Professional Documents
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the Taliban
By Richard L. Dixon
The U.S. and NATO involvement in Afghanistan has disintegrated into a quagmire that in the
years to come will even be more painful than our military adventures in the jungles of Southeast
Asia over 40 years ago. Afghanistan as a country has earned a notorious reputation for being a
black pit where would be conquerors have met their fatal demise. From the likes of “The Median
and Persian Empires, Alexander the Great, the Seleucids, the Indo-Greeks, Turks, Mongols,
British and Soviets all met the end of their ambitions in Afghanistan.” (Dahr Jamail).
The inhabitants view us as occupiers instead of liberators. This is especially true within the
become the same empire just as the British in the past. Our military is overstretched and under-
supplied in trying to maintain stability in a region of the world that has never experienced such a
“Framing the idea of empire as a force for good, however, is one of the recurring themes of empires
throughout history. Indeed the Roman and British empires were formed, not
by force alone, but on the basis of their capacity to present their authority at home and
abroad as being in the service of right and peace. That is how empires have regularly justified
their authority to use instruments of coercion extraterritorially; that is, they have felt they were
exercising “imperial sovereignty” rather than just “national sovereignty.” (Ivan Eland, November 26,
2002).
In fact, our continued presence in the guise as Empire has emboldened the enemy (Al Qaeda) and
provided ready-made recruits who view the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as a crusade against Islam.
Our continued presence will become a blowback which will threaten other regimes such as Bahrain,
Qatar, Kuwait, UAE, and Yemen which is now experiencing a Shia rebellion in their Northern most
provinces. Pakistan is trying to throw the yoke of a Taliban uprising in the SWAT Valley which
threatens nearby Islamabad. “It also shows that imperial behavior by one power can lead to
counterbalancing by other powers. Imperial expansion can even cause proliferation of weapons of
mass destruction among poor countries as the great equalizers vis-à-vis the imperial power.
Finally, the military interventions required to maintain an empire can erode the foundations
of the constitutional system of a republic such as the United States.” (Ivan Eland, November 26,
2002).
All have underestimated the terrain, people, culture, and history of the country and the region.
Throughout its history Afghanistan has been a country steeped in tribal conflict, ruled by
warlords, poor mountain terrain, and governed by a fierce independence. It’s no wonder that
Frank L. Holt called Afghanistan the “Land of Bones.” Unless the United States and NATO
quickly changes it mode of operations in Afghanistan, no amount of Troop increases will give us
leverage for a quick victory in such a God forsaken country. Both the U.S. and NATO would be
“Second, we must acknowledge that the wars waged in Afghanistan by Alexander, Britain, the
Soviet Union, and now the United States share some salient features that may not bode
well for our future. For example, all these invasions of Afghanistan went well at first, but so far
no superpower has found a workable alternative to what might be called the recipe
3. Repeat as needed.
Afghanistan cannot be subdued by half measures. Invaders must consider the deadly demands of
winter warfare, since all gains from seasonal campaigns are erased at every lull. Invaders must
resolve to hunt down every warlord, for the one exception will surely rot the fruits of all other
victories. Invaders cannot succeed by avoiding cross-border fighting, since the mobile insurgents
can otherwise hide and reinforce with impunity. Invaders must calculate where to draw the
decisive line between killing and conciliation, for too much of either means interminable
Afghanistan itself is a contrast in culture, language, and tradition. It presents both an opportunity
and problem for the major players in the region which includes the United States, NATO, Russia,
China, Pakistan, Iran, and India. The country poses a danger to all parties involved and threatens
to destabilize the Eurasian region and Indian subcontinent. The Pakistanis are already trying to
put down a Taliban insurgency in the SWAT Valley which is only 70 Kilometers from
Islamabad and threatens to put nuclear weapons in the hands of crazed and radical Islamists.
India has been fighting a rebellion in the Kashmir region that it shares with Pakistan since the
partitioning of the region by the British. Iran is dealing with both a huge influx of Shia refugees
that they are desperately trying to integrate into their nation. The U.S. and NATO are not only
fighting a resurgent Taliban but also a thriving heroin trade in the Golden Triangle area which
funnels drug money back into the insurgency. In essence, Afghanistan is like the bad in-laws
who won’t go away and one has to readily adapt to their ever constant presence. The meddling,
intrusion, and interference in the affairs in the country has not given its inhabitants hope for
Responsibility for much of the political instability and misery of its people can be traced to
external powers seeking to realize their own strategic, ideological, and economic interests in the
country. The close and more distant neighbors of Afghanistan have regularly intervened in its
politics and economy. Foreigners have sometimes acted on behalf of domestic clients and have
organized and armed them to dominate large portions of the country.” (Marvin G. Weinbaum,
June 2006).
The only viable solution for stability in the region is to gain the trust and support of the people
one province at a time. In the past, the Russians, British, Greeks, and Mongols have acted as
invaders in every sense of the world thereby earning the wrath and hatred of the local population.
Even the Warlords were despised just as much; they get rely on the support of the people in their
gurriella operations against the foreign invaders. We find that both Al Qaeda and the Taliban are
viewed with suspicion by the population because they come from all parts of the Islamic world.
“While it has made military gains, the Taliban today enjoys little support among an Afghan
public tired of war. Its leadership does not command a significant standing army; indeed the
Taliban is a disparate network of groups using the name as they pursue different agendas.
Disillusionment with both the international community and the state has grown but the vast
majority of people remain far more fearful of what would happen if foreign troops were to leave
rather than stay. Strengthening popular support and goodwill should be the heart of the counter-
insurgency and the creation of a resilient state.” (International Crisis Group, March 13, 2009).
If the Taliban and Al Qaeda are so despised then why are they so strong and control most of the
Southern Provinces. The obvious answer to that question is that the past Bush Administration
took its eye off Afghanistan once they drove the Taliban and Al Qaeda networks from power in
order to consolidate and concentrate its efforts on the Iraqi War. The lack of a comprehensive
strategy to deliver a decisive blow to the already reeling Taliban was perhaps one of the worst
strategic blunders by the Bush Administration. With time on their side, the Taliban regrouped by
using the mountainous terrain of Pakistan to resupply, rearm, and recruit willing and eager young
people.
The Taliban has also been able to convince the local population that their resistance is against a
foreign occupying force who do not have the best interest of the people at heart. Indeed, NATO
has made some blunders which have resulted in massive civilian casualties that have given
credibility to both the Taliban and Al Qaeda propaganda effort. Unfortunately, the alliance has
written off the civilian casualties as unfortunate consequences in the execution of war. The
fallout and collateral damage has cost the United States and NATO a lost of legitimacy from the
countries that borders around and about Afghanistan. “Collateral damage will have a blow-back
effect; that is, it will make missions, whether military, humanitarian, or diplomatic, harder to
achieve. This also has an immediate effect of exposing U.S. forces and institutions to greater
danger. What may have once been a willingness to cooperate transforms into a hatred that
propels people to take up arms against U.S. forces, as they are seen as bring-ing nothing more
than death and destruction. (Marcus Raskin & Devin West, October 10, 2008).
Afghanistan Commander General McChrystal gives a first hand account of the obstacles that the
NATO alliance and their coalition face in overcoming and defeating the insurgency. This list
includes a very well-organized and defiant enemy in the likes of the Taliban and Al Qaeda, lack of
confidence by the people in the government of Afghanistan, and corruption and abuse of power by
crooked public officials. “Resources will not win this war, but under-resourcing could lose it.
Resourcing communicates commitment, but we must also balance force levels to enable effective
ANSF partnering and provide population security, while avoiding perceptions of coalition
dominance. Ideally, the ANSF must lead this fight, but they will not have enough capability in the
near-term given the insurgency’s growth rate. In the interim, coalition forces must provide a bridge
capability to protect critical segments of the population. The status quo will lead to failure if we wait
for the ANSF to grow.” (General Stanley A. McChrystal, August 30, 2009).
What is unique about General McChrystal’s assessment of the insurgency and the best path to
counteract and defeat them, is that he gives a detailed insight into the major players in the region,
what influence they have exerted on the internal affairs of the country of Afghanistan whether
negative or position, and the expected outcome that they are trying to shape for their advantage.
These major players include the countries of Iran, Pakistan, Russia, China, and the Central Asian
Republics. The success in putting down the insurgency will depend upon how coalition forces will
Externally Iran could play a major role in controlling the growing narcotics by tightening down and
persecuting smugglers inside their borders. However, if Israel launches a pre-emptive strike on Iran’s
nuclear facilities, there is the possibly that Iran would heighten the intensity of the war by pouring in
material, recruits, and weapons to increase the insurgency effort against the United States. They
could also get directly involved in the war and rallying the extremist elements as a jihad by defining
the Afghan conflict in wider terms as a war against Islam. This would prove to be very costly and the
end result could be for a call of additional troops \within the region.
Iran’s role in the internal affairs of Afghanistan is multi-pong and is part of a bigger effort to
exert its influence in both the Persian Gulf and the Asian corridor.
1. It is their intention of creating Shia unrest in the region to act as a counterbalance against
the U.S. presence in Iraq and to keep the international community guessing in terms of its
weapons program.
2. The Iranians are working indirectly to control their borders to prohibit their country as
being an access way for the transportation and spread of the heroin traffic that is coming
from the Southern Regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan. They view the heroin trade as a
destabilizing influence.
3. The Iranians are training, arming, and supplying the warlords as an opposing force
against Al Qaeda who seeks to supersede their influence within the region by
4. The Iranians view a stabilized Karzai regime as important to stem the tide of refugees
who are causing problems in terms of sector security and integration within their country.
India’s increased role in the internal affairs of Afghanistan to use that country as a counterweight
against Pakistan especially after the deadly terrorist attack this past spring in the financial capital of
Mumbai. There was a direct link between the participants who carried out the attack and the
Pakistani Secret Service. The Pakistanis view the actions of India as trying to recruit a hostile state in
the likes of Afghanistan and would be less inclined and cooperative to control the Taliban Insurgents.
In the past, both India and Afghanistan have had close diplomatic ties to the dismal of the
Pakistanis who view Kabul and New Delhi’s cozy diplomatic relations as a threat to its internal
security. Their recognition of the Taliban in power was meant to thwart those diplomatic
overtures. Under the Karzai regime, diplomatic relationships between the two nations have been
restored. India has a vested interest in stemming the tide of illegal drugs passing through it
The solution that India proposes to combat the growing opium trade is to legalize them into
legitimate enterprises with stiff penalties for violations and to import huge quantities of seed,
supplies, technical assistance, and money for the farmers within the Southern Region of
licensing, add value to crop at the village level by converting it into morphine and channeling
funds generated for economic development. This would in turn generate incentive for an
estimated 14 million Afghans dependant on illegal poppy cultivation to sever links with drug
traffickers. India could contribute by sharing its experiences on its model of licensing poppy
production, under which the entire village stands to lose its license if a family indulges in an
illegal act, thus providing a powerful social deterrent.” (Raghav Sharma, April, 2009)
NATO and the United States should take note of the success of India in the affairs of
Afghanistan and should forge partnership alliances to expand its programs throughout the nation
of Afghanistan.
Russia and the Central Asian Republics would prove a vital staging ground in mopping up efforts
against the Taliban through joint operations command. They view that controlling and eventually
The Russians have much to offer to the United States from their failed operations in the Russian-Afghan
War in the 1980’s. “When the Soviet Union decided to invade Afghanistan, they evaluated their
chances for success upon their experiences in East Germany, Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
Unfortunately for their soldiers, as well as the people of Afghanistan, they ignored not only the
experiences of the British in the same region, but also their own experience with the Basmachi
resistance fighters in Central Asia from 1918-1933. Consequently, in Afghanistan the Soviet
army found its tactics inadequate to meet the challenges posed by the difficult terrain and the
The Russians have a vital stake in a stable Afghanistan because the resurgent Taliban would seek to
spread their insurrection to the neighboring former Soviet Republics. Learning, listening, and acting
on their timely recommendations will mean a chance of success in the battle against the Taliban.
There are those who view the role of the United States and NATO as a slippery slope to disaster. To
them Afghanistan represents a quicksand towards disaster both militarily and politically. They view
the efforts to promote democracy in Afghanistan under the current conditions of corruption and
insurgency as a zero-sum game for the United States. That is the United States is not readily
equipped in the task of nation-building in fractured regimes that have only known war and have not
given these countries the necessary time to develop key political and economic institutions to foster
“But there is a deeper and more ominous possibility which so far has largely
tyrannized as Iraqis and Afghanis historically have been is by its very nature
multi-layered web of civic organizations for a number of its most basic functions.
prevented from emerging in the first place, leaving citizens atomized and
leaves the conquered country either in the hands of a new dictator, albeit one
The key ingredient to success in Afghanistan is to utilize the external actors to forge a peaceable
solution and climate within the region. It would become less of a dangerous neighborhood if the
United States tapped into the spheres of influences of the Iranians, Russians, Indians, and
Pakistanis by satisfying their nationalistic interest and expectations with an exchange of a solemn
promise that they would continue to work for meaningful solutions of peace within the region.
These third party relationships should be combined with a comprehensive internal strategy
militarily, politically, and economic to get Afghanistan back on the road to recovery and
2. Reintegrating former Taliban fighters back into the fabric of Afghan society. All options
should be kept on the table including negotiating with more moderate elements of the Taliban
to bring them into the Afghan governing structure. General David Petraeus utilized the
option as a corner stone policy during the surge in Iraq and was able to enlist the help of
several prominent Sunni Tribal Chieftains (who were once formerly opposed to the US
presence in Iraq) that were instrumental in pacifying several problem areas. However,
negotiating should not be misconstrued as a notion of positive acceptance of the Taliban as a
serious political player. Its command infrastructure and organization must be destroyed and
dismantled whereby forcing them to come to the table to accept a settlement that is
acceptable to both the coalition and Afghan government. “The central question for the
attained, reconciliation between some Taliban elements and the Afghan state
Afghan state that can control its national territory and deliver the personal
ensure internal stability. Success in this respect is essential even if the United
States focuses only on the limited objective of defeating al-Qaeda and its
Islamabad to eschew relinquishing its support for the Taliban because they
J. Tellis, 2009).
3. Combat the corruption of both Afghan governmental officials and the warlords. "The
in the south and east of the country, is viewed in Europe and the United
in turn, intensifies the fear that the war in Afghanistan cannot be won and
leads corrosively to the widespread discussions about exit from the country.
popular alienation that results leaves Karzai forsaken at precisely the time
committed to winning the war in the right way and staying the course in
The notion by those that Afghanistan would eventually settle down into a western style
democracy is seriously mistaken, the United States should do the best it can for the country and
then get out. Afghanistan will always continue to be a work in progress as has always been the
2. Ivan Eland, The Empire Strikes Out: The New Imperialism and Its Fatal Flaws,” Cato
3. Ibid. 3.
4. Frank L. Holt, Into the Land of Bones: Alexander the Great in Afghanistan (Berkeley:
7. Marcus Raskin & Devin West, “Collateral Damage: A U.S. Strategy in War,” Paths for
8. U.S. Department of Defense, Commander’s Initial Assessment: Initial United States Forces-
9. Raghav Sharma, “India & Afghanistan: Charting the Future,” IPCS Special Report #69,
10. Lester W. Grau, ed., The Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in
11. Jean-Paul Faguet, “Building Democracy in Quicksand: Altruism, Empire, and the United
States,” London School of Economics, Development Studies Institute (November 19, 2003),
1 & 2.
(2009), v-vi.
13.Ibid. 7.