People vs Lase 219 SCRA 584 Digest

People v. Lase

Offer of Compromise in Criminal Case

Facts:
Appellant was convicted of the murder of one Dante Huelva.
o Huelva was urinating on the roadside when accused appellant stabbed
him in the back.
This was witnessed by two people Sayson and Pangatihon.
Accused-appellant interposed the defense of alibi and relied on the testimony of
his principal witnesses to support his version that he was somewhere else and
not at the scene of the crime at the time of the killing.
During the trial, Godofreda Huelva, mother of the victim testified that accused-
appellant offered to settle the case for the sum of P10,000.00.
o In his surrebuttal testimony, accused-appellant vaguely denied this offer
of compromise. He, however, insinuated that he could offer a higher
amount

RTC: The Trial court held him liable for the killing of Dante Huelva qualifying it to murder,


Issue: Whether or not the offer to settle the case should be admitted as evidence
of guilt

YES. An offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an
implied admission of guilt. The second paragraph of Section 27, Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court expressly provides that,'In criminal cases, except those involving
quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be compromised, an
offer of compromise by the accused may be received in evidence as an implied
admission of guilt. Murder is not among those criminal cases that can be
compromised.


Treachery was proven but not evident premeditation

The crime was committed with treachery due to the sudden and unexpected attack on
the victim, who was then urinating at the side of the road, with a deadly 7-inch Batangas
knife. Accused-appellant consciously adopted this mode of attack to facilitate or insure
the commission of the crime without risk to himself arising from any defensive or
retaliatory act on the part of the victim. Evident premeditation was not duly established
by the prosecution.

As to the delay in giving the witness' statement
The failure of prosecution witness Pangantihon to immediately report the incident did not
affect his credibility. His initial reluctance either due to unwillingness to be involved in or
dragged into criminal investigations is understandable.



2. PEOPLE V. TIOZON - francisco
Doctrine:
The declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of
the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included
therein, may be given in evidence against him.
Facts:
Tiozon was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crim of PD 1866 and qualified Murder for killing Bolima.
Tiozon files a Notice of Appeal, hence, the case.
--- --- ---
One night, while sps. Bolima were sleeping inside their
house, someone knocked their door. The husband opened
the door and saw that the person who is knocking is his
Pareng Troping (Tiozon, who were very drunk that
moment).
Tiozon sat down and the wife of Bolima saw Tiozon
showing a gun to her husband.
The wife moved away from the two, when she looked back
to the place where her husband and Tiozon was, she found
out that the two had already left.
Five minutes later, she heard two successive gunshots.
She heard that Tiozon was knocking at their door and at
the same time informing her, Mare, nabaril ko pare, hindi
ko sinasadya.
o husband Bolima died
RTC: Tiozon ws found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of PD 1866 and qualified murder.
o The testimony of the wife that accused, immediately
after the shooting incident took place admitted to her
having accidentally shoot the victim is admissible
evidence against the accused declarant since this is
covered by the rule on res gestae or one of an
exception to the hearsay rule.
Tiozon appealed
o One of the grounds:
The testimony of the wife of the victim that after
hearing two successive gunshots accused-
appellant went back to her house and informed
her that he accidentally shot her husband,
should not have been considered by the trial
court as part of the res gestae...

Issue:
W/N the declaration of Tiozon acknowledging his guilt to
the wife (of Bolima) that he killed Bolima may be considered by
the trial court as evidence against Tiozon.
In res gestae doctrine - the Court said that this doctrine
was misapplied in the case.
Held:
Yes, as an evidence against Tiozon but not as part of res
gestae.
We do not, however, agree with the additional observation
of the trial court, in respect to the sixth circumstance, that
the statement made by the accused-appellant to the wife of
the victim immediately after the shooting incident that he
accidentally shot the victim is covered by the rule on res
gestae. This is a misapplication of the rule in the instant
case. Statements as part of the res gestae are among the
exceptions to the hearsay rule. The rule is that a witness
can testify only to those facts which he knows of or his
own knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own
perceptions.
o Accordingly, a testimony of a witness as to what he
heard other persons say about the facts in dispute
cannot be admitted because it is hearsay evidence.
There are, however, exceptions to this rule. One of
them is statements as part of the res gestae under
Section 36 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The exceptions assume that the testimony offered is
in fact hearsay; but it is to be admitted in evidence.
Under the aforesaid Section 36, statements may be
deemed as part of theres gestae if they are made by
a personwhile a startling occurrence is taking place or
immediately prior or subsequent thereto with respect
to the circumstances thereof. Statements
accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue
and giving it a legal significance may also be received
as part of the res gestae.
In the instant case, however, the questioned testimony of
the wife of the victim is not hearsay. She testified on what
the accused-appellant told her, not what any other party,
who cannot be cross-examined, told her. The accused-
appellants statement was an oral confession, not a part
of res gestae, which he can easily deny if it were not true,
which he did in this case.
In People vs. Tulagan, 143 SCRA 107, 116-117, We
declared that a statement allegedly made by one of the
accused to Natalia Macaraeg that we killed him (referring
to himself and his co-accused) and which Natalia repeated
in her testimony in open court was merely an oral
confession and not part of the res gestae.
Moreover, even assuming that the testimony of the wife of
the victim on the alleged statement of the accused-
appellant is hearsay, the latter is barred from questioning
its admission due to his failure to object thereto at the time
the testimony was given.
SC: No qualifying circumstance prove, Tiozon only be liable for
Homicide.




1. PEOPLE V. DE JOYA - francisco
Doctrine:
Dying declaration to be admissible must be complete.

Facts:
Pioquinto de Joya (72 y/o) was convicted by the RTC of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide (killed Eulalia Diamse vda
de Salac and robbed 2 rings, 1 necklace, 1 piece of earring
belonging to the victim)
--- --- ---
Alvin saw her grandmother (Eulalia) lying down prostrate
and drenched with her own blood.
Alvin immediately ran to her lola and asked her: Apo
(means lola), apo, what happened?
Eulalia held Alvins hand and after which said: Si Paqui.
After saying those words, she let go of Alvins hand and
passed away.
Herminia (daughter of Eulalia) found out that the 2 gold
rings worn by her mother were missing, right earring was
likewise missing.
RTC: convicted de Joya for the crime charged against him
o one of the grounds: most convincing is the dying
statement of the deceased when her grandson Alvin
asked her Apo, Apo, what happened? and she
answered, Si Paki, then she expired.
When Alvin was asked during his testimony who
is this Paki, he identified the accused. The
accused during his testimony never denied that
he is called Paki.

Issue:
W/N the dying statement made by Eulalia can be received
as evidence against de Joya.

Held:
No.
It must be noted at once, however, that the words Si
Paqui do not constitute by themselves a sensible
sentence. Those two words could have been intended to
designate either (a) the subject of a sentence or (b) the
object of a verb. If they had been intended to designate the
subject, we must note that no predicate was uttered by the
deceased. If they were designed to designate the object of
a verb, we must note once more that no verb was used by
the deceased. The phrase Si Paqui must, moreover, be
related to the question asked by Alvin:Apo, Apo, what
happened? Alvins question was not:Apo, Apo, who did
this to you?
It has been held that a dying declaration to be admissible
must be complete in itself. To be complete in itself does not
mean that the declarant must recite everything that
constituted the res gestae of the subject of his statement,
but that his statement of any given fact should be a full
expression of all that he intended to say as conveying his
meaning in respect of such fact.
3
The doctrine of
completeness has also been expressed in the following
terms in Prof. Wigmores classic work:
o The application of the doctrine of completeness is
here peculiar. The statement as offered must not be
merely a part of the whole as it was expressed by the
declarant; it must be complete as far it goes. But it is
immaterial how much of the whole affair of the death
is related, provided the statement includes all that the
declarant wished or intended to include in it. Thus, if
an interruption (by death or by an intruder) cuts short
a statement which thus remains clearly less than that
which the dying person wished to make, the
fragmentary statement is not receivable, because the
intended whole is not there, and the whole might be of
a very different effect from that of the fragment; yet if
the dying person finishes the statement he wishes to
make, it is no objection that he has told only a portion
of what he might have been able to tell.
The reason upon which incomplete declarations are
generally excluded, or if admitted, accorded little or no
weight, is that since the declarant was prevented (by death
or other circumstance) from saying all that he wished to
say, what he did say might have been qualified by the
statements which he was prevented from making. That
incomplete declaration is not therefore entitled to the
presumption of truthfulness which constitutes the basis
upon which dying declarations are received.
It is clear to the Court that the dying declaration of the
deceased victim here was incomplete. In other words, the
deceased was cut off by death before she could convey a
complete or sensible communication to Alvin. The trial
court simply assumed that by uttering the words Si Paqui,
the deceased had intended to name the person who had
thrust some sharp instrument through and through her neck
just below her ears. But Eulalia herself did not say so and
we cannot speculate what the rest of her communication
might have been had death not interrupted her. We are
unable to regard the dying statement as a dying declaration
naming the appellant as the doer of the bloody deed.
SC: Decision was reversed. de Joya was acquitted on grounds
of reasonable doubt.