1

SOUTHERN ETHIOPIA AND THE CHRISTIAN

KINGDOM
3508 - 1708
, WITH SPECIAL
REFERENCE TO TRB GLLA MIGRA-
TIONS AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES
by
Mend Wolde Aregay
Thesis submitted for the
degree of Ph.D. at
the University of London
School of Oriental and
African Studies
January,
l971
2
ABSTRACT
During the thirteeiath and fourteenth centuries the
various pastoral and nomadic peoples in the eastern lowlands
of Eth1opia made repeated attempts to migrate to the high-
lands o their west. The continuous pressure they exerted
upon the Christian kingdom of Ethiopia brought about the
shift of its political centre to the south and the develop-
ment of a highly centralized system of goveri.ment, The
defensive measures which were evolved during these centuries
included the annexation of all the lands through which the
pastoral nomads gained access to the highlands, and the
creation of' numerous regimelits of disciplined pz'ofessional
soldiers. But towards the end of the fifteenth century,
power hungry court officers and provincial notables began
to challenge the absolute powers f' the emperors. The
thesis attempts to study the conflicts between the monarchy
and the nobility during the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. It also tries to examine the disruptive effects
of these conflicts upon the political, administrative and
military institutions which had sustained the empire and
held together its heterogeneous peoples.
3
The penetration of the Turks into the Red Sea had
hardly any effect on Ethiopian politics. The inability of
the empire to withstand the Muslim and Galla invasions of
the sixteenth century Is best explained by the factional
conflicts which divided and weakened it. The Intensity of
the civil wars which raged after
1559
led to the destruc-
tion of the centralized system of government and the com-
plete barbarization of the many bodIes of professional
soldiers. The actions of Fasiladas and lyasu might have
saved the empire from further disintegration if the bitter
religious wars of their days had not hastened the onset of
anarchy.
4
CONTENTS
Page
Preface, . . . . .,
16
Abbreviations .,
Ch. I.
Ethiopia at the Beginning of the Sixteenth
18
Century. . . . . . . . . . .

Ch. II. background to the Galla Migrations

118
Ch. III. The Civil Wars of l56O-17O and the
Progress of the Baraytuma
. .
. 1jj14
Ch. IV. The Reign 0! Sarsa Dengel. . . . . . 230
Ch. V. A Period of Anarchy . . . . . . . .
. . 34
Ch. VI. Attempts t Reconstruct the Absolutism of
the Monarchy. . . . . . . . . .
441
Ch.
VII.
The Decline or the Monarchy. . . ,
. . 563
Select Bibliography . . . . . . . , . .

601
PREFACE
When I f.rst began to prepare the outline for this
thesis, my intention was to limit myself to the study of
Sarsa Dengel's reign. In the works of the few historians
who have dealt with the sIxteenth century, this emperor is
represented as a wise and powerful king. He is cred1ted
with having curbed the troublesome provincial aristocracy
by creating sri efficient, centralized administration. He
is also credited with the creation of a mobile army of
loyal and disciplined soldiers. With this army, it is
said, the emperor crushed the Turkish-Adal alliance 'which
had threatened the very existence of Christian Ethiopia.
He is also said to have checked the migrations of the Galla
and to have brought back into the empire many of the southern
provinces which had been lost during the reigns of his weak
predecessors. The primary sources on the emperor were
limited, especially as the Jesuit missIonarl?s were not
very active in his
time. Nevertheless, his reign seemed an
attractive subject for a thesis. No
historiaL had analyzed
It in detail. And Sarsa Dengel's achievements in the
political, administrative end military fields seemed to
6
provide a rare opportunity for making a broad, cOmparative
study of the Ethiopian empire at a period when
it still
retained some of its pagan and Muslim provinces.
After a careful examination of the secondary sources
I was unable to understand the nature of those political,
administrative and military difficulties which Sarsa Dengel
is presumed to have inherited. As the chronicle of the
emperor offered no enlightenment either
about the difficul-
ties or about the solutions he Is believed to have found
for them, I began to doubt the accuracy of some of the
statements made about him In the secondary sources. Whexi
saying these things, hawever, I am In no way underrating
the scholarship or belittling the contrIbutjoi of the his-
torians who have interested themselves In Ethiopia in
general or In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries In
particular.
The first and still the only truly comprehensive
study of Ethiopian history was made by James Bruce. His
contribution to our knowledge of Ethiopia Is threefold.
He has left much valuable Information on the geography and
trade of Ethiopia aM
eastern Sudan during the third
quarter of the eighteenth century. His account of Ethiopian
politics at this time is the most detailed we have. And by
7
using Ethiopian chronicles for that section of his work
dealing with general history, he not only revealed the
existence of ample native sources but also demonstrated that
in many ways they were more reliable and Informative than
the European sources. The Jesuit missionaries Paez and
Almelda were better acquainted with the native sources than
Bruce was. They had Included in their books excellent
summaries of most of the chronicles. But unlike Bruce,
they had not ventured Into Interpretative history; and
their works remained unpublished and largely unknown untI].
Beccarl brought out his monumental volumes at the beginning
of this century.
Bruce had all the qualities of a good historian; an
eloquent and fluent style, and a curious, observant and
analytic mind, He had, in addition ) an uncanny Insight Into
the Ethiopian way of life. He did not confine himself to
court history or to describing the main political events
only. He tried to show the historical Interaction between
the Christian, pagan and Muslim peoples of the empire.
Nevertheless, as he was chiefly interested In describing
his explorations and the personalities he met during his
stay In the country, the historical section of his work
received only a small degree of attention. Apparently, he
8
did not even give himself the time necessary to examine
thoroughly the chroticles he had brought back with him.
He wrote his chapter on Sarsa Dengel without the assistance
of the long chronicle on the emperor. For his history of
Ninas he relied on some of the Jesuit documents, but his
antipathy for the missionaries jnade him unnecessarily
partial towards the emperor. His treatment of the Gafla
migrations and of Sarsa Dengels activities in the southern
pagan provinces is sketchy and generally misleading. Th.it
then Bruce was a pionee historian. He wrote without the
advantage of having before him other opinions with which
he could have compared his own.
The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries are perhaps
the best documented periods in Ethiopian history. In addi-
tion to the detailed chronicles on many of the emperors
of these centuries, we have the unique works of Chihab ed-
Din, Bahre r and Pawlos. these works give reliable accounts
of both major and minor events in which the emperors were
not directly involved. The numerous books, reports and
letters left by the Jesuit missionaries shed much light on
political and social life in many of the provinces far
removed from the court. It is, therefore, understandable
that the Ethiopicists who followed Bruce gave priority to
9
the task of editing and translating the rich heritage of
primary sources. Eminent scholars like Basset, Beccarl,
Cerulli, Conti Rossini, Conzelmari, Guidi, Pereira nd
Perruchon have hardly attempted to write interpretative
histories of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. But
by editing and translating the primary sources they have
greatly simplified the task of every student of Ethiopian
history.
Budge's two volume history appeared more than a
century and a quarter after Bruce's work, and after almost
all the important Ethiopian and Jesuit sources had been
published. Nevertheless, Budge's contribution to the
interpretative history of Ethiopia Is limited. His aim
was to provide the English reader with a comprehensive out..
line history. This was necessary because there were few
English translations oi the chronicles and the results of
the archaeological findings in Aksum were available in the
German languages
only.
Coulbeaux's political and religious
study followed soon after Budge's hIstory As a disappoin-
ted missionary, who had spent the best part of his life In
unsuccessful missionary activities In Ethiopia, Coulbeaux
was not an Impartial historian. Besides, he does not seem
to have been the kind of scholar who could distinguish the
10
reliable from the unreliable source.
In Kammerer's massive tomes on the Red Sea and the
adjacent lands, the central theme Is not the history or
Ethiopia. It Is the study of the growth of geographical
knowledge of these areas since classical times and the
development of charts and maps of them during and after the
middle ages. In the process of tracing these developments,
Kammerer gives useful accounts of the main events, In both
Ethiopia and Yaman, which preceded and followed Turkish
penetration of the Red Sea. But there can be no doubt
that in his analysis of the Christian-Muslim conflicts in
Ethiopia he overestimates the Interventionist role of the
Arabs and the Turks. On the basis of highly questionable
premises he depicts the conflicts of the sixteenth century
as mere episodes of the guerres du poivre" between
Portugal and Turkey. In his chapters on Ethiopian. history
Kammerer Is at his strongest when describing the activities
of the Jesuit missionaries. However, here too he tends to
minimize the importance of internal political, military
and social developments and to portray Oviedo, Paez and
Mendez as men who influenced the course of events. These
tendencies arose mainly because Kammerer gave insufficient
attention to the chronicles.
1.1
Two recent books which can be regarded as comprehen-
sive studies of Ethiopia are Trimingham's Islam in Ethiopia
and tJllendorff 1 s The Ethio pians. The first book Is inten-
ded to fulfil a limited purpose, which is to describe the
Muslim cnimunities in Etbiopia today. The chapters on the
historical background to the spread of Islam show an
exhaustive knowledge of the sources and a masterful grasp
of the essentials. Trimlngham is aware that the long con-
flict between Christians and Muslims was essentially a
struggle between sedentary and migratory peoples. Yet he
fails to break away prom the accepted hypothesis of jihads
inspired first by the Arabs and then by the Turks. His
analysis of the changing fortunes of the monarchy lacks
depth and perspective. He thus formulates hasty opinions
about the place of Sarsa Dengel, Susenyos and Fasiladas in.
the history of Ethiopia.
ITis
conclusion that the estab-
lishment of a fixed capital city at Gondar led to factional
conflict, and this in turn to regionalism in. polit1 cs, is
open to serious doubt.
Ullendorff's book is essentially a description of
modern society and culture. Even If he did not set out to
write a history of the country, he has to some extent
12
delved into the past and traced the origins of the main
cultural, legacies. His chapter on the Churct introduces
new ideas about the interaction between Christianity,
Islam and pganisrn. Understandably, the chapter on the
historical background is brief. It has little to say
about the political, administrative and military develop-
ments during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
Thus, thinking that the events of the sixteenth
century needed further examination, .1 have gone as far back
as the fourteenth century and tried to trace the develop-
inent of the pQlitical, administrative and military insti-
tutions. Wherever the sources permitted, I have tried to
show the position of the Christian, Muslim and pagan
peoples within the empire. It seems to me that the
successes of the Muslim and Galla invaders can be best
understood If seen with the internal frictions between
the
monarchy and the provincial aristocracy in the background.
Because In the process of examining the political and
military developments of the sixteenth century I had come
to a somewhat novel opinicn about the achievements of Sarsa
Dengel, the scope of the thesis had to be widened to cover
the whole of the seventeenth century.
13
It is in Fasiladas rather than in Sarsa Dengel that
I would find the reformer who tried to curb the power of
the provincial war-lords and to save from further disinte-
gration whatever was left of the empire. The establishment
of the court at Gondar need not be regarded as a turning
point in Ethiopian history. The tendency towards regional-
ism in Ethiopian politics did not begin with Fasiladas. It
rather ended with his father Susenyos. Neither Fasiladas
nor his grandson were completely reconciled to the loss or
the southern and eastern provinces which the Galla had
occupied. Curiously enough, in the few secondary works
which deal with this period much has been made of the foun-
dation of Gondar. Hardly any attention Is given to the
religious controversies which raged during and after the
reign of Fasiladas. Although I run the risk of overempha-
sizing the effects of these controversies, it seems to me
that they explain Fasiladas's failure to reconstruct a
stable government and lyasu's inability to keep the provin..
ces he tried to recover from the Galla.
If the thesis succeeds in explaining some of the
Issues raised in It and in presenting a panoramic view of
the Ethiopian empire during the sixteenth and seventeenth
14
centuries, the credit is entirely due to Professor Roland
Oliver. I would not have attempted such an ambitious task
without his encouragement, and I would not have ventured
to suggest bold explanations if he had not continuously
urged me to look beyond what seemed obvious.
The thesis is based mainly on the published chronicles
and Jesuit documents. The existing translations of some of
the chronicles and other native documents are not always
clear or accurate. On many occasions I have consulted
Professor Edward tJllendorff about all sorts of real and
imagined difficulties. I am very grateful for his patience
and for his indispensable assistance. I am also deeply
indebted to tr. Richard Gray for his extremely useful
guidance on the source materials available in the Roman
archives.
The British Council has been. my generous sponsor
during the three years that I have been studying at the
School of Oriental and African Studies. A grant from the
Central Research Fund of the University of London has
enabled me to visit some of the archives and libraries in
Italy, Spain and Portugal. I am grateful to the Ilaile
Sellassie I University for the generous financial assistance
15
which has enabled me to rulfll while studying my obligations
towards my family. The advantages of studying African
history at the School of Oriental and African Studies are
very well known. I am indebted to Dr, Abraham Demoz, t)r.
M. Abir and Professor S. Rubenson, who, as officials in the
Faculty of Arts of the Haile Sellassie I University, helped
me with all the necessart arrangements for my studies in
Europe.
IG
ABBREVIATIONS
.9
/
AEAnriales d
t Et hioD ie.
Published by t he "Irst it ut
t hiopien d'Arch'ologie". Addi5 Ababa.
ASJ
Archive of t he Societ y of Jesus. Rome.
BACL
Bibliot eca da, Academia das Ciencias. Lisbon.
BSGIBollettino della Societ ' Geograflca 4 It aliana.
CSCO
Corpus Script orum Christ ianorum Orlent alium.
Script ores Aet hiopici. Series Alt era:
Hist orica et Bagiographica.
GSGS
Geographical Sect ion, General St aff, War Office;
maps, series GSGS +61F6.
JAJournal Asiat i p ue. Paris.
JAH
The Journal of African Hist ory. Cambridge,
M Et AL
M emorie della Reale Accademia dei Lincel.
Classe di scienze morali, st oriche e
filologiche. Rome.
MSOSMitteilungendes Seminars ftr Orientalische
Sp rachen. Berlin.
CM Orient e moderno. Rome.
Rer. Aet h. Reruni Aet hiopicarum script ores occident ales
Inedit i a saeculo XVI ad XIX. Ed. Camil].o
Beccari.
17
RRAL
Rendiconti della Reale Accademla del Lincel.
Classe di scienze morall, storiche e
fliologiche. Rome.
RSRevue smitl p
ue d'ep igrap hie et d'histolre
nclerna Paris.
RSERassegna dl studl etiop ici. Rome.
RSO
Rlvista degli studi orientall. Rome.
ZA
Zeltschrift fr Assyrlologie mid Verwandte
Gebiete. Strassbourg.
18
CHAPTER I
ETHIOPIA AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SIXTEENTH CENTURY
I. Political geography of the empire.
With the sources so far at our disposal it is by no
means easy to define the extent of the Ethiopian empire and to
delineate its boundaries at the beginning of the eventful six-
teenth century. The chronicles of this and the preceding cen-
turies are, as a whole, silent about the provinces somewhat
removed from Shawa where the emperors generally resided. Being
at best court histories recording the importa.nt activities of the
emperors, the chronicles mention mostly those places which the
emperors visited and those in which they campaigned. With the
exception of the longer history of Ahmad Granh by Chihab ed-Din,
the incomplete Arabic annals of the sultans of Adal and Harar
deal almost exclusively with local factional feuds. Chihab ed-
Din e s history is indispensable for the identification of many of
the eastern provinces where for centuries lowland pastoralists
and nomads clashed with highland agriculturalists. Unfortunately
the history ends abruptly in 1535,
just after Ahrnad had finished
his conquest of these provinces and before he began to move
into the western parts of the country.
For most contemporary Europeans who wrote on Ethiopia it
was still the country of the Prester John. As the legendary king
was believed to have under him many kings, princes and dukes,
19
Ethopia was shaped to fit the legend by being divided into
several kingdoms, principalities and dukedoms.' Of the pioneers
in the navigation of the Indian Ocean and the Red Sea, none knew
better the east coast of Africa than Afonso de Albuquerque. Yet,
even after he sailed into the Red Sea in 1513,
he thought that
Ethiopia extended in the south to Sofala and the Cape of Good
Hope, in the west as far as Nubia and Congo, and in the north up
to Suakin. 2
The first objective and trustworthy account of the
country by a European was written by the Portuguese priest
FranciscoAlvarez. Even though he was in Ethiopia for six years
between 1520 and i56,
he too was unable to free himself from the
lingering memory of the legend of Prester John. He not only
stretched the country to the Indian Ocean but peopled some of its
regions with amazons and sea-people. 3
John Bermudez, another
Portuguese, in spite of his close to thirty years' stay in
1. Up to date bibliographies on the legend of the Prester John are
given in J.Doresse, L'Empire duPttre-Jean, II, 21l-f8, 3+6-+8;
and V. Slessarev Prester John, The Letter and. the Legend,
(Minneapolis, l99), pp.95-122.
2. Cartas de Affonso de Albu quer que (ed. R.A. Bulho Pato),I, 230.
3.
F.Alvarez, The Prester John of the Indies (trans. Lord Stanley
of Alderley and rev, and ed. C.F. Beckingham and G.W.B.
Huntingford3, II, 1.i-6,
)+59,
Barros, who obtained his inform-
ation on Ethiopia from Alvarez's companions or from the surviv-
ors of the Dom Christopher da Gama expedition, said that
amazons lived In a Manguiste das Suites or Kingdom of Women.
Evidently, someone had confirmed the legend about the amazons
by confusing the Antharic word set (woman) with Zet, one of the
Sidama groups of south-western Ethiopia. Da Asia, dec. III,
liv. iv, cap.l,
p.371.
20
Ethiopia, wrote abundantly of amazons, unicorns, griffins, phoenix
birds and snakes with priceless jewels on their heads.
1
"His des-
cription of the size and. extent of the country was, needless to
say, vague and inaccurate. Mapmakers of the sixteenth and seven-
teenth centuries preserved these exaggerations by filling up with
Ethiopian place-names the blank spaces of the uncharted interior
2
of Africa.
Luis de Urreta, a Dominican monk from Spain, used much of
the literature which erroneously identi.fied the realm of the
legendary Prester John with Ethiopia to publish a book in l6l0.
In this book Ethiopia was represented as the ideal and Catholic
"City of God". The author had not set out to be a historian; he
was basically an utopianist. But by attributing the evangeliza-
tioh of parts of Ethiopia to holy men of the Dominican order, he
provoked strong reactions from the Jesuit missionaries who were
labouring to Introduce Catho1icism.
1. J.Bermudez, "A Short Account of the Embassy" in The Portuguese
Eedition to Ab y ssinia, l5+1-1 (trans. R.S. WhIteway), p.236.
2. A useful study of printed maps has been made by W.G.L.
Randles. "South East Africa and the Empire of Monomotapa
as shown on selected maps of the 16th century", Studia, II
(1958), Lisbon.
3.
HistoriaEclesiastica 1 Politica, Natural y oral de los
Grarides y Remotos Reynos de la Etio p ia1 onarchia del
E perador, liarnado Preste Juan de las Indias. Valencia: en
casa de Pedro Patricio Mey, 1610,
+, Luis de Urreta in fact wrote a book about the supposed
activities of the Dominicans in Ethiopia. Historia de
Sarada Orden de Predicadores. en 10remotos TRevnos d
Valencia; en casa de Juan Chrysostomo Garriz, 1611.
21
Pero Paez wrote his history to refute Luis de
Urretats
allega-
tions of Portuguese and Jesuit interference in the well-ordered
political and religious affairs of an already Catholic country.
Paez t s example was followed by other Jesuit missionaries who in
their letters and books tried to correct the misconceptions about
the size and wealth of Ethiopia and the might of its emperors.
These missionaries had, however, arrived after most of the
southern and eastern provinces were overrun by the Galla. Al-
ready by the beginning of the seventeenth century the Ethiopians
themselves had but vague notions of the extent of the country
before the Galla migrations. Hence, in spite of the diligent
inquiries made first by Paez and, after him, by Manuel de Almeida
and Alfonso Mendez, we have no accurate information on the bound-
aries of the empire or on the number and names of its provinces.
According to the information which Paez elicited from the
Emperor Susenyos and his principal secretaries, the empire
stretched from Tokar in the north to Bahr Gamo in the south and
from Bur on the Red Sea to Wambarya in the south-west. 1 Earlier
sources also place the northern limit somewhere to the south of
Suakin. Alvarez is quite vague, he simply says that Suakin was at
the end of Ethiopia. 2 More detailed information was collected by
1. Paez, "Historia de Ethiopia", in Rer. Aeth.., II, l+, Beckingham
and Huntingford have identified the Focail of Paez as Tokar.
Some Records of Ethiopia, p.2 35.
2 . The Prester John of the Indies, II, )+)+9
-
?
L.C1Q
I
0
4L. Steftsii
gtLId,l
- 0
--.
c
Ia. A11
I
A.A,
To Aa. r,.
/
/
TAA
,4I SLlflt
Si&a kn
'5.
9
i0cha. ,,,_-
-'
i.f of
4a'en
c7 I
oto
/
/
/
/
/
/
Pro L,g& 11Q-
nzof te/itefitn a.ni./ire
Ih.e bi pis-n' of.MSix/e-,iuI
'I)
the Venetian scholar A. Zorzi from Ethiopian pilgrims to
Jerusalem and from Italian adventurers who had been to Ethiopia.
According to one of his informants, Baqia and a district called
Dagore were the northernmost areas which were inhabited by
Christians. The region inhabited by Muslims, subjects of the
sultan of Suakin, began at Cia, a city or district about ten
dayst journey from Dagore. There is no evidence which confirms
the statement by the same informant to the effect that the sultan
of Suakin was tributary to the emperor.' The northern limit
may therefore, have begun somewhere near Cia which seems to have
been south of Tokar. The inhabitants of Baqia, a district ex-
tending jn the north-east direction from the Ansaba river,
and perhaps also of the land called Dagore, were Christian agri-
culturalists of the Bet Asgada clans. The inhabitants of Cia, on
the other hand, were nomads, and Imperial control over them may
not have been effective. Nevertheless, the relative security
with which Christian pilgrims were able to travel up to Suakin
suggests that the authority of the emperor was respected by
these Muslim nomads.
References to the north-western frontier are equally
scarce. Alvarez mentions the Muslim Bellonos who lived to the
north of Bagaineder province and who were subjects of the
emperor. 2
Evidently Alvarez had no clear notion of the position
1. O.G.S.Crawford, Ethio p ian Itineraries circa l'+oo-l52 +, pp.12 7,
l7^-77.
2 . The Prester John of the Indies, II, '+6o-6i.
24
of either Bagameder or the Bellonos. The latter may be identified
with the Balaw. In the chronicles the name of Balaw is given in-
discriminately to all the Muslims who lived in the vast regions
between the Taka and Fazugli, whether subjects of the emperors or
of the kings of Fung. The eastern part of the Taka was within
the Ethiopian empire because in 1535 Ahznad Granh gave it to one
of his officers. According to Paez, the kingdom of Dequin, which
comprised most of the Taka, was, before the seventeenth century,
a vassal of the emperor. 1
The Muslim llamaj who lived
immediately to the south of the Taka were serving with Lebna
Dengel in his war with Ahmad.
To the south of the Hamaj lived the Dubani. The majority
of them were pagans in spite of Zar'a Ya'eqob's efforts to have
them converted to Christianity. We have ample information about
the positions they occupied during the seventeenth and eighteenth
1. "Historia de Ethiopia", op.cit., II, 1 2
5, 2 70.
2 . Chihab ed-Din, Histoire de la contiuetede 1'Abyssi,
(trans. and ed. R. Basset), trans., pp.52 , 1^61_62 .
A balaw makonnen or governor of Balaw is mentioned in
the He ga waser
tata
mangest. But we cannot ascertain
whether the district in question was the eastern part
of the Taka, the land of the Hamaj, or the land of the
Balaw to the west of Gaflabat and Ras-el-fil. J. Varenbergh
(trans. and ed.), "Studien zur abessinischen Reichsordrning"
in IA., XXX (1915-1916), p.12 .
2
centuries. They spread from somewhere near Adyabo, a district
of Tigre, to the neighbourhood of Gallabat on the Atbara river.1
To their west were the Balaw. The Barya and the Kunama of
2
Mazaga were, therefore, included among the Dubani. Althougb.
all the Dubani were Ethiopian subjects we cannot establish the
boundary line between them and the Balaw subjects of Fung.
At the beginning of the seventeenth century the lands of Deleb,
Qeheba, Barta, Radamer and Abu Ramla made up some of the frontier
districts of Fung. The Ethiopian district of Chanqa was
opposite Deleb. The boundary line also passed close to the
Fung market town of Sarki. The Jesuit missionary Luis de
Azevedo makes Fazugli a district of Ethiopia. 3 As the missionary
wrote in
1607,
many years before Susenyos began his slaving
raids into Fung territories, he could nDt have confused the raids
with campaigns of conquest. As Crawford's researches have shown
that the authority of the king of Fung also reached into Fazugli,
the boundary line must have cut through this gold producing regio
1. I.Guidi (trans. and ed.), "Annales Iohanriis I, lyasu I et
Bakaffa", CSCO, V, text, pp
.159-62 ,. 186-87,
trans., pp.166-
70, 196-97; and also by Guidi (trans. and ed.), "Annales
regum lyasu II et Iyo'as", ibid., VI, text, p.111, trans.
pp.12 0-2 1.
2 . The province of Dubani listed by Luis de Azevedo is probably
Mazaga. Letter of July 2 2 , 1607, to the provincial of Goa,
Rer. Aeth., XI, 13 2 .
3 .
Ibid.
0.awford, The Fun g Kingdom of Sennar, pp.82 -83,
26
Thus it seems plausible to assume that the line ran somewhat to
the east but not far from the present demarcation with the
Sudan.
On the east, the Red Sea coast as far south as the Strait
of Bab el Mandeb was Ethiopian. Although Lebna Dengel claimed
sovereignty over the island of Massawa it was, in effect, under
the control of the sheikh of Dahiak. The territory along the
Gulf of Aclen was loosely connected with the sultanates of Adal
and Harar, both of which were tributary to the emperor. The
region between the coast and the plain of Babile, to the south
of the Harar mountains, was inhabited by Somali pastoralists and
nomads dependent on the sultans of Harar.
There are practically no indications as to how far to
the south and south-west the empire extended. The influence of
the sultanate of Harar and the small emirates to its west may
have reached up to the Wabi Shaballe river. The vast territory
between this river and the Durnal may have constituted a hunting
ground for slave and ivory hunters from Harar and Bali. The
latter province seems to have extended southwards to the Ganale
Doria. From this river the boundary line may have continued
westwards to the northern bank of Lake Abaya. It may then have
followed the western shores up to the end of Lake Charno. From
here the line probably took a north-westerly direction past the
confluence of the Dincia with the Omo to the Dabus river, from
which it may have followed the Tumat river to Fazugli.
27
This roughly traced boundary defines at the time the
Ethiopian highlands. The peoples living within these highlands
were cut off n the south and the west from the neighbouring
peoples who lived in the extensive and largely unhealthy low-
lands. Within the highlands, on the other hand, the configur-
ation from region to region was not so very marked as to prevent
contact and commerce between the peoples.
L'Et/iopia 'e una egione delimitaldalle sue
condizioni naturall, una unit fipica, la cui,
principale constitulta do col1calli ammasX(
montani e da alte terre, solcate da fenditure
profonde... 1
In spite of contact and commerce, the ruggedness of the
highlands which Conti Rossini describes prevented the evolution
of a uniform culture and the growth of a fully integrated state.
Although the political foundations of the empire had been laid
as early as the third century by the kings of Aksum, the creation
of a culturally homogeneous state was only partially achieved by
the beginning of the sixteenth. The division of the empire
into provinces followed to a great extent the ethnic particu-
larities preserved by the difficulties of communications.
Tigre, the northernmost province of the empire, com-
prised two administrative divisions separated by the Marab river.
1. C. Conti Rossini, Etio p la e g enti d'Etio p ia, p.2.
28
The northern division, administered by a governor with the
title of bahr na g
ash, included the coastal lowlands, the dis-
tricts of Marya and Baqia, the highlands north of the Marab
river and the lowlands to the west. The coastal lands east of
Baqia, as well as those of Adikono and lower Bur, were inhabited
by Muslim pastoralists amongst whom were the Darbeta, the Saho
and the Hazo clans. The central highlands were inhabited by
Christians. We cannot identify the people who lived to the west
of the Christian groups of the Marya, on either side of the
Barka river. They may have been the same Beni Amer tribes
which occupy them today. The Ieni Amer also seem to have been
known by the all-embracing name of Balaw.1
Between the upper valley of the Barka and the Marab
river lived the Barya. They were pagan.s like the Kunama, who
were their neighbours to the south, between the Marab and Takaza
rivers. Both peoples, unlike the other inhabitants of the
province,were of non-Cushitic stock. As the extent of the dis-
trict of Mazaga is not known, we cannot say whether all of the
Barya and Kunama recognized the authority of its Muslim rulers.
1. For a traditional genealogy of the Balaw in northern Tigre
(the Eritrea of today) see Gabra-lyasus Abay, Masarat alet
hezbi marab melash, pp. 100-101, and C. Conti Ro ssini,
Proverbi, tradizioni e canzoni tigrine (Rome, 19+2 ), pp.
130_1+7, 158-59, l8-85.
29
The district seems to have included most of the lands inhabited
by the Kimama. Its rulers were prosperous and strong throughout
the sixteenth century, after which it declined rather rapidly.1
The cause of its decline is not known. Slaving raids by the
emperors and by the governors of Tigre on its predominantly
pagan population may have been partly responsible.
The southern division, with which the name of Tigre is
now identified, had a more homogeneous population. The coastal
lowlands south of Bur were inhabited by the Balasua and the
Irob, Muslim pastoralists akin to the Saho and the Hazo in the
north. A few clans of the northern Afar sought sustenance in
the inhospitable salt plains of Arho, east of the highland dis-
tricts of Sera'e and Mambarta. The other Afar clans who lived
in
the lands between Arho and the sea seem to have been under
the chief of the Danakil province. In the more fertile plains
of Azabo, immediately to the south of Wajarat, lived the
pastoralist Doba. Although Alvarez described them as Muslims,
many of the Doba clans had been converted to Christianity during
the reign of Ba'eda Maryam
( 11 .
l68_1 L f78). 2 The Doba spread into
the plains of the nearby provinces of Angot and Qeda. The rest
1.
Oral traditions and place-names in Walqayt seem to suggest
that the rulers of Mazaga had exercised some political in-
fluence over the Dubani tribes living to the south of the
Takaza. G.Ellero, "Il Uolcait", RSE, Vu
(l9+8 ), 95.
2.
The Prester John of the Indies, I,
1 89-92; J.Perruchon
(trans. and ed.), Les chronicues de Zar'a Ya'ecob et de
a'eda Maryam, pp.l'i-S,
1 78.
C')
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31
of Tigre was inhabited by ti grinha speaking Christians whose
main occupation was farming.
To the south-east of Tigre were the provinces of Beguna,
Qeda, Wag, Lasta and Angot. According to Alvarez's description,
Beguna was a mountainous province.' It may have been located
south of the Buchena river and Lake Ashange and east of the
Selari river. Southwards it reached up to Ashguagua, a terri-
tory of Lasta where the Takaza river had its source. 2 Wag and
Lasta were enclosed by the Selari and Takaza rivers. Although
both provinces were the political centres of Ethiopia during
the obscure period of the Zagwe dynasty, agawenha, or more
precisely the Khamir dialect of agawenha, remained the main
language of their Christian inhabitants. The people of Beguna
probably spoke agawenha as well as tigrinha; though Amharic may
have been the language of the soldiers of the Jan Amora and
other regiments garrisoned in the province. Immediately to the
east of Beguna and south of the Azabo plains was Qeda, com-
prising the mountains of Zabul and the surrounding lowlands.
The lowlands were inhabited by the Doba and other pastoralists
related to them, while on the mountains of Zabul were stationed
soldiers of the Jan Qantafa regiment. Angot, relatively the
1. The Prester John of the Indies, I, 2 00.
2 . F.M.E. Pereira (trans. and ed.), Chronica de Susenvos, I,
2i-6, 3l4-, II, 189-90, 2+3.
ii
largest of these provinces, began somewhere near the Alaniata
river and extended southwards up to Lake Raiq)- It included
the district which, during the wars of Ahniad Granh, came to be
occupid by the Yajju people, as well as the district of
Ambassal where Amba Geshan was located. 2 Much of Angot was,
therefore, mountainous land, inhabited, by Christian Amhara who
were engaged in farming. We do not know how far eastward it
stretched, but it seems to have touched upon the Danakil province.
The plains below the escarpments may have been inhabited by
pastoralists of the Zalan and Maya groups.
Danakil or Danka]. province began somewhere near the salt
plains of Irho. Southwards it may have extended into the
neighbourhood of Lake Abbe and the Awash river. The Muslim in-
habitants of the province called themselves Afar. They were
known as Dankale by their neighbours in the interior and as
Danakil by the traders and travellers from Arabia. Much of
Danakil province consisted of dry and barren plains, and the
Afar, nearly all of whom were nomads, were forced to disperse
themselves over extensive areas. The Afar consisted of loosely
1. Alvarez puts the lake in the province of Amhara. The Prester
John of the Indies, I, 2+9. Paez leaves it in Angot.
"Historia de Ethiopia", Rer. Aeth., II 278. So does Luis
de Azevedo in his letter of July 22, l07,
ibid., XI, 128.
2. Paez says that Amba Geshan was within Amhara. "Historia de
Ethiopia", ibid., II, 8o-8i. This is because during the
reign of Susenyos the district of Ambassal was added to the
province, then governed by his brother Yamana Chrestos.
33
related tribes all of which recognized the authority of one
chief. His residence was somewhere inland from the port of
Baylul, but probably nearer to Tigre than to Angot or Amhara.
Immediately to the south of Takaza, separated from Tigre
by this river, were a number of small provinces. Salamt was
wedged between the lofty heights of Semen province and the deep
valley of the Takaza. To the west of Salamt and Semen, between
the Takaza and the Angarab rivers, were the provinces of Waldebba,
Waiqayt and Sagade. The latter two seem to have included terri-
tories inhabited by Muslim and pagan tribes of the Dubani and to
have bordered upon the kingdom of Fung. Wagara, a fairly large
province, lay south-west of Semen and south of Waldebba and
Waiqayt. In the north, Wagara began at the escarpment of
Lamalmo and stretched southwards past the mountains around
Gondar to the edge of the highlands overlooking the p]ains of
Dambiya. The Betagaz and Balasa rivers probably separated it
from Semen and Bagameder respectively, and. the Anagarab from
Waldebba. Up to the beginning of the fourteenth century the
inhabitants of all these provinces were Agaw of the Kayla branch.
They were commonly known as Falasha because of their reigion,
which was a very early form of Judaisrn.
1
In spite of repeated
efforts throughout the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries to
force the Falasha into Christianity, large pockets of the people
1. On the type of Tudaisni followed by the Falasha see
E.U].lendorff, The Ethiopians,
pp.
110-112.
34
in these provinces succeeded in persevering in their faith until
the beginning of the seventeenth century. By this time, as a
result of the slaving and pillaging raids perpetrated by
successive emperors, the remaining Falasha communities were
found in the fastness of Semen.
The plains immediately to the north and north-east of
Lake Tana made up the relatively small province of Dambiya.
Like the provinces to its north, It had a large Falasha popu-
lation until they were all forced to adopt Christianity by the
Emperor Susenyos in the seventeenth century. The inhabitants
of the numerous small provinces to the west of Wagara and
Dambiya were predominantly pagan Agaw. The inhabitants of the
highland districts of Quara had embraced Christianity, while
those in the lowlands to the west of the escarpments remained
pagan. The western parts of the frontier district of Chelga,
through which passed the caravan route to Fung, probably con-
tained many tribes of pagan and Muslim Shanqela. Since in the
seventeenth century the boundary line between Fung and Ethiopia
passed through Sarki, past Abu Rarnia into Fazugli, the various
Shanqela tribes living in the lowlands between the Rahad and
Dinder rivers must have been subjects of the emperor. The
provinces of Tankal, Taqussa and Alafa, which were to the west
of Lake Tana, were inhabited by pagan Agaw. Although sedentary
agriculturalists, the Agaw of these provinces raised large
herds of cattle.
3;
Large as the provinces o' Amhara and Bagameder were, their
inhabitants had reached an exceptional stage of homogeneity. The
people were nearly afl Christian Amhara, most of them engaged
exclusively in agriculture. The boundary of Amhara began some-
where to the north of Lake Haiq, perhaps where the Mule river
turns eastward. The full length of the Bashelo river consti-
tuted the boundary with Bagameder. The Sotola-Walaqa river
separated Amhara from the province of Walaqa. But in the south-
east, Amhara seems to have extended beyond the Zaguol river to
include the district (now known as Wara Ilu) in which were
found the famous chux'ches of Ganata Giyorgis and Makana Sellasie.
Bagameder was probably bounded by the Balasa river on the north,
by the Takaza on the northeast, by the Gidda on the east and by
the Bashelo and the Blue Nile on the south and south-west. The
districts of Shewada, Dorana and Barna, located between the
Betagas and Balasa rivers, seem to have been parts of Semen.1
However, until the middle of the sixteenth century, the districts
of Ernfraz, Fogara, Wedo and Darha, comprising the plains east of
Lake Tana, were within Bagameder. They were detached from the
province by Sarsa Dengel after he established his court in
Emfraz.
1. hronica de Susenvos, I, 150, II, ii6.
36
/?,
'H;,
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fT-
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37
Pagan Agaw inhabited the small
province of Achafar
which lay directly to the south-west of Alafa. The less
elevated province of Balya was to the west of Aehafar, more or
less enclosed by the Dinder and Balas rivers. The eastern
parts of the province, perhaps the lands up to Mt. Balya, were
Inhabited by pagan Agaw. Various Shanqela tribes, probably be-
longing to the Gunza and Gubba groups, occupied the western
parts, up to the neighbourhood of Abu Ramla. Between Alafa and
the Small Abay river were other provinces also inhabited by
pagan Lgaw. The districts of Segaba,. Dankuera, Sankra, Sewawa,
Gajege, Qisarya, Ambas Gama, and perhaps Wandage and Lag as
well, made up the province the governor of which was known by
the title of uolla shum. The lands between Wadnege and the
Small Abay made up the province of Bad.
Gojam, one of the largest provinces, lay to the south
ol' Lake Tana and the Small Abay. It was boimded by the Blue Nile
in all directions except the west, where the DUT'a river separated
it from Chara, Matakal and Wambarya. The inhabitants of the
province could be ditinctively divided into two groups,
Christian Amhara and pagan &gaw. The first group lived in the
eastern districts along the Blue Nile, beginning at the Small
Abay and stretching southwards up to the Suha or Bugana river
and bordering upon the provinces of Bagameder, Amhara, Walaqa and
Shawa. After the seventeenth century the &me Gojam came to be
38
applied exclusively to the eastern districts inhabited by the
Amhara. The region inhabited by the Agaw began In the narrow
plains to the west of the Jarna river, a tributary of the Small
Abay, and reached up to the Blue Nile. In the east it began
somewhere near the Amadamit and Mangesta mountains, ending at
the Dura river on the west. The Agaw were divided into
numerous, highly fragmented tribes the best known of which were
the Hankasha, Zalabasa, Ambara, Dangela, Buguena, Guaguesa,
Kuakuera, Azana and Zigam. The provinces of Chara and Matakal,
to the north-west of the Dura, received their name from the Agaw
tribes which inhabited them. The province of Wanibarya was in-
habited by various Shanqela tribes. The Dangesh tribe was the
most numerous and best known.
To the east of Gojam, bounded by the Walaqa, the
Wancit and the Blue Nile rivers, was the small province of
Walaqa. Its inhabitants were all Christian Amhara. Directly
to its south was Shawa, separated by the Wancit from Aihara and
Walaqa, and by the Blue Nile from Gojan. The population of
Shawa at the beginning of the sixteenth century could be grouped
into three divisions. The Christian Amhara lived iu the
northern and central districts of Marabete, Manz, Gesh, Gerarya,
Wagda, Selalesh and in the southern plains bordering on the
province of Fatagar. The eastern districts of Tagulat and Sarmat
had a mixed population of Christian and Muslim Amhara. The pre-
dominantly pagan Gafat tribes lived in the western districts of
Mugar, Endagebtan and Gendabarat.
39
The small provinces of Garth and Gedem, situated on
the escarpments to the east of Amhara, were more military
settlements than administrative divisions. Like Beguna and Qeda
to the north, these provinces were strategically important for
the defence of the highlands against encroachments from the
nomads and pastoralists of the eastern lowlands. Ganh bordered
upon Angot and. Amhara, and. it seems to have been located to the
south-east of the Haiq and Ardibbo lakes. Wasal, one of the
biggest market towns of eastern Ethiopia, may have been in the
province. Gedem lay south of Amhara and east of Gesh and Manz.
It may have included the eastern slopes between the Robi and.
Borkanna rivers but ending just before reaching the arid plains
to the left of the Awash river. Both Ganh and Gedem contained
a very mixed and, apparently, fully integrated population of
Christian and Muslim Amhai'a as well as Christian and Muslim Afar
from the nearby lowlands.
Ifat began at the edge of the escarpments, immediately
to the east of the districts of Gesh, Tagulat and Sarmat. It
was probably bounded by Gedem on the north, by the Qassam river
on the south and by the Awash on the east. Until the end of the
thirteenth century it was an independent sultanate exercising
undisputed hegemony over seyeral sultanates and emirates which
1. Garth was located to the east of a big river then known as
Hanazo. Ibid., I, 263, II,
203.
The Hanazo of the
chronicles is, in all likelihood, the Borkanna.
40
extended from Sarmat and Fatagar all the way up to the Gulf of
Aden. Ifat derived its greatness more from its strategic
position than from its size or reeources. It controlled part
of the trade between the rich interior and the sea. Even more
important, its position enabled it to acquire political influence
over the nomads and pastoralists migrating through its passes and
defiles into the highlands. Its aecline began when Yekuno Amlak
and his successors gradually deprived it of its dependencies and
satellites and occupied and garrisoned the key passes in it.
Since for many centuries Ifat was the crossroads for various
nomadic and pastoralist peoples, Its inhabitants at the begin-
ning of the sixteenth century may have been of different origins.
The indigenous people seem to have been Muslim Arnhara and
Argobba. At this time, these peoples were found on the escarp-
ments. The inhabitants of the lowlands adjoining the Awash river
were predominantly Muslim Ad.al. As a result of the settlement of
many regiments of Christian soldiers, large sections of the
Amhara, Argobba and Adal peoples had embraced Christianity.
Adal was also an independent sultanate until it was
reduced to vassalage at about the same time as Ifat. Members
of the Walasma dynasty of hat had intermarried extensively with
the ruling families of Adal. And as the aridity and low elevation
of its lands had prevented the emperors from garrisoning their
regiments in it, for some time Adal inherited the political
41
influence and ambitions of Ifat, The sultanate of Adal proper
consisted of the lowlands which stretched from the Awash to the
neighbourhood of Lake Abbe. Various small emirates, tributary
to the sultans of Adal, were found in the more arid plains be-
tween the lake and the Gulf of Tajura. One of these emirates was
Awssa, situated to the south-east of the lake. Adal and the
dependent emirates were inhabited by several groups of the
southern Afar, all of them commonly known by the name of Adal.
The occupation of the Adal tribes depended on the fertility of
the lands they inhabited. The tribes which lived near the Awash
and Lake Abbe combined cattle raising with some agriculture,
while those which lived in the more arid territories to the east
were nomads depending on their herds of camels and goats.
The sultanate of ilarar is commonly but wrongly identi-
fled with Adal, just as Adal is also erroneously identified with
hat. The distinction between the three sultanates is seen as
having been nothing else buL the mere shift of the Walasma court
from Ifat, through Adal to Harar. The sultanate of Harar was in
fact one of the largest and most powerful members of the confeder-
atIon which was led first by Ifat and then by Adal. Harar comes
into the limelight of history after it, in turn, began to lead
the confederation. Much of what we know about the sultanate
comes from the descriptions of Chihab ed-Din, who wrote at a time
when It had established hegemony over most of the surrounding
Ad
sultanates and emirates. In earlier centuries, Harar probably
had little sway over the Ad.al nomads to its north. It may have
exercised some form of political control over the nomadic Somali
tribes living in the territories through which passed the caravan
route to Berbera, while over the tribes found to the south of the
Babile plains its Influence may have been very limited. The
s.ltanate itself probably comprised the highlands of Harar and
Garamulata, reaching eastwards to the Marar plains and southwards
to the Babile lowlands. Of its heterogeneous inhabitants, the
semiticized Adare seem to have lived on the highlands. The less
semiticized Harla occupied the southern slopes and most of the
lowlands of Babile. Both the Adare and the Harla were engaged
primarily in agriculture and to a certain extent in trade. The
nomadic Warjeh, who seem to have been as semiticized as the
Adare themselves, lived In the dry plains Immediately to the north
and north-east of the Harar highlands.
Located on the highlands of Charchar were several
emirates, the best known of which were Sim, Hargay, Gedaya,
Gatur and Nagab. Very little is known about their exact loca-
tions or about their inhabitants. Considering their historical
association with hat and Harar, It may be plausible to assume
that the inhabitants of those emirates adjoining the sultanate of
Harar spoke Adare, while the people of those near Ifat and Dawaro
spoke variations of Argobba and. Amharic.
P

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47
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44
The province of Dawaro lay to the west of these
emirates. Until the middle of the fourteenth century it seems
to have been a small sultanate and. a member of the confederation
led by Ifat, After his subjugation of Ifat, Amda Seyon garrisoned
in Dawaro several regiments which would intercept migrating and
raiding parties from Adal. The strategic importance of Dawaro
seems to have increased with the ascendancy of the sultanate of
Harar during the sixteenth century. According to the various
sources of this period, the province of Dawaro began in the high-
lands to the west of the Charchar range and extended along the
right side of the Awash, into the lowlands beyond Mt. Hazalo.
Southwards, it stretched from the Awash up to the Wabi Shaballe
river, by which It was separated from the province of Bali. It
seems, thus, that it included much of the Gugu mountains. Such
may not have been its original size. But with increasing
pressure from migrating pastoralists and nomads from the lowlands,
some of the small emitates between Bali and the sultanates of
Adal and Harar may have been added to it. This could have been
brought about by military situations in which the regiments in
the various districts of this region were placed under the
command of the ras or azinach of Dawaro; hence the expression
"Dawaro and its dependencies" in the chronicle of Galawdewos)
1. W. El.Conzelman (trans. and ed.), Chroni p ue de Galawdewos,
pp .37,
li-.
45
The population of the province was heterogeneous. Christians
and Muslims, speaking Amharic as we]J. as Argobba, lived in the
districts near Fatagar and Ifat, while the people living in
the eastern parts, near the emirates, were probably ralted to the
Adare. Adal and Doba pastoralists lived in the lowlands around
: i.
Mt. Hazalo.
Because of the large number of regiments which
were settled throughout the province, Christianity had spread
even amongst the Adal and Doba pastoralists.
We cannot be certain about the location of the many
small provinces which were near Shawa and Dawaro, on either side
of the Awash river. Margay may have been situated on the
easterly slopes between the Qassam and the Awash. West of Margay,
and still to the south of the Qassam river, were important
garrison posts like Darge and Jan Zalaq. They were probably
located to the east of the mountains around Bollo Sellasie, and
may have been districts of Shawa or Fatagar. The small district
2
of Qawat seems to have been near Darge and Jan Zalaq. According
to Chihab ed-Din, the inhabitants of Qawat were the Christian
Yaj
3 u
, whose language was apparently different from Adare and
Arnharic. Since in the eastern districts of Fatagar, somewhere
in the neighbourhood of the Mojo river, there were large settle-
ments of the Maya pastoralists, the Yajju may have been related
].. On the Argobba and Doba in Dawaro see Chihab ed-Din
Histoire de la conciute de l'Abvssini, trans.,pp.1f-75.
2. Ibid., pp.95-97, 268-269, 271.
46
1
to them. The province of Fatagar, which was located to the
north of the Awash river, may have begun somewhere near the
Boseti mountains, where it probably touched on Dawaro. Since
the district of Lalibela, where Mt. Zequala was located, was
within Fatagar, the province seems to have reached at least up
to the foot of the Entoto mountains. Yalabasha, the district in
which Zar'a Ya'eqob was born, was also part of it. In addition
to its Christian Amhara inhabitants, the province had large
settlements of Maya pastoralists many of whom had embraced
Christianity.
We are equally uncertain about the location, of the
various small provinces south of Fatagar, beyond the Awash.
Sharka was to the west of Dawaro and may have extended from some-
where near the upper course of the Arba river to the mountains
south of the Wanji plains. Geberge lay next to Sharka. It in-
cluded the plains facing the confluence of the Mojo with the
Awash. The province of Warab was situated near Geberge, between
Shawa and Waj. Washelo, another small province to the west of
Warab, seems to have separated Shawa and Gurage. The province
0'
Arenh seems to have bordered upon Sharka. In all probability
it was located to the south of Sharka, in the highlands to the
east of Lake Zway. Little is known about the inhabitants of
either province except that there were many regiments posted In
them. The provinces to the south of Fatagar, however, seem to
1. Ibid., pp.298,
355,
361.
They fought side by side with the
Maya against the followers of Ahmad Grarth.
47
have been inhabited mostly by the Amhara and partly by the
Gurage, all of them Christians.
The province of Bali extended south of the Wabi
Shaballe past the Wabi Gestro to the Ganale Doria. The most
densely inhabited and, therefore, the most effectively adminis-
tered districts of Bali were in the more elevated northern and
western regions. But as one of the major trade routes between
Harar and the southern provinces passed through Bali, the
attractions of Ivory may have led to the extension of the
boundary eastwards beyond the Dumal river at least up to the Wabi
Mana. There was another even more important reason which would
have niade some kind of imperial control over this eastern region
neQessary.Since the fifteenth century pressure by the migrating
Gafla was mounting all along the Ganale Doria. The emperors
could not have remained indifferent to infiltration northwards
into Dawaro by Galla clans like the Wara Qalo. The population
of Bali consisted primarily of pagan Sidama. Because of the
commercial ties which the province had with the sultanates and
emirates to the north and north-east, a portion of its peoples
had become Muslims. The remains of a rock-hewn structure near
Goba suggest the presence of Christian communities in this area
in a period prior to the fourteenth century. However, Christianity
does not seem to have made a real impact until after the middle
of this century, when regiments of Christian soldiers were
garrisoned in the different parts of the province. The Galla
48
across the Ganale Doria must have been outside imperial
control.
Of the provinces which lay to the west of Bali and
within the Rift Valley, we have somewhat more definite indications
about Was. Lake Zway and perhaps Lake Shala also were within
this province. 1
It is described as a fertile province in the
various sources, and the greater part of it apparently lay to
the west of the lakes. Its population probably consisted of
Amhara and Maya communities. 2
Christianity seems to have been
the predominant religion especially as Baeda Maryam and Galaw-
dewos had. their courts in the province.
There were several small provinces to the west of Bali
and to the south of
Waj+
of which little more is known than their
names. Kuera seems to have been situated to the east of the Shala
and wasa lakes. Since it was a strategically important province,
and the trade route through Bali into Harar seems to have passed
through it, Kuera may have stretched eastwards to the highlands,
up to the Wabi Shaballe. The province of Gamo seems to have been
west of Kuera and, therefore, south of Wa1.3 The Bubisa and
1. Luis de Azevedo says that Lake Shala was near Waj. Letter of
July 22, 1607,
Rer. Aeth., XI, 128. Paez on the other hand.
places the lake inside the province. 9 Historla de Ethiopia",
ibid., II,
277.
The informant who described the lake to Zorzi
seems to have got it confused with Zway. Crawford, Ethiopian
Itineraries circa ])1OO-152+, pp.l86-89.
2. The inhabitants of Waj were among the supporters of Yekuno
Amlak who enabled him to usurp the throne. C.Conti Rossini's
letter in "Notes et Mlanges", RS, X (1902), 375-36; and his
"La caduta della dinastia Zague e la versione amarica del BeL
ela Nagast", RRAL, XXXI
(19 22),
296-97.
3. The position of Gamo and Kuera is discussed below,
PP30C-309.
49
Sancora mountains may have comprised the centre of the province,
and westwards it may have reached the Barbare river to border
upon Hadya. According to the few descriptions which we have on
Bater Ainora and Ayfaras, these provinces seem to have separated
Hadya from Gurage and Waj. Bater Amora, or more accurately Basar
Amora, was a regimental name. Both provinces seem to have been
settlements of regiments the chief tasks of which seems to have
been to prevent the movement of Adal warriors into Hadya. The
most likely position of Bater Amora and Ayfaras is in the plains
east of the Wera river arid including the mountains of Urbarag.
The little known provinces of Buzama and Bozanegus are said to
have touched on Icambata. As the trade routes from Kambata and
Walamo to Bali passed through both provinces, they may have been
situated on the plains to the west of the Bilate river, between
the Awasa and Abaya lakes. As the more southerly of the two,
Bozanegus may have bordered on Bahr Oamo. The inhabitants of both
provinces may have been pagan Sidama related to the peoples of
Kambata. The inhabitants of Kuera and Gamo were probably re-
lated to those of Arenh and Bali. Bater Amora and Ayfaras, on
the other hand, seem to have been inhabited by Gudela and Gurage
Muslims. The presence of regiments of Christian soldiers in most
of these provinces could not have failed to further the spread
of Christianity.
A-
?
8a,.
q
p I_
Pr-ov; 'ncesof Ai Cvvo-iQviasii
51
To the west of Warab and Waj lay the province of
Gurage. Since the various tribes of the Gurage were further
divided into something like ++ clans, they may have occupied
1
a very large territory. The province could have included the
lands between Buntu Liban, Walisso, Walqite, Endeber and Gogeti.
According to Alvarez all the Gurage tribes seem to have been
more or less exclusively pagan. 2 This seems to be borne out
by the traditional hostility which prevailed between the chiefs
of the Gurage tribes and the Muslim rulers of' Hadya. The
language of the Gurage was distinct from the various Sidama
languages spoken in the surrounding provinces. It was one of
the Semitic languages, and in many aspects more closely related
to the Gafat, Argobba and Adare languages than to Amharic.3
Hadya was a mountainous province situated between
Waj, Gurage and Kambata. It may have comprised of the highlands
on either side of the Barbare river. Since Alaba was one of its
districts, the province touched upon Bater Amora and Ayfaras.
Qab'en was also a district of Hadya, hence on the north-west the
province probably touched the Omo and its tributary the Wabi
which began in Gurage. The inhabitants of Hadya were pagan
1. Chronica de Susenyos, I, 32, II, 26.
2. The Prester John of the Indies, II,
3.
M.Cohen, Etudes d'Ethiopien Meridional, pp. lF-37; W.
Leslau, "The Position of Gafat in Ethiopic', Language,
XX
(l9-I -F ),
Baltimore.
52
Sidama, although, as in Bali, the ruling families practised
Islam. The province of Ganz as directly to the north of Hadya,
probably beyoid the Wabi river. On the north it bordered on
Gendabarat and Endagebtan, districts of Shawa, and on the west
on Damot and Janjero. This may mean that Ganz extended west-
wards from the Awash river to either the Nonno or the Darge,
tributaries of the Gibe. In the north and north-west the
Dabisa and the Gudar may have defined the province. Its in-
habitants were closely related to the peoples of Hadya. In
fact, Ganz was part of Hadya, and ruled by Muslim chiefs. By
the sixteenth century, however, Christianity had become wide-
spread in it.
The province of Kambata probably began somewhere
near the Ancegia river. It included the lowlands between the
Omo river and the highlands of Hadya. Beyond the Dinicia river
it may have widened towards the east until it reached the
Bilate to touch upon Buzama and Bozanegus. It probably spread
from a line between the Godicio and Bodaclo villages up to the
Dime river and the northern shores of Lake Abaya. Next, to
the south came the provinces of Suf Gamo and Bahr Gamo.
Since, according to Paez, the latter was the most southerly
part of the empire, it may have been located on the Gamu high-
lands found to the west of the Abaya and Chamo lakes. Suf
Gamo may have comprised of the lower region between the high-
lands and the Onio.The Zala people, mentioned in the Hega
waser'ata an g
est could in all probability be identified with
the Sidama g roup of the same name which is today found south
of the Maze river, a tributary of the Omo) The inhabitants
of all these provinces, including Kambata, were of the Sidama
stock. The majority of them were pag an. The ruling families,
apparently throug h intermarriag e and other modes of contact
with the imperial family, had embraced Christianity.2
Althoug h described by Alvarez as one of the big g est
and richest provinces, there is scarcely any definite informa-
tion on the size and extent of Damot. 3
At some time In the
thirteenth century it may have included most of the lands
between the Gibe and the Blue Nile but its renown in the six-
teenth century was derived less from its own natural resources
than from its commercially and strateg ically Important
position.The g old and the slaves which made it famous must
have come from provinces like Enarya and Bizamo. Damot lay
to the west of Shawa and Ganz. It probably beg an near the
Nonno or the Gudar. On the west it may have been separated
from Bizamo by the Ang ar river.
1. J. Varenbarg h, "Studien zur abessinischen Reichsordnung ",
op.cit., p.12.
2. See below,
p.
3 .
The Prester John of the Indies, II,
1+55.
+. Paez, "HJ.storia de Ethiopia't , Rer. Aeth., II, 251.
54
A more interesting question about Damot concerns
the identity of its inhabitants. In the chronicles and in the
writings of the Jesuit missionaries the peoples of the pro-
vince are known as Damot, as if Damot was the name of both the
inhabitants and the province. What this indicates is that the
peoples of the province were distinct from the Gafat to the
north and the Amhara to the west. The inhabitants of Damot
were probably Sidama groups closely related to the peoples of
Enarya and Janjero in the south and to the Zet, the Shat and
the Gonga to the west. Although Chihab ed-Din listed the
Jimrna as distinct from the Dampt, every available evidence
shows that the former constituted one of the biggest Sidama
groups who lived in the province. 1The participation of the
,.Timma in military activities suggests that many of them were
professional soldiers and, possibly, Christians as well.
The region between Damot and the Blue Nile, to the
west of the Gudar, was divided into several small provinces
inhabited by different peoples. Abashgay seems to have been
one of these provinces, though nothing definite can be said
2
of its position or its inhabitants.The lands of Enazar and
1. Histoire de la concute de 1'Abyssinie, trans.,p.2 2 +.
2 . Crawford t s identification of Abashgay with a locality in
Gurage does not agree with the indications in the itinerary
which place it in Damot. Ethio p ian Itineraries circa 1-fOO-
l 5 2 -f ,
pp,82 -8+, 1'i-8--i-9. See also Beckingham and Huntingford,
some Records of Ethio p ia, p.2 2 6.
SOU
p r0 V1
11 C
1
. b
9
6
LA
'U
I...
1.
-
}'YL Cl - '.) l
jF
\
A
I
(
'
. 0
'?
gI -
/Th
\
56
Mansar, mentioned in a land charter issued during the reign of
Sara Dengel, were to the west of Shawa.' Mansar can, in all
probability, be identified with Mantera mentioned in the Hega
waser'atamang
est. Mantera seems to have neighboured upon Zet,
Gadatula and Bizamo. 2 These places were mostly inthe western
part of the region. Some Jimma communities may have been
found inthe north-eastern part, around. Asandabo. 3 Although
the main body of the Gafat was in western Shawa, some tribes
seemed to have lived in parts of this region. The district of
Abadray took its name from one of the Gafat tribes. This may
have been the reason which made Alvarez to place all the Gafat
to the west of Shawa.Unlike the Jimma, the Zet and the
other peoples of this region, the pagan Gafat spoke a semiti-
cized language.
1. The charter Is found in a copy of the
Tatamera
Maryam,
fol. 7v, MS. Orient, 65o, British Museum.
2. 3. Varenbrgh "Studien zur abessinischen Reichsordnung",
op.cit., p.12.
3.
The land of Jeran, which was near Asandabo and. which came
to be occupied by the Obo clan of the Macha Galla, was
probably one of the homes of the Jixnina. Chronica de
Susenyos, I, 192-93, II, l'+8-+9.
+. The Prester John of the Indies, II, +58. See also
Manuel de Almeida's map in Some Records of Ethiopia,
facing p.xcvii.
57
We Imow the names of several pagan Sidama groups who
lived in the highlands around the Choman swamps, We do not
know, however, whether the territories inhabited by these
groups constituted separate provinces or whether they were
administered by the governors of nearby Damot or Bizamo. The
best known of the groups were the Gambo, the Shat and the Zet,
all of them probably engaged in farming and cattle raising.
The Gambo occupied the lands to the east of the Choman swamps.
The Shat lived to the south of Bizamo, probably in the lands
immediately across the Angar river. The Zet seem to have been
between the land of the Shat and the province of Konch. Mich
of the region between the Angar, the Blue Nile and the Didessa
constituted the province of Bizamo. Of the many pagan Sidama
groups who lived in it, the most numerous and best known were
the Shtnasha and the Jegat.1
Fortunately, more definite indications are available
on the location of the provinces to the west of the Gibe-Omo
river. Konch, the northernmost of these provinces, was situated
directly to the south of the Zet district, between the Gibe,
the Wurgessa and, the Gibe-Enarya. The province of Enarya lay
1. The Shnasha, the Jegat and the other groups in Biza.mo
seem to have been known by the general name of Gonga.
Azevedo to Francisco Vieira, June 3, i6], fol.97 v,
MS.779, Braga. See also Beckingham and Eunting1ord,
Some Records of Ethiooia, p.l1i-5.
58
to the south of the Konch and. to the west of the Gibe-Enarya.
West of Enarya, between the Gibe-Enarya and the Gibe-Jimma,
were Guniar and Bosha. The former province probably comprised
the lands between the Gibe-Enarya and the Botor range, while
the latter lay to the west, on the plains between the range and
the Gibe-Jimma. The much smaller province of Shankora was,
according to a land charter granted by Sarsa Dengel, between
Gumar and Bosha; it probably occupied the plains adjacent to
the Gibe. 1 The province of Janjero was, in the words of Paez,
almost a peninsula. 2
It was neatly demarcated by the Gibe-
Jimma, the Gino and the Gojab.
Beyond the Gojab lay Kaffa. In none of the con-
temporary sources is it explicitly included among the provinces
of the empire. However, Paez and Almeida do mention, besides
Gumar, another province called Gamaro, a name still given to
the people of Kaffa by their neighbours the Gimira. 3 Further-
more, the ga waser 1 ata man gest includes among the tributaries
1 .
Ta t amera Mar
y am, fol.1 6 v, MS. Orient. 6, British Museum.
Azevedo places it near Janjero, but does not indicate
whether to the north-west or to the south-west. Letter of
July 22,
1607, Rer, Aeth., XI,
133.
2. "Historia de Ethiopia", ibid., II, 273.
3 .
Ibid.,
p.1 5.
Some Records of Ethio p ia, p.1 0. There is of
course the possibility that the Gumar of both authors re-
ferred to the district of Gurage of the same name, while
Gamaro was Intended for the Gumar between Bosha and Enarya.
A summary of Azevedo's description of Kaffa and the Gojab
river is given in "Re1 ao do cam. de Aethipia
pa.
o Rio
Brava", fol.557v, MS.779, Braga.
ternational African
59
of the empire such places (or peoples) as the Wachara and Kont,
by which may have been intended the Chara and Konta of Kaffa.1
If the ruler of Kaffa was not directly a vassal of the
emperor, he may have been subject to the governor of Enarya.
Other places mentioned side by side with Enarya and Konch in
this document but which have yet to be identified are Qand and
Gadatula. 2 The inclusion of Kaffa and some of the lands to
the west of the Didessa within the empire may be justified by
Pae&s reference to the Beber, a big river near Enarya, from
which came most of the best type of gold. 3 The Beber may per-
haps be the Birbir, a tributary of the Baro.
1. J. Varenbargh, "Studien zur abessinisehen Reichsordnung",
op.cit., p.12 .
Ibid. For names of places and peoples in Kaffa see F.J.
Bieber, Kaffag em altkuschltisches Volkstum in Inner-
Africa (2 vols.; Vienna, 192 0-2 3 ), II,
13 7-3 8;
and M.A.
Bryan, The Distribution of the Semitic and Cushitic
2 .
3. "Historia de Ethiopia", o p .cit., II, 2 +7-1f8. The Shanqela
people who, according to Azevedo, neighboured. on Janjero
may have been inhabitants of Kaffa. Letter of July 2 2 ,
1607, ibid., XI,
13 2 -3 3 .
On alluvial gold of the Birbir
river see L. Usoni, Risorse minerarie dell'Africa Orientale
(Rome, 195
2 ), pp.2 09-2 2 7.
60
II. Government and administration.
The struggle with migrating pastoralists and. nomads
from the eastern lowlands, which had continued at least since the
thirteenth century, had certainly contributed much towards the
shaping of political and military institutions in the highlands.
After Yekun.o Amlak overthrew the last Zagwe king and removed. the
court from Lasta to Shawa, the most vulnerable of the frontier
provinces, he caused. to be written a justifying charter known
as the Kebra na gast. In it Yekuno Amlak was made a legitimate
heir of the Aksumite kings, while the Zagwe rulers were shown
as usurpers without just claims to the Ethiopian throne. The
purpose of Yekuno Amlak in encouraging the legend. of legitimacy
seems tO have been to secure himself against dynastic and.
factious conflicts and to unite the country behind him so that
he could concentrate on the defence of the highlands against
invasion. The need for national reconciliation and unity was
so pressing that he had little difficulty in making his leader-
ship acceptable.
By this charter succession was limited. to Yekuno
Amlak
t s descendants in the male line. Although princesses and.
their descendants were excluded from succession, neither Yekuno
Amlak nor those of his successors who helped in the completion
of the ebra na g
ast wished to Insert the rule of priniogeniture.
61
The omission could not have been accidential, as the emperor
and his successors were concerned with 11mitin the opportunity
for internal troubles. Yet although the institution of primo-
geniture could have effectively minimized contention over
succession, Yekuno Amlak and his successors went to the trouble
of establishing the mountain prison of Amba Geshan in which all
1
possible heirs were confined.
This development was probably
dictated by the need for capable military leaders. The primary
function of an emperor was to provide military leadership. In
the situation in which Ethiopia was in the thirteenth and four-
teenth centuries, it could not afford to be saddled by incompe-
tent commanders.
In the He g
a waser t ata mangest, it is said that the
heir to the throne was chosen by the emperor and his soldiers.2
This interesting and illuminating document was originally a
digest of the administrative and military reforms made by Amda
Seyon. However, it was revised twice, first during the reign
of Sarsa Dengel and then during that of lyasu I. The version
which we now know is a truncated eighteenth century copy in
1.
Alvarez was told that the prison was instituted by Yemrehana
Chrestos, one of the Zagwe kings, The Prester John of the
Indies, I, 237. A more likely story is that reported by
Paez, who was told that it began after the death of Yagbe'a
Seyon in l29+. "Historia de Ethiopia", op.cit., II, 111-12.
2. 3. Varenbrgh "Studien zur abessinischen Reichsordnung't,
op.cit., pp.l, 30.
62
which are dimly reflected the radical changes which the political
and military institutions had undergone during the eventful sir-
teenth and seventeenth centuries.' An examination of the various
chronicles, and of the works of Alvarez and Pae, shows that even
though the emperor could name his successor, his choice did not
decide the issue. It was probably realized that an emperor could
be partial towards a son who was not of age or who did not have
in him the soldierly qualities needed in a ruler. On the other
hand, there is no indication whatsoever that either the soldiers
as a whole or the regimental and army commanders were consulted
on the matter.
There was a body, consist.ng of the high ranking
civil and religious officers of the court, which was entrusted
with the task of choosing and installing an emperor. None of the
provincial governors and the regimental commanders took part in
the deliberations of this body. As the civil and religious
officers of the court lacked the power necessary to enforce their
will on the country, it may have been thought that they would
place the interest of the country above any personal or factious
ambition. Paez's diligent and exhaustive investigation has es-
tablished the titles and functions of these officers.2
The
1.
1d., p.1. See also I. Guidi's introduction to his Italian
translation of the document in "Contributi alla storia lette-
rarla di. Abissinia", RRAL, xxxi (1922)
66-68; and. his
Storia della letteratura etiopica,
2. "Historla de Ethiopia", o
p .cit., II, 129-31.
Ud
two bitwadadoch, who were members of this body of "electors"
cannot be considered as military men. They were essentially
civilian ministers of the court to whom the emperors gave the
command of armies for specified missions only.
As far as can be ascertained from the various chroni-
des covering the period up to the sixteenth century, no emperor
indicated his choice for the succession while he himself was
healthy and strong.
It seems therefore that the instances wherein
emperors nominated their heirs were exceptions to the rule. Even
then, the choice of a successor was by custom published at the
same time as the death of the emperor.' Since the announcements
were generally made by the favourites of the deceased ruler, we
have no way of establishing if in fact he had named an heir. We
know of cases in which members of strong factions had kept the
death of an emperor secret until they had arranged matters to
their satisfaction. These cases were particularly frequent in
the fifteenth century when factious rivalry was beginning to
threaten the political framework of the country.
The overriding importance of military leadership
over all the other duties of the emperor can also be inferred
from the custom of excluding handicapped princes from succession.
1. G. Correa's story of how an emperor kept a will in which he
nominated his heir is interesting but unconfirmed.
Les da India, III, 28.
64
It cannot be said that this custom was connected with the order
of deaconhood which was usually conferred on princes. For
physical handicaps did not prevent any person from being ordained
a deacon or even a priest. The custom could have been instituted.
because it was feared that handicapped emperors would make poor
commanders ,1
Until the reign of Lebna Dengel, the mountain prison
of Amba Geshan was guarded strictly. Even though there were no
princes outside it who could lay claim to the throne, stringent
precautions were taken to keep the death of an emperor secret
until his successor had been chosen. This must have been be-
cause incessant defensive warfare required unrelaxed vigilance.
The influence which this kind of "frontier" warfare had on the
evolution of political institutions and traditions is perhaps
best illustrated by the ceremonies of coronation. An emperor was
expected to hold two ceremonies. The first one was held in any
convenient place, immediately after the prince was taken out of
Amba Geshan. The officiating clergyman, the sera massare, was
not a prelate of the church but one of the monks who lived in
the court. The second ceremony, on the other hand, was held in
Aksum, in the presence of the bishop, the other prelates of the
Church and all the provincial governors. Because of their mili-
tary occupations, few emperors found. the occasion for this second
1. This custom had the salutary effect of making the execution
of pretenders unnecessary. The loss of the nose or an ear
sufficed to disqualify them for the throne.
6
ceremony
The evolution of provincial administration also seems
to have been influenced by the prolonged menace of invas:Lon from
the eastern lowlands. We know little about the administrative
system which existed at the time of Yekuno Amlak's accession.
The difficulties which he faced in controlling such powerful
men as Ya t
ebika Egzi suggest that Ethiopia may have been divided
into regions over which local chiefs and noblemen exercised
strong powers. 2
The multiplicity of ethnically distinct
peoples, the geographical barriers which separated them, and
the weakness of most of the Zagwe kings, could not have failed
to enhance the power which these noblemen wielded. The
efforts of Yekuno Amlak and his immediate successors to
mobilize the resources of the country against the menace from
the lowlands do not seem to have always met with a sympathetic
reception from the noblemen. The chronicle of Amda Seyon and
the praise songs composed about him suggest that his policy of
centralization was strongly opposed by them. He had first to
1. According to Paez, if an emperor could not find, the time to
go to Aksum, the second ceremony was performed in a church
of Amnhara called Garangaredaz. "Historia de Ethiopia", Q..fl
cit., II, 131. I cannot identify the church. Ba'eda Maryam
had to cancel his plans for a second coronation at Aksum when
he learned of the movement of Adal invaders. The ceremony
wa later held at a place in Amhara called Dejeno. Les
chroniQues de Zar'a
YateQob
et de
Bat
eda Maryam, ppJ-25,
l+9-5O, 173.
2. Yekuno Amlak t s difficulties with the aristocratic families
of the north are analyzed by Tadesse Tamnrat In his 'tChurch
and State in Ethiopia,
127o_1527t1
(Ph.D. thesis, London,
1968), pp.l35-l+O.
66
disengage himself from the frontier" wars and to campaign for
many years in practically all the provinces which then made up
the country. After subduing his internal enemies, he seems to
have reformed the administration in such a way as to weaken the
power of these noblemen.
The main feature of Arnda Seyon
t
s reform consisted, if
not in increasing the number of administrative districts in each
province, at least in granting more powers and privileges to
the district officers. Successive emperors, Yeshaq and Zar'a
Ya'eqob in particular, continued to weaken the
financial
position and political influence of provincial governors.
Through intermarriage with, and. the granting of privileges to,
district officers, most of the districts in the provinces were
brought under direct imperial control.1
Thus Tigre was divided into two distinct provinces.
The governor of the province north of the Marab river had the
title of bahr iagash. The governor of the southern province
was known as tire makonnen. Any person from any par't of the
) country could be appointed to either post. Out of their desire
to weaken the power of provincial governors, successive emperors
1. Paez, probably because of the influence of the legend of the
Prester Tohn and the classification used by Alvarez, divides
the empire into kingdoms and provinces. The administrative
divisions which he calls kingdoms were the provinces, while
the divisions which he listed as provinces were mostly dis-
tricts placed under direct control of the throne. "Historia
de Ethiopia", op.clt., II, 15. This classification was
adopted by Manuel de Almeida. Some Records of Ethiopia,
pp.10-li. H.S.Lewis was probably misled by it when writing
of the monarchies of Gafat, Damot, Shawa, Go jam, etc.
A Galla Monarchy , p.25.
67
had so strengthened the position of district officers that by
the middle of the fifteenth century the authority of the throne
over the officers had become quite limited. Well entrenched,
landed aristocracies had emerged in most districts of Tigre.
If a man who did not belong to the few such families in each
district was appointed administrator, the families often stirred
up trouble against him and against the emperor. 1 The emperor's
choice for district officer was thus limited to a few families in
each district.
In that part of Tigre to the north of the Narab, there
were only two districts over which the bahr nagash had direct
authority. These districts were assigned to him so that he
could use a portion of the revenues from them for the maintenance
of his household. He could direct the affairs of the two dis-
tricts himself or delegate their administration to assistants of
his choice. In the southern part of Tigre, the governor had full
authority over Hawzen, a district which seems to have included.
the lands around Adwa. For all practical purposes, therefore,
each governor could be considered as a district officer. The
power of the governor over the district officers was limited to
judicial matters only. The district officer presided over the
district court, and the governor, as chief justice for the pro-
vince as a whole, could hear appeals from all the districts.
1. M. Barradas, "Tractatus Tres", Rer. Aeth., IV, 81.
68
Otherwise, since the district officers were appointed by the
emperor, they were directly responsible to him.
The provincial governor was a civilian officer. He
did not exerciSe
any military power, as the suspicious emperors
had separated the military from the civil authority. Tigre was
frequently troubled by migrating pastoralists from the coastal
lowlands. There were numerous regiments garrisoned in all the
highland districts. But the lands assigned to the regiments
were administered by the commanding officers. On judicial
matters the regimental soldiers and officers were subject to the
authority of the district administrators and provincial governors.
On military matters they were responsible to the emperor, and
his express authorization was required everytime the governor
needed to mobilize the regiments.
To some extent the authority of district officers was
circumscribed by the way in which emperors assigned the lands.
Villages, estates and lands which made up administrati,ve sub-
divisions of districts were given as endowments to churches and
monasteries or assigned as fiefs, for life or in perpetuity, to
noblemen and noblewomen who for some reason or another had won
the favour of emperors. Regiments were settled in lands which
often comprised more than one administrative subdivision. In
those lands assigned to religious bodies or favoured individuals,
the rights and privileges granted to the possessor were generally
69
far-reaching. Even in judicial matters, the district or pro-
vincial courts were dependent on the goodwill and co-operation of
the possessor. In those lands belonging to religious bodies, the
courts could deal only with cases involving laymen. Conflicts
of ownership as well as of jurisdiction imist have created
occasions for frequent imperial intervention.
The region of Wag and Lasta was enclosed by the Selari
and Takaza rivers and inhabited by Agaw speaking Christians.
Until the beginning of the seventeenth century the region as a
whole seems to have constituted one administrative province.
This may have been due to the fact that the region was the home
of the Zagwe kings, and resistance to Yekurio Amlak's usurpation
was strongest there. In the peace and reconciliation which
followed, Yekurio Amlak seems to have given the region as heredi-
tary fief to the Zagwe pretender. For many centuries Wag and
Lasta remained exempted from taxes and no regiments were
garrisoned in them. In judicial matters, however, the hereditary
lord of this region, who had the title of wa g se
y
um, had the
same limited powers as the other provincial governors. At the
beginning of the sixteenth century, the wa se yum seems to have
been made dependent upon the governor of either Begun.a or Angot.
Little is known of the administration of the "frontier"
provinces of Beguna, Qeda, Angot and Garth. The governor of
Begu.na had the title ofand in 1520 the office was held by
Saga Za'ab, LebnaDengel's envoy to Lisbon. There were some
70
regiments, the best known being the Jan Amora regiment, stationed
in the province. Since the commanding officers administered the
regimental lands, the responsibilities of the ra were probably
limited enough to be entrusted to a clergyman who was leaving
for distant Lisbon. The governor of Angot had the title of
sahafe lam in the fourteenth century and that of ras at the be-
ginning of the sixteenth. The governors of Qeda and Garth were
known as eda g and garth nes respectively. The men appointed
to these offices do not seem to have been connected to their res-
pective provinces by birth or any other tie. Like Beguna, the
three provinces were strategically situated for the defence of
the highlands against encroachments from the people of the low-
lands. The regimental lands were probably sufficiently extensive
to limit the lands directly administered by the governors. In
Angot, the largest of these provinces, several villages were
benefices of the bishop, while vast estates in the district of
Ambassal were reserved for the maintenance of the princes on Amba
Geshan. Furthermore, the jan serar or administrator of Ambassal,
whose main task was to look after the princes, was directly res-
ponsible to the emperor.
In the administration of Amhara we can see the full
development of the policy of centralization. It was a relatively
large province divided into many districts. The lands of most
of the districts were parcelled out among the numerous churches
71
and monasteries built by successive emperors. The lands which
Ba'eda Maryam gave to his church of Atronsa Maryam were so ex-
tensive that they were reorganized into a district under the
administration of a makbeb who was appointed by the emperor.1
The churches of Ganata Giyorgis and Makana Sellasie, built by
Naod and Lebna Dengel, were no less liberally endowed. The
latter emperor also settled vast estates in the province upon his
sisters. Amhara was not a
0 frontier't
province, as it was shielded
by Angot, Ganh and Gedem. The regiments established in it could
not have been many, hence Chihab ed-Din
t
s refliark that the irthabi-
tants of the province were all clerics: doctors, priests and
2
monks.
Thus, by 1521, the date at which Makna Sellasie was
completed, the office of sahafe
of Amhara was abolished and
all the district officers made directly responsible to the
emperor.
The administration of Bagameder was similar to that of
Tigre. At the beginning of the sixteenth century Bagameder had
more than the 17 districts which It had in thd following century.
We do not know if at any time In their history the Falasha of the
small provinces of Sagade, Balamt, Wagara and Semen had formed
a fully integrated political entity. Considering that the frag-
1. Les chroni p
ues de Zar'a Ya'eciob et de Ba'd.a Maryam, pp.122-
23, 169-70. Later, during the reign of Susenyos the lands
administered by the niakbeb were placed under the governor of
Amhara. Chronica d.e Susenvos, I, 262, II, 202.
2. Histoire de la con pute de 1'Abvssinie, trans.,
p.306.
I,"
mented Agaw tribes of Gojam had never developed any kind of
unified leadership, it is quite possible that the Abet Ajar of
the Agaw who defied Amda Seyon was a Falasha leader.'
In spite of its size and wealth, Gojarn does not seem
to have been a difficult province to govern. The barriers of
language and religion kept its inhabitants divided. According
to the Jesuit missionary Azevedo, it was made up of some 29
districts. 2
The Agaw tribes were governed by their chiefs and
elders. The g
olam nagash administered the eastern, Amhara-
inhabited districts. But he may have had judicial authority
over the districts of the Agaw. The office of
g o.larn na gash was
given to anyone whom the emperor favoured. In the time of Lebna
Dengel it was held by Empress Eleni. As she lived mostly in the
court, a deputy of her choice looked after the administration of
the province.
Since the emperors held their courts in Shawa, the
governor of the province, who had the title of sahafe , may
have exercised very limited authority over the district officers.
The men who administered the districts were probably favourites
of the emperors. Moreover, some of the biggest regiments of the
1. I. Guidi, "Le canzoni geez-amaria in onore di Re Abissini",
RBAL, V(l889) 62; W.G.B. Huntingford, The Glorious
Victories of 'Kmda Seyon, p.129.
2. Letter of July 22,
1607,
Rer. Aeth., XI, 132.
It)
country held large parts of the eastern districts. The sahafe
lam may, therefore, have been responsible for judicial matters
in the Gafat-irthabited districts of Mugar, Endagebtan and
Gendabarat. The Gafat were divided into several tribes, each
tribe having its chief or elder who looked after its affairs.
Like the chiefs of the Agaw tribes, the Gafat leaders do not
seem to have been directly dependent on the emperor.
Until the middle of the thirteenth century Damot was
ruled by a king with the title of motilami. There is no reason
to think that the kingdom was at any time directly controlled by
the Aksumite or Zagwe kings. Enriched and strengthened by trade
with Muslim merchants from Adal and Harar, the kings of Damot
seem to have expanded their territory northwards up to the Blue
Nile and eastwards into western Shawa and Hadya. However, its
independence and its chances of becoming the dominant state of
southern Ethiopia were cut short by Yekuno Amlak or one of his
immediate successors. Its status became that of a province and
numerous regiments were established in it. The title of
motilanri. gave way to. the less dignified rank of masfen or lord.
By the time of Amda Seyon, the province o Damot was divided into
many districts the administrators of which were made responsible
to the emperor.' At the beginning of the sixteenth century the
1. Besides Abashgay, Mawa was another district which was given
the status of a province. It is listed as Mahaoha by
Azevedo in Rer. Aeth., XI, 132.
74
governor of the province had the common title of sahafe
Yekurio Amlak and his successors were not expansionists.
The urgent task of defending the highlands against persistent
attacks from the lowlands forced them to conquer and keep
strategic areas along the escarpments. In spite of the occupa-
tion of Ifat, Fatagar, Dawaro and Bali and the establishment of
many garrisons in them, the emperors found little difficulty in
coming to terms with ruling families of the sultanates. Members
of these families were allowed to retain their positions of in-
fluence and even some of their administrative powers. The in-
elusion of such titles as walasma and garad among those con-
ferred on provincial governors suggests that the governorship
of at least Ifat and Bali remained in the hands of descendants
of the local dynasties. Through intermarriage and appointment
to important court and military offices many of the influential
Muslim families were gradually converted to Christianity and
integrated into the wider group of Ethiopian nobility.
While wooing the ruling families into acquiescence,
the emperors did not hesitate to divide the former sultanates
into districts the administrators of which were made responsible
to the throne. Geberge, Margay, Arenh and Sharka may have be-
longed to one or other sultanate. Waj, too, may have covered a
1. Alvarez was told that the title of the king of Darnot meant
king of the pagans. This seems to sug est that the descen -
dant of the ancient motilami was still given some form of
recognition. The Pres er John of the Indies, II,
)+55
75
much wider territory which, perhaps as a result of rebellion
against Amda Seyon, was broken up into smalle' administrative
divisions. The small provinces of Ayfaras, Warab and Gamo may
have been part of it.1
Since defence rather than expansion for its own sake
was the reason for the concluest of the Muslim states along the
escarpments, the emperors did not try to annex the lowland sul-
tanates and emirates. Adal, Harar and the satellite emirates
were made to pay nominal yearly tributes. No restrictions of
any kind were imposed on the powers of their rulers. Because
the security of the caravan routes was to the mutual advantage
of emperors, sultans and emirs, they all undertook to keep the
routes safe and open to merchants.2
Although Alvarez was told that the Gurage people had
a king, there is no other more trustworthy evidence to show that
the numerous tribes which made up the Gurage were, at any time
in their history, politically united. 3
According to the praise
song honouring Yeshaq, the Ennamor, Qaraqar, Hawzanha and Angarage
tribes were each paying their taxes directly to the imperial
treasury.If the Angarage of the praise song can be identified
1. Two of the administrative divisions of Waj were called Zway
and Maqi. 3 . Varenbargh, "Studien zur abessinischen
Reichsordnung", op.cit., pp.12-13 .
2. Andrea Corsali's letter of Sept.18,
1517,
to Lorenzo de'
Medici in G.B. Ramusio, Delle naviationi et viaggi, p.186 V.
3 . The Prester John of the Indies, II,
)+5)+
+, I. Guidi, "Le canzoni geez-arnar1ia in onore di Re Abissini",
op.cit., p.56.
76
with the Gurage, then the latter name was not only applied to all
the tribes speaking the Gurage langua.ge but also used for one
particular tribe. 1 Alvarez's king of the Gurage may therefore
have been but a tribal chief.
Hadya provides another example of how the policy of
divide et impera was gradually introduced into provincial adminis-
tration. The first of its territories to be made districts with
administrators dependent upon the throne were Ganz, Gudela,
Alaba, Qeb'en and Gab. Until the reign of Zar'a Ya'eqob these
districts remained parts of Hadya with the governor of the pro-
vince having at least judicial powers over the officers. After
the rebellion of Mahiko, the emperor separated Ganz, Gadaycho and,
perhaps, Alaba as well, and granted them the status of provinces.
Because the chief of Gadaycho had given Zar'a Ya'eqob useful
assistance in the actions taken against Mahiko, the emperor
decreed that the administration of Gadaycho would remain in the
hands of the chiej' and his descendants and that the governor of
Hadya would have no authority over them.2
In the sixteenth century the governors of Bosha,
Shankora and Gumar were appointed by the emperor from among local
notables. By the beginning of the following century, however,
1. Gurage is in fact mentioned twice in J. Varenb'ergh,
"Studien zur abessinischen Reichsordnung", op.cit., pp.12-13.
2. Les chroniciues de Zar'a Ya'eob et de Ba'eda Mary in, p.22.
77
the governor of Enarya had acquired authority over the three
provinces. This political integration was brought about by the
need for common and coordinated defence against the attacits of
the Macha Galla. The governorship of Enarya and perhaps of the
other three provinces as well was hereditary. But before an heir
could take over the responsibilities of his office, his succession
had to be approved by the emperor. The governorship of Janjero
was not hereditary; it was given to a person elected by the
religious leaders. The emperor probably held the right of
investiture. The absence of cohesive political organizations
among the Gafat, the Jinuna, the Shtnasha and the other neighbour-
ing Sidama peoples probably enabled the emperors to appoint
governors of their choice over the provinces between the Gibe
and the Blue Nile.
Because of the regiments garrisoned in them, the pro-
vinces of Gamo, Bater Amora, Kuera, Buzama and Bozanegu.s were
probably administered by the military commanders. Of the pro-
vinces to the west and south-west, however, the information we
have is so limited that no satisfactory description of their
administration can be attempted. Chihab ed-Din's reference to
the convention which regulated the position of Suf Gaino and Bahr
Gamo within the empire is not very enlightening. 1 By convention
1. Histoire de la coniute de l'Abvssinie, trans., p.396.
78
is probably to be understood the terms of vassalage by which
these provinces paid tributes while being governed by local
notables, chosen according to local customs. In all probability,
the emperor exercised the same right of investiture as in Janjero
and Enarya. Although Chihab ed-Din said that the inhabitants of
Suf Gamo and Bahr Gamo were pagans, the remains of churches dis-
covered in various parts of the Gamu highlands show that there
were Christians in them at least since the beginning of the six-
teenth century.1
Equally little is known about the administration of
Kambata and Walamo. At the beginning of the seventeenth century
the ruler of the first province was a Christian named Hamalmal.
The security of his position within the province and the in-
difference he showed to requests for the remittance of revenues
to the central treasury suggest that he was from an influential
local family.
So far we have been describing the administrative re-
organization designed to reduce the power of provincial governors.
The intention behind the second type of reorganization seems to
have been the introduction of firm control over the activities of
governors and district officers. The He ga waser'ata mangest
attributes this reform, which embraced the judicial as well as
the administrative aspects of government, to Amda Seyon.
1. R.P. Azais and R. Chambard, Cing annes de recherches arch(o-
1ogigues en Ethio9ie, I, 267-69; and A. Caquot, "Note sur
Berber Maryam", AE, I (1955), 109-116.
79
Probably with the intention of tightening the control
over the provincial courts, Anida Seyon created various courts
of appeal. To keep the number of cases within practical limits,
the right of appeal was restricted to questions of serious
crime and to litigations over inheritance of land. Paez's de-
tailed description of the hierarchial arrangement of the courts
shows how the whole judicial system worked.'
To assist him in his judicial, administrative and
military functions, Amda Seyon created four ministerial offices.
The senior minister had the tit'e of
tanh
bitwadad (bitwadad of
the right) and. the second in rank that of era bitwadad (bitwadad
of the left). As the meaning of the title of bitwadad (the only
beloved) suggests, the ministers were his favourite stewards to
whom he delegated those tasks which he himself could not carry
out. The other two ministers, who had the title of hedug or
assistant, worked with the two bitwadadoch. It also seems that
Ainda Seyon empowered these ininisteis and the other stewards of
the court to supervise the remittance of taxes and tributes.
To forestall the stewards from acquiring too much influence over
the provinces, the districts in each province were assigned to
different stewards. Thus, about nine stewards supervised the
remittance of taxes from the various districts of Tigre, while
some eight officers were made responsible for the districts of
hawa.
1. "Historia de Ethiopia", Rer. Aeth., II, l67-l7+.
80
III Military organization
Soldiering was a lifelong profession. Monetary pay-
ment did not exist, because of the absence of any kind of
currency; and a soldier was assigned lands for his subsistence.
The soldier himself did not work the lands, as his services
could be needed at any season of the year. The lands given to
him were worked by the peasants holding the rights of occupation;
hence the term bala gar (owner of the country or the land) for
peasant. The custom of' settling soldiers on such lands was on a
more regular and permanent basis than billeting. The peasant
was under the obligation to pay a fixed portion of his harvest.
In all probability the portion of the soldier was equivalent to
that which the peasant would have ordinarily paid by way of tax
to the emperor. Towards the end of the sixteenth century the
portion was fixed at one third of the total harvest. 1 In
addition, the peasant was obliged to render certain labour
services to the soldier, such as supplying him with firewood.
We do not know, however, if the peasant had to supply the
soldier with chickens, sheep or goats.
1. Paez, "Historia de Ethiopia t t , Rer. Aeth., II, 285. There is
some reason to think that the proportion varied from time to
time and from place to place. lyasu I once subdued a
rebellion in Wag by threatening to settle soldiers on its
lands and to make the people live on one third of the produce.
I. Guidi, t t Anna].es Iohax,Iyasu I et Bakaff'a", op.cit.,
text, p .139, trans., p.1+5.
81
Probabliy because the peasant tended to resist these
impositions, he was prevented by law from possessing and carrying
any kind of arms. This and other discriminatory regulations
which restricted the freedom of the peasant resulted in the
cleavage of Ethiopian society into two classes, that of the
chawa or professional soldiers and that of the balage (a corrup-
tion of balagar) or peasantry. 1 The peasant was not a serf.
There is no indication to suggest that his right of occupation
of the land was ever questioned. But until the cataclysmic
events of the sixteenth century the discriminatory regulations
were enforced rigorously. The peasant's freedom to change his
domicile was restricted and his condition, therefore, could not
have been better than that of a serf.
The development of the regimental system could not
have been influenced by the need for collective defence against
the resistance of peasants. The system was a legacy from the
Aksumite kingdom, where figiting men seem to have been grouped
in bigger and somewhat more amorphous bodies than squadrons or
similar fixed units. The Aksumite military body was known as
sarwe, a term which seems to have had the meaning of a regiment
or division. A collection of more than one sarwe seems to have
Constituted a sarawit or army. 2 Unfortunately, we cannot
1. On distinction of dress see Paez, "Historia de Ethiopia",
Rer.Aeth., II,
199.
It seems that the churches frequented by
the peasants were notorious for their poverty and shabbiness.
The Prester John of the Indies, I, 80.G. Correa was told by
Alvarez or one of the other members of the mission that
peasants could not slaughter a cow without the permission of
the administrator. Lendas da India, III, 72.
2. E.A.W. Budge, A Histor y of Ethio p ia, I,
2tI7+8,
253-56.
on
0(.
ascertain if the Aksumite military bodies had had their origins
in the division of the Aksumites into ethn.ic groups and the
arrangements of each group in tribes and clans.
An examination of the terms hara and sewa suggests
that there may have been various stages in the development of
regiments. The fact that these terms are Ge'ez rather than
Amharic also suggests that the development began in Aksumite
times. The term hara means a soldier as well as a free man.
The original significance of sewa was that of a prisoner of war.
However, in the earliest documents which we have and which date
to the beginning of the fourteenth century, the word sewa or chawa
had acquired such a different significance that it had become
nearly synonymous with hara. The Aksumite kings used to trans-
port rebellious subjects and defeated enemies into territories
far removed from their homes. The transformation of the meaning
of sewa may indicate that the transplanted prisoners of war were
eventually restored to freedom and used to maintain order in the
places of their settlement.
All available information also shows that the armies
created by Yekuno Amlak and his successors were heterogeneous in
composition. Vanquished warriors of Damot, Enarya, Hadya, Ifat
and other southern provinces were reorganized into small regiments
and settled in diverse parts of the country. Christian soldiers
of Amhara, Agaw and Tigre origins undoubtedly constituted the
1. Ibid., pp.21F5-+6.
orb
0',
regiments which made up the occupying forces in the southern and
eastern provinces. Many of the peoples migrating from the low-
lands were also given lands in return for military services.
The Zalan and the Maya were the best known of the lowland
pastoralists to whom the emperors granted the status of chawa
by settling them all along the eastern escarpments.
In the chronicle of
Zarta
Ya t eqob there is a reference
to soldiers of the various regiments speaking in their own
languages.' This suggests that each regiment comprised men
from the same area or tribe. Warriors who excelled In the use
of the same type of weapons and who foug1it in the same manner
were thus kept together. This arrangement must have also
contributed towards strengthening the regimental esprit de corps.
The poisoned arrows of the Maya and the Zalan, and their use of
their herds of cattle in breaking eeiny formations, made them
formidable in defence as well as in attack.2
Regiments had one of two functions to fulfil, depend-
ing on the parts of the country in which they were posted. In
the provinces of the interior their task was to maintain order
and to discourage rebellion. The number of regiments was
greater in the provinces in which the sentiments of regionalism
1. Les chronipues de Zar 1 a Ya'ecob et de Ba'eda Maryam,
pp.36-37.
2. Chronlca de Susenyos, I, 210, II, 162.
84
were stronger and in which the local aristocracy were resentful
of the increasing centralization of authority. Regiments were
therefore garrisoned in districts and among communities known
for their restlessness. The settlement of soldiers was ameans of
both preventing and punishing rebellion. Regiments did not con-
stitute police forces. Their soldiers were not used in the
apprehension or punishment of criminals who did not challenge
the authority of the emperor or endanger the security of the
province. The district administrator, in his capacity as
district magistrate, was responsible for criminal activities by
individuals or small groups. He relied on the co-operation of
the community involved in the apprehension and punishment of
such offenders.1
The use of regiments as deterrents of rebellion against
imperial authority made the separation of the military from the
civil power necessary. The ras or commander of a regiment was
2
appointed by the emperor and responsible only to him. The
commander was se
y
um or administrator of the regimental lands.
The authority of the provincial governor over him was limited to
judicial matters only. The commander had no power to move his
soldiers across district boundaries. In situations where the
1. Paez, "Historia de Ethiopia", Rer. &eth., II,
172-73.
2. For the use of ras as a military title see B. Turaiev (trans.
and ed.),
ttVjtae
sanctorum Indigenarum", CSCO, XXIII, text,
p .17,
trans.,
p.15;
and The Prester John of the Indies, I,
1i6. Other titles given to officers in command of regiments
were liq and seyum.
8i
movement of regiments across administrative boundaries became
necessary, neither the commander nor the governor could act
without instructions from the emperor. If more than one regiment
was required to deal with a situation, the emperor generally
placed the governor in command of the regiments needed. The
main disadvantage of a system which required the emperor
t s in-
struction for every major military operation was the time lost
while messengers shuttled between province and court. But the
delay may not always have had adverse effect on the outcome of
the operations. A military measure was generally the last
resort in the settlement of a political problem. The delay gave
time for intermediaries to try to bring about a reconciliation.
If the situation deteriorated to the extent that the governor
was unable to cope with it, then the emperor or one of his
bitwadadoch went to the place of trouble with reinforcements
from other provinces.
Because civilian officers were given commazd. of
military operations for specific objectives only, they assumed
military titles only during the period of their command. At the
end of an operation the officer relinquished his command and his
military title. The etymology of military titles shows their
strict connection with positions during marching and during
operations on the field. The title given to an officer commanding
more than one regiment was azmach.Its meaning Is closer to
86
marshal than to general. The officer in command of the vanguard
became a fitawrari while the men in charge of the right and left
wings and of the rear were given the titles of qnhazmach,
1
gerazmach and dajazmach respectively.
During a major field
battle, the army, which would include the regiments of many pro-
vinces, was led by the emperor or by one of the two senior
bitwadadoch.In most cases the emperor or the minister repres-
enting him took the central position.
The second and more important function of the regtments
was the defence of the highlands from the persistant incursions
and threats of invasions by lowland and pastoralists and. nomads.
Chronicles and other documents show that the greatest concentra-
tion of regiments was in the provinces thich touched the eastern
escarpment. For although the political boundary of Ethiopia
reached to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, the escarpment con-
stituted the real boundary separating the sedentary f'om the
pastoralist peoples. An examination of some military terms would
serve to illustrate the preoccupation with frontier defence.
The word wasan meant boundary or limit. Zar'a Ya'eqob created a
regiment which he called Hasab Bawasan (thought or concern on the
1. Paez was told that during marching, the commander of the
rear- g
uard
was changed daily. "Historia de Ethiopia",
Rer. Aeth., ii, i56. It is not clear if this practice
was an innovation of Susenyos, introduced because the
rear was not an advantageous position for looting.
87
limit or frontier) and established in Dawaro, at the foot of the
escarpment.' The word gadab meant a ditch, a river bank or a
trench. It seems to have had also the significance of a natural
or man made position for defence. The azmach appointed by
Ba t eda Maryam over the parts of Angot adjoining the Doba lands
seems to have been instructed to build up such a position
against possible eruption by the Ooba pastoralists. 2 Later at
the height of the Galla migrations the people of Enarya entren-
ched themselves behind a gadab, 3 It is quite possible that
this g.dab was the Gibe river itself. The term mecheg, which
meant a fortified stronghold, occurs frequently in the various
sources. Emperor Eskender was killed while defending such a
post. Another word which had a more or less similar signifi-
cance but occurs less frequently is dalen or dagen.
1. Les chronigues de Zar'a Ya'egob et de Ba'eda Mar y am,
p.58.
The chronicler later mentions a person called Hasaba Wasan
who is described as an officer of the emperor. It is possible
that this is a confusion and that the commander of the Hasab
Bawasan regiment Is Intended. Ibid., pp.61-62.
2 . Ibid.,
p.177.
One of the regiments of Dawaro was called Jan
Gadab, ibid., p.-i-5. A Gadab Harnid, Muslim official of
Dawaro is also mentioned. IbId.,
p.132.
3 .
Cbronica de Susenyos, I, +6, II,
37.
Qj., I, 33, II, 27.
+. Les chronIues de Zar'a
Yategob
et de Ba'eda Marvam,
p.153;
J. Perruchon (trans. and ed.), "Histoire
dtEskender,
d'
'Amda-Seyon II et de Na'od", JA, III (l89+), text,
p.3-fO,
trans.,
pp.3 55-56;
and Chihab ed-Din, Histoire de la
nqute de l'AbyssinIe, trans.,
pp.235-36.
88
Th frontier regiments were generally posted on
defensible mountain strongholds, but as near as possible to the
valleys and passes which communicated between the highlands and
the lowlands. The number of these regiments suggests that they
were strung close to each other. Since the process of garrison-
ing the escarpment began with Yekuno Amlak himself, the strong-
holds were reinforced wherever necessary by stone walls and
other means of fortifications.
There were so many passes and defiles along the escarp-
ment, and the pressure from the migrating peoples at times was so
strong, that the frontier garrisons had to be supported by other
regiments placed behind them. The supporting regiments were,
for example, noticeably numerous in the provinces located on
either side of the Awash valley. Although Dawaro was virtually
a military camp teaming with regiments, the provinces to its west
like Ifat and Shawa as well as Bali, Arerih and Sharka were also
heavily garrisoned.
Considering that members of the old ruling families
of the former sultanates continued to perform administrative
functions, the separation of the military from the civil author-
ity became even more necessary in the frontier provinces. Pres-
umably, therefore, the commander of each garrison was responsible
for the defence and the administration of the lands assigned to
it. Whenever the pressure from the lowlands became too strong
89
for one regiment, the emperor instructed the governor to take
command of some or all the regiments in the province. The
command was given to him to repulse a particular enemy attack
only. In the duration of hi command, the governor used the
military title of azmach. Because such commanders were res-
ponsible for the defence of frontier provinces, the title of
dajazmach was sometimes conferred upon them. But it is not very
often that an emperor could trust his governors with such a res-
ponsibility. Normally, the mission was entrusted to one of the
senior bitwadadoch.If the province was threatened with in-
vasion, the emperor himself took to the fild.
The tight control which the emperor maintained over the
activities of the regiments would not have been possible without
an elaborate system of communications. Documentary evidence does
not provide us with a good picture of how the system worked. It
seems, however, that the secretariat office which the sahafe tet
zaz headed was big enough to deal with the correspondence which
went on between the court and the provinces. Much of the comniuni-
cation with the emperor was carried on in writing. Moreover, the
defensive occupation of the frontier regiments required an effec-
tive system of scouting and transmitting warnings. In the
chronicles of the seventeenth century, the messengers who alerted
the provinces of the interior and, if necessary, the court, of
impending incursions were called chawahi or criers.
90
The emperors did not keep with them in the court a
big mobile, striking force. There were household soldiers who
numbered quite a few thousands. But they served as attendaxts
who waited upon the emperor and acted as his escort within and
away from the court. The household soldiers were also essential
for the pageantry and the complex ceremonies with which the
emperors bolstered their image of powerful, invincible sovereigns.
Problems connected with sanitary facilities and the supply of
food, firewood, water and other similar essentials prevented the
concentration of regiments in the court. Whenever many regi-
ments were kept in the court for some length of time, the con-
sequencewas generally the outbreak of a disastrous epidemic.
Zar'a Ya'eqob t s fear that the provincial regiments would be
seduced to mutiny and rebellion by the governors and district
administrators who disturbed his reign led to the concentration
of many regiments in the court. The depredation caused upon
them by diseases, more than outweighed his success against the
ambitious notables who challenged his authority, and hastened
the dispersal of Ihe survivors.
Because of the extent of the frontier, a mobile,
striking force would have been ineffective.If the attack
occurred in Tigre or even in more southerly places like Qeda,
Angot or Garth, the march from the court would have exhausted
the soldiers. Besides, they would have had to fight in wi-
91
familiar territory. It was more convenient to move regiments
from the provinces which were nearer to the vulnerable points.
The emphasis was, therefore, on an efficient system of coinmuni-
cations, so that regiments from various garrisons could be
rapidly alerted and moved about. On the part of the emperor
and his ministers there was unflagging alertness and, readiness.
In the imperial stable, for example, fully saddled horses were
always kept in readiness in case the emperor had to take to the
field. 1
If it became necessary messages were sent to the
appropriate regiments to prepare for immediate marching.
2
Some-
times, probably when the situation was not very serious or when
the emperor himself was near the frontier, the regiments were
summoned to the court and dispatched without delay.
These who come for war come up to the King's
tents, and show themselves off close to them,
and they skirmish and sport aria show their
method of fighting, as they think best to please
the King. This we saw endless times. These men
who thus go to the wars do not stay two days at
the Court, because their rule Is to call 100,000
men, if they want as many, to assemble in two
days, so as they arrive they are sent of f.J
1. Paez, "Historia de Ethiopia", Rer. Aeth., II,
56.
2.
Hence the custom whereby messengers and other officials of
the emperor did not carry provisions while travelling but
were fed and lodged by the people in whose villages they
stopped. Ibid., p.211+.
3.
The Prester John of the Indies, II, 4F7.
92
This would mean that the soldiers of every regiment
had to be within easy reach. Absence from the lines was punished
by a fine called ferah krawe. A soldier who repeatedly absented
himself may have been disciplined by corporal punishment inflic-
ted before his colleagues and eventually by expulsion rrom the
regiment .
Although Alvarez intimated that soldiers on the march
helped themselves to whatever cattle and crops they found on
their way, foraging was not a common practice. Soldiers did,
in fact, carry with them enough to last them for the duration
of an expedition. In the seventeenth century, lyasu instructed
his men to prepare supplies for four months. As the army or
regiment was generally accompanied by the wives and servants of
the soldiers and by hosts of vLvandires, and. as the supplies
cois1sted of dehydrated foods, transportation did not cause in-
convenience. Indiscriminate plundering of lands belonging to
other regiments, or of estates and districts protected by im-
perial charters and assigned to churches, members of the imperial
family and to district notables, would Mve destroyed the very
stability which the emperors were cultivating. If the military
operation was against rebellious subjects, plundering and looting
was permitted only as a means of punishment.
1. On punishments for cowardice and indiscipline see Paez,
"Historia de Ethiopia", or.cit., II, +; and J.es chroniQues
de Zar'a Ya'eciob et de Ba'eda Marivam, pp.l39-1-10.
93
It is true, nevertheless, that in times of widespread
restlessness and internal wars, mutinous regiments often went on
the rampage. &ich a situation arose in the time of
Zarta
Ya'eqob.
The emperor not only removed and punished the governors and dist-
rict officers who had alienated the loyalty of the regiments, but
also began a thorough reorganization of the army. He trans-
ferred most of the regiments to other districts. Those regi-
ment, the soldiers of which had perpetrated treasonable acts,
were disbanded and their lands assigned to other regiments.1
Nothing definite is known about the size of regiments
or the number of those posted in each province. According to
Maqrizi, when in the time of Yeshaq the Muslims of Adal invaded
Bali, the province was defended by ten commanders, each having
about 10,000 men under him. 2 Though the Ethiopian highlands
were densely populated then, it is very unlikely that the body
of men under each commander could have constituted a regiment.
The war described by Maqrizi was one of' invasion and each comnian-
der must have been in charge of more than one regiment. Unless
Maqrizi or his informant had inflated the number of the defending
soldiers so as to highlight the bravery of the Muslim inaders,
Yeshaq must have moved into Bali many regiments from the nearby
provinces.
1. Ibid., p) -i-6 .
2. F.T.Rinck (trans. and ed.) , Macrizi historia re gum islamiti-
corum in Abyssinia, p.21+.
94
Reliable documents suggest a much smaller and more
reasonable size of regiment. A district of Beguna, froza the
revenues of which Saga Za'ab received his livelihood, had a
regiment consisting of about 0 soldiers. If by vassals
Alvarez had the professional soldiers in mind, then there were
about 10,000 of them in the whole province.' He also says that
the defence of Beguna was entrusted to the renowned Jan Amora
regiment. 2 But evidently it was not the only one garrisoned in
this frontier province. 3 In Saraye, the biggest district in
northern Tigre, there were about 15,000 soldiers. All of them
could not have belonged to the Basar Wajat regiment, the only
one known to have been posted in the district. The Tenach, one
of the regiments of Bali, numbered 1760 men. It seems, therefore,
that even though regiments were not uniform in size they were not
very big. The tribal origin of the regiments, and the custom
whereby sons embraced the profession of their fathers, would have
made trimming to a fixed number difficult. Bahrey's comparison
of big regiments like the Glyorgis
Haile
and the Selus Haile with
Gafla age-set bands suggests that the regiments were divided into
units or companies. 5 The recruitment of sons of soldiers into
1. The Prester John of the Indies, II, +6+.
2 . Ibid., I,
l9+-95.
3 .
s chronipues de Zar'a Yp t e 1
ob et de
Bateda
Marvam, p.i+8.
Amda Seyon's eavairy regiment called Koram probably came from
this province. J. Perruchon (trans. arid. ed.), "Histoire des
guerres d' 'Amda Syon", JA, XIV (1889), text, p.382, trans.,
+. The Prester John of the Indies, I, 1i6. Alvarez says that there
were in the province of the bahr na
gash many men with the
titles of ras and commanding soldiers.
5. I.Guidi. (trans. and ed.) "Historia gentis
Galla", CSCO,III,
text, p.225,
trans., p.18.
9;
the regiments of their fathers may have led. to the formation of
units for young boys and young men. Furthermore, small units
would have been more effective in frontier warfare, where the
number of passes and defiles to be guarded was large. The men
of the Hafro Aygaba regiment of Efat, for example, manned several
strongholds.
Every regiment was a permanntccorporate body,
receiving its name and standard from the emperor who created it.
Some of the regiments founded by Linda Seyon or his predecessors
could have grown in size by the middle of the fifteenth century.
The Lands originally assigned to them may have become insufficient
for their soldiers. This may partly account for the restlessness
manifested by some of the frontier regiments, especially those of
Bali, during the reigns of Zar'a Ya'eqob and Ba'eda Naryam. And
it seems that
Zarta ya'eqob not only moved about the regiments
to new posts but also reduced the size of the bigger ones by de-
taching companies and creating new regiments out of them. For,
although the chronicler explains that the regiments newly estab-
lished were named after the districts in which they were settled,
we find that many of them continued to be known by old names
as Basar Wajat and Bahr Amba.'The newly created regiments
were probably proud of their connections with the mother regi-
ments. The reluctance to change names is, perhaps, illustrated
1. Fes chronipues de Zar'a
Yateob
et de Ba
t
eda Maryam,
pp.%-'+7.
96
by the mutinous Tenach regiment of Bali. When Ba'eda Maryam had.
it transferred to Gojam, he gave it the name of Dawit Harasa,
after his own throne-name. But until the seventeenth century
the regiment continued to be knuwn by its old name, though modi-
fied to Henach) Similar reluctance may explain why Maya and
Zalan regiments, dispersed over various districts, were known by
their tribal names.
Spears and bows and arrows were the basic weapons.
Regiments mostly used the arms common to the tribes or localities
from which the soldiers were recruited. The regiments which
grew out of tribes of lowland pastoralists like the Maya and
Zalan specialized in fighting with poisoned arrows. Soldiers
recruited from among the inhabitants of the highlands fought with
the very weapons used by the Aksuxnites. Each soldier carried
two kinds of spears, one or more short missile javelins and. one
long spear which he used. in hand to hand fighting. Shields,
knives and clubs were carried. by men from the highlands
as well
as the lowlands. Regiments occupied in the defence of passes
and. defiles also fought with slings and avalanches of rocks.
1. Chronica de Susenvos, I,
2 5 Ii,
II, 195.
Towards the end of
the century the name seems to have been modified to Yenach.
t t
Axales lohannis I, lyasu I et Bakaffa t 1 , op.cit., text,
p.5 1, trans., p.52.
97
Most regiments, apparently with the exception of those
specializing in the use of bows and arrows, included cavalry
units. Since Amda Seyon had established throughout the various
parts of the country ranches for the breeding of mules it is
quite possible that similar arrangements were made for hors'
In any case, we know that by the beginning of the fourteenth
century many provinces were giving horses as part of their taxes.
Horses were not fit for service in the frontier posts, but by the
sixteenth century cavalry units had increased in number.
Emperors were using much of their wealth to import equipment for
their horsemen. Both Alrarez and Chihab ed-Din show that the
household cavalrymen wore helmets and shirts of mail. Lebna
Denge]. may have begun to buy the equipments for men and horses
discarded by the overthrown Mameluk soldiers. At the time when
Alvarez was in Ethiopia imported swords were expensive even for
the richer noblemen. But they had become fashionable and the
soldiers may have taken to carrying local imitations. These
swords were not strong and dependable, as the smiths were not
good at tempering Iron.
According to the chronicles all princes were trained,
while young, in horsemanship, in the use of all kinds of weapons
as well as in swimming and other similar skills. Alvarez also
reports of the great interest he observed among the great and the
1. The establishment of the mule ranches
in described in detail In
fol.106v-lQ7v of the Tarika zia
gast, MS. OrIent. 821, British
Museum.
98
small for the displays of skills in wrestling, riding, sword-
play and. jousting. It may, therefore, be assumed that some
sort of training was required of all soldiers. Nevertheless,
neither in the type of weapons he carried nor in the way he
used them was the professional soldier superior to the low-
land. pastoralist or nomad he was trying to keep off the high-
lands. Within the highlands his advantage over the peasant
lay in the simple fact that he was armed while the latter was
not.
99
IV
The Church as an integrative force.
IJllendorff has accurately described the Ethiopian Church
as being syncretistic)Its syncretism developed from the
deliberate policy of toleration and acceptance which the emperors
adopted in order to maintain peace among their culturally hetero-
geneous subjects. The emperors were the defenders and the
supporters of the Church, yet they seem to have believed that the
imposition of Christianity on the pagan and Muslim peoples they
had subdued would not be conducive to peaceful integration. Inter-
marriage and the resettlement of tribes in places far removed from
their homes were the integrative means they px'eerred. The
garrisoning of Christian soldiers in pagan and Muslim provinces
led to intermarriages. When churches inevitably sprang up in the
areas where such soldiers were settled, Christianity tended to
filter slowly and inconspicuously to the surrounding pagan or
Muslim peoples.
While thus gaining ground on paganism and Islam,
Christianity adapted itself to the superstitions, non-Christian
beliefs and practices of the people. The Church did not demand
of the convert an understanding of the theological intricacies of
Christianity or the observance of its ethics. The Church even
tolerated witchcraft, polygamy and other customs forbidden by the
canonical laws. Because of itsspncretistic nature Ethiopian
Christianity faced two kinds of dangers.
1. The Ethio p ians, p.101.
100
In Shawa and the predominantly pagan provinces to the
south, the danger of relapse to paganism became strong. By the
fifteenth century polygamy and witchcraft were openly practised
by members of the imperial family and the old Christian aristo-
cratic houses. Zar
t a Ya t
eqob had to resort to inquisitorial like
processes in order to save Christianity from being overwhelmed
by paganism. His realization that Christianity was nothing more
than a veneer in the religious life of his subjects made him
decree the reading of holy texts and the preaching of sermons
in the churches of the empire.
The second threat to Christianity arose from the
territorial encroachments into the highlands by Muslim pastoral-
ists and nomads. The uninterrupted pressure on the districts of
the eastern escarpment forced the inhabitants to be inconstant
in their religious attachment, in order to survive through the
shifting fortunes of emperors and sultans. In these areas Islam,
too, was equally affected by mass apostasy. Both religions were
taken up and. abandoned whenever doing one or the other became ex-
pedient. Even the loyalty of the regiments posted to defend the
passes and defiles of the escarpment was shaken. During the reign
of Zar t a Ya'eqob the soldiers of the Jan Sagana regiment, which
was stationed in Dawaro, deserted more than once to the sultanate
of Adal. Some years later, in the time of
Bateda
Maryam, soldiers
of the Tenach and other unnamed regiments of Bali were discovered
conspiring and planning to go to Adal.
4 A-
1Uj
Although Lebna Dengel was wrong in considering the
ritual of nimersion during the celebration of Epiphany as a
second baptism for repenting apostates, he, nevertheless,
admitted the readiness with which old Christians and new converts
abandoned their faith and returned to it. The scandalized Alvarez
wrote, 't here they think nothing of joining the Moors and becoming
Moors, and if they wish to return, they get baptized again and
are pardoned and Christians as
beforett)
This attitude was so
prevalent all along the escarpment that from Tigre to Bali there
was no boundary between Christians and Muslims.
In, spite of Zar'a Ya
t eqob
t s vigorous intervention, the
Church had thus remained insensible to these dangers. One of the
reasons for its lack of dynamism was its dependence on the
monarchy for support and guidance. The second reason was to be
found in Its very organisation. It comprised secular clergy and
monks. The first group included priests and clerics of lower
orders. They did not observe celibacy and their function was to
officiate at church services and to minister to the general needs
of their parishoners. They were not expected to be engaged in any
missionary activities. Monks, on the other hand, rarely offici-
ated in church services. Besides concentrating on fasting and
pra
y
er, they were interested in the pursuit of higher learning
and in the dissemination of the Gospel. Monasticism was intro-
1. The Prester John of the Indies, II,
3)+7,
fl3.
I flC
iUA.
duced into Ethiopia by disciples of the great Egyptian
anchorites Paul, Antony and Macharius. Like their famous
models of holiness, the retiring and inward looking monks were
fired more by the desire of personal victory over worldly temp-
tations than by the challenge of gaining converts to the Church.
The founding of the two monastic orders in the thir-
teenth century by the monks Takla Haymanot and Ewostatewos
aroused a strong missionary zeal among their disciples. Fired
by this zeal, monks of the monasteries founded by these leaders
had taught and converted pagans of the western and southern
provinces. The enthusiasm for missionary activities was short-
lived, primarily because of the absence of support and encourage-
ment from the emperors. The monks began to squabble and to pick
issues with each other. By the beginning of the fifteenth
century, the two orders were pitted against each other.With the
dissensions between them, the threats of internal conflicts be-
came very real. The fact that from time to time emperors had to
intervene in order to patch the differences between the monks
meant increasing confusion between political and religious
issues.
In theory the Church was an independent body. It was
headed by a bishop or abun selected from among Egyptian monks
and consecrated by the patriarch of Alexandria. The bishop and,
if necessary, the patriarch had full power to deal with the
organization and beliefs of the Church. But the Alexandrian
4 n
lUt)
patriarchate, stifled and subdued as it was by the Arabs, could
not provide inspired leadership. Most of the bishops it sent
into Ethiopia were old men who had. spent the best part of their
lives inside the walls of desert monasteries. Few of them
learned sufficient Amharic or Ge'ez
to be able to communicate
with the people or to play active roles in a society to which
they were total strangers. The limited influence that the
office of the bishop carried was described by Abuna
Marqos to
Alvarez.
Then he began to speak of the great pleasure he had
received from what they had told to him about what I
hai said many times, and from what he had seen had
passed with me at the baptism, and from the clarity
with which I had spoken the truth in the presence of
the Prester, which he would not believe from him,
the Abima, because he was alone; and that if he
had an associate or twos who would help him In
speaking the truth, he would free the Prester from
many things and errors, in which he and his people
were.
Abu.na Marqos had lived in the country for over fifty
years, yet he knew neither the spoken nor the literary language.
Such self-imposed Isolation tended to exclude the bishops from
active participation in religious life. Their role came to be
restricted to the rather ritualistic activities of blessing the
holy oil (used during coronations and ordinations), consecrating
altars for new churches and conferring holy orders. Among the
other prelates of the Church there were none who could unite the
clergymen and provide the leadership which it sorely needed.
1.
Ibid.,
p.31+9.
104
The echage was prior of Dabra Libanos, the monastery founded
on the site of Takia Hayrnanot t s hermitage. As successor of the
famous holy man, the echage not only enjoyed tremendous spiritual
prestige but also possessed supervisory powers over the monas-
teries which adhered to Takla Haytnanot's way of monastic life.
He had no authority over the monasteries of the rival order or,
as he had no powers to confer holy orders, over the secular
clergy. Because of Takia Haymanot's Involvement in the political
events of his days, his successors were intimately connected with
affairs of the court. Their influence may have been damaged by
their alignment on the side of one of the many political factions.
The most scathing criticism ever directed against the
Church was made by the Jesuit Gongalo Rodrigues.In a letter
written after about a year's stay in Ethiopia, he attacked the
Church for complicity in withholding Christianity from the
pagans of the empire.
And that you may know what soxt of people these are:
persons who should well know about it affirmed to me
several times that many of those pagans who border upon
them and who pay them tribute begged them many times that
they make them Christians and that, thus, they would
happily continue to pay them their taxes. And they did
not want to do it so that they may continuously make
raids on them, which they do, and they take from them
their children and wives and possessions. And they send
them to the sea to be sold to the Turks and the Moors,
to whom those of this kingdom sell every year more than
10 or 12 thousand slaves of whom there would not have
been one person who woul. not have willingly become
Christian.
1. Letter of Dec.13,
1556,
to the fathers and brothers of the
Society of Jesus in Europe fol.
75v Jesuitas na Asia.
Cartas,
i56-i6, S)+9-l\L50, BibLoteca de Ajuda.
4t
P
'Ut)
Rodrigues made this charge at a moment when he was
profoundly offended by Galawdewos's refusal to have anything to
do with Catholicism and the Jesuit missionaries. Nevertheless,
there are incontestable indications that this emperor, one of
the most humane persons to sit on the throne, occasionally in-
d.ulged in slave raiding. Our task, therefore, is not to establish
the validity of this charge but to ascertain for how long
slaving activities had been going on. According to the available
sources, slave raiding by the emperors and their soldiers seems
to have been essentially a sixteenth century phenomenon. As we
pointed out previously, the emperors did not In general show any
desire to impose Christianity on their pagan and Muslim subjects.
Even when Zar'a Ya'eqob made arrangements for the conversion of
the pagan Shanqela or Dubani of western Tigre and the Muslims of
the coastal plains, he did not envisage forceful imposition.'
Ba'eda Maryam's conversion of the Doba was not a measure adopted
for the spread of Christianity. It was part of his effort to
force them to become sedentary agriculturalists and thereby put
2
an end to their incursions into the highlands.
1. Conti Rossini, "Aethiopica", RSO, lx (1921-23),
1+53_5}+.
2. Les chroniques de Zar'a Ya'eqob et de Ba'eda Maryam,
p
151.
106
None of the chronicles for the preceding centuries
suggest that prisoners of war were sold to slave merchants.
Slave raiding is inherently incompatible with the building up
of an ordered administration. The praise song composed in honour
of Yeshaq shows that all the different peoples of the empire,
including the Shanqela of the western districts, were peaceful
taxpayers.' As far as we can ascertain from the sources, Lebna
Dengel was the first emperor who began
to conduct a prosperous
trade in slaves.
1. Guidi "Le canzoni geez-amariIa in onore di Re Abissini",
op.ci., p.55.
107
V The government of Lebna Dengel.
The policy of checking the power of the provincial
governors and district administrators by assigning supervisory
powers over them to stewards of the court proved to contain within
it a source of danger to imperial absolutism. The ministers,
stewards and pages of the court were recruited from among the
provincial nobility. They could, therefore, aspire to greater
influence and power over the provinces and armies than delegated
to them by the emperors. We do not know when exactly the con-
flict between the monarchy and the provincial notables began to
be superseded by conflict between emperors and their household
ministers. It seems, however, that the internal political
difficulties which Zar'a Ya'eqob faced arose primarily from the
ambition of his ministers, and the only way, short of usurping
the throne, by which the court ministers could realize their
hopes was by keeping on the throne weak men who could be directed
by them.
For some obscure reason, the chronicler of Zar'a Ya'eqob
professes ignorance of thetreason planned or eornxnitted
bTALmda
Masqal, who was bitwadad and son-in-law oi the emperor. The
comparison, though figurative, of the minister's treason with
the pride and aspirations of Satan suggesiE that an attempt to
overthrow the emperor had been made. 1 The princes of Amba Geshan
1. Les chroniques de Zar'a Ya'eqob et de Ba'eda Maryam, p.10.
108
seem to have allowed themselves to be used by ambitious men, for
the punishment Zar'a Ya'eqob inflicted on the former was severe.'
The appointment of his daughters to the offices of the bitwadadoch
and the restrictions he placed on the movement of his pages
reveal his determination to extirpate the source of the new kind
of danger. The conspiracy against him must have extended to the
provinces because he gave all the governorships to his daughters,
sons and nieces. His new ministers and governors were loyal to
him, but they abused the trust and confidence he placed in them
by neglecting their dut:Les. While they dissipated their time in
pagan religious orgies, their representatives oppressed the
peasantry. In the end the emperor decided on a system of
government which could be described as truly absolute and
centralized. He placed every department and aspect of government
under his own direction. He filled the court and provincial
offices with men who were completely dependent upon him.
Probably because the various regiments were involved
in the plots against him, Zar'a Ya'eqob brought many of them to
the court. He kept them usefully occupied in the construction
of the city of Dabra Berhan, but the recurrent outbreak of epi-
demics forced him to return them to the provinces. To ensure
that the soldiers were not involved in further conspiracies
1. He made the princes to move from Amba Geshan to the hot,
mosquito infested lowlands. Paez, "Historia de Ethiopia",
Rer.Aeth., II, ll+.
109
against him, he gave each regiment a new posting. Some of the
bigger and, perhaps, more troublesome regiments seem to have been
broken up into smaller bodies.
The thoroughness with which the emperor had divested
the established families of their wealth and privileges only
exacerbated their hatred of him. The attempts to overthrow him
did not cease. In one of the conspiracies which occurred towards
the end of his reign, his enemies tried to place his son Bateda
Maryam on the throne. The mother of the prince was among the
conspirators, but she does not seem to have been a principal
figure. Being a gentle but weak man, the prince may have been
revolted by the harshness with which his father punished any
sIgn of disloyalty to himself and to the throne. It is not sur-
prising, therefore, that when Ba'eda Maryam succeeded his
father, he set out to undo the measures which to him must have
appeared tyrannical. He began his reign by granting a general
amnesty to all those imprisoned and exiled by his father. Soon
after he reintroduced all the court offices and the governorships
which Zar'a Ya'eqob had abolished, giving them back to members of
the noble families.
Ba t
eda Maryam did not die without repenting of his
actLons. His mildness so weakened the power of the throne that
much of his ten year long reign was disturbed by factious
rivalry. While those who benefited from the changes he made
praised his good sense in restoring the traditional administrative
110
system, those who failed to get a satisfactory share of power
abused him as being unfit to govern. Although he did not have
the temperament for hunting, they criticized him of spending too
much time on sports and of neglecting the affairs of the state.
The hostility between the factions became uncontrollable, and
Ba'eda Maryam was in the end reduced to courting the support and
goodwill of some of his governors.
With this victry against absolutism and centralization,
the nobility became more determined than ever not to allow any
strong person to ascend the throne or to stay on it long. On the
death of Ba'eda Maryam, the faction in power placed his infant
son Eskender on the throne. During his minority the country was
agitated by conflicts between the regents and the rivals whom
they excluded from power. Eskend.er grew up to be a conscientious
ruler ,thbngh more concerned with the increasing pressure from the
lowland pastoralists than with the internal troubles. He was un-
able to control his soldiers, who were incited to rebellion by
rival factions of ambitious stewards.
Eskender died at an early age while defending a frontier
post against attacks by one of the lowland tribes. Fighting
immediately broke out between the divided regiments. One side,
led by Zasellus, raised for emperor one of the princes of Amba
Geshan. The rival side, led by Takla Chrstos, proclaimed the
accession ofseven year old son. Zasellus was defea-
ted, but the successful faction was deprived of a long regency
when the boy died within six months.
hA
Na'od, the youngest of Ba'eda Maryani!s sons, was
barely of age when he came to the throne. He was a peaceful man,
more inclined to
piety than to politics. He desired strongly to
dispel the atmosphere of unrest. But instead of reasserting the
authority of the crown over all the rival factions, he tried to
become a mediator. In his anxiety to avoid exasperating the
hostility between them, he allowed serious crimes of treason to
go unpunished. His greatest failure, however, was his inability
to rally the country to defend itself against the encroachments
of the pastoralists and nomads. At a time when the threats from
the lowlands had become serious, ambitious men like Taka Chrestos,
who seems to have been the bitwadad in command of the armies,
tried to arouse the frontier regiments to rebellion.
Na'od had refused to send his grown up Sons to Aniba
Geshan, and when he died in 1508 the rival groups tried to put
on the throne princes of their choice. One party supporting
the claim of
Natodis first son was opposed by another in favour
of the eleven year old Lebna Dengel. The latter group included
Eleni, the influential widow of Zar'a Ya'eqob, her friend Abuna
Narqos, and the court minister Wasan Sagad. Their reason for
objection to the succession of Na'od's oldest son was his alleged
violent temper. But as the venerable bishop later confided to
Alvarez, Eleni and the others of her side had to bribe many of
the great men in order to secure the accession of Lebna Denge].1
1. The Prester John of the Indies, I, 2+1J+3.
112
Evidently, they would
not have spent their money if the prospect
of a long regency had not tempted them.
Because of the tremendous prestige of Eleni, the
faction which she led seems to have exercised power without en-
countering serious challenge from the rival groups. Although
Na'od Mogasa, the mother of the emperor, was one of the regents
she does not seem to have been ambitious or politically inclined.
However, she secured important positions for her father and her
lover. The former was a bahr nagash and the latter a bitwadad)-
The aged Eleni took for herself the governorship of Gojam with
the revenues of which she began the construction of the osten-
tatious church of Martula Maryam. Wasan Sagad, as bitwadad of
the right remained the virtual master of the country. He was,
apparently, a cunning politician, as he spent the wealth which
he amassed not only in the construction of an equally ostenta-
tious church in Dawaro but also in buying the goodwill of the
clergy and the soldiers.
The character ai.dLpersoaltty of Lebna Dengel cannot
be properly assessed from the short chronicles about his reign.
1
They deal mainly with the activities of Ahmad. Grarth. Fortunately,
we have the more detailed work of Alvarez who, during the six
years which he passed in the country, came to know the emperor
and most of his officers very well. Alvarez liked and admired
1. When Na'od Mogasa's father died in l5l^, he was succeeded
by his son Don. See Alvarez's letter of Jan.9 1518, to
King Manuel of Portugal in J. Ramos-Coelho (ed.3,
Al gun documeni do Arehivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, p.'+i6.
was succeectecl oy his son Bulla.
ndies I, llIi.
113
the emperor. But like the faithful reporter that he set out to
be when he began his book, the Portuguese chaplain remembered
conversations he had without making any attempt to embellish and.
persons he knew without trying to extol. His description of those
actions of Lebna Dengel which could be censured as oppressive
thus become all the more reliable.
In his love of wealth and its display the young
emperor seems to have grown up to excel his relations and
guardians. Alvarez unwittingly provides us with several examples
of unmitigated. greed. The most strtking concerned the market
town which Alvarez calls Manadeley. It was a prosperous town in
southern Tigre, commanding the caravan route between the salt
plains and the central provinces. The emperor forced the
merchants who frequented it to borrow 1,000 waqet of gold. and to
agree to pay every year the equivalent amount in interest. Each
time the merchants tried to pay back the loan their offer was
rejected.' Less striking but equally revealing of the
emperor's character is the Incident of the five bales of pepper.
Because he coveted the clothes and. the sword which the ambassador
wore and the bales of pepper which he had brought for hi own
use, Lebna Dengel suspected him of keeping back some of the gifts
sent by the king of Portugal. Despite the protestations of the
1. IbId. pp.187-88. The merchants of Wasal were also complain-
ing o1
having to pay heavy taxes. Ibid., p.251.
114
ambassador and. Alvarez, he refused to grant them an audience
until they had surrendered bales of pepper, sword and breeches.1
Chihab ed-Din, on his part, provides us with inforina-
tion on Lebna Dengel's interests in the slave trade. It was not
unusual for emperors to be involved, in trade. The quantity of
costly clothes which they needed for their households and for
gifts to churches, clerics and officers was so big that they often
found it convenient to retain some of the merchants as their
agents. Eleni's agent had been the Armenian Matthew, whom she
later sent as her ambassador to Portugal. He was not a pros-
perous merchant anI his business interests do not seem to have
included the exportation of slaves. Lebna Dengel, on the other
hand, employed well knoi.in slave merchants of Adal as his agents.2
The emperor was a hard and vindictive man. Knowing
his character, Eleni and Na'od. Mogasa had given their patronage
to noblemen whose pride and dignity the emperor had offended.
After the death of the two ladies, which occurred sometime
between 1521 and
1523,
he began a systematic removal and even
the elimination of all their favourites. Wasan Sagad, probably
because he was too popular, was given a governorship and sent
1. Ibid., pp.276-77, 297.
2. Hjstojre de la conpute de 1'Abyssinie, trans., pp.70-71.
One Ahmad, nagadras o chief of caravans, had sufficient
influence with Lebna Dengel to obtain fiefs for his friends.
Conti Rossini (trans. and ed.), "Documnenta ad illustrandam
historjam.I. Liber Axumae", CSCO, VIII, text, p.29, trans.,
p 33.
ii
away from the court, The
bitwadad of the left and the tigre
makonne were imprisoned. He even removed his young nephew Bulla
from the governorship or northern Tigre. Alvarez tried to find
out from the notables of his acquaintance the reasons for the
arrests and imprisonments. All he could learn was that the
bitwadad of the right had been the lover of Na t od Mogasa. But
for the universal gloom which followed Eleni's death, Alvarez
was given this explanation.
They said that since she had died all of them had
died great and small, and that while she lived,
all lived and were defended and protected; and
she was the father and mother of all, and if the
king took this road, his kingdom would become
deserts 1
As far as can be ascertained from the different sources
on Lebna Dengel's reign, the emperor did not launch an attack on
the noblemen because they had usurped the powers of the throne.
It seems rather that his resentment of the domination by the two
ladies and their favourites was exploited by a riva],. faction.
Members of this faction, apparently, encouraged him to take
measures against their rivals by persuading him that he would
thereby strengthen his position. We are unfortunately unable to
describe the composition or activities of this faction. The
leaders may have been Robel and Dagaihan.
1. The Prester JoIin of the Indies, II, +3+.
116
It seems thus that the years preceding the Muslim
invasion of 1528 and.
1529
were troubled by factious conflicts.
In a letter believed to have been written by the emperor some-
time in
i5-iO
to John Bermudez, the man through. whom he had sought
Portuguese assistance, he complains, "All my leading men have,
in support of the Moors, rebelled against me. " 1 Dom John de
Castro, admiral in the fleet which brought Dom Christopher da
Gama to Ethiopia, gathered the following information at Massawa.
The Prester John, by name Atini Dingi]. and
afterwards David, ruling over the land. of
Ethiopia or Abyssinia in the year 1530,
was
so cruel to his vassals and tyrannized his
people So much that he fell into universal
hatred of the Abyssinians. At this time
Gadamet, king of Zeia, finding the time
favourable, began to make war on the Prester
to see what he could find, in the spirit of the
Abyssinians. And this not because he was strong
enough to undertake such a big enterprise but
either because he was encouraged by the great
dislike which the Abyssinians had for their king
or because he was secretly aroused to this war by
some lords of the Kingdom. . . . In all the p1aes
through which he passed he treed the inhabitants,
and he made all free and exempt of the tributes
and levies which were imposed upon them by the
Prester John: with which generous acts he thus
won to himself the sentiments of the Abyssinians,
and not only of the common people but also of the
most important lords of the Kingdom. 2
1. Correa, Lendas da India, IV,
138-39.
2. Roteiros de 0. Joo de Castro (ed. A. Fontoura da Costa),
III, 59. See also Correa, o p . cit. , IV, 170.
117
The letter and 5ohn de Castro's account of the war
were written after the Muslims had consolidated their conquest
of the highlands. However, it cannot be said that the rebellions
against Lebna Dengel described in them referred to- defections
which took place after his efforts to stop the Muslims had all
failed. In
1531
Wasan Sagad, on whom had fallen the burden of
reorganizing the hopelessly crumbled defences, openly accused
the emperor that if it were not for his tyranny and. Injustice
towards his people the Muslims wuld not have succeeded.1
Chihab ed-Din mentions many instances of defection by dis-
affected ministers, governors and regimental commanders.
1. Chlhab ed-Din, Histoire d.e la congute de l'Abyssinie,
trans., p.221.
118
CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND TO THE GALLA MIGRATIONS
I. The
iadic peoples of theastern Lw1ands.
In thelong but obscurehistory of thestrugglebetween
Christians and Muslims, an extremely important rolewas played by
theMuslim nomads of theDanakil lowlands. James Brucewas aware
of thepart played by thesenomad whom hecalls the"shepherds0.
But as hemakes his shepherds aibordinateto their sedentary co-
religionists in thesultanates of Ifat, Adal and Harar, the
c.useof thestruggles becomes political. TheMuslim states
were, according to Bruce, trying to regain their independence
from theWiopian emperors. 1
Cerulli, a scholar who has made
an immensecontribution to our understanding of theinternal
history of thesesultanates, su.spects that an expansion of Islam
may haveprovoked a defensivereaction on thepart of Christian
Ethiopia.2
Healso sees in thelong-drawn out conflict between
Christians and Muslims a rivalry for expansion between two
states, Ethiopia and Ifat, and a contest for supremacy between
two dynasties, theSolomonic and TheWalasma. Cerulli thus
attributes thestruggleto religious and political causes, but,
unlikeBruce, hesees theaggressor in Ifat.
1. Bruce, Travels, II, 10, 13.
2. CeruIli, "La lingua ela storia di Harar", Studi EtioPici,
I, :L+, 23-28.
119
The real cause of the struggle must be sought in the
movements of the nomadic peoples of the lowlands. It was
Trimingham who first placed the Afar nomads in the centre of
events.
Behind all these struggles between Ethiopia and
the Muslims was a movement of expansion of the
'Afar (Dankali) and Somali. The movement appears
to have been initiated by the 'Afar who lived in
the region of the oasis of Aussa and the valleys
descending from the eastern districts of Shoa.
Their seasonal migrations carried the tribes
westwards and they were ready, given the required
stimulus, to burst out of their desert plains and
flood over the sedentary societies of the plateaux.
Because of some basic contradictions in his opinion of
the greatness of Ifat, Trimingham loses sight of his theory and
falls into line with Bruce and Cerulli. In his demarcation of
the sultanate, Trimingham places within it all the lowland
regions as well as the Charchar-Harar highlands.
2
The whole
issue is thus reduced once more to the westward expansion of
Ifat. Perhaps one reason why scholars, Cerulli and Trimingham
included, have tended to interpret the struggle in terms of a
clash resulting from the expansionist policies of Ethiopia and
Ifat, or of political, commercial and even religious rivalry
1. Islam in Ethiopia, p .
79.
The westward migration of the
Afar was first suggested by Kammerer. He thought that the
Afar, the Adal clans in particular, invaded Harar and Irat,
from which they began to threaten Christian Ethiopia.
According to Karnmerer, the threat to Ethiopia seems to have
been felt by Laljbela, La Mer Rouge, l'Abyssinie et l'Arabi,
vol.1, part 3, pp.3+l, 35l-35+.
However, had the Muslim ml-
grations into the highlands been taking place as early as
that, Lalibela would not have risked building his famous
churches at so exposed a place as Roha.
2. Islam n Ethio p ia,
pp.67-68.
120
betvedn them, is because they find It difficult to conceive the
widely scattered and highly fragmented Afar nomadsinfluencing
the policy of the sophisticated sedentary Muslims of Ifat, Adal
and Harar.
That the vast lowland regions between the Shawan plateau
and the Red Sea and between the Charchar-Harar highlands and the
Gulf of Aden did not form one political unit Is brought out
clearly in the chronicle of Amda Seyon and confirmed by the
various Arabic documents on the sultantes themselves. 1 Even hat,
Adal and Harar do not seem to have been united under the same
ruler until the rise of Ahmad Granh.
Before the outbreak of the conflict between Christians
and Muslims, Ifat and the other sultanates of sedentary agrici.1 -'
turalists were themselves seriously troubled by raids and incur-
sions of the lowland nomads. According to an enlightening Arabic
document, these Incursions seem to have began early in the
twelfth century. 2 Throughout this century and much of the
1 . The various sultanates and emirates as well as the different
tribes of lowland pastoralis and nomads involved inthe re-
peated attempts to invade the highlands are listed in
"Histoire des gilerres d'Amda Syon t t , op.clt., text, pp.31 8-23,
trans., pp
.359- 62 . The attempts by Conti Rossini and, after
him, by Huntingford to identify some of the many names given
in
the chronicle help to bring the nomadic Afar tribes thore
Into the picture. See C. Conti Rossini, "Catalogo del nomi
proprt di luogo dell'Etiopja, contenuti. nei testi
gi'Iz ed
aznharia finora publicati", Atti del
p rimo Congresso Geo gra-
fico Itallano, II (1 89 k-f) , 387 -'-
i-39; and Huntingford's intro-
duction to his English translation of the chronicle,
Glorious Victories of Amda Sevon,
pp
.30-32. On the Information
from the Arabic documents see Rinck, Macrizi historia regum
Islamiticorum in Ab
y ssinia, pp.1 -2,
1 0; Cerulli,"L'Etiopja
medjera1 e in alcuni brani di scrittori arabi", RSE, 1 1 1
(contd.,)
121
following, the rulers of Ifat and the other sultanates
made
independent as well as joint retaliatory expeditions into the
lowlands but without succeeding in checking the movements of
the restless inhabitants. The
pressure from the nomadic
peoples, in fact, continued to mount to the extent that some
of the pastoralist and sedentary peoples of the sultantes had
to give way by migrating westwards into the Christian inhabited
highlands.
The defensive measures which yekuno Amlak and his
immediate successors adopted threatened the very existence of
the sultanates; and their rulers had to come to terms either
with the emperors or with the nomads. The ambivalent policies
of Ifat. , Adal and Harar are clearly reflected in the various
chronicles of Ethiopia and the sultanates themselves. However,
as the nomads were more dangerous than the emperors the ani-
mosity between the sedentary Muslims and the nomads often gave
way to partnership. Considering the immense prestige whi,ch the
Walasma rulers of hat enjoyed among all the Muslims of eastern
Ethiopia, it seems that members of this dynasty were mainly
responsible for bringing about and perpetuating this partnership.
(Footnotcontd. from
p.12c'. )
(191+3), 2
79; Kammerer La Mer ?ou g e l t Abvssinie et ltArabie,
vol.1, part
3,
pp.285-
7;
and Huntingford, op.cit., pp.19-20.
2.
Cerul]j
(trans. and ed.), "II sultanato dello Scioa nel
secolo XIII secondo un nuovo documento storico", RSE, I
(l9+1), i-i^.
122
So very poor is our knowledge of climatic conditions
in the periods in question, and of the interaction between the
pastoralist and nomadic peoples of the lowlands, that an inquiry
into the causes of the restlessness of these peoples cannot be
answered by anything better than conjectures. The duration of
the conflict between highland Christians and lowland Muslims is
such that the struggle can hardly be explained in terms of slave
raiding or clashing policies of political, commercial or
religious expansion. Substantial increase in livestock accompaflie
by growth in population may have been the initial cause of the
movements. Due to the barrenness of their lands, the coastal
nomads were probably more affected by the general growth than
the pastoralists further inland. Various Somali tribes could
have also moved westwards and northwards from the coast of the
Gulf of Aden, pressing against the Warjeh, Gabal and Afar nomads
of Adal. It may have been this pressure by the Somali which,
added to the outburst from within the Danakil lowlands, gave the
Christian-Muslim conflict the intensity which it retained for
more than three centuries.'
1. See I.M. Lewis's interesting suggestions about the causes
of Somali expansion in "The Somali Conquest of the Horn of
Africa", JAB, I (19
6 0), 222.
123
To alleviate the concerted pressure by the Muslims
on the Christians of the highlands, the emperors adopted two
main policies. The first was to provide land for a small
number of tribes and clans and to settle them in those eastern
provinces which were continuously threatened by invasion. We
do not know if the emperors made the conversion to Christianity
one of the conditions for the settlement of these peoples, but
many did become Christians. This policy intended, so to speak,
to provide a safety-valve for the Afar and Somali pressure, had
some success. The second policy, which was complementary to
that of settlement, consisted in the garrisoning of regiments
near the valleys and defiles of the escarpment through which
the invaders gained access to the highlands. Although the
purpose of the military system was primarily to defend the
Christian inhabited highlands from invasion, it wa gradually
developed so as to separate the lowland Muslim peoples from each
other by the establishment of military camps between them. Two
ways of garrisoning were adopted; one in a general north to
south direction, alon.g the escarpment from Hamassen, down Doba
district to Bali; another consisting of parallel lines of
garrisoned strongholds penetrating in a west to east direction
towards the flanakil lowlands and the Harar highlands.
124
The latter system was never developed to the extent
that It could have been for two main reasons4 the reluctance of
the highland soldier to live in the hot lowlands,' and the fear
of committing the classical error of extending one's lines of
communications.
The result was the conversion of Ifat and
Dawaro into veritable military camps from which regiments were
able to strike easily and swiftly into Adal and Harar, where no
soldiers were stationed, and to the lowlands beyond. The
garrisoning of Dawaro and Ifat succeeded in separating the Afar
nomads from the sedentary inhabitants of the provinces, but
failed to fence off the Somali tribes from the nomads and
pastoralists of Adal or the sedentary agriculturalists of Harar.
1.
The chronicle of Anida Seyon gives many examples of the
soldiers' dislike of the hot and dry lowlands and of
their reluctance to stay long in them. "HLstoire des
uerres d'Amda Syon", op.cit., text, pp
.3O3-3O+, +l5-i6,
trans.,
pp.31+7-+8, '+65.
2. Ibid., text,
p.32'+, trans., p.362.
125
IIAhmad Granh's invasion of Ethiopia.
Overwhelmed by the repeated Ethiopian victories, the
ruling families of Ifat and Adal gradually ceased to lead the
Muslims of the lowlands into the highlands. The sultans of
Harar, who claimed to be direct representatives of the Walasma
dynasty of Ifat, took up the leadership in an effort to save
their sultanate from being engulfed by the Afar and Somali nomads.
Although the rulers of Harar led incursion after incursion through
the valley of the Awash into Fatagar, Waj and Bali, the advantages
Ethiopia enjoyed in material and human resources, and the effec-
tiveness bf its defence systems, Soon began to have an effect on
relations between arar and Ethiopia.1
A radically different policy was adopted by Muhammad
ibn Badlay, a contemporary of Ba'eda Maryam. According to a
message he sent the emperor, the Muslims desired peace and prom-
ised to continue to pay their annual tribute. 2 The adoption of
1. The incursions up the Awash valley and along the Charchar
highlands explain why the Ethiopian court was removed from
north-eastern Shawa to Fatagar, and why it had been shifting
between the latter province and Waj.
Zarra
Ya'eqob passed
most of his time between Dabra Berhan, the city he founded,
and Yalabasha, while Ba t eda Maryam was moving between the
latter and some place in Waj. Les chronigues de Zar'a Ya'
egob et de Ba'eda Maryam,
pp.67, 155, 180, 182.
2. Ibid., p.131.
126
this policy meant the resignation from the traditional mission
of uniting the sedentary Semitic speaking Muslims and. the purely
Cushitic Afar and Somali nomads and leading them in the drive to
the west. It was an uninspiring policy, because it benefited
only a small segment of the peoples, the town dwellers of the
Harar highlands. By adopting it the Harar dynasty lost its
prestige, not only with the pastoralists and nomads, but also
with the inhabitants of the small satellite emirates to the east
and south-east of the sultanate. lust as the ruling families of
Ifat, Adal and Harar had earlier found it wise to direct the
movements of the pastoralists and the nomads through their lands,
it became now necessary for the chiefs of the small emirates like
Hobat and Harla to take over the military and political leader-
ship from Muhammad ibn Badlay and his successors.' Of the
1. Hobat was probably an emirate of Afar pastoralists situated
on the plains north of the Harar highlands. The caravan
route from Daaro to Zala may have passed through it.
See Cerulli, "Ii sultanato dello Scioa nel secolo XIII",
op
.cit., pp.13, 18, 26; Chihab ed-Din, Histoire de 1.
congute de l'Abyssinie, trans., p.l6-17, 20-21;
Trimingham, Islam in Ethiop ia,
p . 5 5.
The emirate of Harla,
which took its name from its inhabitants, occupied much of
the southern slopes of the Charchar-Harar highlands and some
parts f the Babile plains. The Harla were divided into
many clans of agriculturalists, some of which were the Zerba,
Zemobarah, Bazarah, Yagolah, Jazar, Arab Takha and Alga.
Histoire de la concug te de l'Abyssinie, trans., pp.111-i2,
118, 171. The Harla were probably closer to the Somali
than to their Semitic speaking neighbours in Harar or the
Afar in the lowlands to the north and north-east. (Contd.)
12'I
(Footnote 1,
p.
s2 contd.)
Chihab ed-Din does not seem to have regarded the Harla
and the Somali as in any way related to each other.
But the rivalry and animosity which he 'witnessed between
them could have been the hostility which neighbouring
nomads and agriculturalists normally manifest towards
each other. The Harla are remembered by the Somali of
Jijiga, and the Galla of Babile and eastern Charchar,
as giant Somali who built and populated the many
Muslim towns the ruins of which can be seen in these
areas. Azals and haznbard,. Cinq annes de recherches
archologigues en Ethiopie, I, 33-35, 131-33;
and R.E.
Drake-Brockinan, British SomaLLiand,The Harla
name has also survivec, in a small cl.n of Somali
found to the south of Harar city. Ibid., p.27+;
G. Ferrand, Lesoina]is, p
.98 ;
P.2. Cox, Genealogies of
the Sonial Including Those of the Avsa and Gadabursi, p.1;
and R.R. Burton, First Footsteps in ast Africa, p.171+.
128
frontiersmen who took over the leadership of the pastoralists
and nomads, the most known were Lada'e tTsman, Garad Mahfuz,
Garad. Abun and Ahmad ibn Ibrahim. 1
The effectiveness of the
new leadership was demonstrated by the successive defeats
suffered, by the Ethiopians. In the time of Ba'eda Maryam two
big armies were practically annihilated. His successor Eskender,
a better soldier than his father, responded by de(
T astatlng Harar
as far east as Its relatively sheltered capital city of Dakar,
but he 'ost most of his men on his way back. Mahfuz remained
the scourge of Dawaro, Fatagar and Waj for twenty-four years,
until his death in 1516.
The decline of the Harar dynasty was manifested by
the rivalry and conflict among its members which followed the
assassination of sultan Muhammad ibn Azhar ad-Din in 1 51 8. This
opened a short period of intense civil war in which the sedentary
peoples of Harar, supported by the Somali, pitted themselves
against the agriculturalists and pastoralists of the border
emirates, backed by the Afar. This dangerous rift was healed
by the young but patient and visionary Ahmad lbn Ibrahim,
commonly known as Abmad, Grarth. In spite of the unpopularity of
the last sultans, the dynasty still had some prestige left. Ahinad
divested the office of the sultan of all its powers, but pre-
1 . Ceruili has corrected Perruchon's error of translation by
which he made
adae
Tjsman a sultan and a successor to
Muhammad ibn Badlay. Les chroni p ues de Zar'a Ya'eciob et de
Ba'eda aryam, p.1 50; and Cerulli, t t Documenti arabi per la
storia deli' Etiopia", MRAL, Pt (1 931 ), n.5, p1 )+8.
129
served it for its value as a symbol of unity and continuity.1
Historians Interested. in the successes of Mahfuz and.
Ahmad Granh had explained the change in the fortunes of the
Muslims by relating the Muslim-Christian conflict to the rivalry
of the Egyptians and then of the Turks with the Portuguese over
the Indian trade. Briefly stated, the explanation is that the
Arabs and Egyptians, and, after 1517,
the Turks, encouraged and
armed the Muslims of Ethiopia i. order to prevent a military
alliance between Ethiopia and Portugal. This explanation is
based on an overestimation of Arab influence on the Ethiopian
Muslims and on a misreading of the chronology of Turkish expan-
sion into Arabia and the Red Sea. Several factors, all of them
remote from rivalry over the spice and silk trade of India,
account for the successes of Mahfuz and Abmad Granh. The
gradual deterioration of relations between the emperors and the
aristocracy, and in particular the effect of Lebna Dengel's
tyrannical reign, have already been discussed in the introduc-
tory chapter.
Although Chihab ed-Din's chronicle Is the first his-
torical document to offer abundant references to the Somali, it
is not an Indication that the Somali were just beginning to in-
vade the Danakil plains and the lowlands east and south of Harar.
1. Histoire de la conute de l'Abysslnie, trans.,
pp.1-36;
and Trimin ham, o
p .cIt., pp.8'+-86.
130
The role the Somali played during the short civil war, and the
close ties between the somali chiefs and the nobility of the
various emirates which Chihab ed-Din describes, show that the
Somali and the other Muslims had been neighbours of each other
for a long time. However, on many occasions Chihab ed-Din
throws slurs on Somali chiefs, and represents some of their
tribes as lawless bandits. Since he was a Yamanite and a late-
comer to the early period of Ahmad Granh, his opinion could be
a reflection of local opinion. These and other details suggest
that the Somali had taken advantage of the civil conflict to
take more grazing lands from the Afar as well as from each other.
The Habar Magadi were established near the Harar high-
lands, east of the erer river from where they preyed on
car,vans going to ad from Zala.' The equally intractable
Marehaan, who occupied the plains south-east of Harar,
neighboured upon the Habar Magadi. 2 The location of the Bartirri
is uncertain; they could have lived east of the Marehaan.3
1. Histolre de la conute de
ltAbyssinie,
trans., pp.i-5+6.
2. Ibid., p.+. According to Chihab ed-Din, Hirabu, chief of
the Marehaan, was the son of Goita Tedros son of Adam.
Ibid., pp.70, 92. Goita was a common title among the
Semitic speaking Muslims. That a Somali chief would have
for father a man from the agricultural emirates is another
indication of the integration of the Somali with the
sedentary Muslims.
3.
It seems that the Bartirri and the Marehaan were then
fractions of the Habar Magadi. Ibid.,
p.173.
131
The fewness of the Bartirri men who were enrolled under Ahmad
indicates either that the tribe was not big, or else that it was
only just beginning to move into areas under the influence of
Harar. Even if the Gueri of Amda Seyon's chronicle cannot be
confidently identified with the Gerri, there can be no doubt
that this tribe was among the first of the Somali groups to
move west into the Danakil plains. At the beginning
Othe
sixteenth century the Gerri were deeply involved in Harar
politics, taking Ahmad's side, and their chief, Mattan ben Usuian,
had taken his sister for wife.' They inhabited the plains
north-east of Harar, which made them open to incursions from
the Habar Nagadi, who were on the side of Ahmad' s enemies.2
The Ilarti, Jiren3
, Mait, Bersub, 5 Mazro or Mazar,6
1. Ibid.,
p.73.
2. Ibid.,
pp)+5.)+6.
3 .
The Tiren have disappeared as an independent tribe. It is
unlikely that there Is any connection with the Jirana of the
Wa.11o Galla. Cf. Huntingford, The Galla of Ethiopia, p.l+.
-i-, The Nait have also disappeared, but the name has survived
in the coastal village of Mait and the nearby island of
the same name north of Erigavo. Cf. I.M.Lewis, "The
Somali Conquest of the Horn of Africa t t , op.clt., p.223 .
5 .
The'Bersub today form a large Somali tribe, but a fragment
seems to have been assimIlated by the Gal1a., giving rise to
the Wara Bersub. Azais and Chamnbard, Cinci ann g es de recherche
rcholo gI pues enthio p ie, ,
79;
and Huntingford,.cit.,
p.15.
6. There is no trace of this tribe.
132
Gurgura 1 and Sagara2 were also under the political influence of
Harar, but if the number of soldiers who fought in the army of
Ahmad can be taken as an indication, not of their overall number
but of the degree of their integration into Harar political
organization, then these tribes were still in the process of
migrating from the east. Likewise the Hawiya, living to the
south of the Marehaan, had only a weak link with Harar. The
Yibir, today consisting of a number of small clans of bondsmen
wiaely scattered among the Somali, were then represented as
equals of the other Somali.
Very little can be said about the effect which the
garrisoning of Ifat and Dawaro had on the Muslim inhabitants.
The hardships of supporting the numerous regiments could have
resuLted in the migration of a large number of people to Adal and
to the Harar highlands. The Argobba wIo lived to the south of
Harar city seem to have come from Ifat. Those of their noblemen
and chiefs who stayed behind were integrated into the Ethiopian
administration, but would not have been insensible to their
subordinate positions
1. The Somali Gurgu.ra were assimilated by the Nole Galla.
Ibid.,
pp.78-79;
P. Paulitschke, Beitrae zur Ethnographie
und Anthro p olo g ie der Somal, Galla und Harart, p.1+7
E.Scarin, Hararino. Ricerce e studi g eo grafici, p.8. A
Gurgura district is, however, indicated in GSGS/NC38, north-
east of Erigavo.
2 . Burton mentions a Shagharrah district occupied by the Tarso,
op.cit.,, p.277. See also Paulitschke, Harar, p.186.
But the main answer to the whole problem of the sudden
military improvement in the Muslims is found in the character
and personality of the two leaders. The people they governed
were weaker and more divided than they had ever been. These men
both had the charismatic qualities of the true leader, and they
united and inspired their people for heroic sacrifices. In the
scant references to Mahfuz made by Alvarez, he shows him as a
simple, austere and single-minded person.' It was probably due
to her father's influence that Batia Del Wambara developed her
strong character.
Ahmad ibn Ibrahim was born sometime in 150 or
1507.
Althougli there is no clear evidence to show that he was a Somali,
hj father seems to have been connected with the chiefs of Ilarla.3
Ibrahim was garad of one of the small emirates, probably Sim, be-
tween Harar and Dawaro, and. had taken part in many incursions
into Fatagar and Shawa. Owing to his political position or to
his loyalty to Mahfuz, he was able to arrange for his son an
L. The Prester John of the Indies, II,
1-ll-l+. See also Chihab
ed-Din, Histoire de la conciute de 1'Abvssinie, trans., p.96.
2. According to Chihab ed-Ding Ahmad was 21 years old in 1527,
soon after his victory over Dagaihan, Lebna Dengel's son-in-
law and then governor of Bali. Ibid., p)++.
3.
Ibrahim's sister was the mother of Muhammad, chiet' of the
Zerba clan of the Harla. Ibid., p .
73.
But the lady In
question need not have been of Hai'la origin.
134
advantageous marriage with Batia Del Wambara. Precocious as
Ahmad was, he
owred his early rise to his family connections.
What distinguis1ed. Ahmad from his father-in-law and made him
succeed where the other had failed, was his belief that he was
destined to conquer Ethiopia. He was completely free of the
harshness and intolerance characteistic in most religious
fanatics of his period. His boundless confidence was not merely
the result of piety or the influence of religious men; it came
from his correct estimate of his abilities as an admini.strator
and soldier. This enabled him to deal patiently with his
opponents at home and gained him the respect of many of Lebna
Dengel's subjects.
For the essentially mili.tary goal of Ahrnad, such
qualities alone would not have been enough. He was a capable
soldier and tactician. Unlike Lebna Dengel and the comxnaners
often chosen by hi,m, Ahrnad. did not consider the size of an army
as a basic condition for defeat or victory. As a tactician, he
rarely took unnecessary risks or fought on unfavourable ground.
He had the inborn capacity to inspire his men and to keep up
their morale. Heretofore most emirs had conducted with serious
losses their own incursions into the highlands. When invasions
were coordinated and led by the sultans or the viziers, the
soldiers of the various emirates had fought under the banner of
13I
their respective chiefs. The Muslims had thus been vulnerable
whenever faced by the better organized Ethiopian armies of pro-
fessional soldiers. Ahmad could not have created regiments of
experienced soldiers had he wanted to, but he introduced certain
rational changes on the basis of Ethiopian examples. He welded
the various contingents into three groups so that in time of
battle they could be arrayed Into two wings of infantry with the
cavalry taking the centre. 1
Of the three, only the cavalry
could be said to consist of experienced soldiers. They were
chosen from among the malassay of the sedentary, Semitic speaking
Muslims and were armed with sabres from Arabia.2
1. Ibid., pp.+9-50, 8+-88.
2. Ibid., pp.8-i-, 111-12,
130-31.
I am indebted to Ato Dun
Muhammad of the Haile Sellassie I University for this ex-
planation of the term malassa y which has baffled readers
of the chrnjcles. It was not a Ge'ez word. for Muslims
or the name of a tribe, but meant confraternities of
warriors. These developed from childhood friendships and
associations. When boys of the same tom or district
reached maturity, they organized themselves formally into
groups by taking oaths of loyalty to each other. In
former days the purpose of these confraternities was
essentially military, and the childhood games were inten-
ded to provide basic training In fighting and the handling
of weapons. Today, when fighting is no longer an Important
activity, the word malassay means a very close and loyal
friend. The associations between young men have not com-
pletely disappeared. Cf. his "The Mugads of Harar",
etin, IV
(1955), 15-19.
13G
The unprecedented victory of
1529
at Sheinbra Kurie,
in which an incredibly superior force was annihilated, wa more
a personal triumph for Ahinad than a success for the Muslims.
Because his personality overshadowed everything else, the
original purpose of the invasion, which had been to enable
agriculturalists, pastoralists and nomads to shift a little to
the west, became subordinate to Ahmad's desire to conquer
Ethiopia. This over ambitious desire did nat arise from
religious zeal. It began modestly when Ahmad had to clear the
central provinces of the regiments stationed In them. In the
process Ahmad seems to have realized the importance of changing
his military victory into a political one. For the needs of the
Muslims the occupation of Dawaro, hat, Shawa and the provinces
between the Rift Valley lakes and the Gibe river would have
sufficed. The fear that they would not be able to keep them,
as long as there lived an emperor with enougx resources to enable
him to atterlipt the recovery of his lands, plunged Ahmad into the
conquest of an empire. Ahmad was not unaware of the misrule of
Lebna Dengel which had caused much dissatisfaction among the
nobility. He also knew that many of the Muslims and some of
the pagans would welcome him as a deliverer. He was not very
worried when, as he penetrated deeper into the highlands, more
and more of his Somali and Afar allies returned to their
13?
1
herds.By
1535,
when he reached Tigre, all that remained of
his army were the corps of malassa y horsemen. The vast majority
of his soldiers was recruited from converted Ethiopian soldiers
who had formerly made up the imperial regiments. Even the
administration of many of the conquered. districts had to be left
in the hands of those local lords who embraced Islam.
Ahmad.'s position appeared secure, because Lebna Dengel
lacked the imagination, and perhaps evei the courage, to create
difficulties for his enemy. It took the inexperienced eighteen
years' old Galawdewos, who had succeeded his father in i5+O,
less than two years to show how weak Ahmad's hold over the
country really was, and how deceptive was the extent of his
conquest. Galawdewos did not have a genius which matched
Ahmad's, but he did have the measure of ability and strength of
personality necessary to inspire confidence in the Christian
population. The few successful attacks he made on Muslim garri-
sons, and the timely arrival of Dorn Christopher da Gama and. his
-fOO Portuguese soldiers, sufficed between them to wreck Ahmad's
ambitions.
1. An example of Somali as well as malassav opposition to
further conquest beyond Shawa is mentioned by Chihab ed-
Din, op.cit., pp.206-207. Their reluctance to advance
further into the plateau was induced by the fear that the
whole country might rally to the emperor and that they
might lose what they had gained.
138
Since the chronicles on the conquest concentrate on
its purely military aspects, it is dif'icult to make any estimate
of the extent to which the Muslim peoples shifted westwards
during the invasion. The Muslim peoples under Ahmad comprised,
as we have seen, nomads, pastoralists and agriculturalists. It
appears that much of the sedentary population had moved into the
nearby highland provinces leaving to the other two sections some
space in which to spread themselves. The case of the E1-Ijju
is an indication of such a movement. The El-Iju lived in a
district of Ifat called Qawat, a land so fertile, says Chihab
ed-Din, that it was known as a smaller Gojam. They were
Christians at the beginning of the conquest and had a language
distinct from the languages of the neighbouring Axnhara and
Muslims. Though a large part of the El-Ijju embraced Islam,
their ruler and some of the people remained Chrisjians. Many
El-Ijju men, were made to accompany the Imam in his conquest of
1
Amhara.
How or when the El-Ijju of Qawat came to settle in
Angot is not known but there can be little doubt that they are
the forefathers of the Yajju of Wallo. Had the ancestors of
the Yajju been soldiers of El-Ijju stationed in Angot, it is
unlikely that they would have survived the vengeance of the
1. Ibid.,
pp. 2
69, 291, 298,
355,
361, 382.
139
local Christians or the later pressure of the Galla. The El-Ijju
must have moved to Angot in large numbers, and the reason they
did not return to their fertile country after the collapse of
Ahmad's empire must be because Muslims from across the Awash had
occupied Qawat. The Yajju trace their origin to a Sheikh Umar
who settled in Angot in the time of Ahmad. 1
The Galla, who have
failed to subdue or assimilate them completely, know them by the
name of Wara Sheikh. 2
The Yajju speak Amharic and, as their
history shows, have adapted themselves more readily and rapidly
than the neighbouring Marawa, Wechale or Wallo Galla to the tra-
ditional social and political structures of Christian Ethiopia.
After the Irnain's death the leadership of the Muslims
fell on Abbas, who had been second in command. According to the
chronicle of Galawdewos, the new leader declared himself king of
the Muslims who were in Bali, Fatagar and Dawaro.
3 Who these
Muslims were is not clear, but they could not have been survivors
of Ahmad's army, because this was made up mostly of prisoners and
1.
A.Tayya, Ya-it'ova hezb tank, pp.+_)+5; and Gubr Sellass1,
Chroniciue du regne de Mnlik I1, I, 198.
2.
ThLs name is an indication that the Yajju were Muslims at the
time of the Gafla invasion. See Tn1mringham, op.cit., pp.
195-96.
3.
W.E.Conzelman, Chronidue de Galawdewos, pp.28,
138.
140
deserters who had embraced Islam, and who, as soon as they dis-
covered that Galawdewos had proclaimed, as it were, a national
amnesty, gladly returned to their former faith. 1
Had these
Muslims been forcibly converted from Christianity they would
surely have turned against Abbas when they heard of the emperor's
desire to forgive and forget. On the other hand, had they been
soldiers from the various emirates, they would not have cut them-
selves off from their compatriots by declaring themselves indepen-
dent of the sultan at Harar. Abbas's action suggests that the
Muslims under him were not only self-sufficient bit felt that
their welfare was not very much in the heart of the sultan. In
spite of the confidence and strength which the emperor's army
had gained from its victory over Granh, Galawdewos was unusually
hesitant about attacking Abbas in flawaro.
In the end it was
Abbas himself who came out to Waj, apparently with the intention
o blocking the emperor in case he wanted to march into Bali or
Dawaro 2
Abbas was a very experienced soldier, and his
1.
Miguel Castanhoso, one of the soldiers of Dom Christopher da
Gama, had given a vivid and moving account of the many former
Christian noblemen and soldiers who had remained loyal to the
imam up to the end and of their reconciliation with Galawdewos.
One of the lords was Dagana whose son az ach Yeshaq was one of
the few men who had not gone over to Ahmad Granh. R.S.White-
way (trans. and ed.), The Portu g uese Expedition to Abyssinia,
pp.81F-86.
2. Chroniciue de Galawdewos, p p . 2
9-30 ,
138.
141
offensive of i5+5
was not an overestimation of his strength but a
desperate attempt to protect the Muslims of these provinces.
Not only was his army numerically inferior, but many of the
capable captains and brave inalassa y
who had served Ahmad so well
1
had perished in the various provinces.
concludes his account of this episode:
The chronicler thus
Aprs avoir accompli cet exploit le roi
Galwdwos, que la paix soi su liii! mit
sujets en possession du pays beni ou coulaient
le lait et le miel, afin qu'ils habitassent des
maisons qu'ils n'avaient pas construites, qu'ils -
bussent l'eau des puits qutils n'avaient pas creuses
et qu'ils r6coltassent les moissns des champs
qu'ils n'avaient pas ensemencs.
The death of Abbas and of many of his soldiers was
hence followed by an exodus of many Muslims from Bali and Dawaro.
The crowding of refugees in emirates occupiea by Afar pastoral-
ists was not conducive to peace between Muslims and Cliristians,
or even among the Muslims 'themselves. Galawdewos was forced to
move his court into Dawaro to prevent a new invasion of the
highlands. The pacificatiOn of the eastern lowlands made impera-
tive the reconstruction of the military defences which had
1. As he wrote to King JObn III of Portugal in his letter of
1550,
Galawdewos had acquired many of the field guns and
inatchlocjcs which Ahmad Granh had taken from the Portuguese
and the matchlocks which his 200 Turkish mercenaries had
brought with them from Yaman. The Portuguese Expedition
to Ab
y ssinia, p.117.
2. Chronique de Galawdewos, pp.31, l39--FO.
142
crumbled during the invasion. Some of the old regiments whose
soldiers had been completely dispersed were resuscitated. The
Muslims' need to recover the provinces won for them by Ahinad,
and Galawdewos's determination to keep them out, left Bali ex-
posed to Galla occupatiotL.
I ACi
1L1)
IIIThe beginning of the Galla migrations
There is an argument which dies hard that much of
northern Somalia and the Ethiopian province of Ogade was inhabi-
ted by the Galla until, in the
anth ori tth century,
the Somali. who were in the extreme north of the Horn began to
displace them. 1 This opinion is based on Somali traditions,
which attribute a Galla origin to many ruins of houses and
remains of ancient cairn-tombs found over much of Somalia. The
French explorer Rcvoil was shown such. ruins at Olok a few miles
west of Cape Guardafui. At Khor Abdahan, Just south of the
Cape, he came across the remains of a rectangular building whose
foundations were cut from the rock, where he also found potsheds
and fragments of what he considered to be a Roman type millstone.2
What the Somali of Alleyah, on the Gulf of Aden, regarded as of
Galla make is more surprising. It was the ruin of a two
storeyed construction built with lime and stones. 3 At Harnmar,
1. The main exponents of this hypothesis are Cerulli, Etiopia
Occidentale, II, 17
2
; and his So alia, I, 286-88; Hunting-
ford, The Galla of Ethiopia, p.
19;
and Beckingham and
Huritingford, Some Records of Ethiopia, pp.lxxi-lxxiii;
I.M.Lewis, "The Galla in Northern Somaliland", RSE, XV
(1959), 21-3
8;
and his rhe Somali Conquest of the Horn
of Africa", op.cit.,
213 -3 0.
See also Swayne, Seventeen
Trips to Sornaliland, pp.22, 27.
2. G.Rvoi1, La vallee du Darror, pp)+l,
52-53 .
3 . Ibid., pp.100-101.
144
south of Berbera, the British explorer James found stone mounds
said to be remains of an ancient Galla settlement. His Somali
guides also told. him that the site had always been known as
Sheikh and that it was a place of pilgrimage for the neighbouring
1
Somali.
If these traditions were to be taken at their face
value, we would have a clear explanation for the westward move-
ment of the Afar and Somali nomads and of the Semitic speaking
sedentary peoples from the Harar highlands and the Danakil low-
lands. However, neither Harar and Ethiopian traditions nor
chronicles make any mention of the presence of the Galla in.
these areas until after the second half of the sixteenth
century. Soleillet and the other early travellers thought that
the name Galla was derived from the Somali
The Somali use
the word to designate the pagans whom they claim to have expelled
from northern Somalia. But as H.S.Lewis points out the word j
in Somali means pagan and could perfectly well refer to the pre-
Islamic Soniali. 3
The reminiscences in Somali traditions of the
1. F.L.James, The Unknown Horn of Africa, pp.6+-65. Also L.
Robecchi-Bricchetti, Nel p aesi de g li aromi, p)4f3; and
C.Citerni, Ai confini meridionali dell' Etio p ia, p.137.
2. Soleillet, Vo y a g es en
p.111I-. Huntingford suggests
that Galla may be a Sidama name, though he does not explain
the reasons for his view. The Galla of.Ethio p ia, p.11.
3 .
H.S.Lewis 11 The Origin of the Galla and Somali", JA.H, VII
(1966), 31.
145
many wars they fought, supposedly in the process of taking over
the lands of the Galla, were in reality about the defensive wars
which the Somali fought during the peak of the Galla migrations.
Many of the above mentioned ruins, especially those near
the Cape and Berbera, show a sophisticated knowledge of building
which one might expect from sedentary and trading communities,
but hardly from isolated and wandering camel herdsmen as the
Galla are believed to have been. In any case, acceptance of
these traditions would lead to the untenable conclusion that the
Horn, including the coastal lands, was occupied by the Galla.
The same Somali traditions which attribute these sites to the
Galla often speak, in association with the ruins, of kafirs and
Fars! Proper excavation in those sites may one day reveal the
mystery of the ruins and the identity of their makers.
1. Conti Rossini mentions the- existence of strong traditions
in Suakin, the Dahla Islands, Assab and other coastal
centres about the presence of Persians or Furs, as the
inhabitants call them.
Storia d t Etio p i p , pp.295-96.
Towards the end of the
sixth century the Persians had helped the South Arabians
to expel the Aksurnite soldiers, Although this was not
followed by a Persian occupation of the African coast,
they may have established trading posts in the main
coastal centres, including the incense markets of the
Horn.
146
Galla traditions place the Galla homeland in southern
Ethiopia, in the highlands between the Ganale Doria river and
the Abaya and Chamo lakes.' All Galla, whether of Tigre,Amhara,
Shawa, Harar or Wallaga, claim consistently that they had common
ancestors who came from Bahr Gamo. 2 The mountain of Walabo, east
of Lake Abaya, is generally associated with important Galla
religious ceremonies and remembered as the home of the first Abba
Muda of all the GaUa. 3
Not all the Galla remember today the
exact whereabouts of this ancestral homeland. To the Galla of
Shawa or Arussi, Bahr Gamo was in the south near or beyond a big
sea. To those of Harar, the mountain of Walabo lay to the west.
1. There is no basis whatsoever to Huntingford's assertion that
the Galla, in their traditions, claim that their first home-
land was the former British Somaliland and northern Somalia.
The Galla of Ethio p ia, p .19.
?. W.C.Harris,
Travels in
- 'J. _I_J_
,
As sociation
D. Brielli,
p .89.
ands of Aethiopia, III,
)i5;
C.Johnston,
byssinia through the Countr y of Ac1al to
II, 392; C,T.Beke,rtieOItmof the
the Advancement of Science,
pp.5-6;
and
cordi storici dei
Uollou,
Studi Etiopici,
3.
P. Soleillet, Vo y a g es en EPhinie, p p .260-261; Martial de
Salviac, Les Galla, grande nation africaine,
pp.
1-2;
Cerulli, Etio p ia occidentale, II, 1 69-17
2 ;
and his
Somalia, II, 127.
147
By west, however, they meant in the direction of Bali but not,
as Martial de Salviac thought, the vast regions between the White
Nile, the Baro-Sobat rivers and the Blue Nile.
' The Galla of
Wallo and Tigre, as may be expected, are not sure of any
direction. Many people In Ethiopia have forgotten that Bahr
Gamo was the name of an ancient province west of Lake Abaya and
1aie
thus been given a somewhat confusing etymology. It is said
that bahr g
amo means beyord the sea, and. this has led to some
groundless assumptions about the Gallas coming from outside
2
Africa.
Beke' s argument that the Galla would not have
1.
Martial de Salviac, op.clt., pp.1-2, 157.
2. n the assumption that the Galla may have come from. Zanzibar
see Rochet d' Hrjcourt Voyage (l8+l), pp.205-206; and
Soleillet, op.cit. 7
p.53.
Martial de Salviac even goes to
the trouble of trying to prove that the Galla were a lost
branch of the Gauls of France. O p .cit., pp.3
1
f5-75.
While
among the Borana of southern Ethiopia, V. B?ttego was told
by some of the elders that the Galla were of the white
race and had crossed a sea before coming to Ethiopia.
L' Omo (narrated by L. Vannutelli and C. Citerni), pp.167-
68. The Ethiopian author Asme, writing towards the end
of the XlXth century, makes the Galla to come from
Madagascar, by way of Mombasa. Ya Galla Tank, fol.31,
MS. Ethiopien 302, Bibliothque National de Paris.
Needless to say that until their contact with European
travellers and. missionaries the Galla or the other
Ethiopians could not have known the very names of Zanzibar
or Madagascar.
I am indebted to Dajazmach Zewde Gabre Sellassie for
allowing me to consult his Xerox copy of the Paris MS.
148
compounded a phrase from Amharic and Galla words seems logical.
But his correction of bahr gamo to Bar gamo made him inrer
that the Galla entered Ethiopia through Wallaga from beyond the
Baro.'
The earliest reference to the Galla is found in the
famous map which the Venetian Fra Mauro drew for Prince Henry
the Navigator. Mauro completed his map in l-F
59
using inforina-
tion he obtained from the Ethiopian monks who had come to
attend the Council of Florence. 2 The monks came to Italy in
l4Fl , and, as they had been living in Jerusalem for some time,
the information they gave to Mauro could be on developments
which had occurred much earlier. Mauro's map shows a river to
which he gave the two names of Xebe and Galla. The part called
Galla, which is the lower course of Mauro's river, is placed
directly below the river Auasi nd the province of Vaidi, namely
south of the Awash and of Waj. Kammerer has identified the Galla
river with the Omo, while Crawford thinks it is one of the
1. C.T.Beke, "On the Origin of the Gal1a' 1 , o p .cit,, p.6.
2. On the importance of Fra Mauro's chart in the develop-
ment of cartography see Charles de la Roncire,
Ti ir, IT t' 4- 1 I A N 4 ri,,ii ynr.ci4- p ci, , , rk a+
xplorateurs, II, 126, 135; A. Kammerer, La Mer Rou,
'A1yssinie et 1'Arabie, vol.1, part 3, pp.308, 37'f-87;
nd. P. Zurla, Di Marco Polo e g li altri viaggiatorl
eneziprji p lu illustri, II, 3'-F3-+9.
149
1
tributaries of the Gibe.

From its direction of flow and its

position in relation to the Awash and Waj, the most likely
identification is with the Gariale Doria, since the Wabi is
named elsewhere on the map. But the most important piece of
information which Mauro has given, the significance of which
neither Kammerer nor Crawford seem to have realized, Is the
very nai.e of Galla.
Zurla, in his study of Mauro, thinks that the people
described as fierce enemies of the Ethiopians and located south
of the Galla river were the Galla themselves.
2
Zurla's assump-
tion is probably correct, because Ethiopian chronicles make no
mention of any serious opposition to imperial authority by any
of the people south of Hadya or west of the Omo. In which case
Mauro's reference to these people would have this meaning: that
sometime towards the end of the fourteenth century or the begin-
ning of the fifteenth, the Galla had begun to cross the Ganale
Doria to raid Bali. Another Information of considerable signifi-
cance mentioned by Chihab ed-Din, though not a confirmation of
this conclusion, acts in conjunction with Mauro's as a corrective
1.
A.1(ammerer, op.cit., plate CXI in vol.1, part 3; and
Crawford, Ethiopian Itineraries circa 11-fOO-l52i-, p.198.
2. P. Zurla, Il rnapparnondo di. Fra Maurog camaldolese, p.136.
150
to the over-simplified and laconic references in Ethiopian
chronicles and oral traditions to the early history of the
Galla movement. The Muslim chronicler locates, somewhere in
or near Dawaro bt.t north of the Wabi Shabelle and neighbouring
on the garri,soned mountain fortress 0' Jan Amba, a district
called Wara Qalo)
The only truly dependable history of the Gala migra-
tions was written by the cleric Bahrey towards the end of Sarsa
Dengel's reign, hence long after the Galla had advanced beyond
Bali and Shawa into Ainhara, Bagameder and Angot. 2 On the first
movement of the Galla 1nt Ethiopia Bahrey writes:
The Galla came from the west and crossed the
river of their country, which is called Galana,
to the frontjer of Bali, in the time of Hase
Wanag Sagad.i
The Jesuit Manuel de Almeida, who seems to have had a
first-hand knowledge of Bahrey's manuscript, also dates the begin-
ning of the migrations to the Muslim invasion under Ahmad Granh.
1. Histoire de la conciute de l'Ab y ssinie, trans., p.1:37.
2. On the basis of internal evidence and comparison with the
chronicle of Sarsa Dengel, Beckingham and Huntingford have
dated the writing of Bahrey's history to the year
1593.
Some Records of Ethiopia, p.xxxvi.
3. English versiou in ibid., p.111. See also I. Guidi (trans.
and ed.), "Historia gentis Galla", CSCO, III, text, p.223,
trans.,
p.195.
The Galana river is in all probability the
Ganale Doria or the Galana Dida, its main tributary.
151
These lands lying between Baly and the sea,
the coast of which sailors call 'the desert' is
the real home and fatherland of the Gallas.
Thence came this plague and scourge of 'God
in the d,ays of the Emperor David, who was at first
called by his baptismal name Lebena Danguil, and was
also called Onag agued afterwards. They emerged at
the same time as the Moor Gran.he of Adel had invaded
and already conquered a large part of the empire.
They invaded the kingdom of Ball with which they had
a common frontier, or of which they were close
neighbours 1
John Bermudez was in Ethiopia throughout much of this
period. His unf'ortunate failure to realize the historical im-
portance of the years he passed In Ethiopia and his inability to
record even the most innocent of facts honestly and simply has
justifiably made historians suspicious of his book. It seems,
however, that Airneida's reference to the desert between Bali and
the Indian ocean was based on Bermudez's assertion that the
Galla had come from the country near Mogadishu.2
What Bahrey and the missionaries have forgotten to
tell is that infiltratiol2 by some Galla tribes into Ethiopia
had been going on for a long period before
Ahmadts
conquest.
The general impression of a sudden and overwhelming irruption by
a totally unknown people which they have created is unrealistic
1.
'Historia de Ethiopia a Alta", Rer. Aeth., V, +7+;
English
translation by Beckingham and Huntingford in Some Records of
Ethiopia,
pp.l33-31I-.
2. The Portu guese Exp edition to Ab y ssinia, p.228.
152
and legendary. The entry of the first Galla tribes into Bali
and the penetration by some into Dawaro does not appear to have
always been in the form of raids and incursions, as it is quite
improbable that Chihab ed-Din's Wara Qalo could have settled by
force in the highly garrisoned province of Dawaro and at that so
very near the stronghold of Jan Amba. Peaceful settlement of
migrating peoples was a tried policy. Such an arrangement with
the Wara Qalo and perhaps other Galla tribes as well would not
only have freed the regiments to deal with the Muslims who were
then a more serious threat, but would have also given allies to
the EthiopLan regiments, since these tribes would if necessary
defend their newly acquired lands against any enemy.
Much of Ethiopian, including Galla, traditional history
of the migration has been influenced by Bahrey. There is,
however, one legend about the origin of the Glla which seems to
have originated among the Amhara a few decades after Bahrey wrote
his history, but before it became widely known. The earliest
version of this legend dates to the first half of the seventeenth
century. From the tthtopian monk Abba Gregory, Ludoif learned
that the Galla were descended from slaves who, in order to es-
cape a harsh and cruel master, had fled south where they had so
multiplied and increased that they were able to return and in-
1
vade Ethiopia.According to another widely known version,
1. H. Ludolf, Historia Aethiopica, llv.I, cap.XVE, s.12-17.
153
the forefathers of the Gafla were born in Dawaro in the time of
Amda Seyon. It is said that a lady of noble birth who had fallen
into very difficult times became the mistress of a slave to the
provincial governor. She bore him seven children who increased
to the extent that they had to spread into the other parts of
the country. 1
These stories are no more serious than fables,
but there is a slight hint in them that in the siXteenth
century the Galla were not total strangers to the inhabitants of
south-eastern Ethiopia.
Nothing definite can be said. about the causes of the
Galla migrations. While in Addis Alam in 1928,
Cerulli heard
from an old man of the Gombichu tribe the interesting legend of
the beast 1i1msa which drove the Galla out of their homes in
Walabo. 2
As this legend does not seem to be known to other
Galla tribes, it is difficult to say that the beast was an
enemy of all the Galla. Cerulli thinks he has found in it a
confirmation of the hypothesis that the Somali expelled the
Galla from northern Somalia and then pushed them through Borana
onto the plateau. We have already seen how vague are the tra-
ditions about the presence of the Galla in northern Somalia.
1. A. Caquot trans. and ed.), '
tHlstoire amharique de Gra et des
Gallas", AE, II (1957), l23+3.
C.T.Beke was told that the
Galla were descendants of a lady of the imperial family, who
was given in marriage to a slave from Gurage. "On the Origin
of the Ga11', pcit., p,
11-. Brielli heard a similar story
in Waflo. "Ricordi stand dei Uollo", tudi Etio
pici,
p.87.
2. Etiopia occident1., II, 169-71.
154
Their expulsion from sQuthern Somalia is also contradicted by
eye witness accounts. When in l62^ the Jesuits Jeronimo Lobo
and Jo'o d Velasco landed on the Somali coast, where the Juba
and Wabi Shabelle lose themselves, they met many Galla tribes
who were sufficiently acquainted with the interior to advise
them against attempting to reach Ethiopia.'
Huningford does not disagree with Cerulli; in fact
he has the Somali chase the Galla up to Lake Rudolf.
2 It is,
therefore, to be assumed that, when he says that the li
p imsa may as
well have been the Sidama, he is suggesting that peoples other
than the Somali pushed the Galla up into Bali.
3
Although there
is no trace of Galla occupation of the lands west of Lake Stefanie,
some clash with the Arbore of this region may have taken place.
While Jeronimo Lobo was near the Juba, he was told by the Galla
that the Arbore were one of the nations through which he had to
pass to reach Ethiopia. The Arbore are today a small group and
there is no record of any kind which suggests that they had once
spread east of Lake Stefanie. Yet it is possible that they and
the neighbouring Konso had exerted some pressure on the Galla.
1. II. Le Grand (trans.)Vpga histori pue d'Ab y ssinie du
R.P. Jero e Lobo, p.2. $ee also Jo5X de Velascos letter
of July 2, l62 1 l, to Andreas Palmeiro in Rer. Aeth., XII,
77-79.
2. Beckingham and Huntingford, Some Records of Ethiopia,
p. lxxiii.
3 .
Ibid., p. lxxvi.
Le Grand, loc.cit.
, . . ' 1 c . v ) "
c
Moe'ie'iso(ike Gal(4 j I&vi of QaIawJwos
/155
jr
/
4aJ0
\. , (oL. I+c J
ML Utyilo
rc &
I
.
/L
f r j a
zt.I
J /
ofr
)
7l/g
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5k--G01i
---I
156
The whole of Walabo, and the rest of the highlands
between Lake Abaya and the Ganale Doria which the Galla consider
to be their original homeland, is now inhabited by the Darassa
and the Jam Jam groups of the Sidarna. It is probable that the
migration of various peoples from Ifat, Adal, the Charchar-
Harar highlands and the Danaki]. lowlands into the central plateau
had forced a southward dislocation of the peoples of Hadya,
Kambata, Gamo and Kuera. This may also account for the fact
that the Galla took the more difficult route through Bali, since,
at least until the wars of Ahmad Granh, it was a well defended
province. It would have been easier, otherwise, for the Galla to
descend into the lands immediately to the north of Lake Abaya,
and they would have been immediately inside the Immensely wide
and flat plains of the Rift Valley.
Still the magnitude of the migration was such that
such pressures cannot explain it. Bahrey and Almeida report a
curious practice, which suggests that a tremendous growth of
population was the main reason of the expansion. What religious
significance the custom of abandoning newly born girls had among
the ancient Galla Is not known, but it was probably their means
of controlling the rate of growth. 1 That this expansion was
1. Alineida, "Historia de Ethiopia a Alta", Rer. Aeth., V, +76;
Beckingham and HuntIngford, Some Records f Ethiopia,
pp.118,
13 6 ; "Historia gentis Galla", op.clt., text,
p.226,
trans., pp.199-200.
157
primarily due to an internal force may be argued from the fact
that the period of intense movement coincided with the time when
militarily Ethiopia was at its weakest. A further confirmation
of this view may be found in the nostalgic attachment which all
the Galla of Ethiopia have for the mystical religious and
political figure called Abba Muda. There is a surprising agree-
ment between Galla traditions and Bahrey's history about the
political unity of the Galla during the early part of the migra-
tion.' They were a unified nation sharing a common religious
leader, who was at the same time the source of political power.
Galla political organization was based on the gada or age-set
system. Yet though essentially democratic, no elected luba or
governing age-set began its office until it had received formal
confirmation from the Abba Muda.
At the beginning the sixteenth century the entire
Galla population seens to have been made up of two bodies which
historians and social anthropologists have designated as northern
and southern Galla. Although long before the migrations began
the two bodies may have recognized the supremacy of the same Abba
Muda, it seems that by this time the ties which bound them to-
gether had been weakened by the forces which brought about their
dispersal no'thwards into Ethiopia and southwards into Somalia
1. Ibid., text, p,223, trans.,
p.196;
Some Records of Ethiopia,
p.112.
158
and Kenya. 1 Each body was divided into two groups which
originally may have been exogamic moieties. The two groups of
that body whioh moved northwards into Ethiopia were called Boran
and Baraytuma. Each group had its own gada or age-set system,
but was attached to the other if not by the laws of exogamy at
least by allegiance to the same Abba Muda. We do not know
where in the vast region between Lake Abaya and the JUba river
these two groups lived. But it was tribes of the Baraytuma
which, even before Ahmad Granh began his invasioti, preceded the
Boran in the migration into Ball, and through into Dawaro. From
this we may be able to infer their relative position.
Jesuit sources state that at the time of their migra-
tions into Ethiopia the Galla were pastoralists who knew no
agriculture. Gaspar Barzeus was told that they lived on a diet
of milk and blood. 2 Later, Almeida wrote that their food con-
sisted of milk and meat. 3 However, both said that the Galla ate
whatever cereals they were alle to get du'ing their invasion.
1 . The study of the migrations Of the southern Gafla, also
divided into two groups called Borana and Baraytuma, is
outside the scope of this thesis.
2 . "Relatlo de statu politico et religioso Aethiopiae a patre
Gaspare Barzaeo per teste g oculatos accepta et in Europam
missa", Goa,
1551, Rer. Aeth., 1 , 3 2 .
3 .
"Historia de Ethiopia a Alta", ibid., V, 1 f1 , +76; Beckingham
and Huntingford, Some Records of Ethiopia,
p.136.
159
The Importance of barley in Galla religious life, and the
reverence they have for the pillars in their huts, have con-
vinced Haberland that they were sedentary and that agriculture
was not a way of life they adopted after their settlement in
the Ethiopian provinces.' The diet of milk which the Jesuits
reported may have been, therefore, forced upon the Galla by the
circumstances of the migrations and by the availability of
cereals in the areas they raided and occupied.
When in the time of Lebna Dengel the Baraytuma tribes
began to penetrate into Bali, the province was under Muslim
occupation. The presence of hordes of Muslim settlers seems to
have checked the movements of the Galla. It was during the
furious wars which after
i5+5 Galawdewos and the Muslims con-
tinued to wage against each other that Bali came to be completely
occupied by the Galla.
The emperor's position was critical. To his fear of
renewed Muslim attempts on Dawaro was added the rebellion of the
people of Hadya. Heavy taxation seems to have been the cause of
2
dissatisfaction. Dawaro had been a battle field for many years
and its produce could not support the many regiments he had with
1. Galla Sid-Athiopjens,
pp.773-75.
2.
On the rebellion of the Hadya see Chronipue de Galawdewos,
pp
.33,
l-i-l.
Cerulli thinks that the reason why Galawdewos
stayed at Dawaro was to defend it against Galla incursions
from Bali. "La lingua e la storia dei Sidamo", Studi
EtIoici, II,
30. But the events between
l5+5 and 1551
indicate that the emperor's main preoccupation then were
the Muslims.
160
him. Bali had not fared better, and the burden of maintaining
the armies had fallen on nearby provinces like Shawa, Hadya and
Damt. The Galla incursions were not unplanned and haphazard.
During the three years that Galawdewos was held up in Dawaro the
second group, the Boran, began pushing up along the western edge
of the highlands of Bali. Still, from the manner in which the
chronicler tells of his campaigns against the Galla, their in-
cursions did not yet threaten the few regiments he had in Bali.'
Some time in
i5-i
-8 the invasion which was feared took
place. The Muslims, led by the sultan's brother and by Garad
All, Ahmad's son, poured into the lowland districts of Dawaro.
They were, however, defeated by the governor before they could
reach the highlands and both their leaders were taken prisoners,
This victory gave Galawdewos a short respite to deal with
matters of revenue. He left for Damot, entrusting the defence
against the Muslims to Fanuel. The seriousness of the situation
may be seen from the unusually vast powers he gave Fanuel.
1. Chroniue de Galawdewos, pp .33, l+l.
i l l - ' Ui-
D' abord ii nomma, pour gouverner a s. pl ace
l es provinces de l ' est, tel l es que l e Daw.ro
et cel l es qul en dpendaient, Fnu
t
e1, un des
principaux officiers de son armee; puis ii se
rendit dans ' 0uest...... Cette expedition
avait pour but de faire l a guerre aux peupl es...
qui habitaient aux frontires du pays de Damot. 1
After a campaign of six
months he returned with enough
cattl e and gol d to subsidize extensive expeditions against the
Musl ims, who had taken advantage of his absenoe to attack Dawaro.
Fanuel had repul sed theni and kil l ed theLr l eader, Asqua Din, but
the emperor ordered him to fol l ow them into their own emirates.
The incursion was successfu1, but Fanuel died soon after his
return to Dawaro. 2
As the emperor had decided that the best
strategy of defence was to strike repeatedl y into the Musl im
l ands, in
1550,
he himsel f l ed the regiments into Harar. During
the five months In which he campaigned there, he caused so much
damage that the emirates were temporaril y weakened.3
1. Ibid., pp
.37-38 ,
1++. The expedition was probabl y directed
against the inhabitants of Bosha and Konch. Conti Rossini
(trans. and ed.), "Historia regis Sarsa Dengel '
t , CSCO, III,
text,
p.38 ,
trans.,
p)+5. Bermudez cl earl y states that the
reason for the expedition was the refusal by the governor
of Konch to pay the revenues. Bermudez in The Portuguese
Expedition to Abyssinia,
pp.237-38.
2. ChronIgue de Gal awdewos, pp.39, +i, i41--+6.
3.
Ibid., pp.-F2-++, i-i-6--i-8.
162
Lorsque le roi Galwdwos revint du pays
II etaitall4, son royaume 6tait solidement
constitue dans les limites qu'il lui aait
donn6es et jouissait d'une tranquillite
complte; toutefQis ii etait an peu trouble
par les incursions des Ga1ls qui habitaient
prs de la frontire.1
The Boran incurjons into western Bali must have
increased in the meantime, but he had now the opportunity to
spare enough regiments for its defence. Lccordingly he moved
his court to Waj, taking many soldiers with him.
Bermudez's account of events, especially of those
after
i5+5, does not correspond with that of the chronicler.
According to Bermudez, the emperor, after the death of Abbas,
gave Dawaro and Bali to Ayres Dias, the mulatto captain of the
Portuguese, while he himself, presumably out of cowardice, stayed
at Waj. 2 Throughout his book there is no hint of the Muslim
incursions into Dawaro or of the expeditions of Fanuel and the
emperor into the emirates. He purposely makes out that the
main preoccupation at this tiiue were the Galla, in order to
enhance himself as the prophet of God, who had brought this
scourge upon the Ethiopians, who had rejected him as their
1. Ibid.,, p
.
p)+6, 11+9.
2. He calls the province Oygere. The Portuguese Expedition to
Abyssinia, p.202. Ahmad's widow, Batia del Wambara was
not captured. Bermudez is mistaken when saying that the
emperor gave her for wife to Ayres Dias.
icc
iUt)
spiritual father.' He says that in 151+8
or 151+9 one Calide was
governing Dawaro and Bali and had been sent there because
Galawdewos feared him and wanted him out of the way.
2
When the
emperor quarrelled with Bermudez, he exiled him, together with
his loyal Portuguese to Dawaro. As he knew that this province
was being attacked by the Galla, he hoped that the Portuguese
would defend it for him or lose their lives in the process.
Bermudez then says that Calide was so unwilling to share the
revenues with them that they had to fight it out. Calide was
killed, but soon after the Portuguese were chased out by the
Galla, who took possession of the province. When Bermudez told
this to the emperor, we are told, the latter lost command of
himself and wept like a child. Bermu,dez adds that by this time
the Galla had also invaded Bali and Hadya, and Galawdewos had
turned his back on them, with the unconvincing excuse that he had
to go and visit the other provinces which he had not seen yet.3
1. Ibid., pp.230,
21l9.
It is very curious that Paez and Almeida,
observant historians as they were, believed that the Galla
were sent by God to punish the country for refusing to recog-
nize Bermudez as its patriarch. Paez, "Historia de Ethiopia",
Rer. Aeth., II, 23 3
1
+6; and Airneida, "Historia de Ethiopia a
Alta", ibid., V, 1++-75.
2. Bermudez's account in The Portuguese Expedition to Abyssinia,
pp.226-27. Since succession was in the male line,
explanation for Galawdewos's fear of Calide seems groundless.
Furthermore, if this Calide is the Calite mentioned by
Castarthoso, then the nobleman could not have been a close re-
lation of the emperor. See Castanhoso In ibid., p.82.
3. Ibid., pp.230-31.
1 i
lull
There is no clue In Berimidez as to when the loss of
the three provinces took place, but the visit he mentions pro-
bably refers to the expeditions Galawdewos undertook for the
collection of revenue against the Gambo in. May or June of
1552
and against the Gumar and Wagam later in December.
'
The second
campaign lasted nearly seven months at the end of which he re-
turned to Waj and the Galla.
In about
5 5 ) +
the Afar of Adal
invaded Amhara, reaching up to the neighbourhood of Tadbaba
Maryam, the church he had just finished building. 2
The emperor,
however, staged in Waj, either because he thought the Muslim in-
cursion was not very serious, or because he had by now began to
see the Galla as a greater menace.
Galawdewos was a remarkable person. The moving des-
cription of the emperor by the chronicler was not prompted by
the desire to flatter; It seems he wrote much of it after the
emperor's death. 3All the Jesuits who knew him say more or
less the same things of him. He was a God-fearing, humble and
just man, accessible to the many who needed his help. His
1. Chronipue de Galawdewos, p p.
5+-56, l53-5+.
2. Ibid., p p. 59-60,
156-57. Conzelman's rendering of the
phrase zamada tanbtt, relatives or allies of the Muslims
into "les Musulmans se 11gurent" is not very exact.
3.
IbId., pp1+1-I- 11-6 , ]'+7-+8.
i
n r'
DI)
greatest assets in those turbulent days were his kindness and
readiness to forgive. It was his courage more than his military
ability which made him challenge, from the day he succeeded his
father to the throne, so formidable an enemy as Ahmad. His
kindness and his deep sense of duty enabled him to make loyal
subjects out of the many who, only a few years before, had em-
braced Islam and were fighting for Ahniad, and to rebuild a nation
which was nearly lost. It was without force that Galawdewos was
able to maintain internal peace and stability throughout a
period when he was struggling to keep Muslims and Galla out of
hi.s kindom.
A better picture of the relative internal tranquility
hich prevailed is described by the 3esuit Gona10 Rodrigues, who
was In Ethiopia fol' one year between March of 1555
and April of
the next year. 1 He has written a short but Informative account
of his Itinerary from Massawa through Tigre and Arnhara to Waj,
and. back through Gerarya, tambiya and Wagara. Throughout this
long route, the only place where Rodrigues felt in danger was
in Wagara, where the Falasha were growing restless, probably
because they were unwilling to pay taxes. 2 The picture had
1.Letter of Gonalo Rodrigues, dated February 3, 1556,
to the
fathers and brothers of the Society of Jesus who were in
Europe. It takes up fol. 67-83 of MS. 1 F9-IV-59, Jesultas na
Asia, in the Biblioteca de Ajuda.
2. IbId., fol.82 v. The rebellion of the Falasha is mentioned
in Conti Rossini (trans. and ed.),
u L l
autobiografia di Pawlos
monaco Abissino del secolo XVI , ', RRAL, XXVII (1918),
285,
291. The dates ir this document are sometimes inaccurate and
confusing.
166
hardly changed when in
1557 Bishop Oviedo came to Waj by way of
Tigre and Amhara.1
In contrast to this the political situation among the
!usllms seems to have been unstable. The unity achieved by
Ahmad Grarih was destroyed when Abbas made himself independent
of Harar. The division apparently continued, because, when in
15+8 Fanuel invaded the emirates, he was met by two kings, one
of whom lost his life while fighting. 2 A nineteenth century
Amharic history of Emir Nur also tells of war among the Muslims.
Although its historical accuracy is questionable, some of the
stories told in it seem to be dim memories of actual events.
According to this chronicle, the emperor, mistakenly called
Zar'a Ya'eqob, was camped at Assabot. Further south at Hanchir
Ahinad ibn Abdul Azlz, king of the Muslims, had his court, while
at Karaba another Muslim ruler, Salih, was building a mosque.
These two kings were attacked by Nur, who, shortly before, had
deposed the sultan at Harar and taken his throne. The chronicle
then tells of Nur t s victory and of Ahmad's flight to Mt. Fantail.
Nur followed him and camped at Matahara. It also mentions an ex-
pedition the emperor made to Harar. 3 According to the chronicle
1. A very detailed description of the journey of Bishop Oviedo
from Arqiqo to the court in Waj is given by Diogo de Couto,
Da Asia, dec. VII, liv. IV, eap. VI,
pp.3 19-25.
2. Chroniciue de Galawdewos, pp)+l, ]+5-+6.
3 . K. Wendt, ltAmharische Geschichte eines Emirs von Harar im
xvi. Jahrhundert", Orientalia, IV
(193 5), )+91_91+.
167
of Galawdewos, the Ernir Nur was in the army of Hasgua Din which
Fanuel repulsed in i5-i
-8. He was also at Harar when the emperor
entered the city some two years later.' He did not, however,
become emir of Harar until 1552.
In April of 1557 a large number of Turks under
Ozdemur, pasha of Yaman, landed at Arqiqo and immediately under-
took an invasion of Harnassen. The reasons for this new develop-
ment in Turkish policy are not clear. Diogo de Couto thought
that they had come to help the Muslims of Adal.
3 Couto, however,
seems to have been influenced by memories of the aid which another
pasha had given to Ahmad Granh in 15
1
+2 after he had been twice
defeated by Dom Christopher da Garna. Nur, vizier of Harar, would
have found the Turkish help more useful, had the soldiers been
given to him. Nor can the Turkish 1and1ng at Ariqo be inter-
preted as a diversionary stratagem made to bring Galawdewos to
the north, or to weaken him by opening a second front, because
ademur and Nur made no attempt whatsoever to co-ordinate their
movements. There was rio trouble from Nur until 1559.
1. Chronipue deGalawdewos, pp.3 9, 1+3 ,
i1+5,
11+7.
2. Cerulli, "Documenti arabi per la storia dell'Etlopia",
op.cit., pp.55-56.
3 . Da Asia, dec. VII, liv. IV, cap. IV, p.3 09.
168
Ozdemur t s act ion seems t o have been dict at ed by his
fears t hat t he Port uguese
might
occupy t he port of Massawa.
The t wo Visit s made by Port uguese vessels t o Massawa in 1555
and i556,
in connect ion wit h t he mission of t he Jesuit Gon9alo
Rodrigues, may have aroused t he suspicion of Turkish merchant s
at Massawa and Arqiqo. 1
Joao Peixot o, t he capt ain sent t o fet ch
R4r1gues t o Goa, had also at t acked Suakin and killed it s ruler.2
'urt hermore, Rodrigues and t he Port uguese in Et hiopia were openly
t alking of t he need for a st rong, armed escort for t he Jesuit
pat riarch who was being sent t o Et hiopia, and Ozdemur could have
heard of t his.Thus, when he learned t hat Port uguese ships had
passed t hrough t he Bab el Mandeb in March of 1557, he was
sufficient ly prepared t o follow t hem from Mocha. He had no way
of knowing t hat t hese ships were only bringing t he Jesuit bishop
Ovieclo.
Galawdewos had not expect ed t his, and his complet e
unpreparedness was at first a great advant age t o t he Turks. They
invaded Hamassen, and occupied t he administ rat ive capit al of
Debarwa. They even penet rat ed furt her inland, and besieged Dabra
Damo. 3 This Init ial success encouraged
Gat ewa,
queen of t he
1. On Turks t rading in Massawa and Arqlqo see Gon3 10 Rodrigues's
let t er of March 22,
1555,
t o Bait hazar Dias in Goa, Rer.Aet h.,
X, Si.
2. Dlogo de Cout o, Da Asia, dec. VII, liv. III, cap.I, p.189.
According t o Gaspar Correa, t his ruler was a merchant , but
had ousted the legitimate sultan. He had then hired a body-
guard of -*O Turks, for whom he paid to the pasha of the Hejaz
half of his annual revenue, amount ing t o 3 0,000 ashrafl.
Lendas da India IV,
173 .
3 .
Chroniaue de Galawdewos, pp.7 1i- , i6^ .
169
Muslims of Mazaga, to throw in her lot with the Turks.
1
Ozdeniur,
however, had made two serious errors, first in penetrating beyond
the narrow coastland, and second in choosing a celebrated but
otherwise unimportant monastery as one of his targets.
2 The
emperor could spare at this time many of his soldiers, whom he
sent with azmach Yeshaq. Ga'ewa's nephew, Abdul Wahab, was
defeated at the Takaza, and soon afterwards the Turks were
surrounded at Debarwa. 3
Ozdemur and many of his men fled to
Mazaga, where they were decimated by malaria. Later the pasha
escaped to Arqiqo and then to Suakin.
1 . Ga'ewa, was sister of King Makatter of Mazaga, who had
submitted to Ahmad Granh in 1535.
When Makatter died,
Ahmad appointed her as regent of her brother's young son.
Histoire de la concute de 1 'Ab y ssinie, trans., pp.+28-29,
4+3 1 . Apparently she had succeeded in taking the throne to
herself, The reason for her rebellion against Galawdewos
is not clear but it may have had something to do with
trjbute.
2 . This monastery was one of the few places which had escaped
the pillaging hordes of Ahmad Granh. As it was the last
refuge of Lebna Dengel, Ozdemur may have been deceived by
stories of hidden treasures.
3 .
This episode with the Turks is told in great detail by
Diogo de Couto, op.cit., dec. VII, liv. VII, cape 1 ST,
pp
.9l-9+;
cap. V,
pp.91 +-97.
Ga'ewa's nephew is here
called Habem. Dilabo, who is probably the Abdul Wahab in
"L'autobiografia di Pawlos", op.cit., pp.285, 2 91 .
The chronicler of Galawdewos seems to have confused this
particular event. Chronipue de Galawdewos, p p .
75-76, 165.
170
At about the same time that the Turks landed in the
north, the Galla began to open a new front. The Boran had
found their advance to the north blocked by the concentration of
troops at Waj and, instead of attempting to cross the Wabi
Shabelle, they turned west and began to raid the lands to the
north of Lake Awasa? This was, for several reasons, a con-
venient region to raid. It was the frontier between Muslim
Hadya and the relatively weak pagan inhabitants of Gurage,
Kuera and Gamo. The Muslims had been coming from the eastern
lowlands, and their successful attempts to establish themselves
athong the pagans had been a cause of friction between them, and
between the Muslims and the emperors, who were trying to maintain
stability as well as balance. At this time, the resistance of
the population of Hadya to the heavy demands which Galawdewos
was making upOn them was leaving the region more and more vulner-
able to Galla raids. It waS not a coincidence that the Galla
descent into the Rift Valley plains in
1557 and
1558
followed the
outbreak of insurrections in Hadya. 2 The Galla had by now
1. Diogo d Couto mentions a lake to the south of Lake Zway,
and opposite Hadya, near which the Galla were camped.
It can be any of the other Rift Valley lakes of this
region. O p .cit., dec. VII, liv. VII, cap. IT, p.88.
See also Chroni pue de Galawdewos,
pp.65, 159.
2. Diogo de Couto, o p .clt., dec.VIr, liv. VII, cap. lIT,
pp . 8 7-
88.
171
perfected their strategy of choosing the least defended places
and exhausting by repeated raids whatever strength the local
inhabitants had.
Nevertheless the sporadic discontent by the peoples of
Hadya, Damot, Wagara or Mazaga was not serious enough to reduce
the regiments at Waj. What the emperor continued to fear was the
renewal of Muslim attempts to take Dawaro and Ifat. Thus, when
at the beginning of 1559
Emir Nur of Harar invaded Dawaro, the
situation became critical. While Galawdewos was defending
Dawaro, ali was lost to the Galla. More was to be lost in the
brief struggle with Nur.
The sequence of events which led to the battle of
March 23 are complicated. The Galla raids on the lake 'egion
had been increasing, arid the need of defending it had reduced the
forces generally stationed at Waj, Furthermore, this was the
season of Lent, and, as Easter was approaching, many of the
soldiers were away in their lands and homes. The tew who were
left in the court were too exhausted by the rigours of fasting
to take up arms. According to the chronicler and Diogo de
Couto, the emperor knew the risks involved when, on Maundy
Thursday, he tried to block the progress of the Muslims into
Fatagar. He had wanted to die a martyr and to make a sacrifice
of himself near the day on
which Christ had sacrificed himself.
i i ' . ,
The chroni cler hi nts at the pessi mi sm and despondency whi ch had
been i ncreasi ngly spreadi ng i n the ountry si nce the Turks landed
at Arqi qo. Honks and. hermi ts had been foretelli ng the di ffi cult
ti mes whi ch were comi ng, and even prophesyi ng the emperor' s
martyrdom. The chroni cler does not seem to have i nvented these
thi ngs after the ki nd of death whi ch the emperor di ed. ' The
3esui ts and Di ogo de Couto wri te that the local pri ests were
telli ng the emperor what hi s fate would be. Even the bi shop
Ovi edo hi mself seems to have i ndulged i n prophesyi ng. 2
It is, however, i mprobable that Galawdewos, the man
of acti on, would have harboured a desi re for martyrdom. There
were seri ous practi cal reasons whi ch made i t di ffi cult for the
emperor to wai t unti l after Easter, when hi s soldi ers would
fi ni sh fasti ng and return to the court. Hi s cousi n Hamalmal,
who had taken ?anuel' s place, di d not have all hi s soldi ers wi th
hi m i n Dawaro. When he heard of Nur' s approach, he had tact-
fully avoi ded hi m, thereby leavi ng awaro and Fatagar to thei r
fate. 3 Galawdewos seems thus to have been forced to stop
the Musli ms before they reached atagar or Waj. He may also
1. Chroni ci ue de Galawdews, pp
.65-6 7, 159-60.
2. Di ogo de Couto, o p . clt. , dec. VII, liv. X, cap. N, pp)--65-66.
3.
Ibi d. , dec. VII, li v. VII, cap. VI, p. 105.
i'II,
have realized the need of repulsing the Muslims as quickly as
possible so as to be in a position to deal with the Galla.
His error was in underestimating the Muslims. They were
numerically superior and far better equipped than his men.
The consequences of this conflict were more serious than the
death of the emperor. It was the greatest opportunity which
the Galla were to have throughout the history of their
migration into the north.
174
CHAPTER III
THE CIVIL WARS OF 1560-1570 AND THE
PROGRESS OF THE BARAYTIJMA
1. The Troubled Reign of Minas (1559-1563).
Minas could not have been less than thirty years old wher
he succeeded his brother Galawdewos. Until he came to the
throne he was inexperienced in matters of leadership and
admnistration, but in this he was no different from any
of the previous emperors who had to spend most of their
early years in confinement at Amba Geshan. He was born
sometime at the beginning of the cnvulsive Muslim invasion
of Ahmad G-ranh, and in 1539
he was captured by Umar, one of
the Muslim commanders. Ahniad and his wife Del Wambara treated
him kindly, even to the extent of marrying him to one of
their daughters. The marriage was politically motivated,
aimed at conciliating the opposition of the remaining
Christians to Ahmad's rule and the domination of Islam.
Atimad's designs concerning Minas, and his plans in. general,
were upset by the unexpected appearance of Dom Christopher
da G-ama at Arqiqo in 1541. A.bmad was not a vassal of
Turkey, and until then he had had no need for Turkish help.
However, as he feared that Portu.gu.ese firearms might cost
him an empire which be had ast succeeded in conquering and.
subduing, in September of the same year he dispatched an
. 17
appeal for Turkish musketeers to the pasha at Zebid.
Apparently in order to impress upon the pasha the extent
of his success and how serious a setback Islam would receive
if he lost his empire to the Portuguese, he sent Minas
and some of the other important captives he had, with
him to the pasha. 2 Minas remained at Zebid until 1544,
when, soon after Ahmad's death, he was ransomed, and ever
since then he had been living with his mother Sabla
Wangel.3
1.
We may doubt the chronicler's ability to remember and
quote accurately the words of the pasha of Zebid but
the words "Muslim of Adal, who has subjected the land
of Abyssinia" which he put into his mouth suggests
strongly that he did. not consider Ahxiad a vassal of
Turl5ey. F.M.E. Pereira (trans. and ed.), Historia de
Minas, pp. 21, 40.
The independence of Ahmad, from
Turkey may further be argued from the fact that the
pasha did. not send the help Ahmad requested until after
Ahmad was beaten twice by the Portuguese and sent much
gold to induce t e pasha and to pay the expenses of
the musketeers. Whiteway, The Portuguese Expedition
to Abyssinia,
p. 55.
The pasha was called Mustafa
Nashshar. R.B. Serjeant, The Portuguese off the Sotith
Arabian Coast,
pp.
102-103.
2 .
We need not take seriously,the statement that Mina was
sold by Ahmad in Basset, "Etudes ur l'histoire d'thiopie",
op.cit., text,
p.
336, trans., p.109.
3.
Bruce was mistaken when saying that Minas was exchanged
for Au, Ahinad Granh's son who was captured in
1548.
Bruce, Travels, II, 200; Budge, History o Ethiopia,
II, 356.
That Minas was exchanged for Muhammad, another
son of Ahmadis told in Chronigu.e de Galawdewos, pp.
34-35,
142-43.
See also Historia de Mints, p.2 2 . Muhammad was
brought in by the renegade Dagana, father of bahr nagast
Yeshaq, right aft r Ahmad's death. Whiteway,
pp. 84-85.
17G
Galawdewos had no son, and. Until 1555,
the likely heir
was his brother Ya'eqob, who was older than Mmnas)
Ya'eqob, however, died in this year, and the emperor had
Minas and their mother brought :from Gojam to live in the
court. The emperoi was still young enough to hope for a son,
but his unusual consideration for Minas suggests that he
wanted to leave the troubled ernpIxe to a mature person who
could cope with the problems. Even if Galawdewos did not
break with tradition to the extent of giving his brother
any post of responsibility, Minas's residence in the court
was an opportunity of which, unfortunately, he does not
seem to have taken advantage.
Minas began his reign by a cowardly act which was to
undermin the morale both of his armies and of the nobility.
Instead, of rallying around him whatever so]..diers he could
find, and attempting to stop Nur, he and his mother hurriedly
left Waj or the distant and secure mountain o Mangesta
Samayat in Go jam. 2
We do not know whether it was Minas
himself or his mother who was res?on s ibl e
for this. He might
have feared falling once more into the hand.s of the Muslims.
On the other hand,there can be no doubt that Sabla Wangel
had. a strong influence over him; and she was not distinguished
by any strength of character or understanding of political
stibteties. She too had suffered enough from the invasion
of Ahrnad Granh to want to avoid Nur.
1. Nothing can be said about the ages of Ya'eqob and Minas
other than t mention that Galawdewos, the eldest of the
three brothers, was eighteen years old in 1540. Paez,
"Historia de Ethiopia", Rer. Aeth., III, 19.
1 P1 rI
Less than three weeks after Galawdewos's death, 1
Minas had an opportunity to rectify his mistake and to show
to the country that be could govern and lead effectively.
Many of the nobility and military commanders had
followed him to Mangesta Samayat, to pay their homage and to
attend his formal coronation. 1
The only noticeable absentee
was Yeshaq, who was in Debarwa and had probably not yet
heard of Minas's movements. The emperor's indecisiveness
at this critical moment could not have failed to confirm the
general doubt about his courage and. ability. His chronicler
reports that at this time two important decisions were made.
One was the appointment of Hamalmal as military commander
or"daazmach, governing from the Blue Nile up to as far as
his authority reached." 2
The responsibility of
defending against the Muslims all the ands from Shawa to
Dawaro was thus entrusted to Hamalmal, when Minas himself
should have assumed it. Hamalmal was not a coward, bat his
ability was not such as would inspire confidence.
The other decision was to make Dambiya the emperor's
winter headquarters for that year.
3
Although the chronicler
says that it was taken by the nobility, the suggestion must
2 . (previous page)
Diogo de Coato, Da Asia, dec. VII, liv. VIII, cap. IX, p.2 3 2
I
1.
Historia de Minas, pp. 2 7, 45-46.
2 . Ibid.,
pp.
2 7-2 8, 46.
3 .
Ibid., pp
.
2 7, 46.
178
have come fr m either Minas or his mother. It was
certainly not a measure intended to separate him from
Sabla Wangel and to remove him from her influence, because
she accompanied him to Dainbiya. Nor was it to the interest
of the governors of Dambiya, Wagara, Bagemeder or even Go jam
to have the emperor and his immense retinue in or near their
provinces, for this would not only reduce their personal
revenues but also curtail their powers. For the good of
the country as well as for the interests of all, including
Hamalmal, Minas's presence was required, if not in Waj, then
at least in Shawa.
Whatever faith some people still had in his potentiality
as a leader was further undermined when in October he
embarked on a futile and unnecessary campaign against the
Falasha of Semen. The reason for the fresh insurrection
of the Falasha is unknown; they probably felt part of the
burden of sustaining the vast population of the imperial
court, where most of the provincial nobility were now
living. More regiments were called up from the provinues,
including those of Tigre under Yeshaq and his father Dagana.
The campaign was a failure because Minas was unable to
break into the Falasha strongholds. 1 His embarrassment was so
1. Fu.lgencio Freire gives this interesting report brought to
Arqiqo by a merchant who was in Dambiya. The Falasha
wanted to submit and to continue payment of the regular
tribute, but Minas refused to make peace unless they all
embraced Christianity, a term which they rejected
outright. Letter of August 12, 1560, to Nunes Barreto in
Rer. Aeth., X, 105. There is no serious reason to doubt
that this report, as all the other stories which Freire
neard at Arqiqo were correct.
A
179
great that the clergy had to be asked to explain that the
failure was not due to mismanagement but because the prppitious
time for victory was yet to come.'
He might have continued to misgovern without fear for his
throne, had he not decided upon the dangerous policy of at
once removing from office all the important provincial
governors. This began in the winter when he moved to Dambiya.
The chronicler is intentionally vague and euphemistic in
describing the unpopular policy.
Soon after he sat on that most Christian
throne he began to re-establish the law and
constitution of the kingdom; but the great men
of the realm, like Keflo and his colleagues,
began to criticize and grumble, and to promote
sedition secretly until by act they made it
manifest 2
As Minas had not been long on the throne, and as he
had. not come oat with any positive policy of his own, we
cannot understand. what reasons he had to want to remove and
to demote so many of Galawdewos's appointees. A passing
remark by the chrontcler on Sabla Wangel's influence over
her son suggests that to some extent she was behind the
changes he made. The chronicler says that she was always with
Minas, helping him to consolidate his authority over the
country. 3
She had not been on good terms with Galawdewos,
1.
Historia de Mine, pp. 28, 46. Further' details of this
humiliating campaign are given by Diogo de Couto. The
emperor decided to give up after his men, trying to break
into tke mountain strongholds, were repulsed with heavy
losses. Da Asia, dec. VII, liv. VIII, cap. IX, p.23 3 .
2.
Historia de Minds,
pp.
28, 46.
3 . Ibid.,
pp . 27, 46.
180
mainly because he did. not a33ow her to interfere in his
relationship with his ministers and other officers. One
of t e reasons Diogo de Couto gives for the estrangement
between mother and son wa Galawdewos's refusal to return
some lands he had. taken from sham Keflo, the husband of her
sister. 1 It is possible that she suspected some of the
nobility of turning Galawdewos against her.
During Ahmad Granh's invasion Yeshaq, the bahr nagash,
and Robel, the tigre makonnen, had been among the few loyal
followers that Sabla Wangel and her husband had had.2
After the death of the imam, Yeshaq had become one of the
most important men in the country. lie had remained as bahr
nagash until 1551, when he was recalled to the court, probably
to take up the office of one of the bitwadadoch. 3 Little
1.
Da Asia, dec. VII, liv. VII, cap. IV, p.91. Another reason
which de Couto gives is that ever since 1543
she and some
of the nobility had been pressing the emperor to exile the
Portuguese soldiers into the interior. She probably grudged
them the positions and lands Galawdewos had given them.
Ibid., dec. VII, liv. X, cap. IV, p.466. That the antagonism
between mother and son was deep and of long standing is
seen from the strongly worded description the Jesuit Gaspar
Barzeus wrote in 1551. "Relatio de statu politico et reli-
gioso Aethiopiae", ReT. Aeth,,X, 3 0. See also Pereira,
Chronica de Susenyos, II, 257-88.
2. Whiteway, op.cit.,
pp .
143 , 168.
3 .
He was replaced by Kumo, a relative of the emperor and with
service and loyalty that matched his and Robel's. "L'auto-
biografia di Pawlos", op.cit.,
pp .
285, 291; Whiteway, .
cit.,
pp .
13 8-3 9. When Oviedo arrived at Waj in 1557, Yeshaq
was one of the officers of the court. Though the Jesuits said
he was a kettle-drummer, he might have been a bitwadad of
the left. Manuel Fernand.es et al to the Prepositor General
of the Society of Jesus, July 29, 1562, in Rer. Aeth.,
I, 149.
40.1
1OL
is heard of R bel throu out his time, but his dev tion and
by ity h d bee re ax ed by t e marriage of his au ter,
Selu.s Haila tin
s.
It is not kn wn if Yes aq was simi-
larly h nou ed, but at the time on s's accessi n to the
throne Ya'eqob's widow ad all his childrei were in the
north wit Yes aq. 2 In any case, w ether Yes a was a
relative or merely the gu.ar ian of Ya'aiob's chil ren, there
is no evidence that he entertain d any thou hts of treason
again t I in s until he and hi.s father lost their governor shi s.
Immediately after the em ero returned from Semen he took
t e n rthern r iiince from Yes iaq, offering him in its place
3
nagash
the city of Ak.sum. We
d not know t whom the office of bahr
7
1.
After Minas's accession to the throne she was given the
royal name of Adnias M gasa. I. Guidi (trans. and ed.),
"Annales re urn lyasu. II et
Iyoash',
CSCO, VI, text, p.8,
trans.,
p.
8.
2 .
Yeshaq married tha daughter of Ya'eqob to his son Takla
Michael. Da Asia, dec. VII, liv. X, cap. VI, 489-90.
Unless this aaa hter of Ya'eqob was illegitim te, it would
mean that there bad been no previous marriage between
the prince and a relative of Yeshaci.
3.
We cannot be sure that the n bura'ed Yeshaq mentioned in
a 1 n charter dated 1560 was t e bahr naash. C. Conti
R ssini (tra s. an ed.), "Documenta ad illustrandam
historiam: I. Liber k'tumae", CSCO, VIII, text, p.
43,
trans.,
p.
52.
40')
iOi.i
was given, bat Dagana's successor as tigre makonnen was one
Zai'a Yohannes. Still more puzzling was the alienation of
Keflo, who, besides being a brother-in-law of Sabla Wangel,
had, on the death of Galawdewos, openly supported Minas's
sac c e S S lOfl.
The conspiracy against the emperor included many
other noblemen whose motives are, unfortunately, unknown
to us. One of them was Yoharuies, his cousin and Hamalmal's
brother. Dissatisfaction with the emperor was further
intensified by his irritable and volatile character, his
/ pride and sensitivity seriously impairing his relationship
" with the nobility, the Jesuits and, the Portuguese.2
Within less t an a year after his succession he had become
i unpopular with the great men that an attempt was made on
his life. One Balaw Ra'ad, probably an officer of the
court, was suborned. for the task. The attempt failed, and
Balaw Ra'ad and his helper were caught, but Minas made the
1. It is not known what connections
Zaz? a
Yohannes had with
Sabla Wangel or Selu.s Hala. The monk Pawlos describes
him as melmel, an Amharic word which in the igeenth
century signified a paramour of an important lady.
" L'autobiografia di Pawlos" , op.cit.,
pp.
286, 293.
He may have been Sabla
Wangels
lover.
2.
Jesuit sources carry frequent references to the emperor's
volatile nature. Manuel Pernandes et al., letter of July
29, 1562
in Rer. Aeth., X, 151; Manuel Pernandes to
Nu.nes Barreto, March 31, 1563,
ibid., p.171. Paez adds
that Minas used to insult and humiliate the nobility in
the Turkish language. " Historia de Ethiopia" , op.cit.,
III, 56-57. The chronicler of the emperor is, under-
standably, very silent on this matter but a later
chronicler does confirm the Jesuits' description.
Chronica de Susenyos, I, 96, II, 75.
1Qc
lot)
mistake of executing them before subjecting them to
examination, in order to discover the main conspirators.1
some time in the early months of 1561 the emperor had
t go to Lasta and Angot. His absence enabled the conspira-
tors to plot more openly, and they agreed to raise up as
emperor Ya'eqob's eldest son, Taskara Qal. The Jesuit
bishop Andre de Oviedo was easily persuaded to support their
cause by reruiting the Portuguese in Ethiopia to their
side and by promising to bring more from India.
Oviedo's intervention on the side of the conspirators
was to discredit the Jesuits and to cause much hardship for
the Portuguese. Some years later he tried to justify his
action against the crowned emperor by alleging that Minas's
succession was contrary to the laws of succession the
country, and that from the start it had been opposed by the
nobility, who had wanted to give the throne to Taskara Qal,
because his father was older than Minas. Oviedo further said
1. Bruce did. not apply his analytic mind to the history of
Minas in general and. to the question of the attempted
assassination in particular. It is not easy to see what
motives two shepherds or pastoralists, as he describes
Balaw Ra'ad and his companion, could have to try to kill
Minas or how they could have found it so easy to penetrate
into his bedroom. Travels, II, 206-207; and, after Bruce,
Budge, History of Ethiopia, II, 357. That there were
several demoted and dismissed notables and that they were
beaind tne attempt on Minas's life is brought out clearly
by Diogo de Couto in op.cit., dec. VII, liv. VIII, cap. IX,
pp .
233, 236-37. It is significant that before the
culprits were caught Minas's suspicions were on the
Portuguese.
A
184
that he did not think Minas was suitable for the throne,
because he believed that during his captivity among the
Muslims be had embraced Islam and. bad. acquired much of the
Turkish hatred for the Portugtaese. 1It was because of
this, Oviedo and the other Jesuits explained, that immediately
after his accession he had. begun to persecute all Catholics,
especially the Ethiopian converts, who were mostly wives,
childrex and. servants of the Portuguese. Needless to say
there is nothing in the Ethiopian sources to su.bsfantiate
these allegations. According to the traditional laws of
succession Minas had as much right as Ya'eqob's eons or any
of the male descendants of the emperors. And if be had
indeed. turned Muslim, neither the people nor the Church
seem to have held it against him.2
1. Manuel Pernandes et al., July
29,
1562, Rer. Aeth. , X, 151;
Manuel Pernandes, Maroh 31, 1563, ibid., p.171; and
Oviedo et al., to the viceroy of India, July 14, 1564,
ibid., p.184.
2. Paez's attempt to prove the apostasy of Minas from his
marriage to Ahmad's daughter is not convincing. Islam
allows such marriages, even if they were not as politically
expedient as this was. "Historia de Ethiopia", op.cit.,
III, 57. On the other hand, Bruce's defence of Minas is
even weaker, as it is based on groundless assumptions.
Travels, II, 212-13. The only strong argwnerlt that can
be brought in support of Oviedo's allegation is that con-
version from one religion to the other was so common and
frequent that Minas could have done it without fear of
losing face, especially since he was young and would have
been forced into it.
A
18
In the light of Paez's account, the emperor was, at
the beginning of his reign, far from cruel to the Jesuits or
the Portuguese. 1 Oviedo had easy access to him, and the
emperor on his own initiative arranged several discussions
between the Jesuits and the Ethiopian clergy over the
differences between their Churches. The trouble arose
because of Minas's weak chaiacter. He took part in the
discussions, but as his education in general and, his knowledge
of the Christian religion in particular was very inadequate,
he found his arguments easily refuted by Oviedo. The
progress of their discussions soon reached such an impasse
that Minas often forgot his position and responsibility.
The exchanges between them became embarrassing insults.
One day, after they had discussions
about circumcision which the Bishop condemned
with many authorities, the Emperor resented
it so much that the next day, while going to
the camp, he turned to the Bishop who was
following a little behind and said to him,
1. "Relacam da entrada dos Pes. da Compa. de Jesu em
Aethyopia. Feita pelo Pe. Po. Pais no anno de 609".
fol. 45v,
Cartas anuas das miss's da Etiopia, Ms. 779,
BibliotecaPublica de Braga. Paez did not include
this information in his book, probably beause he had
little sympathy for Minas and wanted to save himself
the task of explaining the change in the emperor's
attitude towards Oviedo. See also M. Pernand.es to the
Prepositor General, June 13, 1567,
Rer. Aeth.,X,
213;
and Budge, History of Ethiopia, II,355.
18G
"Do you know, Bishop, why I am circumcized?
For cleanliness". To which the Bishop
replied, "Yes, with this cleanliness you
shall go to hell".1
After this the emperor closed the gates of his court
to the Portuguese. Still Oviedo was not daunted by it.
However, the Bishop did. not refrain
from censuring him in public and in private,
and in his sermons lie urged the Portuguese not
to serve that Emperor, sayingjthat he was a
heretic .nd stubborn, hich ended by scandalizing
and arousing more indignation against the
Bishop.2
In Oviedo's case the wounding retorts and the daring
insults were not unintentional. His words and actions at
this time, with Minas, as earlier before with Galawdewos,
were carefully studied so as to provoke. Ever since 1556,
when he met John Bermudez and Gon9alo Rodrigues in Goa, he
had been convinced that only by the use of force could the
union of the Ethiopian Church with that of Rome be achieved.3
1.
Diogo de Couto, Da Asia, dec. VII, liv. VII, cap. XII,
p . 159.
There is some contusion in this chapter. The
events described in the first few pages took place in
the time of galawdewos; the angry scenes in the camp and.
in the court told in the second part, however, happened
in Minas's time.
2. Ibid.
3.
On the mission of G. Rodrigu.es and Diogo Dias and their
recommendation for the use of force, see Rodrigues to the
Jesuit Fathers in Europe, Februay 3, 1556, fol. 79v,
Jesuitas na Asia, M..
49-IV-50
of the Biblioteca de
Ajud.a; Dias to King John III, Dec. 30, 1557,
Her. Aeth.,
X, 90-93. Incidenta'ly, the extent of Bermudez's conceit
and the shameless lies he can tell in order to place
himself at the centre of events may be seen from the way
he decribe the mission of the two men. Whiteway,
op.ci., p.l.
18
He and Nu,nes Barreto, the patriarch designate and his
superior, had tried to persuade Francisco Barreto, then
governor of Portuguese India, to provide them with an armed
escort of at least 500 men. Barreto had refused, on the
grounds that the political situation in India and, the treasury
of Goa would not allow him to send a fleet to the Red Sea,
and that in any case he would need the king's authorization.1
The patriarch remained behind in Goa to obtain the authori-
zation of John ui. 2 Oviedo was disappointed when Nunes
Barreto did not follow kiim with the soldiers.
3 He did not
believe that Portugal was financially incapable of
recruiting and equipping 500 men and transporting them to
Ethiopia. He thought that King John's reluctance to
authorize the escort of soldiers was due to his fear of
being condemned by the monarchs of Europe if he waged an
unprovoked war against a country that only recently he had
befriended. By arousing a strong anti-Portuguese sentiment
in Ethiopia he hoped to provide the king with a legitimate
excuse for intervening.
1. Da Asia, dec. VII, liv. III, cap. VII,
pp.
220-222.
2. N. Barreto to John III, Dec. 1,
1556, Rer. Aeth.,
X, 68-78.
3 .
Da Asia, dec. VII, liv. VII, cap. V, pp .
98-99;
liv.
VIII, cap. IX, p.236.
188
He had tried the same censures and condemnations
against Galawdewos, and the emperor, because of his
feelings of gratitude and indebtedness to the Portuguese,
had done his best to dampen the strong anti-Catholic
reaction thus provoked. Some of the Portuguese, led by
the captain Gaspar de Sousa, had objected to Oviedo's
method. It was in spite of him that in
1559
de Sousa and
some of his men accompanied the emperor to his fatal battle.1
With Minas, the bishop nearly succeeded. He knew the
emperor's violent temper, and was even prepared to sacrifice
his life, if that would make the provocation to Portugal
very serious. On one or two occasions he goaded Minas to
the extent that the latter raised his sword. He would have
killed him but for the intervention of people who were
present
1. Oviedo had not only separated most of the Portuguese from
the Ethiopians by taking them away from Galawdewos's cdrt
to Du.kam, but had even issued a orma1 "sentence" con-
demriing and prohibiting any social intercourse between
the Portuguese andxxn-Catholics. The text of the document,
dated Feb. 21, 1559,
is in Almeida's "Historia de Ethiopia
a Alta", Rer. Aeth., V, 383-84.
2.
When the story of Oviedo was put together at the beginning
of the seventeenth century the bishop was transformed into
a holy, miracle working saint. The Jesuits told it with the
purpose of influencing Rome to canonize him. Belchior da
Silva, "Inquiraqo da vida e morte do patriarcha Dom Andre
de Oviedo e dos de ais padres da Compan.hia de Jesus que
faleceram na Etiopia em servio dos cat.licos. Ano de
1603", in Cartas anuas das miss'es da Etiopia, M. 779,
Braga; Paez, "Relaam da entrada doe Pee. da Compa. de
Jesu em Aethyopia", ibid; Antonio de Araa,
189
H n tfalt iciteapr ct n f
Port u se rati ral , th bish welcomed th in itati n to
p rt cipate in he c nspiracy tun eat i as.e promi ed.
Ye haq nd his colle g es t at the ortesever or 1'
Gul send. h m s 1 iers. Those who lived in Ethio Ia
were, with t eir ca tam Francisco Jacome, placed at the
disal f Task ra Qal's p rty. In return t e corators
le ed. t eir u ort for t e cause o C tholicism. The
exact terms of vied 's understar i g with Taskara Qal's
supporters is not fully known, because t e Jes its, fearing
t at ttieir letters to Inda might fall in wrong hands,
were very caatio s in their corresponderce)Some fifty
years 1 ter Paez met a few peo le who knew Oviedo a d the
others4, li wrote that Taskar Qal was t have reco ised
Barreto as Ethiopian triarch in the evert that Minas was
dethroned.2
Th conspirato s were not prep red t declare t sir
rebellion U. til after the soldiers Oviedo had romi e them
arrived from In a. But somehow
Inin
s beO e su picio s and
....Hi t i de la ant vida, m erte ye virt es de el
a tre ki ree bie o,3. F.G.
4 73
of the
iblioteca aci n 1 de isboa; Paez, " istorie
Ethiopi ", er. Aeth., III, 1-111.
1. I., p . 63-64;. Ferna des to F. reire, July 2
1562,
ibid.., X, l'+5; ar P. Freire tre ositor Ger ral,
v. 30, 1562, i
., p.
157.
2. "1 came tra as Fe . cia om a. e Je u", p.ct.,
f 1. 46r - 46 v.n Yes q's willing e s t embr ce
Cath licism ee Meichi r Car eiro t t e Pre ositor
eneral, Nov. 3 , 1562, er. A th., X, 160;. F rn ndes
t N. Bareto, Ivarch 31, 1563, ibi. .,. 175, at
BruOe, Travels, II, 210.
190
summoned Yeshaq, who wa in Danibiya, to Lasta. Yeshaq , and
his friends thereupon came ou.t into the open and proclaimed
Taskara Qal emperor. With the intention of either splitting
Minas's forces or of inciting an insurrection in Tigre, Yeshaq
left for the north. 1 For the first time since he became
emperor, Minas showed courage and determination. He pursued
Yeshaq and scattered his men, arid then returned to Dambiya
and on July 3, 1561, crushed the rest of his enemies.
eflo died while trying to escape, but Taskara Qal,
Yohannes, Oviedo and the rest were taken risoner
If Ozd.emu.r had not been present at Arqiqo at this time,
the rebellion might have ended quietly with 'eshaq seeking a
1.
According to the Jesuits it seems that Yeshaq was also
hoping to welcome the soldiers Oviedo had promised to
bring from India. M. Fernandes et al., July 29,
1562,
Rer. Aeth., X, 152.
2.
Digo de Coto's account in which Yeshaq, fought at Daxnbiya
together with Keflo and Yohannes is inaccurate. His
version of Keflo's fate is also different; according to
him he was caught and beheaded. Da Asia, dec. VII, liv.
VIII, cap. IX, pp. 238-39.
We do not know whether the
reason for the revolt of the guolla shum, the governor of
the districts to the south-east of Lake Tana, who raised
an emperor about this time, was his dismissal from office
or the exactions of the court. Minas had, no difficulty
in crushing it. "L'autobiografia di Pawlos", op.cit.,
pp .
287, 294;
and Conti Rossini (trans. and ed.)
"Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", CSCO, III, text, p.80,
trans., p.91;
and, the above mentioned letter in
Rer. Aeth., X, 152.
191
reconciliation. 1 The pasha had come from Suakin in March
of the previous year to prevent what be thought was the
landing 0' a large Portuguese force. The small vessel which
had alarmed the Turks was trying to land a Jesuit brother,
Fu.lgencio Freire by name, and sent from India to learn news
of Oviedo. 2 We do not know why Ozdemur stayed at Arqiqo;
he might have found the political developments in the interior
interesting. It is very improbable that there was any contact
between Ozdemu.r and Yeshaq before the events of July. The
pasha saw in this civil conflict an opportunity to set foot
once again on the Ethiopian highlands. Through the sultan
of Dahiak, who wa y a friend and perhaps a commercial agent
of Yeshaq, a pact was soon arranged by which Ozdemur placed
1. In fact de Cou.to says that Minas sent a royal pardon to
Yeshaq which he rejected immediately, proceeding to gather
around him all the Portuguese he could find so as to cause
more damage. Ibid., dec. VII, liv. X, cap. VI, pp. 488-89.
On Ozdemur' s previous attempt to occupy northern
Ethiopia see above, pp.-
2. F. Freire to N. Barreto, Aug. 12, 1560, Rer. Aeth.,
X, 103-107.
19"
his soldiers at the disposal of the rebel lord. 1 Yeshaq
was prepared to pay a heavy pri.ce; it was, according to
Fulgencio Freire, the cession of one third of the country.2
Although Bruce later wrote that what Yeshaq promised and
ceded to the Turks was the land between Debarwa and the sea,
this may have been but part of the full pledge.3
Taskara Qal had died in prison and, as the rest of Ya'eqob's
children were still in Tigre, the second son, Marqos, was
proclaimed emperor and given the throne-name of A'laf Sagad.4
The adherence of Harbo, Keflo's son-in-law, provided wider
support for Marqos's case.
1.
Diogo de Couto, loc.cit.,
p .
489. This sultan might be the
sultan Ismael who was ruling Dahiak and Massawa in 1557.
Ibid., dec. VII, liv. IV, cap. IV, p.306. Their
friendship might have begun or become strong as a result
of the customs agreement they made some time in 1559 after
Ozdemur's flight to Suakin. F. Freire to Barreto, Aug. 12,
1560, Rer. Aeth., X, 104. Ozdemu.r came to Debarwa in
January of 1562. M. Fernandes to Barreto, March 31, 1562,
ibid., p.172.
2.
F. Freire to the Prepositor General, Nov. 30
, 1562, ibid.,
p .
157.
3.
Travels, II, 208-209.
4.
There is no doubt that Taskara Qal was murdered and that
his death was a serious embarrassment to Minas. Paez,
"Historia de Ethiopia", op.cit., III,
57. According to
Bruce the precipice over which Taskara was thrown was
Lamalmo in Wagara. Travels, II, 208. The chronicle of
Susenyos offers a somewhat different and, apparently,
apologetic version. The prince was imprisoned at Bora,
where relatives of Selu.s Haila, by her instruction, hurled
him over a cliff. Chronica de Susenyos, I, 96-97,
II, 75-76.
1fl)
Realizing the seriousness of the situation, Minas
mobilized zaearly all the forces of the country. Leaving
behind them only the garisons of few key posts, Taklo of
Daxnot, Rom Sagad of Shawa and, other men whose governorships
we cannot identify came with the regiments of their pro-
'vinces. In April of 1562, at Endarta, this numerically
superior army was beaten by Turkish muskets and artillery
pieces. Minas retreated to Ambara, where he spent the
rest of the year making feverish preparations to defend. his
throne. His dispersed regiments were gathered together,
while smiths and other artisans replaced the arms the soldiers
had lost. 1 But Minas did not get his second change; he
died from fever on February 18, while marching north.
When we remember what Yeshaq , 's intention was, we may
ask why he and his Turkish allies did not pursue the fleeing
Minas. The reason may have been the approach of the rainy
season, and from what Fulgencio Freire reported from Cairo,
where he was a prisoner and waiting to be ransomed 1 Ozdemu.r
was using the time to obtain men and finance to press on with
the war. 2
These requests were fulfilled, but the death of
1. Historia de Mins,
pp .
33, 50-51.
2.
F. Preire to the Prepositor General, Nov. 30, 1562,
Rer. Aeth., X, 157.
194
Ozdemur upset the partnership between Yeshaq and the TLIrks.1
It appears that the ycu1g Ozdemur who succeeded his father as
pasha of Su.akin was a very ambitious and impetuous man.
He seems to have regarded Yeshaq more as a subject than an
ally.
II. The Fall of Dawaro and the Penetration of the Baraytwna
into Angot.
Bruce was u.nju.stifiably prejudiced against Jesuits and
Catholics, and in Minas's conflict with Oviedo and the
Portuguese his sympathy was clearly with the emperor. It was
sentiment rather than a sense of justice which led him to
believe that the emperor's character was denigrated by the
Jesuits and by all who read their letters and accounts.
Forgetting his duties as a historian, he drew of im the
d&stotd picture of a misunderstood and wronged warrior king.
1. On the date of the elder Ozdemlir's death see ibid., and
Oviedo et al., to the viceroy of India, July 14, 1564,
ibid., p. 14. The Yamanite chronicler Kutbuddin
(Kothbeddin al-Mekki) is wrong when placing Ozdemur's
death in 967 A.H. (1559-1560).
S. e Sacy "Le foundre du
Yemen ou. conqute du Yemen par les Othomais" in Notices
et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothegue Naionale,
IV, (1797-1798), 452.
195
Minas was a prince of very morose and
violent disposition, but very well adapted to
the time in which he lived; brave in his
person, active and attentive to all the
affairs of government. He was sober, and an
enemy of all sorts of pleasure; frugal, and,
in his dress or stile CsicJof living,
little different from any soldier in the army.
It is unnecessary to enter into the inherent contra-
dition 0' this assessment of Minas, or even to ask of Bruce
the sources for such a detailed description. His account of
Minas' s life was based on the chronicle; and there is
nothing in this document suggesting that the emperor' s
frugality and his concern for the country made him unpopular
with "the common soldiers accustomed to the liberality and
magnificence" of Galawdewos. Bruce was also wrong when he
said that Minas had fought the Muslims. 2 The fact is that
Minas need not have feared capture by Nur, for soon after
his victory the emir was forced to return to Harar.
And while they [the Muslimsj were marching
with the intention of conquering the Empire
there came to them news of how Abiticon Melahamcal
1.
Travels, II, 2 12 ; 8.nd, after Bruce, Budge,
History of Ethiopia, II, 359.
2 . Trave, II, 2 13-2 14.
3.
Abetohon Hainalmal is meant. The word abetohon is an
ancient title given to princes.
196
had entered throu.gh their kingdom and killed
their king, and how after he had withdrawn
the Kaffir Galla entered through the lands
and went devastating and destroying them.
Abandoning ever.ything they [the Mtaslims
hastened there to help, leaving the affairs
of Ethiopia in some tranquility.1
Understandably, Diogo Ue Couto's account is not
fully accurate. The Jesuits and all the Portuguese had also
abandoned Shawa, and de Couto's informant did not know of the
big bands of Muslims which Nu.r had left behind him.
2 The
composition of these bands is unknown. Besides the very
fami1ir name of the malassay, the chronicler of Sarsa
Dengel mentions the Ermaj and Seniur.
3 The malassay were
young warriors from the highland emirates, while the Semu.r
were Somali or people closely related to them. These Muslims
were probably unnerved by the absence of Nur and the Galla
invasion of Dawaro and their emirates and, had Minas returned
to Waj, he might have easily subdued them.
It is true that before the beginning of the rainy
season of 1559
he sent Hamalmal back to Shawa with full
powers over it and the provinces to its east and south-east.
1.
Da Asia, dec. VII, liv. VIII, cap. IX, pp. 232-33.
2 .
The informant was one Goncalo Soares Cardim, native of
Sintra, who came to Ethiopia with Oviedo. He outlived the
bishop, and sent de Couto an account of events from
1557
up to O'viedo's death in 1577.
Diogo de Couto incorporated
in his history part of the account, stopping with Minas's
defeat in 1562.
He promised to continue with the rest in
his eighth decada, but for some reason which I have been
unable to dicover he forgot to do so. Da Asia, dec.
VII, liv. IV, cap. IV,
pp.
308-309; and liv. X, cap. VI,
p. 494.
3 .
"Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", op.cit., text, p.36,
trans., p.42.
197
The monk Pawlos reports that he avenged the death of
Galawdewos, yet the man he killed and despoiled could not
have been Nur but a minor Muslim chief. 1 Hamalmal lacked
the ability and boldness of his predecessor Fanuel. There
is no indication that he tried to push the Muslims out of
Waj and Fatagar. In fact, not only were they left undis-
turbed in these provinces, but Hamalmal's transfer to Angot
some time towards the end of 1561 or the beginning of the
following year also enabled them to advance along the Awash
into Garage and Hadya.
Galawdewos's death was thus disastrous to Ethiopia as
well as to the su.ltanates of Haral' and Adal and their
satellite emirates. Until they were scattered by Nur, the
Ethiopian garrisons had prevented large scale infiltrations
by Muslims and Galla into Dawaro. The Muslims were in no
position to replace the regiments they had dispersed. By
their penetration into the interior they had spread them-
selves thin. And as people who were more or less continuously
1. "L'autobiografia di Pawlos", op.cit., pp .
286, 293. Conti
Rossini (note 2 in the latter page) thinks that Pawlos
is referring to Hamalmal's expedition against Hararin
March of 1559. However, Freire's report that Hainalmal's
encounter with the Muslims took place while Minas was in
Dambiya leaves no doubt that this was an expedition made
after the Muslims had entered the plateau. What is
doubtful in this report is the victory against the king
of Zeijla that it attributes to Hana1mal. F. Freire,
Aug. 12, 1560, Her. Aeth., X, 105.
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
198
TRIBES of the BARAYTUMA GROUP
Hunib ana
Itu
Wara De'aya
Marawa (clans; Ana, Uru, Abati)
Karayu (clans: Liban, Waflo, Jele, Obo, Suba, Bala'e)
Akachu
Warantisha
Subclans 01' the Wallo
Wara Buko
Wara Gura'e
Wara Nole'elu
Wara Karayu
Wara Ilu
Wara Nole'a.li
Wallo confederation.
Sadacha confederation
199
mobile and ag ressive, they had not acquired the Ethiopian
experience of frontier defence. The peasant population,
on its part, does not seem to have put up any resistance.
Long subjections to the regiments of professional soldiers
and restrictions on the possession of arms had, perhaps,
dulled their instinct of self-defence. Also, since for
centuries Dawaro had been a battlefield for warring high-
landers and. lowland.ers, the peasants here may have been even
weaker and more passive than those of the interior. 1 The
Baraytwna G-alla could not have chosen a better moment to
enter this strategically important province.
Because of its position in the Rift Valley and along
the Awash river, Dawaro was the gateway to many regions.
By moving up the Awash the Baraytuma could have reached
Fatagar and. the Awash-ibe regions, the areas best suited
for pasture and agriculture. Only the presence of the
Muslim hordes discourages them from following it. The
northern and eastern directions, on the other hand, were free
of serious obstacles. Of the seven tribes that made up the
1. Alvarez gives a very interesting story about the treatment
of peasants by Mahfuz during one of his incursions into
Fatagar. It seems that the peasants were spared while
the professional soldiers were taken prisoner. The
Prester John of the Indies, II, 411-12. We cannot, of
course, conclude that t is was a general practice through-
out the history of the westward movements.
200
BaraytLuna group, t e Humbana and. the Itu turned east along
the Charchar - Harar highlan s. The recert ex edition had
.I
denuded the emirates o their able men, and the fa 1 of
Dawaro made it impo sible f r t ese men to go to the rescue
of their homes a d. relatives. The disast r of Hazalo, in which
Mar was severely beaten, may not have beer c stly in terms
of human life, but pout cally and militarily its significance
cannot be anderesti ted. 1 It revealed to the Muslims that
the Galla were a force to be reckoned with. After it,
communications betweer t e central highlands and the
sultan tes became extremely di ficalt, and, suddenly though
undramatically, an era of Waslim-Christian relationship drew
to a close. Han icapped by the drought, which began in 1559
ard la te for three years, the a ricultural emirates di n t
resist lo g. 2
qit in this short period the Hambana and the
1. Beckingharn a d Huntinbf rd, 3 me ecords of thi pia,
p.117. It se ms certai. t at t e H zalo of the chr nicles
is the mountain n w known as Ayelu and foam east of the
Awash, not far from themt wh e t is nv r is joined
by the I ulla. Mt. Hazal m y hay been inside Dawaro. The
le ends told about t e mountain su ge t tnat there was on
it a mon tery or a c arch which may h ye erved one of
the re imerits of the ro'vince. A. Caquot (tra s. aid e .),
"L'h melie e l'hour e l'archan e Ouriel ( er ana
Una'el)", A, I (195 ), 76; G.
ssa , I ie tre t -
cinque aisse nell' Al a tio a, VIII, l73-
179- 0; and . Antonelli, "1 rimo viag 10 di un Euro eo
attr vers 1'Aassa", BS I, XLVI (1889), 537.
2 .
T e c ronicl s, it see , re a.cde the roaght as a
p ni hment ft e de th of,,Gal w ew s. C r
e
- 1 w e
, p.
109, 180; "Et e
ur l'hiFt ie 'Ethiopie"
p. .t., text, p. 33 , trans.,
. 108; a d_J. Perruchon,
(tra s. n ed.), " oteur l'hi t i e ' thiopie. Le
rgne e alawdew s", 3, II (189 ) te t, . 165, tr s.,
p . 2 8-69.
201
Itu gobbled up the entire Charhar-Harar range. Of that
-
rich and powerful sultanate only the city of Harar remained,
bat famine and plague made its struggle for survival
desperate.
Five of the Baraytuina tribes, namely the Karayu,
Marawa, Akachu, Warantisha arid. Wara De'aya, descended into
lowland Dawaro and,followirig the course of the Awash, con-
tinued. northwards. The Marawa and the Karayu formed the
spearhead of this movement. Passing Ifat, they proceeded
along the foot of the massif into Amhara and beyond. Close
behind them followed the Akachu, and the Warant1ha. The
Wara De'aya was the last wave, and as the preceding two
tribes were momentarily stopped at G-edem and southern
Ajnhara, it turned east thnto the somewhat fertile plains of
Mora and Awssa. 1 Bahrey's very brief report of this
historic thrust of the Baraytwna is at the same time a sad
commentary on Minas's reign.
The fifth luba was called Mesle.
It was he who ki'led Jan Amora and fought
Hamalmal at Dago. He deastated all the
lands and ruled over them; and. he
entered with his animals, whereas previously
the Galla made war coming out from the
Wabi and had returned Ihere. Oar king
Asnaf Sagad. bad fought him, starting from
1. The question whether the Wara De'aya belonged to the Boran
or Baraytwna group is discussed below on p.,g.
i. r
20
0.i
0
0'
3
/IJb
4111.
.c k
,
g4
\
iL
Liis1
(
I,
p
c)
0'
0'
4;l
1)9'
0
0
(,.
'3.
I%I
Pr.ore.$s
of 11
4:-n
tke. (i?v1.
9
Mi-,iaS.
"U.)
Asa Zanab)
T e eight-year term of the age-set or 1 a called
es1e fell between 1556 and l56.There is no way of
finding ut how these move ents were planred, launched and
co-ord.inated. Nevertheless, the timing and the cnoice of
directions do sug est that the leadership was fully aware
of the political developments in Ethiopia and Adal. The
Baraytuma were completely unfamiliar with the lands north
f Dawaro. Without informed leadership they would not have
reached Angot and Tigre within the short period of four to
five years. After they entered Ifat, the direction of their
movement was t a great extent defined for them by the
escarpment of the massif on their left and the arid plains
of Adal to their right. This lowland route was convenient
for cattle, women and children. It was also safer because
it was thinly populated and, therefore, undefende..
This lowlan r iate from Dawaro t Tigre had been used
bef re b nomads and pastoralists o the various Afar tribes,
t e raya aria the Zalan.
T e garrisons whose tasic was to
check the jnflux of pe pie fr m the lowlan s into the
plateau,
, if necessary by de.ce din into t e heart of the
lowla s, were ke t immobile by the rat er irresolute
1, Becking am and Hu.ntingf rd, S me Re or s '
thxpa,
116-17; an Guidi, "Hi&oriaefltis all , op.cit.,
text, p. 225, trans., . 199. The translations in b th
b o s a more r e t an lit r 1;
n in or er to re-
serve the exact and r ginal se a I
y e rendered it
witho t an e t ng. Asnaf Sagad. was alawdew s's
t r re-name.
204
Hamalmal. Bahrey me tioned this commander's meeting with
the araytu.ma f Dago. The chronicler was qu.ite se sitive
t bloody battles, and from the way he passed over this ne
it a pears to have been a minor a d i cidental engagement.
ago was a small district to the east of Ta ulat, between
Sh Wa, Gedem and Ifat. 1 The engagement must thus have
occurred before Hamalmal's transfer t Angot. What perhaps
happened was that, some time in 1560 or 1561, advance clans
of the Karayu or Marawa tribes had turned east along the
valley of the obi river, towqrds Manz, and had then been
brushed off by one of Haxmlmal's regiments. They would
have turned back, in any c.se, after they saw the formidable
r nge of Ianz.
It is difficult to establish the time of the Galla thrust
into Angot and south-eastern Tigre. Pawlos mentions it
between the death of Minas and Hamalmal's m eting with
Yeshaq in Tigre. 2
The Baraytwna had made their invasion to
1.
The encampment or fortress of Dago is mentioned in Les
chronigues de Zar'a Ya'egob et e Ba'eda Maryam, pp34,
131, 151. Itwas at tne e ge of the 1 teau overlooking
the lowlards of Gedem and Ifat and de e ding a pass
leading to Dabra Berhan. See also Ta la Sadeq ak riya,
Ya-It opya tarik.Ka ase Ye uno Amlak es a ase Lebna
engel, p. 155.
This lace is not to be confused with
he Dag e in Huntin ford, The Gi rio s Victories of
A da Seyon,
pp.
3 , 107.
2 .
"L'au.tobThgrafia di. Pawlos", op.cit., p. 2 87, 2 94.
(1
UJ
coincide with the absence of Hamalmal and most of the
regiments from Angot. Left by itself, the Jan Aniora garrison
could not do mUch against the stampede of Galla warriors and
cattle. If after his return from Tigre Hamalinal had stayed
at his post instead of leaving in pursuit of Sarsa Dengel,
the province might have been saved. Hamalmal's lack of
concern for the fate of the provinces in his charge is
remarkable. Remembering his conduct in 1559
one cannot
avoid the suspicion that his personality suffered from more
serious defects than disloyalty and indecisiveness. Apart
from the regiments, the only strong and organized force that
could have resisted the Baraytuma were the Doba, but in 1562
and
1563
they had suffered heavy depredations by the armies
which Minas had gathered against Yeshaq.1
III. The State of the Regiments of the Central and Eastern
Provinces in the early Years of Sarsa Dengel's Reign.
Immediately after the accession of 1inas's son Sarsa
Dengel, it became clear that there was to be no respite from
the civil wars that had plagued, the country for the last
three years. If anything, the situation was still more
alarming. This time, the p1lenge to the throne came not
1. Historia de ?&is, pp .
33, 51.
206
from the dispossessed nobility but from people of power,
provincial governors and commanders of armies. Initially
the pvading influence of Sabla Wangel was responsible for
the estrangement between the new emperor and some of his
father's loyal supporters.
Very few of the country's great men were in the
imperial camp when Minas unexpectedly died. There was no
doubt that Minas's oldest son, Sarsa Dengel,. who was
thirteen and a half years old, would be unanimously declared
emperor. 1 Yet bitter arguments arose between the henchmen
of the governors and army commanders who were moving
in the vanguard and the party of the empresses led by Selus
Haila herself. Due to the prince's age, a regency had
perforce to be set up, and the for ger group wanted to delay
the formalities of choosing and installing the successor
,
1. "Etudes su.r l'histoire d'Ethiopie", op.cit., text,
p . 337,
trans.,
p.
110. Trimingham does not cite his authority
when making Sarsa Dengel nineteen years old at the time
of his accession. Islam in Ethiopia, p.95. Sarsa
Dengel's age is not given in the longer chronicle but he
is described as a child. "Historia regis Sarsa Dengel",
op.Oit., text,
p.8,
trans., pp. 10-11. The Jesuits also
do not indicate his age in their letters. Manuel Fernandes
refers to him as the young boy. Letter to the viceroy,
March, 28, 1563, Rer. Aeth., X, 169.
207
until the important men were consulted. The party of the
empresses was opposed to any delay and, hence, to any
consultation. It wanted to exclude from the regency some of
the powerful men, apparently Hainalmal in particu.ar.
The presence of one of the empresses seems to have been
decisive, for two days later her side prevailed and Sarsa
Dengel was declared emperor under the throne-name Malak
Sagad.1
The chronicler of Sarsa Dengel's reign does not mention
that a regency was formed. In all likelihood none were
probably named to it, in order to mitigate the offence
already given to the powerful men. However delicately the
victorious party might have tried to behave, there can be
no doubt that it had acted contrary to established customs.
Such a Stratagem might have worked in times of peace. In a
time of civil strife, as this was, it was an unnecessarily
risky political game, especially as the empresses had not
made sure of the loyalty and support of any of the strong
men. A'though the chronicler justified it thus, "C'est
l'Esprit du Seigneu.r qu.i les poussa faire cette chose,
A
af in que le regne de ce oi ne fu.t pas da a l'aide des bommes
1. Bruce and, after him, Budge are wrong when stating that
Sarsa Dengel was crowned at Aksum. Travels, II, 214;
and History of Ethiopia, II, 360. The coronation at
Akeum took place in l519.
208
vaillants", the exclusion of Hamalmal from the regency was
selfish and shortsighted. 1 He was not a man distinguished
by military ability or political wisdom, but in this time
of mediocre men he enjoyed sufficient prestige to make the
victory of the empresses an empty one.
Sabla Wangel must have been either unaware of her
unpopularity with most of the nobility and. regimental
officers or very avaricious for power. She not only had the
young emperor brought to her home of Mangasta Samayat, but
even cut off all communication between him and the
officers of his camp.
Ce fut alors que les grands du royau.me firent
retenir le son de leurs plaintes, qui
aient secrtes auparavant, et manifeslerent
les calomnies qui avaient t caches; car 113
prirent comme prtexte la sparation du roi
et sa demeure avec sa mre; c'est avec cela
qu'ils pavrent la rue de lur plaintes,
et 1 prirent cela comme pretexte de leur
rvolte.. 2
To a certain degree Hanialmal's indignation was
understandable; however, as a man of great responsibilities,
for after all his positioxi made him second only to the
emperor, his reaction was unscrupulous and opportunistic.
According to the monk Pawlos, he continued his march to Tigre,
1.
"Historia regis Sara Dengel", op.cit., text, pp.
3-4,
trans., pp. 5-6.
2.
Ibid., text, p.5., trans., p.8.
209
where he came to an an erstanding with Yeshaq and Harbo.
The fu.11 details of this entente are Lmknown, but Haznalmal
agreed to recognize the emperorship of Marqos. 1 He did not
stay long with them, and by the time he returned to Angot
he had changed his mind about Marqos. The boy was a protg
of Yeshaq, and the not so quick-witted Mamalmal realized
that, if he helped in dethroning Sarsa Dengel, he would only
find himself superseded in position and. influence by Yeshaq
and Harbo. At this time he had no equal in strength and
power. His leadership was acknowledged by Taklo, governor
of Damot, Rom Saad, commander of the regiments of Shawa
and perhaps its governor as well, to say nothing of the host
of lesser noblemen and army officers, like his brother
Yohannes, Eslamo and Mand.alewos, who depended. on him. In
full display of his military superiority, he followed Sarsa
Dengel into Gojam and began investing Mangesta Samayat.
1. "L'autobiografia id. Pawlos", op.cit., pp. 287, 294
It
is puzzling why Conti Rossini. should think (n. 3, p.294)
that the meeting mentioned by Pawlos was the one they
held on the Blue Nile, between Go jam and Shawa, some time
in 1564,
especially since it was during this later
meeting that they broke off their entente about Marqos.
"Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", .cit., trxt, pp. 16-17,
trans., p.20. That Contj Rossini's interpretation is
wrong may be seen from M. Fernandes's letter of March 28,
1563,
Rer. Aeth., X, 169. Apparently they had agreed to
meet at Mangesta Saniayat, and Yeshaq had come up to
Bagameder. What we cannot find out from our sources is why
he did not continue to Gojam.
210
Sabla Wangel's isolation became clear when the
court officers arid pages deserted her. She and Ainas
Mogasa were left alone with the children. O their Tigre
supporters only one, Takia Giyorgis, was with them,but it
appears that he was without soldiers. Zaza Yohannes and the
other more important noblemen must have remained in Tigre,
probably to defend their home districts from invasion by
Yeshaq in case he decided to take advantage of the confusion.
We can, to some extent, understand why the aged empress
alone refused to be daunted by the overwhelming coalition
against her. The answer is suggested by the chronicler when
he wrote, "C'est ainsi qu.e Hamalmal avait voulLi devenir
r oi .

This may also explain why the churchmen were so

singularly Inactive during this clearly explosive situation.
Even if, shortly before, the clergy about the court had
offended him by strongly opposing the delay of Sarsa Dengel's
coronation, they need, not have feared him. They were suifi-
ciently protected by their cloth. For the ambitious
Hamalmal the victimization of the monks and priests would have
meant political suicide. It was his high ambition that
prevented them from trying to bring about a reconciliation
between him and the empress.
What enabled Sabla Wangel to resist the pressure from
Hamalmal was her belief that he would not dare take any steps
1. "Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", op.cit., text, p.
14,
trans., p.18.
C14 A
to usurp the crown. He was the grandson ofbut
through his daughter Romana Warq. Although he could have
easily taken Mangesta Samayat and imposed his will on
everyone in it, he was uncertain how the country, that is
the nobility and the regiments which were still uncommitted,
would receive him if he disregarded the sacrosanct tradition
of succession and made himself emperor. In the end he seems
to have chosen to come to terms with Sabla Wangel rather
than gamble with the high position he held. However, the
empress and, with her, the clergy distrtisted him so
thoroughly that his protestations of friendship had no effect.'
Only Selus Haila seems to have believed that he was sincerely
seeking reconciliation.
When she failed to move Sabla
Wangel from her stubborn determination to make no deals with
him, she went over to his camp, probably with the hopp
of dissuading him from further endangering her son's throne.
If by the proud will of Sabla Wangel and the lethargic
mind of Hamalmal a civil war was averted, the struggle for
power continued unresolved. Hamalmal crossed the Blue Nile
and camped at Endagebtan. His return to Shawa was not from
any sense of duty; he had no intention of rescuing Waj and
Fatagar from the Muslims, or Ifat, Gedem and Amhara from the
Baraytwna. We do not know what made him leave Gojam, whether
1. Ibid., text, pp. 6-7, trans., p . 8-9.
it was the difficulty of feeding his numerous regiments
or the confidence that Sahla Wangel would eventually tire
of her isolation and relent by making him co-regent.
Whatever the reason, the crisis of authority was
prolonged. The effect this had on the morale of the soldiers
and. the structure of the regimental organization was far-
reaching. The power vacuum led to the breakdown of the
administration and defence of all the eastern provinces.
not
Hamalmal had/only involved the administrators and regiments
in his quarrel with Sabla Wangel, but had also removed them
from their places of duty, first by taking them to Mangesta
Samayat, and. then by keeping them inactive in his fortified
camp at Endagebtan. Worse still, he allowed, encouraged.
might be a better word, some of the garrisons that had.
remained in the frontier districts to abandon their mountain
strongholds. Without any help or encouragement from the
feuding court and. nobility, these garrisons had. tried to
keep out Muslim and Galla invaders. A few of them, especi-
ally those of Fatagar axid If at, had even joined hands with
the Muslim invaders to keep out the common enemy, the
Baraytwna Galla. In all likelihood the alliance of the Ermaj
and Semur with some of these garrisons began after Hamalinal's
')4 f'
f,J)
appointment over Angot)
Hamalmal had overlooked the problems of feeding the
continuously increasing regiments. Gafat villages of
Endegebtan and the neighbouring district of Gendabarat were
wantonly pillaged, and. soon there was no way of preventing
clashes between the local garrisons and the regiments
Hamalmal had brought from other parts of' Shawa, Angot and
other places. To the administrators of western Shawa and
Damot, and the officers of the regiments stationed in them,
it became quite clear that their rebellion against Sarsa
Dengel had, given rise to a tyranny of the big regiments.
Appeal to Hamalmal was useless, because his greatness
depended upon the size of his armies and thus he could not
afford to displease his regiments. For the weaker noblemen
and smaller regiments of this region, the remedy lay in
buttressing the power of the emperor towards the weakening
1. Basset's abbreviated chronicle has this interesting piece
of information which the longer hist ry does not give except
by allusion. "And in that same year (the first year of
Sarsa Dengel's reign7 the armies rebelled together with
the Muslims, and they pillaged t}3e riches of the camp and
joned with Abeto Hamalmal..." "Etudes cur l'histoire
d'Ethiopie", o?.cit.,
text, p. 337,
trans.,
p.
110.
The Muslims referred to here could not have been Yeshaq's
Turkish friends, who did not come anywhere near Gojam
or Shawa, but the Muslim bands of Adal and Harar, which
had attached themselves to the garrisons of the eastern
provinces. See "Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", op.cit.,
text,
p .
36, trans., p.42.
214
of which they had contributed so much.
Sabla Wangel, too, was beginning to realize that her
selfishness about the regency and her stubbornness over
reconciliation with Hamalmal had brought her nothing.
Furthermore, she had hardly finished her sigh of relief at
Hamalmal's departure when she was frightened by Harbo, who
caine to take Sarsa Dengel to Yeshaq. Sarsa Dengel and his
younger brother were smuggled out of Mangesta Sanrat and
taken to Shawa.1
No sooner was Sarsa Dengel separated from his mother
than better counsel began to prevail. Negotiations were
begun with some of the regiments which were dissatisfied with
Hamalmal, particularly with the one at Sabrad. Sarsa Dengel
was warmly received by the 30 horsemen and more than. 5,000
foot soldiers. 2
The request by the Sabrad regiment that the
emperor should be crowned again in their camp was not without
significance. A second coronation 6eremony was not unusual,
but it was generally celebrated with much pomp and pageantry
and in the presence of the important lay and secular
dignitaries of the country. It had become recessary because
empe'ors often died while marching or campaigning. In such
circumstances successors were chosen and installed as
quickly as possible and with little formality. The
1.
Ibid., text,
pp .
8-9,
trans., pp
.
10-11.
2 .
Ibid,, text,
p.
13, trans.,
pp.
16-17.
21 r ' ii
cor onation of September 2, 1563, was in no way like the
customar y second cer emonies. It was held. at the r equest
of an unimpor tant r egiment which in that manner wanted to
impr ess upon the young emper or his obligation to it and on
Hanialma]. its dissociation fr om r ebellion and. disor der . The
officer s of the r egiment and the adviser s of the emper or
could not have chosen a mor e symbolic way of manifesting the
widespr ead. desir e for a r etur n to or der ly gover nment.
Many Gafat chiefs of Gendabar at followed the example
of the Sabr ad r egiment and made their submission to Sar sa
Dengel. Soon Hamalmal was deser ted by Taklo and his r egiments
of Damot, whose adher ence was the fir st significant suppor t
which the emper or had r eceived since he was r aised to the
thr one. Har nammal r ealized the danger , but the r emedy he
adopted to r egain the soldier s and to get r id of Sar 9a
Dengel was too belated and uninspir ed to r estor e confidence
in him. Takla Mar yam, the man be named as emper or , was old
and unknown. 1 When this failed, he withdr ew mor e gar r isons
1. "L' autobiogr afia di Pawlos", op.cit., pp. 287, 295. Takla
Mar yam is said to have been a iaescend.ant of Emper or Sayfa
Ar ' ed, and it seems he was br ought fr om Ainba Geshan.
"Histor ia r egis Sar sa Dengel", op.cit., text, pp. 15-16,
tr ans., pp. 19-20.
216
from the eastern districts. Of these the Giyorgis Haile,
probably comprising several regiments, was to become
notorious for its own lawlessness. A very short time
before, it had been heavily beaten at Qacheno by the Akachu
or Warantisha tribe; its soldiers were only too happy
of the excuse to avoid further encounters with the Galla.1
Taklo is described by Sarsa Dengel's chronicler as a
wise man, renowned for his prudent counsel. 2 While
Hamalmal was making preparations to march against them in
Damot, Taklo took a step that ensured the security of Sarsa
Dengel's throne. He brought over to their side Asm-ad-Din,
leader ol' the Maslim, who were occupying Waj, by promising,
according to the chronicler, that the emperor would give
him a governorship. 3
Asm-ad-Din and his followers already
1.
Beckingham and Huntingford, Some Records of Ethiopia,
p .
118. The commanding officer of the Giyorgis Halle
garrison at this time was a man called Awssa. Conti
Rossini, "Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", op.cit., text,
pp. 2 7-2 8, trans., pp.
3 2 -3 3 . It was to the defeat of the
Giyorgis Haile at Qacheno and not to the Adal district
of Awssa that Bahrey was referring when comparing the
losses of Nur and Awssa. Some Records of Ethiopia,
p.
117. Hence the errors in ibid., note 5, on the same
page; and in Schleicher, Geshichte der Galla, n.l,
pp .
19-2 0.
2 .
"Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", op.cit., text, pp.
15-16,
2 3 , trans.,
pp.
19, 2 7.
3 .
Ibid., text, p.16, trana, pp. 19-2 0. This very important
fact is mi sing from Bruce, because he thought Taklo and
Asm-ad-Din were one and the same person called Tecla
Asfadin. Travels, II, 2 15. Basset f
perhaps influenced by
Bruce, wrongly translated the sentence in which the two
men are mentioned, reading "The King ordered the governor
Taklo-la--Asfadin to begin campaigning", for "and Taklo
217
had their province; what they needed was a recognition of
their de facto occupation, a guarantee against future
expulsion by imperial forces. This timely and, expedient
move gained for Sarsa Dengel the vital support of 800
Muslim horsemen, who prevented Hamalmal from employing con-
fidently the 500 on his side. This and, his usual indoisiveness
prevented him from seeking an open engagement and from
taking advantage of the awe with which his regiments of
veterans were regarded by the other side. Although the
three months' long skirmishing was uneventful, it was not
undecisive. It showed that the rebellion against Sarsa
Dengel had failed.
After Hamalmal had returned. to Endagebtan, Yeshaq,
came to Gojain. During their meeting on the bank of the Nile,
Yeshaq, failed once more to gain Hamalmal's support for
Marq, os. The rebel of Tigre was no longer the formidable
enemy or rival that he had. been before, and. there was little
help that he could give to Hanialmal for repudiating the aged
Takia Maryam. Marqos was better known and more likely to
attract support, but juggling with candidates to the throne
would not have restored for Hamalmal the prestige and
strength that had been eroded by his irresolution.
.....brought out and made Asf-ad-Din icJ to take to war,
an4 they fought with Hamalmal". "Ettides sur l'histoire
d'thiopie", op.cit., text,
p .
337, trans., p.110.
218
Yeshaq went back to Debarwa leaving Marqos with him.
Thus, encumbered with two pseudo-emperors, and with hardly
a chance of putting either of them on the throne, Hamalmal
again shut himself inside his fortified camp. The emperor's
supporters were quick to seize the opportunity; they came
out and surrounded him. The threat of starvation to his
immense army forced him to seek peace.1
By this time Hanialmal had realized his weakness and
the situation that his conceit had led him into. He was,
therefore, relieved to see the whole matter taken out of
his hands, especially since Sarsa Dengel did. not treat his
surrender as such but as reconciliation. For his regiments,
however, peace was undesirable. They were not unhappy at
leaving their besieged camp, only they had no intentioh of
going back to their posts. On February 15, 1564,
only two
days after Hamalmal's surrender, all his regiments,
especially those he had brought from Angot and Gedem and
those that had joinea him from the eastern districts o
Shawa, rose up in arms and plundered the entire imperial
camp. To think that he had, engineered this mutiny to prove
himself indispensable to the young emperor would be greatly
overestimating him. He had promized the emperor that he
would repair all the damage the country had suffered from
his rebellion. The main reason behind the revolt of
1. "Historia regis Sarsa Derigel", op.cit., text, p.
18,
trans.,
pp .
21-22.
219
Hamalmal's regiments was to wreck the peace, if necessary
by killing Taklo, the man chiefly responsible for Sarsa
Dengel's recovery of strength. 1 To the relief of many
soldiers, Harnalmal was appointed to Gojam, the court
reluctantly allowing some of the regiments to go with him.
There were two reasons why the regiments which were
with Hamalmal could not all be sent to Goam. The province
had its own regiments, and the settlement of additional
garrisons, some of them very large, would require taking
lands from the local nobility and regiments, which would
certainly give rise to serious clashes. On the other hand,
if Hamalmal took all the soldiers, the defence of Shawa
and Gedein would be made impossible. Besides, the governors
and district administrators might feel slighted. To the
regiments these considerations had little meaning. Rom
Sagad, Harnalmal's lieutenant in rebellion, was made governor
of Shawa, a post he probably held after Minas's transfer of
Hamalmal to Angot, and many of the old regiments were
assigned to him. On their way to the central and eastern
districts, his soldiers vented their dissatisfaction by
wantonly plundering Gendabarab, Endagebtan and Mugar.
Even the monasteries were not sparei. 2
As this gained them
1.
Ibid., text, p. 2 0-2 1, trans., pp. 2 4-2 5.
2 .
Ibid., text, pp. 2 1-2 2 , trans., pp. 2 5-2 6. The chronicler
says that the plunderers were Hamalmal's men. This is
because Hamalmal and om Sagad were marching together,
and because until the former's assignment to Gojam
Rom Sagad and the Shawan regiments were under him.
220
nothing, the regiments, through their officers, urged. Rom
Sagad to rebellion. The Giyorgis Haile soldiers and their
commander Awssa were at the basis of this revolt. They
marched through Shawa and Fatagar into Waj, robbing and
destroying without restraint. In Waj they seduced the
Bater Amora garrison to abandon its post and. join them.
Even the regiments of Damot and western Shawa might have
deserted the emperor, had not Rom Sagad been lured to his
death by the wise and cautious garad of Hadya. Aze had
protected his people by standing aside from the civil war.1
Although Rom agad came to invite him to join the rebellion,
Aze suspected that what the rebel leader wanted was an
excuse to open Hadya for his lawless hordes.
The death of Rom Sagad was followed by the dispersal
of the regiments. Those of Waj, including the Bater Amora,
went back to their posts. Therest, led by the Giyorgis Haile,
started for Gojam, hoping that Hanialmal would settle them
there. Sarsa Dengel, now nearly fifteen years old, inter-
cepted them before they crossed the Nile. Although he was
1. Bruce's groundless identification of Aze as a Galla
clan had misled some scholars into assuming that the Galla
had moved into Shawa at this peri9d. Travels, II, 215;
Basset, "tudes sur l'histoire d'Ethiopie", p.cit.,
trans., p.110, and n.206, p.160; and Budge, History
of Ethiopia, II, 362. Beckinghazn and Hu.ntingford are
definitely wrong when citing Basset's chronicle itself
as the autnority for this identification. Some Records
of Ethiopia, pp. lxiv, lxxv.
221
unable to persuade them to return to their districts, he
pregented them from leaving Shawa altogether. The Giyorgis
Haile were settled at Mugar, and the rest were added to
the growing army under the emperor's command. 1 A
significant development that resulted from this rampage in
Patagar and Waj was the allianae of small bands of the
Muslim invaders with the peoples of Hadya. Many of these
bands were remnants of Nar's hordes, but it is possible
that there were amongst them fugitives from the emirates
which the Ita and the Hwnbana had taken.
The death of Hamalmal and Eslamo, also his companion
in rebellion,in October of 1564, following soon after that
of Rom Sagad., deceived the emperor into thinking that his
difficulties were over. His expedition into Waj and the
military post of Bater Amora might have resulted in the re-
settlement of more regiments in this area. But before the
emperor could make any arrangements that would strengthen
its defences, the Giyorgis Haile revolted once again. The
soldiers ravaged their way to Gurage, where the inhabitants,
less suppressed than the peasantry elsewhere an&imore
accustomed to resisting central authority, ably protected
themselves. When the soldiers lost more than 600 of their
companions, they crossed t e Nile and despoiled many of the
Gojam districts opposite Shawa. Sabla Wangel's home of Mangesta
1. "Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", op.cit., text, p.26,
trans., p.30.
Saxnayat was also looted. The situation became so serious
that the emperor had to take from the Bater Amora garrison
some 300 horses that it could ill afford. 1 He overtook
the Giyorgis Haile at Walaqa, and before the soldiers had
completely destroyed the province he cajoled them into
submission by promising them full pardon. The plea of
Awssa, commander of the garrison, is noteworthy.
Ce n'est pas par ma volont que j'ai fait
cette sottise contre mon maitre et ma
soaveraine; mais c'est par la sottise de
mon peuple...; mais la crainte et la
terreur m'ont saisi quand mes compagnons
ont agi si mal contre le campement de mon
maitre, en pillant les biens de 1'Itege et
des princesses, et les bei.ns des gens du
campement.2
By the middle of 1566 the soldiers of the imperial
camp were infected with the restlessness of the Giyorgis
Haile. The trouble started when the Aqet Jar, the royal
bodyguard, followed by the Aragua Chawa and other regiments,
refused to stay and pass the rainy season in Damot, allegedly
because of its unhealthy climate. 3The soldiers' preference
1. Ibid., text,
pp.
26-27, trans., p.31.
2. Ibid., text,
pp.
27-28, trans., p.32.
3.
Ibid, text, p.30, trans., p.35. It is not improbable
t at Aragua Chawa is the name, not of one, bat of
several regiments of 'veterans from the eastern lines.
Aragua may be from the Amharic aroge meaning old or
ancient.
') ') C'
was for Shawa, the peasants of which made easier victims than
the freer, and, therefore, more spirited Sidarna and Gafat
of Damot. Sarsa Dengel had opposed it in order to spare
the Shawan peasants further suffering and to save the crops
on which he and his men would depend the following year.
The situation was made complicated by an intense conspiracy
in the court to oust Taklo, on whose advice, presumably, the
emperor had decided to winter at Damot. The various ministers
and officers of the court envied his influence on the
emperor, even though his contributions towards the partial
strengthening of the emperor's position and the return to
political stability were indirecUy to their advantage. The
jealous courtiers persuaded Sarsa Dengel to give Taklo'e
governorship of Damot to one Fasilo, commander of some regi-
ments of Shawa and. 3atagar, on the ground that only he
would be able to stop the Aqet Jar and Aragua Chawa from
marching to Shawa. 1
Fasilo was an adventurer, very much the
soldier of the time, for whom a high post outside or inside
1. Bruce thinks he was a cousin of Hamalmal, though on the
basis of what authority we cannot discover. Travels,
II, 215. Among some other regiments Fasilo commanded
the Marrir, and it was he and this regiment that were
responsible for the revolt intended to break off the
peace between Hamalmal and the emperor. "Historia regis
Sarsa Dengel", op.cit., text, pp. 2O-2Z, trans., pp.
24-25.
It seems that it was ciliefly to this Marrir regiment
that the lowland Muslims, the Ermaj and the Semur, had
attacned themselves.
224
the court had little significance. He and his soldiers had
only one desire, which was to plunder the imperial camp
and to rob its men of their horses and weapons. In the
revolt of August the emperor would have lost his life, if the
chief of Konch had not given him refuge and protection.
Fasilo spared neither the disobedient soldiers nor the
intriguing courtiers.
Once more Taklo came to the rescue of Sarsa Dengel.
By his tactful persuasion he brought the Giyorgis Hafle and
regiments allied to it to the emperor's side. Fasilo
tried to frustrate Sarsa Dengel'S recovery by raising a
rival emperor, but Taklo's persuasiveness and the timely
arrival of help from Goam led to mass desertions from his
camp. Failo was caught in Bagameder while escaping to
Debarwa. The surrender of his regiments att the beginning of
1567 was auspicious; it was followed by an even more
significant event. Yeshaq came all the way to Gojam and
submitted to Sarsa Derigel, the emperor responding generously
by reinstating him as bahr nagash. It seems that Yeshaq
had become very unsure about the outcome of his friendship
with the younger Ozdemar. Pawlos has a. brief report of the
imprisonment of Yeshaq bj the Turks immediately after
Ozd.emu.r succeeded his father. The break came in 1564, when
Yeshaq pushed the Turks off he highlands into Arqiqo and.
Massawa, losing two of his sons in the act.
1 We do not
1. "L'autobiografia di Pawlos', op.cit.,
pp.
287, 294-95.
225
know the cause of their quarrel, but it is not impossible
that it arose because Ozdemur regarded the whole of the
northernmost province as Turkish territory and Yeshaq
as its subject.'
Although we have attributed the initial cause of the
re-
civil war, which began with Yeshaq's4ellion, to Minas's
unwise and ill-timed handling of some of the nobility, the
crisis was only a manifestation of the old tug-of-war between
the forces of centralization and decentralization,or in
other words between the monarchy's desire towards absolutism
and the aristocracy's jealousy of its autonomy. After the
Muslim invasion under Ahmad Granh, the conflict had been
briefly forgotten. Galawdewos's preoccupation with the
Muslims and the Galla, and. his own mild and trusting nature
had led to a successful partnership between the emperor and
the nobility. Because of Galawdewos's concern with the
problem of reconstruction, while at the same time reorganizing
defendes against new invasions, the nobility came to
1. A possible reason for the quarrel could have been
Yeshaq's decision to abandon the apparently hopeless
claim of the throner Marqos. The Jesuit version of
Yeshaq's break with the
Turks has intriguing inaccuracies.
It says that after capturing Sarsa Dengel with the
help of the 1 urks, Yeshaq turned against them, taking
the land he had. given them. The younger Ozdemu.r arrived
at Arqiqo at this time to take his father's place, and
sup orted by partisans of Sarsa Dengel he reoccupied
Debarwa. The Jesuits added that the latest news they
had was that Ozdemur had gone back to the coast. Oviedo
and M. Pernandes to the viceroy of India, July 14, 1564,
Rer. Aeth., X, 184-85.
Since the Jesuits were at Premona,
it is difficult how they could have been ignorant of
events at Debarwa. It is not very unlikely that they were
trying to defend their friend and protector by showing
Sarsa Dengel and his supporters as the curits.
226
enjoy greater powers which many earlier kings had jealously
kept for themselves. We mayite as examples the appointment
of Fanuel and later of Hamalmal as civil and military
governors of Dawaro and the nearby districts, and Yeshaq's
position in the north after the Turkish landing. Under
ordinary circumstances, that is if Ozdemu.r had not been in
Arqiqo to give his support to Yeshaq, and if the Muslim and
Galla invasions had not been so serious, the civil war might
have been brief. With the help of the regiments which were
under the authority of the crown, the emperor would have
subdued the nobility, acquiring in the process greater
control over them. But the prolongation of the war and the
scale of the invasions brought about an ozinous shift of the
position of the regiments vis-a-vis the two sides. For a
short time at the beginning of Sarsa Dengel's reign it seemed
as if the regiments had transferred their allegiance to the
nobility. However, it soon became apparent that they had
found a new loyalty, that of looking after their own interests.
The Giyorgis Haile and the Marrir became as disloyal to the
nobility as they were to the monarchy. This declaration
of independence by the class of professional soldiers was
first made by the frontier garrisons and the cause of this
new development, we may assume, was the dislocation created
by the Muslim and Galla migrations.
22'?
IV. The Restoration of Imperial Authority over the Southern
P r ov ine es.
So far, Sarsa Dengel's authority did. not extend south
of Damot and Shawa. Though there were no v isible signs of
loyalty to the emperor in the prov inces beyond, this was due
more to their reluctance to be inv olv ed in the civ il war than
to any positiv e challenge to the thrones Nearly all of the
prov inces were ruled by local chiefs and the garrisons
stationed in them were few. Interv ention in the day to day
internal administration was felt less here than in the pre-
dominantly Christian prov inces to the north. Thus many of
the prov inces west of the Gibe were fav ourably disposed. to
Sarsa Dengel, as the chief of Konch was in 1566 when the
emperor was a fugitiv e from Fasilo. Sepenhi, ruler of Enarya,
also demonstrated. his loyalty when, at the beginning of 1568,
he brought rich tributes of gold of which the emperor had
great need. 1 The Bosha were still resentful of the oppres-.
sive tributes Galawdewos had forced. out of them, and some
campaigning became necessary before they submitted to his
nephew. We hear nothing at this time of Bizamo and Janjro,
but it is not improbable that they were glad to keep out the
rapacious regiments by v arious tokens of loyalty to the throne.
1. "Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", op.cit., text, p.38,
trans., p.44.
228
Strengt e ed by the tribute he had received and
by the reinforcement he had collected on the other side of
the Gibe, the emperor turned his face towards Had.ya and
Gara e. Aze, ruler of Muslim Hadya, had resisted all
attempts to drag him into the factious struggle for power.
Ever since 1559, the defence of Hadya against encroachments
by Nur's hordes had devolved upon its inhabita ts. This
had led to the creation of a relatively big force, which
included 1,700 horsemen, and which enabled Aze to keep Rom
Sagad. and the Giyorgis Haile out of Hadya. To avoid the
fate of parts of Garage and western Shawa at the hands of
the rampaging regiments, Aze allied himself with the Muslim
invaders of Fa.tagar, many of whom he settled in his roviri.ce.
Hence, when Sarsa Dengel approached with demands for t e
overdue tributes, the ad itional strength of a cavalry of
500 malassay, whose weapons and cuirasses made them
formidable, gave him confidence te able to refuse.'
Had the ma1assy been ably seconded by the large number of
Hadya nien, Sarsa Dengel's task wight have been very difficult.
As it was, only the mala say fou ht. Aze made his s bmission,
a d. although he retained his chieftainship, the administration
of the province and t e command of the soldiers in it was
given to one Takia Giyorgis.
1. Ibid., text, . 40, trans.,
p .
47.
229
The pacification of Hadya took most of 1569 ana the
first few months of the following year, after which the
emperor went to Wa and camped atBar, the old court
of Galawdewo8. The growing power of Aze had. made the
Garage uncomfortable, and they were qaite relieved to see
the return of the imperia).. forces to these pars. In Waj
the Muslims under Asm-ad-Din were left in peace. Sarsa
Dengel had, brought with him several regiments like the
Glyorgis Haile and. the Germe, and although they were
strengthened by the horses and arms they took from the
Hadya men and the malassay, he showed no signs of continuing
to Dawaro or Bali. The chroni1er offers no indication about
his attitude towards the Glla occupation of these and other
provinces to the north, for by the beginning of 1571 he and
his regiments were back at Gendabarat and Mugar. As there
was no urgent reason that required his presence in western
Shawa, it is to be pesamed that he had, no plans towards the
recovery of territories lost since 1559 or fears that the
Galla would launch new waves of migrations. Sarsa Dengel
was nineteen years old at this time, and. nearly six years
had passed since he crossed the Nile. It seems he was
anxious to visit his provinces to the north and, to assure
himself of the loyalty of their governors,
230
CHAPTER
iv:
THE REIGN OP SARSA DENGEL
I. The transformation of Provincial Governors into War-lo
Much has been written about the greatness of Sasa
Dengel: about his straggles to keep out Galla and. Muslim
invaders, to subdue "untamed" people like the Agaw and.
Falasha, and to stabilize a strife-torn nation. The degree
to which his military exploits were overestimated and
glorified i epitomized by Ullendorff, who compares him with
Amda Seyon)
The differences between the two monarchs are
so wide that the comparison becomes qtute unjust to the
foarteentb entu.ry statesman. An examination of the sources
would show that, whereas Amda Seyon shaped armies and. regi-
ments for the defence of the country against the nomads and
pastoralists of the eastern lowlands, Sarsa Dengel contributed
/ to he dismantling of the system of defences by using the
( soldiers to ravage peacefal provinces, thereby clearing the
way for the Galla. The dislocation of regiments from the
strategic locations where they were poSd had begun before he
1. Bruce, Travels, II, 231, 234; Budge, History of Ethiopia,
II, 372-73; and lJllendorff, The Ethiopians, p. 76.
See also Trimin,gham, Islam inEthiopia, p.95.
M. Saineano'
analysis of the reign of Sarsa Dengel is perhaps an
excellent example of how a clear and detailed c1ronicle
could be misused. According to him the emperor created
a big army of highly disciplined soldiers with which he
eras ed all internal anU external enemies to make his
sovereignty effectively felt throughout the country.
L'Abyssinie dans la secoride moiti du XVIe sicle ou la
rgne de Sartsa-Dengel (Malak-Sagad)(l563-l594) d'aprs
les annales Ethiopiennes in ' dites, pp.. 8, 51-52.
231
came to the throne. As he was then a minor, he was not
responsible for the fragmentation of garrisons which
followed the rebellion of the noblemert, especially of
Hamalmal. He aggravated the situation by permitting the
cntro1 of the provincial armies to pass into the hands of
the governors and, by bu.lding up to counteract the power
of the nobility, a Large army of his own, composed of
splinter units from the regiments, and of irregulars and
mercenaries.
Sarsa Dengel's hopes of restoring to the throne the
authority and dignity which it had enjoyed until
1557,
of
recapturing the administrative powers it had. lost to the
provincial aristocracy, and of reconstructing the military
system for the defensive purposes it was intended to serve
were to be frustrated by his inexperience, by his fear of the
nobility, and by the unwillingness of the professional soldiers
to return to or to remain in their posts. He was born and
raised in the home of Sabla Wanel, and the instabili'y of
political conditions ever since the acession of his father
to the throne had deprived him of opportunities for
serious education.
Although with the help of Taklo and some of the
regiments of Damot be was able to rid himself of the
preten ers, the ambitious nobility had set up as his xivals,
the influence of bis women relatives continued to dminate
his court throughout his long reign of 34 years. Sabla
Wangel's place was taken by his mother Selus Haila and his
aunt Amata Glyorgis, the rich daughter of Lebna Dengel,
who was instrumental in arranging Hamalml's surrender.1
It is not unreasonable to assume that the strong eminine
influence in his life left marked effects on his character.
As we shall see, he was weak and indecisive. The only way
he knew of winiting or retaining the loyalty o the nobility
and the soldiers was by heaping favours on them. e com-
promised and surrendered on important issues in order to
please them. After the defeat of Pasilo, the name of Taklo
disappears from the chronicle, and, b
y
1571 Damot was given
to the loyal Takla Giyorgis. We do not know whether Taklo had
died. or was edged out of the court and active political life
by the two women, but it is significant that throughout the
rest of Sarsa Dengel's reign there were very few important
people in the court who, in one way or another, did not owe
their position tO his women relatives.
Harbo had given demonstrations of repfntance when he
helped in the f'inal ownf all of Pasilo and when he arranged
the reconciliation between Yeshaq and the emperor. Yeshaq
also seemed sincere in his desire for peace when, besides
the gifts he offered, he placed 700 of his men in the service
of the emperor. The manner in which they made their homage
1. "Hisoria regis SarsaDengel", op.cit., text, p.1S,
Accordofe abridge4 chrojic1e
died 'inye9.r 0.'. arsa .vengel's
reign. "tudes sur l'histoire d'Ethiopie", op.cit.,
text,
p.
337, trans., p.110.
and. offered their gifts clearly indicated that the two men
regarded themselves as more than ordinary officers of the
crown, entrusted with the adixiinistration of the provinces
and the collection of revenues, and whom the emperor could
remove any time he was dissatisfied with their services.
Both men continued to maintain close relationships with the
Jesuits, and in 1567, the very year in which Yeshaq was
reconciled with the emperor, they were urgently soliciting
military assistance from the Portuguese governor in India.1
Oviedo described Yeshaq's power in Tigre as being like that
of a king. 2 In a letter of
1575,
Manuel Fernandes said
that Harbo ruled TDambiya for many years, more against the
wish of the emperor than because of it.3
Sarsa Bengel had, therefore, reason to suspect that
their attitude of independence contradicted their protes-
tations of loyalty and to fear that they might further
endanger the security of his throne. When he left for
Dambiya in 1571 he could not have failed to foresee that the
1. Azmach Yeshaq to the Viceroy of India, June 2, 1567,
Rer. Aeth., X,
2 05-2 07;
The Portuguese in Ethiopia to the
same, June 13, 1567, fibid., pp. 2 O7-2 0; Abetohon Yohanres
to the same, June 30, 1567, ibid., pp.
2 35-36; and
Azmach Yeshaq, to the same, June 30, 1567, ibid., pp. 2 36-38.
2. Ovied.o to Dom Sebastian, king o Portugal, June 18, 1567,
ibid., p.222.
3.
M. Fernandes to V. Rodrigues, provincial of India,
Dec. 2 0,
1575,
ibid., p
. 2 77.
234
Boran, whose incursions ffom Dawaro were checked, by his
presence in Waj, would begin to move up the Awash valley
into Fatagar. He seems to have realized that, unless he
dispelled his fears of rebellion and ascertained for himself
that conditions in the interior provinces would continue
tranquil, he would not be able to dominate the regiments or
u.nderta.ke the task of reorganizing the defences of the
eastern provinces.
At the same time Harbo and Yeshaq had reasons to feel
that, in spite of the reconciliation, they would not enjoy
the trust of the emperor and that he might even remove them
as soon as he was confident of himself. Sarsa Dengel does
not seem to have realized that the way he allowed himself to
be influenced by his mother and his aunt would obstruct his
efforts to normalize his relations with the proud noblemen.
When he me them in
1567,
the two women dominated the court.'
Although the death of $abla Wangel could have
cleared the way for a lasting peace, the eminent presence cf
the queen mother and. of Amata GriyorgIs must have made the
noblemen despair of ever playing signifioa.nt roles in the
court and the country at large. Before leaving Waj, the
emperor appointed Takia Giyorgis gcvernor of Damot and
1. In fact, according to Pawlos, the reconciliation was
between Yeshaq and the queen-mother. "L'autobiografia
di Pawlos", p.cit., pp. 288, 295.
dajazmach of the Gibe-Awash region. We do not know if
Takia Giyorgis was related to SaWa WangeL or Selu.s Haila,
bu.t his attachment to the former lady could not have made
him frielialy with either of the noblemen. A more serious
cause of concern for Yeshaq was the rapid rise of Daharagot
whc came frcm Bora, and was related to Selas Haila.'
His marriage, at the beginning of th.s year, with Walata
Dengel, daughter of Amata Giyorgis, established him as one
of the prominent figures of the country; and 1eshaq . could
not have failed to see in him a rival for the governorship
of Tigre. The marriage was probably intended to cement the
friendship between the two women and their partnership in
running the court.2
Although the arrangements for the emperor's meeting
with Harbo and Yeshaq were carefully prepared in advance, the
1.
Chronica de Susenyos, I, 129-30, II, 100, 357-58. The
interesting refernce to the flight of Yeshaq . from Salawa
suggests that the nobleman had later invested, though
unsuccessfully, the home of his rival, I. Guidi (trans.
and. ed.) "Annales lohannis I, lyasu I et Bakaffa",
CSCO, V, text,
p.
35, trans., p.35.
2.
They were still friends in 1579 and their partnership is
thus described, "car toutes lee deux ont pr4fr Line
parfae union, sans separation, dane l'amour et la con-
corde, dans la demeu.re et dane l'existence: que Dieu
ne lee spare jamais, ni idni au de1, pour toujours,
amenY' "Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", op.cit., text,
po 82, trans., p.94.
23(
outcome is in dequately described by the chronicles. One
way by which he tried to secure the support and, loyalty of
Yeshaq, see s to have been by marrying the sister of the
bahr nagash. Pero Paez knew M ryam $e'na quite well and
could not have been mistaken when he said. she was Yeshaq's
sister. 1In. the last years of her husband's reign sae was
to emerge as the elevezest and most ambitious wb.man of
her time. Few queens in Ethiopian history could, in fact,
rival tl-e pernicious influence she exercised. over more than
two decades. Yet, buriously enough, her name appears only
once in the long chronicle, the pages of which are crowded
with names of queens and. princesses. Furthermore, she was
not given the title of itege, or queen, until after Selus
1. "Relacam da entrada doe Pes. da Compa. de Jesta em
Aethyopia", fol. 50 , MS. 779, Braga. In his larger
history Paez does not mention Maryam Se'ria's relationship
with Yeshaq. He only says that she was a noblewoman of
Shire which was Yeshaq's district. "Historia de
Ethiopia", Rer. Aeth., II, 164. In la letter of July 30,
1608, to the p'ovinaial of India, Lais de Azevedo des-
cribes Yeshaq as the son-in-law of 'Sarsa Dengel. There
can be no doubt that Azevedo intended to write that the
bahr naash was the emperor's father-in-law. Ibid.,
XI, 164, This relationship between Yeshaq and the
empress would explain the reinstatement of Yeshaq's
son as governor of Shire later when she became regent.
Chronica de Susenyos, I, 111, II, 86.
237
Haila's death in
1593.1
Thus, even 41 because of her brother's
faithlessness st was not repudiated by her husband, her
presence in the court may have been embarrassing at first.
The author of jhe long chronicle could not foresee the
change which was to take place in her fortune and seems,
therefore, th have caref ally kept her name out of his
pages..
Judging from the way relations between the emperor and
the twQ noblemen deterioi'ate afteiwards, we may say that his
meetings with them in 1572 were unsuccessful. Tbe respon-
sibility was partly his. Sarsa Denge1' eagerness to win
their loyalty and the attit.ide o meekness that ie showed
were interpreted by them as signs of weakness even though
militarily he was quite strong. Even if he had to marry
Yeshaq's sister in order to secure a lasting peace, it was
a political error for an emperor to show so much humility
ajad modesty towards the ambitiou.s Yeshaq. It may be seen from
1. See colophon on fol. 103 r, Kebra agast, MS. 0rent:
818, British Museum; W. Wright, Catalogue of the
Ethiopic Manuscripts, p. 309. In the original version of
the long ckronicle from which
the Oxford MS. was copied,
Maryam Se'na has the title of ejmabet which is equivalent
tO 'lady". In..a revised version of the sane chronicle,
which Paez used for his translation of Sarsa Dengel's
history and from which the Frankfurt MS. was oopied, she
has the title ol itege, apparently an insertion ol the
copyist. "Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", op.cit.,
text, pp. Ui, 155, trans.,
pp.
126, 172.
238
the chronicle that the emperor had set ou.t for Dambi.ya to
solicit loyalty instead of demand.t.
Si, en se souvenant de leu.r conduite
mon gard et l'gard de mon pre,
its ont .honte de venirmon caznpement
et de s'approcher de moi, j'irai mQi-m&ne
chez eu.x et je les ferai s'approcher de
moi, et je resterai d'accord. avec eux en
humilit et amiti6)-
For some reason that is not suggested in the chronicle,
Yeshaq. did. not come to Gubay, in Emfraz, at the time he was
expected. It is quite possible that he delayed hs omiri.g
in order to impress upon the emperor that he was not a weak
vassal prostrating himself before hi lord. Sarsa Dengel
and Selu.s Haila were inahLLrry to return to Shawa, but when
they went as far north as the Angarab river to await Yeshaq's
arrival, the dignity of the throne must have been somehow
debased and the arrogant confidence of the bahr nagash
enhanced.
The chronicles are not informative as to the real
concessions the emperor made to the noblemen. It seems
that Yeshaq not only kept his office as bahr nagash, bat
was also made a minister of the court with the title of
hedu.g r&s.In land charters made out in the fourtenth
year of Sarsa Dengel's reign mention is made of a hedu.g ras
Yeshaq. Even .f the authenticity of these charters is pat to
question, the forgers would have taken extreme caution to
1. Ibid., text, p. 43, trans., p.50.
239
mention the men in office in 1577 and.
1 5 7 8 . 1
There is
also the possibility that the Yeshaq of the charters was a
different person fromlihe bahrnagash, Althou.gh no other
person of this name except the bahr nagash is mentioned in
the chronicles, the hedu.g ras may have been forgotten as
were Arkadewos and Aklil, two ministers bearing the same
title and, mentioned in another charter of Sarsa Dengel.2
If, on the other hand,, our identification is correct,
the emperor and. his mother would have been well advised to
d.isimu1ate their suspicion of Yeshaq and make him take over
his zeponsibi1ities as a minister in the court. By this
means they could. have separated him from his supporters in
Tigre, including Oviedo and the Turks, and isolated him from
his friends like Harbo and Abetohon '(ohannes. Instead,
they sent him back to Debarwa and. further strengthened his
position by confirming the governorship of the southern
part of Tigre on hjs friend and ally Yoha.nnes. Sarsa
Dengel's timidity seems to have also restrained. him from
demanding his share of the revenues from Harbo and Yeshaq.
They entertained the court regally and heaped expensive
1.
Both charters are dated 14th year of Sarsa Dengel's reign.
They were, therefore, issued after Yeshaq had been re-
instated as hediag ras and made dajazmach. The charters
are included in Ta'amera Maryam, fols 7 v, 16 v, MS.
Orient. 650, British useum.
2. Ibid., fol. 7v.
240
silk stuffs on him, his mother and the household officers,
but there is no mention in. the chronicles of any settlement
of the substantial arrears in revenues. Even if the
massive Boran irruption into the central plateau did hot
give the emperor much time to consider carefully the con-
sequences of his generous treatment of his former enemies,
he should have been forewarned of the diffculties that would
follow Yeshaq's return to Tigre at a time when the Turks
re-entered Debarwa.
With the loyal governors in the other provinces Sarsa
Dengel was, as may be expected, exceedirtgly generous and
trusting. He hardly resorted to that tried policy of
frequently changing governors by which emperors had kept
ambitious officers in check while at the same time filling
their coffers by the mashomya thus collected. 1He summoned
the overnors t assist him in his various campaigns, but
rarely interfered in the way they managed the civil and
military affairs of their provinces. The chronicles are
not very enlightening on the amount of revenues and the
regularity with which they were paid into the central
1. The mashomya was a fixed and obligatory gift paid into
the central treasury at the time when a person was
appointed over a province or a district. M. Barradas,
"Tratatus Tres", Rer. Aeth., IV, 83-84; Chronica de
Susenyos, I, 240, II, l35.
The mashomya was probably the
same thin as the mamalaja of the Hega waser'ata mangest.
J. Varenbergh, "Studien zur abessinischen Reichsordnung",
op.cit., p . 24-25.
9i11
treasury. As the governors of this time had large armies
to mai.ntain and were responsible for the defence of their
provinces, it is likely that he allo.wed them to keep
much of the revenues. Because of the great freedom governors
enjoyed, and the long years they were kept in their
governorships, they became dispensers of wealth and positions
to the noblemen and soldiers in their provinces.
On returning to Shawa from hie meetin s with Harbo
and Yeshaq, the emperor called up the governors of Damot,
Thjain, Shawa and the smaller provinces to its south for a
campaign against the Boran. Though surprisingly brief, the
campaign against the Boran was successful and the Galla
were prevented from entering Shawa. The governors and
their armies were selit back to their homes, and the emperor,
at the head of a multitude of soldiers spent intach of 1573
and the following year foraging in western Shawa, the Gafat
districts of Damot, and in Bizamo. It is not that the
coiuitry was at peace during these two years. The Boran had
only been pushed back to Dawaro and the Bara tuma were
making headway into Walaqa, Amhara and Bagameder. Even if
the treasury had been empty since the time of Galawdewos,
and, if the farms of Waj and Patagar too wasted by the Boran
to sustain armies, Shawa and the provinces to its soith-west
were still so untouched as to make it unnecessary to resort
to the dstruc14ve measure of foraging.
' ) A
When Sarsa Den el emerged from beyond the Gibe River,
his soldiers satiated with the cattle and captives they had
taken, tw grim reports awaited him. One was about raids
made in north-western Shawa by bands from one of tkie
Baraytwna tribes which had come down the Jama river, and
the second on disturbances caused in Gojam by the soldiers
of Zar' a Yohannes. The emperor sent a company of about 50
horsemen against the Baraytuma bands, while he himself set
out to Gojam to attend to the mutiny there.
Very little is known about the events leading up to
the death o Zar' a Yohannes, which, according to a variant
of the abridged chronicle, seems to have taken place
before Sarsa Dengel went to Bizamo. 1 The monk Pawlos, who
also places his deatb at about the same time, sayethat he
died while fighting the
Baraytuma
in A mhara. 2 A s Zar' a
Yohanns was in charge of Gojam, he would not have crossed
into the nearby province unless ordered by the emperor to
assist its governor, or unless the incursions into Gojain
were becoming so -serious that he found it necessary to stop
the Galla on. the other wide of the Blue Nile. Whatever the
1. Pe;ruohon (trans. and ed.) , "Notes pour l' histoire
d' Ethiopie. Rgne de Sarsa-Dengel ou Malak-Saad ler
(l5631597)", RS, IV (1896), 179-80, 2T4.
2 . "L' aatobio rafia di Pawlos", op.cit., pp. 289, 296.
"I'',)
case may have been, Zar'a Yohannes's companies of followers
were left stranded while the emperor was on an extended
raiding expedition.
Zar'a Yohannes began administering Gojam in 1564,
immediately after Hamalinal's demise. At the time of Fasilo's
rebellion, when the crown of Sarsa Dengel was at stake, he
tould. not muster more than 850 men to send. to the emperor.
Yet after a governorship of about ten b ears he had.. built up
a big army of personal followers. Nearly a year bad elapsed
between his death and the emperor's arrival in Go jam to
settle the mutiny. We do not know when Qosmos, the new
governor, was appointed. If the post was filled soon after
the death of Zar'a Yohannes, the mutiny may have arisen
because Qosmos refused to take into his 2ervice the followers
of his predecessor. If such was the case, it could only have
been becaue he had. already built up a body of his own
followers which he brought with him to Gojam. If, on the
other hand, the emperor had been so unwise as to delay the
appointment o a successor until 1574
and
1575,
the dis-
turbances may have occu.rz'ed because there was
flQone to
collect the.
revenues from which the soldiers of Zar'a
Yohannes were provided for.
The mutiny of the Giyorgis Ilaile in Dambiya is
another Oase illustrating the consequence of allowing civil
-
and militar powers to be combined in the hands of...p-
vincial officers. tarbo, like Zar'a Yohaxmes, Yeshaq and
244
all the other overnors of this time, carried the military
title of azmach. or commander. As early as 1567,
when the
throne of Sarsa Dengel was still unsteady, he had under
him a substantial force of horsemen and footmen. Although
his friendship with the bahr nagash was sufficient reason
for suspicion, the emperor left him in a position of ppwer
and influence. At the beginning of
1575
Yeshaq as preparing
for rebellion and Harbo was actively engaged in winning the
support of the Dambiya regiments. The emperor was credulous
enough to accept Harbo's pleas of innocence, and if the
governor bad not died suddenly, he would have raised the
whole province. Nevertheless, the Giyorgis Haile niu.tinied
against their officers, threatening to go to Yeshaq)
This attitude of the soldiers implioated Yeshaq,
and the emperor's suspicions were confirmed when the bahr
nagash refused to meet him to Dambiya. Yeshaq's restlessness
began in the early days of 1575,
when the ,spread of rumours.
of the landing of a Portuguese force at Baylul, on the
Danakil coast. Two small vessels which had come from India
1. "Historia regis Sarsa Denge1, op.cit., text,
p.
46,
trans., p. 53.
Bruce had no reason to assume that the
Giyorgis Haile and other regiments of Dambiya had
rebelled by allying themselves with Muslim. soldiers
settled in. the province by Ahmad Granh. Travels,
II, 228. Budge, whose only source is Bruce, even
includes the soldiers of Zar'a Yohannes in this mutiny.
History of Ethiopia, II, 364.
24
with letters for t e missionaries had given rise to the e
rumours. Yeshaq and viedo, however, were not very dis-
appointed when they learned the truth, because in his
letters to them the Portug ese g vernor in India gave
str rig hints for future relief and assista ce. 1T eir ho es
were further raised high by the sailors of the two vessels,
who talked of a large fleet being in pre aration to sail
with soldiers in the following year.2
Sarsa Dengel was disturbed by the rumours. When he
received Yeshaq's reply he had retaliated by taking from
him his title of hedug ras. Since Yeshaq had never resided
in the court, this title was tx4'ely honorary; its loss
could not harm him in any way. The only effective measure
that could
ha'rve
brought him to heel would have been to give
his overnorship to another n bleman. Sarsa Dengel not
only failed to do this, but when he heard the talh.s about a
Portug ese lan irig, I e sert a delegation of very important
peo le t negotiate a reconQiliation. He also began to
court t e friendship o the Portuguese and the goodwill of
Oviedo. Many of the Portug ese were in Dawbiya a d Go jam
at this time, and he sent t e.ir captain, rancisco Jac me,
to Tigre. According to the Jesuit 1\anuel Perna es, and
there is n obvi us reason for d ubtin him, Jacome was
1.
viedo t A. Valignani, visitor o Irid a, A 11 5, 1576,
er. eth., X, 283-84; A. Per andes to V. R dri lies,
rovir ial of I ia,
1b ., pp.
286-88.
2.
A. ere to same, Se t. 22, 1575, ib d., . 26
246
sent to meet the captain of the Portugtese force which
was reported to have landed, to explain to him that Sarsa
Dengel was not responsible for Minas's ill-treatment of the
missionaries, and to arrange matters with him so that the
Portuguese soldiers would help him drive the Turks oat of
Ethiopia.1
The emperor's I'ears must have been quite
manifest, because in 1576 Oviedo was writing that only the
landing of Portuguese men would, suffice to make Sarsa
Dengel embrace Catholicism.2
Not long after February the truth about the rumoured
landing became known. The emperor's inactivity throughout
the rest of the year is incomprehensible, especially as
Yeshaq showed no inclination towards peace. The pasha was
then in Su.akin and Yeshaq was trying to expel the Turkish
garrison out of :bebarwa and push it back to the- coast.
Had the emperor mustered, the regiments in Dambiya and. the
surrounding provinces and marched to Tigre, the bahr nagash
might have been forced to submission. By the end of this
year's rainy season the emperor's position was weakened by
I. M. Iernandes to same, Dec. 20, l76, ibid., pp. 278-79.
That Jacome was won over by Sarsa Dengel may be seen in
the letter to the captain o the armada supposed to
have landed at Baylul, June 29 1575, ibid,,, p.258.
2. Oviedo to the viceroy, April 7, 1576,
ibid., p.291.
247
the Muslim invasion of Bali. Rebellion was also brewing in
Amhara, which culminated in the proclamation of an emperor
sometime before the rainy season of 1576e flopin to sm9ther
his intractableness by new horlours, arsa Denge. restored
to him his title of hedug ras and made him dajazmach.1
The chronicle is not specific about the military powerS the
latter title entailed for Yesaq..From the widespread
discontent that grew among the nobility in the southern
part of the province and, particularly, from the quarrels
which ensued between the sons of Abetohen Yohannes and
Yeshaq, there can be no doubt that the emperor had given
him full civil and military powers over all of Tigre.
Yeshaq's appatite, however, was not to be satisfied
easily, and. he bad not cleverly dragged on the negotiations
for econciliatIon in order merely to obtaiil these con-
cessions. He had been secretly arzanging an alliance with
the rebels of Amhara to overthrow Sarsa Dengel. The Anthara
rebellion was led by Amha Giyorgis, who had proclaimed the
son of one .AzaI Gera as emperor. 2 it i implied in the
chronicle that no one in Dambiya or elsewhere in the country
1.
"Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", op.cit., text, p.48,
trans., p.56.
2 .
Ibid. Since the pretender was brought down from Aniba
Geshan, his father could not have been the same Gera
who was governing Bagameder in 1563.. Ibid., text,
pp .
4-5, trans., p.7.
248
had. any knowledge of the development in Amhara, but this is
very unlikely, because such an affair as the proclamation.
of an emperor could not have been a matter for secrecy.
There is no indication as to the position Amha iyorgie
occupied. in the province. The presence later in 1578 of
a sizeable contingent of Galla warriors on the side of
Yeshaq, who could have come only !rom Angot or Amhara,
suggests that Axxthaa G-iyorgis was adminis.trator of one of
the eaSterly districts f Amhara or else that be was
commander of a regiment garrisoned somewhere near Amba
Geshan, from which he obtained h's candidate for the throne.
l i e had probably acquired fame and. prestige while defending
his territory agaixst the Galla; and, in the process he
may have developed ambitions for wider recognition.
Historians may never discover what the contemporaries
of the emperor thought of his failure to react to this
combination against his throne. It seems,
howe.vrer,
as if
the chronicler wanted posterity to think that, but for the
Muslim irasion of Bali, Sarsa Den el would have smashed
up the coalition. There is no clear evidence accusing the
chronicler of a deliberate attempt t create the impressidn
that the alU,ance betweeti Yeshaq . and Amha Giyoi'gis nioe or
less coincided with the Muslim attack on Bali, Yetthe
author unequivocally states that the emperor first heard
news of the invasion shortly before the rainy season of
1576, thereby implying that the concessions to Yeshaq
24
were made so that the emperor wot4jhave his hands free to
deal with the more serious threat which the Muslims posed.'
When enumerating the services of Takia Giyorgis of
Damot, the author of the chronicle mentions the governor's
heroic defence of Hadya against Sultan MuJammad. of Ad.al and
Harar. 2 The significant fact of Muslim penetration into
Hadya is left out in the section of the chronicle dealing
with the invasion itself. If, as the author implies, the
Muslims entered Bali sometime before the rainy season of
1576, it would mean that they hac. reached Hadya and then
retreated. into Bali within a period of about six months, and
that i this same time Su.ltax Muhammad had, won over to his
side the chiefs of Hadya, Asm-ad-Din and other Muslims in
the provinces of these regions. Since serious campaigning
would have been very difficult in the rainy season, it would
also mean that Takia Giyorgis would have begun to clear the
invaders out of Hadya and. Waj, at least by aboit September.
According to a variant of the same chronicle, the emperor
left Dambiya in mid. September 3 He was joined in Shawa,
sometime between October and November, by Takia Giyorgis and.
the other governors. f Tak].a dilyorgia had. been campaigning
1. Ibid., text,
pp .
48-49, trans., p.
56-57.
2 . Ibid., text, pp. 57-58, trans., p.67.
3 .. ibid., text, notes on p.184, trans., n.l,
p.57.
250
in Hadya and Wad, he could not 4iave met the emperor. That
sultan Muhammad began his march into Bali at least before
the rainy season of
1575 can be clearly inferred from one of
the Arabic chronicles of Harar. 1 The obvious conclusion,
therefore, is that the emperor did not set out from Danibiya,
on. his march against the Muslims, until after the governor
of Darnot had pushed them back to the other side of the Wabi
Shaballe river..
By the time the emperor reached Bali, the
sultan
and
his followers had alre.dy realized that their invasion had
failed. The Muslim chiefs must have heard of the fall of
many of their towns to the Humbana and Itu tribes, because
t
iuite
a few of them were prepared to come to terms with.
Sarsa DengeL. Asm-ad--Din himself was unwilling to destroy
the home and position he had acquired. Through him many of
the Muslim captains were encouraged to abandon the sultan.
Some of them were to rise to eminence in the court and, in
the provinces.
Bruce's account of the invasion is seriously impaired
b his ignorance of the existence of the long chronicle.
He wrote his chapter on Sarsa Dengel mainly gn the basis of
the abbreviated chronicle. Although he vainly searched
for supplementary information, he bad. to rely on the
j.ngenuity of his imagination and his gift f r narration to
give manihg and coherence to the dry, disjointed facts
1. Ce1a1li, "Documenti arabi per la storia dell'
Etiopia", op.cit., pp. 60-61.
4
2 .1 A
of tie ohroz'iicle. Unfort.znate1y, for Bruce and every
student who appreciates hs indispensable contributions to
Ethiopian history, this chronicle suffers from a worse
defeat than. incompleteness. 1It is sometimes inaccurate,
as in its entries for 1576 and 1577.
And. in the 13th
year[of
Sarsa Dengel's
reignJMiahaminad came, and the treason of
Yeshaq hardened. Ie appointed Dargot
over Tigre, and. he fought and. defeated
him. And in the 14th year he went
against Muhammad, and he fought him
on the river Wabi. He defeated him and
wintered at Zehon Dur.2
This inacurate report of the abridged chronicle,
and his own views of a strong Turkish influence on Ada3.
politics misled Bruce into thinking that the Muslim invasion
into Bali. was a clever diversion contrived by the bahr nagash
and the pasha. 3here is no evidence for upholding a
theory of a tripartite alliance against Sarsa Dengel,
If the theory seems plausible, it is because of an apparent,
1. M. aineano's beltt1ing of Bruce's work as a whole
because of the errors in his history of Sarsa Dengel's
reign is unjustified, especially as he does not hesitate
to borrow, without any acknowledgement, from him.
Although. he had the advantage over Bruce of knowing the
long chronicle he' regards Aze as a Galla tribe, makes
Yeshaq the inshgator of Sultan Muhammad's invasion, and
represents Sarsa Dengel as the greatest king_the country
ever had. L'Abyssinie dans la seconde moitie du. XVIe
sic1e, pp. 8, 10, 24, 26.
2. '1 Etades cur l'histoire d'Ethiopie", op.cit., text,
pp.
337-38, trans., p. 111.
3.
Travels, II, 228-29.
orn
fs el
rather circujnstantia. coincidence of events of which, in
any case, Bruce had no knowledge. The monk Pawlos reports
that after the emperor had left for Bali, the bahr nagash
sent his soldiers into Dambiya. The timing of Yeshaq's
movement of troops into Dambiya is insufficient evidence tQ
think that he and Sultan Muhammad had planned coordinate
actions. The sultan was in retreat by the end of 1576,
and Yeshaq would have realized the futility of opening a
campaign in which the Muslims could not provide sustained
diversionary actions. The implausibility of the theory
becomes clear when we consider that at this time the Turks
were not involved in the conflict with the emperor. The
pasha was still in Suakin and relations between Yeshaq and
After, commander of the garrison in Debarwa, were more than
strained.
Because of the inadequacy of sources, it is difficult
to understand the whole background to Yeshaq's open aeclara-
tion of his rebellion towards the end of 1576 or the beginning
of the following year. He was a careful and clever man, and,
unless he was counting on support from other noblemen, he
would not have taken up to arms while he was in conflict with
the Turks, and after Takla Giyorgis had disposed of the Muslim
fofces. One source of support on which Yeshaq confidently
relied was Amhara. The long chronicle is silent about the
outcome of Yeshaq's overtures to Amha Giyorgis, but it seems
that they had, reached a satisfactory arrangement. The
nobleman of Amhara does not seem to have taken part in the war
fought in Tigre. He may have been reluctant -to leave his
distriotbr fear that his absence might encourage the Galla
to attack it. He probably limited his contribution to the
overthrow of Sarsa Dengel, by providi1xg the puppet emperor
whom he had brought down from Amba Geshan, and by placing
tinder Yeshaq contingents of his men, including many Galla
warriors. The Baraytuma had not yet scaled the escarpment
into igre, and Yeshaq ,culd not have obtained from anywhere
but Anot and. Amhara the alla men whom he had in his camp
in 1578.1
Dambiya was another source of support. ver if Harbo
was dead and the mutinous Glyorgis Haile were pacified,
this province had for long associated itselZ with Yeshaq's
ambitions at king-making. The author of the long chronicle
alludes to misdeeds by Harbo's widow and children by which
they lost the favour of the emperor and brought ruin upon
themselves. 2
The nature of these misdeeds is not specified,
but it was very likely connected with the presence of Yeshaq's
soldiers at the beginning of l577.
Re may have sent the
eoldiers to reinstate the Sons of Harbo and to enable them to
raise the soldier8 there against the emperor. If the
1.
"Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", op.it., text, p.69,
trans., p.80.
2 . Ibid., text, p.46, trans., p.54.
3.
"L'autobiografia di Pawlos", op.cit.,
pp .
2 89 , 2 96.
24
situation in this province bad. not been so serious, the
emperor would not have sent Takie. iyorgis before the
soldiers under the command of the governor had had time o
recover from the fatigue of campaigning in Bali. Th
chronicle also tells of the desertion sometime in the middle
of 1578 by Halibo, commander of the Qu.erbar units and
the emperor's chief negotiator with Yeshaq.
En effet, ences jours, Halibo s'Stait
enfui , daupres de Yeshaq, qu.i l'avait
oblge a rester sou.s garde avec liii,
apres l'avoir enchane, non avec des fers,
mais par les biens de la trahison, qu.i
sont pires que les chaines et lea fers.-
Sarsa Dengel was reputed for his bravery and daring
in combat. 2
When confr nted., however, by political or
military situations that required immediate and determined
actions, he was slow to make decisions, preferring to let
matters take their own course. The campaign in BaLi was
concluded before the rainy season of 1577, yet he remained
inactive while another emperor was, even if only nominally,
ruling in the northern prov.nces, and Yeshaq's intrigues
1.
"Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", op.cit.., text,
p.
52,
trans., p.61.
2 .
The chronicle is naturally eulogistic of the emperor's
exploits. That be was not a cQward can be seen from the
high opinion the Portuguese had of his bravery.
Paez, "Rela9am da entrada dos Pes. da Compa. de Jesu
em Aethyopia", fol. 50 r, MS. 779, Braga.
25
were having success within his own court. His indecision
might have continued indefinitely, if the successes o:f
Takia Giyorgis in Dambiya had not encouraged him to take
steps for the protection of his throne. In his belated
determination to face Yeshaq he iliobilized practically every
available regiment, including the small garrisons which
were still left in the frontier provinces of Bali, Sharka,
Arenh and Waj, and the Muslims of Adal arid Hara.r who had
settled in them. Sarsa Dengel had not, so far, evolved
any consistent policy regarding the Boran or Baraytuma
incUrsions. This act of mobilization made it clear that,
in order to protect himself, he was prepared to eipose the
frontier provinces as well as hawa to Galla occupation.
The Boran were once again moving up the Awash valley, and
before the emperor and his armies left Stiawa, they had
entered Waj. For many of the nobility of these areas, for
his household officers, his mother and his aunt, the
predicament was crucial: an expedition into Tigre was
tantamount to abandoning the lands south of the. Blue Nile
to the c.alla. 1
Pressure was exerted on the emperor to
come to terms with Yesaq, and as he had. never felt con-
fident enough to meet the nobleman in the ie1d, it was
with relief that he resumed the futile negotiations for peace.
1. "Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", op.cit., text, pp. 51-52,
trans.,
pp.
60-61.
256
This time Sarsa Dengel resorted to a subtle move
aimed at preventing a reconcIliation between Yeshaq and the
Turks. His fear of a Portuguese landing had, subsided by the
time. Nevertheless, he was prepared for such an eventuality-.
Occasion had not favoured, a meeting with Oviedo, but he had
wooed the goodwill of the few Portuguese who were still
alive and the Jesuits who came to Dambiya and. Gojam. The
emperor found his attempt to keep Yeshaq and the Turks
apart more difficult t accomplish. Because of Yeshaq's -
desire t expel them from Debarwa, the turks there were shut
in within their fortress. The vigilance of the bahr nagash,
whose spies were active inside the court Itself., and the fact
that the pasba was in Suakin, were obstacles for communication
between the emperor and the Turks, When Sarsa Dengel
captured. the fortress in
1579,
the casket of gold. that he
had, sent them was found intact. 2 It was, obviously, sent
before he reached Tigre, and most probably before the rainy
season of 1578, therefore while he was still in Shawa. The
chronicler explains that the emperor was not seeking a lasting
peace with them, but only wanted to intensify their caution
toward,s Yeshaq. Sarsa Dengel could not have failed to
realize that something more substantial than a casket of
gold would be needed to purchase the neutrality of the
1. Ibid., texi,
p.
77, trans,, p.89.
r . ,
i
Tur ics. The chr onicler puts in the pasha's mouth wor ds to
the effect that the emper or pr omised him much gold if he
would stay within the r ampar ts of the for tr ess in the event
of a conflict with Yeshaq. 1It is, ther efor e, possible
that the emper or was pr epar ed to r ecognize the e facto
pr esence of the Tur ks in Debar wa.
This over tur e by the emper or , r ather than Yeshaq's
quar r els with After , was the r eason that br ought the pasha
to Debar wa some time towar ds the end of the r ainy season.
The fact that the gold was later found intact may suggest
that the pasha had no hesitation in r eecting the emper or 's
ter ms. The defeat of Yeshaq would have constituted a ser ious
blow to Tur kish inter ests in Massawa and Debar wa. If Yeshaq
was r emoved, the emper or would have little difficulty in
expelling the Tur ks. The pasha was awar e -of the hostility
of the peasantr y towar ds them, and he must have suspected
that the emper or himself, or the official who would r eplace
Yeshaq, would only gr udgingly shar e with him the r evenues fr om
the customs. Yeshaq, on his par t, seems to have known of
Sar sa Dengel's effor ts to isolate him, for he did not wait
until the pasha came to Debar wa to make peace with him.
1. Ibid. , text,
p.
72, tr ans. , 83.
258
But shortly before Yeshaq and the Turks renewed
their alliance, the emperor, for a reason which is barely
discernable in the sources, decided to go to Dambiya. It
does not seem thai he wanted to await the outcome of his
negotiations from a province which was nearer to Tigre. The
reason may h.ve had something to do with Takia Giyorgis,
whom he had sent in advance, preswnably to deal with the
Sons of Uarbo and the soldiers of Yeshaq. The author of
the long chronicle and the monk Pawlos make vague hints o
a disagreement between the emperor and the govenor. 1 The
latter was a responsible and, dedicated man; and the hInts
do not warrant suspecting him of disloyalty or treason.
The cause of the disagreement may have been his desire to
make a surprise march to Tigre., A man of action lilce him
could not have been deceived by the dilator
y
tactics which
Yeshaq was using. Besides, he seems to have known that
irresolution was Sarsa Dengel's main shortcoming, as he
had. not waited for the emperor's instructions when be dealt
with the insubordinate Aze of Hadya and with Sultan Muhammad.
According to the sources, therefore, Takia Giyox'gls had
begun to march against Teshaci when he was recalled by the
emperor, This would explain why Dambiya was defenceless when
bands of the Abati, a Marawa clan, began to ravage
tbe
die-
tricts lying east of lake Tana.
1. Ibid., text,
p .
53, trans., p.62; airc3. "L'au.tobiografia
di. Pawlos", op.cit.,
pp .
289, 296.
259
That even at this late stage the emperor believed
an armed conflict with Yeshaq avoidable may be seen from
the su.rprise he showed. when he learned o the bahr nagash's
reconciliation with the Turks. When in reply to his peace
offers Yeshaq sent him two cannon balls, the crafty nobleman
had not miscalculated the effect his unorthodox gesture would
have on the morale of the armies at Dambiya. When, shortly
after this, Takia Giyorgis died, the situation in the emperor's
camp looked critical. Takia Giyorg&s had led the regiments
of Damot and the provinces to its east into many successful
campaigns, while the emperor was away on raiding expeditions
or was idly stationed in Dambiya.
Lorsque Takia Giyorgis mourut, les
cours de tous lee hommes dii camp
s'emurent et la crainte en'vahit
leurs esprits, de sorte qui'ils
disaient: "Ainsi la couronne de
notre orgu.eil esttombeLe
puisant refuge ou nou.s avionsA
p],ace notre confiance vient d'etre
detnuit!Comment , pourrons-ro us
alien dane le Tigre, si au debut dii
chemin nou.s avons'rapp4's d'un tel
maiheu.r? Nolis ne poLavons pas nous
hater d'aller eontre Yeshaq, alors
qu'il a tant de fiisiis, tant de
canons et de nobreaux chevaux!"-
Sarsa Dengel was able to avert a serious meetixlg only
by
adopting Takia Giyorgis's plan for a surprise attack on
!eshaq. Eveh then, if it was not known that most of the
ioblemen of Tigre were chaffing under the domination of Yeshaq,
1. "Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", op.cit, text, p.57,
trans., p.67.
260
and that they were rea&y to abandon his puppet king the
moment Sarsa Dengel showed up ir. the province, his armies
might not have marched under him.1
The reasons for Yeshaq's restlessness ever since
1560 have been discussed in their proper places. If a
historian of less impeccable scholarship and , erudition than
Conti Rossini bad described the contumacy of Yeshaq as one
example of deep rooted Tigre particalarism nd inherent
resistance to domination by the Amhara, further analysis
of motives would have been unnecessary as well as
redundant. As a patriotic Italian, Conti Rossini may choose
to disreg.rd the fact that the objective of the Tigre
nobility or the nineteenth century was not separation but the
1. Ibid., tett,
pp.
52, 60-61, trans., pp. 61, 7i.
a
261
the crown itself. 1 But, as a scholar and, translator of
Sarsa Dengel's chronicle, he could not have failed to observe
1 . "La uerra turco-. abissindel 1 578", OM I (1 921 -1 922),
634. Conti Bossini's representation of Yeshaq, as a
Tigre hem is based on Paez's remark that the grave of the
bahr nagasb. at Adiqoro became, some years rater, a centre
of pilgrimage. "Historia de Ethiopia", Rez' Aeth.
II, 61 6. Although, in such times of upheaval as the
sixteenth and seventeenth centul'ies, people may have
sought comfort in anything, it is unlikely that a legend
of holiness and supernatural powers could have grown
around a grave hardly thirty years old There are two
possible explanations for Paez's remark. It .is possible
that the memory of Yeshaq was being deliberately glorified
by the descendants of the Portuguese and. the Ethiopian
Catholics who were befriended by him. That this was not
unusual can be discerned from the great miracles and
happ
enings which were invented to sanctify the names of
TDom Christopher cia Gam3, and of Oviedo and. his associates.
Ibid., II, 324-25;
III, 91 -1 24. What is more likely,
however, is that Yeshaq, was buried in a church which
already enjoyed some reputation for its healing virtues.
It seems that Sarsa Dengel himself attributed his success
against Yeshaq partly to the favour of the patron saint
Z the church of Adiqoro. "Liber Axwnae", op.eit.,
text,
pp .
44-45, trans., pp.
53-54.
"U'.,
the homes of Selus Haila, Da ara ot, governor of Gojam
at this time, an t at of Takia Selus, administrator of
Shire, or the origins of Yeshaq's allies like Keflo, Harbo
and Amha igorgis.
The ba r n gash's attempts at king-.
making could not be said to h y e sprun,, from separatist
motives but from a stron des re to influence national
politics. The facts of his rebellions or of his asso-
ciation with t e Turks do not, therefore, warrant the
conclusion, "Quale rofondo senso d'indi endenza
sia pur
dali Scioa e dali' Arnhara!"1
T e situation was in fact quite different. Sarsa
Dengel arid his mother were pre ared. to make every possible
concession to maintain Yeshaq in peace, short of surrendering
the -throne to his pretender. No provincial overnor enjoyed
as much ower as the bahr nagash did. during the reign of
Sarsa Dengel, and monarchai authority ad never seemed as
remote in Tigre as it did in this eriod. Had eshaq's desire
been for local autonomy, the emperor had iven it to him.
If Yeshaq had not raised rival emperors again t Iin s or
his son, but bad limited his ambition to acquiring full
. "L guerra turcQ-abissina del
1578", OM, II (1922-1923),
56. Kammerer u es Conti Ro sifli's argwnerits to arrive
at a curious c nclu. ion. Ace r ing to him, the peo les
of igre and Axnh ra harb u.red sentiments of articularism
and indepen e ce because t ey thought that the dyn sty,
which was s u.thern in it ri ins, lacked a n tional
b se. L Mer
ug , 1' by snie et l'Arabie, vol. III,
part 1, . 17b.
powers over Tigre only, the migration of the Galla might
have had a somewhat different history. Abba Neway, the
warrior monk in Sarsa Dengel's court, was not correct when
he compared Yeshaq with Lucifer. 1 The bahr nagash knew
he could never sit on the throne, but he certainly tried to
be the power behind it. As the chronicler observed, he
loved to dominate and to rule. 2 His love for power was
not, however, an Uncontrollable obsession. There were no
symptoms of it in the time of Galawdewos or before; and, most
probably he would not have challenged the authority of Minas
and his son if they had shown themselves strong and decisive
monarchs.
Yeshaq mistook both the limitations of Sarsa Dengel as
a general and the indiscipline of his soldiers. This double
underestimation brought about his downfall in 1578.
Thinking that the emperor and his armies would not start their
march from Dambiya until after the harvest season, which
begins in November, he had sent his soldiers to their homes.
Takia Giyorgis had wanted to take advantae of Yeshaq's
unpreparedness when he wanted to march during the rainy
season. Yeshaq wasstil1 unprepared when in October the
emperor showed up in central Tigre. Many of the nobility of
the province who had been waiting for this moment sided with
the emperor. Among them were Gabra lyasus of Tamben and.
1.
"Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", op.cit., text,
p.
69,
trans., p. 79.
2 . Ibid., text,
p.
47, trans., p. 54.
264
tne fo r s s f betch n Yo a es wh , in ite o the
riendsh between Ye aqt e r fat er, h n t found
service a er the bahr n gash very roml ing. Zh rtly after
this, Yohannes hi self aband ed his old ily.
Th ejor egem... ts were fought in the area of
Entec aw, with t e cam 1 n operUng inaus iciou ly for the
em eror when, n November 13, Tar ish firea s p t his arnies
to flight. As Yeshaq's men a d the T rks di not re
tne u.r ait, the ama e to lives andrale wa 1g i c t.
r h secoe g geriert, on December 17, their attac was
frustrated by the emperor's h rsernen, who were able to pene-
trate into tie Turkish lines.eshaq's confidence in t e
TLrks was s aken, and he imnediately o e ed negotiations f r
peace. The em eroi was willing t rei i tate him i his
r er position, only Ye haq's insiste ce that the Turks
be allo ed. t remair in Debarwa made agreement impossible.
is claim that he wanted t h n u his c mmitm nt to the
Turks is an nvincir, espec.i ily as hi relationships
with k e e eror wit tTurk t e selves belie his
prete ce f r inte r ty o ch r cter.. He warted them in
ebarwa s an in ra ce ag in t t e day when the em r
mi ht deci e to rem 'ye hm r m the overn rshi.
In the 1 st an ecis've battl , fought on January
16, t e allie were cr she . They attacked th em r r while
h ws e caron a o ei fi. 1 . Alth ug he
d1y a
fracti n
th fire rm the Ta
os es e , hi over-
"
w el ngrty in c 'v lry deci e t e
y.1
Yes q
an tp s a we e a on t e de , wh in u. ed m re t a
40 Tu k . The rest, mddine th e who were ua ng the
f rtress, nwn ering close to 300, surrendered. 2They were
f rme mt a b y of royal mu eteers, witi Aft r f r
t er ca tam.3The fortress of ebarwa was demolished,
but o attem t w s ma e to reca t re Arq qo or assaw
The hi t ry of arsa De gel's re n after
1579
is
a his ry of 1 st op ortu.nmt es in every sen e o' the phrase.
Just as he failed to take a va t ga of this vict ry to push
the Turks at least of the mainland, he neglected to use
the strong sition in which he found himself to curb the
power of the rovin ial governois. It was as f the satis-
faction he derived fr m the security of hi thi ne, a d the
tremendous military presti e he be an to enjoy from the
1. The number 0'
musketeers in the em er r's cam is unkn wn,
but th re mu t have been more than the 150 used to
rein orce t
Qu rban units in the econd engagement,
Ibd., text,. 67, trans.,. 77.
2.
Acc rdIng to P ez t ere were about 750 Turks in the field,
only 300 f whom we e taken pris ners. e estimates the
casualty on the emperor's si e at more than 3,00 dead.
"Relagani da entra a d. s es. a Cam a. e Jesu em
Aethyo Ia", fol. 50 r, S. 77 , ra a.
3.
b e t e irc r oration o the w rd b s a, a c rru. tion f
pa
, mt the I t of military titl s. " istoria
re is
rsa en 1", p.cit., text, . 77, ts., .89.
26G
success of the Tigre campaign, had. oblierated from his mind.
the memories of hardships which the nobility and, the
regiments had brought upon himself and the country.
The administrative chthiges which followed in Tigre
cannot be regarded as deliberate reforms introduced to divide
the power or the provincial governor among the district
officers. The success of the campaign was mainly due to the
support of the nobility of the province; and the reason
the office of the daazmatch was hot given to .nyone was
because the emperor feared offending many by favouring
one.Thus, the two parts of Tigre were placed under two
governors, each exerqising his civil and military duties
independently of the other. Many of the administrators of
the districts, like Hamassen and Saraye t the north of the
Marab river 'and Shire and Akswn to the south, were granted
much of their aicient privilege, which made them practically
independent of the governors in matters of oivil adminis-
tration. 1 The return to the use of the ancient titles for
the governors and district officers of Tigre suggests that
Sarsa Dengel had merely resorted to the traditional dis-
tribution of power by which wiser emperors had effectively
maintained equilibrium. Precisely because hi resort to
this method was dictated by the need to please the nobility,
the reorganization had only a brief duratIon. Gradually, as
1. Ibid., text, pp. 84, 98-100, trans., pp.
102, 111-114.
or the restoration of its ancient rights and privileges
to Aksum ee also: "Liber Axuxnae", op.eit., text, pp.
73-74,
trans., pp. 87-89.
26
some began to grow in favot( l r and others to decl ine, the
administration of Tigre became inIstinaishabl e from the
styl e in whioh t1.e other provinces were being governed. For
some time, one Takia Giyorgis was created dajazmaeh o the
province. Then the office was given to Daharagot, and the
powers he hel d in 1590
are thus described in the l ong
chronicl e.
..cel ui-ci tait al ors gouverneur du
Tigr et bahr naga: ce da azma6
tait comme an roi, car l e Hase l 'avait
autoris
faire ce qu'il voul ait,
nommer et a destituer l es chefs du
T igr g .1
of
Because/the l imitation of sources, any attempt at
a ful l reconstruction of the evol ution of government in
these times may be undul y ambitious. It
is, neverthel ess,
possibl e to discern that the broadening of the powers of
provincial governors was accompanied by a progressive cbn-
traction of the authority and infl uence of court ministers.
This deve)..opment was noticed by two erudite observers, the
Jesuit Pero Paez nd the unknown oompier of that most
singul ar document, the Hega waser'ata mangest.
Pero Paez was tol d. th.t the offices of the two
bitwadadoch were abol ished by Gal awdewos because the office-'
hol ders had become too powerful and domineering to carry out
his orders. 2
Since the reign o Gal awdewoa was not
1.
"Histoia regis Sarsa Dengel ", op.cit., text, p. 12 8,
trans.,
p.
145.
2 .
"Historia de Ethiopia", Rer. Aeth., II, 52 .
268
disturbed by any kind of tension between himself and his
officers, this explanation for the disappearance o the two
ministerial posts is inaccurate. According to the monk
Pawlos, there was an officer with the title of hedu.g ras, a
title by which the deputy to a bitwadad was ilesignated, who
was s-ent to Wagara in
1556.1
His arrival there was probably
connected with the outbreak of the Falasha rebellion in
that year. He was apparently carrying out a task that would
normally be delegated to him when, for some reason, neither
of the bitwadadoch was available to execute it. The fact
that a bitwadad was not sent need not be necessarily taken
to mean that there was then, no minister of this title. The
responsibilities which in 1548 Galawdewos entrusted to Panuel
are not described clearly by the chronicler and, certainly,
were not translated correctly by Conzelman. 2 Fanuel was of
noble descent, and it is significant that he was described as
a soldier rather than as a n bleman or lord. Such a des-
cription implies that he was not at this time a provincial
governor, but a commander of the armies. Furthermore, the
chronicler does say that Fanuel was made governor of Dawaro,
but that Galawd.ewos deputed him in his place while he himself
went to Damot. Fantiel was not created a dajazmach over
1, "L'autobiografia di Pawlos", op.cit., pp.
2 85,
2 91.
2 . Chronique de Galawdewos, pp. 37, 144.
269
Dawaro and neighbouring provinces; he emperor had merely
delegated a him the defence of the region for the period
that he was away. He was, thus, carrying out the n%rnlal
duties f a bitwdad.The two posts seem to have been
occupied in 1557, and, until he was sent to deal with the
occupation of the coastland by the Turks, Yeshaq, may have
held one of them. 1 The position of Hamalmal in the last
years of Galawdewos also suggests that he may have held one
of the posts. Presumably, the role of the bitwadadoch
began to decline in the time of Minas, when the influence of
Sabla Wangel was paramount and. when the duties of the
ministers, especially those duties concerning the command
of armies, were rationed among the provincial governors,
many of whOm were made d.ajazmachoch.
The inluence exercised by the great ladies of the
court, and, the encroachments on the powers of the throne
perpetrated by the provincial governors, were more marked in
the time of Sarsa Dengel. The compiler of the Hega waser'ata
mangest was better informed thax Paez when he explained the
atrophy pf the ministerial posts in these words.
After the behet Yadadoch died, and the
country was wasted by the hands of the
Gal1, Hase Malak Sagad. was exiled and
he came to Dambiya. And there was only
one behet wadad., and he appointed to it
Ras Walda Chrestos together with the
governorship of Bagameder; and to the
office of belaten geta he appointed
Abetobon Ma'einro. Story:- and when
the ra went to the country of his
1. See above, p.
270
appointment, from then until now the
belaten geta grew in a.uthority. And. the
behet wadadoch became accsastomed to
going to the country of their appointment.
As the Hega waser'ata mangest was compi'ed in the
first half of the eighteenth century, and since the author
had summarized the constitutional evolution of several
centuries in a few words, this passage must be read in con-
junction with the ohronicles and other sources on the reign
of Sarsa Dengel. There is no clue on the. identity of the
bitwadadoch who died before Sarsa Dengel moved to Daxnbiya1
It is significant that the author did not place their
deaths during the Muslim inv.sion under Ahmad Grarth. Since
the Galla incursions did not become destructive until the
time of Minas, we may assume that their deaths took place
sometime during or after his reign. In which case it is
doubtful if the ministerial posts had become vacant by the
demise of the holders. The ministers may have been among
the many officers demoted by Minas, or they may have
forfeited their positions by taking part in the rebellions
against Sarsa Denel at the beginning of his reign. Walda
Chrestos was not made bitwadad until after 1590, and from
the few cbrters aria land grants which have sur'vived from this
1. This translation is based on the version of the Hega
waser'ata mangest in Compendium of Ancient Histo, fol.
34 r, MS. Orient. 821, British Museum. See version of
a Frankfort MS. and its Gez'man translation in J. Varenbergh,
"Studien zar abessinischen Reichsordnung", op.cit., text,
pp. 21-22, trans., pp. 37-38.
For an Italian translation
see Guidi's in "Contributi alla storia letteraria di
Abissinia", op.cit., pp .
81-82.
271
time we know there were some hedu.g rasoch before him.
Among those named are Yeshaq, Arkadewos and Aklil. Yet,
besides the emperor himself and his female relatives, the
most conspicuous people in the court were c'ergymen,. stewardsf
and pages with no higher ranks than those of azaj, west
belatena and. ba'ala mawa'el.' Neither Arkadewos, Aklil,
Batro and Melko, all ministers with the title of hedug rae,
nor Ma'emero, the belaten geta, are meitioned in the chroni-
cles. 2 As the author of the long chronicle rarely gives
the names of the loyal governors of Shawa, Anibara and. other
provinces, these men were probably peaceful provincial
officers whom the .emperor honoured by bestowing upon them
the ministerial titles. Thus, when giving the titles the
emperor seems to have had no intention of allowing the men
to reside in the court and to assist him in the government
of the country.
FrOm the glimpses of h character and personality
that we get in the reports of the Jesuit missionaries, it
appears that Sarsa Dengel was sensitive of his inadequacies
as a ruler. The people he generally kept around hm were
sycophants and adventurers who could not have been particularly
1. "Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", op.cit., bext,
pp .
43, 136,
trans., pp. 50-51, 155. Although the title of aza was
generally given to the chief justices Sarsa Dengel seems
to ha've bestowed it upon his chief stewards. The west
belatena was a minor page and the ba'ala mawa'el,
literally
ttthe
man of the day", was a favoured steward.
2 . Batro and Melko, both with the itle of hedug rae, were
mentioned in the same land charter with Wald.a Chrestos.
"Liber Axumae", op.cit., text,
p.
46, trans., p.56.
interested in the welfare o the country. As he was
irresolute when faced with serious questions of p.1icy and
strategy, he may not have liked being urged to action b3r
others. Keeping the abler people away in the provinces
may have relieved him of his responsibility towards the
provinces while providing for him in the court n atmos-
phere which best sai'ed his temperament.
The estrangement which developed between the emperox
and his mother seems to have been due to this temperament.
We do not know when the differences between them became
serious. But as the influence of Selus . Iiaila arid. Walata
Giyorgis began to decline after 1579,
tbe cause may have
been the emperor's failure to defend Shawa against -the Boraxi.
Selus Haila's name continued to be mentioned in land charters,
but, as may be discerned from the chronicle, by 1587 she arid
Walata Giyorgis were replaced by Maryam Se'ria and Walata
Michael ii the affections of the emperor. The relationship
between the last named lady and the emperor is not known
but she is described as
...qui a 6t' appe]e Ia m'ere du. roi,
cause de la beaute de sa vertu. et de
sollicitude pour tout ce qu.i tait
utile ata Hasege, semblable au.x soins
d'une mre pou' les besoins de son
unique enfant.'-
The elevation of Walda Chrestos to the post of
bitwadad did not arouse the jealousy of the influential
1. "Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", op.cit., text, p.
ill,
trans., p. 127.
)PJfl
ladies of the court. He was also not a man who could dis-
please the emperor by his advice on how he country should
be governed or defended. The bitwadad was a Muslim by
origin. He was probably one of th followers of Sultan
Muhammad who came to the emperor's side at Bali in
1577.
He changed his name from Wasano Muhammad, after be embraced
Christianity some time between
1587
anl
1590.1
It was
during the second expedition against the Turks that Wald.a
ChrestoS was put in command of the emperor's army, He
may have been a good soldier, bw he does not seem to have
been. an educated person. 2 He could not haveeenjoyed much
influence outside tbe court. His appointment to the
dignity of a first minister could not have meant anything
else than a mark of favour. Besides, after hi appQintment
to Bagameder, he spent more of his time in the province tharL
1. Ibid., te]t,
p.
12 9, trans., p.146. The important Muslim
captain who was with the emperor in 1577 may have been
Walda Chrestos. "Relacam da entrada dos Pes. da Compa.
de Jesu em Aethyopia", fol. 51 r, MS. 779,
Braga.
2 . Walda Chrestos, who wa alive in the early years of
Susenyos's reign, told Paez of the great feasting arid
merrymaking which was taking place i. the court of
Galawdewos in 1559 and, which enabled Nur to have an easy
victory. Altiou.gh Walda Chrestos was then a Muslim, if
he was an observant or a well informed person be would
have known that the battle took place on Thursday of the
Holy Week. "Historia de Etiopia", Rer. Aeth., III, 2 1-2 2 .
274
in the court. Maryam Se' na's influence within and.
outside the court remained unchallenged thrQughoirt the rest
of er husband's reign. On the death of Selus Haila in 1593,
she was given the title of itege. Her two daughters were
married to Atnatewos of Gojam and. Keflawand of Tigre.
Although both. men came from important ami1ie$, they were
weak and spineless, as if the emperor and the queen had.
carefully chosen them for their lack of ambition.
Little is known of the last five years of Sarsa
Dengel's reign. Pawlos' s.b.ort and useful annal of his
life and. times stops at 1578. The long chronicle e1ose its
account with the Gambo epedition of 1592. Francisco Lopes,
the only one of the Jesuit missionaries who was alive in
these years, hardly sent home any letters or reports. Only
the abbreviated chronicle traces the emperor's reign to its
end, but because of its brevity it barely sheds light on the
events it mentions. Even so, it would seem clear that his
activities were characteristically inconsequential. He
spent the whole of the 28th and 31st years of his reign at
his couzt at Ayba. For a while in 1593
he fought with the
Falasha, and in 1595 he seems to have gone to Enarya to
receive the tributes. In 1595 the Baraytuma and Boran
elected new ruling age-sets. The incursions of the former
into Bagameder and Dambiya and of the latter into Gojam were
intensified. Sarsa Dengel made two expeditions,. into
27
Bagameder in 1596 and .nto Dainot in the followi.iig year,
but it is doubtful if he had any success. He died in Shat,
apparently from malaria, whle eturru.ng trom Damot.'
II. Slaving Raids and Further Fragmentation of Regiments.
The concentration of civil and military powers in
the hands of provincial governors ineVitably meant a decreas-
ing share of the revenues for the imperial treasury. The
sources are not very helpful in determining which proyinces
raid n their revenues regularly and which did. not.
Nothing, it seems, was remitted from Dajnbiya and Tigre uxitil
1565. Gera in Bagamed.er and Za'ra Yohannes in
GQjaIU were
not strong enough to Assist the emperor by sending hii
oldiers, It is unlikely that they were able to collect all
the revenues. As the eastern1 provinces were being assaulted
by the Galla, they could hardly have been in the position
to contribute anything. Hadya was in ebe1lion practically
throughout unti 1568; and Guarage was too preoccupied
,
1. Perruchon, "Notes pour l'kustoire d'Etluopie. Regne de
Sarsa-Dngel ou. Malak-Sagad ler (l563_l597 t
, op.cit.,
text,p. 183, trans., ppu
.
277-78. Basset's 'version of the
short chr9nicle stops with the emeror's 31st year of
reign. "Etu.des ear Vhistoire d'Ethiopie",
text, p. 339, trans., pp. 122-13.
27(
with the ambitions of the Hadya chiefs to think of helping
the court. In those early years when Sarsa Dengel was
trying to save the crown from falling to the pretenders the
nobility were setting up one after the other, he was sus-
tained by the help be rece.ved from Enarya and Damot.
However, he may not have demanded the ull amount of
revenues or the arrears, for fear of offending Sepenhi and
Taklo.
Shawa was the only province which paid at least part
of the taxes due fromL. However, as many of the princes
and princesses descended from Lebna Dengel had their
lands in the various districts of this province, the revenues
collected from it could not have been substantial. Amata
G-iyorgis owed her influence in the court and outside to
the immense wealth she derived, from her lands. 1 Selus
Haila and many of the court stewards were to make their
homes in Gendabarat.
Even after 1570 when Sarsa Dengels throne was
securely established, he lacked the confidence to dema.nd
from his governors the remittance of revenues. The
various sources mention the tributes Yeshaq gave in 1568,
1571 and 1572, without clarifying whether these tributes
were the gifts he sent or brought to the emperor, his mother
1. "Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", op.cit., text, pp .
18,
34, 42, trans., pp. 22, 3 , 49.
277
and, the officers of the court, or the full amount of taxes
from merchants, farmers and cattle owners. 1 Yeshaq was
bahr nagash at this time, governing that part of the province
north of the Marab river. There is no indication as to the
amount paid in. by Abetohorn Yohannes fr qm southern Tigre,
especially from those districts rich in salt and cattle.2
We do not, likewise, know if any attempt was made to get
the r'venues of Dambiya from Harbo. As early as 1567
Earbo had. built up an army of horsetheri and footmen for the
sustenance of whom be seems to have been in need of much
finance. 3 The gifts or tributes which the enperor received
7
from Yeshaq, and Harbo in 1572 did not improve the financial
fproblems of the court. In the following year he began, or
frather resumed, the predatory activities which were to
become the main occupation of his life.
1. "L'autobiografia di Pawlos", o?.cit.,
pp.
288-89, 295-96;
and "Etudes s(..r l'bistoire d'Ethio ie", op.cit., text,
p .
3 3 7, trans., 111. AQcording to the long chronicle the
costly cloths, carpets and other objects which Sarsa
Dengel received from Harbo and Yeshaq in 1572 were purely
gifts. "Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", op.cit., text,
pp. 43 -44,
trans.,
pp.
50-51.
2 The prince was maintaining a substantial army. P. Jacome
to the viceroy in India fJu.ne,
1567J,
Rer. Aeth., X,
23 8.
3 . Azmach Yeshaq to same, June 2, 1567, ibid.,
pp.
206.
See also Oviedo's postscript on the same letter, pp.
206-207.
278
L.[in DamotJ, ii ag&t comme ii avait
l'habitude d'agir; mais nou.s n
voilons pas reconter son histoire ni
comment ii pilla des boeuXs, redaisit
des homme et des femmes en eselavage,
re9ut Line quantit d'or en tribiit en
pre'serrt; car une pareilie chose est
bien petite en comparaison de sa ptilesance
et sea victoires. us choisit alors
u.n endroit du. Bizamo pou.r y passer les
pluies.1
Sarsa Dengel learned from the soldiers this pre-
datory method of su.pp1ementing the meagre income to the
treasury. Pasilo, commander of the Marir regiment, gave
him his first instru.ction when he advised him,
Le vaut mieu.x faire passer au. Hasegue
is saison des plu.ies(of l566Jdans le
pays de Barya, parce que nous y mangeons
le bl des palens (arai) et notis
pilierons lea biens des p&iens (arai), 2
jusqu. 'a. leuirs enfants et leurs femmes.
Conti Rossini shouild not have capitalised. the word
Barya as it refers not to the Barya people of western Tigre
but to slaves in general. In the above passage it is used.
to describe the Gafat and variotis Sidama peoples of Damot,.
It is significant that in many places of the long c.,hronicle
the Gafat and Sidama of Damot, Bosha and Bizamo are
designated as bayra and agbert, words hardly used in earlier
hitories. 3
Previouis emperors, inclu.ding Galawdewos, bad
1.
"Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", op.cit., text, p.45,
trans., p.52.
2.
Ibid., text, p. 3 0, trans., p.35.
3 .
Ibid., text, pp. 3 8, 114-15,
trans.,
pp.
44-45, 129-3 1.
The word agbert is the plural form of gabr meaning slave.
27i
enslaved pagan and Muslim captives of war. But there is no
evidence to suggest that they raided their peaceful subjects
in order to enslave them. The use of these words indicates
that in the time of Sarsa Dengel practically the entire
pagan population of western Ethiopia was classified as fair
game for slave-raids.
The authority the governors were given over provincial
regiments coupled With their retention of much of the state
revenues, gradually transformed the soldiers from employees
of the state into retainers of the local lords. The first
recorded instance of such a transfer Qf loyalty was in Go jam,
where many soldiers from local garrisons and from outside
regiments, dislocated, by the civil wars, became personal
followers of Zar'a Yohannes. The word Wa'ali, by which
retainers of this type are designated in the long chronicle,
describes the change which was taking place. 1 A wa'ali's
relationship with the governor or any nobleman was essentially
like that between a mercenary and, his employer. Unlike the
traditional type of professional soldiers or chawa, who
were settled on lands and districts at the disposal of the
crown, the wa'ali lived in the camps of their masters. No
1. "Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", op.cit., text, p. 45,
trans.,
p.53;
and "Etudes sur Ihistoire d'Ethiopie",
op.cit., text, p. 337, trans., p. lii.
280
monetary currency existed in the cou.ntry; the wa'ali
were maintained on the revenues that normally should have
gone to the central treasury. When this became insuffi-
cient, they were sent on predatory raids.
Thus there was the example of the Giyorgis Haile,
the soldiers o' which garrison were willing to give their
services to whoever would maintain them. Earlier the soldiers
of this body had mu.tinied in sympathy for their commander
Awssa, who was arrested because of a law-suit he had with
Sabla Wangel. It is not known how they came to leave Mugar
for Dambiya; whether the emperor had transferred them in
order that they might act as a deterrent to Harbo's rebellious
tendencies or whether they had been wooed to Dambiya by Harbo
himself. The chronicle mentions a debt of 700 ounces of
gold which Uarbo still owed at the time of his death. 1 The
cost of building up a body of followers and of purchasing the
support of regiments like the Glyorgis Haile was expensive
even for a rich man like Harbo. By 1574 the discipline
of the Giyorgis Haile soldiers had declined to the extent
that their QWU officers were unable to keep them from moving
further North to the camp of Yeshaq. Sarsa Dengel pacified
them by providing them with lands to live on, immobilizing
1. "Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", op.cit., text, p. 46,
trans,, p.54.
i c i - '
them at the same ti me by c onfi sc ati ng thei r horses.1
For hi s part, Sarsa Dengel was also transformi ng many
of the provi nc i al regi ments i nto an army of personal
followers. Si nc e 1564
he bad begun tO keep wi th hi m some
of the regi ments whi c h Hamalmal b.rougli t from the vari ous
provi nc es and whi c h were unwi lli ng t return to thei r posts.
Oat Qf these, and many others whi c h he was to c o.11ec t dari ng
hi s movements through the provi nc es between Waj and. Bi zamo,
emerged the bodi es of royal uni ts whi c h c ame to be c ollec .
- ti v ly known as Querban or, someti mes,. Querban Heywate.2
The name does not fi gure i n the long li sts of regi ments,
garri sons and armi es or of the vari oas bodi - es of c ourt pages
and stewards found i n the many doc uments deali ng wi th
previ ous rei gns. Names of regi ments generally had a mi li tary
si gni fi c anc e; they alluded. to the 1oc ati on where the
regi ments were posted. or to the bravery of the soldi ers.
Names of the bodi es of c ourt pages bad generally the
quali fyi ng word.meani ng royal or i mperi al. Although
we c annot be c ertai n about the hi story of the troops
1. "tades sur l' hi stoi re d' Ethi opi e", op.c i t., text,
p .
357,
trans, p. llland "L' auti oafi a di . Pawlos",
op.c i t., pp. 2 9, 2 96.
2 , The c hroni c le i tself makes a c lear di sti nc ti on between
the Que.ban and the Chawa or regi xti ents. "Hi stori a regi s
Sarsa Dengel", o.c i t., text, pp. 67, 71, 12 8- 2 9,
trans., pp, 77, t2 , 146.
oQn
(.Od
collectively known as Querban, it is not improbable that
the name had its orign in the events which began in 1563,
when the garrison of Sabrad gave its support to Sarsa
Dengel. The word querban means eucharist or communion,
though its use in this case is probably in the sense of
covenant. Querban Heywate may be trans1ated as 'covenant
of my life' or 'covenant with my life', presumably
alluding to the oaths of loyalty that the Soldiers swore.
In aduition to ttaQuerban, the emperor's army included
Muslim bands from the hordes of Nur and Sultan Muhammad,
Galla warriors, some Portuguese and young men of Portuguese
descent, as well as the company of Turics.
To a great extent, then, the position of the provincial
governors was stronger than that of the emperor. Many of
their regiments were stable, still attached to the lands they
were settled upon, and disciplined. Since the emperor had.
with him hosts of irregulars, adventurers and scroungers,
he was placed in the awkward situation of having to keep
them eontenteL He had. to be careful that, in satisfying
the foraging exigencies of his soldiers, he did not antagonize
the nobility and regiments throughout the country.

igre
and Dambiyanhad not suffered very much from the movements of
armies during -the campaign o 1578-79. His deoision to protect
its peasants from his soldiers was induced, less by
humanitarian sentiments than by political considerations.
Od
Si je prolonge mon se'jou.r dane e
Tigr, le pays sera rine, parce que
nos soldats sont noUibreu.x, voire mme
innombrables. Ii vaut mieux q. lae je
sorte vers le Dambya et que je lee
conduise au pays des paens, pour
qii'lls y mangent le b1 et pillent
les biens.1
On this particular foraging expedition he did not
take the provincial regiments with him. He sent them back
with the governors to their homes. The chronicler seems
to hint that the emperor could have avoided this expedition;
he could have raised sufficient revenues it lie had not
decided to exempt the court officers and hoasehold stewards
from paying the taxes due from the districts they held in
Dambiya. To his soldiers, who were unhappy at being restrained
first in Tigre and now in Dainbiya, he profliised, in the words
of the chronicler, to lead them to places where they would
pillage "cattle, slaves and servants". 2 The prey were the
pagan Agaw of Alafa and Achafar.
It may be said that up to 1579 the threats to de-
throne him had forced him to become an. accomplice to the
predatorinees of his troops and to potpone until better
times the need to put the administration of the country in
order and to reorganize the defence of the eastern and
1. Ibid., text,
p.
83, trans., p.94.
2 . Ibid., text,
pp.
83-84, trans,, p.96.
284
south-eastern provinces. He and the governors, indeed,
seem to have believed that tie defeat of Yeshaq and th
Tu.rks had freed their hands, because on their return from
Tigre they deliberated and agreed upon a general plan of
campaign for the relief of the territories under al1a
occupation between Angot and Dawaro. 1 The governor and
regiments of the provinces threatened by the Boran and Baray-
twna had Left Dambiya with the hope that they would be
assisted in warding off the incursions. For some six months
after the adoption of this plan, while the emperor was away
on his raiding expedition, nothing was done towards its
iplementation. By the time he returned to Gubay be had
abandoned it, Instead, he decided upon a campaign against
the Falasha, in their impregnable strongholds in Semen,
for which he called up the governors and armies of Gojam
and Tigre and, what is even more difficult to comprehend,
those of Waj, .kmhara and. Angot as well.
According to the chronicler the reason for this
campaign was the refusal by Rada'i, chief of the Semen
Falash, to pay taxes, 2 This was a provocative act, but it
is doubtful if the political situation in Semen was serious
1. Ibid.
2 . Ibid.
28
enough to iistify abandoning a military policy o wider
dimensions and requiring the assistance of regiments badly
needed in their own provinces. 'alasha intractableness was
not a new i sue, and previous emperors like- Axnda Seyon,
Ba'eda
Maryam
and. Galawdewos had delegated the pacification
to their jninisters. The emperor's military prestige had
been enhanced by the Tigre campaign and,u.nlike his father,
he was not in need of proving his abilities as a soldier.
It is not improbable that the rebellion of Radi
happened to be a timely excuse to avoid1 returning to the
frontier provinces.
Sarsa Dengel's change of mind would have been under-
standable if tk.e taxes from Rada'i's district were needed
for su.bsidizin the campaigns against the Boran ana. Baraytu.ma ,
bu the geographical conditions of Semen were such that its
contributions to the central treasury must have been limited.
The anomaly in Sarsa Dengel's government becomes obvious
when we recall how he exempted from t.xation many officers
and noblemen of the richer districts. The abandon with which
his tropps committed excesses upon the peaceful Muslims and
Christians of Shewada and nearby districts may suggest
what the real purpose of the Semen expedition was.1
1. Ibid., text, pp. 85-86, trans.,
pp . 97-98,
28
The expedition ended with the capture of Rada'i.
His banishment to Waf in no way pacified the Falasha, and
two other campaigns were needed before some semblance of
peace was restored. Little is known of the second expedition,
except that it tookiace some time after the rainy season
of 1582 and, before that of 1583. The leader of the
insurrection was Rada'i's brother and successor in the chief-
tainship, iCalef, who had escaped capture in the previous war.
The third campaign was brief, lasting from December of 1587
to Jaxrnary of the following year. 3' Prom the point of view
of military history these campaigns are of some interest,
partictxlarly because they illustrate the strategic impor-
tance that two or three mountain strongholds could have
for the control of big districts arid the way these
strongholds were defended and besieged. Irthe first campaign
Sarsa Dengel's efforts were conoentrated on capturing two
strongholds, and in the third on taking one where the new
chief Gu.shan had fortified himself. The submission of the
Falasha might nOt have taken so much time and effort if the
emperor's soldiers had not been so greedy for captives.
1
1. Gusban's rebellion took. place in the 24th year Qf
Sarsa Dena1's reign. Qonti, Rossini Le mistaken when
saying thattook place in the rainy season of 1585.
"Tistoria regis Sarsa Dengel", op.cit., text,
p.
102,
trans., p. 1l1,, ri.p.116. See also "tudes sU.r
l'histoire d'Ethiopie", op.cit., text,
p.
338,
trans.,
p.
111.
287
The chronicler tells of several instances in h1ch men and
women, among them Gushan's wife and. sister, threw themselves
down precipices rather than be enslaved.1
In the intervening years the emperor was occupied
with slaving expeditions which took him over much of western
and southern Etliopia. His activities or the period between
1580 anl 1587 are not,unfortunately,covered in the long
chronicle. The brief entries in the abbreviated. chronicle
mention, devastating raids conducted thto various districts
of ojam and into provinces on the other Bide of the Blue
Nile: against th Gafat in Shat in 1581, against the Agaw
o Bad and Sarka in the following two years and against
districts neighbouring on Exiarya in
1584.2
More people
in other regions were probably affected in these as well as
in the years between 1585 and 1587, for which the
same chronicle offers meagre information.3
The extent to which the Semen campaigns and the
slaving razzias added to the dislocation and fragmentation
1. "Historia regis Sarsa Dengel"., op.cit,, text, pp. 88-89,
106, 110, trans.,
pp.
101, 120-21, 125W.
2. The Gafat in Shat were mostly refu.gees whom the Galla
had displaced from Shawa and the districts directly to its
west. On the indigenous inhabitants of Shat see above,
p.57:
/
3.
Etudes su.r ].'histoire d'Ethiopie", op.cit., text,
p .
338, trans.,
p.
111.
of the regiments and to the decline of the morale of t e
soldiery may never be fully estimated. Athoagh the banish-
ment of Rada'i does suggest that Daharagot returned to his
province, we do. not know if all the regiments that were called
up against the Palasha chief were sent back to their homes.
The Shahagene of Tigre seem t have been resettled in Semen.1
Vez'y likely also some regiments like the Doba Seltan),
from Amhara and Angot, where the Baraytu.ma were spreading
themselves out, may have been posted somewhere in Semen,
Bagameder or even further west. The presence of the regi-
ments had many advantages for the emperor. Jn the Semen
campaigns- they overwhelmed Falasba resistance and made the
sieges safer for him and his soldiers. Their participation
in the slaving expeditions helped to discourage all kinds-
of resistance and. enabled the emperor to cover wider areas
and to take more cS.ttle and captives.
Compared to the regular soiaiers or chawa, the pagan
Agaw, Gaf at, Sidama and Shanqela were poorly armed and
inexperienced in tactical warfare. When Sarsa Dengel reached
his destination, the various regiments and Qu.erban units
1. There are two places called Shahagene, one in Tigre,
anj the other, in Semen. A. d'Abbadie, Gographie de
l'Ethiopie,
p.
241; and. "Historia regis Sarsa Dengel",
op.cit., trans., n.2,
p.118. Some families of the
Shahagene remained behind in Tigre, and they seem to
have tried unsuccessfully to appropriate the lands
formerly assigned for the maintenance of the regiment.
"Liber Axu.mae", op.cit., t xt, p. 4, trans., p.54.
Almeida describes the pred.toy
activ.es of a large body
of Shahagene soldiers in western Semen, at the place where
the Dambiya 10 Tigre caravan route crossed the Zarima
river. He says that the original home of the Shaha.gene
was near Fremona. 'Historia de Ethiopia a 4lta",
Rer. Aeth., VII, 246.
28
were assigned different objectives, so that simultaneous
attacks could be made on several clusters of villages.
The relatively strong bbdy of musketeers, composed chiefly
of Portugase and. Tur1s, were detailed to the various
sections of the army. 1
Although in. pitched battled with
equally sophisticated enemies these musketeers were far less
effective than the spear-carrying or sword-wielding horse-
men, against these pagan peopleB they were terror-inspiring.
Because of the size of the army and
the slow progress of
its march on account of its large impedimenta, the victims
were rarely caught unaware. Armed resjstance would have
been useless. Some like the Shan(ela submitted to
captivity, others like the Sidama of Gambo vainly threw
themselves at the mercy of the emperor and. others sought,
equally in vain, refuge in mountain strongholds, deep
valleys or caves and rocks. The soldiers were experts at
capturing mountain strongholds or ferreting out people from
any places of hiding. The chronicler was not exarating
when he compared the raids to a lion's attack upon a cow
or a wolf's upon a lamb.2
,. "Historia regis Sarsa Dengel"., op.cit., text, pp.
144,
116-17, trans., pp.
130, 132-33; and Paez, "Rela9am
da entrada dos Pee. d.a Compa. de Jesu
em Aethyopia",
fol. 51 r, MS. 779, Braga.
2. "Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", op.cit.,
xtp.l39,
trans.,
p.
158.
290
Necessary as these slaving raids had, become to the
emperor and, his army of adventurers, and to the hordes of
scavengers which had attached themselves to the camp, they
were uppopular with the regular regiments. The wording of
the proclamations summoning the various regiments of Dambiya,
Bagameder and. Wagara make^it clear that the soldiers of the
regiments were unwilling to go on these raids. When in 1588,
right after the expedition against the Falasha, Sarsa Dengel
decided to go on razzias into Gojam, no soldier was allowed.
to stay behind even if he was exhausted by the march against
Gushan. If a soldier pleaded. illness he had to be examined
by his officers, and if he absented. himself without their
knowledge he was tried for treason. 1 Another call to
arms made towards the end of the same year was even more
threatening. Sarsa Dengel himself ordered that
A herald goes about crying that all the
warriors, horsemen and. those who bearrshields
and spears should come to our gate. If anyone
stays behind. on a false pretext, his house
shall be ransacked, his possessions con-
fiscated, and his whole life shall belong to
whoever accuses him and has him convicted.2
1.
Ibid., text, p. 113, trans., p. 129.
2. Ibid.., text,
p.
117, trans.,
p.
134. Although Conti
Rossini's French version is more elegant, I have given
the passage in English because he did not know the
meaning of astahalakiso. The traditional form of a
proclamation exhorting people to report
ireason says
that an informer would. get, after conviction, the
property of the person he accused, while the state took
his life.
291
As the Querban a id other sol iers of the em eror
lived in and around the palace at Gu.bay, the call to arms
could not have been inte ded for any but the regiments
posted in the outlying districts and neighbouring provinces.
Several fact rs may explain the reluctance of the regiments
to accompany the emperor. The risks to life from the
resistance to the raids were slight. The marc es over the
lowlands and across the valleys, however, held dangers for
health. Another factor may have been the heavy share of
the booty demanded by the emperor. Apparently, there
existed certain arrangements by which booty in cattle,
captives and. other takings were shared between the
soldiers and the emperor. The fact that the chronicler makes
the effort to point out the fairness of the arrangements may
"Lbe
taken to indicate the contrary. The division of the booty
after the 1588 razzias on the Shariqela of Balya and the
A aw of Hankasha is described thus:
V
....il prel va de tous les awa et
belattena 0a part Q.'esclaves et de
boeufs; le jour ou. il prit ce qu.i
lui revenait de droit personne ne
murmura: en effect, a chacun restait
une quantit1us grande que ce qu'il
avait pris...-'-
1. Ibid., text,
p.
115, trans., p. 131. In the text the
word for "his share" is garasa which should be tianslated
as "tax". During the caopai n against Gushan of
Seme , Yon 'el, governor f the district, shared his
captives with the emperor. Ibid., text, . 106,
trans., p . 12 21.
Even if the soldiers were left with the good number
of cattle and slaves, drivizg them back to their homes or
to Gubay and disposing of them to merchants may have made the
'azz.as somewhat u.pprofitable affairs. Unlike the men of
the emperor, who were essentially soldiers of fortune, the
regimental chawa did not depend on the raids for their
livelihoods, they had homes and lands. The times were
unsettled and banditry was rife; they may have had reason
to feel that their homes and farms would not be safe while
they were away. The Galla raids into Bagameder and Dambiya
were also becoming frequent.
Mutinies by regiments, rebellions by noblemen and
slave raids by the emperor himself were gz'adually upsetting
the stratified but stable society which bad. survived a war
of such
cataclysmic
propoitions as Ahmad Granh's invasion.
G-on9alo Rodrigu.es's description of his itineraries between
Massawa and Waj show that tranquility prevailed over much of
the country in 1555 and 1556. His description is important
because of it wide coverage. He had passed through Amhara
on his way to the cotrt at Sef Bar, and bad then returned by
way of Gojam, Dambiya and Wagara, A similar picture of
stability is also conveyed by Diogo de Couto's account of
Oviedo's voyage to the court in 1557.
Both descriptions
hardly register any change from the conditions in which
Francisco Alvarez lived during his five years' stay in the
country. The extent to which conditions had deteriorated
by 1575 may be seen from the scattered letters that the
Jesuit missionaries wrote after that date. Banditry had
become a thriving occupation for soldiers from the d.is-
integrating regiments.1
Civil and military officers were
everywhere becoming notorious for their readiness to oppress
and despoil.2 Even large and well protected caravans were
insecure.
The widespread disorderliness of society is reflected
by Sarsa Dengel's camp, which wa in marked .contrast with
the well regulated and, in fact, regimented courts of his
predecessors. Besides the Querban and other troops made
up of Turks, Muslims of Adal and Harar, and. Galla, there were
countless men. without occupation or function. Th Wadala and
Wad Hadar of the long chronicle, as well as the bandits who
preyed upon farmers, travellers and merchants, could not have
been from the peasantry because the restrictions on the
1.
A. Ferriarides to the prepositor of Goa, Sept. 22, 1575,
Rer. Aeth., X, 265; M. Fernandes to V. Rodrigues,
provincial of India, Dee. 20, 1576, ibid., p.276; and
Paez, "Historia de Bthiopia", ibid., ILl, 118-19.
2.
Of Asbo, probablg the man who later became d.aiazxnach Qf
Daznot, Pawlow complains that
iu 169 be took from him his
six cows; adding that this was not the first time Abo
had despoiled eople of their properties. "L'autobiografia
d Pawlos", op.cit., pp.
288, 295. See the charges of
oppression made against the people of Eda Dagana in
"Liber Axmae", op.cit., text, p.
74, trans., p.88.
294
possessioh of arms by them were ealous1y upheld by the
ivi1 and military officers. The Wad.ala and Wad Hadar were
probably soldiers, or sons of soldiers, who came to the court,
attracted by the opportunities provided by the frequent razzias.
The Wadala were scavengers who lived on the leavings of the
regular so1diers Their disorderliness 1 and the overcrowded
and. utisanita y conditions in which they lived, made them
dangerous to property and. health. As earLy as 1579 the
emperor had tried, though unsuccessfully, to rid the camp
of them by settling them at Bad) To the usual camp
followers may be added the multitude f the blind, cripjed
and. sick people who followed the emperor everywhere, even to
mountainous Semen.2
Paez describes one event which, perhaps, illus-
trates the estrangement which developed between some regiments
and the emperor as a result of indiscriminate pillaging by
his soldiers. Nanina was a small district of Gojam inhabited
mostly by pagan Agaw The garrison of the area comprised
o some 10,000 men who were, according to Paez, Christian
l
M ilistoria regis Sarsa Dengel", op.cit., text, p. 85,
trans., p.97 See also text, pp. 9-90, 113-14, trans.,
pp .
102, 129.
2. That M. Saineano was in no position to belittle the work
of Bruce can be discerned from the naive explanations
he gave for the presence of such handicapped beggars on
the Semen campaign. He says that they followed the
emperor because they loved him and, wanted to die for .him
on the.fie1d
'Abysinie dans la secondenmoitie du
Ky le siecle, p.2
295
Agaw. tn a conflict which arose some time after 1588 between
the peasants of Nanina and, the emperor, the soldiers of the
garrison sided with the former. Paez was told that the
conflict began because the peasants refused to- pay their
taxes; this was probably how the emperor justified all of
his razzias. The trouble may have begun when, towards the end
of this year, the emperor with his army had stopped at
Nanina and spent Christmas there. His troops had, in all
likelihood, pillaged the district including the lands of the
garrison. The soldiers of the garrison mar have manifested
their disenchantment. In any case, the emperor made up his
mind to disband them and take back the lands on which they
were settled. As his soldiers were not willing to attack the
garrison, he promised to give the lands to the Portuguese if
they could occupy them, a taslc in which they failed.1
The Agaw of G-oam and the Gafat to its souh seem t
have lacked. the political organization of the Sidama
peoples of Konch, Bosha and
Enarya.
The Agaw constituted the
foundation of the EthiopIan state and culture; after the
long period qf political and uLtu.ral evolution only those
Agaw whQ lived in the periphery of the country bad retained
their tribal Qrganization. They had. remained pagans and
still spoke in the Agaw rather than the Mharic language,
1. "Relaam cia entrada dos Pes. cia Compa. d Jesu em
Aethyopia", fol. 51 r, MS. 779, Braga.
296
but their close association with the other Christianjzed
and. seiticized Agaw to the east and. the north had eroded their
sentiments of political distinctness)' Although the Ga'at
were less numerous and concentrated within smaller
districts,, they too were sufficiently integrated. Their
social organization in the sixteenth century was essentially
tribal. The Sidama peoples to the south ot the Gafat,
however, had been until the fourteenth century far removed
from the political and cultural centres of Ethiopia. The
fact that they were for long outside the boundaries of a
stronger stat'may have helped to strengthen and preserve
their own pplitical organizations. In the period we are
dealing with, their rulers, ciiefs and oJdiers were drawn
from their own people, and were thus able to protect them-
selves by military r other means from the raids of the
regiments.
In the early years of Sarsa Dengel's reign the rulers
of Enarya and Konch had given their support to the tottering
thrones because they thought the monarchy would muzzle the
disorderly regiments and restore political stability.
Although they paia. their trjbutes regularly, and. made in
1. The absence of tribal cohesion among the pagan Agaw is
described by Almeida. 9listoria de Ethiopia a Alta",
Rer. Aeth., VI, 326.
297
addition substantial gifts in gold, the order and stability
-they desireI vvas not re-established. The Bosha, on the
other hand, tried to defend themselves against the undue
demands of Sarsa Denel's soldiers, but they found. themselves
too weak and small to stop the numerous regiments. The
only way by which these peoples could save themselves from
being enslaved was by adopting Christianity.
Some students of Ethiopian history have credited
Sarsa Dengel with making the initiative for the conversion
of these varioUs Sidama peoples. According to Cou.lbeaux,
all of Sidama peoples west of the Gibe-Omo river were
Christians long befor th time, but had been completely
separated from the rest of the country ever since the wars
of Ahmad Granh. What Sarsa Dengel, therefore, did, was to
recoveri' the lost provinces, to revitalise the Christianity
of the people by bringing more priests arid, building more
churches, and to assist them to repulse the G'alla who were
pressing upon them from all sides. 1 Influenced by Coulbeau.x,
Budge says that Sarsa Dengel did not introduce Christianity
among these peoples, he only strengthened a faith which was
already widespread. Unlike Coulbeaux, however, he thinks
that the emperor was not motivated by political considerations
1. J.B. Qoulbeaux, Histoire politigue et religieuse
d'Abyssinie, II, 160-61.
298
but by his fanatical support for the Ethiopian Church,
the teachings o which he tried to spread throughout the
country. 1
Other authors are less explicit in expressing
the reason for the conversions. As all, historians to date
have seen a great statesman in the emperor, they have
ascribed, the conversions to his desire to create a stable
and culturally homogeneous nation. In my view, Coulbeaux's
view on the est.b1ishment of Christianity in the regions
west of the Gibe-Omo river as also the motives which he and
other historians have ascribed to the emperor, are all
gxtoundless
There is sufticient evidence to suggest that con-
version to Christianity was a means by which many of the
J
pagan peoples who feared the slave raids hope& to protect
I themselves. We have already considered the charges preered
by Goncalo Hodrigues ,in 1556,
to the effect that the
Christian nobility, apparently with the acquiescence of the
empsrors, freq.
uently rejected reqc.ests by the pagans in the
country to be converted to their religion.
2 Oviedo
repeated the accusation ten years later, thi9 time in
connection with the Shinasha of Bizano. He 6aid that iii
1. Budge, History of Ethiopia, II, 373.
2. See above, pp.gO-1OS.
29D
1564 the Shinasaha had repeatedly begged a relative of the
emperor to stop raiding them and to give them priests to
convert them. Oviedo was, in the same letter, presenting
arguments in favour of the use of force for the conversion of
Ethiopia to Catholicism. His descriptions of the riches
in gold waiting to be gathered and of the mu],titude of
souls thirsting for the christian faith were, of course,
intended to overcome the re).uctance of the king f Portugal
to declare war on Christian country, defended by his
predecessor. 1 We cannot, however, accuse Oviedo of
inventing the charge, because a variant of the long chronicle
says -almost the same thing.
Ii LSarsa Dengeijapprit q. ue le pe
de Badano, chef de 1'Enarya, appele La'asonhi,
voulait devenir chrtien, mais que les aza,
charges des finaxces du royaume, ne lu.i
avaient pas donne leur agrment, parce que'ils
avaient t retanus par les soucis matriels,
par l'amour de l'argent.2
1. Oviedo to the king Dom Sebastian, June 18, 1567.
Rer. Aeth., X,
224.
A. Pernandes is even more explicit
in his accusation. He says the reaso why the nobility
objected to the conversion of the pagans is because they
wanted to sell them. See his letter of Sept. 22, 1575
to the repositor of Ga, ibid.,
p.
267.
2. "Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", op.cit., text, p.167, trans.
p. 180. This statement is riotund in the Oxford MS, which
was copied from the original of the long chroiicle written
in the lifetime of Sarsa Dengel. It comes from the
Frankfurt MS., made from the revised copy written soon
after the emperor's death, and ptrts of wlaich Paez trans-
lated and included in his history. Cf. "Historia de
Ethiopia", op.cit. III,
145.
There is no reason to suspect
Paez or any Lthiopian Catholic of inserting this state-
ment into the chronicle with the intention of maligning
the Ethiopian Church or its adherents.
300
The older version of the chronicle, froni which the
Oxford MS. was copied, and. which Conti Rossini. used, also
shows that the desire for the conversion of Enarya originated
not with Sarsa Dengel but with La'asozthi, probably
Seperthi' SsucC essor
As there does not seem to have been much troop
movement in Bizamo in 1563 and 1564,
we cannot be certain
of the oppression
the Shi4aasha complained of when they
asked to be converted and to be left in peace. The regi-
ments of Taklo or Fasilo may have been preying upon them.
It was the Gafat in Shat district who, ir i581, first
succeeded in. persuading Sarsa Dengel to allow them to become
Ch'istians. The event is mentioned very bief1y, and we do
not know if the Shat Gaat wk.o were being harried by the
emperor had asked influential prelates of the Church to
intercede for them. The chronicle does not specify the alleged
crime for which they were being pillaged and enslaved, but
in -the light of the above evidence, the author could not have
been telling the truth when he wrote that the emperor made
their conversion a conditibn for hFs pardon.
That the emperor required no excuse for his destruc-
tive raids may be inferred from the fate of the Agaw of
Ha.nkasha in
1558
and the people of Gambo ,in 1591.
The
1. "Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", op.cit., text, pp.. 120-21,
trans., pp. 136-138.
case of the Gambo people illustrates clearly Sarsa Dengel's
relationship witK his troops and may perhaps clarify the
conversion of the Shat Gafat. When the emperor opened an
unprovoked and wasteful ra.d on the people of Gambo, ttiey
appealed to Abba Abraham, abbot of Dabra Libanos, to save
them from extermination.
EnsuIte celui-ci, ayant traits lear
affaire pres du. roi , lear envoya tan
messager en disant: "Venez, j'ai. termine
votre affaire; aucun mal ne vous arrivera."
Alors, pendant la ntait, ils descendirent
de leu.r amba avec leurs femines et leur
enfants, et au. matin, us entrrent dans
le campement. Le Hasege, bon et clement
pour tout le monde, lear dit: "Ne
craignez pas: aacu.n mal ne votas arrivera."
Et, -tandis qu'ils tieMt sou.lags de
toute crainte et terreur, vers les neui
hetars,les sold.ats du campement les
entou.rerent soudain et pillrerit tout le
monde, sans epargner personne. Mais le
Hasege, en voyant cette trahi.son des hoinmes
du. campement, manqu.ant de discipline, envoya
cont'e eux de nombreux,cavaliers. Alrs tous
les Cawa and les Aqet var du.rent restituer
tous les esciaves et les servantes qu'ils
venalent de prendre; la restitution eat
lieu soas peine d'excomintmicatiofl, sans rien
laisser dans leurs maisons.-
The soldiers mast have manifested to the emperor their
resentment of his intervention. A few days 4.ater one of the
Aqet Jar was killed, while cutting ensat from a plantation.
The emperor used the incident to make peace with his troops,
al.towing them to massacre ana enslave the remaining people
of Gambo.
l.Ibid., text, p.
140, trans., p.159.
" U " . ,
Contrary to the suggestion made in the revised
chronicle, Sarsa Dengel must have known at the time
La'asonhi's motives for wanting to be converted, as well as
the reasons why his request was refused. 1 The regular
payments of tributes and gifts of gold that the emperor
received from Bosba, Enarya and, perhaps Bizamo too, may
explain why he led. very few slaving raids against them.
The ceremony of the conversion of Badancho and the other
chiefs of Enarya is described in detail, while the
chronicle says nothing about the circumstances which took the
emperor there and made him agree to the conversion. Enarya
was iot threatened by the Boran in
1588. 2
But as Shawa
and Damot were completely invaded, soldiers and other
people from these provinces must have been rushing for safety
into Bosha, Enarya and Bizamo as well as into Gojam. The
disordea which. followed the presence of large numbers of
soldiers whose profession and religion gave them licence to
despoil t e pagans there, may have frightened Badancho into
1.
That Sarsa Dengel knew of La'asonhi's requests at the
time when this ruler of Enarya was alive is implied in
the original chronicle. The emperor was careful to
tell Badancho that his father died before receiving
baptism because the times for narya's conversion had
not yet come. Ibid. , , text,
p.
120, trans. ,
p.
136.
2.
Bruce seems to hint that the people of Enarya gratefully
embraced Christianity because the emperor saved them
from being overrun by the Galla. Travels, II, 230.
sending f r the emperor. Sarsa Dengel, on his part, may
have been concer ed for t e tributes of gold. as well as
for the trade in e.ivet and ivory from which the treasury
derived handsome profits. Conversion to Christianity
protected the pagan peoples of Enarya, Gu.mar and Bosha
from a 1 acts of lawlessness by the soldiers by giving them
legal equality.
As a result of the raids, the export of slaves from
Ethiopa must have been high in the time of Sarsa Dengel.
As the sources provide no informatiGn on this issue, we
cannot determine the extent to which the trade had increased.
The Galla had blocked the routes to Zayla, and. Yeshaq's
rebellion had closed Arqiqo. To meet the need for a port of
export, Sarsa Dengel established ties with the emerging
kingdom of Pung. In. 1571, someone, probably a bishop from
Alexandria, reached Dambiya by way of the Atbara river, but we
do not know if the king of Fling gave his assistance to the
traveller. By 1578, however, relations must have become
strong, for an ther bishop, Abuna Marqos, arrived by way of
Sennar and. Fazugli)As can be seen from the letter f a
merchant of Ancona, called Girolamo Cherubini, the friend-
ship continued throughout the reign of the emperor. The
1. "L'autobio rafia di Pawlos", op.cit., pp. 288-289, 296.
304
certain haji, who was like a father to the king of Fung
and. a close friend of the emperor, may have been a rich
merchant who acted as agent to both monarchs. 1 Sarsa
Dengel also maintained friendly ties with the Tu.rks in Arqiqo
and Massawa after their defeat in 1579.
Relations with them
were occasionally upset, as in 1590, as Cherubini noted,
but the Turks would not have neglected to encourage the
exporting of slaves through the ports in their hands.2
In 1590 Sarsa Dengel had a second opportunity to
recapture Arqiqo, His failure to drive the Turks out of the
mainland
is one o the many instances showing how the troops
imposed their will upon the emperor. The Turks were, until
this year, contented with the customs duties they collected
at Arqiqo and with the frienthip of the emperor. Some time
before, a nobleman of aamaseen called Walda Ezu.m had rebelled
against Takia Giyorgis, dajazmach of the province, and. waw
defeated. When be appealed to the Turks for support, the
pasha, hoping to regain Debarwa, made him accept the office
of bahr nagash from him. Daharagot, who replaced Takla
Glyorgis, was defeated by the Turks. Sarsa Dene1 caine with
1.
Cherubini's letter of Dec. 24, 1597,
was written in
Dmbiya. Roberto Almagi., Contributi alla toria della
conoscenza dell
s
Etiopia, p.43.
2.
Ibid.; k. Fernandes to the prepositor of Goa, Sept. 22,
1575,
Rer, Aeth., X, 266; M. Fernandes to the Pre-
positor General of the Society of Jesus, JuLy 3, 1582,
ibid.,
p.
330.
3
t
t e armies of Gojam, ]Jambiya and Bagmedar, as well as wit
troo s of soldiers from Sh a, Damot aM Amhara. As soon as
the em eror reacled Tire, t e pasha retreated to Arqiqo.
The emper r pursued him to the port an besieged the fortress
there. The Turks ran short of water and sup lies, and the
pasha, afraid that he might not be able to escape to the
- isia d. of Massawa, was considering surren er when the
troops of the emperor decided they could no ion er put up
with the heat or with the shortage of supplies. Without
any attempt at persuading his soldiers to persevere, Sarsa
Dengel made peace with the pasha and went back to Dambiya)
We cannot determine whether the chronicler was at a
loss on how to conclude his history of Sarsa Dengel's reign,
or whet er he wanted to tell the truth without appearing
critical, and thus displeasing the emperor, but he could not
have made a more honest or telling commentary than this:
Lorsque ce roi revint du Tigr6, tous lee
pays qul avaientava s, d.ans lee
rgins hautes et dans lee regions basses,
furent rempli d'une telle abondance qu'il
n'y en avait jamais eu de semblable aupara-
vant, de sorte qu'on se disait: "c mment
n'aurait-on pas eu. une pareille abondance,
aprs que n s pays ontpills, puisque
1. "Historia regis Sarsa engel", p.cit., text,
pp.
131,
l3336, trans., p . 149, 151-155. According to Paez,
the fortress was besieged for five or six days. Among
the Turks were 3 rene ades, probably of Eur pean
origin, who were lanning t arrest the pasha and hand
hi over to the em ero When the si ge was lifted,
the pas a had all 30 of them beheaded. "Relaani
da entra a os Pee. da Corn a. de Jesu. em Aethyopia",
fol. 51, v, MS. 779, Bra a.
30G
la main droite du. roi, qui set pleine
de misricorde, nous a sid' Dsormai,s,
nous d6sirerofls
qii
nous fas-se encore
piller, se l'ox dolt avoir vne telle
abondance et bend.iction dane nos payst"
lie conservent encore jusu'a pre'serrt
ce dsir et cette esperance. QueUe fut
cette abondance, qui avaitdonnee par,
le Seigneu.rt Le pays, qu.'on avait devaste
en prenant des esciaves et dx bu.tin, a te
rempli de bn6diction et d.'abondance:
lee paysaris sont dvenL1e joyeux et allegres.
III. The Westward Progress of the arayttunaxand Boran.
Before we begin our discussion on the movements of
the G-aila into the interior provinces, we should examine
briefly some errabou.t the chronology and direct.on
of the migrations which arose from a misinterpretation f
Bahre
y
's statement on the Dawe tribe.- According to him, the
Dawe was one of the last tribes to reach the highlands.
It passed through Ku.eraGamo t ravage Bater Amora and
Waj, 2
Certilli, identifies Kuera with Koira, a small
1. 1tHistoria regis Sarsa Dengel", op.it., text, p.
141,
trans., pp. 160-61. In a letter of March 2 1, 1584 to A.
Valignani, provincial of India, F. Lopes makes a scathing
criticism of Sarsa Dengel. He
sars that instead of
defending the country, the emperor
'and. his captains were
destroying it. Rer. Aeth., X, 333.
2 .
"Historia gentis Galla", op.tit., text, p.
2 2 4, trans.,
pp. 196-97; Some Records f Ethiopia, pp. 113-14.
When Bahrey says that the Dawe Galla were among the last
of the Boran to leave their cot.uitry he does not indicate
whether by their country he means Bali or the Galla
homeland further south. This, however, does not affect
the argument because the Dawe which left Bal& after the
Boran tribes must have been amon g
the last to enter it.
3r
district east of Lake Abaya, inhc.bited. by a Sidma
tribe called Koira or Baditu. He also thihks that Garno
refers to the Gainu highlands west of the same lake. On the
basis of these identifications, Cerulli. draws conclusions that
contradict Bahrey's own history of the Galla. Cerulli places
the Dawe in front of the other Boran tribes, and makes the
Boran rather than the Baaytwna the spearhead of the migra-
tions. He then traces for the al1a a direction that leads
from Walabo, across Koira and the Gainu. highlands irito Walamo
and Kambata) He does not explain how the Galla moved into
Bali, but presumably he assumes that they left the Rift
Valley at Bater Amora to invade the Ball highlands. Trimin-
gham, who is clearer and less ambiL&ous in his statements
than Ceulli, reveals the contradiction in the latter when
he says that the GaU.a entered. Ethiopia in two directions,
1. Cerulli, Etiopia occidentale, II, 171-72. Cerulli has
certainly attached too much importanee to the tradition
about the separation of the Gombichu and Ada Galla from
the Macha. This tradition cannot explain the northward
arid eastward migrations of the Baraytuma. It cannot
even account for the separation of the Tti.lama from the
Macha. The Goinbichu and Ada clans are not mentioned in
Bahrey's list. The conflict between the Talama clans
of Gombichu and Galan mentioned in the tradiUon,
probably refers to hostility which broke ut between
them some time after the seventeenth century. Both
clans were at peace in 1688 and established somewhere
between Dabra Iibarios and Walaqa. "nnales lohannis I,
lyasu I et Bakaffa", op.cit., text, pp. 126-27, trans.,
p.
131.
308
from Lake Abaya and Bali. He also repeats Cerulli's error
by putting the Dawe in front of all the calla.
As Bahrey is very specific about the position of the
Dawe tribe in the waves of Boran movement, both historians
could easily have avoided their mistake on this point.
Besides, the time of the death of Pasil, the goveznor
or
military officer who tried to repulse the Dawe from Kuera,
is given in the long chronicle: it was shortly before 1588.2
There is a very strong argument against Ceru3li's
idea o a migration along the Rift Valley. If, as he says,
the Galla or the Boran, or even the Dawe by themselves, had
moved through Gamu, Walamo ard Kambata, the Sidama inhabitants
of these places could not have survived the invasion. Even
if we assume that it was the Dawe tribe alone that moved up
in this direction, it would be difficult to explain why this t
tribe should have decided to ut a new and hazardous path,
when it could have followed the main body of the Boran group
into Bali. Crossing the narrow strip of land which they
called the Bridge of God, which separates the Abaya and
Chamo lakes, would have been very difficult, especially as the
people Qf Gamu. would not have failed to def end themselves.
1.
Trimingham, Isl.m in Ethiopia, . 93
2.
"Hietoria regis Sarsa Dengel", o.cit., text, p.
127,
trans., p. 144.
he Dawe tribe is also called Jawe and
Jawi. Chronica de Susenyos, I, 260, II, 2 0. Basset
has wrongly identified th Jawe with the Yaju.
"Etudes stir l'histoire d'EthiopIe", op.cit., n. 378,p.382.
The location/of the dj.strict or province of

3O
is in all probability indicated by the small village of
Kuyera situated between the lakes of Shala akid Awasa, near
the town of Shahhamene. The name of Gamo does not seem to
have survived, but we can be almost eeitain that it is no
way connected with Gamu. If Bahrey had meant the mountainous
region west of the Lake Abaya, it is quite possible he would
have called it Bahrgamo or Sufgamo. This contention seems
to be cox.firmed by an Amharic praise song in which Gafat,
G-amo and Ganz are mentioned together. 1 Waj, Gamo, Bater
Amora and Gurage are also mentioned together in the Hega
waser'ata mangest. 2 Alvarez provides further confirmation
when he describes G-anz and. Gamo as bordering upon Waj and
Shawa. 3 Gamo, then, was somewhere to the south of Wa.
It may have been on the plains between Lake Shala and the
Dilate river. Bater Amora was located south of the Guxage
highlands.
Already in the time of Galawdewos the Boran had begun
to take a westerly direction from the thighiands of Bali and
to descend into the Rift Valley plains. They had directed theij
l, "Le canzoii geez-amaria ix onore di Re Abi.uaini',
op.cit., p.56,
2.
J. Varenbergh, "Studien zu.r abessinisehen Reichsordnun,g",
op.cit., p.13.
3.
The Prester John of the Indies, II, 454.
310
incursions against southern Waj when they were intercepted
by the emperor and forced bk into Bali. When, after the
Muslim invasion ander Nur and the death of Galawdewos, the
Baraytuma moved into Dawaro, the Boran discontinued their
raids into the lowlands below Lake Dway. The defence of
provinces like Wa and. Fatagar had devolved upon the Mu.sliin
troops left behind by Nur, and that of provinces like Hadya
and Garage upon the inhabitants themselves. Unlike the
regiments, these peoples had no hoice but to Uefend themselves.
And, for the Boran it became much easier to follow the
Baraytwna into Dawaro.
The Boran, however, were unable to continae in the
path of the other group and. move into Ifat and the Adal
plains. Instead, they turned west and. began to move up the
Awash valley towards Fatagar and Waj. The reason may have
been the slow progress made 'by the Itu.. and. Wara De'aya
in spreading Into the Adal-Awssa plains. At the same time
the defence of the provinces west of Dawaro was 'beginning
to weaken. By 1563
Asm-ad-Din and. other Muslims in Waj and.
Fatagar were becoming involved in the various struggles for
the throne. Soon
after
this year the Hadya and Garage
peoples were to find difficulties in fending off the
rapacious regiments of Rom Sagad and Aws a. Then h
stubbornness oZ Aze involved Hadya in a futile rebellion
against Sarsa Dengel. Nevertheless, until 1571, when the
emperor decided to leave Waj, there were soldiers of one
311
kind, or another who checked the Boran from irrupting into
the plateau. There is also another reason for the fact that
throughout these years the Boran made no incursions into Waj
or Fatagar. The Boran had, until their arrival at Dawaro,
been movin behind the Baraytwna. They made comparatively
less raids and wars, and, were 'thus able to drive more cattle
tnan the other group. This not only slowed their progress
but made them far less aggressive than the Baraytuma.
In1eed, Sarsa/Dengel does not seem to have entertained any
apprehensibn from the Boran when in 1571 he transferred
Takia Giyorgis from Hadya to Damot. Daharagot, who had just
been married to the daughter of Am ta Giyorgis, was left in
charge of Waj. If there had been some cause to fear the Boran,
the emperor might have placed him in command of the regiments
in the small easterly provinces of Sharka and Arenh.
Some time after the emperor had left, the Galla broke
into the plateau. News of their irruption into Waj and
Patagar, and, of the threat they posed to Shawa, seems to have
reached the emperor either shortly before or during his
meeting with Yeshaq somewhere in Wagara. It may account for
the brief duration of their meeting, and for th tact that the
emperor did not give any assistance towards the expulsion
of the Turks, who had taken advantage of Yeshaq's absence
to reoccupy Debarwa. Sarsa Dengel correctly assessed the
disasters that would follow if he allowed the Boran to occupy
')1 (1
Stiawa, which was, as the chronicler hinted, the heart of
the empire in more senses than one.' Summoning the governors
and .rmies of Gojam, Daniot, Shawa and. the provinces to
its soath, the emperor reached Waj towards the nd of 1572.
The unpreparedness of the Boran, mainly du.e to their
limited experience in making incursions into new territories
and facing an organized army and also to the immense herds
of cattle they were driving, made the task of repulsing them
easier for the emperor.
Lorsqu'fl. arriva au Wag, ii coz1tata
que lee Gallagavaient rempli tout le
Maya et la Wag avec leuxs troupeaux, leurs
enfnts et 1eurs femmes, on ne savait
plus o. marcher, car leu.rs boeufs
avaient refnpli tous les/lietix. A caLse
de la qu.antit de leu.r boeufs, person.ne
tie pouvait plu.s alle2' aux pturages avec
son compgnony et chaun marchait avec
tine extreme difficu1te, en oussant
les boeufs par ioi et par la aux ptu.rages,
pour se grayer Lin etiemin. Cependant lee
Galla n'ava..ient rea au.cune nouvelle
de 1'arrive d'une 'telle arme, qui
cotavrait la terre Iorsq,, u'elle tait en
marche 2
The chronicle'r could not have been describing an
actU.al situation, or reporting an opinion then carrent, when he
1.
"Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", op.cit., text, p.
44,
trans., p. 51.
2. Ibid., text,
p.
44, trans., p.52. Brace's account of
this engagement is entirely without foundation. The
Dawe or Jaw!, as tie calls he tribe, were nowhere near
the Blue Nile or Bizamo at this time. Travels, II, 227.
313
( c _ -
ki
-/
I N
1
'p
C ,
lfc&t ,
., :.
4)
/
L.
p
11
(.
N
v
I
.1'
>N
k
- -
Prorg ,sof Lse. Bot-a.-i i"t LJte L&v1.
561.. t
S P-. 'Pi Q.I.
(14 1
said that -she Boran were completely wiped out during this
engagement. Casualties were probably high, if not from the
emperor's a idlers, then at least from the stampede of the
cattle, but only the few tribes in the vanguard would have been
affected. In. fact, the soldiers were impatient to round up
as many of the cattle as they could, and thus pursued the
0-alla oniy as far as atagar, apparently turning back before
they- reached the Awash river. As Sarsa Dengel was well aware
of the successes of the Baraytwna and the concentration of
the Boran at Dawaro and the eastern parts of Patagar, he could
not have felt that he had permanently eliminated the Boran
threat to Waj or Shawa. Yet at the risk of exposing all the
provinces along the Awash to renewed invasions, he and his
soldiers withdrew to Damot and Bizamo, and thence to Gojam
and Dambiya, not to return to Waj until 1577. However, a few
garrisons of the veteran regiments known as Aragua Chawa
still kept their posts at Arenh, Sharka and Wa. The Boran
were reluctant t leave
their cattle and engage n incursions,
and thus until 1577 they did. not attempt to spread out into
the rest of Fatagar and. the vast plains around. it.
The inability of the Boran to gain new ground until
the advance of u1tan Muhammad into Bali, Waj and Hadya
provided them the opportunity to do
so, is onl
y
one of several
examples showing that the Boran, like the Baraytuma,
ksucceeded in their conquest of territory because of the many
internal as well as external conflicts wh.ch engaged the
315
attention of emperors, governors and regiments. Bahrey had
perpetuated a myth that attributed the successes of the Galla
to a numerical superiority of their fighting men.' Without
any sort of statistical data, his argument that only a small
ffaction of the country's popu),. tion bore arms will remain
uncontested. What is not acceptable is his suggestion
that the professional soldiers found. all over the country
were numerically inferior to the Galla warriors.
Much has also been said of the traits of barbarity
and fierceness which re believed to have made the Galla
indomitable enemies. 2 But even if the Galla pillaged and
destrdyed much during their raids and incu.rsions, the
history of Bahrey and of the chroniclers who wrote daring the
periods of the mirations show that in most of the pitched.
battles fought between the armies of the emperors or the
regiments of the provinces and the Galla warriors, victory
went almost invariably to the armies ol' regiments, If Bahrey
and the other writers of these periods exaggerated the
eagerness of the G-alla to shed blood, it is because in one w&y
1.
"Historia gentis Galla", op.cit., text, pp. 2 2 9-30,
trans., pp. 2 04-2 06; Some Records of Ethioia, pp.
12 5-12 6; I. Guidi (trans.) "Due nuovi manoscritti della
'conaca abbre'viata' di Abissinia", e. L, Liidx, RRAL, II,
(192 6), 372 -74. According to Paez the soldieof the
regiments were numerous enough to subdue the Galla arid
even conquer other peoples. What they lacked, he says,
was unij
and. discipline. "Histora de Ethiopia",
Rer. Aeth, II, 157.
2 .
Almeida, "Historia d.e Ethiopia a Alta", ibid., V, 476;
Some Records of Ethiopia, p. 137; and Bruce, Travels,
II, 2 15.
316
or another these aathor3 had suffered from the Galla
raids and conqtLests. Bahrey and the others provide staff!-
cient testimony on the readiness with which the Galla
incorporated into their society the peoples living in the
areas that they conquered) Ju.dging from the evidence of the
chronicle, the brutality of the professional soldiers, be
it to decapitate or emasculate men or to enslave women and
chil&ren, does not seem to h.ve beer matched by the reputed
savagery of the Galla. 2
Susenyos's complaints, as reported
by Aimeida, about the cowardice of the professional soldiers
must not be interpreted in a literal sense,
3 The emperor's
criticism of the soldiers was directed more against the
inconstancy of their allegiance thail at their morale in the
face of Galla warriors.
The Galla warriors used the same type of weapons that
most f the highland footmen carried. Thee oonisted of
1. See below,pp.
4l-2O.
2 .
Sarsa Dengel himself was as brutal and savage as the meanest
of his soldiers. While in Gambo, "Ensuite le roi, leur
ayant coupe le cou, les mit en rang et lee tendit dans
la eampagne"." Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", op.cit.,
text, p. 13,
trans.,
p.
158. After displaying the head
of Yeshaq in his caip in 1579, he is said to have sent it
to Maryam Se'na in Dambiya. As she was Yeshaq's sister,
the emperor t
s action was inhwnan eveli for those days.
"Rela9axn de entrada dos Pes. da Compa. de Jesa em
Aethyopia", fol. 50 r, MS. 779, Braga.
3.
Almeida, "Historia de Ethiopia a Alta", op.cit., V, 477;
and Some Records of Ethiopia, p.
137.
31':
clubs, spears and shields made from the skins of oxen or
buffalOes. They had. rio horses and. they lacked the swords,
coats of mail and helmets worn by many horsemen. The adoption
of the horse du.ring the time of the age-set Mesle
(l555-.563)
did. not bring about an immediate transformation of Galla
fighting techniques.The Baraytuma acquired some horses
from the few regiments of Dawaro, Ifat and Aznhara which they
chased from their posts, and from the followers of Nur whom
they ambushed at Hazalo. 2 Neither this group nor the Boran
had. yet penl-trated. into the centre of the highlands, where
were ooated. the numerous horse farms whioh supplied the
needs of the regiments. The writi.ngs f the Jesuit mission-
aries show that in the time of Sarsa Dengel, as well as ir
that of
Susenyos, the Galla fought with the same equipment,
which they were using at the beginning of their migrations.3
1. Ibid., p. 117; and "Historia gentis Galla"., text,
p.
2 2 6,
trans.,
p . 199.
2 . Bitwadad. Walda Chrestos told Paez that Nur had celebrated
his victory over Galawdewos by riding on a donkey, as a
sign of humility. Walda Chrestos was a Muslim of Adal or
Harar but he must have been a young boy at the time. The
incident of the donkey may have taken place when Nur was
returning to Harar city after 1osin his horses at Hazalo,
"Historia de Ethiopia", Rer. Aeth., III, 2 2 .
3.
M. Fernand.es
to V. Rodrigues, provincial of India, Dec. 2 Y,
1575.
Ibid., X, 279-80.
318
Because of their essentially pastoral way of life
and the tribal structure of their society, the Galla bad no
armies like those of the emperors. Each tribe was a unit and
free to act according to its needs or the exigencies of the
circumstances in which it fou.na Itself. However, as long as
the tribes of each rou.p were moving within a limited territory
and, therefore, were subject to the same needs and difficulties,
the leaders of the tribes within each group discussed aims
and strategy. The activities of the tribes were co-ordinated
as long as their incursions did not -take them too far away
from each other. But as the purpose of the incursions was
to acquire more and more lands, the cohesion which held clans
of the same tribe together and, also tribes within a group,
gradually disappeared as the distance between tribes and clans
increased. Generally, the Galla fought in small bands which
the chronicles called chefra. 1 The bands often made repeated
1. Chronica de Susenyos, I, 79, 97, II, 63, 71.
The author
of the ehronicle states that the Amhara soldiers did not
know bow to fight in chefra formation. For a big army to be
able to break itself iiito many bands and to reform itself
when necessary, much training and experience was necessary.
And by the beginning of the seventeenth century it
is even
doubtful if the soldiers kept regimental formations.
Fighting in chefra formation was, on the other hand,
inherent to the tribal and age-set organization of Galla
ovganiation. Boys or men belonging to the same age-set
fought together, as is clearly stated in ibid.,I44-lO6, *
and by Bahrey in "Historia gentis Galla
u
, op.cit., text,
pp. 230-31,
trans., pp. 206-07; and Some Records of
Ethiopia, pp. 127-28.
The tribe was divided into clans,
and the boys or men of a clan age-set probably made up
one or more chefroch
* ir, 82;
310
raids into the same area with the aim of weakening whatever
resistance was offered by the peasants or regiments in it.1
Such bands rarely engaged big regiments unless they were
su.rprised or found. their paths o retreat blocked.
As the Galla employed tactics similar to those which
the various Muslim nomads and pastoralists had been using
when pressing all along the eastern frontiers, the regiments
could easily have checked the bands by blocking the various
valleys and by making retaliatory raids into the areas where
the tribes were concentrated, We have discussed at 'ength
the civil wars and upheavals, which began with Minas and which
account for the failure of a system f defence8 which had.
proved successful in the c?nturie$ before him.
1. We cannot estimate the average nUmber of warriors in each
band. According to Paez, the groups of bands which raided
Fremona some time at the beginning of the century had be-
tween 3000 to 8000 men.
11 Historia de Ethiopia", op.cit.,
III, 98. Almeid.a also estimates that a raiding party of
several bands would have 6, 7 or 8,000 warriors. "Hietoria
de Ethiopia a Alta", ibid., V, 477; and. Some Records of
Ethiopia, pp. 137-38. it is difficult to say whether these
figures suggest the size of one clan age-set of all the
age-sets in a clan.
320
One opirion recently advanced to explain the success
of the Galla is worthy of consideration. Abir has suggested
that the emperors did not resist the Galla invasions because,
unlike the Muslims of Adal, they were disunited and did tiot
attempt to impose an alien culture upon Christian Ethiopia.1
Although because of its simplicity this explanation appears
plausible, it is based on two questionable premises: that
the Muslims of the lowlands were united and waged wars to
impoze Lslam on the non-Muslims, and that the emperors were
not troubled by the loss of large and rich provinces to the
Galla. Furthermore, the explanation fails to take into oon-
sideration the difficult position in which the monarchy had
found itself since the accession of Minas.
Until 1579 Sarsa Dengel was preoccupied with the
various attempts to dethrone him. To build a strong army o'f
his owtl, he was prepared to indulge tke unruly regiments and to
gratify their greed at the cost of his peaceful subjects.
To assume, however, that he was not aware of the Galla threat
to the country, and, that he willingly allowed them to occupy
(province after province, would be to reject the evidence of
all sources for his reign. Weak and irresolute s he was,
the problems he taaed at any given time were many.
1. M. Abir, Lthiopia: the Era of the Princes, p. xxii.
321
Understandably, his prioritiee concerned the preservation of
his throne. His response to the dilemma of defending his
throne or the country is illustrated by his reaction in 1574
to the news of the disorders caused in Go jam by the soldiers
of Zar'a Yohannes and that of Galla incursions into north-
western Shawa. Raiding bands, probably belonging to the
Waraxitisha tribe of the Baraytuina, had moved down the Wanchit
river into the strategic valley o the Jaina, which separate
Shawa from Walaqa. While he himself was getting ready to go
to Gojam, he sent a squadron of abou. 50 horsemen who drove
the Galla bands back Into the valley and rejoined him with
trophies of some 80 beads. He understood clearly the sig-
nificance of tre presence of the Galla in the Jama valley;
on'
y
, in his eyes the discontent o a few companies of
soldiers was more ominous than the encirclement and
isolation of Walaqa arid Shawa.
Although on a far bigger scale, the emperor found him-
self jn a similar situation in 1577. Taking advantage of the
distraction caused in the princes south of the Awash by
Sultan Muhammad's invasion, the BoDan began to push from
Dawaro and Fatagar into
Wa1.
Even if th emperor's reaction
to the Muslim invasion of Bali, Wa and Hadya was belated,
he had come all the way to Bali to take part in the final
defeat of the sultan. Yet, had he not been stopped by his
mother at Gendabarat, he wou.li. have returned to Dambiya,
taking with hi all the regiments of these provinces. The
reason for his baste may be guessed. Yeshaq. was trying to
arouse in Dambiya support for the pretender he had proclaimed
emperor. Sarsa Dengel's concern was, oiice more, for the
security of his throne. The exhortations of his stewards not
to abanon Shawa and the other provinces to the Boran, and.
the entreaties of Selu.s ifaila not to let her perish by their
bands, indicate clearly that even the sluggish progress of
the Boran was catasLng much consternation within the court
and throughout the provinee. 1 S,rsa Dengel would have liked
to proceed straight to De.mbi- , but in order to assuage
the fears of his mother and his stewards, most of whom had
their lands and. homes in Shawa, he went back. to Fatagar.
The chronicler reports that the Galla were decimatd.2
However, as the emperor was in a huiry to join Takia Giyorgis
at Dambiya, the alla lo.Dses must have been smaller than in
the previous engagement.
Throughout his lone reign Sarsa Dengel never once set
foot in Ambara or Ango. The chronicles, therefore, say
little about the actvies of the Baraytwna tribes. He
does not seem to haVe sent back any of the iegiments which
1.
"Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", op.cit., text, pp. 51-52,
trans.,pp. 60-61.
2.
Ibid., text, p.. 52, trans., p.61. According to the abbre-
viated chronic1e the battle took placesomewhere along the
Mojo river. "Etudes sur l'histoire d.'Ethipie", op.cit.,
text, p. 338, trans., p. 111.
Hamalmal had withdrawn froi the ?rovinces. Rather he took
oat the few which were still the to help kiini in his Semen
and. other campaigns,, The absence of strong regiments and
governors with military powers was, contrary to what may be
expected, advantageous to the people of both provinces.
They were only occasionally involved in the continuous
civil was in which the rest of the country was embroiled.
The narrow green lowland that skirted the highlands
from Ifat o Angot, along which the five Bay.tuma
tribes had spread themselves oat, did. not fully satisfy
their hunger for lands Of the five, the Wara De'aya was the
last to leave Dawaro. From Ifat its bands were making
incursions along the Awash river into the plains of Adal
and Awasa. The other four also oand it difficult to secure
any foothold on the highlands, The reason was that the
people of northern Shawa and of Amhara and Angot, being
unentangled in the civil wars, were able to defend themselves.
Their task was made ,rnuc.b. easier by the configuration of the
highlands. The three big rivers, the Awash, the Blue Nile
and the Takaza, which more or less surrounded these prOvinces
received manr tributaries from them. The deep valleys and.
gorges of the many rivers flowing in various- directions
made the highlands irregular, but also inaccessible and
defensible. We do not know how the people organized their
defences and. to what extent the peasants were involved in them.
The pesistance to the Galla was,, however, strong enough to
324
force th,e Baraytuma tribes, which were more aggressive and
had successfully engaged more regiments than the Boran, tO
drive their cattle through the difficult valleys of the rivers.
From what may be discerned in the chronicle of
Su.senyos, the Marawa preceded th? Karayu and Akachu intor
Angot and the plains of Doba. 1 Bat for the pressu.re of the
two tribes, the Marawa clans mighthave been satisfied to settle
in these areas. Thei were unable to move westward, because
the plains of Ganh and Doba merged into the Danakil lowlands.
One other direction for movement was northward into the
highlands f Lasta, Begu.na and southern Tigre. But the
escarpments were probably well defended by the people o'f
Lasta. and eguna, who had taken very little part in the
civil wars, because the Marawa seem to have made very little
progress in that direction. southern Tigre was also strongly
guarded by those Doba who were able to escape fom the
vulnerable plains. The only utlets the tribe
coall find
were the valleys of the Takaza and the Gidda rivers.
The earliest reported z'aid into Dambiya was made
shortly before the rainy season of l69. Pawlos mentions of
a defeat which Harbo suffered at the hands of the Galla4 It
is confirmed by Bahrey, who adds that Harbo's brother Waka
was killed in the first raids into Bagameder made by the
1. Se below,
32i
Barayturna during the leadership of the age-set Harmu.fa (1563-
1571). Harbo would not have been eincerned with the defence
of Bagameder if Gubay, the seat of his administration, and
Emfraz, the district in which it was found, had. not been
threatened by the raids)The Only approaches that would
have given the Marawa bands easy access. into Emfraz were
the valleys of the Shena and, other nearby rivers, which flowed
through south-western Bagameder into the Blue Nile. This
assumption seems plausible, because the next known Baraytuma
incursions were directed from Amhara, across the Blue Nile
into Gojam. Pawlos and Bahrey say that Zar'a Yohannes
died. in April of 1574 while fightLrlg the Galla in Amhara.2
ApparenUy, he had crossed into the neighbouring province to
prevent the Galla from enterin Gojam. His large army may
have been aibushed or harassed by the more mobile Marawa
bands in the narrow and rugged valleys of the nile and
1. "L'au.tobiografia di Pawlos*
I
, op.cit., pp. 288, 295.
The boast which the GaUa made about the Christians they
threw into water probably refers to the people who were
drowned in Lake Tana while trying to escape into the
islands. "Historia gentis Galla", op.cit., text;, p. 226,
trans.,
p.
200; Some Records of Ethiopia,
pp.
118-19.
2.
"L'autobiografia di Pawlos", op.cit,, pp. 289, 296;
"Historia gentis Galla", op.cit., text,
p.
226, trans.
p.
200; Some Records of Ethiopia, p.1l9.
326
Bashelo. The Marawa, then, had split in Angot, some bands
following the Takaza and. others Lishing down the Gidda and
Eahhelo towaris the Blue NiL. Bands of the latter group
had. turned north along the Nile to reach the valley of the
Shena.
Three large clans, the Ana, Uru. and. Abat, made up the
Marawa tribe. The Abati bands which ravaged Dambiya in 1578
could not have come from the Shena valley, When Sarsa
Dengel overtook them at Wana Daga, they bad retyrned from
their raids and were in course of Withdrawing to their base.
The valley through which they had come nust, therefore, have
been somewhere near Wayna Daga. Later, when the GaU. became
better acquainted. with the physiognomy of the country, they
were able to avoid. detection or pursuit by choosing the
corridors for their approah or retreat. At this early
period of their westward movement into the interior of the
highlands, their knowledge of the many vs.11eys arid gorges
was inadequate; and they would have Used the same corridor botI
when coming to raid and when retreating afterwards. I is
u.nlilcely that the Abati bands had reached Dambiya by turning
west from the Bashelo. at the distt!et of Gait and moving up
along its tributaries. They would. have found. difficulty in
going over the elevated chain of mountains which spread from
near Mandara Maryam, across Maka.na lyasus to Dabra Madhani.
The river system which could. have provided them an outlet to
and. from Wayna Daga was either the Menna and. its triutaries
32?
o' the Teqen and its affluents. The latter was probably the
one which the Marawa used at this stage of their incursions
into Bagameder and. Dambiya, because the place of its con-
fluence with the Takaza was much nearer Angot than that of the
Menna.
Pawlos had, presumably, these thovements of the Marawa
in mind when he said that the Galla went oat of Angot in
1757 . 1
Much of the provi,nce, especially its eastern lowland
districts, remained in GaLb. occupation, and Pawlos may have
been referring to the failure of the Ivlarawa to ocupy the
highland districts. His atement also seems to suggest that
this tribe was not forcefully displaced. by the Karayu.
The operations of the various Baraytuma tribes were still
being co-ordinated by the luba system of the whole group
and. the IVlarawa, it seems, were directed to push westward.
Sarsa Dengel's decision, taken after the Tigre
expedition of 1579. to continue to reside in Dambiya and to
use Gubay as the seat of his court, did not check the
Maawa incursions into the proince. The bands of the tribe
took advantage o tke frequent absence of the empe
l
Eor, and. of
the regiments of Bagameder and Dambi,ya, to continu.e their
raids into both provinces. According to the few letters
which the Jesuit missionaries wrote, the b nds seem to have
1. "L'aabobiografia de Pawlos", op.cit., pp. 28 , 296.
328
moved in arid out 1re1y. Bahrey mentions an incursion into
Dambiya made some time between 1585
and 1586, while the
emperor was in Damot, in whiQh Aboli, a relative of the
emperor, and Samra Ab, a bahr nagash were killed. 1 Gubay
was located on top of a series of hills which faced towards
Lake Tana. The position and the impregnable castle which the
emperoi built there with the help of the Turks protected it
from the assaults of the Marawa bands. The rest 4f Emfraz,
however, was vulnerable, and occasionally the emperor went out
to Bagameder to intercept the bands. The abbreviated chro-
nicle meitions one such expedition undertaken sometime
between 1586 and
1587.2
etween
1589
and.
1590
he visited
various places around Jan Meda in south-western Bagameder.3
Phe strong fear of the Galla felt by th people of this region,
and. the emperor's trausfr of his court to Wagara,
1.
"Historia gentis Galla"., op.cit., text, p. 227, trans., p.
201; Some Records of Ethiopia, pp. 120-21. , Tk.e death
of Aboli, during a' raid. b the Wallo Galla, is also
mentioned in "Etudes sur l'biatoire d'Etbiopie", op.cit.,
text,
p.
338, trans., pp, 111-12. It seems, therefore, that
the Nallo
bands, which had their base in. Ganh and the
neighbouring districts Qf Amhara, were br'anching out in
two op oaite dire<tions. The bands raiding D mbiya may
have been assisting the Marawa wbile those moving towards
Awssa ma
y
have been helping t e Wara De'aya. This woL1d
probably account for the division of the Wallo clans
into two confederatonS in
1585.
2. Ibid.
3.
Ibd., 'Historia regis S'arsa Dengel",t x
p.
128, trans., p. 145.
For the position of Jan Meda
see Chronica de $usenyoe, 1, 245, II, 189, 523.
32.)
indicate that so far the thrust over the Shena valley
was more viQient than that from the direction/of Wayna Daga.
The long chronicle reports that the extended tour of
southwester4l Bagameder by Sarsa Dengel helped to dis-
courage farther Galla raids. If we examine the factors
which may have induced him to change the seat of his court
sometime towards the end of 1590, it appears that he had not
even made Gubay safe from the raids. Emfraz, being located
near the lake, was relatively low and hot; and because of
the overcrowded conditions of the court, diseases of
epidemic proportions seem to have broken out at Gubay.
However, the rainy season of .590 and the few months
immediately following it, which the emperor spent t Gubay,
passed without any incidence o disease, or famine or trouble
of ay kind.1
It seems, therefore, that the court was
moved fuzther north to Ayb in order to esca e the raids
which wc1d commence once the rivers became fordable. The
slaving activities in which the emperor became engaged after
moving to Ayba show thai he had, not gon.e to Wagara
to be nearer Wayna Daga and other nearby areas of
Baganieder threatened by Narawa bands coming f'om the Takaza
1. "Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", op.cit., text, p. 137,
trans., p.156. Gubay was not also visited by any
epidemic dunn the rainy season of the previous year.
Ibid., text,
p.
128, trans., p.l45.
330
river. Ayba was sufficiently distant from the Shena
valley and. protected by the mountains flanking it on the
north and the east from any bands which might come across
Wayna Daga. At the same time, it was not far removed from
Alafa, Achafar, Go jam and the provinces beyond among the
pagan peoples of which the emperor and his soldiers preyed.
On the activities of the other Baraytwna tribes
which followed the Marawa into Anihara, the sources dealing
with the reign of Sarsa Dengel give very inadequate informa-
tion. Judging by the positions the tribes were holding at
the beginning of the seventeenth century, we may say that the
Waranti.sha were spread out along the valleys of the Wancit,
lower Jama and Walaqa rivers; the Akac1u to their west, ix
southern Amhara and in G-edem; and the Karayu throu.ghout
Anihara, Angot and Garth. The four tribes, incltrd.ing the
Marawa, had thus spread themselves out over extensive and
mountainous territories. Tribal representatives were forced
to travel over long distances and difficult terrains, to meet
and discuss matters of common concern. And, as a result
of the dispersal, ties between tribes and within clans became
gradually looser. That dispersal also brought a divergence
of interests, even within clans of the same tribe, is
illustrated by the break up within the Karayu, apparently the
largest of the Baraytuma tribes, into various confederations
331
in 1585.
When Bahrey, who is or source for this event,
says that they were soon reconciLed, he is probably implying
that they ended the hostilities that had broken oat between
them. 1
Group ties and tribal cohesion were giving way- to
alliances and confederations which were maintained or
sundered. accordiri to the needs and exigencies of the time
and circumstances.
The state of isolatIon in which the scattered clans
and bands found themselves created opportunities for traces
to be declared between the
Galla
arid the indige-noas defenders.
We have suggested that the Galla warriors Yeshaq had in his
camp in 1578 must have been sent them by Amha Giyorgis. 2 He
himself, perhaps suspecting that the Galla might break the
trace if be went north to Tigre, seems to have tayed in
c
Amhara. In l81 Sarsa Derigel had many Galla men on his
side. They may have been from the Marawa bands which were
entering Dambi.ya.3
The geographical factors and political conditions
which enabled the inhabitants of Amhra, Angot and Bagarneder
to defend themselves did not exist in Shawa and the provinces
1.
"Historia gentis Galla", Ibid. text, p.
2 2 4, trans., p.i97;
Some Records of Ethiopia, p. li4.
2 .
"Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", text, p .
69, trans1, p.80.
3.
Ibid., text,
p.
12 8, trans., p.l46.
dd.
to its south. With. the exce tion of some regions, the
plateau south of the Adabay river and the Blue Nile was not
fracttared by deep valleys and gorges. The terrain of the
Shawan districts between the Wancit and Adabay rivers was
rugged, and their inhabitants, including those of Tagulat,
were protected by the. precipitous escarpments o Ifat,
where the Christian and Muslim people had offered some
resistance to the Baraytama bands. These areas were far
to the north of the Awash valley, through which the main body
of the 8oran group was approaching, and thus escaped being
overrun by it. South of Shawa, on the other side of the
Awash river, were the billy provinces of Gurage and Hadya.
These provinces were more or less directly in the path of
the Boran, arid tneir physiognomy was not too ru.ged to dis-
courage invasion. What saved the inhabitants from being
swamped by the Boran -must have been their own resistance.
The Garage people had taken little part in the various
rebelliQns and, conflicts for powers, and. their defence was
apparently stronger and more effective than that of the
Hadya. people, who were weakened first by Aze'6 insubordination
nd then by their futile alliance with Sultan Muhammad.
The other regions where geographical rug edriess would have
enabled the pe&ple to resist Boran occupation were those to
the south of the Blue Nile and west of ShaWa and Dampt.
') 0
Out)
ut their Gaf at and ambo inhabitazrts were so reduced and
debilitated by the repeated depredations of the regiments
of Hamalmal and Fasilo, and then b the empeor and. his
soldiers, that when the Galla reached their districts they
lacked the strength to defend themselves.
To chec the progress of the Boran in the plateau
between these regions, massive armies and, organized defence
would. have been necessary. Nu.merou.s sqa,adrons of cavalry would
have been required in order to detect and repulse raiding
bands. Until 1578 the presence of some regiments, and
Sarsa Dengel's two campaigns there, had, kept the Boran off the
plateau. The fate of the western parts of Bali and of
Arenh, Sharka, Wa, Shawa and Damot was decided when the
p
emperor took the regiments stationed in them to Tigre. It was
the realization of the consequences which aroused Selu,s Haila
and, the stewards of the court to prpteet to him th t by
undertaking the expedition to Tigre he would be abandoning
Sh wa and the rxeighbou.ring provinces to the Boran.
Had the emperor returned to Shawa immediately after
his victory agains' Yeshaq, the Boran invasion of the
plateau might not have been swift and, total. As it was,he
not on'
y
abandoned the general plan of campaign which he
and the governors of these provu'icea had agreed upon at Gabay,
but also called up Daharagot from Waj, arid, probably the
oficers in charge of Shawa and Damot as well, to assist
him against Rada'i of Semen. The year of 1579 was,
'In'
fortuitously, the tize when the Boran and the Baraytuma
elected new age-sets, the Birmage (1579-1587) into office.
Custom j1emnded that a new lu.ba demonstrated on the field it
ability to lead and to promote the welfare of the group.
In the period of migrations a luba inaugurated its eight
years' term by launching offensives for neW conqaests.' When
Daharagot returned froi Semen with the powers of a
dajazmach over Waj, Arenh and Sharka, the mass of the Boran
hasI begun to move across Fatagar and Waj. Neither the
poisoned arrows of the Maya nor the experience of the veterans
in the Aragua Chawa regiments could hold them back. Dahara-
go1s defence of the provinces under him was brave and
determined. 2
We do not kilow when and how he withdrew from
Waj or, especially, if he and the survivors in his regi-
ments tried to help tie governors of Shawa or Damot.
Nothing is heard of him until 1590, when he reappears in the
chronicles as dajazmach of Tigre.
A famous victim of' the Boran invasion was Lebna
Dengel's grandso
n
, Fasilada. }Iis lands and his home were
1.
Alnieida, "Hstoria de Ethiopia a Alta", er.Aeth.,
V, 477; Some Records of Ethiopia, p. 135.
2 .
"}listoria entis galla', pcit., texl, pp.
2 2 6-2 7,
trans.,
p.
2 01; Some Records of Ethiopia, p. 12 0.
33.j
in Gojam, but he seems to have been Icilled while rallying the
people f Shawa to their own defence. His son Susenyos
was captured at the same time and, was not freed until after
a year and a half when his oaptors had already reached
Damot.1 The age-set Birmage was still in office, and the
governor of this province was one Asbo. He defended Damot
with some energy, but eventually he too withdrew, leaving
it in the hands of the Boran. By 1587, when the Birmae's
term of office caine to an end, the Boran tribes had occupied
all of Shawa and Dsniot, up to the gorge of the Blue Nile.
Among the countless people who had. fled to G-ojam were Selus
Haila and, several other members f the royal family.
The failure of Sarsa Dengel and, his troops to show
some sort of reaction to the loss of all the provinces east
of the Blue Nile defies not only justiftcation but even
u.nderstaning. Sometime between 1584 and 1585
he was in.
Enarya. and Shat. While in l85 his
mother was homeless
and a refugee at the Gojam v1lage of Dajan, and while the
Boran were completing their conquest of Damot, he was raid,ing
for slaves across the river in
a1ya
and Wambarma. The Mulata
rep1aed. the Birmage in this year, and the new lube began its
1. Chr nica de Susenyos, I, 5-6, II, 4. The Fasil who was
ki.ld by the Dawe at 1uera in
1588 could not have been
Lebna Dangel's grandson. The Dawe could, not have reacbed
Damot ahead of the other Boran tribes.
33G
peiiod of office by a series of raids across the river into
Gojam. Dajan must have been hit in the earliest raids, because
by the end of the year Selus Haile had moved to Dabra
Abraham, near Wambarma. Her reasons for not going to Gubay
are not known, tier relationship with her son seems to have
become strained by this time, but even so she could have
chosen other much safer places than Dajan or ]Yabra Abraham.
She could not have been hoping to return to her home in
Gendabarat. It is possible she mar have wanted to stay near
other homeless people to comfort them or to encourage them
to resist.
She may have also risked her life so thai the
emperor, who had. so
far fa.iled. to live up t his duties,
might out of a feeling of embarrassment or shame make a move
to stop the Boran. By the beginning of the following year
the incursions were reaching Wambarma and she, with the
relatives of her son, found herself hard pressed at Dabra
Abraham. The emperor was on his way to Enarya when he
heard of her plight and. went to Wambarma. He stopped. just
long enough to push the raiding bands behind the river arid
to transfer his mother to the mountain of Jebala.1
1. "Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", op.cit., text, pp. 118-19,
trans., pp. 134-36; "Historia gentis Galla", ibid.,
text, p. 228, trans., pp. 202-203; Some }ecords of
Ethiopia, pp. 122-23. In the abbreviated chronicle
this eng gement with the Galla is mentioned in a confused
manner. he bands could not have belonged to the Waran-
tisha tribe an9 thus the place-names g,ven may be
inaccurate. "Etudes urll'histoire cI'thiopie", op.cit.,
text, p. 338,trans.,
p.
112.
33r
!1an.y of the emperor's actions are puzzling. One
of them was his expedition against the Dawe tribe, which was
invading Ba'ter Aniora and Gu.rage from Bali across Kuera. He
came to Gt.rage in 1585, ater the ceremonies of Badancho's
conversion were completed. Apart from Bater Arnora and Gurage,
the other provinces wlaich could feel the threat of the Dawe
were Kambata and Hadya, but it is doubtful if Sarsa Dengel
had their defence in mind. If he had. wanted to help the
people of Enarya ani Bosha, he would have campaigned against
the Boran tribes which were crossing the Gibe river at Damot.
On the other hand, he could not have intended to launch a
geneal war against the Boran by attacking them front the rear,
because he turned back at Bater Amora without fighting
the Dawe or any other tribe.' The only thittg he could
have intended, to gain by this gesture was perhaps the
abatement of criticisms about his neglect.
That he did not attempt to encourage the soldieiin the
provinces to resist or fight in every possible way may be
seen from the fact that he took the men of Shawa, flamot and
Amhara to Tigre in 1590. He went to Enaya five year
later, but seems to have retu.rried to Dambiya without facing
1. "Historia gentle Galla", op.cit., text,
p.
228, trans.,
p.
203; Some Records of Ethiopia, pp. 123-24; "Historia
regis Sarsa Derigel", op.cit., text,
p.
127, trans., p.144.
33
any Boran band., In 1595 the two groups elected new age-sets
to suqceed 1Vl'ata, and the incursions into Gojam by the Boran
and. into Wagara and Dambiya by the Baraytu.ma were
intensified. The abbreviated chronicle mentions two expedi-
tioris which the emperor made against the Galls, in Baganrecier
in 1596 and. thDse in Damot in 1597, but no serious engagements
seem to have taken place.1
1. Perruchon, "Notes pour l'histoire d'Ethiopie',
Rgne de Sarsa-Dengel ou Malak-Sagad ler (1563-159)",
op.cit.,
pp.
183, 277-78.
339
IV. The Eclipse of the Sultanates of Harar an& Adal.
Until 1579, the history of the su.ltanates of Harar
and Ada]. and the emaIl emates to their east, like that of
the former Muslim state of Ifat,. was characterized by their
effoxts to coitrol the migratory impu.lse of their Afar and
Somali neighbours and to direct the people towards the
various eastern parts of Ethiopia. Consequently relationships
between the sedentary Muslims and the neighbouring pastoral-
ists and nomads were good only wheft the former produced leaders
who were able to unite the diverse peoples for the acqui-
jtjon Qf new lands in Etb,iopia.Every time lhe invasion of
the highlands failed, as invariably happened, the lowland
nomads went back to raiding th towns and caravans of their
erstwhile allies and to encroacipg upon their territories.
Within the su.ltanates anl emirates tbemslves, the reprisals
from Ethiopia on the one hand, and the raids on their towns
and farms on the other, often gave rise to dynastic rivalries
and factional wars. With the flood-like irruption of the
Bumbaxia, Itu. and Wara De'aya across the fertIle highlands
of Charchar and Harar and the lowlands of Adal and Awssa,
this long and Intereting but little known history came to
a close. All the highland emira6es which had survived
repeated Ethiopian occupations completely vanished. Onlg
Harar .nd the Ada]. emirate of Awssa succeeded in fending off
immediate invasion and total occupation by the Galla, But,
340
even here, the failure by their people to hold their ground
against the Galla, and to mainta.n their h1d over -the Afar
and Somali nomads, brought about a repetition, though on a
small scale, of the rivalries and intestinal coxfflicts
characteristic of the region as a whoe.
Cursory archaeological investigations in the Charchar-
Harar highlands and in the fertile plains to the south and
southeast of Harar city hcive shown ruins of many towns which
thrived in these regions up to this period. Documentary
evidence is so inadequate that it is difficult to estimate
the degree of the resistance the inhabitants of these towns
put up against the new invaders. According to the fragmented
Arabic chronicle of Harar, the rulers of the emirates of
Sim, Shawa, 1'agab, Gedaya and Hargay h d. tried to strengthen
their defences by building walls and. digging trenches around
their main towns. 1
However, the chroniclers contempt for
these devices, and the fact that the people who travelled
and explored in these areas have failed to note reme.ins o
any strong walls around the ruined towns, suggest that the
1. 'Documerti arabi per la storia dell' Etiopia", op.eit.,
p .
57.
34::
walls were hastily erected. 1 The speed with which the
Ba.raytwna tribes overran the highlands had. given the Muslims
little time for sOlid constructions. The
G ?
alla had begun to
invest the towns more or less about the same time that Nur
had defeated Galawdewos, and. his return to Harar by waj of
Mt. Hazalo shows how unsafe was the direct route along the
right side of the Awash river and. the foot of the highlands.
His disastrous encounter with the Galla at Hazalo proves
that their speed was faster than ur had expected. Nixr and
his followers, therefore, had no alternative but o rally
their efforts to save Harar city arid the towns around it
which the Hu.mbana tribe had. nt iet ocupied,
In contrast tbo the pagan, Mus]4m or Christian people
of the interior, the Muslims of Harar and its emirates had
achieve4 a relatively high degree of urbanization. The ex-ten-
g
ive use of slones in the construction of hou.se and mosques
was not because storae was more available than trees, but
1. Remains of thick stone walls built without time were
observed at Bio by Azais and. Chaiubarl, Cm9 annes, I,
131-32. Draka-Erockman was less thorough in his
exploration but he, too, saw some rains of walls in the
sites attributed tc the Har? a.. British Somaliland, p.84.
because the towns were permanent centres of trade. Unlike the
peoples of the interior who, being predominantly peasants,
lived in villages and who, owing to the repeated invasions
from the Muslim states, were accustomed to take advantage
of the numerous mountain strongholds, the townsmen of the
su.ltanates and emirates were surprised and tra ped within
their homes. When the farm lands around 'the towns fell to
the Galla, starvation and pestilence finished off the
people inside the towns.
Fragmentary and sketchy as the Arabic chronicle of
Harar is, it reveals that there were two divei'gent views on
the way Harar and the other besieged towns were to be
defended.Traditionally, the wall of Harar is attributed to
Nur, but it should be rema.rked that the chronicler, who lived
in these terrible years, was contemutous of walls and trenches
and of people who pt their faith in them. He idolized Nux
and other men like him who went out of the city to meet the
Galla in the fields. Azais .nd 'Vhanibard re ort a tradition
which associates the famous Harar holy men Ahu and Abadir and
Ahu Au with Nur in the construction of the wall. We do
not know when the wa...l was built and when it was completed.1
1. Cing arnes, I, 4. The authors think it was finished to-
wards 1580. In the sIege of the city in 1575 Vizier Hamid,
brother 0' ultari Muhammad, fought the Hwubana outSide one
o the gates. It seems, therefore, tha that the wall
was completed by this time. "Documenti arabi per la storia
dell' Etiopia", p.cit., i.6l.
It is, nevertheless possible, that while Nur % who believed in
offensive tactics, fought the Calla in the open country, his
associates were prudently building the wall. Iu.r had basio
reasons for adopting offensive tactics. The famines and
epidemics which were continuously ravaging the towns were
due to the loss of the farm lands around them. Even with
walls and trenches, the survival of the townsmen depended on
the recapture o the farm lands. Until his death in July
of 1567, during one of the frequent outbreaks of pestilence,
the Muslims defended themselves by a combination of offensive
and defensive measures. Although they do not seem to have
u.cceeded. in regaining control of the districts araund them,
they made the Galla think that the towns were unconquerable.
Nu.r was succeeded by his Ethiopian freedman, Emli'
Usnian. The intense opposition which he met from the aristo-
crats and religious leaders o Harar and the dependant towns
suggests that Usman was a usurper. As Nur had left behind
him several grown up Sons it is doubtful whether Usman owed his
eminent position to Nur's favours. In his brief but intense
struggle with his enemies, Iisman was helped by refugees,
mostly noblemen and soldiers, from Galla occupied emirates
like Sim and Hargay. Many of the malassay warriors of
Harar city and the other towns had remained in Ethiopia;
and it seems that Nur had depended. on the services of the
refugees for hi.s offensive raids against the Galla. After
his death, the refugees were in a position to take over the
344
leadership of the towns. The straggle was, therefore, between
the aris1ocracies of the towns and the refugees from the
former depende emirates.
Whether out of conviction that as a military power
Flarar had seen its last days and must therefore re-establish
itself as a centre of commerce, or from the desire to concen-
trate his efforts on his rivals and enemies, Usmari decided
to disengage himself from the Galla. The policy he adopted,
had it been adhered to by
his successors, might have pre-
served Harar as a state and saved its culture from near
exti,nction.
It is not improbable that the policy of coming
to terms with the Humbana tribe was adopted after a careful
examinatiorn of 1-larar's military capacIty. Proni their past
experience, Usman and his suppo.cters knew ho* to strvive
through defeats and invasions. TJsxnan concluded a trace with
the Galla by wh&ch they could come into Harar city and the
towns to its south and south-west to buy arid to sell.he
insistence of the Galla on the repatriation of any of their
people who might seek refuge in the towns coui,d. have a
greater significance than Certli thought. lie interpreted
this as an indication of the existence of tribal wars,
although it was the Hwnbana tribe alone which invaded the
34b
Harar highlands. 1 Like the other tribes of the Baraytuma
and Boran groups, the Hwnbana tribe may have kept the
Muslim peasants on the farms. Hence, when the townsmen
surrendered their claims t q the farm lands oitside their
towns, they were making themselves dependent on the Galla
for the supply of grains and other foods. The Galla, on
then part, made an important concession to the Muslims, which
in time may have enabled the Misiims to acq uire a political
domination over the Galla. By this concessiop the Galla
allowed Muslim soldiers to patrol the markets and: caravan
routes within their territories.
From the ixisults and imprecations which the outi'aged
chronicler heaped upon Usman, the truce appears to have been
unpopular with the noblemen of the towns but not with the
ordinary citizens. The leader of Usman's opponents Was
Jibril, Nur's sox-in-law, whom the emir had 1 probably as a
gesture of goodwill, appointed chief of the men patrolling
I-
1. Ibid., n. 8, p.58. The case of the Muslim woman wbch the
noble families and religious leaders of Harar used in order
to dic1'edit Usman proves, I
thixiic, this assumption. The
woman was originally a Wlu.slim but had given up her faith
after- capture by the Galla. She had then escaped to one
of the markets whieh Jibril patrolled and taken up her
old faith. Usman agreGd to the Galla req uest that she
should be returned to them, bu Jjbril and his partisans
refused to hand her over. Ibid. p.59.
I
markets and, caravan routes. As his brother Ahmad was gara
of Awssa, Jibri.l may have been from the ruling families of
Adal. Usman's position within Harar must have been strong,
because Jibril, afraid to defy him openly, and. on the pretext
of going to patrol a market to be held in Galla occupied
territory, escaped to Awssa, from where, with the help of
his brother, he secured. Zayla. The trade through Zayla
was important for Usmari, not only because it was Harar's
only sotrce of revenues, but also because the cotton cloths
imported through the port were the reason the Galla made
peace with him. He sent to Zayla his stapporter Balaw
Muhammad, at one time garad of Sim, while he himself went
to Awssa. Zayla had become such an important prize that
Jibril, leaving Awssa to Usman,, hurried to Uef end the port
against Balaw Muhammad. The latter succeeded in killing the
brothers and in scattering their followers, but their partisans
arrived from the various towns of Harar in time to avenge
Jibril's defeat. Then they marched to Harar city and easily
routed. the former garad of Hargay whom Usman h.d left in
charge. In June of 1569, to the great joy of legitimists,
enemies of refugees and usurpers, and ad.'vocates of the con.-
tinu.ation f war with the Galla, one Falh. Ibn Abbas, nephew
of Ahmad Granh wa made u1tan.
The nobility and. religious leaders seem to have
passed over the claims of Nur's so p s and. other able men
because they thought th t Taiha had the ambitions of his
3 4 , ; ,
famous uncle and that his leadership would rekindle the
military and. religious fervour of the people. Their
disappointment was deep, therefore, when they discovered
that Talha had no appetite for war or glory. Because of
his illuslrious lineage, Talh was allowed. to rule 'or about
two years then he was deposed and. the throne given to Nasser,
on of Usman ibn Badlay. The chronicler is u.nusually parsi-
monious of comments of any kind, on Nasser and. his reign of
about two years. The fact that the throne went- to his son
Muhammad. does suggest, however, that Nasser had satisfied
the proud. aristocrats of Harar city and the other towns, if
not by regaining the farm lands then at least by breaking
Usman's hated pact.
Nothing is known of the early years of Muhammad's
su, ltansbip. In the long chronicle of Sarsa Dengel it
is alleged that he had killed all the import nt men of the
malassay, toget.kier with their wives and children.' But
thia may be simple defamation of a man who had invaded
several provinces, including Hadya. If Muhammad had been at
war with the leading families of
the Harar towns, the author
of the rabic chronicle would not have failed to mention it,
1. "Historia regis Sarsa Dengel", op.cit., text, p. 4 8,
trans.,
p.
56.
348
or even to condemn him for it. The articipation of Nur's
three Sons in tvasi , atfacaw Iii .1 t
take advantage of his absence to depose him, indicate that
Mu.hammad,'s relationship with the nobility and the religiou.s
men was good. What is inexplic ble about Muhammad is why
he decided upon an adventtarou.a ex p edition, when all the towns
of Harar were surrowaded by hostile Galla. His attempts to
recapture the farm lands may have failed; and knowing the
nostigia of the nobility I j d. religious men for the giorious
days before the Hu.mbana made their appearance, lie may have
wanted to silence their criticisms and, to save his throne by
leading then into Ethiopia. Or, Muhammad may have launched
his invasion with the hope of conquering lands into which the
people of Harar could be moved.
Whatever the reason, an invasion of Ethiopia was,
even in
the days of Sarsa Dengel, an ambitious proj ect, and.
Muhammad must h y e emptied the towns of their able bodied
men. The result was that, not long aftez' the sultan and. his
army had reached
Bali, the alla fell on every town and
viii ge.
mong the one hu4dred towns which the Galla des-
troyed urirxg Muhammad's ill-advised and ill-fated, expedition,
were probably those to th south and south-east, the ruins of
which impressed Azais and Chambard in
1923.1
Despite its
strong wall an the heroic resistance of Hamid, the sultan's
1. "Documenti arabi per la storia deli' Ethiopia", op.cit.,
p.
61.
349
brother and. vizer, the city of Harar would have shared the
same fate if it had not been for the timely arrival of many
refugees from the fallen towns. Under the leadership of one
Mansur, son of Muhammad Ayub, the newcomere hped to stiffen
the eity's
resistance until the Galla were forcea to relax their
siege. Mansu.r, it seems, was given full administrative
powers by the grateful eople of the city, becau.se as soon as
the threat from the Galla had abated, he went to Zayla arid
removed the overseer Sultan Muhammad had left there, He had
almost finished establishing his authority over Awssa when
he was killed, according to the chronicle, by one of his own
men. 1
It is not improbable that Mansizr was a victim of the
intrigues of the city's rival families. As Sultan Muhammad
was still alive in Bali, Mansu.r may have been given the
sultanship so as to clear the way for the succession of
Muhammad ibn Ibrahim Gasa, apparently from the family &f
Abmad Granh, who became imam and. sultan immediately after
Mansur's assassination in September of 1577.
Of the new imam the chronicle says that he was the
first of the "Muslims combatants" to establisk his oouit
at Awssa. 2
Fighting with the Galla was -still going on but the
reason for the transfer would not have been the vulnerability
1. Ibid., p. 62 .
2 . Ibid.
350
of Harar city as the caretaker of which the iniazn left
his brother, also called Mu.,hammad ibn Xbrahim. The transfer
was probably connected with the interruption of the caravan
tra e between the city and Zayla by the fall of the highlands
and plains around the city. The route between Awssa ana
Zayla passed through desert lands into which the Galla could
not penetrate. Au.iammad was a good soldier if not a far
sighted ruler, and Awssa provided him with a secure baSe for
operations against the Humbana around Harar axd the Afar
in the Adal desert. During hi relatively long reign, which
lasted until November of i583,
he built an army which was
formidable for the desert tribes arnd hjm and with which he
kept open the routes to Zay3.a an,d Harar city. The iman had,
however, overestimated the security ' Awssa from the
incursions of bands of
the Wara De'ya tribe, whicth, from
their base iri the Ifat and G. edem plains along the AwaSh river,
had been scouring the watered lowlands between the rivers
and Lake Abbe. The two main towns f Awssa, Parfara and Waraba,
were effectivell besieged. by the bands and the imam was
killed by them, probably in one of his orties.
The imam's formidable army was composed of a motley
of Muslim refugees from the various arts of the eastern
highlands arid their leaders occupied important positions
H.zanah Zahi, gafil-gota or chif of the market and caravan
patrols, made himself sultan, in Awsea, sppoi.nting his
351
companion Lado over Zayla. Since Zahi, who lived in Farfar,
was unable to relieve the two besieged towns, the people of
Waraba invited a band of Bali men, captained, by Abbas
ibn Muhammad to help them against the Galla. Fighting broke
out between Zahi and Abbas, but both were driven oat by
Umar-Din of Sim, who, with the support of neighbouring
Somali nomads, sacked and looted the port. Lado appealed
to the late imam's brother in Harar city, and. Muhammad. jbn
Ibrahim recaptured Zayla arid Awssa and made himself ruler
and imain over the three parts of the sultanate. The sultanate
had become so dependent on the military service of the refugees
that the new imam had to send. Lado back to Zayla and make
Abbas o Bali his vizier. We do not know how long the imam
ruled from Awssa, but in October of 1585 he was deposed by
his vizier. Muhammad succeeded in escaping to Harar city,
the administrator of which was from its leading families.
With the help of loyal subjects like the Harla, the imam
recovered Zayla and Awssa. He lived until May of 1589, bat in
addition to the raids by the Wara De'aya, his rei n was
troubled by the restlessness of the Adal tribes to the south-
east of Awssa, who brought the trade with Zayla almost to a
standstill.
"I,",
According to the chroniele the imam was poisoned,
probably by a. rival family represented by hi successor
Abbas ibn Abun) Abbas failed, to reopen the caravan routes
frm Awssa and Harar city to Zayla, and in October of the
same year he was deposed by one Emir Lhmad-Di. As the
supporters of Ahmad-Din were mostly refugees and adventurerz
he may have been an outsider hImself. According to the
Arabic short chronicle deaiLng with 'kUs periD&, he died
in September of 1591 while returning from a raid on the Wallo
Galla. 2
The Wallo was a large olax of the Karayu. tribe,. Its
hands were active, bu.t their incursions were being made within
Anihara and Angot. They do not seem t have trossed the
Awash into the Dani'kil plains ox the other side. Unable
to defend Awssa against the Wara De'.ya and to protect the
caravan routes against the Adal Afar, the sultan seems to
have tu.rned his face towards the north-west.is initial
success in the acquisition of cattle and. slaves even attracted
Muslim adventurers from rire.
His successor Nur ibn Usman was deposed in the
following December, and with the accession of Imam Ahmad-Din
ibn Abd-as-Salam the siiltanship rettirried to the house of
1.
Ibid.,
p.
77.
2 . Ibid.,
p.
78.
11
Si
Alamad Granh. After a reign of less than one year, in
September of 1591, one of the outsiders Aba .Bakr ibn Umar
Azan, whom the imam had made captain of the caravan patrols,
took over power. In the chronicle, this imam is censored for
the dissolu.te life he led and for his neglect of his duties.
The author was apparently a partisan of the adventurers and
usurpers, as Aba Bakr clearly was. The citizezs of Harar
city and the Awssa towns, thus, seem t have reconciled them-
selves with outsiders, uurpers, intrigues and political
instability. We have no information for the evexis which took
place between 1591 and 1620, but subsequent history shows
that Adal and Harar had not found respite from internal or
external troubles.
354
CHAPTER V
A PERIOD OP ANARCHY
I. Contest Between the War-lords and. the Monarchy
To see in the frequent rebellions of the nobility
symptoms of separatist tendencies or even of regional
and tribal restlessness would be to misunderstand
seriously the political history of Ethiopia. The
contention between the nobility and the monarchy had
been priniarily for the control of the revenues from
the districts and the regiments in them. Sarsa Dengel
surrendered on these issues in order to secure his throne.
After thus acquiring full authority over the districts
and the provinces, the next objective of the emergent
war-lords became to weaken the monarchy so that the
emperors might not claim their revenues or exercise their
prerogative to dismiss and appoint their officers at will.
To make their governorships lifelong tenures, the war-
lords found it necessary to keep on the throne weak
emperors who could be easily dissuaded from exercising
the powers of their office.
Sarsa Dengel and Naryam Se'na had at least three
355
daughters but no son. 1 But even if the empress was
past the age of child-bearing, he was still in his prime;
and in view of his relationship with Harago of Semen,
we know that he was not scrupulous on the question of
marital fidelity. We do not know his reason for dis-
regarding the custom of not nominating a successor to
the throne while it was still occupied. As all of his
brothers had died before hiiii, and. as he had brought up
his nephew Zadengel in his own household, he may have
come to love him like an onlyOr,even more likely,
he may have feared that, on his death, some of the nobility
might give the throne to a prince nt descended from IIinas.
1 .
According to the abridged cb.ronicle and one of Paez's
reports, Sarsa Dengel and his wife liadiliree daughters.
The eldest, Walata Giyorgis was married to Atnatewos.
Probably by a slip of the pen the chronicler makes her
the wife of Zasellasin. The other daughters were
Amata Nicha'el and Cbrestosawit from whom the nobility
of Chehra and Waglo, respectively, weie descended.
Conti Rossini (trans. and ed.), "Due Squarci jnediti di
cronica etiopica", RRAL, II (1 893), 806, 81 0; Paez to
Thomas de Ituren, Sept. 1 4, 1 61 2 in Rer. Aeth.,
XI, 220.
The wife of Keflawand, who had dLed some time before
1 607 and may have been buried in Tigre than in TIahadara
Naryani, was in all likelihood a fourth daughter.
2.
We do not know how many brothers and sisters the
emperor had. Two of his brothers died early in his
reign, Zahawaryat in
1575
and. Fiqtor about a year later.
Conti Rossini, "Historia regis Sarsa Dengel' t
, op.cit.,text
pp. 46-47, trans., pp. 51
..-55. A third brother called
Abbadir (the name may have been a nickname) perished
with his family in a fire a9cidentally started by the
explosion of gnnpowder. "Etudes sur l'histoire
d'thiopie", op.cit, text, p. 338, trans., p. 1 3.
35G
Whatever his reason may have been, he designated Zad.engel,
the son of his brother Lessana Chrestos, as his heir and
bad. him recognized as such by the nobility and by the
Querban soldiers.
But while things were in this manner,
they brought him his bastard son, Z.
Mariam by name, whom he had from a new
Christian of Jewish race; and when he
saw him, for he bad not seen him until
then, carried away by the affection
and, love of a father, he decided in
his beart to give him the emperorship.
He bean to show less honours to Za
Denguil and. to let him stay standing.
And. in his absence he discredited him,
saying that he was unfit for the
emperorship, that he was miserly and
would become very severe. 1
As Earago bore him three or four sons, it is to be
understood that the emperor had designated his nephew
as his heir either before he knew Harago or before he
was told of Zainaryam's birth. 2 He, therefore, changed
1. Paez, "Historia de Ethiopia", Rer. Aeth., III, 208.
2. Harago was probably sister of the Falasha leaders
Rada'i and Gushan whose brother Gideon, governor of
Semen declared for Kefla ?Iaryam as emperor. Kefla
Maryaxn and Natako, brothers of Ya'eqob and. probably
also Sons of Sarsa Dengel, were killed by Susenyos at
the start of his reign. Conti Rossini, "Due squarci
inediti di cronica etiopica", op.cit., pp. 8O6,8lO;
Chronica de Susenyos, I, 101-102,2, II,
79,
217.
Paez's suggestion. that the emperor chose his nephew
as his heir because his sons from Harago were illegi-
timate and. therefore unqualified for succession is not
a convincing story. Illegitimacy has never been a
legal barrier to succession. Paez seems to have seen
the complicated situation in terms of European laws.
Paez, "Historia de Ethiopia", op.cit., III, 207.
357
his mind about Zadengel before Harago bore their second
son Ya'eqob. When Zamarraiu died a few months after his
introduction to the court, Sarsa Dengel saw it as Heaven's
retribution for the humiliation of his nephew. Although
Paez says that the emperor reinstated Zadengel to his
former position, it appears that the birth of Ya'eqob
soon after opened the question of succession once more.'
Abba IIeherek Dengel, the confessor of the empress and.
author of the first parts of Susenyos's chronicle,
reports that Sarsa Dengel liked Susenyos better than
Zadengel because the former of the two princes bore no
ill-will towards Ya'eqob, while the latter hated him.2
The emperor was apparently thinking of leaving the throne
to his son, but feared that Zad.engel would cause trouble.
Nevertheless, for reasons which we do not know, Sarsa
Dengel failed to make up his mind, about his nephew.
At the time of the emperor's death in
1597
Zadengel
was nineteen years old. 3 His father was a priest, well
known for his literary achievements. Zadengel hiiself
was well educated, and, in those occasions when he was
1. Ibid.,
p.
208.
2. Chronica de Susenyos, I,
7,
II, 6.
3.
He was about 26 years old when Paez saw him first in
June of l6OL l."Historia de Ethiopia", op.cit., III,
239.
358
favoured to sit in his uncle's audience hail he revealed
astuteness in political and. legal matters and. sensibility
against injustice and. oppression. To the rapacious
Querban soldiers, the scheming ladies of the court and
the proud nobility of the provinces, Zadengel's concern
for order and. justice was a source of uneasiness. Sarsa
Dengel seems to have held himself responsible for his
nephew's unpopularity, because, when he was seriously
ill at Damot, he told the noblemen around him to give
the crown to Zad.engel. Atnatewos and the other gover-
nors who were there objected, giving the same reasons
which the emperor himself had used when earlier dis-
qualifying him. They urged. him to give them the seven
years old Ya'eqob. Sarsa Dengel was not displeased by
their attitude, since his own choice of Zadengel arose
more from his desire to put his conscience at rest than
from his concern for the country. Thus, before he died,
he told. them to do as the7 pleased..1
Even if Sarsa Dengel had. insisted on his nephew's
succession, it is dcttbtful if he would have been obeyed
1. Ibid., p. 208. The long and extremely wise speech
which Bruce places in the mouth o the emperor seems
to be a pure invention of the writer. Travels, II,
26-37.
359
by thexobility. Ya'eqob's tender age made him an ideal
candidate. A regency was therefore constituted and,
during the seven years that it lasted, it was dominated
by the empress and. her sons-in-law. Harago, who was
only a mistress, was not included in it, but the appoint-
ment of her brother to the governorship of Semen must
have satisfied her. Zadengel was kept in chains on the
island of Daq, while Susenyos, who avoided a similar fate
by the timely warning he received, turned himself into
a ruthless bandit.
In placing Ia'eqob on the throne, the objective of
the nobility was not to exercise monarchical powers in
the name of a young emperor. Their purpose was to keep
out Zad.engel who, they feared, might try to recover the
powers which Sarsa enge1 had conceded to them. There-
fore, true to their objectives, neither Atnatewos nor
Keflawand, the strongest of the war-lords, used their
position as regents to impose their will upon the other
governors. The regency was only nominal. None of its
members wished to interfere in the administration of the
provinces, which continued to be governed by the same
people who were in office in the last years of Sarsa
Dengel. Although he was first minister, Atnatewos con-
cerned himself only with the consolidation of his rule
over Gojam, and. with the creation of a substantial army
360
of retainers. Keflawand was master of both parts of
Tigre, sharing the various offices with his close rela-
tives. Naryam Se'na had. restored the fortunes of her
family in Shire, by giving the district to Yeshaq's son
Sebhat La'ab) As Keflawand. was married to the empress's
daughter, there was no rivalry between the two men.
Baganieder continued under Walda Cbrestos, while Walaqa
was governed by the prince Be'la Chrestos, who nisy have
been, the son of one of those princesses who were influential
in. the court of Sarsa Denel. Amhara also remained under
the same governor, who may have been Yona'el, whom Sarsa
Dengel had. appointed over it.
The regents showed an even greater reluctance to
interfere in the affairs of the provinces to the south
and south-east of the Blue Nile The court maintained
amicable relations with the ruler of Enarya, who had.
every reason to find the new regime advantageous for
himself and the province. The court would. not have
demanded the full amount of the yearly revenues or punished
him for default, but the governor seems to have presented
the empress with enough gifts of gold to help her acquire
imported luxuries. The other provinces, including Shawa,
1. Chronica de Susenyos, I, Ill, II, 86.
361
had no reason to be grateful to the regime, since it
made no attempt to protect them from the ravages of
the Galla or of Susenyos's robber bands.
For all practical purposes, then, Naryam Se'na
was the sole regent. Her sex, her rank and. her relation-
ship with the various governors made her the ideal person
to whom could be entrusted the tasks of running a small
court and of bringing up the emperor. She hardly inter-
fered in the governorships of her sons-in-law or of the
other noblemen, many of whom she had befriended while
her husband was alive. The war-lords were satisfied,
and. so long as the regency lasted none of them attempted
to unseat Ya'eqob. Nevertheless, Paez was mistaken
when he said that throughout that time the country was
undisturbed by rebellions.1
o basic reasons can be recognized for the
internal conflicts which began to simmer from the time
the regency was created. The existence of a strong
monarchy with a centralized government was not inimical
to the interests of the important families of the districts.
As long as these families limited their political
activities to their respective districts, the monarchy
had not felt threatened by them. The war-lords, on the
1. "Historia d.e Ethiopia", op.cit., III, 209.
"U"
other hand., had. risen to their present position. of
strength by usurping not only the powers and prerogatives
which the monarchy had. exercised over the provinces but
also the real, and in many cases here.itary, privileges
which the nobility had. enjoyed in the districts.
Neagre as our information is, there can be no doubt
that the hostility between local aristocratic families
and. the war-lords made the os1tion of the latter less
secure than Paez thought. If conditions in the other
provinces in any way resembled those in Tigre, then the
country was more in turmoil during the regency than in
the last years of Sarsa Dengel. Keflawand possessed
the same powers of appointing and. dismissing all officers
which Daharagot had before him.. 1 He kept the office of
the bahr nagash within his family by giving it first to
1. According to Azevedo, Keflawand. was not of noble birth
but possessed immense wealth. This is difficult to
believe because wealth generally went with birth.
Even if we suppose that he had amassed his estates
and other riches during his fourteen years of office,
if he was not of noble birth the empress would not
have sought his alliance and. the suppor't of his family
to reduce the power which the family of Selus Haila and
Daharagot enjoyed. The Jesuit missionaries had no
liking for Keflawand because they thought that he and
his officers were interfering with privileges, endowments,
and autonomy of Fremona. Thus, Azevedo describes him
as completely illiterate and. a very bad man. Letter
of July 22, 1607, to the provincial of Goa, op.cit.,
XI,
105.
dUt)
his brother and later to his son-in-law. He also had at
least one son and certainly many other relatives who were
given charge of various districts. Sometime in 1590,
the office of bahr nagash had been given by Sa.rsa Dengel
to one Equba Micha'el. The fact that the same man
returned to that office in 1608, after Keflawab.d had.
fallen, suggests that there was little friendship between
the two men in the years during which Equba I'licha'el
was out of office. Daharagot was still alive during the
regency, though neither he nor his sons seem to have
been allowed to live in. Tigre) His brother and. other
relatives resided in Bora, and relations between them
and. Keflawand appear to have been more than strained.
Paez himself reports a serious rebellion which took place
in one part of Tigre towards the end of 1603.
2
Nore-
over, the reinstatement of Yeshaq's family in Shire could.
not have failed to rekindle old rivalries.
The letters and reports which the Jesuits began to
write after 1603 show clearly the extent to which law .
-lessness had. increased since the deatb. of Sarsa Dengel.
District noblemen, some of whom maintained 3,000 to 4,000
retainers, preyed upon the peasants of neighbouring
1.
Chronica de Susenyos, I, 88, 242, II, 68, 186.
2. F. Guerreiro, Re1ao anual, II, 169-70.
364
districts and on caravans passing through their lands.1
Former regimental soldiers who were unable to attach
themselves to any of the well-to-do noblemen organized
themselves in bands of 300 or more strong, using for
colours in their profession of banditry, the old regi-
mental standards and kettled.rums.
The second source of conflict arose from the
dissatisfaction of the Querban units and. the regiments
which Sarsa Dengel had commanded and led in his numerous
slaving expeditions. The soldiers were living in
Dambiya, Wagara and the Darha and. Sama districts of
Bagained.er. We do not hear of any noblemen governing
the first two provinces after the time of Harbo's death.
Much of the land in the districts, with the exception
of the estates which belonged to the ladies of the court
and. to the various churches and monasteries, was probably
allotted for the maintenance of the soldiers and their
officers. They lacked nothing for their sustenance,
but as Ya'eqob was too young to take to the field, they
may have missed the usual profitable raids. Atnatewos
and. the other govexors were occupied in the affairs of
their provinces. Besides, if any one of them bad tried
1. Azeved.o to the provincial of India, July 30, 1608,
Rer. Aeth., XI,
155.
36ti
to lead. his amy of retainers through the territories of
his colleagues, he would have antagonized them and aroused
their suspicions.
But the main reason for the discontent of the
soldiers must have been the absence of any kiiid of excite-
ment. Without the rich banquets which usually closed
each raiding expedition, in which trophies were exhibited,
they must have found the court of Naryam Se'na a very
dull place. The officers were no longer among the
central figures of the court. The regency was dominated
by a calculating but satisfied nobility, and. the court
had ceased to be the centre of either political or
military activity.
The Querban units and the regiments associated with
them had been commanded by Sarsa Dengel personally, and
after his death the soldiers had no leader who could.
represent their interest in the court. An enterprising
man by the name of Zasellasie soon saw the advantage to
be gained by assuming the leadership. His father was a
Gurage soldier who had. joined one of the Querban units
which was later settled in the Darha district of Bagaxneder)
Zasellasie was born there and he spent his youth among
1. Chronica de Susenyos, I, lll II,
86; and "Due squarci
inediti de cronica etiopica", op.cit.,
pp. 807, 813.
366
the Wadala of the court. Then, after serving as
retainer to several noblemen, he was accepted Into one of
the Querban units. By the beginning of the regency he
had. risen to become chief of Ya'eqob's stewards.
As long as the young emperor wielded no power, the
ambitious man could derive no satisfaction from his post.
Therefore, a few years later, Zasellasie and. the troops
attached to the emperor's person removed Ya'eqob from
the court and. then. pillaged the homes of IIaryain Se'xia
and the nobility who lived there. The empress under-
stood that, by isolating the young emperor, Zasellasie
intended to curtail her influence over him and over the
court as a whole. Her pleas for support were immediately
answered by most of the noblemen, and. Zasellasie was
arrested and banLled over into the custody of her kinsman
in Shire.
Atnatewos was in Gojamn tbroughout this development.
His decision to intercede on Zasellasie's behalf is
difficult to understand. He could not have envied the
influence which his mother-in-law enjoyed, as she does
not seem to have taken any measure which conflicted with
his interests. suite possibly, he may have feared that
the imprisonment of Zasellasie would. exacerbate the
already tense relationship between the nobility and. the
Querban soldiers. Ya'eqob was, sooner or later, going
367
to gather the reins of government in his hands, and.
Atnatewos may have wanted to prevent the soldiers from
taking steps which would have made Ya'eqob independent of
the nobility. Zasellasie was, therefore, transferred
to Gojam and. then reinstated in his :post at the court.
But his influence over the emperor so frightened the
empress that she had. him sent away by appointing him
administrator of Wasan Amba, a frontier district of
Gojam under heavy attack from the Boran.
By the beginning of 1603 Ya'eqob, though only
fourteen years old, decided to end. the regency.
Believing that Zasellasie was a loyal servant who had
suffered. exile and relegation for his devotion to his
person, he had him brought from Gojam and put him in
command of the Daraba units and. several corps of Galla
auxilliaries. Either because the honours he received
fell short of his expectations or because he saw that
Ya'eqob was too weak and timid to survive the opposition
of the nobility, Zasellasie made common cause with
Atnatewos and. the others who could not forgive the
emperor for coming of age. When the governor of Gojam
rebelled. openly, Zasellasie joined him with the men under
his command. The latter had, apparently, overestimated
his popularity with the Querban soldiers, who fought
368
sold.ily behind the emperor. A victory by Atnatewos
held, no prospects for them other than to share the
fate of renowned regiments like the Glyorgis Haile
andte reduced Into bodies of retainers. 1 The emperor
succeeded in capturing both his enemies. But he showed
poor judgment when, shortly after, he pardoned Atnatewos
and, reinstated him in his previous posts, while Zasellasie,
the less influential of the two, was banished to
distant Enarya.
Ya'eqo'b lacked the experience and. the shrewdness
necessaiy to keep the loyalty of the Querban, with which
be could have checked the influence of the empress and
the power of the lords. His position was made parti-
cularly difficult because he had. no trustworthy advisers.
The only man he thought was his friend bad betrayed him,
and the rest of his stewards were probably niore loyal
to the empress than to him. It is not surprising that
he was completely ignorant of the conspiracy against him
until the empress and. the nobility had Zadengel brought
to the court in Qoga and proJLmed him emperor.2
1. Among the many other regiments in Gojam which Atnatewos
had made squadrons of retainers were the Giyorgis Haile,
the Senan, the Daiva and. the Arbab. Chronica de
Susenyos, I, 58, II, kG.
2. The young emperor must have been without friend or
adviser. Otherwise, he must have suspected something
when Atnatewos brought Zadengel out of Daq island
towards the end of 1602 and kept him in his home in
/Continued over
369
Ya'eqob tried to escape to his uncle in Semen, but he
was betrayed by his attendants and brought to the court.
Neither the soldiers of the Querban units and. the
associated regiments nor their officers seem to ha've
taken part in the overthrow. It is even unlikely that
such important figures of the Querban as Walda Chrestos
knew of the conspiracy until after Its successful con-
clusion. And as the name of Sarsa Dengel was still
remembered with affection amongst the soldiers, the
nobility thought it necessazy to justify their sudden
preference for a man whom, only seven years ago, they had
put in chains. There may also have been an ulterior
and more sinister motive, in the trial which they rigged.
They may have wanted to debase and disgrace the institution
of the monarchy, ami to dispel the aura of sacrosanctity
which still surrounded the throne, so that future emperors
would. find it difficult to challenge their power. The
trial was cleverly conceived to avoid contravention of
existing laws and. customs. 1 The emperor derived his
Footnote 2 continued from previous page.
Gojam. Chronica de Susenyos, I, ki, II, 33.
The
author of the brief history of Ya'eqob seems to con-
fuse Atnatewos with Zasellasie. The latter was in
Enarya at the time of the deposition. "Due squarci
inediti di cronica etiopica", op.cit., pp. 806, 811.
1. Paez's description of the trial is best preserved in
Guerreiro's rsume. Relao annal, II, 168.
370
authority not from man but from God, and there was no
precedent for any kind of impeachment. Pretenders and.
princes raised by rebellious lords, however, were tried
by the ord.lnary justices. Although Ya'eqob had
been properly crowned by the nobility themselves when
he was only seven years old, he was made to stand before
the judges of Qoga and to answer to a charge of usti.r-
pation by false representation. It was alleged. that he
was a pagan and. the son of a peasant and that his claim
to be a Christian and. the son of Sarsa Dengel was untrue.
Witnesses were brought who testified that he practised
Galla divination rites and. indulged in forbidden sexual
acts. 1
A further significant aspect of the trial is
that it was conducted. without the knowledge of the new
emperor. Fortunately for Ya'eqob, Zadengel had it
stopped. immediately after he heard. of it. Rejecting
the advice of many to maim or disfigure him, Zadengel
had. him conveyed. to Enarya for confinement there.2
In Zad.engel we find. a rare, humane and. sensitive
personality. He was undoubtedly one of the most
1 . Chronica de Susenyos, I, 4-8-49, II, 39.

In the
abridged, chronicle the reason given for the dethrone-
ment was insanity. "Due squarci inediti di cronica
etiopica", op.cit.,
pp.
806, 81 1 .
2. Paez, "Historia de Ethiopia", op.cit., III, 226.
371
interesting, although, because we know so little about
him, also one of the most enigmatic men who ruled over
the country. His father was an ordained priest 8nd he
himself had. received an extensive education from the
monastery at Daga island. 1 Already, while his uncle
was still alive, he had revealed that he possessed an
upright character and. a deep love for justice. His
seven years of imprisoent were also usefully employed
in the improvement of his knowledge on religious and
secular matters. When he was placed on the throne in
September of
1603,
at the age of twenty-six, he had a
good understanding of the political situation. He may
have admired the integrity and dedication of Galawdewos
whose throne-name he adopted.
At the very beginning of his reign, he seems to
have thought of strengthening his position against the
inevitable opposition of the nobility by winning the
1. Paez saw no chronicle on the reign of Zadengel or
Ya'eqob. He says that a history of the latter had
begun to be written, but was soon abandoned, though
at what stage we do not know. Thid.,
p .
207. The
entries in the abridged chronicle were probably
written some time after this period. This may explain
for the errors in them as well as in the entry on
Sarsa Dengel.On Zadengel's education, see ibid.,
p.
227;
Due squarci ined.iti de cronica etiopica",
op.cit., pp. O7, 813; and Perruchon, "Notes pour
l'histoire d'Ethiopie. Rgnes de Ya'qob et ZaDengel
(1597-1607)",
RB, IV (1896), 356-58.
4)Pljc)
allegiance of the Querban. He freed Zasellasie and
appointed him over Dambiya and. Wagara, where most of the
units lived. He even gave him his sister in marriage,
hoping thereby to attach him closer to himself. 1 The
expedition against the Agaw of Ainbas Gama, in Acha.ar,
may have also been made for the benefit of the soldiers.
He was, however, too noble and. conscientious to purchase
security by leading the soldiers into more of such
pernicious raids. Instead he turned his attention to
the defence of Gojam, which was under attack by various
tribes of both the Boran and Baraytuina groups. In
between his ca.mpaigns he found time to adopt measures
which, he hoped, iuld curb the tyranny of the lords and.
the predatoriness of the bands of robbers which infested
most of the provinces. Unfortunately, no chronicler
took the trouble to describe these measures; and all
that is known is that he strove to relieve the poor of
their misery.
But the King Zad.engel, after he was
crowned, became strong and respected.
1. In .aI
Italian version of Paez's letter of July 29,
1605, Zasellasie's wife was sister to the emperor,
while in Guerreiro's extract from the same letter, the
original of which was probably written in Spanish, she
was his cousin. Paez to the provincial of Goa,
Rei'.
Aeth., XI,
6k; Guerrelro, Relao anual, II, 2101.
This fact is omitted in Paez's main work. Cf. "Historia
de Ethiopia", or.&t., III, 25k-55.
in all parts of the realm. He
ordained. good. laws which were
pleasing to God.. He hated oppres-.
sion and, loved justice. Robbers
seemed like Satans to him, and
thieves like demons. His reign was
clement to the poor and punishment
to the bad.. Peasants and merchants
loved. him and praised. him. 1
That he intended to define legally the rower of the
nobility and the rights of his ordinaxr subjects may be
inferred. from the curious request he made to Paez,
who
had arrived. at Fremona in May of 1603. He asked the
missionaIr to come to the court and to bring with him
the books of laws by which the Portuguese kings governed
their peoples.2
Zadengel must have had another reason, more important
than his desire to consult Portuguese laws, to write to
Paez a second. time, after the latter had replied to say
that he did not have the books. The first letter, the
reply to which is dated I,Iarch 2, was probably written
around the beginning of February. Paez was preparing to
set out to the court iInniedi.ately, when he was strongly
advised by Keflawand to postpone his departure. The
governor confidentially explained to him that it would
1. Chronica de Susenyos, I, k9, II, 39.
2. "Historia de Ethiopia", op.cit, III, 227.
374
not be safe to travel at that time, because some of
the great men were trying to bring back Ya'eqob.1
Because of his distance from the scene of action,
Keflawand was not actively involved in the plot, but it
seems that Atnatewos and the empress were keeping him
informed of developments.
Paez attributed the urgent messages inviting him to
the court to the emperor's interest in religious matters
and. to his desire to see the missionary whose learning had
gained him widespread admiration. 2 The case, however,
seems to have been otherwise. Until this time Zadengel
had not shown any interest in Catholicism or in the
Portuguese descendants who practised it. In fact, some
time earlier, be bad manifested such irritation with the
Portuguese for considering themselves different from the
rest of the population that, when he became emperor, they
feared they would be persecuted by him. 3 The interest
which he showed in Paez and in Catholicism should rather
be examined in the light of his preoccupation with the
little known intrigues of the war-lords and the soldiers.
While the emperor was occupied in the defence of
1. Guerreiro, Relao anual, II, 170.
2. Paez, "Historia d.e Ethiopia", op.cit., III, 227.
3.
Ibid.,
p.
226.
37;
Gojam, the empress and Atnatewos had plotted to restore
Ya'eqob to the throne. Ya'eqob was released from con-
finement, and was heading north with the escort provided
him by the governor of Enarya, when a heavy attack on
the province by the Galla forced him to seek refuge in
Kainbata. The names of the lords Zadengel arrested at
the end of the Gojam canipaigo. are not know, but a rift
had certainly developed between the emperor and Atnatewos,
who was made to relinquish the offices he held.
Atnatewos was not disappointed by the failure of the plot,
as he found another candidate in Susenyos. Some time
before April, Be'la Chrestos, governor of Walaqa, rebelled
against the emperor and. opened his province to Susenyos.
Be'la Chrestos had been, brought up in the court of Sarsa
Dengel. He was a friend of the press and. her son-
in-law and a member of their faction. It is unlikely
that he would have taken such a step without the know-
ledge of Atnatewos at least.
By this time the influence of the empress was
beginning to decline. We cannot, unfortunately, establish
whether this was due to an estrangement between her and
Atnatewos over Susenyos or to the poor state of her
health. The former reason seems likely because of the
close friendship which soon developed between. her and
376
Zasellasie. The emperor did not prevent her from
transferring her residence to Vandege, the place he had
chosen because of its proximity to Achafar and Gojam.
She may have stayed in Qoga so as to be with Zasellasie
and the Querban. lb. any case, Atnatewos had. been
apprehensive that Ya'eqob, on returning to the throne,
might remember his role in deposing him. Susenyos's
notoriety may have led him to think that the unprincipled
prince would make an amenable emperor, without concern
for justice or good government.
Embittered by this persistent enmity towards him,
the emperor decided to strike at the very foundation of
the social system which gave power to the nobility and.
independnce to tbe soldiers of the Querban units and
the associated regiments. There can be no doubt that
he had no time for cautious and calculated measures.
Nevertheless, his behaviour towards his enemies, including
Atnatewos and the empress, and his relationship with
Paez, strongly show that, in spite of the pressure under
which he worked in the crucial months between April and
August, he was neither desperate nor reckless. Because
of their drastic nature the steps he took were difficult
to implement in a short time, but they were far from
being impractical.
377
Thus, before setting out for Walaqa in search of
the rebels, he published two decrees. The first was
intended to deprive the war-lords of their private armies
by mobilizing their retainers into a new army Called the
Nalak Hara. Zadengel must have recognized the diffi-
culty of keeping these men loyal once they returned to
their homes in the various provinces, as they had to do
before June when the rainy season would begin. The
second decree, therefore, seems to have been intended not
only to abolish the privileges enjoyed by all soldiers
but also to deprive the district and provincial nobility
of the means of keeping large numbers of retainers.
The circumstances in which the decrees were made and the
exact words in which they were published have not been
properly recorded. There is a significant difference
between the ways it is phrased in the chronicle of
Susenyos and in the abbreviated history. According to
the former source, Zad.engel made only one proclamation
for the mobilization of peasants, retainers and Qiierban
soldiers. The decision to ann the peasantry, therefore,
seems to have been less a basic and permanent reform than
a temporary measure by which the emperor hoped to rally
the support of the peasants against Susenyos.
378
"If every man who is of age, who lives
in any land. of my kingdom, does not
come to me, not only the chawa whose
task has always been warfare but also
the farmer as well as the retainers of
the ladies and the servants of the
monks; if any one stays behind. and.
does not heed. this call-up, his house
shall be pillaged. and. his property
confiscated." And when this thing
was heard. all the people became
afraid. and. alarmed. for they knew
that the word. of King Zadengel was
just and. his statement decisive.
All men who were of age for fighting
and who carried instruments of war
came and joined him. None stayed
behind in the villages except the
lame, the paralyzed, the blind and
the sick. The retainers of the
lords he took all from them, and. he
made them chawa and called. them
Malak Hara. 1
According to the abridged history, the law intended
to enable the peasants to bear arms was proclaimed in
words which suggest complete and. permanent emancipation:
sab'e hara wagabar meder. Conti Rossini, Perruchbn and
Pereira have misuMerstood. the significance of the phrase,
probably because they did not realize the extent to which
1. Chronica de Susenyos, I, 50-5
1 ,
II, O-kl.The
chronicle was commenced by Neheraka Dengel fourteen
and. a half years after the proclamations. The author
was then in Qoga with IIarya.m Se'na. It is therefore
possible that this report is only a swnmary of what
he had. heard from other people. Pereira seems to be
confused by the term katecha, a misspelling of ketecha,
which means mobilization but which he translated as
granazy.
379
the laws then discriminated against the peasantry.1
The translations which these authors gave to the phrase
cannot, therefore,be accepted. The word hara meant
"soldier" or "army" as well as "free" or "a free man".
Considering its use in the name Nalaic Hara, the phrase
may be simply, though not accurately, rendered as,
"Nan is a soldier, and land the tributary". Since the
soldier enjoyed privileges which were denied to the
peasant, and. since he considered himself less limited
by law than the peasant was, the phrase was also under-
stood to mean, "Nan is free, and. land the tributary".2
1. Conti Rossini's translation is not very inaccurate:
"Gli uomini tutti sieno soldati, e [nel tempo stesso]
la terra paghi ii tributo". His explanation, on the
other hand., does not apply to the condition of the
peasantry of those days because they were never called
to arms.
"Due squarci inediti di cronica etiopica",
op.cit.,
pp.
807, 811-12, including n. 13.
Perruchon's
rendering is completely off the mark: "sue les
homrnes soient,soldats et agriculteurs". "Note pour
l'histoire d'Ethiopie.Rgnes d.e Ya'qob et Za-Dengel
(1597-16077',
op.cit., pp
. 359,
362.Pereira makes no
improvement when he prefers this translation, "Os
homens para soldados, e os lavrad.ores para tlavrar]
a terra". Chronica de Susenyos, II, 322.
2.
It is precisely in this sense that, in the time of
lyasu, the soldiers interpreted the phrase. They
believed that as free men they could not be made to
aconmpany the emperor on every expedition. "Annales
lohannis I, lyasu I et Bakaff a", op.cit., text, p.
190,
trans.,
p.
201.Conti Rossini repeats Guidi's
accurate rendering of the phrase in "Ii libro d.elle
leggende e tradizioni Abissine dellEcciaghi
Filps",
RRAL, XXVI
(1917), n.5,
pp. 71k-15.
380
The decrees may not have been formulated on the basis
of any recognizable religious or philosophical enquiry
into the rights of man. But we can, in a manner of
speaking, say that it was aimed at levelling the obvious
differences between the two main classes, by abolishing
the system whereby peasants, in addition to giving portions
of their fanu products, rendered domestic and other menial
services to the soldiers, the nobility and the clergy.
The immediate result of the decree would have been the
disappearance of the professional soldier.
Zadengel's measure was neither impractical nor
visionary. The condition of the peasantry had already
begun to undergo radical changes in the provinces which
the Galla had invaded and. in. the areas which they were
attacking. In the various mountain strongholds in.
which noblemen, soldiers and peasants had found refuge,
the barriers against the bearing of arms by the lower
class were fast disappearing. The time being one of
stress, every hand which could wield a weapon had
become indispensable. 1 It seems also -that in the
provinces where the Galla had not reached, the peasants
1. The earliest case described in a chronicle concerns
the Gojam district of Dajan, opposite Nugar. When
in 1598 bands of the
Tulama, assisted by Susenyos,
crossed the Blue Nile and attacked the district, the
cb.awa and. the peasants fought side by
side and repulsed
them.Chronica de Susenyos, I, 2, II, 19.
381
were reacting to the ravages which bandits and soldiers
on rampage were causing.
In the districts aroimd Wandege and. in the areas
where the Querban and the other soldiers were living,
the decree was received with acclaim by those who bene-
fitted from it. The peasants responded to the emperor's
call to arns. It was a substantial force which he led.
against the rebels. But Susenyos moved from Walaqa
to Shawa and. camped at Dabra Libanos. The approach of
the rainy season prevented the emperor from following.
Paez came to the court shortly after the emperor
returned from this unsuccessful campaign. As this was
the missionary's first visit to the court, he was decieved
by the polite but far from cordial relationship which
existed between Zadengel on one hand and. the empress
and Atnatewos on the other. Still, Paez's letters
reveal the complete isolation of the emperor. His only
friend and trusted minister was La'ka Naryam. Though
honest in his devotion, he was too inexperienced to
benefit the emperor by his coi.msel.
The opposition of the nobility was hardening. His
increasing popularity with the peasants was the only
reason which kept them from rebelling openly. Neither
the enthusiasm of the untried. peasantry, nor the hesitation
of the nobility, seem to have iven Zad.engel a feeling
of lasting security. Already when sending his urgent
invitations to Paez, he must have thought of appealing
for help to the Portuguese authorities. What we caunot
ascertain Is whether it was Paez or the captain of the
Portuguese descendants who told. the emperor that, unless
he became Catholic, the king of Spain. would not send him
any soldiers.' Paez was, undoubtedly, a person who
elicited respect. His piety, his learning and his
eloquence inspired admiration. However, what decided
the emperor to write to the Pope and to the king of
Spain expressing a desire to accept Catholicism could
not have been the eloquence of the missionary. He had.
arrived at the court on the 17th of June and the final
copies of the letters were ready by the 26th. It is
unlikely that the learned and responsible Zadengel could.
have been turned into a reckless fanatic by two sermons
and a few discussions.2
1.
This is what Paez advised Susenyos to do when the latter
told him of his intention to ask the king of Spain for
assistance. Paez, "Historia de Ethiopia", op.clt., III
401.
2.
Bruce obviously saw no abridged chronicle with the
entries on. Ya'eqob and Zadengel. His accounts of
their reigns are based on the writings of Paez. Even
then Bruce has made too much of Paez's knowledge of
Ge'ez and his elegance of diction, for the missionary
nowhere says that he learned this language or Amharic
during his first year, The catechism which the two
/Continued over.
Two proclamations, published the day after the
emperor and Paez had agreed to write the letters, have
misled many diligent scholars into believing that the
emperor became so zealous for the propagation of
Catholicism that he decided to force into it a loyal
nobility and a peaceful people. 1 One of the procla-
mations threatened confiscation of property of anyone
convicted of perjury after swearing in the name of St
nary. It is true that Paez had deplored this profanity
in a sermon delivered before the emperor and Maryam Se'na,
but false swearing was considered equally, if not more,
wicked in the eyes of the Ethiopian Church.
The second proclamation banned the observance of
Footnote 2 continued from previous page.
boys, who were too young to deserve the description
of disciples, recited was translated into Amharic by
Joo Gabriel, one of the Portuguese descendants who
received his education in one of the monasteries.
Luis de Azevedo's report of July 22, 1607 in Rer.
Aeth., XI, 126. The only novelty in the catechism
was the language in which the boys recited it. As
for Paez's sermon being the first evei preached in
Ethiopia we need to say nothing. Bruce, Travels, II,
24 4 -2'-I-5 .
1. Ibid., p.
2L 1 . 5;
a^
after Bruce, Basset in "ftudes
sur l'histoire d'Ethiopie", op.clt., see note on
p. 119; and Budge in his History of Ethiopia, II,
378. If Paez had converted Zadengel, La'ka ?taryam
or any of the great men of the court he would have
reported it in his letters or other writings.
384
Saturday as a religious holiday. 1 Paez and the other
Jesuits who preceded or followed him into Ethiopia,
coming as they did from countries in which the Holy
Office of the Inquisition was regarded as the pillar of
religious orthodoxy a.nd. social stability, condemned, as
heresies the observance of the Sabbath and. other prac-
tices of the Ethiopian Church, some of which they
wrongly connected with the laws of Noses. Paez had
raised the issue of the Sabbath in one of the discussions
he had before the emperor. But he does not seem to
have realized that it was then a subject of controversy
within the Church itself. It had. been a source of con-
tention between the leading monasteries ol' the country
for centuries.Despite Zar'a Ya'eqob's decisive inter-
vention in favour of observance, the argument had never
stopped. It was
raging
in the time of Sarsa Dengel
when, as is characteristic of such controversies, the
court was divided into two factions, the rivalry between
which was intensified by the vacillations of the emperor.2
Zaden,gel knew that the successful outcome of his
request to Spain depended on how urgently Paez recommended
1 . Paez, "Historia de Ethiopia", op.cit., III, 2k6.
2. Antonio Pernandes to Pope Sixtus 'V, July 1 2,
1587
in
Rer. Aeth., X, 34-2.
385
it. The anti-Sabbath law was not made for any other
purpose than to make Paez think that the emperor's
inclination towards Catholicism was sincere. Contrary
to what Bruce and, after him, many other historians say,
these proclamations caused no uproar nor did they arouse
any suspicions about the emperor's very secret dealings
with Paez. The only person surprised by them was the
missionary himself, who thought that the emperor's zeal
was making him careless. Zadengel's life became
important to him, and he advised him to proceed cautiously
until they received favourable replies to their letters.
This was, of course, precisely what the emperor had
hoped to achieve. Even after the proclamations,
Atnatewos and the empress continued to cultivate
assi-
duously Paez's friendship. Atnatewos's devious stand
during the few discussions held in the emperor's audience
hail suggests that he wan.ted the missionary to think him
more sympathetic than the emperor to the cause of
Catholicism in Ethiopia. He opposed Paez publicly,
while privately he showed himself an ardent disciple.1
We do not know exactly how the soldiers of the
Querban. units and the associated regiments were affected
by the emancipation of the peasants. It may be that the
1. "Historia de Ethiopia", ibid., III, 2L14.
386
peasants not only refused. to render the customary
domestic services but also made it clear to the soldiers
that as taxpayers they were no longer obliged to main-
tain them.In the face of the nobility's indecision,
the soldiers took the initiative by inviting Susenyos,
who was within easier reach than Ya'eqob, to come to
them. 1 Though wiprepared for rebellion, Zasellasie
could not let the soldiers take such a step without him.
His jealousy of .Ltnatewos made him persuade the soldiers
to declare openly their support for Ya'eqob. Most of
the provincial governors must have secretly associated
themselves with Zasellasie, because the emperor was
forced to dismiss many from their offices. Still he
was so powerless against them that, in order to escape
a plot to assassinate him as he came out from. church on
the feast of the Assumption, he had to leave the court.2
Notwithstanding, the emperor's position was not
hopeless. He was confident of support from the common
people once the rainy season caine to an end. Disunity
continued to pevai1 amongst his enemies, and it seemed
that some of the noblemen, out of fear of failure as well
1 .
Chronica de Susenyos, I, 52, II, 42.
2.
Guerreiro, Relao anual, II, 402; Paez, uHistorja
de Ethiopia 1 t , op.cit., III, 25
4
; Paez to the pro-
vincial of Goa, July 29, 1 605, ibid., XI, 65.
287
as distrust of Zasellasie, would make their peace with
him. Unfortunately, his fate was sealed when Zasellasie
learned from a Muslim merchant about the letters Paez
had. dispatched to Goa? He then had. no difficulty in
persuading the bishop Abuna Petros to release all men,
great and small, from their oaths of loyalty to the
emperor. The clergy in. general were affected by the
emancipation of the peasants and the bishop in particular
may have been offended when the emperor published his
religious proclamations without consulting him.
Consequently it was an extremely superior force
which Zadengel faced in Dambiya on October 13.

He
was wounded by one Umar-Din, probably a captain of one
of the inalassay units, and dispatched by many spear
thrusts from Zasellasie and. other men.2
Before describing the outrageous attacks made on
the lifeless body, the short history thus explains the
cause of the rebellion.
And of the reason of Hase Zad.engel's
death it was said: and in that first
1. Thid.; also Guerreiro, Re1ao anual, II, 404.
2. "Historia de Ethiopia", op.cit., III, 261. This
Umar-Din was probably the azaj who represented the
Muslim members of the Querban units during their
aborted negotiations with Susenyos in
1605.
Chronica
de Susenyos, I, 70, II,
55.
According to Paez,
Susenyos had him killed later for daring to strike
at the person of a monarch. "Historia de Ethiopia",
op.cit., III, 296-297.
388
year there arose against Hase
Zadengel his armies which were
called Querban. and. Nizan and
Ras Zasellasie because of that
proclamation which he made to be
published saying, "Nan is soldier,
and, land the tributary." 1
When in the days which followed the battle Ya'eqob
failed to show up, Atnatewos attempted to have Susenyos
chosen for succession to the throne. To Zasellasie
and the Querban soldiers this prince was undesirable,
firstly because he was the kind of warrior who would
expect to be obeyed and, secondly, because of his close
associations with the Galla, which the professional
soldiers found unsavoury. The rivalry between the two
men became so pronounced that much of the country was
split into two parties, with the empress aligning herself
with Zasellasie. Only by leaving the throne vacant
could a disastrous war be avoided.
But the lords of the day, after they
killed Zadengel, the Messiah of God,
deliberated upon not raising a king
after this king. And. they said, "We
shall all stay in our respective
governorsb.ips and. territories; and
no one shall rule over us 'by becoming
king."2
There is no reason to believe that the lords wanted
1. "Due sq.uarci inediti di cronica etiopica", op.cit.,
pp. 8
07, 812-13.
2. Chronica de Susenyos, I,
53,
II, 4-2.
280
to abolish the monarchy. The arrangement was a tem-
porary compromise only. Atnatewos welcomed it because
he hoped it would give him time to insta]lhimself in
Gojam after his rather prolonged absence from the province.
Zasellasie and the Querban soldiers accepted it because
they had yet to locate and reach Ya'eqob.1
The interregnuin began with a return in most provinces
to the situation which existed at the beginning of
Zad.engel's reign. Most of the lords regained their
governorships, with the exception of some like Yona'el,
who had died. in the fighting.s none of the noblemen
in those districts of Amhara and Shawa which the Galla
had not occupied bad bothered to take part in the affairs
of th,e court, they were left undisturbed. The lords
lacked the constitutional authority to annul the offending
decrees. But, supported as they were by the soldiers
and the clergy, they must have made sure that the peasants
forgot those decrees.
We do not know which of the lords took the first steps
which broke the stalemate. Within about a month after
Zadengel's death, Atnatewos had made arrangements to
1. Guerreiro, Relao anual, II,
407.
When at the
beginning of November Paez met ?!Iaryam Se'na at Qoga,
she told him she was expecting Ya'eqob to arrive any
time. Thid.,
p.
408; "Historia de Ethiopia",
cit., III, 266.
A
390
crown Susexyos, while Zasellasie had, sent his messengers
to fetch Ya'eqob from Enarya. Susenyos wa crowned on
December l, and immediately afterwards Zasellasie and.
the Querban soldiers asked him to lay down the crown in
favour of Ya'eqob.' They promised him that, if Ya'eqob
was not found by June, they themselves would give him
the crown. Susenyos refused, and fighting broke out
between the two camps. The party of Zasellasie was on
the verge of victory when, towards the end of April,
the messengers returned from Enarya and reported that
Ya'eqob could not be found. Believing that Ya'eqob
had somehow perished, the Querban soldiers decided to
seek a prince whom they could set up as a rival to
Susenyos.Zasellasie, however, advised his colleagues
and the soldiers to recognize Susenyos rather than waste
time while searching for a candidate through imba Geshan.
Zasellasie seems to have feared that the time would enable
Atnatewos and Susenyos to strengthen their position by
winning to their side all the bandits and dispossessed
noblemen of Dambiya, Wagara and Bagamede.
1. The coronation is described in Chronica de Susenyos,
I, 58-59, II, 46-47. The throne-name which Busenyos
took at this coronation was Malak Sagad . After
Sarsa Dengel and. Ya'eqob, he would have been the third.
of that name if later, either after his victory against
Ya'eqob or his coronation at Aksum, he had. not called
himself Seltan Sagad.
"Historia d,e Ethiopia", op.cit.,
III,
297.
391
And. upon hearing this matter, the
aqetjar sat according to their
groups and tribes, and. likewise the
querban, the elders of the people
and. the ministers of the kingdom
according to their offices, and. the
nar and the chawa according to
their companies, and the princesses
with the great ladies of the camp
according to their ranks; and. they
deliberated. at the same time as if
of one heart and, one mouth, saying,
"It is better for us that King Seltan
Sagad. is crowned, as neither we nor
our fathers know the other [princes]."
Delegates of all the groups met Susenyos at Bagameder,
whither he had fled. They made him swear to respect the
institutions and. lands of all the military bodies and. not
to dispossess Maryam Se'na or any of the princesses of
the estates with which they had been favoured by his
predecessors. The delegates, on their part, swore to
remain loyal to him, even if Ya'eqob were to reappear.
But when, less than a week after the oaths were adin.inis-
tered., Ya'eqob showed up at Dambiya, Susenyos was
abandoned by everybody, including Atnatewos.
Ya'eqob repaid his indebtedness to Zasellasie by
making him governor of Gojam as well as first minister.
1. Chronica de Susenyos, I, 70, II, 55.
The chronicler's
use of the name Seltan Sagad indicates that he was not
quoting the exact words they said. On the use of
the term nar for firearms see D. Ayalon, Gunpowder and
Firearms T'the Namluk Kingdom (London, 1956), pp.
16,
5,
41. The nar, or musketeers, of this meeting were
probably the Turks. The Portuguese were living in
Nanina and, if they sided with anyone, they would be
with Atnatewos. Paez, "Historia de Ethiopia"
? op.cit.,
III, 264; and his letter of July 29, 16
0
5,
ibid, LI70.
Atnatewos was made to expiate his role in the deposition
and, his connections with Susenyos by being excluded from
all kinds of political or adalnistrative activities.
Susenyos, on the other hand., returned. to his old. occu-
pation. He began to help the various Galla tribes in
reducing strongholds throughout Shawa, Walaqa and. Amhara.
There can be no doubt that Ya'eqob lacked all the
good qualities which were manifest in Zadengel. I1aryam
Se'na and Atnatewos had, perhaps intentionally, neglected.
the education of their ward.. The first intimation about
the emperor's supreme indifference to his responsibilities
and. prerogatives is given by the way he tried to make
peace with his rival. He proposed. to offer Suseriyos
the provinces of S1awa, Walaq, a and Amhara if Susenyos
would, relinquish his claim to the throne. 1 As can be
understood from the condition he made, Ya'eqob was not
proposing to partition the country between two crowned
heads. On the other hand., he could not have expected
Susenyos to agree to it if he had. not offered something
more attractive than the mere governorship of the
provinces. The offer may have thus implied. a tenure
for life. Ya'eqob was probably thinking that he was
giving away nothing substantial as the three provinces,
1. Chronica de Susenyos, I, 7k, II, 58.
like those directly to the south of Gojain, were gradually
drifting away from royal control. By offering to give
three provinces to a man whom he would not be able to
control or to remove, he showed his ..readiness to acconl-
modate and to compromise on a much greater scale than
Sarsa Dengel bad done. Yet when in 1602 the uerban
soldiers had. tried to stop Susenyos's raids on their
camps by acceding to his demand for Shawa and. parts of
Gojam, Zadengel, though then a prisoner, had advised
Atnatewos to oppose it, warning him that it would result
in the partition of the coimtry.1
Knowing that sooner or later Ya'eqob would be
deserted by the lords, Susenyos rejected the offer.
He was a confident and. stubborn man, and. be saw in the
throne a very rewarding stronghold to be stormed. In
February of 1606, when Zasellasie pursued him. into Ainhara,
he met him with several bands of the Karayu, clans of the
Wallo, Bala'e and. Jele. He defeated. Zasellasie by
forcing him to fight at a place which was inconvenient
for the Querban horsemen.2
1. ibid., I, ki, II,
3.
2.
The soldiers of the Querban units seem to have been
mostly mounted.Ibid., I,
65,
II, 51.
A
394
Ya t
eqob was following close by, and. he was not far
away from the field when Zasellasle was defeated. But
instead of helping him gather together his scattered men,
the emperor censured him publicly for his defeat. As a
result, "the camp was divided into two parts. Accusations
and. counter accusations multiplied in the site; and
'ear and despair entered into the hearts of all the
soldiers. t h l
Three weeks later Ya'eqob himself, in spit e
of the reinforcement which Keflawand had brought from
Tigre, suffered defeat by committing a similar mistake.
He blamed his captain for it and went so far as to order
the execution of a few.
Such undeserved treatment provoked many of the lords,
including Zasellasie, to change sides. It was with a
much reduced force that in March of 1607 the emperor
attacked his rival. The place Ya'eqob had. chosen for
battle being rugged and precipitous, the Querban horsemen
suffered. more by falling than by the spears of their
enemies. Among the many who perished with Ya'eqob was
the bishop, Aburta Petros.
When finally in 1607 6usenyos came to the throne,
1. Ibid., I, 80, II,
63.
395
he had reached the mature age of
352
His education
had. suffered from the circunl.9tances of his childhood,
He could only read. and, perhaps, write. As a man.
fully shaped. and fashioned by his long career as a brigand.
and condottiere, he was guided by no principle or objective
but by his own interests. The country was to hXm a
rich spoil to be shared with his companions. The court
and provi..ncial offices were immediately distributed
among his brothers and. his followers. All the lords,
including Atnatewos, were brought to the court, where
their activities could be observed and. where, without
their retainers, they could cause the least harm.
Xeflawand caine from Tigre and begged to be relieved of
his duties and to be allowed to retire to his estates.
However, as Susenyos could not as yet spare enough
men who could hold the distant province or him, he let
Keflawand keep the governorship, but made him stay at
the court. Susenyos was fortunate in that the empress
1. Susenyos's correct age is given by Azevedo in his
report of July 30, 1608, to the provincial of India.
Rer. Aeth., XI, 164. Paez says that the emperor
was
33
years in 1607. Although this is repeated by
Almeida, there can be no doubt they are giving the
emperor's age at the time of his coronation in Gojam.
"Historia d.e Ethiopia", ibid., III, 296; and "Historia
de Ethiopia a Alta", ibid., VI, 188; VII, 193. The
chroniclers count his reign from his coronation in
1605.
396
had. died, a few days after his victory. Because of the
tremendous prestige she enjoyed, she could have become
the most implacable of his enemies.
In spite of these precautions the rebellions and
turmoils which followed his victory were such that a less
battle-scarred and imperturbable man might not have sur-
vived,. Paez estimates that in the first two years of
Susenyos's reign sixteen or eighteen pretenders were
proclaimed emperor in the various parts of the country.1
If the noblemen of two or three provinces had co-operated.
'by supporting one candidate only, Susenyos's term might
have been a veI r short one. Fortunately for him, the
party of discontented men in each province acted in com-
plete disregard. of their neighbours. It is thus diffi-
cult to imagine how tb.ey could. have hoped. to succeed.
One pretender who caused. the emperor serious concern
was the false Ya'eqob of Tigre. Although Paez asserts
that the body of Ya'eqob was buried in the presence of
many of his and. Susenyos's captains, this pretender was
the first of several Imposters who claimed to be the late
emperor. 2 The young man, who had. drff1Ul in finding
1. "Historia de Ethiopia", ibid., III, 409-410; and. his
letter of September 14, 1612 to Thomas de Ituren, ibid.,
XI, 253.
2. "Historia de Ethiopia", ibid., III, 419.
397
someone to retain him, went to Dabra Bizan and. easily
convinced the abbot and his monks that he was Ya'eqob
and that he had escaped from the battle with a broken
jaw. Much of his face was covered all the time, but
as the abbot had decided to become a king-maker, he did
not bother to verify. If Keflawand had his suspicions
be was not deterred by them. With his endorsement of
the pretender's claim, most noblemen of the province,
those who wanted to recover their former positions and
those who simply needed an excuse to plunder, rose up in
arms. By the middle of 1608 both parts of the provinces
were more or less under the pretender.
Susenyos was unable to relieve his hard-pressed
brother, Se'la Chrestos, because his other brother in
Baganieder, Yamana Chrestos, was placed in a still more
precarious position by the eruption of bands of all the
Marawa clans into the province. Se'la Chrestos managed
to stay alive until he was joined by the emperor in March
of 1609 mainly with the small support given him by the
few men whose fortunes he had repaired. Men like
Equba Nicha'el, who was made bahr nagash, had helped Sarsa
Dengel against Yeshaq, but had lost favour when Naryani
Se'na became influential. 1 Susenyos's coronation at
1. Azevedo, "Annua do Ethiopia do anno d.e
609",
fol. 58 r
and v, MS.
779,
Braga; and his report of July 30, 1608,
/Continued over.
398
Aksun did more to calm the province than the campaigns
he undertook against his rival. The pretender gradually
lost his supporters, and about a year or so later he
went to Bora to arouse the relatives of Selus Haila and.
Daharagot. When the men there discovered that he was
an imposter, they sent his head to the emperor. They
did not want any unnecessary fighting in their district.
One recognizable factor which helped to isolate
the rebellions to within the district or province where
they were kindled and to prevent them from turning into
widespread conflagrations was the unwillingness of those
who had remained. attache& to their farms and estates to
be involved in any more fighting. Kanafra Chrestos,
the first of the pretenders made to challenge Suseixyos,
was captured and delivered to the emperor by the people
amongst whom he was living. Zase].lasie had managed to
escape from the stronghold where he was confined.He also
met an ignominious end at the hands of the peasants and.
soldiers of a Gojain village which he and. his followers
Iootnote 1 continued from previous page.
to the provincial of Goa. Rer. Aeth., XI, 169.
Yeshaq's son Sebhat La'ab was on the side of the
pretender. Almeida, tt Historia de Ethiopia Alta",
ibid., VI, 22k.
399
tried to plunder)
Those chawa of the old regiments who had not become
retainers but had been plundered by men of the Querban
units and by soldiers who had turned bandits began to
rally around. the emperor. Se'la Chiestos's comiections
with the soldiers from Damot also helped to bring behind
Susenyos all the refugee soldiers in Gojam. The
second rebellion of Nalkasad.eq and Awsabyos, leaders of
the uerban units in Wagara,was a serious threat.
While Susenyos was in Tigre, a prince called Arzo was
declared emperor, and the units in Bagameder and Dambiya
were in sympathy with their colleagues of Wagara. 2 Without
the help of the chawa of the regiments, Yainana Chrestos
would not have crushed the rebellion. The disbanding
of all the uerban units soon after this was everywhere
received with satisfaction. Vhen in the same year of 1609
the emperor's son-in-law Yolyos decided to rebel because
Gojam was taken from him, the soldiers under his command
abandoned him. Nany of them went all the way to Qoga,
where the court was, to show their loyalty to the emperor.
1. Chronica de Susenyos, I, 114, II, 88; and. Azevedo to
the provincial of India, July 30, 1608, Rer. Aeth.,
XI,
170.
According to Bruce he was killed by Galla
warriors settled on the Gojam side of the Blue Nile.
Travels, II, 268.
2. According to the chronicle of Susenyos, Arzo was one
of the princes who lived at Ainba Geshan. Chronica de
a
I ti
400
V
\
i?
she
c
\\
I,.
9 .p.
J t 3 . LlLL t

\
p.7'
b -P
p't
/;
\1
2
6
-1
.
A
Posao
a. kf&.
d six
-7tt
a i
It seems thus tha t the excessi ve vi olence of thi s peri od
of a na rcby ha d a roused a wi desprea d desi re for pea ce.
Unfortuna tely, Susenyos wa s i nsensi ble to thi s desi re.
II. Condi ti ons i n the Provi nces Occupi ed by the Ga lla
Si nce Ba hrey's home wa s i n Ga mo, he wa s better
a cqua i nted wi th a ffa i rs of the Bora n tha n of the Ba ra ytuma
group. He does not menti on the na me of a ny of the Bora n
tri bes whi ch sta yed behi nd i n Ba li , but of those whi ch
conti nued from Ba li he gi ves a long li st of tri bes,
cla ns a nd subcla ns. Accordi ng to thi s li st i t seems tha t
the tri bes whi ch preceded the Da we or Ja wi i nto Sha wa
a nd nei ghbouri ng provi nces were the Ma cha a nd the Da cha .
However, both tri bes ha d proli fera ted to the extent tha t,
by the ti me they rea ched Sha wa , thei r cla ns a nd subcla ns
ha d become full-fledgec. tri bes. Alrea dy a t thi s ti me
the Da 'a le a nd. the Ji da , the two tri bes i nto whi ch the
Ma cha tri be ha d di vi ded i tself, were bei ng oversha dowed
by thei r numerous cla ns. Ba hrey's second a nd si mpler
Footnote 2 conti nued from previ ous pa ge.
Susenyos, I, 125-27, 280-81, II,
97-99,
216. The
a bri dged chroni cle, however, ma kes hi m the son of
Sa rsa Dengel's brother Za ha wa rya t, whi ch na y epla i n
w1y a ll the Querba n sold.i rs wa nted to ha ve hi m.
"Etudes sur l'hi stoi re d'Ethi opi e", op.ci t., text,
pp.
339-40,
tra ns.,
p.
112.
classification of the Boran suggests that by this time Macha
arid Dacha were less the names of individual tribes than
of two conglomerations of related tribes. For reasons
which we do not know, the Dacha group of tribes came to
be better known by the namp of Tulama)
In the migration into the central plateau, perhaps
earlier in the usb of the Boran into Bali as well, the
Macha came in front of the Tulama. Bahrey mentions
that in the engagements which the Boran bodies had with
the regiments of the various provinces tribes like the
Suba acquired fame. 2 He also says that four of the I'Iacha
tribes f.rmM a confederation during the leadership of
the luba Robale
(15fl-1579),
the age-set which led in
the invasion of Shawa. Since the remaining three Macha
tribes, amongst which was the Suba, did. not form a
separate confederation until the term of the next luba,
the Birmage
(1579-1587),
we may assume that a decisive
fissure did not develop within the Macha body until It
had reached western Shawa and Damot.3
1. Cf. the suggestion of Becklngham and Huntingford, Some
Records of Ethiopia, n.
3, p .
112.
2. Ibid.,
p.
113; "Historia gentis Galla", op.cit.,
text,
p.
226, trans., p. 200.
3.
Ibid., text, p. 22'I-, trans.,
p.
196; Beckingham and
Huntingford, Some Records of Ethiopia,
pp.
112-113.
403
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404
We have no preelse clue as to the cause of the
split. One thing seems certain; as the division was
not between the Da'ale and the Jida families, it could
not have been due to rivalry or to any other kind of
conflict between them or between tribes belonging to them.
The conderation of the Afre or the Four, which was the
first to be formed, comprised, the Da'ale tribes of Chele
and Hoko and the Jida tribes of Iiban and Gudru. The
second confederation, that of the Sadacha or the Three,
consisted of two Da'ale tribes, the Obo and the Suba, and
one Jida tribe, the Bakako. Furthermore, since the con-
federations were not formed at the same time, the tribes
of the Afre could not have allied for the purpose of
warring with the xest of the Nacha tribes. Although
Bahrey hints at occasional clashes between the two con-
federations, there is nothing in his history or in other
contemporary accounts which suggests that there were
serious and debilitating wars between them. 1 As is
1. The first reference, in the writings of the Jesuit
missionaries, to clashes between the Galla is made
by Azevedo in his report of July 22,
1607.
As it
is made in connection with the division of the Galla
into two families, namely into the Baraytuma and the
Boran groups, Azevedo must have heard of the hostili-
ties which were beginning to arise in the few places
where tribes of the two groups met. We shall see an
example of this below. Otherwise, in the same para-
graph, Azeveclo speaks of the great concert the Galla
had on matters of interest to them. Rer. Aeth., XI,
133.
405
customary in all pastoral and, nomadic societies, any
dissension between clans, or even individuals, of the two
confederations would have often attracted the attention
of the highest authorities of both, but would not have
involved them in wars against each other.
Geographical factors more than any military reasons
seem to have forced this separation upon the riacha.
Apparently, while the Sadacha passed through Shawa and
began penetrating through Damot in the direction of the
upper Gibe, the ibes of the Afre moved into Gendabarat,
End.agebtan and Mugar districts of Shawa. Their progress
into Gojam was checked by the Blue Nile itself and by the
large number of soldiers from the regiments of Shawa and
Damot which bad, retreated behind it. Consequently, the
Afre tribes were forced to spread out westward into the
Gafat districts which bordered on the river and into
Bizamo. They found this province less attractive than
Go jam, probably because of the resistance its iinasha and
Gonga inhabitants put up, while Waznbarma, the inhabi-
tants of which were weakened by Sarsa Dengel's slaving
raids, was vulnerable. Thus, beginning in
l85,
when
Selus Haila who was at Dabra Abrabam nearly fell into the
hands of one of their bands, the Afre continued to make
devastating incursions into Gojain. Neither Sarsa Dengel
406
nor, after him, Atnatewos, as first minister and. governor
of the province during the regency, rallied any forces
for its defence. The reason why the Afre failed to over-
run Gojain was because the Gafat people had already invaded
Its southern districts. The mass of Gaf at refugees
massed on the Gojam side of the Blue Nile was too dense
to allow free movement to the Afre bands.
Since the Sadacha tribes were still in the Damot
districts directly to their south, the Afre remained
heinnied in within the Gafat lands adjacent to Gojam.
The position that each of the four tribes occupied in the
long, narrow stretch of territory cannot be easily
detennined.. Later, when dealing with the reign of
Susenyos, we shall find the Chele and the Hoko in the
west, in. the region opposite Wambarina, the Gudru in the
centre and most of the Liban in Gendabarat, east of the
Gud.ar river.
Little can be said of the movement of the Sadacha
tribes beyond Damot. As they, together with the
Afre, were in the vanguard of the Boran, they must have
reached the upper waters of the Gibe before, or at least,
at about the same time that the Afre came to Bizamo.
We do not know which they tried to do first, whether to
proceed westward past the headwaters of the Gibe into
407
Bizamo and the vast regions drained by the Didessa and.
its tributaries, or to cross the Gibe south into Janjero,
En.arya and. Konch. They must have attempted and failed
to move in either direction, because for a long period
they remained contained within the falrLy narrow area
which lies between the Gibe and the basin of the Gud.ar
river. The narrow pass between the Gibe and. the Choman
swamps which opened into southern Bizamo was blocked by
its Christian inhabitants, principally by the Jininia,
whose presence there is remembezed by such names as
Lagamara and Tullu Amara) If the Sad.acha had tried to
avoid this obstacle by turning to the north-west they
would have had to press against the immobilized Afre,
or else to risk getting bogged down with their cattle
in the Choman swamps. Expansion into the south was
made difficult by the determined resistance of the people
of Enarya and neighbouring provinces of Konch and Gwnar.
1. The name Tullu Ainara first appears in the chronicle
of lyasu I. "Annales lohannis I, lyasu I et BafaUa",
op.cit., text,
p.
221, trans., p.
25.
The word tullu
in the Galla language means "mountain", and. the word
laga is "river". Right to the west o these Christians
were the Shat, who in turn acted as a buffer between
Enarya and the Afre near Bizamo. Luis de Azevedo,
"Annua de Etiopia de amno de
613",
fol.
97v-98r.,
NS.
779, Braga;Paez, "Historia de Ethiopia", op.cit.,
III,
L
147..49; Some Records of Ethiopia, pp. l-6-48.
408
Until the beginning of the regency the Tulama tribes
gained hardly any grounds to the west of Shawa. The
immobility of the two Nacha families and, the concentra-
tion of refugee soldiers in the Gojam districts opposite
Endagebtan and. Mugar had. in turn checked the gress of
the Tulairia.The foremost tribes of this body, amongst
which was the Kono, established their base in the two
districts, from which they made continuous incursions
into Gojam. Failing to make any headway in that direction
these tribes began to infiltrate, across the Jaina, into
Walaq, where they caine into contact with the Warantisha
tribe of the Baraytuma)
Thus when, sometime in 1603, a new age-set took
over the leadership of the various Boran bodies, their
incursions in these different directions immediately
gained in strength and momentum. Because of the made-
quacy of our sources, we know only of few of the incur-
sions made after 1603. Perhaps the most important
military event was the battle fought at the beginning of
16011. between the Sadacha and the people of Enarya. It
is described in Paez's report of July 1605 and in the
1. The presence of the Kono tribe in Mugar and Walaqa
is mentioned in Cronica d.e Susenyos, I, 11-12, 38,
II,
9, 30.
409
chronicle of $useiiyos. Since the chronicle was written
long after Susenyos's accession to the throne, the
author seems to have slightly tampered with the truth
to suit the responsibilities the prince had. assumed,
Although he had participated in this attack on Enarya
as a condottiere, not as a mercenary, the author has
represented it as a plundering foray which Susenyos made
with the assistance of some Galla friends.' Paez's
description, written soon after the event, shows that
the Galla attacked in large numbers, and the determin-
ation with which the people of Enarya defended themselves
suggests a realization by them that their defeat would
be followed by disastrous consequences. In spite of
the disadvantageous position from which the Galla fought,
for the defenders used a big river, probably the Gibe
itself, as a shield, they killed governor Gueincho and
many of his captains. His men immediately chose his
nephew to take his place and fought with such stubborn-
ness that they repulsed the Sadacha. The Galla and
Susenyos's band withdrew, leaving about 700 horses behind.
them.2
1. Ibid., I, 5-46, II,
36-37.
2. Guerreiro, Rela.o anual, II, 171.
410
About the same time that Enarya was being invested,
other Galla bands tried to invade various parts of
Gojam. According to the abridged history, the bands
against which Zadengel fought belonged to Liban, but
this inlorination is so bare of details that it does not
enable us to determine whether they were from the Liban
tribe of the Afre or from the KOno clan of the same
name. 1
Paez's description of the tbree engagements
the emperor fought with them is longer but just as
vague. However, the strength of the three invading
parties suggests that they belonged to a much bigger
body than the Liban clan of the Koiio would have been.
The first party alone defeated Atnatewos, and would.
have crushed Zadengel, if the emperor had not shown
extraordinary coolness and. spirit. The casualties of
more than 1 ,700 suffered by this party leads us to
assume that the invasion which Zad.engel repulsed was
launched by the Afre coiffederation. 2 They must have
moved across Wambarma. and up the valley of the Ber river.
Nothing is heard of the Baraytuma until after the
1 .
"Due squarci ined.iti di cronica etiopica", op.cit.,
pp.
807, 81 1 -1 2.
2.
Guerreiro, loc.cit.; Paez, "Historia de Ethiopia",
op.eit., III, 228-29.
14.1
'IA
accession of Zad.engel. And the little information we
have of it at this time shows that, ux,like the Boran
group, it had made siiificant advances during the
period of the regency. The first notice comes from
Paez, who describes the raids made into the various lands
around Fremona at the beginning of
1604.1
These
incursions into the very heart of Tigre were, in all
probability, made by bands of the Marawa clan. This
would mean that the Narawa tribe had, at the same time
that it was expanding westward towards Dambiya and Wagara,
cleared the plains of northern ingot, western Beguna
and southern Tigre of their Doba and. other inhabitants.
The bands which
rayaged
the lands around Freznona must
have climbed the escarpments of Tigre and passed through
Wajarat, Endarta and Tainben.
Our other indications on the Baraytuma expansion
again refer to the Narawa tribe. Although during the
raids around Fremona, the Jesuit missionary barely
escaped with his life, he considered himself lucky in
meeting the Galla in Tigre rather than on the way to
the court. The death of the many travellers, in whose
company Paez would have left if he had not been per-
suaded to stay by Keflawand, probably took place in
1. Guerreiro, op.cit., II, 170-71.
Al')
Wagara. 1 Dambiya does not seem to have been disturbed
by the surge of raids, everywhere intensified by the new
luba which had taken office, because ?aryam Se'na con-
tinued to live in oga, which was in Emfraz. The
presence in 1608 of numerous bands from all three clans
of the ?Iarawa in the valley of the Teqen, in western
Bagaineder means that, since the death of Sarsa Dengel,
the tribe had. shifted the course of its incursions from
the valley of the Bashelo to that of the Takaza.2
One reason which made the course down the Bashelo and.
up the Blue Nile into the Shena valley less attractive,
was the settlement of many Querban soldiers in the dis-
tricts of Sama, Darha, Wedo and Enifraz; and these troops
had not been engaged on any campaign or raiding expe-
dition since the death of the emperor. The Karayu
and. the Akachu clans were also spreading out in Amhara.
In the process the !larawa may have been pushed out of
the Bashelo valley and. forced to concentrate their
raids on the Bagameder districts adjacent to the Takeza.
Fragmentary as our information for the period of
anarchy is, it is clear that since the death of Sarsa
1. Ibid.,
p.
170.
2.
Chronica de Susenyos, 1, 116-22, II, 90-9g.
413
Dengel neither the Boran nor the Baraytuma repeated
their earlier successes by adding vast new territories
to their conquests. Obviously, their failure to do
so caxinot be accounted for by any organised resistance
from either of the emperors who ruled during this period.
Their failure was rather due to their dispersal in
different directions and over extensive regions.
This dispersal had begun to weaken their power to
strike and their capacity to penetrate past naturelor
human barriers.
When discussing the progress of the Baraytuma
group in the previous chapter, we mentioned briefly
how the dispersal of its tribes over the various regions
of eastern Ethiopia tended to loosen ties between tribes
and bonds between clans of the same tribe. We shall
now try to examine in some detail how this affected
relationships amongst the Galla themselves as well
as relations between them and the various peoples they
had subjugated.
Internecine rifts and hostilities cannot be ex-
pected to have occurred among the Galla at this stage
of the deceleration in the momentum of their migration.
Even if they realized that their pace was slowing down,
they could still see ahead of them, more lands to move
414
into. The only case of intertribal friction we know
of concerns the Warantisha tribe. 1 It was later to
make a peace agreement with Susenyos and, to break it soon
after. This so incensed the chronicler that he could
see nothing but betrayals, villainy and, bloodshed in .
all the affairs in which the tribe was concerned. It
is, therefore, very probable that the series of clashes
between this tribe and. other Barayturna tribes, which
the chronicler enumerates, did not really happen,
but that the frictions which may have resulted in
clashes were smoothed by the authorities who con-
ducted the affairs of the group. Of the many clashes
mentioned by the chronicler, the only situation where
hostility may have flared, up is that between the
Warantisbad the Liban clan of the Tulaina tribe of
Kono. Here, because there were no authorities who
could have settled differences between tribes of the
two groups, the Warantisb.a sought the alliance of
the emperor.
The story of the Warantisha may therefore be
interpreted in this manner. It was the first of the
Baraytuma tribes to enter Walaq. a by way of the Wancit
and Jama vaLleys. Perbaps because of the steepness
1. Ibid., I, lkl, II, 109.
A1P'
with which, at Bechana district, the plateau of Gojam
rose from the Blue Nile and the resistance which Zar'a
Yohannes put up, the tribe was wiable to make any head-
way into Gojam. The Wara De'aya tribe was, apparently,
following behind, and, due to the inability of the
Warantisha to give way, the Wara De'aya. tribe had. to
turn eastwards into the fertile plains of Adal and the
Awssa.
In the meantime, bands of the Warantisha began to
move up the valley of the Blue Nile into that of the
Walaq.
a river, where they came into contact with bands
of the Akachu tribe and of the Wallo clan of the Karayu.
But as southern Anibara was not big enough for clans of
all three tribes to operate in it, the Warantisha seem
to have been redirected into Walaqa, to spread them-
selves out across the province and to push across into
Gojani. It was at this stage, probably by the beginning
of the regency, that Liban bands of the Tulama tribe of
Kono began to cross from Shawa into Walaqa. As the
chronicler tells, no hostility broke out between the
two sides. They lived in peace for some time, probably
for the duration of the period of anarchy. They may
even have made joint raids against the strongholds within
the province and incursions into Gojam. The peace and,
416
perhaps, their co-operation may have been destroyed
when more and. more bands of the Kono and other Tulama
tribes entered into the province, thereby overcrowding
and outnumbering the Warantisha. Since the other
Baraytuma tribes were engaged in expanding their lands,
the only quarter where the Varantisha could find, sym-
pathy and support was that of Susenyos who, as a bandit,
had stayed with its bands and helped them reduce some
of the strongholds. We do not know the terms of the
agreement; when the chronicler says that the emperor
gave the Warantisha the Walaqa lands of Jama and Amonat,
he may have meant to say that ha recognized its occu-
pation of these lands in return for undertaking to defend
these and other neighbouring lands against the Tulania.
The other significant aspect of the dispersal of
the Galla was the way it affected their relationship
with the various peoples with whom they caine into con-
tact. Describing the policy that the Baraytuina group
adopted towards the peoples it subjugated immediately
after leaving Bali, Bahrey says that it "began to
enslave the inhabitants, and it made them slaves and.
called them gabar".' The tein gabar and the institution
1. "Historia genis Galla", op.cit., text,
p. 225,
trans., p. 198; Some Records of Ethiopia,
p.
116.
417
it described was not only Ethiopian but also charac-
teristic to those agricultural provinces the officers
of which were appointed by the emperor and where regi-
ments were settled. Since as conquerors the Galla
needed to maintain the distinction between themselves
and the subjugated peoples, they took the social system
which they found and adopted it to suit their require-
ments and. the conditions then prevailing. As nomadic
peoples, the ties of affiliation between clans of the
same tribe and between tribes o the same group were
very strong. Furthermore, as their form of goverm-
nient was basically democratic, it was extremely necessary
that strangers were kept out of their age-sets.
We do not know how and when, in the progress of
the migrations, the Galla began to modify the class
system which the institution of gabar represented.
Of the many factors which made its preservation by the
Galla impractical, if not impossible, the most iinpor-
tant was the fact that they were continuously on the
move. In the eyes of the peasants, the Galla were not
mere intruders but aliens and enemies, who bad caused
much damage and upset their sedentary way of life.
Even if the peasants were too inexperienced in handling
arms and fighting to cause concern to their new masters,
418
there must have been amongst the captives many noble-
men and, soldiers. It is unlikely that the Galla would
have given preferential treatment to these, they
probably made them gabar like tb.e peasants. As a
result, the Galla wou'd have needed to employ substan-
tial numbers of their warriors in watching over the
subject peoples.Galla society, being pastoral and
democratic, lacked the fully developed. machinery for
policing large numbers of such peoples. And with
raids and, incursions to be made an& new territories to
be Invaded., to have resentful subjects was unnecessary
and. potentially dangerous. To reduce tension and to
eliminate all possibility of hostilities between them
and their subjects, the Galla bad to modify the gabar
system which they had. adopted. Different tribes may
have improvised different r1ationships and, in view
of the limitation of sources, we can only define a
general system which, it seems, was commonly adopted
by both groups.
The first indication of Improvization is suggested
by Balirey himself, when. he hints at the existence of
separate age-sets for the gabar) ThiS would mean that
1. Ibid.,
p.
128; "Historia gentis Galla ", op.cit.,
text, p. 231, trans.,
p. 207.
419
the subject peoples were not organized territorially,
or grouped in large bodies and governed by appointed
Ga].la Officers. Rather they were attached to each
clan, by the bands of which thel were taken prisoners,
and given age-sets
so that they could regulate their
own affairs. In the old society the gabar system had.
helped to keep the professional soldiers free from
agricultural and other domestic occupations. As farming
was made impossible by the mobility of the Galla, the
services required from the subject peoples seem to have
been to assist in tending after the cattle and to help
in the raL&s, incursions and other wars of expansion.
This may explain why much of Nugar and Walaqa had become
desolate wasteland auring this period of anarchy and.
why, in 1614, the Jesuit Antonio Fernand.es and his corn-
panlons saw very few signs of farming while passing
through Waj, Fatagar and. most of Shawa)
To this type of gabar class belonged the numerous
communities which were attached to the different Macha
tribes. The Galla caUed them yahabata and. ilmaguazit
and, as there were different yahabata communities attached.
1. Chronica d.e Susenyos, I, 12, 141, II, 9-10,
109;
and.
Azevedo, "Arinua de Etiopia do anno de
1615",
fol.
124v - 1
25r,
MS.
779,
Braga.
420
the two clans of the Chele and to those of the Jawi
and, the Hoko, the words yahabata and ilmaguazit were
not proper names for only two families or communities
of subject peoples. Some of these gabar communities,
seeking the assistance of the governor of Gojam in
1618, thus described their relationship with the Galla
to whom they were attached.
Behold we have quarrelled with our
masters the Galla. We have fought
with them until we have both shed.
blood. Come quickly and. receive us.
For from old our origin and. descent
is from you and not from the Galla.
The men of the yahabata and ilmaguazit were good
fighters, most of them being mounted. The Galla
probably needed their services more in fighting than
looking after the cattle. But since these communities
regarded the Galla as their masters, they must have been
excluded from the Galla age-sets and from leadership.
It is also quite possible that they must have been
restricted in the number of cattle which they could
own. Although many of their people were later con-
verted to Christianity, this would not exclude the
possibility that there were among the older members
mary Christians from all the provinces which lay west
1. Chronica d.e Susenyos, I, 191, II, 1L17.
IflJ
"A
of Bali and Dawaro. As most of the captured people
would have lapsed in faith, the Church, in any case,
would have required their rebaptism. The majority
of the warriors in these communities would be young men
born in captivity, many of them with Galla fathers.1
Avery brief reference to the position of subject
peoples among the Baraytuma tribes suggests that not all
the non-Galla were treated as gabar.
After this matter of victory [against
the Wallo in Amhara] the King of
Kings Seltan Sagad ordered that they
cut off the genitals and. chopped the
noses and ears of the Galla who were
taken prisoners. Those who were
talata and abar he had them adorned
with beautiful ornaments. And he
sent the Galla who were emasculated
and the talata who were adorned on
their way to their homes. Because
of this all the tribes of the Galla
became very sad and all the children
of the Amhara, those who were born
here and those who 'ere captured, were
overjoyed by his love for them and his
kindness to them. 2
When using the clause "those who were born here
and those who were captured", the chronicler was not
making a distinction between those subject peoples whom
1. Pereira's tentative explanations of the two terms
are not satisfactory.Thid.,II, '4-67-68.
The word ilmna in the Galla language means "son".
Further investigation is necessary before we can
say whether the ilmaguazit were sons of Galla warriors
by gabar women or simply children of captive men and
women.
2. Ibith, I, 235-36,11,181. Pereira's translation of the
last sentence is not very accurate.
A')')
the Galla captured in Amhara and those whom they had
captured previously in other provinces. He was simply
distinguishing the Amhara who were not with the Galla
from the talata and gabar Anihara who had come to raid
them with the Galla. As we have no reason for sup-
posing that the Galla would have created separate and
privileged communities for some of their captives
while making others gabar, there must have been strong
factors which prevented the Galla from Including the
talata with the gabar.
The origin of the word talata is as obscure as
that of the two terms for the gabar communities amongst
the Nacha. Since the chronicler mentions the existence
of talata communities in Fatagar, a province under
tribes of the ulaina family, there can be no doubt
that the word was a general name for a type of coinnrnnity
as yahabata and ilniaguazit were for gabar communities.1
We find that towards the end of the century the Nacha
tribes also had their talata communities. In the
time of lyasu, there was little peace between the talata
and the waladanha. The word talata may have been
derived from the Galla word dalattu which means "born"
or "first born". The word. waladanha may have come
from the Galla word wa1da meaning "assembly" or "meeting
1. Chronica de Susenyos, I,
285, II, 220.
423
point". 1
Hence, waladanha may have been an .A.mharicized.
word. for the pure Galla who enjoyed full rights arid.
took part in the meetings and. other political and.
social activities of the age-sets.
Although the chronicler of lyasu writes of talata
Galla and. waladanha Galla, he makes clear distinction
between the talata Galla and the 1 acha. 2 We cannot,
however, say that the talata were exclusively the sons
of the Galla by their Amhara, Gaf at, Jimma and other
captive women of the highlands. If the talata o the
Karayu were sons of Galla warriors, Susenyos may have
found it difficult to distinguish one group from the
other. Furthermore the talata who sought the assistance
of lyasu in their conflict with the waladanha were far
too numerous and occupied too large a part of the
areas in and. near the old province of Damot to be
1 .
I am grateful for the kind assistance I received
from Dr B.W. Andrzejewski of the School of African
and Oriental Studies. As my. understanding of
grammatical rules is extremely limited, I am guilty
of oversimplifying his explanations. It is very
unlikely that the word waladanha is in any way
related to the Amharic welaj, a word roughly equi-
valent to "bastard child". Pereira's identification
of the talata with the Afar Taltal who live in the
eastern Tigre lowlands is definitely unacceptable.
Thid., II, 505.
2 .
"Annales lohannis I, lyasu I et Bakaffa", op.cit.,
text,
pp.
1 90,
2 56, trans., pp. 2 OO 2 75.
424
considered as only the bastard children of the Nacha.
The talata Jinuna, for example, lived between Nt. Jibat,
Asandabo and. Tullu Amara) Yet those Jiimna people who
lived in Tullu Ainara were not completely subjugated by
the Galla when lyasu visited them in
1703.
Until we can definitely establish the significance
of the word talata, we may assume that the communities
thus designated. in the chronicles belonged to those
people who, when their lands fell to the Galla, avoided
capture by fortifying themselves within mountain strong-
holds. In time, some of these strongholds may have
been opened for purposes of trade with the Galla around
them, and from the trade friencIrelations may have
gradually developed. Other strongholds may have been
reduced by the Galla themselves or with the help of
the many companies of former I
l
eigmental soldiers who
had. turned into ruthless bandits. Even when surren-
dering, the strong position of the besieged may have
enabled. them to obtain reasonable teims, thereby saving
themselves from being made gabar. Of the talata com-
munities some may have been auxiliary bodies, more or
less like allies of the Galla. Others may have been
1. Ibid., text, p. 240, trans.,
p. 256.
a dv'
somewhat subordinate, client bodies, the people of
which kept their lands and were ruled by their own men,
but paid. tribute to the Galla. The talata may not
have been made to adopt age-sets. When taking part
in raids they may have kept more substantial portions
of the booty than the gabar.
To appreciate the number of mountain strongholds
which succeeded in holding out for many years after the
provinces in which they were had fallen to the Baraytuma
or Boran Galla, we need only glance at the acciuit of
Susenyos's early career. Most of these strongholds
were formerly strategic mountain posts around which
regiments were garrisoned. These had then become
centres of refuge for the soldiers who could not move
away to safer places, and for the peasants working the
surrounding farms. In those parts of Ifat around
Qacheno, the garrison post which the soldiers of Giyorgis
Haile regiment abandoned, Suseriyos stormed and reduced
about kO strongholds in which were living the remnantS
of the Hafro Aygaba regiment and the
Muslims of the
area. Antonio Fernandes and his companions stopped at
some such strongholds while passing from Hadya through
Waj, Fatagar and. Shawa into Gojain. Even Bali had
enough of these strongholds to enable it to maintain a
426
shadow of the old administration. The people in
them, must have felt secure and, relatively prosperous,
because in
1598
the garad., one Dagano, set out for
Danibiya to give tribute and pay homage to the new
emperor. He passed safely through the Galla in Waj,
Fatagar and Shawa, only to fall into the hands of
Susenyos at Walaqa.
In the chronicle of Susenyos mention is made to
a group of merchants who, in 1602, set out from some-
where near Lake Zway towards Dabra Libanos. As the
dwellers of Bel'et, one of the fortified villages
around the monastery, mistook them for Galla bands, the
merchants may have been trying to reopen one of the old.
trade routes.' And as they were robbed. by Susenyos,
it is unlikely that any route was reopened at this
time. In any case, the merchants may have come to Waj
from Zayla and Awsea. That the Galla were reopening
some of the routes and encouraging the movement of
merchants can. be seen from Fernandes's description of
the trading activities carried. on in a mountain strong-
hold. situated on the border with Waj. 2 The stronghold
1. Ibid., I, 38, II, 30-31.
2. Luis d.e Azevedo, "Annua d.e Etiopia do anno de 1615",
fol. 124'r, NB.
779,
Braga.
427
was inhabited by Nuslims and Christians, all of them
subjects of Alico, ruler of the district. Here the
Jesuit came across a caravan of merchants who had
brought cotton cloths and. other goods from Zayla and.
were buying slaves and horses from the inhabitants
and the Galla around the stronghold.
Alico's family
connections illustrate the degree to which community
feeling was beginning to develop. The chief, who
was himself a Muslim, had a Cbristian relative, while
his daughters were married. to some important Galla men.
Because the Galla of the Afre confederation needed salt,
the trade route between Enarya and Tigre seems to have
been patronized by them. The way some Galla men
requested customs dues from Antonio Fernattdes soon after
he crossed the ford on the Blue Nile which led from
Gojam to Bizamo suggests that they were accustomed to
collecting dues.
III. The Special Role of Refugees in the Southern
Provinces
Because the geographical conditions of the central
plateau and. the military situation which prevailed
there in the time of Sarsa Dengel enabled. the Macha an
Tulama bodies to sweep across it en masse, a large
429
taking back with him to Dambiya. Of those soldiers
who were unable or unwilling to follow him, however,
many seem to have moved, to the nearby mountains of
Gurage, where they helped the people to fend off
attacks by the Tulama and the Dawe. The usefulness
of refugees with military experience may be seen from
the high regard the people of Gurage had for Dama
Chrestos and his men. Although Daina Cb.restos had the
title of governor of Waj, he lived mostly amongst them,
helping them against the Galla, against the aggressive
rulers of Hadya and. against marauders like Susenyos)'
Others, from among the soldiers and. the ordinary inha-
bitants, may have retreated southwards into Hadya,
Kambata, Walamo and the small provinces of Kuera, Buzana
and Bozanegus. Fernandes's report suggests that Uadya
and Kainbata did. not receive serious damage from the
Galla, and that Kuera and the neighbouring districts
had avoided being completely submerged.
The presence of Christians in the mountainous
districts of Hadya and. its border strongholds indicates
the movements of refugees from WaJ and perhaps from
Ganz and Gamo as well. The rulers of Hadya had the
1. Ibid.., I,
3Ll37,
II, 27-30.
A
430
long tradition of strenghening themselves by welcoming
migrating Muslims of the lowlands as well as all kinds
of fugitives from the court. At this time Sid.i felt
so strong that he renewed the ambition of his precursor
Aze to extend his authority over Gurage, the peoples
of which had never succeeded in bridging their tribal
differences and acquiring the leadership which could
have united them.
Most of the soldiers and non-military inhabitants
of Damot and Ganz had followed Asbo into Gojam. The
preponderance of refugees from Damot in the southern
and central districts of Gojam was such that it seems
that Atnatewos had to share its administration with Asbo.
It is also very probable that some refugees had moved
into Kambata while others had crossed the Gibe into
Bosha, Konch and Enarya. The soldiers may have tried
to practise vandalism in those areas to which they
retreated, but the pressure of the Galla may have
forced them to co-operate with the indigenous people
on their mutual defence. Curiously enough, Fernandes
does not report the presence of many Christians in the
court of pagan Janjero.
It is perhaps in connection with the dispersal of
refugees, especially of the regimental soldiers, that
431
we can explain the claim to Tigre ancestry made by
diverse peoples of southern Ethiopia. The people who
claim this descent spread from eastern Shawa
all the
way south to Walamo) In addition to their inhabi-
tants of mixed faiths, and. the soldiers of local regi-
ments like the Hafro Aygaba, the strongholds of Ifat,
Tagulat and. Sarmat provided shelter for men from other
regiments of nearby districts and for refugees from
Dawaro, Adal and. Harar. There may have been amongst
these some people of Tigre origin, but they must have
constituted a small fraction. Putting aside the
remote possibility that the name Tigre may have had a
significance unconnected with the northern province,
we can only mention two possibilities for the origin of
1. On the traditions concerning the Tigre origin of
the Nuslins of Shawa and Gurage, see C. Nond.on-
Vid.ailhet, "Lea dialectes thiopiens du Gouraghe",
ES, VIII (1900)
170;
Cerulli, "Ii sultanato dello
Scioa nel secolo XIII", RSE, 1 (1941),
15;
and
Alaqa Taye, Ya-Ityopya tank,
pp.
48-49. On traditions
amongst the Bosha, see Cecchi, Da Zeila alle frontiere
del Caffa, II, 460, including n.l; amongst the people
of Kaffa, F.J. Bieber, Kaffa, emaltkuschitisches
Volkstum in Inner-Afrika, II,
79;
amongst those of
Kullo and Konta L. Traversi, "Escursione nel Gimma",
BSGI, XXV (1888, 920-21; amongst the peop1 of
Wallamo, E.H. Habenland., Uutersuchungen zurn lthiopischen
Knitum,
pp.
255-63.
Beckin.gham and Huntingford.,
provide a brief survey of the various traditions in
the introductory chapter to their Some Records of
Ethiopia.
.z ,,
the claim.1
Although there had. not been any significant
migratory movement from the north to the south, the
presence of the court in Shawa could not have failed
to attract all kinds of people from all over the
country. The province of Tigre was frequently plagued
by famine due to recurrent drought and locust invasioz i.
The Jesuit sources, for example, contain numerous des-
criptions of impoverished people regularly moving into
Suseriyos's court in Dambiya. It is, therefore,
possible that in Shawa the term tigre had acquired a
significance connected with wandering or emigrating.
But as such an origin would have given the terni a
pejorative sense, it is unlikely that descent from men-
dicant wanderers or homeless adventurers would have been
remembered with pride over several centuries.
The other possibility which looks more plausible,
is that the term tigre was associated with soldiery,
just as the name Sidaina came to mean to the Galla a
stranger and a non-Galla, and as Amara caine to signify
1. A. d'Abbadie was told that there was a place called
igri in Tagulat, near Ankober. Goraphie d 1'
Ethiopie, p. 21. Even if the place had this name
in the XVIth century, there are many reasons why
it cannot be linked with the traditions. 8hawa or
Ifat were more known names and, therefore, easier
to remember.
433
a Christian to the T1usliin inhabitants of Ifat, Adal
and. Harar. Among the highland. farmers of present day
Shawa and Wallo the name Adal is given indiscriminately
to the Afar and. Galla transhwnant pastoralists of the
eastei lowlands, The term tigre could have acquired
this significance because of the frequent movement of
regiments from all the provinces of the north, espe-
cially whenever the pressure from the Nuslims of the
eastern lowlands became intense, as in the time of
Lebna Dengel.
How such a significance could have developed may
be illustrated. by two cases of recent occurrence.
Borelli gives a short description of the Gondare bands
which acquired some renown in the time of Nenelik 11.1
These bands of vazying sizes, comprised mostly of
soldiers of fortune from Tigre, Bagamed.er and. Gojam.
For reasons not known, these men had. not wanted to serve
as retainers of their local lords. 2 Instead, and
perhaps attracted by the booty and, slaves to be had. in
the campaigns being waged to the south and south west
of Ehawa, they flocked to this province, where they
1. J. Borelli, Ethiopie Nridionale,
p. 175;
and also
Cerulli, Etiopia occidentale, I,
137.
2. I have not made any deep research on this matter.
4.4
organised themselves into bands, chose their leaders
and then placed themselves in the service of the emperor
and his war-lords. We do not know why these bands
came to be called Gondare. It niay be because until
shortly before ?lenelik's time Gondar had been the
capital of the kingdom and the province of Bagamed.er
the centre of soldiering and fighting.
IIany of the soldiers who, from among the Gondare
bands and the provincial levies, committed serious
crimes, sought refuge in the inaccessible parts of
Sidamo and BoranaHere they formed themselves into
bands of robbers and became notorious under the name 0'
tigre.' Some of the members and leaders of these bands
seem to have come from Tigre. But we do not know if
the presence of the men from the north was the reason
for so naming the bands. The term tigre may simply
have come to mean, a soldier who had turned bandit and
slaver.
The regimental soldiers who, at the time of the
Galla migrations, withdrew into the various sheltered
districts and. provinces of southern Ethiopia were
1. A.W. Hod.son, Sevei Years in Southern Abyssinia,
p. 71.
435
probably numerically inferior to the peasants and other
people who retreated with them. However, the military
experience of the soldiers and their possessio. of arms
must have enabled them, at least in some cases, to
acquire advantageous positions over the local people
and fellow refugees.The soldiers of the Hafro .Aygaba
regiment seem to have been prominent in eastern Shawa.
They may have also intermarried with the local Itusliin
and. Christian inhabitants and with the other refugees
from Ad.al and Harar.el1gious and., in the case of
the Turks, racial differences, did. not affect the
solidarity of the Querban units, who had a much lesser
need for unity than the besieged refugees. Descent
from the Hafro lygaba soldiers or from the men of Dana
Chrestos could be, in all likelihood, remembered with
pride.
The interesting aspect of the claim to Tigre
ancestry is that it is made mostly by people who may
have been partly or wholly non-Christians. The inha-
bitants of northern Shawa, Kambata or Enarya, who were
mostly Christians at this time, remember no such descent.1
1. According to A. Pernandes the people of Kaffa were
pagan at the beginning of the XVIIth century.
Azevedo, "Annua de Ethiopia do anno d.e 1615", fol.
123r, N$.
779,
Braga.
436
This may mean that in those places of retreat where
the people were Christians the refugees were easily
amalgamated. In those places where the people were
mostly Nuslixns or pagans the absorption of Christian
refugees may have been slow. Nevertheless, how much
of their Christian faith and traditions the soldiers
passed to their Nuslim or pagan hosts is a question
which will perhaps remain unanswerable. We cannot say
whether the conversion of some of the tribes of Gurage
had begun in earlier periods, or whether it followed
the establishment of Christian refugees amongst them.
Nor can we establish if the vestiges of Christianity
which are found among the people of Walamo preceded
or followed the coming of refugees. According to
traditions gathered by Haberlari.d, the ruling family
of this province was, some time at the beginning of the
seventeenth centuz7, superseded by a nobleman who came
from Tigre. 1 The dynasty which he founded is said to
have implanted Christianity as well as court ceremonies.
Other traditions reported by Gabrilov, however, seem to
indicate that Christianity was antecedent to the Galla
1 . Haberland, Untersuchungen zum lthiopischen Knigtuni,
pp. 259-60.
437
migrations and the wars of Ahinad. Granh) Since
Christianity had preceded the Galla into Kuera and even
into the highlands of Gamu, east of Lake Abaya,
Gabrilov's traditions may have some truth. In which
case, all that can be said is that the coining of
Christian soldiers into the basically pagan areas may
have strengthened the faith and. given it longer life.
There is nothing in the documentary sources which
could help us either to substantiate or to disprove
the tradition concerning the founding of a dynasty by
a shum from Agame who had a few hundred followers. It
is doubtful if leaders of refugees like Daina Chrestos
were strong enough to overthrow local rulers and.
chiefs, however weak these may have been. Susenyos
tried unsuccessfully to impose his rule over Ifat and
the northern districts of Shawa. We do not know how
strong Walamo was, but if the founder was a marauder,
like the prince from Waja.rat who joined Susenyos's band.
in
1605,
the people of Walamo could have resisted him.
On the other hand, the dynasty may have been founded
by intermarriage between a member of the ruling fanily
and. a leader of the refugees given shelter in the
1. W. Gabrilov, "Un' interessante regione deli'
Abissinia.
Ii Uoilaino", Rlvista delle Colonie
Italiane, IV
(1930), 1073-75.
438
province. Or, the tradition may be as spurious as
that legend which traces Gurage ancestry to one azmach
Sebhat of Gura'e, or that equally fabulous story of the
two Portuguese, called Sapira and Sigaro, who founded
rival dynaths in. Kaffa during the reign of Susenyos.
The emergence of bandits and condottiere who
operated with the Galla was obviously a. later develop-
ment. It is unlikely that the alla, at the height
of their migrations would have allowed such men to
move in and. out of their camps. Such men could have
come into existence only after the impetus of migration
was beginning to become weak, and when the Galla needed
the assistance of experienced men to help them reduce
fortified villages and mountain strongholds. Even
during this period of anarchy there were very few
independent marauders roaming the provinces south of
Gojain, especially as the Galla were capturing those
non-Galla whom they sound in the open and. selling them
to the merchants of Awasa and. Zayla. It was primarily
fugitive princes and rebellious noblemen who were given
refuge by the Galla. Such men came with numerous well
equipped and experienced followers.
The early career of Susenyos is not truthfully
represented by the chronicler. He would have us
believe that because Susenyos was a prince, the Tulama,
439
the Macha, the Warantisha and. the Wallo submitted. to
him and. that, becoming like his gabar, they followed.
him. into Walaqa, Bizamo and. Enarya. We would rather
see Susenyos as a condottiere with a large following
who proved useful to the various Galla tribes whom
he served. He helped the Afre tribes against strong-
holds in Walaqa and Gojam and. against the Gafat and
the Shinasha. When the attacks on Walaqa and. Gojam
proved unsuccessful and. dangerous, he placed himself
at the disposal of the tribes of Gurage, which were
worried by the ambitions of Sidi, ruler of Hadya.
1 1 e was defeated. by
Sid.i*s
formidable army, and. some of
his men, led by Abranyos, another rebellious prince,
deserted. him.
In 1 603 be was with the Sadacha,
assisting them in their attack on Enarya. By this
time, Abranyos also had. found his way to Enarya to take
part in the fighting on the side of the defenders.
The assistance which men like Susenyos and their
followers gave to the Galla probably caused. less damage
than is suggested. by the chronicler. Besides, the
author says little about the checks which the Galla
and Susenyos received. in Gojam and. in the strongholds
of Walaqa and Shawa. The benefits which resulted. from
these associations probably outweighed. the harm done.
440
The Galla were beginning to open friendly relations
with the people they had. failed to overpower, and also
to take part in trade. As a result of these relations,
individuals were emerging from the anonymity of the
age-sets; and. some of the individuals wanted wealth
and influence. Amuma and, perhaps, Buko also,
possessed much wealth, some of which may have proceeded
from expeditions made jointly with the men of fortune.
Ainuma, for example, used hiS influencs among the Galla
in Waj and Patagar to make their relations with the
strongholds of Hadya and. Shawa amicable,
Perhaps the greatest contribution of Susenyos and
the many political refugees who sought asylum or assis-
tance amongst the Galla was in involving them in the
factious conflicts and rebellions which plagued the
country. The Galla probably thought they were
making use of the rebel princes. The result, however,
was that the Galla, whose unity was anyway breaking
down from their dispersal, were dragged into the inter-
minable conflicts in which their interests became con-
fused with those of the people they wanted to conquer.
441
CHAPTER VI
ATTEMPTS TO RECONSTRUCT THE ABSOLUTISM OP THE MONARCHY
I. Suseixyos's
system of government
Proper education and. upbringing might have given
Susenyos a historical awareness of the economic and
political factors which enabled the provincial war-lords
to challenge the authority of the monarchy. What the
years of banditry did, even if they helped to make him
self-reliant and intrepid., was to blunt his political
sensitiveness and insight. If at the time of his
accession he had any notions on authority and. govern-
ment, he had probably acquired them during his sojourn
in Sarsa Dengel's court some time in 1596. The con-
trast between the turbulent conditions in southern
Gojam, where Susenyos had his home, and the conspicuous
calm which existed in the court would have impressed
him. He may have attributed the peacefulness of Sarsa
Dengel's last years to the particular relationships
which existed between the emperor and his provincial
officers.
Thus, upon coming to the throne, Susenyos had
adopted the expediency of removing as many of the lords
as he could and putting in their places his brothers and
442
some of his other trusted companions. Although the
successful suppression of the various rebellions which
the lords had incited against him was not entirely due
to the military strength of his officers, the emperor
was satisfied with the effectiveness of his action.
Consequently, the simple idea ttLat only those whom the
emperor raised and honoured would serve him loyally
was elaborated into a policy on which Susenyos founded
the security of his throne and the stability of the
country
Susenyos's governors were mostly his brothers,
his cousins and his sons-in-law. Naturally, he had
more trust and confidence in them than Sarsa Dengel.
had had in the men patronized by his mother or his wife.
Susenyos's policy, therefore, failed to reverse or even
to stop the continuing shift of power from the court
into the provinces.
Rather, it increased the dimensiori.s
of the power of the war-lords and widened the horizon
of their ambitions.
When in 1612 Se'la Chrestos became governor of
Gojam, he received in addition the province of Walaqa
1. Paez recalls the emperor explaining to him, "Father,
those whom I bring up and honour serve me with a good
heart; as for these (the noblemen), there are few
who can be trusted." "Historia de Ethiopia", Rer.
Aeth., II,
55.
See also Almeida, "Historia de
Xthiopia a Alta", Ibid., 11, 67.
443
as well as some districts of north-western Shawa)
As his brother's favourite, he had every freedom in
the choice of assistants and the organization of the
administration. Since he had with him a limited
number of lieutenants and, retainers, the only way he
could effectively control his wide territory was by
amalgamating the numerous districts into three larger
administrative divisions. This expedient was intended
at the same time to disarm the hereditary notables of
the districts, who regarded him as an outsider to power-
politics within the province. Thus, the close to thirty
districts of Gojam were reduced to three main divisions.
The eastern districts of the province, as they were still
inhabited by their old Christian inhabitants, came to
be known under the name of Gojani. The southern and
central districts, into which the various peoples of
Damot and. Shawa had moved, were given the name of
Damot. The third division comprised the western and
northern districts, inhabited by the pagan Agaw.
Although the administrators of the different dlvi-
sions still bore ancient titles like gojani nagash, damot
1. Paez, loc.clt., p. k2k.Of the districts of Shawa
we know that at least Narabete was under Se'la Chrestos.
Azevedo to Francisco Vieira, provincial of Goa,
June 30, l6lL 4, fol. lOOr, NS.
779,
Braga.
444
sahafe lam or walaqa nagash, they were mere retainers
of Se'la Chrestos, and as such directly dependent upon
him. 1 Unfortunately, neither the chronicle of Susenyos
nor the documents of the Jesuits tell us whether these
officers received their appointments from the emperor
or from Se'la Chrestos.It is quite possible that the
brothers had, not interfered with the traditional
patterns of administration to the extent of abolishing
the ceremonies which accompanied the appointment of
governors. The officers to be appointed were probably
recommended by Se'la Chrestos, while the titles and the
insignias of office were probably conferred by the emperor.
This centralization of the provincial athninis-
tration d,ealt the last blow to the ancient military
system of distributing regiments throughout different
1. The men who held the office of go jam nagash throughout
Se'la Chrestos's long governorship were his retainers.
Almeida, loc.cit., VI,
237,
4-21; and Chronica de
Susenyos, I, 158, 222, II, 122, 171. The office of
walaqa nagash was, in 1614-, also held by a retainer
of the governor. Azevedo, "Annua de Etiopia do
Jun. 28 anno de
1615",
fol.
l25v,
NS. 779, Braga.
Buko, the damot sahafe lam, seems to have acknowledged
Se'la Chrestos as his lord when in 1621 he dedicated
the thirty recusant laymen he killed with his own hands
to the governor, the emperor and the Roman Church.
Thomde Barros, "Relatione della missione fatta da'
pad.ri della Compgri1a di Giesu nell'Etiopia, gl'anni
1621, 1622, e 1623", in Lettere Annue d'Etiopia,
Nalabar, Brazil e Goa.Dall'Anno 1620, fin'al 1624-,
p. 29.
445
strategic points in the province. The disintegration
of the old. garrisons meant a marked decline in the
number of soldiers whom the emperor could mobilize at
any giveii time. As a governor, however, Se'la Chrestos
was stronger than any other before him. The full
freedom he enjoyed in the expenditure of the provincial
revenues enabled him to gather around him a large
number of retainers. These retainers were recruited
from among the Sons of soldiers who belonged. to the old
regiments of Gojam, Shawa and Damot. Although the
old reginiental names were given to the squadrons into
which the retainers were organized, the new units con-
sisted of many fewer men than the old. regiments.1
since the administrators under Se'la Chrestos
were his retainers, who had. no say in the expenditure
of the revenues collected from their respective divisions,
they were unable to maintain private armies of their
own. Whenever the necessity arose, Se'la Chrestos
placed some of his squadrons under them. But as the
necessity arose very frequently, due to the increasing
raids of the Galla, the governor often appointed. the
captains of his various squadrons over th administrative
1. On the names of the new squadrons of Se'la Chrestos,
see Cbronica de Susenyos, I,
254 , 283,
II,
195,
218.
446
areas. Needless to Bay, the defence of the whole of
Gojani would have been best served by appointing over
Shawa and Walaqa governors who were directly dependent
on the emperor and who had, their own strong forces of
retainers.
Likewise, the defence of Tigre and. Bagameder against
the incursions of the Narawa demanded the appointment
of strong governors over Lasta and the nearby districts
of Angot, as yet unoccupied by the Galla. Instead,
Lasta was detached from Wag and Beg'una and given to
Yamana Chrestos, governor of Bagamed.er.1 The few
strongholds remaining in ingot were placed wider Afa
Chrestos. The necessity of securing control over
their widely scattered territories also forced. both
governors to amalgamate the different districts under
them into bigger administrative units. The two
governors were older than the emperor and Se'la Chrestos,
and. they had sons old. enough to assist them in the
command of their retainers and the adininistratioii of
their territories.
Until l6l the smaller provinces which lay
between Dambiya and the Takaza river were entrusted to
1 . Almeid.a, "Historia de Ethiopia a Alta", Rer. Aeth.,
V, 12, 30, VI,
325.
447
the less important of the emperor's favourites.
Walda Hawaryat and. Takia Giyoris, both of them his
sons-in-law, governed Salamt and. Semen respectively.
Asqa Giyorgis, a nephew, was placed over Wagara.
When the dispossessed nobility of these provinces
rose up in, arms in support of a pretender called Takluy,
the second iniposter to claim that he was the Emperor
Ya'eqob, the task of suppressing the rebellions was
entrusted to lolyos. He was the oldest and. most
devoted of the emperor's companions and the husband of
his favourite daughter. Since Yolyos had been, until
his new appointment, governor of Tigre, the emperor
probably did not want to disappoint him by ving him
one of the small provinces. He, therefore, put him
over Wagara, Semen, Salamt and Vag, as well as over
the tbree Tigre districts of Abargale, Bora and Salawa.1
As Yolyos depended on his retainers only, these places
proved difficult to subdue and to govern. The moun-
tainous nature of the coniponetit provinces and the
inaccessibility of the Takaza valley presented serious
obstacles to the movement of soldiers.
Susenyos's modifications of the traditional
1. Chronica de Susenyos, I, 151, II, 117.
448
boundaries of provinces were thoughtless and. arbitrary,
all of them more harmful tb.an beneficial. The changes
made were not in answer to any basic political or
military necessity. Provinces were enlarged or reduced
in accordance with the degree of affection the emperor
had for his officers. Because his other sons-in-law
were younger men who had not been with him in his days
of banditry, he not only reduced the area of the pro-
vinces he gave them but often used other devices which,
much to their irritation, curbed their powers. After
the death of Yolyos, his successor Walda Hawaryat
received a much circumscribed territory comprising only
Semen, Salamt, Wag and.. Abargale. 1 The erratic nature
of Susenyos's administration of the provinces is best
illustrated by the repeated changes he made in Tigre.
Se'la Chrestos asked to be withdrawn from the provinces
in
1 609,
because the various district notables refused
to obey the orders of his brother or to part with their
private armies. His successors, first Amsale Chrestos
and then Yolyos, restored some peace to it by giving
offices to many of the noblemen who had been favoured.
by both Daharagot and. Keflawand. The province was
1 . Ibid., I, 1 70, II, 1 31 .
449
exceptionally calm in the two or three years of Yolyos's
governorship. As he was dajazmach of both parts of
the province, he may have realized that his own army
was too small to cope with the widespread insurgence
which would inevitably follow any attempt at amal-
gamating districts into larger units or replacing the
local notables with his retainers. He recruited the
assistants and. lieutenants from among the local notables.1
He even intervened on their behalf when the lands and
privileges the emperor heaped on the Jesuits and the
Portuguese living in the mission centre of Premona
resulted in conflicts of jurisdiction.2
After Yolyos's removal in 161 14 . , following Paez's
complaint against him, the two parts of the province
were placed under different governors. Although the
tigre makonnen, Takia Giyorgis, was also a son-in-law,
three of the districts of the provinces were added to
the new domain which Suseriyos created for Yolyos.
1. Asgadom, af a makomien or assistant of Yolyos, had
held the same post under Kelawand. Almeida,
"Historia de Ethiopia a Alta", Rer. Aeth., VI, 109-113;
and Azeved.o to the provincial of Goa, July 22, 1607,
ibid., XI, 914 .l06.
2. Paez to the Prepositor General, July 2, 161 11. , ibid.,
pp.
320-21; Paez to Thomas de Iturn, June 20, 1615,
ibid., p.
358.
See also Paez, "Historia de Ethiopia",
ibid., II, 380-82; and Almeid.a, loc.cit., pp. 2811--85.
450
The marriage of daughters of the empersr to Yeshaq and
Peqra Iticha'el, and. of a niece to a man called Neserata
Chrestos, could not have failed to curtail further the
authority of the bahr nagash or tigre makonnen with whom
tIiwee men served. Although these changes rekindled
old. rivalries between the aristocratic families of each
district, particularly those of Shire, Tigre remained
by far the best governed of the provinces until 1618,
when the emperor began to coerce the country into
Catholicism. Both governors of Tigre must have shown
unwillingness to emforce the emperor's religious
injunctions, because the province was first given to a
brother of Se'la Chrestos and then to Qeb'a Chrestos,
a cousin of the emperor and a fanatical Catholic.
During the many years in which Qeb'a Chrestos remained.
d.ajazmach of the province, he exercised unrestricted.
authority, bringing his relatives to assist him. We
do not know if he reorganized. the districts into large
administrative units) It is quite possible that his
brother Asma Giyorgis ruled a much larger area than. Aniba
1. According to Almeida, the province of Tigre reached.
Lamalmo by which it was separated from Wagara.
Waldebba and perhaps the small province of Salaiut
may have been placed under Qeb'a Chrestos. "Historia
d.e Ethiopia a Alta", ibid., V, 12-13, 30, VI, 2].7.
The same is more or less said. by D. d.e Mattos in his
letter of June 6, 1621, to the Prepositor General in
ibid., XI, k77;
and by Nendez, "E]cpeditionis Aethio-
plcae", ibid., VIII, 25-27.
451
Senayt, and the prince Feqra I'1icha'e1 than Tamben.
Susenyos's governors did not regard themselves as
mere servants or protgs who could be removed or trans-
ferred. at the will of the emperor. His brothers, in
particular, ruled their provinces as personal domains,
which they expected to pass to their sons and heirs.
In their opulent households they emulated every pomp
and. state of the imperial court.The stewards and
pages who assisted them in ruuning the administration
of their provinces and in commanding their armies were
given the same titles as the corresponding officers of
the court. Every governor had his belaten geta who
deputized for him whenever he was away at the court,
and who led a part of his army during raids and cam-
paigns. 1
Even Yonael, a junior officer of Susenyos,
who governed Baganied.er for about five months in 1620,
had his belaten geta and fitawrari. 2 Se'la Chrestos
and. Queb'a Chrestos, and probably the other governors
as well, had. their massare. 3 These, like the rag
massare of the court, were responsible for maintaining
1.
Takia Glyorgis had his. N. Barrad.as to the Prepositor
General, Nay 3 0, 1631, ibid., III, k3l.
2.
Chronica d.e Susenyos, I, 2i-8-49, II, 191.
3, ?lend.ez to the Prepositor General, July 8, 1629, Rer.
Aeth., XII,
371;
Barrad.as's letter of May 30, 1631,
ibid., p. k77.
452
order within the audience halls of the governors.
Wielding the whip, which was the mark of authority,
they preceded their masters during all public functions.
Since governors chose and. appointed their assistants,
all these titles were, in all probability, conferred
by them.
The emulation of the organization of the court,
and the adoption of its formalities and. ceremonies,
must have been a conscious attempt by the governors
towards preserving and. institutionalizing the real
powers they enjoyed. Some of the provincial war-
lords of Sarsa Dengel had. the power to appoint officers
over the districts un.er them and. probably also to
confer the appropriate titles. But, as Sarsa Dengel
had every reason to fear and suspect his war-lords,
he had. granted. such powers as emergency measures only.
Certainly, neither Daharagot nor Atnatewos and Keflawand
had yet reached. the stage where they considered. the
provinces in their charge as their personal domains.
There is no indication whatsoever that, before the time
of Susenyos, any of the provincial governors conferred.
upon their retainers court titles like belaten geta and.
rag massare or military titles like fitawrari. Susenyos,
on the other hand, believed that the strength of his
453
governors would secure lais throne against the machi-
nations of the nobility. And he encouraged them to
build up their armies and. to use every means which
would strengthen their hold on their provinces.
That the governors of Susenyos were aware of the
elevated status they occupied may be inferred from the
title Se'la Chrestos adopted to describe his rank as
first minister. According to the chronicle, the title
which Susenyos conferred upon the holder of this office
was still bitwadad. 1 Yet Se'la Chrestos described
himself as re'sa makuannent. 2 This title, though diff i-
cult to translate, may be literally rendered as head
of the lords. The office of. the bitwadad had, become
anachronistic by this time, since neither Yana
Chrestos nor Se'la Chrestos, who held it one after the
other, were called upon to reside in the court and to
exercise the functions of their office. Unlike this
title, which emphasized the master-servant aspect in
the relationship between the emperor and, the favourite
who held the office, the designation preferred by Se'la
Chrestos implied less dependence on the emperor. The
significance conveyed is that of a primus inter pares.
1.
Chronica de Susenyos, I, 137, 267, II, 106, 221.
2.
Se'la Chrestos to Nutio Vitelleschi, Prepositor
General, [1625], Rer. Aeth., XII, 1 63.
454
It is not unlikely that Se'la Chrestos, as his brother's
favourite, had. bestowed the title upon himself. Its
adoption suggests not only an assertion by Susenyos's
governors of the confidence they had. gained in their
powers but also the beginnings of a belief in the
inviolability of their dignity and prerogatives.
The emperor on the other hand. showed complete
indifference to the formalities and. ceremonies which
enhanced the unique, sacrosanct position of his person.
His contempt for these thj.ngs nay perhaps be attributed.
to his confidence in his strength and to the influence
of the Jesuits. Susenyos had spent most of his for-
mative years in banditry, an occupation in which an
agile mind and. strong arms are indispensable. By
allowing his governors to make themselves strong and to
establish themselves firmly in the provinces he had
given them, he believed that he was securing himself
against any opposition. And since ritual and. pageantry
had. not saved either of his predecessors, he may have
thought he could dispense with theni. Besides, ritual
and. pageantry involved, the clergy and the nobility.
While he had. no patience for the former, he was at war
with the latter. 'Yet had he not come under the
influence of Paez, the emperor might have come, in time,
455
to appreciate the value of ceremonies. His portentous
contempt and. disregard for everything traditional to
Ethiopia began to manifest itself as early as 1609.
If the captain of the Portuguese bad not assured him
that there was nothing paganish or sacrilegious in the
coronation ceremony, Susenyos would have refused to be
crowned at
Susenyos was undoubtedly the strongest and most
secure of the emperors since Galawewos, but no one did
more than himself to compromise the dignity of the
throne. He lifted the itua1 veils which had shrouded
the monarchy. His governors were allowed to march into
the court at the head of their armies. All his officers
entered fully dressed and. armed into the audience hail
and his private chambers. During the religious dis-
cussions over which he presided, he permittd the majesty
of the emperor to be demeaned, not only by taking part
in the argument or by tolerating the explosion of
tempers, but also by encouraging the hot-headed Catholics
to draw swords and threaten their opponents with death.2
The fami1irit7 of his relationship with Paez and the
1.
Paez to Thomas de Iturn, Sept. 1k, 1612, ibid..,
XI,
258; and "Historia de Ethiopia", ibid., II,
137.
2.
Ibid., III, 388; Almeida, "Historia de Ethiopia a
Alta", ibid., VI, 298.
456
other Jesuits, in whose homes he often dined, sometimes
staying there until past midnight, and. the public
religious services he attended, in which he knelt and
prayed side by side with the meanest of his pages,
could not have failed to disillusion the beholders on
the mystery and. sacredness which were thought to envelop
the anointed of God.
Traditionally the offices of court stewards and
pages were given to the eons and relatives of the
provincial and. district nobility. In the course of
their services in the court the young noblemen from the
diverse parts of the country learned to speak Amharic
and mastered the etiquette of the court and the mechanism
of adniinistration. It was there that they met and
recognized the coirmion interests which bound them together.
The emperors further strengthened the bonds by arranging
complex intermarriages. So deep was Susenyos's clis-
trast of the nobility that lie discontinued. these customs
and. practices. He filled practically all the court
offices with boys from among te Galla, Agaw, Gafat and.
Gonga captives of his slaving expeditions. These
boys were not considered as slaves, especially as the
Jesuits saw to it that they were converted to Catholicism.
Nevertheless, they had. no political assets of their own.
457
The humbleness of their origins was such that they were
unable to bridge the distance between the court and the
widely scattered parts of the countr7. Consequently,
the influence and. prestige of the court was seriously
curt all e d..
While Susenyos thus surrounded himself with
political nonentities, his brothers were assiduously
attaching themselves to old. recogiaized families. Se'la
Chrestos and his cousin Asma Giyorgis had both married
granddaughters of Sarsa Dengel. If the emperor had
not prevented him, Yamana Chrestos would have liked to
1
give his son to the son of Gid.eon,chief of the Falasha.
r
Se'la Chrestos on the other hand, being the emperor's
favourite, was allowed to bring up In his house the son
of Banaro, governor of Enarya, and to wed his daughter
to him.
Of the palace officers only two retained some of
their former importance. Nad.e redundant by the infor-
mality which increasingly pervaded the emperor's private
and. public life, the belaten geta of the inside and. that
of the outside ceased to be heads of the pages and
stewards. Because the emperor's misallocation of
revenues and his unpopular reli@ous policy meant con-
tinuously augmenting military activities, he delegated
458
both officers to command some of his squadrons.
Although the command of the imperial forces was once
a function of the bitwad.ad. or his deputies, it would be
incorrect to assume that the belaten geta of the outside,
who was above that of the inside, had taken over the
responsibilities of the first minister. For neither
belten eta assisted the emperor in administrative or
judicial matters. 1 In fact, Susenyos gave both offices
to his younger cousins, nephews and the less important
of his retainers. And. there is no evidence to sub-
stantiate Almeid.a's assertion to the effect that the
provincial governors, including the bitwadad. Se'la
Chrestos, were dependent on the senior belaten geta.2
What happened was simply that the senior belaten geta,
without taking over the functions of the bitwad.ad,
had come to be, for all practical purposes, the highest
ranking officer within the court.
Having scattered his able men throughout the
provinces, the emperor thus surrounded himself with
insignificant officers whose opinion he would not deign
to seek. As a result, he turned, for advice and com-
panionship towards the captain of the Portuguese and.,
1. Paez, "Historia de Ethiopia", ibid., II, 171.
2. "Historia de Ethiopia a Alta", ibid., V,
67,
and
VI, 296, 382.
459
through him, towards Paez.
The autocratic regime of Susenyos, thus, depended
not on the traditional powers and prerogatives of the
throne, but on the private armies which he and his
governors gatbered about them. It rested on a foun-
d.ation as frail and intangible as the presumed loyalty
to himself and his house of his brothers, cousins,
nephews and. sons-in-law. Had he been observant and.
far-sighted, he could have realized how vulnerable his
throne was to the ambition of his powerful governors
and to the rivalries and jealousies amongst them.
Already at the start of his reign, there were sufficient
symptoms of discord by which he could have been fore-
warned of the difficulties which were to follow.
Perhaps the most fataiflaw in his personality was
his blind. love for his younger brother, Yamana Chrestos
and Yolyos had. done more
in his service, yet 1e offended
them needlessly by continuously favouring Se'la Chrestos
to them. Se'la Chrestos's appointment in 1611 to the
lucrative and. preatigious governorship of Gojam became
the cause of the rebellion of Yolyos and Keflo. After
Se'la Chrestos's conversion, some time in the following
year, his influence over the emperor became limitless.
The latter had been attracted towards Catholicism as
460
early as
1609, but did not intend to embrace it until
he had the backing of a strong contingent of Portuguese
musketeers. As repeated appeals to flonie and Nad.rid.
had, elicited. vague promises only, he might have become,
in time, disenchanted with Paez and his assurances to
the effect that the propagation of Catholicism in
Ethiopia would produce political stability. It was
Se'la Chrestos who persuaded. the emperor to think that
he was strong enough to impose, without any external
assistance, Catholicism on the country.
. For the emperor's interest in Catholicism was
largely motivated by his concern for the security of
his throne. He had first approached Paez with the
intention of using him as Zad.engel and Ya'eqob had.
hoped. to use the missionary. But Susenyos was more
re1ious than both his predecessors and, as he had not
fully forgiven the indigenous clergy for the loyalty
they had. shown to ra'eq,ob, it was inevitable that he
would. come under the influence of Paez) Since the
missionary continued. to believe that he would. have con-
verted Zad.engel into Catholicism if the clergy had not
anticipated him by inciting rebellioii, he had. come to
1. Among the first acts of Susenyos after removing Ya'eqob
was to dedicate and. offer the crown to Dabra Libanos
and to paint on the royal standard the image of St.
Takla Haynianot.Chronica de Susenyos, I, 100, II, 78.
461
the conclusion that their position of influence had
first to be undermined before Catholicism could succeed.
The clergy who ministered to Susenyos and his court
were time-servers like Abba Nehereka Den.gel; and Paez
had no difficulty in making the emperor believe that
the clergy were responsible for the political strife
which engulfed the country. Paez's a1legations to the
effect that the influence of the clergy over the nobi-
lity and the public at large was nefarious were reinforced
by the political aotivities which Abuna Petros led
until his death during the fighting between. Ya'eqob
and Susenyos.1
With the conviction then that he was working for
the spiritual and. temporal welfare of his subjects,
the emperor began in 161 11. a series of harsh, coercive
measures to disestablish the Ethiopian Church. The
Church could have withstood any attack from arquarter
but the throne. Throughout its long history it had
depended on the monarchy for patronage and protection;
and. Susenyos'B enmity left it helplessly confused. It
1. Susenyos's attitude towards the clergy is su.mmed up
in the virulent speech he made in November of 1621.
Paez, "Historia d.e Ethiopia", Rer. Aeth., III, 384-386.
In his manifesto of
1623,
a letter published throughout
the country, the emperor gives his reasons for rejecting
the leadership of the Alexand.rian bishops. Alineida,
"Historia d.e Ethiopia a Alta", ibid., VI, 396-400.
462
was already weakened by the partial destruction of its
numerous monasteries in Amhara, Shawa, Walaqa and
parts of Gojain, and. by the various heresies which proli-
ferated wildly in the anarchical conditions of the
period. Furthermore, tbere was the threat of schism,
because the Echage Zawangel bad chosen this most critical
moment in the history of the Church to undermine the
authority of the bishop by claiming for himself some
of the other's powers and prerogatives.1
In these circumstances the bishop Abuna Sem'on
had no alternative but to seek the sympathy and support
of those governors and court officers who, he knew,
resented the strong influence which Se'la Chrestos and.
Paez had over the emperor. For from the moment the
emperor embarked on his oppressive religious policy,
he had come to depend on the guidance and. reassurance of
both unpopular men. Under the favour of the emperor
and the influence of the missionary, the pride, conceit
and. intolerance of Se'la Chrestos had bloomed into ruth-
less fanaticism. 2 So infectious was the governor's
contidence tbat even Paez shed his usual modesty and.
caution. He did not bother to cultivate the friendship
1. Paez, "Historia de Ethiopia", ibid., II, 126, k80.
2.
The Jesuits themselves bad been victims of Se'la
Chrestos's uncharitable conscience. Ibid., II,
56 and III, k29.
463
of those whose counsel the emperor did not
seek.
Indeed, the missionary was so close to the brothers
that he saw enemies of his faith in all those who did
not try to approach them through him.
Nost of the opposition which the emperor encountered,
therefore, stemmed. from the rivalries and jealousies
which his favourtism fostered. Yolyos had hardly for-
gotten his grievance over Gojam when, upon. the com-
plaint of Paez, he was recalled from Tigre and publicly
rebuked by the emperor for alleged interference in the
privileges enjoyed by the Jesuit centre at Fremona.
Yamana Chrestos's humiliation came in 1616, when the
title of bitwadad was taken from him and given to Se'la
Chrestos. The chronicler was not fully correct when
stating that the former's d.isgrace was due to his
inability to make his retaines follow him on an. expe-
dition against the Itu in Shawa.' Many times before
this the emperor himself and, some of his other governors
had had to yield to the insubordination of their soldiers.
He only used the occasion to punish his older brother's
lack of enthusiasm for Catholicism, Relations between
them had been strained for long, especially after l6l,
1. Chronica de Susenyos, I,
158-59, II, 122.
464
when Yamana Cbrestos had dissociated himself from a
religious policy which he regarded as a dangerous
betrayal of heritage.
Both Yolyos and Yamana Chrestos were able men,
whose appetite for power was sharpened by the numerous
provinces the emperor placed under them and by the tree
hand. he allowed them. They were probably genuinely
moved by the appeals of the bishop, but there can be
no doubt that resentment and thwarted ambition were the
chief motives for their rebellion in 1617.
While Ras Yamaria Chrestos was in
the land of Wedo [in Bagaineder] he sent
beforehand the kettle-drum and standard
towards Amhara. After this he ordered
his two sons to occupy the gate to the
province. He told his elder son, whose
name is Ehwa Chrestos, "Take the ainba
called Aniora Gadal." To his young son
named Eda Chrestos he said, "And. you,
take the amba called Korab. I shall
follow later with Yolyos and capture
Hafa Chrestos. After I capture him,
all the provinces, which are Amhara,
Ambassal, Walaqa and Nanz, will be in my
hand. The Karayu and Nars.wa Galla will1
support me, because they are behind me."
Powerless though they were, many of the diaaffected
noblemen like Atnatewos and Keflawand, who were virtual
prisoners of the emperor, gave their adherence to the
rebellion. 2 It was strong and popularly supported, but
1. IbId., I, 170-171, II, 131.
2. Atnatewos seems to have occupied himself in writing a
treatise refuting the allegations of heresy made by the
/Cntinued over
465
Yaniana Chrestos's defection after all the plans of
campaign had been agreed upon led to its failure.
The death of the bishop, more than that of Yolyos,
sealed the fate of the Ethiopian Church. The Echage
Zawangel lived in distant isolation at Dabra Libartos.
He was not affected by the ruthless attacks directed
on the Church and its adherents by the emperor and. his
brother. As Susexyos had. not expected the victory,
he was easily persuaded by Paez to see God's approval
in his success and to regard himself as another
Constantine. 1 Believing that he was now invincible,
the emperor proceeded to issue interdicts against the
clergy and. the laymen who upheld the old Church. By
1620 churches and monasteries throughout Dainbiya,
Emfraz, and most parts of Wagara and Gojain were closed.
The recusant clergy and their lay supporters, who had
become liable to ixnprisomnent, flogging, mutilation and
even hanging, sought refuge in the provinces the governors
of which did not enjoy the confidence of the emperor or
Footnote 2 continued from previous page
missionaries against the Ethiopian Church. Azevedo
to the provincial of Goa, July
3,
1619, Rer. Aeth.,
XI, L12627.
1. The missionaries encouraged Susenyos to see himself
as the Constantine of Ethiopia; and one of his
favourite books was an Ainharic translation of one
of the histories of the Roman emperor. Ibid.,
p. L421.
466
the Jesuits)
The pleas of the proscribed, clergy became too
loud, to be ignored even by the indifferent echage.
His brief appearance at the court, and his objections
to the coercive methods employed, by Se'la Chrestos,
aroused so much excitement and hope anong the people
that Susenyos, fearing mutiny by his soldiers, agreed
to issue an injunction against further preaching and
proselytism by the missionaries. He had. thought of
this step only as a measure to ease the tension. He
was greatly surprised and offended when his brother
and Paez criticized him for endaigering their victory
by showing weakness and a desire to appease. Susenyos
rightly considered himself the benefactor of his
brothers and the Jesuits. And since he had put his
life and his throne in jeopardy for the sake of Catholi-
clam, he could not understand how Se'la Chrestos and
Paez could place their obligation to the faith above
their loyalty to him. 2 Although he dissembled his
1. Susenyos often sought the advice of the Portuguese
and, the Jesuits before making important appointments.
Ibid., p.
L 28; and Paez, "Historia de Ethiopia",
ibid., III, 420-21. See also Nendez to the Pre-
positor General, July 8, 1629, ibid., III, 378.
2. "Historia de Ethiopia", ibid., III, 432-34; and A.
Fernandes to Nutlo Vitelleschi, Nay 24, 1620, ibid.,
XI,
451-60. According to Azevedo, the emperor had,
begun to be distrustful of his brother in the previous
year.In. spite of the allegations which Se'la
Chrestos's retainers made against him, he could not
/Continued over
467
disappointment, he began to realize that his brother
believed himself the real champion of Catholicism and.
that the Jesuits had. great confidence in him.1
Neither the self-confidence of his brother nor
the rebellion of Yonael in the same year showed
Susenyos the necessity of curbing the power of his pro-
vincial governors. However, the opu1ar support
enjoyed by Yonael and, after him, by the pretender
Wald.a Qebryal In many parts of Angot, Amhara and. Shawa,
convinced the emperor of the tailure of his religious
policy. He could see no sign of the peace, security
and stability which he had hoped to acb.ieve through
the establishment of the Catholic religion. His d.is-
illusionment reached the stage where, in 1624, he was
considering ways of coming to terms with the proscribed
clergy.2
Footnote 2 continued from previous page.
have aspired tq the throne, at least at this early
period. What aroused Susenyos's suspicions was,
it seems, his brother's ambition to extend the limits
of his province. Letter of July 3, 1619, ibid.,
pp . 432-33.
1. The governor did, in fact, believe that it was he who
inspired the emperor to embrace Catholicism. Se'la
Chrestos to the Pope, Feb. 2,
1613, in "Historia de
Ethiopia", ibid., III, 441.
2. N. Barrad.as, "Tractatus Tres", ibid., IV, 27-28;
and Gaspar Paez, "Annua de Etyopia do Jutho de 624
ated.e 625 do estado secular de Etyopia", fol. 244r,
NS. Goa 39 (I), ASJ, Home.
468
Knowing that Se'la Chrestos would oppose any form
of reconciliation with the supporters of the old Church,
the emperor took measures to safeguard his throne.
As his brothers had proved untrustworthy, he turned.
towards his son. Fasildas was desinated heir and.
magovernor of the Agaw districts of Gojain. The
emperor restrained himself from taking the other parts
of Gojam from his brother and from depriving him of
his arniy only because he feared that an open rift
between them would become advantageous to the pretender
Walda Qebryal.Se'la Cb.restos's retainers, who were
selected from among the able-bodied Sons of the veterans
of Gojam, Shawa and Dainot, were fanatics like their
master. They had. sworn loyalty to the Pope and. the
Church of Rome; and they proudly brandished the distin-
ctive medallions of St ?Iary which the Jesuits had. dis-
tributed to them. 1 However, the death of the pretender
In 1625 restored Susenyos's confidence in his power.
It also made reconciliation with the clergy seem unneces-
sary. Although Se'la Chrestos remained in Gojam,
suspicions of his good relationship with the Jesuits
led. to a substantial reduction in the emperor t S
1. Diogo d.e Nattos to the Prepositor General, June 2,
1621, Rer. Aeth., XI, 488; and Thomas de Barros,
"Relatione della niissione fatta da' padri della
Conipagnia di Giesu nell' Etiopia, gl'anni 1621, 1622,
e 1623", op.cit., pp. 26-27.
469
correspondence with Rome and Nadrid. Until then, he
had. been sending appeals to both capitals for military
assistance. He had even made plans to settle some of
the soldiers, whom he hoped wou1d be 8ent to him, in
the Hainassen and nearby districts of Tigre. His fear
of a Jesuit-inspired rebellioi by Se'la Chrestos became
so strong that he withdrew his permission for the
establishment of a mission centre at Debarwa.
In 1626, soon after the arrival of the patriarch
Alfonso Nendez, the emperor, his household and most of
the court and provincial officers gave official recog-
nition to Catholicism as the established religion of
the country. During the oath-taking ceremony, Se'la
Chrestos made it clear that his loyalty to Fasilad.as
depended on the prince's support for the new Church)
Nendez, perhaps underestimating the depth of the rift
between the brothers, enthusiastically applauded the
governor's piety, thereby strengthening the suspicions
of the emperor and. the prince. With the Intention of
depriving his brother of his army of devoted retainers,
the emperor took away one by one the estatesSe'la
Cb.restos had approprated. The latter was prevented
1. Almeid.a, "Historia de Ethiopia a Alt", Rer. Aeth.,
VI, L.9]
470
from rebellion only by the knowledge that such action
would be disastrous for the Church he had. helped to
establish. In 1628 he was removed from his governor-
ship.
II. The financial consequences
Soon after his victory over Ya'eqob, Susenyos was
faced with the necessity of wooing and keeping as many
as he could of the Querban soldiers who had. fought and
opposed. him. Because of the chaotic conditions which
preceded and. followed his accession, he found himself
without the means to maintain those whom he had succeeded
in gathering around him. InevLtably, therefore, he
resorted to the well-tried expedient of living at the
cost of the various pagan peoples who bad. neither the
organization nor the strength to resist any concerted
attack made against them. Susenyos's reign was
inaugurated by a general license to pillage and plunder,
followed immediately in December of the same year, by
systematic raids on the pagan Agaw living between Llaf a
and Bure. The emperor and
his soldiers did not leave
Gojam until they had. taken many captives from the
Shinasha and other Gonga peoples who had taken refuge in
the southern parts of the province.
471
In the chronicle and. the Jesuit documents of this
period, we are told that these raids were forced upon
a peace-loving monarch by the customary insubordination
of the Agaw and Shinasha, and especially by their refusal
to pay the tribute they owed hiin) The truth of these
statements becomes suspect when we consider the exces-
sively high tribute he demanded of the Shjnasha of Gunian
and his toleration of the wanton destruction of crops
everywhere by his soldiers. Furthermore, the same
sources would have us believe that both the Agaw and
the Gonga of Gojam remained stubbor2a and recalcitrant
even after they had been flushed out of the forests,
caves and mountains on which they relied. for safety.
According to Paez, the Shnasha who had fled from
Bizamo and. settled in the small, rugged territory of
Guman owed the emperor tribute in gold for 1607 and
1608 equivalent to 12,000 cruzados. But, trusting to
the impregnability of Warq Amba, they rejected his offer
to settle for a fourth of the amount, thereby bringing
upon themselves destruction and. captivity. 2 If the
1. Chronica de Susenyos, I, 103-10k, 108-109, 135-36, II,
81, e4-85, 105. Paez, "Historla de Ethiopia", Rer.
Aeth., III, k4k-45; Barrad.as, "Tractatus Tres", ibid.,
IV, 5; and Almeida, "Historia de Ethiopia a Alta",
ibid., VI, 230-31,
325-26.
2. Paez to Thomas do Iturn, Sept. 1k, 1612, ibid., XI,
266-68; and Almeida, "Historia do Ethiopia a Alta",
ibid., VI, 229-30.
472
emperor's intentions had been honest he would not have
levied on the Shtnasha a tribute of this amount, when
the gold revenue for the entire province of Gojam was
estimated at 11,500 cruzados) The Shinasha may have
paid the equivalent of 6,000 cruzados while living in
the gold-rich parts of Bizamo, but the emperor could
not have been ignorant of the difficulty of finding such
gold in the mountains of southern Gojain.
Susenyos's slaving campaigns were more frequent
than those of Sarsa Dengel and resulted in unparalleled
destruction to life and property. The explanation for
this unhappy development lies in the greater blunders
Susenyos committed in the disposition of his armies and.
consequently, in the reallocation of revenues.
The regiments and garrisons had virtually d.is-
appeared from the districts during the period of
anarchy. Most of the soldiers had. become retainers of
the provincial war-lords and district noblemen. After
carefully removing all the war-lords and noblemen from
every position of importance,
Suseixyos's
governors kept
most of the soldiers in their service. No attempt was
made by the emperor or the governors to resuscitate any
1. Paez, "Historia de Ethiopia", ibid., II, 283.
473
of the old regiments, or to return to their homes the
hordes of retainers they had inherited from their pre-
decessors. Since the emperor's administrative policy
favoured the concentration of power and. strength in
the hands of his trusted governors, it is
uilikely that
he ever- thought of dtspersing the soldiers throughout
the districts, where they might be used against him by
his enemies. Besides, the different rebellions which
at the beginning threatened his reign, and the wide-
spread discontent which his religious policy later
aroused, made it necessary for the emperor and his
governors to keep substantial forces ready and. within.
reach.
Thus, the significant military development of
Susenyos's time was the detachment of soldiers in active
employment from the lands which provided their susten-
ance. Since the emperor considered the arrangement
whereby his governors kept their retainers in their camps
and. seats of administration to be convenient for the
security of his throne, he saw no danger in surrendering
the control of every item of provincial revenue. Both
Paez and .Llmeida, than whom no one was better acquainted
with the state of the emperor's finances, state cate-
gorically that he left all revenues, including the dues
474
from the different customs tes, to his governors.'
The only province from which he received revenue was
Enarya. This exception, incidentally, reveals
Susenyos's indifference to matters which did. not
directly contribute to the security of his throne.
The governors of Enarya maintained, large mobile forces
and numerous garrisons which defended the province from
invasion 'by the Sad.acha Galla. As these forces were
in no way employed in the protection of Susenyos's
throne, he used. every means to extract from the insecure
province whatever amount of gold it could prod.uce.2
The new allocation of revenues was more revolutionary
than the partial exemptions which Sarsa Dengel used to
make to his favourite officers. Doubtless, it enabled
the governors of Susenyos to keep more retainers than
the war-lords who preceded them. Nevertheless, the
soldiers thus employed could not have numbered more
than a fraction of the regimental soldiers and their
eons who still owed military service to the state.
The substantial revenues which provincial governors
collected under the title of ferah kerawe suggests that
1. ]lid., p. 28i'; and. .Almeid,a, "Historia d.e Ethiopia a
Alta", ibid., V, 80-82.
2. For relationship between Enarya and the court of
Susenyos, see below,
P.5/8.
475
many of the professional soldiers had. remained in the
lands formerly assigned to them. An interesting d.ocu-
ment, dated
1615,
shows that already at this time ferah
kerawe, formerly a fine imposed on a professional
soldier for failure to answer to a call to arms, had
become a regular item in the list of taxes. 1 The large
number of units of Galla warriors which the emperor
and his governors kept with them may also indicate to
a general reluctance of the professional soldiers to
exchange the security of their homes for the crowded
and. uusanits.ry conditions of the court and provincial
capitals.
The largest concentration of soldiers was in the
emperor's court. In the middle of 1 608, before the
Querban soldiers who lived in Wagara and. parts of Dam-
biya and Bagameder were disbanded, and many of them
incorporated into his amy, the number of his fighting
men had stood at about
25,000.2
Before Paez's death
1 . Conti Rossini, "Liber Axumae", op.clt., text,
p. 7 5,
trans.,
p.
91 . Barradas was mistaken when assuming
that ferah kerawe was paid by peasants, unless the
word villes (peasants) included, in this irstance,
the Sons of the regimental soldiers who had remained
attached to the lands given as livings to their
fathers."Tractatus Tres", Rer. Aeth., IV, 1 87 .
2. Paez, "Historla de Ethiopia", ibid., II, 1 36.
Bruce's estimate of 30,000 men is probably an
exaggeration.Travels, II, 27 8.
476
in 1622, the emperor's army had grown to be nearly
kO,000 strong.' All these men, with their families
and slaves, were quartered in and. around the court.
Since the population of the court included countless
traders, retailers, scroimgers and prostitutes, the
problems connected with housing and the supply of
food, water and firewood must have been enormous.
Epidemics broke out with uncommon regularity and yb-.
lence, forcing the emperor to change the seat of his
court at least five times, not counting the various
encampments he used when he was campaigning. When he
finally settled down at Danqaz, it was because of the
summer house which, some time before 1621, the Jesuits
built for him at nearby Azazo, to which he retreated.
at the beginning of almost every rainy season.
Very little is known of the actual organization of
this immense army. A few squadrons seem to have been
employed as bodyguards of the emperor. The most
famous of these, the Charaqa and Kokab, had about 800
shield-bearing men each. 2 Later, some time after the
death of Paez, the number was raised to a thousand n
each. 3 Several squadrons probably of a similar
1. Paez, loc.cit.,
p. 157;
and. Almeida, "Historia de
Ethiopia a Alta", Rer. Aeth., V, 70.
2. Paez, loc.cit.,
p. 155.
3. Almeida, loc.cit., VII, 26. The commanders of the
squadron were called alaqa and sometimes seyum.
/Continued. over
477
manageable size, were formed out of the regiments and.
the Querban units which Sarsa Dengel had. settled in and
around. Dambiya and. out of the Malak B:ara of Zadengel)
Unfortunately, we know the names of only two of these,
the Seltan Nar'ed and. the Seltan Bachrestos. For
reasons of pride and prestige, some of the squadrons
may have kept the names of the old regiments, as, for
example, did. the Dararasuadron, the soldiers of which,
according to the chronicle, "always ate in his house,
and did not have homes or farms, for they were young
men and always lived with the king". 2 These young men
were apparently of the emperor's bodyguard, and were
selected from. among the sons of soldiers belonging to
an old Damot regiment, the soldiers of which had taken
refuge in Gojain. A squadron of Se'la Chrestos's
retainers was known by the same name. The name of the
Daraba, one of the Querban units which Zasellasie had
commanded, was also preserved. by one of Susenyos's
squadrons. We do not know the number of Galla auxi-
liary units which were permanently stationed at the
Footnote
3
continued from previous page.
Chronica de Susenyos, I, 299, II, 231. The rank of
yashalaqa (commander of 1000 men) does not seem to
have come into use yet.
1. Almeida, loc.cit.,
p.
209.
2. Chronica de Susenyos, I, 228, II,
175.
478
court; the chronicle mentions only the Chebsa and the
Boran.
Lacking the former revenues from the provinces,
the maintenance of the army became, after the security
of his throne, the second major cause of concern for
the emperor. The situation wa desperate from the
Start, for early in 1608 he tried to despoil the Church.
He made a proclamation ordering the expulsion of
unchaste monks from the monasteries and the transfer of
their share of the Church's income to his treasury.1
Since the sources do not record any reaction from the
clergy, the proclamation was presumably without effect.
Unable to think of any alternative means for supporting
his army, the emperor increased the frequency and range
of his pillaging and. slaving expeditions. The raids
of 1610, like those of 1607 and. 1608, extended from
A.1afa, to the west of Dambiya, all the way south to
the camps of the &onga refugees along the Blue Nile.
The long procession of captives, conating mainly of
women and children, as they were driven into Qoga, is
movingly described by Paez. His intercession gained
freedom for about 12,000 of them, but his warning that
1. Azevedo to the provincial of India, July 30, 1608,
Rer. Aeth., XI, 166.
479
these raids were opening the way to the Galla, who
were massed on the other side of the Blue Nile, went
unheeded.. 1 The l6l1 expedition against all the Agaw
of Gojam, allegedly brouit about by their lawlessness
and insubordination, was particularly destructive.
The Agaw of Achafar, considerably debilitated and
reduced by earlier raids, abandoned their homes and.
sought refuge among the other Agaw of Chara and the
Shanqela of Matakal, to which districts the emperor
followed them. 2 Not contented with the cattle an.d.
slaves he and his soldiers acquired in all these
places, he then devastated the extreme south-western
parts of the province. His activities here, as des-
cribed in the chronicle, represent the thoroughness
with which the raids were generally planned and executed.
And after this he arose and. descended
into the land of Lala and Abola, in
which were three pagan tribes which
were the Agaw, the Gonga and the Jagat.
The king then divided his army into
two sections. He made belatenoch geta
Yonael commander of the soldiers in one
section. The king himself took the
other section of the army and he went
down, leaving the impedimenta with
the spoils he took from such places as
Natakal to follow behind. Upon his
arrival the king sent out warari to the
right and to the left. So many cattle
1 . Paez's letter of Sept. ]4, 1 61 2, ibid.,
pp.
267-68.
2. Chronica de Susenyos, I, 1 1
1 .
3 -2 1
4, II, 1 1 1 -1 2.
480
were taken in this very warari that
they offended the eye. I1any men.
and. women slaves, who looked like
the grape and the fruit of the dogma
tree which were not fully ripe, were
also captured. There was much
rejoicing in the camp because of the
large quantity of takings. There
was not a man, in the army of the
king who did not, from the spoils then
taken, come into possession of cattle
and. Laves Onthe second day after
the day of the wararl, the belatenoch
geta Yonael returned to the king his
lord, with large booty of cattle and
people. And the king made gifts of
all the cattle which were taken to
those who had caught them. As for
the slaves he reserved them for him- 1
self and did [with them) as he wanted.
As niay be in! erred from this and other passages
of the chronicle, as well as from the Jesuit documents
on Susenyos's reign, the emperor did not always keep
the slaves for himself. His reservation for himself
of the captives taken by 'Yona'el was probably due to the
particular exigencies he bad. in that year. It seems,
in the first place, that he had already made arrangements
for the purchase of horses from some 'ung merchants.
Achafar was not on the caravan route between Seimar
and Dambiya, and the merchants who brought him k70
horses, most probably to exchange them for slaves, seem
1. Thid., I, 1 L 15-k6, II, 112-13.
In. the first instance
warari means a raiding party. In the second and
third instances, however, it means raiding.
481
to have come purposely to meet him there. Then, as
this was the year in which he began his coercive laws
designed towards disestablishing the Ethiopian Church,
he was in great need. of gold with which to prevent the
mutiny of his officers. Still, the rich haul of cattle
and slaves he brought did not enable him to raise the
gold he needed for gifts and bonuses. He had to melt
down some of his own jewellery.
Even though we cannot assess the size of the slave
trade, there can be no doubt that it was a significant
aspect of the Ethiopian economy throughout the reign of
Susenyos. Paez, a generally reliable observer, placed.
slaves at the head of a short list of export items, which
included also ivory and wax. 1 Considering the recipro-
cal fxiendship which existed until about 1618 between
the emperor on the one hand. and the rulers of Pung,
Zayla and Arqiqo on the other, we may assume, however
short the list of export and import items may have been,
that the volume of commerce was substantial. Yet the
export of ivory and wax could not have failed to be
adversely affected by the incursions and invasions of
the Galla and by the civil wars and predatory activities
1. "Historia de Ethiopia", Rer. Aeth., II,
285.
482
of the soldiers. Susenyos's woveinents were, through-
out his reign, confined to the intensively farmed
provinces which could not have supported a large popu-
lation of elephants. The Agaw of Gojam, fao were the
main producers of honey in the country, had had, for
many years, no respite from pillaging raids. The
reason for the emperor's assiduous cultivation of the
friendship of his neighbours must, therefore, have been
connected with the export of slaves. This, indeed,
seems to be the case when we consider the period when
his friendship with them began to sour.
Although relations between Ethiopia and. Fung had.
been good throughout the period of anarchy, Abd al-Qadir,
the Fung King, welcomed Susenyos's accession with
unaccusto
med
enthusiasm. AM al-Qadir's hopes for an
improvement in the hitherto slack trade in slaves were
probably aroused by Susenyos's renown as a bandit and.
a raider. When, shortly afterwards, the king f Fung
was deposed, he was given asylum by the emperor and
appointed governor of Chelga, a district bordering on
Fung. Susenyos did. nothing to help the king to regain
his throne But the appointment seenis to have been a
calculated act. By it, Susenyos acquired not only an
experienced man to guard the caravan route which passed
483
through Chelga, and a watchdog to keep all Fuxig slave
raiders , but also a means pf keeping the new king of
Fung in good behaviour. For unlike his two prede-
cessors, who had not shown much interest in the slave
trade, Susenyos zesented the presence of poachers on
his hunting grounds. He wanted the king of Fung to
stop giving protection or encouragement to those of his
subjects who raided in Ethiopian territories and who,
at times, had penetrated into Dainbiya itself.1
Of the five reasons which the chronicle gives for
the outbreak of hostility in 1618 between Ethiopia and
Fung, two, which seem to be the most weighty, were con-
nected with poaching on. Ethiopian territories. 2 How-
ever, the devastating expeditions which Susenyos and
his governors made throughout 1618 and the first half
of 1619 on Furig lands, along a vast front which extended
from the Taka in the north to Fazugli in the south,
were not retaliatory raids. These expeditions, which
yielded immense numbers of slaves, became necessary as
1. Chronica de Susenyos, I, 140, II, 108.
2 . Ibid., I, 160-62 , II, 12 4-2 5. Azevedo says that the
enipior's intention was to annex Fung and. to spread
Catholicism among its inhabitants. Letter of July
3, 1619, to the provincial of Goa, Rer. Aeth., XI,
4 39-40. There is no indication, however, to suggest
that the emperor even tried to appoint men of his
choice over the Fung territories raided by his men.
484
a result of the cessation, albeit temporary, of slaving
raids on the pagan Agaw.
The manner in which the raids on the Agaw caine to
be stopped proves clearly that the victims of Susenyos
were not guilty of the various acts of delinquency and
insubordination Imputed to them in the chronicle and
the Jesuit documents. It was the elders of the
Hankasha Agaw who, after the ravages they suffered in
1613 and. 161k, approached Paez and begged him to act as
their intermediary. They promised to pay anything
that Paez and. the emperor would ask of them if the raids
could be stopped. Although the missionary took up
their case after the Agaw had agreed to embrace
Catholicism, it was not until 1617 that the emperor
agreed to spare them. A.nd. in January of the next year
the mission to the Agaw was opened at Temhua) This
arrangement affected the Hankasha only, and in the same
year the emperor and his brother, the governor of Gojm,
made several raids o all other Agaw. Parts of
Hankasha territory were raided, perhaps by mistake, but
the few Christians among the captives were immediately
1. Paez, "Historia de Ethiopia", ibid., III,
k99-500;
Almeida, t Historia de Ethiopia, a Alta", ibid., VI,
327-28; and Azevedo's letter of July
3,
1619, Ibid.,
XI,
k3-39. In the Jesuit documents Temhua is
known as Tanqha.
48
set at liberty. Seeing the advantages of the pro-
tection which the Jesuits could give, the rest of the
Agaw soon sought and, under similar teins, obtained
Paez's help.
The emperor's slaving activities within and out-
side his provinces came to an abrupt end some time in
1619. Luis de Azevedo, who is strangely enough our
only source for this significant event, attributed this
radical change to the inspiration which Susenyos received
when reading a letter of King John III of Portugal to
Dom John de Castro, his viceroy in India. In this
letter the king advised his viceroy to curtail, as much
as possible, the sale of slaves to the Muslim Indians
and to the Arabs arid Turks, firstly because this would
reinforce the numerical strength of Portugal's enemies,
and. secondly because the conversion of the slaves to
Islam would enrich a rival and. inimical religion.1
The emperor was impulsi've by nature and, after his
1. The letter in question is in all probability that of
March 8, 1546, which J. Preire de Andrade has included
in his Vida de D. Joo d.e Castro quarto viso-rey d.a
India (Lisbon: Academia Real das Sciencias, 1535),
pp.
51-58. The very intolerant tone of the letter
Is so inconsistent with contemporary Portuguepolicy
in India that some scholars have cast serious doubts
about its authenticity. See the notes of the editor
Francisco de S. Luiz on
pp.
372-76. See also R.S.
Whiteway, The Rise of Portuguese Power In India
(Westminster, 1899),
pp.
61-62.
486
victory over buna Sein'on and Yolyos, he had come to
believe that he was guided by God in all his actions.
Without any deliberation on the loss of income that
he and his soldiers would incur, he passed a series of
proclamations which prohibited the sale of slaves to,
or their acquisition by, Muslims. 1
The decrees,
though intended, to affect the export of slaves only,
resulted in an almost complete cessation of raiding
activities, especially against the Pung lands. The
internal market, which In all probability was glutted
during all these years, continued to be supplied with
captives taken from among the Galla.
The exportation ban ended the unusually intimate
friendship which had existed between the emperor and
the sultans of Awssa. Susenyos and the Imain Umar-din
al-Mad.ayti were exchanging envoys and gifts before
1607.2 Their business relations may have begun in. the
days when the emperor was a bandit and occasionally
taking captives. Probably out of the desire to secure
safe passage for the slavers who acted as his agents,
1. Azeved.o's letter of July
3, 1619, to the provincial
of Goa, Rer. Aeth., XI, 1-2l.
2.
Among the gifts sent by the imam, there were musket-
balls.Chronica de Susenyos, I, 100, II, 78.The
ammunition for the near 1,500 muskets the emperor
possessed may have come from Arabia through Awssa.
487
he also maintained good relations with the Galla tribes
who lived between Awssa and his provinces. However,
he does not seem to have realized that the restrictions
he imposed on the slave trade uld injure his relation-
ship with Awssa. In 1622 he believed the sultan then
to be still his friend, and even suggested to the Jesuits
in Goa that they would find Zayla a safer port of entry
than krqiqo. 1
When three years later two missionaries
landed at Zayla, the sultan wad, it seems, still trying
to persuade the emperor to lift the restrictions, for
the sultan did. not decide to kill the missionaries
until after the return of the envoys he had sent to
Dambiya.2
Until 1622 the Turks had. allowed the missionaries
and their messengers to move freely through the ports
of Suakin and Arqiqo. To suspect that the pashas
would sud.denly turn hostile, Susenyos must have sensed
a significant degree of coolness in the friendship which
1.
"Excerptum ex litteris annuis Provinciae Goanae",
Dec. 11, 1623, Rer. Aeth., XI, 518.J. Lobo had no
reason to say that the emperor's secretary had, by
mistake, inserted Zayla. for Danakil port of Baylul.
J.Le Grand, Voyage Historigue d'Abyssinie du R.P.
Jerome Lobo, p.
15.
2.
The Imam Adrah ibn Tadrus (1620-26) then opened
triendly relations with the pretender Wald.a Qebryal,
proclaimed in Shawa. Gaspar Paez, "Carta annua d.e
Ethiopia do mes de Iulho de 1625 ate o de 1626",
fol. 3llr, I'ES. 39 (II), ASJ, Rome.
488
had. generally characterized his relationship with them.
We do not know exactly how the Turks manifested their
irritation, but they were certainly worse affected by
the restrictions than Awssa was. For the Awssa mer-
chants continued. to obtain slaves from the various Galla
tribes and from the rulers of
Ha&ya.
Arqiqo, on the
other hand, served as an outlet only for the caravans
which came from Dambiya. Apparently, the Turks had.
resorted. to poaching on. the Ethiopian lands adjoining
the lowlands they occupied., and to encouraging the kid-
napping and inveiglirtg of Christians. Angered by
such activities, the emperor in 1624 stopped. all kinds
of commerce with the Turks. Threats of starvation
and. ruin became serious, and in 1
525
the pasha was
forced to beg the intercession of the newly arrived.
patriarch. Nendez, finding in this an opportunity to
safeguard. the line of coniniunication with Goa, arranged
a reconciliation. By this time Susenyos was also
feeling acute financial difficulties. He was there-
fore ready to relax his restrictions on the trade in
slaves. Thus, in the agreement which restored friend-
ship with the Turks one of the terms read.,
That they did. not buy any slaves
except those who went in the cara-
vans, for all the rest were kidnapped.,
489
and if the case was that the
parents or relatives of someone
went to I'Iassaua and proved that
they [the traders] had kidnapped
him, they tthe Turks] would have
him handed over. 1
Susenyos's restrictions on the slave trade had
come at a time when the number of his soldiers had
almost doubled, and when the implantation of the
Catholic faith on a very hostile soil required heavy
subsidies from him. He could have minimized the sub-
sequent economic strains, had he dispersed his soldiers
or modified the expenditure of revenues in such a way
that the provincial governors made some contribution to
his treasury. The settlement of the Kokab bodyguard
in Wagara soon after Yolyos's rebellion, simply intended
to discourage the retainers and sympathizers of the late
governor from further insurrection, was not followed by
the transfer of other squadrons from the court into the
nearby d.istricts and provinces..fter this time even
Dambiya was placed successively under close relatives
of the emperor, who, like the other governors, must
have spent the revenues from it on the maintenance of
their households and. their retainers.
1. Gaspar Paez, "Carta annua de Ethiopia do mes de
Julb.o de 1625 ate o d.e 1626 do estado secular do
Imperio de Ethiopia", fol. 3Or, MS. Goa
9 CII),
ASJ, Rome.
490
Until his public conversion in 1622, which
marked the official disestablishment of the Church,
he seems to have restricted himself to what he con-
sidered was a legitimate source of income. The various
interdicts he had been passing on the Church had iiot
brought about the mass capitualtion be had expected
from the leaderless clergy. Their defiance and. refrac-
toriness angered the emperor and. his brother, and,
beginning from 1618, they ordered the closure of
churches and monasteries everywhere, and the proscrip-
tion of all recusant clerics. By the middle of 1620
the orders were effectively carried out in Gojam,
Daznbiya, Emfraz and. the reighbouring parts of Wagara and
Bagaineder. Susenyos's intention was to hand over the
lands of the disestablished Church to its successor,
but the Jesuits were far too few in number to administer
them. Until 1621 there were Live Jesuits working in
five mission centres. Although two more came in that
year, the death of Paez and two other missionaries
further reduced their number. As the champion and.
defender of a Church yet to be established, the emperor
became first a receiver and then the owner of vast
confiscated. estates.1
. Those of the richer nobles who refused to embrace
Catholicism were also punished by confiscation of their
lands. ?Iendez to the Prepositor General, July 8, 1629,
Rer. Aeth., XII,
392.
41
These vast estates may have enabled him to feed
his household, 1
But they could not have produced
sufficient crops to bring him the gold and sliver that
he needed for various purposes. At first he seems to
have tried to extort gold from Enarya, the only province
which paid, its revenues directly into his treasury.
It is not so clear if the extortions began while Banaro
was still governor. One of the explanations offered
to the emperor by those responsible for the governor's
assassination in 1620 was that the 1attet had exacted,
oppressive contributions from the people. The demands
the emperor made on Banaro's successor were certainly
extortionate, But the province was unable to meet the
repeated demands made upon it, and. Susenyos was forced
to look for other sources. 2 One of the three land.
charters which we iave from his reign suggests that
he may have obtained gold by the highly improper means
of selling Church lands and. estates.3
1.
Some of the grains were also distributed among the
soldiers. Alineid.a, t t liistoria d.e Ethiopia a Alta",
Ibid., V, 8]..
2. Banaro's successor, Sisgayo, was, for many years
unable to send anything. Ibid.,
p.
80.
3. Chronica de Susenyos, I, 287, II, 221. Se'la
Chrestos's supposed gift of 100 waqets of gold was
equal to the total amount of dues received in one
year at the customs gate of Lainalmo. The other two
/Continued over
492
With the arrival of more and more Jesuits after
1624, the expenses in connection with the propagation
of Catholicism mounted steadily. Although the old.
and new centres received generous endowments in land,
the programme for the construction of churches,
including a cathedral, houses of residence and, semi-
naries which the Jesuits inaugurated was too ambitious
and costly. Susenyos melted. down the gold and. silver
altars and vessels of the closed churches but he was
still unable to meet the expenses. In the end he
jiaced whatever he had. at the disposal of the mission-
aries, and they became in effect his treasurers. In
1628 there were only 22 missionaries scattered in 13
centres. Yet Almeida was already warning the Jesuit
authorities in Goa against sending more men into
Ethiopia. Nost of the Church lands had ended up in
private hands, as he pointed out, but the evicted. clergy
were accusing the Jesuits of having come into the
Footnote 3 continued. from previous page.
charters which we have from Susenyos's reign reveal
a curious element not found in charters issued by
other emperors. In both, Susenyos endows lands
purchased. by those endowed.In. one, Yolyos, while
governor of Tigre, bought from the abbot and monks
of a monastery at Enzona various estates which they
had no right to sell. Conti Rossini, "Liber Axuinae",
op.cit., text,
pp. 47-4
8, trans., pp.
5-.57.
493
country to enrich themselves.1
It would be no exaggeration to say that Susenyos
had less difficulty in maintaining his numerous soldiers
than in subsidizing the construction of a few churches
and, houses. No sooner were the expeditions into Fung
terminated than he received an urgent call for help
from Se'la Chrestos. A new age-set had taken office
among the Galla, and. the governor feared massive incur-
sions by the Sadacha and the Afre confederations into
different parts of southern Gojam. Susenyos left at
the head of all his soldiers. Despite the urgency of
the appeal, he marched very slowly, evidently giving
bis men time to loot everything on the way. When he
finally reached those parts of the province inhabited by
refugees from Shawa and Damot, the people, unable to
sustain the violence of the soldiers, forced the emperor
to take away his men and to leave them to their fate.
At about the same time the Tulama were making devas-
tating raids on the eastern districts of the province.
The inhabitants, all of them Christians, abstained from
asking for any help. The emperor and his brother were
not far away, but the Galla were feared less than the
1. Letter of June 16, 1628, to the Prepositor General,
Rer. Aeth., XII, 259-60; and letter of June 30, 1628,
to the same, ibid.,
pp .
295-96.
494
soldiers .
The flight of the rebel governor of Bagamed.er
towards the end of 1620 created other unexpected oppor-
tunities which relieved the emperor from immediate
embarrassment with his soldiers. During the following
two years he allowed them to pillage and plunder even
district of Amhara, ingot and. Lasta, even though Yonael
had been given refuge by a few Galla clans only. The
eruption of rebellion by supporters of the pretender
Wald.a Qebryal in the northern parts of Shawa was another
welcome opportunity. 2
Between 1623 and
1625,
the
soldiers of the emperor, led by his belaten getoch and
other officers, ravaged all the districts between Walaqa
and. Ifat. When the barrassed pretender sought refuge
at some stronghold of .kmhara and ingot, both provinces
were again opened to the soldiers.
The rebellions of Yonae1 and Walda Qebryal were
instigated by a few proscribed clerics. It was the
indiscriminate pillaging, accompanied as it was with
1. Chronica de Susenyos, I, 223-
.
2L1. , II, 172.
2.
Pereira is right in supposing that the throne-name
of Tweod.ros Sahay adopted by the pretender was con-
nected with the king of that name promised in the
apocalyptic (and. apocryphal) gospel Pekare lyasus.
Ibid., I, 27L1., II, 211 and 5L47.48.
The chaos and
anarchy of the times and. the rise of the false messiah
Zaclirestos could have created widespread doomsday
feelings.
495
great loss of life among the people of the eastern
provinces, which embittered and escalated the opposition
to the emperor. 1 His troops had shattered whatever
atmosphere of stability Yamana Cbrestos and. Af a Chrestos
had succeeded in creating. In their need to defend
themselves against the troops, the indigenous Christians
and. the pagan Galla had to join forces. In the chro-
nicle and the Jesuit documents, the uprisings which
were soon to put an end to the regime of Susenyos are
known as the rebellion of the peasants. However, in
the uprisings were also involved the Galla as well as
the sons of the professional soldiers, who had. remained
attached to the lands given to their fathers. But the
ravages of Susenyos's soldiers had completed the ei2ianci-
pation of the peasants which began with, the incursions
of the Galla.
Although these rebellions enabled Susenyos to main-
tam his soldiers, his share of the booty was not enough
to be turned into the gold and. silver which he needed
for his various expenses. By the end of 1625,
the
1. Prom a very reliable source Nend.ez learned that more
than 100,000 non-Catholic Christians of these pro-
vinces were killed."Lettera di Nonsignor Patriarca
de Ethiopia dell'anno N.DC XXVI. Scritta al II.R.P.
Nutio Vitelleschi Generale della Compagnia di Giesu",
in Lettere Annue di Ethiopia del 162k, 1625,
e 1626,
pp. 166-67.
496
slaving raids on the Agaw of Gojam were resumed.
Catholicism had not made much progress among the pagan
Agaw. As the number of missionaries was small, the
centre which was opened at Temhua was manned by one
priest only. Even then, the centre had often to be
closed, because of incursions by war-bands of the Afre
confederation. Conversions had been also slowed down
due to difficulties connected with the widely practised.
custom of polygamy. The slaving raids were soon
extended into the Shanqela regions to the west and
south-west of Gojam.
III. Progressive settlement and assimilation of the Galla
That the striking power of the Galla had perceptibly
weakened may be seen from their failure to make any
territorial gain during the confusion which preceded
and followed Susenyos's accession. He was completely
unprepared for any confrontation with them when, at the
beginning of 1608, Gojam alone was invaded from at
least three different directions. Numerous bands of
the Warantisha and another unnamed Baraytunia tribe,
which may bave been the I
tu, crossed from Walaqa to lay
waste to Baranta and. adjoining districts. Susenyos
and his two brothers, Yamana Chrestos and Se'la Chrestos,
497
were then raiding the Agaw of the central districts.
Although the retainers of his brothers refused to go
near the Galla, the emperor by himself succeeded in
forcing them back into Walaqa. He wanted to follow
them into their bases in that province, but his soldiers,
who regarded plundering the pagan Agaw a le ss hazardous
occupation than raiding the Galla, refused to cross
the Blue Nile.1
In the meantime, bands of the Liban and other
tribes of the Afre confederation had penetrated along
the valley of the Ber river and ravaged the southern
and, central districts up to Sakala, where the Blue Nile
had its source. The different raiding parties,
enriched by the many cattle and captives they had taken
from the Agaw and from the Gafat and Damot refugees,
were gathering at Jan Badel to cross the Blue Nile,
when the emperor surprised them and forced them to
8catter. Farther west, in the Kuendel valley, he had
a similar success against another group of raiding bands
which was encumbered with booty.
Early in the next year several bands from all
three clans of the Narawa moved down the akaza river
1. Chronica de Susenyos, I, 105, 108, II, 82, 84.
498
and. erupted, along the Teqen valley, into the heart of
Bagameder. At this time the emperor had gathered a
big army and. was on his way to Tigre against the
imposter who, claiming to be the emperor Ya'eqob, bad.
seduced most of the province. On receiving urgent
appeals or help from Yaniana Chrestos, the emperor
hurried towards Ebenat, hoping to stop the Galla before
they descended into the valley of the Reb. But the
mere number of the Galla warriors sufficed to intimidate
and. to put to flight his big army. The victorious
?Iarawa bands then proceeded to pillage all the central
and. southern districts of the province, including
Exnfraz itself. Knowing that they would take the same
route when returning to their homes, Susenyos deter-
mined to avenge his ignominious defeat. Were it not
for the reinforcement Yoiyos brought from Gojain, the
emperor's soldiers would not have faced the Galla.
Burdened as the bands were with captives and. cattle,
they were overtaken before they gained the Takaza
valley and. forced. to abandon their booty.
There can be no doubt that by this time the Galla
appetite for land. was largely satisfied. The raids
and. incursions would continue for many decades yet,
but already the emphasis was less on the conquest of
499
new lands than on the acquisition first of cattle
and, then of captives. The Galla social structure,
particularly its organization in age-sets, was essen-
-________________________________________ _______
/

tially militaristic in character. Even though the

military objective, namely the conquest of new tern-
tories, was largely attained, it was to take some time
before the social structure of the Galla could be
modified for peaceful, settled life. Consequently,
the warriors shifted their emphasis to objectives which
were more attainable and which preserved the military
charactenis tics and values of their organization.
With their dispersti their hunger for land had
abated. Their strength and efficiency in warfare was
also declining. As they faced no threats of expulsion
or subjugation from the emperors or their provincial
officers, they could have gradually returued. to peaceful
pastoralism, and. even recommenced cultivation, in
order to supplement their diet of milk and meat.
Instead, they continued tosustain themselves on meat.
The Galla did not acquire the taste for raw meat until
after their migration into the eastern provinces.
Yet by the end of the century it had become a passion
and the main food. Even if we hesitate to attribute to
them the reluctance of the pastoralist to diminish his
500
stock of cattle by slaughtering for meat, we can at
least suppose that their need for a. regular supply
of milk made them careful about their herds.
1
Cattle
and, secondarily captives, therefore, became the main
reasons for the continuation of raids and, incursions
into the remaining provinces.
Susenyos had no premeditated political or military
plan for dealing with the Galla. Throughout his long
reign he did not contemplate any idea of recovering
the provinces occupied by the Galla by subduing and. sub-
jugating the conquerors. He was, however, a fighter
by inclination and a plunderer by necessity. And, in.
the early years of his reign he seems to have thought
of defending Gojam, and at the same time acquiring
captives for sale, by striking at the various Galla
bases around the province. If in 1 608 his soldiers
had not refused to follow him, he would, have plundered
the Warantisha settlements in Walaqa. Again in 1 61 0
it was his soldiers who prevented hi]n from undertaking
deterrent raids against the Galla in Walaqa, Shawa and.
Bizamno. Only towards the end. of 1 61 2 did he prevail
1 . When there were no raided cattle to be slaughtered
for meat, the Galla drank the milk and blood of their
own herds. Azevedo, "Annua de Etiopia do Jun. 28
anno de 1615", fol. l24v, 1 1 5.
779,
Braga.
501
on his men to accompany him. The surprise raid on
the Warantisha was successful and the soldiers returned
rich in cattle and slaves. Two years later he sent
the combined armies of his own and his three brothers
against the Thlama who were settled in the Shawa dis-
trict of Gerarya. The expedition was profitable.
Nevertheless, the resistance of the Galla must have
been determined. For when in 1616 the emperor tried
to send an expedition against Itu bands which were
joining the Tulaina in north-western Shawa, Yamana
Chrestos's retainers refused to cross the Blue Nile.
The reluctance of the soldiers to campaign in the
Galla occupied areas forced the emperor to adopt less
effective deterrent tactics. One strategem which he
and his provincial officers used with repeated success
was interception. The settlement of the Galla in
specific areas, and their knowledge of the raiding
habits of the bands, enabled the defenders to anticipate
the time of incursions and the directions the bands
would follow. 1 The nervousness of the soldiers was
1. Azevedo records the anticipation and fear which
preceded the change of Galla ruling age-sets.
"Anxiva de Etiopia de 1610", July
13,
1611, fol. 83v,
MS. 779, Braga. In the incursions of 1620 into Tigre,
Takia Giyorgis's interception failed because he
attacked the Galla before they had begun their des-
cent into the lowlands of Doba. Chronica de
Susenyos, I, 225-26, II, 173-74.
502
such that even the emperor aM Se'la Chrestos, who
had the biggest armies, avoided engaging the Galla
raiders until after they had gathered cattle or cap-
tives. They were intercepted. when,1 burdened with
booty, they were crossing deep rivers or negotiating
difficult descents. 1 The choice of ground was impor-
tant, since Galla horsemen by this time outnumbered
and. outclassed the cavalry troops of the emperor and
his governors.2
Galla superiority in horses had developed from
contact with former regimental soldiers and. from con-
quest of the provinces where the main imperial stables
were located. If the provinces yet unconquered had
been as flat as Shawa and the regions to its south,
the adoption of the horse might have made the Galla
bands more mobile and irresistible than before. But
much of the central and northern provinces consisted
of rugged land. When planning incursions across the
Blue Nile into Gojam, from the Takaza valley into Baga-
med.er, or from the Doba lowlands into Tigre, the Galla
horsemen could use only limited means of access and.
retreat. Many of the elements of surprise, such as
1 . Almeida, "Historia de Ethiopia a Alta", Rer. Aeth.,
VII, 208.
2. Chronica de Susenyos, I, 227-28, II, 1 75.
503
mobility, flexibility and night attacks, which had
hitherto made the Galla foot bands invincible, had to
be abandoned. Because of the dispersal of tribes,
the numbers of bands taking part in every expedition
were decreasing. Raiding parties tended to stay near
each other; and the Galla as a whole began to offer
pitched battles in open places, often dividing them-
selves into two massive and. unwieldy wings of footmen
and horsemen. 1 In this manner they succeeded in out-
numbering and overwhelming the retainers of the governors.
However, with the increasing predictability of their
movements arid. manoeuvres, they became less and. less
terrifying as enemies. In their engagements with
the emperor, who had adopted their chefra formation,
the field battles were often disastrous to them.
Absorbed as the emperor was in. Catholicism and. its
propagation, the responsibility of defence against the
Galla rested. mainly with each provincial governor.
With the exception of Se'la Chrestos, the other gover-
nors had relatively small armies, and these could not
sustain the massive attack of Galla foot and horse
warriors. Whenever the provinces were beleaguered,
1 . Thid., I, 1 1 7-1 8, 231, 252, II, 91 , 1 78,
l9.
504
the emperor tried to assist by sending some of his
troops as reinforcement. As the incursions into the
different provinces were more or less concurrent, and
as the emperor's troops were often engaged in raiding
expeditions, he was not always in a position to assist.
Tigre, because of distance, could not be at all
Delieved. by contingents from the court. Hence, even
though Susenyos was the first emperor after Galawdewos
who took seriously his responsibility for the defence
of his provinces, his preoccupation with the maintenance
of his army, and. his concern for the spread of Catholi-
cism, prevented him from giving effective assistance
to the governors. Consequently, the governors,
including Se'la Chrestos, whose intimate involvement in
the religious question frequently took him away from
Gojain, began to use fortifications to supplement the
defensive stratagems described above. The fortifi-
cations, primitive as they were, became reliable mainly
because of the predictability of the movements of the
Galla bands and the preponderance of mounted warriors
in them.
Susenyos seems to have realized the advantages of
building stone walls early in his reign. In or before
1611 he may have sought the advice of Paez and. the
505
other Jesuits on methods ol' improving and strenghening
the traditional mud and stone walls. 1 Although this
matter, like most of the political and military problems
of the country, came to be overshadowed by the religious
issue, the emperor continued to encourage his governors
to strengb.the.,by means of walls, the defence of
strategic passes and locations. It was probably at
his direction that Se'la Chrestos built a series of
walls in the area around Dabra Abraham. The forti-
fications did. not stop the bands of the Afre confeder-
ation from moving up the valley of the Ber and plun-
dering much of southern and. central Gojam. But the
warning given by the small detachment of soldiers
posted there helped many people in the interior to move
to secure places, and enabled the governor or his
lieutenants to make timely interceptions. 2 It must
have been due to the strategic importance of Dabra
Abraham, and not, as Paez thought, because it was a
territory newly incorporated into the country, that Se'la
Chrestos renamed it Addis Alam (New World). 3 Susenyos
1. Azevedo, "Annua de Etiopia de 1610", fol.
77v,
NS.
779, Braga.
2. Azevedo's letter of July
3,
1619, in Rer. Aeth., XI,43 8.
3 . Paez, "Historia de Ethiopia", ibid., II,
258.
The
fortificatiorsin Jara, an eastern district of Gojam,
which Yohannes I had repaired, were probably built
after the Warautisha moved from Ganj to Achafar."Annales
/Continued. over.
506
considered the maintenance and. extension of the walls
in this area so important that he took serious offence
when, in
1627,
his brother neglected his instructions to
this effect.
The detailed descriptions of south-eastern Tigre
by the Jesuit Barrad.as reveal the complexity of the
system of walls erected. by Takia Giyorgis during the
many years that he served as tigre makonnen and. as adini-
nistrator of Endarta. The governor was a minor noble-
man, and the emperor valued. him not so much for his
political support as for his usefulness as an adminis-
trator. When the daughter he had given to Takla
Giyorigis in marriage died., the emperor obtained. a
special dispensation from Rome, and. narried. him to
another of his daughters. The governor tirelessly
encouraged. and. supervised the construction of mud and.
stone walls, which were carefully planned so as to
enhance the security provided by the mountains and.
valleys. 1 He divided. the few retainers he had. into
small detachments and. posted them in strategic positions
in End.arta and. Wajarat. To be near the frontier, he
Footnote
3
continued from previous page.
lohannis I, lyasu I et Bakaffa", qp.cit., text, p.8,
trans., p.7.
1. Barrad.as's annual report of Jun.e 22, 1626, fol. '472r-
73r,
NS. 779, Braga.
507
moved the provincial court from somewhere near Preniona
to Entalo. The name of the outermost fortified post,
Azabo-Doba, shows the direction followed by the Narawa
and Karayu bands during the regular raids which inny
times reached. as far inland as Fremona. 1 The Jesuit
centre itself escaped the attacks and sieges because
of the clumsy wall which the Portuguese descendants
residing in it built in
1 605.
In 1 61 9 the wall was
strengthened and a water tank provided. The recon-
struction of the wall with mortar eleven years later,
and the addition of ramparts and towers, made it
impregnable.
Wherever possible, Takia Glyorgis mqved people
from open and exposed plains into more defensible
locations. It was mainly the farms in the valleys
and those near sheltered or fortified villages which
continued to be worked. The shortage of food,
frequently exacerbated by invasions of locusts, and the
concentration of people inside the walled towns, seems
to have given rise to unusually violent outbreaks of
pestilence
1 . Barradas calls it Azabo-DebaIt guarded one of the
two passes which the Galla used in. their incursions
into Endarta. Thid., fol. 75r.
2. Thid., fol. k75v.
508
If the few hundred muskets the emperor possessed
had, been distributed among the small detachments which
manned the fortified positions, the deterrence to the
Galla might have been more effective than it actually
was. But the emperor kept most of the firearms for
himself, and the few which he gave to his brothers were
handed to trusted retainers who attended to their
persons. Nor does he seem to have realized that the
centralization of provincial administration was not
conducive to efficient frontier defence. Nuch as he
appreciated the labours of Takia Giyorgis, who was
from Endarta itself, the emperor nade no attempt to
reverse or moderate his policy against the autonomy
of district administrators in the other provinces.
Considering that the bands of the different
Baraytuma and Boran tribes continued to make yearly
raids into the provinces ruled 'by the emperor, it is
difficult to assess the extent to which the various
defensive measures provided protection to the beleaguered
people. Yet the care with which interceptions were
carried out, and, the particular attention which the
emperor and some of his governors paid. to the fortifi-
cation of strategic posts, suggest that the defensive
509
efforts were not exerted in vain. We can at least
presume that the defensive measures, even though they
were adopted after the striking power o the Galla had
begun to weaken, may have contributed towards checking
further territorial encroachments by them.
The inability of the Baraytuma and Boran tribes to
extend their conquests had far-reaching effects on
relations between themselves and. with the various non-
Galla peoples. The alliance of the Warantisha with
some clans of the Itu was an event of some consequence.
The cramped situation in which the Itu found themselves
in Dawaro and Ifat may have caused some clans to turn
westwards into Walaqa. When the Humbana clans,
which preceded the Itu in the easterly migration,
reached the inhospitable, dry lowlands to the east of
Harar, they began to spread out over the Harar high-
lands.This had., possibly, blocked the progress of the
Itu, who may have found themselves hemmed in by the
Humbana on the east, the Wara De 1 aya and the Akachu on
the north and. some Boran tribes on the south. Con-
temporary sources do not, unfortunately, give any
indication of the identity of the Boran tribes which,
with the Dawe, had remained behind in Bali. The tribes
which pressed on the Itu from the south and succeeded
510
in dislodging them from western Dawaro and. the adjacent
parts of Shawa and. If at may have been the Arussi and
related tribes which today occupy these same parts.1
Had the overcrowded Itu not received a timely
invitation to proceed to Walaqa, hostilities might
have broken out between them and. the othe' Baraytuma
tribes in front of them. We cannot be certain whether
the invitation originated with the Waranisha in Walaqa,
1. On the traditional enmity between the Arussi and the
Itu tribes, see Cerulli, Somalia, II, 138. Nothing
definite is known about the affiliation of the Arussi
and. related. tribes which now occupy most of the lands
of the old Bali. The Raitu tribe claims to be des-
cended from the Akaku of the Borana. If by the
latter tribe is meant the Akako of the Macha, then
the claim is hiily improbable. Thid.,
p . 125.
See also E. Haberland, Galla Sttd-Xthiopiens, pp. Ll4O2.
The Arussi tribe is first mentioned by J. de Velasco
and. J. Lobo. When the missionaries landed. near the
coastal town of Brava, they learned that the land.
between the coast and. the interior was inhabited. by
the following diverse peoples: Muslim Maracatos,
Garged.a Galla, Muslim Macad.as, Bretamos, Aroisas,
Iberes, Daoas, Cagutus and. Adias. J. de Velasco to
A. Palineiro, Visitor of India, July
25,
l6211, Rer.
Aeth., XII, 78. Lobo, who wrote bis account years
later, names the peoples in. a different order. J.
Le Grand, Voyage Historique d'Abyssinie du R.P.
Jerome Lobo,
p.
22. The Arussi tribe seems too near
the Dawe to belong to a. different group. Compare
lists of tribes in Cerulli, loc.cit., pp. 1 2 L
l2 5
and
see Colli di Felizzano, "Nei Paesi galla a sud. dello
Scioa", BSGI, XLII
(1905),
110-11. The legendary
genea].oy recorded by Gubr Sel1assi has no his-
torical validity whatsoever, Chronigue du rgue de
Nnlik II roi de rois d'Ethiopi (2 vols.; Paris,
1O-i951), I,
L.j_L4.).
511
or whether it was devised by the leaders of the group
as a means of avoiding intertribal conflict, and. at the
same time of reinforcing a weakened tribe which was
being worried by the Tulama in north-western Shawa.
The Warantisha bad to ask for the assistance of the Itu,
probably because the emperor and, the governor of Gojam
could not give them effective support against the
Tulama. Some Itu clans, therefore, passed into Ged,em,
to reach Walaqa by following th Wancit-Jaxna valley.
Fearing for the security of the as yet unconquered
parts of Walaqa aa well as for Gojain, the emperor
regarded the concentration of bands in the Jama valley
as a breach of the truce by the Warantisha. His
unexpected attack on their settlements proved to them
that the Itu reinforcement was too small to help them
against the emperor or the Tulama. They asked for
peace, and Susenyos, senzble to their gfievances, allowed
them to move to the lands of Ganj, in eastern Gojam,
where they would. continue to act as a shield against
their enemies on the other side of the lue Nile)'
Feeling betrayed, the Itu made common cause with
the Tulama who were massed on the Sb.awa side of the Jaina.
During the joint raids they made into Walaqa and Gojam,
1. Chronica de Susenyos, I, l, II, 110.
512
they ravaged Warantisha settlements in both provinces.
The expedition of 161k did not alleviate the pressure
on the Warantisha. Whether from repentance over his
earlier indifference to their desperate situation or
from fear that they might join the Tulama, the emperor
took most of the Warantisha in Jama and Ganj and
resettled them in the vast region of Achafar and.
nearby districts. 1 The arrangement was advantageous
to him, as it enabled. him to populate an area which
his slaving raids had. turned into an empty wasteland.
This time the resettled Galla would make buffers against
raiding bands of the Lire confederation. Their
participation in slaving raids and in the suppression
of rebellions suggest that the rendering of military
service was a condition of their resettlement. Their
conversion to Christianity (obviously Catholicism) in
1619 marked. their initiation into hialand, sedentary
culture.
We have already seen that the absence of imperial
intervention in Shawa, Amhara and Angot enabled, wherever
i the shape of the land permitted, the mdi enous peoples
I
/ to fortify themselves and tod corn lete subjugation
( by the Galla. These provinces had long been subject
1. Thid., I, 1k7, II, 113.
513
to attacks and encroachments from different nomadic
and pastoralist peoples, and their inhabitants could
easily adapt themselves to the permanent proximity
of the Galla. We in!erred the improvement of
relations between them from the presence of numerous
Galla contingents in the camps of Sarsa Dengel and Yeshaq,
as well as from the support which in 1608 many Galla
of Angc and Amhara gave to a pretender of Amba Geshan.
The indiscriminate pillaging committed by Susenyos
before he became emperor, and by other fortune hunters,
could have strengthened the bonds between their Galla
and non-Galla victims.
As emperor, Susenyos showed no inclination to be
less indifferent than his predecessors to conditions in
these provinces. When he defended Bagameder from
incursions by bands of the Narawa and the Karayu, he
was thinking mainly of keeping them out of Dambiya and
Emfraz. His brothers, Yamana Chrestos and Ala Chrestos,
seem to have carefully avoided provoking the Galla
within their respective provinces into open wars with
them. They probably defended the districts unoccupied
by the Galla by building fortifications and by inter-
cepting raiders. They increased the size of theix
armies by incorporating several units of Galla warriors.
514
Such steps seem to have made tractable the already
dispersed Narawa,. Karayu and Akachu clans. Signi-
ficantly enough, the detailed chronicle for Susenyos's
reign mentions few serious conflicts between these
clans and. the governors of Amhara and Bagameder.
Yaniana Chrestos's anticipation of support from the
Marawa and Karayu tribes in his rebellion against his
brothers shows the increasing involvement of these
tribes in the affairs of their neighbours.
These assumptions seem to be substantiated by
subsequent events. The succession in 1619 of new age-
sets to leadership among the Baraytuma and the Boran
meant the intensification of raids for cattle and. cap-
tives. Part of the Narawa bands erupted into Tigre,
where they were foiled by the defensive measures of
Takia Glyorgis. The rest joined the Karayu bands
which, passing through Amhara and central Bagamed.er,
began to plunder Dambiya and. Emfraz. They do not seem
to bave caused much damage in Amhara or Bagaineder, since
the governor of neither province engaged them in any
kind of fighting. The only man who offered them resis-
tance was the governor of Dainbiya. 1 Susenyos's inter-
ception was successful, but his generous treatment of
1. Thid., I, 233, II, 179.
515
the gabar and. talata prisoners failed to induce
desertion or separation.
With the introduction of the coercive religious
measures, many of the Intransigent clergy and. laymen
found refuge amongst the different Narawa and. Karayu
tribes. Between 1620 and. 1623, while purportedly
seeking out Yonel, the soldiers of the emperor ravaged
much of Amhara, Angot and Lasta. The homes of the
indigenous people and of Galla who had nothing to do
with the rebel governor were indiscriminately plundered.
Af a Chrestos's sympathy was, apparently with the people
of the province he had, governed for many years.
Although he had given in to his brother's importuning
and embraced Catholicism at the beginning of 1621, he
was replaced by Sarsa Chrestos, a cousin to both, who
had been serving as baten geta to the emperor. 1 Yona'e1
was eventually killed by members of the Heyo clan in
order to obtain the release of the hostages Susenyos
had, taken. 2 Nevertheless, the excesses of the soldiers
1. The district of Manz was also placed under Sarsa
Chrestos.Ibid., I, 262, II, 202.
2. Ibid., I, 267-68, II, 206.According to 1 ,he abbre-.
viated. cbronicle, the Galla who kil]ed Yonael were
friends 9f the emperor. Basset, "Etudes sur l'his-
toire d'Ethiopie", op.clt., text, p. 31
1. 1, trans.,
p. l2i-. Yonael's death could have been brought about
In a manner similar to that which ended. Walda Qebryal's
rebellion. The latter was killed by Galla and talata
/Continued over
516
were such that the indigenous Christians and the pagan
Galla cooperated in their defence. The numerous rebels
and pretenders who, after 1623, rose to re-establish
the Ethiopian Church could depend on the unstinting
support of peoples of both groups.
The devastation of the Karayi and Narawa settle-
ments by the imperial soldiers seems to have b.ad the
unexpected. effect of easing the pressure on Tigre.
Until then, bands of both tribes had been making frequent
and. massive incursions into the proviiee. The inten-
sity of the raids may have been connected with the
friendly relationship which had. developed between the
different Galla tribes on the one hand and the neigh-
bouring non-Galla peoples in Bagameder, Amhara and.
ingot on the other. By 1625 the threat from the Galla
had abated to the extent that Takia Giyorgis could
give the Jesuit Nanuel Barrdas peinission to travel
through Endarta and to come as far as the fortification
at Azabo-Doba. When four years later the governor
declared himself a rebel, the greater part of his sup-
porters were Galla warriors from the clans which had.
Fqotnote 2 continued from previous page.
retainers of Se'la Chrestos. Chronica de Suseriyos,
I, 28-85, II, 219-20; and G. Paez 2 "Cata annua de
Ethiopia do mes do luiho de 1625 ate o de l62', fol.
303r-303v, NS. Goa
39
(II),ASJ, Rome.
517
settled in the Azabo and Doba plains.1
Although our sources are less informative on
matters concerning the different Boran families, the
report on Feniandes' a journey through the south reveals
that some of the provinces of this part had. revitalized
their defences. The young boy who succeeded Guemcho
in the midst of the assault by the Sadacha division
of the Nacha seems to have failed in holding the Galla
north of the Gibe river. When the missionary passed.
through Enarya in
1613,
much of Bosha had been laid.
waste. 2 Those of its inhabitants who were not taken
captive had withdrawn into the southern and western
parts of Enarya. The Sadacha had. apparently advanced.
up the valleys of the Gibe-Jimina and the other tribu-
taries of the Gibe to its west.
We do not know if the threat which the occupation
of Bosha posed to the rest of Enarya had anything to
do with the accession o Banaro in 1611. But imder
him there was a noticeable improvement in the defences
of the province. While continuing to use the Gibe as
1. Mendez to the Prepositor General, July 8, 1629,
Rer. Aeth., XII,
372-73.
2. Paez, "Historia de Ethiopia", ibid., III, k58; and
Azevedo to Francisco Vieira, June 50, 161k, fol. 98v,
NS.
779,
Braga.
518
a shield against his enemies, he garrisoned new strong-
holds and reinforced old. posts. The garrison oZ the
stronghold of Ganqa was commanded by a governor who
may have been in charge of Konch) There was also a
similar set-up on the mountains of Gumar, overlooking
the plains of Bosha.
Banaro may have hoped for positive military
assistance from the emperor. It was probably for this
reason that he paid regularly the gold tribute when
rulers of the neighboudng provinces of Janjero,
Kanibata and. Hadya had long stopped to heed the emperol's
demands. Sela Chrestos's expedition into Gojain in
1617 led Banaro to believe that the emperor had begun
an offensive against the Macha. For shortly after-
wards, the governor of Enarya began campaigning success-
fully in the Sad.acha lands north of the Gibe. As a
result, he won over many of the discontented yahabata
and ilmaguazit subjects of the Galla. During a sub-
sequent expedition he reached the edge of the Blue Nile
valley. The success of Banaro in inflicting defeats
on the Macha and in. inducing further desertion by their
1. In Azeved.o's letter the mountain stronghold is called
Gena. Thid., fol. 98v. In the published accounts
of Fernandes's voyage, it is called Ganca. Paez,
"Historia d.e Ethiopia", Rer. Aeth., III,
4k9-5l,
and.
Almeid.a, "Historia de Ethiopia a Alta", ibid., VI,
24.
519
subjects encouraged Se'la Chrestos to aim for the
recovery of Daniot and the Gafat districts beyond the
Blue Nile. The project may have been first proposed
by Banaro through his son Yamana Chrestos, whom he
sent to Gojam in
L6l9. But when in the next year
Susenyos began to doubt the loyalty of his brother,
the latter's requests for assistance met a very indif-
ferent reception.
Banaro was assassinated in the same year. What-
ever chances there may have been for the adoption of
an offensive policy were buried wih him. The reasons
for his assassination are obscure. It is unlikely that
he was guilty of the tyranny and. oppression of which
his enemies accused him. In. his desire to maintain
good relations with the emperor by regular payment of
tribute he may have punished tax defaulters with some
severity. Perhaps, political life in Enarya had become
infected with the same factious rivalries and conflicts
which bad been plaguing the Ethiopian and Ada]. thrones.1
The return in 1632 of Banaro' s son Yamana Chrestos,
who was also Se'la Chrestos's son-in-law, was certainly
due to factious rebellion, the cause and nature of which
is, unfortunately, iiri1own.2
1. Almeida, ibid., V, 80.
2. Ibid., VI, 25I.
520
At least until 1613, Janjero was successful in
warding off the assaults of the Galla. Various faotors
contributed to the stiffening of its resistance. On
the north and north-east, the directions from which
the Galla attacked, it was shielded by the Gibe-Jimma
and the Gibe itself. It seems also that, until this
time at least, the province was not troubled by violent
intena1 strife. Lastly, Janjero, for reasons which
are unknown, had not attracted the eyes of Sarsa
Dengel's hordes of slave raiders or those of inarauditig
bandits and condottieri. When Fernandes passed through
the province, its ruler was encamped on a small island
of the Gibe-Jiinma) With the occupation of much of
Bosha by the Sadacha Galla, the frontier of Janjero
with the Galla had apparently become extended and,
hence, more vulnerable.
The brief military resurgence of Enarya and the
various defensive measures undertaken in Gojam may
have been partly responsible for the dissensions which
developed between the Macha and. the peoples whom they
had subjugated and incorporated into their clan system.
The rift was probably occasioned by the progressively
diminishing booty in cattle and captives which the
1. According to Azevedo the island was called Degen.
Letter of June 30, 161'l, to F. Vieira, fol. 99r,
NB. 779, Braga. The name may have some connection
with the Amharic dajen, meaning frontier post.
521
raiding parties brought from Enarya and Gojam. The
unwillingness of the Galla to share the booty fairly
with their subjects could have started demands for
equality with the talata, if not with the Galla them-
selves. There is no way of assessing the size of the
yahabata and ilmaguazit parties which began in 1617 to
desert to Enarya and. Gojam. Those which went into
Gojam were first settled in Wambarya, Wambarma and
other districts adjacent to the Blue Nile. By popu-
lating areas which slaving raids by his own soldiers
and by the Macha bad denuded of their inhabitants, the
emperor hoped to create buZfers against further incur-
sions from across the Blue Nile. The conditions of
settlement were probably similar to those given to
the Warantisha. It seems that the yahabata and
ilmaguazit, finding themselves bard-pressed by their
former masters, tried to make peace with them. 1 To
prevent full reconciliation between them,Susenyos
transferred many of his allies into northert Gojam
and. southern Bagaineder. All the yahabat8. and ilmaguazit
thus settled were soon converted to Christianity.
Both coiffederations of the Macha were unnerved by
the offensive campaigns of S-e1a Chrestos and. Banaro,
1. Chronica de Susenyos, I,
259,
II, 200.
522
and also by the desertions of their subject peoples
which followed. For a time in 1620 they requested
the assistance of' the Pulaina. Although both families
of the Boran were led by new age-sets, their cooperation
was frustrated by the campaigns of both governors.
The Macha redirected their raids and. incursions past
Damot, into Ganz and. Hadya. As the bands had to
operate across Tulama occupied territories, the latter
helped the peoples of Hadya and. Gurage to repe]the
raids. The cbronlcle mentions the presence of Baray-
tuma clans amongst the Tulaina) These clans may have
belonged to the Itu and, perhaps, to the Waran.tisha as
well. The Macha turned west again. The Afre resumed
their incursions into Gojam and the Sadacha their
attacks on Enarya and Janjero. They also began to
intermarry heavily with the Gaf at and. other peoples
who had stayed behind in western Shawa, Dainot and
Bizaino 2
The consequences of the bostility which emerged.
between the Macha and the Tulama were many. Some
clans of the Dawe, which could not find land with either
1. Chronica d.e Susenyos, I,
217,
II, 167.
2. Almeid.a, "Historia de Ethiopia a Alta", Rer. Aeth.,
VI, 28.
523
the Macha or the Tulama, went over to Susenyos.
Clans of the Galan and Hoko, tribes of the Afre and
Sadacha respectively, also entered into the service
of the emperor. All these were settled in Bagameder
so as to prevent them from returning to their kinsmen.1
It was probably the warriors of these clans who made
up the squadrons known as Boran in the chronicle.
Surrounded as it was to the north and east by the
districts of Gurage and Hadya, Kainbata remained secure
from any kind of Galla attacks. The other two provinces,
however, had, sustained heavy assaults until the main
bodies of the Macha, the Tulama and the Dawe passed in
succession into Ganz, Dainot, Shawa and beyond. The
assaults did not abate without the loss of some dis-
tricts to the Galla. Several clans cf the Tulaina,
and perhaps some of the other Boran tribes which followed
the Dawe, settled in these districts and, in the plains
between them and. Bali. Lackirg the strength to break
N through. the defences of the yet unoccupied: districts of
the Gurage and the Ha&ya, these clans then entered into
friendly relations with their neighbours.
The Jesuit Azevedo, probably on infQrmation received
1. Chronica de Susenyos, I, 259-60, II, 200.
524
from Pernandes, says that some time between 1605 and. 1607
Uad.ya annexed Bali.' Considering the presence of
Boran clans in Bater Amora, Waj, Gamo and parts of
Kuera, a direct annexation of Bali looks improbable.
Even if the strong army of Hadya could cut its path
through these Galla, the Christians and Muslims who
lived in the strongholds of Bali would have called
neighbouring Galla tribes to their assistance. What
may have happened is that the Galla clans between Hadya
and Bali, guided by the rich aiid ambitious Amuma and
other enterprising individuals, who, like him, were
emerging from the obscurity of the egalitarian age-
sets, had. agreed to reopen the trade routes to Uarar
and. Zayla. Because of its relative strength and wealth,
Had.ya could have dominated the niany sided. partnership.
It was, however, prevented from acquiring a
lasting hegemony over the neighbouring Galla and distant
Bali by the factional strife which begali to engulf its
politics. It was already divided into at least three
regions. The ruler, Moshe, had given two of these to
his brothers, Abecho and Alico. The latter governed
the eastern districts, which faced the Boran clans.
1. "Aunua de Etiopia do Jun. 28 anno de 1615", o1.
123v,
MS. 779, Braga.
52
In 1615 he was overthrown by his cousin, who had. the
assistance
of Amuma's kinsmen behind. him) The Galla
were probably relieved by the removal of Alico, who
was a vigorous farsighted and ambitious
The last we hear of Bali and the provinces near
it is from Pernandes. The indigenous pagan inhabi-
tants and the Christian refugees of Kuera, Buzaina and
Bozanegus were in 16]A benefitting from the resumption
of trade between Hadya and Harar. An Arabic document
referring to Harar city shows that in 1620 the trade
route to Zayla was open. 3 The city was virtually
independent of Awssa; though its einirs iay have paid.
nominal homage to the imains, just as the rulers of
Janjero, Kambata and Hadya, who had ceased to send
tribute, continued to observe the customary signs of
respect to the emperor. The surrounding Humbana
probably encouraged the flow of trade through the city.
Except for occasional outbreak of hostility, as when
in
1673 the Ilmamo clan attacked. it, the city maintained
1. Thid., fol. 126r.
2. He was trying to encourage trade between Hadya and
the northern districts of Shawa, It seems that he
was also acquiring muskets through Zayla. Ibid.,
fol. l23 v-24r; and letter of June 3 0, 1614, ibid.,
fol. lOOr.
3 . Cerulli, "Documenti arabi per la storia dell'Etiopia",
op.cit.,
pp. 93 -94.
526
friendly intercourse with the Galla.
The branching out of the Wara De'aya and Itu
clans westwards into Walaqa and. Shawa could not have
failed to relieve the pressure on Awssa. This respite
was accompanied by an upsurge in the number of slaves
exported through the sulta.nate, The long reigns of
the two imains who, between 1600 and. 1620, ruled for
about ten years each may have been due to these develop-
inents. With Susenyos's restriction of the export of
slaves and the abatement of raids by the Baraytuina
tribes into parts of Anihara, Bagamed.er and. Tigre,
there was a decline In the slave trade. Some time
after 1620, the factional strifes between members of
the ruling dynasty of Imams were renewed with the
intensity of previous conflicts. The sultanate was
further debilitated by rebellions of independent minded
eniirs of the nomads around Zayla.
527
IV. 'asiladas and his tradition list revolution
Fasiladas felt no deep attachment towards the Jesuits,
who had educated him, or towards the Catholic faith, in
which he had. been brought up. The missionaries had.
lavished their attention and. favour on Kanafe Chrestos,
Susenyos's oldest son and. possible lieir, who died in
1617. Both they and Fasiladas had, nevertheless, been
careful in dissembling the suspicions and fears mutually
entertained, until Se'la Chrestos's tactless oath brought
to the open the doubts on the prince's sincerity in. his
profession of Catholicism. Nary of the emperor's
officers who had reason to resent the influence of Se'la
Chrestos and the missionaries offered to the prince the
leadership in the struggle for the re-establishment of
the old. Church. Fasiladas needed such an alliance in
case the Catholic faction objected to his succession.
But his loyalty and devotion to his father,, and above all,
the fear of being disinherited if discovered, made him
refuse the offer. In effect, his cautiousness saved him
from being implicated in the palace conspiracy of 1628,
in which a rejected wife and. a daughter of the emperor
were involved.
The rebellion of Takla Giyorgis, of whose loyalty
Susenyos was never in doubt, finally convinced the latter
528
that the coercive methods he had, employed for the propa-
gation of Catholicism had only increased the oppositicn
to the religion and to hi,msef. Hoping that some com-
promise might placate the clery who were fanning the
opposition, he suggested to the patriarch that Catholicism
would appear less foreign if it adopted the form of liturgy
and the calendar o worship and fasting of the old Church.1
The suggestion was rejected on the grounds that such a
policy ol' appeasement would. only give confidence to enemies
who had been vanquished. long before.handful of
fanatics, led by Qeb'a Chrestos, advised the use of severe
measures. Punitive campaigns in southern Tigre and
forceful methods in Lasta drove the peaceful inhabitants
of these areas into the arms of the pretender Nalk'a
Chrestos, who had already won the support of most of
the Christians and the Galla in Amhara and Angot.
The challenge to the emperor grew so strong that he

had. to recall his brothers.Yainana Chrestos was placed

over Amhara and. Se'la Chrestos over Gojain, while Sarsa
Chrestos, their nephew, was tranferred to Bagameder.
Fasiladas was given the overall command. of the campaign
1. Susenyos also suggested. that the Catholic Church should
tolerate the practice of polygamy among the Agaw, Gafat

and other agan peoples.Nendez, 'Inf'ormaao do

estado das couzas de Ethiopia do anno 1632", fol.
9v,
NS. Aul 519, BML.
529
against the pretender. The army of the latter was
composed of Galla warriors and poorly equipped, inexper-
ienced. Christian peasants.The prince was, nevertheless,
uiable to gain any satisfying victories, mainly because
his uncles obeyed his orders only rud.gingly. Se'la
Chrestos, in particular, who was still titular first
minister, purposely upset the prince's plans of campaign.
Susen.yos was once again forced to remove his brother from
Gojan, and to return Sarsa Chrestos wht belonged to the
faction of the prince.
Such dissensions inspired the clergy to incite
rebellion in Bagameder. The officers and. soldiers of
usenyos became doubtful of success. I order to fQroe
the prince into accepting the 1ead.ershi of the moveniexit
for the restoration of the old Church, Sarsa Chrestos
rebelled in Gojam, declaring himself iz. favour of
Pasiladas's accession to the throne,
The latter, as
cinmander of his father's troops, had to quell the
rebellion.
While Fasiladas saw that only the restoration of
the old. religion would make the olergy withdraw their
support from the pretender, the emperor hoped to pacify
them by conceding on the non-doctrinal aspects of worship.
Mendez was finally persuaded to allow the concessions,
530
but deprived the emperor of most of the advantages to
be gained b them, by forbidding their introduction, through
proclamation or any form of public announcement. When
his directive was disobeyed, the patriarch accused the
emperor of interfering in matters which were the domain
of the Pope only. 1 Se'la Chrestos, who in the meantime
had. been returned to Gojain, was overheard saying, "Thel
say that this kingdom is of David. What would benefit
us is that it becomes Philip's. For without this, there
will not be in this country firmness in the faith."2
The emperor became permanently disenchanted with the
Jesuits and. with Catholicism.
By the end of l61 the pretender had taken Bagained.er
and established his court on the hills of Wayna Daga,
overlooking the plains f Enifraz and Dambiya. Susenyos
himself took over the direction of defence , but he had
lost faith 1n his cause. The overwhelming victory he
had in June of the following year, .n which his troops
kLlled more than 6,000 of his enemy in . single day,
completely imnerved him. Blaming himself for the
1. LUmeida gives a full quotation of ?1endez'a strongly
worded criticism of the em eror. "Historia de Ethiopia
a Alta", Rer. Aeth., VII, 1-2-k3.

The criticism must

have hurt Susenyos very deeply, because he had been
severe on people who had complained of having to serve
"two em erors".Nendez'S letter of July 8, 1629,
ibid., XII, 381.
2.
Mendez, "Informao do estado das couzas de Ethiopia
do anno 1632", fol. 12r, 115.
Izul 519,
BACL.
531
rebel1ion and wars which had occurred since the reli-
gious dicussiois began, he empowered his son to take
whatever steps would. end the fratricide.' Although
the emperor did. not abdicate, he dia not participate in
the deliberations which culminated in the re-establish-
ment of the Ethiopian Church in the same month. Heart-
broken by his failure, he died in the following Septeniber.2
Although the change of religion led to a significant
reduction in the popular support which the pretender had
been enjoying, it did. not make him abandon his claim for
the throne. What gave Fasiladas greater fear, however,
was the refusal of Se'la Chrestos and. the esuits to
accept the change with resignation. In expectation of
relief from India, the missionaries were preparing to
entrench themselves in the fortified centres thet had in
1. Alrneida, loc.cit., pp.
165-67;
and. Chronica de
Susenyos, I,
333-34,
II, 259.
2.
Although the abbreviated chronicle says that he
abdicated in fa.vour of his son, 8 usenyos continued
to direct the religious and other affairs of the
country even when he was very ill. "etudes sur
l'histoire dthiopie", op.cit., text, p.
3 / 4 .3 ,
trans.,
p. 126. The proclamation quoted by Bruce was never
made in that form. Bruce seems to have put together
the proclamation on the re-establisb.inent of the
Ethiopian Church reported in the esuit documents
and that given in the chronicle.Travels, II, 3 96.
Fasilad.as adopted the throne-najne of Seltan Sagad.
which he later changed to Alam Sagad. He was born
in June or July of 1603.

Chronica e Susenyos, I,
45,
II, 3 6;
and. Paez, "Historia de Ethiopia", Rer.
Aeth., III,
3 87.
522
Goja.m and. Dainbiya. As the clergy were clamouring for
vengeance, the emperor decided that the onl3r way he could
prevent SDanish intervention, and perhaps annexation a1o,
was to imprison his uncle and to send. the missionaries
out of the country. Mendez and. his men were persuaded
to go as far as Tigre, whence they refused. to move.
Zainaryam, a Catholic administrator of Tamben, and other
noblemen promised to protect them until help cawe from
Goa. One of these noblemen was Yohannes Hakay. zany
years before he had. lost his office of bahr nagash to one
Amd.a Micha'el, a son-in-law of Susenyos, who had taken
part in. Takla Giyorgis's rebellion.In the hope of
being reinstated, Yohannes was also threatening Fasiladas
by giving refuge to one of his brothers. 1 But Nendez's
hope of remaining in Ethiopia was short-lived. As soon
as Yohnnes received. his old. office, he handed. over the
missionaries he had with him to the Turks in Arqiqo.
Seven Jesuits, including a bisho:p, remained behind,
hidden by Zamaryam and his friends. Four of them were
discovered by the clergy and put to death before any of
the officers could. save them. The bishop and two priests
were delivered to the emperor. But the clamour of the
clergy was such that, in order to prevent coinxiotion, he
1. Almeida, loc.cit.,
pp.
193-95,
533
had to agree to the execution of the prisoners. The
killing of the missionaries, which took place between
1635
and.
1639,
intensified the emperor's fear of invasion.
The arrival of more Jesuits and. sonie Franciscans at
I'Iassawa and Suak1 seemed to herald the landing of
soldiers from Goa. Fasiladas had no way of knowing
about the war of independence between Portugal and Spain,
or of the depleted state of the Goan treasury. Although
his on treasury was in no better condition, he began
in
1639 to send frequent offers of gold to the imam of
Yaman and to the pasha of Suakin, in the hope that the
former would not allow the invaders to pass into the Red
Sea and that the latter would prevent them from land.in
on the Ethiopian coast. The emperor also sought assis-
tance from the distant capitals of Delhi and Constantinople)
His handling of the extremely difficult religious
problem suggests that he was a mature, sober-minded and.
calculating man. The few letters he exchanged with the
Jesuits show him as an exceptionally rational and, prag-
matic politician. It seems that he understood the errors
his father had committed in allowing the powers and
1. On Fasiladas's relations with neighbouring Turks and
Arabs and. with distant Muslim powers see Antonio da
Pescopagano's lett r of Apr1 18,
1643,
in Somigli di
S. Detole, Etiopa francescana nel documenti dei secoli
XVII e XVIII, I, 205-260; and. Nendez to the Prepositor
enera1, Dec. 1, 1646, Rer. Aeth., XIII,
276-77.
534
revenues of the throne to pass completely into the hands
of ambitious governors. Unfortunately, the sources we
have for Pasiladas's long reign of
35
years are so gravely
inadequate that we cannot discern clearly the measures
and. policies he adopted to correct the errors.The
information in the short chronicles is too fragmentary to
enable us to deduce confidently the principles and
policies behind his actions. The Jesuits, on the other
band, have left many reports on the early years of his
reign. But much of the in!ormation was of too hearsay
a kind, to be dependable.:Besides, the reports were
written with the intention of persuading the Spanish and
Portuguese authorities to intervene on behalf of Catho-
licism; and. Fasiladas is unfairly portrayed as a viplent,
blood-thirsty tyrant who favoured Islam. more than
Christianity.1
One idea which seems to have been the basis for his
thoughts and actions was traditionalism. His support
for the Ethiopian Church did not, in. all probability,
1. The story of Fasilad.as's alleged desire to embrace Islam
began with the Tssuit Torquato Parisiano, who, i2 l&8,
was sent to Nocha to' encoura'e the Ethiopian Catholics.
There be learned of the exchange of envoys bettteem
Fasiladas and. the imam of Yaman.
t l
patrjarchae Mendez
relatio de iniserabili statu P.ethiopiae an. 1E48", ibid.,
XIII, 300-309;
and. "P. Torquati Parisiani S.I. relatio
d,e statu .kethiopiae an. l6i1.?_1I ", ibid., pp. 333-45.
The story is told quite differently by a member of the
imam's mission.
F.E. Peiser, Zur Gescbichte Abessiniens
in 17 ten Jahr. Der Gesandschaftsbericht des Hasan ben
Ahma. El Haini, Berlin, 1895.
arise from his Lear of his uncle and. the missionaries.
It may have developed during his childhood, when his elder
brother was a favourite of the latter, Fasiladas may
have also been influenced by his mother, to whom he
remained attached until her death in 1661. She had been
constant in her ant1pathy to Catholicism and had suffered
because of it much humiliation at the hands of her husband
and. the Jesuits.
Undoubtedly, Fasiladas's preference for the old
religion and customs was strengthened by the disastrous
failure of his rather's religious policy. The lessons
he derived fron his father's errors may have aroused in
him an appreciation for tradition in general. One of the
first things be did. upon ascending the throne was to
round up all his brothers, with the exception of Galawdewos,
and to confine them in a mountain stronghold. He pare1
his younger brother out of affection and respect for
their mother.
This same traditionalism seems to have led also to
the revival of the rigid rituals and. pageantry which
formerly used to enhance the prestige and sacredness of
the monarch. This assumption cannot be substantiated by
any documentary evidence. But the high walls and
covered passages which characterize the palace Fasilad.as
536
built at Gond.ar were, like the tall fences which sur-
rounded Zar'a Ya'eqob's dwelling at D bra Berhan, intended
to limit the emperor's communication with the public.
The design of Sarsa Dengel's castle at Guzara, on the
other hand, does not suggest a strong desire to isolate
the monarch from the people in the court.
Neither the confinement of the princes nor the re-
introduction of rigid court ceremonies could hat,e given
Fasiladas real power over the governors who were the main
threat to him. It would have been injudicious if at
the beginning of his reign he had attempted to weaken
their strength by any obvious means. Yamana Chrestos
and the numerous sons-in-law of Susenyos had been Pasiladas'S
allies in his ttndeclared contest with Se'la Chrestos.
If they bad not persuaded his father to see in time that
there would not be peace without the old Church, the
throne might have been lost to Fasiladas. After his
accession, he continued to need their assistance against
the unrepentant Se'la Chrestos, against the Jesuits who
were desperately trying to bring soldiers from G-oa and
against Nalk'a Chrestos, who persisted in his bid for the
throne.The emperor's fear of the Jesuits was so acute
that he was prepared to concede to Se'la Chrestos the
first ministershi , the governorship of Gojam and. whatever
537
other powers he would ask for, if only he would abjure
Catholicism.
For the first two or three years of his reign,
therefore, Fasilad.as avoided aking changes which could
give offence to the officers of his father. Since they
were equally worried by the same fears, he could count
on their loyalty at least until some of th.e causes of
these fears were removed. His first steps towards
correcting his father's administrative errOrs were taken
affer Se'la Chrestos was securely confined in a mountain
stronghold and. the Jesuits were safely conveyed to Tigre.
The governors were transferred to different provinces,
apparently, with the intention of weakening the bonds
which existed between them and their retainers. Yamana
Cb.restos's popularity with. the clergy had made him power-
liii and, influential, but he was too old to constitute a
threat. In fact he faded out of the political arena
soon after his brother's death. Ed.a Chrestos may hae
expected to inherit the province of his father ramana
Chrestos, because the emperor took the rather unexpected
step or appointing his brother Galawdewos over it. The
chronicle does not Secify how Ed.a Chrestos met his death
in
l67.
But as it happened at the time of the fierce
attacks which the retender was making on th emperor,
Eda Chrestos may have sided with the former.
538
Susenyos's distrust of his younger brother had led
to the breaking up of Se'la Clirestos's governorship into
the three administrative areas of Gojam, Dmot and the
Agaw districts. Fasiladas adopted this as a permanent
system in the administration of the province. He was
able to place his brothers-in-law over the different
areas without fear that they would become strong enough
to cause trouble.The sssne sytem seems to have been
followed in the administration of other provinces. Semen,
Wagara and the smaller provinces adjacent to the Takaa
river were detached. from each other and placed. under dif-
ferent officers appointed. by himself.
In Tigre, where his father had not completely abolished
the prerogatives of the district officers, the emperor
was able to create his own men. The Sons of Takia
Giyorgis, who were his nephews, were given some districts?
The heirs of Keflawand, and the other noblemen whom
Susenyos had reduced. to destitution, were recalled from
oblivion and set up as rivals to the Catholics Zamaryam
and. Asina Giyorgis, and the ambitious Yohannes Hakay.2
By replacing officers by their own brothers and close
1. Wangelawit, the mother of the prince Pawlos, was the
wife of Takia Giyorgis. Almeida, "Historia de Ethiopia
a Alta", Rer. Aeth., VII,
2k3.
2. The afa makonnen Asgadoin, who was assistant of
Keflawand and. Yolyos, was also recalled from banislunent.
Thid.,
p.
258.
539
relatives, Fasiladas created rivalry and jealousy amongst
them. 1 Such measures enabled him to persuade Yohannes to
surrender the prince whom be was harbouring, and to cut
off his friendship with the Jesuits. The Catholic
Zamaryani had hoped to rise to power with the help of
the soldiers whom the Jesuits had. promised to bring, but
eventually he was brought down through the assistance
his brother gave to the governor. 2 After
1639
Fasilad.as
does not seem to have sent any of his brothers-in-law
to the province. It was divi4ed into the two traditional
administrative regions, and the power to appoint district
officers was denied to the bahr nagash and the tigre
makonnen.
A comparison of the only land. charter which we have
for the reign of Pasiladas with charters issued by Sarsa
Dengel and Susenyos shows that Fasiladas ha withdrawn
the powers of a dajazmach from the new men he appointed.
over Tigre. The charter, which records the endowment
of some lands to one of the monasteries of the southern
region, uses the traditional titles of makonnen and seylim.3
1. Ibid., p. 34-8.
2. Ibid., p. L122.
3.
"Liber Axumae't
, op.cit., text, p. 4-8, trans.,
p.
58.
540
1
This suggests not only a severe restriction of the civi'
powers of the governor and d.istrjt officers but also the
wjthth,awal of military authority from them. Fasiladas
may have forced them to relinquish most of the retainers
whon they and their predecessors used. to maintain. In
all probability, the policy of separating the military
rzom the civil autiority was also applied in the other
provinces.
We are uncertain how the separation was brought
about. It could be that the emperor forced. the pro-
vincial officers to part with their squadrons of 'etainers
by demanding the remjttance oi revenues. Pasiladas
was neither a keen nor a successful slave raider, Yet
when he died, he left in the central treasury a sub-
stantial surplus of gold and. silver.' hat be had not
imitated his father's generosity, and his indifference on
the remittance of revenues into the treasury, is also
suggested by the fact that his successor Yohannes f und
it convenient to ivaugux'ate his reign by making a general
remission of certain taxes. 2 Another indication that
there had been a reorganization of revenues favourable to
the treasury is found. in the reference to the system of
1 . "Annales IohannE I, lyasu I et Bakaffa", op.cit.,
text,
p. 7,
trans.,
p.
6 .
2. Ibid., text,
p. 7,
trans., .
5.
541
collecting customs dues,
lyasu, the successor of
Yohan.nes, discovered that his red.ecessor had granted
provincial and. district officers wide poersto levy
dues on goods which passed. t.rough their lands. The
many experienced people whom lyasu selected to consid.er
ways of reforming th existing system recommended a
return to the Degulations which prevailed in the time
of Fasiladas.1
The separation. of the militai7 from the civil power,
which began with the frequent changes and transfer of
provincial officers, seems to have been accelerated by
two important events. One wes the famine which 1ssted.
from the second year of Fasila.as's reign to he fifth.
The violent epidemics Which accompanied. the famine forced
the emperor and the provinial officers to disperse their
retainers. 2
The second event which speeded up the
1. Ibid., text,
p. 195,
trans., p. 206.
2.
The resettlement o squadrons is strongly suggested. by
the distinct remarks made in. some Jesuit documents to
the dispersal of the captains. Almeida, "Historia d.e
Ethiopia a Alt&' Rer. Aeth., VII, 342k and. Diogo d.e
Mattos to the Prepositor General, $ept. 22, 163 4
, ibid.,
XIII, 45. This would definitely explain the emperor's
inability to withstand the attack of the pretender
Nalk'a Chrestos at Libo in 1636. The famine and
the epidemics are briefly described by a contemporary
author. E. Littmann (trans. and. ed.), "philosophi
Abessini", CSCO,
XXXI, text, p. 24-25,
trans., p
24-25.
542
creation of imperial squadrons out of the rete.iners of
provincial officers was the conspiracy of 16'I-7. Among
the manj governors executed fOr their parts in Galawdewos's
attem t to take the throne from his brother was one
Asgader. In
1635
Asgader was given the goernorshi
of Gojam. Then he was transferred to the court and
made belaten geta, though because of the military re-
organization, he was not given command over any of the
emperor's squadrons. Until as late as 1680, one of the
squadrons established in Gojam was called Asgader Qero.
It probably consisted of young men, Sons of the veterans
who had served first under Se'la Clirestos and then under
Asgader, but who were permanently settled there by
Fasiladas.1
.n examination of the slaving expeditions ade by
the emperor and his army commanders supports our assiirn -
tion of a gradual reorganization of the financial and
military aspects of government.A.ccording to the
short chronicles the expeditions began in 1636, the ye r
in which the emperor moved his court to Gond r and
probably laid the foundations for the palace and churches
there. Raids on the Acraw and Shan ela tribes of Gojam
1. "Annales lohannis I, lyasu I et Bakaffa", op.ct.,
text, o. 51, trans.,
pp. 52-53.
543
were regularly undertaken until 1652, but on a much
smaller scale than those made by usenyos.Pasilad.as
and his captains seem to ha e limited themselves to
attacking one or, at most, two tribes each. year.Ths
would mean that Pasiladas did not conduct the r ids for
the purpose of supplying and maintaining his soldiers.
The proceeds from the sale of slaves ma have been used
for financing the constructions at Gondar and the res-
toration of churches in the various parts of the country.
The Turkish pashas ol' Suakin were also making exorbitant
demands on the emperor for their cooperation in keeping
missionaries and other Europeans out of the country.
The number of soldiers who took part in he raids
must have been gradually reduced. In 1652 the Shanqela
inflicted a disconcerting defeat on a raiding force which.
had been sent under Be'la Chrestos. After this,
Fasiladas seems to nave called off further raids.
Throughout tbe rest of his reign only one raid. was made.
The cessation cannot be attributed to the punishment which
his soldiers suffered at the hands of the Shanqela, or
to the further dispersal of soldiers which may have
followed the famine f
1653.
If the e eror had nee ed.
slaves, he could, have obilized his dis ersed squadrons,
as he did ft uently against Galla raiders from Damot,
544
Bizamo and Walaq; ar,d against rebels within his provinces.1
The cessation was,
in all probability, connected with
the complet'n of the constructions and. restorations he
had, undertaken. He may have also stopped sending Lifts
to Suakin, as by now his fears of a military intervention
in favour of the Jesuits must ha,ve subsided,
As far as we can gather from the short chronicles
on the emperol' and, the longer histories of his sucoessors,
Fasiladas made no attempt to use the old regimental system
as a model for his military reorganization. His own
soldiers and. the former retainers of the :provincial
officers were grouped in squadrons. He fixed the size
of each squadron at about 1,000 nen, and the title of
yashalaqa cane to be generally given to all squadron
officers.
In the early years of his reign, before he began to
disperse and resettle hs soldiers and. the retainers of
the provinoial officers, Fasiladas resorted. to a few
deterrent attacks on the alla in the hope of stop ing
them from crossing the Blue Nile into Gojam. The first
1. The deterrent ex editions also seem to have been
attended with similar disasters. The minister
Walda Glyorgis lost practically all the soldiers he
had with him while canipaignin &gai st the Tulama in
Walaqa.Thid., text,
p.
131, trans.,
p.
136. The
date of the cam aign is unknowi The minister does
not, however, rise to rominence until after the down-
fall of Gala dewos.
545
expedition was not ade until after the elimination of
the threat from the pretender Malk'a Chrestos. The tribes
against which the emperor sent his soldiers are not
named in the chronicle. The expedition was, presumably,
directed against the twelve clans of the Afre confe-
deration which Qerlos, the son of $e'la Chrestos, had led.
into Gojain.
The second major deterrent campaign took
place in l6 in Sobi, a district of Bizamo.It was
intezided to discourage the bands of the Hakako tribe
from crossing into Wambarya and Warnbarnia. But in the
process of assigning lands to the varjous squadrons, he
seems to have decided upon reinforcing the fortified
strongholds which were created during the time of his
father. At the same time he strengthened and extended
the fortifications.
Long lines of fortified strong-
holds shielded Gojam, in the east against the Tulaina and.
the Itu, and in the south and south
. -west aainst bands of
the two Macha confederations. Yet, when we see the
territorial gains the various Galla tribes had made by
the end of his reign, it becomes clear that. his system
of fortifications had failed to check them.
The first fact which seems to have contributed to
the failure of Pasiladas's defensive strategy was the
intensification of co flct amongst the Galla tribes.
546
The alliance between the Tulania and, the Itu came to au.
end. once the Warantisha were forced out of Walaqa.
When the more numerous and, hence expansionist Tulama,
turned against the Itu, the latter had no alternative
but to try to croSs into Gojani.The whole o Walaqa
and most of the territories of Anihara which lay between
the Walaqa and. Bashelo rivers thus fell to the Tulania.
The pressure on eastern Gojam became so strong, that
several times during his long reign Pasilad.as stationed
himself in the distrLcts of Jara and. En.nabse.The
presence of many squadrons of Christianized. Itu warriors
in the army of lyasu suggests that Fasilad.as had tried
to relieve Gojam by settling many of the Itu clans in
Gojam and, in Dambiya. But the number of fortifications
which Yohaunes had to repair at the start of his reign
shows clearly that neither the military nor the diplomatic
efforts of Fasilad.as had stopped the Itu.
The same fate seems to have overtaken the fortif 1-
cations in the south and. south-eastern districts. We
do not know the reasons which led. the Harsu clan to split
from the other Hakako clans. It succeeded,, b.owever, in
occupying large territories in Wa barya and the nearby
Agaw lands. Because of the intermarriage wb.ich followed
between the Harsu G ha and. the Agaw whom they subjugated,
their descendants came to be known as Lrsl Agaw and Welaj.
547
lyasu's squadrons of Bahr Arussi and Welaj were probably
made u of young men recruited from among the Harsu Galla
and. their Agaw subjects. The defensive
system
of
Wambarma, especially the fortifications at Dabra Abraham.
or Addis
Alam, also broke down under the repeated attacks
of Gudru, Liban and. Dawe bands. Fasiladas must have
resorted to diplomatic measures, as during the reign of
his successor we find niany Macha and Dawe squadrons
settled in various parts of Gojam.
We also find a few definite indications of tern-
tonal gains made by the Narawa and Karyu tribes in the
eastern provinces. The Wallo and the Wechale spread.
over all of southern Amhara and the whole of Ganh. Some
Marawa and Karayu tlns pushed northwards from Azabo and
established themselves in the lowlan.s of Sera'e and.
?"Iamberta, districts of Tigre. Those clans which were
already establish?d in northern Amhara and. in Angot
extended their conquest into varioUs parts of Lasta and
Bagameder.
Fasiladas was not a military man, and he does not
seem to have chOsen his provincial officers for their
military abilities. Nevertheless, if the Tulama and.
Macha had not been assisted. by rebellious people within
Gojam, it is doubtful that they could. have broken through
548
the fortifications of Jara and. Wambarnia as easily as
they did.In Lasta, the successors of the pretender
Nalk'a Chrestos continued to be supported by Marawa and
Kat'ayu bands. Even when the Galla bad no desire to
acquire further territories they offered. their assistance
readily. Raids into non-Galla territories were made
necessary by the military orientation of Galla society.
The promotion from a junior to a senior age-set demanded
that a Galla youth should distinguish himself by killing
enemies. The second. and more important factor which
weakened Pasiladas's stand. against the Galla was the
rebelliousness of his own subjects.Thus, the expressions
"he went to the a1la" and. "he entered. into the land. of
the Galla" caine to signify that someone had rebelled and
sought refuge among the Galla.'
The followers of Qerlos were not many. Those of
alk'a Chrestos were confined within Lasta. In time
Pasiladas would have succeeded. in bringing tbeii to sub-
mission, Unfortunately, the slow progress be was making
towards establishing a stable and. orderly government soon
tame to be endangered. by the religious controversy which
pitted. the clergy against each other.
1. Ibid., text,
p. 49,
trans.,
p.
50; J. Perruchon (trans.
and. ed.), "Notes pour l'histoire d'Ethiopie.Le rgne
de Yohannes (ler), roi d.'Ethiopie de 1667 a 1682", RS,
VII (1899), 171, 175.
549
V. The religious ontroversy
The origin of the controversy can, be easily traced
to the early years of Susenyos's reign, when the emperor
was forcing the unwilling clergy to the acceptance of
Catholicism. As the se aration of the Alexand.rian Church
from the rest of Christendom had. begun with the Council
of Chalcedon, the Jesuit missionaries concentrated their
attacks on the monophysite faith of the Ethiopian Church.
They argued that as the human nature of Christ was mortal
and imperfect, while the divine nature was immortal and
perfect, the two natures must exist ,separately and. inde-
pendently. Because this doctrine attributed two wills
and. two modes of action to Christ, it was rejected by the
Ethiopian clergy. They maintained that a perfect union
had taken place in. Christ as a result of which he bad
only one will and. one mode of action.To the objection
that no perfect union could take place between a perfect
substance and one which was imperfect, the clergy replied
that the act of union, at the moment of Christ's con-
1)
ception, had. honoured, glorified. and sanctified human
nature in him. Their tenet was, therefore, that the human
nature was made perfect by its union with divinity and
that the two natures were united in such a manner that
they could not be distinguished or separated from each
550
other. 1 This was the monophysite or tawando doctrine
of the Ethiopian Church.
To explain the act of union and the manner by which
the humanity of Christ was jnade worthy of being united
with divinity, many clerics came out with various
opinions. 2 One of these was the doctrine o' geb'at or
unction. When it was first formulated it did. not
threaten to divide the clergy. Its exponents simply
advanced the idea that the humanity of Christ was pun-
fled, of original sin and other subeq .uent imperfections
and made worthy of union with divinity through the unction
of the Holy Spirit. The more orthodox clertos saw that
the doctrine was in agreement with the Scriptures and
the monophysite faith. But as the anointing took place
either at the time of Christ's conception, that is at
the time of union, or afterwards, they pointed out that
the act of union self sufficed to sanctify and. glorify
1. Paez, "Historia d.e Ethiopia", Rer. Aeth., II, 37-9l.
2.
When the clergy found. themselves hard. pressed by tb.e
cold logic and. scholastic learning of the Jesuits,
they exhumed and. aired many of the heresies which had
tropbled the Byzantine empire during the fifth cen-
tury. A few of the heresies revived. in the court of
Susenyos are briefly described in Almeida, "Histonia
de Ethiopia a Alta", ibid., VI, 337;
Luis de Azevodo's
letter of July
3,
1 61 9, ibid., XI,
L 27; and A.
Fernandes's letter of May 1 , 1 620 to N. Vitellescbi,
ibid., pp. L1 47...48.
551
his
humanity.' In 1620 the maintenance or the teaching
of any of the beliets of the Ethiopian Church was made a
punishable crime. The Jesuit missionaries settled the
arguments over qeb'at by condemning it, together with the
tawando doctrine, as contradictory with the teaching of
the Catholic Church.2
Had. there been a bishop or any other prelate who
could have acted as a spokesman for the Ethiopian clergy,
the exponents of geb'at and. the other opinions then
brought forward might not have found. the opportunity to
gain adherents.
The opposition to Susenyos's religious
policy was undirected and. uncoordinated. During the
years of persecution and exile, the geb'at doctrine was
accepted by many of the exiled communities of Ewostatewos.
By 1632, when the Ethiopian Church was re-established,
1.
Chronica de Susenyos, I, 217-
18
, 236-38, II, 167,
182-84. The author of the short history of the con-
troversy, which Guidi edited, is mistaken when saying
that Pasiladas arranged a discussion between Nendez
and the clerics of the Ethiopian Church, led by the
echage.
The missionaries in, fact had begged Xor
such a discussion but their request was turned, down
by the emperor. The author may, therefore, have
been thinking of the discussions held during the
reign of Susenyos.
"Di due frannnenti relativi alla
storia di Abissinia", RRAL, II
(1893),
597-98;
and
Guid.i's Italian translation "Uno squarcio di storia
ecclesiastica di Abissinia", Bess none, VIII (1900-
1901), 15-17.
2. A.
Pernandes's letter of Nay 1, 1620, Rer. .Aeth.,
XI, '147.
552
the doctrine had undergone a radical transformation.
Its exponents included le med. abbots and teachers of
such well known monasteries Qf Gojam as Zage, Enzagedem,
Selalo, Dabra Warq and Gonj. The more sigrtiflcant
development, however, was the new interpretation which
had, come to be given to the doctrine. It was now argued
that it was not Christ's humanity but Christ himself who
was glorified by unction nd made the sn of God. For,
the monks s.id, when the Word was united with humanity
at the moment of Christ's conception, the Word impoverished
and debased itself, thereby losing it divine powers.
They explained later that only by receiviiig the unction
of the oly Spirit did it regain its powers
and, become
purified of all the imperfections and. .imitations it had
acquired through union. They publicized this inter-
pretation b means of such slogans as "Christ the son
of God through mction" and. "Christ was glorified through
the Roly Spirit".1
Coulbeaux thinks that thee qeb'at doctrine, as it was
origina formulated, was a restatement of Nestorianism.2
1. "Di due frannnenti relativi a].la stora di Abissinia",
op.cit., p . 599-600;
and 'Utio quarcio di storia
ecolesiastica di Abissinia", op.cit.,
pp.
16-18.
2.
Histoire politigue et religieuse d'Abyssnie, II,
267-69.
Cf. Alineida, "Historia d.e Ethiopia a Alta",
Rer. Aeth., VI, 337.
A scholarly study of the origin
and nature of the religious controversy is yet to be
/Continued over
553
There is, however,, a strong reason for disagreeing with
him.
During the reigns of Susenyos and. Fasilad.as the
moderate partisans of the tawalido doctrine accepted the
idea of Christ's humanity receiving the unction of the
Holy Spirit. And nothing can be further removed from
Nestorianism than the tawandoormonopbysite doctrilie.
Nor can the exponents of the new interpretation be
charged with resuscitating the heresy of Nestorius.
If anything, their doctrine was &rian in its orientation.
During a council held at Qura Anbasa in
1679
they denied
any connection with Nestorianism while, at the same
time, presenting arguments which put the Trinitarian
doctrine in doubt. 1 It is precisely because of the
elements of Arianism in qeb'at that most of the councils
suirimoned by lyasu, the grandson of Pasiladas, were con-
cerned with the question of the Trinity itself. 2 These
Footnote 2 continued from previous page.
written. Coulbeaux's attempt to define the doctrines
is unsatisfactory, mainly because he had relied less
on the chronicles and. other documents of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries than on the opinions current
at the end of the nineteenth century when he himself was
in Ethiopia. Although Guidi,. does not enter into the
nature of the controversy, by far the best introduction
to the subject is still his very short survey "La
chiesa Abissina ", ON, II (1922-1923), 187-89.
1. "Annales lohaunis I, lyasu I et Eakaffa", op.cit.,
text, p. 41, trans., p. 42.
2. Thid., text,
p.
81, 90-91, 120, trans., p . 81, 92, 124.
That as corollaries of the geb'at doctrine doubts were
/Continued ever
554
.Arian ele ents were clearly ondeinned. in the council of
1699, held. at Yebaba.
And. then, they discussed about things of
worship saying, that as a matter of
faith the three adorations are due to the
Holy Trinity. And Out of reverence two
adorations are due to Our Lady Nary and
to the honoured. wood. of the cross because
it was sanctified by the blood of divinity
cursed. and excommunicated is he who
says, "The body of Christ was glorified.
through union and became the son of God.
through unction and was born in glory
and became the first-born among brothers,
the king of kings, the chief of priests,
the lord. of the prophets and the head of
the apostles." Upon Whoever says that
through unctin Christ became God's son
in substance, thus making h,im inferior
like us, may the curse of Anus, the
curse o Sabellius and. the curse of
Nestonius be not removed. from his soul
arid his body for ever and ever,Amen. 2
The questions at issue were, therefore, the basic
Christian doctrines of the Trinity and of the Redemption.
Footnote 2 continued from previous page.
arousea. on the doctrines of the Red.emption and. the
Eucharist as well is brought out even more clearly in
the short chronicle of lyasu edited. by erruchon,
"Notes pour l'histoire d'thiopia. Le rgne de lyasu
(len), roi d.'Ethiope de 16821706",r RS, IX
(1901),
162-63.
1. I have thus translated. th Ge'ez phrase baqeb'at waldo
za bahrey, which sums up the essence of the geb'at
doctrine. Guidi renders the Amhanic equivalent
baqeb' at rabahrey lej into "figilo xiaturale"."Uno
s uarcio di storia ecclesiastica di Abissinia", 2.
cit., p.
15.
2.
"Notes p iir l'histoire d'thiopie. Le rgne de lyasu
(len), roi d.'thiopie d.e 16 2 a 1706", op.cit.,
p . 163-64.
555
The controversy pitted the monasteries of the order of
Takia Haymanot against those of Ewostatewos. The monks
of the former order adhered to the orthodox moophysite
belief, while those of the latter upheld. the qeb'at
doctrine. Since monasteries of both orders were found
in all the provinces, every paDt of the oointI7 began tQ
feel the divisive effects of the controversy. Pasiladas
was a statesman, and his avowed policy was to place the
interests of the country and. the people above those of
any religious
or pOlitical faction. Ai,though the tra-
ditional patronage of the throne towards the Church, and.
his own past role of champion of the Alexandria. faith,
demanded that he upheld the tawando doctrine
by
punishing
any deviation from it, it seems that he tried to maintain
a neutral Dosition. He probably feared that his inter-
vention wotild aggravate the situation b
y
transformiig
what seemed like an innocuous quibbling between tradi-
tiona.11y rival orders into a schism which could involve
the country in another civil war.
Because our sources on the time of Fasilad.aa are
limited, we cannot trace the full effects of the dhristo-
lo1cal controversy. Perhaps the fist serious political
event which could be connected with it is the conspiracy
of Galawd.ewos. In some Jesut documents it is alleged
556
at the prince tried to overthrow his brother in order
to restore Catholicism and to recall Nendez. 1 The
allegation cannot be taken seriously, as one of the
missionaries left behind by the atriarch describes the
prince as an unrepentant enemy of Catholicism.
2 Indeed,
if Pasiladas had suspected his brother of harbourin any
kind of affection for the Jesuits, he would not have
entrusted him with the governorship of Bagameder. A
letter by one of the Portuguese descendants iii Ethiopia,
written soon after the conspiracy wa$ uncovered, only
says that Galawdewos was Epected of having sought the
assistance of the Catholics in the country. 3 Even this
is doubtful, as the emperor does not seem to have taken
any strong measures against the Portuguese descend nts
1. "Suinma aliarum e istolarum ex Aethiopiae, Goae facta",
Rer. Aeth., XIII, 291-92.Te contents oi' this docu-
inent are summaries of letters sent from Ethiopia.
It is quite possible that the letter containing this
version of Galawd.ewos's rebellion was written by one
of the Portuguese descendants in the hope of bringing
about a military Intervention by the governor of Goa.
The allegation is re e ted by T. Parisiano in his account
of conditions in Ethiopia in the years bet een 1647 and.
1649.

Ibid., p. 3 3 6-3 7. But his report seems to

have cone from the same source. See "patriarchae
Nendez relatio d.e nijserabili statu Aethiopiae an. 1E48'1,
ibid., pp. 3 06-3 0?.
2.
F. Rodrigues to ?Iendez, Jan. 20, 163 6, ibid., p. 100.
3 .
B. Nogueira to the Prepositor and the fathers in Goa,
Narch 12, 1647, ibid.,
p.
284.
I-. As Nogueira himself wss living so ewb.ere near Arqiq.o
his information was all hearsay. In his letter of
/Con.tinued over
557
Galawd.ewos had. made no attem t to communicate with
Nendez; the restoration of Catholicism could not have been
the motive for the conspiracy.

It was torpt in fact

that the prince sent messengers. The bishop that he
asked from Alexandria could not have been needed for the
purpose of crowning him in the event of a successful
rebellion. Galawdewos would have known that any senior
cleric of the Church could perform a coronation. ceremony.
The fact that the prince sent his messengers at about the
same time as Fasiladas's men were leaving on a similar
errand suggests that the conspiracy was connected with
the growing animosity between the two parties in the
Church.1
Footnote
L .
continued. from previous page.
Nay 8 , 1652,
to Nendez he gives a different version
of Galawdewos's a.rrest and execution.Nogueira says
that the prince was hated by the clergy and. feared. by
his brother the emperor. According to the letter,
Galawdewos had. more and. better equip ed soldiers than
the emperor. After having him arrested. out of "pure
envy", Fasiladas had him charged with crimes against
the faith and with desiring to send envoys to Rome,
Portugal and India. See fol. 706r-706 v
, NS.
779,
Braga.
1. I am unable to account for the action of the patriarch
of Alexandria in consecrating and. sending two bishops,
Nicha'el and Yobannes. The fact that they came by
different routes, and the reaction which Fasiladas
showed. on the arrival of the latter, strOngly suggests
that one bishop was not eant to be the assistant and
the heir to the other. But in Fasiladas's action in
allowng Yohannes to succeed Nicha'el we have further
roof of the e eror's efforts to bring about a recon-
ciliation between t e factions.
558
As far as we can ascertain, the Abuna arqos, who
caine to Ethiopia in 1636, was still alive when the
emperor requested another bishop from Alexandria.
According to Nend.ez, Nargos was
de?osed.
and placed in
confinement for leading a debauched life. 1 Nend.ez's
allegations are, however, c ntradicted by earlier
reports of his own and. of other Jesuits which described
the bishop as a God-fearing man, kindly disposed even
to the missionaries themselves. 2 Also, in a document
which lists the heads of the Ethiopian h14rch, Narqos is
said to have been an orthodox bishop. 3 Presumably, there-
fore, the reason which led to the quarrel with the
emperor was the bishops uncomproinisin effort to stamp
out heresy within the Church by crushing the qeb'at
faction. And since Galawdewos did not make any attempt
to help Narqos, but sent his own men to Alexandria, we
car only assume that he was not on the side of the bishop
or the enieror.
1. Nendez to the Sacra Congregatie de Propaganda Fide,
Dec. 18,
1651,
Rer. Aeth., XIII, 381-82.
2. I" lendez, 't Expeditionis Aethiopicae" , ibid., II, 206-207;
J, Francisco to Nen.dez, June 20, 1636, ibid., XIII, 108;
B. Bruni to Neudez, Feb. 19, 1637, ibid., p. 1234
and Nendez to the fathers of the Soiety in Portugal,
Dec. 1,
1639,
ibid., p. 170.
3.
I. Guidi (trans. and. ed.), " Le liste dei etropoliti.d'
Abissinia" , Bessarione, VI (1899-1900),
5,
11-12.
559
Galawdewos and the many notables who were executed.
with him must have been partisans of the monks of Ewostatewos.
The barsh punishment inflicted upon them seems to have
been intended to discourage ambitious noblemen from har-
nessing for their personal advantages the strong emotions
aroused by the controversy. While Fasiladas left the
resolution of' the controversy itself to the leaders of
the Church, he did not hesitate to order te execution
of monks who tried to incite their sympathizers to
rebellion. 1 Hi policy of non-intervention, combined
with the persecution of the more fanatical monks of both
sides, seems to have encouraged moderation. The general
cothicil of l62, the first of two councils known to have
been held during his reign, condemned the qeb'at doctrine
and excommunicated its exponents. Yet, the formula
1. The death in lE4 of the monk Lebsa Chrestos, teacher
in the monastery of Selalo, was probably connected
with the conspimcy of Galawdewos. "tudes sur
l'histoire d'thiopie", op.cit., text, p. 3k5. This
fact is omitted in the translation.See trans., p. 288.
This monastery, situated Ln eastern Gojain, was one of
the main centres where the geb'at doctrine was taught.
In the other short histor7 o the emperor, the matyrdom
in
1658
of monks of the monastery of Iaguiia is reoorded.
"Notes pour l'histoire d'thi6pie. Le rgne de Fasilad.as
(Alam-Sagad), de 1632 1667", text, RS, V ( 1 8
97), 369,
trans., ibid., VI (1898), 90. flagifina was a centre for
purist tawando monks. The French physician, Charles
J. Poncet, was told that Fasiladas eliminated some
7,000 clerics who had rebeled against him."A Voyage
to Ethiopia" in The Red Sea and Adjacent Countries at
the Close of the 8ev nteenth Century (trans. W. Foster),
p.
123.
560
adopted by the council was conciliatory enough to satisfy
the more moderate of the geb'at partisans. The formula
rejected the idea of divinity suffering any humiliation
or limitation through incarnation. But it acoepted. the
sanctification and glorification of Christ's humai4ty
through unction. 1 The emperor took no steps to limit
the freedom of the excommunicated clerics. Their lay
sympathizers found. themselves in no wa discriminated
against in appointments to court and. provincial offices.
Unfortunately, the impartialit7' of Fasilad.as went
unappreciated by the extremists of both sides. The
traditional depend.ence of the clergy on the patronage
and guidance of the throne had ended with Susenyos.
After their victory over this emperor, the clergy had
come to realize that, while they could dispense with the
patronage of the throne, the throne would not be able to
withstand their opposition. Hence rejecting the
1. The council, in which the clerics Adam and Zaiyasus
acted as spokesmen for the tawando and geb'at parties,
respectively, could not have taken place in the
court of Susenyos but in that of his son. Not only
is there no me tion of such a disputation in any of
the Jesuit documents, but it is also very unlikely
that Susenyos, who died firm in his attachment to the
Catholic faith, would have resided over such a
meeting."Di due frainmenti relativi all storia di
Abissinia", op.cit., pp. 599-600; and "Uno Squarcio
di storia ecciesiastica di Abissinia", op.cit., p. 17.
561
conciliatory definition of the council, u.ncomprontisin
clerics on both sides made direct appeals for support
to the public at large.
Their intransigence had. the
effect of obstructing and frustrating Fasilad.as in his
efforts to strengthen the monarchy and to restore stabi-
lity and order to the country. For noblemen who could
not have resisted his muzzling reforms, the controversy
created unexpected opportunities. In the name of one
or the other doctrine, they were able to win popular
support and. to defy the monarchy.
A further attempt to overthrow the emperor seerna to
have been made by two notables called Nesa Chrestos and
Demyanos. In all probability, the downfall in 1665 of
the first minister, Walda Chrestos, and. his brothers was
also due to their involvement in a similar treason. We
do not know to which 91' the religious factions these men
belonged.But the rebellion ol' the emperor's son Dawit
in 1666 was certainly instigated by extremist tawando
clerics. The unjustified discontent or the mon.&s of the
order of Takia Hayrnanot and their intrigues against tbe
emperor cost them his goodwill. His distrust of their
lay supporters led to the appointment of prtians of
the geb'at doctrine to the court offices. At the time
of his death, the dominance of notables of this faction
562
in the court was such that they were able to place on
the throne a prince who, they knew, would be guided by
their counsel.
563
CHAPTER VII
THE DECLINE OF TEE NO ARCHY
1. The Religious Wars
When Fasiladas was suddenly taken Ill in October
of
1667,
he had made no provision for a successor. The
man then in favour, the belatn geta Nalk'a Chrestos, was
a pattisan of the geb'at faction. During the two days
of the emperor's fatal illness, IIalk'a Chretos distributed
gold, silver and clothes to the clergy and. to the "poor"
of Gondar. After thus purchasing popularity and. preparing
the people of the capital for the important role he was to
play, he selected Yohannes for succession. The prince
was probably sympathetic to the geb'at cause. What made
him a good choice, however, was his timidity, love of
peace and desire to please. Until his death in 1680
Nalk'a Chrestos remained the real power in Ethiopian
affairs.
Understandably, the chronicler speaks little of the
minister and. more of the emperor. This makes it 6.iffi-
cult to tell the extent to which the ambition of Malk'a
Chrestos was outweighed by his loyalty to the cause of his
faction. Prompted by him, Yohannes began his reign by
granting an amnesty to many whom his father had imprisoned
564
and banished. 1
There is no reason for regazd..ng this
act as a conciliatory gesture intended to soften extremists
of both factions. Uncompromising tawando partisans,
especially those involved in the rebellion of Dawit, do
not seem to have benefited by the amnesty. It was
probably supporters of Galawdewos and. pople imprisoned
for purely political offences who were reprieved.
Yohan.nes spared nothing to swing sympathy and. support
to the cause of the geb'at doctrine. To the peasantry
he made concessions of some of the revenues,, while out of
the reserves which Fasiladas had accumulated donations of
gold and silver were made to the soldiery and the clergy.
Encouraged by the popularity he was thus acquiring, the
emperor began to take steps towards the overthrow of the
tawand.o doctrine. Nalk'a Chrestos was made first minister
and re'sa makuannent. Se'la Chrestos had borne the latter
title. Its reintroduction suggests that the men whom
Yohannes appointed to the court and provincial offices
were given great powers. The new officers were partisans
of the geb'at faction.ence factional interest created
between the emperor and. his men boid.s as strong as those
which had united Susenyos and his brothers. As trust and
1 . "An.nales Iohan.nis I, lyasu I et Bakaffa", op.cit.,
text, p.6., trans.,
p. 5.
56
confidence were esentiaI for success, Yohanne surrendered
all his powers to the ministers and, governors. Within
one year after his accession he had. undone all the improve-
ments for which hs father had worked. throughout his long
re1n.
The emperor and his minister had more than one year
in which to prepare the ground. for the overthrow, yet
they hesitated to declare open war on the partisans of
the other faction. Yohannes was probably frightened. by
the bitter ill-feeling he had aroused. among the tawalido
partisans by the appointments he had made, and. by other
Signs of bias which he had. shown. To divert attention
from his actions, be began to harass and persecu.te harm-
less minorities.He forced the r'Iuslims and the Falasha
who lived in Gond.ar to live in segregated. quarters.
Although his wiser father had created many squadrons of
Falasha soldiers, the emperor passed. impractical decrees
which limited. communications between them and the
Christians. The various descendants of the Portuguese
were rounded. up from wherever they lived. and escorted, at
gunpoint, past the rontier with ?ung. The partisans
o qeb'at had never been accused. b their enemies of
upholding a doctrine which smacked. of Catholicism. By
these attacks on the weak and the harmless Yohan.nes
566
probably hoped to attract the attention of the public
away from his actions a ainst the tawando faction.
The influential leaders of the faction were removed
from the provinces and. brought to the court. But they
remained free and. in enjo7ment o their estates. Amongst
them were Anestasyos, whose father Yolyos had the repu-
tation of a martyr, and Fares, a nobleman of Bora and
Salawa. In trying to bribe these and other well known
men to his side, the emperor dissipated his reserves and
revenues. He resorted to slavin raids, conducting his
expeditions with the frequency and thoroughness of Sarsa
Dengel and Susenyos. The raids of Yohaunes were so
devastating that,. after the second expedition into Gojani,
the agan Agaw begged to be made Christians. 1 Although
the chronicler says that the emperor had. pity on them,
subsequent raids on them show that their pleas were not
attended to. The raids brought gold and silver needed
for donations and for the maintenance of the imperial
household. But the extent to which he indulged in them
suggests that the raids also served to distract the
attention of the soldiers.The contentious clerics
1 . Ibid., text,
p.
1 2, trans., p. 1 2.
567
were coming to the court and. inciting the public against
each other and, in the case of the advocates of the
tawando, against the emperor as well.
The official condemnation of the tawando d.octririe
came in
1671.
By this time the emperor had bribed some
of the monks of Dabra Libanos to depose their echage and
to elect the tractable Heryaqos. I'Iessengers to Alex-
and.ria had. also succeeded in persuading the patriarch to
replace Abuna Chrestodolu. The bishop had, apparently,
refused to preside over a. council which. would 'everse the
definition he had earlier helped to promulgate. us
successor Sinod.a was as nialleable as the echage. The
compiler of one of the lists of bishops had generously
excused Sindoa's amenability to ignorance and lack f
learning
Yohannes's preference for bribery rather than force
did irrepaab1e damage to the organization of the Church.
Because Sinoda was made to uphold widely disparate opinions,
the office of the bishop began to lose its restige.
The unity of the tawando faction was also permanently
destroyed.The split which developed between the incor-
ruptible extremists on the one hand. and the moderates and
1. "Le liste dei !'Ietropolii d'Abissinia", Bessarione, VI
(1899-1900),
5,
12-13.
568
ainenables on the other cost the echage the influence which
he had. traditionally exercised in the s iritu.al and.
political affairs of the country.
Bribery and. cajolery were means which only the court
could employ. While the spokesmen of the two factions
were courted and, pampered by the emperor and his ministers,
outside the capital city the clergy and. their 1'ollowers
waged real war against each other. All the provincial
governors were hand-picked. partisans of geb'at. Although
they had the will they l.cked the means 10 silence
opposition to the new definition. The officers ar4
squadrons in each district took the side of the mOnas-
teries which dominated in it. For, what the methods of
Yohann.es had achieved. was not the establishment of eb'at
as the doctrine of the whole Church, but the alienation
of the court from the rest of the country. The unborn-
promising attitude of the clergymen who lived too far
away from the court t be bribed forced the noblemen and
rofessional soldiers who, lived near then to commit them-
selves to the cause bf one or the other faction. The
majority of the people in Gojam and Bagaineder were
prepared to uphold the geb'at doctrine. Tho e of Wald.ebba,
Sagad.e, Wag, Lasta, Angot and. arts of Anhara, on the
other hand, committed themselves to the overt row of the
569
doctrine and if necessary of Yohannes himself. Tigre
was more or less equally divided.In the districts under
the bahr naash and. those adjacent to the Narab river the
geb'at doctrine was accepted.)- The inhabitants of
End.arta, Wajarat, Salawa, Bora and Abargale, however,
aligned themselves with their neighbours to the south.
Although the rebellion in southern Tigre, Lasta and.
the other tawando areas began soon after the condemnation
of the doctrine, the conflict did not attract the attention
of the chroniclers until after l67'I-.

The main, reason

for this was that the emperor, apart from temporarily
detaining suspected leaders like Fares, did not bother to
take steps to end. the conflict.Instead he and his
soldiers, especially those of Gojam wb.o as partisans of
geb'at were loyal to him, occupied themselves year after
year in raiding the Agaw and. Shanqela of that province.
Immediately after his release, Fares returned, to Tigre,
where with another nobleman. called. Zaniaryam he began to
wage war against Delba lyasus, governor of the province
and. son-in-law of the emperor.
Unlike the civil wars of the time of Susenyos, those
of Yohannes were not fought between emperors and. rebellious
1. The clergymen of Aksum seem to have become the mainstay
of the doctrine."Annales lohannis I, lyasu I et Bakaffat'
op.cit., text,
pp. 27-28
, trans.,
p.
28.
570
governors or mutinous soldiers. The fightixg in Tigre
and, elsewhere was between people of the same or neigh-
bouring provinces. There were no national, religious
or political figures to unite the partisans of each
faction in the provinces.The wars were really struggles
between rival monasteries and noblemen in each district
and province. This accounts in part for the unusual
bitterness and. brutality with which they were fought.
Probably for the first time in the history of the country
wounded and captured Christians were mercilessly emas-
culated by their neighbours and fellow Christians. The
other reason for the excessive cruelties committed by all
sides was the participation of Galla warriors. The forces
pittea against each other were more or less well balanced,
and each side sought the assistance of neighbouring Galla
tribes and clans. By this time the Baraytuma tribes in
the eastern rovinces had settled dQwn. Their partici-
pation. ii the wars was not prompted by motives of tern-
tonal expansion.
The veteran, Galla were attracted by
the prospects of looting. For the young men, apprenticed
in the lower age-sets, these wars provided opportunities
for the first killings which would transform tb.em into
proud members of the warrior age-sets.1
1. Ibid.
571
Nothing illustrates better the differenc between
the court and the rovi ces in ther p roaches to the
conflict than the offer Yohannes made in
1675
to mediate
between the rival factions. The court, apparently,
co sidered itself in no- way responsible either for
starting or ending the war. The emperor wou1d not have
shown this much interest if he had not been alarmed by
the efforts the rebels of Tigre and. Lasta were making to
find a suitable candidate for the throne. Besides
securing the assistance of many Narawa and Karayii clans
of ingot and Tigre, Fares and Zamaryam were also trying
to enage the sultan of Awssa on their side.' As if the
whole war had, been a purely private feud, a reconciliation
1. The statement of the chronicler to the effect that t e
rebels offered the crown to the sultan cannot be taken
seriously.Thid., text, p. 28, trans., . 28.
Nevertheless, the co ciliatory st te ents an ered the
geb'at advocates to the extent th t one of the spe red
the ule on which the em eror was riding."Notes
pour 1'histoire d'thioie.Le rgne de Yohannes (ler),
roi d'thiopie d.e 1667 a 1682", ES, VII (1899), 169-70,
17L
1,The first sig s of a serious doctrinal s lit
within the tawab.do party seem to have ap e.red at this
council.Some- monks may have roposed., probably as
a oonciliatory opinion, the Catholic precept of two
independent natures in Christ. "Annales Iohannis I,
lyasu Xet Bakaffa", op.cit., text, p. 5'-, trans., p. 56.
This opinion is stated fully in a variant of the abridged
chronicle edited by Basset. It was one of t e reasons
for lyasu's summoning of a council in
1705.
Conti
Rossini, "D e squarci ined.iti di cro ica etiopica",
REAL, II
(1893),
8
15, 817.
572
was arranged between Delba lyasus and. the rebel le ders.
Fares and. Zainaryam were given offices, the latter being
made d 1jaz ach of some districts in Tigre. To pacify
the monks and the ordinary lay artisans of t h o, the
bishop and. the leaders of tae two monastic communities
held. a council in which they voiced some co ciliatory
state ents.
The nature of' the statements i not known.
:But no decision was taken which changed the defiziition
or a.a.maged the position of the geb'at doctrine.
The people must have been exhausted. by t eir four-
year long civil war. For although the emperor did
nothing to satisfy the expectations of the tawando parti-
sans, the truce lasted almost two years.
Then, with
the exception of Zainaryam, the rebel leaders of Tigre and
Lasta took to arms again. This time fighting also broke
out in Sagade, Semen, Bagameder and. even in geb'at domi-
nated. Gojam. We hear nothing of the situation in the
northern districts of Shawa. As there were few monas-
teries which belonged to the community of
Ewost tewos,
the monks there probably had. no rivals to war against.
Dux'jn three successive years, Yohannes tried to force the
rebels of Lasta into submission.
In spite of th assis-
tance he received from the Galla of Angot and. Ainhara, he
failed to make a dent on the resistance of the rebels.
573
In the end. he returned to his usual diversions of raiding
the Agaw and Shanqela of Go,jam and of harassing the
Nuslims and. Falasha of Gondar.
With the death of Nalk'a Chrestos in 1680 the
qeb'at party lost its real leader. The emperor was known
to be a weak and nerveless man. The first who turned
against him were the noblemen who were once partisans
of tawando but whose acquiescence he had obtained by
giving them good offices in the court and by marrying
them to his daughters and. nieces. They were joined by
former governors and ministers of Fasladas whom Nalk'a
Chrestos had. outmanoeuvred. The intention of the many
conspirators was to place lyasu on the throne. As the
eldest of the three survivi g Sons of the emperor, lyasu
must have been genuinely sympathetic to the tawand.o cause
and critical of his father's indifference to the conflicts.
The conspirators had no provinces from which they
could raise soldiers. They could have joined. the rebels
of Tigre and Lasta,
but?
apparenbly, they Xearea. being
overshadowed by Fares. Thus, together with lyasu they
went to the Tulama and, the Karayu in Walaqa and Amhara.
With the help of the Galla, the rebels destroyed the
fortifications in eastern Gojain which Yohannes had rebuilt.
574
They began to lay waste the lands of the geb'at partisans.
Although the latt r were able to defend themselves, the
emperor was afraid of losing his throne. A reconciliation
was arranged between him and his son ix. which he agreed to
recognise lyasu as his heir and to summon a council in
which the religious issue would be reconsidered.
Yohamies, in fact, must have agreed to bring about
a victory for the tawando doctrine. At the end of the
discussions in the council ot 1681 he himself announced
the cndeination of the geb'at doctrine. Sinoda followed
by anathematizing it and excommunicating its advocates.
The decision of the council satisfied the partisans of
tawando. They forgave the emperor's past partiality
fo geb'at and, exculpated him from responsibility 'by
blaming the clerics of the court and the ministers for
having misled him. Yet a year later, lyasu rebelled
again and. was caught while trying to reach the Galla in
Amhara. The reason for the prince's discontent is not
known. Quite possibly, the emperor, feeling the humi-
of
1iation/aving
betrayed.
his faith and his friends, had
planned to choose from among his Qtb.er Sons one who was
favourably inclined towards geb'at. If such was the
case, the partisans of tawando must have seei, to it that
lyasu was forgiven and. guaranteed the succession. The
75
emperor died. soon after, on July 19, ar.d lyasu ascended
the throne without any opposition.'
Like his grandfather Pasiladas, lyasu. wanted to
take the religious controversy out of politics. ITe had.
neither the inclination nor the patience for intricate
theological discussions. He accepted the tawand.o defi-
nitioi, and he felt that its establishment as the doctrine
of the Church and. the condemnation of geb'at in 1681
should end. the controversy. Immediately upon his accession,
therefore, he began to reinstate into the court and pro-
vincial offices all the partisans of tawando whom Yohannes
had removed or excluded, including Pares and. Anestasyos.
Nearly all the officers of the late emperor, who were sus-
pected of harbouring strong sentiments
of loyalty to the
coMeinned doctrine were confined in the various strong-
holds of the country. No action was, however, taken to
limit the freedom of the clerics who advocated geb'at.
lyasu seems to have believed that, without the assistance
of the noblemen, the disoont nted clerics by themselves
would not be troublesome.Indeed, he showed little con-
1. The prince was about 22 years old when he succeeded his
father. "Relatio cons. de Naillet ad niinistru.m de
Pontchartrain d.e Aethiopiae statu", Nay 12,
1698,
Rer.
Aeth., XIV, 32; and Poncet's "A Voyage to Ethiopia"
in The Red Sea an Adjacent Countries at the Close of
the seventeenth C tury, p. 130. lyasu's throne-name
was Adyd
576
cern when, three months after his accession, disputes
and disturbances broke out between the leading monks of
the two sides. He rejected their attempts to involve
him by declaring that the controversy had been settled
by his father and that he and. his judges would only
listen if they had arguments over land or other such
matters. He made it clear that the prelates of the
Church were the competent authorities who could decide
on religious issues)
Sinoda was still the bishop, and Heryaqos the echage.
Although the geb'at clericS were willing to attend
meetings presi.ed by these prelates, those of the tawando
action were not. The bishop, on his part, repentant
for his condemnation of geb'at, refused to take part in a
discussion which he knew would not reverse the situation,
lyasu saw no alternative but to have him removed. Accor-
dingly, messengers were secreted out of the country to
ask the patriarch of Alexandria for a more orthodox bishop.
When news of this leaked out, the
gebtat
clerics, in their
turi, began to incite sedition end rebellion. The
situation deteriorated so rapidly in 1684 that the emperor
had to go to the monastery to which the bishop had retired.
He offered to reinstate some of the geb'at notables and.
1. "Annales lohannis I, lyasu I et Bakaffa", op.cit.,
text, p.
63,
trans., p. 62.
577
squadron commanders whom he had dismissed. He a10
promised the bishop that he would not have him deposed
when. his replacement arrived from Alexandria. 1 Then
lyasu went to Go jam and tried to pacify the various
squadrons there. But as in many of the provinces
extremists of both factions began to resort to arms, he
Iecided to summon a council.
If any religious controversy could be settled by
one single council, that of 1686, held at Goid.ar, should
have brought peace to the Church and the country. The
council opened with a moving address by lyasu, in. which
be exhorted the prelates and the monks to bury their
hatred for each other. He and. his ministers swore to
give fair and impartial judgment. The manifest pliancy
of the emperor encouraged the qeb'at clerics to hope for'
success. The council ended by adopting a conciliatory
definition similar to that upheld during the reign of
Pasiladas 2
But opinions between and. within the two parties were
too divergent, and. lyasu's spirit of moderation was nt
shared by the clerics. With the capitulation of Tohannes
1.
Ibid., text, pp.
e4-85, trans., p . 85-86.
2.
The deliberations of this council are reported at gre t
length by the chronicler.
he definition adopted is
found in ibid., text, pp. 9l--95,
trans., pd 96-97.
578
and the hesitation of lyasu himself in mind, extremists
of both sides refused to accept the definition of the
council. Insurrection broke out more or less at the
same time in many provinces. In Gojam, the geb'at monks
founc. a champion in Walle, chief of some of the Nacha
clans which Susenyos or Fasilad.as had settled in the d i s -
tricts adjoining the Blue ITile.These and the Dawe
clans in the central districts of the province were con-
vertei to Christianity long before Yohan.nes came to the
throne. Because of the preponderance of qeb'at monas-
teries in the provilice, the Gall. had become staunch
partisans of the doctrine. Also during the many years
w1en the northern provinces were in rebellion, the alla
chiefs and squadrons bad been )ohamies's companions in
arms. It was he who had made Walle aajazmach of the
southern districts.
Walle and the leaders of the qeb'at monks crossed
he river to seek the support of other Dawe clans and
the Acre tribes. They succeeded in their mission and,
after proclaiming one Yeshaq as emperor, they returned
to Gojam with the intention of marching upon Gondar.
Howe7er, lyasu met them just after they bad. crossed, the
river. He succeeded in d,is ersing them before they aM
their allies could organize themselves for an orderly
579
march. As he had not inflicted serious damage on the
invaders, he began to restore and strengthen the old.,
neglected fortifications in Vambarma and the other
southern districts. He planned to wait in Gojam until
Walle and his Dawe and Afre allies attempted. another
invasion.
But, in the meantime, rebels in Amhara and. southern
Tigre had also proclaimed their emperors. The qeb'at
monks in the district of Ambassal were responsible for
the upheavals which occurred in the southern province.
They found supporters amongst the- Narawa and Karayu
warriors whom Yohannes had formed into squadrons and
settled in the various districts adjacent to Lasta. The
Galla soldiers, most of whom had already embraced
Cbristian.ity, had thereby become partisans of the qeb'at
faction.Now, witb. a pretender at their head, they began
to move towards Bagameder, probably with the intention of
reaching Gondar)The rebellion in Tigre was less
serious. It was incited by extremist tawando monks
and the pretender found himself opposed and, soon after,
captured by those satisfied with the dfin1tion of the
council.
Whatever satisfaction lyasu may have received from
1. Ibid., text, p . 1031014, trans.,
p.
106.
580
the development in Tigre was spoiled by reports of serious
disturbances in Damb , Lya. Fearing that thee could spread
into Wagara and Bagameder, he hurried to Gond.ar. From
his court he opened negotiations f'r peace with the
geb'at leaders in the different provinces. We do not
know the nature of the terms he proposed, but the leaders
must have found them sufficiently attractive to agree to
lay down their arms and to attend a council.
The monasteries belonging to the order of Ewostatewos
did not have a leader who, like the echage of the rival
order, could impose a semblance of unity on the qeb'at
partisans. Without the lay spokesmen and patrons who
had guided the affairs of the party, its campaigns and
rebellions had lacked coordination. The more rabid
extremists had even ant.gonized. their valuable ally the
bishop by pelting and. beating him. When the council
opened at the beginning of the rainy season of 1688,
the qeb'at monks were too divided to agree on their repre .
- sentatives. A rguments and quarrels between the far too
many qeb'at monks who caine to the meetings led to the con-
demnation of their doctrine.Its advocates were all
arrested and. exiled. A n injunction was made against its
teaching and, dissemination. Nost of the monks of Gojam
and A mhara who did. not want to comply with the injunction
581
sought refuge among t the Galla who were not subjects
of the emperor.
As a result of Yohannes's neglectful reign and. the
religious wars which troubled the country, power had.
once more slip ed. away from the throne. Provincial and
district officers had. regained control over the revenues
and the soldiers. 1 lyasu understood the state of con-
fusion in the administration. But he was unwilling to
use for the reorganization of the government the temporary
respite which his strong 1 ieasures against the geb'at
clerics had. gained him. The reasoi for this unwilling-
ness can be clearly seen in Charles Poncet's description
of the emperor. The French physician, who came to know
lyasu intimately during the few months that he was in
Gond.ar, between
1 699
and 1 700, tells bow much the emperor
wa dominated. by his passion for war. 2 The chronic1
also provides numerous examples of bow easily sedentary
activities exasperated him. In the rare times when he
1 . The considerable authority which provincial arid district
officers had come to enjoy is Illustrated by the pro-
liferation of customs gates along the routes used. by
the salt caravans. After the deatb of Fasiladas the
officers created new gates an increa ed the dues.
Ibid., text, p . 1
95-96,
trans.,
pp.
206-208.
2. "A Voyage to Ethiopia" in The Red Sea an A jacent
Countries at t e Close of the Se nteenth ntury,
pp. 1 O-3l.
582
was not warring against the Galla around Gojarn er raiding
the Shanqela and. the Dubani of the western regions, he
preferred to go on hunting expeditions than to stay in
Gondar.
The administrative confusion was such that eventually
he yjeldea to the pressure of his court stewards and.
justices who wanted him to define the powers of the pro-
vincial governors. This task he delegated to the governors
who were in the court in 1690 and to his belaten geta.
Their recommendations, which he ratified without any
examination, 1egtimized the strong position which the
governors had acquired. The stewards of the court, who
traditionally acted as watchdogs for the prerogatives of
the emperor, were corn letely su erseded by provncia1
and district officers. 1 lyasu probably be1eved that by
thus transferring most of his administrative responsi-
bilities to th provincial officers, he was freeing him-
self for the cam aigns he had. wanted to make since t e
very beginning of his reign.
II. The Galla Campaigns
The Galla cainpaig s of lyasu cnnot be attributed.
1. "Annales IohannisI, lyasu I et B k ffa", op.cit.,
t xt, p. lL 14_ L 16, rans.,. 151-52.
583
merel to his love for V hting. Had. he bee after
dventure for its own sake, e would ha e found sufficient
diversion in hunting and sla e raiding. These were, in
any case, the favourite pasti]ne to which he resorted
whenever lie wan ed to rest from the councils and from
his campaigns against the Galla.The campaigns, on the
other hand, were un opular with the soldiers; and lyasu
knew that with every expedition which he made he was more
and. more alienating th loyalty of his s.uadrons.
A satisfactory explanation for Iyasu 1 s wish to open
a campaign against the Tulama tribes in Shawa, Walaqa
and Amhara is given in the chronicle. It seems that at
the time of his rebellion against his father, when he
had sought refuge among the Pulania, he had romised to
hel free the Christian subjects of the G ha) He had
tried to lead an expedition as early as l68, but was
forced to give it up because of the restlessness of the
geb'at partisans.It was not until 1 68 , when he thought
he had settled the religious co fhict, that he was able
to fulfil his promise.
In the chronicle the people who wanted to be rescued
from subjugation to the Galla a e called the kordida.
1 . Ibid., text, p. 1 27, trans., p. 132.
58
The term is difficult to translate, but the description
sug ests that the people we e a cong10 eration of
!L.aguaztt, yahabata an1. talata.' There were also
amo gst them d.escenddnts of families who had. fled fro
Dambiya and Gojam to escape the persecutions of Susenyos
and Se'la Chrestos. lyasu's carefully planned expe-
dition was successful. Thousands of families of the
kordida were brought back from the Tulama 'ands. Unfor-
tunately, the chronicle says nothiag about the subsequent
fate of these iaiiiilies. Many may have been given land.s
in Wagara after the emperor round.e. up the various hordes
of bandits who preyed upon the caravan roite bet'ieen
Gondar and. Tigre.
Perhps encouraged by the success of this expedition,
lyasu decided upon subduing all the Tulama. The gover-
nors of Shawa and. Amhara harassed them until one by one
the tribes submitted.. .. very important factor in the
speedy pacificatio;ri of the Tulama w'as the hostility,
which increasingly bedevilled their rela lonshi with
their subject peoples. The gala gand. of t e bulad who
in 1692 vaunted. of their role ir the subjugation of all
t e Tulaina and. of so e of the Macha tribes like the Liban
may have been subject pec les
lire
the kordid.a. What is
1. See above
PP.4/-22,.
585
in.teresti g about these gala g nda is t at, unli e the
kord.id.a tb.ey did not ask to be taken out of the lands
under the G ha and resettled. elsewhere. They propoed.
to hel the emperor to subdue and. pacify all the Tulama
and. Nacha tribes.The fact that lyasu's gifb to the
gala gand.a included large quantities of cereals seems to
suggest that they had returned to farming.1
The establishment of imperial authority over the
various Baraytuma tribes between Shawa and. Tigre did not
require much military activity. Nost of the Wallo, Karayu
and Narawa Galla were already well integrated with the
Anihara, Doba and. Tigre peoples near them. What the
emperor did, therefore, was to grant the Galla some privi-.
leges and to give them territories Ln addition to those
which they had received. from Yohannes. No engagements
took place when in 1692 lyasu toured. Lasta and the adjacent
Galla districts of Amhara and Angot. The interesting
litigation which later arose between the people of lasta
and. the Narawa clans around them could perhaps illus-
trate lyasu's policy for this region. The lasta people
wanted the forests cleared because the Gahla bands were
using them as hiding places during their raids. The
1. "Annales lohamnis I, lyasu I et Bakaffa", op.cit.,
text,
p.
166, trans., p. 174-.
586
Galla objected., claiming that they were retainers of the
emperor and sed. the forests for peace-keepi g o erations.
Although Fares, the first minister, was o. the side of
the Lasta people, lyasu confirmed, the Galla claims.1
As the people of tasta were whofly partisan of the
tawando doctrine, his suspicions of them were probably
coml.ected with the unwil1ingnes which some of the notables
had shown over the remittance of revenues.2
That lyasu's initial efforts at rescuing subjugated
Christians gradua1ly developed into an ainbitio s pro-
gramme of pacifying all the al1a oQcupied lands is best
illustrated by the expeditions of l96. The acti,vities
of a rebel called Takla Haymanot, who was successfully'
enlisting the support of many Wallo and. Karayu bands,
provided the emperor with the excuse to go into the
valleys of the Bashelo and the Wancit. It seems that e
penetrated beyond Shawa into the former rovince of
tf,t and Dawaro.3
While camped in Ifat, he is said to have proposed to
his soldiers, an& to the governors of Shawa and. Ainhara,
who had. joined him with their r tainers, a plan for
1. ]lid., text, pp. 207-208, trans.,
p.
220.
2. Ibid., text, pp. 139-40, 205, trans., p . 1 4
5 - 46, 217.
3.
Ibid., text, p. 180, trans.,
p.
189.
See also ibid.,
text,
pp.
184-85, trans.,
p.
194.
587
pushing the Galla beyond. the Awash.Et is doubtful that
Iyasu had. thought that the reconquest of the eastern
provinces would be a simple task. 1t was probably the
chronicler who placed this boastfully expressed plan into
the emperor's mouth. What lyasu had in mind. may have
been the pacification of the Karayu, Itu, and Boran clans
which had. acquired more or less exclusive possession of
most of Shawa and the region to its east. Understan-
dably, it was the governors of Shawa and Amhar. who per-
suad.ed the emperor against the plan. The chronicle
does not give their reason for discouraging the emperor
against opening a campaign, but it does n.ot seem that
they feared. the conse
que.ces of undisciplined soldiers
marching through their homes and. fields. Nore likely,
the governors wanted to avoid destroying the peaceful
relationship which was developing between their subjects
and the Galla. The only way by which the Galla occupied
provinces ou1d. have been pacified was by stationing
numerous garrisons in them. If lyasu had shown the
desire to remain n Shawa, or even better in Ifat, for
as long a time as would have been necessary, the governors
might not have objected to his plan. But lyasu and hi
men had. no intention of doing so. In fact, they
returned. to Gondar without fighting any of the Galla.
588
The cumulative effect of the ill-conceived and
partially successful campaigns was that the soldiers
became increasingly reluctant to take part in them.
In
1697 the emperor found an. opportunity to pacify all
the Afre and Sadacha tribes of the 1'Iacha. The long-
standing hostility between the talata and the other
subject peoples in the lands between the Gibe and the
Blue Nile and their Macha masters had orce more erupted
into armed conflict. In answer to an appeal for help
from the talata, lyasu set out for the old, province of
Daniot. But his squadrons refused to accompany him
beyond the Blue Nile. The soldiers complained that the
expeditions into distant lands were taking them away
from their farming occupations. They also told him
that they would only fight in defence of their homes and.
lands, and, that,, although their profession.. was soldiery,
they were not obliged to respond to every order of mobi-
lization. They justified their refusal to help lyasu
in his Galla campaigns by referring to the very decree
which had brought the swift arid terrible anger o the
Querban soldiers upon Zadengel.1
When the soldiers thus refused to give the state the
1. Ibid., text,
p.
190, trans., p. 201.
589
military service which by profession they were obliged
to render, lyasu should have realized that some kind of
military reorganization was necess ry before under-
taking major pacification campaigns against the acha.
The complaints of the soldiers were not very unreasonable.
Some of these campaigns lasted between four to six months.
The forced marches were exhausting. md as they could
not carry sufficient supplies to last them for such long
periods 1 they often found the emperor's efforts to main-
tain discipline quite exacerbating.Besides, unlike the
emperor and. his men, the Galla were fighting in familiar
terrain.Tb.ey were successful in cutting off stragglers
and. in ambushing squadrons which they found detached
from the main body of the aririy.
lyasu's second attempt to go to the assistance o
the t lata and other subject peoples of the Nacha was even
more frustrating. The soldiers in Baganieder, Wagara,
Dambiya and Gojain practically ignored his orders of
mobilization.
ii donna ordre aux chefs de,,faire
le recensement de tous les awa,
selon leurs divere ces Lies
diffrents bataillons,J qui avaient
r ondu a l'appel. Car auparavant
ii leur avait souvent dorin l'ordre de
rapeler vite sous les armes tous les
awa,...ils n'en trouvernt [de runis
sous les ames) qu'un cinqui&ine
ou dixime d.e chaque bataillon et de
590
chaque corps. En constatant cette
chose, tous les chefs furent & ouvants,
car us savaient que le ioi allaient
entreprendre une forte expd.ition, et
qu'il avait donn un rendez-vous
Cprcis
et] srieux . un ind.ividu, qui devait
le cond.uire au pays stir lequel ii avait
fom son dessein, d.ans ces jours d.e la
semaine de la Passion, [la seniaine sainte).
us rapportrent au rol que dams chaque
espoe, [bataillon] et d.ans chaqu corps
on n'avait trouv& de awa [qul eussent
rpandu a l'appel] pas jnme la cinquime
ou la d.ixinie partie, coinme nous avons
racont plus haut. Le roi en appr'enant
cette chose, s'irrita et l'aspect d.e son
visage s'altra tpar suite de la eolre3
leur fit des reproches parce que
les awa, contre leur [ordre), taient
rests [sans rejoiid.re leurs bataillons],
1]. maudit le inonde et pleura .amrement en
versant ci.e larmes de ses yeux, car son
coeur tait en flanunes et brulait coinme
le feu, parce qu'il rebroussait chemin,
[abandonnant] Ia route de son expedition,
et voyant ruin par ia i'difice du rendez-
vous, [le projet de recontre qu'il avait
nouj. i
It was not until 1700 that the emperor was able to
go against the Macha. Probably because he was unable tOL
muster up all his squadrons, he had. to satisfy himself
with minor engagements with the Gudru tribe. While
returning to Gojam, however, he lost a large number of
his men in an ambush set up by the Galla. Although
militarily the expedition was a failure, it bad a serious
effect on the Afre tribes.The presence of the emperor
1. Ibid., text,
p.
192, trans., pp. 202-2O3.
591
seems to have encouraged. the Baso clan to break openly
with the confederation. The clan, which probably belonged.
to the Dawe or the Tulama, was apparently pubhed about
and overcrowded by the tribes of the confederation.
Hoping to extend its territory, it sought the assistance
of the emperor.
The expeditions of 1702 and.
170k
against the Nacha
were the most interesting of the many which lyasu con-
ducted. against the Galla. Both campaigns show that, if
he had h.d a disciplined. aritly, and that ir he could have
stay?d in the ?lacha lands for a few years, the reconquest
of the lost provinces could have been easily accomplished,
The first expedition was directed mainy against the Ure
tribes. The Gud.ru, the most doinant of the cenfederatioA,
were harassed by the emperor's men anciby the Baso warriors.
even the clans of the Liban tribe, which was the second
strongest member of the confederation, turned, against
their allies and refused to give them refuge in their
lands. But Tyasu bad made no plans to stay for the
rainy season in weStern Shawa. His return to Gondar
was in fact hastened not only by the impatience of his
soldiers but also by news of the many conspiracies which
were afoot for his overthrow. So inconclusive was the
campaign that the Baso, feari g the revenge of the Gudru,
592
asked to be moved as a body and resettled in Gojam.
In his second expedition lyasu campaigned through-
out the old province of Damot and. the adjacent districts
to its west.Everywhere he received the full cooper-
ation of the talata under the clans of both Macha con-
federations. With their assistance he was able to
inflict severe and. decisive defeats upon the various
Galla armies which tried to stop his progress. When
he camped .ear Ganqa, the rival rulers of Enarya
applied to him for investiture. The factious conflicts
which bad troubled Enarya ever since the time of usenyos
had weakened it; and much of Bosha and Guar was lost
to the Sadacha Galla. Although the emperor confirmed
the governorship upon one of the rivals, he took no steps
to prevent the renewal of fighting between the su porters
of the two rulers.If lyasu's assaults on Konch an1,
particularly on the main markets near the Gibe river,
were intended to help the ruler of his choice, his inter-
vention was more harmful than useful, His licentious
soldiers looted all the villages and. emasculated all the
defenders whom they were unable to kill.1
The talata and. other subject peoples of the Macha
seem to have wanted the emperor to stay long amongst them.
1. Ibid., text, p. 2k5, trans.,
p.
262.
593
\--
N /
' i ' . . - '
D
\ -O
I,

1
- -
',-,
L
'1;-
h1j-
1 ) 1
a
B4i .' -
0
io"an kt.njdo?n i'n
(tOS.
594
But the soldiers, who were opposed to the expedition
from the beginning, were continuously urging him to
return to his court.' The talata had. apparently resumed
farming, for they kept the soldiers well supplied with
provisions. 2 Nevertheless, the soldiers made matters
difficult for the emperor by plundering the talata
villages and. enslaving their women and children. lyasu's
efforts to protect the talata by repeatedly proclaiming
that they were his subjects were ignored by the soldiers.'
Ilany of the talata communities, including the strong and
numerous Jiinnia groups, were forced to defend themselves.
Some even made peace and sided with their Galla enemies.
As a result, lyasu achieved hardly anything worthwhile
by this expedition.
III. The Tragic End. of lyasu
During the years in which lyasu's attention was fixed
on the pacification of the Galla, he did little to check
the resurgence of factious strife between the partisans
of the two religious groups. The situation had become
further complicated by the split which had developed. within
1. Thid., text, pp. 2k9-50, trans., pp. 267-68.
2. Ibid., text, pp. 24l-2, trans., pp.
257-58.
3.
Thid., text, p. 238, trans., p.
25' # .
595
the tawando party. It was divided not only between
extremists and. moderates over the definition of the
council of 1686, but a third sect had. also emerged with
a creed much closer to the doctrine of the Catholic Church.
At the same time, the emperor's dependence on the soldiers
of Gojan for his Galla campaigns had resulted in the
relaxation of all the restrictions which he had, imposed.
on the geb'at clerics. The injunction against upholding
the doctrine was ignored, and its advocates were allowed
to defend. and. propagate it openly. Much to the ann.oya.uce
of Fares and the tawando provincial governors, the officers
of the three administrative divisions of Gojam had become
the
emperors
s favourites.Tullu, chief of the Galla
settled in the division known as Dmot, was not only made
dajazmach of the area but also given the emperor's daughter
in marriage. 1 Tullu shared the leadership of the qeb'at
faction with Eleni, lyasu's favoured sister. Among the
other members of the faction who were close to the emperor
was Yostos, the son of Delba lyasus, Fares's 1a'te rival
and enemy.
It was not without reason, therefore, that the tawando
clerics and their lay partisans began to turn against
1. "Etudes sur l'histoire d'Ethiopie", op.cit., text,
p.
369,
trans., p. 318.
596
the emperor. Public disturbances and. conspiracies to
depose him were multiplying. Not willing to be dis-
tracted. from his Galla campaigns, he tried to safeguard
his throne by giving the office of first minister to his
eldest son Takia Haymanot and transferring Fares to
Tigre.This measure, taken sometime before the first
or second expedition against the NaOha, turned out to be
a serious error. By it the emperor offended the powerful
leader of the tawando faction and. angered those of it
clerics who wanted him to continue his anti-geb'at policy.
When lyasu returned from his second. 1'Iacha expe-
d.ition, he began preparations for a council over the
religious issue. It is very unlikely that he wanted to
bring about the condernnatioii of the tawando doctrine.
He probably wanted to satisfy the demands of his geb'at
favourites while allowing the council to renew the
injunctions against their doctrine and. its advocates.
But probably because there was no way of explaining this
to the tawando partisans, his plans for a council were
rejected. by them. The violent quarrel which broke out
between the emperor and. the echage further encouraged
the leaders of the other faction.' They wanted the
emperor to use this quarrel as an excuse to turn against
1. "Notes pour l'histoire d'thiopie. Le rgne d.e lyasu
(1er)',
op.cit., pp. 259-60.
597
the tawando clerics.
His refusal to hold a council in which the tawando
faction would not be properly represented alienated Tullu
and the other governors of Gojarn.Tullu's rebellion
towards the end of
1705 may have shown the emperor how
precarious his position had become. A reconciliation
with Tullu was affected; and immediately after it, lyasu
held an important meeting at Dambiya.' According to a
short history of his reign, the subjects discussed con-
cerned. all matters of government. 2 Although none of
the tawando figures were present, we d.o not know if the
emperor committed himself to the qeb'at cause.The fact
that Yostos, who was one of the leading participants in
this flieeting, was sent to bring Takla Haymanot from
Gondar suggests that the emperor planned to settle the
question of succession in a manner satisfactory to the
partisans of qeb'at. In any case, as Takia Haynianot had
done nothing suspicious, it was in this light that the
leaders of the other faction iiiterpreted lyasu's attitude
towards his eldest son. The prince, on his part, had
1. Ibid.,
p. 269.
As was the custom of most rebels, Tullu
dis associates crossed the Blue Nile to seek support
among the TIacha tribes. The man sent by lyasu with
peace offers to Tullu may have been the latter's spiri-
tual father and, hence, a qeb'at monk.
2. Ibid.
598
strong reasons to doubt his father's affection for him.
lyasu's health was far from being good, and his love for
Dawit, his son from his favourite concubine, was well-
known. Thus, Fares and the other tawando governors,
who happened to be in Gondar at the time of Yostos's
arrival, advised Takia Haynianot totsurp the throne before
he found himself disinherited in favour of his younger
brother. 1
We have two somewhat contradictory versions about
the events attending Takia Haymanot's coronation in
March of
1706.
According to the abridged chronicle, it
seems that lyasu was prevented from marching against his
son by the desertion of Tullu and the many squadrons of
GaUa and talata warriors under him. 2 However, it is
difficult to believe how Tullu and Eleni could have hoped
to sway Takia Haymanot to their side when they knew Fares
and other tawando notables to be the mainstay of his
power. The short history of lyasu edited by Perruchon
suggests that Pares and 1is colleagues had succeeded in
deposing lyasu before giving the throne to his son. 3 It
1. "tudes stir l'histoire a'thiopie", op.cit., text,
pp .
3 70-71, trans., p. 3 20.
2. Ibid., text,
p.
3 71, trans., p. 3 21.
3 . "Notes pour l'histoire d'thiopie. Le rgne de lyasu
(ler)", op.cit.,
p.
262.
If lyasu had not been somehow
forced to relinquish the crown, the author would not, in
all probability, have used the unusually strong expression
/Continue& over
599
appears, therefore, that yasu did. not voluntarily
abdicate and retreat to a monastery on one of the islands
of Lake Tana. Furthermore, Tullu and Eleni may have
submitted to Takia Hayinanot only after they saw how
cleverly they had been outmanoevred by Fares. It was
not until after the imprisonment of Tullu and Eleni that
the partisans of qeb'at decided to take to arms. Their
attempt to take lyasu out of the island and reinstate
him on the throne had a disastrous consequence. Takla
Haymanot sent his naternal uncles to the monastery and.
had him cruelly assassinated.
Takia Haymanot's reign was very short. Two pre-
tenders, one in Gojam and. anothei in .kmhara, were set up
against him by the qeb'at partisans. After crushing the
rebellions, he tried to come to terms with his enemies by
appointing the leaders, including Yostos, to the court
offices. Nany of them suspected that this was a ruse by
which he intended to separate them froi their retainers.
And in,June of 1708 he, in turn, became the victim of
assassination.
Footnote 3 continued from previous page.
"they deposed him and made his son Takla Haymanot
king". As this short history seems to have been
written by a contemporary and well-informed. tawand.o
cleric, it is more dependable than the abrid ed
chronicle which was to a great extent ba ed on the
long chronicle and written after the death of lyasu.
600
If one event can be said. to mark the end. of an era
and the beginning of another, it is the murder of lyasu.
A brief comp rison of the circumstances which attended
lyasu's death and the equally grue1 some end of Zadengel
would show the great changes which bad taken place within
the century which separated both events. The religious
conflicts had. undermined not only the authority of the
monarchy but also the unity of the Christian provinces.
The conflicts enabled the provincial noblemen to make
themselves independent of central authority. But as
the inhabitants of each province were deeply divided. over
the religious issue the noblemen found themselves vehe-
mently opposed within their own provinces. lyasu's
death, therefore, failed to clear the way for the emer-
gence of war-lords commanding unchallenged authority in
each province.
It only ushered in a period of uiiin.ter-
rupted. and unmitigated anarchy.
601
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Miracles of the Virgin Mary". MS. Orient.
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