Final Paper On Chinese History (Opium War)

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The Opium War: Its History and Legacy

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1. INTRODUCTION
On August 29, 1842, a treaty was signed between the Queen of Great Britain and the
Emperor of China, which entailed opening of the Northern ports of China, ceding the island of
Hong Kong, and paying the total amount of twenty-one million dollars in four different dates.
Things do not add up when we consider why the Qing Dynasty (1644 1911), with the largest
standing army (800,000 soldiers) in the world, lost numerous battles against the 7,000 British
soldiers dispatched in China (Lovell 113). To that peculiarity, discussions of the following four
themes, globally occurred in the 19
th
century, might shed light on our understanding of the
Qings fall during the Opium War (1839 1841): the advent of new ideologies, increased desire
for international free trade, internal upheavals and treatment, and advanced military technology.
Throughout the 19
th
century, the four factors (or lack thereof) played crucial roles in
defining the Opium War in the global context. First, ideologies like nationalism and patriotism
expanded throughout the world, putting the national interest as the single most important
consideration. Second, desires to gain access to previously untapped markets led advanced
nations to expand the region of free trade across the continents. Third, riots, civil wars, and
industrial depressions weakened the internal stability of China as well as Britain. Fourth,
technological development and exploitation of new source of energy (i.e. coal) allowed the
western armies to expand militarily. These four global themes equally affected China and Britain,
by which Chinas conflict with Britain in stopping the opium trade intensified, by which the
British Parliament justified entering a war with the Qing Dynasty, and by which China suffered
military defeat and was forced to sign the Treaty of Nanking (August 29, 1842).
2. THE QING EMPIRE AND THE APPOINTMENT OF LIN ZEXU
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The quest for China seemed quite clear: eradicate the supplies and demands of opium in
Canton and restore the healthy economic balance. But there were formidable obstacles to
achieving this, and such were internal fragility in China, entangled financial interests of multiple
parties and pressure for the free trade, abetted by British lobbyists to the British Parliament.
Daoguang (1820 1850), Qing Emperor in the 19
th
century, appointed Lin Zexu (December 31,
1838 September 28, 1840) to resolve this cluster of problems. Yet, Lins strict anti-opium
policy combined with his several miscalculations exacerbated the conflict between China and
Britain. Charles Elliot (1836 May 1841), who represented British trade in Canton, was not shy
about initiating a war for the benefit of the British. At the backdrop of the sequences leading up
to the Opium War was Lins diplomatic shortfall. Eventually, the combination of Chinas
internal and external failures paved the destructive path to the Opium War.

Chinas Internal Struggle
Even before the Emperor Daoguang took the throne in 1820, Qing Dynasty (1644 1911)
struggled to maintain Chinas internal order. The Dynasty formed upon the granite spilled of the
Han peoples blood. For example, in 1645, Manchus ten-day rampage in the city of Yangzhou
left 800,000 dead Chinese bodies (Lovell 209). Since the bloody conquest, the chasm between
the Han and the Manchu had continued to deepen. Therefore, as the minority leader of majority
Han people, Daoguang symbolized the centuries-long issue of legitimating its leadershipthe
rights to rule by the Heavens decree (the Mandate of Heaven). Continuous expansion
throughout Kangxis reign (1661 1722) and Qianlongs reign (1736 1795) stretched the
frontlines of the empire, conquering many nations such as Taiwan, Mongolia and Tibet (Lovell
39 40); However the Qing Dynasty in the 18
th
century faced what Paul Kennedy called
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imperial overstretch, according to which the empire was forced to fight internal and external
wars without adequate financial resources or manpower (Bayly 89). Three invasions of Burma
(1766 1769) resulted in defeats or stale mates, and occupation of Vietnam in 1788 collapsed
with the loss of 4,000 soldiers. Internally, the public order continued to decline in the 1830s, and
Qing governments military power was eroded by the constant domestic rebels (Lovell 42 - 43).
Population exploded, all vying for jobs and resources, causing ecological damages as well as
bureaucratic chaos. The government system had overextension problems and failed to secure
funds to fulfill its functions. Failure to offer growing applicants civil servant positions resulted in
lack of social mobility. Worse yet, the examination system discriminated by giving preferential
treatment to the minority Manchus, increasingly frustrating the Hans (Lovell 44 - 46).
In part, the Emperors personality contributed to his regimes internal instability.
Daoguang was indecisive and prone to scapegoat others for any flaws or failures. His lack of
trust in his people and fickleness often led him to reprimand the officials. Daoguang would
censure and replace commanders who could not win the impossible victories, foretelling
indication of Lin Zexus punishment once he lost the battle with the British warships (Lovell 41 -
42). Over the period of 1840 and 1841, Daoguang replaced more than five generals in charge of
the battles. At the letter of victory, the emperor would bestow feathers of peacock for
congratulations as fast as he would ostracize and punish a general for the war loss.

Corruption in China
By the 1830s, widespread Opium usage devastated the Chinese population, especially in
Canton. As the majority of population witnessed, smoking opium was not some exotic luxury,
but an addictive pattern that self-discipline could not fix. In Chinese Repository Volume 4s
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article 6, entitled Journal of occurrences, the unnamed author described how the death of a
person from the opium usage was not uncommon, and that even though investigations would
follow, the public did not deem such death shocking or anything out of ordinary (Chinese
Repository 4 1834, 248). The detailed instructions of preparing opium for smoke were openly
available to the public, allowing an average Chinese to make his own opium smoke within a day.
This implied the wide access people had to opium in 1837 (Chinese Repository 6 1837, 200
205). Despite the edicts commenced by the emperor against the opium, spread of opium was
irreversible like that of a plague.
Moreover, by the 1830s, the opium issue already penetrated the government officials. A
number of notorious opium offenders included employees in the government at Canton, most of
whom smoked and even helped selling opium. For instance, a dismissed captain from a military
regiment used his previous position to protect the smugglers, making handsome profit by such
action (Waley 18). If the guards or officials found ship selling opium, they would habitually let
the offenders escape in exchange for a bribe (Waley 60). Under the surface of the opium trade by
the British were the Hong merchants in Canton. They gained vast wealth by assisting foreign
factories to establish and thrive, all of which contributed to the growth of opium importation in
Canton. The merchants also prepared the exchange of opium with silver bullions, abetting the
illegal outflow of silver from China, which inhibited the Qings effort to finance the military
operations (Chinese Repository 7 1839, 615 617).

3. LIN ZEXU, CHARLES ELLIOT AND THE BRITISH PARLIAMENT
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Relationship between Lin and the emperor bore similarities to that between Elliot and the
British Parliament. Both men were dismissed by the authorities to whom and which they swore
allegiance. Both became scapegoats for their failures to resolve opium trade issues that were
mostly structurally caused rather than by an individuals fault. Curiously enough, another set of
comparison can be made between the Qing Empire and the British Parliament, where the
formers internal instabilities also incurred in the latter. The only difference was that the British
Parliament looked outside of the country to resolve this problem.

Relationship Between Lin Zexu and Daoguang
To the Emperor, Lin was the right man for the daunting mission of removing opium from
the surface of Canton. The difficulties with the opium ban were complex, as the officials usually
exploited their titles to gain wealth, and that many officials themselves smoked opium. But Lin,
from the beginning of his career, was famous for his bureaucratic virtuosity, extreme diligence
and incorruptibility (Lovell 56). His tenacity for pursuing what is ethical earned Daoguangs
trust. On the day after his arrival in Canton, Lin laid out the orders to restrict and examine his
staffs for any wrongdoings. He also focused solely on import and export to estimate the
magnitude of the opium trade, determined to resolve the opium matter (Waley 20 21).
The relationship between the Emperor and Lin, however, deteriorated quickly as the war
progressed in 1841. There were a couple of attributes. First, Daoguangs fickle mind and
intolerance of any loss made him lose trust on Lin. Second, the physical distance from Peking to
Canton prevented Lin from frequent interactions with the Emperor. As the saying goes, those
who have the Emperors ears will influence his actions: Eunuchs had Daoguangs ears; Lin did
not. Weeks took for Lins letters to be delivered in Peking, and sometimes letters written in
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different dates arrived on the same day, causing Daoguang to question Lins credibility (Waley
123). Absent of the Emperors support, Lin could not carry through what he set out to do.

Lin Zexus Role on the Road to the Opium War
Armed with determination, Lin banned opium trade and consumption in Canton. But his
resolute determination positioned him to be inflexible in dealing with the British traders. The
foremost reason for this was his miscalculation that the British will not provoke a war with China.
To the contrary, the British had vested interest in maintaining the trade for its national economy.
Even by 1836, three to four years before the Opium War began, annual outflow of silver
mounted to ten or more millions of taels (Chinese Repository 5 140 142). Lord Palmerston, the
British Foreign Secretary, persuaded the Queen that only by trading opium could the balance of
trade be maintainedotherwise the finances of India would suffer disastrous damages (Waley
31). Thus, the Britishs stakes in the opium trade were quite large an incentive for the British to
engage in a war.
Furthermore, Lins Sino-centric view led him to once believe that the British would
perish without the goods imported from China such as tea and rhubarb (Waley 33). Perhaps, Lin
gave too much weight to the consideration that the British would cease the opium trade so as to
continue the legal trade with China. In his letter to the British Queen, Lin warned her that
continuation of the opium trade would lead the Chinese to destroy both illegal and legal
shipments (Chinese Repository 8 9 - 11). Nevertheless, just as Britain relied on trading with
China, vast number of people in Canton made living with the bilateral trades besides opium
(Waley 87). Burying himself deeply into the mission, Lin unlikely saw the impact of a complete
halt in the opium trade.
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As a diplomatic letter, Lins writing utterly ignored the British perspectives. Though he
had much interest in Western culture and people, he failed to exhibit his understanding during
the diplomacy with Britain. Used phrases like heaven-like benevolence, permission and
calamities from heaven implied that the principles of heaven stood for China, and that Britain
ought to respect this (Chinese Repository 8 9 11). While the tribute system in China
allegiance paid by foreigners in return for protectioncould have led Lin to assume a higher
ground, a more underlying reason for his superiority has to do with his misjudgment that the
Chinese would easily defeat the British.
Reality of the Chinese naval power should have sunk in after the first engagement at
Chuenpee on November 3
rd
1839, where two English frigates drove back the largest Chinese
naval forces (Waley 85). The incident should have confirmed to Lin that Qing ships and cannon
were no match for the British (Lovell 94). However, Lin obstinately disregarded this notion. On
February 19
th
, 1840, Lin opined that the British navy could not bring ammunition and provisions
to last, and that their crews would be worn out, easily disposable by the Chinese forces (Waley
99). On October 24
th
, 1840, after the warfare had begun, Lin maintained, the Englishdespite
all appearances to the contrary, are at the end of their resources (Waley 118). These suggest his
fundamental misunderstanding of the magnitude of the British forces and British governments
vast motive in running the opium trade.

Relationship between Charles Elliot and the British Parliament
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Just like Lin, Elliot also had to cope with the slow communication between him and
Palmerston, his superior in London. First commercial electrical telegraph was developed in July
9
th,
1839, and the advent of first transatlantic telegraphs cable materialized in 1866 (Hubbard 78).
His dispatches took five months to arrive in London and a return dispatch would take another six
months, making the communication with the British government extremely inconvenient. But
this was Elliots only one of many problems he had to confront in Canton and in Britain.
The two Chinese sources of the Opium War, Lin Zexu and The Opium War, depict
Charles Elliot as a villain, who turned previously commercial disputes into a national war
(Lovell 61). But a closer look at his role would find that such descriptions slip past a complicated
relationship between Elliot and the British government. While Elliot patriotically served Britain,
he personally abhorred the opium trade and opiums perversity. His self-contradiction derived
from the clash of his personal belief against opium and the British governments interest in
maintaining the opium trade. Elliot was a frustrated man lodged in between two gigantic nations
on the course of collision with each other.
Charles Elliot, the Chief Superintendent of British Trade, served as a buffer between
Britain and China. Elliot took responsibilities for something he never would have endorsed, such
as the murder of Lin Weixi by the English and American sailors on July 7
th
, 1839. The incident
embittered the British-Chinese relationship, and subsequently became Lin Zexus primary
leverage to halt the trade in Canton. Lin demanded for the murderer of Lin Weixi, and declared
that a failure to do so would put Elliot on trial (Waley 79). Facing the charges himself, Elliot
eventually performed his duty by sheltering British offenders to be tried in British court, instead
in the Qing court.
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Elliot also opposed the opium trade, controlled by the merchants like Jardine and
Matheson. On the brink of the Opium War, he wrote to Palmerston, No man entertains deeper
detestation of the disgrace and sin of this forced traffic on the coast of China than the humble
individual [Elliot] who signs this dispatch (Lovell 63). At the same time, Elliot clearly was not
reserved about having a war with China, which in fact he believed would have the purgatory
benefits (Lovell 68). He would do what was in the best interest of his country. For that matter,
Elliot served to the continuation of the opium trade that resulted in growing dispute with Lins
strict opium ban, subsequently leading to the military intervention.

British Parliament and its Internal Problems
British Parliament in the 1830s suffered as much internal instabilities as the Qing
government. Poor harvest, industrial depression and high unemployment caused the majority
Whigs party to lose support. Constant rebellions in Ireland, Jamaica and Canada threatened
Britains social status quo, and external pressure in the form of blockades by France and Russia
choked the trade route available for the British. Riots by Welsh Miners caused damage to the
government facilities and authorities. Moreover, the idea of war lost interest to the politicians
who have witnessed loss of 16,500 British soldiers during the expedition in Kabul (Lovell 98
105). Despite all the above notions to the contrary, British Parliament well understood that the
only way to resolve their two million pound budget deficit was by continuing trades in China.
Behind the scene of British Parliaments decision to enter the war with China, there was a
deeply rooted sense of nationalism, a sense of patriotic identity surrounding religion, language
and resistance to invaders (Bayly 202 203). The nationalism turned the British Parliaments
attention from the lost profit from the opium ban to a more stirring issue of patriotism, issue of
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protecting the British citizens and restoring the national honor desecrated by the Chineses
pompous behaviors. With the mixture of the patriotism and economic benefits, the British
Parliament declared the war against the Qing Dynasty.

4. THE OPIUM WAR AND THE TREATY OF NANKING
Once Elliot was dismissed, the Opium War turned around the corner of diplomacy to a
straight warfare. Lin was also dismissed by Daoguang on September 28, 1840, and the newly
appointed High Commissioner Qishan (September 1840 February 13 1841) took charge of
banning the opium trade and negotiating with the British naval forces. But the series of ensuing
events suggested that no progresses were being made; the British warships hopelessly destroyed
the Chinese troops and fortresses. A several important reasons for the failures in military
engagements with the British could be found in military dilapidation, lack of honesty in internal
communication, and local residents frustration towards the government: military technology
could not compete with the battle-experienced British navies; lies given to Daoguang by the
Chinese governor-generals amplified the problems in resolving the Opium trade issues; locals
despised more the cruelty and corruption of the government officials than the defeat by the
British.

Elliots Efforts to Maintain Sino-British Relations and Subsequent Dismissal
Elliot believed that negotiation should salvage the long-term Sino-British relations, and in
order for this, he asserted that rather than negotiation supported by the mere appearance of
formidable forces that might improve the trade in Canton temporarily, a long-term trade would
be best attained by without a blowby a quiet improvement of opportunities that would allow
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the British to avoid Chinas hostilities and deep hatred (Lovell 129). Despite the his contribution
to the nation while sacrificing his safety, profit and family life, Elliot later finds himself pitted
against the accusations of not fulfilling the duty and being sympathetic toward the Chinese.
Palmerston, in April 1941, brought cases against Elliot for disobeying his original instructions to
negotiate extraterritorial rights for British citizens, to agree on reasonable tariffs and most
importantly, open the northern ports for trades (Lovell 169 170).
Shortly after, Elliot was replaced by Sir Henry Pottinger, a 51 year old veteran of the
British Indian Army (Lovell 177). Even after his dismissal, Elliot faced his notoriety depicted by
the British newspapers, which deemed Elliot as the facilitator of the trade in opium, one of the
darkest that ever invoked the wrath of the Most High God upon a people (Lovell 105). But the
blame against Elliot did not stop the opium trade. To the very opposite result, Elliots dismissal
in May 1941 marked a fast turning point of the war, beyond which the British installed a gunboat
diplomacy designed to effectively subdue the Qing Empire (Lovell 168).

Advanced Military Technology by the British Compared to the Qings Military
The transition from the old regime to modernity occurred along with the discovery of
coal usage for manufacturing and transportation. The development of steam power initiated a
series of military-technological innovation in Northwestern Europe, giving them a decisive edge
over non-European nations such as China, India, South America, and Africa (Bayly 60). The
stable legal systems (e.g., property rights) and independent financial institutions fostered
innovation and incentivized individuals to invest in innovating technologies. Large financial
institutions supported commercial innovations by means of pooling risks and dividing
management from ownership, allowing British firms to grow and expand their market beyond
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neighboring nations (Bayly 62). With time progression, Britain amassed sophisticated naval
ships such as Nemesis (arrived in Canton on January 7, 1841), 184-by-29-foot iron steamer that
boasted accuracies and firepower. In Britain, constant warfare gave them reasons to innovate and
produce deadly weapons and warships. As a result, both armies and commercial firms recruited
and train professional soldiers, later leveraging this advantage to carry out aggressive expedition
in China (Bayly 64).
To the contrary, the Qing forces lacked adequate equipment, fortress and warships. While
the British acquired modern firepower, parts of the Qing army continued to use bows, swords
and spears used in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Qing cannons weathered through
centuries of neglect and were rusted. Qings warships were junks used for patrols, not capable of
engaging in wars. Qings fortresses were roofless and poorly designed to defend against land
warfare. Soldiers lacked disciplines. Under the minority Manchu Bannermen, the Chinese
soldiers were underfed and underpaid, and therefore frequently protested, ransacked or deserted
their duties. Even ammunitions were too endeared and expensive to be used for practical
trainings (Lovell 114).
In Chinese Repository 5 Article 3, entitled Military skill and power of the Chinese, the
unnamed observer of the Chinese forces further described the state of Qing forces before the
Opium War began. The Correspondent explained that the advancement of the British canons
allowed the cannon ball to travel up to two miles. Meanwhile, the Chinese technology was in the
same state as it was in the thirteenth century, and any development was only trifling (Chinese
Repository 5 1836: 166). The author then delves into the miserable quality of Chinese
gunpowder easily subject to deterioration due to the changing weather. Many cannons in the
forts of Canton River are old and useless, and Chinese marine cannons did not exist. The walls of
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the fortresses were also of the poor material (granite slabs), and soldiers in these forts were
poorly trained and not disciplined (Chinese Repository 5 1836: 167).
City of Zhoushan, in July, 1840, was completely destroyed by the British warship in nine
minutes because of the stark difference in military advancement. In the battle of January 7, 1841,
Qishan used a awful strategy of congesting the fortification with soldiers, even paying 11,000
dollars as bribes to men to stay and fight (Lovell 136). Against the British cannon bombardments,
the fortress soon turned into a graveyard for the soldiers. Yishan (February 13, 1841 October
1841) and Yang Fang (February 13, 1841 April 23, 1841) who took Qishans position could
not do much better (Lovell 137 145). Their lack of plan, a sense of urgency and incompetence
resulted in battles that led the British to capture Canton on May 26, 1841, surrounding the city
from the waters in the South and hills in the North. Subsequent battles at Ningbo, Zhenhai and
Zhoushan with 12,000 soldiers under the leadership of Yijiang (October 18, 1841) in March
1842 proved to be futile against British gun-power, resulting in no British death but loss of six
hundred Chinese troops. Same military defeat occurred during the battle at Zhapu (May 1842),
and the battle of Zhenjiang (July 1842), all due to the worn out military equipments and lack of
soldiers morale. During the battle in Canton in February 1841, officers and soldiers even fled on
their small boats during the battle scene, the remaining soldiers shooting at their escaping
superiors. On the other hand, the most British casualties inflicted were from the peasant militias
who engaged in battles with the British to protect their families, not the Qing Empire: The
Sanyuanli Incident on May 29, 1841 was subsequently commemorated by the Chinese as a
triumph against the Western imperialism (Lovell 158).

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Lack of Honesty in Internal Communications and Locals Hatred Against Qing Officials
Partly because the Qing military could not compete against the British, the
Commissioners resorted to lying to the Emperor. When Qishan lost the battle on January 7, 1840,
he informed Daoguang that the cause of the loss was due to the 2,000 Chinese traitors helping
the British. On January 27, 1841 despite the emperors order to the contrary, Qishan invited
Elliot for a face-to-face diplomatic meeting, while denying that the meeting had not happened at
all (Lovell 137). This exchange of lies exacerbated the problems because to the emperor, who
took the letter from his Commissioners at face value, the idea of negotiation and coming a term
with the British never came across his mind. Daoguang further urged Qishan to punish and
annihilate, saying that its time to dispatch a punitive mission to suppress them my mind is
made up, there will be no wavering at all. (Lovell 136)
Similarly, before March 20, 1841when the Trade in Canton resumedYang Fang
intentionally misinformed the Emperor that having lost two ships and countless men, the
English fled in terror, no longer daring to advance. Glorifying his interactions with the British
was one thing. However, lies turned into troubles because without the accurate information, the
emperor himself could not assess the situation and make salient decisions. Instead, on March 22,
1841, Daoguang ordered Yang Fang to pursue the British and storm Hong Kong, which in reality
was simply impossible (Lovell 145).
Finally, the locals had less intention of helping the Qing government than losing to the
British forces. The fact was that the majority of the local residents, especially those Cantonese,
depended greatly on foreign trade, and thus was hard hit by the Governments opium ban
policies (Waley 88). Meanwhile beginning with Lin Zexu, the locals at Canton were considered
as traitors, Lin describing them as poisons (Lovell 127). There were rationales for the Chinese
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local civilians hatred against the Chinese officials. In the city of Zhenjiang in July 1842, for
example, the local Chinese groups were fighting not against the British, but the Manchu
authorities who arrested the civilians at the flimsiest suspicion and killed them as traitors (Lovell
216). Incidents convinced the locals that the Machus were the ones who brought torments upon
the Chinese, not the British soldiers.

5. CONCLUSION
Among the seven articles of the one page treaty between the British and the Qing, the
first article reads as follows: There shall henceforward be peace and friendship between Her
Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and His Majesty the
Emperor of China. After the unilateral destruction in the Qing Empire, it is almost paradoxical
that Britain would commence the treaty with the words such as peace and friendship.
Furthermore, the rest of the articles all note how China ought to open their ports (Canton, Amoy,
Foochowfoo, Ningpo, and Shanghai) and allow consuls to be established in each port, also cede
the island of Hong Kong and pay twenty-one millions of dollars for the damages and ransoms.
Such humiliating terms starkly juxtapose with the letter Lin sent out to the Queen of Britain in
early 1839, warning her against the calamities of Heaven in one sentence and showing her
Heaven-like benevolence of the emperor in another (Chinese Repository 8 9 -11).
We now understand that throughout the Opium War, ideologies like patriotism allowed
the British Parliament to justify declaring a war, despite the negative public sentiments. On the
other hand, lack of patriotism by the local Chinese made them sway by the economic interests
and even assist the British in times of war. Perhaps the most important distinction between the
British and the Qing government can be found in their reaction to their instabilities. Facing the
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internal upheavals and government deficit, British Parliament looked outward in China to defuse
and distract the attention at the internal problems. Expedition in China to ensure free trade would
help increase government revenue and reduce deficit. Conversely, Qing government looked
inward in resolving the problems. Daoguang distrusted his men at the top, undermining the unity
of his cabinet. The commissioners exploited the far distance from Peking, and lied about the
victories and pulled scapegoat on others by calling the local civilians traitors. While the corrupt
officials squeezed petty dollars from their own people, the British sucked away 10 million taels
of silver each year from China.
The Opium War legacy exposed the trust issues prevalent in the Qing government. After
the war, people focused on improving technologies and infrastructures rather than blaming the
war loss. Fundamentally, perhaps, the idea of nationalism or patriotism could not sprout in China.
The minority Manchus, outsiders and foreigners themselves, massacred their way to the Chinese
throne. Nationalism is rooted in the fact that the state represents the people within. The state of
China clearly failed to represent the Han people in many aspects, including in granting as equal
opportunities and respects as that given to Manchus. At the time of war and chaos, people
witnessed the fearfulcannons, guns and death; but simultaneously, perhaps, people saw the
truth and clarity of their government. The Opium War left the Chinese with stains and
humiliation, but also hopes in future civil revolutions to come.

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Works Cited
Bayly, C.A. Birth of the Modern World: 1780- 1914. Wiley-Blackwell, 2004.
Hubbard, Geoffrey (1965) Cooke and Wheatstone and the Invention of the Electric
Telegraph, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London
Letter to the Queen of England from the imperial commissioner and the provincial
authorities requiring the interdiction of opium". Chinese Repository Vol.VIII. Article II 1839.
Lovell, Julia. The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams and the Making of China. First Edition
edition. Picador USA, 2011.
Military skill and power of the Chinese Chinese Repository Vol. V. Article III 1836.
"Opium". Chinese Repository Vol. V. Article VIII 1836.
"Treaty between Her Majesty and the Emperor of China." N.p., 7 Nov. 1843.
http://www.london-gazette.co.uk/issues/20276/pages/3597.
Waley, A. The opium war through chinese eyes. Stanford, California: Stanford University
Press, 1958.

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Appendix (Timeline of the Opium War)

1838
December 31: Lin appointed by the Emperor Daoguang

1839
March 10: Lin arrives in Canton

March 11: Lin posts to his staff about how he wants to focus only on Opium, and posts to general
public to form a five people surveillance system.

March 16: Meeting during which Lin discussed about sending letter to Queen.

March 18: Lin determines that he wants to destroy all the foreign opium in front of the traders
and the locals.

April 22: Lin is appointed as Governor-General of Kiangnan and Kiangsi, the most coveted of all
the Governor-Generalships.

May 24: Emperor accepts Lins suggestion that he send opium to Peking (45) -- trust issues
between Lin and Emperor.

June 3: Destruction of the opium began.

July 7: Murder of Lin Wei-His.

July 19th: Now importers are subject to death penalty for dealing in opium.

September 22: Lin lays down three conditions for a settlement--(1) the murderer of Lin Wei-Hsi
must be surrendered, (2) the opium-receiving ships must all leave China at once, and (3) any
opium-trading ship still loitering at Canton will be deserted.

September 28: Lin asserts that if the murder of Lin Wei-Hsi is not handed over, China will
annihilate the English.

October 6: Lin writes to the Emperor to defend the guarantee system instead of all-search
procedure.

October 14: Captain Waner of Thomas Coutts becomes the first guarantee signer.

November 3: Captain Smith of Volage opens fire at the Chinese Naval forces

December 6: All British ships are debarred from trading.

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1840
January 18: Captain Warner of the Thomas Coutts was responsible for delivering the letter to
Queen Victoria but did not come through.

January 26: Lins Special Commissioner position ended.

February 19: Emperors first warning to Lin for his accountability.

February29: 23 Chinese boats for opium trade are set on fire.

May 4: Lin opposes to Tsengs proposal of total abolition of all foreign trade during the
Committee meeting.

June 21: The main body of British expeditionary force (consisted of twenty warships) appears in
Canton.

June 24: The British forces leaves from Canton to Northward.

July 4: Fall of Ting-Hai by the British force.

August 3: James Gordon Bremer, Commander-in-Chief of the British naval, declares a state of
blockade in Canton.

August 11: Elliot and Fleet reach Tianjin and were clearly not expected.

September 28: Emperor decides that Lin is not the right person to deal with the situation and
dismisses him.

October 20: Lin is summoned by the Emperor for a trial.

1841
January 7: Second Battle of Chuenpee.

January 20: Convention of Chuenpee.

February 23 26: The Battle of Bogue (British victory).

February 27: the British voluntarily evacuates from Zhoushan.

May: Elliots dismissal.

May 21: The Siege of Canton.

May 24: The British moves up the river to the west of Canton.

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May 25 26: The forts at Canton are captured; agreements between Elliot and Yishan for the
ransom of six million dollars.

May 29 -31: the Sanyuanli Incident.

August 26 - 27: the Battle in Xiamen; falls to the British under the leadership of Sir Henry
Pottinger.

October: Battle in Zhoushan; more than estimated 5,000 Qing forces are dead.

October 10: Battle in Zhenhai; about 1,500 Qing soldiers died.

October 18: Yijiang is appointed as the General by the emperor.

November: Elliots return to England.

1842

2
nd
week of February: Yijiang gathers almost 12,000 troops across eight different provinces.

Early March: Yijiang attacks the British forces.

March 9: Battle at Ningbo

March 10: the attack at Ningbo starts, but fails. Battle at Zhenhaialso fails.

March 28: Lius report about grim prospect of war reaches Daoguang

May 18: Battle of Zhapu; whole villages would commit suicides after the loss.

July 17: Battle of Zhenjiang; the state of Civil War between the Manchu authorities and local
Chinese population.

August 7 13: Zhang Xi arrives in Nanjing and meets with Pottinger for discussion about the
treaty.

August 29: the Treaty of Nanking is signed.

Final Paper On Chinese History (Opium War)

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The Opium War: Its History and Legacy

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