UST Law - An Abused Autonomy

AN ABUSED AUTONOMY AND THE LOST
LAND OF UNFULFILLED PROMISE:

ARMM UNDER THE LIMELIGHT WHERE
DID IT GO WRONG?
Nesrin B. Cali*
K
OUTLINE
I. INTRODUCTION
II. ARMM HISTORY
The Islamization of the Philippines: The Dawn of the Struggle of the Bangsamoro
People for Independence
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF)
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF)
The Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG)
III. THE ELUSIVE ROAD TO PEACE
Tripoli Agreement of 1976: The Internationally Forged Accord for Peace
The People Power-Inspired Charter: The Fundamental Legal Wellspring of the
ARMM
From Legal Fiction to Reality: The Creation of the ARMM Through the
Constitutionally Mandated Organic Acts
a rt i cl e s
* 10 Ll.B., candidate, University of Santo Tomas Faculty of Civil Law. Editor-in-Chief,
UST Law Review.
ne s ri n b . ca l i
4
us t l aw re v i e w, vol . l i x , ay 2 0 0 9 - 2 0 1 0
IV. THE EXTENT AND NATURE OF ARMM AUTONOMY:
An Act of Self-Immolation
V. AUTONOMY AND THE IMPLICIT RIGHT TO SELF
DETERMINATION: Do They Confer the Right of Secession?
V. ARMM UNDER THE LIMELIGHT: An Appraisal of the Constitution-
authorized Arrangement for Peace and National Unity
VI. CLOSING CURTAIN: Fulflling the Promise of the Land of Promise
Autonomy should not only be understood in its superfcial sense,
that is, in the context of territorial secession. It should essentially be
understood as autonomy and independence in terms of good governance,
economy and resources vital for the subsistence of a community. For if a
supposed autonomous community cannot even afford to stand on its own
two feet, the autonomy granted to it and the right to self-determination,
which it holds by virtue of such autonomy, are nothing but a mirage, a
blinding illusion. Autonomy, in that setting, inevitably becomes the road
to self-destruction.
-Nesrin B. Cali
INTRODUCTION
On November 23, 2009, one of the Philippines most brutal and ghastly
pre-election violences shook the nation.
1
It was so tremendously atrocious that
its tremors were not only felt in local shores but also in the international plane.
2

The beastly act, which involved the violent taking of ffty-seven lives, mostly
of women, was condemned nationwide. Arrests of those who are suspected
of being perpetrators were made and eventually, martial law was declared. This
is how impactful the Maguindanao Massacre has been in the country.
As widely reported in the news coverage of the event, the victims of
the massacre, including the wife of the vice mayor of Buluan, province of
1
http://www.philstar.com/article.aspx?articleid=526314 (last accessed 21 Decem-
ber 2009).
2
http://www.philstar.com/article.aspx?articleid=526314 (last accessed 21 Decem-
ber 2009).
5
AN ABUSED AUTONOMY AND THE LOST LAND OF UNFULFILLED PROMISE
Maguindanao,
3
Ishmael Toto Mangundadatu, the latters sisters, journalists,
media men, lawyers, motorists
4
were about to fle the certifcate of candidacy
of vice mayor Mangundadatu for the gubernatorial race in the town of Buluan
with the Comission on Elections (COMELEC) offce in Shariff Aguak. Before
they could reach their destination, as fate would have it, about a hundred
armed men stopped the convoy of six vehicles, abducted all passengers therein
and later on slaughtered them mercilessly. There is evidence that some of the
female victims were raped and sexually violated before they were killed
5
and
practically all of the women were shot in their genitals and decapitated.
6
The
victims, as well as their vehicles, were later on buried en masse. Subsequently, the
grave was found and the results of the investigation pointed to the Ampatuan
clan, a political scion in Maguindanao and a rival of the Mangundadatus, as the
master mind of the unspeakable crime.
7
This harrowing story, at frst glance, may appear to be a typical story of
political rivalry gone brutally deadly. On a deeper analysis, however, one would
realize that there is more to it than thatit is one of the, if not the, ultimate
refection and manifestation of the deplorable state of Mindanao in terms of
politics, economy and peace-and-order conditions.
Indeed, the Maguindanao Massacre has focused the limelight on the
ARMM.
8
It impelled some to call for its abolishment, while others insisted that
3
Maguindanao is a province of the Philippines located in the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Its capital is Shariff Aguak. It borders Lanao del Sur to the
north, Cotabato to the east, and Sultan Kudarat to the south.
4
Vice-mayor Mangundadatu reportedly invited the 37 journalists to cover the fling
of his candidacy as word reached him that his political rivals would chop him into pieces
once he fled his certifcate of candidacy. He believed that sending his wife and his sisters,
along with the journalists, would deter such threatened attack.
5
http://manilastandardtoday.com/insudeNews.htm?f=/december/4/news1.
isx&d=/2009/december/4 (last accessed 21 December 2009).
6
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/philippines/6664185/Philip-
pine-massacre-suspect-surenders.html (last accessed 21 December 2009).
7
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/11/25/09/police-name-ampatuan-jr-top-
suspect-massacre (last accessed 21 December 2009).
8
ARMM stands for Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
6
the autonomy given to certain portions of Muslim Mindanao has nothing to
do with the Massacre, the latter being simply a violent manifestation of heated
political enmity prevalent in the Philippines. It is in this light that the author
deems it necessary to revisit the ARMM and make an objective assessment
of how it has performed in achieving the goals for which it was created. To
accomplish this endeavor, this article will trace the historical backdrop of the
ARMM, i.e., the roots of the struggle for autonomy and independence in
Muslim Mindanao and the events that followed, which ultimately led to the
establishment of the ARMM. The regions economic, political, educational
and peace-and-order conditions shall also be evaluated as factors are decisive
in determining how ARMM fared in realizing the raison dtre that animated
it to life. Based on this evaluation, a determination of the most prudent action
or remedy shall be taken upon the ARMM shall be made, taking into account
what will best serve the interest of the Bangsa Moro people
9
and what will
fnally bring peace and prosperity in the war-torn Muslim Mindanao.
A CHRONICLE OF EVENTS PRECEDING THE ARMM
The Islamization of the Philippines: The Dawn of the Struggle of the
Bangsamoro People for Independence
The long historical thread of struggle for autonomy and self-
determination among the Bangsa Moro people, which has been spawning for
decades, has been the major catalyst that animated the Autonomous Region in
Muslim Mindanao to life. A true understanding of this issue on the fght for
independence among the people of Muslim Mindanao
10
will not be attained,
however, unless their roots are traced. A succinct account of the Islamization
of the Philippineswhich gave the Bangsa Moro people distinct culture,
traditions and spiritual beliefsis thus in order.
9
Infra note 13.
10
As used in the 1987 Constitution, Muslim Mindanao refers only to those areas of
Mindanao which are predominantly Muslim. (J. Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Repub-
lic of the Philippines: A Commentary [2003] at 1099.)
7
Islam, as a religion and as a way of life,
11
was introduced in the
Philippines between the 12
th
and 14
th
century, with the arrival of Arab traders,
travelers, sufs (saintly Muslims) and Muslim missionaries. The pioneer among
them, Karim ul Makhdum, arrived in the country, particularly in the Sulu
Archipelago and Jolo, in 1380. He converted a large number of inhabitants
to and instituted Islam in the communities therein. Soon the monotheistic
religion spread, leading to the establishment of Islamic sultanates
12
in the
southern part of the Philippines.
Decades after Islam was introduced to the Philippines, the religion
has been an integral part of the lives of the Bangsa Moro people.
13
It has
not only governed their spiritual relations with the Supreme Being they call
Allah,
14
it has been the ultimate body of rules and laws that regulated their
everyday lives, their relations and dealings with others and how they conduct
themselves in society.
15
It has been an important component of their identity
as a people. Hence, when the Spanish conquistadores arrived in the Philippines
in 1521, the aggressive defance against colonial subjugation among the Bangsa
Moro people was understandablethey deemed that their faith and distinct
identity as a people was under imminent threat of being destroyed and taken
11
N. B. Cali, Dispelling Myths, Mysteries, and Misconceptions of a Legal system Mis-
understood: A Comparative Analysis on the Islamic and Philippine Criminal Justice Systems,
U.S.T. L.Rev., Vol. LII at 199.
12
Sultanates are political units ruled by a chief called sultan. Each sultanate was
independent, had sovereign power and had diplomatic and trade relations with other countries
in the region.
13
Bangsa Moro (the Moro People) is the generic name for the 13 ethnolinguistic
Muslim tribes in the Philippines which constitute a quarter of the population in Mindanao in
the Southern Philippines. They number from 5-6 million and are found in every major island
of the country. They share a distinct culture, speak different dialects, are varied in their social
formation but share a common belief in Islam. This is a uniting factor among the different
groups. There are three main Moro ethnolinguistic groups: the Maguindanao-Iranun group in
the Cotabato region, the Tausug-Samal group in the Sulu Archipelago, and the Maranaws of
the Lanao region. Under R.A. 9054, Bangsa Moro People is defned as(b) Bangsa Moro people.
These are citizens who are believers in Islam and who have retained some or all of their own
social, economic, cultural, and political institutions.

14
Allah is the Arabic word for god or deity.

15
Supra note 11.
8
away, considering the hard line proselytizing by the Spanish conquerors.
16

They persisted in resisting and disallowing any colonial rule and infuence to
seep into any aspect of their lives for about three centuries and true enough,
they were able to preserve their faith, their customs and traditions, and their
distinctive identity as Bangsa Moro people.
Their struggle to defend Islam and their substantially Islamic-infuenced
culture, however, did not end when the Spanish invaders left the Philippines
and ceded the country to the United States of America by virtue of the Treaty
of Paris.
17
They, as they did during the Spanish reign, fercely revolted against
American rule for the same principal reasonthe protection of Islam and
preservation of their culture and identity.
Although the American colonizers succeeded in neutralizing Moro
opposition by employing several policies of attraction such as establishing a
Moro province purportedly to take care of the Moro peoples welfare and
interests, education and forging peace treaties such as the Bates Treaty with
local Moro leaders, the Bangsa Moro peoples fervent desire to keep intact
their religion and culture did not die. Their battle for autonomy and self-
determination lingered even after the United States relinquished its sovereignty
over the Philippines and conferred it independence as a new nation-state on 4
July 1946 by virtue of the Treaty of Manila.
18

POST-COLONIAL RESISTANCE: THE BIRTH OF INSURGENCY
AND ARMED CONFLICT IN MINDANAO
While most Filipinos rejoiced at the liberation of the Philippines from
colonial control, the Bangsa Moro people perceived it as a huge blow to their
16
Islam reached the inhabitants of the northern part of the Philippines. After the
arrival of the Spanish colonizers, said inhabitants were converted to Catholicism.
17
The treaty was signed on 19 December 1898.
18
http://untreaty.un.org/unts/1_60000/1/6/00000254.pdf (last accessed 21
December 2009).
9
endeavor to secure autonomy and self-determination in order to keep their
Islamic beliefs and culture pure from external infuences, as their homeland was
annexed to the predominantly Catholic Philippine Republic. Specifcally, they
fear that their religious, cultural, and political traditions may be weakened or
destroyed in view of the said annexation. The infux of Christian settlers from
Luzon and Visayas presented several problems for them too, i.e., they were
dispossessed of their ancestral and communal lands and they were becoming
a minority in their own homeland, an occurrence that resulted to them being
discriminated against. They also resent the economic underdevelopment and
poverty in Mindanao and believe that the main cause of the deplorable economic
situation is their being under the headship of the National Government.
These further fanned the fery desire for independence and self-determination
that has been ablaze since the Spanish colonizationand this gave birth to
secessionist groups, particularly the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF),
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), and the Abu Sayyaf, the three main
groups leading the secessionist movement in Mindanao.
Moro National Liberation Front
Founded and led by a university professor, Nur Misuari in 1971, the
Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) was primarily organized as a response
to the Jabidah Massacre,
19
rampant lawlessness in Mindanao and the declaration
of Martial Law on 21 September 1972 by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
Composed of youth intellectuals and Muslim nationalists, the MNLF vigorously
19
Also known as the Corregidor Massacre, the Jabidah Massacre refers to the sum-
mary killing of about twenty-eight (28) to sixty (60) young Moros recruited for training on
guerilla tactics in preparation for Operation Merdeka, then a top-secret plan of former
Philippine President Ferdinand Marcoss administration to invade the east Malaysian state of
Sabah, which the Philippines claims as part of its territory. The recruits were brought to the
island of Corregidor on January 13, 1968 and were killed on March 18, 1968, after the recruits
attempted to air their grievances, such as the non-payment of promised monthly stipend,
against the training offcers of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) to Malacaang.
Although investigations were made by the government and court-martial proceedings against
the offcers involved were undertaken, the case unexplainably drowned in the Philippine jus-
tice system and to this day, the calls for justice by the victims families and supporters were
never answered.
10
pushed for the independent statehood of Mindanao. Particularly, the MNLF
believes that (1) the Moro people constitute a distinct bangsa (nation) that has
a specifc Islamic historical and cultural identity; (2) the bangsamoro (Islamic
nation) has a legitimate right to self-determination; and (3) the MNLF has
a duty and obligation to wage a jihad
20
against the Philippine State. As such,
the movement fought for due representation of Muslims in the Philippine
political process. In 1996, peace talks between the Government and MNLF
have resulted to the establishment of the Zone of Peace and Development
(ZOPAD) in Mindanao; the creation of Southern Philippines Council for
Peace and Development (SPCPD); and Misuaris election as governor of the
Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao from 1996-2001, which gave the
Muslims a stake in the political process of the country. Thus, only the Moro
Islamic Liberation Front and the Abu Sayyaf remain in the Muslim secessionist
movement at present.
21
Moro Islamic Liberation Front
The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is a breakaway group of the
MNLF. Although it separated from the latter in 1980, it was formally organized
in March 1984 under the leadership of Hashim Salamat.
22
Disagreements in
the goals of the independent Mindanao that they have been struggling for and
the refusal of the MNLF to take on a more aggressive approach in establishing
a separate Islamic state resulted in the branching out of the road into two.
The MILF has a more religious orientation than its parent organization and
its primary objective is to establish an independent Islamic state. It aims to
20
From the Islamic point of view, Jihad
21
www.army.mil.ph/OG5_articles/Insegencies.htm (last accessed 21 December
2009).

22
The MILF is a rebel group which was established in 1984 when, under the lead-
ership of the late Hashim Salamat, it splintered from the Moro National Liberation Front
(MNLF) then headed by Nur Misuari, on the ground, among others, of what Salamat per-
ceived to be a manipulation of the MNLF away from an Islamic basis towards Marxist-Maoist
orientations. (Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral
Domain, infra note 117.)
11
accomplish such through dawa (Islamic preaching) and jihad.
23

Initially, the MILF was supported by the Libyan and Malaysian
governments. However, when it became notorious for its terrorist activities,
such as attacking civilian villages and pilfering homes in Mindanao, to persuade
the Philippine government to give in to its demands of granting Muslim
Mindanao full autonomy, support from the Muslim community and has been
under global scrutiny.
24
It has also been under suspicion of being linked to the
notorious Bin Laden-led terrorist group Al-Qaeda. For years, the MILF has been
engaged in armed combat with the AFP, resulting into thousands of deaths,
the displacement of more than half a million from their homes, and tens of
thousands others in refugee camps in several provinces in Mindanao.
25

Abu Sayyaf Group
The most notorious among the secessionist organizations in
Mindanao, the Abu Sayyaf
26
Group, consisting of a radical group that broke
away from the MNLF, was formed in 1991 under the headship of Abduragak
Abubakar Janjalani.
27
It has the same objective as the MNLF and MILF, i.e.,
the establishment of an independent Islamic state in Mindanao. However, the
means it employsviolencehas found itself in the company of terrorist
groups under global scrutiny and surveillance. It gained international disrepute
in 2000 with the kidnapping of 21 foreigners and Filipinos in Sipadan,
Malaysia.
28
Since then, it has been held responsibleand it itself admitted

23
www.army.mil.ph/OG5_articles/Insegencies.htm (last accessed 21 December 2009).
24
http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/moro.cfm (last accessed 21 December 2009).
25
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/27/world/asia/27phils.html (last accessed 21 De-
cember 2009).
26
Abu Sayyaf is an Arabic term which means bearer of the sword.

27
Janjalani was a veteran of the Afghan war and during his participation in the war
he developed close ties with other Islamic radical groups. He strongly opposed the peace
process between the government of the Philippines and the MNLF, and demanded an inde-
pendent Islamic state.
28
Using high-powered speedboats, the Abu Sayyaf kidnapped 21 people -- 19 for-
eigners and two Filipinos -- from a dive resort in Sipadan, Malaysia. The hostages were brought
to Sulu. Most of the hostages were released in the following months; the last hostage, Roland
12
several bombings in the country, such as the bombing of M/V Superferry
14 that left ninety-four (94) people killed
29
and the Valentines Day bombing,
which left eight people lifeless.
30
THE ELUSIVE ROAD TO PEACE
Decades of war and armed confict in Mindanao resultant of the
insurgencies therein have not only damaged the lives of the residents of the
affected areas but it has also adversely affected the Philippines economy and
image in the international community. Specifcally, the instability in Mindanao
has discouraged foreign entrepreneurs from investing in the country. Travel
bans have been issued by foreign governments several times against the
Philippines, thereby curtailing its burgeoning tourism industry. Realizing the
multi-faceted injury that the war is inficting upon the country, the Government
of the Philippines has continuously, albeit with little success, negotiated with
the secessionist groups in Mindanao to arrive at a compromise and bring peace
in the land of promise.
31

Tripoli Agreement of 1976: The Internationally Forged Accord for
Peace
The Tripoli Agreement of 1976
32
is the very frst concrete and
tangible attempt of the Government of the Philippines to bring peace in
Ulla (Filipino), was able to escape on June 6, 2003. http://www.gmanews.tv/story/154797/
abu-sayyaf-kidnappings-bombings-and-other-attacks (last accessed 21 December 2009).
29
M/V SuperFerry 14 caught fre near Corregidor, Bataan after an explosion oc-
curred onboard. 94 people were killed while 24 remain missing. Abu Sayyaf claimed it bombed
the ferry. Criminal charges were fled in October 2004 against six suspects linked to the group
after the government established that the Abu Sayyaf were indeed behind the attack. Id.
30
The so-called Valentines Day bombings took place on 14 February 2005. The
eight casualties were killed in separate bombings in General Santos City, Makati and Davao
City. Abu Sayyaf claimed responsibility for the incidents. Id.
31
Mindanao is known as the Land of Promise because of its vast natural re-
sources.

32
In full Agreement Between the Government of the Philippines and Moro Na-
tional Liberation Front with the Participation of the Quadripartite Ministerial Commission
Members of the Islamic Conference and the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic
Conference.
13
Mindanao after the armed confict therein escalated in the 1970s. It was also
the accord that laid the foundation for the establishment of an autonomous
government in Muslim Mindanao. It was entered into and by the Government
of the Philippines and the MNLF with the participation of the Quadripartite
Ministerial Commission, consisting of the Libyan Arab Republic, the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia, the Republic of Senegal and the Democratic Republic of
Somalia and the Secretary General of the Organization of Islamic Conference
(OIC).
33
It was signed and on 23 December 1976 and took effect on the same
date.
Specifcally, the Tripoli Agreement stipulated for the institution of
autonomy in Southern Philippines within the realm of the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Philippines. It provides for the areas covered by
the said autonomy, namely Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur,
Zamboanga del Norte, North Cotabato, Maguindanao, Sultan Kudarat, Lanao
del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Davao del Sur, South Cotabato, and Palawan. The
rights, springing by virtue of such autonomy, of the Muslims therein are also
provided for, such as the right to set up their own courts which implement
the Islamic Shariah laws and to establish a Legislative Assembly. It provided
for an autonomous arrangement with its own administrative, economic and
fnancial system. It also defnes the aspects of governance which the National
Government shall retain.
34
Consequently, the former Philippine President
33
The Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) is the second largest inter-gov-
ernmental organization after the United Nations which has membership of 57 states spread
over four continents. The Organization is the collective voice of the Muslim world and en-
suring to safeguard and protect the interests of the Muslim world in the spirit of promoting
international peace and harmony among various people of the world. The Organization was
established upon a decision of the historical summit which took place in Rabat, Kingdom of
Morocco on 12th Rajab 1389 Hijra (25 September 1969) as a result of criminal arson of Al-
Aqsa Mosque in occupied Jerusalem. (http://www.oic-oci.org/page_detail.asp?p_id=5, [last
accessed December 18, 2009])
34
In this regard, the Tripoli Agreement provides:
1.Foreign Policy shall be of the compe-
tence of the Central Government of the Philippines.
2. The National Defense Affairs shall be the concern of the Central Authority pro-
vided that the arrangements for the joining of the forces of the Moro National
Liberation Front with the Philippine Armed Forces be discussed later.
14
Ferdinand E. Marcos signed Presidential Decree 1618
35
which formally created
two autonomous regions in MindanaoRegions IX and XII.
36
Among
other things, the Decree established internal autonomy in the two regions
within the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial integrity of
the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution,
37
with legislative and
executive machinery to exercise the powers and responsibilities specifed in
therein.
38
The Decree also requires the autonomous regional governments
to undertake all internal administrative matters for the respective regions,
39

except on such matters which are within the competence and jurisdiction of
the National Government.
40
With respect to the relation of these autonomous
35
The presidential decree is entitled IMPLEMENTING THE ORGANIZATION
OF THE SANGGUNIANG PAMPOOK AND THE LUPONG TAGAPAGPAGANAP
NG POOK IN REGION IX AND REGION XII AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES. It was
promulgated on July 25, 1979.
36
Section 2 of the presidential decree provides:
SEC. 2. Territorial Coverage of the Autonomous Regions. (a) Region IX shall
comprise the provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte including
the Cities of Dipolog and Dapitan, and Zamboanga del Sur including the Cities of
Pagadian and Zamboanga.
(b) Region XII shall comprise the provinces of Lanao del Norte including
the City of Iligan, Lanao del Sur including the City of Marawi, Maguindanao includ-
ing the City of Cotabato, North Cotabato, and Sultan Kudarat.
37
Id., 3.
38
Id.
39
Id. 4.
40
Id. These include, but are not limited to the following:
(1) National defense and security;
(2) Foreign relations;
(3) Foreign trade;
(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange, banking and quasi-bank-
ing, and external borrowing,
(5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation or utilization of all
natural resources;
(6) Air and sea transport
(7) Postal matters and telecommunications;
(8) Customs and quarantine;
(9) Immigration and deportation;
(10) Citizenship and naturalization;
(11) National economic, social and educational planning; and
(12) General auditing.
15
regions with the central government, it states that the President shall have the
power of general supervision and control over the Autonomous Regions.
41

The extent of the internal autonomy conferred to these regions has been
elucidated upon by the Philippine Supreme Court
42
in the case of Limbona v.
Mangelin.
43
The scope of such autonomy came up as an incidental issue when
the Courts jurisdiction over the legislative body of Region XII was questioned.
The Court, in completely brushing aside any doubt as to its jurisdiction over
the said body, held:
[A]utonomy is either decentralization of administration
or decentralization of power. There is decentralization
of administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in the process to
make local governments more responsive and accountable,
and ensure their fullest development as self-reliant communities
and make them more effective partners in the pursuit of
national development and social progress. At the same time,
it relieves the central government of the burden of managing
local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national concerns.
The President exercises general supervision over them, but
only to ensure that local affairs are administered according to
law. He has no control over their acts in the sense that he can
substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves
an abdication of political power in the favor of local governments
units declare to be autonomous. In that case, the autonomous
government is free to chart its own destiny and shape its future
with minimum intervention from central authorities. According
to a constitutional author, decentralization of power amounts
to self-immolation, since in that event, the autonomous
government becomes accountable not to the central authorities
but to its constituency.
41
Id. 35(a).
42
Hereinafter abbreviated as SC for brevity.
43
170 SCRA 786 (1989).
16
But the question of whether or not the grant of
autonomy Muslim Mindanao under the 1987 Constitution
involves, truly, an effort to decentralize power rather than
mere administration is a question foreign to this petition, since
what is involved herein is a local government unit constituted
prior to the ratifcation of the present Constitution. Hence, the
Court will not resolve that controversy now, in this case, since
no controversy in fact exists. We will resolve it at the proper
time and in the proper case.
Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units
enjoy autonomy in these two senses, thus:
Sec. 1. The territorial and political
subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines
are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and
barangays. Here shall be autonomous regions
in Muslim Mindanao, and the Cordilleras as
hereinafter provided.
29

Sec. 2. The territorial and political
subdivisions shall enjoy local autonomy.
xxx xxx xxx
See. 15. There shall be created
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao
and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and geographical areas
sharing common and distinctive historical
and cultural heritage, economic and social
structures, and other relevant characteristics
within the framework of this Constitution and
the national sovereignty as well as territorial
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of
the latter category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject
alone to the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted
principles on the effects and limits of autonomy. On the other
hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as
we noted, under the supervision of the national government
17
acting through the President (and the Department of Local
Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII),
then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably
beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that
the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are
beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former
category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An
examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the
autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us
that they were never meant to exercise autonomy in the
second sense, that is, in which the central government
commits an act of self-immolation. Presidential Decree
No. 1618, in the frst place, mandates that [t]he President
shall have the power of general supervision and control over
Autonomous Regions. In the second place, the Sangguniang
Pampook, their legislative arm, is made to discharge chiefy
administrative services, thus:
SEC. 7. Powers of the Sangguniang Pampook.
The Sangguniang Pampook shall exercise local
legislative powers over regional affairs within
the framework of national development plans,
policies and goals, in the following areas:
(1) Organization of regional administrative
system;
(2) Economic, social and cultural development
of the Autonomous Region;
(3) Agricultural, commercial and industrial
programs for the Autonomous Region;
(4) Infrastructure development for the
Autonomous Region;
(5) Urban and rural planning for the
Autonomous Region;
(6) Taxation and other revenue-raising measures
as provided for in this Decree;
18
(7) Maintenance, operation and administration
of schools established by the Autonomous
Region;
(8) Establishment, operation and maintenance
of health, welfare and other social services,
programs and facilities;
(9) Preservation and development of customs,
traditions, languages and culture indigenous to
the Autonomous Region; and
(10) Such other matters as may be authorized by
law, including the enactment of such measures
as may be necessary for the promotion of
the general welfare of the people in the
Autonomous Region.
The President shall exercise such powers as may
be necessary to assure that enactment and acts
of the Sangguniang Pampook and the Lupong
Tagapagpaganap ng Pook are in compliance
with this Decree, national legislation, policies,
plans and programs.
The Sangguniang Pampook shall maintain
liaison with the Batasang Pambansa.
Hence, we assume jurisdiction.
44
(Emphasis supplied)
With respect to the coercive and binding effect of the Tripoli Agreement
on the Philippine Government, the same has been, although not categorically,
ruled upon by the SC in the case of Abbas v. COMELEC.
45
In that case, the
validity and constitutionality of Republic Act (R.A.) 6734, the Organic Act
creating the ARMM pursuant to the 1987 Constitution,
46
was challenged on
the premise that it runs afoul the provisions of the Tripoli Agreement. In
rejecting the contention and ruling that the Agreement is not a treaty such that
44
Id. at 794-797.

45
179 SCRA 287 (1989).
46
Hereinafter The Constitution for brevity.
19
it is binding upon the Philippine Government,
47
the Court held:
Petitioners premise their arguments on the assumption
that the Tripoli Agreement is part of the law of the land,
being a binding international agreement. The Solicitor General
asserts that the Tripoli Agreement is neither a binding treaty,
not having been entered into by the Republic of the Philippines
with a sovereign state and ratifed according to the provisions
of the 1973 or 1987 Constitutions, nor a binding international
agreement.
We fnd it neither necessary nor determinative of
the case to rule on the nature of the Tripoli Agreement
and its binding effect on the Philippine Government
whether under public international or internal Philippine
law. In the frst place, it is now the Constitution itself
that provides for the creation of an autonomous region
in Muslim Mindanao. The standard for any inquiry into
the validity of R.A. No. 6734 would therefore be what is
so provided in the Constitution. Thus, any confict between
the provisions of R.A. No. 6734 and the provisions of the
Tripoli Agreement will not have the effect of enjoining the
implementation of the Organic Act. Assuming for the sake
of argument that the Tripoli Agreement is a binding treaty
or international agreement, it would then constitute part
of the law of the land. But as internal law it would not be
superior to R.A. No. 6734, an enactment of the Congress
of the Philippines, rather it would be in the same class as
the latter. (Citation omitted)Thus, if at all, R.A. No. 6734
would be amendatory of the Tripoli Agreement, being
a subsequent law. Only a determination by this Court that
R.A. No. 6734 contravened the Constitution would result in
the granting of the reliefs sought.
48
(Emphasis supplied)
47
Under Art. VIII 14 1 of the 1973 Constitution, the governing constitution
at the time the Tripoli Agreement was entered into, a treaty is entered into in the following
manner:
Sec. 14. (1) Except as otherwise provided in this Constitution, no treaty shall be
valid and effective unless concurred in by a majority of all the Members of the National As-
sembly.
48
Supra note 45 at 294. The respected constitutionalist Fr. Joaquin Bernas is also of
the opinion that the Tripoli Agreement is not a treaty. (Supra note 9 at 1105.)
20
The People Power-Inspired Charter: The Fundamental Legal Wellspring
of the ARMM
The Constitution under the auspices of former Philippine President
Corazon Aquino, was not only hailed as the fundamental law that restored
democracy in the country after the two-decade tyrannical rule by former
President Marcosit was also seen as a new beacon of light and hope for the
Bangsamoro people, being the frst constitution
49
to mandate the creation of an
autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao.
50
The rationale for the inclusion of
such provisions may be perused from the decision of the SC in Disomangcop v.
It bears noting that, aside from the Tripoli Agreement of 1976, the Government
of the Philippines also forged with the MNLF what was considered as a breakthrough in the
protracted peace processthe 1996 Final Peace Agreement (FPA). The FPA provided for
a transition phase (Phase I) and an expanded autonomous region (Phase II). In Phase I, the
ARMM, together with ten (10) other provinces and nine (9) cities were designated the Spe-
cial Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD). A new structure, the Southern Philippine
Council for Peace and Development (SPCPD) was established to oversee or manage peace
and development efforts within the SZOPAD. In addition to the SPCPD, a Consultative As-
sembly of eighty-one (81) members was also established and it was mandated to be a forum
for consultation and ventilation of issues and concerns. As such, it was tasked to conduct
public hearings, recommend policies to the President through the SPCPD chairman, and make
rules and regulations for the effective and effcient administration of the SZOPAD.
In 2001, the Government of the Philippines entered into another peace Agreement
but this time, it was with the MILF. The accord is known as the Tripoli Agreement of 2001.
The Agreement consists of three main parts, namely: Security Aspect, Rehabilitation Aspect
and Ancestral Domain Aspect. The Security Aspect states that the parties to the Agreement
shall commence negotiations for peaceful resolution of the armed confict. The Rehabilitation
Aspect deals mainly with the rehabilitation of the residents who have been displaced by the
war and to respect their human rights. In the Ancestral Domain Aspect, it is stated therein that
the parties shall further discuss the matter at a later date. And truly, the parties did execute an
agreement regarding this Aspect, i.e., the Memorandum of Agreement on Ancestral Domain
(MOA-AD), which the SC invalidated and declared as unconstitutional in the case of Province
of North Cotabato v. Government of the Philippines Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, infra note 110.
49
The predecessors of the 1987 Constitution are the 1935 Constitution and 1973
Constitution.
50
The 1987 Constitution also granted the creation of an autonomous region in the
Cordilleras. However, an autonomous region in the latter never came into being as the Or-
ganic Act enacted for its creation failed to obtain the necessary number of votes. Only one
province approved said Organic Act, hence there was failure to comply with the requisite that
an autonomous region must consist of at least two (2) provinces. (Ordillo v. COMELEC, 192
SCRA 100 [1990]).
21
Datumanong.
51
The Court, by mostly quoting the deliberations of the members
of the 1986 Constitutional Commission,
52
revealed the validation for the
creation of autonomous regions in this wise:
The 1987 Constitution mandates regional
autonomy to give a bold and unequivocal answer to the
cry for a meaningful, effective and forceful autonomy.
According to Commissioner Jose Nolledo, Chairman of the
Committee which drafted the provisions, it is an indictment
against the status quo of a unitary system that, to my
mind, has ineluctably tied the hands of progress in
our country . . . our varying regional characteristics are
factors to capitalize on to attain national strength through
decentralization.
The idea behind the Constitutional provisions for
autonomous regions is to allow the separate development
of peoples with distinctive cultures and traditions.
These cultures, as a matter of right, must be allowed to
fourish.
Autonomy, as a national policy, recognizes the wholeness
of the Philippine society in its ethnolinguistic, cultural, and
even religious diversities. It strives to free Philippine society
of the strain and wastage caused by the assimilationist
approach. Policies emanating from the legislature are invariably
assimilationist in character despite channels being open for
minority representation. As a result, democracy becomes an
irony to the minority group.
Several commissioners echoed the pervasive sentiment
in the plenary sessions in their own inimitable way. Thus,
Commissioner Blas Ople referred to the recognition that the
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras do not belong to
the dominant national community as the justifcation for
conferring on them a measure of legal self-suffciency,
meaning self-government, so that they will fourish
politically, economically and culturally, with the hope
51
444 SCRA 203 (2004).
52
It is the commission which was tasked to draft the 1987 Constitution.
22
that after achieving parity with the rest of the country they
would give up their own autonomous region in favor of
joining the national mainstream. For his part, the Muslim
delegate, Commissioner Ahmad Alonto, spoke of the diversity
of cultures as the framework for nation-building. Finally,
excerpts of the poignant plea of Commissioner Ponciano
Bennagen deserve to be quoted verbatim:
. . . They see regional autonomy as the
answer to their centuries of struggle against
oppression and exploitation. For so long, their
names and identities have been debased. Their
ancestral lands have been ransacked for their
treasures, for their wealth. Their cultures have
been defled, their very lives threatened, and
worse, extinguished, all in the name of national
development; all in the name of public interest;
all in the name of common good; all in the
name of the right to property; all in the name of
Regalian Doctrine; all in the name of national
security. These phrases have meant nothing to
our indigenous communities, except for the
violation of their human rights.
. . .
Honorable Commissioners, we wish to
impress upon you the gravity of the decision
to be made by every single one of us in this
Commission. We have the overwhelming
support of the Bangsa Moro and the Cordillera
Constitution. By this we mean meaningful and
authentic regional autonomy. We propose
that we have a separate Article on the
autonomous regions for the Bangsa Moro
and Cordillera people clearly spelled out
in this Constitution, instead of prolonging
the agony of their vigil and their struggle.
This, too is a plea for national peace. Let
us not pass the buck to the Congress to decide
on this. Let us not wash our hands of our
23
responsibility to attain national unity and peace
and to settle this problem and rectify past
injustices, once and for all.
The need for regional autonomy is more pressing in
the case of the Filipino Muslims and the Cordillera people
who have been fghting for it. Their political struggle
highlights their unique cultures and the unresponsiveness
of the unitary system to their aspirations. The Moros
struggle for self-determination dates as far back as the
Spanish conquest in the Philippines. Even at present, the
struggle goes on.
Perforce, regional autonomy is also a means
towards solving existing serious peace and order problems
and secessionist movements. Parenthetically, autonomy,
decentralization and regionalization, in international law, have
become politically acceptable answers to intractable problems
of nationalism, separatism, ethnic confict and threat of
secession.
However, the creation of autonomous regions does
not signify the establishment of a sovereignty distinct from
that of the Republic, as it can be installed only within the
framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as
well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Regional autonomy is the degree of self-determination
exercised by the local government unit vis--vis the central
government.
In international law, the right to self-determination
need not be understood as a right to political separation, but
rather as a complex net of legal-political relations between a
certain people and the state authorities. It ensures the right
of peoples to the necessary level of autonomy that would
guarantee the support of their own cultural identity, the
establishment of priorities by the communitys internal
decision-making processes and the management of collective
matters by themselves.
If self-determination is viewed as an end in itself
24
refecting a preference for homogeneous, independent nation-
states, it is incapable of universal application without massive
disruption. However, if self-determination is viewed as a
means to an endthat end being a democratic, participatory
political and economic system in which the rights of individuals
and the identity of minority communities are protectedits
continuing validity is more easily perceived.
Regional autonomy refers to the granting of basic
internal government powers to the people of a particular area
or region with least control and supervision from the central
government.
The objective of the autonomy system is to permit
determined groups, with a common tradition and shared
social-cultural characteristics, to develop freely their
ways of life and heritage, exercise their rights, and be
in charge of their own business. This is achieved through
the establishment of a special governance regime for certain
member communities who choose their own authorities from
within the community and exercise the jurisdictional authority
legally accorded to them to decide internal community affairs.
In the Philippine setting, regional autonomy
implies the cultivation of more positive means for
national integration. It would remove the wariness among
the Muslims, increase their trust in the government and
pave the way for the unhampered implementation of the
development programs in the region. Again, even a glimpse
of the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission could
lend a sense of the urgency and the inexorable appeal of true
decentralization:
MR. OPLE. . . . We are writing a
Constitution, of course, for generations to
come, not only for the present but for our
posterity. There is no harm in recognizing
certain vital pragmatic needs for national
peace and solidarity, and the writing of this
Constitution just happens at a time when it
is possible for this Commission to help the
25
cause of peace and reconciliation in Mindanao
and the Cordilleras, by taking advantage of a
heaven-sent opportunity. . . .
. . .
MR. ABUBAKAR. . . . So in order
to foreclose and convince the rest of the of
the Philippines that Mindanao autonomy will
be granted to them as soon as possible, more
or less, to dissuade these armed men from
going outside while Mindanao will be under
the control of the national government, let us
establish an autonomous Mindanao within our
effort and capacity to do so within the shortest
possible time. This will be an answer to the
Misuari clamor, not only for autonomy but for
independence.
. . .
MR. OPLE. . . . The reason for this
abbreviation of the period for the consideration
of the Congress of the organic acts and their
passage is that we live in abnormal times. In the
case of Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras,
we know that we deal with questions of war and
peace. These are momentous issues in which
the territorial integrity and the solidarity of this
country are being put at stake, in a manner of
speaking.
We are writing a peace Constitution.
We hope that the Article on Social Justice can
contribute to a climate of peace so that any civil
strife in the countryside can be more quickly
and more justly resolved. We are providing
for autonomous regions so that we give
constitutional permanence to the just demands
and grievances of our own fellow countrymen
in the Cordilleras and in Mindanao. One
26
hundred thousand lives were lost in that struggle
in Mindanao, and to this day, the Cordilleras is
being shaken by an armed struggle as well as a
peaceful and militant struggle.
. . .
Rather than give opportunity to foreign
bodies, no matter how sympathetic to the
Philippines, to contribute to the settlement of
this issue, I think the Constitutional Commission
ought not to forego the opportunity to put the
stamp of this Commission through defnitive
action on the settlement of the problems that
have nagged us and our forefathers for so
long.
53
(Emphasis supplied)
The constitutional provisions which particularly deal with the
establishment of and limitations imposed upon the ARMM can be found in
Section 1 of Article X and Sections 15 through 21 of the same article. Sections
1 and 15 authorize the creation of autonomous regions. The textual contents
of the provisions are as follows::
Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions
of the Republic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities,
municipalities, and barangays. There shall be autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
(Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in
Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces,
cities, municipalities, and geographical areas sharing common
and distinctive historical and cultural heritage, economic and
social structures, and other relevant characteristics within the
framework of this Constitution and the national sovereignty
as well as the territorial integrity of the Republic of the
Philippines.
It can be gleaned from these provisions that only the areas covering
53
Supra note 51 at 227-232.
27
Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras
54
are given the right to autonomy. Thus,
it has been asserted that the Congress cannot validly create autonomous regions
other than for Mindanao and the Cordilleras. The remedy of any area that
wishes to be granted autonomy would be to seek a constitutional amendment.
55

Moreover, the formation of autonomous regions, as found in the Constitution,
is based on the diversity of cultures existing in the countrythe need to allow
them to fourishand not just geographic accident. Any clamor for autonomy
which is not grounded upon identity of culture is of suspicious motivation.
Autonomy based on geographic considerations can be inspired by motivations
no less ignoble than what inspires gerrymandering.
56
It is noteworthy that
the constitutional authority to create autonomous regions does not translate
to the establishment of sovereignties separate and distinct from that of the
Republic of the Philippines as the provision immediately quoted above states
that they must be within the framework of this Constitution and the national
sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the Philippines.
57
On this point, question as to the control or supervision exercised by
the National Government over the Constitution-created autonomous regions
may be raised: Has the National Government, by granting autonomy to these
regions relinquished any form of control or supervision over these regions?
The answer to this query can be found under Section 16 which states:
Sec. 16. The President shall exercise general supervision
over autonomous regions to ensure that laws are faithfully
executed.
Clearly, the National Government, through the President, still exercises
some degree of supervision over the autonomous regions. However, this
does not translate to mean that they are under the full control of the central
54
The Cordilleras is located in the Northern part of Luzon. It is composed of six
(6) provinces, namely Apayao, Kalinga, Abra, Mountain Province, Ifugao, and Benguet, plus
the chartered city of Baguio.
55
Supra note 10 at 1099.
56
Id.
57
Id.
28
government such that the autonomy given to them is rendered meaningless.
This is unambiguously declared in the immediately quoted provisionthe
President can only exercise general supervision over the autonomous regions.
The term has been interpreted to mean the power to ensure that subordinate
offcers faithfully execute and act within existing laws.
58
The nature of this
supervision that the President exercises over autonomous regions may not be
expanded by law enacted by the Congress. The Constitutional Commission
explained that the phrase as may be provided by law was deliberately
dropped in order to deny the Congress the power to expand the extent of such
supervision beyond general supervision. In effect, therefore, and pursuant to
the rationale of granting greater autonomy, Section 16 delimits the power of
Congress over autonomous regions.
59
Since the autonomous regions are still within the domain of the
mother state, it thus becomes material to provide for the powers that it may
validly exercise without running counter to the within the framework of this
Constitution proviso and those which are reserved for the central government
to wield. Section 17 provides for this delineation as follows:
Sec. 17. All powers, functions, and responsibilities not
granted by this Constitution or by law to the autonomous
regions shall be vested in the National Government.
Sections 18 and 19, on the other hand, lay down the procedural
mechanics for the creation of the autonomous. The provisions state:
Sec. 18. The Congress shall enact an organic act for each
autonomous region with the assistance and participation of the
regional consultative commission composed of representatives
appointed by the President from a list of nominees from multi-
sectoral bodies. The organic act shall defne the basic structure
of government for the region consisting of the executive
department and legislative assembly, both of which shall be
elective and representative of the constituent political units.

58
III Record of the Constitutional Commission (1986) at 451-452.
59
Id. at 514-516.
29
The organic acts shall likewise provide for special courts with
personal, family, and property law jurisdiction consistent with
the provisions of this Constitution and national laws.
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective
when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent
units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces, cities, and geographic areas voting favorably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.
Sec. 19. The frst Congress elected under this
Constitution shall, within eighteen months from the time of
organization of both Houses, pass the organic acts for the
autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras.
Section 17 enunciates the cardinal principle that the autonomous
regions are local units which are vested with enumerated powers. Hence,
any power which is not included in the enumeration and cannot be implied
from such enumeration remain within the ambit of national governance.
60

The matters over which the autonomous regions may exercise authority are
listed in Section 18. The same section also commands the enactment by the
Congress of organic acts for the two autonomous regions. As provided in the
provision, the organic acts shall defne the basic structure of government for
the autonomous regions. It is worthy to note that the Constitution itself does
not create the autonomous regionsit merely authorizes their establishment.
It is clear from Section 18 that the creation of the autonomous region shall
be effective when approved by majority of the votes casts by the constituent
units in a plebiscite called for the purpose. Moreover, only those provinces,
cities, and geographic areas
61
voting favorably in such plebiscite shall form
part of the autonomous region concerned.
62
To sum up the import of the
60
61
Geographic areas refers to a cluster of towns within a province. It has been
observed that under Section 18, as presently worded, it is possible that a cluster of towns
could be excluded from the autonomous region even if the rest of the province within which
it belongs should vote in favor of inclusion. (Id. at 1105.)
62
For a province, city or geographical area to succeed in excluding itself from the
autonomous region, it must not only boycott the plebiscite but must express its wish by vote.
30
abovecited constitutional provisions, the process in determining what areas
shall be integrated in the autonomous region consists of three steps. First,
there is a preliminary administrative determination of what areas should be
covered. This is required for purposes of determining the composition of
the regional consultative council. Second, Congress, through the Organic Act,
makes a determination of what areas might be incorporated and therefore
should take part in the requisite plebiscite. In this stage, some areas included in
the frst step can already be excluded. Finally, the plebiscite can further modify
the Organic Act because Section 18 states that only provinces, cities, and
geographic areas voting favorably in such plebiscite shall be included in the
autonomous region. Furthermore, it is enough that some provinces, cities
and geographic areas vote in favor of their incorporation in the autonomous
region.
63

Section 19 orders the frst Congress elected under the Constitution
to enact the organic act for the two autonomous regions within eighteen (18)
months from the time of its organization, i.e., from the time of the election
of its offcers and the formation of its different committees. The relatively
short time given to Congress for the enactment of such laws underscores
the urgency and necessity of establishing the autonomous regions as a means
towards solving existing serious peace and order problems and foreclosing
secessionist movements that have hugely contributed to the retardation of the
countrys holistic progress.
64
Section 20 is another constitutional source of the powers, particularly
legislative, granted to the autonomous regions. The provision reads:
Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject
to the provisions of this Constitution and national laws, the
(Id.)
Moreover, double majority, i.e., a majority in individual political units and a major-
ity of total votes cast, is not necessary for an effective ratifcation. (Id. at 1104. See also Abbas
v. COMELEC, supra note 45.)
63
Id. at 1104.
64
31
Organic Act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative
powers over:
Administrative organization; 1.)
Creation of sources of revenue; 2.)
Ancestral domain and natural resources; 3.)
Personal, family, and property relations; 4.)
Regional urban and rural planning 5.)
development;
Economic, social, and tourism 6.)
development;
Educational policies; 7.)
Preservation and development of the 8.)
cultural heritage; and
Such other matters as may be authorized 9.)
by law for the promotion of the general
welfare of the people.
The frst eight (8) paragraphs of the immediately quoted provision
constitute the irreducible legislative powers granted by the Constitution to the
autonomous regions. However, it must be noted that, although these powers
have been characterized as irreducible, they are subject to the provisions of
this Constitution and national laws. In view of the limitative phrase, it has
been observed that the question as to which between a legislative enactment of
the local legislature of the autonomous region and a national statute should be
given prevalence in case of confict is diffcult to resolve.
65
The complication
arises from the fact that Section 20 provides that the enumerated legislative
powers of the autonomous regions shall be subject to national laws, which are
in turn subject to the Constitution one of whose state policies is to ensure the
65
Such diffculty does not obtain when the confict is between the Constitution and
the local statute passed by the legislative of the autonomous region as there is no question that
the former, being the fundamental law of the land, prevails in all instances.
32
autonomy of local governments. It has been suggested that in reconciling the
confict, the ultimate guideline should be the Constitutions desire for genuine
local autonomy.
66
Finally, Section 21 deals with matters relating to internal peace and
order and national defense and security, the import of which is as follows:
Sec. 21. The preservation of peace and order within
the regions shall be the responsibility of the local police
agencies which shall be organized, maintained, supervised, and
utilized in accordance with the applicable laws. The defense
and security of the regions shall be the responsibility of the
national government.
The provision makes a distinction between the problem of internal
peace and order and the problem of national defense and security for the
purpose of determining which falls within the responsibility of the autonomous
regions or the central government. Thus, the problem of ordinary criminality
is the responsibility of the local police agencies, while those relating to threats,
stability, integrity and survival of the nation are matters within the competence
of the national government.
67
The latter concerns have also been traditionally
assigned to the national government.
From Legal Fiction to Reality: The Creation of the ARMM Through the
Constitutionally Mandated Organic Acts
Pursuant to the directives of Sections 18 and 19, Article 10 of the
Constitution, the Congress enacted R.A. 6734, otherwise known as An Act
providing for an organic act for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao.
It was signed into law on August 1, 1989. The law, in consonance with the
constitutional mandate, provided for the basic structure of government within
the framework of the fundamental law and national sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Republic of Philippines. At the outset, it must be noted that
66
67
Id.
33
the enactment of the Organic Act does not by itself create the ARMM. As
stated earlier, it is the approval by majority votes cast by the constituent units
in a plebiscite called for the purpose that shall give birth to the autonomous
region.
68

But before the plebiscite could be conducted in the thirteen (13) and
nine (9) cities enumerated under the law,
69
the validity and constitutionality of
the Organic Act was assailed in the earlier cited case of Abbas v. COMELEC.
70

68
CONST. Art. X, 18.
69
Section 1, par. (2), Article II of the law provides:
Sec. 1. x x x (2) The plebiscite shall be conducted in the provinces of Basilan, Cota-
bato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, South Cotabato,
Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Norte, and Zamboanga del Sur, and the cit-
ies of Cotabato, Dapitan, Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Marawi, Pagadian, Puerto Princesa,
and Zamboanga.
This, however, has been amended by R.A. 9054 as follows:
Sec. 1. Expanded Autonomous Region. (1) The Autono-
mous Region in Muslim Mindanao which, under the provisions
of Republic Act No. 6734, the Organic Act for the Autonomous
Region in Muslim Mindanao, is composed of the four provinces
of Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi, is hereby
expanded to include the provinces and cities, enumerated here-
under, which vote favorably to be included in the expanded area
of the autonomous region and for other purposes, in a plebiscite
called for that purpose in accordance with Section 18, Article X
of the Constitution. The new area of autonomy shall then be
determined by the provinces and cities that will vote/choose to
join the said autonomy. It is understood that Congress may by law
which shall be consistent with the Constitution and in accordance
with the provisions of Republic Act No. 7160, the Local Govern-
ment Code of 1991, provide that clusters of contiguous-Muslim-
dominated municipalities voting in favor of autonomy be merged
and constituted into a new province(s) which shall become part
of the new Autonomous Region.
(2) Plebiscite Coverage. The plebiscite shall be conducted
in the provinces of Basilan, Cotabato, Davao del Sur, Lanao del
Norte, Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Palawan, Sarangani, South
Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del
Norte, Zamboanga del Sur and the newly created Province of
Zamboanga Sibugay, and (b) in the cities of Cotabato, Dapitan,
Dipolog, General Santos, Iligan, Kidapawan, Marawi, Pagadian,
Puerto Princesa, Digos, Koronadal, Tacurong and Zamboanga.
70
Supra note 45.
34
The petitioners therein posited that the law is invalid for clashing with several
provisions of the Constitution. Since the case will give a better understanding
of the intricacies involved in the establishment of the ARMM, an exhaustive
presentation and discussion of the decision is in order.
First, the petitioners argued that R.A. 6734 is violative of the
Constitution on the ground that it unconditionally creates the autonomous
region in Mindanao when the fundamental law makes such creation dependent
on the results of the plebiscite. In support of their supposition, the petitioners
cited Section 1, par. (1), Article II of the law which states that [t]here is hereby
created the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, to be composed of
provinces and cities voting favorably in the plebiscite called for the purpose,
in accordance with Section 18, Article X of the Constitution. They contend
that the tenor of aforequoted provision makes the creation of an autonomous
region absolute so much so that even if only two (2) provinces vote in favor
of autonomy, an autonomous region would still be formed, consisting only
of the said provinces where the favorable votes were garnered. In discrediting
this theory, the Court ruled:
The matter of the creation of the autonomous region
and its composition needs to be clarifed.
First, the questioned provision itself in R.A. No.
6734 refers to Section 18, Article X of the Constitution
which sets forth the conditions necessary for the
creation of the autonomous region. The reference to the
constitutional provision cannot be glossed over for it clearly
indicates that the creation of the autonomous region
shall take place only in accord with the constitutional
requirements. Second, there is a specifc provision in the
Transitory Provisions (Article XIX) of the Organic Act, which
incorporates substantially the same requirements embodied in
the Constitution and flls in the details, thus:
SEC. 13. The creation of the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall
take effect when approved by a majority of the
35
votes cast by the constituent units provided in
paragraph (2) of Sec. 1 of Article II of this
Act in a plebiscite which shall be held not
earlier than ninety (90) days or later than one
hundred twenty (120) days after the approval
of this Act: Provided, That only the provinces
and cities voting favorably in such plebiscite
shall be included in the Autonomous Region
in Muslim Mindanao. The provinces and cities
which in the plebiscite do not vote for inclusion
in the Autonomous Region shall remain the
existing administrative determination, merge
the existing regions.
Thus, under the Constitution and R.A. No 6734,
the creation of the autonomous region shall take effect
only when approved by a majority of the votes cast by the
constituent units in a plebiscite, and only those provinces
and cities where a majority vote in favor of the Organic Act
shall be included in the autonomous region. The provinces
and cities wherein such a majority is not attained shall not
be included in the autonomous region. It may be that even
if an autonomous region is created, not all of the thirteen (13)
provinces and nine (9) cities mentioned in Article II, section
1 (2) of R.A. No. 6734 shall be included therein. The single
plebiscite contemplated by the Constitution and R.A. No.
6734 will therefore be determinative of (1) whether there
shall be an autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and
(2) which provinces and cities, among those enumerated
in R.A. No. 6734, shall compromise it. (Citation omitted)
71

(Emphasis supplied)
Next, the petitioners raised a question as to what majority
means under Section 18, Article 10 of the Constitution. Does it
refer to a majority of the total votes cast in the plebiscite in all the
constituent units, or a majority in each of the constituent units, or
both? In response to this query, the Court said:
71
Id. at 295-296.
36
If the framers of the Constitution intended to require
approval by a majority of all the votes cast in the plebiscite
they would have so indicated. Thus, in Article XVIII, section
27, it is provided that [t]his Constitution shall take effect
immediately upon its ratifcation by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite held for the purpose ... Comparing this
with the provision on the creation of the autonomous region,
which reads:
The creation of the autonomous region shall be effective
when approved by majority of the votes cast by the constituent
units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only
provinces, cities and geographic areas voting favorably in such
plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region. [Art. X,
sec, 18, para, 2].
It will readily be seen that the creation of the
autonomous region is made to depend, not on the total majority
vote in the plebiscite, but on the will of the majority in each of
the constituent units and the proviso underscores this. for if
the intention of the framers of the Constitution was to get the
majority of the totality of the votes cast, they could have simply
adopted the same phraseology as that used for the ratifcation
of the Constitution, i.e. the creation of the autonomous region
shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes
cast in a plebiscite called for the purpose.
It is thus clear that what is required by the
Constitution is a simple majority of votes approving
the organic Act in individual constituent units and not a
double majority of the votes in all constituent units put
together, as well as in the individual constituent units.
72

(Emphasis supplied)
The petitioners next argument theorized that only those areas
in Mindanao which share common and distinctive historical and cultural
heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant characteristics
should be included in the autonomous region. On the basis of this assertion,
72
Id. at 297.
37
the petitioners posited that R.A. 6734 is unconstitutional for including areas
which do not share such characteristics.
73
Again, the High Court dismissed
the contention primarily on the ground that the matter is a political question
which it cannot take cognizance of pursuant to the well-entrenched doctrine
of separation of powers. The Court wrote:
Petitioners argument is not tenable. The Constitution
lays down the standards by which Congress shall determine
which areas should constitute the autonomous region. Guided
by these constitutional criteria, the ascertainment by
Congress of the areas that share common attributes is
within the exclusive realm of the legislatures discretion.
Any review of this ascertainment would have to go into
the wisdom of the law. This the Court cannot do without
doing violence to the separation of governmental powers.
(Citation omitted)
74
(Emphasis supplied)
After challenging the law on the ground that it covers non-Muslim
areas, the petitioners took the extreme view that other non-Muslim locale in
Mindanao should also be joined in the then to-be formed autonomous region
for otherwise the law would be violative of the equal protection clause. In not
lending an iota of credence to this position, the Court ruled:
Petitioners contention runs counter to the very
same constitutional provision he had earlier invoked. Any
determination by Congress of what areas in Mindanao
should compromise the autonomous region, taking into
account shared historical and cultural heritage, economic
and social structures, and other relevant characteristics,
would necessarily carry with it the exclusion of other areas.
As earlier stated, such determination by Congress of which
areas should be covered by the organic act for the autonomous
region constitutes a recognized legislative prerogative, whose
wisdom may not be inquired into by this Court.
Moreover, equal protection permits of reasonable
73
See note 69.
74
38
classifcation (citation omitted), the Court ruled that once class
may be treated differently from another where the groupings
are based on reasonable and real distinctions. The guarantee
of equal protection is thus not infringed in this case, the
classifcation having been made by Congress on the basis of
substantial distinctions as set forth by the Constitution itself.
75

(Emphasis supplied)
The petitioners following contention is premised on the constitutional
guarantee on free exercise of religion. The specifc provision assailed was
Section 17, par. (2), Article IX
76
of the Organic Act, which provides that should
there be a confict between the Muslim Code (P.D. 1083) and the national law,
the Shariah courts created under the same Act should apply the national law.
Petitioners hold that Islamic law is directly derived from the Quran,
77
which
makes it part of divine law. Thusly, it may not be subject to any man-made
national law. The Court wrote off this contention, basing its dismissal on the
rule on actual case and controversy as a prerequisite for exercise of judicial
power. It stated:
As enshrined in the Constitution, judicial power
includes the duty to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable. As a condition
precedent for the power to be exercised, an actual controversy
between litigants must frst exist (citation omitted). In the
present case, no actual controversy between real litigants
exists. There are no conficting claims involving the application
of national law resulting in an alleged violation of religious
freedom. This being so, the Court in this case may not be called
upon to resolve what is merely a perceived potential confict
between the provisions the Muslim Code and national law.
78
The penultimate argument of the petitioners centered on Section 13,
75
Id. at 298-299.

76
In full, it reads:
77
The Quran is the holy scriptures of the Muslims. See also N. B. Cali, supra note
12 at 200.
78
39
Article XIX of the Organic Act, which, among others, states: Provided, That
only the provinces and cities included in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao. The provinces and cities which in the plebiscite do not vote for
inclusion in the Autonomous Region shall remain in the existing administrative
regions: Provided, however, that the President may by administrative
determination, merge the existing regions. (Emphasis supplied).
They averred that the provision grants the President the power to merge
administrative regions, a power not conferred to him by the Constitution. As
such, they claimed that the section is contrary to Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution.
79
On this point, the highest tribunal of the land clarifed:
It must be pointed out that what is referred to in
R.A. No. 6734 is the merger of administrative regions, i.e.
Regions I to XII and the National Capital Region, which are
mere groupings of contiguous provinces for administrative
purposes [Integrated Reorganization Plan (1972), which was
made as part of the law of the land by Pres. dec. No. 1, Pres.
Dec. No. 742]. Administrative regions are not territorial and
political subdivisions like provinces, cities, municipalities and
barangays [see Art. X, sec. 1 of the Constitution]. While the
power to merge administrative regions is not expressly provided
for in the Constitution, it is a power which has traditionally
been lodged with the President to facilitate the exercise of
the power of general supervision over local governments
(citation omitted). There is no confict between the
power of the President to merge administrative regions
with the constitutional provision requiring a plebiscite
in the merger of local government units because the
requirement of a plebiscite in a merger expressly applies
only to provinces, cities, municipalities or barangays, not
to administrative regions.
80
(Emphasis supplied)
79
In full, the provision reads:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided,
merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria
established in the local government code and subject to approval by majority of the votes case
in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
80
40
As a fnal point, the petitioners questioned that creation of an Oversight
Committee
81
under the Organic Act, which shall supervise the transfer to the
autonomous region of the powers, appropriations, and properties vested
upon the regional government. It was their position that the formation of
such committee would delay the establishment of the autonomous region in
Mindanao, contrary to the constitutional edict that such autonomous region
shall be formed upon approval in a plebiscite. In writing fnis the decision, the
Court held:
Under the constitution, the creation of the
autonomous region hinges only on the result of the plebiscite.
If the Organic Act is approved by majority of the votes cast
by constituent units in the scheduled plebiscite, the creation
of the autonomous region immediately takes effect. The
questioned provisions in R.A. No. 6734 requiring an
oversight Committee to supervise the transfer do not
provide for a different date of effectivity. Much less would
the organization of the Oversight Committee cause an
impediment to the operation of the Organic Act, for such
is evidently aimed at effecting a smooth transition period
for the regional government. The constitutional objection
on this point thus cannot be sustained as there is no basis
therefor.
82
(Emphasis supplied)
After having triumphed over the constitutional obstacles thrown on
its path to full effectivity, R.A. 6734 was subject to the requisite plebiscite on
19 November 1989. The results yielded to only four of the constituent units
voting favorably for inclusion in the then nascent ARMM, namely: Lanao del
Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi.
83
ARMM was formally organized a
year later or on 6 November 1990, with former President Aquino leading the
81
This is found under Sections 3 and 4, Article XIX of R.A. 6734.
82
83
Supra note 51 at 207-208. It is worthy to note that the territory covered by the
ARMM is smaller than the territory included in the Autonomous Region envisioned under the
Tripoli Agreement of 1976. However, as earlier discussed, the provisions of the Constitution
defning the areas to be incorporated in the autonomous region prevail over the Agreement,
even if the latter were a valid treaty.
41
inauguration therefor. By that time, she had already signed seven (7) Executive
Orders devolving to ARMM the powers of seven (7) cabinet departments, i.e.,
local government, labor and employment, science and technology, public works
and highways, social welfare and development, tourism, and environment and
natural resources.
More than a decade after the establishment of the ARMM, the Congress
enacted R.A. 9054,
84
which amended the original Organic Act. Similar to
its forerunner, the law contained detailed provisions on the powers of the
Autonomous Regional Government and those powers which are retained by
the National Government. It lapsed into law on 31 March 2001
85
and was
subject to a plebiscite on 14 August 2001, whereby the province of Basilan and
the City of Marawi voted favorably for inclusion in the ARMM.
The amendatory Organic Act, like its predecessor, was subject to
constitutional challenge. However, unlike R.A. 6734, a specifc provision of
the statute was struck down as unconstitutional by the SC in the recent case
of Sema v. COMELEC.
86
Particularly, Section 19, Article VI thereof, which
grants the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to create provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays, was assailed. In declaring the provision as
anathematic to the Constitution, the Court lengthily explained:
84
The law is entitled An Act to Strengthen and Expand the Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, Amending for the Purpose Republic Act No. 6734,
entitled An Act Providing for the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao, as Amended.
85
Const. Art, VII 27 1:
Section 27. (1) Every bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be
presented to the President. If he approves the same he shall sign it; otherwise, he shall veto
it and return the same with his objections to the House where it originated, which shall enter
the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. If, after such reconsidera-
tion, two-thirds of all the Members of such House shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent,
together with the objections, to the other House by which it shall likewise be reconsidered,
and if approved by two-thirds of all the Members of that House, it shall become a law. In
all such cases, the votes of each House shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of
the Members voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The President shall com-
municate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within thirty days after
the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it.
(Emphasis supplied)
86
558 SCRA 700 (2008).
42
The creation of local government units is governed
by Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 10. No province, city, municipality,
or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished or its boundary substantially altered
except in accordance with the criteria established
in the local government code and subject to
approval by a majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
Thus, the creation of any of the four local government
units province, city, municipality or barangay must comply
with three conditions. First, the creation of a local government
unit must follow the criteria fxed in the Local Government
Code. Second, such creation must not confict with any
provision of the Constitution. Third, there must be a plebiscite
in the political units affected.
There is neither an express prohibition nor an express
grant of authority in the Constitution for Congress to delegate
to regional or local legislative bodies the power to create
local government units. However, under its plenary legislative
powers, Congress can delegate to local legislative bodies the
power to create local government units, subject to reasonable
standards and provided no confict arises with any provision of
the Constitution. In fact, Congress has delegated to provincial
boards, and city and municipal councils, the power to create
barangays within their jurisdiction, subject to compliance
with the criteria established in the Local Government Code,
and the plebiscite requirement in Section 10, Article X of the
Constitution. However, under the Local Government Code,
only x x x an Act of Congress can create provinces, cities or
municipalities.
Under Section 19, Article VI of RA 9054, Congress
delegated to the ARMM Regional Assembly the power to
create provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays within
the ARMM. Congress made the delegation under its plenary
legislative powers because the power to create local government
units is not one of the express legislative powers granted by
the Constitution to regional legislative bodies. In the present
43
case, the question arises whether the delegation to the ARMM
Regional Assembly of the power to create provinces, cities,
municipalities and barangays conficts with any provision of
the Constitution.
There is no provision in the Constitution that
conficts with the delegation to regional legislative bodies
of the power to create municipalities and barangays,
provided Section 10, Article X of the Constitution is
followed. However, the creation of provinces and cities is
another matter. Section 5 (3), Article VI of the Constitution
provides, Each city with a population of at least two
hundred ffty thousand, or each province, shall have at
least one representative in the House of Representatives.
Similarly, Section 3 of the Ordinance appended to the
Constitution provides, Any province that may hereafter
be created, or any city whose population may hereafter
increase to more than two hundred ffty thousand shall be
entitled in the immediately following election to at least
one Member x x x.
Clearly, a province cannot be created without a
legislative district because it will violate Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution as well as Section 3 of the
Ordinance appended to the Constitution. For the same
reason, a city with a population of 250,000 or more cannot
also be created without a legislative district. Thus, the power
to create a province, or a city with a population of 250,000 or
more, requires also the power to create a legislative district. Even
the creation of a city with a population of less than 250,000
involves the power to create a legislative district because once
the citys population reaches 250,000, the city automatically
becomes entitled to one representative under Section 5 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution and Section 3 of the Ordinance
appended to the Constitution. Thus, the power to create a
province or city inherently involves the power to create a
legislative district.
For Congress to delegate validly the power to create
a province or city, it must also validly delegate at the same
time the power to create a legislative district. The threshold
44
issue then is, can Congress validly delegate to the ARMM
Regional Assembly the power to create legislative districts
for the House of Representatives? The answer is in the
negative.
87
(Emphasis supplied)
Expounding on the pronouncement that the power to create
political subdivisions necessarily carries with it the power to create
legislative districts, the latter being a strictly legislative power, the Court
wrote:
Under the present Constitution, as well as in past
Constitutions, the power to increase the allowable membership
in the House of Representatives, and to reapportion legislative
districts, is vested exclusively in Congress. Section 5, Article
VI of the Constitution provides:
SECTION 5. (1) The House
of Representatives shall be composed
of not more than two hundred and
ffty members, unless otherwise
fxed by law, who shall be elected
from legislative districts apportioned
among the provinces, cities, and
the Metropolitan Manila area in
accordance with the number of their
respective inhabitants, and on the basis
of a uniform and progressive ratio, and
those who, as provided by law, shall
be elected through a party-list system
of registered national, regional, and
sectoral parties or organizations.

x x x x

(3) Each legislative district
shall comprise, as far as practicable,
contiguous, compact, and adjacent
territory. Each city with a population
of at least two hundred ffty thousand,

87
Id. at 728-731.
45
or each province, shall have at least one
representative.

(4) Within three years following
the return of every census, the Congress
shall make a reapportionment of
legislative districts based on the
standards provided in this section.
Section 5 (1), Article VI of the Constitution vests in
Congress the power to increase, through a law, the allowable
membership in the House of Representatives. Section 5 (4)
empowers Congress to reapportion legislative districts. The
power to reapportion legislative districts necessarily includes
the power to create legislative districts out of existing ones.
Congress exercises these powers through a law that Congress
itself enacts, and not through a law that regional or local
legislative bodies enact. The allowable membership of the
House of Representatives can be increased, and new legislative
districts of Congress can be created, only through a national
law passed by Congress. In Montejo v. COMELEC, we held
that the power of redistricting x x x is traditionally regarded
as part of the power (of Congress) to make laws, and thus is
vested exclusively in Congress.
This textual commitment to Congress of the
exclusive power to create or reapportion legislative districts
is logical. Congress is a national legislature and any increase
in its allowable membership or in its incumbent membership
through the creation of legislative districts must be embodied
in a national law. Only Congress can enact such a law. It would
be anomalous for regional or local legislative bodies to create
or reapportion legislative districts for a national legislature like
Congress. An inferior legislative body, created by a superior
legislative body, cannot change the membership of the superior
legislative body.
The creation of the ARMM, and the grant of legislative
powers to its Regional Assembly under its organic act, did not
divest Congress of its exclusive authority to create legislative
districts. This is clear from the Constitution and the ARMM
46
Organic Act, as amended. Thus, Section 20, Article X of the
Constitution provides:
SECTION 20. Within its territorial
jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of
this Constitution and national laws, the organic
act of autonomous regions shall provide for
legislative powers over:
(1) Administrative
organization;
(2) Creation of sources of
revenues;
(3) Ancestral domain and
natural resources;
(4) Personal, family, and
property relations;
(5) Regional urban and
rural planning development;
(6) Economic, social, and
tourism development;
(7) Educational policies;
(8) Preservation and
development of the cultural heritage;
and
(9) Such other matters
as may be authorized by law for the
promotion of the general welfare of
the people of the region.
Nothing in Section 20, Article X of the Constitution
authorizes autonomous regions, expressly or impliedly, to
create or reapportion legislative districts for Congress.
On the other hand, Section 3, Article IV of RA 9054
amending the ARMM Organic Act, provides, The Regional
Assembly may exercise legislative power x x x except on
the following matters: x x x (k) National elections. x x x.
Since the ARMM Regional Assembly has no legislative power
to enact laws relating to national elections, it cannot create a
legislative district whose representative is elected in national
elections. Whenever Congress enacts a law creating a legislative
district, the frst representative is always elected in the next
47
national elections from the effectivity of the law.
Indeed, the offce of a legislative district representative
to Congress is a national offce, and its occupant, a Member
of the House of Representatives, is a national offcial. It
would be incongruous for a regional legislative body like the
ARMM Regional Assembly to create a national offce when
its legislative powers extend only to its regional territory. The
offce of a district representative is maintained by national
funds and the salary of its occupant is paid out of national
funds. It is a self-evident inherent limitation on the legislative
powers of every local or regional legislative body that it can
only create local or regional offces, respectively, and it can
never create a national offce.
To allow the ARMM Regional Assembly to create
a national offce is to allow its legislative powers to operate
outside the ARMMs territorial jurisdiction. This violates
Section 20, Article X of the Constitution which expressly
limits the coverage of the Regional Assemblys legislative
powers [w]ithin its territorial jurisdiction x x x.
The ARMM Regional Assembly itself, in creating
Shariff Kabunsuan, recognized the exclusive nature of
Congress power to create or reapportion legislative districts
by abstaining from creating a legislative district for Shariff
Kabunsuan. Section 5 of MMA Act 201 provides that:
Except as may be provided by
national law, the existing legislative district,
which includes Cotabato City as a part thereof,
shall remain.
However, a province cannot legally be created without
a legislative district because the Constitution mandates that
each province shall have at least one representative. Thus,
the creation of the Province of Shariff Kabunsuan without
a legislative district is unconstitutional.
88
(Emphasis in the
original)
Both R.A. 6734 and R.A. 9054 are, in legal category, statutes. However,

88
Id. at 731-736.
48
they are more than ordinary statutes for the reason that they enjoy affrmation
by a plebiscite. As such, they cannot be amended by an ordinary statute. The
amendatory law should also be ratifed through a plebiscite.
89
THE EXTENT AND NATURE OF ARMM AUTONOMY: An Act of
Self-Immolation
An important and relevant facet of the establishment of the ARMM
that must not be overlooked is the question on the extent and nature of the
constitutionally granted autonomy to the said region. The issue, when dissected,
branches out into the following queries: What is the extent of the Presidents
power over the autonomous regions, specifcally ARMM? What is the degree
of control that the Congress may exercise over these regions, if any? And
can the national courts exercise jurisdiction over them? In resolving these
questions, it is imperative to consider the constitutional provisions concerning
the autonomous regions, the Organic Acts, and the jurisprudence expounding
on the nature and extent of such autonomy.
The primordial parameter in determining the scope of the autonomy is
no less than the Constitution, it being the fundamental source. As quoted earlier,
Section 15, Article X thereof declares: There shall be created autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras x x x within the framework
of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines. (Emphasis supplied) A
simple perusal of this provision readily negates the idea that the autonomous
region authorized to be created in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras is a
separate and distinct political entity from the Republic of the Philippines. Also,
the President is given the power to exercise general supervision
90
over these
regions and the powers conferred to them by the Constitution are enumerated
so much so that those which are not within the realm of the enumerated

89
Supra note 10 at 1103. See also Disomangcop v. Datumanong, supra note 51 at 225.
90
CONST. ART. X 16.
49
powers shall remain with the National Government.
91

However, the demarcation lines that have been drawn by the
Constitution to defne the extent of the autonomy of the autonomous regions
are not suffciently clear and determinative. Hence, an examination of the
Organic Acts is in order.
Section 2, Article II of R.A. 6734 reiterates the policy of autonomy found
in the Constitution, i.e., the basic structure of government of the ARMM shall
be within the framework of the Constitution and national sovereignty and the
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines x x x. Also incorporated
therein is the power of general supervision of the President over the ARMM.
92

Under Section 1, Article III of the law, it is stated therein that [t]he area of
the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao shall remain an integral and
inseparable part of the national territory of the Republic of the Philippines as
defned by the Constitution and existing laws and that [t]he people of the
Autonomous Region shall uphold the Constitution as the fundamental law of
the land and unequivocally owe allegiance and fdelity to the Republic of the
Philippines.
93
Section 1, Article V thereof provides the matters over which
the ARMM has jurisdiction as devolved to it by the Constitution, to wit: 1.)
Administrative organization; 2.) Creation of sources of revenues; 3.) Ancestral
domain; 4.) Personal, family and property relations; 5.) Regional, urban and
rural planning development; 6.) Economic, social and tourism development;
7.) Educational policies; 8.) Preservation and development of the cultural
heritage; 9.) Powers, functions and responsibilities now being exercised by
the departments of the National Government, except: a) Foreign affairs; b.)
National defense and security; c.) Postal service; d.) Coinage, and fscal and
monetary policies; e.) Administration of justice; f.) Quarantine; g.) Customs

91
See notes 40 and 94.
92
Section 1, Article VI. In full, the provision reads:
The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision over the Region-
al Government, including the local government units therein, directly or through the Regional
Governor, to ensure that national and regional laws are faithfully executed.
93
R.A. 9054 reiterates the same policy under Section 1, Article III thereof.
50
and tariff; h.) Citizenship; i.) Naturalization, immigration and deportation; j.)
General auditing, civil service and elections; k.) Foreign trade; l.) Maritime,
land and air transportation and communications that affect areas outside the
Autonomous Region; and m.) Patents, trademarks, trade names, and copyrights;
and 10.) Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of
the general welfare of the people of the region.
94
The executive power is expressly vested in the Regional Governor
94
This provision has been modifed by R.A. 9054. Section 3, Article IV thereof now
provides:
SEC. 3. Scope of Regional Assembly Legislative Power; Exceptions. The
Regional Assembly may exercise legislative power in the autonomous re-
gion for the beneft of the people and for the development of the region
except on the following matters:
(a) Foreign affairs;
(b) National defense and security;
(c) Postal service;
(d) Coinage and fscal and monetary policies;
(e) Administration of justice. It may, however, legislate on matters
covered by the Shariah. The Shariah shall apply only to Muslims.
Its application shall be limited by pertinent constitutional provi-
sions, particularly by the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment and by pertinent national legislation that promotes
human rights and the universally accepted legal principles and
precepts;
(f) Quarantine;
(g) Customs and tariff;
(h) Citizenship;
(i) Naturalization, immigration and deportation;
(j) General auditing;
(k) National elections;
(l) Maritime, land and air transportation, and communications.
The autonomous government shall, however, have the power to
grant franchises, licenses and permits to land, sea and air trans-
portation plying routes in the provinces or cities within the region,
and communications facilities whose frequencies are confned to
and whose main offces are located within the autonomous re-
gion;
(m) Patents, trademarks, trade names, and copyrights; and
(n) Foreign trade.
Also, the General Welfare Clause is now contained in a separate provision
under the amendatory Organic Act, specifcally under Section 4, Article IV thereof.
51
of the ARMM.
95
With respect to legislative authority, the same is vested in
the Regional Assembly except to the extent that it is reserved to the people
by provisions on initiative and referendum as provided by law.
96
The three
inherent powers of a state, i.e., the police power,
97
the power of taxation
98

and eminent domain
99
have also been delegated to the ARMM subject to
limitations provided by law. As regards the administration of justice, Section 1,
Article VIII of R.A. 9054 provides that [t]he judicial powers shall be vested
in the Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law
including the Shariah Courts x x x.
100
Instructive on this point also are the decisions of the SC on the
autonomous regions. Hence, they shall be accordingly discussed below.
The extent and nature of the autonomy conferred to the constitutionally
established ARMM was frst jurisprudentially tackled in the case of Limbona v.
Mangelin,
101
although not in categorical terms because the autonomous region
involved in that case was one created under P.D. 1618.
102
The relevant portion
of the Decision reads:
95
Section 1, Article VIII of R.A. 6734. This is now contained in Section 1, Article
VII of R.A. 9054. It is to be noted that the number of Cabinet members who shall assist the
Regional Governor has been increased from nine (9) to ten (10) members under the latter
law.
96
Section, Article VI of R.A. 9054. The previous Organic Act contains a similar
provision under Section 1, Article VII thereof.
97
Section 4, Article IV , R.A. 9054.
98
Section 1, Article IX, R.A. 9054.
99
Section 6, Article IV, R.A. 9054.
100
This is a modifcation of the provision on the administration of justice under R.A.
6734. Section 1, Article IX thereof reads:
Sec. 1. The Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and other
courts established by law shall continue to exercise their judicial powers as
provided by the Constitution and national laws.
Moreover, R.A. 6734 directly created the Shariah Appellate Court and other Shariah
courts under Section 2, Article IX thereof, while R.A. 9054 authorizes the Regional Assembly
to establish Shariah courts under Section 5, Article VIII thereof.
101
Supra note 43.
102
Supra note 35.
52
It is, to be sure, said that precisely because the
Sangguniang Pampook(s) are autonomous, the courts may
not rightfully intervene in their affairs, much less strike down
their acts. We come, therefore, to the second issue: Are the so-
called autonomous governments of Mindanao, as they are now
constituted, subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts?
In other words, what is the extent of self-government given
to the two autonomous governments of Region IX and
XII?
The autonomous governments of Mindanao were
organized in Regions IX and XII by Presidential Decree No.
1618 promulgated on July 25, 1979. Among other things, the
Decree established internal autonomy in the two regions [w]
ithin the framework of the national sovereignty and territorial
integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its Constitution,
with legislative and executive machinery to exercise the powers
and responsibilities specifed therein.
It requires the autonomous regional governments to
undertake all internal administrative matters for the respective
regions, except to act on matters which are within the
jurisdiction and competence of the National Government,
which include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) National defense and security;
(2) Foreign relations;
(3) Foreign trade;
(4) Currency, monetary affairs, foreign exchange,
banking and quasi-banking, and external borrowing,
(5) Disposition, exploration, development, exploitation
or utilization of all natural resources;
(6) Air and sea transport
(7) Postal matters and telecommunications;
(8) Customs and quarantine;
53
(9) Immigration and deportation;
(10) Citizenship and naturalization;
(11) National economic, social and educational
planning; and
(12) General auditing.
In relation to the central government, it provides that
[t]he President shall have the power of general supervision
and control over the Autonomous Regions ...
Now, autonomy is either decentralization of
administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central government
delegates administrative powers to political subdivisions in
order to broaden the base of government power and in the
process to make local governments more responsive and
accountable, and ensure their fullest development as self-
reliant communities and make them more effective partners in
the pursuit of national development and social progress. At the
same time, it relieves the central government of the burden of
managing local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national
concerns. The President exercises general supervision over
them, but only to ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law. He has no control over their acts in the sense
that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand,
involves an abdication of political power in the favor of
local governments units declared to be autonomous. In that
case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own
destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention from
central authorities. According to a constitutional author,
decentralization of power amounts to self-immolation, since in
that event, the autonomous government becomes accountable
not to the central authorities but to its constituency.
But the question of whether or not the grant of
autonomy Muslim Mindanao under the 1987 Constitution
involves, truly, an effort to decentralize power rather
54
than mere administration is a question foreign to
this petition, since what is involved herein is a local
government unit constituted prior to the ratifcation of
the present Constitution. Hence, the Court will not resolve
that controversy now, in this case, since no controversy in fact
exists. We will resolve it at the proper time and in the proper
case.
103
A year after the Limbona decision, the Court ruled without any dissent
that the autonomy granted to the constitutionally sanctioned autonomous
regions is not merely administrative autonomy but political autonomy or
decentralization of power in the case of Cordillera Broad Coalition v. COA.
104

The Court, this time in a more clear-cut language, said:
It must be clarifed that the constitutional guarantee
of local autonomy in the Constitution [Art. X, Sec. 2] refers to
the administrative autonomy of local government units or cast
in more technical language, the decentralization of government
authority. Local autonomy is not unique to the 1987 Constitution,
it being guaranteed also under the 1973 Constitution [Art. II,
Sec. 10]. And while there was no express guarantee under the
1935 Constitution, the Congress enacted the Local Autonomy
Act [R. A. No. 2264] and the Decentralization Act [R.A. No.
5185], which ushered the irreversible march towards further
enlargement of local autonomy in the country.
On the other hand, the creation of autonomous
regions in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras which
is peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the
grant of political autonomy and not just administrative
autonomy of these regions. Thus, the provision in the
Constitution for an autonomous regional government
with a basic structure consisting of an executive
department and a legislative assembly and special courts
with personal, family and property law jurisdiction in each
of the autonomous regions [Art. X, Sec. 18]. (Emphasis
supplied)
103
104
181 SCRA 495 (1990).
55
A more extensive discussion on the scope of autonomy was taken up in
the more recent case of Disomangcop v. Datumanong,
105
which principally involved
the jurisdiction of ARMM over public works. In holding that the ARMM, by
virtue of the autonomy it wields as an autonomous entity, has jurisdiction over
public works, the Court, through retired Justice Tinga, elucidated:
Decentralization is a decision by the central
government authorizing its subordinates, whether
geographically or functionally defned, to exercise
authority in certain areas. It involves decision-making
by subnational units. It is typically a delegated power,
wherein a larger government chooses to delegate
certain authority to more local governments. Federalism
implies some measure of decentralization, but unitary
systems may also decentralize. Decentralization
differs intrinsically from federalism in that the sub-
units that have been authorized to act (by delegation)
do not possess any claim of right against the central
government.
Decentralization comes in two forms
deconcentration and devolution. Deconcentration
is administrative in nature; it involves the transfer
of functions or the delegation of authority and
responsibility from the national offce to the regional
and local offces. This mode of decentralization is
also referred to as administrative decentralization.
Devolution, on the other hand, connotes
political decentralization, or the transfer of powers,
responsibilities, and resources for the performance
of certain functions from the central government
to local government units. This is a more liberal
form of decentralization since there is an actual
transfer of powers and responsibilities. It aims to
grant greater autonomy to local government units
in cognizance of their right to self-government,
to make them self-reliant, and to improve their
105
Supra note 51.
56
administrative and technical capabilities.
This Court elucidated the concept of autonomy
in Limbona v. Mangelin, thus:
Autonomy is either
decentralization of administration
or decentralization of power. There
is decentralization of administration
when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the
base of government power and in the
process to make local governments
more responsive and accountable,
and ensure their fullest development
as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the
pursuit of national development and
social progress. At the same time, it
relieves the central government of the
burden of managing local affairs and
enables it to concentrate on national
concerns. The President exercises
general supervision over them, but
only to ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law. He has
no control over their acts in the sense
that he can substitute their judgments
with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand,
involves an abdication of political power in the favor of
local government units declared to be autonomous. In
that case, the autonomous government is free to chart
its own destiny and shape its future with minimum
intervention from central authorities. According to
a constitutional author, decentralization of power
amounts to self-immolation, since in that event the
autonomous government becomes accountable not to
the central authorities but to its constituency.
57
In the case, the Court reviewed the expulsion
of a member from the Sangguniang Pampook,
Autonomous Region. It held that the Court may assume
jurisdiction as the local government unit, organized
before 1987, enjoys autonomy of the former category.
It refused, though, to resolve whether the grant of
autonomy to Muslim Mindanao under the 1987
Constitution involves, truly, an effort to decentralize
power rather than mere administration.
A year later, in Cordillera Broad Coalition
v. Commission on Audit, the Court, with the same
composition, ruled without any dissent that the
creation of autonomous regions contemplates the
grant of political autonomyan autonomy which is
greater than the administrative autonomy granted to
local government units. It held that the constitutional
guarantee of local autonomy in the Constitution (Art.
X, Sec. 2) refers to administrative autonomy of local
government units or, cast in more technical language,
the decentralization of government authority. On
the other hand, the creation of autonomous regions
in Muslim Mindanao and the Cordilleras, which is
peculiar to the 1987 Constitution, contemplates the
grant of political autonomy and not just administrative
autonomy to these regions.
And by regional autonomy, the framers
intended it to mean meaningful and authentic
regional autonomy. As articulated by a Muslim
author, substantial and meaningful autonomy is
the kind of local self-government which allows the
people of the region or area the power to determine
what is best for their growth and development
without undue interference or dictation from the
central government.
To this end, Section 16, Article X
7
limits the
power of the President over autonomous regions.
In essence, the provision also curtails the power of
Congress over autonomous regions. Consequently,
58
Congress will have to re-examine national laws and
make sure that they refect the Constitutions adherence
to local autonomy. And in case of conficts, the
underlying spirit which should guide its resolution is
the Constitutions desire for genuine local autonomy.
The diminution of Congress powers over
autonomous regions was confrmed in Ganzon
v. Court of Appeals,

wherein this Court held that
the omission (of as may be provided by law)
signifes nothing more than to underscore local
governments autonomy from Congress and to
break Congress control over local government
affairs.
This is true to subjects over which autonomous
regions have powers, as specifed in Sections 18 and
20, Article X of the 1987 Constitution. Expressly
not included therein are powers over certain areas.
Worthy of note is that the area of public works is not
excluded and neither is it reserved for the National
Government.
x x x
The aim of the Constitution is to extend
to the autonomous peoples, the people of
Muslim Mindanao in this case, the right to self-
determinationa right to choose their own path of
development; the right to determine the political,
cultural and economic content of their development
path within the framework of the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Philippine Republic.
Self-determination refers to the need for a political
structure that will respect the autonomous peoples
uniqueness and grant them suffcient room for self-
expression and self-construction.
In treading their chosen path of
development, the Muslims in Mindanao are to be
given freedom and independence with minimum
59
interference from the National Government.
This necessarily includes the freedom to decide on,
build, supervise and maintain the public works and
infrastructure projects within the autonomous region.
The devolution of the powers and functions of the
DPWH in the ARMM and transfer of the administrative
and fscal management of public works and funds to the
ARG (Autonomous Regional Government) are meant
to be true, meaningful and unfettered. This unassailable
conclusion is grounded on a clear consensus, reached
at the Constitutional Commission and ratifed by
the entire Filipino electorate, on the centrality of
decentralization of power as the appropriate vessel
of deliverance for Muslim Filipinos and the ultimate
unity of Muslims and Christians in this country.
106

(Emphasis supplied)
Thus, as can be deduced from the aforecited relatable provisions of
the Constitution, the Organic Acts and the jurisprudence on the matter, the
autonomy that ARMM is endowed with does not merely refer to transfer of
administrative powers. It involves actual abdication of political powers thus
allowing the autonomous region to decide for itself what is best for its growth
and developmentpolitically, economically and culturallywithout much
intervention from the central repository of authority. It is wider in scope
than the local autonomy granted to local government units
107
and as such, it is
106
Id. at 233-240.
107
CONST. Art. X 2.
The Court made a distinction between the local autonomy granted to the local gov-
ernment units and the regional autonomy conferred to autonomous regions in Limbona, supra
note 51, in this wise:
Under the 1987 Constitution, local government units enjoy au-
tonomy in these two senses, thus:
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Repub-
lic of the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays.
Here shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao ,and the Cordil-
leras as hereinafter provided.
Sec. 2. The territorial and political subdivisions shall enjoy local
autonomy.
xxx xxx xxx
See. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim
60
tantamount to semi-independence.
AUTONOMY AND THE IMPLICIT RIGHT TO SELF-
DETERMINATION: Do They Confer the Right of Secession?
Implicit in the bestowing of regional autonomy to the ARMM is the
recognition of the right of its people to self-determination, i.e., the right of the
people to chart their own destiny. On this point, an interesting question arises:
Does the right to self-determination, in turn, give ARMM the right to secede
from its mother nation-state?
It was in the Disomangcop
108
case that the Court had the occasion to
address this matter on self-determination as a necessary consequence of
regional autonomy. In answering the query posed earlier in the negative, the
Court expounded:
[T]he creation of autonomous regions does not
signify the establishment of a sovereignty distinct from that of
the Republic, as it can be installed only within the framework
of this Constitution and the national sovereignty as well as
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
Regional autonomy is the degree of self-determination
exercised by the local government unit vis--vis the central
Mindanao and in the Cordilleras consisting of provinces, cities, municipali-
ties, and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive historical and
cultural heritage, economic and social structures, and other relevant charac-
teristics within the framework of this Constitution and the national sover-
eignty as well as territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines.
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter
category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to the decree of
the organic act creating it and accepted principles on the effects and limits
of autonomy. On the other hand, an autonomous government of the
former class is, as we noted, under the supervision of the national govern-
ment acting through the President (and the Department of Local Govern-
ment). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII), then, is autonomous
in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably beyond the domain of this Court
in perhaps the same way that the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the
Philippines are beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the for-
mer category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction.
108
Supra note 51.
61
government.
In international law, the right to self-determination
need not be understood as a right to political separation,
but rather as a complex net of legal-political relations
between a certain people and the state authorities. It
ensures the right of peoples to the necessary level of autonomy
that would guarantee the support of their own cultural identity,
the establishment of priorities by the communitys internal
decision-making processes and the management of collective
matters by themselves.
If self-determination is viewed as an end in itself
refecting a preference for homogeneous, independent nation-
states, it is incapable of universal application without massive
disruption. However, if self-determination is viewed as a
means to an endthat end being a democratic, participatory
political and economic system in which the rights of individuals
and the identity of minority communities are protectedits
continuing validity is more easily perceived.
109
The abovequoted ruling was echoed resoundingly by the Court in its
decision in The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Philippines
Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain.
110
The Court, through Justice Carpio-Morales,
explicated on the reason why the right to self-determination, although
recognized, cannot be used as a basis for the right to secede in this wise:
International law has long recognized the right to
self-determination of peoples, understood not merely as the
entire population of a State but also a portion thereof. In
considering the question of whether the people of Quebec
had a right to unilaterally secede from Canada, the Canadian
Supreme Court in REFERENCE RE SECESSION OF
QUEBEC had occasion to acknowledge that the right of a
people to self-determination is now so widely recognized
in international conventions that the principle has acquired
a status beyond convention and is considered a general
109
Id. at 229-231.
110
568 SCRA 402 (2008).
62
principle of international law.
Among the conventions referred to are the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights which state,
in Article 1 of both covenants, that all peoples, by virtue of
the right of self-determination, freely determine their political
status and freely pursue their economic, social, and cultural
development.
The peoples right to self-determination should not,
however, be understood as extending to a unilateral right of
secession. A distinction should be made between the right of
internal and external self-determination. REFERENCE RE
SECESSION OF QUEBEC is again instructive:
(ii) Scope of the Right to Self-determination

126. The recognized sources of
international law establish that the right to
self-determination of a people is normally
fulflled through internal self-determination
a peoples pursuit of its political, economic,
social and cultural development within the
framework of an existing state. A right
to external self-determination (which in
this case potentially takes the form of the
assertion of a right to unilateral secession)
arises in only the most extreme of cases
and, even then, under carefully defned
circumstances. x x x
External self-determination can be defned as in
the following statement from the Declaration on Friendly
Relations as

The establishment of a sovereign and independent
State, the free association or integration with an
independent State or the emergence into any other
political status freely determined by a people constitute
modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that
63
people.

127. The international law principle
of self-determination has evolved within
a framework of respect for the territorial
integrity of existing states. The various
international documents that support
the existence of a peoples right to self-
determination also contain parallel statements
supportive of the conclusion that the exercise
of such a right must be suffciently limited to
prevent threats to an existing states territorial
integrity or the stability of relations between
sovereign states.
The Canadian Court went on to discuss the exceptional
cases in which the right to external self-determination can
arise, namely, where a people is under colonial rule, is subject
to foreign domination or exploitation outside a colonial
context, and less defnitely but asserted by a number of
commentators is blocked from the meaningful exercise of its
right to internal self-determination. The Court ultimately held
that the population of Quebec had no right to secession, as the
same is not under colonial rule or foreign domination, nor is
it being deprived of the freedom to make political choices and
pursue economic, social and cultural development, citing that
Quebec is equitably represented in legislative, executive and
judicial institutions within Canada, even occupying prominent
positions therein.
The exceptional nature of the right of secession is further
exemplifed in the REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE OF JURISTS ON THE LEGAL ASPECTS
OF THE AALAND ISLANDS QUESTION. There, Sweden
presented to the Council of the League of Nations the question
of whether the inhabitants of the Aaland Islands should
be authorized to determine by plebiscite if the archipelago
should remain under Finnish sovereignty or be incorporated
in the kingdom of Sweden. The Council, before resolving the
question, appointed an International Committee composed
of three jurists to submit an opinion on the preliminary issue
64
of whether the dispute should, based on international law,
be entirely left to the domestic jurisdiction of Finland. The
Committee stated the rule as follows:
x x x [I]n the absence of express
provisions in international treaties, the
right of disposing of national territory is
essentially an attribute of the sovereignty
of every State. Positive International Law
does not recognize the right of national
groups, as such, to separate themselves
from the State of which they form part by
the simple expression of a wish, any more
than it recognizes the right of other States to
claim such a separation. Generally speaking,
the grant or refusal of the right to a portion
of its population of determining its own
political fate by plebiscite or by some
other method, is, exclusively, an attribute
of the sovereignty of every State which is
defnitively constituted. A dispute between
two States concerning such a question, under
normal conditions therefore, bears upon
a question which International Law leaves
entirely to the domestic jurisdiction of one
of the States concerned. Any other solution
would amount to an infringement of sovereign
rights of a State and would involve the risk
of creating diffculties and a lack of stability
which would not only be contrary to the very
idea embodied in term State, but would also
endanger the interests of the international
community. If this right is not possessed by a
large or small section of a nation, neither can
it be held by the State to which the national
group wishes to be attached, nor by any other
State.
The Committee held that the dispute concerning
the Aaland Islands did not refer to a question which is left
by international law to the domestic jurisdiction of Finland,
65
thereby applying the exception rather than the rule elucidated
above. Its ground for departing from the general rule, however,
was a very narrow one, namely, the Aaland Islands agitation
originated at a time when Finland was undergoing drastic
political transformation. The internal situation of Finland
was, according to the Committee, so abnormal that, for a
considerable time, the conditions required for the formation
of a sovereign State did not exist. In the midst of revolution,
anarchy, and civil war, the legitimacy of the Finnish national
government was disputed by a large section of the people,
and it had, in fact, been chased from the capital and forcibly
prevented from carrying out its duties. The armed camps and
the police were divided into two opposing forces. In light
of these circumstances, Finland was not, during the relevant
time period, a defnitively constituted sovereign state. The
Committee, therefore, found that Finland did not possess the
right to withhold from a portion of its population the option
to separate itself a right which sovereign nations generally
have with respect to their own populations.
Turning now to the more specifc category of
indigenous peoples, this term has been used, in scholarship
as well as international, regional, and state practices, to refer
to groups with distinct cultures, histories, and connections
to land (spiritual and otherwise) that have been forcibly
incorporated into a larger governing society. These groups are
regarded as indigenous since they are the living descendants
of pre-invasion inhabitants of lands now dominated by others.
Otherwise stated, indigenous peoples, nations, or communities
are culturally distinctive groups that fnd themselves engulfed
by settler societies born of the forces of empire and conquest.
Examples of groups who have been regarded as indigenous
peoples are the Maori of New Zealand and the aboriginal
peoples of Canada.
As with the broader category of peoples, indigenous
peoples situated within states do not have a general right to
independence or secession from those states under international
law, but they do have rights amounting to what was discussed
66
above as the right to internal self-determination.
111
(Emphasis
in the original)
Deducing from the above explication of the Court, the recognized
right to self-determination of the Bangsa Moro people as a consequence of the
autonomy granted to them cannot be validly invoked as a source of the right
to secede from the Republic of the Philippines since what is acknowledged is
internal self-determination and not external self-determination, the latter
essentially consisting of politically disaffliating from the mother state. As the
Court held, the latter form of self-determination only applies in exceptional
cases, none of which obtains in the case of Muslim Mindanao.
The SC, in the same case, also ruled on the effect of the United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN DRIP) on the Bangsamoro
peoples right to separate from the mother state, viz.:
In a historic development last September 13, 2007, the
UN General Assembly adopted the United Nations Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UN DRIP) through
General Assembly Resolution 61/295. The vote was 143 to
4, the Philippines being included among those in favor, and
the four voting against being Australia, Canada, New Zealand,
and the U.S. The Declaration clearly recognized the right of
indigenous peoples to self-determination, encompassing the
right to autonomy or self-government, to wit:
Article 3

Indigenous peoples have the right to
self-determination. By virtue of that right
they freely determine their political status and
freely pursue their economic, social and cultural
development.

Article 4

Indigenous peoples, in exercising their

111
Id. at 489-494.
67
right to self-determination, have the right to
autonomy or self-government in matters
relating to their internal and local affairs,
as well as ways and means for fnancing their
autonomous functions.

Article 5

Indigenous peoples have the right to
maintain and strengthen their distinct political,
legal, economic, social and cultural institutions,
while retaining their right to participate fully,
if they so choose, in the political, economic,
social and cultural life of the State.
Self-government, as used in international legal discourse
pertaining to indigenous peoples, has been understood as
equivalent to internal self-determination. The extent of
self-determination provided for in the UN DRIP is more
particularly defned in its subsequent articles, some of which
are quoted hereunder:
Article 8
1. Indigenous peoples and individuals
have the right not to be subjected to
forced assimilation or destruction of
their culture.
2. States shall provide effective
mechanisms for prevention of, and
redress for:
(a) Any action which has the aim or
effect of depriving them of their
integrity as distinct peoples, or
of their cultural values or ethnic
identities;
(b) Any action which has the aim or
effect of dispossessing them of
their lands, territories or resources;
68
(c) Any form of forced population
transfer which has the aim or effect
of violating or undermining any of
their rights;
(d) Any form of forced assimilation or
integration;
(e) Any form of propaganda designed
to promote or incite racial or ethnic
discrimination directed against
them.
Article 21

1. Indigenous peoples have the right,
without discrimination, to the
improvement of their economic and
social conditions, including, inter alia,
in the areas of education, employment,
vocational training and retraining,
housing, sanitation, health and social
security.
2. States shall take effective measures and,
where appropriate, special measures
to ensure continuing improvement of
their economic and social conditions.
Particular attention shall be paid to the
rights and special needs of indigenous
elders, women, youth, children and
persons with disabilities.

Article 26

1. Indigenous peoples have the right to
the lands, territories and resources
which they have traditionally
owned, occupied or otherwise used
or acquired.
69
own, use, develop and control the
lands, territories and resources that
they possess by reason of traditional
ownership or other traditional
occupation or use, as well as those
which they have otherwise acquired.
3. States shall give legal recognition and
protection to these lands, territories
and resources. Such recognition shall
be conducted with due respect to the
customs, traditions and land tenure
systems of the indigenous peoples
concerned.

Article 30

1. Military activities shall not take place in
the lands or territories of indigenous
peoples, unless justifed by a relevant
public interest or otherwise freely
agreed with or requested by the
indigenous peoples concerned.

2. States shall undertake effective
consultations with the indigenous
peoples concerned, through appropriate
procedures and in particular through
their representative institutions, prior
to using their lands or territories for
military activities.

Article 32

determine and develop priorities and
strategies for the development or use
of their lands or territories and other
resources.
70

2. States shall consult and cooperate
in good faith with the indigenous
peoples concerned through their own
representative institutions in order to
obtain their free and informed consent
prior to the approval of any project
affecting their lands or territories
and other resources, particularly in
connection with the development,
utilization or exploitation of mineral,
water or other resources.

3. States shall provide effective mechanisms
for just and fair redress for any such
activities, and appropriate measures
shall be taken to mitigate adverse
environmental, economic, social,
cultural or spiritual impact.

Article 37

1. Indigenous peoples have the right
to the recognition, observance and
enforcement of treaties, agreements
and other constructive arrangements
concluded with States or their
successors and to have States honour
and respect such treaties, agreements
and other constructive arrangements.

2. Nothing in this Declaration may be
interpreted as diminishing or eliminating
the rights of indigenous peoples
contained in treaties, agreements and
other constructive arrangements.
Article 38
States in consultation and cooperation
71
with indigenous peoples, shall take
the appropriate measures, including
legislative measures, to achieve the
ends of this Declaration.
Assuming that the UN DRIP, like the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights, must now be regarded as
embodying customary international law a question which
the Court need not defnitively resolve here the obligations
enumerated therein do not strictly require the Republic to
grant the Bangsamoro people, through the instrumentality
of the BJE,
112
the particular rights and powers provided
for in the MOA-AD.
113
Even the more specifc provisions of
the UN DRIP are general in scope, allowing for fexibility in its
application by the different States. (Emphasis in the original)
The above decision more than makes clear that the Bangsa Moro people
cannot legally secede from the Republic of the Philippines on the strength of
the autonomy it presently enjoys. Such autonomy and the implicit right to
self-determination do not confer upon it the license to form its envisioned
independent Islamic state for the abdication of a territorial portion of a state
is essentially an attribute of sovereignty. This means that only the mother state,
as the entity possessing sovereignty, may legally take the initiative to surrender
a part of its territory.
ARMM UNDER THE LIMELIGHT: An Appraisal of the
Constitution-Authorized Arrangement for Peace and National Unity
As presented in the earlier sections of this article, the ARMM was
established primarily to answer the call of the Bangsa Moro people for genuine
and meaningful autonomy, which would extend to them the right to decide
which path to take in pursuit of their growth and development as a people
with distinct culture, traditions and religious beliefs. It was also meant to put a
period to the decades-old armed confict in Mindanao and attain a unifed and
112
BJE stands for Bangsamoro Juridical Entity.
113
Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain. It was entered into by
and between the Government of the Philippines and the MILF to implement the Ancestral
Domain aspect of the 2001 Tripoli Agreement.
72
harmonious relationship between the Muslims and Christians in the country.
In the twenty (20) longs years that it has been in existence, one may ask: Has
the ARMM achieved the objectives and purposes for which it was created? Has
it been an adequate answer to the call of the Bangsa Moro people for genuine
autonomy? Has it brought peace and prosperity to Mindanao? Has it restored
the lives of its people to normalcy? Has it achieved unity between the Muslim
and Christian citizens of the country?
In responding to these questions, it is imperative to consider the factors
indicative of the success of the ARMM as epoch-making, Constitution-based
project to achieve national unity and prosperity for the Bangsamoro people,
such as the state of the regions economy, governance, education and security.
Economy
Even before ARMM was established, Mindanaos economy, despite
its vast natural resources, was underdeveloped. In fact, the economic problem
that plagued the area was one of the factors that inspired the separatist groups.
Unfortunately, decades after the ARMM came into existence, such economic
underdevelopment still looms in Mindanao.
Economy-wise, reports have confrmed that ARMM has fared poorly.
In the year 2000, the region claimed the top spot in a survey concerning
the Philippines poorest regions conducted by the National Statistical Board
Coordination (NSBC).
114
Three years later, although it was toppled off the
top position, two of its constituent provinces, Zamboanga del Norte and
Maguindanao, occupied the frst and second positions respectively in the list of
the most poverty-stricken provinces. In 2006, it was reinstalled as the poorest
region in the same survey, with Tawi-Tawi, Maguindanao and Lanao del Sur
being among the top ten poorest provinces of the country.
115
Reports also
show that in Maguindanao alone, seven (7) out of ten (10) of its inhabitants are
114
http://www.nscb.gov.ph/poverty/2006_05mar08/table_16.asp (last accessed 21
December 2009).
115
Id.
73
poor and a third of them cannot even afford the minimum food requirements,
pegged at P28.58 per day.
116
The region has remained desperately impoverished
despite the huge amount of funds it received from the National government
and foreign-funding institutions, and a promising increase of its gross regional
domestic product (GRDP).
117
Income-generating activities that can help
boost its economy, such as local or foreign investments, are also scarce, further
worsening the regions already gloomy economic state. Employment rate is
also lamentable, given the fact that there is very little business development in
the region. The only sectors driving and supporting ARMMs economy are the
agricultural and fsheries sectors.
118

Governance
With respect to governance and administration, graft and corruption
have long been imputed to the ARMM government, an assertion which may
give sense to the fact that despite substantial amount of funds being poured
into the region by the National Government, its people still languish in
pitiable state of impecuniosity. In the General Appropriations Act of 2003,
more than P5 billion (P5,023,758,000.00) was allotted to the region.
119
The
same amount was extended to it in the following year. In the year 2005, the
amount increased by more than P1 billion, that is, P6,691,223,000.00 and the
same sum was appropriated for the region in the year that followed.
120
In the
years 2007 and 2008, ARMM received P8,644,315,000.00
121
and P8,331,452.00
respectively.
122
Finally, in 2009, it obtained almost P10 billion in funding,
116
http://balita.ph/2010/01/25/acting-armm-gov-optimistic-on-growing-econo-
my/ (last accessed 27 January 2010).
117
Id.
118
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net (last accessed 21 December 2009).
119
http://www.dbm.gov.ph/dbm_publications/gaa_2003/gaa_links/ARMM1STP.
pdf.#autonomous (last accessed 21 December 2009).
120
http://www.dbm.gov.ph/gaa2005/ar.txt (last accessed 21 December 2009).
121
http://www.dbm.gov.ph/gaa2007/AR/AR.pdf (last accessed 21 December
2009).
122
http://www.dbm.gov.ph/gaa2008/Disk29/ARMM_A.pdf (last accessed 21 De-
cember 2009).
74
i.e., P9,448,957,000.00.
123
Aggregately therefore, ARMM received more than
P50 billion from the National Government from 2003-2009. This is not the
only source of funding of ARMM as it is also empowered to raise its own
revenues and is entitled to a share in the Internal Revenue Allotment (the share
of the local units in the national taxes collected). Further, it is a benefciary
to several foreign-funded projects, including those programs bankrolled
by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the
Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), Canadian International
Development Agency, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), Australian Agency
for International Development (AusAID), World Bank and the European
Union.
124
It is thus mystifying that, notwithstanding the fact that it receives
more funding than any other local government unit in the country, the region
has consistently occupied the top position in the roster of most impoverished
regions in the Philippines. It has very little to show for such a huge amount of
money it is given.
But such allegations of corruption are not at all bare and conjectural.
A glaring illustration of the corrupt practices in the regional government is the
unexplained wealth that its offcials have amassed over the years. For instance,
after the gruesome Maguindanao Massacre shuddered the country, which
incident is principally linked to the Ampatuans, the National Government
conducted investigations on latters assets and raided their mansions. Reports
reveal that the networth of the Ampatuans is P1.3 billion and they own about
thirty-four (34) mansions in different parts of the country.
125
In the course of
the raids, a feet of luxurious vehicles were found and even hoards of state-of-
the-art-armaments were discovered buried in the backyard of the Ampatuan
residence.
126
This situation does not only hold true for the Ampatuans. In several
123
http://www.dbm.gov.ph/GAA09/AR.pdf (last accessed 21 December 2009).
124
Supra note 118.
125
http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/nation/12/09/09/wealth-ampatuan-sr-only-
p11-m (last accessed 21 December 2009).
126
http://www.sunstar.com.ph/manila/military-probes-frearms-found-near-am-
patuans-home (last accessed 2 December 2009).
75
parts of Muslim Mindanao, local government offcials and their families live
like royalties while their constituentsthe people they are supposed to serve
and provide a better tomorrow towallow in poverty and are compelled to
seek livelihood elsewhere, whether in other parts of the country or abroad.
Although graft and corruption is not a peculiar attribute of the
ARMM government as the same holds true for other local government units
as well as the National Government, it is safe to say that it is more severe in
this regional government so much so that it has left the ARMM lagging behind
and eroded its chances for holistic development.
Education
With armed confict, rampant lawlessness, corruption and poverty
lurking around, it is no surprise that the state of ARMMs education is
deplorable. Hostilities in the area have continuously disrupted classes with
public schools being used as evacuations centers for displaced families.
127

Another signifcant factor which has rendered the regions education
in a dreadful state is the non-payment of salaries of public school teachers. For
years, teachers in the region have complained of delay or no-payment of their
salaries and the illegal deductions made thereon.
128
The failure of the regional
government to account for their Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) contributions, which are directly deducted from their salaries, has also
been protested against.
129
These teachers cannot be expected to perform at
their best when they are meagerly compensated, hence aggravating the regions
poor educational condition.
127
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/regions/view/20090921-226303/
Poor-test-scores-blamed-on-ARMM-unrest (last accessed 21 December 2009).
128
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/regions/view/20100210-252423/
DepEd-ARMM-stops-illegal-deductions-from-teachers-pay (last accessed 02 February 2010)
129
http://www.newsfash.org/2004/02/ht/ht005318.htm (last accessed 21 Decem-
ber 2009).
76
Peace-and-Order and Security Conditions
The peace-and-order condition of the region, needless to say, is
appalling such that it has gained worldwide attention and notoriety. However,
it is not only the fact that it is a hub of insurgent, even terrorist organizations
that is contributing to the regions volatile security. Rampant lawlessness,
aggravated by warlordism among powerful political families, seems to be the
norm in the area. Violent cultural practices such as rido or clan wars, whereby
feuding families kill off each other and without being brought under the penal
justice system, are commonplace.
Election-related violence is another testament to the unstable peace-
and-order condition of the ARMM. In the past elections, for instance, the
COMELEC had to declare failure of election in the region and defer elections
at a later date. Reports also disclose that the 2001, 2004 and 2007 elections in
the area were marred by violence and deaths.
130
In anticipation of the 2010
elections, the Philippine National Police (PNP) has declared the entire ARMM
as an election hotspot, thus necessitating strict security measures. However,
there is no better verifcation of this prevalent lawlessness and atmosphere of
violence in the region than the most brutal and inhumane act of violence in
the Philippines election-related historythe Maguindanao Massacre.
CLOSING CURTAIN:
Fulflling the Promise of the Land of Promise
In his ponencia in the case of Disomangcop, Justice Tinga eloquently
characterized the ARMM as the epoch-making, Constitution-based project for
achieving national unity in diversity.
131
Indeed, the ARMM was created for a
very noble and rightful purpose. It was meant to be the National Governments
answer to the strident clamor for autonomy among the Bangsamoro people. It
was intended to give them the avenue to freely pursue their political, economic,
130
http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/breakingnews/nation/view20100120-248428/En-
tire-ARMM-seen-as-hotspot (last accessed 23 January 2009).
131
77
social and cultural development with the least interference from the central
government. It was meant to allow their distinct and highly Islamic-infuenced
culture and traditions fourish in the midst of a predominantly Christian
nation-state. It was meant to quell the armed violence and bloodshed therein,
which to date have claimed thousands of lives and displaced innocent families.
It was to serve as the peace pact between the Bangsamoro people and the
National Government. It was to be symbolic of the beginning of unity and
harmonious relations between Muslims and Christians of the country. After
twenty (20) years and after an objective consideration of the resultant events
that transpired since its establishment, there is no room for doubt that the
ARMM has done very little to achieve objectives that animated it into life
So where did the ARMM go wrong?
The failure of the ARMM to fully realize the goals for which it was
created may be charged against the lack of proper and exhaustive study of
its viability by the National Government and those who advocated for its
establishment. The Government, before it granted certain parts of Mindanao
the choice to be autonomous, should have fully analyzed and examined the
then prevailing conditions in the region: In terms of governance and political
culture, can they effectively lead themselves? Economy- and resources-wise,
can they subsist on their own? Is the educational system therein stable so that
it can provide its people the opportunity to a better life, employment and
the chance to be freed from poverty? Are there enough jobs in the different
economic sectors therein to provide livelihood for its people? Can they stand
on their own without much assistance from the central government? These
are the signifcant questions that should have been considered resolved to
give the National Government a better insight before it decided to heed the
call for autonomy among the Bangsa Moro people. True, the struggle of the
Bangsa Moro people to attain independence had been in existence for decades
already even before the birth of the ARMM. But that does not justify the
Governments hasty decision to give Muslim Mindanao an autonomous status.
As the old saying goes, anything done in a hurry yields poor results.
78
The situation in the ARMM may be analogously juxtaposed to the case
of a child of tender age whose parents have let him gone to completely rely
on himself. Needless to say, the child is without the faculty and capability to
take care of himself. For the parents to continue to leave the child on his own
would be deleterious to his welfare and well-being. Thus, before they may free
him of their parental authority and allow him to set out into the world and
drive his own life, it is important to infuse in him the values that would aid him
in his decision-making, arm him with the resources necessary for his existence,
and make certain that he indeed capable of charting his own destiny.
Undoubtedly, the ARMM has failed. The author, therefore, staunchly
believes that the ARMM should be abolished or at least modifed in a fashion
that its present results would be forestalled, if its abolishment proves to be
too drastic or unviable. Of course, such would call for an amendment of the
Constitution since, as pointed out earlier, the legal spring of the ARMM is
primordially the Constitution. It is acknowledged that altering the Charter is
easier said than done for the process could be rigorous, even controversial.
But if it is the only and most prudent way to salve Muslim Mindanao from
the enumerable problems weighing it down to destruction, it would be more
than worth it to undergo the complicated process. It must be noted also that
the present statutes governing the ARMM should be repealed or amended
accordingly, as the case may be.
The proposed abolition of the ARMM is not bereft of any legal or
logical basis. To this day, the armed confict in the region has not permanently
ceased. To this day, thousands of families have been displaced and schooling
continues to be disrupted by the war. Corruption in the regional government
has obviated any form of progress in the region. Ordinary people still
endure the harshness of poverty while those who are in power found the
autonomous atmosphere a convenient environment for creating their own
fefdom. Lawlessness and violence still affict the region, as recently shown
by the Maguindanao Massacre. Incidentally, it may be argued that the fault
79
for the Maguindanao Massacre should not be attributed to the ARMM.
132

However, it must be emphasized that the Maguindanao Massacre is the ultimate
manifestation and substantiation of the uncontrollable lawlessness in the
region. Taking into account the devastating outcome of the ARMM, it seems
that it no longer exists for the reasons for which it was founded. It prompts
one to ask: Does it still exist for the welfare of the Bangsamoro people or does
it subsist to serve the vested interests of those who wield power in the region?
Moreover, do the ordinary Bangsa Moro people genuinely desire autonomy or
separation from the mother state? In the creation of the ARMM, were they
suffciently represented in the voice that persistently clamored for autonomy?
Or was it just the voice of the powerful, the infuential among them that called
for it? Thus, the autonomy granted to the ARMM as it is presently should
be withdrawn for the aftermath speaks for itselfit has done no good to
the people whom it is supposed to accord the right to self-determination and
whose lives it is supposed to alleviate.
It must be emphasized that autonomy should not only be understood
in its superfcial sense, that is, in the context of territorial secession. It should
essentially be understood as autonomy and independence in terms of good
governance, economy and resources vital for the subsistence of a community.
For if a supposed autonomous community cannot even afford to stand on its
own two feet, the autonomy granted to it and the right to self-determination,
which it holds by virtue of such autonomy, are nothing but a mirage, a blinding
illusion. Autonomy, in that setting, inevitably becomes the road to self-
destruction. Thus, until and unless Muslim Mindanao has the meansin terms
of good governance and economy and resourcesto enable it to stand on its
own, which it clearly presently does not possess, the grant of autonomy and
the right to self-determination is meaningless and nugatory. In fact, according
autonomy under such circumstances can, as it has, result to the achievement
of the extreme opposite of its avowed purpose, i.e., instead of serving the
interests and well-being of the Bangsa Moro people, it can be detrimental to
132
http://www.philstar.com/Article.aspx?articleId=534367&publicationSubCategoryId=67 (last ac-
cessed 23 December 2009).
80
them and actually threaten their very existence as a people, as a community.
133
Autonomy, secession, independencethese are not what Muslim
Mindanao needs at this time of struggle against poverty, large scale graft and
corruption, and violence. What it really needs to fght for instead is to improve
the state of its education, boost its economy by developing the industries
that primarily support it, generate jobs to give its people livelihood for their
subsistence, and strive to eliminate the armed confict therein so as to cease all
the adverse effects the latter has ensued. What it needs right now is to engage
in more productive activities that can uplift the condition of its peoples lives.
To be able to do so, it must fully cooperate and stand as one with the rest of
the country.
However, it must be underscored that the authors stand to abolish or
modify the ARMM does not necessarily mean the total preclusion of any grant
of autonomy in the future should the proposal be taken into consideration
and given effect by the countrys lawmakers. The Bangsamoro people will still
then have a legitimate claim to autonomy. However, it should not be granted to
them now, not at this time when they are clearly incapable and incompetent of
truly determining what is best for their growth and development as a people.
Before closing the curtain, let it be said with resonance that the National
Government, as parens patriae, must take immediate and concrete action before
Mindanao, labeled as the Land of Promise, is shattered into destruction and
forever becomes The Lost Land of Unfulflled Promise.

133
Furthermore, the citizens of the country should not be made to pay, in the form of taxes, for a system
that is clearly not working. The billions of funds being poured into the ARMM should instead be devoted to other
public purposes which are more benefcial to the country. http://www.mb.com.ph/node/234948/gibo-join (last ac-
cessed 21 December 2009).

UST Law - An Abused Autonomy

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AN ABUSED AUTONOMY AND THE LOST

LAND OF UNFULFILLED PROMISE:

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