflect
presidential decision-making and deliberations and that the President believes should remain
confidential. The latter includes advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising
part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.

Accordingly, they are characterized by marked distinctions. Presidential communications
privilege applies to decision-making of the President while, the deliberative process privilege, to decision-
making of executive officials. The first is rooted in the constitutional principle of separation of power and
the Presidents unique constitutional
role; the second on common law privilege. Unlike the deliberative process
privilege, the presidential communications privilege applies to documents in their entirety, and covers
final and post-decisional materials as well as pre-deliberative ones
[31]
As a consequence, congressional or
judicial negation of the presidential communications privilege is always subject to greater scrutiny than denial
of the deliberative process privilege.

Turning on who are the officials covered by the presidential communications privilege, In Re: Sealed
Case confines the privilege only to White House Staff that has operational proximity to direct presidential
decision-making. Thus, the privilege is meant to encompass only those functions that form the core of
presidential authority, involving what the court characterized as quintessential and non-delegable Presidential
power, such as commander-in-chief power, appointment and removal power, the power to grant pardons and
reprieves, the sole-authority to receive ambassadors and other public officers, the power to negotiate treaties,
etc.
[32]


The situation in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of Justice
[33]
tested the In Re: Sealed Case principles.
There, while the presidential decision involved is the exercise of the Presidents pardon power, a non-delegable,
core-presidential function, the Deputy Attorney General and the Pardon Attorney were deemed to be too remote
from the President and his senior White House advisors to be protected. The Court conceded that

functionally those officials were performing a task directly related to the Presidents pardon power, but
concluded that an organizational test was more appropriate for confining the potentially broad sweep that would
result from the In Re: Sealed Cases functional test. The majority concluded that, the lesser protections of the
deliberative process privilege would suffice. That privilege was, however, found insufficient to justify the
confidentiality of the 4,341 withheld documents.

But more specific classifications of communications covered by executive privilege are made in older
cases. Courts ruled early that the Executive has a right to withhold documents that might reveal military or
state secrets,
[34]
identity of government informers in some circumstances,
,[35]
and information related to
pending investigations.
[36]
An area where the privilege is highly revered is in foreign relations. In United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.
[37]
the U.S. Court, citing President George Washington, pronounced:

The nature of foreign negotiations requires caution, and their success must often depend
on secrecy, and even when brought to a conclusion, a full disclosure of all the measures,
demands, or eventual concessions which may have been proposed or contemplated would be
extremely impolitic, for this might have a pernicious influence on future negotiations or produce
immediate inconveniences, perhaps danger and mischief, in relation to other powers. The
necessity of such caution and secrecy was one cogent reason for vesting the power of making
treaties in the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate, the principle on which the
body was formed confining it to a small number of members. To admit, then, a right in the
House of Representatives to demand and to have as a matter of course all the papers respecting a
negotiation with a foreign power would be to establish a dangerous precedent.


Majority of the above jurisprudence have found their way in our jurisdiction. In Chavez v.
PCGG
[38]
, this Court held that there is a governmental privilege against public disclosure with respect to state
secrets regarding military, diplomatic and other security matters. In Chavez v. PEA,
[39]
there is also a
recognition of the confidentiality of Presidential conversations, correspondences, and discussions in closed-door
Cabinet meetings. In Senate v. Ermita, the concept of presidential communications privilege is fully
discussed.

As may be gleaned from the above discussion, the claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in
cases where the subject of inquiry relates to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President,
such as the area of military and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the
commander-in-chief,
[40]
appointing,
[41]
pardoning,
[42]
and diplomatic
[43]
powers. Consistent with the doctrine of
separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality than others.

The above cases, especially, Nixon, In Re Sealed Case and Judicial Watch, somehow provide the
elements of presidential communications privilege, to wit:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power.

2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in
operational proximity with the President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be
overcome by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely
contains important evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an
appropriate investigating authority.
[44]


In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the ground
that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall under conversation and correspondence
between the President and public officials necessary in her executive and policy decision-making
process and, that the information sought to be disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic
relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Simply put, the bases are presidential communications
privilege and executive privilege on matters relating to diplomacy or foreign relations.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the three (3)
questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the communications relate to a
quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive agreement
with other countries. This authority of the President to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence
of the Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence.
[45]
Second, the
communications are received by a close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test,
petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is
no adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

The third element deserves a lengthy discussion.

United States v. Nixon held that a claim of executive privilege is subject to balancing against other
interest. In other words, confidentiality in executive privilege is not absolutely protected by the Constitution.
The U.S. Court held:

[N]either the doctrine of separation of powers, nor the need for confidentiality of high-level
communications, without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege of
immunity from judicial process under all circumstances.

The foregoing is consistent with the earlier case of Nixon v. Sirica,
[46]
where it was held that presidential
communications are presumptively privileged and that the presumption can be overcome only by mere
showing of public need by the branch seeking access to conversations. The courts are enjoined to resolve the
competing interests of the political branches of the government in the manner that preserves the essential
functions of each Branch.
[47]
Here, the record is bereft of any categorical explanation from respondent
Committees to show a compelling or citical need for the answers to the three (3) questions in the enactment
of a law. Instead, the questions veer more towards the exercise of the legislative oversight function under
Section 22 of Article VI rather than Section 21 of the same Article. Senate v. Ermita ruled that the the
oversight function of Congress may be facilitated by compulsory process only to the extent that it is
performed in pursuit of legislation. It is conceded that it is difficult to draw the line between an inquiry in
aid of legislation and an inquiry in the exercise of oversight function of Congress. In this regard, much will
depend on the content of the questions and the manner the inquiry is conducted.

Respondent Committees argue that a claim of executive privilege does not guard against a possible
disclosure of a crime or wrongdoing. We see no dispute on this. It is settled in United States v.
Nixon
[48]
that demonstrated, specific need for evidence in pending criminal trial outweighs the Presidents
generalized interest in confidentiality. However, the present cases distinction with the Nixon case is very
evident. In Nixon, there is a pending criminal proceeding where the information is requested and it is the
demands of due process of law and the fair administration of criminal justice that the information be
disclosed. This is the reason why the U.S. Court was quick to limit the scope of its decision. It stressed
that it is not concerned here with the balance between the Presidents generalized interest in
confidentiality x x x and congressional demands for information. Unlike in Nixon, the information here
is elicited, not in a criminal proceeding, but in a legislative inquiry. In this regard, Senate v. Ermita stressed
that the validity of the claim of executive privilege depends not only on the ground invoked but, also, on
the procedural setting or the context in which the claim is made. Furthermore, in Nixon, the President did not
interpose any claim of need to protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets. In the present
case, Executive Secretary Ermita categorically claims executive privilege on the grounds of presidential
communications privilege in relation to her executive and policy decision-making process and diplomatic
secrets.

The respondent Committees should cautiously tread into the investigation of matters which may present
a conflict of interest that may provide a ground to inhibit the Senators participating in the inquiry if later on an
impeachment proceeding is initiated on the same subject matter of the present Senate inquiry. Pertinently,
in Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon,
[49]
it was held that since an
impeachment proceeding had been initiated by a House Committee, the Senate Select Committees immediate
oversight need for five presidential tapes should give way to the House Judiciary Committee which has the
constitutional authority to inquire into presidential impeachment. The Court expounded on this issue in this
wise:

It is true, of course, that the Executive cannot, any more than the other branches of
government, invoke a general confidentiality privilege to shield its officials and employees from
investigations by the proper governmental institutions into possible criminal wrongdoing. The
Congress learned this as to its own privileges in Gravel v. United States, as did the judicial
branch, in a sense, in Clark v. United States, and the executive branch itself in Nixon v.
Sirica. But under Nixon v. Sirica, the showing required to overcome the presumption
favoring confidentiality turned, not on the nature of the presidential conduct that the
subpoenaed material might reveal, but, instead, on the nature and appropriateness of the
function in the performance of which the material was sought, and the degree to which the
material was necessary to its fulfillment. Here also our task requires and our decision
implies no judgment whatever concerning possible presidential involvement in culpable
activity. On the contrary, we think the sufficiency of the Committee's showing must depend
solely on whether the subpoenaed evidence is demonstrably critical to the responsible
fulfillment of the Committee's functions.
In its initial briefs here, the Committee argued that it has shown exactly this. It contended
that resolution, on the basis of the subpoenaed tapes, of the conflicts in the testimony before it
would aid in a determination whether legislative involvement in political campaigns is
necessary and could help engender the public support needed for basic reforms in our electoral
system. Moreover, Congress has, according to the Committee, power to oversee the operations
of the executive branch, to investigate instances of possible corruption and malfeasance in office,
and to expose the results of its investigations to public view. The Committee says that with
respect to Watergate-related matters, this power has been delegated to it by the Senate, and that
to exercise its power responsibly, it must have access to the subpoenaed tapes.
We turn first to the latter contention. In the circumstances of this case, we need neither
deny that the Congress may have, quite apart from its legislative responsibilities, a general
oversight power, nor explore what the lawful reach of that power might be under the
Committee's constituent resolution. Since passage of that resolution, the House Committee on
the Judiciary has begun an inquiry into presidential impeachment. The investigative authority of
the Judiciary Committee with respect to presidential conduct has an express constitutional
source. x x x We have been shown no evidence indicating that Congress itself attaches any
particular value to this interest. In these circumstances, we think the need for the tapes
premised solely on an asserted power to investigate and inform cannot justify enforcement
of the Committee's subpoena.
The sufficiency of the Committee's showing of need has come to depend, therefore,
entirely on whether the subpoenaed materials are critical to the performance of its legislative
functions. There is a clear difference between Congress' legislative tasks and the responsibility of
a grand jury, or any institution engaged in like functions. While fact-finding by a legislative
committee is undeniably a part of its task, legislative judgments normally depend more on
the predicted consequences of proposed legislative actions and their political acceptability,
than on precise reconstruction of past events; Congress frequently legislates on the basis of
conflicting information provided in its hearings. In contrast, the responsibility of the grand jury
turns entirely on its ability to determine whether there is probable cause to believe that certain
named individuals did or did not commit specific crimes. If, for example, as in Nixon v. Sirica,
one of those crimes is perjury concerning the content of certain conversations, the grand jury's
need for the most precise evidence, the exact text of oral statements recorded in their original
form, is undeniable. We see no comparable need in the legislative process, at least not in the
circumstances of this case. Indeed, whatever force there might once have been in the
Committee's argument that the subpoenaed materials are necessary to its legislative judgments
has been substantially undermined by subsequent events. (Emphasis supplied)


Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of executive privilege
violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on matters of public
concern.
[50]
We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not appear before them at all. But
petitioner made himself available to them during the September 26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven
(11) hours. Not only that, he expressly manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators,
with the exception only of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.

The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article III
provides:

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be
recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts,
transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by
law.


The provision itself expressly provides the limitation, i.e. as may be provided by law. Some of
these laws are Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6713,
[51]
Article 229
[52]
of
the Revised Penal Code, Section 3 (k)
[53]
of R.A. No. 3019,
and Section 24(e)
[54]
of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. These are in addition to
what our body of jurisprudence classifies as confidential
[55]
and what our Constitution considers as belonging to
the larger concept of executive privilege. Clearly, there is a recognized public interest in the confidentiality of
certain information. We find the information subject of this case belonging to such kind.

More than anything else, though, the right of Congress or any of its Committees to obtain information in
aid of legislation cannot be equated with the peoples right to public information. The former cannot claim that
every legislative inquiry is an exercise of the peoples right to information. The distinction between such rights
is laid down inSenate v. Ermita:

There are, it bears noting, clear distinctions between the right of Congress to information which
underlies the power of inquiry and the right of people to information on matters of public
concern. For one, the demand of a citizen for the production of documents pursuant to his right
to information does not have the same obligatory force as a subpoena duces tecum issued by
Congress. Neither does the right to information grant a citizen the power to exact testimony from
government officials. These powers belong only to Congress, not to an individual citizen.

Thus, while Congress is composed of representatives elected by the people, it does not
follow, except in a highly qualified sense, that in every exercise of its power of inquiry, the
people are exercising their right to information.


The members of respondent Committees should not invoke as justification in their exercise of power a
right properly belonging to the people in general. This is because when they discharge their power, they do so
as public officials and members of Congress. Be that as it may, the right to information must be balanced with
and should give way, in appropriate cases, to constitutional precepts particularly those pertaining to delicate
interplay of executive-legislative powers and privileges which is the subject of careful review by numerous
decided cases.

B- The Claim of Executive Privilege
is Properly Invoked

We now proceed to the issue -- whether the claim is properly invoked by the President. Jurisprudence
teaches that for the claim to be properly invoked, there must be a formal claim of privilege, lodged by the head
of the department which has control over the matter.
[56]
A formal and proper claim of executive privilege
requires a precise and certain reason for preserving their confidentiality.
[57]



The Letter dated November 17, 2007 of Executive Secretary Ermita satisfies the requirement. It serves as
the formal claim of privilege. There, he expressly states that this Office is constrained to invoke the settled
doctrine of executive privilege as refined in Senate v. Ermita, and has advised Secretary Neri
accordingly. Obviously, he is referring to the Office of the President. That is more than enough compliance.
In Senate v. Ermita, a less categorical letter was even adjudged to be sufficient.

With regard to the existence of precise and certain reason, we find the grounds relied upon by
Executive Secretary Ermita specific enough so as not to leave respondent Committees in the dark on how the
requested information could be classified as privileged. The case of Senate v. Ermita only requires that an
allegation be made whether the information demanded involves military or diplomatic secrets, closed-door
Cabinet meetings, etc. The particular ground must only be specified. The enumeration is not even intended to
be comprehensive.
[58]
The following statement of grounds satisfies the requirement:

The context in which executive privilege is being invoked is that the information sought to be
disclosed might impair our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic
of China. Given the confidential nature in which these information were conveyed to the
President, he cannot provide the Committee any further details of these conversations, without
disclosing the very thing the privilege is designed to protect.

At any rate, as held further in Senate v. Ermita,
[59]
the Congress must not require the executive to state
the reasons for the claim with such particularity as to compel disclosure of the information which the privilege
is meant to protect. This is a matter of respect to a coordinate and co-equal department.

II
Respondent Committees Committed Grave Abuse of Discretion in Issuing the
Contempt Order


Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent
to lack of jurisdiction, or, in other words where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by
reason of passion or personal hostility and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive
duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
[60]


It must be reiterated that when respondent Committees issued the show cause Letter dated November
22, 2007, petitioner replied immediately, manifesting that it was not his intention to ignore the Senate
hearing and that he thought the only remaining questions were the three (3) questions he claimed to be covered
by executive privilege. In addition thereto, he submitted Atty. Bautistas letter, stating that his non-appearance
was upon the order of the President and specifying the reasons why his conversations with President Arroyo are
covered by executive privilege. Both correspondences include an expression of his willingness to testify
again, provided he be furnished in advance copies of the questions. Without responding to his request for
advance list of questions, respondent Committees issued the Order dated January 30, 2008, citing him in
contempt of respondent Committees and ordering his arrest and detention at the Office of the Senate Sergeant-
At-Arms until such time that he would appear and give his testimony. Thereupon, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration, informing respondent Committees that he had filed the present petition for certiorari.

Respondent Committees committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the contempt Order in view of
five (5) reasons.

First, there being a legitimate claim of executive privilege, the issuance of the contempt Order suffers
from constitutional infirmity.

Second, respondent Committees did not comply with the requirement laid down in Senate v. Ermita that
the invitations should contain the possible needed statute which prompted the need for the inquiry, along
with the usual indication of the subject of inquiry and the questions relative to and in furtherance
thereof. Compliance with this requirement is imperative, both under Sections 21 and 22 of Article VI of the
Constitution. This must be so to ensure that the rights of both persons appearing in or affectedby such
inquiry are respected as mandated by said Section 21 and by virtue of the express language of Section
22. Unfortunately, despite petitioners repeated demands, respondent Committees did not send him an advance
list of questions.

Third, a reading of the transcript of respondent Committees January 30, 2008 proceeding reveals that
only a minority of the members of the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee was present during the
deliberation.
[61]
Section 18 of the Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provides that:

The Committee, by a vote of majority of all its members, may punish for contempt any
witness before it who disobeys any order of the Committee or refuses to be sworn or to testify or
to answer proper questions by the Committee or any of its members.


Clearly, the needed vote is a majority of all the members of the Committee. Apparently, members who
did not actually participate in the deliberation were made to sign the contempt Order. Thus, there is a cloud of
doubt as to the validity of the contempt Order dated January 30, 2008. We quote the pertinent portion of the
transcript, thus:

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO, A). For clarification. x x x The Chair
will call either a caucus or will ask the Committee on Rules if there is a problem. Meaning,
if we do not have the sufficient numbers. But if we have a sufficient number, we will just
hold a caucus to be able to implement that right away becauseAgain, our Rules provide
that any one held in contempt and ordered arrested, need the concurrence of a majority of
all members of the said committee and we have three committees conducting this.

So thank you very much to the members

SEN. PIMENTEL. Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO,A). May I recognize the Minority Leader
and give him the floor, Senator Pimentel.

SEN. PIMENTEL. Mr. Chairman, there is no problem, I think, with consulting the
other committees. But I am of the opinion that the Blue Ribbon Committee is the lead
committee, and therefore, it should have preference in enforcing its own decisions.
Meaning to say, it is not something that is subject to consultation with other committees. I
am not sure that is the right interpretation. I think that once we decide here, we enforce
what we decide, because otherwise, before we know it, our determination is watered down
by delay and, you know, the so-called consultation that inevitably will have to take
place if we follow the premise that has been explained.

So my suggestion, Mr. Chairman, is the Blue Ribbon Committee should not forget its
the lead committee here, and therefore, the will of the lead committee prevails over all the other,
you, know reservations that other committees might have who are only secondary or even
tertiary committees, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO, A.) Thank you very much to the Minority
Leader. And I agree with the wisdom of his statements. I was merely mentioning that under
Section 6 of the Rules of the Committee and under Section 6, The Committee by a vote of a
majority of all its members may punish for contempt any witness before it who disobeys any
order of the Committee.

So the Blue Ribbon Committee is more than willing to take that responsibility. But we
only have six members here today, I am the seventh as chair and so we have not met that
number. So I am merely stating that, sir, that when we will prepare the documentation, if a
majority of all members sign and I am following the Sabio v. Gordon rule wherein I do believe,
if I am not mistaken, Chairman Gordon prepared the documentation and then either in caucus or
in session asked the other members to sign. And once the signatures are obtained, solely for the
purpose that Secretary Neri or Mr. Lozada will not be able to legally question our subpoena as
being insufficient in accordance with law.

SEN. PIMENTEL. Mr. Chairman, the caution that the chair is suggesting is very
well-taken. But Id like to advert to the fact that the quorum of the committee is only two as far
as I remember. Any two-member senators attending a Senate committee hearing provide that
quorum, and therefore there is more than a quorum demanded by our Rules as far as we are
concerned now, and acting as Blue Ribbon Committee, as Senator Enrile pointed out. In any
event, the signatures that will follow by the additional members will only tend to strengthen the
determination of this Committee to put its foot forward put down on what is happening in this
country, Mr. Chairman, because it really looks terrible if the primary Committee of the Senate,
which is the Blue Ribbon Committee, cannot even sanction people who openly defy, you know,
the summons of this Committee. I know that the Chair is going through an agonizing moment
here. I know that. But nonetheless, I think we have to uphold, you know, the institution that
we are representing because the alternative will be a disaster for all of us, Mr. Chairman. So
having said that, Id like to reiterate my point.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. CAYETANO, A.) First of all, I agree 100 percent
with the intentions of the Minority Leader. But let me very respectfully disagree with the
legal requirements. Because, yes, we can have a hearing if we are only two but both under
Section 18 of the Rules of the Senate and under Section 6 of the Rules of the Blue Ribbon
Committee, there is a need for a majority of all members if it is a case of contempt and
arrest. So, I am simply trying to avoid the court rebuking the Committee, which will instead of
strengthening will weaken us. But I do agree, Mr. Minority Leader, that we should push for this
and show the executive branch that the well-decided the issue has been decided upon the Sabio
versus Gordon case. And its very clear that we are all allowed to call witnesses. And if they
refure or they disobey not only can we cite them in contempt and have them arrested. x x x
[62]



Fourth, we find merit in the argument of the OSG that respondent Committees likewise violated Section
21 of Article VI of the Constitution, requiring that the inquiry be in accordance with the duly published
rules of procedure. We quote the OSGs explanation:

The phrase duly published rules of procedure requires the Senate of every Congress to
publish its rules of procedure governing inquiries in aid of legislation because every Senate is
distinct from the one before it or after it. Since Senatorial elections are held every three (3) years
for one-half of the Senates membership, the composition of the Senate also changes by the end
of each term. Each Senate may thus enact a different set of rules as it may deem fit. Not having
published its Rules of Procedure, the subject hearings in aid of legislation conducted by the
14
th
Senate, are therefore, procedurally infirm.


And fifth, respondent Committees issuance of the contempt Order is arbitrary and precipitate. It must
be pointed out that respondent Committees did not first pass upon the claim of executive privilege and inform
petitioner of their ruling. Instead, they curtly dismissed his explanation as unsatisfactory and simultaneously
issued the Order citing him in contempt and ordering his immediate arrest and detention.

A fact worth highlighting is that petitioner is not an unwilling witness. He manifested several times his
readiness to testify before respondent Committees. He refused to answer the three (3) questions because he was
ordered by the President to claim executive privilege. It behooves respondent Committees to first rule on the
claim of executive privilege and inform petitioner of their finding thereon, instead of peremptorily dismissing
his explanation as unsatisfactory. Undoubtedly,
respondent Committees actions constitute grave abuse of discretion for
being arbitrary and for denying petitioner due process of law. The same
quality afflicted their conduct when they (a) disregarded petitioners motion for reconsideration alleging that
he had filed the present petition before this Court and (b) ignored petitioners repeated request for an advance
list of questions, if there be any aside from the three (3) questions as to which he claimed to be covered by
executive privilege.

Even the courts are repeatedly advised to exercise the power of contempt judiciously and sparingly with
utmost self-restraint with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction and preservation of the dignity of
the court, not for retaliation or vindication.
[63]
Respondent Committees should have exercised the same
restraint, after all petitioner is not even an ordinary witness. He holds a high position in a co-equal branch of
government.

In this regard, it is important to mention that many incidents of judicial review could have been avoided
if powers are discharged with circumspection and deference. Concomitant with the doctrine of separation of
powers is the mandate to observe respect to a co-equal branch of the government.

One last word.

The Court was accused of attempting to abandon its constitutional duty when it required the parties to
consider a proposal that would lead to a possible compromise. The accusation is far from the truth. The Court
did so, only to test a tool that other jurisdictions find to be effective in settling similar cases, to avoid a
piecemeal consideration of the questions for review and to avert a constitutional crisis between the executive
and legislative branches of government.

In United States v. American Tel. & Tel Co.,
[64]
the court refrained from deciding the case because of
its desire to avoid a resolution that might disturb the balance of power between the two branches and
inaccurately reflect their true needs. Instead, it remanded the record to the District Court for
further proceedings during which the parties are required to negotiate a settlement. In the subsequent case
of United States v. American Tel. &Tel Co.,
[65]
it was held that much of this spirit of compromise is reflected
in the generality of language found in the Constitution. It proceeded to state:

Under this view, the coordinate branches do not exist in an exclusively adversary relationship to
one another when a conflict in authority arises. Rather each branch should take cognizance of an
implicit constitutional mandate to seek optimal accommodation through a realistic evaluation of
the needs of the conflicting branches in the particular fact situation.


It thereafter concluded that: The Separation of Powers often impairs efficiency, in terms of
dispatch and the immediate functioning of government. It is the long-term staying power
of government that is enhanced by the mutual accommodation required by the separation of
powers.


In rendering this decision, the Court emphasizes once more that the basic principles of constitutional
law cannot be subordinated to the needs of a particular situation. As magistrates, our mandate is to rule
objectively and dispassionately, always mindful of Mr. Justice Holmes warning on the dangers inherent
in cases of this nature, thus:

some accident of immediate and overwhelming interestappeals to the feelings and
distorts the judgment. These immediate interests exercise a kind of hydraulic pressure which
makes what previously was clear seem doubtful, and before which even well settled principles of
law will bend.
[66]



In this present crusade to search for truth, we should turn to the
fundamental constitutional principles which underlie our tripartite system of government, where
the Legislature enacts the law, the Judiciary interprets it and the Executive
implements it. They are considered separate, co-equal, coordinate and supreme within their respective
spheres but, imbued with a system of checks and balances to prevent unwarranted exercise
of power. The Courts mandate is to preserve these constitutional principles at all times to keep the
political branches of government within constitutional bounds in the exercise of their respective powers and
prerogatives, even if it be in the search for truth. This is the only way we can preserve the stability of
our democratic institutions and uphold the Rule of Law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The subject Order dated January 30, 2008, citing
petitioner Romulo L. Neri in contempt of the Senate Committees and directing his arrest and detention, is
hereby nullified.

SO ORDERED.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995
ARTURO M. TOLENTINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
G.R. No. 115525 October 30, 1995
JUAN T. DAVID, petitioner,
vs.
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., as Executive Secretary; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, as Secretary of Finance; LIWAYWAY
VINZONS-CHATO, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and their AUTHORIZED AGENTS OR
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
G.R. No. 115543 October 30, 1995
RAUL S. ROCO and the INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF FINANCE; THE COMMISSIONERS OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE
AND BUREAU OF CUSTOMS, respondents.
G.R. No. 115544 October 30, 1995
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC.; EGP PUBLISHING CO., INC.; KAMAHALAN PUBLISHING CORPORATION; PHILIPPINE
JOURNALISTS, INC.; JOSE L. PAVIA; and OFELIA L. DIMALANTA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as Commissioner of Internal Revenue; HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his
capacity as Executive Secretary; and HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance, respondents.
G.R. No. 115754 October 30, 1995
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC., (CREBA), petitioner,
vs.
THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
G.R. No. 115781 October 30, 1995
KILOSBAYAN, INC., JOVITO R. SALONGA, CIRILO A. RIGOS, ERME CAMBA, EMILIO C. CAPULONG, JR., JOSE T. APOLO,
EPHRAIM TENDERO, FERNANDO SANTIAGO, JOSE ABCEDE, CHRISTINE TAN, FELIPE L. GOZON, RAFAEL G. FERNANDO,
RAOUL V. VICTORINO, JOSE CUNANAN, QUINTIN S. DOROMAL, MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD,
INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. ("MABINI"), FREEDOM FROM DEBT COALITION, INC., and PHILIPPINE BIBLE SOCIETY,
INC. and WIGBERTO TAADA,petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and THE
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS, respondents.
G.R. No. 115852 October 30, 1995
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., petitioner,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF FINANCE and COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
G.R. No. 115873 October 30, 1995
COOPERATIVE UNION OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, in her capacity as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue, HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in
his capacity as Executive Secretary, and HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as Secretary of
Finance, respondents.
G.R. No. 115931 October 30, 1995
PHILIPPINE EDUCATIONAL PUBLISHERS ASSOCIATION, INC. and ASSOCIATION OF PHILIPPINE BOOK
SELLERS, petitioners,
vs.
HON. ROBERTO B. DE OCAMPO, as the Secretary of Finance; HON. LIWAYWAY V. CHATO, as the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue; and HON. GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR., in his capacity as the Commissioner of Customs, respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N

MENDOZA, J.:
These are motions seeking reconsideration of our decision dismissing the petitions filed in these
cases for the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as the Expanded
Value-Added Tax Law. The motions, of which there are 10 in all, have been filed by the several
petitioners in these cases, with the exception of the Philippine Educational Publishers Association,
Inc. and the Association of Philippine Booksellers, petitioners in G.R. No. 115931.
The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, filed a consolidated comment, to which the
Philippine Airlines, Inc., petitioner in G.R. No. 115852, and the Philippine Press Institute, Inc.,
petitioner in G.R. No. 115544, and Juan T. David, petitioner in G.R. No. 115525, each filed a reply. In
turn the Solicitor General filed on June 1, 1995 a rejoinder to the PPI's reply.
On June 27, 1995 the matter was submitted for resolution.
I. Power of the Senate to propose amendments to revenue bills. Some of the petitioners (Tolentino,
Kilosbayan, Inc., Philippine Airlines (PAL), Roco, and Chamber of Real Estate and Builders
Association (CREBA)) reiterate previous claims made by them that R.A. No. 7716 did not "originate
exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, 24 of the Constitution. Although
they admit that H. No. 11197 was filed in the House of Representatives where it passed three
readings and that afterward it was sent to the Senate where after first reading it was referred to the
Senate Ways and Means Committee, they complain that the Senate did not pass it on second and
third readings. Instead what the Senate did was to pass its own version (S. No. 1630) which it
approved on May 24, 1994. Petitioner Tolentino adds that what the Senate committee should have
done was to amend H. No. 11197 by striking out the text of the bill and substituting it with the text of
S. No. 1630. That way, it is said, "the bill remains a House bill and the Senate version just becomes
the text (only the text) of the House bill."
The contention has no merit.
The enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance in which the Senate proposed an amendment
to a House revenue bill by enacting its own version of a revenue bill. On at least two occasions during
the Eighth Congress, the Senate passed its own version of revenue bills, which, in consolidation with
House bills earlier passed, became the enrolled bills. These were:
R.A. No. 7369 (AN ACT TO AMEND THE OMNIBUS INVESTMENTS CODE OF 1987 BY
EXTENDING FROM FIVE (5) YEARS TO TEN YEARS THE PERIOD FOR TAX AND DUTY
EXEMPTION AND TAX CREDIT ON CAPITAL EQUIPMENT) which was approved by the President
on April 10, 1992. This Act is actually a consolidation of H. No. 34254, which was approved by the
House on January 29, 1992, and S. No. 1920, which was approved by the Senate on February 3,
1992.
R.A. No. 7549 (AN ACT GRANTING TAX EXEMPTIONS TO WHOEVER SHALL GIVE REWARD TO
ANY FILIPINO ATHLETE WINNING A MEDAL IN OLYMPIC GAMES) which was approved by the
President on May 22, 1992. This Act is a consolidation of H. No. 22232, which was approved by the
House of Representatives on August 2, 1989, and S. No. 807, which was approved by the Senate on
October 21, 1991.
On the other hand, the Ninth Congress passed revenue laws which were also the result of the
consolidation of House and Senate bills. These are the following, with indications of the dates on
which the laws were approved by the President and dates the separate bills of the two chambers of
Congress were respectively passed:
1. R.A. NO. 7642
AN ACT INCREASING THE PENALTIES FOR TAX EVASION, AMENDING FOR THIS
PURPOSE THE PERTINENT SECTIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE
CODE (December 28, 1992).
House Bill No. 2165, October 5, 1992
Senate Bill No. 32, December 7, 1992
2. R.A. NO. 7643
AN ACT TO EMPOWER THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE TO
REQUIRE THE PAYMENT OF THE VALUE-ADDED TAX EVERY MONTH AND TO
ALLOW LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS TO SHARE IN VAT REVENUE, AMENDING
FOR THIS PURPOSE CERTAIN SECTIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL
REVENUE CODE (December 28, 1992)
House Bill No. 1503, September 3, 1992
Senate Bill No. 968, December 7, 1992
3. R.A. NO. 7646
AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE TO
PRESCRIBE THE PLACE FOR PAYMENT OF INTERNAL REVENUE TAXES BY
LARGE TAXPAYERS, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE CERTAIN PROVISIONS OF
THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED (February 24, 1993)
House Bill No. 1470, October 20, 1992
Senate Bill No. 35, November 19, 1992
4. R.A. NO. 7649
AN ACT REQUIRING THE GOVERNMENT OR ANY OF ITS POLITICAL
SUBDIVISIONS, INSTRUMENTALITIES OR AGENCIES INCLUDING GOVERNMENT-
OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS (GOCCS) TO DEDUCT AND
WITHHOLD THE VALUE-ADDED TAX DUE AT THE RATE OF THREE PERCENT
(3%) ON GROSS PAYMENT FOR THE PURCHASE OF GOODS AND SIX PERCENT
(6%) ON GROSS RECEIPTS FOR SERVICES RENDERED BY CONTRACTORS (April
6, 1993)
House Bill No. 5260, January 26, 1993
Senate Bill No. 1141, March 30, 1993
5. R.A. NO. 7656
AN ACT REQUIRING GOVERNMENT-OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS
TO DECLARE DIVIDENDS UNDER CERTAIN CONDITIONS TO THE NATIONAL
GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (November 9, 1993)
House Bill No. 11024, November 3, 1993
Senate Bill No. 1168, November 3, 1993
6. R.A. NO. 7660
AN ACT RATIONALIZING FURTHER THE STRUCTURE AND ADMINISTRATION OF
THE DOCUMENTARY STAMP TAX, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE CERTAIN
PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED,
ALLOCATING FUNDS FOR SPECIFIC PROGRAMS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
(December 23, 1993)
House Bill No. 7789, May 31, 1993
Senate Bill No. 1330, November 18, 1993
7. R.A. NO. 7717
AN ACT IMPOSING A TAX ON THE SALE, BARTER OR EXCHANGE OF SHARES
OF STOCK LISTED AND TRADED THROUGH THE LOCAL STOCK EXCHANGE OR
THROUGH INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERING, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE THE
NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, BY INSERTING A NEW
SECTION AND REPEALING CERTAIN SUBSECTIONS THEREOF (May 5, 1994)
House Bill No. 9187, November 3, 1993
Senate Bill No. 1127, March 23, 1994
Thus, the enactment of S. No. 1630 is not the only instance in which the Senate, in the exercise of its
power to propose amendments to bills required to originate in the House, passed its own version of a
House revenue measure. It is noteworthy that, in the particular case of S. No. 1630, petitioners
Tolentino and Roco, as members of the Senate, voted to approve it on second and third readings.
On the other hand, amendment by substitution, in the manner urged by petitioner Tolentino, concerns
a mere matter of form. Petitioner has not shown what substantial difference it would make if, as the
Senate actually did in this case, a separate bill like S. No. 1630 is instead enacted as a substitute
measure, "taking into Consideration . . . H.B. 11197."
Indeed, so far as pertinent, the Rules of the Senate only provide:
RULE XXIX
AMENDMENTS
xxx xxx xxx
68. Not more than one amendment to the original amendment shall be considered.
No amendment by substitution shall be entertained unless the text thereof is submitted
in writing.
Any of said amendments may be withdrawn before a vote is taken thereon.
69. No amendment which seeks the inclusion of a legislative provision foreign to the
subject matter of a bill (rider) shall be entertained.
xxx xxx xxx
70-A. A bill or resolution shall not be amended by substituting it with another which
covers a subject distinct from that proposed in the original bill or resolution. (emphasis
added).
Nor is there merit in petitioners' contention that, with regard to revenue bills, the Philippine Senate
possesses less power than the U.S. Senate because of textual differences between constitutional
provisions giving them the power to propose or concur with amendments.
Art. I, 7, cl. 1 of the U.S. Constitution reads:
All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the
Senate may propose or concur with amendments as on other Bills.
Art. VI, 24 of our Constitution reads:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills
of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments.
The addition of the word "exclusively" in the Philippine Constitution and the decision to drop the
phrase "as on other Bills" in the American version, according to petitioners, shows the intention of the
framers of our Constitution to restrict the Senate's power to propose amendments to revenue bills.
Petitioner Tolentino contends that the word "exclusively" was inserted to modify "originate" and "the
words 'as in any other bills' (sic) were eliminated so as to show that these bills were not to be like
other bills but must be treated as a special kind."
The history of this provision does not support this contention. The supposed indicia of constitutional
intent are nothing but the relics of an unsuccessful attempt to limit the power of the Senate. It will be
recalled that the 1935 Constitution originally provided for a unicameral National Assembly. When it
was decided in 1939 to change to a bicameral legislature, it became necessary to provide for the
procedure for lawmaking by the Senate and the House of Representatives. The work of proposing
amendments to the Constitution was done by the National Assembly, acting as a constituent
assembly, some of whose members, jealous of preserving the Assembly's lawmaking powers, sought
to curtail the powers of the proposed Senate. Accordingly they proposed the following provision:
All bills appropriating public funds, revenue or tariff bills, bills of local application, and
private bills shall originate exclusively in the Assembly, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments. In case of disapproval by the Senate of any such bills, the
Assembly may repass the same by a two-thirds vote of all its members, and thereupon,
the bill so repassed shall be deemed enacted and may be submitted to the President for
corresponding action. In the event that the Senate should fail to finally act on any such
bills, the Assembly may, after thirty days from the opening of the next regular session of
the same legislative term, reapprove the same with a vote of two-thirds of all the
members of the Assembly. And upon such reapproval, the bill shall be deemed enacted
and may be submitted to the President for corresponding action.
The special committee on the revision of laws of the Second National Assembly vetoed the proposal.
It deleted everything after the first sentence. As rewritten, the proposal was approved by the National
Assembly and embodied in Resolution No. 38, as amended by Resolution No. 73. (J. ARUEGO,
KNOW YOUR CONSTITUTION 65-66 (1950)). The proposed amendment was submitted to the
people and ratified by them in the elections held on June 18, 1940.
This is the history of Art. VI, 18 (2) of the 1935 Constitution, from which Art. VI, 24 of the present
Constitution was derived. It explains why the word "exclusively" was added to the American text from
which the framers of the Philippine Constitution borrowed and why the phrase "as on other Bills" was
not copied. Considering the defeat of the proposal, the power of the Senate to propose amendments
must be understood to be full, plenary and complete "as on other Bills." Thus, because revenue bills
are required to originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, the Senate cannot enact
revenue measures of its own without such bills. After a revenue bill is passed and sent over to it by
the House, however, the Senate certainly can pass its own version on the same subject matter. This
follows from the coequality of the two chambers of Congress.
That this is also the understanding of book authors of the scope of the Senate's power to concur is
clear from the following commentaries:
The power of the Senate to propose or concur with amendments is apparently without
restriction. It would seem that by virtue of this power, the Senate can practically re-write
a bill required to come from the House and leave only a trace of the original bill. For
example, a general revenue bill passed by the lower house of the United States
Congress contained provisions for the imposition of an inheritance tax . This was
changed by the Senate into a corporation tax. The amending authority of the Senate
was declared by the United States Supreme Court to be sufficiently broad to enable it to
make the alteration. [Flint v. Stone Tracy Company, 220 U.S. 107, 55 L. ed. 389].
(L. TAADA AND F. CARREON, POLITICAL LAW OF THE PHILIPPINES 247 (1961))
The above-mentioned bills are supposed to be initiated by the House of
Representatives because it is more numerous in membership and therefore also more
representative of the people. Moreover, its members are presumed to be more familiar
with the needs of the country in regard to the enactment of the legislation involved.
The Senate is, however, allowed much leeway in the exercise of its power to propose or
concur with amendments to the bills initiated by the House of Representatives. Thus, in
one case, a bill introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives was changed by the
Senate to make a proposed inheritance tax a corporation tax. It is also accepted
practice for the Senate to introduce what is known as an amendment by substitution,
which may entirely replace the bill initiated in the House of Representatives.
(I. CRUZ, PHILIPPINE POLITICAL LAW 144-145 (1993)).
In sum, while Art. VI, 24 provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing
increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills must "originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives," it also adds, "but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments."
In the exercise of this power, the Senate may propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure.
As petitioner Tolentino states in a high school text, a committee to which a bill is referred may do any
of the following:
(1) to endorse the bill without changes; (2) to make changes in the bill omitting or
adding sections or altering its language; (3) to make and endorse an entirely new bill as
a substitute, in which case it will be known as a committee bill; or (4) to make no report
at all.
(A. TOLENTINO, THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES 258 (1950))
To except from this procedure the amendment of bills which are required to originate in the House by
prescribing that the number of the House bill and its other parts up to the enacting clause must be
preserved although the text of the Senate amendment may be incorporated in place of the original
body of the bill is to insist on a mere technicality. At any rate there is no rule prescribing this form. S.
No. 1630, as a substitute measure, is therefore as much an amendment of H. No. 11197 as any
which the Senate could have made.
II. S. No. 1630 a mere amendment of H. No. 11197. Petitioners' basic error is that they assume that
S. No. 1630 is an independent and distinct bill. Hence their repeated references to its certification that
it was passed by the Senate "in substitution of S.B. No. 1129, taking into consideration P.S. Res. No.
734 and H.B. No. 11197," implying that there is something substantially different between the
reference to S. No. 1129 and the reference to H. No. 11197. From this premise, they conclude that
R.A. No. 7716 originated both in the House and in the Senate and that it is the product of two "half-
baked bills because neither H. No. 11197 nor S. No. 1630 was passed by both houses of Congress."
In point of fact, in several instances the provisions of S. No. 1630, clearly appear to be mere
amendments of the corresponding provisions of H. No. 11197. The very tabular comparison of the
provisions of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 attached as Supplement A to the basic petition of
petitioner Tolentino, while showing differences between the two bills, at the same time indicates that
the provisions of the Senate bill were precisely intended to be amendments to the House bill.
Without H. No. 11197, the Senate could not have enacted S. No. 1630. Because the Senate bill was
a mere amendment of the House bill, H. No. 11197 in its original form did not have to pass the
Senate on second and three readings. It was enough that after it was passed on first reading it was
referred to the Senate Committee on Ways and Means. Neither was it required that S. No. 1630 be
passed by the House of Representatives before the two bills could be referred to the Conference
Committee.
There is legislative precedent for what was done in the case of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. When
the House bill and Senate bill, which became R.A. No. 1405 (Act prohibiting the disclosure of bank
deposits), were referred to a conference committee, the question was raised whether the two bills
could be the subject of such conference, considering that the bill from one house had not been
passed by the other and vice versa. As Congressman Duran put the question:
MR. DURAN. Therefore, I raise this question of order as to procedure: If a House bill is
passed by the House but not passed by the Senate, and a Senate bill of a similar nature
is passed in the Senate but never passed in the House, can the two bills be the subject
of a conference, and can a law be enacted from these two bills? I understand that the
Senate bill in this particular instance does not refer to investments in government
securities, whereas the bill in the House, which was introduced by the Speaker, covers
two subject matters: not only investigation of deposits in banks but also investigation of
investments in government securities. Now, since the two bills differ in their subject
matter, I believe that no law can be enacted.
Ruling on the point of order raised, the chair (Speaker Jose B. Laurel, Jr.) said:
THE SPEAKER. The report of the conference committee is in order. It is precisely in
cases like this where a conference should be had. If the House bill had been approved
by the Senate, there would have been no need of a conference; but precisely because
the Senate passed another bill on the same subject matter, the conference committee
had to be created, and we are now considering the report of that committee.
(2 CONG. REC. NO. 13, July 27, 1955, pp. 3841-42 (emphasis added))
III. The President's certification. The fallacy in thinking that H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 are distinct
and unrelated measures also accounts for the petitioners' (Kilosbayan's and PAL's) contention that
because the President separately certified to the need for the immediate enactment of these
measures, his certification was ineffectual and void. The certification had to be made of the version of
the same revenue bill which at the momentwas being considered. Otherwise, to follow petitioners'
theory, it would be necessary for the President to certify as many bills as are presented in a house of
Congress even though the bills are merely versions of the bill he has already certified. It is enough
that he certifies the bill which, at the time he makes the certification, is under consideration. Since on
March 22, 1994 the Senate was considering S. No. 1630, it was that bill which had to be certified. For
that matter on June 1, 1993 the President had earlier certified H. No. 9210 for immediate enactment
because it was the one which at that time was being considered by the House. This bill was later
substituted, together with other bills, by H. No. 11197.
As to what Presidential certification can accomplish, we have already explained in the main decision
that the phrase "except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc."
in Art. VI, 26 (2) qualifies not only the requirement that "printed copies [of a bill] in its final form [must
be] distributed to the members three days before its passage" but also the requirement that before a
bill can become a law it must have passed "three readings on separate days." There is not only
textual support for such construction but historical basis as well.
Art. VI, 21 (2) of the 1935 Constitution originally provided:
(2) No bill shall be passed by either House unless it shall have been printed and copies
thereof in its final form furnished its Members at least three calendar days prior to its
passage, except when the President shall have certified to the necessity of its
immediate enactment. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereof shall be
allowed and the question upon its passage shall be taken immediately thereafter, and
the yeas and nays entered on the Journal.
When the 1973 Constitution was adopted, it was provided in Art. VIII, 19 (2):
(2) No bill shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days,
and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to the Members three
days before its passage, except when the Prime Minister certifies to the necessity of its
immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of
a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken
immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.
This provision of the 1973 document, with slight modification, was adopted in Art. VI, 26 (2) of the
present Constitution, thus:
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and
the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeasand nays entered in
the Journal.
The exception is based on the prudential consideration that if in all cases three readings on separate
days are required and a bill has to be printed in final form before it can be passed, the need for a law
may be rendered academic by the occurrence of the very emergency or public calamity which it is
meant to address.
Petitioners further contend that a "growing budget deficit" is not an emergency, especially in a country
like the Philippines where budget deficit is a chronic condition. Even if this were the case, an
enormous budget deficit does not make the need for R.A. No. 7716 any less urgent or the situation
calling for its enactment any less an emergency.
Apparently, the members of the Senate (including some of the petitioners in these cases) believed
that there was an urgent need for consideration of S. No. 1630, because they responded to the call of
the President by voting on the bill on second and third readings on the same day. While the judicial
department is not bound by the Senate's acceptance of the President's certification, the respect due
coequal departments of the government in matters committed to them by the Constitution and the
absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion caution a stay of the judicial hand.
At any rate, we are satisfied that S. No. 1630 received thorough consideration in the Senate where it
was discussed for six days. Only its distribution in advance in its final printed form was actually
dispensed with by holding the voting on second and third readings on the same day (March 24,
1994). Otherwise, sufficient time between the submission of the bill on February 8, 1994 on second
reading and its approval on March 24, 1994 elapsed before it was finally voted on by the Senate on
third reading.
The purpose for which three readings on separate days is required is said to be two-fold: (1) to inform
the members of Congress of what they must vote on and (2) to give them notice that a measure is
progressing through the enacting process, thus enabling them and others interested in the measure
to prepare their positions with reference to it. (1 J. G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY
CONSTRUCTION 10.04, p. 282 (1972)). These purposes were substantially achieved in the case of
R.A. No. 7716.
IV. Power of Conference Committee. It is contended (principally by Kilosbayan, Inc. and the
Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI)) that in violation of
the constitutional policy of full public disclosure and the people's right to know (Art. II, 28 and Art. III,
7) the Conference Committee met for two days in executive session with only the conferees present.
As pointed out in our main decision, even in the United States it was customary to hold such sessions
with only the conferees and their staffs in attendance and it was only in 1975 when a new rule was
adopted requiring open sessions. Unlike its American counterpart, the Philippine Congress has not
adopted a rule prescribing open hearings for conference committees.
It is nevertheless claimed that in the United States, before the adoption of the rule in 1975, at least
staff members were present. These were staff members of the Senators and Congressmen, however,
who may be presumed to be their confidential men, not stenographers as in this case who on the last
two days of the conference were excluded. There is no showing that the conferees themselves did
not take notes of their proceedings so as to give petitioner Kilosbayan basis for claiming that even in
secret diplomatic negotiations involving state interests, conferees keep notes of their meetings.
Above all, the public's right to know was fully served because the Conference Committee in this case
submitted a report showing the changes made on the differing versions of the House and the Senate.
Petitioners cite the rules of both houses which provide that conference committee reports must
contain "a detailed, sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or other amendments." These
changes are shown in the bill attached to the Conference Committee Report. The members of both
houses could thus ascertain what changes had been made in the original bills without the need of a
statement detailing the changes.
The same question now presented was raised when the bill which became R.A. No. 1400 (Land
Reform Act of 1955) was reported by the Conference Committee. Congressman Bengzon raised a
point of order. He said:
MR. BENGZON. My point of order is that it is out of order to consider the report of the
conference committee regarding House Bill No. 2557 by reason of the provision of
Section 11, Article XII, of the Rules of this House which provides specifically that the
conference report must be accompanied by a detailed statement of the effects of the
amendment on the bill of the House. This conference committee report is not
accompanied by that detailed statement, Mr. Speaker. Therefore it is out of order to
consider it.
Petitioner Tolentino, then the Majority Floor Leader, answered:
MR. TOLENTINO. Mr. Speaker, I should just like to say a few words in connection with
the point of order raised by the gentleman from Pangasinan.
There is no question about the provision of the Rule cited by the gentleman from
Pangasinan, but this provision applies to those cases where only portions of the bill
have been amended. In this case before us an entire bill is presented; therefore, it can
be easily seen from the reading of the bill what the provisions are. Besides, this
procedure has been an established practice.
After some interruption, he continued:
MR. TOLENTINO. As I was saying, Mr. Speaker, we have to look into the reason for the
provisions of the Rules, and the reason for the requirement in the provision cited by the
gentleman from Pangasinan is when there are only certain words or phrases inserted in
or deleted from the provisions of the bill included in the conference report, and we
cannot understand what those words and phrases mean and their relation to the bill. In
that case, it is necessary to make a detailed statement on how those words and
phrases will affect the bill as a whole; but when the entire bill itself is copied verbatim in
the conference report, that is not necessary. So when the reason for the Rule does not
exist, the Rule does not exist.
(2 CONG. REC. NO. 2, p. 4056. (emphasis added))
Congressman Tolentino was sustained by the chair. The record shows that when the ruling was
appealed, it was upheld by viva voce and when a division of the House was called, it was sustained
by a vote of 48 to 5. (Id.,
p. 4058)
Nor is there any doubt about the power of a conference committee to insert new provisions as long as
these are germane to the subject of the conference. As this Court held in Philippine Judges
Association v. Prado, 227 SCRA 703 (1993), in an opinion written by then Justice Cruz, the
jurisdiction of the conference committee is not limited to resolving differences between the Senate
and the House. It may propose an entirely new provision. What is important is that its report is
subsequently approved by the respective houses of Congress. This Court ruled that it would not
entertain allegations that, because new provisions had been added by the conference committee,
there was thereby a violation of the constitutional injunction that "upon the last reading of a bill, no
amendment thereto shall be allowed."
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an
amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No.
7354 and that copiesthereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of
each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure
was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26 (2) of the Constitution. We
are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government,
to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
(Id. at 710. (emphasis added))
It is interesting to note the following description of conference committees in the Philippines in a 1979
study:
Conference committees may be of two types: free or instructed. These committees may
be given instructions by their parent bodies or they may be left without instructions.
Normally the conference committees are without instructions, and this is why they are
often critically referred to as "the little legislatures." Once bills have been sent to them,
the conferees have almost unlimited authority to change the clauses of the bills and in
fact sometimes introduce new measures that were not in the original legislation. No
minutes are kept, and members' activities on conference committees are difficult to
determine. One congressman known for his idealism put it this way: "I killed a bill on
export incentives for my interest group [copra] in the conference committee but I could
not have done so anywhere else." The conference committee submits a report to both
houses, and usually it is accepted. If the report is not accepted, then the committee is
discharged and new members are appointed.
(R. Jackson, Committees in the Philippine Congress, in COMMITTEES AND
LEGISLATURES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 163 (J. D. LEES AND M. SHAW,
eds.)).
In citing this study, we pass no judgment on the methods of conference committees. We cite it only to
say that conference committees here are no different from their counterparts in the United States
whose vast powers we noted in Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, supra. At all events, under
Art. VI, 16(3) each house has the power "to determine the rules of its proceedings," including those
of its committees. Any meaningful change in the method and procedures of Congress or its
committees must therefore be sought in that body itself.
V. The titles of S. No. 1630 and H. No. 11197. PAL maintains that R.A. No. 7716 violates Art. VI, 26
(1) of the Constitution which provides that "Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one
subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof." PAL contends that the amendment of its
franchise by the withdrawal of its exemption from the VAT is not expressed in the title of the law.
Pursuant to 13 of P.D. No. 1590, PAL pays a franchise tax of 2% on its gross revenue "in lieu of all
other taxes, duties, royalties, registration, license and other fees and charges of any kind, nature, or
description, imposed, levied, established, assessed or collected by any municipal, city, provincial or
national authority or government agency, now or in the future."
PAL was exempted from the payment of the VAT along with other entities by 103 of the National
Internal Revenue Code, which provides as follows:
103. Exempt transactions. The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:
xxx xxx xxx
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws or international agreements to
which the Philippines is a signatory.
R.A. No. 7716 seeks to withdraw certain exemptions, including that granted to PAL, by amending
103, as follows:
103. Exempt transactions. The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:
xxx xxx xxx
(q) Transactions which are exempt under special laws, except those granted under
Presidential Decree Nos. 66, 529, 972, 1491, 1590. . . .
The amendment of 103 is expressed in the title of R.A. No. 7716 which reads:
AN ACT RESTRUCTURING THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM, WIDENING
ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR THESE
PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE
NATIONAL INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
By stating that R.A. No. 7716 seeks to "[RESTRUCTURE] THE VALUE-ADDED TAX (VAT) SYSTEM
[BY] WIDENING ITS TAX BASE AND ENHANCING ITS ADMINISTRATION, AND FOR THESE
PURPOSES AMENDING AND REPEALING THE RELEVANT PROVISIONS OF THE NATIONAL
INTERNAL REVENUE CODE, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," Congress thereby
clearly expresses its intention to amend any provision of the NIRC which stands in the way of
accomplishing the purpose of the law.
PAL asserts that the amendment of its franchise must be reflected in the title of the law by specific
reference to P.D. No. 1590. It is unnecessary to do this in order to comply with the constitutional
requirement, since it is already stated in the title that the law seeks to amend the pertinent provisions
of the NIRC, among which is 103(q), in order to widen the base of the VAT. Actually, it is the bill
which becomes a law that is required to express in its title the subject of legislation. The titles of H.
No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 in fact specifically referred to 103 of the NIRC as among the provisions
sought to be amended. We are satisfied that sufficient notice had been given of the pendency of
these bills in Congress before they were enacted into what is now R.A.
No. 7716.
In Philippine Judges Association v. Prado, supra, a similar argument as that now made by PAL was
rejected. R.A. No. 7354 is entitled AN ACT CREATING THE PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORPORATION,
DEFINING ITS POWERS, FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, PROVIDING FOR REGULATION
OF THE INDUSTRY AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES CONNECTED THEREWITH. It contained a
provision repealing all franking privileges. It was contended that the withdrawal of franking privileges
was not expressed in the title of the law. In holding that there was sufficient description of the subject
of the law in its title, including the repeal of franking privileges, this Court held:
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general
objectives of the statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but
would actually render legislation impossible. [Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th Ed.,
p. 297] As has been correctly explained:
The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but
matter germane to the subject as expressed in the title, and adopted to the
accomplishment of the object in view, may properly be included in the act.
Thus, it is proper to create in the same act the machinery by which the act
is to be enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its infraction, and to
remove obstacles in the way of its execution. If such matters are properly
connected with the subject as expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that
they should also have special mention in the title. (Southern Pac. Co. v.
Bartine, 170 Fed. 725)
(227 SCRA at 707-708)
VI. Claims of press freedom and religious liberty. We have held that, as a general proposition, the
press is not exempt from the taxing power of the State and that what the constitutional guarantee of
free press prohibits are laws which single out the press or target a group belonging to the press for
special treatment or which in any way discriminate against the press on the basis of the content of the
publication, and R.A. No. 7716 is none of these.
Now it is contended by the PPI that by removing the exemption of the press from the VAT while
maintaining those granted to others, the law discriminates against the press. At any rate, it is averred,
"even nondiscriminatory taxation of constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional."
With respect to the first contention, it would suffice to say that since the law granted the press a
privilege, the law could take back the privilege anytime without offense to the Constitution. The
reason is simple: by granting exemptions, the State does not forever waive the exercise of its
sovereign prerogative.
Indeed, in withdrawing the exemption, the law merely subjects the press to the same tax burden to
which other businesses have long ago been subject. It is thus different from the tax involved in the
cases invoked by the PPI. The license tax in Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 80 L.
Ed. 660 (1936) was found to be discriminatory because it was laid on the gross advertising receipts
only of newspapers whose weekly circulation was over 20,000, with the result that the tax applied
only to 13 out of 124 publishers in Louisiana. These large papers were critical of Senator Huey Long
who controlled the state legislature which enacted the license tax. The censorial motivation for the
law was thus evident.
On the other hand, in Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 75 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1983), the tax was found to be discriminatory because although it could have
been made liable for the sales tax or, in lieu thereof, for the use tax on the privilege of using, storing
or consuming tangible goods, the press was not. Instead, the press was exempted from both taxes. It
was, however, later made to pay a special use tax on the cost of paper and ink which made these
items "the only items subject to the use tax that were component of goods to be sold at retail." The
U.S. Supreme Court held that the differential treatment of the press "suggests that the goal of
regulation is not related to suppression of expression, and such goal is presumptively
unconstitutional." It would therefore appear that even a law that favors the press is constitutionally
suspect. (See the dissent of Rehnquist, J. in that case)
Nor is it true that only two exemptions previously granted by E.O. No. 273 are withdrawn "absolutely
and unqualifiedly" by R.A. No. 7716. Other exemptions from the VAT, such as those previously
granted to PAL, petroleum concessionaires, enterprises registered with the Export Processing Zone
Authority, and many more are likewise totally withdrawn, in addition to exemptions which are partially
withdrawn, in an effort to broaden the base of the tax.
The PPI says that the discriminatory treatment of the press is highlighted by the fact that transactions,
which are profit oriented, continue to enjoy exemption under R.A. No. 7716. An enumeration of some
of these transactions will suffice to show that by and large this is not so and that the exemptions are
granted for a purpose. As the Solicitor General says, such exemptions are granted, in some cases, to
encourage agricultural production and, in other cases, for the personal benefit of the end-user rather
than for profit. The exempt transactions are:
(a) Goods for consumption or use which are in their original state (agricultural, marine
and forest products, cotton seeds in their original state, fertilizers, seeds, seedlings,
fingerlings, fish, prawn livestock and poultry feeds) and goods or services to enhance
agriculture (milling of palay, corn, sugar cane and raw sugar, livestock, poultry feeds,
fertilizer, ingredients used for the manufacture of feeds).
(b) Goods used for personal consumption or use (household and personal effects of
citizens returning to the Philippines) or for professional use, like professional
instruments and implements, by persons coming to the Philippines to settle here.
(c) Goods subject to excise tax such as petroleum products or to be used for
manufacture of petroleum products subject to excise tax and services subject to
percentage tax.
(d) Educational services, medical, dental, hospital and veterinary services, and services
rendered under employer-employee relationship.
(e) Works of art and similar creations sold by the artist himself.
(f) Transactions exempted under special laws, or international agreements.
(g) Export-sales by persons not VAT-registered.
(h) Goods or services with gross annual sale or receipt not exceeding P500,000.00.
(Respondents' Consolidated Comment on the Motions for Reconsideration, pp. 58-60)
The PPI asserts that it does not really matter that the law does not discriminate against the press
because "even nondiscriminatory taxation on constitutionally guaranteed freedom is unconstitutional."
PPI cites in support of this assertion the following statement in Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105, 87 L. Ed. 1292 (1943):
The fact that the ordinance is "nondiscriminatory" is immaterial. The protection afforded
by the First Amendment is not so restricted. A license tax certainly does not acquire
constitutional validity because it classifies the privileges protected by the First
Amendment along with the wares and merchandise of hucksters and peddlers and
treats them all alike. Such equality in treatment does not save the ordinance. Freedom
of press, freedom of speech, freedom of religion are in preferred position.
The Court was speaking in that case of a license tax, which, unlike an ordinary tax, is mainly for
regulation. Its imposition on the press is unconstitutional because it lays a prior restraint on the
exercise of its right. Hence, although its application to others, such those selling goods, is valid, its
application to the press or to religious groups, such as the Jehovah's Witnesses, in connection with
the latter's sale of religious books and pamphlets, is unconstitutional. As the U.S. Supreme Court put
it, "it is one thing to impose a tax on income or property of a preacher. It is quite another thing to exact
a tax on him for delivering a sermon."
A similar ruling was made by this Court in American Bible Society v. City of Manila, 101 Phil. 386
(1957) which invalidated a city ordinance requiring a business license fee on those engaged in the
sale of general merchandise. It was held that the tax could not be imposed on the sale of bibles by
the American Bible Society without restraining the free exercise of its right to propagate.
The VAT is, however, different. It is not a license tax. It is not a tax on the exercise of a privilege,
much less a constitutional right. It is imposed on the sale, barter, lease or exchange of goods or
properties or the sale or exchange of services and the lease of properties purely for revenue
purposes. To subject the press to its payment is not to burden the exercise of its right any more than
to make the press pay income tax or subject it to general regulation is not to violate its freedom under
the Constitution.
Additionally, the Philippine Bible Society, Inc. claims that although it sells bibles, the proceeds derived
from the sales are used to subsidize the cost of printing copies which are given free to those who
cannot afford to pay so that to tax the sales would be to increase the price, while reducing the volume
of sale. Granting that to be the case, the resulting burden on the exercise of religious freedom is so
incidental as to make it difficult to differentiate it from any other economic imposition that might make
the right to disseminate religious doctrines costly. Otherwise, to follow the petitioner's argument, to
increase the tax on the sale of vestments would be to lay an impermissible burden on the right of the
preacher to make a sermon.
On the other hand the registration fee of P1,000.00 imposed by 107 of the NIRC, as amended by 7
of R.A. No. 7716, although fixed in amount, is really just to pay for the expenses of registration and
enforcement of provisions such as those relating to accounting in 108 of the NIRC. That the PBS
distributes free bibles and therefore is not liable to pay the VAT does not excuse it from the payment
of this fee because it also sells some copies. At any rate whether the PBS is liable for the VAT must
be decided in concrete cases, in the event it is assessed this tax by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue.
VII. Alleged violations of the due process, equal protection and contract clauses and the rule on
taxation. CREBA asserts that R.A. No. 7716 (1) impairs the obligations of contracts, (2) classifies
transactions as covered or exempt without reasonable basis and (3) violates the rule that taxes
should be uniform and equitable and that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation."
With respect to the first contention, it is claimed that the application of the tax to existing contracts of
the sale of real property by installment or on deferred payment basis would result in substantial
increases in the monthly amortizations to be paid because of the 10% VAT. The additional amount, it
is pointed out, is something that the buyer did not anticipate at the time he entered into the contract.
The short answer to this is the one given by this Court in an early case: "Authorities from numerous
sources are cited by the plaintiffs, but none of them show that a lawful tax on a new subject, or an
increased tax on an old one, interferes with a contract or impairs its obligation, within the meaning of
the Constitution. Even though such taxation may affect particular contracts, as it may increase the
debt of one person and lessen the security of another, or may impose additional burdens upon one
class and release the burdens of another, still the tax must be paid unless prohibited by the
Constitution, nor can it be said that it impairs the obligation of any existing contract in its true legal
sense." (La Insular v. Machuca Go-Tauco and Nubla Co-Siong, 39 Phil. 567, 574 (1919)). Indeed not
only existing laws but also "the reservation of the essential attributes of sovereignty, is . . . read into
contracts as a postulate of the legal order." (Philippine-American Life Ins. Co. v. Auditor General, 22
SCRA 135, 147 (1968)) Contracts must be understood as having been made in reference to the
possible exercise of the rightful authority of the government and no obligation of contract can extend
to the defeat of that authority. (Norman v. Baltimore and Ohio R.R., 79 L. Ed. 885 (1935)).
It is next pointed out that while 4 of R.A. No. 7716 exempts such transactions as the sale of
agricultural products, food items, petroleum, and medical and veterinary services, it grants no
exemption on the sale of real property which is equally essential. The sale of real property for
socialized and low-cost housing is exempted from the tax, but CREBA claims that real estate
transactions of "the less poor," i.e., the middle class, who are equally homeless, should likewise be
exempted.
The sale of food items, petroleum, medical and veterinary services, etc., which are essential goods
and services was already exempt under 103, pars. (b) (d) (1) of the NIRC before the enactment of
R.A. No. 7716. Petitioner is in error in claiming that R.A. No. 7716 granted exemption to these
transactions, while subjecting those of petitioner to the payment of the VAT. Moreover, there is a
difference between the "homeless poor" and the "homeless less poor" in the example given by
petitioner, because the second group or middle class can afford to rent houses in the meantime that
they cannot yet buy their own homes. The two social classes are thus differently situated in life. "It is
inherent in the power to tax that the State be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been
repeatedly held that 'inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or
exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.'" (Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148, 153 (1955). Accord,
City of Baguio v. De Leon, 134 Phil. 912 (1968); Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA 654, 663 (1984);
Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 371 (1988)).
Finally, it is contended, for the reasons already noted, that R.A. No. 7716 also violates Art. VI, 28(1)
which provides that "The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a
progressive system of taxation."
Equality and uniformity of taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same
class be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and natural
classifications for purposes of taxation. To satisfy this requirement it is enough that the statute or
ordinance applies equally to all persons, forms and corporations placed in similar situation. (City of
Baguio v. De Leon, supra; Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, supra)
Indeed, the VAT was already provided in E.O. No. 273 long before R.A. No. 7716 was enacted. R.A.
No. 7716 merely expands the base of the tax. The validity of the original VAT Law was questioned
in Kapatiran ng Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas, Inc. v. Tan, 163 SCRA 383 (1988) on
grounds similar to those made in these cases, namely, that the law was "oppressive, discriminatory,
unjust and regressive in violation of Art. VI, 28(1) of the Constitution." (At 382) Rejecting the
challenge to the law, this Court held:
As the Court sees it, EO 273 satisfies all the requirements of a valid tax. It is uniform. . .
.
The sales tax adopted in EO 273 is applied similarly on all goods and services sold to
the public, which are not exempt, at the constant rate of 0% or 10%.
The disputed sales tax is also equitable. It is imposed only on sales of goods or services
by persons engaged in business with an aggregate gross annual sales exceeding
P200,000.00. Small corner sari-sari stores are consequently exempt from its
application. Likewise exempt from the tax are sales of farm and marine products, so that
the costs of basic food and other necessities, spared as they are from the incidence of
the VAT, are expected to be relatively lower and within the reach of the general public.
(At 382-383)
The CREBA claims that the VAT is regressive. A similar claim is made by the Cooperative Union of
the Philippines, Inc. (CUP), while petitioner Juan T. David argues that the law contravenes the
mandate of Congress to provide for a progressive system of taxation because the law imposes a flat
rate of 10% and thus places the tax burden on all taxpayers without regard to their ability to pay.
The Constitution does not really prohibit the imposition of indirect taxes which, like the VAT, are
regressive. What it simply provides is that Congress shall "evolve a progressive system of taxation."
The constitutional provision has been interpreted to mean simply that "direct taxes are . . . to be
preferred [and] as much as possible, indirect taxes should be minimized." (E. FERNANDO, THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES 221 (Second ed. (1977)). Indeed, the mandate to Congress
is not to prescribe, but to evolve, a progressive tax system. Otherwise, sales taxes, which perhaps
are the oldest form of indirect taxes, would have been prohibited with the proclamation of Art. VIII,
17(1) of the 1973 Constitution from which the present Art. VI, 28(1) was taken. Sales taxes are also
regressive.
Resort to indirect taxes should be minimized but not avoided entirely because it is difficult, if not
impossible, to avoid them by imposing such taxes according to the taxpayers' ability to pay. In the
case of the VAT, the law minimizes the regressive effects of this imposition by providing for zero
rating of certain transactions (R.A. No. 7716, 3, amending 102 (b) of the NIRC), while
granting exemptions to other transactions. (R.A. No. 7716, 4, amending 103 of the NIRC).
Thus, the following transactions involving basic and essential goods and services are exempted from
the VAT:
(a) Goods for consumption or use which are in their original state (agricultural, marine
and forest products, cotton seeds in their original state, fertilizers, seeds, seedlings,
fingerlings, fish, prawn livestock and poultry feeds) and goods or services to enhance
agriculture (milling of palay, corn sugar cane and raw sugar, livestock, poultry feeds,
fertilizer, ingredients used for the manufacture of feeds).
(b) Goods used for personal consumption or use (household and personal effects of
citizens returning to the Philippines) and or professional use, like professional
instruments and implements, by persons coming to the Philippines to settle here.
(c) Goods subject to excise tax such as petroleum products or to be used for
manufacture of petroleum products subject to excise tax and services subject to
percentage tax.
(d) Educational services, medical, dental, hospital and veterinary services, and services
rendered under employer-employee relationship.
(e) Works of art and similar creations sold by the artist himself.
(f) Transactions exempted under special laws, or international agreements.
(g) Export-sales by persons not VAT-registered.
(h) Goods or services with gross annual sale or receipt not exceeding P500,000.00.
(Respondents' Consolidated Comment on the Motions for Reconsideration, pp. 58-60)
On the other hand, the transactions which are subject to the VAT are those which involve goods and
services which are used or availed of mainly by higher income groups. These include real properties
held primarily for sale to customers or for lease in the ordinary course of trade or business, the right
or privilege to use patent, copyright, and other similar property or right, the right or privilege to use
industrial, commercial or scientific equipment, motion picture films, tapes and discs, radio, television,
satellite transmission and cable television time, hotels, restaurants and similar places, securities,
lending investments, taxicabs, utility cars for rent, tourist buses, and other common carriers, services
of franchise grantees of telephone and telegraph.
The problem with CREBA's petition is that it presents broad claims of constitutional violations by
tendering issues not at retail but at wholesale and in the abstract. There is no fully developed record
which can impart to adjudication the impact of actuality. There is no factual foundation to show in
the concrete the application of the law to actual contracts and exemplify its effect on property rights.
For the fact is that petitioner's members have not even been assessed the VAT. Petitioner's case is
not made concrete by a series of hypothetical questions asked which are no different from those dealt
with in advisory opinions.
The difficulty confronting petitioner is thus apparent. He alleges arbitrariness. A mere
allegation, as here, does not suffice. There must be a factual foundation of such
unconstitutional taint. Considering that petitioner here would condemn such a provision
as void on its face, he has not made out a case. This is merely to adhere to the
authoritative doctrine that where the due process and equal protection clauses are
invoked, considering that they are not fixed rules but rather broad standards, there is a
need for proof of such persuasive character as would lead to such a conclusion. Absent
such a showing, the presumption of validity must prevail.
(Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, 130 SCRA at 661)
Adjudication of these broad claims must await the development of a concrete case. It may be that
postponement of adjudication would result in a multiplicity of suits. This need not be the case,
however. Enforcement of the law may give rise to such a case. A test case, provided it is an actual
case and not an abstract or hypothetical one, may thus be presented.
Nor is hardship to taxpayers alone an adequate justification for adjudicating abstract issues.
Otherwise, adjudication would be no different from the giving of advisory opinion that does not really
settle legal issues.
We are told that it is our duty under Art. VIII, 1, 2 to decide whenever a claim is made that "there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government." This duty can only arise if an actual case or controversy
is before us. Under Art . VIII, 5 our jurisdiction is defined in terms of "cases" and all that Art. VIII, 1,
2 can plausibly mean is that in the exercise of that jurisdiction we have the judicial power to
determine questions of grave abuse of discretion by any branch or instrumentality of the government.
Put in another way, what is granted in Art. VIII, 1, 2 is "judicial power," which is "the power of a
court to hear and decide cases pending between parties who have the right to sue and be sued in the
courts of law and equity" (Lamb v. Phipps, 22 Phil. 456, 559 (1912)), as distinguished from legislative
and executive power. This power cannot be directly appropriated until it is apportioned among several
courts either by the Constitution, as in the case of Art. VIII, 5, or by statute, as in the case of the
Judiciary Act of 1948 (R.A. No. 296) and the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129).
The power thus apportioned constitutes the court's "jurisdiction," defined as "the power conferred by
law upon a court or judge to take cognizance of a case, to the exclusion of all others." (United States
v. Arceo, 6 Phil. 29 (1906)) Without an actual case coming within its jurisdiction, this Court cannot
inquire into any allegation of grave abuse of discretion by the other departments of the government.
VIII. Alleged violation of policy towards cooperatives. On the other hand, the Cooperative Union of the
Philippines (CUP), after briefly surveying the course of legislation, argues that it was to adopt a
definite policy of granting tax exemption to cooperatives that the present Constitution embodies
provisions on cooperatives. To subject cooperatives to the VAT would therefore be to infringe a
constitutional policy. Petitioner claims that in 1973, P.D. No. 175 was promulgated exempting
cooperatives from the payment of income taxes and sales taxes but in 1984, because of the crisis
which menaced the national economy, this exemption was withdrawn by P.D. No. 1955; that in 1986,
P.D. No. 2008 again granted cooperatives exemption from income and sales taxes until December
31, 1991, but, in the same year, E.O. No. 93 revoked the exemption; and that finally in 1987 the
framers of the Constitution "repudiated the previous actions of the government adverse to the
interests of the cooperatives, that is, the repeated revocation of the tax exemption to
cooperatives and instead upheld the policy of strengthening the cooperatives by way of the grant of
tax exemptions," by providing the following in Art. XII:
1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities,
income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and services
produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as
the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the underprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound
agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and
efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both
domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises
against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country
shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. Private enterprises, including
corporations, cooperatives, and similar collective organizations, shall be encouraged to
broaden the base of their ownership.
15. The Congress shall create an agency to promote the viability and growth of
cooperatives as instruments for social justice and economic development.
Petitioner's contention has no merit. In the first place, it is not true that P.D. No. 1955 singled out
cooperatives by withdrawing their exemption from income and sales taxes under P.D. No. 175, 5.
What P.D. No. 1955, 1 did was to withdraw the exemptions and preferential treatments theretofore
granted to private business enterprises in general, in view of the economic crisis which then beset the
nation. It is true that after P.D. No. 2008, 2 had restored the tax exemptions of cooperatives in 1986,
the exemption was again repealed by E.O. No. 93, 1, but then again cooperatives were not the only
ones whose exemptions were withdrawn. The withdrawal of tax incentives applied to all, including
government and private entities. In the second place, the Constitution does not really require that
cooperatives be granted tax exemptions in order to promote their growth and viability. Hence, there is
no basis for petitioner's assertion that the government's policy toward cooperatives had been one of
vacillation, as far as the grant of tax privileges was concerned, and that it was to put an end to this
indecision that the constitutional provisions cited were adopted. Perhaps as a matter of policy
cooperatives should be granted tax exemptions, but that is left to the discretion of Congress. If
Congress does not grant exemption and there is no discrimination to cooperatives, no violation of any
constitutional policy can be charged.
Indeed, petitioner's theory amounts to saying that under the Constitution cooperatives are exempt
from taxation. Such theory is contrary to the Constitution under which only the following are exempt
from taxation: charitable institutions, churches and parsonages, by reason of Art. VI, 28 (3), and
non-stock, non-profit educational institutions by reason of Art. XIV, 4 (3).
CUP's further ground for seeking the invalidation of R.A. No. 7716 is that it denies cooperatives the
equal protection of the law because electric cooperatives are exempted from the VAT. The
classification between electric and other cooperatives (farmers cooperatives, producers cooperatives,
marketing cooperatives, etc.) apparently rests on a congressional determination that there is greater
need to provide cheaper electric power to as many people as possible, especially those living in the
rural areas, than there is to provide them with other necessities in life. We cannot say that such
classification is unreasonable.
We have carefully read the various arguments raised against the constitutional validity of R.A. No.
7716. We have in fact taken the extraordinary step of enjoining its enforcement pending resolution of
these cases. We have now come to the conclusion that the law suffers from none of the infirmities
attributed to it by petitioners and that its enactment by the other branches of the government does not
constitute a grave abuse of discretion. Any question as to its necessity, desirability or expediency
must be addressed to Congress as the body which is electorally responsible, remembering that, as
Justice Holmes has said, "legislators are the ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the
people in quite as great a degree as are the courts." (Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. May, 194
U.S. 267, 270, 48 L. Ed. 971, 973 (1904)). It is not right, as petitioner in G.R. No. 115543 does in
arguing that we should enforce the public accountability of legislators, that those who took part in
passing the law in question by voting for it in Congress should later thrust to the courts the burden of
reviewing measures in the flush of enactment. This Court does not sit as a third branch of the
legislature, much less exercise a veto power over legislation.
WHEREFORE, the motions for reconsideration are denied with finality and the temporary restraining
order previously issued is hereby lifted.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Melo, Kapunan, Francisco and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla and Vitug, JJ., maintained their separate opinion.
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo and Puno, JJ, maintained their dissenting opinion.
Panganiban, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-33713 July 30, 1975
EUSEBIO B. GARCIA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. ERNESTO S. MATA, Secretary of National Defense, and GENERAL MANUEL T. YAN, Chief of Staff, Armed
Forces of the Philippines, respondents-appellees.
Emilio Purugganan for petitioner-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Rosalio A. de Leon and Solicitor Eulogio
Raquel-Santos for respondents-appellees.

CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City,
Branch IX, in civil case Q-13466, entitled "Eusebio B. Garcia, petitioner, versus Hon. Ernesto Mata
(Juan Ponce Enrile), et al., respondents," declaring paragraph 11 of the "Special Provisions for the
Armed Forces of the Philippines" of Republic Act No. 1600
1
unconstitutional and therefore invalid and
inoperative.
We affirm the judgment a quo.
The facts material to this case are embodied in the following stipulation submitted jointly by both
parties to the lower court:
Petitioner was a reserve officer on active duty with the Armed Forces of the Philippines
until his reversion to inactive status on 15 November 1960, pursuant to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 2332. At the time of reversion, Petitioner held the rank of Captain with
a monthly emolument of P478.00, comprising his base and longevity pay, quarters and
subsistence allowances;
On June 18, 1955, the date when Republic Act No. 1382 took effect, petitioner had a
total of 9 years, 4 months and 12 days of accumulated active commissioned service in
the Armed Forces of the Philippines;
On July 11, 1956, the date when Republic Act 1600 took effect, petitioner had an
accumulated active commissioned service of 10 years, 5 months and 5 days in the
Armed Forces of the Philippines;
Petitioner's reversion to inactive status on 15 November 1960 was pursuant to the
provisions of Republic Act 2334, and such reversion was neither for cause, at his own
request, nor after court-martial proceedings;
From 15 November 1960 up to the present, petitioner has been on inactive status and
as such, he has neither received any emoluments from the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, nor was he ever employed in the Government in any capacity;
As a consequence of his reversion to inactive status, petitioner filed the necessary
petitions with the offices of the AFP Chief of Staff, the Secretary of National Defense,
and the President, respectively, but received reply only from the Chief of Staff through
the AFP Adjutant General.
On September 17, 1969 the petitioner brought an action for "Mandamus and Recovery of a Sum of
Money" in the court a quo to compel the respondents Secretary of National Defense and Chief of
Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
2
to reinstate him in the active commissioned service of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to readjust his rank, and to pay all the emoluments and
allowances due to him from the time of his reversion to inactive status. On December 2, 1970 the trial
court dismissed the petition. The court ruled that paragraph 11 of the "Special Provisions for the
Armed Forces of the Philippines" in Republic Act 1600 is "invalid, unconstitutional and inoperative."
The petitioner had a total of 9 years, 4 months and 12 days of accumulated active commissioned
service in the AFP when Republic Act 1382 took effect on June 18, 1955. Section I of this law
provided:
Reserve officers with at least ten years of active accumulated commissioned service
who are still on active duty at the time of the approval of this Act shall not be reverted
into inactive status except for cause after proper court-martial proceedings or upon their
own request: Provided, That for purposes of computing the length of service, six months
or more of active service shall be considered one year. (emphasis supplied)
The petitioner's accumulated active commissioned service was thus short of the minimum service
requirement prescribed in the aforequoted provision of R.A. 1382.
On July 11, 1956,
3
while the petitioner was yet in the active service, Republic Act 1600 was enacted
into law. Paragraph 11 of the SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR THE ARMED FORCES OF THE
PHILIPPINES (on page 892 of the Act) provided as follows:
11. After the approval of this Act, and when there is no emergency, no reserve officer of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines may be called to a tour of active duty for more than
two years during any period of five consecutive years: PROVIDED, That hereafter
reserve officers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines on active duty for more than two
years on the date of the approval of this Act except those whose military and
educational training, experience and qualifications are deemed essential to the needs of
the service, shall be reverted to inactive status within one year from the approval of this
Act: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That reserve officers with at least ten years of active
accumulated commissioned service who are still on active duty at the time of the
approval of this Act shall not be reverted to inactive status except for cause after proper
court-martial proceedings or upon their request; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any such
reserve officer reverted to inactive status who has at least five of active commissioned
service shall be entitled to a gratuity equivalent to one month's authorized base and
longevity pay in the rank held at the time of such reversion for every year of active
commissioned service; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any reserve officer who receives a
gratuity under the provisions of this Act shall not except during a National emergency or
mobilization, be called to a tour of active duty within five years from the date of
reversion: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That the Secretary of National Defense is
authorized to extend the tour of active duty of reserve officers who are qualified military
pilots and doctors; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That any savings in the appropriations
authorized in this Act for the Department of National Defense notwithstanding any
provision of this Act to the contrary and any unexpended balance of certification to
accounts payable since 1 July 1949 regardless of purpose of the appropriation shall be
made available for the purpose of this paragraph: AND PROVIDED, FINALLY, That the
Secretary of National Defense shall render a quarterly report to Congress as to the
implementation of the provisions of this paragraph. ( pp. 892-893, RA 1600) (emphasis
supplied)
The petitioner consequently argues that his reversion to inactive status on November 15, 1960 was in
violation of the abovequoted provision which prohibits the reversion to inactive status of reserve
officers on active duty with at least ten years of accumulated active commissioned service.
On the other hand, the respondents contend that the said provision has no relevance or pertinence
whatsoever to the budget in question or to any appropriation item contained therein, and is therefore
proscribed by Art. VI, Sec. 19, par. 2
4
of the 1935 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriation bill unless it
relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein; and any such provision or
enactment shall be limited in its operation to such appropriation.
A perusal of the challenged provision of R.A. 1600 fails to disclose its relevance or relation to any
appropriation item therein, or to the Appropriation Act as a whole. From the very first clause of
paragraph 11 itself, which reads,
After the approval of this Act, and when there is no emergency, no reserve officer of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines may be called to a tour of active duty for more than two
years during any period of five consecutive years:
the incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. While R.A. 1600 appropriated money for the
operation of the Government for the fiscal year 1956-1957, the said paragraph 11 refers to the
fundamental government policy matters of the calling to active duty and the reversion to inactive
status of reserve officers in the AFP. The incongruity and irrelevancy continue throughout the entire
paragraph.
In the language of the respondents-appellees, "it was indeed a non-appropriation item inserted in an
appropriation measure in violation of the constitutional inhibition against "riders" to the general
appropriation act." It was indeed a new and completely unrelated provision attached to the
Appropriation Act.
The paragraph in question also violated Art. VI, Sec. 21, par. 1
5
of the 1935 Constitution of the
Philippines which provided that "No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one
subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill." This constitutional requirement nullified and
rendered inoperative any provision contained in the body of an act that was not fairly included in the
subject expressed in the title or was not germane to or properly connected with that subject.
In determining whether a provision contained in an act is embraced in the subject and is properly
connected therewith, the subject to be considered is the one expressed in the title of the act, and
every fair intendment and reasonable doubt should be indulged in favor of the validity of the
legislative enactment. But when an act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the
subject of the act, as expressed in the title, such provisions are inoperative and without effect.
We are mindful that the title of an act is not required to be an index to the body of the act. Thus,
in Sumulong vs. Comelec, 73 Phil. 288, 291, this Court held that it is "a sufficient compliance with
such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all the provisions of the statute are
germane to that general subject." The constitutional provision was intended to preclude the insertion
of riders in legislation, a rider being a provision not germane to the subject-matter of the bill.
6

The subject of R.A. 1600, as expressed in its title, is restricted to "appropriating funds for the
operation of the government." Any provision contained in the body of the act that is fairly included in
this restricted subject or any matter properly connected therewith is valid and operative. But, if a
provision in the body of the act is not fairly included in this restricted subject, like the provision relating
to the policy matters of calling to active duty and reversion to inactive duty of reserve officers of the
AFP, such provision is inoperative and of no effect.
To quote the respondents-appellees on this point:
It is obvious that the statutory provision in question refers to security of reserve officers
from reversion to inactive status, whereas the subject or title of the statute from which it
derives its existence refers to appropriations. Verily, it runs contrary to or is repugnant to
the above-quoted injunctive provision of the Constitution. Where a conflict arises
between a statute and the Constitution, the latter prevails. It should be emphasized that
a Constitution is superior to a statute and is precisely called the "supreme law of the
land" because it is the fundamental or organic law which states the general principles
and builds the substantial foundation and general framework of law and government,
and for that reason a statute contrary to or in violation of the Constitution is null and void
(Talabon vs. Iloilo Provincial Warden, 78 Phil. 599).1wph1.t If a law, therefore,
happens to infringe upon or violate the fundamental law, courts of justice may step in to
nullify its effectiveness (Mabanag vs. Lopez Vito, 78 Phil. 1).
Upon the foregoing dissertation, we declare Paragraph 11 of the SPECIAL PROVISIONS FOR THE
ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES as unconstitutional, invalid and inoperative. Being
unconstitutional, it confers no right and affords no protection. In legal contemplation it is as though it
has never been passed.
7

Verily, not having shown a clear legal right to the position to which he desires to be restored, the
petitioner cannot compel the respondents to reinstate and/or call him to active duty, promote or
readjust his rank, much less pay him back emoluments and allowances.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is denied, and the decision of the lower court dismissing the
complaint is hereby affirmed. No pronouncement as to costs.
Makalintal, C.J., Fernando, Makasiar, Esquerra, Muoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr. and Martin,
JJ., concur.
Antonio, J., took no part.
Teehankee, J., is on leave
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:
I cannot but concur in the able and scholarly opinion of Mr. Justice Castro. There is indeed constant
need to make it emphatically clear that the Constitution proscribes the insertion of riders in the
Budget, the pernicious implications of which are too plain and well-known to call for further
elucidation. I am adding a few words here, only to bolster, if I may, the conclusion that petitioner's
pose would still be unsustainable even if it could be assumed that the Special Provisions invoked by
him were constitutional.
According to the stipulation of facts submitted jointly by both parties to the lower court, "(p)etitioner's
reversion to inactive status on 15 November 1960 was pursuant to provisions of Republic Act 2334,
and such reversion was neither for cause, at his own request, nor after court martial proceedings" and
that "(o)n June 18, 1955, the date when Republic Act 1382 took effect, petitioner had a total of (only)
9 years, 4 months and 12 days of accumulated active commission service in the Armed Forces of the
Philippines." In other words, indisputably petitioner is not in a position to invoke Republic Act 1382
which provides as follows:
SECTION 1. Reserve Officers with at least ten years of active accumulated
commissioned service who are still on active duty at the time of the approval of this Act
shall not be reverted into inactive status except for cause after proper court martial
proceedings or upon their own request: Provided, That for purposes of computing the
length of service, six months or more of active service shall be considered one year.
for the simple reason that he lacked, as of the date of the approval of this law, the 10-year
accumulated active commissioned service required thereby.
On June 19, 1959, Republic Act 2334 was enacted containing the following pertinent provisions:
SEC. 2. After the approval of this Act, and except in time of emergency, no reserve
officer shall be called to extended tours of active duty exceeding a total of two years
within any period of five consecutive years: Provided, That reserve officers on active
duty for more than two years on the date of approval of this Act, with the exception of
those covered by section three of this Act, shall be reverted to inactive status within
three years from the approval of this Act: Provided, further, That hereafter calls to
extended tours of active duty of reserve officers shall be in proportion to the officers
requirement of each major service in the reserve force build-up program of the Armed
Forces of the Philippines and the priority for selecting such reserve officers within each
major service shall follow the order of age groupings for the reserve force as defined in
section fifty-two of the National Defense Act, as amended.
SEC. 3. The provisions of section two of this Act shall not apply to reserve officers
covered by the provisions of Republic Act Numbered Thirteen hundred eighty-two nor to
those possessing technical qualifications, skills, and competence which are
indispensable to the needs of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and for whom there
are no satisfactory replacements from among reserve officers in the inactive status:
Provided, That the selection of such officers shall be as determined by a Board of
Officers to be appointed by the Chief of Staff.
Having the foregoing provisions in mind, it is clear to me that in reverting petitioner to inactive status
on November 15, 1960, the Armed Forces authorities and original respondents herein, now
substituted respectively by the present incumbents, acted properly and were merely complying with
the injunction of Section 2 above that "(r)eserve officers on active duty for more than two years on the
date of the approval of this Act, with the exception of those covered by section three of this Act, shall
be reverted to inactive status within three years from the approval of this Act." As already stated, it is
definite that petitioner is not covered by the provisions of Republic Act 1382 and there is no evidence
here whatsoever that petitioner comes within the other exception of the Act. We have not been shown
that, if he possesses the indispensable technical qualifications, skills, etc. mentioned in Section 3, he
has been selected by the Board of Officers appointed by the Chief of Staff for the purpose.
Now, under the Special Provision in question contained in the National Budget for the fiscal year
1955-56 (Republic Act 1600), reserve officers with at least ten years of active accumulated
commissioned service up to July 11, 1956, the date of its enactment, and who were still on active
duty on said date "shall not be reverted to inactive status except for cause after proper court martial
proceedings or upon their request." Upon the other hand, as already stated, under the subsequent
law, Republic Act 2334, "(r)eserve officers on active duty for more than two years on the date of the
approval of this Act" (June 19, 1959), with the exceptions already noted which do not apply to
petitioner, "shall be reverted to inactive status within three years from the approval of this Act." To my
mind, there is irreconcilable repugnance between these two legal provisions. The first prohibited
reversion while the second ordains it under practically identical circumstances. Accordingly, it is my
considered view that Republic Act 2334 has repealed the Special Provision relied upon by petitioner,
assuming its validity, notwithstanding the absence of any specific repealing clause in this later
legislation. As I see it, the inconsistency between the two is so clear and definite that one cannot
stand together with the other. What the first says should not be done (reversion), the later one enjoins
mandatorily to be accomplished.
As to the possible contention that petitioner had acquired a vested right to a permanent status under
the prior law, I believe it is plainly within the power of the legislature to adjust the rights and status of
reserve officers of the Armed Forces. No member of the army has a vested right in his employment,
status or rank therein. One can easily imagine the difficulties and complications, which can affect the
national security or the fiscal resources of the government, if the legislature were deprived of the
authority to adjust the tours of duty of reserve officers according to the demands of the prevailing
situation. After all, from the very nature of things, every member of the reserve force should be under
constant notice that this status as such member is subject to legislative control. Moreover, reversion
cannot be considered as depriving the, officer concerned totally of his employment and benefits, for
Section 4 of Republic Act 2334 provides in this connection as follows:
SEC. 4. Any reserve officer who is reverted to inactive duty under the provisions of this
Act after having completed an accumulated period of active commissioned service of
between five years and twenty years shall, unless he is already entitled to the retirement
benefits under Republic Act Numbered Three hundred forty, as amended, be entitled
upon reversion to receive a gratuity equivalent to one month's authorized base and
longevity pay in the permanent rank held at the time of such reversion multiplied by his
years of active commissioned service: Provided, That such reversion is not as a result
of court martial action or due to the officer's gross misconduct, the intemparate use of
drugs or alcoholics, or inefficiency: Provided, however, That if a reserve officer is
reemployed in a civilian office of the government or government owned or controlled
corporation, he shall not be made to reimburse the amounts received by him as gratuity
under this Act: Provided, further, That if a reserve officer who has received gratuity
under this Act reenters the active service, he shall not be eligible for a new gratuity until
he has completed at least five years of active commissioned service from the date of
such reentry, and no subsequent gratuity shall be paid covering any period of active
commissioned service for which he has already received gratuity under this Act:
Provided, further, That in case a reserve officer who has received gratuity under this Act
subsequently reenters the active service and is retired pursuant to Republic Act
Numbered Three hundred forty, such gratuity shall be deducted from his retirement
gratuity or pensions: And provided, finally, That for purposes of this section, any period
of service amounting to six months or more shall be counted as one year.
In conclusion, whether the Special Provision in question is constitutional or not, petitioner cannot
complain about his reversion to inactive duty, considering the provisions of Republic Act 2334 by
virtue of which, according to the stipulation of facts, it was ordered by respondents. Hence, the herein
petition should be dismissed.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 71977 February 27, 1987
DEMETRIO G. DEMETRIA, M.P., AUGUSTO S. SANCHEZ, M.P., ORLANDO S. MERCADO, M.P.,
HONORATO Y. AQUINO, M.P., ZAFIRO L. RESPICIO, M.P., DOUGLAS R. CAGAS, M.P., OSCAR
F. SANTOS, M.P., ALBERTO G. ROMULO, M.P., CIRIACO R. ALFELOR, M.P., ISIDORO E. REAL,
M.P., EMIGDIO L. LINGAD, M.P., ROLANDO C. MARCIAL, M.P., PEDRO M. MARCELLANA, M.P.,
VICTOR S. ZIGA, M.P., and ROGELIO V. GARCIA. M.P., petitioners,
vs.
HON. MANUEL ALBA in his capacity as the MINISTER OF THE BUDGET and VICTOR
MACALINGCAG in his capacity as the TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FERNAN, J.:
Assailed in this petition for prohibition with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is the
constitutionality of the first paragraph of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177, otherwise known
as the "Budget Reform Decree of 1977."
Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as concerned citizens of this country, as members of the
National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa representing their millions of constituents, as parties with
general interest common to all the people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers whose vital interests
may be affected by the outcome of the reliefs prayed for"
1
listed the grounds relied upon in this
petition as follows:
A. SECTION 44 OF THE 'BUDGET REFORM DECREE OF 1977' INFRINGES UPON
THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW BY AUTHORIZING THE ILLEGAL TRANSFER OF PUBLIC
MONEYS.
B. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 IS REPUGNANT TO THE
CONSTITUTION AS IT FAILS TO SPECIFY THE OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES FOR
WHICH THE PROPOSED TRANSFER OF FUNDS ARE TO BE MADE.
C. SECTION 44 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1177 ALLOWS THE PRESIDENT
TO OVERRIDE THE SAFEGUARDS, FORM AND PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED BY
THE CONSTITUTION IN APPROVING APPROPRIATIONS.
D. SECTION 44 OF THE SAME DECREE AMOUNTS TO AN UNDUE DELEGATION
OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO THE EXECUTIVE.
E. THE THREATENED AND CONTINUING TRANSFER OF FUNDS BY THE
PRESIDENT AND THE IMPLEMENTATION THEREOF BY THE BUDGET MINISTER
AND THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF
THEIR AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION.
2

Commenting on the petition in compliance with the Court resolution dated September 19, 1985, the
Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of petitioners, who were
allegedly merely begging an advisory opinion from the Court, there being no justiciable controversy fit
for resolution or determination. He further contended that the provision under consideration was
enacted pursuant to Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution; and that at any rate,
prohibition will not lie from one branch of the government to a coordinate branch to enjoin the
performance of duties within the latter's sphere of responsibility.
On February 27, 1986, the Court required the petitioners to file a Reply to the Comment. This, they
did, stating, among others, that as a result of the change in the administration, there is a need to hold
the resolution of the present case in abeyance "until developments arise to enable the parties to
concretize their respective stands."
3

Thereafter, We required public respondents to file a rejoinder. The Solicitor General filed a rejoinder
with a motion to dismiss, setting forth as grounds therefor the abrogation of Section 16[5], Article VIII
of the 1973 Constitution by the Freedom Constitution of March 25, 1986, which has allegedly
rendered the instant petition moot and academic. He likewise cited the "seven pillars" enunciated by
Justice Brandeis in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936)
4
as basis for the petition's dismissal.
In the case of Evelio B. Javier v. The Commission on Elections and Arturo F. Pacificador, G.R. Nos.
68379-81, September 22, 1986, We stated that:
The abolition of the Batasang Pambansa and the disappearance of the office in dispute
between the petitioner and the private respondents both of whom have gone their
separate ways could be a convenient justification for dismissing the case. But there
are larger issues involved that must be resolved now, once and for all, not only to dispel
the legal ambiguities here raised. The more important purpose is to manifest in the
clearest possible terms that this Court will not disregard and in effect condone wrong on
the simplistic and tolerant pretext that the case has become moot and academic.
The Supreme Court is not only the highest arbiter of legal questions but also the
conscience of the government. The citizen comes to us in quest of law but we must also
give him justice. The two are not always the same. There are times when we cannot
grant the latter because the issue has been settled and decision is no longer possible
according to the law. But there are also times when although the dispute has
disappeared, as in this case, it nevertheless cries out to be resolved. Justice demands
that we act then, not only for the vindication of the outraged right, though gone, but also
for the guidance of and as a restraint upon the future.
It is in the discharge of our role in society, as above-quoted, as well as to avoid great disservice to
national interest that We take cognizance of this petition and thus deny public respondents' motion to
dismiss. Likewise noteworthy is the fact that the new Constitution, ratified by the Filipino people in the
plebiscite held on February 2, 1987, carries verbatim section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution under Section 24[5], Article VI. And while Congress has not officially reconvened, We
see no cogent reason for further delaying the resolution of the case at bar.
The exception taken to petitioners' legal standing deserves scant consideration. The case of Pascual
v. Secretary of Public Works, et al., 110 Phil. 331, is authority in support of petitioners' locus standi.
Thus:
Again, it is well-settled that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who
will sustain a direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many
decisions nullifying at the instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of
public funds, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of the
state for the purpose of administering anunconstitutional act constitutes
a misapplication of such funds which may be enjoined at the request of a taxpayer.
Although there are some decisions to the contrary, the prevailing view in the United
States is stated in the American Jurisprudence as follows:
In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite
standing to attack the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that
not only persons individually affected, but also taxpayers have sufficient
interest in preventing the illegal expenditures of moneys raised by taxation
and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes
requiring expenditure of public moneys. [ 11 Am. Jur. 761, Emphasis
supplied. ]
Moreover, in Tan v. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677 and Sanidad v. Comelec, 73 SCRA 333, We said that
as regards taxpayers' suits, this Court enjoys that open discretion to entertain the same or not.
The conflict between paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 and Section 16[5],
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution is readily perceivable from a mere cursory reading thereof. Said
paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides:
The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the different
departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive Department, which are
included in the General Appropriations Act, to any program, project or activity of any
department, bureau, or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved
after its enactment.
On the other hand, the constitutional provision under consideration reads as follows:
Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, however,
the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
and the heads of constitutional commis ions may by law be authorized to augment any
item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other
items of their respective appropriations.
The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit and categorical under
the 1973 Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the different branches of the government and
those of the constitutional commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and
resources, the constitution allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the
purpose of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the government
branch or constitutional body concerned. The leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and
conditions for which funds may be transferred were specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for the
purpose of augmenting an item and such transfer may be made only if there are savings from another
item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body.
Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly over extends the privilege granted under said
Section 16[5]. It empowers the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department,
bureau, office or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any
department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or approved after its
enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in the
item from which the same are to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of
augmenting the item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard the
standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue delegation of legislative
powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof. Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the
provision in question null and void.
"For the love of money is the root of all evil: ..." and money belonging to no one in particular, i.e.
public funds, provide an even greater temptation for misappropriation and embezzlement. This,
evidently, was foremost in the minds of the framers of the constitution in meticulously prescribing the
rules regarding the appropriation and disposition of public funds as embodied in Sections 16 and 18
of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution. Hence, the conditions on the release of money from the
treasury [Sec. 18(1)]; the restrictions on the use of public funds for public purpose [Sec. 18(2)]; the
prohibition to transfer an appropriation for an item to another [See. 16(5) and the requirement of
specifications [Sec. 16(2)], among others, were all safeguards designed to forestall abuses in the
expenditure of public funds. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 puts all these safeguards to naught. For, as
correctly observed by petitioners, in view of the unlimited authority bestowed upon the President, "...
Pres. Decree No. 1177 opens the floodgates for the enactment of unfunded appropriations, results in
uncontrolled executive expenditures, diffuses accountability for budgetary performance and
entrenches the pork barrel system as the ruling party may well expand [sic] public money not on the
basis of development priorities but on political and personal expediency."
5
The contention of public
respondents that paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. 1177 was enacted pursuant to Section 16(5) of
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution must perforce fall flat on its face.
Another theory advanced by public respondents is that prohibition will not lie from one branch of the
government against a coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the latter's sphere
of responsibility.
Thomas M. Cooley in his "A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations," Vol. 1, Eight Edition, Little,
Brown and Company, Boston, explained:
... The legislative and judicial are coordinate departments of the government, of equal
dignity; each is alike supreme in the exercise of its proper functions, and cannot directly
or indirectly, while acting within the limits of its authority, be subjected to the control or
supervision of the other, without an unwarrantable assumption by that other of power
which, by the Constitution, is not conferred upon it. The Constitution apportions the
powers of government, but it does not make any one of the three departments
subordinate to another, when exercising the trust committed to it. The courts may
declare legislative enactments unconstitutional and void in some cases, but not
because the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity to the legislative. Being
required to declare what the law is in the cases which come before them, they must
enforce the Constitution, as the paramount law, whenever a legislative enactment
comes in conflict with it. But the courts sit, not to review or revise the legislative action,
but to enforce the legislative will, and it is only where they find that the legislature has
failed to keep within its constitutional limits, that they are at liberty to disregard its action;
and in doing so, they only do what every private citizen may do in respect to the
mandates of the courts when the judges assumed to act and to render judgments or
decrees without jurisdiction. "In exercising this high authority, the judges claim no
judicial supremacy; they are only the administrators of the public will. If an act of the
legislature is held void, it is not because the judges have any control over the legislative
power, but because the act is forbidden by the Constitution, and because the will of the
people, which is therein declared, is paramount to that of their representatives
expressed in any law." [Lindsay v. Commissioners, & c., 2 Bay, 38, 61; People v.
Rucker, 5 Col. 5; Russ v. Com., 210 Pa. St. 544; 60 Atl. 169, 1 L.R.A. [N.S.] 409, 105
Am. St. Rep. 825] (pp. 332-334).
Indeed, where the legislature or the executive branch is acting within the limits of its authority, the
judiciary cannot and ought not to interfere with the former. But where the legislature or the executive
acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare
what the other branches of the government had assumed to do as void. This is the essence of judicial
power conferred by the Constitution "in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law" [Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution; Art. X, Section 1 of the 1973
Constitution and which was adopted as part of the Freedom Constitution, and Art. VIII, Section 1 of
the 1987 Constitution] and which power this Court has exercised in many instances. *
Public respondents are being enjoined from acting under a provision of law which We have earlier
mentioned to be constitutionally infirm. The general principle relied upon cannot therefore accord
them the protection sought as they are not acting within their "sphere of responsibility" but without it.
The nation has not recovered from the shock, and worst, the economic destitution brought about by
the plundering of the Treasury by the deposed dictator and his cohorts. A provision which allows even
the slightest possibility of a repetition of this sad experience cannot remain written in our statute
books.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential Decree No.
1177 is hereby declared null and void for being unconstitutional.
SO ORDER RED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, EXEQUIEL B. GARCIA and A. GONZALES, petitioners,
vs.
HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, as Secretary of Budget and Management; HON. VICENTE T. TAN, as National
Treasurer and COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
G.R. No. 113174 August 19, 1994
RAUL S. ROCO, as Member of the Philippine Senate, NEPTALI A. GONZALES, Chairman of the Committee on
Finance of the Philippine Senate, and EDGARDO J. ANGARA, as President and Chief Executive of the Philippine
Senate, all of whom also sue as taxpayers, in their own behalf and in representation of Senators HEHERSON
ALVAREZ, AGAPITO A. AQUINO, RODOLFO G. BIAZON, JOSE D. LINA, JR., ERNESTO F. HERRERA, BLAS F.
OPLE, JOHN H. OSMENA, GLORIA MACAPAGAL- ARROYO, VICENTE C. SOTTO III, ARTURO M. TOLENTINO,
FRANCISCO S. TATAD, WIGBERTO E. TAADA and FREDDIE N. WEBB, petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, and THE NATIONAL
TREASURER, THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, impleaded herein as an unwilling
co-petitioner, respondents.
G.R. No. 113766 August 19, 1994
WIGBERTO E. TAADA and ALBERTO G. ROMULO, as Members of the Senate and as taxpayers, and FREEDOM
FROM DEBT COALITION, petitioners,
vs.
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR., in
his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, HON. CARIDAD VALDEHUESA, in her
capacity as National Treasurer, and THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
G.R. No. 113888 August 19, 1994
WIGBERTO E. TAADA and ALBERTO G. ROMULO, as Members of the Senate and as taxpayers,petitioners,
vs.
HON. TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, JR., in
his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, HON. CARIDAD VALDEHUESA, in her
capacity as National Treasurer, and THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
Ramon R. Gonzales for petitioners in G.R. No. 113105.
Eddie Tamondong for petitioners in G.R. Nos. 113766 & 113888.
Roco, Buag, Kapunan, Migallos & Jardeleza for petitioners Raul S. Roco, Neptali A. Gonzales and Edgardo Angara.
Ceferino Padua Law Office fro intervenor Lawyers Against Monopoly and Poverty (Lamp).

QUIASON, J.:
Once again this Court is called upon to rule on the conflicting claims of authority between the
Legislative and the Executive in the clash of the powers of the purse and the sword. Providing the
focus for the contest between the President and the Congress over control of the national budget are
the four cases at bench. Judicial intervention is being sought by a group of concerned taxpayers on
the claim that Congress and the President have impermissibly exceeded their respective authorities,
and by several Senators on the claim that the President has committed grave abuse of discretion or
acted without jurisdiction in the exercise of his veto power.
I
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was passed and
approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed conditions and
limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously submitted by the
President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify projects in the "pork
barrels" allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the Constitution,
Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to have
become Republic Act No. 7663, entitled "AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE OPERATION
OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER THIRTY
ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES" (GAA of 1994).
On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the provisions of
the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions.
No step was taken in either House of Congress to override the vetoes.
In G.R. No. 113105, the Philippine Constitution Association, Exequiel B. Garcia and Ramon A.
Gonzales as taxpayers, prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare as unconstitutional and void: (a)
Article XLI on the Countrywide Development Fund, the special provision in Article I entitled
Realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses, and Article XLVIII on the Appropriation for Debt
Service or the amount appropriated under said Article XLVIII in excess of the P37.9 Billion allocated
for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports; and (b) the veto of the President of the Special
Provision of
Article XLVIII of the GAA of 1994 (Rollo, pp. 88-90, 104-105)
In G.R. No. 113174, sixteen members of the Senate led by Senate President Edgardo J. Angara,
Senator Neptali A. Gonzales, the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, and Senator Raul S. Roco,
sought the issuance of the writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus against the Executive
Secretary, the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, and the National Treasurer.
Suing as members of the Senate and taxpayers, petitioners question: (1) the constitutionality of the
conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b)
Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d) Commission on Human Rights (CHR), (e) Citizen
Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGU'S) and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUC's); and
(2) the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for debt service.
In G.R. No. 113766, Senators Alberto G. Romulo and Wigberto Taada (a co-petitioner in G.R. No.
113174), together with the Freedom from Debt Coalition, a non-stock domestic corporation, sought
the issuance of the writs of prohibition and mandamus against the Executive Secretary, the Secretary
of the Department of Budget and Management, the National Treasurer, and the COA.
Petitioners Taada and Romulo sued as members of the Philippine Senate and taxpayers, while
petitioner Freedom from Debt Coalition sued as a taxpayer. They challenge the constitutionality of the
Presidential veto of the special provision in the appropriations for debt service and the automatic
appropriation of funds therefor.
In G.R. No. 11388, Senators Taada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and
mandamus against the same respondents in G.R. No. 113766. In this petition, petitioners contest the
constitutionality of: (1) the veto on four special provision added to items in the GAA of 1994 for the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH);
and (2) the conditions imposed by the President in the implementation of certain appropriations for
the CAFGU's, the DPWH, and the National Housing Authority (NHA).
Petitioners also sought the issuance of temporary restraining orders to enjoin respondents Secretary
of Budget and Management, National Treasurer and COA from enforcing the questioned provisions of
the GAA of 1994, but the Court declined to grant said provisional reliefs on the time- honored
principle of according the presumption of validity to statutes and the presumption of regularity to
official acts.
In view of the importance and novelty of most of the issues raised in the four petitions, the Court
invited former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and former Associate Justice Irene Cortes to submit
their respective memoranda as Amicus curiae, which they graciously did.
II
Locus Standi
When issues of constitutionality are raised, the Court can exercise its power of judicial review only if
the following requisites are compresent: (1) the existence of an actual and appropriate case; (2) a
personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of
judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question is the lis
mota of the case (Luz Farms v. Secretary of the Department of Agrarian Reform, 192 SCRA 51
[1990]; Dumlao v. Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 392 [1980]; People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56
[1937]).
While the Solicitor General did not question the locus standi of petitioners in G.R. No. 113105, he
claimed that the remedy of the Senators in the other petitions is political (i.e., to override the vetoes)
in effect saying that they do not have the requisite legal standing to bring the suits.
The legal standing of the Senate, as an institution, was recognized in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 191
SCRA 452 (1990). In said case, 23 Senators, comprising the entire membership of the Upper House
of Congress, filed a petition to nullify the presidential veto of Section 55 of the GAA of 1989. The filing
of the suit was authorized by Senate Resolution No. 381, adopted on February 2, 1989, and which
reads as follows:
Authorizing and Directing the Committee on Finance to Bring in the Name of the Senate
of the Philippines the Proper Suit with the Supreme Court of the Philippines contesting
the Constitutionality of the Veto by the President of Special and General Provisions,
particularly Section 55, of the General Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) and
For Other Purposes.
In the United States, the legal standing of a House of Congress to sue has been recognized (United
States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 551 F. 2d 384, 391 [1976]; Notes: Congressional Access To The
Federal Courts, 90 Harvard Law Review 1632 [1977]).
While the petition in G.R. No. 113174 was filed by 16 Senators, including the Senate President and
the Chairman of the Committee on Finance, the suit was not authorized by the Senate itself.
Likewise, the petitions in
G.R. Nos. 113766 and 113888 were filed without an enabling resolution for the purpose.
Therefore, the question of the legal standing of petitioners in the three cases becomes a preliminary
issue before this Court can inquire into the validity of the presidential veto and the conditions for the
implementation of some items in the GAA of 1994.
We rule that a member of the Senate, and of the House of Representatives for that matter, has the
legal standing to question the validity of a presidential veto or a condition imposed on an item in an
appropriation bill.
Where the veto is claimed to have been made without or in excess of the authority vested on the
President by the Constitution, the issue of an impermissible intrusion of the Executive into the domain
of the Legislature arises (Notes: Congressional Standing To Challenge Executive Action, 122
University of Pennsylvania Law Review 1366 [1974]).
To the extent the power of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his
office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution (Coleman v. Miller,
307 U.S. 433 [1939]; Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F. 2d 1307 [1973]).
An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless
substantial injury, which can be questioned by a member of Congress (Kennedy v. Jones, 412 F.
Supp. 353 [1976]). In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the courts.
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, as Amicus Curiae, noted:
This is, then, the clearest case of the Senate as a whole or individual Senators as such
having a substantial interest in the question at issue. It could likewise be said that there
was the requisite injury to their rights as Senators. It would then be futile to raise
any locus standi issue. Any intrusion into the domain appertaining to the Senate is to be
resisted. Similarly, if the situation were reversed, and it is the Executive Branch that
could allege a transgression, its officials could likewise file the corresponding action.
What cannot be denied is that a Senator has standing to maintain inviolate the
prerogatives, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution in his office
(Memorandum, p. 14).
It is true that the Constitution provides a mechanism for overriding a veto (Art. VI, Sec. 27 [1]). Said
remedy, however, is available only when the presidential veto is based on policy or political
considerations but not when the veto is claimed to be ultra vires. In the latter case, it becomes the
duty of the Court to draw the dividing line where the exercise of executive power ends and the
bounds of legislative jurisdiction begin.
III
G.R. No. 113105
1. Countrywide Development Fund
Article XLI of the GAA of 1994 sets up a Countrywide Development Fund of P2,977,000,000.00 to "be
used for infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers and other priority projects and
activities and credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries." Said Article provides:
COUNTRYWIDE DEVELOPMENT FUND
For Fund requirements of countrywide
development projects P 2,977,000,000

New Appropriations, by Purpose
Current Operating Expenditures
A. PURPOSE
Personal Maintenance Capital Total
Services and Other Outlays
Operating
Expenses
1. For Countrywide
Developments Projects P250,000,000 P2,727,000,000 P2,977,000,000

TOTAL NEW
APPROPRIATIONS P250,000,000 P2,727,000,000 P2,977,000,000
Special Provisions
1. Use and Release of Funds. The amount herein appropriated shall be used for
infrastructure, purchase of ambulances and computers and other priority projects and
activities, and credit facilities to qualified beneficiaries as proposed and identified by
officials concerned according to the following allocations: Representatives, P12,500,000
each; Senators, P18,000,000 each; Vice-President, P20,000,000; PROVIDED, That, the
said credit facilities shall be constituted as a revolving fund to be administered by a
government financial institution (GFI) as a trust fund for lending operations. Prior years
releases to local government units and national government agencies for this purpose
shall be turned over to the government financial institution which shall be the sole
administrator of credit facilities released from this fund.
The fund shall be automatically released quarterly by way of Advice of Allotments and
Notice of Cash Allocation directly to the assigned implementing agency not later than
five (5) days after the beginning of each quarter upon submission of the list of projects
and activities by the officials concerned.
2. Submission of Quarterly Reports. The Department of Budget and Management shall
submit within thirty (30) days after the end of each quarter a report to the Senate
Committee on Finance and the House Committee on Appropriations on the releases
made from this Fund. The report shall include the listing of the projects, locations,
implementing agencies and the endorsing officials (GAA of 1994, p. 1245).
Petitioners claim that the power given to the members of Congress to propose and identify the
projects and activities to be funded by the Countrywide Development Fund is an encroachment by the
legislature on executive power, since said power in an appropriation act in implementation of a law.
They argue that the proposal and identification of the projects do not involve the making of laws or the
repeal and amendment thereof, the only function given to the Congress by the Constitution (Rollo, pp.
78- 86).
Under the Constitution, the spending power called by James Madison as "the power of the purse,"
belongs to Congress, subject only to the veto power of the President. The President may propose the
budget, but still the final say on the matter of appropriations is lodged in the Congress.
The power of appropriation carries with it the power to specify the project or activity to be funded
under the appropriation law. It can be as detailed and as broad as Congress wants it to be.
The Countrywide Development Fund is explicit that it shall be used "for infrastructure, purchase of
ambulances and computers and other priority projects and activities and credit facilities to qualified
beneficiaries . . ." It was Congress itself that determined the purposes for the appropriation.
Executive function under the Countrywide Development Fund involves implementation of the priority
projects specified in the law.
The authority given to the members of Congress is only to propose and identify projects to be
implemented by the President. Under Article XLI of the GAA of 1994, the President must perforce
examine whether the proposals submitted by the members of Congress fall within the specific items
of expenditures for which the Fund was set up, and if qualified, he next determines whether they are
in line with other projects planned for the locality. Thereafter, if the proposed projects qualify for
funding under the Funds, it is the President who shall implement them. In short, the proposals and
identifications made by the members of Congress are merely recommendatory.
The procedure of proposing and identifying by members of Congress of particular projects or
activities under Article XLI of the GAA of 1994 is imaginative as it is innovative.
The Constitution is a framework of a workable government and its interpretation must take into
account the complexities, realities and politics attendant to the operation of the political branches of
government. Prior to the GAA of 1991, there was an uneven allocation of appropriations for the
constituents of the members of Congress, with the members close to the Congressional leadership or
who hold cards for "horse-trading," getting more than their less favored colleagues. The members of
Congress also had to reckon with an unsympathetic President, who could exercise his veto power to
cancel from the appropriation bill a pet project of a Representative or Senator.
The Countrywide Development Fund attempts to make equal the unequal. It is also a recognition that
individual members of Congress, far more than the President and their congressional colleagues are
likely to be knowledgeable about the needs of their respective constituents and the priority to be given
each project.
2. Realignment of Operating Expenses
Under the GAA of 1994, the appropriation for the Senate is P472,000,000.00 of which
P464,447,000.00 is appropriated for current operating expenditures, while the appropriation for the
House of Representatives is P1,171,924,000.00 of which P1,165,297,000.00 is appropriated for
current operating expenditures (GAA of 1994, pp. 2, 4, 9, 12).
The 1994 operating expenditures for the Senate are as follows:
Personal Services
Salaries, Permanent 153,347
Salaries/Wage, Contractual/Emergency 6,870

Total Salaries and Wages 160,217
=======
Other Compensation

Step Increments 1,073
Honoraria and Commutable Allowances 3,731
Compensation Insurance Premiums 1,579
Pag-I.B.I.G. Contributions 1,184
Medicare Premiums 888
Bonus and Cash Gift 14,791
Terminal Leave Benefits 2,000
Personnel Economic Relief Allowance 10,266
Additional Compensation of P500 under A.O. 53 11,130
Others 57,173

Total Other Compensation 103,815

01 Total Personal Services 264,032
=======
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses
02 Traveling Expenses 32,841
03 Communication Services 7,666
04 Repair and Maintenance of Government Facilities 1,220
05 Repair and Maintenance of Government Vehicles 318
06 Transportation Services 128
07 Supplies and Materials 20,189
08 Rents 24,584
14 Water/Illumination and Power 6,561
15 Social Security Benefits and Other Claims 3,270
17 Training and Seminars Expenses 2,225
18 Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses 9,360
23 Advertising and Publication
24 Fidelity Bonds and Insurance Premiums 1,325
29 Other Services 89,778

Total Maintenance and Other Operating Expenditures 200,415

Total Current Operating Expenditures 464,447
=======
(GAA of 1994, pp. 3-4)
The 1994 operating expenditures for the House of Representatives are as follows:
Personal Services
Salaries, Permanent 261,557
Salaries/Wages, Contractual/Emergency 143,643

Total Salaries and Wages 405,200
=======
Other Compensation
Step Increments 4,312
Honoraria and Commutable
Allowances 4,764
Compensation Insurance
Premiums 1,159
Pag-I.B.I.G. Contributions 5,231
Medicare Premiums 2,281

Bonus and Cash Gift 35,669
Terminal Leave Benefits 29
Personnel Economic Relief
Allowance 21,150
Additional Compensation of P500 under A.O. 53
Others 106,140

Total Other Compensation 202,863

01 Total Personal Services 608,063
=======
Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses
02 Traveling Expenses 139,611
03 Communication Services 22,514
04 Repair and Maintenance of Government Facilities 5,116
05 Repair and Maintenance of Government Vehicles 1,863
06 Transportation Services 178
07 Supplies and Materials 55,248
10 Grants/Subsidies/Contributions 940
14 Water/Illumination and Power 14,458
15 Social Security Benefits and Other Claims 325
17 Training and Seminars Expenses 7,236
18 Extraordinary and Miscellaneous Expenses 14,474
20 Anti-Insurgency/Contingency Emergency Expenses 9,400
23 Advertising and Publication 242
24 Fidelity Bonds and Insurance Premiums 1,420
29 Other Services 284,209

Total Maintenance and Other Operating Expenditures 557,234

Total Current Operating Expenditures 1,165,297
=======
(GAA of 1994, pp. 11-12)
The Special Provision Applicable to the Congress of the Philippines provides:
4. Realignment of Allocation for Operational Expenses. A member of Congress may
realign his allocation for operational expenses to any other expenses category provide
the total of said allocation is not exceeded. (GAA of 1994, p. 14).
The appropriation for operating expenditures for each House is further divided into expenditures for
salaries, personal services, other compensation benefits, maintenance expenses and other operating
expenses. In turn, each member of Congress is allotted for his own operating expenditure a
proportionate share of the appropriation for the House to which he belongs. If he does not spend for
one items of expense, the provision in question allows him to transfer his allocation in said item to
another item of expense.
Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign his allocation for
operational expenses to any other expense category (Rollo, pp. 82-92), claiming that this practice is
prohibited by Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution. Said section provides:
No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations: however, the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives,
the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions
may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations.
The proviso of said Article of the Constitution grants the President of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives the power to augment items in an appropriation act for their respective
offices from savings in other items of their appropriations, whenever there is a law authorizing such
augmentation.
The special provision on realignment of the operating expenses of members of Congress is
authorized by Section 16 of the General Provisions of the GAA of 1994, which provides:
Expenditure Components. Except by act of the Congress of the Philippines, no change
or modification shall be made in the expenditure items authorized in this Act and other
appropriation laws unless in cases
of augmentations from savings in appropriations as authorized under Section 25(5) of
Article VI of the Constitution (GAA of 1994, p. 1273).
Petitioners argue that the Senate President and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, but not
the individual members of Congress are the ones authorized to realign the savings as appropriated.
Under the Special Provisions applicable to the Congress of the Philippines, the members of Congress
only determine the necessity of the realignment of the savings in the allotments for their operating
expenses. They are in the best position to do so because they are the ones who know whether there
are savings available in some items and whether there are deficiencies in other items of their
operating expenses that need augmentation. However, it is the Senate President and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall approve the realignment. Before giving
their stamp of approval, these two officials will have to see to it that:
(1) The funds to be realigned or transferred are actually savings in the items of expenditures from
which the same are to be taken; and
(2) The transfer or realignment is for the purposes of augmenting the items of expenditure to which
said transfer or realignment is to be made.
3. Highest Priority for Debt Service
While Congress appropriated P86,323,438,000.00 for debt service (Article XLVII of the GAA of 1994),
it appropriated only P37,780,450,000.00 for the Department of Education Culture and Sports.
Petitioners urged that Congress cannot give debt service the highest priority in the GAA of 1994
(Rollo, pp. 93-94) because under the Constitution it should be education that is entitled to the highest
funding. They invoke Section 5(5), Article XIV thereof, which provides:
(5) The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure that
teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through
adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment.
This issue was raised in Guingona, Jr. v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991), where this Court held that
Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution, is merely directory, thus:
While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution, Congress is
mandated to "assign the highest budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure that
teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents through
adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and fulfillment," it does not
thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power
to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the attainment of other
state policies or objectives.
As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985, the budget for education has tripled to
upgrade and improve the facility of the public school system. The compensation of
teachers has been doubled. The amount of P29,740,611,000.00 set aside for the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports under the General Appropriations Act
(R.A. No. 6381), is the highest budgetary allocation among all department budgets. This
is a clear compliance with the aforesaid constitutional mandate according highest
priority to education.
Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not without any power,
guided only by its good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably
service our enormous debt, the greater portion of which was inherited from the previous
administration. It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of the
country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus, if in the
process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the share
allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be
thereby assailed as unconstitutional.
G.R. No. 113105
G.R. No. 113174
Veto of Provision on Debt Ceiling
The Congress added a Special Provision to Article XLVIII (Appropriations for Debt Service) of the
GAA of 1994 which provides:
Special Provisions
1. Use of the Fund. The appropriation authorized herein shall be used for payment of
principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness; PROVIDED, That any
payment in excess of the amount herein appropriated shall be subject to the approval of
the President of the Philippines with the concurrence of the Congress of the
Philippines; PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in no case shall this fund be used to pay for
the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators.
2. Reporting Requirement. The Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas and the Department of
Finance shall submit a quarterly report of actual foreign and domestic debt service
payments to the House Committee on Appropriations and Senate Finance Committee
within one (1) month after each quarter (GAA of 1944, pp. 1266).
The President vetoed the first Special Provision, without vetoing the P86,323,438,000.00
appropriation for debt service in said Article. According to the President's Veto Message:
IV. APPROPRIATIONS FOR DEBT SERVICE
I would like to emphasize that I concur fully with the desire of Congress to reduce the
debt burden by decreasing the appropriation for debt service as well as the inclusion of
the Special Provision quoted below. Nevertheless, I believe that this debt reduction
scheme cannot be validly done through the 1994 GAA. This must be addressed by
revising our debt policy by way of innovative and comprehensive debt reduction
programs conceptualized within the ambit of the Medium-Term Philippine Development
Plan.
Appropriations for payment of public debt, whether foreign or domestic, are
automatically appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and Section 31 of
P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, the
Administrative Code of 1987. I wish to emphasize that the constitutionality of such
automatic provisions on debt servicing has been upheld by the Supreme Court in the
case of "Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr., and Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Hon. Guillermo N.
Carague, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, et al.," G.R. No.
94571, dated April 22, 1991.
I am, therefore vetoing the following special provision for the reason that the GAA is not
the appropriate legislative measure to amend the provisions of the Foreign Borrowing
Act, P.D. No. 1177 and E.O. No. 292:
Use of the Fund. The appropriation authorized herein shall be used for
payment of principal and interest of foreign and domestic
indebtedness: PROVIDED, That any payment in excess of the amount
herein appropriated shall be subject to the approval of the President of the
Philippines with the concurrence of the Congress of the
Philippines:PROVIDED, FURTHER, That in no case shall this fund be
used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators
(GAA of 1994, p. 1290).
Petitioners claim that the President cannot veto the Special Provision on the appropriation for debt
service without vetoing the entire amount of P86,323,438.00 for said purpose (Rollo, G.R. No.
113105, pp. 93-98; Rollo, G.R. No. 113174, pp. 16-18). The Solicitor General counterposed that the
Special Provision did not relate to the item of appropriation for debt service and could therefore be the
subject of an item veto (Rollo, G.R. No. 113105, pp. 54-60; Rollo, G.R. No. 113174, pp. 72-82).
This issue is a mere rehash of the one put to rest in Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA 452
(1990). In that case, the issue was stated by the Court, thus:
The fundamental issue raised is whether or not the veto by the President of Section 55
of the 1989 Appropriations Bill (Section 55
FY '89), and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990 Appropriations Bill
(Section 16 FY '90), is unconstitutional and without effect.
The Court re-stated the issue, just so there would not be any misunderstanding about it, thus:
The focal issue for resolution is whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto
power accorded by the Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the power to
veto "provisions" of an Appropriations Bill?
The bases of the petition in Gonzales, which are similar to those invoked in the present case, are
stated as follows:
In essence, petitioners' cause is anchored on the following grounds: (1) the President's
line-veto power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover
provision/s; therefore, she exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY '89)
and Section 16 (FY '90) which are provisions; (2) when the President objects to a
provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise the item-veto power but should
veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the power to strike out
conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of
the 1987 Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also
vested with the prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.
The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the President may not veto a
provision without vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a
distinct and severable part of a bill may be the subject of a separate veto but also
overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any provision in the general appropriations
bill shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein and that any such
provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates (1987
Constitution, Article VI, Section 25 [2]). In other words, in the true sense of the term, a
provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation to some particular
appropriation to which it relates, and does not relate to the entire bill.
The Court went one step further and ruled that even assuming arguendo that "provisions" are beyond
the executive power to veto, and Section 55
(FY '89) and Section 16 (FY '90) were not "provisions" in the budgetary sense of the term, they are
"inappropriate provisions" that should be treated as "items" for the purpose of the President's veto
power.
The Court, citing Henry v. Edwards, La., 346 So. 2d 153 (1977), said that Congress cannot include in
a general appropriations bill matters that should be more properly enacted in separate legislation, and
if it does that, the inappropriate provisions inserted by it must be treated as "item", which can be
vetoed by the President in the exercise of his item-veto power.
It is readily apparent that the Special Provision applicable to the appropriation for debt service insofar
as it refers to funds in excess of the amount appropriated in the bill, is an "inappropriate" provision
referring to funds other than the P86,323,438,000.00 appropriated in the General Appropriations Act
of 1991.
Likewise the vetoed provision is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign
Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment policy. As held by the Court
in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate law, not in the appropriations law.
The Court will indulge every intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto, the same as it will
presume the constitutionality of an act of Congress (Texas Co. v. State, 254 P. 1060; 31 Ariz, 485, 53
A.L.R. 258 [1927]).
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the legislative process
(Memorandum of Justice Irene Cortes as Amicus Curiae, pp. 3-7). That is why it is found in Article VI
on the Legislative Department rather than in Article VII on the Executive Department in the
Constitution. There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a veto. The
burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a violation of the
Constitution.
Under his general veto power, the President has to veto the entire bill, not merely parts thereof (1987
Constitution, Art. VI, Sec. 27[1]). The exception to the general veto power is the power given to the
President to veto any particular item or items in a general appropriations bill (1987 Constitution, Art.
VI,
Sec. 27[2]). In so doing, the President must veto the entire item.
A general appropriations bill is a special type of legislation, whose content is limited to specified sums
of money dedicated to a specific purpose or a separate fiscal unit (Beckman, The Item Veto Power of
the Executive,
31 Temple Law Quarterly 27 [1957]).
The item veto was first introduced by the Organic Act of the Philippines passed by the U.S. Congress
on August 29, 1916. The concept was adopted from some State Constitutions.
Cognizant of the legislative practice of inserting provisions, including conditions, restrictions and
limitations, to items in appropriations bills, the Constitutional Convention added the following
sentence to Section 20(2), Article VI of the 1935 Constitution:
. . . When a provision of an appropriation bill affect one or more items of the same, the
President cannot veto the provision without at the same time vetoing the particular item
or items to which it relates . . . .
In short, under the 1935 Constitution, the President was empowered to veto separately not only items
in an appropriations bill but also "provisions".
While the 1987 Constitution did not retain the aforementioned sentence added to Section 11(2) of
Article VI of the 1935 Constitution, it included the following provision:
No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it
relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or
enactment shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates (Art. VI,
Sec. 25[2]).
In Gonzales, we made it clear that the omission of that sentence of Section 16(2) of the 1935
Constitution in the 1987 Constitution should not be interpreted to mean the disallowance of the power
of the President to veto a "provision".
As the Constitution is explicit that the provision which Congress can include in an appropriations bill
must "relate specifically to some particular appropriation therein" and "be limited in its operation to the
appropriation to which it relates," it follows that any provision which does not relate to any particular
item, or which extends in its operation beyond an item of appropriation, is considered "an
inappropriate provision" which can be vetoed separately from an item. Also to be included in the
category of "inappropriate provisions" are unconstitutional provisions and provisions which are
intended to amend other laws, because clearly these kind of laws have no place in an appropriations
bill. These are matters of general legislation more appropriately dealt with in separate enactments.
Former Justice Irene Cortes, as Amicus Curiae, commented that Congress cannot by law establish
conditions for and regulate the exercise of powers of the President given by the Constitution for that
would be an unconstitutional intrusion into executive prerogative.
The doctrine of "inappropriate provision" was well elucidated in Henry v. Edwards, supra., thus:
Just as the President may not use his item-veto to usurp constitutional powers
conferred on the legislature, neither can the legislature deprive the Governor of the
constitutional powers conferred on him as chief executive officer of the state by
including in a general appropriation bill matters more properly enacted in separate
legislation. The Governor's constitutional power to veto bills of general legislation . . .
cannot be abridged by the careful placement of such measures in a general
appropriation bill, thereby forcing the Governor to choose between approving
unacceptable substantive legislation or vetoing "items" of expenditures essential to the
operation of government.The legislature cannot by location of a bill give it immunity from
executive veto. Nor can it circumvent the Governor's veto power over substantive
legislation by artfully drafting general law measures so that they appear to be true
conditions or limitations on an item of appropriation. Otherwise, the legislature would be
permitted to impair the constitutional responsibilities and functions of a co-equal branch
of government in contravention of the separation of powers doctrine . . . We are no
more willing to allow the legislature to use its appropriation power to infringe on the
Governor's constitutional right to veto matters of substantive legislation than we are to
allow the Governor to encroach on the Constitutional powers of the legislature. In order
to avoid this result, we hold that,when the legislature inserts inappropriate provisions in
a general appropriation bill, such provisions must be treated as "items" for purposes of
the Governor's item veto power over general appropriation bills.
xxx xxx xxx
. . . Legislative control cannot be exercised in such a manner as to encumber the
general appropriation bill with veto-proof "logrolling measures", special interest
provisions which could not succeed if separately enacted, or "riders", substantive pieces
of legislation incorporated in a bill to insure passage without veto . . . (Emphasis
supplied).
Petitioners contend that granting arguendo that the veto of the Special Provision on the ceiling for
debt payment is valid, the President cannot automatically appropriate funds for debt payment without
complying with the conditions for automatic appropriation under the provisions of R.A. No. 4860 as
amended by P.D. No. 81 and the provisions of P.D. No. 1177 as amended by the Administrative
Code of 1987 and P.D. No. 1967 (Rollo, G.R. No. 113766, pp. 9-15).
Petitioners cannot anticipate that the President will not faithfully execute the laws. The writ of
prohibition will not issue on the fear that official actions will be done in contravention of the laws.
The President vetoed the entire paragraph one of the Special Provision of the item on debt service,
including the provisions that the appropriation authorized in said item "shall be used for payment of
the principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" and that "in no case shall this fund
be used to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators." These provisions are
germane to and have a direct connection with the item on debt service. Inherent in the power of
appropriation is the power to specify how the money shall be spent (Henry v. Edwards, LA, 346 So.,
2d., 153). The said provisos, being appropriate provisions, cannot be vetoed separately. Hence the
item veto of said provisions is void.
We reiterate, in order to obviate any misunderstanding, that we are sustaining the veto of the Special
Provision of the item on debt service only with respect to the proviso therein requiring that "any
payment in excess of the amount herein, appropriated shall be subject to the approval of the
President of the Philippines with the concurrence of the Congress of the Philippines . . ."
G.R. NO. 113174
G.R. NO. 113766
G.R. NO. 11388
1. Veto of provisions for revolving funds of SUC's.
In the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUC's), the President vetoed special
provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and maintenance of
revolving funds. The Special Provisions vetoed are the following:
(H. 7) West Visayas State University
Equal Sharing of Income. Income earned by the University subject to Section 13 of the
special provisions applicable to all State Universities and Colleges shall be equally
shared by the University and the University Hospital (GAA of 1994, p. 395).
xxx xxx xxx
(J. 3) Leyte State College
Revolving Fund for the Operation of LSC House and Human Resources Development
Center (HRDC). The income of Leyte State College derived from the operation of its
LSC House and HRDC shall be constituted into a Revolving Fund to be deposited in an
authorized government depository bank for the operational expenses of these
projects/services. The net income of the Revolving Fund at the end of the year shall be
remitted to the National Treasury and shall accrue to the General Fund. The
implementing guidelines shall be issued by the Department of Budget and Management
(GAA of 1994, p. 415).
The vetoed Special Provisions applicable to all SUC's are the following:
12. Use of Income from Extension Services. State Universities and Colleges are
authorized to use their income from their extension services. Subject to the approval of
the Board of Regents and the approval of a special budget pursuant to Sec. 35, Chapter
5, Book VI of E.O.
No. 292, such income shall be utilized solely for faculty development, instructional
materials and work study program (GAA of 1994, p. 490).
xxx xxx xxx
13. Income of State Universities and Colleges. The income of State Universities and
Colleges derived from tuition fees and other sources as may be imposed by governing
boards other than those accruing to revolving funds created under LOI Nos. 872 and
1026 and those authorized to be recorded as trust receipts pursuant to Section 40,
Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292 shall be deposited with the National Treasury and
recorded as a Special Account in the General Fund pursuant to P.D. No. 1234 and P.D.
No. 1437 for the use of the institution, subject to Section 35, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O.
No. 292L PROVIDED, That disbursements from the Special Account shall not exceed
the amount actually earned and deposited: PROVIDED, FURTHER, That a cash
advance on such income may be allowed State half of income actually realized during
the preceding year and this cash advance shall be charged against income actually
earned during the budget year: AND PROVIDED, FINALLY, That in no case shall such
funds be used to create positions, nor for payment of salaries, wages or allowances,
except as may be specifically approved by the Department of Budge and Management
for income-producing activities, or to purchase equipment or books, without the prior
approval of the President of the Philippines pursuant to Letter of Implementation No. 29.
All collections of the State Universities and Colleges for fees, charges and receipts
intended for private recipient units, including private foundations affiliated with these
institutions shall be duly acknowledged with official receipts and deposited as a trust
receipt before said income shall be subject to Section 35, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O.
No. 292
(GAA of 1994, p. 490).
The President gave his reason for the veto thus:
Pursuant to Section 65 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines, Section 44,
Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292, s. 1987 and Section 22, Article VII of the
Constitution, all income earned by all Government offices and agencies shall accrue to
the General Fund of the Government in line with the One Fund Policy enunciated by
Section 29 (1), Article VI and Section 22, Article VII of the Constitution. Likewise, the
creation and establishment of revolving funds shall be authorized by substantive law
pursuant to Section 66 of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines and Section
45, Chapter 5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292.
Notwithstanding the aforementioned provisions of the Constitution and existing law, I
have noted the proliferation of special provisions authorizing the use of agency income
as well as the creation, operation and maintenance of revolving funds.
I would like to underscore the facts that such income were already considered as
integral part of the revenue and financing sources of the National Expenditure Program
which I previously submitted to Congress. Hence, the grant of new special provisions
authorizing the use of agency income and the establishment of revolving funds over and
above the agency appropriations authorized in this Act shall effectively reduce the
financing sources of the 1994 GAA and, at the same time, increase the level of
expenditures of some agencies beyond the well-coordinated, rationalized levels for such
agencies. This corresponding increases the overall deficit of the National Government
(Veto Message, p. 3).
Petitioners claim that the President acted with grave abuse of discretion when he disallowed by his
veto the "use of income" and the creation of "revolving fund" by the Western Visayas State University
and Leyte State Colleges when he allowed other government offices, like the National Stud Farm, to
use their income for their operating expenses (Rollo, G.R. No. 113174, pp. 15-16).
There was no undue discrimination when the President vetoed said special provisions while allowing
similar provisions in other government agencies. If some government agencies were allowed to use
their income and maintain a revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been
enjoying such privilege before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions
to the "one-fund policy" (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the
Securities and Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget and
Management's Procurement Service).
2. Veto of provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.
In the appropriation for the Department of Public Works and Highways, the President vetoed the
second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2, specifying the 30% maximum ration of works to be
contracted for the maintenance of national roads and bridges. The said paragraph reads as follows:
2. Release and Use of Road Maintenance Funds. Funds allotted for the maintenance
and repair of roads which are provided in this Act for the Department of Public Works
and Highways shall be released to the respective Engineering District, subject to such
rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the Department of Budget and
Management. Maintenance funds for roads and bridges shall be exempt from budgetary
reserve.
Of the amount herein appropriated for the maintenance of national roads and bridges, a
maximum of thirty percent (30%) shall be contracted out in accordance with guidelines
to be issued by the Department of Public Works and Highways. The balance shall be
used for maintenance by force account.
Five percent (5%) of the total road maintenance fund appropriated herein to be applied
across the board to the allocation of each region shall be set aside for the maintenance
of roads which may be converted to or taken over as national roads during the current
year and the same shall be released to the central office of the said department for
eventual
sub-allotment to the concerned region and district: PROVIDED, That any balance of the
said five percent (5%) shall be restored to the regions on a pro-rata basis for the
maintenance of existing national roads.
No retention or deduction as reserves or overhead expenses shall be made, except as
authorized by law or upon direction of the President
(GAA of 1994, pp. 785-786; Emphasis supplied).
The President gave the following reason for the veto:
While I am cognizant of the well-intended desire of Congress to impose certain
restrictions contained in some special provisions, I am equally aware that many
programs, projects and activities of agencies would require some degree of flexibility to
ensure their successful implementation and therefore risk their completion.
Furthermore, not only could these restrictions and limitations derail and impede program
implementation but they may also result in a breach of contractual obligations.
D.1.a. A study conducted by the Infrastructure Agencies show that for practical intent
and purposes, maintenance by contract could be undertaken to an optimum of seventy
percent (70%) and the remaining thirty percent (30%) by force account. Moreover, the
policy of maximizing implementation through contract maintenance is a covenant of the
Road and Road Transport Program Loan from the Asian Development Bank (ADB Loan
No. 1047-PHI-1990) and Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (OECF Loan No. PH-
C17-199). The same is a covenant under the World Bank (IBRD) Loan for the Highway
Management Project (IBRD Loan
No. PH-3430) obtained in 1992.
In the light of the foregoing and considering the policy of the government to encourage
and maximize private sector participation in the regular repair and maintenance of
infrastructure facilities, I am directly vetoing the underlined second paragraph of Special
Provision No. 2 of the Department of Public Works and Highways (Veto Message, p.
11).
The second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 brings to fore the divergence in policy of Congress
and the President. While Congress expressly laid down the condition that only 30% of the total
appropriation for road maintenance should be contracted out, the President, on the basis of a
comprehensive study, believed that contracting out road maintenance projects at an option of 70%
would be more efficient, economical and practical.
The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be the subject of a veto.
It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other hand, it specified how the
said item shall be expended 70% by administrative and 30% by contract.
The 1987 Constitution allows the addition by Congress of special provisions, conditions to items in an
expenditure bill, which cannot be vetoed separately from the items to which they relate so long as
they are "appropriate" in the budgetary sense (Art. VII, Sec. 25[2]).
The Solicitor General was hard put in justifying the veto of this special provision. He merely argued
that the provision is a complete turnabout from an entrenched practice of the government to maximize
contract maintenance (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888, pp. 85-86). That is not a ground to veto a provision
separate from the item to which it refers.
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is therefore
unconstitutional.
3. Veto of provision on purchase of medicines by AFP.
In the appropriation for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the President vetoed the special
provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the Generics Drugs Law (R.A.
No. 6675). The vetoed provision reads:
12. Purchase of Medicines. The purchase of medicines by all Armed Forces of the
Philippines units, hospitals and clinics shall strictly comply with the formulary embodied
in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health (GAA of 1994, p. 748).
According to the President, while it is desirable to subject the purchase of medicines to a standard
formulary, "it is believed more prudent to provide for a transition period for its adoption and smooth
implementation in the Armed Forces of the Philippines" (Veto Message, p. 12).
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should strictly
comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of Health is an
"appropriate" provision. it is a mere advertence by Congress to the fact that there is an existing law,
the Generics Act of 1988, that requires "the extensive use of drugs with generic names through a
rational system of procurement and distribution." The President believes that it is more prudent to
provide for a transition period for the smooth implementation of the law in the case of purchases by
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, as implied by Section 11 (Education Drive) of the law itself. This
belief, however, cannot justify his veto of the provision on the purchase of medicines by the AFP.
Being directly related to and inseparable from the appropriation item on purchases of medicines by
the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed by the President without also vetoing the said item
(Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia, 11 SCRA 486 [1964]).
4. Veto of provision on prior approval of Congress for purchase of military equipment.
In the appropriation for the modernization of the AFP, the President vetoed the underlined proviso of
Special Provision No. 2 on the "Use of Fund," which requires the prior approval of Congress for the
release of the corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire Special Provisions
No. 3 on the "Specific Prohibition":
2. Use of the Fund. Of the amount herein appropriated, priority shall be given for the
acquisition of AFP assets necessary for protecting marine, mineral, forest and other
resources within Philippine territorial borders and its economic zone, detection,
prevention or deterrence of air or surface intrusions and to support diplomatic moves
aimed at preserving national dignity, sovereignty and patrimony: PROVIDED, That the
said modernization fund shall not be released until a Table of Organization and
Equipment for FY 1994-2000 is submitted to and approved by Congress.
3. Specific Prohibition. The said Modernization Fund shall not be used for payment of
six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes and 150 armored
personnel carriers (GAA of 1994, p. 747).
As reason for the veto, the President stated that the said condition and prohibition violate the
Constitutional mandate of non-impairment of contractual obligations, and if allowed, "shall effectively
alter the original intent of the AFP Modernization Fund to cover all military equipment deemed
necessary to modernize the Armed Forces of the Philippines" (Veto Message, p. 12).
Petitioners claim that Special Provision No. 2 on the "Use of Fund" and Special Provision No. 3 are
conditions or limitations related to the item on the AFP modernization plan.
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the "Use of Fund" for the AFP modernization program
that the President must submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its approval, is an
exercise of the "congressional or legislative veto." By way of definition, a congressional veto is a
means whereby the legislature can block or modify administrative action taken under a statute. It is a
form of legislative control in the implementation of particular executive actions. The form may be
either negative, that is requiring disapproval of the executive action, or affirmative, requiring approval
of the executive action. This device represents a significant attempt by Congress to move from
oversight of the executive to shared administration (Dixon, The Congressional Veto and Separation of
Powers: The Executive on a Leash,
56 North Carolina Law Review, 423 [1978]).
A congressional veto is subject to serious questions involving the principle of separation of powers.
However the case at bench is not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the
legislative veto as provided in Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be
disposed of on other grounds. Any provision blocking an administrative action in implementing a law
or requiring legislative approval of executive acts must be incorporated in a separate and substantive
bill. Therefore, being "inappropriate" provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly
vetoed.
As commented by Justice Irene Cortes in her memorandum as Amicus Curiae: "What Congress
cannot do directly by law it cannot do indirectly by attaching conditions to the exercise of that power
(of the President as Commander-in-Chief) through provisions in the appropriation law."
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization Funds for payment of
the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for by the AFP, is
violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the obligation of contracts
(Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered into by the Government itself.
The veto of said special provision is therefore valid.
5. Veto of provision on use of savings to augment AFP pension funds.
In the appropriation for the AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund, the President vetoed the new provision
authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension and gratuity funds. The
vetoed provision reads:
2. Use of Savings. The Chief of Staff, AFP, is authorized, subject to the approval of the
Secretary of National Defense, to use savings in the appropriations provided herein to
augment the pension fund being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation
Benefits System as provided under Sections 2(a) and 3 of P.D. No. 361 (GAA of 1994,
p. 746).
According to the President, the grant of retirement and separation benefits should be covered by
direct appropriations specifically approved for the purpose pursuant to Section 29(1) of Article VI of
the Constitution. Moreover, he stated that the authority to use savings is lodged in the officials
enumerated in Section 25(5) of Article VI of the Constitution (Veto Message, pp. 7-8).
Petitioners claim that the Special Provision on AFP Pension and Gratuity Fund is a condition or
limitation which is so intertwined with the item of appropriation that it could not be separated
therefrom.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the pension fund for
the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System is violative of
Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution.
Under Section 25(5), no law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations, and under
Section 29(1), no money shall be paid out of
the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law. While Section 25(5) allows as an
exception the realignment of savings to augment items in the general appropriations law for the
executive branch, such right must and can be exercised only by the President pursuant to a specific
law.
6. Condition on the deactivation of the CAFGU's.
Congress appropriated compensation for the CAFGU's, including the payment of separation benefits
but it added the following Special Provision:
1. CAFGU Compensation and Separation Benefit. The appropriation authorized herein
shall be used for the compensation of CAFGU's including the payment of their
separation benefit not exceeding one (1) year subsistence allowance for the 11,000
members who will be deactivated in 1994. The Chief of Staff, AFP, shall, subject to the
approval of the Secretary of National Defense, promulgate policies and procedures for
the payment of separation benefit (GAA of 1994, p. 740).
The President declared in his Veto Message that the implementation of this Special Provision to the
item on the CAFGU's shall be subject to prior Presidential approval pursuant to P.D. No. 1597 and
R.A.. No. 6758. He gave the following reasons for imposing the condition:
I am well cognizant of the laudable intention of Congress in proposing the amendment
of Special Provision No. 1 of the CAFGU. However, it is premature at this point in time
of our peace process to earmark and declare through special provision the actual
number of CAFGU members to be deactivated in CY 1994. I understand that the
number to be deactivated would largely depend on the result or degree of success of
the on-going peace initiatives which are not yet precisely determinable today. I have
desisted, therefore, to directly veto said provisions because this would mean the loss of
the entire special provision to the prejudice of its beneficient provisions. I therefore
declare that the actual implementation of this special provision shall be subject to prior
Presidential approval pursuant to the provisions of P.D. No. 1597 and
R.A. No. 6758 (Veto Message, p. 13).
Petitioners claim that the Congress has required the deactivation of the CAFGU's when it
appropriated the money for payment of the separation pay of the members of thereof. The President,
however, directed that the deactivation should be done in accordance to his timetable, taking into
consideration the peace and order situation in the affected localities.
Petitioners complain that the directive of the President was tantamount to an administrative embargo
of the congressional will to implement the Constitution's command to dissolve the CAFGU's (Rollo,
G.R. No. 113174,
p. 14; G.R. No. 113888, pp. 9, 14-16). They argue that the President cannot impair or withhold
expenditures authorized and appropriated by Congress when neither the Appropriations Act nor other
legislation authorize such impounding (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888, pp. 15-16).
The Solicitor General contends that it is the President, as Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces
of the Philippines, who should determine when the services of the CAFGU's are no longer needed
(Rollo, G.R. No. 113888,
pp. 92-95.).
This is the first case before this Court where the power of the President to impound is put in issue.
Impoundment refers to a refusal by the President, for whatever reason, to spend funds made
available by Congress. It is the failure to spend or obligate budget authority of any type
(Notes: Impoundment of Funds, 86 Harvard Law Review 1505 [1973]).
Those who deny to the President the power to impound argue that once Congress has set aside the
fund for a specific purpose in an appropriations act, it becomes mandatory on the part of the
President to implement the project and to spend the money appropriated therefor. The President has
no discretion on the matter, for the Constitution imposes on him the duty to faithfully execute the laws.
In refusing or deferring the implementation of an appropriation item, the President in effect exercises
a veto power that is not expressly granted by the Constitution. As a matter of fact, the Constitution
does not say anything about impounding. The source of the Executive authority must be found
elsewhere.
Proponents of impoundment have invoked at least three principal sources of the authority of the
President. Foremost is the authority to impound given to him either expressly or impliedly by
Congress. Second is the executive power drawn from the President's role as Commander-in-Chief.
Third is the Faithful Execution Clause which ironically is the same provision invoked by petitioners
herein.
The proponents insist that a faithful execution of the laws requires that the President desist from
implementing the law if doing so would prejudice public interest. An example given is when through
efficient and prudent management of a project, substantial savings are made. In such a case, it is
sheer folly to expect the President to spend the entire amount budgeted in the law
(Notes: Presidential Impoundment: Constitutional Theories and Political Realities, 61 Georgetown
Law Journal 1295 [1973]; Notes; Protecting the Fisc: Executive Impoundment and Congressional
Power, 82 Yale Law Journal 1686 [1973).
We do not find anything in the language used in the challenged Special Provision that would imply
that Congress intended to deny to the President the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less
to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the
appropriation law is not the proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and
manifested in another law considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and
there are existing laws on the creation of the CAFGU's to be amended. Again we state: a provision in
an appropriations act cannot
be used to repeal or amend other laws, in this case, P.D. No. 1597 and R.A. No. 6758.
7. Condition on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, etc.
(a) In the appropriations for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the Congress added
the following provisions:
The Judiciary
xxx xxx xxx
Special Provisions
1. Augmentation of any Item in the Court's Appropriations. Any savings in the
appropriations for the Supreme Court and the Lower Courts may be utilized by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court to augment any item of the Court's appropriations for (a)
printing of decisions and publication of "Philippine Reports"; (b) Commutable terminal
leaves of Justices and other personnel of the Supreme Court and payment of adjusted
pension rates to retired Justices entitled thereto pursuant to Administrative Matter No.
91-8-225-C.A.; (c) repair, maintenance, improvement and other operating expenses of
the courts' libraries, including purchase of books and periodicals; (d) purchase,
maintenance and improvement of printing equipment; (e) necessary expenses for the
employment of temporary employees, contractual and casual employees, for judicial
administration; (f) maintenance and improvement of the Court's Electronic Data
Processing System; (g) extraordinary expenses of the Chief Justice, attendance in
international conferences and conduct of training programs; (h) commutable
transportation and representation allowances and fringe benefits for Justices, Clerks of
Court, Court Administrator, Chiefs of Offices and other Court personnel in accordance
with the rates prescribed by law; and (i) compensation of attorney-de-
officio: PROVIDED, That as mandated by LOI No. 489 any increase in salary and
allowances shall be subject to the usual procedures and policies as provided for under
P.D. No. 985 and other pertinent laws (GAA of 1994, p. 1128; Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Commission on Audit
xxx xxx xxx
5. Use of Savings. The Chairman of the Commission on Audit is hereby authorized,
subject to appropriate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, to use savings for
the payment of fringe benefits as may be authorized by law for officials and personnel of
the Commission (GAA of 1994, p. 1161; Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Office of the Ombudsman
xxx xxx xxx
6. Augmentation of Items in the appropriation of the Office of the Ombudsman. The
Ombudsman is hereby authorized, subject to appropriate accounting and auditing rules
and regulations to augment items of appropriation in the Office of the Ombudsman from
savings in other items of appropriation actually released, for: (a) printing and/or
publication of decisions, resolutions, training and information materials; (b) repair,
maintenance and improvement of OMB Central and Area/Sectoral facilities; (c)
purchase of books, journals, periodicals and equipment;
(d) payment of commutable representation and transportation allowances of officials
and employees who by reason of their positions are entitled thereto and fringe
benefits as may be authorized specifically by law for officials and personnel of OMB
pursuant to Section 8 of Article IX-B of the Constitution; and (e) for other official
purposes subject to accounting and auditing rules and regulations (GAA of 1994, p.
1174; Emphasis supplied).
xxx xxx xxx
Commission on Human Rights
xxx xxx xxx
1. Use of Savings. The Chairman of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) is hereby
authorized, subject to appropriate accounting and auditing rules and regulations, to
augment any item of appropriation in the office of the CHR from savings in other items
of appropriations actually released, for: (a) printing and/or publication of decisions,
resolutions, training materials and educational publications; (b) repair, maintenance and
improvement of Commission's central and regional facilities; (c) purchase of books,
journals, periodicals and equipment, (d) payment of commutable representation and
transportation allowances of officials and employees who by reason of their positions
are entitled thereto and fringe benefits, as may be authorized by law for officials and
personnel of CHR, subject to accounting and auditing rules and regulations (GAA of
1994, p. 1178; Emphasis supplied).
In his Veto Message, the President expressed his approval of the conditions included in the GAA of
1994. He noted that:
The said condition is consistent with the Constitutional injunction prescribed under
Section 8, Article IX-B of the Constitution which states that "no elective or appointive
public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or indirect compensation
unless specifically authorized by law." I am, therefore, confident that the heads of the
said offices shall maintain fidelity to the law and faithfully adhere to the well-established
principle on compensation standardization (Veto Message, p. 10).
Petitioners claim that the conditions imposed by the President violated the independence and fiscal
autonomy of the Supreme Court, the Ombudsman, the COA and the CHR.
In the first place, the conditions questioned by petitioners were placed in the GAB by Congress itself,
not by the President. The Veto Message merely highlighted the Constitutional mandate that additional
or indirect compensation can only be given pursuant to law.
In the second place, such statements are mere reminders that the disbursements of appropriations
must be made in accordance with law. Such statements may, at worse, be treated as superfluities.
(b) In the appropriation for the COA, the President imposed the condition that the implementation of
the budget of the COA be subject to "the guidelines to be issued by the President."
The provisions subject to said condition reads:
xxx xxx xxx
3. Revolving Fund. The income of the Commission on Audit derived from sources
authorized by the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines (P.D. No. 1445) not
exceeding Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000) shall be constituted into a revolving fund
which shall be used for maintenance, operating and other incidental expenses to
enhance audit services and audit-related activities. The fund shall be deposited in an
authorized government depository ban, and withdrawals therefrom shall be made in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by law and implementing rules and
regulations:PROVIDED, That any interests earned on such deposit shall be remitted at
the end of each quarter to the national Treasury and shall accrue to the General
Fund: PROVIDED FURTHER, That the Commission on Audit shall submit to the
Department of Budget and Management a quarterly report of income and expenditures
of said revolving fund (GAA of 1994, pp. 1160-1161).
The President cited the "imperative need to rationalize" the implementation, applicability and
operation of use of income and revolving funds. The Veto Message stated:
. . . I have observed that there are old and long existing special provisions authorizing
the use of income and the creation of revolving funds. As a rule, such authorizations
should be discouraged. However, I take it that these authorizations have legal/statutory
basis aside from being already a vested right to the agencies concerned which should
not be jeopardized through the Veto Message. There is, however, imperative need to
rationalize their implementation, applicability and operation. Thus, in order to
substantiate the purpose and intention of said provisions, I hereby declare that the
operationalization of the following provisions during budget implementation shall be
subject to theguidelines to be issued by the President pursuant to Section 35, Chapter
5, Book VI of E.O. No. 292 and Sections 65 and 66 of P.D. No. 1445 in relation to
Sections 2 and 3 of the General Provisions of this Act (Veto Message, p. 6; Emphasis
Supplied.)
(c) In the appropriation for the DPWH, the President imposed the condition that in the implementation
of DPWH projects, the administrative and engineering overhead of 5% and 3% "shall be subject to
the necessary administrative guidelines to be formulated by the Executive pursuant to existing laws."
The condition was imposed because the provision "needs further study" according to the President.
The following provision was made subject to said condition:
9. Engineering and Administrative Overhead. Not more than five percent (5%) of the
amount for infrastructure project released by the Department of Budget and
Management shall be deducted by DPWH for administrative overhead, detailed
engineering and construction supervision, testing and quality control, and the like, thus
insuring that at least ninety-five percent (95%) of the released fund is available for direct
implementation of the project. PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That for school buildings,
health centers, day-care centers and barangay halls, the deductible amount shall not
exceed three percent (3%).
Violation of, or non-compliance with, this provision shall subject the government official
or employee concerned to administrative, civil and/or criminal sanction under Sections
43 and 80, Book VI of E.O.
No. 292 (GAA of 1994, p. 786).
(d) In the appropriation for the National Housing Authority (NHA), the President imposed the condition
that allocations for specific projects shall be released and disbursed "in accordance with the housing
program of the government, subject to prior Executive approval."
The provision subject to the said condition reads:
3. Allocations for Specified Projects. The following allocations for the specified projects
shall be set aside for corollary works and used exclusively for the repair, rehabilitation
and construction of buildings, roads, pathwalks, drainage, waterworks systems, facilities
and amenities in the area:PROVIDED, That any road to be constructed or rehabilitated
shall conform with the specifications and standards set by the Department of Public
Works and Highways for such kind of road: PROVIDED,FURTHER, That savings that
may be available in the future shall be used for road repair, rehabilitation and
construction:
(1) Maharlika Village Road Not less than P5,000,000
(2) Tenement Housing Project (Taguig) Not less than
P3,000,000
(3) Bagong Lipunan Condominium Project (Taguig) Not
less than P2,000,000
4. Allocation of Funds. Out of the amount appropriated for the implementation of various
projects in resettlement areas, Seven Million Five Hundred Thousand Pesos
(P7,500,000) shall be allocated to the Dasmarias Bagong Bayan resettlement area,
Eighteen Million Pesos (P18,000,000) to the Carmona Relocation Center Area (Gen.
Mariano Alvarez) and Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000) to the Bulihan Sites and
Services, all of which will be for the cementing of roads in accordance with DPWH
standards.
5. Allocation for Sapang Palay. An allocation of Eight Million Pesos (P8,000,000) shall
be set aside for the asphalting of seven (7) kilometer main road of Sapang Palay, San
Jose Del Monte, Bulacan
(GAA of 1994, p. 1216).
The President imposed the conditions: (a) that the "operationalization" of the special provision on
revolving funds of the COA "shall be subject to guidelines to be issued by the President pursuant to
Section 35, Chapter 5,
Book VI of E.O. 292 and Sections 65 and 66 of P.D. No. 1445 in relation to Sections 2 and 3 of the
General Provisions of this Act" (Rollo, G.R.
No. 113174, pp. 5,7-8); (b) that the implementation of Special Provision No. 9 of the DPWH on the
mandatory retention of 5% and 3% of the amounts released by said Department "be subject to the
necessary administrative guidelines to be formulated by the Executive pursuant to existing law"
(Rollo, G.R. No. 113888; pp. 10, 14-16); and (c) that the appropriations authorized for the NHA can
be released only "in accordance with the housing program of the government subject to prior
Executive approval" (Rollo, G.R. No. 113888, pp. 10-11;
14-16).
The conditions objected to by petitioners are mere reminders that the implementation of the items on
which the said conditions were imposed, should be done in accordance with existing laws, regulations
or policies. They did not add anything to what was already in place at the time of the approval of the
GAA of 1994.
There is less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to
guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they are
proper or inappropriate. The issuance of administrative guidelines on the use of public funds
authorized by Congress is simply an exercise by the President of his constitutional duty to see that
the laws are faithfully executed (1987 Constitution, Art. VII, Sec. 17; Planas v. Gil 67 Phil. 62 [1939]).
Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to take "necessary and proper
steps" to carry into execution the law (Schwartz, On Constitutional Law, p. 147 [1977]). These steps
are the ones to be embodied in the guidelines.
IV
Petitioners chose to avail of the special civil actions but those remedies can be used only when
respondents have acted "without or in excess" of jurisdiction, or "with grave abuse of discretion,"
(Revised Rules of Court,
Rule 65, Section 2). How can we begrudge the President for vetoing the Special Provision on the
appropriation for debt payment when he merely followed our decision in Gonzales? How can we say
that Congress has abused its discretion when it appropriated a bigger sum for debt payment than the
amount appropriated for education, when it merely followed our dictum in Guingona?
Article 8 of the Civil Code of Philippines, provides:
Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the constitution shall from a part of
the legal system of the Philippines.
The Court's interpretation of the law is part of that law as of the date of its enactment since the court's
interpretation merely establishes the contemporary legislative intent that the construed law purports to
carry into effect (People v. Licera, 65 SCRA 270 [1975]). Decisions of the Supreme Court assume the
same authority as statutes (Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation, 136 SCRA 141 [1985]).
Even if Guingona and Gonzales are considered hard cases that make bad laws and should be
reversed, such reversal cannot nullify prior acts done in reliance thereof.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED, except with respect to
(1) G.R. Nos. 113105 and 113766 only insofar as they pray for the annulment of the veto of the
special provision on debt service specifying that the fund therein appropriated "shall be used for
payment of the principal and interest of foreign and domestic indebtedness" prohibiting the use of the
said funds "to pay for the liabilities of the Central Bank Board of Liquidators", and (2) G.R. No.
113888 only insofar as it prays for the annulment of the veto of: (a) the second paragraph of Special
Provision No. 2 of the item of appropriation for the Department of Public Works and Highways (GAA
of 1994, pp. 785-786); and (b) Special Provision No. 12 on the purchase of medicines by the Armed
Forces of the Philippines (GAA of 1994, p. 748), which is GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno,
Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PADILLA, J., concurring and dissenting:
I concur with the ponencia of Mr. Justice Camilo D. Quiason except in so far as it re-affirms the
Court's decision inGonzalez v. Macaraig (191 SCRA 452).
Sec. 27(2), Art. VI of the Constitution states:
The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not effect the item or items to
which he does not object.
In my dissenting opinion in Gonzalez, I stated that:
The majority opinion positions the veto questioned in this case within the scope of
Section 27(2) [Article VI of the Constitution]. I do not see how this can be done without
doing violence to the constitutional design. The distinction between an item-veto and
a provision veto has been traditionally recognized in constitutional litigation and
budgetary practice. As stated by Mr. Justice Sutherland, speaking for the U.S. Supreme
Court in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 299 U.S. 410-416:
. . . An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which in itself
is a specific appropriation of money, not some general provisions of law
which happens to be put into an appropriation bill . . .
When the Constitution in Section 27(2) empowers the President to veto any particular
item or items in the appropriation act, it does not
confer in fact, it excludes the power to veto any particular provision or provisions
in said act.
In an earlier case, Sarmiento v. Mison, et al., 156 SCRA 549, this court referred to its
duty to construe the Constitution, not in accordance with how the executive or the
legislative would want it construed, but in accordance with what it says and provides.
When the Constitution states that the President has the power to veto any particular
item or items in the appropriation act, this must be taken as a component of that
delicate balance of power between the executive and legislative, so that, for this Court
to construe Sec. 27(2) of the Constitution as also empowering the President to veto any
particular provision or provisions in the appropriations act, is to load the scale in favor of
the executive, at the expense of that delicate balance of power.
I therefore disagree with the majority's pronouncements which would validate the veto by the
President of specific provisions in the appropriations act based on the contention that such are
"inappropriate provisions." Even assuming, for the sake of argument, that a provision in the
appropriations act is "inappropriate" from the Presidential standpoint, it is still a provision, not
an item, in an appropriations act and, therefore, outside the veto power of the Executive.
VITUG, J., concurring:
I concur on the points so well expounded by a most respected colleague, Mr. Justice Camilo D.
Quiason. I should like to highlight a bit, however, that part of the ponencia dealing on the Countrywide
Development Fund or, so commonly referred to as, the infamous "pork barrel".
I agree that it lies with Congress to determine in an appropriation act the activities and the projects
that are desirable and may thus be funded. Once, however, such identification and the corresponding
appropriation therefore is done, the legislative act is completed and it ends there. Thereafter, the
Executive is behooved, with exclusive responsibility and authority, to see to it that the legislative will is
properly carried out. I cannot subscribe to another theory invoked by some quarters that, in so
implementing the law, the Executive does so only by way of delegation. Congress neither may
delegate what it does not have nor may encroach on the powers of a co-equal, independent and
coordinate branch.
Within its own sphere, Congress acts as a body, not as the individuals that comprise it, in any action
or decision that can bind it, or be said to have been done by it, under its constitutional authority. Even
assuming that overseeing the laws it enacts continues to be a legislative process, one that I find
difficult to accept, it is Congress itself, not any of its members, that must exercise that function.
I cannot debate the fact that the members of Congress, more than the President and his colleagues,
would have the best feel on the needs of their own respective cosntituents. I see no legal obstacle,
however, in their making, just like anyone else, the proper recommendations to albeit not necessarily
conclusive on, the President for the purpose. Neother would it be objectionable for Congrss, by law,
to appropriate funds for specific projects as it may be minded; to give that authoriy, however, to the
individual members of Congress in whatever guise, I am afraid, would be constitutionality
impermissible.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23326 December 18, 1965
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION ASSOCIATION, INC., JOSE E. ROMERO, SALVADOR ARANETA, GUILLERMO
B. GUEVARA, PIO PEDROSA, CONRADO BENITEZ, JOSE M. ARUEGO, SOTERO H. LAUREL, FELIXBERTO
M. SERRANO, and ROMAN OZAETA, petitioners,
vs.
PEDRO M. GIMENEZ, JOSE VELASCO, ELADIO SALITA and JOSE AVILES, respondents.
Roman Ozaeta, Guillermo B. Guevara, Jose M. Aruego, Sotero H. Laurel and Felixberto M. Serrano for themselves
and for other petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
REGALA, J.:
We are called upon in this case to decide the grave and fundamental problem of the constitutionality
of Republic Act No. 3836 "insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation
and sick leave to Senators and Representatives, and to the elective officials of both houses (of
Congress)." The suit was instituted by the Philippine Constitution Association, Inc. (Philconsa, for
short), a non-profit civic organization, duly incorporated under Philippine laws, by way of a petition for
prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Auditor General of the Philippines and the
disbursing officers of both Houses of Congress from "passing in audit the vouchers, and from
countersigning the checks or treasury warrants for the payment to any former Senator or former
Member of the House of Representatives of retirement and vacation gratuities pursuant to Republic
Act No. 3836; and likewise restraining the respondent disbursing officers of the House and Senate,
respectively, and their successors in office from paying the said retirement and vacation gratuities."
It is argued that the above-numbered Republic Act, at least to the end that it provided for the
retirement of the members of Congress in the manner and terms that it did, is unconstitutional and
void. The challenge to the constitutionality of the law is centered on the following propositions:
1. The provision for the retirement of the members and certain officers of Congress is not
expressed in the title of the bill, in violation of section 21 (1) of Article VI of the Constitution.
2. The provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on
increase of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the
provisions of Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution.
3. The same provision constitutes "selfish class legislation" because it allows members and
officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years of service and gives them a gratuity
equivalent to one year salary for every four years of service, which is not refundable in case of
reinstatement or re-election of the retiree, while all other officers and employees of the
government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years of service and are given a gratuity
which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of service, which, in any case,
cannot exceed 24 months.
4. The provision on vacation and sick leave, commutable at the highest rate received, insofar
as members of Congress are concerned, is another attempt of the legislators to further
increase their compensation in violation of the Constitution.
The text of Republic Act No. 3836
The text of Republic Act No. 3836 reads:
AN ACT AMENDING SUBSECTION (c), SECTION TWELVE OF COMMONWEALTH ACT
NUMBERED ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-SIX, AS AMENDED BY REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED
THIRTY HUNDRED NINETY-SIX:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
SECTION 1. Subsection (c), Section twelve of Commonwealth Act Numbered One Hundred
eighty-six, as amended by Republic Act Numbered Thirty hundred ninety-six, is further
amended to read as follows:
"(c) Retirement is likewise allowed to a member, regardless of age, who has rendered at least
twenty years of service. The benefit shall, in addition to the return of his personal contributions
plus interest and the payment of the corresponding employer's premiums described in
subsection (a) of Section five hereof, without interest, be only a gratuity equivalent to one
month's salary for every year of service, based on the highest rate received, but not to exceed
twenty-four months: Provided, That the retiring officer or employee has been in the service of
the said employer or office for at least four years immediately preceding his retirement.
"Retirement is also allowed to a senator or a member of the House of Representatives and to
an elective officer of either House of the Congress, regardless of age, provided that in the case
of a Senator or Member, he must have served at least twelve years as a Senator and/or as a
member of the House of Representatives, and, in the case of an elective officer of either
House, he must have served the government for at least twelve years, not less than four years
of which must have been rendered as such elective officer: Provided, That the gratuity payable
to a retiring senator, member of the House of Representatives, or elective officer, of either
House, shall be equivalent to one year's salary for every four years of service in the
government and the same shall be exempt from any tax whatsoever and shall be neither liable
to attachment or execution nor refundable in case of reinstatement or re-election of the retiree.
"This gratuity is payable by the employer or office concerned which is hereby authorized to
provide the necessary appropriation or pay the same from any unexpended items of
appropriations or savings in its appropriations or saving in its appropriations.
"Elective or appointive officials and employees paid gratuity under this subsection shall be
entitled to the commutation of the unused vacation and sick leave, based on the highest rate
received, which they may have to their credit at the time of retirement."
SECTION 2. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
Approved, June 22, 1963.
The Solicitor General's Office, in representation of the respondent, filed its answer on September 8,
1964, and contends, by way of special and affirmative defenses that:
1. The grant of retirement or pension benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers
objected to by the petitioner does not constitute "forbidden compensation" within the meaning
of Section 14 of Article VI of the Philippine Constitution.
2. The title of the law in question sufficiently complies with the provisions of Section 21, Article
VI, of the Constitution that "no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one
subject which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.
3. The law in question does not constitute legislation.
4. Certain indispensable parties, specifically the elected officers of Congress who are
authorized to approve vouchers for payments for funds under the law in question, and the
claimants to the vouchers to be presented for payment under said items, were not included in
the petition.
5. The petitioner has no standing to institute this suit.
6. The payment of commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely
"in the nature of a basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member" and, therefore, is
not an indirect scheme to increase their salary.
A brief historical background of Republic Act No. 3836
Republic Act No. 3836 was originally House Bill No. 6051, which was introduced by Congressmen
Marcial R. Pimentel of Camarines Norte and Marcelino R. Veloso of the Third District of Leyte, on
May 6, 1963. On the same date, it was referred to the Committee on Civil Service. which on the
following May 8, submitted its REPORT No. 3129, recommending approval of the bill with
amendments, among others, that the word "TWENTY" in the bill as filed representing the number
of years that a senator or member must serve in Congress to entitle him to retirement under the bill
must be reduced to "TWELVE" years, and that the following words were inserted, namely, "AND THE
SAME (referring to gratuity) SHALL BE EXEMPT FROM ANY TAX WHATSOEVER AND SHALL
NOT BE LIABLE FROM ATTACHMENT OR EXECUTION NOR REFUNDABLE IN CASE OF
REINSTATEMENT OR REELECTION OF THE RETIREE." On May 8, 1963, the bill with the
proposed amendments was approved on second reading. It was passed on third reading on May 13,
1963, and on the same day was sent to the Senate, which, in turn, on May 23, 1963, passed it
without amendment. The bill was finally approved on June 22, 1963. As explained in the
EXPLANATORY NOTE attached to the bill, among others
The inclusion of members of Congress in subsection (c), Section 12 of C.A. 186, as amended,
will enable them to retire voluntarily, regardless of age, after serving a minimum of twenty
years as a Member of Congress. This gratuity will insure the security of the family of the
retiring member of Congress with the latter engaging in other activities which may detract from
his exalted position and usefulness as lawmaker. It is expected that with this assurance of
security for his loved ones, deserving and well-intentioned but poor men will be attracted to
serve their people in Congress.
As finally approved, the law (Subsection [c], paragraph 2, Section 1, R.A. 3836) allows a Senator or a
Member of the House of Representatives and an elective officer of either House of Congress to retire
regardless of age. To be eligible for retirement, he must have served for at least twelve years as such
Senator and/or as member of the House of Representatives. For an elective officer of either House,
he must have served the government for at least twelve years, of which not less than four years must
have been rendered as such elective officer. The gratuity payable by the employer or office
concerned is equivalent to one year's salary for every four years of service in the government. Said
gratuity is exempt from taxation, not liable to attachment or execution, and not refundable in case of
reinstatement or re-election of the retiree.
First legal point personality of the Petitioner to bring suit.
The first point to be considered is whether petitioner Philconsa has a standing to institute this action.
This Court has not hesitated to examine past decisions involving this matter. This Court has
repeatedly held that when the petitioner, like in this case, is composed of substantial taxpayers, and
the outcome will affect their vital interests, they are allowed to bring this suit. (Pascual v. Secretary,
G.R. No. L-10405, December 29, 1960; and Gonzales v. Hechanova, 60 Off. Gaz. 802 [1963]).
The petitioner, Philconsa, is precisely a non-profit, civic organization composed of several leaders
from all walks of life whose main objective is to uphold the principles of the Constitution.
In rejecting the motion to dismiss in the case of Pascual v. Secretary, supra, this Court stated, among
other things, that "there are many decisions nullifying, at the instance of the taxpayers, laws providing
the disbursement of public funds, upon the theory that the expenditure of public funds by an officer of
the State for the purpose of administering an unconstitutional act constitutes a misappropriation of
such funds, which may be enjoined at the request of the taxpayers."
1
This legislation (Republic Act
3836) involves the disbursement of public funds.
We are not, however, unmindful of the ruling laid down by the Supreme Court of the United States in
the case ofMassachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, holding that:
... the relation of a taxpayer of the United States to the Federal Government is very different.
His interest in the moneys of the Treasury partly realized from taxation and partly from other
sources is shared with millions of others; is comparatively minute and indeterminable; and
the effect upon future taxation of any payment out of the funds, so remote, fluctuating and
uncertain, that no basis is afforded for an appeal to the preventive powers of equity.
The general view in the United States, which is followed here, is stated in the American
Jurisprudence, thus
In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack
the constitutionality of a statute the general rule is that not only persons individually affected,
but also taxpayers have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys
raised by taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring
expenditure of public moneys. (11 Am. Jur. 761; emphasis supplied.)
As far as the first point is concerned, We hold, therefore, that the contention of the Solicitor General is
untenable.
Second legal point Whether or not Republic Act No. 3836 falls within the prohibition embodied in
Art. VI, section 14 of the Constitution.
The first constitutional question is whether Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article VI, of the
Constitution, which reads as follows:
The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise
provided by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each,
including per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling
expenses to and from their respective districts in the case of Members of the House of
Representative and to and from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when
attending sessions of the Congress. No increase in said compensation shall take effect until
after the expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and of the House of
Representatives approving such increase. Until otherwise provided by law, the President of the
Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives shall each receive an annual
compensation of sixteen thousand pesos (emphasis supplied)
Before discussing this point, it is worthy to note that the Constitution embodies some limitations and
prohibitions upon the members of Congress, to wit:
1. They may not hold any other office or employment in the Government without forfeiting their
respective seats;
2. They shall not be appointed, during the time for which they are elected, to any civil office
which may have been created or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased while
they were members of Congress; (Section 16, Article VI, Constitution)
3. They cannot be financially interested in any franchise;
4. They cannot appear in any civil case wherein the Government is an adverse party;
5. They cannot appear as counsel before any Electoral Tribunal; and
6. They cannot appear as counsel in any criminal case where an officer or employee of the
Government is accused. (Section 17, Article VI, Constitution)
In addition to the above prohibitions, the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act 3019) also prohibits members
of Congress to have any special interest in any specific business which will directly or indirectly be
favored by any law or resolution authored by them during their term of office.
It is thus clear that the Constitutional Convention wisely surrounded the Constitution with these
limitations and prohibitions upon Members of Congress. This is a practical demonstration or
application of the principle of the and balances which is one of the peculiar characteristics of our
Constitution. In the light of this background, can We conclude that Congress can validly enact
Republic Act 3836, providing retirement benefits to its members, without violating the provisions in the
aforementioned Article VI, Section 14, of the Constitution, regarding increase of the compensation act
including other emoluments?
It is worthy to note that the original salary for the members of the National Assembly (unicameral
body) was fixed at P5,000.00 per annum each. This was raised to P7,200 per annum by the
enactment of the 1940 Constitutional amendment, when the unicameral body, the National Assembly,
was changed to Congress, composed of two bodies, the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Again, in 1964, by the enactment of Republic Act 4143, the salary for the Members of Congress was
raised to P32,000.00 per annum for each of them; and for the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, to P40,000.00 per annum each.
Likewise, it is significant that, as stated above, when the Constitutional Convention first determined
the compensation for the Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per
annum, but it embodies a special proviso which reads as follows: "No increase in said compensation
shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the National Assembly
elected subsequent to approval of such increase." In other words, under the original constitutional
provision regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members, no
increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the Assembly
elected subsequent to the approval of such increase. (See Aruego, The Framing of the Constitution,
Vol. 1, pp. 296-300; Sinco, Philippine Government and Political Law, 4th ed., p. 187)
This goes to show how zealous were the members of the Constitutional Convention in guarding
against the temptation for members of Congress to increase their salaries. However, the original strict
prohibition was modified by the subsequent provision when the Constitutional amendments were
approved in 1940
2

The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the term
compensation "other emoluments." This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question as to
whether the retirement benefits as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview of the term
"other emoluments."
Most of the authorities and decided cases have regarded "emolument" as "the profit arising from
office or employment; that which is received as compensation for services or which is annexed to the
possession of an office, as salary, fees and perquisites.
3

In another set of cases, "emolument" has been defined as "the profit arising from office or
employment; that which is received as compensation for services, or which is annexed to the
possession of office, as salary, fees and perquisites; advantage, gain, public or private." The gain,
profit or advantage which is contemplated in the definition or significance of the word "emolument" as
applied to public officers, clearly comprehends, We think, a gain, profit, or advantage which is
pecuniary in character. (citing Taxpayers' League of Cargon County v. McPherson, 54 P. 2d. 897,
90l.: 49 Wy. 26; 106 A.L.R. 767)
In Schieffelin v. Berry, 216 N.Y.S. (citing Wright v. Craig, 202 App. Div. 684, 195 N.Y.S. 391, affirmed
234 N.Y. 548, 138 N.E. 441), it has been established that pensions and retirement allowances are
part of compensation of public officials; otherwise their payment would be unconstitutional.
In another case, State v. Schmahl, 145 N.W. 795, 125 Minn. 104, it is stated that "as used in Article 4,
section 9, of the Constitution of Minnesota, providing that no Senator or Representative shall hold any
office, the emoluments of which have been increased during the session of the Legislature of which
he was a member, until after the expiration of his term of office in the Legislature, the word
"emoluments" does not refer to the fixed salary alone, but includes fees and compensation as the
incumbent of the office is by law entitled to receive because he holds such office and performed some
service required of the occupant thereof."
From the decisions of these cases, it is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of
emolument, because it is a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office.
Republic Act No. 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June 22, 1963.
Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the expiration of the full
term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives approving such increase.
Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution.
Third Legal Point Whether or not the law in question violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution.
Another reason in support of the conclusion reached herein is that the features of said Republic Act
3836 are patently discriminatory, and therefore violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
(Art. III, Sec. 1, part. 1.)
In the first place, while the said law grants retirement benefits to Senators and Members of the House
of Representatives who are elective officials, it does not include other elective officials such as the
governors of provinces and the members of the provincial boards, and the elective officials of the
municipalities and chartered cities.
The principle of equal protection of law embodied in our Constitution has been fully explained by Us
in the case ofPeople v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 126, where We stated that the classification to be
reasonable must be based upon substantial distinctions which make real differences and must be
germane to the purposes of the law.
As well stated by Willoughby on the Constitution of the United States (second edition), p. 1937, the
principle of the requirement of equal protection of law applies to all persons similarly situated. Why
limit the application of the benefits of Republic Act 3836 to the elected members of Congress? We
feel that the classification here is not reasonable. (See also Sinco, Philippine Political Law, 11th ed.
[1962]; Selected Essays on Constitutional Law [1938-62], p. 789; The Equal Protection of the Laws,
37 Cal. Law Rev. 341.)
Secondly, all members of Congress under Republic Act 3836 are given retirement benefits after
serving twelve years, not necessarily continuous, whereas, most government officers and employees
are given retirement benefits after serving for at least twenty years. In fact, the original bill of Act 3836
provided for twenty years of service.
In the third place, all government officers and employees are given only one retirement benefit
irrespective of their length of service in the government, whereas, under Republic Act 3836, because
of no age limitation, a Senator or Member of the House of Representatives upon being elected for 24
years will be entitled to two retirement benefits or equivalent to six years' salary.
Also, while the payment of retirement benefits (annuity) to an employee who had been retired and
reappointed is suspended during his new employment (under Commonwealth Act 186, as amended),
this is not so under Republic Act 3836.
Lastly, it is peculiar that Republic Act 3836 grants retirement benefits to officials who are not
members of the Government Service Insurance System. Most grantees of retirement benefits under
the various retirement laws have to be members or must at least contribute a portion of their monthly
salaries to the System.
4

The arguments advanced against the discriminatory features of Republic Act 3836, as far as
Members of Congress are concerned, apply with equal force to the elected officers of each House,
such as the Secretaries and the Sergeants-at-arms. Under Republic Act 3836, the Secretaries and
Sergeants-at-arms of each House are given the benefits of retirement without having served for
twenty years as required with other officers and employees of the Government.
Fourth Legal Point Whether or not the title of Republic Act No. 3836 is germane to the subject
matter expressed in the act.
Another Constitutional point to determine is whether the title of Republic Act 3836 complies with the
requirement of paragraph 1, section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, which reads as follows:
No bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill.
We are not unmindful of the fact that there has been a general disposition in all courts to construe the
constitutional provision with reference to the subject and title of the Act, liberally.
It is the contention of petitioner that the said title of Republic Act 3836 gives no inkling or notice
whatsoever to the public regarding the retirement gratuities and commutable vacation and sick leave
privileges to members of Congress. It is claimed that petitioner learned of this law for the first time
only when Jose Velasco, disbursing officer of the House, testified on January 30, 1964, before Justice
Labrador, in connection with the hearing of the case, and he revealed that in 1963, Congress enacted
the retirement law for its members. In fact the Appropriation Act for the fiscal year 1964-65, Republic
Act No. 4164, provides:
13. For payment of retirement gratuities of members of the Senate pursuant to the provisions
of Republic Act No. 3836: PROVIDED, That no portion of this Appropriation shall be
transferred to any other item until all approved claims shall have been paid P210,000.00.
In the appropriations for the House of Representatives the following items appear:
7. For government share of premiums on life insurance and retirement of Members and
employees of the House of Representatives, as provided for under Republic Act No. 1616
P300,000.00
8. For payment of the cash commutation of the accumulated vacation and sick leaves as
provided for under Republic Act No. 611, and retirement gratuities of Members and employees
of the House of Representatives under Republic Act No. 1616 P1,300,000.00.
In the Appropriations Act of 1965-1966 (Republic Act No. 4642), the following item appears in the
appropriations for the Senate:
13. For payment of retirement gratuities of Senate personnel pursuant to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 1616: PROVIDED, That no portion of this appropriation shall be transferred
to any other item until all approved claims shall have been paid P100,000.00.
It is thus clear that in the Appropriations Act for 1965-1966, the item in the Senate for P210,000.00 to
implement Republic Act 3836 was eliminated.
In the appropriations for the House (1965-1966), the following items appear:
7. For government share of premiums on life insurance and retirement of Members and
employees of the House Of Representatives as provided for under Republic Act No. 1616
P1,200,000.00.
8. For payment of the cash commutation of the accumulated vacation and sick leaves as
provided for under Republic Act No. 611, and retirement gratuities of Members and employees
of the House of Representatives under Republic Act No. 1616 P1,700,000.00.
It is to be observed that under Republic Act 3836, amending the first paragraph of section 12,
subsection (c) of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 660 and. 3096, the
retirement benefits are granted to members of the Government Service Insurance System, who have
rendered at least twenty years of service regardless of age. This paragraph is related and germane to
the subject of Commonwealth Act No. 186.
On the other hand, the succeeding paragraph of Republic Act 3836 refers to members of Congress
and to elective officers thereof who are not members of the Government Service Insurance System.
To provide retirement benefits, therefore, for these officials, would relate to subject matter which is
not germane to Commonwealth Act No. 186. In other words, this portion of the amendment (re
retirement benefits for Members of Congress and elected officers, such as the Secretary and
Sergeants-at-arms for each House) is not related in any manner to the subject of Commonwealth Act
186 establishing the Government Service Insurance System and which provides for both retirement
and insurance benefits to its members.
Parenthetically, it may be added that the purpose of the requirement that the subject of an Act should
be expressed in its title is fully explained by Cooley, thus: (1) to prevent surprise or fraud upon the
Legislature; and (2) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislation that are being
considered, in order that they may have the opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or
otherwise, if they shall so desire (Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., Vol. 1, p. 162; See also
Martin, Political Law Reviewer, Book One [1965], p. 119)
With respect to sufficiency of title this Court has ruled in two cases:
The Constitutional requirement with respect to titles of statutes as sufficient to reflect their
contents is satisfied if all parts of a law relate to the subject expressed in its title, and it is not
necessary that the title be a complete index of the content. (People v. Carlos, 78 Phil. 535)
The Constitutional requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title should
be reasonably construed so as not to interfere unduly with the enactment of necessary
legislation. It should be given a practical, rather than technical, construction. It should be a
sufficient compliance with such requirement if the title expresses the general subject and all
the provisions of the statute are germane to that general subject. (Sumulong v. The
Commission on Elections, 73 Phil. 288, 291)
The requirement that the subject of an act shall be expressed in its title is wholly illustrated and
explained inCentral Capiz v. Ramirez, 40 Phil. 883. In this case, the question raised was whether
Commonwealth Act 2784, known as the Public Land Act, was limited in its application to lands of the
public domain or whether its provisions also extended to agricultural lands held in private ownership.
The Court held that the act was limited to lands of the public domain as indicated in its title, and did
not include private agricultural lands. The Court further stated that this provision of the Constitution
expressing the subject matter of an Act in its title is not a mere rule of legislative
procedure, directory to Congress, but it is mandatory. It is the duty of the Court to declare void any
statute not conforming to this constitutional provision. (See Walker v. State, 49 Alabama 329; Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, pp. 162-164;
5
See also Agcaoili v. Suguitan, 48 Phil. 676; Sutherland on
Statutory Construction, Sec. 111.)
In the light of the history and analysis of Republic Act 3836, We conclude that the title of said
Republic Act 3836 is void as it is not germane to the subject matter and is a violation of the
aforementioned paragraph 1, section 21, Article VI of the Constitution.
In short, Republic Act 3836 violates three constitutional provisions, namely: first, the prohibition
regarding increase in the salaries of Members of Congress; second, the equal protection clause; and
third, the prohibition that the title of a bill shall not embrace more than one subject.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, Republic Act No. 3836 is hereby declared null
and void, in so far as it refers to the retirement of Members of Congress and the elected officials
thereof, as being unconstitutional. The restraining order issued in our resolution on December 6, 1965
is hereby made permanent. No costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P. and
Zaldivar, JJ.,concur.
Barrera, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-75697 June 18, 1987
VALENTIN TIO doing business under the name and style of OMI ENTERPRISES, petitioner,
vs.
VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD, MINISTER OF FINANCE, METRO MANILA COMMISSION, CITY MAYOR and
CITY TREASURER OF MANILA, respondents.
Nelson Y. Ng for petitioner.
The City Legal Officer for respondents City Mayor and City Treasurer.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This petition was filed on September 1, 1986 by petitioner on his own behalf and purportedly on
behalf of other videogram operators adversely affected. It assails the constitutionality of Presidential
Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to
regulate and supervise the videogram industry (hereinafter briefly referred to as the BOARD). The
Decree was promulgated on October 5, 1985 and took effect on April 10, 1986, fifteen (15) days after
completion of its publication in the Official Gazette.
On November 5, 1985, a month after the promulgation of the abovementioned decree, Presidential
Decree No. 1994 amended the National Internal Revenue Code providing, inter alia:
SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed video-tape
cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos;
Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall be subject to
sales tax.
On October 23, 1986, the Greater Manila Theaters Association, Integrated Movie Producers,
Importers and Distributors Association of the Philippines, and Philippine Motion Pictures Producers
Association, hereinafter collectively referred to as the Intervenors, were permitted by the Court to
intervene in the case, over petitioner's opposition, upon the allegations that intervention was
necessary for the complete protection of their rights and that their "survival and very existence is
threatened by the unregulated proliferation of film piracy." The Intervenors were thereafter allowed to
file their Comment in Intervention.
The rationale behind the enactment of the DECREE, is set out in its preambular clauses as follows:
1. WHEREAS, the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms including,
among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or variation
thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of moviehouses and theaters, and have
caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent (40%) and a
tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement and other
taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in
government revenues;
2. WHEREAS, videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per
annum from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and such earnings have not
been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180 Million
in taxes each year;
3. WHEREAS, the unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also
affected the viability of the movie industry, particularly the more than 1,200 movie
houses and theaters throughout the country, and occasioned industry-wide
displacement and unemployment due to the shutdown of numerous moviehouses and
theaters;
4. "WHEREAS, in order to ensure national economic recovery, it is imperative for the
Government to create an environment conducive to growth and development of all
business industries, including the movie industry which has an accumulated investment
of about P3 Billion;
5. WHEREAS, proper taxation of the activities of videogram establishments will not only
alleviate the dire financial condition of the movie industry upon which more than 75,000
families and 500,000 workers depend for their livelihood, but also provide an additional
source of revenue for the Government, and at the same time rationalize the heretofore
uncontrolled distribution of videograms;
6. WHEREAS, the rampant and unregulated showing of obscene videogram features
constitutes a clear and present danger to the moral and spiritual well-being of the youth,
and impairs the mandate of the Constitution for the State to support the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character and promote their
physical, intellectual, and social well-being;
7. WHEREAS, civic-minded citizens and groups have called for remedial measures to
curb these blatant malpractices which have flaunted our censorship and copyright laws;
8. WHEREAS, in the face of these grave emergencies corroding the moral values of the
people and betraying the national economic recovery program, bold emergency
measures must be adopted with dispatch; ... (Numbering of paragraphs supplied).
Petitioner's attack on the constitutionality of the DECREE rests on the following grounds:
1. Section 10 thereof, which imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the
local government is a RIDER and the same is not germane to the subject matter
thereof;
2. The tax imposed is harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint of
trade in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution;
3. There is no factual nor legal basis for the exercise by the President of the vast
powers conferred upon him by Amendment No. 6;
4. There is undue delegation of power and authority;
5. The Decree is an ex-post facto law; and
6. There is over regulation of the video industry as if it were a nuisance, which it is not.
We shall consider the foregoing objections in seriatim.
1. The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be
expressed in the title thereof" 1 is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough to
include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. It is not necessary that the title express
each and every end that the statute wishes to accomplish. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts
of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long as
they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.
2
An act having a single
general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse
they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be
considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the
general object."
3
The rule also is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not
be so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation.
4
It should be given
practical rather than technical construction.
5

Tested by the foregoing criteria, petitioner's contention that the tax provision of the DECREE is a rider
is without merit. That section reads, inter alia:
Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding any
provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of
the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or
disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction of any motion picture or
audiovisual program. Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall
accrue to the province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall acrrue to the municipality
where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be
shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of, the general object of the DECREE, which is the regulation of the video industry
through the Videogram Regulatory Board as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not
inconsistent with, nor foreign to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation
6
it is simply one
of the regulatory and control mechanisms scattered throughout the DECREE. The express purpose of
the DECREE to include taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the
heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from Preambles 2 and 5, supra. Those
preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the measure. The title of the DECREE,
which is the creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board, is comprehensive enough to include the
purposes expressed in its Preamble and reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to
express all those objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the DECREE.
7

2. Petitioner also submits that the thirty percent (30%) tax imposed is harsh and oppressive,
confiscatory, and in restraint of trade. However, it is beyond serious question that a tax does not
cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities
taxed.
8
The power to impose taxes is one so unlimited in force and so searching in extent, that the
courts scarcely venture to declare that it is subject to any restrictions whatever, except such as rest in
the discretion of the authority which exercises it.
9
In imposing a tax, the legislature acts upon its
constituents. This is, in general, a sufficient security against erroneous and oppressive taxation. 10
The tax imposed by the DECREE is not only a regulatory but also a revenue measure prompted by
the realization that earnings of videogram establishments of around P600 million per annum have not
been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of an additional source of revenue. It is an
end-user tax, imposed on retailers for every videogram they make available for public viewing. It is
similar to the 30% amusement tax imposed or borne by the movie industry which the theater-owners
pay to the government, but which is passed on to the entire cost of the admission ticket, thus shifting
the tax burden on the buying or the viewing public. It is a tax that is imposed uniformly on all
videogram operators.
The levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for
regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of
intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an
objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition.
The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the
legislature to impose the tax was to favor one industry over another. 11
It is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation,
and it has been repeatedly held that "inequities which result from a singling out of one
particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional
limitation". 12 Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power.13
At bottom, the rate of tax is a matter better addressed to the taxing legislature.
3. Petitioner argues that there was no legal nor factual basis for the promulgation of the DECREE by
the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the 1973 Constitution providing that "whenever in
the judgment of the President ... , there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof, or
whenever the interim Batasang Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to act
adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action, he may, in
order to meet the exigency, issue the necessary decrees, orders, or letters of instructions, which shall
form part of the law of the land."
In refutation, the Intervenors and the Solicitor General's Office aver that the 8th "whereas" clause
sufficiently summarizes the justification in that grave emergencies corroding the moral values of the
people and betraying the national economic recovery program necessitated bold emergency
measures to be adopted with dispatch. Whatever the reasons "in the judgment" of the then President,
considering that the issue of the validity of the exercise of legislative power under the said
Amendment still pends resolution in several other cases, we reserve resolution of the question raised
at the proper time.
4. Neither can it be successfully argued that the DECREE contains an undue delegation of legislative
power. The grant in Section 11 of the DECREE of authority to the BOARD to "solicit the direct
assistance of other agencies and units of the government and deputize, for a fixed and limited period,
the heads or personnel of such agencies and units to perform enforcement functions for the Board" is
not a delegation of the power to legislate but merely a conferment of authority or discretion as to its
execution, enforcement, and implementation. "The true distinction is between the delegation of power
to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring
authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter, no valid objection can be made." 14 Besides, in the very language of the
decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a "fixed and limited period" with
the deputized agencies concerned being "subject to the direction and control of the BOARD." That
the grant of such authority might be the source of graft and corruption would not stigmatize the
DECREE as unconstitutional. Should the eventuality occur, the aggrieved parties will not be without
adequate remedy in law.
5. The DECREE is not violative of the ex post facto principle. An ex post facto law is, among other
categories, one which "alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or
different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense." It is petitioner's
position that Section 15 of the DECREE in providing that:
All videogram establishments in the Philippines are hereby given a period of forty-five
(45) days after the effectivity of this Decree within which to register with and secure a
permit from the BOARD to engage in the videogram business and to register with the
BOARD all their inventories of videograms, including videotapes, discs, cassettes or
other technical improvements or variations thereof, before they could be sold, leased, or
otherwise disposed of. Thereafter any videogram found in the possession of any person
engaged in the videogram business without the required proof of registration by the
BOARD, shall be prima facie evidence of violation of the Decree, whether the
possession of such videogram be for private showing and/or public exhibition.
raises immediately a prima facie evidence of violation of the DECREE when the required proof of
registration of any videogram cannot be presented and thus partakes of the nature of an ex post
facto law.
The argument is untenable. As this Court held in the recent case of Vallarta vs. Court of Appeals, et
al. 15
... it is now well settled that "there is no constitutional objection to the passage of a law
providing that the presumption of innocence may be overcome by a contrary
presumption founded upon the experience of human conduct, and enacting what
evidence shall be sufficient to overcome such presumption of innocence" (People vs.
Mingoa 92 Phil. 856 [1953] at 858-59, citing 1 COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 639-641). And the "legislature may enact that when
certain facts have been proved that they shall be prima facie evidence of the existence
of the guilt of the accused and shift the burden of proof provided there be a rational
connection between the facts proved and the ultimate facts presumed so that the
inference of the one from proof of the others is not unreasonable and arbitrary because
of lack of connection between the two in common experience". 16
Applied to the challenged provision, there is no question that there is a rational connection between
the fact proved, which is non-registration, and the ultimate fact presumed which is violation of the
DECREE, besides the fact that the prima facie presumption of violation of the DECREE attaches only
after a forty-five-day period counted from its effectivity and is, therefore, neither retrospective in
character.
6. We do not share petitioner's fears that the video industry is being over-regulated and being eased
out of existence as if it were a nuisance. Being a relatively new industry, the need for its regulation
was apparent. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie
industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment, considering "the unfair
competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the viewing public brought
about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films and
films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to the drop in theatrical
attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of video establishments are virtually untaxed
since mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license fees are required to engage in
business. 17
The enactment of the Decree since April 10, 1986 has not brought about the "demise" of the video
industry. On the contrary, video establishments are seen to have proliferated in many places
notwithstanding the 30% tax imposed.
In the last analysis, what petitioner basically questions is the necessity, wisdom and expediency of
the DECREE. These considerations, however, are primarily and exclusively a matter of legislative
concern.
Only congressional power or competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be
the basis for declaring a statute invalid. This is as it ought to be. The principle of
separation of powers has in the main wisely allocated the respective authority of each
department and confined its jurisdiction to such a sphere. There would then be intrusion
not allowable under the Constitution if on a matter left to the discretion of a coordinate
branch, the judiciary would substitute its own. If there be adherence to the rule of law,
as there ought to be, the last offender should be courts of justice, to which rightly
litigants submit their controversy precisely to maintain unimpaired the supremacy of
legal norms and prescriptions. The attack on the validity of the challenged provision
likewise insofar as there may be objections, even if valid and cogent on its wisdom
cannot be sustained. 18
In fine, petitioner has not overcome the presumption of validity which attaches to a challenged
statute. We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing
Presidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, (C.J.), Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla,
Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993
THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President, BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, Vice-President
for Legal Affairs, MARIANO M. UMALI, Director for Pasig, Makati, and Pasay, Metro Manila, ALFREDO C. FLORES,
and Chairman of the Committee on Legal Aid, JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 85, Quezon City and Branches 160, 167 and 166, Pasig, Metro Manila, respectively: the NATIONAL
CONFEDERATION OF THE JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, composed of the METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION rep. by its President. REINATO QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL
CIRCUIT COURT, Manila; THE MUNICIPAL JUDGES LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES rep. by its President, TOMAS
G. TALAVERA; by themselves and in behalf of all the Judges of the Regional Trial and Shari'a Courts,
Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Courts throughout the Country, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications,
JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Postmaster General, and the PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP., respondents.

CRUZ, J.:
The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the Judiciary. It is asserted by the
petitioners that this hallmark of republicanism is impaired by the statute and circular they are here
challenging. The Supreme Court is itself affected by these measures and is thus an interested party
that should ordinarily not also be a judge at the same time. Under our system of government,
however, it cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge, because no other office has the
authority to do so. We shall therefore act upon this matter not with officiousness but in the discharge
of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness.
The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine
Postal Corporation through its Circular No.
92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the
Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government
offices.
The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be
prejudiced by the above-named measures. The National Land Registration Authority has taken
common cause with them insofar as its own activities, such as sending of requisite notices in
registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been allowed to intervene.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces
more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in
both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the
members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the
Judiciary.
We approach these issues with one important principle in mind, to wit, the presumption of the
constitutionality of statutes. The theory is that as the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive,
every statute is supposed to have first been carefully studied and determined to be constitutional
before it was finally enacted. Hence, unless it is clearly shown that it is constitutionally flawed, the
attack against its validity must be rejected and the law itself upheld. To doubt is to sustain.
I
We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every
bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof."
The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to prevent
surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the title gives no
intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and
(3) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made,
of the subject of legislation that is being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being
heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.
1

It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the franking
privilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes.
R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers,
Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes
Connected Therewith."
The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3, which provides:
The State shall pursue the following objectives of a nationwide postal system:
a) to enable the economical and speedy transfer of mail and other postal matters, from
sender to addressee, with full recognition of their privacy or confidentiality;
b) to promote international interchange, cooperation and understanding through the
unhampered flow or exchange of postal matters between nations;
c) to cause or effect a wide range of postal services to cater to different users and
changing needs, including but not limited to, philately, transfer of monies and valuables,
and the like;
d) to ensure that sufficient revenues are generated by and within the industry to finance
the overall cost of providing the varied range of postal delivery and messengerial
services as well as the expansion and continuous upgrading of service standards by the
same.
Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads as follows:
Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions,
rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
repealed or modified accordingly.
All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided for
under Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and
5059. The Corporation may continue the franking privilege under Circular No. 35 dated
October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice President, under such arrangements and
conditions as may obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof.
The petitioners' contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the challenged act violates
the Constitution.
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as
to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general
subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the
legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement.
2

To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the
statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render
legislation impossible.
3
As has been correctly explained:
The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but matter
germane to the subject as expressed in the title, and adopted to the accomplishment of
the object in view, may properly be included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the
same act the machinery by which the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the penalties for
its infraction, and to remove obstacles in the way of its execution. If such matters are
properly connected with the subject as expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that they
should also have special mention in the title (Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed.
725).
This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: "The repeal of a statute on a
given subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same subject; and
therefore a repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the
subject. It would be difficult to conceive of a matter more germane to an act and to the object to be
accomplished thereby than the repeal of previous legislations connected therewith."
4

The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject
of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in
its title.
5
As observed in one case,
6
if the title of an act embraces only one subject, we apprehend it
was never claimed that every other act which repeals it or alters by implication must be mentioned in
the title of the new act. Any such rule would be neither within the reason of the Constitution, nor
practicable.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the
accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient
and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause,
Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.
II
The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking
privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in
the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in
the Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution,
reading as follows:
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three
readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been
distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or
emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and
the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeasand nays entered in
the Journal.
The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that
amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled
by a conference committee of both chambers. They stress that Sec. 35 was never a subject of any
disagreement between both Houses and so the second paragraph could not have been validly added
as an amendment.
These argument are unacceptable.
While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between
the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is
described thus:
A conference committee may, deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited
to resolving the precise differences between the two houses. Even where the
conference committee is not by rule limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely
limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be inserted into the conference
bill. But occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results, results
beyond its mandate, These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict
limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian
power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In a Nutshell,
1986 Ed., p.81).
It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to
and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was
enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of
the House of Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then
presented to and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the
approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v.
Gimenez
7
laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters
that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nayson the final reading of the
bill).
8
The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still
valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons,
9
where we explained the reason thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as
we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate both the, letter and spirit of the
organic laws by which the Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade
a coordinate and independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the
legitimate powers and functions, of the Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment
was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies
thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill
and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article
VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate
department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
III
The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based on the equal protection clause.
It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege from
the Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the Philippines, the Vice President of the
Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the Commission on Elections;
former Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office; and the general public
in the filing of complaints against public offices and officers.
10

The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid
classification in accordance with the equal protection clause. In fact, the franking privilege has been
withdrawn not only from the Judiciary but also the Office of Adult Education, the Institute of National
Language; the Telecommunications Office; the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; the
National Historical Commission; the Armed Forces of the Philippines; the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Ladies Steering Committee; the City and Provincial Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan (Office
of Special Prosecutor); the Kabataang Barangay; the Commission on the Filipino Language; the
Provincial and City Assessors; and the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons.
11

The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in
a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to provide for a more, specific guaranty
against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be
challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an
unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things
similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities
imposed,
12
Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue
favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or
things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for
example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of
the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or
things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same
particulars.
13

What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in the first place? Is the franking privilege
extended to the President of the Philippines or the Commission on Elections or to former Presidents
of the Philippines purely as acourtesy from the lawmaking body? Is it offered because of
the importance or status of the grantee or because of its need for the privilege? Or have the grantees
been chosen pell-mell, as it were, without any basis at all for the selection?
We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt that the statute as a whole was carefully
deliberated upon, by the political departments before it was finally enacted. There is reason to
suspect, however, that not enough care or attention was given to its repealing clause, resulting in the
unwitting withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Judiciary.
We also do not believe that the basis of the classification was mere courtesy, for it is unimaginable
that the political departments would have intended this serious slight to the Judiciary as the third of
the major and equal departments the government. The same observations are made if the
importance or status of the grantee was the criterion used for the extension of the franking privilege,
which is enjoyed by the National Census and Statistics Office and even some private individuals but
not the courts of justice.
In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the
perceived need of the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial
revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of communication between
the government and the people.
Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the departments of the government, it is the
Judiciary, that has been denied the franking privilege. There is no question that if there is any major
branch of the government that needs the privilege, it is the Judicial Department, as the respondents
themselves point out. Curiously, the respondents would justify the distinction on the basis precisely of
this need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary the franking privilege while extending it to others less
deserving.
In their Comment, the respondents point out that available data from the Postal Service Office show
that from January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00. Of
this amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other agencies whose functions include the service of
judicial processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office of the
Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming fromthe Judiciary amounted to
P73,574,864.00, and those coming from the petitioners reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00.
The respondents' conclusion is that because of this considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary,
the franking privilege must be withdrawn from it.
The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking privilege should
be extended only to those who do not need it very much, if at all, (like the widows of former
Presidents) but not to those who need it badly (especially the courts of justice). It is like saying that a
person may be allowed cosmetic surgery although it is not really necessary but not an operation that
can save his life.
If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it
seems to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government, including those who do not
need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially
where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all,
and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn,
Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes
the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege,
there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the
Judiciary for such privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the
Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand why the Supreme
Court should be similarly treated as that Committee. And while we may concede the need of the
National Census and Statistics Office for the franking privilege, we are intrigued that a similar if not
greater need is not recognized in the courts of justice.
(On second thought, there does not seem to be any justifiable need for withdrawing the privilege from
the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, which, like former Presidents of the
Philippines or their widows, does not send as much frank mail as the Judiciary.)
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation,
was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may
have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain
functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the government
and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter.
14
Among the services it should be prepared to
extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the government that need the franking privilege in
the discharge of their own public functions.
We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Corporation is capitalized at P10 billion pesos, 55%
of which is supplied by the Government, and that it derives substantial revenues from the sources
enumerated in Section 10, on top of the exemptions it enjoys. It is not likely that the retention of the
franking privilege of the Judiciary will cripple the Corporation.
At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of justice, the
withdrawal from it of the franking privilege can only further deepen this serious problem. The volume
of judicial mail, as emphasized by the respondents themselves, should stress the dependence of the
courts of justice on the postal service for communicating with lawyers and litigants as part of the
judicial process. The Judiciary has the lowest appropriation in the national budget compared to the
Legislative and Executive Departments; of the P309 billion budgeted for 1993, only .84%, or less than
1%, is alloted for the judiciary. It should not be hard to imagine the increased difficulties of our courts
if they have to affix a purchased stamp to every process they send in the discharge of their judicial
functions.
We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid
exercise of discretion by the Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find its repealing
clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It
is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the
grantees of the franking privilege.
This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a matter of
arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and power to correct.
IV
In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its subject is not expressed in its title and
that it was not passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, we annul Section 35 of
the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no person shall "be deprived
of the equal protection of laws."
We arrive at these conclusions with a full awareness of the criticism it is certain to provoke. While
ruling against the discrimination in this case, we may ourselves be accused of similar discrimination
through the exercise of our ultimate power in our own favor. This is inevitable. Criticism of judicial
conduct, however undeserved, is a fact of life in the political system that we are prepared to accept..
As judges, we cannot debate with our detractors. We can only decide the cases before us as law
imposes on us the duty to be fair and our own conscience gives us the light to be right.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the franking privilege
from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional trail Courts, the Municipal trial Courts,
and the National Land Registration Authority and its Register of Deeds to all of which offices the said
privilege shall be RESTORED. The temporary restraining order dated June 2, 1992, is made
permanent.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 87636. November 19, 1990.]
NEPTALI A. GONZALES, ERNESTO M. MACEDA, ALBERTO G. ROMULO, HEHERSON T.
ALVAREZ, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AGAPITO A. AQUINO, TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR.,
ERNESTO F. HERRERA, JOSE D. LINA, JR., JOHN OSMEA, VICENTE T. PATERNO, RENE A.
SAGUISAG, LETICIA RAMOS-SHAHANI, MAMINTAL ABDUL J. TAMANO, WIGBERTO E.
TAADA, JOVITO R. SALONGA, ORLANDO S. MERCADO, JUAN PONCE ENRILE, JOSEPH
ESTRADA, SOTERO LAUREL, AQUILINO PIMENTEL, JR., SANTANINA RASUL, VICTOR ZIGA,
Petitioners, v. HON. CATALINO MACARAIG, JR., HON. VICENTE JAYME, HON. CARLOS
DOMINGUEZ, HON. FULGENCIO FACTORAN, HON. FIORELLO ESTUAR, HON. LOURDES
QUISUMBING, HON. RAUL MANGLAPUS, HON. ALFREDO BENGSON, HON. JOSE
CONCEPCION, HON. LUIS SANTOS, HON. MITA PARDO DE TAVERA, HON. RAINERIO REYES,
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, HON. ROSALINA CAJUCOM and HON. EUFEMIO C. DOMINGO,
Respondents.
Gonzales, Batiller, Bilog & Associates for petitioners.
D E C I S I O N
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This constitutional controversy between the legislative and executive departments of government
stemmed from Senate Resolution No. 381, adopted on 2 February 1989,
"Authorizing and Directing the Committee on Finance to Bring in the Name of the Senate of the
Philippines the Proper Suit with the Supreme Court of the Philippines contesting the Constitutionality
of the Veto by the President of Special and General Provisions, particularly Section 55, of the General
Appropriation Bill of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) and For Other Purposes."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioners are thus before us as members and ex-officio members of the Committee on Finance of
the Senate and as "substantial taxpayers whose vital interests may be affected by this case."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Respondents are members of the Cabinet tasked with the implementation of the General
Appropriations Act of 1989 and 1990, some of them incumbents, while others have already been
replaced, and include the National Treasurer and the Commission on Audit Chairman, all of whom
are being sued in their official capacities.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
The Background Facts
On 16 December 1988, Congress passed House Bill No. 19186, or the General Appropriations Bill for
the Fiscal Year 1989. As passed, it eliminated or decreased certain items included in the proposed
budget submitted by the President.
Pursuant to the constitutional provision on the passage of bills, Congress presented the said Bill to
the President for consideration and approval.
On 29 December 1988, the President signed the Bill into law, and declared the same to have become
Rep. Act No. 6688. In the process, seven (7) Special Provisions and Section 55, a "General
Provision," were vetoed.
On 2 February 1989, the Senate, in the same Resolution No. 381 mentioned at the outset, further
expressed:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREAS, Be it Resolved, as it is hereby Resolved, That the Senate express its sense that the
veto by the President of Section 55 of the GENERAL PROVISIONS of the General Appropriation Bill
of 1989 (H.B. No. 19186) is unconstitutional and, therefore, void and without any force and effect;
hence, the aforesaid Section 55 remains;
"x x x"
Thus it is that, on 11 April 1989, this Petition for Prohibition/ Mandamus was filed, with a prayer for
the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order, assailing mainly the
constitutionality or legality of the Presidential veto of Section 55, and seeking to enjoin respondents
from implementing Rep. Act No. 6688. No Restraining Order was issued by the Court.
The Comment, submitted by the Solicitor General on 25 August 1989 (after several extensions
granted), was considered as the Answer to the Petition and, on 7 September 1989, the Court
Resolved to give due course to the Petition and to require the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda. Petitioners filed their Memorandum on 12 December 1989. But, on 19 January 1990,
they filed a Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Supplemental Petition, which was granted, basically
raising the same issue as in the original Petition, this time questioning the Presidents veto of certain
provisions, particularly Section 16, of House Bill 26934, or the General Appropriations Bill for Fiscal
Year 1990, which the President declared to have become Rep. Act No. 6831.chanrobles
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
The Solicitor Generals Comment on the Supplemental Petition, on behalf of respondent public
officials, was submitted on 24 April 1990. On 15 May 1990, the Court required the parties to file
simultaneously their consolidated memoranda, to include the Supplemental Petition, within an
inextendible period of thirty (30) days from notice. However, because the original Resolution of 15
May 1990 merely required the filing of a memorandum on the Supplemental Petition, a revised
Resolution requiring consolidated memoranda, within thirty (30) days from notice, was released on 28
June 1990.
The Consolidated Memoranda were respectively filed on 26 June 1990 by petitioners, and on 1
August 1990 by respondents. On 14 August 1990, both Memoranda were Noted and the case was
deemed submitted for deliberation.
On 11 September 1990, the Court heard the case on oral argument and required the submittal of
supplemental Memoranda, the last of which was filed on 26 September 1990.
The Vetoed Provisions and Reasons Therefor
Section 55 of the Appropriations Act of 1989 (Section 55 [FY 89] hereinafter), which was vetoed by
the President, reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 55. Prohibition Against the Restoration or Increase of Recommended Appropriations
Disapproved and/or Reduced by Congress: No item of appropriation recommended by the President
in the Budget submitted to Congress pursuant to Article VII, Section 22 of the Constitution which has
been disapproved or reduced in this Act shall be restored or increased by the use of appropriations
authorized for other purposes by augmentation. An item of appropriation for any purpose
recommended by the President in the Budget shall be deemed to have been disapproved by
Congress if no corresponding appropriation for the specific purpose is provided in this Act."cralaw
virtua1aw library
We quote below the reason for the Presidential veto:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The provision violates Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the Constitution. If allowed, this Section would
nullify not only the constitutional and statutory authority of the President, but also that of the President
of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court,
and Heads of Constitutional Commissions, to augment any item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations. A careful review
of the legislative action on the budget as submitted shows that in almost all cases, the budgets of
agencies as recommended by the President, as well as those of the Senate, the House of
Representatives, and the Constitutional Commissions, have been reduced. An unwanted
consequence of this provision is the inability of the President, the President of the Senate, Speaker of
the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions to augment any item of appropriation of their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations even in cases of calamity or in the event of
urgent need to accelerate the implementation of essential public services and infrastructure projects.
"Furthermore, this provision is inconsistent with Section 12 and other similar provisions of this
General Appropriations Act."cralaw virtua1aw library
A substantially similar provision as the vetoed Section 55 appears in the Appropriations Act of 1990,
this time crafted as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"B. GENERAL PROVISIONS
"Sec. 16. Use of Savings. The President of the Philippines, the President of the Senate, the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of
Constitutional Commissions under Article IX of the Constitution and the Ombudsman are hereby
authorized to augment any item in this Act for their respective offices from savings in other items of
their appropriations: PROVIDED, THAT NO ITEM OF APPROPRIATION RECOMMENDED BY THE
PRESIDENT IN THE BUDGET SUBMITTED TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO ARTICLE VII,
SECTION 22 OF THE CONSTITUTION WHICH HAS BEEN DISAPPROVED OR REDUCED BY
CONGRESS SHALL BE RESTORED OR INCREASED BY THE USE OF APPROPRIATIONS
AUTHORIZED FOR OTHER PURPOSES IN THIS ACT BY AUGMENTATION. AN ITEM OF
APPROPRIATION FOR ANY PURPOSE RECOMMENDED BY THE PRESIDENT IN THE BUDGET
SHALL BE DEEMED TO HAVE BEEN DISAPPROVED BY CONGRESS IF NO CORRESPONDING
APPROPRIATION FOR THE SPECIFIC PURPOSE IS PROVIDED IN THIS ACT."cralaw virtua1aw
library
It should be noted that in the 1989 Appropriations Act, the "Use of Savings" appears in Section 12,
separate and apart from Section 55; whereas in the 1990 Appropriations Act, the "Use of Savings"
and the vetoed provision have been commingled in Section 16 only, with the vetoed provision made
to appear as a condition or restriction.

Essentially the same reason was given for the veto of Section 16 (FY 90),
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"I am vetoing this provision for the reason that it violates Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the Constitution
in relation to Sections 44 and 45 of P.D. No. 1177 as amended by R.A. No. 6670 which authorizes
the President to use savings to augment any item of appropriations in the Executive Branch of the
Government.
"Parenthetically, there is a case pending in the Supreme Court relative to the validity of the
Presidents veto on Section 55 of the General Provisions of Republic Act No. 6688 upon which the
amendment on this Section was based. Inclusion, therefore, of the proviso in the last sentence of this
section might prejudice the Executive Branchs position in the case.
"Moreover, if allowed, this Section would nullify not only the constitutional and statutory authority of
the President, but also that of the officials enumerated under Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the
Constitution, to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective
appropriations.
"An unwanted consequence of this provision would be the inability of the President, the President of
the Senate, Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and
heads of Constitutional Commissions to augment any item of appropriation of their respective offices
from savings in other items of their respective appropriations even in cases of national emergency or
in the event of urgent need to accelerate the implementation of essential public services and
infrastructure projects."cralaw virtua1aw library
The fundamental issue raised is whether or not the veto by the President of Section 55 of the 1989
Appropriations Bill (Section 55 FY 89), and subsequently of its counterpart Section 16 of the 1990
Appropriations Bill (Section 16 FY 90), is unconstitutional and without
effect.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
The Contending Views
In essence, petitioners cause is anchored on the following grounds: (1) the Presidents line-veto
power as regards appropriation bills is limited to item/s and does not cover provision/s; therefore, she
exceeded her authority when she vetoed Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) which are
provisions; (2) when the President objects to a provision of an appropriation bill, she cannot exercise
the item-veto power but should veto the entire bill; (3) the item-veto power does not carry with it the
power to strike out conditions or restrictions for that would be legislation, in violation of the doctrine of
separation of powers; and (4) the power of augmentation in Article VI, Section 25 [5] of the 1987
Constitution, has to be provided for by law and, therefore, Congress is also vested with the
prerogative to impose restrictions on the exercise of that power.
The Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondents, counters that the issue at bar is a political
question beyond the power of this Court to determine; that petitioners had a political remedy, which
was to override the veto; that Section 55 is a "rider" because it is extraneous to the Appropriations Act
and, therefore, merits the Presidents veto; that the power of the President to augment items in the
appropriations for the executive branches had already been provided for in the Budget Law,
specifically Sections 44 and 45 of Pres. Decree No. 1177, as amended by Rep. Act No. 6670 (4
August 1988); and that the President is empowered by the Constitution to veto provisions or other
"distinct and severable parts" of an Appropriations Bill.

Judicial Determination
With the Senate maintaining that the Presidents veto is unconstitutional, and that charge being
controverted, there is an actual case or justiciable controversy between the Upper House of Congress
and the executive department that may be taken cognizance of by this Court.
"Indeed, where the legislature or the executive branch is acting within the limits of its authority, the
judiciary cannot and ought not to interfere with the former. But where the legislature or the executive
acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare
what the other branches of the government had assumed to do as void. This is the essence of judicial
power conferred by the Constitution in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law [Art. VIII, Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution; Art. X, Section 1 of the 1973
Constitution and which was adopted as part of the Freedom Constitution, and Art. VIII, Section 1 of
the 1987 Constitution] and which power this Court has exercised in many instances" (Demetria v.
Alba, G.R. No. 71977, 27 February 1987, 148 SCRA 209).
We take note as well of what petitioners stress as the "imperative need for a definitive ruling by this
Court as to the exact parameters of the exercise of the item-veto power of the President as regards
appropriation bills . . . in order to obviate the recurrence of a similar problem whenever a general
appropriations bill is passed by Congress." Indeed, the contextual reiteration of Section 55 (FY 89) in
Section 16 (FY 90) and again, its veto by the President, underscore the need for judicial arbitrament.
The Court does not thereby assert its superiority over or exhibit lack of respect due the other co-
ordinate departments but discharges a solemn and sacred duty to determine essentially the scope of
intersecting powers in regard which the Executive and the Senate are in dispute.chanrobles.com :
virtual law library
Petitioners have also brought this suit as taxpayers. As ruled in Sanidad v. COMELEC (No. L-44640,
12 October 1976, 73 SCRA 333), this Court enjoys the open discretion to entertain taxpayers suits or
not. In Tolentino v. COMELEC (No. L-34150, 16 October 1961, 41 SCRA 702), it was also held that a
member of the Senate has the requisite personality to bring a suit where a constitutional issue is
raised.cralawnad
The political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of the rival
claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to this Court. It cannot
abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution, although said provision by no means
does away with the applicability of the principle in appropriate cases.
"SECTION 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as
may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."cralaw virtua1aw library
Nor is this the first time that the constitutionality of a Presidential veto is raised to the Court. The two
oft-cited cases are Bengson v. Secretary of Justice (62 Phil. 912 [1936]), penned by Justice George
A. Malcolm, which upheld the veto questioned before it, but which decision was reversed by the U.S.
Supreme Court in the same entitled case in 292 U.S. 410, infra, essentially on the ground that an
Appropriations Bill was not involved. The second case is Bolinao Electronics v. Valencia (G.R. No. L-
20740, 30 June 1964, 11 SCRA 486), infra, which rejected the Presidents veto of a condition or
restriction in an Appropriations Bill.
The Extent of the Presidents Item-veto Power
The focal issue for resolution is whether or not the President exceeded the item-veto power accorded
by the Constitution. Or differently put, has the President the power to veto "provisions" of an
Appropriations Bill?
Petitioners contend that Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) are provisions and not items and
are, therefore, outside the scope of the item-veto power of the President.chanrobles lawlibrary :
rednad
The veto power of the President is expressed in Article VI, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution
reading, in full, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to
the President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the
same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in
its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of
such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other
House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of
that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by
yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The
President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days
after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
"(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation,
revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Paragraph (1) refers to the general veto power of the President and if exercised would result in the
veto of the entire bill, as a general rule. Paragraph (2) is what is referred to as the item-veto power or
the line-veto power. It allows the exercise of the veto over a particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill. As specified, the President may not veto less than all of an item of
an Appropriations Bill. In other words, the power given the executive to disapprove any item or items
in an Appropriations Bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an item and to approve the
remaining portion of the same item.
Originally, item veto exclusively referred to veto of items of appropriation bills and first came into
being in the former Organic Act, the Act of Congress of 29 August 1916. This was followed by the
1935 Constitution, which contained a similar provision in its Section 11(2), Article VI, except that the
veto power was made more expansive by the inclusion of this sentence:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . When a provision of an appropriation bill affects one or more items of the same, the President
can not veto the provision without at the same time vetoing the particular item or items to which it
relates . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

The 1935 Constitution further broadened the Presidents veto power to include the veto of item or
items of revenue and tariff bills.

With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the section took a more simple and compact form,
thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Section 20 (2). The Prime Minister shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not
object."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is to be noted that the counterpart provision in the 1987 Constitution (Article VI, Section 27 [2],
supra), is a verbatim reproduction except for the public official concerned. In other words, also
eliminated has been any reference to the veto of a provision. The vital question is: should this
exclusion be interpreted to mean as a disallowance of the power to veto a provision, as petitioners
urge?
The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and practice are concededly different. An item
in a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable parts . . . of the bill (Bengzon,
supra, at 916). It is an indivisible sum of money dedicated to a stated purpose (Commonwealth v.
Dodson, 11 S.E., 2d 120, 124, 125, etc., 176 Va. 281). The United States Supreme Court, in the case
of Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice (299 U.S. 410, 414, 57 S.Ct 252, 81 L. Ed., 312) declared "that an
item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which in itself is a specific appropriation of
money, not some general provision of law, which happens to be put into an appropriation bill."cralaw
virtua1aw library
It is our considered opinion that, notwithstanding the elimination in Article VI, Section 27 (2) of the
1987 Constitution of any reference to the veto of a provision, the extent of the Presidents veto power
as previously defined by the 1935 Constitution has not changed. This is because the eliminated
proviso merely pronounces the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill may be the
subject of a separate veto (Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 62 Phil., 912, 916 (1926); 2 BERNAS,
Joaquin, S.J., The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1st ed., 154-155, [1988]).
The restrictive interpretation urged by petitioners that the President may not veto a provision without
vetoing the entire bill not only disregards the basic principle that a distinct and severable part of a bill
may be the subject of a separate veto but also overlooks the Constitutional mandate that any
provision in the general appropriations bill shall relate specifically to some particular appropriation
therein and that any such provision shall be limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it
relates (1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 25 [2]). In other words, in the true sense of the term, a
provision in an Appropriations Bill is limited in its operation to some particular appropriation to which it
relates, and does not relate to the entire bill.chanrobles law library
Petitioners further submission that, since the exercise of the veto power by the President partakes of
the nature of legislative powers it should be strictly construed, is negative by the following dictum in
Bengzon, supra, reading:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The Constitution is a limitation upon the power of the legislative department of the government, but in
this respect it is a grant of power to the executive department. The Legislature has the affirmative
power to enact laws; the Chief Executive has the negative power by the constitutional exercise of
which he may defeat the will of the Legislature. It follows that the Chief Executive must find his
authority in the Constitution. But in exercising that authority he may not be confined to rules of strict
construction or hampered by the unwise interference of the judiciary. The courts will indulge every
intendment in favor of the constitutionality of a veto the same as they will presume the
constitutionality of an act as originally passed by the Legislature" (Commonwealth v. Barnett [1901],
199 Pa., 161; 55 L.R.A., 882; People v. Board of Councilmen [1892], 20 N.Y.S., 52; Fulmore v. Lane
[1911], 104 Tex., 499; Texas Co. v. State [1927], 53 A.L.R., 258 [at 917]).
Inappropriateness of the so-called "Provisions"
But even assuming arguendo that provisions are beyond the executive power to veto, we are of the
opinion that Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) are not provisions in the budgetary sense of
the term. Article VI, Section 25 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 25 (2) No provision or enactment shall be embraced in the general appropriations bill unless it
relates specifically to some particular appropriation therein. Any such provision or enactment shall be
limited in its operation to the appropriation to which it relates."cralaw virtua1aw library
Explicit is the requirement that a provision in the Appropriations Bill should relate specifically to some"
particular appropriation" therein. The challenged "provisions" fall short of this requirement. Firstly, the
vetoed "provisions" do not relate to any particular or distinctive appropriation. They apply generally to
all items disapproved or reduced by Congress in the Appropriations Bill. Secondly, the disapproved or
reduced items are nowhere to be found on the face of the Bill. To discover them, resort will have to be
made to the original recommendations made by the President and to the source indicated by
petitioners themselves, i.e., the "Legislative Budget Research and Monitoring Office" (Annex B-1 and
B-2, Petition). Thirdly, the vetoed Sections are more of an expression of Congressional policy in
respect of augmentation from savings rather than a budgetary appropriation. Consequently, Section
55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) although labelled as "provisions," are actually inappropriate
provisions that should be treated as items for the purpose of the Presidents veto power. (Henry v.
Edwards [1977] 346 S Rep. 2d, 157-158)
"Just as the President may not use his item-veto to usurp constitutional powers conferred on the
legislature, neither can the legislature deprive the Governor of the constitutional powers conferred on
him as chief executive officer of the state by including in a general appropriation bill matters more
properly enacted in separate legislation. The Governors constitutional power to veto bills of general
legislation . . . cannot be abridged by the careful placement of such measures in a general
appropriation bill, thereby forcing the Governor to choose between approving unacceptable
substantive legislation or vetoing items of expenditure essential to the operation of government. The
legislature cannot by location of a bill give it immunity from executive veto. Nor can it circumvent the
Governors veto power over substantive legislation by artfully drafting general law measures so that
they appear to be true conditions or limitations on an item of appropriation. Otherwise, the legislature
would be permitted to impair the constitutional responsibilities and functions of a co-equal branch of
government in contravention of the separation of powers doctrine . . . We are no more willing to allow
the legislature to use its appropriation power to infringe on the Governors constitutional right to veto
matters of substantive legislation than we are to allow the Governor to encroach on the constitutional
powers of the legislature. In order to avoid this result, we hold that, when the legislature inserts
inappropriate provisions in a general appropriation bill, such provisions must be treated as items for
purposes of the Governors item veto power over general appropriation bills.
x x x
". . . Legislative control cannot be exercised in such a manner as to encumber the general
appropriation bill with veto-proof logrolling measure, special interest provisions which could not
succeed if separately enacted, or riders, substantive pieces of legislation incorporated in a bill to
insure passage without veto. . . ." (Emphasis supplied)
Inappropriateness of the so-called "Conditions/Restrictions"
Petitioners maintain, however, that Congress is free to impose conditions in an Appropriations Bill
and where conditions are attached, the veto power does not carry with it the power to strike them out,
citing Commonwealth v. Dodson (11 SE, 2d 130, supra) and Bolinao Electronics Corporation v.
Valencia (No. L-20740, June 30, 1964, 11 SCRA 486). In other words, their theory is that Section 55
(FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) are such conditions/restrictions and thus beyond the veto
power.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
There can be no denying that inherent in the power of appropriation is the power to specify how
money shall be spent; and that in addition to distinct "items" of appropriation, the Legislature may
include in Appropriation Bills qualifications, conditions, limitations or restrictions on expenditure of
funds. Settled also is the rule that the Executive is not allowed to veto a condition or proviso of an
appropriation while allowing the appropriation itself to stand (Fairfield v. Foster, supra, at 320). That
was also the ruling in Bolinao, supra, which held that the veto of a condition in an Appropriations Bill
which did not include a veto of the items to which the condition related was deemed invalid and
without effect whatsoever.
However, for the rule to apply, restrictions should be such in the real sense of the term, not some
matters which are more properly dealt with in a separate legislation (Henry v. Edwards, La, 346, So
2d 153). Restrictions or conditions in an Appropriations Bill must exhibit a connection with money
items in a budgetary sense in the schedule of expenditures. Again, the test is appropriateness.
"It is not enough that a provision be related to the institution or agency to which funds are
appropriated. Conditions and limitations properly included in an appropriation bill must exhibit such a
connexity with money items of appropriation that they logically belong in a schedule of expenditures .
. . the ultimate test is one of appropriateness" (Henry v. Edwards, supra, at 158).
Tested by these criteria, Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) must also be held to be
inappropriate "conditions." While they, particularly, Section 16 (FY 90), have been "artfully drafted" to
appear as true conditions or limitations, they are actually general law measures more appropriate for
substantive and, therefore, separate legislation.
Further, neither of them shows the necessary connection with a schedule of expenditures. The
reason, as explained earlier, is that items reduced or disapproved by Congress would not appear on
the face of the enrolled bill or Appropriations Act itself. They can only be detected when compared
with the original budgetary submittals of the President. In fact, Sections 55 (FY 89) and 16 (FY 90)
themselves provide that an item "shall be deemed to have been disapproved by Congress if no
corresponding appropriation for the specific purpose is provided in this Act."cralaw virtua1aw library
Considering that the vetoed provisions are not, in the budgetary sense of the term, conditions or
restrictions, the case of Bolinao Electronics Corporation v. Valencia (supra), invoked by petitioners,
becomes inapplicable. In that case, a public works bill contained an item appropriating a certain sum
for assistance to television stations, subject to the condition that the amount would not be available to
places where there were commercial television stations. Then President Macapagal approved the
appropriation but vetoed the condition. When challenged before this Court, it was held that the veto
was ineffectual and that the approval of the item carried with it the approval of the condition attached
to it. In contrast with the case at bar, there is no condition, in the budgetary sense of the term,
attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill which was struck out. For obviously,
Sections 55 (FY 89) and 16 (FY 90) partake more of a curtailment on the power to augment from
savings; in other words, "a general provision of law, which happens to be put in an appropriation bill"
(Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, supra).
The Power of Augmentation and The Validity of the Veto
The President promptly vetoed Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90) because they nullify the
authority of the Chief Executive and heads of different branches of government to augment any item
in the General Appropriations Law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations, as guaranteed by Article VI, Section 25 (5) of the Constitution. Said
provision reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Sec. 25. (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the
President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from
savings in other items of their respective appropriations" (Emphasis ours).
Noteworthy is the fact that the power to augment from savings lies dormant until authorized by law.
This Court upheld the validity of the power of augmentation from savings in Demetria v. Alba, which
ruled:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . to afford the heads of the different branches of the government and those of the constitutional
commissions considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources, the constitution allowed
the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose of augmenting an item from
savings in another item in the appropriation of the government branch or constitutional body
concerned. The leeway granted was thus limited. The purpose and conditions for which funds may be
transferred were specified, i.e., transfer may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting an item and
such transfer may be made only if there are savings from another item in the appropriation of the
government branch or constitutional body" (G.R. No. 71977, 27 February 1987, 148 SCRA 214).
The 1973 Constitution contained an identical authority to augment from savings in its Article VIII,
Section 16 (5), except for mention of the Prime Minister among the officials vested with that power. 1
In 1977, the statutory authority of the President to augment any appropriation of the executive
department in the General Appropriations Act from savings was specifically provided for in Section 44
of Presidential Decree No. 1177, as amended (RA 6670, 4 August 1988), otherwise known as the
"Budget Reform Decree of 1977." It reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 44. . . .
"The President shall, likewise, have the authority to augment any appropriation of the Executive
Department in the General Appropriations Act, from savings in the appropriations of another
department, bureau, office or agency within the Executive Branch, pursuant to the provisions of Art.
VIII, Sec. 16 (5) of the Constitution (now Sec. 25 (5), Art. VI)" (Emphasis ours), (N.B.: The first
paragraph declared void in Demetria v. Alba, supra, has been deleted).
Similarly, the use by the President of savings to cover deficits is specifically authorized in the same
Decree. Thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 45. Authority to Use Savings in Appropriations to Cover Deficits. Except as otherwise
provided in the General Appropriations Act, any savings in the regular appropriations authorized in
the General Appropriations Act for programs and projects of any department, office or agency, may,
with the approval of the President be used to cover a deficit in any other item of the regular
appropriations: ". . .

A more recent grant is found in Section 12 of the General Appropriations Act of 1989, the text of
which is repeated in the first paragraph of Section 16 (FY 90). Section 12 reads:chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary

"Sec. 12. Use of Savings. The President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the heads of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to augment any item in this Act for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations."cralaw virtua1aw
library
There should be no question, therefore, that statutory authority has, in fact, been granted. And once
given, the heads of the different branches of the Government and those of the Constitutional
Commissions are afforded considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources (Demetria
v. Alba, supra). The doctrine of separation of powers is in no way endangered because the transfer is
made within a department (or branch of government) and not from one department (branch) to
another (CRUZ, Isagani A., Philippine Political Law [1989] p. 155).
When Sections 55 (FY 89) and 16 (FY 90), therefore, prohibit the restoration or increase by
augmentation of appropriations disapproved or reduced by Congress, they impair the constitutional
and statutory authority of the President and other key officials to augment any item or any
appropriation from savings in the interest of expediency and efficiency. The exercise of such authority
in respect of disapproved or reduced items by no means vests in the Executive the power to rewrite
the entire budget, as petitioners contend, the leeway granted being delimited to transfers within the
department or branch concerned, the sourcing to come only from savings.
More importantly, it strikes us, too, that for such a special power as that of augmentation from
savings, the same is merely incorporated in the General Appropriations Bill. An Appropriations Bill is
"one the primary and specific aim of which is to make appropriation of money from the public
treasury" (Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 292 U.S., 410, 57 S.Ct. 252). It is a legislative
authorization of receipts and expenditures. The power of augmentation from savings, on the other
hand, can by no means be considered a specific appropriation of money. It is a non-appropriation
item inserted in an appropriation measure.chanrobles law library : red
The same thing must be said of Section 55 (FY 89), taken in conjunction with Section 12, and
Section 16 (FY 90), which prohibit the restoration or increase by augmentation of appropriations
disapproved and/or reduced by Congress. They are non-appropriation items, an appropriation being a
setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public revenue for a specific purpose (Bengzon v.
Secretary of Justice, 62 Phil. 912, 916 [1936]). It bears repeating that they are more of a substantive
expression of a legislative objective to restrict the power of augmentation granted to the President
and other key officials. They are actually matters of general law and more properly the subject of a
separate legislation that will embody, define and delimit the scope of the special power of
augmentation from savings instead of being inappropriately incorporated annually in the Appropriation
Act. To sanction this practice would be to give the Legislature the freedom to grant or withhold the
power from the Executive and other officials, and thus put in yearly jeopardy the exercise of that
power.
If, indeed, by the later enactments of Section 55 (FY 89) and Section 16 (FY 90), Congress, as
petitioners argue, intended to amend or repeal Pres. Decree No. 1177, with all the more reason
should it have so provided in a separate enactment, it being basic that implied repeals are not
favored. For the same reason, we cannot subscribe to petitioners allegation that Pres. Decree No.
1177 has been revoked by the 1987 Constitution. The 1987 Constitution itself provides for the
continuance of laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and other
executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution until amended, repealed, or revoked (1987
Constitution, Article XVIII, Section 3).
If, indeed, the legislature believed that the exercise of the veto powers by the executive were
unconstitutional, the remedy laid down by the Constitution is crystal clear. A Presidential veto may be
overriden by the votes of two-thirds of members of Congress (1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section
27[1], supra). But Congress made no attempt to override the Presidential veto. Petitioners argument
that the veto is ineffectual so that there is "nothing to override" (citing Bolinao) has lost force and
effect with the executive veto having been herein upheld.
As we see it, there need be no future conflict if the legislative and executive branches of government
adhere to the spirit of the Constitution, each exercising its respective powers with due deference to
the constitutional responsibilities and functions of the other. Thereby, the delicate equilibrium of
governmental powers remains on even keel.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of the assailed Presidential veto is UPHELD and this Petition is
hereby DISMISSED.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

Fernan, C.J., took no part.

Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I regretfully dissent from the Courts opinion in this case because fundamental principles underlying
the doctrine of separation of powers were violated when the President vetoed certain provisions of
the 1989 and 1990 Appropriation Bills.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
I am disturbed by the consequences of the Courts act of legitimation, among them the
following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) The traditional power of Congress over the public purse is negated if functions or offices it has
abolished or reduced are restored through the grant of carte blanche authority to shift savings from
one department or agency to another. What the Court is sustaining is no longer augmentation within
the purview of the Constitution. It is already fund juggling against the express command of the body in
whom fiscal power is vested.

(2) The Court is, in effect, allowing a modified lump sum appropriation for the entire Executive
Branch. The Executive is annually given appropriations ranging from Two Hundred Billion Pesos to
Two Hundred Fifty Billion Pesos. Whenever the President calls on all Departments to effect ten
percent (10%) savings, compliance immediately follows. There is thus a built in excess of Two Billion
Pesos. This tremendous amount can now be used to finance projects which Congress declares
improvident or of low priority. Secretaries of executive departments can thumb their noses at the
legislature and, by asking for the Presidents largesse, implement even that which has been
interdicted.
(3) The Constitution does not grant fiscal autonomy to the Executive Branch. There is no
comparison between the appropriations for the Judiciary and other constitutional offices on one hand
and for the Executive Branch on the other. There is reason to give flexibility in the use of funds for the
Judiciary and other constitutional creatures. However, tight congressional control over the way
executive programs of government are funded is part of a responsible presidential system of
government.
(4) The power to augment is intended for functions, projects, and offices where both Congress
and the President expressly or impliedly concur, not where one specifically exercises its constitutional
power to regulate or modify the expenditures of the other. In the same way that Congress cannot
increase the budgetary proposals of the Executive, neither should the Executive restore that which
Congress has expressly abolished or reduced.
(5) The Constitution grants the President power to veto any particular item or items of an
appropriation bill. The Constitution withholds the power to veto provisions from the President. We are
rewriting the Constitution to restore what the framers have eliminated when we ignore the difference
between an item and a provision.
The Court is interpreting the power to augment under Section 25 (5), Article VI of the Constitution as
a grant of near untrammelled authority to shift savings from appropriated funds for functions and
projects never intended by the lawmakers to be funded and worse, for functions and projects which
Congress has expressly stated should not be beneficiaries of public funds for a specific
year.chanrobles law library
With a budget of over Two Hundred Billion Pesos (P200,000,000,000.00) annually given to the
Executive Department, the implications of the Courts ruling are extremely serious, to say the least.
The Courts interpretation of the power of augmentation effectively corrodes the power of Congress
over a function which by its nature is inherently legislative. I dont believe the Constitution ever
intended to give carte blanche authority to the President to suppress certain activities in the Executive
Department already agreed upon with Congress and from the funds thus saved, transfer various
amounts to projects and offices which Congress declares must be abolished or reduced. Why not
simply give the President a lump sum allocation of P250 Billion and let it be spent as the Executive
wills?
The raising of funds for the expenses of Government is a legislative prerogative. The legislative
power also determines through Appropriation Acts how the revenues collected shall be spent and for
what purpose. Congress alone has the power to give the President the necessary funds to implement
Government programs. This vested power of Congress over the financial affairs of Government
underlies and colors all interpretations of budgetary provisions and appropriation laws.

Because of the high profile of Malacaang in the disbursement of funds for public needs, people tend
to forget that it is only implementing the law as passed by Congress. The President has no power to
enact or amend statutes, most specifically appropriation statutes. The Executive merely proposes and
submits recommendations. It is Congress which decides.
In the same way that Congress creates public offices, it can also abolish them whenever, in its
opinion, bona fide simplicity, economy, and efficiency would be achieved. By allowing the President
through augmentation to re-create public offices abolished or reduced by Congress, the Court is
treading upon time-tested doctrines, the effects of which may, in the future, be regretted.
It is misleading for the respondents to tie up the Presidents augmentation authority with the same
authority given to the Chief Justice and the heads of Constitutional Commissions. The Judiciary and
these Commissions enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their roles in the constitutional scheme call for
independence and flexibility in the use of appropriated funds. Most of their expenditures are fixed and
recurring. The Department of Budget and Management (DBM) prunes their requests for funds to the
bone such that when the budget is presented to Congress, there is nothing more to abolish or reduce.
The Judiciary and Commissions are usually neglected if not forgotten when the financial pie is sliced.
Thus the Judiciary with around 23,000 Justices, Judges, Clerks of Court, lawyers, and other
supporting personnel is generally allocated a miniscule one (1%) percent of the national budget by
DBM proposals. In the aborted 1991 proposals, the percentage was lowered to 00.67 percent or a
little over one-half percent. Any savings are quite modest and usually result from non-filling of judicial
positions. The Constitutional Commissions have the same problems. The Court now validates the
free use of savings by the Executive against the express will of Congress. Since these could easily
amount not to one percent but to ten percent or more of the gargantuan budget for the Executive
Branch, the implications are extremely disturbing.
As for the power given to the Senate President and Speaker, it is Congress which enacts the law and
the need for augmentation is not really significant.
The same is not true for the President where the amount from which savings are generated is always
beyond P200 Billion. The argument that the leeway granted is delimited to transfers within the
department or branch overlooks the fact that almost the entire budget of the Government is eaten up
by the Executive Branch. It is relatively easy for the Office of the President, for example, to get P100
Million from funds allocated as assistance to local governments or construction of major public works
and augment another item anywhere in the entire Executive Branch. This is indeed the power to
rewrite the entire budget. It is not the legislative power over the public purse which alone is
denigrated. The power to fiscalize government expenses is equally diminished.
The constitutional history of the Presidents item veto power shows that it should not be interpreted to
include the vetoing of provisions. It must be limited to items.
The 1935 Constitution granted the power to veto "provisions" provided the particular item or items to
which the provision relates are also vetoed.cralawnad
The 1973 Constitution removed the power to veto "provisions." The Chief Executive was given the
power to veto only "any particular item or items" in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill.
The 1987 Constitution follows the 1973 formula. The President may veto any particular item or items
in an appropriation, revenue, or tariff bill but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he
does not object.

The majority opinion correctly concedes that the terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and
practice are different.
If that is so, I fail to see how we can rule that the power of the President under the 1935 Constitution
to veto "provisions" remains even if it was expressly eliminated from both the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. Where the Constitution says "items," the veto power must be limited to "items." It
cannot include "provisions" which was expressly stricken out.
As a general rule, laws passed by Congress can be vetoed by the President only in their entirety or
none at all. She cannot select provisions and sections she does not like and veto them while
approving the rest of the statute. The Constitution allows a limited power of veto only when it comes
to appropriation, revenue or tariff bills. The power is limited to items. It should not be interpreted by
this Court to mean the expanded power to also veto "provisions."cralaw virtua1aw library
To state it in another way, the President may veto a distinct and severable part of a bill only (1) if
that severable part is an item and not a provision, and (2) if that severable part belongs to an
appropriation, revenue or tariff bill. All other bills must be vetoed in their entirety.
Regarding the citation from Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice (299 U.S. 410, 414 [1936]) for a liberal
construction, the veto power is interpreted in favor of validity only when it is limited to the items it
covers. No amount of liberal interpretation, for instance, can allow the President to veto any item,
part, or section of a bill which has nothing to do with appropriations, revenues, or tariffs.
I must emphasize that the provisions vetoed by the President are not inappropriate and definitely are
not riders.
There can be no dispute that Congress has the power to reduce the budgetary proposals prepared by
the Executive.
If Congress abolishes, removes, or reduces a project, function, or activity by cutting the funds
proposed for it, a provision enforcing that abolition, removal, or reduction is appropriate and germane
to the part thus stricken out. It would be absurd to require that it should appear in separate legislation.
A rider is a provision which is alien to the bill to which it is attached. An example is the Spooner
Amendment which transferred government powers over the Philippines in 1901 from the military to
the civil government, from the Executive to Congress. This section had nothing to do with the Army
Appropriation Bill in which it was included. On the other hand, the vetoed provisions in the instant
case specifically refer to appropriations which were disapproved or reduced in those very same bills.
In fact, the vetoed provisions of the 1989 and 1990 Appropriation Acts are not only germane to these
Acts but are precisely authorized under Section 25 (5) of Article VI of the Constitution. Under Section
25 (5), the President, Senate President, Speaker, Chief Justice and heads of Constitutional
Commissions are by law authorized to augment items in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items. As stated by the majority opinion, the power to
augment from savings lies dormant until authorized by law. When Congress exercises that dormant
power and by law authorizes these officials to augment items, certainly it has the power to also state
what items may not be augmented. I fail to see how the exercise of this power can be termed an
inappropriate rider.

The grant of the power to augment includes the authority to specify what matters are not part of the
granted power. I cannot agree that the 1977 authority to augment appropriations from savings can
prevail over 1989 and 1990 provisions to the contrary. The 1989 grant of the power to augment in
Section 12 of the 1989 Appropriations Acts is necessarily circumscribed by the withholding of that
power in the provisions illegally vetoed. One part cannot remain if a related part is vetoed.chanrobles
law library : red
In closing, I repeat that the Courts opinion allows the President to denigrate and render ineffective a
clear and positive expression of legislative policy on how the funds of Government shall be spent.
Where Congress expressly states that our limited funds should not be spent on a particular function
or office, we should not give the President the power to appropriate through transfers of funds the
money to maintain the abolished or greatly reduced function or office. The power of augmentation is
intended to save programs or projects agreed upon by both the President and Congress where the
funds allocated turn out to be inadequate. It was never conceived to render inutile the legislative
power over the purse. The power to determine how public funds should be spent should remain
lodged where it rightfully belongs.
Paras, J., dissents.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Mme. Justice Herrera has written another opinion that commends itself for its logic and lucidity.
Regrettably, there are certain conclusions in the ponencia that I cannot share.
In justifying her veto, the President says that "the provision violates section 25(5) of Article VI of the
Constitution," as if to suggest that she derives her power of augmentation directly from this section.
She does not, of course. This is not a self-executing provision. The said section states that she and
the other officials mentioned therein "may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the general
appropriations law for their respective offices . . ." This means she needs statutory authority before
she can augment.
The President says nevertheless that she has that authority and points to Section 440 of PD No.
1177, otherwise known as the Budget Reform Decree of 1977, as amended. Significantly, the
provision she invokes is precisely the section modified by Congress in the General Appropriations Act
of 1989 (and also of 1990). In vetoing Section 55 of that law, the President is in effect saying that the
authorization earlier given her cannot be revoked.
The authority to augment is not such an extraordinary endowment that, once given, becomes
sacrosanct and irrevocable. What the Legislature has conferred in its discretion, it can also recall in
the exercise of that same discretion. The only exception I know to the principle that Congress cannot
pass irrepealable laws is the impairment clause, and even that is fast losing ground.
I am not persuaded that Section 55 of the General Appropriations Law of 1989 is a rider as
contended by the respondents. A rider is a provision not germane to the subject or purpose of the bill
where it is included, Section 55 is not irrelevant to the General Appropriations Act of 1989 as it deals,
quite obviously, with appropriations. Its purpose is in fact to limit the powers of the President in the
disposition of the funds appropriated in that measure.
I suggest it is Section 44 of the Budget Reform Decree and not Section 55 of the General
Appropriations Act of 1989 that is the rider. Section 44 is extraneous to the subject and purpose of
PD No. 1177, which deals only with "the form, content and manner of preparation of the budget" that
are required to "be prescribed by law" under Article VI, Sec. 25(1) of the Constitution. The budget is
only a recommendation of appropriations, not the appropriation itself. The authority to augment given
by Section 44 of PD No. 1177 belongs in the General Appropriations Act and has no place in the
Budget Reform Decree.
The ponencia says that to sanction the inclusion of Section 55 in the General Appropriations Act
"would be to give the Legislature the freedom to grant or withhold the power from the Executive and
other officials and thus put in yearly jeopardy the exercise of that power" to augment. I respectfully
submit that the freedom is not ours to give. It was vested in Congress by the Constitution itself, and
we ourselves have no authority to grant or withhold it.
It is needless to debate whatever distinction there may be between the item and the provision. The
important consideration is that, whatever its nature, Section 55 of the General Appropriations Act
cannot be vetoed in any case because it seeks to withdraw a delegated power.
The power of the purse belongs to Congress and has been traditionally recognized in the
constitutional provision that "no money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law." The transfer of funds from one item to another in the General
Appropriations Act is part of that power, except that the Constitution allows Congress to delegate it by
law to the President, the Senate President, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief
Justice and the heads of the Constitutional Commissions. When exercising this authority, the
aforementioned officials act not by virtue of their own competence but only as agents of Congress.
There should be no question that the agency conferred on these officials can be revoked by
Congress at any time and for any reason it sees fit. The delegates cannot challenge this withdrawal
and insist on holding on to the authorization that the legislature had the discretion to withhold from
them in the first place. The authority to augment involves the element of confidence. Should
Congress choose to withdraw it, a becoming respect for the doctrine of separation of powers, if not
anything else, should persuade the delegates to yield to the wish of the principal.
The challenge to the validity of Section 55 is to me plain quibbling. To argue that no recall has been
made is to ignore the obvious. What matters is the intention of Congress, which should be clear
enough if only the respondents would not muddy the waters. The plain and unmistakable intention of
Congress is to withdraw from the President, for its own reasons, the delegated power to
augment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The following observations in the Emergency Power Cases, 92 Phil. 603, are appropriate:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
Although House Bill No. 727 had been vetoed by the President and did not thereby become a regular
statute, it may at least be considered as a concurrent resolution of the Congress formally declaring
the termination of the emergency powers. To contend that the Bill needed presidential acquiescence
to produce effect would lead to the anomalous, if not absurd, situation that, while Congress might
delegate its powers by a simple majority, it might not be able to recall them except by two-thirds vote.
In other words, it would be easier for Congress to delegate its powers than to take them back. This is
not right and is not, and ought not, to be the law.
I think it would have been more characteristic of the President if she had graciously respected the will
of the Legislature and so again recognized her role in the constitutional scheme of the Republic.
Paras, J., dissents.

PADILLA, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I dissent mainly for two (2) reasons:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
First: the questioned veto has no constitutional basis.
Article VI, Section 27 of the 1987 Constitution provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the
President. If he approves the same, he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same
with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its
Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsideration, two-thirds of all the Members of
such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other
House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of
that House, it shall become a law. In all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by
yeas or nays, and the names of the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journals.
The President shall communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty
days after the date of receipt thereof; otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
(2) The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an appropriation,
revenue, or tariff bill, but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which he does not object."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Section 27 (1) refers to a general veto, where the President objects to an entire bill approved by
Congress and returns it to Congress for its reconsideration. The situation at bar is admittedly not a
general veto of the appropriation acts for 1989 and 1990, Section 27 (1) does not, therefore, apply.
The majority opinion positions the veto questioned in this case within the scope of Section 27 (2)
above-quoted. I do not see how this can be done without doing violence to the constitutional design.
The distinction between an item-veto and a provision-veto has been traditionally recognized in
constitutional litigation and budgetary practice. As stated by Mr. Justice Sutherland, speaking for the
U.S. Supreme Court in Bengzon v. Secretary of Justice, 299 U.S. 410-416:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . An item of an appropriation bill obviously means an item which in itself is a specific appropriation
of money, not some general provisions of law which happens to be put into an appropriation bill. . .
."cralaw virtua1aw library
When the Constitution in Section 27 (2) empowers the President to veto any particular item or items
in the appropriation act, it does not confer in fact, it excludes the power to veto any particular
provision or provisions in said act.

In an earlier case, Sarmiento v. Mison, Et Al., 156 SCRA 549, this Court referred to its duty to
construe the Constitution, not in accordance with how the executive or the legislative would want it
construed, but in accordance with what it says and provides. When the Constitution states that the
President has the power to veto any particular item or items in the appropriation act, this must be
taken as a component of that delicate balance of power between the executive and the legislative, so
that, for this Court to construe Sec. 27 (2) of the Constitution as also empowering the President to
veto any particular provision or provisions in the appropriation act, is to load the scale in favor of the
executive, at the expense of that delicate balance of power.
Stated differently, to stretch the power of the President to veto any item in the appropriation act so as
to include the power to veto any particular provision in the same act, without any conclusive indication
that the same was the intent of the constitutional framers and the people who adopted the 1987
Constitution, is for the Court to indulge in spatial constitutional aerobics simply to justify what, to my
mind, is an indefensible presidential veto.
Second: Section 55 (FY 1989) and Section 16 (FY 1990) are founded on principles of sound reason
and public policy; the attempt to "veto" them is a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
To begin with, Article VI, Section 25, par. 5 of the 1987 Constitution provides:chanrobles
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
"(5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however, the President, the
President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment
any item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of
their respective appropriations."cralaw virtua1aw library
It will be at once noted that the fundamental policy of the Constitution is against transfer of
appropriations even by law, since this "juggling of funds is often a rich source of unbridled patronage,
abuse and interminable corruption.
However, the same provision allows the enactment of a law that would authorize the President of the
Philippines, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House, the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court, and the heads of Constitutional Commissions to augment from savings realized from any
appropriations for their respective offices, any other item of appropriation also for their offices. In
accordance with this Constitutional leave, Section 12 of the appropriation act of 1989 (also Section 16
(1st part) of the appropriation act of 1990) provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Sec. 12. Use of Savings. The President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Heads of the Constitutional
Commissions, and the Ombudsman are hereby authorized to augment any item in this Act for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations."cralaw virtua1aw
library
Thus, a transfer from savings is allowed to augment any appropriation pertaining to the office which
effects the savings.
And yet, Congress as the appropriating and funding department of the Government has seen fit to
place a condition or a qualification in the authority to augment, from savings, any appropriation in the
offices concerned. It requires that no such savings can be used to augment an appropriation
previously disapproved by Congress or to restore an appropriation previously reduced by Congress.

I can see no valid reason, in logic or in sound management, why such a condition can not be
accepted. It only makes certain that congressional action disapproving an appropriation or reducing
the amount of an appropriation, is not rendered inutile or meaningless by a transfer of savings in an
appropriation to such other items already disapproved or reduced by Congress.
It can hardly be disputed that the condition, restriction or qualification embodied in Sections 55 and
16, here discussed, was enacted by Congress in the exercise of its legislative power to appropriate
funds for government operations. The exercise of that legislative power, in the first instance, should
be accorded due respect and, as I see it, the veto of the said condition is an undue encroachment by
the executive on a properly exercised legislative power. This Court, in delineating power boundaries
between the different departments of government, sadly expands, in this case, the bounds of an
already too-powerful executive, at the expense of legislative prerogative. The majority appear to have
overlooked that the power to appropriate and set reasonable conditions incidental thereto is a
function entrusted by the Constitution in the legislature and only in the legislature.
In Bolinao v. Valencia, G.R. No. L-20740, 30 June 1964, 11 SCRA 486, this Court already had
occasion to uphold a condition laid down by the legislative in an appropriation measure, to the extent
of declaring a presidential veto of such condition as illegal if made separately from the appropriation
itself. This Court held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"It may be observed from the wordings of the Appropriations Act that the amount appropriated for the
operation of the Philippine Broadcasting Service was made subject to the condition that the same
shall not be used or expended for operation of television stations in Luzon, where there are already
existing commercial television stations. This gives rise to the question of whether the President may
legally veto a condition attached to an appropriation or item in the appropriation bill. But this is not a
novel question. A little effort to research on the subject would have yielded enough authority to guide
action on the matter. For, in the leading case of State v. Holder, it was already declared that such
action by the Chief Executive was illegal. This ruling, that the executives veto power does not carry
with it the power to strike out conditions or restrictions, has been adhered to in subsequent cases. If
the veto is unconstitutional, it follows that the same produced no effect whatsoever, and the restriction
imposed by the appropriation bill, therefore, remains. Any expenditure made by the intervenor PBS,
for the purpose of installing or operating a television station in Manila, where there are already
television stations in operation, would be in violation of the express condition for the release of the
appropriation and, consequently, null and void. . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
By clear analogy, the President could not veto Sections 55 (FY 1989) and 16 (FY 1990) as
conditions, without vetoing the items or appropriations which are affected by said conditions, meaning
the entire appropriation bills.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to GRANT the petition and to declare the presidential veto of Section 55 (FY
1989) and Section 16 (FY 1990) as null and void and of no effect whatsoever, for being clearly
unconstitutional. It follows that Sections 55 (FY 1989) and 16 (FY 1990) remain as binding conditions
in the disposition of savings in appropriations covered by the appropriation acts for 1989 and
1990.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
Paras, J., dissents.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 103524 April 15, 1992
CESAR BENGZON, QUERUBE MAKALINTAL, LINO M. PATAJO, JOSE LEUTERIO, ET
AL., petitioners,
vs.
HON. FRANKLIN N. DRILON, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. GUILLERMO
CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Department of Budget and Management, and HON.
ROSALINA CAJUCOM, in her capacity as National Treasurer, respondents.
A.M. No. 91-8-225-CA April 15, 1992
REQUEST OF RETIRED JUSTICES MANUEL P. BARCELONA, JUAN P. ENRIQUEZ, JUAN O.
REYES, JR. and GUARDSON R. LOOD FOR READJUSTMENT OF THEIR MONTHLY PENSION.

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
The issue in this petition is the constitutionality of the veto by the President of certain provisions in the
General Appropriations Act for the Fiscal Year 1992 relating to the payment of the adjusted pensions
of retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals.
The petitioners are retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who are currently
receiving monthly pensions under Republic Act No. 910 as amended by Republic Act No. 1797. They
filed the instant petition on their own behalf and in representation of all other retired Justices of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals similarly situated.
Named respondents are Hon. Franklin Drilon the Executive Secretary, Hon. Guillermo Carague as
Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management, and Hon. Rosalinda Cajucom, the
Treasurer of the Philippines. The respondents are sued in their official capacities, being officials of the
Executive Department involved in the implementation of the release of funds appropriated in the
Annual Appropriations Law.
We treat the Comments of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) as an Answer and decide the
petition on its merits.
The factual backdrop of this case is as follows:
On June 20, 1953, Republic Act No, 910 was enacted to provide the retirement pensions of Justices
of the Supreme Court and of the Court of Appeals who have rendered at least twenty (20) years
service either in the Judiciary or in any other branch of the Government or in both, having attained the
age of seventy (70) years or who resign by reason of incapacity to discharge the duties of the office.
The retired Justice shall receive during the residue of his natural life the salary which he was
receiving at the time of his retirement or resignation.
Republic Act No. 910 was amended by Republic Act No. 1797 (approved on June 21, 1957) which
provided that:
Sec. 3-A. In case the salary of Justices of the Supreme Court or of the Court of Appeals
is increased or decreased, such increased or decreased salary shall, for purposes of
this Act, be deemed to be the salary or the retirement pension which a Justice who as of
June twelve, nineteen hundred fifty-four had ceased to be such to accept another
position in the Government or who retired was receiving at the time of his cessation in
office. Provided, that any benefits that have already accrued prior to such increase or
decrease shall not be affected thereby.
Identical retirement benefits were also given to the members of the Constitutional Commissions under
Republic Act No. 1568, as amended by Republic Act No. 3595. On November 12, 1974, on the
occasion of the Armed Forces Loyalty Day, President Marcos signed Presidential Decree 578 which
extended similar retirement benefits to the members of the Armed Forces giving them also the
automatic readjustment features of Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595.
Two months later, however, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree 644 on January 25, 1975
repealing Section 3-A of Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595 (amending Republic Act
No. 1568 and Presidential Decree No. 578) which authorized the adjustment of the pension of the
retired Justices of the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals, Chairman and members of the Constitutional
Commissions and the officers and enlisted members of the Armed Forces to the prevailing rates of
salaries.
Significantly, under Presidential Decree 1638 the automatic readjustment of the retirement pension of
officers and enlisted men was subsequently restored by President Marcos. A later decree Presidential
Decree 1909 was also issued providing for the automatic readjustment of the pensions of members of
the Armed Forces who have retired prior to September 10, 1979.
While the adjustment of the retirement pensions for members of the Armed Forces who number in the
tens of thousands was restored, that of the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of
Appeals who are only a handful and fairly advanced in years, was not.
Realizing the unfairness of the discrimination against the members of the Judiciary and the
Constitutional Commissions, Congress approved in 1990 a bill for the reenactment of the repealed
provisions of Republic Act No. 1797 and Republic Act No. 3595. Congress was under the impression
that Presidential Decree 644 became law after it was published in the Official Gazette on April 7,
1977. In the explanatory note of House Bill No. 16297 and Senate Bill No. 740, the legislature saw
the need to reenact Republic Act Nos. 1797 and 3595 to restore said retirement pensions and
privileges of the retired Justices and members of the Constitutional Commissions, in order to assure
those serving in the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals and Constitutional Commissions adequate old
age pensions even during the time when the purchasing power of the peso has been diminished
substantially by worldwide recession or inflation. This is underscored by the fact that the petitioner
retired Chief Justice, a retired Associate Justice of the Supreme Court and the retired Presiding
Justice are presently receiving monthly pensions of P3,333.33, P2,666.66 and P2,333.33
respectively.
President Aquino, however vetoed House Bill No. 16297 on July 11, 1990 on the ground that
according to her "it would erode the very foundation of the Government's collective effort to adhere
faithfully to and enforce strictly the policy on standardization of compensation as articulated in
Republic Act No. 6758 known as Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989." She further
said that "the Government should not grant distinct privileges to select group of officials whose
retirement benefits under existing laws already enjoy preferential treatment over those of the vast
majority of our civil service servants."
Prior to the instant petition, however, Retired Court of Appeals Justices Manuel P. Barcelona, Juan P.
Enriquez, Juan O. Reyes, Jr. and Guardson R. Lood filed a letter/petition dated April 22, 1991 which
we treated as Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA. The petitioners asked this Court far a
readjustment of their monthly pensions in accordance with Republic Act No. 1797. They reasoned out
that Presidential Decree 644 repealing Republic Act No. 1797 did not become law as there was no
valid publication pursuant to Taada v. Tuvera, (136 SCRA 27 [1985]) and 146 SCRA 446 [1986]).
Presidential Decree 644 promulgated on January 24, 1975 appeared for the first time only in the
supplemental issue of the Official Gazette, (Vol. 74, No. 14) purportedly dated April 4, 1977 but
published only on September 5, 1983. Since Presidential Decree 644 has no binding force and effect
of law, it therefore did not repeal Republic Act No. 1797.
In a Resolution dated November 28, 1991 the Court acted favorably on the request. The dispositive
portion reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the requests of retired Justices Manuel P. Barcelona, Juan P. Enriquez,
Juan O. Reyes and Guardson Lood are GRANTED. It is hereby AUTHORIZED that
their monthly pensions be adjusted and paid on the basis of RA 1797 effective January
1, 1991 without prejudice to the payment on their pension differentials corresponding to
the previous years upon the availability of funds for the purpose.
Pursuant to the above resolution, Congress included in the General Appropriations Bill for Fiscal Year
1992 certain appropriations for the Judiciary intended for the payment of the adjusted pension rates
due the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals.
The pertinent provisions in House Bill No. 34925 are as follows:
XXVIII. THE JUDICIARY
A. Supreme Court of the Philippines and the Lower Courts.
For general administration, administration of personnel benefits, supervision of courts,
adjudication of constitutional questions appealed and other cases, operation and
maintenance of the Judicial and Bar Council in the Supreme Court, and the adjudication
of regional court cases, metropolitan court cases, municipal trial court cases in Cities,
municipal circuit court cases, municipal, court cases, Shari'a district court cases and
Shari'a circuit court cases as indicated hereunder P2,095,651,000
xxx xxx xxx
Special Provisions.
1. Augmentation of any Item in the Court's Appropriations. Any savings in the
appropriation for the Supreme Court and the Lower Courts may be utilized by the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court to augment any item of the Court's appropriations for: (a)
printing of decisions and publications of Philippine Reports; b) commutable terminal
leaves of Justices and other personnel of the Supreme Court and any payment of
adjusted pension rates to retired Justices entitled thereto pursuant to Administrative
Matter No. 91-8-225-CA; (c) repair, maintenance, improvement, and other operating
expenses of the courts' books and periodicals; (d) purchase, maintenance and
improvement of printing equipment; e) necessary expenses for the employment of
temporary employees, contractual and casual employees, for judicial administration; f)
maintenance and improvement of the Court's Electronic Data Processing; (g)
extraordinary expenses of the Chief Justice, attendance in international conferences
and conduct of training programs; (h) commutable transportation and representation
allowances and fringe benefits for Justices, Clerks of Court, Court Administrator, Chief
of Offices and other Court personnel in accordance with the rates prescribed by law;
and (i) compensation of attorneys-de-oficio; PROVIDED, that as mandated by LOI No.
489 any increases in salary and allowances shall be subject to the usual procedures
and policies as provided for under P.D. No. 985 and other pertinent laws. (page 1071,
General Appropriations Act, FY 1992; Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
4. Payment of Adjusted Pension Rates to Retired Justices. The amount herein
appropriated for payment of pensions to retired judges and justices shall include the
payment of pensions at the adjusted rates to retired justices of the Supreme Court
entitled thereto pursuant to the ruling of the Court in Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-
C.A. (page 1071, General Appropriations Act, FY 1992).
xxx xxx xxx
Activities and Purposes
1. General Administration and Support Services.
a. General administrative Services P 43,515,000
b. Payment of retirement gratuity
of national goverment officials
and employees P 206,717,000
c. Payment of terminal leave benefits to
officials and employees antitled thereto P 55,316,000
d. Payment of pension totired jude
and justice entitled thereto P 22,500,000
(page 1071, General Appropriations Act, FY 1992)
C. COURT OF APPEALS
For general administration, administration
of personnel benefit, benefits and the
adjudication of appealed and other cases
as indicated hereunder P114,615,000
Special Provisions.
1. Authority to Use Savings. Subject to the approval of the Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court in accordance with Section 25(5), Article VI of the Constitution of the Republic of
the Philippines, the Presiding Justice may be authorized to use any savings in any item
of the appropriation for the Court of Appeals for purposes of: (1) improving its
compound and facilities; and (2) for augmenting any deficiency in any item of its
appropriation including its extraordinary expenses and payment of adjusted pension
rates to retired justices entitled thereto pursuant to Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-
C.A. (page 1079, General Appropriations Act, FY 1992; Emphasis supplied)
2. Payment of adjustment Pension Rates to Retired Justices. The amount herein
appropriated for payment of pensions to retired judges and justices shall include the
payment of pensions at the adjusted rates to retired justices of the Court of Appeals
entitled thereto pursuant to the Ruling of the Supreme Court in Administrative Matter
No. 91-6-225-C.A. (page 1079 General Appropriations Act, FY 1992).
XL. GENERAL FUND ADJUSTMENT
For general fund adjustment for
operational and special requirements
as indicated hereunder P500,000,000
xxx xxx xxx
Special Provisions
1. Use of the Fund. This fund shall be used for:
xxx xxx xxx
1.3. Authorized overdrafts and/or valid unbooked obligations, including the
payment of back salaries and related personnel benefits arising from
decision of competent authorityincluding the Supreme Court decision in
Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-C.A. and COA decision in No.
1704." (page 11649 Gen. Appropriations Act, FY 1992; Emphasis
supplied)
On January 15, 1992, the President vetoed the underlined portions of Section 1 and the entire
Section 4 the Special Provisions for the Supreme Court of the Philippines and the Lower Courts
(General Appropriations Act, FY 1992, page 1071) and the underlined portions of Section 1 and the
entire Section 2, of the Special Provisions for the Court of Appeals (page 1079) and the underlined
portions of Section 1.3 of Article XLV of the Special Provisions of the General Fund Adjustments
(page 1164, General Appropriations Act, FY 1992).
The reason given for the veto of said provisions is that "the resolution of this Honorable Court in
Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA pursuant to which the foregoing appropriations for the
payment of the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have been enacted
effectively nullified the veto of the President on House Bill No. 16297, the bill which provided for the
automatic increase in the retirement pensions of the Justices of the Supreme Court and the Court of
Appeals and chairmen of the Constitutional Commissions by re-enacting Republic Act No. 1797 and
Republic Act No. 3595. The President's veto of the aforesaid provisions was further justified by
reiterating the earlier reasons for vetoing House Bill No. 16297: "they would erode the very foundation
of our collective effort to adhere faithfully to and enforce strictly the policy and standardization of
compensation. We should not permit the grant of distinct privileges to select group of officials whose
retirement pensions under existing laws already enjoy preferential treatment over those of the vast
majority of our civil servants."
Hence, the instant petition filed by the petitioners with the assertions that:
1) The subject veto is not an item veto;
2) The veto by the Executive is violative of the doctrine of separation of powers;
3) The veto deprives the retired Justices of their rights to the pensions due them;
4) The questioned veto impairs the Fiscal Autonomy guaranteed by the Constitution.
Raising similar grounds, the petitioners in AM-91-8-225-CA, brought to the attention of this Court that
the veto constitutes no legal obstacle to the continued payment of the adjusted pensions pursuant to
the Court's resolution.
On February 14, 1992, the Court resolved to consolidate Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA with
G.R. No. 103524.
The petitioners' contentions are well-taken.
I
It cannot be overstressed that in a constitutional government such as ours, the rule of law must
prevail. The Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to
which all persons including the highest official of this land must defer. From this cardinal postulate, it
follows that the three branches of government must discharge their respective functions within the
limits of authority conferred by the Constitution. Under the principle of separation of powers, neither
Congress, the President nor the Judiciary may encroach on fields allocated to the other branches of
government. The legislature is generally limited to the enactment of laws, the executive to the
enforcement of laws and the judiciary to their interpretation and application to cases and
controversies.
The Constitution expressly confers or the judiciary the power to maintain inviolate what it decrees. As
the guardian of the Constitution we cannot shirk the duty of seeing to it that the officers in each
branch of government do not go beyond their constitutionally allocated boundaries and that the entire
Government itself or any of its branches does not violate the basic liberties of the people. The
essence of this judicial duty was emphatically explained by Justice Laurel in the leading case
of Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139 [1936]) to wit:
The Constitution is a definition of the powers of government. Who is to determine the
nature, scope and extent of such powers? The Constitution itself has provided for the
instrumentality of the judiciary as the rational way. And when the judiciary mediates to
allocate constitutional boundaries it does not assert any superiority over the other
department, it does not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature, but only
asserts the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution and to establish for the parties in an
actual controversy the rights which that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
(Emphasis supplied)
The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise of a constitutionally vested
power. But even as the Constitution grants the power, it also provides limitations to its exercise. The
veto power is not absolute.
The pertinent provision of the Constitution reads:
The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or items in an
appropriation, revenue or tariff bill but the veto shall not affect the item or items to which
he does not object. (Section 27(2), Article VI, Constitution)
The OSG is correct when it states that the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all. He or
she cannot act like an editor crossing out specific lines, provisions, or paragraphs in a bill that he or
she dislikes. In the exercise of the veto power, it is generally all or nothing. However, when it comes
to appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, the Administration needs the money to run the machinery of
government and it can not veto the entire bill even if it may contain objectionable features. The
President is, therefore, compelled to approve into law the entire bill, including its undesirable parts. It
is for this reason that the Constitution has wisely provided the "item veto power" to avoid inexpedient
riders being attached to an indispensable appropriation or revenue measure.
The Constitution provides that only a particular item or items may be vetoed. The power to
disapprove any item or items in an appropriate bill does not grant the authority to veto a part of an
item and to approve the remaining portion of the same item. (Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr., 191 SCRA
452, 464 [1990])
We distinguish an item from a provision in the following manner:
The terms item and provision in budgetary legislation and practice are concededly
different. An itemin a bill refers to the particulars, the details, the distinct and severable
parts . . . of the bill (Bengzon,supra, at 916.) It is an indivisible sum of money dedicated
to a stated purpose (Commonwealth v. Dodson, 11 S.E. 2d 120, 124, 125, etc., 176 Va.
281) The United States Supreme Court, in the case of Bengzon v. Secretary of
Justice (299 U.S. 410, 414, 57 Ct. 252, 81 L. Ed, 312) declared "that an"tem" of an
appropriation bill obviously means an item which in itself is a specific appropriation of
money, not some general provision of law, which happens to be put into an
appropriation bill." (id. at page 465)
We regret having to state that misimpressions or unfortunately wrong advice must have been the
basis of the disputed veto.
The general fund adjustment is an item which appropriates P500,000,000.00 to enable the
Government to meet certain unavoidable obligations which may have been inadequately funded by
the specific items for the different branches, departments, bureaus, agencies, and offices of the
government.
The President did not veto this item. What were vetoed were methods or systems placed by
Congress to insure that permanent and continuing obligations to certain officials would be paid when
they fell due.
An examination of the entire sections and the underlined portions of the law which were vetoed will
readily show that portions of the item have been chopped up into vetoed and unvetoed parts. Less
than all of an item has been vetoed. Moreover, the vetoed portions are not items. They
are provisions.
Thus, the augmentation of specific appropriations found inadequate to pay retirement payments, by
transferring savings from other items of appropriation is a provision and not an item. It gives power to
the Chief Justice to transfer funds from one item to another. There is no specific appropriation of
money involved.
In the same manner, the provision which states that in compliance with decisions of the Supreme
Court and the Commission on Audit, funds still undetermined in amount may be drawn from the
general fund adjustment is not an item. It is the "general fund adjustment" itself which is the item. This
was not touched. It was not vetoed.
More ironic is the fact that misinformation led the Executive to believe that the items in the 1992
Appropriations Act were being vetoed when, in fact, the veto struck something else.
What were really vetoed are:
(1) Republic Act No. 1797 enacted as early as June 21, 1957; and
(2) The Resolution of the Supreme Court dated November 28, 1991 in Administrative Matter No. 91-
8-225-CA.
We need no lengthy justifications or citations of authorities to declare that no President may veto the
provisions of a law enacted thirty-five (35) years before his or her term of office. Neither may the
President set aside or reverse a final and executory judgment of this Court through the exercise of the
veto power.
A few background facts may be reiterated to fully explain the unhappy situation.
Republic Act No. 1797 provided for the adjustment of pensions of retired Justices which privilege was
extended to retired members of Constitutional Commissions by Republic Act No. 3595.
On January 25, 1975, President Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 644 which repealed Republic
Acts 1797 and 3595. Subsequently, automatic readjustment of pensions for retired Armed Forces
officers and men was surreptitiously restored through Presidential Decree Nos. 1638 and 1909.
It was the impression that Presidential Decree No. 644 had reduced the pensions of Justices and
Constitutional Commissioners which led Congress to restore the repealed provisions through House
Bill No. 16297 in 1990. When her finance and budget advisers gave the wrong information that the
questioned provisions in the 1992 General Appropriations Act were simply an attempt to overcome
her earlier 1990 veto, she issued the veto now challenged in this petition.
It turns out, however, that P.D. No. 644 never became valid law. If P.D. No. 644 was not law, it
follows that Rep. Act No. 1797 was not repealed and continues to be effective up to the present. In
the same way that it was enforced from 1951 to 1975, so should it be enforced today.
House Bill No. 16297 was superfluous as it tried to restore benefits which were never taken away
validly. The veto of House Bill No. 16297 in 1991 did not also produce any effect. Both were based on
erroneous and non-existent premises.
From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that when the President vetoed certain provisions of
the 1992 General Appropriations Act, she was actually vetoing Republic Act No. 1797 which, of
course, is beyond her power to accomplish.
Presidential Decree No. 644 which purportedly repealed Republic Act No. 1717 never achieved that
purpose because it was not properly published. It never became a law.
The case of Tada v. Tuvera (134 SCRA 27 [1985]and 146 SCRA 446 [1986]) specifically requires
that "all laws shall immediately upon their approval or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in
full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on
another date specified by the legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code." This was the
Court's answer to the petition of Senator Lorenzo Taada and other opposition leaders who
challenged the validity of Marcos' decrees which, while never published, were being enforced. Secret
decrees are anathema in a free society.
In support of their request, the petitioners in Administrative Matter No. 91-9-225-CA secured
certification from Director Lucita C. Sanchez of the National Printing Office that the April 4, 1977
Supplement to the Official Gazette was published only on September 5, 1983 and officially released
on September 29, 1983.
On the issue of whether or not Presidential Decree 644 became law, the Court has already
categorically spoken in a definitive ruling on the matter, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
PD 644 was promulgated by President Marcos on January 24, 1975, but was not
immediately or soon thereafter published although preceding and subsequent decrees
were duly published in the Official Gazette. It now appears that it was intended as a
secret decree "NOT FOR PUBLICATION" as the notation on the face of the original
copy thereof plainly indicates (Annex B). It is also clear that the decree was published in
the back-dated Supplement only after it was challenged in the Taada case as among
the presidential decrees that had not become effective for lack of the required
publication. The petition was filed on May 7, 1983, four months before the actual
publication of the decree.
It took more than eight years to publish the decree after its promulgation in 1975.
Moreover, the publication was made in bad faith insofar as it purported to show that it
was done in 1977 when the now demonstrated fact is that the April 4, 1977 supplement
was actually published and released only in September 1983. The belated publication
was obviously intended to refute the petitioner's claim in the Taada case and to
support the Solicitor General's submission that the petition had become moot and
academic.
xxx xxx xxx
We agree that PD 644 never became a law because it was not validly published and
that, consequently, it did not have the effect of repealing RA 1797. The requesting
Justices (including Justice Lood, whose request for the upgrading of his pension was
denied on January 15, 1991) are therefore entitled to be paid their monthly pensions on
the basis of the latter measure, which remains unchanged to date.
The Supreme Court has spoken and it has done so with finality, logically and rightly so as to assure
stability in legal relations, and avoid confusion. (see Ver v. Quetullo, 163 SCRA 80 [1988]) Like other
decisions of this Court, the ruling and principles set out in the Court resolution constitute binding
precedent. (Bulig-Bulig Kita Kamaganak Association, et al. v. Sulpicio Lines, Inc., Regional Trial
Court, etc., G.R. 847500 16 May 1989, En Banc, Minute Resolution)
The challenged veto has far-reaching implications which the Court can not countenance as they
undermine the principle of separation of powers. The Executive has no authority to set aside and
overrule a decision of the Supreme Court.
We must emphasize that the Supreme Court did not enact Rep. Act No. 1797. It is not within its
powers to pass laws in the first place. Its duty is confined to interpreting or defining what the law is
and whether or not it violates a provision of the Constitution.
As early as 1953, Congress passed a law providing for retirement pensions to retired Justices of the
Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals. This law was amended by Republic Act 1797 in 1957.
Funds necessary to pay the retirement pensions under these statutes are deemed automatically
appropriated every year.
Thus, Congress included in the General Appropriations Act of 1992, provisions identifying funds and
savings which may be used to pay the adjusted pensions pursuant to the Supreme Court Resolution.
As long as retirement laws remain in the statute book, there is an existing obligation on the part of the
government to pay the adjusted pension rate pursuant to RA 1797 and AM-91-8-225-CA.
Neither may the veto power of the President be exercised as a means of repealing RA 1797. This is
arrogating unto the Presidency legislative powers which are beyond its authority. The President has
no power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to repeal existing
laws. The President's power is merely to execute the laws as passed by Congress.
II
There is a matter of greater consequence arising from this petition. The attempt to use the veto power
to set aside a Resolution of this Court and to deprive retirees of benefits given them by Rep. Act No.
1797 trenches upon the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary.
Sec. 3, Art. VIII mandates that:
Sec. 3 The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may
not be reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year
and, after approval, shall be automatically and regularly released.
We can not overstress the importance of and the need for an independent judiciary. The Court has on
various past occasions explained the significance of judicial independence. In the case of De la Llana
v. Alba (112 SCRA 294 [1982]), it ruled:
It is a cardinal rule of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are
endowed with rights, to secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it does
through public officials, it has to grant them either expressly or implicitly certain powers.
These they exercise not for their own benefit but for the body politic. . . .
A public office is a public trust. That is more than a moral adjuration. It is a legal
imperative. The law may vest in a public official certain rights. It does so to enable them
to perform his functions and fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. . . . It is an added
guarantee that justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by any fear of
reprisal or untoward consequence. Their judgments then are even more likely to be
inspired solely by their knowledge of the law and the dictates of their conscience, free
from the corrupting influence of base or unworthy motives. The independence of which
they are assured is impressed with a significance transcending that of a purely personal
right. (At pp. 338-339)
The exercise of the veto power in this case may be traced back to the efforts of the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) to ignore or overlook the plain mandate of the Constitution on fiscal
autonomy. The OSG Comment reflects the same truncated view of the provision.
We have repeatedly in the past few years called the attention of DBM that not only does it allocate
less than one percent (1%) of the national budget annually for the 22,769 Justices, Judges, and court
personnel all over the country but it also examines with a fine-toothed come how we spend the funds
appropriated by Congress based on DBM recommendations.
The gist of our position papers and arguments before Congress is as follows:
The DBM requires the Supreme Court, with Constitutional Commissions, and the
Ombudsman to submit budget proposals in accordance with parameters it establishes.
DBM evaluates the proposals, asks each agency to defend its proposals during DBM
budget hearings, submits its own version of the proposals to Congress without informing
the agency of major alterations and mutilations inflicted on their proposals, and expects
each agency to defend in Congress proposals not of the agency's making.
After the general appropriations bill is passed by Congress and signed into law by the
President, the tight and officious control by DBM continues. For the release of
appropriated funds, the Judiciary, Constitutional Commissions, and Ombudsman are
instructed through "guidelines", how to prepare Work and Financial Plans and requests
for monthly allotments. The DBM evaluates and approves these plans and requests and
on the basis of its approval authorizes the release of allotments with corresponding
notices of cash allocation. These notices specify the maximum withdrawals each month
which the Supreme Court, the Commissions and the Ombudsman may make from the
servicing government bank. The above agencies are also required to submit to DBM
monthly, quarterly and year-end budget accountability reports to indicate their
performance, physical and financial operations and income,
The DBM reserves to itself the power to review the accountability reports and when
importuned for needed funds, to release additional allotments to the agency. Since
DBM always prunes the budget proposals to below subsistence levels and since
emergency situations usually occur during the fiscal year, the Chief Justices, Chairmen
of the Commissions, and Ombudsman are compelled to make pilgrimages to DBM for
additional funds to tide their respective agencies over the emergency.
What is fiscal autonomy?
As envisioned in the Constitution, the fiscal autonomy enjoyed by the Judiciary, the Civil Service
Commission, the Commission on Audit, the Commission on Elections, and the Office of the
Ombudsman contemplates a guarantee on full flexibility to allocate and utilize their resources with the
wisdom and dispatch that their needs require. It recognizes the power and authority to levy, assess
and collect fees, fix rates of compensation not exceeding the highest rates authorized by law for
compensation and pay plans of the government and allocate and disburse such sums as may be
provided by law or prescribed by them in the course of the discharge of their functions.
Fiscal autonomy means freedom from outside control. If the Supreme Court says it needs 100
typewriters but DBM rules we need only 10 typewriters and sends its recommendations to Congress
without even informing us, the autonomy given by the Constitution becomes an empty and illusory
platitude.
The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence
end flexibility needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and
constraints on the manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds
appropriated for their operations is anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express
mandate of the Constitution but especially as regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and
separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our constitutional system is based. In the interest
of comity and cooperation, the Supreme Court, Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman
have so far limited their objections to constant reminders. We now agree with the petitioners that this
grant of autonomy should cease to be a meaningless provision.
In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General Appropriations Act is
tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to
fiscal autonomy. The freedom of the Chief Justice to make adjustments in the utilization of the funds
appropriated for the expenditures of the judiciary, including the use of any savings from any particular
item to cover deficits or shortages in other items of the Judiciary is withheld. Pursuant to the
Constitutional mandate, the Judiciary must enjoy freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it
in the appropriations law. It knows its priorities just as it is aware of the fiscal restraints. The Chief
Justice must be given a free hand on how to augment appropriations where augmentation is needed.
Furthermore, in the case of Gonzales v. Macaraig (191 SCRA 452 [1990]), the Court upheld the
authority of the President and other key officials to augment any item or any appropriation from
savings in the interest of expediency and efficiency. The Court stated that:
There should be no question, therefore, that statutory authority has, in fact, been
granted. And once given, the heads of the different branches of the Government and
those of the Constitutional Commissions are afforded considerable flexibility in the use
of public funds and resources (Demetria v. Alba, supra). The doctrine of separation of
powers is in no way endangered because the transfer is made within a department (or
branch of government) and not from one department (branch) to another.
The Constitution, particularly Article VI, Section 25(5) also provides:
Sec. 25. (5) No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations; however,
the President, the President of the Senate, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, and the heads of
Constitutional Commissions may, by law, be authorized to augment any item in the
general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of their
respective appropriations.
In the instant case, the vetoed provisions which relate to the use of savings for augmenting items for
the payment of the pension differentials, among others, are clearly in consonance with the
abovestated pronouncements of the Court. The veto impairs the power of the Chief Justice to
augment other items in the Judiciary's appropriation, in contravention of the constitutional provision
on "fiscal autonomy."
III
Finally, it can not be denied that the retired Justices have a vested right to the accrued pensions due
them pursuant to RA 1797.
The right to a public pension is of statutory origin and statutes dealing with pensions have been
enacted by practically all the states in the United States (State ex rel. Murray v, Riley, 44 Del 505, 62
A2d 236), and presumably in most countries of the world. Statutory provisions for the support of
Judges or Justices on retirement are founded on services rendered to the state. Where a judge has
complied with the statutory prerequisite for retirement with pay, his right to retire and draw salary
becomes vested and may not, thereafter, be revoked or impaired. (Gay v. Whitehurst, 44 So ad 430)
Thus, in the Philippines, a number of retirement laws have been enacted, the purpose of which is to
entice competent men and women to enter the government service and to permit them to retire
therefrom with relative security, not only those who have retained their vigor but, more so, those who
have been incapacitated by illness or accident. (In re: Amount of the Monthly Pension of Judges and
Justices Starting From the Sixth Year of their Retirement and After the Expiration of the Initial Five-
year Period of Retirement, (190 SCRA 315 [1990]).
As early as 1953, Rep. Act No. 910 was enacted to grant pensions to retired Justices of the Supreme
Court and Court of Appeals.
This was amended by RA 1797 which provided for an automatic adjustment of the pension rates.
Through the years, laws were enacted and jurisprudence expounded to afford retirees better benefits.
P.D. No. 1438, for one, was promulgated on June 10, 1978 amending RA 910 providing that the lump
sum of 5 years gratuity to which the retired Justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals were
entitled was to be computed on the basis of the highest monthly aggregate of transportation, living
and representation allowances each Justice was receiving on the date of his resignation. The
Supreme Court in a resolution dated October 4, 1990, stated that this law on gratuities covers the
monthly pensions of retired Judges and Justices which should include the highest monthly aggregate
of transportation, living and representation allowances the retiree was receiving on the date of
retirement. (In Re: Amount of the Monthly Pension of Judges and Justices, supra)
The rationale behind the veto which implies that Justices and Constitutional officers are unduly
favored is, again, a misimpression.
Immediately, we can state that retired Armed Forces officers and enlisted men number in the tens of
thousands while retired Justices are so few they can be immediately identified. Justices retire at age
70 while military men retire at a much younger age some retired Generals left the military at age
50 or earlier. Yet the benefits in Rep. Act No. 1797 are made to apply equally to both groups. Any
ideas arising from an alleged violation of the equal protection clause should first be directed to
retirees in the military or civil service where the reason for the retirement provision is not based on
indubitable and constitutionally sanctioned grounds, not to a handful of retired Justices whose
retirement pensions are founded on constitutional reasons.
The provisions regarding retirement pensions of justices arise from the package of protections given
by the Constitution to guarantee and preserve the independence of the Judiciary.
The Constitution expressly vests the power of judicial review in this Court. Any institution given the
power to declare, in proper cases, that act of both the President and Congress are unconstitutional
needs a high degree of independence in the exercise of its functions. Our jurisdiction may not be
reduced by Congress. Neither may it be increased without our advice and concurrence. Justices may
not be removed until they reach age 70 except through impeachment. All courts and court personnel
are under the administrative supervision of the Supreme Court. The President may not appoint any
Judge or Justice unless he or she has been nominated by the Judicial and Bar Council which, in turn,
is under the Supreme Court's supervision. Our salaries may not be decreased during our continuance
in office. We cannot be designated to any agency performing administrative or quasi-
judicial functions. We are specifically given fiscal autonomy. The Judiciary is not only independent of,
but also co-equal and coordinate with the Executive and Legislative Departments. (Article VIII and
section 30, Article VI, Constitution)
Any argument which seeks to remove special privileges given by law to former Justices of this Court
and the ground that there should be no "grant of distinct privileges" or "preferential treatment" to
retired Justices ignores these provisions of the Constitution and, in effect, asks that these
Constitutional provisions on special protections for the Judiciary be repealed. The integrity of our
entire constitutional system is premised to a large extent on the independence of the Judiciary. All
these provisions are intended to preserve that independence. So are the laws on retirement benefits
of Justices.
One last point.
The Office of the Solicitor General argues that:
. . . Moreover, by granting these benefits to retired Justices implies that public funds,
raised from taxes on other citizens, will be paid off to select individuals who are already
leading private lives and have ceased performing public service. Said the United States
Supreme Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Miller: "To lay with one hand the power of
the government on the property of the citizen, and with the other to bestow upon
favored individuals . . . is nonetheless a robbery because it is done under the forms of
law . . ." (Law Association V. Topeka, 20 Wall. 655) (Comment, p. 16)
The above arguments are not only specious, impolite and offensive; they certainly are unbecoming of
an office whose top officials are supposed to be, under their charter, learned in the law.
Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon and Chief Justice Querube Makalintal, Justices J.B.L. Reyes, Cecilia
Muoz Palma, Efren Plana, Vicente Abad Santos, and, in fact, all retired Justices of the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals may no longer be in the active service. Still, the Solicitor General and
all lawyers under him who represent the government before the two courts and whose predecessors
themselves appeared before these retirees, should show some continuing esteem and good manners
toward these Justices who are now in the evening of their years.
All that the retirees ask is to be given the benefits granted by law. To characterize them as engaging
in "robbery" is intemperate, abrasive, and disrespectful more so because the argument is unfounded.
If the Comment is characteristic of OSG pleadings today, then we are sorry to state that the then
quality of research in that institution has severely deteriorated.
In the first place, the citation of the case is, wrong. The title is not LAW Association v.
Topeka but Citizen's Savings and Loan Association of Cleveland, Ohio v. Topeka City (20 Wall. 655;
87 U.S. 729; 22 Law. Ed. 455 [1874]. Second, the case involved the validity of a statute authorizing
cities and counties to issue bonds for the purpose of building bridges, waterpower, and other public
works to aid private railroads improve their services. The law was declared void on the ground that
the right of a municipality to impose a tax cannot be used for private interests.
The case was decided in 1874. The world has turned over more than 40,000 times since that ancient
period. Public use is now equated with public interest. Public money may now be used for slum
clearance, low-cost housing, squatter resettlement, urban and agrarian reform where only private
persons are the immediate beneficiaries. What was "robbery" in 1874 is now called "social justice."
There is nothing about retirement benefits in the cited case. Obviously, the OSG lawyers cited from
an old textbook or encyclopedia which could not even spell "loan" correctly. Good lawyers are
expected to go to primary sources and to use only relevant citations.
The Court has been deluged with letters and petitions by former colleagues in the Judiciary
requesting adjustments in their pensions just so they would be able to cope with the everyday living
expenses not to mention the high cost of medical bills that old age entails. As Justice Cruz aptly
stated in Teodoro J. Santiago v. COA, (G.R. No. 92284, July 12, 1991);
Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree because their
intention is to provide for his sustenance, and hopefully even comfort, when he no
longer has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood. After devoting the best years
of his life to the public service, he deserves the appreciation of a grateful government as
best concretely expressed in a generous retirement gratuity commensurate with the
value and length of his services. That generosity is the least he should expect now that
his work is done and his youth is gone. Even as he feels the weariness in his bones and
glimpses the approach of the lengthening shadows, he should be able to luxuriate in the
thought that he did his task well, and was rewarded for it.
For as long as these retired Justices are entitled under laws which continue to be effective, the
government can not deprive them of their vested right to the payment of their pensions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The questioned veto is SET ASIDE as illegal and
unconstitutional. The vetoed provisions of the 1992 Appropriations Act are declared valid and
subsisting. The respondents are ordered to automatically and regularly release pursuant to the grant
of fiscal autonomy the funds appropriated for the subject pensions as well as the other appropriations
for the Judiciary. The resolution in Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA dated November 28, 1991
is likewise ordered to be implemented as promulgated.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Bellosillo, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 81311 June 30, 1988
KAPATIRAN NG MGA NAGLILINGKOD SA PAMAHALAAN NG PILIPINAS, INC., HERMINIGILDO
C. DUMLAO, GERONIMO Q. QUADRA, and MARIO C. VILLANUEVA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. BIENVENIDO TAN, as Commissioner of Internal Revenue, respondent.
G.R. No. 81820 June 30, 1988
KILUSANG MAYO UNO LABOR CENTER (KMU), its officers and affiliated labor federations and
alliances,petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, THE COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE, and SECRETARY OF BUDGET, respondents.
G.R. No. 81921 June 30, 1988
INTEGRATED CUSTOMS BROKERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES and JESUS B.
BANAL, petitioners,
vs.
The HON. COMMISSIONER, BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondent.
G.R. No. 82152 June 30, 1988
RICARDO C. VALMONTE, petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, SECRETARY OF FINANCE, COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
REVENUE and SECRETARY OF BUDGET, respondent.
Franklin S. Farolan for petitioner Kapatiran in G.R. No. 81311.
Jaime C. Opinion for individual petitioners in G.R. No. 81311.
Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raeses, Sy, Taquio and Associates for petitioners in G.R. No 81820.
Union of Lawyers and Advocates for Peoples Right collaborating counsel for petitioners in G.R. No
81820.
Jose C. Leabres and Joselito R. Enriquez for petitioners in G.R. No. 81921.

PADILLA, J.:
These four (4) petitions, which have been consolidated because of the similarity of the main issues
involved therein, seek to nullify Executive Order No. 273 (EO 273, for short), issued by the President
of the Philippines on 25 July 1987, to take effect on 1 January 1988, and which amended certain
sections of the National Internal Revenue Code and adopted the value-added tax (VAT, for short), for
being unconstitutional in that its enactment is not alledgedly within the powers of the President; that
the VAT is oppressive, discriminatory, regressive, and violates the due process and equal protection
clauses and other provisions of the 1987 Constitution.
The Solicitor General prays for the dismissal of the petitions on the ground that the petitioners have
failed to show justification for the exercise of its judicial powers, viz. (1) the existence of an
appropriate case; (2) an interest, personal and substantial, of the party raising the constitutional
questions; (3) the constitutional question should be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the
question of constitutionality is directly and necessarily involved in a justiciable controversy and its
resolution is essential to the protection of the rights of the parties. According to the Solicitor General,
only the third requisite that the constitutional question should be raised at the earliest opportunity
has been complied with. He also questions the legal standing of the petitioners who, he contends,
are merely asking for an advisory opinion from the Court, there being no justiciable controversy for
resolution.
Objections to taxpayers' suit for lack of sufficient personality standing, or interest are, however, in the
main procedural matters. Considering the importance to the public of the cases at bar, and in keeping
with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine wether or not the other branches of
government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they
have not abused the discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure
and has taken cognizance of these petitions.
But, before resolving the issues raised, a brief look into the tax law in question is in order.
The VAT is a tax levied on a wide range of goods and services. It is a tax on the value, added by
every seller, with aggregate gross annual sales of articles and/or services, exceeding P200,00.00, to
his purchase of goods and services, unless exempt. VAT is computed at the rate of 0% or 10% of the
gross selling price of goods or gross receipts realized from the sale of services.
The VAT is said to have eliminated privilege taxes, multiple rated sales tax on manufacturers and
producers, advance sales tax, and compensating tax on importations. The framers of EO 273 that it is
principally aimed to rationalize the system of taxing goods and services; simplify tax administration;
and make the tax system more equitable, to enable the country to attain economic recovery.
The VAT is not entirely new. It was already in force, in a modified form, before EO 273 was issued.
As pointed out by the Solicitor General, the Philippine sales tax system, prior to the issuance of EO
273, was essentially a single stage value added tax system computed under the "cost subtraction
method" or "cost deduction method" and was imposed only on original sale, barter or exchange of
articles by manufacturers, producers, or importers. Subsequent sales of such articles were not
subject to sales tax. However, with the issuance of PD 1991 on 31 October 1985, a 3% tax was
imposed on a second sale, which was reduced to 1.5% upon the issuance of PD 2006 on 31
December 1985, to take effect 1 January 1986. Reduced sales taxes were imposed not only on the
second sale, but on every subsequent sale, as well. EO 273 merely increased the VAT on every
sale to 10%, unless zero-rated or exempt.
Petitioners first contend that EO 273 is unconstitutional on the Ground that the President had no
authority to issue EO 273 on 25 July 1987.
The contention is without merit.
It should be recalled that under Proclamation No. 3, which decreed a Provisional Constitution, sole
legislative authority was vested upon the President. Art. II, sec. 1 of the Provisional Constitution
states:
Sec. 1. Until a legislature is elected and convened under a new Constitution, the
President shall continue to exercise legislative powers.
On 15 October 1986, the Constitutional Commission of 1986 adopted a new Constitution for the
Republic of the Philippines which was ratified in a plebiscite conducted on 2 February 1987. Article
XVIII, sec. 6 of said Constitution, hereafter referred to as the 1987 Constitution, provides:
Sec. 6. The incumbent President shall continue to exercise legislative powers until the
first Congress is convened.
It should be noted that, under both the Provisional and the 1987 Constitutions, the President is vested
with legislative powers until a legislature under a new Constitution is convened. The first Congress,
created and elected under the 1987 Constitution, was convened on 27 July 1987. Hence, the
enactment of EO 273 on 25 July 1987, two (2) days before Congress convened on 27 July 1987, was
within the President's constitutional power and authority to legislate.
Petitioner Valmonte claims, additionally, that Congress was really convened on 30 June 1987 (not 27
July 1987). He contends that the word "convene" is synonymous with "the date when the elected
members of Congress assumed office."
The contention is without merit. The word "convene" which has been interpreted to mean "to call
together, cause to assemble, or convoke,"
1
is clearly different from assumption of office by
the individual members of Congress or their taking the oath of office. As an example, we call to mind
the interim National Assembly created under the 1973 Constitution, which had not been "convened"
but some members of the body, more particularly the delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention
who had opted to serve therein by voting affirmatively for the approval of said Constitution, had taken
their oath of office.
To uphold the submission of petitioner Valmonte would stretch the definition of the word "convene" a
bit too far. It would also defeat the purpose of the framers of the 1987 Constitutional and render
meaningless some other provisions of said Constitution. For example, the provisions of Art. VI, sec.
15, requiring Congress to convene once every year on the fourth Monday of July for its regular
session would be a contrariety, since Congress would already be deemed to be in session after the
individual members have taken their oath of office. A portion of the provisions of Art. VII, sec. 10,
requiring Congress to convene for the purpose of enacting a law calling for a special election to elect
a President and Vice-President in case a vacancy occurs in said offices, would also be a surplusage.
The portion of Art. VII, sec. 11, third paragraph, requiring Congress to convene, if not in session, to
decide a conflict between the President and the Cabinet as to whether or not the President and the
Cabinet as to whether or not the President can re-assume the powers and duties of his office, would
also be redundant. The same is true with the portion of Art. VII, sec. 18, which requires Congress to
convene within twenty-four (24) hours following the declaration of martial law or the suspension of the
privilage of the writ of habeas corpus.
The 1987 Constitution mentions a specific date when the President loses her power to legislate. If the
framers of said Constitution had intended to terminate the exercise of legislative powers by the
President at the beginning of the term of office of the members of Congress, they should have so
stated (but did not) in clear and unequivocal terms. The Court has not power to re-write the
Constitution and give it a meaning different from that intended.
The Court also finds no merit in the petitioners' claim that EO 273 was issued by the President in
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. "Grave abuse of discretion" has
been defined, as follows:
Grave abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction (Abad Santos vs. Province of Tarlac, 38 Off. Gaz.
834), or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic
manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross
as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty
enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. (Tavera-Luna, Inc. vs. Nable, 38 Off.
Gaz. 62).
2

Petitioners have failed to show that EO 273 was issued capriciously and whimsically or in an arbitrary
or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. It appears that a comprehensive study
of the VAT had been extensively discussed by this framers and other government agencies involved
in its implementation, even under the past administration. As the Solicitor General correctly sated.
"The signing of E.O. 273 was merely the last stage in the exercise of her legislative powers. The
legislative process started long before the signing when the data were gathered, proposals were
weighed and the final wordings of the measure were drafted, revised and finalized. Certainly, it
cannot be said that the President made a jump, so to speak, on the Congress, two days before it
convened."
3

Next, the petitioners claim that EO 273 is oppressive, discriminatory, unjust and regressive, in
violation of the provisions of Art. VI, sec. 28(1) of the 1987 Constitution, which states:
Sec. 28 (1) The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall
evolve a progressive system of taxation.
The petitioners" assertions in this regard are not supported by facts and circumstances to warrant
their conclusions. They have failed to adequately show that the VAT is oppressive, discriminatory or
unjust. Petitioners merely rely upon newspaper articles which are actually hearsay and have
evidentiary value. To justify the nullification of a law. there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication.
4

As the Court sees it, EO 273 satisfies all the requirements of a valid tax. It is uniform. The court,
in City of Baguio vs. De Leon,
5
said:
... In Philippine Trust Company v. Yatco (69 Phil. 420), Justice Laurel, speaking for the
Court, stated: "A tax is considered uniform when it operates with the same force and
effect in every place where the subject may be found."
There was no occasion in that case to consider the possible effect on such a
constitutional requirement where there is a classification. The opportunity came in
Eastern Theatrical Co. v. Alfonso (83 Phil. 852, 862). Thus: "Equality and uniformity in
taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be
taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and
natural classifications for purposes of taxation; . . ." About two years later, Justice
Tuason, speaking for this Court in Manila Race Horses Trainers Assn. v. de la Fuente
(88 Phil. 60, 65) incorporated the above excerpt in his opinion and continued; "Taking
everything into account, the differentiation against which the plaintiffs complain
conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity and is not discriminatory within
the meaning of the Constitution."
To satisfy this requirement then, all that is needed as held in another case decided two
years later, (Uy Matias v. City of Cebu, 93 Phil. 300) is that the statute or ordinance in
question "applies equally to all persons, firms and corporations placed in similar
situation." This Court is on record as accepting the view in a leading American case
(Carmichael v. Southern Coal and Coke Co., 301 US 495) that "inequalities which result
from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no
constitutional limitation." (Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil. 148, 153).
The sales tax adopted in EO 273 is applied similarly on all goods and services sold to the public,
which are not exempt, at the constant rate of 0% or 10%.
The disputed sales tax is also equitable. It is imposed only on sales of goods or services by persons
engage in business with an aggregate gross annual sales exceeding P200,000.00. Small corner sari-
sari stores are consequently exempt from its application. Likewise exempt from the tax are sales of
farm and marine products, spared as they are from the incidence of the VAT, are expected to be
relatively lower and within the reach of the general public.
6

The Court likewise finds no merit in the contention of the petitioner Integrated Customs Brokers
Association of the Philippines that EO 273, more particularly the new Sec. 103 (r) of the National
Internal Revenue Code, unduly discriminates against customs brokers. The contested provision
states:
Sec. 103. Exempt transactions. The following shall be exempt from the value-added
tax:
xxx xxx xxx
(r) Service performed in the exercise of profession or calling (except customs brokers)
subject to the occupation tax under the Local Tax Code, and professional services
performed by registered general professional partnerships;
The phrase "except customs brokers" is not meant to discriminate against customs brokers. It was
inserted in Sec. 103(r) to complement the provisions of Sec. 102 of the Code, which makes the
services of customs brokers subject to the payment of the VAT and to distinguish customs brokers
from other professionals who are subject to the payment of an occupation tax under the Local Tax
Code. Pertinent provisions of Sec. 102 read:
Sec. 102. Value-added tax on sale of services. There shall be levied, assessed and
collected, a value-added tax equivalent to 10% percent of gross receipts derived by any
person engaged in the sale of services. The phrase sale of services" means the
performance of all kinds of services for others for a fee, remuneration or consideration,
including those performed or rendered by construction and service contractors; stock,
real estate, commercial, customs and immigration brokers; lessors of personal property;
lessors or distributors of cinematographic films; persons engaged in milling, processing,
manufacturing or repacking goods for others; and similar services regardless of whether
or not the performance thereof call for the exercise or use of the physical or mental
faculties: ...
With the insertion of the clarificatory phrase "except customs brokers" in Sec. 103(r), a potential
conflict between the two sections, (Secs. 102 and 103), insofar as customs brokers are concerned, is
averted.
At any rate, the distinction of the customs brokers from the other professionals who are subject to
occupation tax under the Local Tax Code is based upon material differences, in that the activities of
customs brokers (like those of stock, real estate and immigration brokers) partake more of a
business, rather than a profession and were thus subjected to the percentage tax under Sec. 174 of
the National Internal Revenue Code prior to its amendment by EO 273. EO 273 abolished the
percentage tax and replaced it with the VAT. If the petitioner Association did not protest the
classification of customs brokers then, the Court sees no reason why it should protest now.
The Court takes note that EO 273 has been in effect for more than five (5) months now, so that the
fears expressed by the petitioners that the adoption of the VAT will trigger skyrocketing of prices of
basic commodities and services, as well as mass actions and demonstrations against the VAT should
by now be evident. The fact that nothing of the sort has happened shows that the fears and
apprehensions of the petitioners appear to be more imagined than real. It would seem that the VAT is
not as bad as we are made to believe.
In any event, if petitioners seriously believe that the adoption and continued application of the VAT
are prejudicial to the general welfare or the interests of the majority of the people, they should seek
recourse and relief from the political branches of the government. The Court, following the time-
honored doctrine of separation of powers, cannot substitute its judgment for that of the President as
to the wisdom, justice and advisability of the adoption of the VAT. The Court can only look into and
determine whether or not EO 273 was enacted and made effective as law, in the manner required by,
and consistent with, the Constitution, and to make sure that it was not issued in grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; and, in this regard, the Court finds no reason to
impede its application or continued implementation.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. Without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J., Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento,
Cortes and Grio-Aquino, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr. and Medialdea, JJ., are on leave.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-49336 August 31, 1981
THE PROVINCE OF ABRA, represented by LADISLAO ANCHETA, Provincial Assessor, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE HAROLD M. HERNANDO, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of Branch I, Court of First Instance
Abra; THE ROMAN CATHOLIC BISHOP OF BANGUED, INC., represented by Bishop Odilo etspueler and Reverend
Felipe Flores, respondents.

FERNANDO, C.J.:
On the face of this certiorari and mandamus petition filed by the Province of Abra,
1
it clearly appears
that the actuation of respondent Judge Harold M. Hernando of the Court of First Instance of Abra left
much to be desired. First, there was a denial of a motion to dismiss
2
an action for declaratory relief
by private respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued desirous of being exempted from a real
estate tax followed by a summary judgment
3
granting such exemption, without even hearing the side
of petitioner. In the rather vigorous language of the Acting Provincial Fiscal, as counsel for petitioner,
respondent Judge "virtually ignored the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court; ... wantonly
violated the rights of petitioner to due process, by giving due course to the petition of private
respondent for declaratory relief, and thereafter without allowing petitioner to answer and without any
hearing, adjudged the case; all in total disregard of basic laws of procedure and basic provisions of
due process in the constitution, thereby indicating a failure to grasp and understand the law, which
goes into the competence of the Honorable Presiding Judge."
4

It was the submission of counsel that an action for declaratory relief would be proper only before a
breach or violation of any statute, executive order or regulation.
5
Moreover, there being a tax
assessment made by the Provincial Assessor on the properties of respondent Roman Catholic
Bishop, petitioner failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available under Presidential Decree
No. 464 before filing such court action. Further, it was pointed out to respondent Judge that he failed
to abide by the pertinent provision of such Presidential Decree which provides as follows: "No court
shall entertain any suit assailing the validity of a tax assessed under this Code until the taxpayer,
shall have paid, under protest, the tax assessed against him nor shall any court declare any tax
invalid by reason of irregularities or informalities in the proceedings of the officers charged with the
assessment or collection of taxes, or of failure to perform their duties within this time herein specified
for their performance unless such irregularities, informalities or failure shall have impaired the
substantial rights of the taxpayer; nor shall any court declare any portion of the tax assessed under
the provisions of this Code invalid except upon condition that the taxpayer shall pay the just amount
of the tax, as determined by the court in the pending proceeding."
6

When asked to comment, respondent Judge began with the allegation that there "is no question that
the real properties sought to be taxed by the Province of Abra are properties of the respondent
Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc."
7
The very next sentence assumed the very point it asked
when he categorically stated: "Likewise, there is no dispute that the properties including their
procedure are actually, directly and exclusively used by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc.
for religious or charitable purposes."
8
For him then: "The proper remedy of the petitioner is appeal
and not this special civil action."
9
A more exhaustive comment was submitted by private respondent
Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. It was, however, unable to lessen the force of the objection
raised by petitioner Province of Abra, especially the due process aspect. it is to be admitted that his
opposition to the petition, pressed with vigor, ostensibly finds a semblance of support from the
authorities cited. It is thus impressed with a scholarly aspect. It suffers, however, from the grave
infirmity of stating that only a pure question of law is presented when a claim for exemption is made.
The petition must be granted.
1. Respondent Judge would not have erred so grievously had he merely compared the provisions of
the present Constitution with that appearing in the 1935 Charter on the tax exemption of "lands,
buildings, and improvements." There is a marked difference. Under the 1935 Constitution:
"Cemeteries, churches, and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings,
and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, or educational purposes shall be exempt
from taxation."
10
The present Constitution added "charitable institutions, mosques, and non-profit
cemeteries" and required that for the exemption of ":lands, buildings, and improvements," they should
not only be "exclusively" but also "actually and "directly" used for religious or charitable
purposes.
11
The Constitution is worded differently. The change should not be ignored. It must be duly
taken into consideration. Reliance on past decisions would have sufficed were the words "actually" as
well as "directly" not added. There must be proof therefore of the actual and direct use of the lands,
buildings, and improvements for religious or charitable purposes to be exempt from taxation.
According to Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Guerrero:
12
"From 1906, in Catholic Church v.
Hastings to 1966, in Esso Standard Eastern, Inc. v. Acting Commissioner of Customs, it has been the
constant and uniform holding that exemption from taxation is not favored and is never presumed, so
that if granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer. Affirmatively put, the law frowns on
exemption from taxation, hence, an exempting provision should be construedstrictissimi juris."
13
In
Manila Electric Company v. Vera,
14
a 1975 decision, such principle was reiterated, reference being
made to Republic Flour Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue;
15
Commissioner of Customs
v. Philippine Acetylene Co. & CTA;
16
and Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of
Customs.
17

2. Petitioner Province of Abra is therefore fully justified in invoking the protection of procedural due
process. If there is any case where proof is necessary to demonstrate that there is compliance with
the constitutional provision that allows an exemption, this is it. Instead, respondent Judge accepted at
its face the allegation of private respondent. All that was alleged in the petition for declaratory relief
filed by private respondents, after mentioning certain parcels of land owned by it, are that they are
used "actually, directly and exclusively" as sources of support of the parish priest and his helpers and
also of private respondent Bishop.
18
In the motion to dismiss filed on behalf of petitioner Province of
Abra, the objection was based primarily on the lack of jurisdiction, as the validity of a tax assessment
may be questioned before the Local Board of Assessment Appeals and not with a court. There was
also mention of a lack of a cause of action, but only because, in its view, declaratory relief is not
proper, as there had been breach or violation of the right of government to assess and collect taxes
on such property. It clearly appears, therefore, that in failing to accord a hearing to petitioner Province
of Abra and deciding the case immediately in favor of private respondent, respondent Judge failed to
abide by the constitutional command of procedural due process.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted and the resolution of June 19, 1978 is set aside. Respondent
Judge, or who ever is acting on his behalf, is ordered to hear the case on the merit. No costs.
Barredo, Concepcion, Jr., and De Castro, JJ., concur.
Aquino, J., concur in the result.
Abad Santos, J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-39086 June 15, 1988
ABRA VALLEY COLLEGE, INC., represented by PEDRO V. BORGONIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JUAN P. AQUINO, Judge, Court of First Instance, Abra; ARMIN M. CARIAGA, Provincial
Treasurer, Abra; GASPAR V. BOSQUE, Municipal Treasurer, Bangued, Abra; HEIRS OF
PATERNO MILLARE,respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the defunct Court of First Instance of
Abra, Branch I, dated June 14, 1974, rendered in Civil Case No. 656, entitled "Abra Valley Junior
College, Inc., represented by Pedro V. Borgonia, plaintiff vs. Armin M. Cariaga as Provincial
Treasurer of Abra, Gaspar V. Bosque as Municipal Treasurer of Bangued, Abra and Paterno Millare,
defendants," the decretal portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby declares:
That the distraint seizure and sale by the Municipal Treasurer of Bangued, Abra, the
Provincial Treasurer of said province against the lot and building of the Abra Valley
Junior College, Inc., represented by Director Pedro Borgonia located at Bangued, Abra,
is valid;
That since the school is not exempt from paying taxes, it should therefore pay all back
taxes in the amount of P5,140.31 and back taxes and penalties from the promulgation
of this decision;
That the amount deposited by the plaintaff him the sum of P60,000.00 before the trial,
be confiscated to apply for the payment of the back taxes and for the redemption of the
property in question, if the amount is less than P6,000.00, the remainder must be
returned to the Director of Pedro Borgonia, who represents the plaintiff herein;
That the deposit of the Municipal Treasurer in the amount of P6,000.00 also before the
trial must be returned to said Municipal Treasurer of Bangued, Abra;
And finally the case is hereby ordered dismissed with costs against the plaintiff.
SO ORDERED. (Rollo, pp. 22-23)
Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly incorporated with the
Securities and Exchange Commission in 1948, filed a complaint (Annex "1" of Answer by the
respondents Heirs of Paterno Millare; Rollo, pp. 95-97) on July 10, 1972 in the court a quo to annul
and declare void the "Notice of Seizure' and the "Notice of Sale" of its lot and building located at
Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31. Said
"Notice of Seizure" of the college lot and building covered by Original Certificate of Title No. Q-83 duly
registered in the name of petitioner, plaintiff below, on July 6, 1972, by respondents Municipal
Treasurer and Provincial Treasurer, defendants below, was issued for the satisfaction of the said
taxes thereon. The "Notice of Sale" was caused to be served upon the petitioner by the respondent
treasurers on July 8, 1972 for the sale at public auction of said college lot and building, which sale
was held on the same date. Dr. Paterno Millare, then Municipal Mayor of Bangued, Abra, offered the
highest bid of P6,000.00 which was duly accepted. The certificate of sale was correspondingly issued
to him.
On August 10, 1972, the respondent Paterno Millare (now deceased) filed through counstel a motion
to dismiss the complaint.
On August 23, 1972, the respondent Provincial Treasurer and Municipal Treasurer, through then
Provincial Fiscal Loreto C. Roldan, filed their answer (Annex "2" of Answer by the respondents Heirs
of Patemo Millare; Rollo, pp. 98-100) to the complaint. This was followed by an amended answer
(Annex "3," ibid, Rollo, pp. 101-103) on August 31, 1972.
On September 1, 1972 the respondent Paterno Millare filed his answer (Annex "5," ibid; Rollo, pp.
106-108).
On October 12, 1972, with the aforesaid sale of the school premises at public auction, the respondent
Judge, Hon. Juan P. Aquino of the Court of First Instance of Abra, Branch I, ordered (Annex "6," ibid;
Rollo, pp. 109-110) the respondents provincial and municipal treasurers to deliver to the Clerk of
Court the proceeds of the auction sale. Hence, on December 14, 1972, petitioner, through Director
Borgonia, deposited with the trial court the sum of P6,000.00 evidenced by PNB Check No. 904369.
On April 12, 1973, the parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied by the trial
court in its questioned decision. Said Stipulations reads:
STIPULATION OF FACTS
COME NOW the parties, assisted by counsels, and to this Honorable Court respectfully
enter into the following agreed stipulation of facts:
1. That the personal circumstances of the parties as stated in paragraph 1 of the
complaint is admitted; but the particular person of Mr. Armin M. Cariaga is to be
substituted, however, by anyone who is actually holding the position of Provincial
Treasurer of the Province of Abra;
2. That the plaintiff Abra Valley Junior College, Inc. is the owner of the lot and buildings
thereon located in Bangued, Abra under Original Certificate of Title No. 0-83;
3. That the defendant Gaspar V. Bosque, as Municipal treasurer of Bangued, Abra
caused to be served upon the Abra Valley Junior College, Inc. a Notice of Seizure on
the property of said school under Original Certificate of Title No. 0-83 for the satisfaction
of real property taxes thereon, amounting to P5,140.31; the Notice of Seizure being the
one attached to the complaint as Exhibit A;
4. That on June 8, 1972 the above properties of the Abra Valley Junior College, Inc.
was sold at public auction for the satisfaction of the unpaid real property taxes thereon
and the same was sold to defendant Paterno Millare who offered the highest bid of
P6,000.00 and a Certificate of Sale in his favor was issued by the defendant Municipal
Treasurer.
5. That all other matters not particularly and specially covered by this stipulation of facts
will be the subject of evidence by the parties.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed of the Honorable Court to consider and admit
this stipulation of facts on the point agreed upon by the parties.
Bangued, Abra, April 12, 1973.
Sgd. Agripino Brillantes
Typ AGRIPINO BRILLANTES
Attorney for Plaintiff
Sgd. Loreto Roldan
Typ LORETO ROLDAN
Provincial Fiscal
Counsel for Defendants
Provincial Treasurer of
Abra and the Municipal
Treasurer of Bangued, Abra
Sgd. Demetrio V. Pre
Typ. DEMETRIO V. PRE
Attorney for Defendant
Paterno Millare (Rollo, pp. 17-18)
Aside from the Stipulation of Facts, the trial court among others, found the following: (a) that the
school is recognized by the government and is offering Primary, High School and College Courses,
and has a school population of more than one thousand students all in all; (b) that it is located right in
the heart of the town of Bangued, a few meters from the plaza and about 120 meters from the Court
of First Instance building; (c) that the elementary pupils are housed in a two-storey building across the
street; (d) that the high school and college students are housed in the main building; (e) that the
Director with his family is in the second floor of the main building; and (f) that the annual gross income
of the school reaches more than one hundred thousand pesos.
From all the foregoing, the only issue left for the Court to determine and as agreed by the parties, is
whether or not the lot and building in question are used exclusively for educational purposes. (Rollo,
p. 20)
The succeeding Provincial Fiscal, Hon. Jose A. Solomon and his Assistant, Hon. Eustaquio Z.
Montero, filed a Memorandum for the Government on March 25, 1974, and a Supplemental
Memorandum on May 7, 1974, wherein they opined "that based on the evidence, the laws applicable,
court decisions and jurisprudence, the school building and school lot used for educational purposes of
the Abra Valley College, Inc., are exempted from the payment of taxes." (Annexes "B," "B-1" of
Petition; Rollo, pp. 24-49; 44 and 49).
Nonetheless, the trial court disagreed because of the use of the second floor by the Director of
petitioner school for residential purposes. He thus ruled for the government and rendered the assailed
decision.
After having been granted by the trial court ten (10) days from August 6, 1974 within which to perfect
its appeal (Per Order dated August 6, 1974; Annex "G" of Petition; Rollo, p. 57) petitioner instead
availed of the instant petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction before this
Court, which petition was filed on August 17, 1974 (Rollo, p.2).
In the resolution dated August 16, 1974, this Court resolved to give DUE COURSE to the petition
(Rollo, p. 58). Respondents were required to answer said petition (Rollo, p. 74).
Petitioner raised the following assignments of error:
I
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SUSTAINING AS VALID THE SEIZURE AND SALE OF THE
COLLEGE LOT AND BUILDING USED FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES OF THE PETITIONER.
II
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE COLLEGE LOT AND BUILDING OF THE
PETITIONER ARE NOT USED EXCLUSIVELY FOR EDUCATIONAL PURPOSES MERELY
BECAUSE THE COLLEGE PRESIDENT RESIDES IN ONE ROOM OF THE COLLEGE BUILDING.
III
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE COLLEGE LOT AND BUILDING OF THE
PETITIONER ARE NOT EXEMPT FROM PROPERTY TAXES AND IN ORDERING PETITIONER TO
PAY P5,140.31 AS REALTY TAXES.
IV
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN ORDERING THE CONFISCATION OF THE P6,000.00 DEPOSIT
MADE IN THE COURT BY PETITIONER AS PAYMENT OF THE P5,140.31 REALTY TAXES. (See
Brief for the Petitioner, pp. 1-2)
The main issue in this case is the proper interpretation of the phrase "used exclusively for educational
purposes."
Petitioner contends that the primary use of the lot and building for educational purposes, and not the
incidental use thereof, determines and exemption from property taxes under Section 22 (3), Article VI
of the 1935 Constitution. Hence, the seizure and sale of subject college lot and building, which are
contrary thereto as well as to the provision of Commonwealth Act No. 470, otherwise known as the
Assessment Law, are without legal basis and therefore void.
On the other hand, private respondents maintain that the college lot and building in question which
were subjected to seizure and sale to answer for the unpaid tax are used: (1) for the educational
purposes of the college; (2) as the permanent residence of the President and Director thereof, Mr.
Pedro V. Borgonia, and his family including the in-laws and grandchildren; and (3) for commercial
purposes because the ground floor of the college building is being used and rented by a commercial
establishment, the Northern Marketing Corporation (See photograph attached as Annex "8"
(Comment; Rollo, p. 90]).
Due to its time frame, the constitutional provision which finds application in the case at bar is Section
22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution, which expressly grants
exemption from realty taxes for "Cemeteries, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant
thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable or
educational purposes ...
Relative thereto, Section 54, paragraph c, Commonwealth Act No. 470 as amended by Republic Act
No. 409, otherwise known as the Assessment Law, provides:
The following are exempted from real property tax under the Assessment Law:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings,
and improvements used exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific or educational
purposes.
xxx xxx xxx
In this regard petitioner argues that the primary use of the school lot and building is the basic and
controlling guide, norm and standard to determine tax exemption, and not the mere incidental use
thereof.
As early as 1916 in YMCA of Manila vs. Collector of lnternal Revenue, 33 Phil. 217 [1916], this Court
ruled that while it may be true that the YMCA keeps a lodging and a boarding house and maintains a
restaurant for its members, still these do not constitute business in the ordinary acceptance of the
word, but an institution used exclusively for religious, charitable and educational purposes, and as
such, it is entitled to be exempted from taxation.
In the case of Bishop of Nueva Segovia v. Provincial Board of Ilocos Norte, 51 Phil. 352 [1972], this
Court included in the exemption a vegetable garden in an adjacent lot and another lot formerly used
as a cemetery. It was clarified that the term "used exclusively" considers incidental use also. Thus,
the exemption from payment of land tax in favor of the convent includes, not only the land actually
occupied by the building but also the adjacent garden devoted to the incidental use of the parish
priest. The lot which is not used for commercial purposes but serves solely as a sort of lodging place,
also qualifies for exemption because this constitutes incidental use in religious functions.
The phrase "exclusively used for educational purposes" was further clarified by this Court in the
cases of Herrera vs. Quezon City Board of assessment Appeals, 3 SCRA 186 [1961]
and Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. Bishop of the Missionary District, 14 SCRA 991 [1965],
thus
Moreover, the exemption in favor of property used exclusively for charitable or
educational purposes is 'not limited to property actually indispensable' therefor (Cooley
on Taxation, Vol. 2, p. 1430), but extends to facilities which are incidental to and
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of said purposes, such as in the case of
hospitals, "a school for training nurses, a nurses' home, property use to provide housing
facilities for interns, resident doctors, superintendents, and other members of the
hospital staff, and recreational facilities for student nurses, interns, and residents' (84
CJS 6621), such as "Athletic fields" including "a firm used for the inmates of the
institution. (Cooley on Taxation, Vol. 2, p. 1430).
The test of exemption from taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the
Constitution (Apostolic Prefect v. City Treasurer of Baguio, 71 Phil, 547 [1941]).
It must be stressed however, that while this Court allows a more liberal and non-restrictive
interpretation of the phrase "exclusively used for educational purposes" as provided for in Article VI,
Section 22, paragraph 3 of the 1935 Philippine Constitution, reasonable emphasis has always been
made that exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the main purposes. Otherwise stated, the use of the school building or lot for
commercial purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. Thus, while the use of the
second floor of the main building in the case at bar for residential purposes of the Director and his
family, may find justification under the concept of incidental use, which is complimentary to the main
or primary purposeeducational, the lease of the first floor thereof to the Northern Marketing
Corporation cannot by any stretch of the imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of
education.
It will be noted however that the aforementioned lease appears to have been raised for the first time
in this Court. That the matter was not taken up in the to court is really apparent in the decision of
respondent Judge. No mention thereof was made in the stipulation of facts, not even in the
description of the school building by the trial judge, both embodied in the decision nor as one of the
issues to resolve in order to determine whether or not said properly may be exempted from payment
of real estate taxes (Rollo, pp. 17-23). On the other hand, it is noteworthy that such fact was not
disputed even after it was raised in this Court.
Indeed, it is axiomatic that facts not raised in the lower court cannot be taken up for the first time on
appeal. Nonetheless, as an exception to the rule, this Court has held that although a factual issue is
not squarely raised below, still in the interest of substantial justice, this Court is not prevented from
considering a pivotal factual matter. "The Supreme Court is clothed with ample authority to review
palpable errors not assigned as such if it finds that their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just
decision." (Perez vs. Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 645 [1984]).
Under the 1935 Constitution, the trial court correctly arrived at the conclusion that the school building
as well as the lot where it is built, should be taxed, not because the second floor of the same is being
used by the Director and his family for residential purposes, but because the first floor thereof is being
used for commercial purposes. However, since only a portion is used for purposes of commerce, it is
only fair that half of the assessed tax be returned to the school involved.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision of the Court of First Instance of Abra, Branch I, is hereby
AFFIRMED subject to the modification that half of the assessed tax be returned to the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Yap, C.J., Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10405 December 29, 1960
WENCESLAO PASCUAL, in his official capacity as Provincial Governor of Rizal, petitioner-
appellant,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF PUBLIC WORKS AND COMMUNICATIONS, ET AL., respondents-
appellees.
Asst. Fiscal Noli M. Cortes and Jose P. Santos for appellant.
Office of the Asst. Solicitor General Jose G. Bautista and Solicitor A. A. Torres for appellee.

CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal, by petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal,
dismissing the above entitled case and dissolving the writ of preliminary injunction therein issued,
without costs.
On August 31, 1954, petitioner Wenceslao Pascual, as Provincial Governor of Rizal, instituted this
action for declaratory relief, with injunction, upon the ground that Republic Act No. 920, entitled "An
Act Appropriating Funds for Public Works", approved on June 20, 1953, contained, in section 1-C (a)
thereof, an item (43[h]) of P85,000.00 "for the construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and
improvement" of Pasig feeder road terminals (Gen. Roxas Gen. Araneta Gen. Lucban Gen.
Capinpin Gen. Segundo Gen. Delgado Gen. Malvar Gen. Lim)"; that, at the time of the
passage and approval of said Act, the aforementioned feeder roads were "nothing but projected and
planned subdivision roads, not yet constructed, . . . within the Antonio Subdivision . . . situated at . . .
Pasig, Rizal" (according to the tracings attached to the petition as Annexes A and B, near Shaw
Boulevard, not far away from the intersection between the latter and Highway 54), which projected
feeder roads "do not connect any government property or any important premises to the main
highway"; that the aforementioned Antonio Subdivision (as well as the lands on which said feeder
roads were to be construed) were private properties of respondent Jose C. Zulueta, who, at the time
of the passage and approval of said Act, was a member of the Senate of the Philippines; that on May,
1953, respondent Zulueta, addressed a letter to the Municipal Council of Pasig, Rizal, offering to
donate said projected feeder roads to the municipality of Pasig, Rizal; that, on June 13, 1953, the
offer was accepted by the council, subject to the condition "that the donor would submit a plan of the
said roads and agree to change the names of two of them"; that no deed of donation in favor of the
municipality of Pasig was, however, executed; that on July 10, 1953, respondent Zulueta wrote
another letter to said council, calling attention to the approval of Republic Act. No. 920, and the sum
of P85,000.00 appropriated therein for the construction of the projected feeder roads in question; that
the municipal council of Pasig endorsed said letter of respondent Zulueta to the District Engineer of
Rizal, who, up to the present "has not made any endorsement thereon" that inasmuch as the
projected feeder roads in question were private property at the time of the passage and approval of
Republic Act No. 920, the appropriation of P85,000.00 therein made, for the construction,
reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement of said projected feeder roads, was illegal and,
therefore, void ab initio"; that said appropriation of P85,000.00 was made by Congress because its
members were made to believe that the projected feeder roads in question were "public roads and
not private streets of a private subdivision"'; that, "in order to give a semblance of legality, when there
is absolutely none, to the aforementioned appropriation", respondents Zulueta executed on
December 12, 1953, while he was a member of the Senate of the Philippines, an alleged deed of
donation copy of which is annexed to the petition of the four (4) parcels of land constituting said
projected feeder roads, in favor of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines; that said
alleged deed of donation was, on the same date, accepted by the then Executive Secretary; that
being subject to an onerous condition, said donation partook of the nature of a contract; that, such,
said donation violated the provision of our fundamental law prohibiting members of Congress from
being directly or indirectly financially interested in any contract with the Government, and, hence, is
unconstitutional, as well as null and voidab initio, for the construction of the projected feeder roads in
question with public funds would greatly enhance or increase the value of the aforementioned
subdivision of respondent Zulueta, "aside from relieving him from the burden of constructing his
subdivision streets or roads at his own expense"; that the construction of said projected feeder roads
was then being undertaken by the Bureau of Public Highways; and that, unless restrained by the
court, the respondents would continue to execute, comply with, follow and implement the
aforementioned illegal provision of law, "to the irreparable damage, detriment and prejudice not only
to the petitioner but to the Filipino nation."
Petitioner prayed, therefore, that the contested item of Republic Act No. 920 be declared null and
void; that the alleged deed of donation of the feeder roads in question be "declared unconstitutional
and, therefor, illegal"; that a writ of injunction be issued enjoining the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, the Director of the Bureau of Public Works and Highways and Jose C. Zulueta from
ordering or allowing the continuance of the above-mentioned feeder roads project, and from making
and securing any new and further releases on the aforementioned item of Republic Act No. 920, and
the disbursing officers of the Department of Public Works and Highways from making any further
payments out of said funds provided for in Republic Act No. 920; and that pending final hearing on
the merits, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued enjoining the aforementioned parties respondent
from making and securing any new and further releases on the aforesaid item of Republic Act No.
920 and from making any further payments out of said illegally appropriated funds.
Respondents moved to dismiss the petition upon the ground that petitioner had "no legal capacity to
sue", and that the petition did "not state a cause of action". In support to this motion, respondent
Zulueta alleged that the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, not its provincial governor, should represent the
Province of Rizal, pursuant to section 1683 of the Revised Administrative Code; that said respondent
is " not aware of any law which makes illegal the appropriation of public funds for the improvements of
. . . private property"; and that, the constitutional provision invoked by petitioner is inapplicable to the
donation in question, the same being a pure act of liberality, not a contract. The other respondents, in
turn, maintained that petitioner could not assail the appropriation in question because "there is no
actual bona fide case . . . in which the validity of Republic Act No. 920 is necessarily involved" and
petitioner "has not shown that he has a personal and substantial interest" in said Act "and that its
enforcement has caused or will cause him a direct injury."
Acting upon said motions to dismiss, the lower court rendered the aforementioned decision, dated
October 29, 1953, holding that, since public interest is involved in this case, the Provincial Governor
of Rizal and the provincial fiscal thereof who represents him therein, "have the requisite personalities"
to question the constitutionality of the disputed item of Republic Act No. 920; that "the legislature is
without power appropriate public revenues for anything but a public purpose", that the instructions
and improvement of the feeder roads in question, if such roads where private property, would not be
a public purpose; that, being subject to the following condition:
The within donation is hereby made upon the condition that the Government of the Republic of
the Philippines will use the parcels of land hereby donated for street purposes only and for no
other purposes whatsoever; it being expressly understood that should the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines violate the condition hereby imposed upon it, the title to the land
hereby donated shall, upon such violation, ipso facto revert to the DONOR, JOSE C.
ZULUETA. (Emphasis supplied.)
which is onerous, the donation in question is a contract; that said donation or contract is "absolutely
forbidden by the Constitution" and consequently "illegal", for Article 1409 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, declares in existence and void from the very beginning contracts "whose cause, objector
purpose is contrary to law, morals . . . or public policy"; that the legality of said donation may not be
contested, however, by petitioner herein, because his "interest are not directly affected" thereby; and
that, accordingly, the appropriation in question "should be upheld" and the case dismissed.
At the outset, it should be noted that we are concerned with a decision granting the aforementioned
motions to dismiss, which as much, are deemed to have admitted hypothetically the allegations of
fact made in the petition of appellant herein. According to said petition, respondent Zulueta is the
owner of several parcels of residential land situated in Pasig, Rizal, and known as the Antonio
Subdivision, certain portions of which had been reserved for the projected feeder roads
aforementioned, which, admittedly, were private property of said respondent when Republic Act No.
920, appropriating P85,000.00 for the "construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and
improvement" of said roads, was passed by Congress, as well as when it was approved by the
President on June 20, 1953. The petition further alleges that the construction of said roads, to be
undertaken with the aforementioned appropriation of P85,000.00, would have the effect of relieving
respondent Zulueta of the burden of constructing his subdivision streets or roads at his own
expenses,
1
and would "greatly enhance or increase the value of the subdivision" of said respondent.
The lower court held that under these circumstances, the appropriation in question was "clearly for a
private, not a public purpose."
Respondents do not deny the accuracy of this conclusion, which is self-evident.
2
However,
respondent Zulueta contended, in his motion to dismiss that:
A law passed by Congress and approved by the President can never be illegal because
Congress is the source of all laws . . . Aside from the fact that movant is not aware of any law
which makes illegal the appropriation of public funds for the improvement of what we, in the
meantime, may assume as private property . . . (Record on Appeal, p. 33.)
The first proposition must be rejected most emphatically, it being inconsistent with the nature of the
Government established under the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and the system of
checks and balances underlying our political structure. Moreover, it is refuted by the decisions of this
Court invalidating legislative enactments deemed violative of the Constitution or organic laws.
3

As regards the legal feasibility of appropriating public funds for a public purpose, the principle
according to Ruling Case Law, is this:
It is a general rule that the legislature is without power to appropriate public revenue for
anything but a public purpose. . . . It is the essential character of the direct object of the
expenditure which must determine its validity as justifying a tax, and not the magnitude of the
interest to be affected nor the degree to which the general advantage of the community, and
thus the public welfare, may be ultimately benefited by their promotion. Incidental to the public
or to the state, which results from the promotion of private interest and the prosperity of private
enterprises or business, does not justify their aid by the use public money. (25 R.L.C. pp. 398-
400; Emphasis supplied.)
The rule is set forth in Corpus Juris Secundum in the following language:
In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must be exercised for public purposes only,
discussedsupra sec. 14, money raised by taxation can be expended only for public purposes
and not for the advantage of private individuals. (85 C.J.S. pp. 645-646; emphasis supplied.)
Explaining the reason underlying said rule, Corpus Juris Secundum states:
Generally, under the express or implied provisions of the constitution, public funds may be
used only for public purpose. The right of the legislature to appropriate funds is correlative with
its right to tax, and, under constitutional provisions against taxation except for public purposes
and prohibiting the collection of a tax for one purpose and the devotion thereof to another
purpose, no appropriation of state funds can be made for other than for a public purpose.
x x x x x x x x x
The test of the constitutionality of a statute requiring the use of public funds is whether the
statute is designed to promote the public interest, as opposed to the furtherance of the
advantage of individuals, although each advantage to individuals might incidentally serve the
public. (81 C.J.S. pp. 1147; emphasis supplied.)
Needless to say, this Court is fully in accord with the foregoing views which, apart from being patently
sound, are a necessary corollary to our democratic system of government, which, as such, exists
primarily for the promotion of the general welfare. Besides, reflecting as they do, the established
jurisprudence in the United States, after whose constitutional system ours has been patterned, said
views and jurisprudence are, likewise, part and parcel of our own constitutional law.lawphil.net
This notwithstanding, the lower court felt constrained to uphold the appropriation in question, upon
the ground that petitioner may not contest the legality of the donation above referred to because the
same does not affect him directly. This conclusion is, presumably, based upon the following
premises, namely: (1) that, if valid, said donation cured the constitutional infirmity of the
aforementioned appropriation; (2) that the latter may not be annulled without a previous declaration of
unconstitutionality of the said donation; and (3) that the rule set forth in Article 1421 of the Civil Code
is absolute, and admits of no exception. We do not agree with these premises.
The validity of a statute depends upon the powers of Congress at the time of its passage or approval,
not upon events occurring, or acts performed, subsequently thereto, unless the latter consists of an
amendment of the organic law, removing, with retrospective operation, the constitutional limitation
infringed by said statute. Referring to the P85,000.00 appropriation for the projected feeder roads in
question, the legality thereof depended upon whether said roads were public or private property when
the bill, which, latter on, became Republic Act 920, was passed by Congress, or, when said bill was
approved by the President and the disbursement of said sum became effective, or on June 20, 1953
(see section 13 of said Act). Inasmuch as the land on which the projected feeder roads were to be
constructed belonged then to respondent Zulueta, the result is that said appropriation sought a
private purpose, and hence, was null and void. 4 The donation to the Government, over five (5)
months after the approval and effectivity of said Act, made, according to the petition, for the purpose
of giving a "semblance of legality", or legalizing, the appropriation in question, did not cure its
aforementioned basic defect. Consequently, a judicial nullification of said donation need not precede
the declaration of unconstitutionality of said appropriation.
Again, Article 1421 of our Civil Code, like many other statutory enactments, is subject to exceptions.
For instance, the creditors of a party to an illegal contract may, under the conditions set forth in Article
1177 of said Code, exercise the rights and actions of the latter, except only those which are inherent
in his person, including therefore, his right to the annulment of said contract, even though such
creditors are not affected by the same, except indirectly, in the manner indicated in said legal
provision.
Again, it is well-stated that the validity of a statute may be contested only by one who will sustain a
direct injury in consequence of its enforcement. Yet, there are many decisions nullifying, at the
instance of taxpayers, laws providing for the disbursement of public funds,
5
upon the theory that "the
expenditure of public funds by an officer of the State for the purpose of administering
an unconstitutional act constitutes a misapplication of such funds," which may be enjoined at the
request of a taxpayer.
6
Although there are some decisions to the contrary,
7
the prevailing view in the
United States is stated in the American Jurisprudence as follows:
In the determination of the degree of interest essential to give the requisite standing to attack
the constitutionality of a statute, the general rule is that not only persons individually affected,
but alsotaxpayers, have sufficient interest in preventing the illegal expenditure of moneys
raised by taxation and may therefore question the constitutionality of statutes requiring
expenditure of public moneys. (11 Am. Jur. 761; emphasis supplied.)
However, this view was not favored by the Supreme Court of the U.S. in Frothingham vs. Mellon (262
U.S. 447), insofar as federal laws are concerned, upon the ground that the relationship of a taxpayer
of the U.S. to its Federal Government is different from that of a taxpayer of a municipal corporation to
its government. Indeed, under the composite system of government existing in the U.S., the states of
the Union are integral part of the Federation from an international viewpoint, but, each state enjoys
internally a substantial measure of sovereignty, subject to the limitations imposed by the Federal
Constitution. In fact, the same was made by representatives ofeach state of the Union, not of the
people of the U.S., except insofar as the former represented the people of the respective States, and
the people of each State has, independently of that of the others, ratified said Constitution. In other
words, the Federal Constitution and the Federal statutes have become binding upon the people of the
U.S. in consequence of an act of, and, in this sense, through the respective states of the Union of
which they are citizens. The peculiar nature of the relation between said people and the Federal
Government of the U.S. is reflected in the election of its President, who is chosen directly, not by the
people of the U.S., but by electors chosen by each State, in such manner as the legislature thereof
may direct (Article II, section 2, of the Federal Constitution).lawphi1.net
The relation between the people of the Philippines and its taxpayers, on the other hand, and the
Republic of the Philippines, on the other, is not identical to that obtaining between the people and
taxpayers of the U.S. and its Federal Government. It is closer, from a domestic viewpoint, to that
existing between the people and taxpayers of each state and the government thereof, except that the
authority of the Republic of the Philippines over the people of the Philippines is more fully direct than
that of the states of the Union, insofar as the simple and unitary type of our national government is
not subject to limitations analogous to those imposed by the Federal Constitution upon the states of
the Union, and those imposed upon the Federal Government in the interest of the Union. For this
reason, the rule recognizing the right of taxpayers to assail the constitutionality of a legislation
appropriating local or state public funds which has been upheld by the Federal Supreme Court
(Crampton vs. Zabriskie, 101 U.S. 601) has greater application in the Philippines than that adopted
with respect to acts of Congress of the United States appropriating federal funds.
Indeed, in the Province of Tayabas vs. Perez (56 Phil., 257), involving the expropriation of a land by
the Province of Tayabas, two (2) taxpayers thereof were allowed to intervene for the purpose of
contesting the price being paid to the owner thereof, as unduly exorbitant. It is true that in
Custodio vs. President of the Senate (42 Off. Gaz., 1243), a taxpayer and employee of the
Government was not permitted to question the constitutionality of an appropriation for backpay of
members of Congress. However, in Rodriguez vs. Treasurer of the Philippines and
Barredo vs. Commission on Elections (84 Phil., 368; 45 Off. Gaz., 4411), we entertained the action of
taxpayers impugning the validity of certain appropriations of public funds, and invalidated the same.
Moreover, the reason that impelled this Court to take such position in said two (2) cases the
importance of the issues therein raised is present in the case at bar. Again, like the petitioners in
the Rodriguez and Barredo cases, petitioner herein is not merely a taxpayer. The Province of Rizal,
which he represents officially as its Provincial Governor, is our most populated political
subdivision,
8
and, the taxpayers therein bear a substantial portion of the burden of taxation, in the
Philippines.
Hence, it is our considered opinion that the circumstances surrounding this case sufficiently justify
petitioners action in contesting the appropriation and donation in question; that this action should not
have been dismissed by the lower court; and that the writ of preliminary injunction should have been
maintained.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed, and the records are remanded to the
lower court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this decision, with the costs of this instance
against respondent Jose C. Zulueta. It is so ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Gutierrez David,
Paredes, and Dizon, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-45459 March 13, 1937
GREGORIO AGLIPAY, petitioner,
vs.
JUAN RUIZ, respondent.
Vicente Sotto for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for respondent.
LAUREL, J.:
The petitioner, Mons. Gregorio Aglipay, Supreme Head of the Philippine Independent Church, seeks
the issuance from this court of a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondent Director of Posts from
issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International Eucharistic
Congress.
In May, 1936, the Director of Posts announced in the dailies of Manila that he would order the issues
of postage stamps commemorating the celebration in the City of Manila of the Thirty-third
international Eucharistic Congress, organized by the Roman Catholic Church. The petitioner, in the
fulfillment of what he considers to be a civic duty, requested Vicente Sotto, Esq., member of the
Philippine Bar, to denounce the matter to the President of the Philippines. In spite of the protest of the
petitioner's attorney, the respondent publicly announced having sent to the United States the designs
of the postage stamps for printing as follows:
"In the center is chalice, with grape vine and stalks of wheat as border design. The stamps are blue,
green, brown, cardinal red, violet and orange, 1 inch by 1,094 inches. The denominations are for 2, 6,
16, 20, 36 and 50 centavos." The said stamps were actually issued and sold though the greater part
thereof, to this day, remains unsold. The further sale of the stamps is sought to be prevented by the
petitioner herein.
The Solicitor-General contends that the writ of prohibition is not the proper legal remedy in the instant
case, although he admits that the writ may properly restrain ministerial functions. While, generally,
prohibition as an extraordinary legal writ will not issue to restrain or control the performance of other
than judicial or quasi-judicial functions (50 C. J., 6580, its issuance and enforcement are regulated by
statute and in this jurisdiction may issue to . . . inferior tribunals, corporations, boards, or persons,
whether excercising functions judicial or ministerial, which are without or in excess of the jurisdiction
of such tribunal, corporation, board, or person, . . . ." (Secs. 516 and 226, Code of Civil Procedure.)
The terms "judicial" and "ministerial" used with reference to "functions" in the statute are undoubtedly
comprehensive and include the challenged act of the respondent Director of Posts in the present
case, which act because alleged to be violative of the Constitution is a fortiorari "without or in excess
of . . . jurisdiction." The statutory rule, therefore, in the jurisdiction is that the writ of prohibition is not
confined exclusively to courts or tribunals to keep them within the limits of their own jurisdiction and to
prevent them from encroaching upon the jurisdiction of other tribunals, but will issue, in appropriate
cases, to an officer or person whose acts are without or in excess of his authority. Not infrequently,
"the writ is granted, where it is necessary for the orderly administration of justice, or to prevent the
use of the strong arm of the law in an oppressive or vindictive manner, or a multiplicity of actions."
(Dimayuga and Fajardo vs. Fernandez [1923], 43 Phil., 304, 307.)
The more important question raised refers to the alleged violation of the Constitution by the
respondent in issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the Thirty-third International
Eucharistic Congress. It is alleged that this action of the respondent is violative of the provisions of
section 23, subsection 3, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, which provides as follows:
No public money or property shall ever be appropriated, applied, or used, directly or indirectly,
for the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, secretarian, institution, or
system of religion, or for the use, benefit, or support of any priest, preacher, minister, or other
religious teacher or dignitary as such, except when such priest, preacher, minister, or dignitary
is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage, or leprosarium.
The prohibition herein expressed is a direct corollary of the principle of separation of church and
state. Without the necessity of adverting to the historical background of this principle in our country, it
is sufficient to say that our history, not to speak of the history of mankind, has taught us that the union
of church and state is prejudicial to both, for ocassions might arise when the estate will use the
church, and the church the state, as a weapon in the furtherance of their recognized this principle of
separation of church and state in the early stages of our constitutional development; it was inserted in
the Treaty of Paris between the United States and Spain of December 10, 1898, reiterated in
President McKinley's Instructions of the Philippine Commission, reaffirmed in the Philippine Bill of
1902 and in the autonomy Act of August 29, 1916, and finally embodied in the constitution of the
Philippines as the supreme expression of the Filipino people. It is almost trite to say now that in this
country we enjoy both religious and civil freedom. All the officers of the Government, from the highest
to the lowest, in taking their oath to support and defend the constitution, bind themselves to recognize
and respect the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom, with its inherent limitations and
recognized implications. It should be stated that what is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious
liberty, not mere religious toleration.
Religious freedom, however, as a constitutional mandate is not inhibition of profound reverence for
religion and is not denial of its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active
power that binds and elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And, in so far as it instills into the
minds the purest principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. When the
Filipino people, in the preamble of their Constitution, implored "the aid of Divine Providence, in order
to establish a government that shall embody their ideals, conserve and develop the patrimony of the
nation, promote the general welfare, and secure to themselves and their posterity the blessings of
independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy," they thereby manifested reliance
upon Him who guides the destinies of men and nations. The elevating influence of religion in human
society is recognized here as elsewhere. In fact, certain general concessions are indiscriminately
accorded to religious sects and denominations. Our Constitution and laws exempt from taxation
properties devoted exclusively to religious purposes (sec. 14, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the
Philippines and sec. 1, subsec. 4, Ordinance appended thereto; Assessment Law, sec. 344, par. [c].
Adm. Code). Sectarian aid is not prohibited when a priest, preacher, minister or other religious
teacher or dignitary as such is assigned to the armed forces or to any penal institution, orphanage or
leprosarium 9 sec. 13, subsec. 3, Art. VI, Constitution of the Philippines). Optional religious instruction
in the public schools is by constitutional mandate allowed (sec. 5, Art. XIII, Constitution of the
Philippines, in relation to sec. 928, Adm. Code). Thursday and Friday of Holy Week, Thanksgiving
Day, Christmas Day, and Sundays and made legal holidays (sec. 29, Adm. Code) because of the
secular idea that their observance is conclusive to beneficial moral results. The law allows divorce but
punishes polygamy and bigamy; and certain crimes against religious worship are considered crimes
against the fundamental laws of the state (see arts. 132 and 133, Revised Penal Code).
In the case at bar, it appears that the respondent Director of Posts issued the postage stamps in
question under the provisions of Act No. 4052 of the Philippine Legislature. This Act is as follows:
No. 4052. AN ACT APPROPRIATING THE SUM OF SIXTY THOUSAND PESOS AND
MAKING THE SAME AVAILABLE OUT OF ANY FUNDS IN THE INSULAR TREASURY NOT
OTHERWISE APPROPRIATED FOR THE COST OF PLATES AND PRINTING OF POSTAGE
STAMPS WITH NEW DESIGNS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippines in Legislature
assembled and by the authority of the same:
SECTION 1. The sum of sixty thousand pesos is hereby appropriated and made immediately
available out of any funds in the Insular Treasury not otherwise appropriated, for the costs of plates
and printing of postage stamps with new designs, and other expenses incident thereto.
SEC. 2. The Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and
Communications, is hereby authorized to dispose of the whole or any portion of the amount herein
appropriated in the manner indicated and as often as may be deemed advantageous to the
Government.
SEC. 3. This amount or any portion thereof not otherwise expended shall not revert to the Treasury.
SEC. 4. This act shall take effect on its approval.
Approved, February 21, 1933.
It will be seen that the Act appropriates the sum of sixty thousand pesos for the costs of plates and
printing of postage stamps with new designs and other expenses incident thereto, and authorizes the
Director of Posts, with the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, to dispose
of the amount appropriated in the manner indicated and "as often as may be deemed advantageous
to the Government". The printing and issuance of the postage stamps in question appears to have
been approved by authority of the President of the Philippines in a letter dated September 1, 1936,
made part of the respondent's memorandum as Exhibit A. The respondent alleges that the
Government of the Philippines would suffer losses if the writ prayed for is granted. He estimates the
revenue to be derived from the sale of the postage stamps in question at P1,618,17.10 and states
that there still remain to be sold stamps worth P1,402,279.02.
Act No. 4052 contemplates no religious purpose in view. What it gives the Director of Posts is the
discretionary power to determine when the issuance of special postage stamps would be
"advantageous to the Government." Of course, the phrase "advantageous to the Government" does
not authorize the violation of the Constitution. It does not authorize the appropriation, use or
application of public money or property for the use, benefit or support of a particular sect or church. In
the present case, however, the issuance of the postage stamps in question by the Director of Posts
and the Secretary of Public Works and Communications was not inspired by any sectarian
denomination. The stamps were not issue and sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. Nor
were money derived from the sale of the stamps given to that church. On the contrary, it appears
from the latter of the Director of Posts of June 5, 1936, incorporated on page 2 of the petitioner's
complaint, that the only purpose in issuing and selling the stamps was "to advertise the Philippines
and attract more tourist to this country." The officials concerned merely, took advantage of an event
considered of international importance "to give publicity to the Philippines and its people" (Letter of
the Undersecretary of Public Works and Communications to the President of the Philippines, June 9,
1936; p. 3, petitioner's complaint). It is significant to note that the stamps as actually designed and
printed (Exhibit 2), instead of showing a Catholic Church chalice as originally planned, contains a
map of the Philippines and the location of the City of Manila, and an inscription as follows: "Seat
XXXIII International Eucharistic Congress, Feb. 3-7,1937." What is emphasized is not the Eucharistic
Congress itself but Manila, the capital of the Philippines, as the seat of that congress. It is obvious
that while the issuance and sale of the stamps in question may be said to be inseparably linked with
an event of a religious character, the resulting propaganda, if any, received by the Roman Catholic
Church, was not the aim and purpose of the Government. We are of the opinion that the Government
should not be embarassed in its activities simply because of incidental results, more or less religious
in character, if the purpose had in view is one which could legitimately be undertaken by appropriate
legislation. The main purpose should not be frustrated by its subordinate to mere incidental results
not contemplated. (Vide Bradfield vs. Roberts, 175 U. S., 295; 20 Sup. Ct. Rep., 121; 44 Law. ed.,
168.)
We are much impressed with the vehement appeal of counsel for the petitioner to maintain inviolate
the complete separation of church and state and curb any attempt to infringe by indirection a
constitutional inhibition. Indeed, in the Philippines, once the scene of religious intolerance and
prescription, care should be taken that at this stage of our political development nothing is done by
the Government or its officials that may lead to the belief that the Government is taking sides or
favoring a particular religious sect or institution. But, upon very serious reflection, examination of Act
No. 4052, and scrutiny of the attending circumstances, we have come to the conclusion that there
has been no constitutional infraction in the case at bar, Act No. 4052 grants the Director of Posts, with
the approval of the Secretary of Public Works and Communications, discretion to misuse postage
stamps with new designs "as often as may be deemed advantageous to the Government." Even if we
were to assume that these officials made use of a poor judgment in issuing and selling the postage
stamps in question still, the case of the petitioner would fail to take in weight. Between the exercise of
a poor judgment and the unconstitutionality of the step taken, a gap exists which is yet to be filled to
justify the court in setting aside the official act assailed as coming within a constitutional inhibition.
The petition for a writ of prohibition is hereby denied, without pronouncement as to costs. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 94571 April 22, 1991
TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR. and AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., petitioners,
vs.
HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary, Budget & Management, HON.
ROZALINA S. CAJUCOM in her capacity as National Treasurer and COMMISSION ON
AUDIT, respondents.
Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioners.

GANCAYCO, J.:p
This is a case of first impression whereby petitioners question the constitutionality of the automatic
appropriation for debt service in the 1990 budget.
As alleged in the petition, the facts are as follows:
The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt
service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831, otherwise known as the
General Appropriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion,
1
while the appropriations for the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports amount to P27,017,813,000.00.
2

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled "Amending
Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re:
Foreign Borrowing Act)," by P.D. No. 1177, entitled "Revising the Budget Process in Order to
Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society," and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An Act
Strenghthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its
Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loan by Appropriating Funds For The
Purpose.
There can be no question that petitioners as Senators of the Republic of the Philippines may bring
this suit where a constitutional issue is raised.
3
Indeed, even a taxpayer has personality to restrain
unlawful expenditure of public funds.
The petitioner seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177,
and P.D. No. 1967. The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the
1990 budget pursuant to said decrees.
Respondents contend that the petition involves a pure political question which is the repeal or
amendment of said laws addressed to the judgment, wisdom and patriotism of the legislative body
and not this Court.
In Gonzales,
5
the main issue was the unconstitutionality of the presidential veto of certain provision
particularly Section 16 of the General Appropriations Act of 1990, R.A. No. 6831. This Court, in
disposing of the issue, stated
The political question doctrine neither interposes an obstacle to judicial determination of
the rival claims. The jurisdiction to delimit constitutional boundaries has been given to
this Court. It cannot abdicate that obligation mandated by the 1987 Constitution,
although said provision by no means does away with the applicability of the principle in
appropriate cases.
Sec. 1. The judicial power shad be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part
of any branch or instrumentality of the Government.
With the Senate maintaining that the President's veto is unconstitutional and that charge
being controverted, there is an actual case or justiciable controversy between the Upper
House of Congress and the executive department that may be taken cognizance of by
this Court.
The questions raised in the instant petition are
I. IS THE APPROPRIATION OF P86 BILLION IN THE P233 BILLION 1990 BUDGET
VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 5, ARTICLE XIV OF THE CONSTITUTION?
II. ARE PD No. 81, PD No. 1177 AND PD No. 1967 STILL OPERATIVE UNDER THE
CONSTITUTION?
III. ARE THEY VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 29(l), ARTICLE VI OF THE
CONSTITUTION?
6

There is thus a justiciable controversy raised in the petition which this Court may properly take
cognizance of On the first issue, the petitioners aver
According to Sec. 5, Art. XIV of the Constitution:
(5) The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and
ensure that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best
available talents through adequate remuneration and other means of job
satisfaction and fulfillment.
The reason behind the said provision is stated, thus:
In explaining his proposed amendment, Mr. Ople stated that all the great
and sincere piety professed by every President and every Congress of the
Philippines since the end of World War II for the economic welfare of the
public schoolteachers always ended up in failure and this failure, he
stated, had caused mass defection of the best and brightest teachers to
other careers, including menial jobs in overseas employment and
concerted actions by them to project their grievances, mainly over low pay
and abject working conditions.
He pointed to the high expectations generated by the February
Revolution, especially keen among public schoolteachers, which at
present exacerbate these long frustrated hopes.
Mr. Ople stated that despite the sincerity of all administrations that tried
vainly to respond to the needs of the teachers, the central problem that
always defeated their pious intentions was really the one budgetary
priority in the sense that any proposed increase for public schoolteachers
had to be multiplied many times by the number of government employees
in general and their equitable claims to any pay standardization such that
the pay rate of teachers is hopelessly pegged to the rate of government
workers in general. This, he stated, foredoomed the prospect of a
significant pay increase for teachers.
Mr. Ople pointed out that the recognition by the Constitution of the highest
priority for public schoolteachers, and by implication, for all teachers,
would ensure that the President and Congress would be strongly urged by
a constitutional mandate to grant to them such a level of remuneration and
other incentives that would make teaching competitive again and attractive
to the best available talents in the nation.
Finally, Mr. Ople recalled that before World War II, teaching competed
most successfully against all other career choices for the best and the
brightest of the younger generation. It is for this reason, he stated, that his
proposed amendment if approved, would ensure that teaching would be
restored to its lost glory as the career of choice for the most talented and
most public-spirited of the younger generation in the sense that it would
become the countervailing measure against the continued decline of
teaching and the wholesale desertion of this noble profession presently
taking place. He further stated that this would ensure that the future and
the quality of the population would be asserted as a top priority against
many clamorous and importunate but less important claims of the present.
(Journal of the Constitutional Commission, Vol. II, p. 1172)
However, as against this constitutional intention, P86 Billion is appropriated for debt
service while only P27 Billion is appropriated for the Department of Education in the
1990 budget. It plain, therefore, that the said appropriation for debt services is
inconsistent with the Constitution, hence, viod (Art. 7, New Civil Code).
7

While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated to
"assign the highest budgetary priority to education" in order to "insure that teaching will attract and
retain its rightful share of the best available talents through adequate remuneration and other means
of job satisfaction and fulfillment," it does not thereby follow that the hands of Congress are so
hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the national interest and for the
attainment of other state policies or objectives.
As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985, the budget for education has tripled to upgrade and
improve the facility of the public school system. The compensation of teachers has been doubled.
The amount of
P29,740,611,000.00
8
set aside for the Department of Education, Culture and Sports under the
General Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 6831), is the highest budgetary allocation among all department
budgets. This is a clear compliance with the aforesaid constitutional mandate according highest
priority to education.
Having faithfully complied therewith, Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its
good judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debt, the
greater portion of which was inherited from the previous administration. It is not only a matter of honor
and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is
at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than the
share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation cannot be thereby
assailed as unconstitutional.
Now to the second issue. The petitioners made the following observations:
To begin with, Rep. Act 4860 entitled "AN ACT AUTHORIZING THE PRESIDENT OF
THE PHILIPPINES TO OBTAIN SUCH FOREIGN LOANS AND CREDITS, OR TO
INCUR SUCH FOREIGN INDEBTEDNESS, AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO FINANCE
APPROVED ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES OR PROJECTS, AND TO
GUARANTEE, IN BEHALF OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, FOREIGN
LOANS OBTAINED OR BONDS ISSUED BY CORPORATIONS OWNED OR
CONTROLLED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FOR ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT PURPOSES INCLUDING THOSE INCURRED FOR PURPOSES OF
RELENDING TO THE PRIVATE SECTOR, APPROPRIATING THE NECESSARY
FUNDS THEREFOR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES, provides:
Sec. 2. The total amount of loans, credits and indebtedness, excluding
interests, which the President of the Philippines is authorized to incur
under this Act shall not exceed one billion United States dollars or its
equivalent in other foreign currencies at the exchange rate prevailing at
the time the loans, credits and indebtedness are incurred: Provided,
however, That the total loans, credits and indebtedness incurred under
this Act shall not exceed two hundred fifty million in the fiscal year of the
approval of this Act, and two hundred fifty million every fiscal year
thereafter, all in United States dollars or its equivalent in other currencies.
Sec. 5. It shall be the duty of the President, within thirty days after the
opening of every regular session, to report to the Congress the amount
of loans, credits and indebtedness contracted, as well as the guarantees
extended, and the purposes and projects for which the loans, credits and
indebtedness were incurred, and the guarantees extended, as well as
such loans which may be reloaned to Filipino owned or controlled
corporations and similar purposes.
Sec. 6. The Congress shall appropriate the necessary amount out of any
funds in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to cover the
payment of the principal and interest on such loans, credits or
indebtedness as and when they shall become due.
However, after the declaration of martial law, President Marcos issued PD 81 amending
Section 6, thus:
Sec. 7. Section six of the same Act is hereby further amended to read as
follows:
Sec. 6. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
and in order to enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay
the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking
charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the
bonds, debentures, securities or other evidences of
indebtedness sold in international markets incurred under
the authority of this Act, the proceeds of which are deemed
appropriated for the projects, all the revenue realized from
the projects financed by such loans, credits or indebtedness,
or on the bonds, debentures, securities or other evidences of
indebtedness, shall be turned over in full, after deducting
actual and necessary expenses for the operation and
maintenance of said projects, to the National Treasury by the
government office, agency or instrumentality, or government-
owned or controlled corporation concerned, which is hereby
appropriated for the purpose as and when they shall become
due. In case the revenue realized is insufficient to cover the
principal, interest and other charges, such portion of the
budgetary savings as may be necessary to cover the
balance or deficiency shall be set aside exclusively for the
purpose by the government office, agency or instrumentality,
or government-owned or controlled corporation
concerned: Provided, That, if there still remains a deficiency,
such amount necessary to cover the payment of the principal
and interest on such loans, credit or indebtedness as
and when they shall become due is hereby appropriated out
of any funds in the national treasury not otherwise
appropriated: . . .
President Marcos also issued PD 1177, which provides:
Sec. 31. Automatic appropriations. All expenditures for (a) personnel
retirement premiums, government service insurance, and other similar
fixed expenditures, (b)principal and interest on public debt, (c)
national government guarantees of obligations which are drawn upon, are
automatically appropriated; Provided, that no obligations shall be incurred
or payments made from funds thus automatically appropriated except as
issued in the form of regular budgetary allotments.
and PD 1967, which provides:
Sec. 1. There is hereby appropriated, out of any funds in the National Treasury not
otherwise appropriated, such amounts as may be necessary to effect payments on
foreign or domestic loans, or foreign or domestic loans whereon creditors make a call
on the direct and indirect guarantee of the Republic of the Philippines, obtained by:
a. The Republic of the Philippines the proceeds of which were relent to
government-owned or controlled corporations and/or government financial
institutions;
b. government-owned or controlled corporations and/or government
financial institutions the proceeds of which were relent to public or private
institutions;
c. government-owned or controlled corporations and/or financial
institutions and guaranteed by the Republic of the Philippines;
d. other public or private institutions and guaranteed by government-
owned or controlled corporations and/or government financial institutions.
Sec. 2. All repayments made by borrower institutions on the loans for whose account
advances were made by the National Treasury will revert to the General Fund.
Sec. 3. In the event that any borrower institution is unable to settle the advances made
out of the appropriation provided therein, the Treasurer of the Philippines shall make the
proper recommendation to the Minister of Finance on whether such advances shall be
treated as equity or subsidy of the National Government to the institution
concerned, which shall be considered in the budgetary program of the Government.
In the "Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing Fiscal Year 1990," which
accompanied her budget message to Congress, the President of the Philippines,
Corazon C. Aquino, stated:
Sources Appropriation
The P233.5 billion budget proposed for fiscal year 1990 will require
P132.1 billion of new programmed appropriations out of a total P155.3
billion in new legislative authorization from Congress. The rest of the
budget, totalling P101.4 billion, will be sourced from existing
appropriations: P98.4 billion from Automatic Appropriations and P3.0
billion from Continuing Appropriations (Fig. 4).
And according to Figure 4, . . ., P86.8 billion out of the P98.4 Billion are programmed for
debt service. In other words, the President had, on her own, determined and set aside
the said amount of P98.4 Billion with the rest of the appropriations of P155.3 Billion to
be determined and fixed by Congress, which is now Rep. Act 6831.
9

Petitioners argue that the said automatic appropriations under the aforesaid decrees of then
President Marcos became functus oficio when he was ousted in February, 1986; that upon the
expiration of the one-man legislature in the person of President Marcos, the legislative power was
restored to Congress on February 2, 1987 when the Constitution was ratified by the people; that there
is a need for a new legislation by Congress providing for automatic appropriation, but Congress, up to
the present, has not approved any such law; and thus the said P86.8 Billion automatic appropriation
in the 1990 budget is an administrative act that rests on no law, and thus, it cannot be enforced.
Moreover, petitioners contend that assuming arguendo that P.D. No. 81, P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No.
1967 did not expire with the ouster of President Marcos, after the adoption of the 1987 Constitution,
the said decrees are inoperative under Section 3, Article XVIII which provides
Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of
instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall
remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked." (Emphasis supplied.)
They then point out that since the said decrees are inconsistent with Section 24, Article VI of
the Constitution, i.e.,
Sec. 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the House of
Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with amendments. (Emphasis
supplied.)
whereby bills have to be approved by the President,
10
then a law must be passed by Congress
to authorize said automatic appropriation. Further, petitioners state said decrees violate
Section 29(l) of Article VI of the Constitution which provides as follows
Sec. 29(l). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of
an appropriation made by law.
They assert that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an appropriation,
11
otherwise
it is an undue delegation of legislative power to the President who determines in advance the amount
appropriated for the debt service.
12

The Court is not persuaded.
Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that "All existing laws, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with the
Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked."
This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted by its framers to preserve the
social order so that legislation by the then President Marcos may be recognized. Such laws are to
remain in force and effect unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution or, are otherwise
amended, repealed or revoked.
An examination of the aforecited presidential decrees show the clear intent that the amounts needed
to cover the payment of the principal and interest on all foreign loans, including those guaranteed by
the national government, should be made available when they shall become due precisely without the
necessity of periodic enactments of separate laws appropriating funds therefor, since both the periods
and necessities are incapable of determination in advance.
The automatic appropriation provides the flexibility for the effective execution of debt management
policies. Its political wisdom has been convincingly discussed by the Solicitor General as he argues

. . . First, for example, it enables the Government to take advantage of a favorable turn
of market conditions by redeeming high-interest securities and borrowing at lower rates,
or to shift from short-term to long-term instruments, or to enter into arrangements that
could lighten our outstanding debt burden debt-to-equity, debt to asset, debt-to-debt or
other such schemes. Second, the automatic appropriation obviates the serious
difficulties in debt servicing arising from any deviation from what has been previously
programmed. The annual debt service estimates, which are usually made one year in
advance, are based on a mathematical set or matrix or, in layman's parlance, "basket"
of foreign exchange and interest rate assumptions which may significantly differ from
actual rates not even in proportion to changes on the basis of the assumptions. Absent
an automatic appropriation clause, the Philippine Government has to await and depend
upon Congressional action, which by the time this comes, may no longer be responsive
to the intended conditions which in the meantime may have already drastically changed.
In the meantime, also, delayed payments and arrearages may have supervened, only to
worsen our debt service-to-total expenditure ratio in the budget due to penalties and/or
demand for immediate payment even before due dates.
Clearly, the claim that payment of the loans and indebtedness is conditioned upon the
continuance of the person of President Marcos and his legislative power goes against
the intent and purpose of the law. The purpose is foreseen to subsist with or without the
person of Marcos.
13

The argument of petitioners that the said presidential decrees did not meet the requirement and are
therefore inconsistent with Sections 24 and 27 of Article VI of the Constitution which requires, among
others, that "all appropriations, . . . bills authorizing increase of public debt" must be passed by
Congress and approved by the President is untenable. Certainly, the framers of the Constitution did
not contemplate that existing laws in the statute books including existing presidential decrees
appropriating public money are reduced to mere "bills" that must again go through the legislative
million The only reasonable interpretation of said provisions of the Constitution which refer to "bills" is
that they mean appropriation measures still to be passed by Congress. If the intention of the framers
thereof were otherwise they should have expressed their decision in a more direct or express
manner.
Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by implication is frowned upon. Equally fundamental
is the principle that construction of the Constitution and law is generally applied prospectively and not
retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated.
On the third issue that there is undue delegation of legislative power, in Edu vs. Ericta,
14
this Court
had this to say
What cannot be delegated is the authority under the Constitution to make laws and to
alter and repeal them; the test is the completeness of the statute in all its terms and
provisions when it leaves the hands of the legislature. To determine whether or not
there is an undue delegation of legislative power, the inequity must be directed to the
scope and definiteness of the measure enacted. The legislature does not abdicate its
function when it describes what job must be done, who is to do it, and what is the scope
of his authority. For a complex economy, that may indeed be the only way in which
legislative process can go forward . . .
To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation there must be a standard, which implies at the
very least that the legislature itself determines matters of principle and lays down
fundamental policy . . .
The standard may be either express or implied . . . from the policy and purpose of the
act considered as whole . . .
In People vs. Vera,
15
this Court said "the true distinction is between the delegation of power to make
the law, which necessarily involves discretion as to what the law shall be, and conferring authority or
discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be
done; to the latter no valid objection can be made."
Ideally, the law must be complete in all its essential terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature so that there will be nothing left for the delegate to do when it reaches him except enforce
it. If there are gaps in the law that will prevent its enforcement unless they are first filled, the delegate
will then have been given the opportunity to step in the shoes of the legislature and exercise a
discretion essentially legislative in order to repair the omissions. This is invalid delegation.
16

The Court finds that in this case the questioned laws are complete in all their essential terms and
conditions and sufficient standards are indicated therein.
The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No.
1967 is that the amount needed should be automatically set aside in order to enable the Republic of
the Philippines to pay the principal, interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans,
credits or indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they shall become due without the need to
enact a separate law appropriating funds therefor as the need arises. The purpose of these laws is to
enable the government to make prompt payment and/or advances for all loans to protect and
maintain the credit standing of the country.
Although the subject presidential decrees do not state specific amounts to be paid, necessitated by
the very nature of the problem being addressed, the amounts nevertheless are made certain by the
legislative parameters provided in the decrees. The Executive is not of unlimited discretion as to the
amounts to be disbursed for debt servicing. The mandate is to pay only the principal, interest, taxes
and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or indebtedness, or on the bonds, debentures
or security or other evidences of indebtedness sold in international markets incurred by virtue of the
law, as and when they shall become due. No uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the
limit will be the exact amounts as shown by the books of the Treasury.
The Government budgetary process has been graphically described to consist of four major phases
as aptly discussed by the Solicitor General:
The Government budgeting process consists of four major phases:
1. Budget preparation. The first step is essentially tasked upon the Executive Branch
and covers the estimation of government revenues, the determination of budgetary
priorities and activities within the constraints imposed by available revenues and
by borrowing limits, and the translation of desired priorities and activities into
expenditure levels.
Budget preparation starts with the budget call issued by the Department of Budget and
Management. Each agency is required to submit agency budget estimates in line with
the requirements consistent with the general ceilings set by the Development Budget
Coordinating Council (DBCC).
With regard to debt servicing, the DBCC staff, based on the macro-economic
projections of interest rates (e.g. LIBOR rate) and estimated sources of domestic and
foreign financing, estimates debt service levels. Upon issuance of budget call, the
Bureau of Treasury computes for the interest and principal payments for the year for all
direct national government borrowings and other liabilities assumed by the same.
2. Legislative authorization. At this stage, Congress enters the picture and
deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President, and Congress in the
exercise of its own judgment and wisdomformulates an appropriation act precisely
following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies that no money
may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an appropriation made by
law.
Debt service is not included in the General Appropriation Act, since authorization
therefor already exists under RA No. 4860 and 245, as amended and PD 1967.
Precisely in the fight of this subsisting authorization as embodied in said Republic Acts
and PD for debt service, Congress does not concern itself with details for
implementation by the Executive, but largely with annual levels and approval thereof
upon due deliberations as part of the whole obligation program for the year. Upon such
approval, Congress has spoken and cannot be said to have delegated its wisdom to the
Executive, on whose part lies the implementation or execution of the legislative wisdom.
3. Budget Execution. Tasked on the Executive, the third phase of the budget process
covers the various operational aspects of budgeting. The establishment of obligation
authority ceilings, the evaluation of work and financial plans for individual activities, the
continuing review of government fiscal position, the regulation of funds releases, the
implementation of cash payment schedules, and other related activities comprise this
phase of the budget cycle.
Release from the debt service fired is triggered by a request of the Bureau of the
Treasury for allotments from the Department of Budget and Management, one quarter
in advance of payment schedule, to ensure prompt payments. The Bureau of Treasury,
upon receiving official billings from the creditors, remits payments to creditors through
the Central Bank or to the Sinking Fund established for government security issues
(Annex F).
4. Budget accountability. The fourth phase refers to the evaluation of actual
performance and initially approved work targets, obligations incurred, personnel hired
and work accomplished are compared with the targets set at the time the agency
budgets were approved.
There being no undue delegation of legislative power as clearly above shown,
petitioners insist nevertheless that subject presidential decrees constitute undue
delegation of legislative power to the executive on the alleged ground that the
appropriations therein are not exact, certain or definite,invoking in support therefor the
Constitution of Nebraska, the constitution under which the case of State v. Moore, 69
NW 974, cited by petitioners, was decided. Unlike the Constitution of Nebraska,
however, our Constitution does not require a definite, certain, exact
or "specific appropriation made by law." Section 29, Article VI of our 1987 Constitution
omits any of these words and simply states:
Section 29(l). No money shall be paid out of the treasury except in
pursuance of an appropriation made by law.
More significantly, there is no provision in our Constitution that provides or prescribes
any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an authorization or
appropriation by Congress shall be made, except that it be "made by law," such as
precisely the authorization or appropriation under the questioned presidential decrees.
In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made impliedly (as
by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the current fiscal year (as by
enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as said appropriation may be made in
general as well as in specific terms. The Congressional authorization may be embodied
in annual laws, such as a general appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of
general or special application which appropriate public funds for specific public
purposes, such as the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the
legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed (In re
Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in the present.
17

Thus, in accordance with Section 22, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, President Corazon C.
Aquino submitted to Congress the Budget of Expenditures and Sources of Financing for the Fiscal
Year 1990. The proposed 1990 expenditure program covering the estimated obligation that will be
incurred by the national government during the fiscal year amounts to P233.5 Billion. Of the proposed
budget, P86.8 is set aside for debt servicing as follows:
National Government Debt
Service Expenditures, 1990
(in million pesos)
Domestic Foreign Total
RA 245, as RA 4860
amended as amended,
PD 1967
Interest
Payments P36,861 P18,570 P55,431
Principal
Amortization 16,310 15,077 31,387
Total P53,171 P33,647 P86,818
18

as authorized under P.D. 1967 and R.A. 4860 and 245, as amended.
The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D. 1177
and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations, unless they are repealed or
otherwise amended by Congress. The Executive was thus merely complying with the duty to
implement the same.
There can be no question as to the patriotism and good motive of petitioners in filing this petition.
Unfortunately, the petition must fail on the constitutional and legal issues raised. As to whether or not
the country should honor its international debt, more especially the enormous amount that had been
incurred by the past administration, which appears to be the ultimate objective of the petition, is not
an issue that is presented or proposed to be addressed by the Court. Indeed, it is more of a political
decision for Congress and the Executive to determine in the exercise of their wisdom and sound
discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Feliciano, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea, Regalado and
Davide, Jr., JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., dissenting:
I dissent. Any law that undermines our economy and therefore our security is per se unconstitutional.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I regret I must dissent.
One of the essential requirements of a valid appropriation is that the amount appropriated must be
certain, which means that the sum authorized to be released should either be determinate or at least
determinable. As has been uniformly held:
It is essential to the validity of an appropriation law that it should state the exact amount
appropriated or the maximum sum from which the authorized expenses shall be paid,
otherwise it would be void for uncertainty, since the legislative power over appropriation
in effect could have been delegated in such case to the recipient of the funds
appropriated or to the official authorized to spend them. (State v. Eggers, 16 L.R.A.,
N.S. 630; State v. La Grave, 41 Pac. 1075).
Thus, a law which provided that there should be paid out of the State Treasury to any
person, firm or corporation engaged in the manufacture of sugar in that State the sum of
five-eights of one per cent per pound upon each pound manufactured under the
conditions and restrictions of the Act was held as invalid appropriation for lack of
certainty in the amount to be paid out of the Treasury, the legislature having failed to fix
the amount to be appropriated. (State of Nebraska v. Moore, 50 Neb. 88, cited in
Gonzales, Phil. Political Law, p. 213).
The presidential decrees on which the respondents rely do not satisfy this requirement.
Section 7 of P.D. 81 provides that "all the revenue realized from the projects financed by such loans,"
after deducting the actual and necessary operating and maintenance expenses, is appropriated for
servicing the foreign debts.
The same sections says that in case of deficiency, "such amount necessary to cover the payment of
the principal and interest on such loans, credit or indebteedness as and when they shall become
due is hereby appropriated."
Section 31 of P.D. 1717 provides that "all expenditures for the payment of the principal and interest
on public debt" are automatically appropriated.
Section 1 of P.D. 1967 appropriates "such amounts as may be necessary to effect payments on
foreign or domestic loans."
It is easy to see that in none of these decrees is the amount appropriated fixed, either by an exact
figure or by an indication at least of its maximum.
The ponencia says that "the amounts are made certain by the legislative parameters provided in the
degree." I am afraid I do not see those parameters. I see only the appropriation of "all the
revenue derived from the projects financed by such loans" and "such amounts as may be
necessary to effect payment on foreign or domestic loans" or "the principal and interest on public
debt, as and when they shall become due." All these are uncertain.
Even President Marcos as a legislator, did not know how much he was appropriating.
The ponencia assures us that "no uncertainty arises in executive implementation as the limit will be
the exact amounts as shown by the books of the Treasury." That is cold comfort, indeed, if we
consider that it is the Treasury itself that is sought to be limited by the requirement for certainty. The
intention precisely is to prevent the disbursement of public funds by the Treasury itself from "running
riot."
We surely cannot defend an appropriation, say, of "such amounts as may be necessary for the
construction of a bridge across the Pasig River" even if the exact cost may be shown later by the
books of the Treasury. This would be no different from the uncertain appropriations the Court is here
sustaining.
I think it is a mistake for this government to justify its acts on the basis of the decrees of President
Marcos. These are on the whole tainted with authoritarianism and enfeebled by lack of proper study
and draftmanship, let alone suspect motives. I suggest that these decrees must be reviewed carefully
and whenever proper, set aright by necessary modification or outright revocation. Instead, the
respondents are invoking them blindly.
Sarmiento, J., concurs.
PADILLA, J., dissenting
I join Mr. Justice Cruz in his dissent. I only wish to add the following:
Section 29(l), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides:
Sec. 29(l). No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law.
It is quite obvious from this provision that there must first be a law enacted by Congress (and
approved by the President) appropriating a particular sum or sums before payment thereof from the
Treasury can be made.
If the above constitutional provision is to be meaningful and effective at all, I believe that the law
appropriating aparticular sum or sums for debt service, whether involving domestic or foreign loans of
the Government, should be enacted by the Congress, composed of the most recently elected
representatives of the people. To construe the term "lay" in the above provision to mean the decrees
issued by then President Marcos would, in effect, be supporting a continuing governance of a large
segment of the Philippine economy by a past regime which, as every one knows, centralized for a
good number of years legislative and executive powers in only one person.
Besides, these decrees issued by President Marcos relative to debt service were tailored for the
periods covered by said decrees. Today it is Congress that should determine and approve the proper
appropriations for debt servicing, as this is a matter of policy that, in my opinion, pertains to the
legislative department, as the policy determining body of the Government.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 99886 March 31, 1993
JOHN H. OSMEA, petitioner,
vs.
OSCAR ORBOS, in his capacity as Executive Secretary; JESUS ESTANISLAO, in his capacity
as Secretary of Finance; WENCESLAO DELA PAZ, in his capacity as Head of the Office of
Energy Affairs; REX V. TANTIONGCO, and the ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD, respondents.
Nachura & Sarmiento for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondents.

NARVASA, C.J.:
The petitioner seeks the corrective,
1
prohibitive and coercive remedies provided by Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court,
2
upon the following posited grounds, viz.:
3

1) the invalidity of the "TRUST ACCOUNT" in the books of account of the Ministry of Energy (now,
the Office of Energy Affairs), created pursuant to 8, paragraph 1, of P.D. No. 1956, as amended,
"said creation of a trust fund being contrary to Section 29 (3), Article VI of the . . Constitution;
4

2) the unconstitutionality of 8, paragraph 1 (c) of P.D. No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order
No. 137, for "being an undue and invalid delegation of legislative power . . to the Energy Regulatory
Board;"
5

3) the illegality of the reimbursements to oil companies, paid out of the Oil Price Stabilization
Fund,
6
because it contravenes 8, paragraph 2 (2) of
P. D. 1956, as amended; and
4) the consequent nullity of the Order dated December 10, 1990 and the necessity of a rollback of the
pump prices and petroleum products to the levels prevailing prior to the said Order.
It will be recalled that on October 10, 1984, President Ferdinand Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating a
Special Account in the General Fund, designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The
OPSF was designed to reimburse oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported
petroleum products resulting from exchange rate adjustments and from increases in the world market
prices of crude oil.
Subsequently, the OPSF was reclassified into a "trust liability account," in virtue of E.O. 1024,
7
and
ordered released from the National Treasury to the Ministry of Energy. The same Executive Order
also authorized the investment of the fund in government securities, with the earnings from such
placements accruing to the fund.
President Corazon C. Aquino, amended P.D. 1956. She promulgated Executive Order No. 137 on
February 27, 1987, expanding the grounds for reimbursement to oil companies for possible cost
underrecovery incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products, the
amount of the underrecovery being left for determination by the Ministry of Finance.
Now, the petition alleges that the status of the OPSF as of March 31, 1991 showed a "Terminal Fund
Balance deficit" of some P12.877 billion;
8
that to abate the worsening deficit, "the Energy Regulatory
Board . . issued an Order on December 10, 1990, approving the increase in pump prices of petroleum
products," and at the rate of recoupment, the OPSF deficit should have been fully covered in a span
of six (6) months, but this notwithstanding, the respondents Oscar Orbos, in his capacity as
Executive Secretary; Jesus Estanislao, in his capacity as Secretary of Finance; Wenceslao de la Paz,
in his capacity as Head of the Office of Energy Affairs; Chairman Rex V. Tantiongco and the Energy
Regulatory Board "are poised to accept, process and pay claims not authorized under P.D.
1956."
9

The petition further avers that the creation of the trust fund violates
29(3), Article VI of the Constitution, reading as follows:
(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a
special fund and paid out for such purposes only. If the purpose for which a special fund
was created has been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to
the general funds of the Government.
The petitioner argues that "the monies collected pursuant to . . P.D. 1956, as amended, must be
treated as a 'SPECIAL FUND,' not as a 'trust account' or a 'trust fund,' and that "if a special tax is
collected for a specific purpose, the revenue generated therefrom shall 'be treated as a special fund'
to be used only for the purpose indicated, and not channeled to another government
objective."
10
Petitioner further points out that since "a 'special fund' consists of monies collected
through the taxing power of a State, such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof is
limited to the special purpose/objective for which it was created."
11

He also contends that the "delegation of legislative authority" to the ERB violates 28 (2). Article VI
of the Constitution, viz.:
(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix, within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and
export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the
framework of the national development program of the Government;
and, inasmuch as the delegation relates to the exercise of the power of taxation, "the limits,
limitations and restrictions must be quantitative, that is, the law must not only specify how to
tax, who (shall) be taxed (and) what the tax is for, but also impose a specific limit on how much
to tax."
12

The petitioner does not suggest that a "trust account" is illegal per se, but maintains that the monies
collected, which form part of the OPSF, should be maintained in a special account of the general fund
for the reason that the Constitution so provides, and because they are, supposedly, taxes levied for a
special purpose. He assumes that the Fund is formed from a tax undoubtedly because a portion
thereof is taken from collections of ad valorem taxes and the increases thereon.
It thus appears that the challenge posed by the petitioner is premised primarily on the view that the
powers granted to the ERB under P.D. 1956, as amended, partake of the nature of the taxation power
of the State. The Solicitor General observes that the "argument rests on the assumption that the
OPSF is a form of revenue measure drawing from a special tax to be expended for a special
purpose."
13
The petitioner's perceptions are, in the Court's view, not quite correct.
To address this critical misgiving in the position of the petitioner on these issues, the Court recalls its
holding inValmonte v. Energy Regulatory Board, et al.
14

The foregoing arguments suggest the presence of misconceptions about the nature and
functions of the OPSF. The OPSF is a "Trust Account" which was established "for the
purpose of minimizing the frequent price changes brought about by exchange rate
adjustment and/or changes in world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum
products."
15
Under P.D. No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137 dated 27
February 1987, this Trust Account may be funded from any of the following sources:
a) Any increase in the tax collection from ad valorem tax or customs duty
imposed on petroleum products subject to tax under this Decree arising
from exchange rate adjustment, as may be determined by the Minister of
Finance in consultation with the Board of Energy;
b) Any increase in the tax collection as a result of the lifting of tax
exemptions of government corporations, as may be determined by the
Minister of Finance in consultation with the Board of Energy:
c) Any additional amount to be imposed on petroleum products to
augment the resources of the Fund through an appropriate Order that may
be issued by the Board of Energy requiring payment of persons or
companies engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing and/or
marketing petroleum products;
d) Any resulting peso cost differentials in case the actual peso costs paid
by oil companies in the importation of crude oil and petroleum products is
less than the peso costs computed using the reference foreign exchange
rate as fixed by the Board of Energy.
xxx xxx xxx
The fact that the world market prices of oil, measured by the spot market in Rotterdam,
vary from day to day is of judicial notice. Freight rates for hauling crude oil and
petroleum products from sources of supply to the Philippines may also vary from time to
time. The exchange rate of the peso vis-a-vis the U.S. dollar and other convertible
foreign currencies also changes from day to day. These fluctuations in world market
prices and in tanker rates and foreign exchange rates would in a completely free market
translate into corresponding adjustments in domestic prices of oil and petroleum
products with sympathetic frequency. But domestic prices which vary from day to day or
even only from week to week would result in a chaotic market with unpredictable effects
upon the country's economy in general. The OPSF was established precisely to protect
local consumers from the adverse consequences that such frequent oil price
adjustments may have upon the economy. Thus, the OPSF serves as a pocket, as it
were, into which a portion of the purchase price of oil and petroleum products paid by
consumers as well as some tax revenues are inputted and from which amounts are
drawn from time to time to reimburse oil companies, when appropriate situations arise,
for increases in, as well as underrecovery of, costs of crude importation. The OPSF is
thus a buffer mechanism through which the domestic consumer prices of oil and
petroleum products are stabilized, instead of fluctuating every so often, and oil
companies are allowed to recover those portions of their costs which they would not
otherwise recover given the level of domestic prices existing at any given time.To the
extent that some tax revenues are also put into it, the OPSF is in effect a device through
which the domestic prices of petroleum products are subsidized in part. It appears to the
Court that the establishment and maintenance of the OPSF is well within that pervasive
and non-waivable power and responsibility of the government to secure the physical
and economic survival and well-being of the community, that comprehensive sovereign
authority we designate as the police power of the State. The stabilization, and subsidy
of domestic prices of petroleum products and fuel oil clearly critical in importance
considering, among other things, the continuing high level of dependence of the country
on imported crude oil are appropriately regarded as public purposes.
Also of relevance is this Court's ruling in relation to the sugar stabilization fund the nature of which is
not far different from the OPSF. In Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank,
16
this Court upheld the legality
of the sugar stabilization fees and explained their nature and character, viz.:
The stabilization fees collected are in the nature of a tax, which is within the power of
the State to impose for the promotion of the sugar industry (Lutz v. Araneta, 98 Phil.
148). . . . The tax collected is not in a pure exercise of the taxing power. It is levied with
a regulatory purpose, to provide a means for the stabilization of the sugar industry. The
levy is primarily in the exercise of the police power of the State (Lutz v. Araneta, supra).
xxx xxx xxx
The stabilization fees in question are levied by the State upon sugar millers, planters
and producers for a special purpose that of "financing the growth and development of
the sugar industry and all its components, stabilization of the domestic market including
the foreign market." The fact that the State has taken possession of moneys pursuant to
law is sufficient to constitute them state funds, even though they are held for a special
purpose (Lawrence v. American Surety Co. 263 Mich. 586, 249 ALR 535, cited in 42 Am
Jur Sec. 2, p. 718). Having been levied for a special purpose, the revenues collected
are to be treated as a special fund, to be, in the language of the statute, "administered
in trust" for the purpose intended. Once the purpose has been fulfilled or abandoned,
the balance if any, is to be transferred to the general funds of the Government. That is
the essence of the trust intended (SEE 1987 Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 29(3), lifted
from the 1935 Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 23(1).
17

The character of the Stabilization Fund as a special kind of fund is emphasized by the
fact that the funds are deposited in the Philippine National Bank and not in the
Philippine Treasury, moneys from which may be paid out only in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law (1987) Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 29 (3), lifted from the
1935 Constitution, Article VI, Sec. 23(1). (Emphasis supplied).
Hence, it seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are exacted in
the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF is a special fund is plain from
the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general fund; and while it is
placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund nonetheless remains subject to
the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that these measures comply with the
constitutional description of a "special fund." Indeed, the practice is not without precedent.
With regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the Court finds that the provision
conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum products provides
a sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. In addition to the general policy of the
law to protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing domestic pump rates, 8(c) of P.D.
1956
18
expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional amounts to augment the resources of the
Fund.
What petitioner would wish is the fixing of some definite, quantitative restriction, or "a specific limit on
how much to tax."
19
The Court is cited to this requirement by the petitioner on the premise that what
is involved here is the power of taxation; but as already discussed, this is not the case. What is here
involved is not so much the power of taxation as police power. Although the provision authorizing the
ERB to impose additional amounts could be construed to refer to the power of taxation, it cannot be
overlooked that the overriding consideration is to enable the delegate to act with expediency in
carrying out the objectives of the law which are embraced by the police power of the State.
The interplay and constant fluctuation of the various factors involved in the determination of the price
of oil and petroleum products, and the frequently shifting need to either augment or exhaust the Fund,
do not conveniently permit the setting of fixed or rigid parameters in the law as proposed by the
petitioner. To do so would render the ERB unable to respond effectively so as to mitigate or avoid the
undesirable consequences of such fluidity. As such, the standard as it is expressed, suffices to guide
the delegate in the exercise of the delegated power, taking account of the circumstances under which
it is to be exercised.
For a valid delegation of power, it is essential that the law delegating the power must be (1) complete
in itself, that is it must set forth the policy to be executed by the delegate and (2) it must fix a standard
limits of which
are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform.
20

. . . As pointed out in Edu v. Ericta: "To avoid the taint of unlawful delegation, there must
be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines
matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of
complete abdication may be hard to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy,
marks its limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It
indicates the circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected. It is
the criterion by which the legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter, the
executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may either be express or
implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though
does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and
purpose of the act considered as a whole.
21

It would seem that from the above-quoted ruling, the petition for prohibition should fail.
The standard, as the Court has already stated, may even be implied. In that light, there can be no
ground upon which to sustain the petition, inasmuch as the challenged law sets forth a determinable
standard which guides the exercise of the power granted to the ERB. By the same token, the proper
exercise of the delegated power may be tested with ease. It seems obvious that what the law
intended was to permit the additional imposts for as long as there exists a need to protect the general
public and the petroleum industry from the adverse consequences of pump rate fluctuations. "Where
the standards set up for the guidance of an administrative officer and the action taken are in fact
recorded in the orders of such officer, so that Congress, the courts and the public are assured that
the orders in the judgment of such officer conform to the legislative standard, there is no failure in the
performance of the legislative functions."
22

This Court thus finds no serious impediment to sustaining the validity of the legislation; the express
purpose for which the imposts are permitted and the general objectives and purposes of the fund are
readily discernible, and they constitute a sufficient standard upon which the delegation of power may
be justified.
In relation to the third question respecting the illegality of the reimbursements to oil companies,
paid out of the Oil Price Stabilization Fund, because allegedly in contravention of 8, paragraph 2 (2)
of P.D. 1956, amended
23
the Court finds for the petitioner.
The petition assails the payment of certain items or accounts in favor of the petroleum companies
(i.e., inventory losses, financing charges, fuel oil sales to the National Power Corporation, etc.)
because not authorized by law. Petitioner contends that "these claims are not embraced in the
enumeration in 8 of P.D. 1956 . . since none of them was incurred 'as a result of the reduction of
domestic prices of petroleum products,'"
24
and since these items are reimbursements for which the
OPSF should not have responded, the amount of the P12.877 billion deficit "should be reduced by
P5,277.2 million."
25
It is argued "that under the principle of ejusdem generis . . . the term 'other
factors' (as used in 8 of P.D. 1956) . . can only include such 'other factors' which necessarily result
in the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products."
26

The Solicitor General, for his part, contends that "(t)o place said (term) within the restrictive confines
of the rule ofejusdem generis would reduce (E.O. 137) to a meaningless provision."
This Court, in Caltex Philippines, Inc. v. The Honorable Commissioner on Audit, et al.,
27
passed upon
the application of ejusdem generis to paragraph 2 of 8 of P.D. 1956, viz.:
The rule of ejusdem generis states that "[w]here words follow an enumeration of
persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words
are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are held to be as applying only to
persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned."
28
A
reading of subparagraphs (i) and (ii) easily discloses that they do not have a common
characteristic. The first relates to price reduction as directed by the Board of Energy
while the second refers to reduction in internal ad valorem taxes. Therefore,
subparagraph (iii) cannot be limited by the enumeration in these subparagraphs. What
should be considered for purposes of determining the "other factors" in subparagraph
(iii) is the first sentence of paragraph (2) of the Section which explicitly allows the cost
underrecovery only if such were incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic prices
of petroleum products.
The Court thus holds, that the reimbursement of financing charges is not authorized by paragraph 2
of 8 of P.D. 1956, for the reason that they were not incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic
prices of petroleum products. Under the same provision, however, the payment of inventory losses is
upheld as valid, being clearly a result of domestic price reduction, when oil companies incur a cost
underrecovery for yet unsold stocks of oil in inventory acquired at a higher price.
Reimbursement for cost underrecovery from the sales of oil to the National Power Corporation is
equally permissible, not as coming within the provisions of P.D. 1956, but in virtue of other laws and
regulations as held inCaltex
29
and which have been pointed to by the Solicitor General. At any rate,
doubts about the propriety of such reimbursements have been dispelled by the enactment of R.A.
6952, establishing the Petroleum Price Standby Fund, 2 of which specifically authorizes the
reimbursement of "cost underrecovery incurred as a result of fuel oil sales to the National Power
Corporation."
Anent the overpayment refunds mentioned by the petitioner, no substantive discussion has been
presented to show how this is prohibited by P.D. 1956. Nor has the Solicitor General taken any effort
to defend the propriety of this refund. In fine, neither of the parties, beyond the mere mention of
overpayment refunds, has at all bothered to discuss the arguments for or against the legality of the
so-called overpayment refunds. To be sure, the absence of any argument for or against the validity of
the refund cannot result in its disallowance by the Court. Unless the impropriety or illegality of the
overpayment refund has been clearly and specifically shown, there can be no basis upon which to
nullify the same.
Finally, the Court finds no necessity to rule on the remaining issue, the same having been rendered
moot and academic. As of date hereof, the pump rates of gasoline have been reduced to levels below
even those prayed for in the petition.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED insofar as it prays for the nullification of the reimbursement
of financing charges, paid pursuant to E.O. 137, and DISMISSED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo,
Campos, Jr., and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., is on leave.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-109698 December 5, 1994
ANTONIO DIAZ AND KOSUMO DABAW, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD AND DAVAO LIGHT AND POWER CO.,
INC.,respondents.
R E S O L U T I O N
BELLOSILLO, J.:
On 23 January 1991, Davao Light and Power Company, Inc. (DLPC) filed with the Energy Regulatory
Board (ERB) an application for the approval of the sound value appraisal of its property in service.
The Asian Appraisal Company valued the property and equipment of DLPC as of 12 March 1990 at
One Billion One Hundred Forty One Million Seven Hundred Seventy Four Thousand Pesos
(P1,141,774,000.00).
On 6 December 1992, ERB approved the application of DLPC after deducting Fourteen Million Eight
Hundred Thousand Pesos (P14,800,000.00) worth of property and equipment which were not used
by DLPC in its operation.
On 6 July 1992, petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari before this Court assailing the
decision of ERB on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction.
In our resolution of 8 September 1992, we referred the case for proper disposition to the Court of
Appeals which subsequently dismissed the petition on the ground that (1) the filing of the petition for
review with the Supreme Court was a wrong mode of appeal, and (2) the petition did not comply with
the provisions of Supreme Court Circular 1-88 in that (a) it did not state the date when the petitioners
received notice of the ERB decision, (b) it did not state the date when the petitioners filed a motion for
reconsideration, and (c) it inconsistently alleged different dates when petitioners supposedly received
the denial of their motion by ERB.
On 18 December 1992, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that our resolution of
8 September 1992 was a directive for the Court of Appeals to disregard the above circular.
In its resolution of 24 March 1993, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for lack
of merit. Hence, the instant recourse.
We deny the petition. The predecessor of the Energy Regulatory Board was the Board of Energy
created under P.D. No. 1206. Thereunder, appeals from the decisions of the Board of Energy were
appealable to the Office of the President. However, under the Interim Rules Implementing the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, final decisions, orders, awards or resolutions of the Board of
Energy were made appealable to the Intermediate Appellate Court (Sec. 9).
On 2 February 1987, the New Constitution took effect. Sec. 30, Art. VI, thereof provides: "No law shall
be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution
without its advice and concurrence."
On 8 May 1987, the President promulgated E.O. No. 172 creating the Energy Regulatory Board to
replace the Board of Energy. Under Sec. 10 thereof, "[a] party adversely affected by a decision, order
or ruling of the Board . . . may file a petition to be known as petition for review with the Supreme
Court."
On 27 February 1991, the Supreme Court promulgated Circular No.
1-91, par. (1) of which specifically provides that the proper mode of appeal from any quasi-judicial
agency, including ERB, is by way of a petition for review with the Court of Appeals.
It is very patent that since Sec. 10 of E.O. No. 172 was enacted without the advice and concurrence
of this Court, this provision never became effective, with the result that it cannot be deemed to have
amended the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Consequently, the authority of the Court of
Appeals to decide cases from the Board of Energy, now ERB, remains (Cf. First Lepanto Ceramics,
Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 110571, 7 October 1994).
If the appeal is brought to either Court (Supreme Court or Court of Appeals) by the wrong procedure,
the only course of action open to it is to dismiss the appeal. There is no longer any justification for
allowing transfers of erroneous appeals from one court to another (Quesada v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 93869, 12 November 1990).
Prior to Circular No. 1-91, the Supreme Court promulgated Circular No. 2-90 dated 9 March 1990,
Item No. 4 of which states that "[a]n appeal taken to either the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals
by the wrong or inappropriate mode shall be dismissed".
Paragraph (d) of said Circular No. 2-90 also provides that "[n]o transfer of appeals erroneously taken
to the Supreme Court or to the Court of Appeals to whichever of these Tribunals has appropriate
appellate jurisdiction will be allowed; continued ignorance or willful disregard of the law on appeals
will not be tolerated."
Consequently, the Court of Appeals was correct when it held
Contrary to petitioners' stand, the Supreme Court's Resolution dated September 8,
1992, referring "this case to the Court of Appeals for further disposition" was not a
directive for this court to disregard the above circulars and precedents. Rather the said
SC resolution could mean only that this court should dispose of the subject petition in
conformity with, and not in violation of, those circulars and precedents (Rollo, p. 26).
Both Circulars Nos. 1-88 and 2-90 were duly published in newspapers of general circulation in the
Philippines. Hence, lawyers are expected to keep themselves abreast with the decisions of this Court
and with its Circulars and other issuances relating to procedure or affecting their duties and
responsibilities as officers of the court (Teehankee, Jr. v. Hon. Madayag, G.R. No. 102717, 12
December 1992).
SC Circular No. 1-88, which took effect on 1 January 1989, was not adopted and approved by this
Court for childish, flimsy or petty reasons, nor for pure love of technicalities, but to compel the strict
observance of the Revised Rules of Court in order that proceedings before this Court may not be
needlessly delayed (Gallardo v. Quintus, A.M. No. RTJ-90-577, 18 April 1991).
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED.
Padilla, Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 125416. September 26, 1996]
SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
ENRIQUE T. GARCIA and CATALINO A. CALIMBAS,respondents.
D E C I S I O N
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The 1987 Constitution is unique in many ways. For one thing, it institutionalized people power in
law-making. Learning from the bitter lesson of completely surrendering to Congress the sole
authority to make, amend or repeal laws, the present Constitution concurrently vested such
prerogatives in the electorate by expressly recognizing their residual and sovereign authority to ordain
legislation directly through the concepts and processes of initiative and of referendum.
In this Decision, this Court distinguishes referendum from initiative and discusses the practical
and legal implications of such differences. It also sets down some guidelines in the conduct and
implementation of these two novel and vital features of popular democracy, as well as settles some
relevant questions on jurisdiction -- all with the purpose of nurturing, protecting and promoting the
people's exercise of direct democracy.
In this action for certiorari and prohibition, petitioner seeks to nullify the respondent Commission
on Elections' Ruling dated April 17, 1996 and Resolution No. 2848 promulgated on June 27,
1996
[1]
denying petitioner's plea to stop the holding of a local initiative and referendum on the
proposition to recall Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong, Bataan.
The Facts
On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 7227 (The Bases Conversion and
Development Act of 1992), which among others, provided for the creation of the Subic Special
Economic Zone, thus:
"Sec. 12. Subic Special Economic Zone. - Subject to the concurrence by resolution of the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of the City of Olongapo and the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipalities of Subic, Morong and
Hermosa, there is hereby created a Special Economic and Free-port Zone consisting of the City of Olongapo
and the Municipality of Subic, Province of Zambales, the lands occupied by the Subic Naval Base and its
contiguous extensions as embraced, covered and defined by the 1947 Military Bases Agreement between the
Philippines and the United States of America as amended, and within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Municipalities of Morong and Hermosa, Province of Bataan, hereinafter referred to as the Subic Special
Economic Zone whose metes and bounds shall be delineated in a proclamation to be issued by the President of
the Philippines. Within thirty (30) days after the approval of this Act, each local government unit shall submit
its resolution of concurrence to join the Subic Special Economic Zone to the Office of the
President. Thereafter, the President of the Philippines shall issue a proclamation defining the metes and bounds
of the zone as provided herein." (Underscoring supplied)
RA 7227 likewise created petitioner to implement the declared national policy of converting
the Subic military reservation into alternative productive uses.
[2]
Petitioner was organized with an
authorized capital stock of P20 billion which was fully subscribed and fully paid up by the Republic of
the Philippines with, among other assets, "(a)ll lands embraced, covered and defined in Section 12
hereof, as well as permanent improvements and fixtures upon proper inventory not otherwise
alienated, conveyed, or transferred to another government agency.
[3]

On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subic military reservation to the
Philippine government. Immediately, petitioner commenced the implementation of its task,
particularly the preservation of the seaports, airports, buildings, houses and other installations left by
the American navy.
In April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed a Pambayang Kapasyahan
Bilang 10, Serye 1993, expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec. 12 of
RA 7227, to join the Subic Special Economic Zone. On September 5, 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan
of Morong submitted Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye 1993 to the Office of the President.
On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia, Calimbas and their companions filed a petition with
the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993. The
petition prayed for the following:
"I. Bawiin, nulipikahin at pawalang-bisa ang Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10 Serye 1993 ng Sangguniang
Bayan para sa pag-anib ng Morong sa SSEFZ na walang kundisyon.
II. Palitan ito ng isang Pambayang kapasiyahan na aanib lamang ang Morong sa SSEFZ kung ang mga
sumusunod na kondisyones ay ipagkakaloob, ipatutupad at isasagawa para sa kapakanan at interes ng Morong
atBataan:
(A) Ibalik sa Bataan ang 'Virgin Forests' -- isang bundok na hindi nagagalaw at punong-puno ng malalaking
punong-kahoy at iba't-ibang halaman.
(B) Ihiwalay ang Grande Island sa SSEFZ at ibalik ito sa Bataan.
(K) Isama ang mga lupain ng Bataan na nakapaloob sa SBMA sa pagkukuenta ng salaping ipinagkaloob ng
pamahalaang national o 'Internal Revenue Allotment' (IRA) sa Morong, Hermosa at sa Lalawigan.
(D) Payagang magtatag rin ng sariling 'special economic zones' ang bawat bayan ng Morong, Hermosa at
Dinalupihan.
(E) Ibase sa laki ng kanya-kanyang lupa ang pamamahagi ng kikitain ng SBMA.
(G) Ibase rin ang alokasyon ng pagbibigay ng trabaho sa laki ng nasabing mga lupa.
(H) Pabayaang bukas ang pinto ng SBMA na nasa Morong ng 24 na oras at bukod dito sa magbukas pa ng
pinto sa hangganan naman ng Morong at Hermosa upang magkaroon ng pagkakataong umunlad rin ang mga
nasabing bayan, pati na rin ng iba pang bayan ng Bataan.
(I) Tapusin ang pagkokonkreto ng mga daang Morong-Tala-Orani at Morong-Tasig-Dinalupihan para sa
kabutihan ng mga taga-Bataan at tuloy makatulong sa pangangalaga ng mga kabundukan.
(J) Magkakaroon ng sapat na representasyon sa pamunuan ng SBMA ang Morong, Hermosa at Bataan."
The Sangguniang Bayan of Morong acted upon the petition of respondents Garcia, Calimbas, et
al. by promulgating Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the
Philippines to amend certain provisions of R.A. No. 7227, particularly those concerning the matters
cited in items (A), (B), (K), (E) and (G) of private respondents' petition. The Sangguniang
Bayan of Morong also informed respondents that items (D) and (H) had already been referred to and
favorably acted upon by the government agencies concerned, such as the Bases Conversion
Development Authority and the Office of the President.
Not satisfied, and within 30 days from submission of their petition, herein respondents resorted to
their power of initiative under the Local Government Code of 1991,
[4]
Sec. 122 paragraph (b) of which
provides as follows:
"Sec. 122. Procedure in Local Initiative. -
x x x x x x x x x
(b) If no favorable action thereon is taken by the sanggunian concerned, the proponents, through their duly
authorized and registered representatives, may invoke their power of initiative, giving notice thereof to the
sanggunian concerned.
x x x x x x x x x."
On July 6, 1993, respondent Commission En Banc in Comelec Resolution No. 93-1623 denied
the petition for local initiative by herein private respondents on the ground that the subject thereof was
merely a resolution (pambayang kapasyahan) and not an ordinance. On July 13, 1993, public
respondent Comelec En Banc (thru Comelec Resolution no. 93-1676) further directed its Provincial
Election Supervisor to hold action on the authentication of signatures being solicited by private
respondents.
On August 15, 1993, private respondents instituted a petition
for certiorari and mandamus
[5]
before this Court against the Commission on Elections and
the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan, to set aside Comelec Resolution No. 93-1623 insofar as
it disallowed the conduct of a local initiative to annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Bilang 10, Serye
1993, and Comelec Resolution No. 93-1676 insofar as it prevented the Provincial Election Supervisor
of Bataan from proceeding with the authentication of the required number of signatures in support of
the initiative and the gathering of signatures.
On February 1, 1995, pursuant to Sec. 12 of RA 7227, the President of the Philippines issued
proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds of the SSEZ. Said proclamation included in the
SSEZ all the lands within the former Subic Naval Base, including Grande Island and that portion of
the former naval base within the territorial jurisdiction of the Municipality of Morong.
On June 18, 1996, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845, adopting therein a
"Calendar of Activities for local referendum on certain municipal ordinance passed by the
Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan", and which indicated, among others, the scheduled
referendum Day (July 27, 1996, Saturday). On June 27, 1996, the Comelec promulgated the assailed
Resolution No. 2848 providing for "the rules and guidelines to govern the conduct of the referendum
proposing to annul or repeal Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of
Morong, Bataan".
On July 10, 1996, petitioner instituted the present petition for certiorari and prohibition contesting
the validity of Resolution No. 2848 and alleging, inter alia, that public respondent "is intent on
proceeding with a local initiative that proposes an amendment of a national law. x x x"
The Issues
The petition
[6]
presents the following "argument":
"Respondent Commission on Elections committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in
scheduling a local initiative which seeks the amendment of a national law."
In his Comment, private respondent Garcia claims that (1) petitioner has failed to show the
existence of an actual case or controversy; (2) x x x petitioner seeks to overturn a decision/judgment
which has long become final and executory; (3) x x x public respondent has not abused its discretion
and has in fact acted within its jurisdiction; (and) (4) x x x the concurrence of local government units is
required for the establishment of the Subic Special Economic Zone."
Private respondent Calimbas, now the incumbent Mayor of Morong, in his Reply (should be
Comment) joined petitioner's cause because "(a)fter several meetings with petitioner's Chairman and
staff and after consultation with legal counsel, respondent Calimbas discovered that the demands in
the petition for a local initiative/referendum were not legally feasible."
[7]

The Solicitor General, as counsel for public respondent, identified two issues, as follows:
"1. Whether or not the Comelec can be enjoined from scheduling/conducting the local intiative proposing to
annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan.
2. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the request of petitioner SBMA
to stop the local initiative."
On July 23, 1996, the Court heard oral argument by the parties, after which, it issued the
following resolution:
"The Court Resolved to (1) GRANT the Motion to Admit the Attached Comment filed by counsel for private
respondent Enrique T. Garcia, dated July 22, 1996 and (2) NOTE the: (a) Reply (should be comment) to the
petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunctiom, filed by counsel for respondent Catalino Calimbas, dated July 22, 1996; (b) Separate Comments on
the petition, filed by: (b-1) the Solicitor General for respondent Commission on Elections dated July 19, 1996
and (b-2) counsel for private respondent Enrique T. Garcia, dated July 22, 1996 and (c) Manifestation filed by
counsel for petitioner dated July 22, 1996.
At the hearing of this case this morning, Atty. Rodolfo O. Reyes appeared and argued for petitioner Subic Bay
Metropolitan Authority (SBMA) while Atty. Sixto Brillantes for private respondent Enrique T. Garcia, and
Atty. Oscar L. Karaan for respondent Catalino Calimbas. Solicitor General Raul Goco, Assistant Solicitor
General Cecilio O. Estoesta and Solicitor Zenaida Hernandez-Perez appeared for respondent Commission on
Elections with Solicitor General Goco arguing.
Before the Court adjourned, the Court directed the counsel for both parties to INFORM this Court by Friday,
July 26, 1996, whether or not Commission on Elections would push through with the initiative/referendum this
Saturday, July 27, 1996.
Thereafter, the case shall be considered SUBMITTED for resolution.
At 2:50 p.m. July 23, 1996, the Court received by facsimile transmission an Order dated also on July 23, 1996
from the respondent Commission on Elections En Banc inter alia 'to hold in abeyance the scheduled referendum
(initiative) on July 27, 1996 pending resolution of G.R. No. 125416.' In view of this Order, the petitioner's
application for a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction has become moot and
academic and will thus not be passed upon by this Court at this time. Puno, J., no part due to relationship.
Bellosillo, J., is on leave."
After careful study of and judicious deliberation on the submissions and arguments of the parties,
the Court believes that the issues may be restated as follows:
(1) Whether this petition "seeks to overturn a decision/judgment which has long become final and executory";
namely G.R. No. 111230, Enrique Garcia, et al. vs. Commission on Elections, et al.;
(2) Whether the respondent Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgating and implementing its
Resolution No. 2848 which "govern(s) the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repealPambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan;" and
(3) Whether the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powers of the people of Morong to enact;
i.e., whether such initiative "seeks the amendment of a national law."
First Issue: Bar by Final Judgment
Respondent Garcia contends that this Court had already ruled with finality in Enrique T. Garcia, et
al. vs. Commission on Elections, et. al.
[8]
on "the very issue raised in (the) petition: whether or not
there can be an initiative by the people of Morong, Bataan on the subject proposition -- the very same
proposition, it bears emphasizing, the submission of which to the people of Morong, Bataan is now
sought to be enjoined by petitioner x x x".
We disagree. The only issue resolved in the earlier Garcia case is whether a municipal resolution
as contra-distinguished from an ordinance may be the proper subject of an initiative and/or
referendum. We quote from our said Decision:
[9]

"In light of this legal backdrop, the essential issue to be resolved in the case at bench is whether Pambayang
Kapasyahan Blg. 10, serye 1993 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan is the proper subject of an
initiative. Respondents take the negative stance as they contend that under the Local Government Code of 1991
only an ordinance can be the subject of initiative. They rely on Section 120, Chapter 2, Title XI, Book I of the
Local Government Code of 1991 which provides: 'Local Initiative Defined. -- Local initiative is the legal
process whereby the registered voters of a local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any
ordinance.'
We reject respondent's narrow and literal reading of the above provision for it will collide with the Constitution
and will subvert the intent of the lawmakers in enacting the provisions of the Local Government of 1991 on
initiative and referendum.
The Constitution clearly includes not only ordinances but resolutions as appropriate subjects of a local
initiative. Section 32 of Article VI provides in luminous language: 'The Congress shall, as early as possible,
provide for a system of initiative and referendum, and the exceptions therefrom, whereby the people can
directly propose and enact laws or approve or reject any act or law or part thereof passed by the Congress, or
local legislative body x x x'. An act includes a resolution. Black defines an acts 'an expression of will or
purpose . . . it may denote something done . . . as a legislature, including not merely physical acts, but also
decrees, edicts, laws, judgement, resolves, awards and determination x x x.' It is basic that a law should be
construed in harmony with and not in violation of the Constitution. In line with this postulates, we held in In Re
Guarina that if there is doubt or uncertainly as to the meaning of the legislative, if the words or provisions are
obscure, or if the enactment is fairly susceptible of two or more construction, that interpretations will be
adopted which will avoid the effect of unconstitutionality, even though it may be necessary, for this purpose, to
disregard the more usual or apparent import of the language used.' "
Moreover, we reviewed our rollo in said G.R. No. 111230 and we found that the sole issue
presented by the pleadings was the question of "whether or not a Sangguniang Bayan Resolution can
be the subject of a valid initiative or referendum".
[10]

In the present case, petitioner is not contesting the propriety of municipal resolution as the form
by which these two new constitutional prerogatives of the people may validly exercised. What is at
issue here is whether Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, as worded, is sufficient in form
and substance for submission to the people for their approval; in fine, whether the Comelec acted
properly and juridically in promulgating and implementing Resolution No. 2848.
Second Issue: Sufficiency of Comelec Resolution No. 2848
The main issue in this case may be re-started thus: Did respondent Comelec commit grave abuse
of discretion in promulgating and implementing Resolution No. 2848?
We answer the question in the affirmative.
To begin with, the process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE but respondent
Comelec made preparations for a REFERENDUM only. In fact, in the body of the Resolution
[11]
as
reproduced in the footnote below the word "referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative"
is not mentioned at all. The Comelec labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; the counting of votes
was entrusted to a "Referendum Committee"; the documents were called "referendum returns"; the
canvassers, "Referendum Board of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the description
"referendum". To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in said body of Resolution No.
2848. And yet, this exercise is unquestionably an INITIATIVE.
There are statutory and conceptual demarcations between a referendum and an initiative. In
enacting the "Initiative and Referendum Act,
[12]
Congress differentiated one term from the other, thus:
(a) "Initiative" is the power of the people to propose amendments to the Constitution or to propose and enact
legislations through an election called for the purpose.
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1. Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the
Constitution;
a.2. Initiative on statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation;
and
a.3. Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional,
provincial, city, municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance.
(b) "Indirect initiative" is exercise of initiative by the people through a proposition sent to Congress or the local
legislative body for action.
(c) "Referendum" is the power of the electorate to approve or reject a legislation through an election called for
the purpose. It may be of two classes, namely:
c.1. Referendum on statutes which refers to a petition to approve or reject an act or law, or
part thereof, passed by Congress; and
c.2. Referendum on local law which refers to a petition to approve or reject a law, resolution
or ordinance enacted by regional assemblies and local legislative bodies.
Along these statutory definitions, Justice Isagani A. Cruz
[13]
defines initiative as the "power of the
people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject them at the polls independent of the
legislative assembly." On the other hand, he explains that referendum "is the right reserved to the
people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a legislative body and which
in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a law." The foregoing definitions,
which are based on Black's
[14]
and other leading American authorities, are echoed in the Local
Government Code (RA 7160) substantially as follows:
"SEC. 120. Local Initiative Defined. -- Local Initiative is the legal process whereby the registered voters of a
local government unit may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance.
"SEC. 126. Local Referendum Defined. -- Local referendum is the legal process whereby the registered voters
of the local government units may approve, amend or reject any ordinance enacted by the sanggunian.
The local referendum shall be held under the control and direction of the Comelec within sixty (60) days in case
of provinces and cities, forty-five (45) days in case of municipalities and thirty (30) days in case of barangays.
The Comelec shall certify and proclaim the results of the said referendum."
Prescinding from these definitions, we gather that initiative is resorted to (or initiated) by the
people directly either because the law-making body fails or refuses to enact the law, ordinance,
resolution or act that they desire or because they want to amend or modify one already
existing. Under Sec. 13 of R.A. 6735, the local legislative body is given the opportunity to enact the
proposal. If its refuses/neglects to do so within thirty (30) days from its presentation, the proponents
through their duly-authorized and registered representatives may invoke their power of initiative,
giving notice thereof to the local legislative body concerned. Should the proponents be able to collect
the number of signed conformities within the period granted by said statute, the Commission on
Elections "shall then set a date for the initiative (not referendum) at which the proposition shall be
submitted to the registered voters in the local government unit concerned x x x".
On the other hand, in a local referendum, the law-making body submits to the registered voters of
its territorial jurisdiction, for approval or rejection, any ordinance or resolution which is duly enacted or
approved by such law-making authority. Said referendum shall be conducted also under the control
and direction of the Commission on Elections.
[15]

In other words, while initiative is entirely the work of the electorate, referendum is begun and
consented to by the law-making body. Initiative is a process of law-making by the people themselves
without the participation and against the wishes of their elected representatives, while referendum
consists merely of the electorate approving or rejecting what has been drawn up or enacted by a
legislative body. Hence, the process and the voting in an initiative are understandably more complex
than in a referendum where expectedly the voters will simply write either "Yes" or "No" in the ballot.
[Note: While the above quoted laws variously refer to initiative and referendum as "powers" or
"legal processes", these can also be "rights", as Justice Cruz terms them, or "concepts", or "the
proposal" itself (in the case of initiative) being referred to in this Decision.]
From the above differentiation, it follows that there is need for the Comelec to supervise an
initiative more closely, its authority thereon extending not only to the counting and canvassing of
votes but also to seeing to it that the matter or act submitted to the people is in the proper form and
language so it may be easily understood and voted upon by the electorate. This is especially true
where the proposed legislation is lengthy and complicated, and should thus be broken down into
several autonomous parts, each such part to be voted upon separately. Care must also be exercised
that "(n)o petition embracing more than one subject shall be submitted to the electorate,"
[16]
although
"two or more propositions may be submitted in an initiative".
[17]

It should be noted that under Sec. 13 (c) of RA 6735, the "Secretary of Local Government or his
designated representative shall extend assistance in the formulation of the proposition."
In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the process
itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers belong to the
people, hence the respondent Commission cannot control or change the substance or the content of
legislation. In the exercise of its authority, it may (in fact it should have done so already) issue
relevant and adequate guidelines and rules for the orderly exercise of these "people-power" features
of our Constitution.
Third Issue: Withdrawal of Adherence and Imposition of Conditionalities -- Ultra Vires?
Petitioner maintains that the proposition sought to be submitted in the plebiscite,
namely, Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993, is ultra vires or beyond the powers of the
Sangguniang Bayan to enact,
[18]
stressing that under Sec. 124 (b) of RA 7160 (the Local Government
Code), "local initiative shall cover only such subjects or matters as are within the legal powers of the
sanggunians to enact." Elsewise stated, a local initiative may enact only such ordinances or
resolutions as the municipal council itself could, if it decided to so enact.
[19]
After the Sangguniang
Bayan of Morong and the other municipalities concerned (Olongapo, Subic and Hermosa) gave their
resolutions of concurrence, and by reason of which the SSEZ had been created, whose metes and
bounds had already been delineated by Proclamation No. 532 issued on February 1, 1995 in
accordance with Section 12 of R.A. No. 7227, the power to withdraw such concurrence and/or to
substitute therefor a conditional concurrence is no longer within the authority and competence of the
Municipal Council of Morong to legislate. Furthermore, petitioner adds, the specific conditionalities
included in the questioned municipal resolution are beyond the powers of the Council to
impose. Hence, such withdrawal can no longer be enacted or conditionalities imposed by
initiative. In other words, petitioner insists, the creation of SSEZ is now a fait accompli for the benefit
of the entire nation. Thus, Morong cannot unilaterally withdraw its concurrence or impose new
conditions for such concurrence as this would effectively render nugatory the creation by (national)
law of the SSEZ and would deprive the entire nation of the benefits to be derived therefrom. Once
created, SSEZ has ceased to be a local concern. It has become a national project.
On the other hand, private respondent Garcia counters that such argument is premature and
conjectural because at this point, the resolution is just a proposal. If the people should reject it during
the referendum, then there is nothing to declare as illegal.
Deliberating on this issue, the Court agrees with private respondent Garcia that indeed, the
municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the people
reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the people have
voted for it and it has become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights and obligations can be
enforced or implemented thereunder. At this point, it is merely a proposal and the writ of prohibition
cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility. Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only
actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases.
[20]

We also note that the Initiative and Referendum Act itself provides
[21]
that "(n)othing in this Act
shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring null and void any
propositionapproved pursuant to this Act x x x."
So too, the Supreme Court is basically a review court.
[22]
It passes upon errors of law (and
sometimes of fact, as in the case of mandatory appeals of capital offenses) of lower courts as well as
determines whether there had been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any "branch or instrumentality" of government. In the present case, it is
quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec Resolution No. 2848 to determine the
commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have the same authority in regard to
the proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or approved, or passed upon by any "branch
or instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The Commission on Elections itself has made no
reviewable pronouncements about the issues brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply
included verbatim the proposal in its questioned Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there is really no
decision or action made by a branch, instrumentality or court which this Court could take cognizance
of and acquire jurisdiction over, in the exercise of its review powers.
Having said that, we are in no wise suggesting that the Comelec itself has no power to pass
upon proposed resolutions in an initiative. Quite the contrary, we are ruling that these matters are in
fact within the initiatory jurisdiction of the Commission -- to which then the herein basic questions
ought to have been addressed, and by which the same should have been decided in the first
instance. In other words, while regular courts may take jurisdiction over "approved propositions" per
said Sec. 18 of R.A. 6735, the Comelec in the exercise of its quasi-judicial and administrative powers
may adjudicate and pass upon such proposals insofar as their form and language are concerned, as
discussed earlier; and it may be added, even as to content, where the proposals or parts thereof
are patently and clearly outside the "capacity of the local legislative body to enact."
[23]
Accordingly,
the question of whether the subject of this initiative is within the capacity of the Municipal Council of
Morong to enact may be ruled upon by the Comelec upon remand and after hearing the parties
thereon.
While on the subject of capacity of the local lawmaking body, it would be fruitful for the parties
and the Comelec to plead and adjudicate, respectively, the question of whether Grande Island and
the "virgin forests" mentioned in the proposed initiative belong to the national government and thus
cannot be segregated from the Zone and "returned to Bataan" by the simple expedient of passing a
municipal resolution. We note that Sec. 13 (e) of R.A. 7227 speaks of the full subscription
and payment of the P20 billion authorized capital stock of the Subic Authority by the Republic, with,
aside from cash and other assets, the "... lands, embraced, covered and defined in Section 12 hereof,
..." which includes said island and forests. The ownership of said lands is a question of fact that may
be taken up in the proper forum -- the Commission on Elections.
Another question which the parties may wish to submit to the Comelec upon remand of the
initiative is whether the proposal, assuming it is within the capacity of the Municipal Council to enact,
may be divided into several parts for purposes of voting. Item "I" is a proposal to recall, nullify and
render without effect (bawiin, nulipikahin at pawalangbisa) Municipal Resolution No. 10, Series of
1993. On the other hand, Item "II" proposes to change or replace (palitan) said resolution with
another municipal resolution of concurrence provided certain conditions enumerated thereunder
would be granted, obeyed and implemented (ipagkakaloob, ipatutupad at isasagawa) for the benefit
and interest of Morong and Bataan. A voter may favor Item I -- i.e., he may want
atotal dismemberment of Morong from the Authority -- but may not agree with any of the conditions
set forth in Item II. Should the proposal then be divided and be voted upon separately and
independently?
All told, we shall not pass upon the third issue of ultra vires on the ground of prematurity.
Epilogue
In sum, we hold that (i) our decision in the earlier Garcia case is not a bar to the present
controversy as the issue raised and decided therein is different from the questions involved here; (ii)
the respondent Commission should be given an opportunity to review and correct its errors in
promulgating its Resolution No. 2848 and in preparing -- if necessary -- for the plebiscite; and (iii) that
the said Commission has administrative and initiatory quasi-judicial jurisdiction to pass upon the
question of whether the proposal is sufficient in form and language and whether such proposal or part
or parts thereof are clearly and patently outside the powers of the municipal council of Morong to
enact, and therefore violative of law.
In deciding this case, the Court realizes that initiative and referendum, as concepts and
processes, are new in our country. We are remanding the matter to the Comelec so that proper
corrective measures, as above discussed, may be undertaken, with a view to helping fulfill our
people's aspirations for the actualization of effective direct sovereignty. Indeed we recognize that
"(p)rovisions for initiative and referendum are liberally construed to effectuate their purposes, to
facilitate and not to hamper the exercise by the voters of the rights granted thereby."
[24]
In his
authoritative treatise on the Constitution, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J. treasures these "instruments
which can be used should the legislature show itself indifferent to the needs of the people."
[25]
Impelled
by a sense of urgency, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6735 to give life and form to the
constitutional mandate. Congress also interphased initiative and referendum into the workings of
local governments by including a chapter on this subject in the local Government Code of
1991.
[26]
And the Commission on Elections can do no less by seasonably and judiciously
promulgating guidelines and rules, for both national and local use, in implementation of these
laws. For its part, this Court early on expressly recognized the revolutionary import of reserving
people power in the process of law-making.
[27]

Like elections, initiative and referendum are powerful and valuable modes of expressing popular
sovereignty. And this Court as a matter of policy and doctrine will exert every effort to nurture, protect
and promote their legitimate exercise. For it is but sound public policy to enable the electorate to
express their free and untrammeled will, not only in the election of their anointed lawmakers and
executives, but also in the formulation of the very rules and laws by which our society shall be
governed and managed.
WHEREFORE the petition is GRANTED. Resolution No. 2848 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
The initiative on Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 10, Serye 1993 is REMANDED to the Commission on
Elections for further proceedings consistent with the foregoing discussion. No costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Padilla, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Vitug, Kapunan,
Francisco, and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.
Romero, and Mendoza, JJ., on official leave.
Puno, J., no part due to relationship.


EN BANC
[G.R. No. 127325. March 19, 1997]
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO, ALEXANDER PADILLA and MARIA ISABEL
ONGPIN, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, JESUS DELFIN, ALBERTO
PEDROSA & CARMEN PEDROSA, in their capacities as founding members of the
Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA), respondents, SENATOR RAUL S. ROCO, DEMOKRASYA-IPAGTANGGOL ANG
KONSTITUSYON (DIK), MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD INTEGRITY
AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES (IBP) and
LABAN NG DEMOKRATIKONG PILIPINO (LABAN), petitioners-intervenors.
D E C I S I O N
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
The heart of this controversy brought to us by way of a petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of
the Rules of Court is the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through the system of initiative under Section 2 of Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution. Undoubtedly,
this demands special attention, as this system of initiative was unknown to the people of this country,
except perhaps to a few scholars, before the drafting of the 1987 Constitution. The 1986
Constitutional Commission itself, through the original proponent
[1]
and the main sponsor
[2]
of the
proposed Article on Amendments or Revision of the Constitution, characterized this system as
innovative.
[3]
Indeed it is, for both under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, only two methods of
proposing amendments to, or revision of, the Constitution were recognized, viz., (1) by Congress
upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members and (2) by a constitutional convention.
[4]
For this and
the other reasons hereafter discussed, we resolved to give due course to this petition.
On 6 December 1996, private respondent Atty. Jesus S. Delfin filed with public respondent
Commission on Elections (hereafter, COMELEC) a Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term
Limits of Elective Officials, by Peoples Initiative (hereafter, Delfin Petition)
[5]
wherein Delfin asked the
COMELEC for an order
1. Fixing the time and dates for signature gathering all over the country;
2. Causing the necessary publications of said Order and the attached Petition for Initiative on
the 1987 Constitution, in newspapers of general and local circulation;
3. Instructing Municipal Election Registrars in all Regions of the Philippines, to assist
Petitioners and volunteers, in establishing signing stations at the time and on the dates
designated for the purpose.
Delfin alleged in his petition that he is a founding member of the Movement for Peoples
Initiative,
[6]
a group of citizens desirous to avail of the system intended to institutionalize people
power; that he and the members of the Movement and other volunteers intend to exercise the power
to directly propose amendments to the Constitution granted under Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution; that the exercise of that power shall be conducted in proceedings under the control and
supervision of the COMELEC; that, as required in COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, signature stations
shall be established all over the country, with the assistance of municipal election registrars, who
shall verify the signatures affixed by individual signatories; that before the Movement and other
volunteers can gather signatures, it is necessary that the time and dates to be designated for the
purpose be first fixed in an order to be issued by the COMELEC; and that to adequately inform the
people of the electoral process involved, it is likewise necessary that the said order, as well as the
Petition on which the signatures shall be affixed, be published in newspapers of general and local
circulation, under the control and supervision of the COMELEC.
The Delfin Petition further alleged that the provisions sought to be amended are Sections 4 and 7
of Article VI,
[7]
Section 4 of Article VII,
[8]
and Section 8 of Article X
[9]
of the Constitution. Attached to
the petition is a copy of a Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution
[10]
embodying the proposed
amendments which consist in the deletion from the aforecited sections of the provisions concerning
term limits, and with the following proposition:
DO YOU APPROVE OF LIFTING THE TERM LIMITS OF ALL ELECTIVE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS,
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE SECTIONS 4 AND 7 OF ARTICLE VI, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII,
AND SECTION 8 OF ARTICLE X OF THE 1987 PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
According to Delfin, the said Petition for Initiative will first be submitted to the people, and after it
is signed by at least twelve per cent of the total number of registered voters in the country it will be
formally filed with the COMELEC.
Upon the filing of the Delfin Petition, which was forthwith given the number UND 96-037
(INITIATIVE), the COMELEC, through its Chairman, issued an Order
[11]
(a) directing Delfin to cause
the publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution
(including the proposal, proposed constitutional amendment, and the signature form), and the notice
of hearing in three (3) daily newspapers of general circulation at his own expense not later than 9
December 1996; and (b) setting the case for hearing on 12 December 1996 at 10:00 a.m.
At the hearing of the Delfin Petition on 12 December 1996, the following appeared: Delfin and
Atty. Pete Q. Quadra; representatives of the Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action
(PIRMA); intervenor-oppositor Senator Raul S. Roco, together with his two other lawyers; and
representatives of, or counsel for, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Demokrasya-
Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK), Public Interest Law Center, and Laban ng Demokratikong
Pilipino (LABAN).
[12]
Senator Roco, on that same day, filed a Motion to Dismiss the Delfin Petition on
the ground that it is not the initiatory petition properly cognizable by the COMELEC.
After hearing their arguments, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their
memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda within five days.
[13]

On 18 December 1996, the petitioners herein -- Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander
Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin -- filed this special civil action for prohibition raising the following
arguments:
(1) The constitutional provision on peoples initiative to amend the Constitution can only be implemented by
law to be passed by Congress. No such law has been passed; in fact, Senate Bill No. 1290 entitled An Act
Prescribing and Regulating Constitutional Amendments by Peoples Initiative, which petitioner Senator
Santiago filed on 24 November 1995, is still pending before the Senate Committee on Constitutional
Amendments.
(2) It is true that R.A. No. 6735 provides for three systems of initiative, namely, initiative on the Constitution,
on statutes, and on local legislation. However, it failed to provide any subtitle on initiative on the Constitution,
unlike in the other modes of initiative, which are specifically provided for in Subtitle II and Subtitle III. This
deliberate omission indicates that the matter of peoples initiative to amend the Constitution was left to some
future law. Former Senator Arturo Tolentino stressed this deficiency in the law in his privilege speech
delivered before the Senate in 1994: There is not a single word in that law which can be considered as
implementing [the provision on constitutional initiative]. Such implementing provisions have been obviously
left to a separate law.
(3) Republic Act No. 6735 provides for the effectivity of the law after publication in print media. This indicates
that the Act covers only laws and not constitutional amendments because the latter take effect only upon
ratification and not after publication.
(4) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, adopted on 16 January 1991 to govern the conduct of initiative on the
Constitution and initiative and referendum on national and local laws, is ultra vires insofar as initiative on
amendments to the Constitution is concerned, since the COMELEC has no power to provide rules and
regulations for the exercise of the right of initiative to amend the Constitution. Only Congress is authorized by
the Constitution to pass the implementing law.
(5)The peoples initiative is limited to amendments to the Constitution, not to revision thereof. Extending or
lifting of term limits constitutes a revision and is, therefore, outside the power of the peoples initiative.
(6) Finally, Congress has not yet appropriated funds for peoples initiative; neither the COMELEC nor any
other government department, agency, or office has realigned funds for the purpose.
To justify their recourse to us via the special civil action for prohibition, the petitioners allege that
in the event the COMELEC grants the Delfin Petition, the peoples initiative spearheaded by PIRMA
would entail expenses to the national treasury for general re-registration of voters amounting to at
least P180 million, not to mention the millions of additional pesos in expenses which would be
incurred in the conduct of the initiative itself. Hence, the transcendental importance to the public and
the nation of the issues raised demands that this petition for prohibition be settled promptly and
definitely, brushing aside technicalities of procedure and calling for the admission of a taxpayers and
legislators suit.
[14]
Besides, there is no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.
On 19 December 1996, this Court (a) required the respondents to comment on the petition within
a non-extendible period of ten days from notice; and (b) issued a temporary restraining order,
effective immediately and continuing until further orders, enjoining public respondent COMELEC from
proceeding with the Delfin Petition, and private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa from
conducting a signature drive for peoples initiative to amend the Constitution.
On 2 January 1997, private respondents, through Atty Quadra, filed their Comment
[15]
on the
petition. They argue therein that:
1. IT IS NOT TRUE THAT IT WOULD ENTAIL EXPENSES TO THE NATIONAL TREASURY FOR
GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS AMOUNTING TO AT LEAST PESOS: ONE HUNDRED
EIGHTY MILLION (P180,000,000.00) IF THE COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION FILED BY
RESPONDENT DELFIN BEFORE THE COMELEC.
2. NOT A SINGLE CENTAVO WOULD BE SPENT BY THE NATIONAL GOVERNMENT IF THE
COMELEC GRANTS THE PETITION OF RESPONDENT DELFIN. ALL EXPENSES IN THE
SIGNATURE GATHERING ARE ALL FOR THE ACCOUNT OF RESPONDENT DELFIN AND HIS
VOLUNTEERS PER THEIR PROGRAM OF ACTIVITIES AND EXPENDITURES SUBMITTED TO THE
COMELEC. THE ESTIMATED COST OF THE DAILY PER DIEM OF THE SUPERVISING SCHOOL
TEACHERS IN THE SIGNATURE GATHERING TO BE DEPOSITED and TO BE PAID BY DELFIN AND
HIS VOLUNTEERS IS P2,571, 200.00;
3. THE PENDING PETITION BEFORE THE COMELEC IS ONLY ON THE SIGNATURE GATHERING
WHICH BY LAW COMELEC IS DUTY BOUND TO SUPERVISE CLOSELY PURSUANT TO ITS
INITIATORY JURISDICTION UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN ITS RECENT SEPTEMBER
26, 1996 DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET
AL. G.R. NO. 125416;
4. REP. ACT NO. 6735 APPROVED ON AUGUST 4, 1989 IS THE ENABLING LAW IMPLEMENTING
THE POWER OF PEOPLE INITIATIVE TO PROPOSE AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION. SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGOS SENATE BILL NO. 1290 IS A DUPLICATION
OF WHAT ARE ALREADY PROVIDED FOR IN REP. ACT NO. 6735;
5. COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300 PROMULGATED ON JANUARY 16, 1991 PURSUANT TO REP.
ACT 6735 WAS UPHELD BY THE HONORABLE COURT IN THE RECENT SEPTEMBER 26, 1996
DECISION IN THE CASE OF SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY VS. COMELEC, ET AL. G.R. NO.
125416 WHERE THE HONORABLE COURT SAID: THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS CAN DO NO
LESS BY SEASONABLY AND JUDICIOUSLY PROMULGATING GUIDELINES AND RULES FOR
BOTH NATIONAL AND LOCAL USE, IN IMPLEMENTING OF THESE LAWS.
6. EVEN SENATOR DEFENSOR-SANTIAGOS SENATE BILL NO. 1290 CONTAINS A PROVISION
DELEGATING TO THE COMELEC THE POWER TO PROMULGATE SUCH RULES AND
REGULATIONS AS MAY BE NECESSARY TO CARRY OUT THE PURPOSES OF THIS ACT. (SEC. 12,
S.B. NO. 1290, ENCLOSED AS ANNEX E, PETITION);
7. THE LIFTING OF THE LIMITATION ON THE TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS
PROVIDED UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION IS NOT A REVISION OF THE CONSTITUTION. IT IS
ONLY AN AMENDMENT. AMENDMENT ENVISAGES AN ALTERATION OF ONE OR A FEW
SPECIFIC PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. REVISION CONTEMPLATES A RE-
EXAMINATION OF THE ENTIRE DOCUMENT TO DETERMINE HOW AND TO WHAT EXTENT IT
SHOULD BE ALTERED. (PP. 412-413, 2ND. ED. 1992, 1097 PHIL. CONSTITUTION, BY JOAQUIN G.
BERNAS, S.J.).
Also on 2 January 1997, private respondent Delfin filed in his own behalf a Comment
[16]
which
starts off with an assertion that the instant petition is a knee-jerk reaction to a draft Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution ... which is not formally filed yet. What he filed on 6 December
1996 was an Initiatory Pleading or Initiatory Petition, which was legally necessary to start the
signature campaign to amend the Constitution or to put the movement to gather signatures under
COMELEC power and function. On the substantive allegations of the petitioners, Delfin maintains as
follows:
(1) Contrary to the claim of the petitioners, there is a law, R.A. No. 6735, which governs the conduct
of initiative to amend the Constitution. The absence therein of a subtitle for such initiative is not fatal, since
subtitles are not requirements for the validity or sufficiency of laws.
(2) Section 9(b) of R.A. No. 6735 specifically provides that the proposition in an initiative to amend the
Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite shall become effective as of the day of
the plebiscite.
(3) The claim that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is ultra vires is contradicted by (a) Section 2, Article IX-C
of the Constitution, which grants the COMELEC the power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum, and recall; and (b) Section 20 of R.A.
6735, which empowers the COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry
out the purposes of the Act.
(4) The proposed initiative does not involve a revision of, but mere amendment to, the Constitution because it
seeks to alter only a few specific provisions of the Constitution, or more specifically, only those which lay term
limits. It does not seek to reexamine or overhaul the entire document.
As to the public expenditures for registration of voters, Delfin considers petitioners estimate
of P180 million as unreliable, for only the COMELEC can give the exact figure. Besides, if there will
be a plebiscite it will be simultaneous with the 1997 Barangay Elections. In any event, fund
requirements for initiative will be a priority government expense because it will be for the exercise of
the sovereign power of the people.
In the Comment
[17]
for the public respondent COMELEC, filed also on 2 January 1997, the Office
of the Solicitor General contends that:
(1) R.A. No. 6735 deals with, inter alia, peoples initiative to amend the Constitution. Its Section 2 on
Statement of Policy explicitly affirms, recognizes, and guarantees that power; and its Section 3, which
enumerates the three systems of initiative, includes initiative on the Constitution and defines the same as the
power to propose amendments to the Constitution. Likewise, its Section 5 repeatedly mentions initiative on the
Constitution.
(2) A separate subtitle on initiative on the Constitution is not necessary in R.A. No. 6735 because, being
national in scope, that system of initiative is deemed included in the subtitle on National Initiative and
Referendum; and Senator Tolentino simply overlooked pertinent provisions of the law when he claimed that
nothing therein was provided for initiative on the Constitution.
(3) Senate Bill No. 1290 is neither a competent nor a material proof that R.A. No. 6735 does not deal
with initiative on the Constitution.
(4) Extension of term limits of elected officials constitutes a mere amendment to the Constitution, not a revision
thereof.
(5) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 was validly issued under Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 and under the
Omnibus Election Code. The rule-making power of the COMELEC to implement the provisions of R.A. No.
6735 was in fact upheld by this Court in Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority vs. COMELEC .
On 14 January 1997, this Court (a) confirmed nunc pro tunc the temporary restraining order; (b)
noted the aforementioned Comments and the Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order filed by
private respondents through Atty. Quadra, as well as the latters Manifestation stating that he is the
counsel for private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa only and the Comment he filed was for
the Pedrosas; and (c) granted the Motion for Intervention filed on 6 January 1997 by Senator Raul
Roco and allowed him to file his Petition in Intervention not later than 20 January 1997; and (d) set
the case for hearing on 23 January 1997 at 9:30 a.m.
On 17 January 1997, the Demokrasya-Ipagtanggol ang Konstitusyon (DIK) and the Movement of
Attorneys for Brotherhood Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI), filed a Motion for
Intervention. Attached to the motion was their Petition in Intervention, which was later replaced by an
Amended Petition in Intervention wherein they contend that:
(1) The Delfin proposal does not involve a mere amendment to, but a revision of, the Constitution because, in
the words of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J.,
[18]
it would involve a change from a political philosophy that rejects
unlimited tenure to one that accepts unlimited tenure; and although the change might appear to be an isolated
one, it can affect other provisions, such as, on synchronization of elections and on the State policy of
guaranteeing equal access to opportunities for public service and prohibiting political
dynasties.
[19]
A revision cannot be done by initiative which, by express provision of Section 2 of Article XVII of
the Constitution, is limited toamendments.
(2) The prohibition against reelection of the President and the limits provided for all other national and local
elective officials are based on the philosophy of governance, to open up the political arena to as many as there
are Filipinos qualified to handle the demands of leadership, to break the concentration of political and economic
powers in the hands of a few, and to promote effective proper empowerment for participation in policy and
decision-making for the common good; hence, to remove the term limits is to negate and nullify the noble
vision of the 1987 Constitution.
(3) The Delfin proposal runs counter to the purpose of initiative, particularly in a conflict-of-interest
situation. Initiative is intended as a fallback position that may be availed of by the people only if they are
dissatisfied with the performance of their elective officials, but not as a premium for good performance.
[20]

(4) R.A. No. 6735 is deficient and inadequate in itself to be called the enabling law that implements the
peoples initiative on amendments to the Constitution. It fails to state (a) the proper parties who may file the
petition, (b) the appropriate agency before whom the petition is to be filed, (c) the contents of the petition, (d)
the publication of the same, (e) the ways and means of gathering the signatures of the voters nationwide and 3%
per legislative district, (f) the proper parties who may oppose or question the veracity of the signatures, (g) the
role of the COMELEC in the verification of the signatures and the sufficiency of the petition, (h) the appeal
from any decision of the COMELEC, (I) the holding of a plebiscite, and (g) the appropriation of funds for such
peoples initiative. Accordingly, there being no enabling law, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to hear
Delfins petition.
(5) The deficiency of R.A. No. 6735 cannot be rectified or remedied by COMELEC Resolution No. 2300, since
the COMELEC is without authority to legislate the procedure for a peoples initiative under Section 2 of Article
XVII of the Constitution. That function exclusively pertains to Congress. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6735 does
not constitute a legal basis for the Resolution, as the former does not set a sufficient standard for a valid
delegation of power.
On 20 January 1997, Senator Raul Roco filed his Petition in Intervention.
[21]
He avers that R.A.
No. 6735 is the enabling law that implements the peoples right to initiate constitutional
amendments. This law is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505; he co-
authored the House Bill and even delivered a sponsorship speech thereon. He likewise submits that
the COMELEC was empowered under Section 20 of that law to promulgate COMELEC Resolution
No. 2300. Nevertheless, he contends that the respondent Commission is without jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the Delfin Petition and to order its publication because the said petition is not the
initiatory pleading contemplated under the Constitution, Republic Act No. 6735, and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300. What vests jurisdiction upon the COMELEC in an initiative on the Constitution
is the filing of a petition for initiative which is signed by the required number of registered voters. He
also submits that the proponents of a constitutional amendment cannot avail of the authority and
resources of the COMELEC to assist them is securing the required number of signatures, as the
COMELECs role in an initiative on the Constitution is limited to the determination of the sufficiency of
the initiative petition and the call and supervision of a plebiscite, if warranted.
On 20 January 1997, LABAN filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene.
The following day, the IBP filed a Motion for Intervention to which it attached a Petition in
Intervention raising the following arguments:
(1) Congress has failed to enact an enabling law mandated under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987
Constitution.
(2) COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 cannot substitute for the required implementing law on the initiative to
amend the Constitution.
(3) The Petition for Initiative suffers from a fatal defect in that it does not have the required number of
signatures.
(4) The petition seeks, in effect a revision of the Constitution, which can be proposed only by Congress or a
constitutional convention.
[22]

On 21 January 1997, we promulgated a Resolution (a) granting the Motions for Intervention filed
by the DIK and MABINI and by the IBP, as well as the Motion for Leave to Intervene filed by LABAN;
(b) admitting the Amended Petition in Intervention of DIK and MABINI, and the Petitions in
Intervention of Senator Roco and of the IBP; (c) requiring the respondents to file within a
nonextendible period of five days their Consolidated Comments on the aforesaid Petitions in
Intervention; and (d) requiring LABAN to file its Petition in Intervention within a nonextendible period
of three days from notice, and the respondents to comment thereon within a nonextendible period of
five days from receipt of the said Petition in Intervention.
At the hearing of the case on 23 January 1997, the parties argued on the following pivotal issues,
which the Court formulated in light of the allegations and arguments raised in the pleadings so far
filed:
1. Whether R.A. No. 6735, entitled An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and
Appropriating Funds Therefor, was intended to include or cover initiative on amendments to the Constitution;
and if so, whether the Act, as worded, adequately covers such initiative.
2. Whether that portion of COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 (In re: Rules and Regulations Governing the
Conduct of Initiative on the Constitution, and Initiative and Referendum on National and Local Laws) regarding
the conduct of initiative on amendments to the Constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of
specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative.
3. Whether the lifting of term limits of elective national and local officials, as proposed in the draft Petition for
Initiative on the 1987 Constitution, would constitute a revision of, or an amendment to, the Constitution.
4. Whether the COMELEC can take cognizance of, or has jurisdiction over, a petition solely intended to obtain
an order (a) fixing the time and dates for signature gathering; (b) instructing municipal election officers to assist
Delfin's movement and volunteers in establishing signature stations; and (c) directing or causing the publication
of, inter alia, the unsigned proposed Petition for Initiative on the 1987 Constitution.
5. Whether it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case
before the COMELEC.
After hearing them on the issues, we required the parties to submit simultaneously their
respective memoranda within twenty days and requested intervenor Senator Roco to submit
copies of the deliberations on House Bill No. 21505.
On 27 January 1997, LABAN filed its Petition in Intervention wherein it adopts the allegations and
arguments in the main Petition. It further submits that the COMELEC should have dismissed the
Delfin Petition for failure to state a sufficient cause of action and that the Commissions failure or
refusal to do so constituted grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
On 28 January 1997, Senator Roco submitted copies of portions of both the Journal and the
Record of the House of Representatives relating to the deliberations of House Bill No. 21505, as well
as the transcripts of stenographic notes on the proceedings of the Bicameral Conference Committee,
Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms, of 6 June 1989 on House Bill No. 21505 and Senate
Bill No. 17.
Private respondents Alberto and Carmen Pedrosa filed their Consolidated Comments on the
Petitions in Intervention of Senator Roco, DIK and MABINI, and IBP.
[23]
The parties thereafter filed, in
due time, their separate memoranda.
[24]

As we stated in the beginning, we resolved to give due course to this special civil action.
For a more logical discussion of the formulated issues, we shall first take up the fifth issue which
appears to pose a prejudicial procedural question.
I
THE INSTANT PETITION IS VIABLE DESPITE THE
PENDENCY IN THE COMELEC OF THE DELFIN
PETITION.
Except for the petitioners and intervenor Roco, the parties paid no serious attention to the fifth
issue, i.e., whether it is proper for this Court to take cognizance of this special civil action when there
is a pending case before the COMELEC. The petitioners provide an affirmative answer. Thus:
28. The Comelec has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition filed by private respondent Delfin. This
being so, it becomes imperative to stop the Comelec from proceeding any further, and under the Rules of Court,
Rule 65, Section 2, a petition for prohibition is the proper remedy.
29. The writ of prohibition is an extraordinary judicial writ issuing out of a court of superior jurisdiction and
directed to an inferior court, for the purpose of preventing the inferior tribunal from usurping a jurisdiction with
which it is not legally vested. (People v. Vera, supra., p. 84). In this case the writ is an urgent necessity, in view
of the highly divisive and adverse environmental consequences on the body politic of the questioned Comelec
order. The consequent climate of legal confusion and political instability begs for judicial statesmanship.
30. In the final analysis, when the system of constitutional law is threatened by the political ambitions of man,
only the Supreme Court can save a nation in peril and uphold the paramount majesty of the Constitution.
[25]

It must be recalled that intervenor Roco filed with the COMELEC a motion to dismiss the Delfin
Petition on the ground that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction or authority to entertain the
petition.
[26]
The COMELEC made no ruling thereon evidently because after having heard the
arguments of Delfin and the oppositors at the hearing on 12 December 1996, it required them to
submit within five days their memoranda or oppositions/memoranda.
[27]
Earlier, or specifically on 6
December 1996, it practically gave due course to the Delfin Petition by ordering Delfin to cause the
publication of the petition, together with the attached Petition for Initiative, the signature form, and the
notice of hearing; and by setting the case for hearing. The COMELECs failure to act on Rocos
motion to dismiss and its insistence to hold on to the petition rendered ripe and viable the instant
petition under Section 2 of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. -- Where the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, or person,
whether exercising functions judicial or ministerial, are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with
certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant to desist from further proceedings
in the action or matter specified therein.
It must also be noted that intervenor Roco claims that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction over the
Delfin Petition because the said petition is not supported by the required minimum number of
signatures of registered voters. LABAN also asserts that the COMELEC gravely abused its
discretion in refusing to dismiss the Delfin Petition, which does not contain the required number of
signatures. In light of these claims, the instant case may likewise be treated as a special civil action
for certiorari under Section I of Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
In any event, as correctly pointed out by intervenor Roco in his Memorandum, this Court may
brush aside technicalities of procedure in cases of transcendental importance. As we stated
inKilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.:
[28]

A partys standing before this Court is a procedural technicality which it may, in the exercise of its discretion,
set aside in view of the importance of issues raised. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court
brushed aside this technicality because the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that
they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of procedure.
II
R.A. NO. 6735 INTENDED TO INCLUDE THE SYSTEM
OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, BUT IS, UNFORTUNATELY,
INADEQUATE TO COVER THAT SYSTEM.
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the total number of registered voters, of which every legislative
district must be represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. No amendment under
this section shall be authorized within five years following the ratification of this Constitution nor oftener than
once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This provision is not self-executory. In his book,
[29]
Joaquin Bernas, a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, stated:
Without implementing legislation Section 2 cannot operate. Thus, although this mode of amending the
Constitution is a mode of amendment which bypasses congressional action, in the last analysis it still is
dependent on congressional action.
Bluntly stated, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution through the
system of initiative would remain entombed in the cold niche of the Constitution until Congress
provides for its implementation. Stated otherwise, while the Constitution has recognized or granted
that right, the people cannot exercise it if Congress, for whatever reason, does not provide for its
implementation.
This system of initiative was originally included in Section 1 of the draft Article on Amendment or
Revision proposed by the Committee on Amendments and Transitory Provisions of the 1986
Constitutional Commission in its Committee Report No. 7 (Proposed Resolution No. 332).
[30]
That
section reads as follows:
SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed:
(a) by the National Assembly upon a vote of three-fourths of all its members; or
(b) by a constitutional convention; or
(c) directly by the people themselves thru initiative as provided for in Article ____ Section ____ of the
Constitution.
[31]

After several interpellations, but before the period of amendments, the Committee submitted a new
formulation of the concept of initiative which it denominated as Section 2; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you, Madam President. May we respectfully call attention of the Members of the
Commission that pursuant to the mandate given to us last night, we submitted this afternoon a complete
Committee Report No. 7 which embodies the proposed provision governing the matter of initiative. This is now
covered by Section 2 of the complete committee report. With the permission of the Members, may I quote
Section 2:
The people may, after five years from the date of the last plebiscite held, directly propose amendments to this
Constitution thru initiative upon petition of at least ten percent of the registered voters.
This completes the blanks appearing in the original Committee Report No. 7.
[32]

The interpellations on Section 2 showed that the details for carrying out Section 2 are left to the
legislature. Thus:
FR. BERNAS. Madam President, just two simple, clarificatory questions.
First, on Section 1 on the matter of initiative upon petition of at least 10 percent, there are no details in the
provision on how to carry this out. Do we understand, therefore, that we are leaving this matter to the
legislature?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
FR. BERNAS. And do we also understand, therefore, that for as long as the legislature does not pass the
necessary implementing law on this, this will not operate?
MR. SUAREZ. That matter was also taken up during the committee hearing, especially with respect to the
budget appropriations which would have to be legislated so that the plebiscite could be called. We deemed it
best that this matter be left to the legislature. The Gentleman is right. In any event, as envisioned, no
amendment through the power of initiative can be called until after five years from the date of the ratification of
this Constitution. Therefore, the first amendment that could be proposed through the exercise of this initiative
power would be after five years. It is reasonably expected that within that five-year period, the National
Assembly can come up with the appropriate rules governing the exercise of this power.
FR. BERNAS. Since the matter is left to the legislature - the details on how this is to be carried out - is it
possible that, in effect, what will be presented to the people for ratification is the work of the legislature rather
than of the people? Does this provision exclude that possibility?
MR. SUAREZ. No, it does not exclude that possibility because even the legislature itself as a body could
propose that amendment, maybe individually or collectively, if it fails to muster the three-fourths vote in order
to constitute itself as a constituent assembly and submit that proposal to the people for ratification through the
process of an initiative.
x x x
MS. AQUINO. Do I understand from the sponsor that the intention in the proposal is to vest constituent power
in the people to amend the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is absolutely correct, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. I fully concur with the underlying precept of the proposal in terms of institutionalizing popular
participation in the drafting of the Constitution or in the amendment thereof, but I would have a lot of
difficulties in terms of accepting the draft of Section 2, as written. Would the sponsor agree with me that in the
hierarchy of legal mandate, constituent power has primacy over all other legal mandates?
MR. SUAREZ. The Commissioner is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. And would the sponsor agree with me that in the hierarchy of legal values, the Constitution is
source of all legal mandates and that therefore we require a great deal of circumspection in the drafting and in
the amendments of the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That proposition is nondebatable.
MS. AQUINO. Such that in order to underscore the primacy of constituent power we have a separate article in
the constitution that would specifically cover the process and the modes of amending the Constitution?
MR. SUAREZ. That is right, Madam President.
MS. AQUINO. Therefore, is the sponsor inclined, as the provisions are drafted now, to again concede to the
legislature the process or the requirement of determining the mechanics of amending the Constitution by
people's initiative?
MR. SUAREZ. The matter of implementing this could very well be placed in the hands of the National
Assembly, not unless we can incorporate into this provision the mechanics that would adequately cover all the
conceivable situations.
[33]

It was made clear during the interpellations that the aforementioned Section 2 is limited to
proposals to AMEND -- not to REVISE -- the Constitution; thus:
MR. SUAREZ. ... This proposal was suggested on the theory that this matter of initiative, which came about
because of the extraordinary developments this year, has to be separated from the traditional modes of
amending the Constitution as embodied in Section 1. The committee members felt that this system of initiative
should not extend to the revision of the entire Constitution, so we removed it from the operation of Section 1 of
the proposed Article on Amendment or Revision.
[34]

x x x
MS. AQUINO. In which case, I am seriously bothered by providing this process of initiative as a separate
section in the Article on Amendment. Would the sponsor be amenable to accepting an amendment in terms of
realigning Section 2 as another subparagraph (c) of Section 1, instead of setting it up as another separate section
as if it were a self-executing provision?
MR. SUAREZ. We would be amenable except that, as we clarified a while ago, this process of initiative is
limited to the matter of amendment and should not expand into a revision which contemplates a total overhaul
of the Constitution. That was the sense that was conveyed by the Committee.
MS. AQUINO. In other words, the Committee was attempting to distinguish the coverage of modes (a) and (b)
in Section 1 to include the process of revision; whereas the process of initiation to amend, which is given to the
public, would only apply to amendments?
MR. SUAREZ.That is right. Those were the terms envisioned in the Committee.
[35]

Amendments to the proposed Section 2 were thereafter introduced by then Commissioner Hilario
G. Davide, Jr., which the Committee accepted. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. I propose to substitute the entire Section 2 with the following:
x x x
MR. DAVIDE. Madam President, I have modified the proposed amendment after taking into account the
modifications submitted by the sponsor himself and the honorable Commissioners Guingona, Monsod, Rama,
Ople, de los Reyes and Romulo. The modified amendment in substitution of the proposed Section 2 will now
read as follows: "SECTION 2. -- AMENDMENTS TO THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE
DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST
TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY
LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE
REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER THIS SECTION SHALL BE
AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION OF THIS CONSTITUTION
NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
MR. SUAREZ. Madam President, considering that the proposed amendment is reflective of the sense contained
in Section 2 of our completed Committee Report No. 7, we accept the proposed amendment.
[36]

The interpellations which ensued on the proposed modified amendment to Section 2 clearly
showed that it was a legislative act which must implement the exercise of the right. Thus:
MR. ROMULO. Under Commissioner Davide's amendment, is it possible for the legislature to set forth certain
procedures to carry out the initiative...?
MR. DAVIDE. It can.
x x x
MR. ROMULO. But the Commissioners amendment does not prevent the legislature from asking another
body to set the proposition in proper form.
MR. DAVIDE. The Commissioner is correct. In other words, the implementation of this particular right would
be subject to legislation, provided the legislature cannot determine anymore the percentage of the requirement.
MR. ROMULO. But the procedures, including the determination of the proper form for submission to the
people, may be subject to legislation.
MR. DAVIDE. As long as it will not destroy the substantive right to initiate. In other words, none of the
procedures to be proposed by the legislative body must diminish or impair the right conceded here.
MR. ROMULO. In that provision of the Constitution can the procedures which I have discussed be legislated?
MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
[37]

Commissioner Davide also reaffirmed that his modified amendment strictly confines initiative to
AMENDMENTS to -- NOT REVISION of -- the Constitution. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. With pleasure, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. My first question: Commissioner Davide's proposed amendment on line 1 refers to
"amendment." Does it not cover the word "revision" as defined by Commissioner Padilla when he made the
distinction between the words "amendments" and "revision"?
MR. DAVIDE. No, it does not, because "amendments" and "revision" should be covered by Section 1. So
insofar as initiative is concerned, it can only relate to "amendments" not "revision."
[38]

Commissioner Davide further emphasized that the process of proposing amendments
through initiative must be more rigorous and difficult than the initiative on legislation. Thus:
MR. DAVIDE. A distinction has to be made that under this proposal, what is involved is an amendment to the
Constitution. To amend a Constitution would ordinarily require a proposal by the National Assembly by a vote
of three-fourths; and to call a constitutional convention would require a higher number. Moreover, just to
submit the issue of calling a constitutional convention, a majority of the National Assembly is required, the
import being that the process of amendment must be made more rigorous and difficult than probably initiating
an ordinary legislation or putting an end to a law proposed by the National Assembly by way of a referendum. I
cannot agree to reducing the requirement approved by the Committee on the Legislative because it would
require another voting by the Committee, and the voting as precisely based on a requirement of 10
percent. Perhaps, I might present such a proposal, by way of an amendment, when the Commission shall take up
the Article on the Legislative or on the National Assembly on plenary sessions.
[39]

The Davide modified amendments to Section 2 were subjected to amendments, and the final
version, which the Commission approved by a vote of 31 in favor and 3 against, reads as follows:
MR. DAVIDE. Thank you Madam President. Section 2, as amended, reads as follows: "AMENDMENT TO
THIS CONSTITUTION MAY LIKEWISE BE DIRECTLY PROPOSED BY THE PEOPLE THROUGH
INITIATIVE UPON A PETITION OF AT LEAST TWELVE PERCENT OF THE TOTAL NUMBER OF
REGISTERED VOTERS, OF WHICH EVERY LEGISLATIVE DISTRICT MUST BE REPRESENTED BY
AT LEAST THREE PERCENT OF THE REGISTERED VOTERS THEREOF. NO AMENDMENT UNDER
THIS SECTION SHALL BE AUTHORIZED WITHIN FIVE YEARS FOLLOWING THE RATIFICATION
OF THIS CONSTITUTION NOR OFTENER THAN ONCE EVERY FIVE YEARS THEREAFTER.
THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY SHALL BY LAW PROVIDE FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE
EXERCISE OF THIS RIGHT.
[40]

The entire proposed Article on Amendments or Revisions was approved on second reading on 9 July
1986.
[41]
Thereafter, upon his motion for reconsideration, Commissioner Gascon was allowed to
introduce an amendment to Section 2 which, nevertheless, was withdrawn. In view thereof, the
Article was again approved on Second and Third Readings on 1 August 1986.
[42]

However, the Committee on Style recommended that the approved Section 2 be amended by
changing percent to per centum and thereof to therein and deleting the phrase by law in the
second paragraph so that said paragraph reads: The Congress
[43]
shall provide for the
implementation of the exercise of this right.
[44]
This amendment was approved and is the text of the
present second paragraph of Section 2.
The conclusion then is inevitable that, indeed, the system of initiative on the Constitution under
Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution is not self-executory.
Has Congress provided for the implementation of the exercise of this right? Those who answer
the question in the affirmative, like the private respondents and intervenor Senator Roco, point to us
R.A. No. 6735.
There is, of course, no other better way for Congress to implement the exercise of the right than
through the passage of a statute or legislative act. This is the essence or rationale of the last minute
amendment by the Constitutional Commission to substitute the last paragraph of Section 2 of Article
XVII then reading:
The Congress
[45]
shall by law provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
with
The Congress shall provide for the implementation of the exercise of this right.
This substitute amendment was an investiture on Congress of a power to provide for the rules
implementing the exercise of the right. The rules means the details on how [the right] is to be
carried out.
[46]

We agree that R.A. No. 6735 was, as its history reveals, intended to cover initiative to propose
amendments to the Constitution. The Act is a consolidation of House Bill No. 21505 and Senate Bill
No. 17. The former was prepared by the Committee on Suffrage and Electoral Reforms of the House
of Representatives on the basis of two House Bills referred to it, viz., (a) House Bill No. 497,
[47]
which
dealt with the initiative and referendum mentioned in Sections 1 and 32 of Article VI of the
Constitution; and (b) House Bill No. 988,
[48]
which dealt with the subject matter of House Bill No. 497,
as well as with initiative and referendum under Section 3 of Article X (Local Government) and
initiative provided for in Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution. Senate Bill No. 17
[49]
solely dealt
with initiative and referendum concerning ordinances or resolutions of local government units. The
Bicameral Conference Committee consolidated Senate Bill No. 17 and House Bill No. 21505 into a
draft bill, which was subsequently approved on 8 June 1989 by the Senate
[50]
and by the House of
Representatives.
[51]
This approved bill is now R.A. No. 6735.
But is R.A. No. 6735 a full compliance with the power and duty of Congress to provide for the
implementation of the exercise of the right?
A careful scrutiny of the Act yields a negative answer.
First. Contrary to the assertion of public respondent COMELEC, Section 2 of the Act does not
suggest an initiative on amendments to the Constitution. The said section reads:
SECTION 2. Statement and Policy. -- The power of the people under a system of initiative and referendum to
directly propose, enact, approve or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution, laws, ordinances, or resolutions
passed by any legislative body upon compliance with the requirements of this Act is hereby affirmed,
recognized and guaranteed. (Underscoring supplied).
The inclusion of the word Constitution therein was a delayed afterthought. That word is neither
germane nor relevant to said section, which exclusively relates to initiative and referendum on
national laws and local laws, ordinances, and resolutions. That section is silent as to amendments on
the Constitution. As pointed out earlier, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to
AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in
whole or in part, the Constitution through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to
laws, ordinances, or resolutions.
The foregoing conclusion is further buttressed by the fact that this section was lifted from Section
1 of Senate Bill No. 17, which solely referred to a statement of policy on local initiative and
referendum and appropriately used the phrases propose and enact, approve or reject and in
whole or in part.
[52]

Second. It is true that Section 3 (Definition of Terms) of the Act defines initiative on amendments
to the Constitution and mentions it as one of the three systems of initiative, and that Section 5
(Requirements) restates the constitutional requirements as to the percentage of the registered voters
who must submit the proposal. But unlike in the case of the other systems of initiative, the Act does
not provide for the contents of a petition for initiative on the Constitution. Section 5, paragraph (c)
requires, among other things, statement of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or
rejected, amended or repealed, as the case may be. It does not include, as among the contents of
the petition, the provisions of the Constitution sought to be amended, in the case of initiative on the
Constitution. Said paragraph (c) reads in full as follows:
(c) The petition shall state the following:
c.1 contents or text of the proposed law sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed, as the
case may be;
c.2 the proposition;
c.3 the reason or reasons therefor;
c.4 that it is not one of the exceptions provided therein;
c.5 signatures of the petitioners or registered voters; and
c.6 an abstract or summary proposition is not more than one hundred (100) words which shall be legibly written
or printed at the top of every page of the petition. (Underscoring supplied).
The use of the clause proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or
repealed only strengthens the conclusion that Section 2, quoted earlier, excludes initiative on
amendments to the Constitution.
Third. While the Act provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle II) and for
Local Initiative and Referendum (Subtitle III), no subtitle is provided for initiative on the
Constitution. This conspicuous silence as to the latter simply means that the main thrust of the Act is
initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If Congress intended R.A. No. 6735 to fully
provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have
provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or
hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far
more important than the initiative on national and local laws.
We cannot accept the argument that the initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
subsumed under the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum because it is national in
scope. Our reading of Subtitle II (National Initiative and Referendum) and Subtitle III (Local Initiative
and Referendum) leaves no room for doubt that the classification is not based on the scope of the
initiative involved, but on its nature and character. It is national initiative, if what is proposed to be
adopted or enacted is a national law, or a law which only Congress can pass. It is local initiative if
what is proposed to be adopted or enacted is a law, ordinance, or resolution which only the legislative
bodies of the governments of the autonomous regions, provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays can pass. This classification of initiative into national and local is actually based on
Section 3 of the Act, which we quote for emphasis and clearer understanding:
SEC. 3. Definition of terms --
x x x
There are three (3) systems of initiative, namely:
a.1 Initiative on the Constitution which refers to a petition proposing amendments to the Constitution;
a.2 Initiative on Statutes which refers to a petition proposing to enact a national legislation; and
a.3 Initiative on local legislation which refers to a petition proposing to enact a regional, provincial, city,
municipal, or barangay law, resolution or ordinance. (Underscoring supplied).
Hence, to complete the classification under subtitles there should have been a subtitle on
initiative on amendments to the Constitution.
[53]

A further examination of the Act even reveals that the subtitling is not accurate. Provisions not
germane to the subtitle on National Initiative and Referendum are placed therein, like (1) paragraphs
(b) and (c) of Section 9, which reads:
(b) The proposition in an initiative on the Constitution approved by the majority of the votes cast in the
plebiscite shall become effective as to the day of the plebiscite.
(c) A national or local initiative proposition approved by majority of the votes cast in an election called for the
purpose shall become effective fifteen (15) days after certification and proclamation of the Commission.
(Underscoring supplied).
(2) that portion of Section 11 (Indirect Initiative) referring to indirect initiative with the legislative bodies
of local governments; thus:
SEC. 11. Indirect Initiative. -- Any duly accredited peoples organization, as defined by law, may file a
petition for indirect initiative with the House of Representatives, and other legislative bodies....
and (3) Section 12 on Appeal, since it applies to decisions of the COMELEC on the findings of
sufficiency or insufficiency of the petition for initiative or referendum, which could be petitions for both
national and local initiative and referendum.
Upon the other hand, Section 18 on Authority of Courts under subtitle III on Local Initiative and
Referendum is misplaced,
[54]
since the provision therein applies to both national and local initiative
and referendum. It reads:
SEC. 18. Authority of Courts. -- Nothing in this Act shall prevent or preclude the proper courts from declaring
null and void any proposition approved pursuant to this Act for violation of the Constitution or want of capacity
of the local legislative body to enact the said measure.
Curiously, too, while R.A. No. 6735 exerted utmost diligence and care in providing for the details
in the implementation of initiative and referendum on national and local legislation thereby giving
them special attention, it failed, rather intentionally, to do so on the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. Anent the initiative on national legislation, the Act provides for the
following:
(a) The required percentage of registered voters to sign the petition and the contents of the petition;
(b) The conduct and date of the initiative;
(c) The submission to the electorate of the proposition and the required number of votes for its approval;
(d) The certification by the COMELEC of the approval of the proposition;
(e) The publication of the approved proposition in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines; and
(f) The effects of the approval or rejection of the proposition.
[55]

As regards local initiative, the Act provides for the following:
(a) The preliminary requirement as to the number of signatures of registered voters for the petition;
(b) The submission of the petition to the local legislative body concerned;
(c) The effect of the legislative bodys failure to favorably act thereon, and the invocation of the power of
initiative as a consequence thereof;
(d) The formulation of the proposition;
(e) The period within which to gather the signatures;
(f) The persons before whom the petition shall be signed;
(g) The issuance of a certification by the COMELEC through its official in the local government unit concerned
as to whether the required number of signatures have been obtained;
(h) The setting of a date by the COMELEC for the submission of the proposition to the registered voters for
their approval, which must be within the period specified therein;
(i) The issuance of a certification of the result;
(j) The date of effectivity of the approved proposition;
(k) The limitations on local initiative; and
(l) The limitations upon local legislative bodies.
[56]

Upon the other hand, as to initiative on amendments to the Constitution, R.A. No. 6735, in all of
its twenty-three sections, merely (a) mentions, the word Constitution in Section 2; (b) defines
initiative on the Constitution and includes it in the enumeration of the three systems of initiative in
Section 3; (c) speaks of plebiscite as the process by which the proposition in an initiative on the
Constitution may be approved or rejected by the people; (d) reiterates the constitutional requirements
as to the number of voters who should sign the petition; and (e) provides for the date of effectivity of
the approved proposition.
There was, therefore, an obvious downgrading of the more important or the paramount system of
initiative. R.A. No. 6735 thus delivered a humiliating blow to the system of initiative on amendments
to the Constitution by merely paying it a reluctant lip service.
[57]

The foregoing brings us to the conclusion that R.A. No. 6735 is incomplete, inadequate, or
wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is
concerned. Its lacunae on this substantive matter are fatal and cannot be cured by empowering the
COMELEC to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes
of [the] Act.
[58]

The rule is that what has been delegated, cannot be delegated or as expressed in a Latin
maxim: potestas delegata non delegari potest.
[59]
The recognized exceptions to the rule are as
follows:
(1) Delegation of tariff powers to the President under Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(2) Delegation of emergency powers to the President under Section 23(2) of Article VI of the Constitution;
(3) Delegation to the people at large;
(4) Delegation to local governments; and
(5) Delegation to administrative bodies.
[60]

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to
promulgate rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority under no. 5
above. However, in every case of permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation
itself is valid. It is valid only if the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out, or implemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard -- the limits of which
are sufficiently determinate and determinable -- to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.
[61]
A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its
limits, maps out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative command is to be effected.
[62]

Insofar as initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution is concerned, R.A. No. 6735
miserably failed to satisfy both requirements in subordinate legislation. The delegation of the power
to the COMELEC is then invalid.
III
COMELEC RESOLUTION NO. 2300, INSOFAR AS IT PRESCRIBES RULES AND
REGULATIONS ON THE CONDUCT OF INITIATIVE ON AMENDMENTS TO THE
CONSTITUTION, IS VOID.
It logically follows that the COMELEC cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to
implement the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution
through the system of initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735. Reliance on the
COMELECs power under Section 2(1) of Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws
and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of
Article IX-C of the Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is authorized and which
satisfies the completeness and the sufficient standard tests.
IV
COMELEC ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
IN ENTERTAINING THE DELFIN PETITION.
Even if it be conceded ex gratia that R.A. No. 6735 is a full compliance with the power of
Congress to implement the right to initiate constitutional amendments, or that it has validly vested
upon the COMELEC the power of subordinate legislation and that COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is
valid, the COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in entertaining the
Delfin Petition.
Under Section 2 of Article XVII of the Constitution and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 6735, a petition for
initiative on the Constitution must be signed by at least 12% of the total number of registered voters of
which every legislative district is represented by at least 3% of the registered voters therein. The
Delfin Petition does not contain signatures of the required number of voters. Delfin himself admits that
he has not yet gathered signatures and that the purpose of his petition is primarily to obtain
assistance in his drive to gather signatures. Without the required signatures, the petition cannot be
deemed validly initiated.
The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for initiative only after its filing. The petition
then is the initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by the COMELEC, sittingen
banc. The only participation of the COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition are (1)
to prescribe the form of the petition;
[63]
(2) to issue through its Election Records and Statistics Office a
certificate on the total number of registered voters in each legislative district;
[64]
(3) to assist, through
its election registrars, in the establishment of signature stations;
[65]
and (4) to verify, through its
election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the registry list of voters, voters affidavits, and
voters identification cards used in the immediately preceding election.
[66]

Since the Delfin Petition is not the initiatory petition under R.A. No. 6735 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 2300, it cannot be entertained or given cognizance of by the COMELEC. The latter
knew that the petition does not fall under any of the actions or proceedings under the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure or under Resolution No. 2300, for which reason it did not assign to the petition a
docket number. Hence, the said petition was merely entered as UND, meaning, undocketed. That
petition was nothing more than a mere scrap of paper, which should not have been dignified by the
Order of 6 December 1996, the hearing on 12 December 1996, and the order directing Delfin and the
oppositors to file their memoranda or oppositions. In so dignifying it, the COMELEC acted without
jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion and merely wasted its time, energy, and resources.
The foregoing considered, further discussion on the issue of whether the proposal to lift the term
limits of the elective national and local officials is an amendment to, and not a revision of, the
Constitution is rendered unnecessary, if not academic.
CONCLUSION
This petition must then be granted, and the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from
entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments on the Constitution until
a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system.
We feel, however, that the system of initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution should
no longer be kept in the cold; it should be given flesh and blood, energy and strength. Congress
should not tarry any longer in complying with the constitutional mandate to provide for the
implementation of the right of the people under that system.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hreby rendered
a) GRANTING the instant petition;
b) DECLARING R.A. No. 6735 inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution, and to have failed to provide sufficient standard for subordinate legislation;
c) DECLARING void those parts of Resolutions No. 2300 of the Commission on Elections
prescribing rules and regulations on the conduct of initiative or amendments to the Constitution; and
d) ORDERING the Commission on Elections to forthwith DISMISS the DELFIN petition (UND-96-
037).
The Temporary Restraining Order issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent as against
the Commission on Elections, but is LIFTED against private respondents.
Resolution on the matter of contempt is hereby reserved.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Romero, Bellosillo,Kapunan, Hermosisima, Jr. and Torres Jr.,
JJ., concur.
Padilla, J., took no part; related to a co-petitioner and co-counsel of the petitioners.
Melo and Mendoza, JJ., joins the separate, concurring opinions of Justices Puno, Francisco and
Panganiban.
Puno, Vitug, , Francisco and Panganiban, JJ., has separate opinions.