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Chapter6TheConstitution
Name:________________________________Group:________________Date:9/23/13
WastheConstitutionoftheUnitedStatesWrittentoProtectthe
EconomicInterests oftheUpper Classes?
1
YES:HowardZinn,fromAPeople'sHistoryoftheUnitedStates(HarperCollins, 1999)
Learning Outcomes
Afterreadingthisissueyou shouldbeableto:
ISSUE SUMMARY
NO: Professor of history Gordon S.Wood views the struggle foranew constitution in
17871788asa social conflict betweenupperclass Federalists whodesiredastronger
centralgovernment andthe "humbler"AntiFederalists who controlled the state
assemblies.
1
Madaras,LarryandSoRelle,James.TakingSides:ClashingViewsinUnitedStatesHistory,Volume1:TheColonialPeriodto
Reconstruction.15thed.Vol.1.McGrawHillHigherEducation.Print
in abombing squadron in the Army Air Corps in World War II, was an early memberofthe Student
Nonviolent CoordinatingCommittee (SNCC), anda staunchpeace activist opposing theU.S. foreign
policy inSoutheastAsia, CentralAmerica, and the Middle East. He believed that history should be
studied andwritten primarilyfor the purposeof eliminatingAmerica'sviolentpastandmoving it in a
more peaceful, equitable direction. In this context, Zinn arguedthat Shays' Rebellion, anuprising of
western Massachusetts farmers who wereunable to pay their taxes to the Massachusetts'
government,was the catalystthat inspired the men at Philadelphia in1787to draft a new
constitution.
Inthesecondessay,ProfessorGordonS.WoodagreeswiththeclassconflicttheoriesofBeard
andZinnregardingthesupportersandopponentsoftheConstitution,buthestressessocialand
ideological,noteconomic,motivations.WoodarguesthattheFederalistswereupperclassaristocrats
whobelievedthatthenationalgovernment,whichtheycontrolled,providedamorecosmopolitanand
enlightenedoutlookthanthelocalandprovincialinterestsofthe"humblersort"whoranthestate
assemblies.AccordingtoWood,theFederalistsatboththe Philadelphia and the state ratifying
conventions employed "democratic"languagetoarguecleverlyandfalselythatthenewnational
governmentwasasdemocraticastheConfederationgovernmentitwouldreplace
YES:HowardZinn
APeople'sHistoryoftheUnitedStates
2
In short, Beard said, the rich must, in their own interest, either controlthegovernment directly
orcontrolthe lawsbywhich government operates.Beard applied thisgeneralideatothe
Constitution, bystudyingthe economicbackgrounds and political ideas of the fiftyfive men who
gathered inPhiladelphia in 1787to draw up the Constitution. He found that a majorityofthem
werelawyersbyprofession, thatmostofthemweremenofwealth,inland,slaves,manufacturing,
orshipping,thathalf of themhad moneyloanedoutatinterest,andthatfortyofthefiftyfiveheld
governmentbonds,accordingtotherecordsoftheTreasuryDepartment.
Thus,BeardfoundthatmostofthemakersoftheConstitutionhadsomedirecteconomicinterestin
establishingastrongfederalgovernment:themanufacturersneededprotectivetariffs;the
moneylenderswantedtostoptheuseof paper money topayoff debts; the land speculators
wanted protection astheyinvadedIndianlands;slaveownersneededfederalsecurityagainstslave
revoltsandrunaways;bondholderswantedagovernmentabletoraisemoneybynationwide
taxation,topayoffthosebonds.
Four groups, Beard noted, were not represented in the ConstitutionalConvention:slaves,
indenturedservants,women,menwithoutproperty.AndsotheConstitutiondidnotreflectthe
2
From A People's History of the United States by Howard Zinn (HarperCollins, 1999). Copyright
1980byHowardZinn.Reprinted bypermission ofHarperCollins Publishers.
interestsofthosegroups.
He wanted to make it clear that he did not think the Constitution waswritten merely to
benefit the Founding Fathers personally,a l t h o u g h onecould not ignore the $150,000 fortune of
Benjamin Franklin, the connectionsof Alexander Hamilton towealthy intereststhrough hisfatherin
law andbrotherinlaw, the great slave plantationsof James Madison,the enormouslandholdings of
George Washington. Rather, it was to benefit the groups theFoundersrepresented, the"economic
intereststhey understood andfeltinconcrete, definite form through their own personal
experience."
Not everyone atthe Philadelphia Convention fitted Beard's scheme.Elbridge Gerry of
Massachusettswas a holderoflanded property,and yethe opposed the ratificationof the
Constitution. Similarly, Luther MartinofMaryland, whose ancestors had obtained large tracts of
land in New Jersey,opposed ratification. But,with afewexceptions, Beard foundastrongconnection
between wealth and support of the Constitution.
By1787therewasnot onlyapositive need forstrongcentralgovernment
toprotect thelargeeconomicinterests, but alsoimmediate fearof rebellion bydiscontented farmers.
Thechief event causing this fearwas anuprising in thesummer of 1786inwestern Massachusetts,
known asShays'Rebellion.
In thewestern towns of Massachusetts there was resentment against thelegislature in
Boston. The new Constitution of1780had raised the propertyqualifications for voting. No one
could hold state office without being quitewealthy. Furthermore,the legislature was refusing to
issue paper money, ashad been done in some other states, like Rhode Island, to make it easier
fordebtridden farmerstopay off their creditors
The voice of the People of this county is such that the court shall notenterthiscourthouse
untilsuchtimeasthePeopleshallhaveredressofthe grievances they labor under atthe
present.
Confrontationsbetweenfarmersandmilitianowmultiplied.Thewintersnowsbegan to
interferewith thetripsof farmerstothecourthouses.WhenShaysbegan marching athousand
menintoBoston, ablizzard forced themback,andoneofhismenfrozetodeath.
An army came into the field, led by General Benjamin Lincoln, onmoney raised by
Boston merchants. In an artillery duel, three rebels werekilled. One soldier stepped in frontof
his own artillerypiece and lostbotharms. The winter grew worse. The rebels were outnumbered
and on the run.Shays took refuge in Vermont,and his followers began to surrender. Therewere a
few more deaths in battle, and then sporadic, disorganized, desperateacts of violenceagainst
authority: the burningof barns,the slaughterofageneral's horses. One government soldier was
killed in an eerie nighttimecollision of two sleighs
It wasThomasJefferson,inFranceasambassadoratthetimeofShays'Rebellion, who
spokeof suchuprisings ashealthy forsociety.In alettertoa friend he wrote: "I hold it that a
little rebellion now and then is a goodthing....Itisamedicine necessaryforthesoundhealth
of government....Godforbidthatweshouldeverbetwentyyearswithoutsucharebellion....
Thetreeoflibertymustberefreshedfromtimetotimewiththebloodofpatriotsandtyrants.Itisits
naturalmanure."
But Jefferson was far from the scene. The political and economic elite
ofthe country were notso tolerant. They worriedthatthe examplemightspread. A veteran of
Washington'sarmy, General Henry Knox, founded anorganization of armyveterans, "TheOrder of
the Cincinnati," presumably (asone historian put it) "for the purpose of cherishing the heroic
memories ofthe struggle in which they had taken part," but also, it seemed, to watch outfor
radicalismin the new country. Knox wrote to Washingtonin late 1786aboutShays'Rebellion, and
indoingsoexpressed thethoughts of manyof thewealthy and powerful leadersof the country:
The people who are the insurgents have never paid any, or but verylittletaxes. Butthey
seetheweakness of government; theyfeelatoncetheir own poverty,compared with the
opulent, and their own force,and they are determined to make use of the latter, in order to
remedythe former. Their creed is "Thatthe property of the United States hasbeen protected
from theconfiscations of Britain bythe joint exertionsof all, and therefore ought to be the
common property of all.And hethat attemptsopposition tothis creed isanenemytoequity
and justiceand oughttobe swept from off thefaceof theearth."
Allcommunitiesdividethemselvesintothefewandthemany.Thefirstaretherichand
wellborn,theotherthemassofthepeople.Thevoiceofthepeoplehasbeensaidtobethe
voiceofGod;andhowevergenerallythismaximhasbeenquotedandbelieved,itisnot
trueinfact.Thepeopleareturbulentandchanging;theyseldomjudge ordetermine
right.Givethereforetothefirstclassadistinctpermanentshareinthegovernment.... Can
ademocraticassemblywhoannuallyrevolveinthemassofthepeoplebesupposed
steadilytopursuethepublicgood?Nothingbutapermanentbodycancheckthe
imprudence of democracy....
AttheConstitutionalConvention,HamiltonsuggestedaPresidentandSenatechosenforlife.
The Convention did not take his suggestion. But neither did it provideforpopularelections,except
inthecaseoftheHouseofRepresentatives,wherethe qualifications were set by the state
legislatures (which required propertyholding for voting in almost all the states), and excluded
women,Indians,slaves.TheConstitutionprovided forSenatorstobeelectedbythestatelegislators,
for the President tobe electedby electors chosen by the state legislators,and for the Supreme Court
tobe appointed by the President.
Itcame time to ratify the Constitution, to submit to a vote in state conventions, with
approval of nine of the thirteen required to ratify it. In NewYork, where debate over ratification
was intense, a series of newspaper articles appeared,anonymously,and they tell us much about
the nature of theConstitution. These articles, favoring adoption of the Constitution, were written
by James Madison, AlexanderHamilton,and John Jay, and came to beknown as theFederalist
Papers (opponents of the Constitution became knownasantiFederalists).
InFederalistPaper #10,JamesMadison arguedthatrepresentative government was needed to
maintain peace in a society ridden by factional disputes.These disputes came from "thevarious and
unequal distribution of property.Thosewhohold andthosewho arewithout property haveever
formed distinctinterests in society." The problem, he said, was how to control the factional
struggles that came from inequalities in wealth. Minority factions could becontrolled,he said, by
the principlethat decisions would be by vote of themajority.
Sotherealproblem,accordingtoMadison,wasamajorityfaction,andherethe solution
was offeredbythe Constitution, tohave "anextensiverepublic,"thatis,alargenationranging
overthirteenstates,forthen"itwillbemoredifficultforallwhofeelittodiscovertheirown
strength,andtoactinunisonwitheachother....Theinfluenceoffactiousleadersmaykindlea
flamewithintheirparticularStates,butwillbeunabletospreadageneralconflagrationthroughthe
otherStates."
Madison's argument can be seen as a sensible argument for having agovernmentwhich
canmaintainpeaceandavoidcontinuousdisorder.Butisittheaimofgovernment simplyto
maintainorder,asareferee,betweentwoequallymatched fighters?Orisitthatgovernment has
somespecialinterestin maintaining a certain kind of order, a certain distribution of power and
wealth, a distribution in which governmentofficialsarenotneutral refereesbut participants? In that
case, the disorder they might worry about is the disorder of popular rebellion against those
monopolizing the society'swealth.Thisinterpretationmakessensewhenonelooksatthe
economicinterests,thesocialbackgrounds,ofthemakersoftheConstitution.
As part of his argument for a large republic to keep the peace, JamesMadison tellsquite
clearly, inFederalist #10,whose peace hewants tokeep: "Arage forpaper money, foran abolition of
debts, foranequal division of property,orforanyotherimproperorwickedproject,willbelessaptto
pervadethewhole body of the Union than aparticular member of it."
When economic interest is seenbehind the political clauses of the Constitution, then the
document becomes not simplythework of wise men tryingtoestablish adecentandorderly society,
but thework of certain groups tryingto maintain their privileges, while giving justenough rights
and liberties toenough of the people to ensure popular support.
In the new government, Madison would belong to one party (theDemocratRepublicans)
along with Jeffersonand Monroe.Hamiltonwouldbelong totherival party (theFederalists) along
with Washington andAdams.But both agreedone a slaveholder from Virginia, the other a
merchant fromNew Yorkon the aims of this new government they were establishing. Theywere
anticipating the longfundamental agreement ofthe two politicalpartiesintheAmerican system.
Hamilton wrote elsewhere intheFederalistPapersthatthe new Union would be able"to repress
domestic factionand insurrection." He referred directly toShays' Rebellion: "Thetempestuous
situationfrom which Massachusetts has scarcely emerged evinces that dangers of thiskind arenot
merely speculative."
The Constitution, then, illustrates the complexity of the Americansystem: that it serves the
interests of a wealthy elite, but also does enough forsmall property owners, for middleincome
mechanics and farmers, to build abroad base of support.The slightly prosperous people who make
up this baseof support are buffers against the blacks, the Indians, the very poor whites.They
enable the elite to keep control with a minimum of coercion, a maximum of lawall made
palatable by the fanfare of patriotism and unity.
The Constitution became even more acceptable to the public at largeafterthefirst
Congress,respondingtocriticism,passedaseriesofamendmentsknownastheBillofRights.These
amendmentsseemedtomakethenewgovernmentaguardian ofpeople'sliberties:tospeak,to
publish, toworship, topetition, toassemble,tobetried fairly,tobesecureathomeagainst
officialintrusion.Itwas,therefore,perfectlydesignedtobuildpopularbackingforthenew
government.Whatwasnotmadeclearitwasatimewhenthelanguageof freedom was new and
itsreality untestedwas the shakiness of anyone'slibertywhenentrustedtoagovernmentofthe
richandpowerful.
Indeed, the sameproblem existed fortheother provisions of the Constitution, like the clause
forbidding statesto "impair the obligation of contract,"orthat givingCongress thepower totaxthe
people andtoappropriate money.They all sound benign and neutral until one asks:Taxwho, for
what? Appropriate what, for whom? To protect everyone's contracts seems like an act offairness,
of equal treatment, until one considers that contracts made betweenrich and poor, between
employer and employee, landlord and tenant, creditor and debtor, generally favorthe more
powerful of the two parties. Thus, toprotect these contracts is to put the great power of the
government, its laws,courts, sheriffs, police, on the side of the privilegedand to do it not, as in
premodern times, asanexerciseofbruteforceagainsttheweakbutasamatteroflaw.
TheFirstAmendment oftheBillof Rightsshowsthatqualityof interest hiding behind
innocence. Passed in 1791by Congress, it provided that"Congressshallmakenolaw ...
abridgingthefreedom of speech,orof thepress...."Yet, sevenyears after the First
Amendment became part of theConstitution, Congress passed a lawvery clearly abridging the
freedom ofspeech.
This was the Sedition Act of1798, passed under John Adams's administration, at a time when
Irishmen and Frenchmen in the United Stateswerelooked on asdangerous revolutionaries because
of the recent French Revolution and the Irish rebellions. The Sedition Act made it a crimeto sayor
writeanything "false, scandalous andmalicious" against thegovernment, Congress,or the President,
with intent to defame them, bring them into disrepute,orexcite popular hatreds against them.
This act seemed to directly violate the First Amendment. Yet, it wasenforced.Ten
Americanswereputinprisonforutterancesagainstthegovernment, and every member of the
Supreme Court in 17981800, sittingas anappellatejudge,helditconstitutional
Everyoneknewthebasicprescriptionforawiseandjustgovernment.Itwassotobalancethe
contendingpowersinsocietythatnoonepowercouldoverwhelmtheothersand,unchecked,
destroythelibertiesthatbelonged toall.Theproblem washowtoarrange the institutions
ofgovernmentsothatthisbalancecouldbeachieved.
Were the Founding Fathers wise and just men trying to achieve a goodbalance? In fact,they
did notwant abalance, except onewhich kept things asthey were, a balance among the dominant
forces at that time. They certainlydid not want an equal balance betweenslaves and masters,
propertylessandproperty holders, Indians and white.
As many as half the people were not even considered by the FoundingFathersasamong
Bailyn's "contendingpowers" insociety.Theywerenotmentioned in the Declaration of
Independence, they were absent in the Constitution, theywere invisibleinthenewpolitical
democracy.TheywerethewomenofearlyAmerica.
NO:GordonS.Wood
Democracy andtheConstitution
3
TheDebateovertheConstitution
From the vantage point of1776,which was generally the perspective oftheAntifederalists, the
Constitution of 1787loomsasan extraordinary, evenunbelievable, creation.None of the
revolutionary leadersatthetime of independence even contemplated, let alone suggested, the
possibility of erectingover allAmerica such a strong, overarching national government asthe
Constitution provided. Such a powerful central government operating directly onindividuals was
diametrically opposed to all the principles of the Revolution.More than anything else, the Revolution
intendedto reduce the overweening powerofthe government,particularlyfarremovedcentral
governmentassociated with the British imperial system. Any revolutionary in 1776 suggesting a national
governmentresembling the one eventually created by theConstitution of 1787would have been
branded a lunatic or, worse, a Britishmonarchist.
TheArticles ofConfederation
pirateswereseizingAmericanshipsandcrewsbecauseCongresshadnomoneytopaythenecessary
tributes.Lackinganytaxingpower, theUnitedStatesgovernmentcouldnotevenpaytheinterest
onitsdebttoitscreditorsathomeorabroad.Congresshadnoauthoritytoregulatecommerceand
thushadnowayofforcinganyopenings intheEuropean mercantile empiresforAmerican traders.
Effortstogetevenlimitedtaxingandcommercialregularitypowersfounderedon the requirements
fortheunanimous consent of allthe statesfor amendmentoftheArticlesofConfederation.
Pressing and serious as these problems of the confederation were, theycannot by themselves
explainthe formation of the Constitution. The Constitution createda nationalgovernment whose
strengthand character wereout of proportionto the obvious and acknowledged weaknessesof
the confederation. Indeed, by1787 almost everyone recognized the debility oftheArticles andwas
prepared to grant additional powers to Congress. Theywerenot preparedfor what came out ofthe
Philadelphia Conventionof 1787arevolutionary transformationof the entire American political
system including a radical diminishing of the independence and power of the states
In1776Americansasyetdidnotcalltheirnewgovernmentsdemocracies;itisimportant for
ourunderstanding of the Constitution's relationshiptodemocracytoknowwhytheydidnot.Itis
truethat thenewstategovernments were very popular, more popular surely than any other
governmentintheeighteenthcenturyworld.IntheAmericanstates,agreaterproportion
of people couldvoteandagreaterproportion of government officialswereelected than in any
other country. The most popular part of the state governments, thelowerhouses of the
legislatures, weregiven anextraordinaryamountofpower, includingmanyprerogatives, likethe
grantingofpardonsandtheappointmentofjudges,thatweretraditionallyexercisedonlybymag
isterial authority in other countries. Still, these new governments were notcalleddemocracies
because,astheeighteenthcenturycommonlyunderstoodtheterm,theywerenotdemocracies
By the 1780s, many Americanleaders realized that these state assemblieswereabusing their extraordinary
powers.The annually electedlegislatures,besetbyhostsof variousinterests, wereconstantly changing
their membershipandweremakinglegislationchaotic.AsJamesMadisonpointed out,morelawswere
enacted by the states in the decade following independence than in theentirecolonialperiod. Manyof
theselawswereunjust:paper money acts, staylaws, and other forms of debtor relief legislation hurt
various creditor groupsinthesocietyandviolated individual property rights.Tosome,thelegislatures
seemed more frightening than the former royal governors. Itdid not matterthatthelegislatorswere
supposedlytherepresentatives ofthepeople andannuallyelectedbythem."173despotswould surelybe
asoppressiveasone,"wroteJefferson."Anelectivedespotismwasnotthegovernmentwefoughtfor."
American leaderstried several approaches to these democratic abuses inthe states. Some
attempted to reform the revolutionary state constitutions byreducing the power of the popular
assemblies and enhancing that of the governors and senates. The Massachusetts constitution of
1780embodied manyof these second thoughts, and during the 1780sother statessought to
remaketheir constitutions in Massachusetts' image. Others tried to use the judiciaryagainst what
were thought tobeunconstitutional actsof thelegislatures; therewere scattered and rudimentary
expressions of what would become judicialreview.Manyleaders,however,thoughtsuch judicial
overturningsoflawenactedbypopularly electedlegislatures smacked of despotism andwere con
trary to republican government
The evidence is strong thatMadison and other nationalists who thought like him wanted greater
consolidation and a correspondingly greater weakening of the states than they got.Madison
wanted a national government that not onlywould have "apositiveand compleat authority in all
cases where uniform measures are necessary,"as in commerce and foreign policy, but would have
"a negative in all caseswhatsoever on the Legislative Acts of the States asthe King of Great Britain
heretofore had." Thisvetopower over all statelegislation seemed to Madison"tobe absolutely
necessary, and to be the least possible encroachment on theState jurisdictions." Without it, he
believed, none of the great objects whichledto theconventionneither theneed for morecentral
authoritynorthedesire to preventinstabilityand injustice in state legislationwould be met.When
the convention eventually set aside this national veto power, Madisoninitially thought that the
Constitution was doomed to failure.
Although deeply disappointed with the Constitution Madison and othernationalists aimed to
make the best of what they had, a greatly enlarged andelevated republicMadison did not want
the new national government tobe anintegrator andharmonizer of different interestsinthe
society;instead hewanted ittobe a "disinterested and dispassionate umpire indisputes"between
these different interests. In other words, Madison was not as modern as weoften make him out
to be. He hoped the national government might play thesamerole the British king had been
supposed toplay in the empire.
Jefferson, forone, hadexpectedtodominate government. These ordinary men were the ones
winning electionstothe statelegislatures and enacting most of what the Federalists described asthe
confused, unjust, and narrowly basedlegislation of the 1780s. What theFederalists wanted from
the Constitution was a structure of government thatwould inhibit such localist kinds of men from
gaining power.
They proposed to do this by enlarging the arena of politics. Raisingimportant
governmentaldecisionmakingtothenationallevelwouldexpandtheelectorateandatthesame
timewouldreducethenumberofthoseelected.
This expanded electorate and elevated government would then act as a kindof filter, refining the
kind of men who would become national leaders. In alarger arena with a smaller number of
representatives, only the most notableand most socially established were likelytogainpolitical
office.If thepeopleof a state, New York, for example, had to select only ten men to the federal
Congress in contrast to the sixtysix they elected to their state assembly, theywere more apt in the
case of the few representatives in the national government to ignore obscure ordinary men with
local reputations and elect thosewhowerewellbred, well educated, andwell known. Electionby
thepeople inlarge districtswould inhibit demagoguery and crass electioneering and wouldtherefore,
asMadison's closest allyintheconvention,JamesWilson, said, "bemost likely to obtain men of
intelligence and uprightness."
ARepublicanRemedyforRepublicanDiseases
Whether such cosmopolitan efforts to create political structures that deliberately excluded the
ordinariness of ordinary people areundemocratic was precisely the issue raised at the framing of
the Constitution. The Antifederalists,speaking for a populistlocalist tradition,certainly thoughtthe
Constitutionwas undemocratic
By the end of the debate over the Constitution, it was possible for theFederalists to describe the new
national government, even with its indirectlyelected presidentand Senate, as "a perfectlydemocratical
form ofgovernment." Already by 17871788 democracy had come to be identified by someAmericans
simply as a representativegovernmentderivedfrom the people.In other words, republicanismand
democracy were becoming equated
EXPLORING THEISSUE
WastheConstitution oftheUnitedStatesWrittentoProtecttheEconomic
Interests oftheUpper Classes?
CriticalThinkingandReflection(MUSTreferencepagenumberinallyouranswers)
1. BrieflystatethetheoryofCharlesA.BeardregardingthemotivationsoftheFoundingFathers.
2. WhywasBeard'stheorysocontroversialatthetimeitwaswritten?WhatevidencedidBearduse
tosubstantiatehistheory?
3. Critically analyzeJames Madison's argument inFederalist Paper #10that aRepublican formof
government functionsbetter inalargeterritory rather than a small one.
4. Distinguishbetweenarepublicanandademocraticformofgovernment.
5. According to Zinn, the majority of the population was poor whenthe Constitution was written.
If this was true and the Constitutionallowsthe elitetocontrolthe masses, how didthe states
ratify it inthefirstplace?Explain.
6. Critically analyze Wood's argument that the new Constitution waswritten because of an excess of
democracy in the state legislaturesandthelackoftaxingandcommercepowersinthe
Confederationgovernment.Whatkindsofdetailsdidheprovidetosupportthisargument?
7. Did the Federalists lie when they argued that the Constitutionwithits strongercentral
governmentwasa fulfillment oftheAmerican R evolution?
8. Compareand contrastthe differinginterpretationsofWoodandZinn regarding the events that
took place at the Philadelphia Convention in 1787.Is there anyway in which the two
interpretationscanbeblended together?
9. According toProfessor Wood: "Weareforevertrying todecideinthedebates who was more right
in their interpretation of the Constitution, the Federalists or the Antifederalists."Critically discuss.
10. Could the United Stateshave survived todayunder arevisedArticlesofConfederation?