Alvero vs.

Dizon
Facts: While the battle for Manila was raging, soldiers of the United States Army, accompanied by men
of Filipino Guerrilla Forces, placed Aurelio S. Alvero under arrest, having been suspected of collaboration
with the enemy, and seized and took certain papers from his house in Pasay, Rizal.
Alvero was accused of treason. He filed a petition, demanding the return of the papers allegedly seized
and taken from his house. Alvero also filed a petition for bail, at the hearing of which the prosecution
presented certain papers and documents, which were admitted as part of its evidence, and said petition
was denied. At the trial of the case on the merits, the prosecution again presented said papers and
documents, which were admitted as part of its evidence, and were marked as exhibits. The judges
issued an order denying the petition for the return of the documents, and admitted as competent
evidence the documents presented by the prosecution. A motion for reconsideration was also denied.
Issue: Whether or not the documents seized by United States Army personnel at Alveros home can be
used as evidence against the latter.
Held: The right of officers and men of the United States Army to arrest herein petitioner, as a
collaborationist suspect, and to seize his personal papers, without any search warrant, in the zone of
military operations, is unquestionable. The purpose of the constitutional provisions against unlawful
searches and seizures is to prevent violations of private security in person and property, and unlawful
invasions of the sanctity of the home, by officers of the law acting under legislative or judicial sanction,
and to give remedy against such usurpations when attempted. But it does not prohibit the Federal
Government from taking advantage of unlawful searches made by a private person or under authority of
state law. Herein, as the soldiers of the United States Army, that took and seized certain papers and
documents from the residence of Alvero, were not acting as agents or on behalf of the Government of
the Commonwealth of the Philippines; and that those papers and documents came into the possession
of the authorities of the Commonwealth Government, through the Office of the CIC of the United States
Army in Manila, the use and presentation of said papers and documents, cannot now be legally
attacked, on the ground of unlawful or unreasonable searches and seizures, or on any other
constitutional ground.
The most important exception to the necessity for a search warrant is the right of search and seizure as
an incident to a lawful arrest. A lawful arrest may be made either while a crime is being committed or
after its commission. The right to search includes in both instances that of searching the person of him
who is arrested, in order to find and seize things connected with the crime as its fruits or as the means
by which it was committed. When one is legally arrested for an offense, whatever is found in his
possession or in his control may be seized and used in evidence against him; and an officer has the right
to make an arrest without a warrant of a person believed by the officer upon reasonable grounds to
have committed a felony.

People vs Andre Marti

Facts: Andre Marti and his common-law wife, Shirley Reyes, went to the booth of the Manila Packing
and Export Forwarders carrying with them 4 gift-wrapped packages. Anita Reyes (the proprietress and
no relation to Shirley Reyes) attended to them. Marti informed Anita Reyes that he was sending the
packages to a friend in Zurich, Switzerland. Marti filled up the contract necessary for the transaction,
writing therein his name, passport number, the date of shipment and the name and address of the
consignee, namely, "WALTER FIERZ, Mattacketr II, 8052 Zurich, Switzerland." Anita Reyes did not inspect
the packages as Marti refused, who assured the former that the packages simply contained books,
cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his friend in Zurich. In view of Marti's representation, the 4 packages
were then placed inside a brown corrugated box, with styro-foam placed at the bottom and on top of
the packages, and sealed with masking tape. Before delivery of Marti's box to the Bureau of Customs
and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes), following standard
operating procedure, opened the boxes for final inspection, where a peculiar odor emitted therefrom.
Job pulled out a cellophane wrapper protruding from the opening of one of the gloves, and took several
grams of the contents thereof. Job Reyes forthwith prepared a letter reporting the shipment to the NBI
and requesting a laboratory examination of the samples he extracted from the cellophane wrapper. At
the Narcotics Section of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), the box containing Marti's packages
was opened, yielding dried marijuana leaves, or cake-like (bricks) dried marijuana leaves. The NBI agents
made an inventory and took charge of the box and of the contents thereof, after signing a "Receipt"
acknowledging custody of the said effects. Thereupon, the NBI agents tried to locate Marti but to no
avail, inasmuch as the latter's stated address was the Manila Central Post Office. Thereafter, information
was filed against Marti for violation of RA 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act and was
convicted. Hence, this appeal.

Issue: Whether an act of a private individual, allegedly in violation of the accused's constitutional rights,
be invoked against the State.

Held: In the absence of governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by the Constitution cannot
be invoked against the State. The contraband herein, having come into possession of the Government
without the latter transgressing the accused's rights against unreasonable search and seizure, the Court
sees no cogent reason why the same should not be admitted against him in the prosecution of the
offense charged. The mere presence of the NBI agents did not convert the reasonable search effected by
Reyes into a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the Constitution. Merely to observe and look
at that which is in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which is open, where no trespass has
been committed in aid thereof, is not search. Where the contraband articles are identified without a
trespass on the part of the arresting officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the constitution.
The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint
directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it
could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable
exercise of power is imposed. If the search is made upon the request of law enforcers, a warrant must
generally be first secured if it is to pass the test of constitutionality. However, if the search is made at
the behest or initiative of the proprietor of a private establishment for its own and private purposes, as
in the case at bar, and without the intervention of police authorities, the right against unreasonable
search and seizure cannot be invoked for only the act of private individual, not the law enforcers, is
involved. In sum, the protection against unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts
committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion by the
government.

Bache and Company vs Ruiz

Facts: Misael P. Vera, Commissioner of Internal Revenue, wrote a letter addressed to Judge Vivencio M.
Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against Bache & Co. (Phil.), Inc. and Frederick E.
Seggerman for violation of Section 46(a) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), in relation to all
other pertinent provisions thereof, particularly Sections 53, 72, 73, 208 and 209, and authorizing
Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon to make and file the application for search warrant which was
attached to the letter. In the afternoon of the following day, De Leon and his witness, Arturo Logronio,
went to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal. They brought with them the following papers: Vera's
letter-request; an application for search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by De Leon; an
affidavit of Logronio subscribed before De Leon; a deposition in printed form of Logronio already
accomplished and signed by him but not yet subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished but
still unsigned by Judge. At that time the Judge was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he
instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the session
had adjourned, the Judge was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer,
upon request of the Judge, read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, the Judge asked
Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal
basis, he could be charged for perjury. The Judge signed de Leon's application for search warrant and
Logronio's deposition. Search Warrant 2-M-70 was then signed by Judge and accordingly issued. 3 days
later (a Saturday), the BIR agents served the search warrant to the corporation and Seggerman at the
offices of the corporation on Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal. The corporation's lawyers protested the
search on the ground that no formal complaint or transcript of testimony was attached to the warrant.
The agents nevertheless proceeded with their search which yielded 6 boxes of documents. The
corporation and Seggerman filed a petition for dissolution of the search warrant, however dismissed. In
the meantime, or on 16 April 1970, the Bureau of Internal Revenue made tax assessments
on the corporation in the total sum of P2,594,729.97, partly, if not entirely, based on the documents
thus seized. The corporation and Seggerman filed an action for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.

Issue: WON a valid arrest warrant has been issued.

Held: Search Warrant No. 2-M-70 issued by respondent Judge is declared null and void. Personal
examination by the Judge of the complainant and the witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine
the existence or non-existence of a probable cause, the determination of whether or not a probable
cause exists calls for the exercise of judgment after a judicial appraisal of facts and should not be
allowed to be delegated in the absence of any rule to the contrary.

In this case at bar, no personal examination at all was conducted by respondent Judge of the
complainant and his witnesses. The participation of respondent Judge in the proceedings which led to
the issuance of Search Warrant 2-M-70 was thus limited to listening to the stenographers readings of
her notes to a few words of warning against the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to
the complainant and his witness. This cannot be considered a personal examination. If there was an
examination at all of the complainant and his witness, it was one conducted by the Deputy Clerk of
Court.

Stonehill vs Diokno

Facts: Respondents (Prosecutors) made possible the issuance of 42 search warrants against the
petitioner and the corporation to search persons and premises of several personal properties due to an
alleged violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Custom Laws, Internal Revenue Code and the Revised
Penal Code of the Philippines. As a results, search and seizures were conducted in the both the
residence of the petitioner and in the corporation's premises.
The petitioner contended that the search warrants are null and void as their issuance violated the
Constitution and the Rules of Court for being general warrants, assailing among others that:
(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized; (2) cash
money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized; (3) the warrants were issued to fish
evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases filed against them; (4) the
searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and (5) the documents, papers and cash money
seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants, to be disposed of in accordance with
law

He filed a petition with the Supreme Court for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and injunction to
prevent the seized effects from being introduced as evidence in the deportation cases against the
petitioner. The court issued the writ only for those effects found in the petitioner's residence.
Issue: Whether or not the petitioner can validly assail the legality of the search and seizure in both
premises

Held:

The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may
be split into (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the corporations and
(b) those found seized in the residences. As regards the first group, Stonehill, et. al. have no cause of
action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the seizures made in pursuance thereof, for
the simple reason that said corporations have their respective personalities, separate and distinct from
the personality of Stonehill, et.al., regardless of the amount of shares of stock or of the interest of each
of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well
settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired
thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be
availed of by third parties. Consequently, Stonehill, et. al. may not validly object to the use in evidence
against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the
corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence
belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by
the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity.

Simply put, only the party whose rights has been impaired can validly object the legality of a seizure--a
purely personal right which cannot be exercised by a third party. The right to object belongs to the
corporation ( for the 1st group of documents, papers, and things seized from the offices and the
premises).

Wilson vs Layne
Facts: A team of Deputy US Marshals and Montgomery County (MD) police officers were accompanied
in their execution of an arrest warrant by a news reporter and photographer from the Washington Post.
The warrant made no mention of the media participation. The police did not find the individual named
in the warrant at his home address. They did, however, awaken the parents of the suspect. In objecting
to the search of his home, Charles Wilson, the suspects father, was wrestled to his living room floor and
a gun held to his head. The reporter witnessed the encounter. Pictures were taken of the respondent
clad only in his underwear as well as of his wife dressed in her nightgown. No photographs were ever
used and no story was ever published about this encounter. 6 Nonetheless, the Wilsons sued the police
agency for bringing the media into their home. In pre-trial activity, the police respondents motioned for
summary judgment on the basis of their qualified immunity, that is, as government employees they
argued that they were protected from lawsuits for reasonable actions performed in the line of duty. The
District Court denied this request. The police officers then appealed to the 4th Circuit of the U.S. Court
of Appeals which heard the case three times ultimately upholding en banc the polices qualified
immunity defense.

Issue: WON execution of warrants with the presence of media furthers the objectives of an authorized
intrusion.

Held: No. Although the officers undoubtedly were entitled to enter the Wilson home in order to execute
the arrest warrant for Dominic Wilson, they were not entitled to bring a newspaper reporter and a
photographer with them. While it does not mean that every police action while inside a home must be
explicitly authorized by the text of the warrant, the Fourth Amendment does require that police actions
in execution of a warrant be related to the objectives of the authorized intrusion. Inasmuch as that the
reporters did not engage in the execution of the warrant and did not assist the police in their task, the
reporters were not present for any reason related to the justification for police entry into the home--the
apprehension of Dominic Wilson. It may well be that media ride-alongs further the law enforcement
objectives of the police in a general sense, but that is not the same as furthering the purposes of the
search. Although it may be claimed that the presence of third parties could serve in some situations to
minimize police abuses and protect suspects, and also to protect the safety of the officers, such a
situation is significantly different from the media presence in this case, where the Washington Post
reporters in the Wilsons' home were working on a story for their own purposes. Taken in their entirety,
the reasons advanced by the officers fall short of justifying the presence of media inside a home. Thus, it
is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for police to bring members of the media or other third parties
into a home during the execution of a warrant when the presence of the third parties in the home was
not in aid of the execution of the warrant.

Burgos vs. Chief of Staff
Facts: Two warrants were issued against petitioners for the search on the premises of Metropolitan
Mail and We Forum newspapers and the seizure of items (office and printing machines, equipment,
paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the
said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature) alleged to
have been used in subversive activities. Petitioners prayed that a writ of preliminary mandatory and
prohibitory injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents be enjoined
from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner.
Petitioners questioned the warrants for the lack of probable cause
Issue: WON a probable cause exists for the issuance of the warrants on the ground that items sought to
be searched are not described with particularity.
Held: the Court declared the two warrants null and void.
Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched.
The Court ruled that the affidavits submitted for the application of the warrant did not satisfy the
requirement of probable cause, the statements of the witnesses having been mere generalizations.
Further, when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in
connection with the publication of subversive materials, the application and/or its supporting affidavits
must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published
or is intending to publish.
People vs Chua Ho San
Facts: In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Chief of Police of
the Bacnotan Police Station, of La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers. While
monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala on 29 March 1995, he intercepted a radio call requesting
police assistance regarding an unfamiliar speedboat which incidentally carried a lone male passenger
who is carrying a multicolored strawbag. Speaking in English, then in Tagalog, and later in Ilocano, Cid
then requested the man to open his bag, but he seemed not to understand. Cid then resorted to "sign
language," motioning with his hands for the man to open the bag. The man apparently understood and
acceded to the request. A search of the bag yielded several transparent plastic packets containing
yellowish crystalline substances. They brought the man to the police station where he has been
informed of his constitutional right. Chua's bag and its contents were sent to the PNP Crime Laboratory
at Camp Diego Silang, Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union for laboratory examination and were found
positive for shabu. Chua was initially charged with illegal possession of methamphetamine
hydrochloride before the RTC (Criminal Case 4037), however, subsequently amended to illegal transport
of a regulated drug. At his arraignment where the amended complaint was read to him by a Fukien-
speaking interpreter, Chua entered a plea of not guilty. Chua provided a completely different story. The
RTC convicted Chua for transporting 28.7 kilos of methamphetamine hydrochloride without legal
authority to do so. Chua prays for the reversal of the RTC decision and his acquittal before the Supreme
Court.
Issue: WON Chuas suspicious behavior when he saw the police authorities alongside persistent reports
of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contrabands constitute "probable cause."
Held: No. Enshrined in the Constitution is the inviolable right to privacy of home and person. It explicitly
ordains that people have the right to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose. Inseparable, and not
merely corollary or incidental to said right and equally hallowed in and by the Constitution, is the
exclusionary principle which decrees that any evidence obtained in violation of said right is inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.
The Constitutional proscription against unreasonable searches and seizures does not, of course, forestall
reasonable searches and seizure. This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is
not absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by
jurisprudence. The Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrests, to wit: (1) arrests in
flagrante delicto, (2) arrests effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrests of escaped prisoners. The
prosecution and the defense painted extremely divergent versions of the incident, but the Court is
certain that Chua was arrested and his bag searched without the benefit of a warrant. There are no facts
on record reasonably suggestive or demonstrative of Chuas participation in an ongoing criminal
enterprise that could have spurred police officers from conducting the obtrusive search. Persistent
reports of rampant smuggling of firearm and other contraband articles, Chua's watercraft differing in
appearance from the usual fishing boats that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan seas, Chuas illegal
entry into the Philippines, Chuas suspicious behavior, i.e. he attempted to flee when he saw the police
authorities, and the apparent ease by which Chua can return to and navigate his speedboat with
immediate dispatch towards the high seas, do not constitute "probable cause." There was no classified
information that a foreigner would disembark at Tammocalao beach bearing prohibited drug on the
date in question. Chua was not identified as a drug courier by a police informer or agent. The fact that
the vessel that ferried him to shore bore no resemblance to the fishing boats of the area did not
automatically mark him as in the process of perpetrating an offense. The search cannot therefore be
denominated as incidental to an arrest.
There was no warrant of arrest and the warrantless arrest did not fall under the exemptions allowed by
the Rules of Court as already shown. From all indications, the search was nothing but a fishing
expedition.

People vs Molina
Facts: Police officers received information from his informer that an alleged marijuana pusher will be
passing at a particular place anytime that morning. At around 9:30, a "trisikad" carrying Nasario Molina
and Gre gorio Mula passed by. SPO1Paguidopon then pointed at Nasario and Gregorio as the pushers.
The team then immediately boarded the vehicle,
overtook the "trisikad" and then requested it to stop. Mula then handed the black bag, which he was
holding to Molina. After introducing himself as police officer, Pamplona requested Molina to open the
bag. Molina replied " Boss, if possible we will settle this." Pamplona however insisted on opening the
bag, which revealed the marijuana leaves inside.

For unlawful possession of 946.9 grams of dried marijuana, accused were found by the RTC - Davao City
guilty of violation of Section 8, of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as amended
by Republic Act No. 7659, and sentenced them to death. Thecourt a quo anchored its judgment of
conviction on a finding that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellants, and the subsequent search
conducted by the peace officers, were valid because accused-appellants were caught in flagrant delicto
in possession of prohibited drugs. The accused Mula and Molina, through counsel, jointly filed a
Demurrer to Evidence, contending that the marijuana allegedly seized from them is inadmissible as
evidence for having been obtained in violation of their constitutional right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The demurrer was denied by the trial court.

Issue: WON the accused manifested outward indication that would justify their arrest, and the seizure of
prohibited drugs that were in their possession.

Held: No. Accused-appellants manifested no outward indication that would justify their arrest. In
holding a bag on board a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be said to be committing, attempting to
commit, or have committed a crime. There was no probable cause in arresting the accused thus making
the arrest illegal. Because the arrest was illegal, so was the search made by the police officers. This being
the case, the evidence is inadmissible and the accused are found not guilty of the alleged offense.

People vs Salanguit

Facts: Sr. Insp. Aguilar applied for a warrant to search the residence of Robert Salanguit. He presented
as his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able to purchase 2.12
grams of shabu from Salanguit. The sale took place in Salunguit's room, and Badua saw that the shabu
was taken by Salunguit from a cabinet inside his room. The application was granted, and a search
warrant was later issued. They, then, went to the residence of Salunguit to serve the warrant. The police
operatives knocked on Salanguits door, but nobody opened it.The police operatives then forced the
door open and entered the house. After showing the search warrant to the occupants of the house, Lt.
Cortes and his group started searching the house. They found 12 small heat-sealed transparent plastic
bags containing a white crystalline substance, a paper clip box also containing a white crystalline
substance, and two bricks of dried leaves which appeared to be marijuana wrapped in newsprint having
a total weight of approximately 1,255 grams. A receipt of the items seized was prepared, but Salanguit
refused to sign it. After the search, the police operatives took Salanguit with them along with the items
they had seized. PO3 Duazo requested a laboratory examination of the confiscated evidence. The white
crystalline substance was found to be positive for shabu. On the other hand, the two bricks of dried
leaves were found to be marijuana. Charges against Salanguit for violations of Republic Act (RA) 6425,
i.e. for possession of shabu and marijuana, were filed on 28 December 1995. He was convicted and
thereafter appealed; contesting his conviction on the grounds that
(1) the admissibility of the shabu allegedly recovered from his residence as evidence against him on the
ground that the warrant used in obtaining it was invalid; (2) the admissibility in evidence of the
marijuana allegedly seized from Salanguit to the "plain view" doctrine; and (3) the employment of
unnecessary force by the police in the execution of the warrant.

Issue: WON the seizure of marijuana leaves is unjustified on the ground that it is violative of the plain
view doctrine

Held: No presumption of regularity may be invoked by an officer in aid of the process when he
undertakes to justify an encroachment of rights secured by the Constitution. In this case, the marijuana
allegedly found in the possession of accused-appellant was in the form of two bricks wrapped in
newsprint. Not being in a transparent container, the contents wrapped in newsprint could not have
been readily discernible as marijuana. Nor was there mention of the time or manner these items were
discovered. Accordingly, for failure of the prosecution to prove that the seizure of the marijuana without
a warrant was conducted in accordance with the "plain view doctrine," we hold that the marijuana is
inadmissible in evidence against accused-appellant. However, the confiscation of the drug must be
upheld.

Under the "plain view doctrine," unlawful objects within the "plain view" of an officer who has the right
to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented in evidence. For this
doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior justification; (b) inadvertent discovery of the evidence; and (c)
immediate apparent illegality of the evidence before the police.

Microsoft vs Maxicorp

Facts: The NBI filed several applications for search warrants in the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch
23) against Maxicorp, Inc., for alleged violation of copyright infringement of petitioner Microsoft
Corporation's products under Section 29 of Presidential Decree No. 49 and for unfair competition under
Article 189 of the Revised Penal Code. After conducting a preliminary examination of the applicant and
his witnesses, Judge William M. Bayhon issued Search Warrants Nos. 96-451, 96-452, 96-453 and 96-454
against Maxicorp. Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents conducted a search of Maxicorp's
premises and seized property fitting the description stated in the search warrants. Maxicorp filed a
motion to quash the search warrants alleging that there was no probable cause for their issuance and
that the warrants are in the form of "general warrants". The RTC denied Maxicorp's motion and its
motion for reconsideration. Maxicorp filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals seeking to
set aside the RTC's order. The Court of Appeals reversed the RTC's order denying Maxicorp's motion to
quash the search warrants.

Issue: WON there exists probable cause

Held: The Supreme Court partially granted the petition. The Court held that the appellate court erred in
reversing the Regional Trial Court's finding of probable cause.

The testimonies of the witnesses coupled with the object and documentary evidence they presented,
were sufficient to establish the existence of probable cause. There was reason to believe that Maxicorp
engaged in copyright infringement and unfair competition to the prejudice of the petitioners. Both NBI
Agents Samiano and Sacriz were insistent that the counterfeit software were not only displayed and sold
within Maxicorp's premises, they were also produced, packaged and in some cases, installed there. The
determination of probable cause does not call for the application of the rules and standards of proof
that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits. The words "probable cause" are
concerned with probability, not absolute or even moral certainty. The prosecution need not present at
this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. The standards of judgment are those of a reasonably prudent
man, not the exacting calibrations of a judge after a full-blown trial. The Court, however, found
paragraph (c) of the search warrants lacking in particularity.

The scope of this description is all-embracing since it covers property used for personal or other
purposes not related to copyright infringement or unfair competition. Moreover, the description covers
property that Maxicorp may have bought legitimately from Microsoft or its licensed distributors.


Sta. Rosa Mining Company vs. Assistant Provincial Fiscal Zabala

Facts: Sta. Rosa Mining Company filed a complaint for attempted theft of materials (scrap iron) forming
part of the installations on its mining property at Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte against Romeo
Garrido and Gil Alapan with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Norte, then headed by
Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre. The case was assigned to third Assistant Fiscal Esteban P. Panotes for
preliminary investigation who, after conducting said investigation, issued a resolution dated 26 August
1974 recommending that an information for Attempted Theft be filed against Garrido and Alapan on a
finding of prima facie case which resolution was approved by Fiscal Ilustre. Garrido and Alapan sought
reconsideration of the resolution but the same was denied by Fiscal Ilustre in a resolution dated 14
October 1974. On 29 October 1974, Fiscal Ilustre filed with the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Camarines
Norte an Information dated 17 October 1987 (Criminal Case 821), charging Garrido aand Alapan with the
crime of Attempted Theft. In a letter dated 22 October 1974, Garrido and Alapan requested the
Secretary of Justice for a review of the Resolutions of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal dated 26 August
1974 and 14 October 1974. On 6 November 1974, the Chief State Prosecutor ordered the Provincial
Fiscal by telegram to "elevate entire records PFO Case 577 against Garrido et al., review in five days and
defer all proceedings pending review." On 6 March 1975, the Secretary of Justice, after reviewing the
records, reversed the findings of prima facie case of the Provincial Fiscal and directed said prosecuting
officer to immediately move for the dismissal of the criminal case. The Company sought reconsideration
of the directive of the Secretary of Justice but the latter denied the same in a letter dated 11 June 1975.
A motion to dismiss dated 16 September 1975 was then filed by the Provincial Fiscal but the court
denied the motion on the ground that there was a prima facie evidence against Garrido and Alapan and
set the case for trial on 25 February 1976. Garrido and Alapan sought reconsideration of the court's
ruling but in an Order dated 13 February 1976, the motion filed for said purpose was likewise denied.
Trial of the case was reset to 23 April 1976. Thereafter, Fiscal Ilustre was appointed a judge in the CFI of
Albay and Fiscal Zabala became officer-in-charge of the Provincial Fiscal's Office of Camarines Norte. On
19 April 1976, Fiscal Zabala filed a Second Motion to Dismiss the case. This
second motion to dismiss was denied by the trial court in an order dated 23 April 1976. Whereupon,
Fiscal Zabala manifested that he would not prosecute the case and disauthorized any private prosecutor
to appear therein. Hence, the Company filed a petition for mandamus before the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether the fiscal can refuse to prosecute the case if the Secretary of Justice reversed the
findings of prima facie case by the fiscal.

Held: If the fiscal is not at all convinced that a prima facie case exists, he simply cannot move for the
dismissal of the case and, when denied, refuse to prosecute the same. He is obliged by law to proceed
and prosecute the criminal action. He cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. At least what he can
do is to continue appearing for the prosecution and then turn over the presentation of evidence to
another fiscal or a private prosecutor subject to his direction and control. Where there is no other
prosecutor available, he should proceed to discharge his duty and present the evidence to the best of
his ability and let the court decide the merits of the case on the basis of the evidence adduced by both
parties. The mere fact that the Secretary of Justice had, after reviewing the records of the case, directed
the prosecuting fiscal to move for the dismissal of the case and the motion to dismiss filed pursuant to
said directive is denied by the trial court, is no justification for the refusal of the fiscal to prosecute the
case. Once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. The Court is the best
and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its
exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should he
addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done
before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or
upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

Paderanga vs Drilon

Facts: An information for multiple murder was filed in the Regional Trial Court, against Felipe Galarion,
Manuel Sabit, Cesar Sabit, Julito Ampo, Eddie Torion, John Doe, Peter Doe and Richard Doe, for the
deaths on 1 May 1984 of Renato Bucag, his wife Melchora Bucag, and their son Renato Bucag II. Venue
was, however, transferred to Cagayan de Oro City per Administrative Matter 87-2-244. Only Felipe
Galarion was tried and found guilty as charged. The rest of the accused remained at large.

Felipe Galarion, however, escaped from detention and has not been apprehended since then. In an
amended information filed on 6 October 1988, Felizardo Roxas, alias "Ely Roxas," "Fely Roxas" and
"Lolong Roxas," was included as a co-accused. Roxas retained Atty. Miguel P. Paderanga as his counsel.
As counsel for Roxas, Paderanga filed, among others, an Omnibus Motion to dismiss, to Quash the
Warrant of Arrest and to Nullify the Arraignment on 14 October 1988. The trial court in an order dated 9
January 1989, denied the omnibus motion but directed the City Prosecutor "to conduct another
preliminary investigation or reinvestigation in order to grant the accused all the opportunity to adduce
whatever evidence he has in support of his defense." In the course of the preliminary investigation,
through a signed affidavit, Felizardo Roxas implicated Atty. Paderanga in the commission of the crime
charged. The City Prosecutor of Cagayan de Oro City inhibited himself from further conducting the
preliminary investigation against Paderanga at the instance of the latter's counsel, per his resolution In
his first indorsement to the Department of Justice, said city prosecutor requested the Department of
Justice to designate a state prosecutor to continue the preliminary investigation against Paderanga. In a
resolution, the State Prosecutor who was designated to continue with the conduct of the preliminary
investigation against Paderanga, directed the amendment of the previously amended information to
include and implead Paderanga as one of the accused therein. Paderanga moved for reconsideration,
contending that the preliminary investigation was not yet completed when said resolution was
promulgated, and that he was deprived of his right to present a corresponding counter-affidavit and
additional evidence crucial to the determination of his alleged "linkage" to the crime charged. The
motion was, however, denied. From the aforesaid resolution and order, Paderanga filed a Petition for
Review with the Department of Justice. Thereafter, he submitted a Supplemental Petition with
Memorandum, and then a Supplemental Memorandum with Additional Exculpatory/Exonerating
Evidence Annexed, attaching thereto an affidavit of Roxas and purporting to be a retraction of his
affidavit of wherein he implicated Paderanga. On 10 August 1990, the Department of Justice, through
Undersecretary Silvestre H. Bello III, issued Resolution 648 dismissing the said petition for review. His
motion for reconsideration having been likewise denied, Paderanga then filed the petition for
mandamus and prohibition before the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether there is no prima facie evidence, or probable cause, or sufficient justification to hold
Paderanga to a tedious and prolonged public trial

Held: A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining
whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well - founded belief that a crime cognizable by the
Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should
be held for trial. The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such evidence
sufficient to "engender a well - founded belief" as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the
respondent's probable guilt thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and
exhaustive display of the parties' evidence; it is for the presentation of such evidence only as may
engender a well grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof. Preliminary investigation is generally inquisitorial, and it is often the only means of
discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his
complaint or information. It is not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of
determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that
the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy. The
institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He has the quasi-judicial
discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court. Hence, the general rule
is that an injunction will not be granted to restrain a criminal prosecution.

The case of Brocka, et al. vs. Enrile, et al. cites several exceptions to the rule, to wit:
(a) To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused;
(b) When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of
actions;
(c) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub-judice;
(d) When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority;
(e) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation;
(f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
(g) Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
(h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
(i) Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; and
(j) When there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground
has been denied.

A careful analysis of the circumstances obtaining in the present case, however, will readily show that the
same does not fall under any of the aforesaid exceptions.


Pita vs CA

Facts: In 1983, elements of the Special Anti-Narcotics Group, and the Manila Police, seized and
confiscated from dealers along Manila sidewalks, magazines believed to be obscene. These were later
burned. One of the publications was Pinoy Playboy published by Leo Pita.

He filed an injunction case against the mayor of manila to enjoin him from confiscating more copies of
his magazine and claimed that this was a violation of freedom of speech. The court ordered him to show
cause. He then filed an Urgent Motion for issuance of a temporary restraining order against
indiscriminate seizure.Defendant Mayor Bagatsing admitted the confiscation and burning of obscene
reading materials but admitted that these were surrendered by the stall owners and the establishments
were not raided.The other defendant, WPD Superintendent, Narcisco Cabrera, filed no answer.

On January 11, 1984, the trial court issued an Order setting the case for hearing on January 16, 1984 "for
the parties to adduce evidence on the question of whether the publication 'Pinoy Playboy Magazine
alleged (sic) seized, confiscated and/or burned by the defendants, are obscene per se or not".

On February 3, 1984, the trial court promulgated the Order appealed from denying the motion for a writ
of preliminary injunction, and dismissing the case for lack of merit. The CA also dismissed the appeal due
to the argument that freedom of the press is not without restraint. In the SC, the petitioner claimed
that:

1. The CA erred in holding that the police officers could without any court warrant or order seize and
confiscate petitioner's magazines on the basis simply of their determination that they are obscene.
2. The Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court and, in effect, holding that the
trial court could dismiss the case on its merits without any hearing thereon when what was submitted to
it for resolution was merely the application of petitioner for the writ of preliminary injunction.

Issue: Was the seizure constitutional?

Held: No. It is basic that searches and seizures may be done only through a judicial warrant, otherwise,
they become unreasonable and subject to challenge. There is of course provision for warrantless
searches under the Rules of Court but as the provision itself suggests, the search must have been an
incident to a lawful arrest and it must be on account for a crime committed.

The Court rejected the argument that "[t]here is no constitutional nor legal provision which would free
the accused of all criminal responsibility because there had been no warrant, and there is no "accused"
here to speak of, who ought to be "punished".

Second, to say that the respondent Mayor could have validly ordered the raid (as a result of an anti-
smut campaign) without a lawful search warrant because, in his opinion, "violation of penal laws" has
been committed, is to make the respondent Mayor judge, jury, and executioner rolled into one.
People vs Mamaril

Facts: Police authorities presented a search warrant to appellant before searching his residence. The
searching team confiscated plastic sachets containing marijuana leaves and seeds. Charged in court for
violation of the Anti-Drugs Law, the appellant contended that the exhibits of the prosecution are
inadmissible in evidence under Sections 2 and 3 (2) of Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution
as the search warrant was illegally issued, considering that the judges examination of the complainant
and his two witnesses was not in writing.

Issue: WON the search warrant so issued is invalid.

Held: The prosecution failed to prove that Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos put into writing
his examination of the applicant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers
before issuance of the search warrant. The records only show the existence of an application for a
search warrant and the affidavits of the complainant's witnesses.

The court found that the requirement mandated by the law that the examination of the complainant
and his witnesses must be under oath and reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and
answers was not complied with, rendering the search warrant invalid. Consequently, the evidence
seized pursuant to said illegal search warrant cannot be used in evidence against appellant in
accordance with Section 3 (2), 45(45) Article III of the Constitution.

Pasion Vda De Garcia vs Locsin

Facts: Mariano G. Almeda, an agent of the Anti-Usuary Board, obtained from the justice of the peace of
Tarlac, a search warrant commanding any officer of the law to search the person, house or store of the
petitioner at Victoria, Tarlac, for certain books, lists, chits, receipts, documents and other papers
relating to her activities as usurer. The search warrant was issued upon an affidavit given by the said
Almeda.

On the same date, the said Mariano G. Almeda, accompanied by a captain of the Philippine
Constabulary, went to the office of the petitioner in Victoria, Tarlac and, after showing the search
warrant to the petitioners bookkeeper, Alfredo Salas, and, without the presence of the petitioner who
was ill and confined at the time, proceeded with the execution thereof
The papers and documents seized were kept for a considerable length of time by the Anti-Usury Board
and thereafter were turned over by it to the respondent fiscal who subsequently filed six separate
criminal cases against the herein petitioner for violation of the Anti-Usury Law.
The legality of the search warrant was challenged by counsel for the petitioner in the six criminal cases
and the devolution of the documents demanded. The respondent Judge denied the petitioners motion
for the reason that though the search warrant was illegal, there was a waiver on the part of the
petitioner.
Issue: WON the search warrant so issued is illegal on the ground that probable cause was not
determined by the judge himself
Held: Freedom from unreasonable searches and seizures is declared a popular right and for a search
warrant to be valid, (1) it must be issued upon probable cause; (2) the probable cause must be
determined by the judge himself and not by the applicant or any other person; (3) in the
determination of probable cause, the judge must examine, under oath or affirmation, the complainant
and such witnesses as the latter may produce; and (4) the warrant issued must particularly describe the
place to be searched and persons or things to be seized.

In the instant case the existence of probable cause was determined not by the judge himself but by
the applicant. All that the judge did was to accept as true the affidavit made by agent Almeda. He did
not decide for himself. It does not appear that he examined the applicant and his witnesses, if any. Even
accepting the description of the properties to be seized to be sufficient and on the assumption that the
receipt issued is sufficiently detailed within the meaning of the law, the properties seized were not
delivered to the court which issued the warrant, as required by law. Instead, they were turned over to
the resp. provincial fiscal & used by him in building up cases against petitioner. Considering that at the
time the warrant was issued, there was no case pending against the petitioner, the averment that the
warrant was issued primarily for exploration purposes is not without basis.

Alvarez vs CFI

Facts: The Anti-Usury Board of the Department of Justice presented to Judge David a sworn affidavit
that a certain Narciso Alvarez is in possession of books, receipts, chits, lists used by him as money
lender/usurer charging usurious rates in violation of law. Affiant Almeda, chief of the task force, didnt
say that the information was based on his personal knowledge but was only received by him from a
reliable source. Subsequently, the judge issued the warrant ordering the search of Alvarez house. On
June 4, 1936, the agents raided the subject place and seized different documents namely, banknotes,
bankbooks, stubs, cashbooks, bills of lading, credit receipts, etc. Thereafter, the articles seized was not
brought immediately to the custody of the judge who issued the SW. Alvarez moved that the agents of
the Board be declared guilty of contempt and prays that all articles in question be returned to him
because the SW issued was illegal. On the other hand, the Anti-Usury Board pleaded that they be
allowed to retain custody of the articles seized for further investigation. When the judge sustained the
latters motion. Alvarez elevated the matter to the SC and prayed that the search warrant as well as the
order of the judge authorizing the Anti-Usury Board to retain custody be declared null and void.

Issue: Whether the SW issued by the judge is illegal for having solely as basis an information secured
from a person whom he considered reliable.

Held: Section 1, paragraph 3, of Article III of the Constitution and Section 97 of General Orders 58
require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the
search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses
he may produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a party
signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully; and it is sometimes
defined as an outward pledge given by the person taking it that his attestation or promise is made under
an immediate sense of his responsibility to God. The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts
within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to
convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance
of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to
warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury
could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused.

The affidavit, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrant, is insufficient and fatally
defective by reason of the manner in which the oath was made, and therefore, the search warrant and
the subsequent seizure of the books, documents and other papers are illegal. Further, it is the practice
in this jurisdiction to attach the affidavit of at least the applicant or complainant to the application. It is
admitted that the judge who issued the search warrant in this case, relied exclusively upon the affidavit
made by agent Almeda and that he did not require nor take the deposition of any other witness. The
Constitution does not provide that it is of an imperative necessity to take the depositions of the
witnesses to be presented by the applicant or complainant in addition to the affidavit of the latter. The
purpose of both in requiring the presentation of depositions is nothing more than to satisfy the
committing magistrate of the existence of probable cause. Therefore, if the affidavit of the applicant or
complainant is sufficient, the judge may dispense with that of other witnesses. Inasmuch as the affidavit
of the agent was insufficient because his knowledge of the facts was not personal but merely hearsay, it
is the duty of the judge to require the affidavit of one or more witnesses for the purpose of determining
the existence of probable cause to warrant the issuance of the search warrant.

Mata vs Bayona

Facts: Soriano Mata was accused under Presidential Decree (PD) 810, as amended by PD 1306, the
information against him alleging that Soriano Mata offered, took and arranged bets on the Jai Alai game
by selling illegal tickets known as Masiao tickets without any authority from the Philippine Jai Alai &
Amusement Corporation or from the government authorities concerned. Mata claimed that during the
hearing of the case, he discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could be found the
search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance of the same, so that he had to
inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts, and to which inquiry Judge Josephine K. Bayona, presiding
Judge of the City Court of Ormoc replied, it is with the court. The Judge then handed the records to
the Fiscal who attached them to the records. This led Mata to file a motion to quash and annul the
search warrant and for the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others, Section 4 of
Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was denied by the Judge on 1 March 1979, stating
that the court has made a thorough investigation and examination under oath of Bernardo U. Goles and
Reynaldo T. Mayote, members of the Intelligence Section of 352nd PC Co./Police District II INP; that in
fact the court made a certification to that effect; and that the fact that documents relating to the search
warrant were not attached immediately to the record of the criminal case is of no moment, considering
that the rule does not specify when these documents are to be attached to the records. Matas motion
for reconsideration of the aforesaid order having been denied, he came to the Supreme Court, with the
petition for certiorari, praying, among others, that the Court declare the search warrant to be invalid for
its alleged failure to comply with the requisites of the Constitution and the Rules of Court, and that all
the articles confiscated under such warrant as inadmissible as evidence in the case, or in any
proceedings on the matter.

Issue: WON the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the
complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and attach them
to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him

Held: YES. Under the Constitution no search warrant shall issue but upon probable cause to be
determined by the Judge or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. The
Rules provide that the judge must before issuing the warrant personally examine on oath or
affirmation the complainant and any witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing,
and attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him. Mere affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. Such written deposition is necessary in order
that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or nonexistence of the probable cause,
to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. We,
therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform
with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record,
rendering the search warrant invalid.