Settlement of Boundary Disputes

CITY OF PASIG VS COMELEC

FACTS:
On April 22, 1996, upon petition of the residents of Karangalan Village that they be separated from its mother Barangays
Manggahan and Dela Paz, City of Pasig, and to be converted and separated into a distinct barangay to be known as
Barangay Karangalan, the City of Pasig passed and approved Ordinance No. 21, Series of 1996, creating Brgy.
Karangalan in Pasig City. Plebiscite on the creation of said barangay was thereafter set for June 22, 1996.

Meanwhile on Sep. 9, 1996, the City of Pasig similarly issued Ordinance No. 52 creating Barangay Napico in Pasig City.
Plebiscite for this purpose was set for March 15, 1997.

Immediately upon learning of such Ordinances, the Municipality of Cainta moved to suspend/cancel the respective
plebiscites scheduled, and filed Petitions with the COMELEC on June 19, 1996, and March 12, 1997, respectively. In both
Petitions, the Municipality of Cainta called the attention of the COMELEC to a pending case before the RTC of Antipolo,
Rizal, Branch 74, for settlement of boundary dispute.

According to the Municipality of Cainta, the proposed barangays involve areas included in the boundary dispute subject of
said pending case; hence, the scheduled plebiscites should be suspended/cancelled until after the said case shall have
been finally decided by the court.


ISSUE: Whether or not the plebiscites scheduled for the creation of Barangays Karangalan and Napico should be
suspended/cancelled in view of the pending boundary dispute between the 2 local governments.

HELD:

A case involving a boundary dispute between LGUs presents a prejudicial question which must first be decided before
plebiscites for the creation of the proposed barangays may be held.
While it may be the general rule that a prejudicial question contemplates a civil and criminal action and does not come into
play where both cases are civil in the interest of good order, the SC can very well suspend action on one case pending
the outcome of another case closely interrelated/linked to the first.

While the City of Pasig vigorously claims that the areas covered by the proposed barangays Karangalan and Napico are
within its territory, it cannot deny that portions of the same areas are included in the boundary dispute case pending
before the RTC of Antipolo. Surely, whether the areas in controversy shall be decided as within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Municipality of Cainta or the City of Pasig has material bearing to the creation of the proposed barangays.

A requisite for the creation of a barangay is for its territorial jurisdiction to be properly identified by metes and bounds or by
more or less permanent natural boundaries. Primarily because territorial jurisdiction is an issue raised in a pending civil
case, until and unless such issue is resolved with finality, to define the territorial jurisdiction of the proposed barangays
would only be an exercise in futility.

In Mariano Jr., vs. COMELEC, the importance of drawing with precise strokes the territorial boundaries of an LGU cannot
be overemphasized. The boundaries must be clear for they define the limits of the territorial jurisdiction of an LGU<. It can
legitimately exercise powers of government only within the limits of its territorial jurisdiction. Needless to state, any
uncertainty in the boundaries of LGUs will sow costly conflicts in the exercise of governmental powers which ultimately will
prejudice the peoples welfare.

Merely because a plebiscite had already been held in regard to a proposed barangay does not necessarily render a
pending petition for settlement of a boundary dispute involving said barangay moot and academic. The issues raised by
the Municipality of Cainta in its petition before the COMELEC against the holding of the plebiscite for the creation of
Barangay Napico are still pending determination before the Antipolo RTC.





MUNICIPALITY OF STA. FE VS MUNICIPALITY OF ARITAO
Facts:
In 1980, petitioner Municipality of Sta. Fe, in Nueva Vizcaya, filed before the RTC of Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for the
Determination of Boundary Dispute involving the barangays of Bantinan and Canabuan. The trial was almost over when
the court realized its error. The court suspended the proceedings and referred the case to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Nueva Vizcaya. The Sanggunian adopted Resolution 64 adjudicating the two barangays as part of respondents
territory. The Sanggunian approved the Committees recommendation but endorsed the boundary dispute to the RTC for
further proceedings.
In the RTC, respondent moved to consider Resolution 64 as final and executory. The RTC denied the motion ruling that
since there was no amicable settlement in the Sanggunian, the latter cannot issue a decision favoring a party. The court
held that, under the law in force, the purpose of such referral was only to afford the parties an opportunity to amicably
settle with the intervention and assistance of the Provincial Board and that in case no such settlement is reached, the
court proceedings shall be resumed.
Respondent filed a motion praying for the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction since the power to try and decide
municipal boundary disputes already belonged to the Sanggunian. The RTC granted the motion. The CA affirmed.
According to the CA, a new legislation can be given retroactive effect so long as it is curative in nature. Thus, the LGC
vesting jurisdiction to the Sanggunian was given retroactive effect.

Since the Local Government Code of 1991 is the latest will of the people expressed through Congress on how boundary
disputes should be resolved, the same must prevail over previous ones. It must be emphasized that the laws on the
creation of local government units as well as settling boundary disputes are political in character, hence, can be changed
from time to time and the latest will of the people should always prevail. In the instant case, there is nothing wrong in
holding that Regional Trial Courts no longer have jurisdiction over boundary disputes.
Issue: WON the CA erred in affirming the dismissal of the case for lack of jurisdiction
Held: No
Ratio: October 1, 1917 (Revised Administrative Code)- jurisdiction with the provincial boards of the provinces in which the
municipalities are situated; June 17, 1970 (RA 6128)- jurisdiction with the CFI of the Province where the municipalities are
situated; February 10, 1983 (BP 337 or the 1983 Local Government Code); January 1, 1992 (LGC); - Sangguniang
Panlalawigan where the municipalities are situated, appeal with the RTC.
This Court agrees with petitioners contention that the trial court had jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint when
it was filed on October 16, 1980 since the prevailing law then was Section 2167 of the RAC, as amended by Sec. 1 RA
6128, which granted the CFI the jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of municipal boundary disputes. Municipality of
Sogod reveal that it dealt with the trial courts dismissal of cases filed for lack of jurisdiction because at the time of the
institution of the civil actions, the law in force was the old provision of Sec. 2167 of the RAC, which empowered the
provincial boards, not the trial courts, to hear and resolve such cases.
The difference in the factual setting notwithstanding, Municipality of Sogod still applies in the sense that similar thereto the
pendency of the present case has also been overtaken by events the ratification of the 1987 Constitution and the
enactment of the LGC of 1991. As shown above, since the effectivity of R.A. No. 6128, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
has been the primary tribunal responsible in the amicable settlement of boundary disputes between or among two or more
municipalities located in the same province.
With the LGC of 1991, however, a major change has been introduced that in the event the Sanggunian fails to effect a
settlement, it shall not only issue a certification to that effect but must also formally hear and decide the case within the
reglementary period. Rule III of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC of 1991 outlines the procedure for the
settlement of boundary disputes. Unlike Ra 6128 and BP 337, the LGC of 1991 grants an expanded role on the
Sanggunian concerned in resolving cases of municipal boundary disputes.
Aside from having the function of bringing the contending parties together and intervening or assisting in the amicable
settlement of the case, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan is now specifically vested with original jurisdiction to actually hear
and decide the dispute in accordance with the procedures laid down in the law and its implementing rules and regulations.
This situation, in effect, reverts to the old rule under the RAC, prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 6128, under which the
provincial boards were empowered to investigate, hear the parties and eventually decide the case on the basis thereof.
On the other hand, under the LGC of 1991, the trial court loses its power to try, at the first instance, cases of municipal
boundary disputes. Only in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction can the proper RTC decide the case, on appeal,
should any party aggrieved by the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan elevate the same.
The RTC correctly dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. Under the rules, it was the responsibility of the court to
dismiss an action whenever it appears that [it] has no jurisdiction over the subject matter. Indeed, the RTC acted
accordingly because at the time of the filing of the motion to dismiss its want of jurisdiction was evident.
It was duty-bound to take judicial notice of the parameters of its jurisdiction as the choice of the proper forum was crucial
for the decision of a court or tribunal without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time by this Court
as it would never become final and executory.
Likewise, the standing rule is that dismissal of a case for lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings
since jurisdiction is conferred by law and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and to
render judgment on the action; otherwise, the inevitable consequence would make the courts decision a lawless thing.
As correctly pointed out by the RTC it will be a futile act for the Court to rule on the case concerning a boundary dispute if
its decision will not after all be followed by the people concerned because the decision is totally unacceptable to them.
How then can the Court enforce its decision?
Petitioner contends that the provisions of the 1987 Constitution and the LGC of 1991 on the settlement of municipal
boundary disputes should be applied prospectively. The Court is not unmindful of the rule.























BARANGAY SANGALANG v. BARANGAY MAGUIHAN
Doctrine:
To this Courts mind, the presence of the cadastral map, which was approved by the Director of Lands, should be given
more weight than the documents sourced by petitioner from the assessors office. Between a geodetic engineer and a tax
assessor, the conclusion is inevitable that it is the formers certification as to the location of properties in dispute that is
controlling, absent any finding of abuse of discretion.
Facts:
The controversy has its roots in a barangay jurisdiction dispute between petitioner Barangay Sangalang and respondent
Barangay Maguihan, both situated in Lemery, Batangas. Specifically, the properties involved in the controversy are those
covered by Tax Declaration Nos. 038-00315, 038-00316, and 038-00317. Resolution No. 75-96 was subsequently passed
recognizing that the areas which are the subject of a barangay dispute covered are within the territorial jurisdiction of
Barangay Sangalang. The documents presented by petitioner were sourced from the tax assessors office, whereas the
documents presented by respondent were sourced from the land management bureau.

Issue:
Which between the documents presented by the parties carries greater weight in proving its claim?
Held:
To this Courts mind, the presence of the cadastral map, which was approved by the Director of Lands, should be given
more weight than the documents sourced by petitioner from the assessors office. Said map was approved on March 17,
1986, which was approximately 10 years before the controversy in hand developed. Hence, the same should be
controlling in the absence of proof that such document is invalid or inaccurate. This Court shares the view of the RTC. It is
undisputed that the Land Management Bureau is the principal government agency tasked with the survey of lands, and
thus, more weight should be given to the documents relating to its official tasks which are presumed to be done in the
ordinary course of business. Between a geodetic engineer and a tax assessor, the conclusion is inevitable that it is the
formers certification as to the location of properties in dispute that is controlling, absent any finding of abuse of discretion.

















MUNICIPALITY OF KANANGA VS MADRONA
FACTS: When a boundary dispute arose between the Municipality of Kananga and the City of Ormoc. By agreement, the
parties submitted the issue to amicable settlement. No amicable settlement was reached.
The City of Ormoc filed before the RTC of Ormoc City a complaint to settle the boundary dispute. Petitioner municipality
filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, but the RTC denied the same.
RTC: it had jurisdiction over the action under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. that Section 118 of the Local Government Code
had been substantially complied with, because both parties already had the occasion to meet and thresh out their
differences. In fact, both agreed to elevate the matter to the trial court via Resolution No. 97-01. It also held that Section
118 governed venue; hence, the parties could waive and agree upon it under Section 4(b) of Rule 4 of the Rules of Court.
ISSUE: WON Section 118 of the LGU on boundary dispute settlement applies.
WON respondent court may exercise original jurisdiction over the settlement of a boundary dispute between a municipality
and an independent component city.
HELD: No, Section 118 does not apply. Yes, RTC has jurisdiction
POLITICAL LAW; LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE; SECTION 118 THEREOF; PROCEDURE FOR SETTLEMENT OF
BOUNDARY DISPUTES BETWEEN A COMPONENT CITY OR MUNICIPALITY AND A HIGHLY URBANIZED CITY;
ORMOC IS NOT A HIGHLY URBANIZED CITY IN CASE AT BAR.
Sec. 118.Jurisdictional Responsibility for Settlement of Boundary Disputes. Boundary disputes between and among
local government units shall, as much as possible, be settled amicably. To this end:
(a) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more barangays in the same city or municipality shall be referred for
settlement to the sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang bayan concerned.
(b) Boundary disputes involving two (2) or more municipalities within the same province shall be referred for settlement to
the sangguniang panlalawigan concerned.
(c) Boundary disputes involving municipalities or component cities of different provinces shall be jointly referred for
settlement to the sanggunians of the provinces concerned.
(d) Boundary disputes involving a component city or municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the
other or two (2) or more highly urbanized cities, shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the
parties.
(e) In the event the sanggunian fails to effect an amicable settlement within sixty (60) days from the date the dispute was
referred thereto, it shall issue a certification to that effect. Thereafter, the dispute shall be formally tried by the sanggunian
concerned which shall decide the issue within sixty (60) days from the date of the certification referred to above.

Under Section 118 of the Local Government Code, the settlement of a boundary dispute between a component city or a
municipality on the one hand and a highly urbanized city on the other or between two or more highly urbanized cities
shall be jointly referred for settlement to the respective sanggunians of the local government units involved. There is no
question that Kananga is a municipality constituted under Republic Act No. 542. By virtue of Section 442(d) of the LGC, it
continued to exist and operate as such. However, Ormoc is not a highly urbanized, but an independent component, city
created under Republic Act No. 179.
Section 118 of the LGC applies to a situation in which a component city or a municipality seeks to settle a boundary
dispute with a highly urbanized city, not with an independent component city. While Kananga is a municipality, Ormoc is
an independent component city. Clearly then, the procedure referred to in Section 118 does not apply to them.

SECTION 451 THEREOF; CITY; CLASSIFICATION; ORMOC IS DEEMED AN INDEPENDENT COMPONENT CITY IN
CASE AT BAR. Under Section 451 of the LGC, a city may be either component or highly urbanized. Ormoc is deemed
an independent component city, because its charter prohibits its voters from voting for provincial elective officials. It is a
city independent of the province. In fact, it is considered a component, not a highly urbanized, city of Leyte in Region VIII
by both Batas Pambansa Blg. 643, which calls for a plebiscite; and the Omnibus Election Code, which apportions
representatives to the defunct Batasang Pambansa. There is neither a declaration by the President of the Philippines nor
an allegation by the parties that it is highly urbanized. On the contrary, petitioner asserted in its Motion to Dismiss that
Ormoc was an independent chartered city.
REMEDIAL LAW; B.P. BLG. 129; GENERAL JURISDICTION OF RTCs TO ADJUDICATE ALL CONTROVERSIES
EXCEPT THOSE EXPRESSLY WITHHELD FROM THEIR PLENARY POWERS; CASE AT BAR. As previously
stated, jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties. It must exist as a matter of law and
cannot be conferred by the consent of the parties or by estoppel. It should not be confused with venue. Inasmuch as
Section 118 of the LGC finds no application to the instant case, the general rules governing jurisdiction should then be
used. The applicable provision is found in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691. Since there is no law providing for the exclusive jurisdiction of any
court or agency over the settlement of boundary disputes between a municipality and an independent component city of
the same province, respondent court committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying the Motion to Dismiss. RTCs
have general jurisdiction to adjudicate all controversies except those expressly withheld from their plenary powers. They
have the power not only to take judicial cognizance of a case instituted for judicial action for the first time, but also to do so
to the exclusion of all other courts at that stage. Indeed, the power is not only original, but also exclusive.