1. Bachrach Motor Co. vs. Talisay-Silay Milling Co.

*Facts: The Talisay- Silay Milling Co., Inc., in order to secure

its indebtedness to the Philippine National Bank, induced its
planters, among whom was Mariano Ledesma to mortgage
their land to the creditor bank. As compensation and bonus
to those planters for the risk they were running with their
property under the mortgage, the Talisay-Silay granted to
herein respondent, Mariano Lacson Ledesma, the sum of
19,911.11.
The petitioner file a complaint against Talisay-Silay for the
delivery of the amount 13,850 or promissory notes or other
instruments of credit for that sum payable as bonus in favor
of Mariano Ledesma. It also prays that the Talisay-Silay be
ordered to to render an accounting of the amounts it owes
Mariano by way of bonus and to pay the petitioner a sum
sufficient to satisfy the judgment and that sale made by
Mariano be null and void.
The PNB filed a 3rd party claim alleging a preferential right
to receive any amount which Mariano might be entitled to
from the Talisay-Silay as bonus because that would be civil
fruits of the land mortgaged to said bank by said debtor for
the benefit of the Talisay-Silay reffered to and by virtue of a
deed of assignment and praying that Talisay-Silay deliver
directly to the bank said sum on account of the latters
credit against the aforesaid Mariano.
Talisay-Silay answered stating that Marianos credit , 7,500
belonged to Cesar Ledesma because he had purchased it.
Cesar in turn, claimed that he is a buyer in good faith.
Bachrach answered the 3rd party claim that its credit
against Mariano was prior and preferential to that of the
bank.
At the trial, all agreed to recognize and respect the sale
made in favor of Cesar and that Bahcrach had a preferred
right to receive Marianos bonus and ordered Talisay-Silay
to deliver the sum.
PNB appealed on the ground that bonus in question is civil
fruits of the land which the owners had mortgaged for the
benefit of the Talisay-Silay and that said bank was entitled
to it on the ground that the mortgage had become due.

something else. The said bonus bears no immediate, but

only remote and accidental relation to the land, having been
granted as compensation for the risk of having subjected
ones land to a lien in favor of the bank for the benefit of the
Talisay-Silay. It is not civil fruits or income from the
mortgaged property and has nothing to do with it.

2) Tacas v. Tobon (Accession)

FACTS:
Aquiliana Tacas, filed an action to recover from defendant
Tobon the ownership and possession of three parcels of
land, together with the fruits collected by him during the
time he was in possession of said land since January 1912.
He alleged that Tobon unlawfully took said parcels upon the
death of Francisco Dumadag, predecessor in interest of the
plaintiffs; and that he remained in possession, enjoying the
fruits to the value of P700 annually.
Exhibit H of the plaintiffs, Dumagdag whose title is a
possessory information record duly approved and inscribed
in the registry of deeds of Ilocos Sur, that he was in
possession of the land for so many years until his death.
In his answer, Tobon alleged that he is the owner of said
lands, having purchased them from Exequiel or Gil Tacas.
(Dumagdags brother-in-law)
Exhibits 1 and 2 of the defendant, instrument whereby Gil
Tacas sold three parcels of farm land in the place called Sisin
to Evaristo Tobon for P300 conan
Ramon Tolentino- justice of peace, concludes that the
signature in Exhibit 1 is false.
The trial court declared the plaintiffs to be the absolute
owners of the three parcels of land in litigation, and ordered
Tobon to deliver said parcels of land to them, together with
the fruits collected each year since 1912 until the complete
termination of the case, and in default thereof, to pay them
P11,040, which is the total value of the rice and tobacco
from 1912 to 1927. Tobon appealed.

*Issue: Whether or not the bonus in question is civil fruits

ISSUE:
WON the trial court erred in ordering Tobon to deliver to
the plaintiffs the fruits of the land from 1912 to 1927?

*Held: No. Art.355 of the Civil Code considers 3 things as

civil fruits: (1) the rents of buildings, (2) the proceeds from
the leases of land, and (3) the income from perpetual or life
annuities or other similar sources of revenue. As the bonus
in question is not the rent of a building or of land. Also it is
not income for it is not obtained from the land but from

RULING:
Yes, the trial court erred insofar that it ordered Tobon to
deliver to the plaintiffs the fruits of the land from 1912 to
1927. Evidence being lacking to show that when he entered
upon the possession of the lands in question, he was aware
of any flaw in his title or mode of acquiring it,he is deemed a

possessor in good faith (Art. 433, Civil Code), and in

accordance with Art. 451 of the Civil Code, the fruits of said
lands were his, until he was summoned upon the complaint,
or until he has filed his answer thereto. Manresa
commented that to every possessor in good faith, there
comes a time when he is considered a possessor in bad
faith. When the owner or possessor with a better right
comes along, where he becomes aware that what he had
taken for granted is at least doubtful, and when he learns
the grounds in support of the adverse contention, good
faith ceases.
The possessor becomes aware that his possession is
unlawful from the time he learns of the complaint, from the
time he is summoned to the trial. It is at this time that his
possession is interrupted, according to Art. 1945, and that
he ceases to receive the fruits, according to the first
paragraph of Art. 451. Thus, Tobas is only bound to return
to the plaintiffs the fruits received
from April 1918 to 1927 with the right to deduct the
expenses of planting and harvesting (Art. 365 of the Civil
Code), which shall be determined by the trial court, after
hearing both parties.
Court upheld the trial courts decision of declaring the
plaintiffs to be the absolute owners of the three parcels of
land in litigation and ordering Tobon to deliver the said
parcels to them but he is bound to return the received fruits
from the time he was aware that his possession is unlawful.

3) Floreza vs Evangelista
Facts: Petitioners own a residential lot upon which
respondent built a house of light material which was with
the consent of petitioners but with no agreement as to the
rental since the petitioners have a debt of P100.00 to
respondent. Petitioners subsequently borrowed more
money from respondent the value of which reached
P740.00. Respondent demolished the house and replaced it
with a house of strong materials and as before, no rentals
were paud. Petitioner then sold said lot to respondent with
a right of repurchase within 6 years. Before the expiration of
the repurchase period, the petitioners paid in full the
repurchase price. Petitioners then asked respondent to
vacate the premises who however refused to do so until he
was reimbursed the value of his house.
Issue: WON petitioner was a builder in good faith

Held: The SC upholds the decision of the CA that the

petitioner could not be upheld as a builder in good faith
under Art. 448 because such can only be applied when the
builder, planter or sower believes he has the right to build,
plant or sow because he thinks he owns the land or believes
himself to have a claim to the title. Respondent makes no
pretension of ownership.The house that respondent built
was with the tolerance of the petitioners in consideration of
the debt they have incurred. Neither could he be considered
as a vendee de retro and has therefore no right to be
reimbursed much less retain the premises reimbursed. The
Court holds that the right of the petitioner are more of a
usufructuary under Art 579 of the NCC for if the
improvements made by the usufructuary were subject to
indemnity, it would be dangerous and unjust for he could
dispose of the owner"s funds by compelling him to pay for
the improvements which he perhaps would not have made.

4. Mercado Vs CA (4, Right of Accession)

The private respondents herein Bulaong Group, had for
many years been individual lessees of stalls in the public
market of Baliuag, Bulacan; from 1956 to 1972. The market
was destroyed by fire on 1956; the members of the Bulaong
Group constructed new stalls therein at their expense; and
they thereafter paid rentals thereon to the Municipality of
Baliuag. In 1972, the members of the group sub-leased their
individual stalls to other persons, referred to as the
(Mercado Group). After the Mercado Group had been in
possession of the market stalls for some months, as sublessees of the Bulaong Group, the municipal officials of
Baliuag cancelled the long standing leases of the Bulaong
Group and declared the persons comprising the Mercado
Group as the rightful lessees of the stalls in question, in
substitution of the former.
The members of the Bulaong Group sued. They filed several
individual complaints with the CFI seeking recovery of their
stalls from the Mercado Group as well as damages. (Their
theory was anchored on their claimed ownership of the
stalls constructed by them at their own expense, and their
resulting right, as such owners, to sub-lease the stalls, and
necessarily, to recover them from any person withholding
possession thereof from them).
Respondent Judge rejected the claim of the Municipality of
Baliuag that it had automatically acquired ownership of the
new stalls constructed after the old stalls had been razed by
fire, declaring the members of the Bulaong Group to be
builders in good faith, entitled to retain possession of the

stalls respectively put up by them until and unless

indemnified for the value thereof. The decision also
declared that the Bulaong and Mercado Groups had
executed the sub-letting agreements with full awareness
that they were thereby violating Ordinance No. 14; they
were thus in pari delicto, and hence had no cause of action
one against the other and no right to recover whatever had
been given or demand performance of anything
undertaken. The judgment therefore decreed (1) the
annulment of the leases between the Municipality and the
individuals comprising the Mercado Group (the defendants
who had taken over the original leases of the Bulaong
Group); and (2) the payment to the individual members of
the Bulaong Group (the plaintiffs) of the stated, adjudicated
value of the stalls, with interest IF
Issue: WON Court erred in declaring the members of the
Bulaong Group to be builders in good faith, entitled to
retain possession of the stalls respectively put up by them
until and unless indemnified for the value thereof.
HELD: YES
It was indeed error for the Court to have so ruled in
accordance with Article 526 of the Civil Code. The members
of this group (Bulalong) were admittedly lessees of space in
the public market; they therefore could not, and in truth
never did make the claim, that they were owners of any part
of the land occupied by the market so that in respect of any
new structure put up by them thereon, they could be
deemed builders in good faith. To be deemed a builder in
good faith, it is essential that a person assert title to the
land on which he builds; i.e., that he be a possessor in
concept of owner, and that he be unaware "that there exists
in his title or mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates
it. It is such a builder in good faith who is given the right to
retain the thing, even as against the real owner, until he has
been reimbursed in full not only for the necessary expenses
but also for useful expenses. On the other hand, unlike the
builder in good faith, a lessee who "makes in good faith
useful improvements which are suitable to the use for which
the lease is intended, without altering the form or
substance of the property leased," can only claim payment
of "one-half of the value of the improvements" or, "should
the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, ... remove the
improvements, even though the principal thing may suffer
damage thereby."
5. Pershing tan quarto vs ca

Facts:
- restituta tacalinar guanaco de pombuena received the
questioned lot of the cadastre survey of the municipality of
centro mizamis occidental either as a purported donation or
by way of purchase (50php, feb 11,1927)
- transaction took place during her mother's lifetime, her
father having predeceased the mother
- that the donation or sale was consummated while restituta
was already married to juan pombuenA
- jan 22,1935 Juan filed for himself and his supposed coowner restituta an application for a torrens title over the
land
- nov 22,1938 a decision was promulgated pronouncing juan
(married to restituta) as the owner of the land
- sept 22,1949 a contract of lease was entered into bet pet
and restituta (with consent of Juan) for 10 years
- dec 27 1960 restituta sued pet for unlawful detainer (the
lease contract having expired)
- an original certificate of title was issued in Juan's name
("married to restituta")
- unlawful detainer case was won by spouses in the
municipal court but cfi dismissed it on appeal bec of an
understanding (barter) whereby pet became the owner of
the disputed lot and the spouses in turn became the owners
of a parcel of land (with house constructed thereon)
previously owned by pet
- that the barter agreement (oct 10,1962) bet juan and pet,
pet constructed on disputed land a concrete building,
without any objection on the part of restituta
- restituta sued both Juan and pet for reconveyance of the
title over the lot, for the annulment of the barter, and for
recovery of the land with damages
Issue:
1. Is the questioned lot paraphernal or conjugal?
2. In having constructed the building on the lot, should pet
be regarded as a builder in good faith (hence be entitled to
reimbursement) or a builder in bad faith (no right to
reimbursement)?
Held:
1. Land is conjugal. Not donation, no public instrument.
Ownership was acquired both by Juan and restituta by
tradition (delivery) as a consequence of contract of sale
(50php). Lot is conjugal, having been acquired by the
spouses thru onerous title (money used being presumably
conjugal there being no proof that restituta had paraphernal
funds of her own).

2. Even assuming that despite registration of the lot as

conjugal, pet nursed the belief that the lit was actually
restituta's (making him in bad faith) stu restituta's failure to
prohibit him from building despite her knowledge that
construction was actually being done, makes her also in bad
faith. Mutual bad faith would entitle pet to the rights of a
builder in good faith thus reimbursement should be given
him if restituta decides to appropriate the building for
herself.
But pet having bartered his own lot and small house with
the lot with Juan (OCT conjugal owner) may be said to be
the owner-possessor of the lot. Thus he is a builderpossessor bec he is the owner himself.
(Builder in gold faith is one who is not aware of the defect
or flaw in his title or mode of acquisition)
- petition granted
6. Lopez Inc., vs Philippine & Eastern Trading Co., Inc.
Facts:
The Philippine & Eastern Trading Co., Inc., as lessee, was
occupying two doors with mezzanine of Lopez building in
Baguio, belonging to Lopez Inc. of which Atty. Eugenio Lopez
was then the President.
During the bombing of the City of Baguio (Japanese
occupation), the Lopez Building including the two doors in
question were burned and seriously damaged
After liberation, because the Lopez Inc. did not
rehabilitate the building, the PETC corporation, desiring to
resume the lease, thought of rebuilding it.
Mr. Macario Rebodos, Vice-President of the PETC, went to
Manila to confer with Atty. Eugenio Lopez, about the
rehabilitation of the premises. He left a letter for Mr. Lopez
with an inmate of the house. Said letter was never
answered by Attorney Lopez.
PETC proceeded to repair or rebuild the two doors
spending the amount of P14,583.45. Said improvements
were introduced with the knowledge of Mr. Joseph K. Icard,
agent for the Lopez, Inc. Later, an agreement was entered
into between the Lopez, Inc. and the PETC whereby the
latter re-occupied the premises paying a rental of P300 a
month.
The PETC failed to pay the monthly rentals amounting to
P2,200. Although admitting its delinquency, PETC was of the
belief that inasmuch as it had the right to be reimbursed in
the sum of P14,583.45, value of the improvements
introduced by it, the amount of its delinquency (P2,200)
could well be charged against it and so it need not pay the
monthly rentals until the value of the improvements had

been exhausted.
Because of PETCs refusal to pay the delinquency the
Lopez Inc. brought an action of ejectment in the Municipal
Court of Baguio to have the PETC vacate the premises pay
the back rentals with legal interest
Municipal Court rendered judgment in favor of the
Plaintiff
PETC appealed to the Court of First Instance of Baguio. CFI
ruled in favor of the Plaintiff ordering the Defendant to
vacate the property. Said Defendant, however, is not
obliged to pay the said P300 monthly in cash. It has the right
to set off against the rental, part of the value of the
improvements. Regarding the P2,200, back rentals, the
court also declares that this sum is already offset by a part
of the amount of the value of the improvements. The
Defendant is free from paying it in cash.
Both parties appealed to the Court of Appeals
Issue: WON the PETC have the right to reimburse the value
of the improvements from Lopez Inc.
Held: As the Court already said, they both thought that a
lessee may be considered a possessor in good faith and that
improvements introduced by him on the leased premises
are to be regarded as made in good faith. This rule or
principle contained in the civil law refers only to party who
occupies or possess property in the belief that he is the
owner thereof and said good faith ends only when he
discovers a flaw in his title so as to reasonably advise or
inform him that after all he may not be the legal owner of
said property. This principle of possessor in good faith
naturally cannot apply to a lessee because as such lessee he
knows that he is not the owner of the leased property.
Neither can he deny the ownership or title of his lessor.
Knowing that his occupation of the premises continues only
during the life of the lease contract and that he must vacate
the property upon termination of the lease or upon the
violation by him of any of its terms, he introduces
improvements on said property at his own risk in the sense
that he cannot recover their value from the lessor, much
less retain the premises until such reimbursement. His right
to improvements introduced by him is expressly governed
by Articles 1573 and 487 of the old Civil Code which reads as
follows:
Article 1573. A lessee shall have, with respect to useful and
voluntary improvements, the same rights which are granted
to usufructuaries.
Article 487. The usufructuary may make on the property

held in usufruct any improvements, useful, or recreative,

which he may deem proper, provided he does not change
its form or substance; but he shall have up right to be
indemnified therefor. He may, however, remove such
improvements should it be possible to do so without injury
to the property.
The rights of the PETC with respect to the improvements
made on the property by him must be governed by Article
487 in relation with Article 1573 of the Civil Code. Under
Article 487 the PETC is entitled to remove improvements
made by himself so far as it is possible to do so without
injury to the property; and this means that he may remove
the improvements provided he leaves the property in
substantially the same condition as when he entered upon
it. Articles 361 and 453 of the Civil Code, which define the
rights between the owner of land and builders of
improvements thereon in good faith, are not applicable as
between landlord and tenant, since the Code supplies
specific provisions designed to cover their rights. Besides
the tenant cannot be said to be a builder in good faith as he
has no pretension to be owner.
PETC is not entitled to reimbursement for the value of the
improvements introduced by it; that it is ordered to pay to
Lopez Inc. the amount of P2,200, with interest at the legal
rate from the date of the filing of the complaint; and to pay
the amount of P300 per month until it actually vacates the
premises. PETC is however given the right to remove the
improvements introduced by it without injury to the
property.

7. Heirs of the late Jaime Binuya vs. CA, Romero, Carpio

and Dungao
FACTS: Petitioners' father, Jaime Binuya, was the registered
owner of a parcel of land. He leased out a portion thereof to
private respondent Dungao who constructed thereon a
residential house. The lease was to run for a period of ten
(10) years, starting 1986. A monthly rental of P20.00 was
agreed upon. In 1973, private respondent Carpio bought
one of Jaime's two (2) houses on the lot. After the said
purchase, Carpio leased that portion of the lot occupied by
the house for a period of ten (10) years commencing 1973.
Both contracts of lease were in writing.
The contract with Dungao was renewed for a period of two
(2) years after its expiration. Although no further renewal or
extension was agreed upon, Dungao was allowed to stay in
the premises on a month to month basis. There was no
extension or renewal of the contract of lease with Carpio

after its expiration, but he, nevertheless, continued to stay

on the premises, paying a monthly rental.
Upon their failure to pay, an amicable settlement thru the
conciliation procedure prescribed under P.D. No. 1508 was
attempted. This having failed, Jaime Binuya filed a separate
civil case for ejectment against Bernardo Carpio and Rustico
Dungao, respectively.
In their Joint-Affidavit submitted to the MTC, private
respondent Carpio claimed that Jaime agreed to reimburse
him (Carpio) for the value of the improvements he would
introduce on the house and that the current value of such
improvements is P80,000.00. On the other hand, private
respondent Dungao claimed that Jaime also agreed to
reimburse him for the value of the improvements he would
introduce on the portion leased should Jaime decide to
repossess the land. Both private respondents further
asserted that their respective contracts of lease were
renewed for a period of ten (10) years per renewal; Carpio
was on his second renewal while Dungao was on his third
renewal.
MTC-in favor of Jaime
RTC-Jaime died. Appeal of resp. affirmed. It ordered
respondents that resp. shall be reimbursed for the value of
the houses since resp. are considered builders in good faith.
ISSUE: CA erred in holding that private respondents are
builders in good faith and in applying the case.
RULING: In jurisprudence it states that The contention that
the defendant is entitled to the benefits of the provisions of
Article 361 of the Civil Code can not be maintained because
the right to indemnification secured in that article is
manifestly intended to apply only to a case where one
builds or sows or plants on land in which he believes himself
to have a claim of title and not to lands wherein one's only
interest is that of tenant under a rental contract; otherwise,
it would always be in the power of the tenant to improve his
landlord out of his property.
Art 361 of the old civil code: The owner of land on which
anything has been built, sown, or planted, in good faith,
shall be entitled to appropriate the thing so built, sown, or
planted, upon paying the compensation mentioned in
Articles 453 and 454, or to compel the person who has built
or planted to pay him the value of the land, and the person
who sowed thereon to pay the proper rent therefor.
(Article 453 referred to necessary and useful expenditures
while Article 454 referred to expenditures purely for
ostentation or mere pleasure.)

****This principle of possessor in good faith naturally

cannot apply to a lessee because as such lessee he knows
that he is not the owner of the leased property. Neither can
he deny the ownership or title of the lessor.
It is to be noted at once that the old Civil Code allowed
neither indemnity nor retention. The new Code, however,
allows indemnity, to the extent of one-half (1/2) of the
value of the useful improvements, if the lessor chooses to
retain them. In short, it is the lessor who has the option to
pay for one-half (1/2) the value of the improvements.
The lessee does not have the right to demand that he be
paid therefor. For if the lessor refuses "to reimburse said
amount", the only remedy available to the lessee is to
"remove the improvements, even though the principal thing
may suffer damage thereby," provided, however, that he
should not "cause any more impairment upon the property
leased than is necessary". Also, not being a possessor in
good faith, and therefore, not entitled to the benefits of
Article 546 of the new Civil Code, the lessee does not have
the right of retention over his improvements until he is
reimbursed one-half (1/2) of the value of the useful
improvements.

8. Imperial Insurance vs. Simon

9. Spouses del Campo vs. Abesia

Facts: The case involves two friendly parties who are coowners of a corner lot at Flores and Cavan Streets in Cebu
City. Plaintiff owns 2/3 of the lot and Defendant owns 1/3 of
the same. The total size of the lot is 45 square meters.
Later on, the two parties decided to divide the co-owned
property into two lots. 30 square meters went to the
plaintiffs and 15 square meters went to the defendants.
From the sketch plan, both parties discovered that the
house of the defendants occupied a portion of the plaintiffs
adjacent lot, eating 5 sqm of it. The parties then requested
the trial court to adjudicate who should take possession of
the encroached 5 sqm.
The trial court ruled that Art 448 does not apply. The owner
of the land on which anything has been built, sown or
planted in good faith, shall have the right to appropriate as
his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the
indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige
the one who built or planted to pay the price of the land,
and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the
builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy the land if its

value is considerably more than that of the building or trees.

In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of
the land does not choose to appropriate the building or
trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon
the terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the
court shall fix the terms thereof.
Since art 448 does not apply, the Plaintiff cannot be obliged
to pay for the portion of defendants house that entered
into the 30 sqm lot, and Defendant cannot be obliged to pay
for the price of the 5 sqm their house occupied. Why? The
RTC believed the rules of co-ownership should govern, and
not that of accession.
RTC then assigned the full 30sqm to Plaintiff and ordered
Defendants to demolish the 5sqm part of their house
encroaching the 30sqm lot of the Plaintiffs. Defendants
where horrified at having to axe the family home, hence
they appealed.
CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the rules of accession applies (and
not co-ownership) on property that used to be co-owned,
but was subdivided.
Ruling: The rule of accession applies because co-ownership
was terminated upon the partitioning of the lot. Art 448
therefore governs. The house of defendant overlapped that
of Plaintiff, but this was built on good faith. Hence, the
plaintiffs have the right to choose one of two options
1)Appropriate the 5sqm portion of the house of Defendants
after indemnifying the Defendants; or 2)Obliging the
Defendants to pay a portion of the land on which their
home rested. (or they can rent it)

10. Pecson vs CA
Facts: Petitioner Pecson was the owner of a commercial lot
located at Quezon City on which he built a four-story
apartment building. Petitioner however failed to pay realty
taxes which caused said land to be sold at public auction by
the city treasurer who in turn sold it to herein private
respondents spouses Nuguid. The respondents contend that
the building should be included in the sale but the trial court
as well as the CA and the SC upon a petition for review,
denied such.
In 1993, respondents filed with the trial court a motion for
the delivery of possession of the lot and the apartment
building citing Art 546 of the Civil Code. The trial court
decreed that the movant (respondent) shall reimburse

plaintiff the construction cost of the apartment building

amounting to P53,000.00; that upon payment of the
reimbursement, respondent shall be entitled to the
immediate issuance of a writ of possession over the lot the
improvement on it; that petitioner should pay respondent
no less that P21,000.00 per month which is the same
amount paid monthly by the tenants occupying the land;
and that the amount of P53,000.00 due from the
respondent shall offset against the amounts collected by the
petitioner as rent. A writ of possession as eventually issued
in favor of respondent.
Issue: WON petitioner is a builder in good faith
Held: The parties agree that the petitioner was a builder in
good faith of the apartment building on the theory that he
constructed it at the time when he was still the owner of the
lot, and that the key issue in this case is the application of
Articles 448 and 456 of the Civil Code.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals, as well as the
parties, concerned themselves with the application of
Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code. These articles read as
follows:
Art. 448. The owner of the land on which anything has been
built, sown or planted in good faith, shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after
payment of the indemnity provided for in articles 546 and
548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the
price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent.
However, the builder or planter cannot be obliged to buy
the land if its value is considerably more than that of the
building or trees. In such case, he shall pay reasonable rent,
if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the
building or trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall
agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof. (361a)
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 546. Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every
possessor; but only the possessor in good faith may retain
the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.
Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in
good faith with the same right of retention, the person who
has defeated him in the possession having the option of
refunding the amount of the expenses or of paying the
increase in value which the thing may have acquired by
reason thereof.
Article 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the
land is the builder, sower, or planter who then later loses

ownership of the land by sale or donation.

Thus in strict point of law, Article 448 is not apposite to the
case at bar. Nevertheless, we believe that the provision
therein on indemnity may be applied by analogy considering
that the primary intent of Article 448 is to avoid a state of
forced co-ownership.

11. Tecnogas Philippines Manufacturing Corp Vs CA (11

Right of Accession)
Petitioner is a corpo who is the registered owner of lot in
San Dionisio Paraaque,
Metro Manila. Said land was purchased by plaintiff from
Pariz Industries, Inc. in 1970, together with all the buildings
and improvements including the wall existing thereon
Defendant (eduardo uy) is the registered owner of a parcel
of land known as Lot No. 4531-B of Lot 4531 of the
Cadastral Survey of Paraaque, covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 279838, of the Registry of Deeds for
the Province of Rizal; that said land which adjoins plaintiffs
land was purchased by defendant from a certain Enrile
Antonio also in 1970; that in 1971, defendant purchased
another lot also adjoining plaintiffs land.
It was discovered in a survey, that a portion the buildings
and wall bought by plaintiff together with the land from
Pariz Industries are occupying a portion of defendants
adjoining land. Upon learning of the encroachment or
occupation by its buildings and wall of a portion of private
respondents land, the petitioner offered to buy from
defendant that particular portion of Uys land occupied by
portions of its buildings and wall with an area of 770 square
meters, more or less, but the latter, however, refused the
offer
The parties entered into a private agreement before a
certain Col. Rosales in Malacaang, wherein petitioner
agreed to demolish the wall at the back portion of its land
thus giving to the private respondent possession of a
portion of his land previously enclosed by petitioner's wall.
Uy later filed a complaint before the office of Municipal
Engineer of Paraaque, Metro Manila as well as before the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal against Technogas in
connection with the encroachment or occupation by
plaintiff's buildings and walls of a portion of its land but said
complaint did not prosper; so Uy dug or caused to be dug a
canal along Technogas wall, a portion of which collapsed in
June, 1980, and led to the filing by the petitioner of the
supplemental complaint in the above-entitled case and a
separate criminal complaint for malicious mischief against

Uy and his wife which ultimately resulted into the conviction

in court Uy's wife for the crime of malicious mischief;
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent Court of Appeals erred in
holding the petitioner a builder in bad faith because it is
presumed to know the metes and bounds of his property.
HELD:
YEs: The two cases it relied upon do not support its main
pronouncement that a registered owner of land has
presumptive knowledge of the metes and bounds of its own
land, and is therefore in bad faith if he mistakenly builds on
an adjoining land. Aside from the fact that those cases had
factual moorings radically different from those obtaining
here, there is nothing in those cases which would suggest,
however remotely, that bad faith is imputable to a
registered owner of land when a part of his building
encroaches upon a neighbors land, simply because he is
supposedly presumed to know the boundaries of his land as
described in his certificate of title. No such doctrinal
statement could have been made in those cases because
such issue was not before the Supreme Court. Quite the
contrary, we have rejected such a theory in Co Tao vs.
Chico, where we held that unless one is versed in the
science of surveying, no one can determine the precise
extent or location of his property by merely examining his
paper title.
There is no question that when petitioner purchased the
land from Pariz Industries, the buildings and other
structures were already in existence. The record is not clear
as to who actually built those structures, but it may well be
assumed that petitioners predecessor-in-interest, Pariz
Industries, did so. Article 527 of the Civil Code presumes
good faith, and since no proof exists to show that the
encroachment over a narrow, needle-shaped portion of
private respondents land was done in bad faith by the
builder of the encroaching structures, the latter should be
presumed to have built them in good faith. It is presumed
that possession continues to be enjoyed in the same
character in which it was acquired, until the contrary is
proved. Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that
the land he is building on is his, and his ignorance of any
defect or flaw in his title. Hence, such good faith, by law,
passed on to Parizs successor, petitioner in this case.
Further, (w)here one derives title to property from
another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while
holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence

against the former. And possession acquired in good faith

does not lose this character except in case and from the
moment facts exist which show that the possessor is not
unaware that he possesses the thing improperly or
wrongfully. The good faith ceases from the moment defects
in the title are made known to the possessor, by extraneous
evidence or by suit for recovery of the property by the true
owner.
Recall that the encroachment in the present case was
caused by a very slight deviation of the erected wall (as
fence) which was supposed to run in a straight line from
point 9 to point 1 of petitioners lot. It was an error which,
in the context of the attendant facts, was consistent with
good faith.

12. Eden ballatan vs ca

Facts:
-dispute arose from a dispute over 42 sqm of residential
land owned by pet
- parties are owners of adjacent lots located at block no.3
poinsettia street araneta university village malabon metro
Manila
- lot 24, 414 sqm, registered in the name of pet
- lots 25 and 26 (415&313sqm) registered in the name of
resp, Gonzalo go sr
- on lot 25, resp Winston go (son) constructed Gus house.
- adjacent to lot no. 26 is lot no.27,417 sqm, registered in
the name of resp li Ching Yao
-1985 pet constructed her house on lot 24. She notice that
the concrete fence and side pathway of the adjoining house
of Winston encroached on her property. Her building
contractor told her that her area was actually less than that
described in the title. Pet informed resp of this discrepancy
and his encroachment on her property. Resp claimed that
his house and fence were built within the parameters of his
father's lot and that the lot was surveyed by engr Jose
quedding the authorized surveyor of the araneta institute of
agriculture (aia) the owner-developer of the subd project
- in a report (feb1985), engr quedding found that the lot
area of the pet was less by few meters and that the lot of
resp li Ching (3 lots away) increased by 2 meters. He
declared that in 1983, he made verification survey of lots
25&26 of resp go and found that the boundaries are in
proper position. He could not explain the reduction in pet's
area since he was not present at the time resp constructed
their boundary walls
-June 1985, engr made a third relocation survey upon

request of parties. He found that lot 24 lost 25sqm on its

eastern boundary, that lot 25 did not lose nor gain any area
and lot 26 lost some 3 sqm which was gained by lot 27 on its
western boundary. Lots 25-27 moved westward to the
eastern boundary if lot 24
- pet made written demand on resp to remove their
improvements on lot 24. Resp refused
- pet instituted against resp a civil case for recovery of
possession Rtc malabon
- Tc in favor of pet
- ca affirmed but modified- instead of ordering resp to
demolish their improvements, orders them to pay pet a
reasonable amount for that portion of the lot which they
encroached
Issue:
Was there encroachment? *not sure
Held:
- the 42sqm portion is on the entire eastern side of lot 24
owned by pet, that this said portion is found the concrete
fence and pathway that extends from resp go's house in
adjacent lot 25; that inclusive of the portion, go did not gain
not lose ang portion of lots 25-26, instead L27 on which li
chug built his house encroached on the land of go gaining in
the process 37 sqm of go's land
- ca found that it was the erroneous survey by engr
quedding that triggered these discrepancies. And it was this
survey that resp go relied upon in the constructing his house
on his father's land. He built his house in the belief that it
was entirely within the parameters of his father's lot. Resp
go had no knowledge that they encroached pet's lot.
Deemed builders in good faith until the time pet informed
them of their encroachment on her property
- Li Ching Yao built his house on his lot before any of the
other parties did. Li constructed house 1982 go 1983 pet
1985. There is no evidence that li Ching was aware that
when he built his house he knew that a portion would
encroach on go's land. Good faith is always presumed and
upon him who alleges bad faith on the part of a possessor
rests the burden of proof
- all parties are presumed to have acted in good faith. Their
rights must be determined in accordance with the
appropriate provisions of the civil code on property
- the owner of the land on which anything has been built
sown or planted in good faith shall have the right to
appropriate as his own the building, Planting or sowing,
after payment to the builder, planter or sower of the

necessary and useful expenses, and in the proper case,

expenses for pure luxury or mere pleasure. The owner of
the land may also oblige the builder planter or sower to
purchase and pay the price of the land. If the owner chooses
to sell his land, the builder planter sower must purchase the
land otherwise the owner may remove the improvements
thereon. The builder planter sower however is not obliged
to purchase the land if its value considerably odd than the
building planting or sowing. In such case, the builder planter
or sower must pay rent to the owner of the land. If the
parties cannot come to terms over the conditions of the
lease, the court must fix the terms. The right to choose
between appropriating the improvement of selling the land
on which the improvement stands to the builder planter
sower is given to the owner of the land.
- pet may choose to purchase the improvement made by go
in their land or sell to go the portion. If go is unable or
unwilling to buy the lot, then they must vacate the land and
until they vacate, tegu must pay rent to pet. Pet cannot
compel go to buy the land if its value is considerably more
than the portion of their house constructed thereon. If the
value of the land is much more than go's improvement, go
must pay reasonable rent. If they do not agree on the terms
of lease, Then they may go to court to fix the same.

13. Filipinas Colleges vs Timbang

Facts:
The CA held that Filipinas Colleges, Inc. are declared have
acquired the rights of the spouses Timbang in and to lot No.
2-a mentioned above and in consideration thereof, Filipinas
Colleges, Inc., was ordered to pay the spouses Timbang the
amount of P15,807.90 plus such other amounts which said
spouses might have paid or had to pay.
On the other hand, Maria Gervacio Blas was declared to
be a builder in good faith of the school building constructed
on the lot in question and entitled to be paid the amount of
P19,000.00 for the same.
Also, in case Filipinas Colleges, Inc. failed to deposit the
value of the land, which after liquidation was fixed at
P32,859.34, within 90 days set by court, Filipinas Colleges
would lose all its rights to land and spouses Timbang would
become the owners thereof
If that is the case, the Timbangs ordered to make known
to the court their option under Art. 448 of the Civil Code
whether they would appropriate the building in question, in
which even they would have to pay Filipinas Colleges, Inc.
the sum of P19,000, or would compel the latter to acquire

the land and pay the price thereof.

Filipinas Colleges, Inc. having failed to pay or deposit the
sum of P32,859.34 and the spouses Timbang made known
to the court their decision that they had chosen not of
appropriate the building but to compel Filipinas Colleges,
Inc., for the payment of the sum of P32,859,34. The motion
was granted and a writ of execution was issued.
Meanwhile, Blas filed a motion for execution of her
judgment representing the unpaid portion of the price of
the house sold to Filipinas Colleges, Inc which was granted.
Levy was made on the house in virtue of the writs of
execution
Then, the Sheriff of Manila sold the building in public
auction in favor of the spouses Timbang, as the highest
bidders
Several motions were subsequently filed before the lower
court wherein the court held that: 1) The sheriffs certificate
of sale covering a school building sold at public auction was
null and void unless within 15 days from notice of said order
spouses Timbang shall pay to Blas the sum of P5,750.00 that
the spouses Timbang had bid for the building at the Sheriffs
sale; 2) that Filipinas is owner of 245.00/32,859.34
undivided interest in Lot No. 2-a on which the building sold
in the auction sale is situated; and 3) that the undivided
interest of the Filipinas in the lot should be sold to satisfy
unpaid portion of the judgment in favor of Blas and against
Filipinas in the amount of P8,200.00 minus the sum of
P5,750.00.
The spouses Timbang contended that because the builder
in good faith has failed to pay the price of the land after the
owners thereof exercised their option under Art. 448 of the
Civil Code, the builder lost his right of retention provided in
Art. 546 and that by operation of Art. 445, the spouses
Timbang as owners of the land became the owner ipso facto
of the school building
Issue: WON the spouses Timbang automatically become the
owners of the building upon failure of Filipinas to pay the
value of the land
Held: No.
Based on Art 448 and 546 of the New Civil Code, the owner
of the land has the right to choose between appropriating
the building by reimbursing the builder of the value thereof
or compelling the builder in good faith to pay for his land.
Even this second right cannot be exercised if the value of
the land is considerably more than that of the building. In
addition to the right of the builder to be paid the value of

his improvement, Article 546 gives him the corollary right of

retention of the property until he is indemnified by the
owner of the land. There is nothing in the language of these
two article, 448 and 546, which would justify the conclusion
of appellants that, upon the failure of the builder to pay the
value of the land, when such is demanded by the landowner, the latter becomes automatically the owner of the
improvement under Article 445. Although it is true it was
declared therein that in the event of the failure of the
builder to pay the land after the owner thereof has chosen
this alternative, the builder's right of retention provided in
Article 546 is lost, nevertheless there was nothing said that
as a consequence thereof, the builder loses entirely all
rights over his own building.
The Court of Appeals has already adjudged that appellee
Blas is entitled to the payment of the unpaid balance of the
purchase price of the school building. Blas is actually a lien
on the school building are concerned. The order of the
lower court directing the Timbang spouses, as successful
bidders, to pay in cash the amount of their bid in the sum of
P5,750.00 is therefore correct.

14. Bernardo vs. Bataclan

FACTS: Plaintifee Bernardo acquired a parcel of land from
Pastor Samonthe thru a contracts of sale. To secure
possession of the land from the vendors the said plaintiff,
instituted a civil case. The trial court found for the plaintiff
in a decision which was affirmed by this Supreme Court on
appeal (G.R. No. 33017). When plaintiff entered upon the
premises, however, he found the defendant herein, Catalino
Bataclan, who appears to have been authorized by former
owners, as far back as 1922, to clear the land and make
improvements thereon. As Bataclan was not a party in the
civil case, plaintiff, on June 11, 1931, instituted against him a
civil case. In this case, plaintiff was declared owner but the
defendant was held to be a possessor in good faith, entitled
for reimbursement in the total sum of P1,642, for work
done and improvements made.
The defendant states that he is a possessor in good faith
and that the amount of P2,212 to which he is entitled has
not yet been paid to him. Therefore, he says, he has a right
to retain the land in accordance with the provisions of
article 453 of the Civil Code. In obedience to the decision of
this court in G.R. No. 37319, the plaintiff expressed his
desire to require the defendant to pay for the value of the
land. The said defendant could have become owner of both
land and improvements and continued in possession

thereof. But he said he could not pay and the land was sold
at public auction to Toribio Teodoro. When he failed to pay
for the land, the defendant herein lost his right of retention.
ISSUE:Whether or not there is good faith.
RULING: The court finds that defendant has lost his right of
retention. In obedience to the decision of this court in G.R.
No. 37319, the plaintiff expressed his desire to require the
defendant to pay for the value of the land. The said
defendant could have become owner of both land and
improvements and continued in possession thereof. But he
said he could not pay and the land was sold at public
auction to Toribio Teodoro. The law, as we have already
said, requires no more than that the owner of the land
should choose between indemnifying the owner of the
improvements or requiring the latter to pay for the land.
When he failed to pay for the land, the defendant herein
lost his right of retention.
The sale at public auction having been asked by the plaintiff
himself and the purchase price of P8,000 received by him
from Toribio Teodoro, we find no reason to justify a rapture
of the situation thus created between them, the defendantappellant not being entitled, after all, to recover from the
plaintiff the sum of P2,212.

15. Miranda v. Fadullon

*Facts: One Lucio Tio was the owner of a parcel of land in
Cebu. A power of Attorney in favor of one Esteban Fadullon
executed by Lucio Tio was registered in the land records of
Cebu City. On the same date, the deed of mortgage in favor
of the Cebu Mutual Building and Loan Association was also
annotated. Fadullon sold the property to the spouses
Dionisio Segarra and Clemencia N. de Segarra with right to
repurchase within a period of 30 days. Fadullon failed to
make the repurchase and 10 days after the expiration of the
period, the spouses file a sworn petition for the
consolidation of their ownership and registered said petition
ion the office of the Register of Deeds. Lucio Tio filed a
complaint in the CFI of Cebu to annul the sale. The Trial
Court annulled the sale and the CA affirmed and further
required the spouses to pay Lucio Tio rentals on the
property until the property shall have been returned. It
appeared that during the possession of the spouses of the
property , they had introduced improvements consisting of
a building with 3 rooms and a storage room and artesian
with tower and water tank and a cement flooring which cost

5,300. They claimed that they were possessor in good faith

and asked the court to asked Lucio Tio to pay for the said
improvements or to allow them to buy the land should Lucio
Tio decide not to pay. Lucio Tio on the other hand, claimed
that the spouses were possessors in bad faith and not
entitled to reimbursement.
*Issue: Whether or not the spouses Segarra were
possessors in bad faith or good faith.
*Held: 2 circumstances which seem to stubbornly belie the
professed good faith of the part of Segarras in buying the
property: (1) The circumstance of the power-of-attorney
appearing on the back of the title as of 5 or 6 years previous
and the other circumstance of the comparatively limited
period of one month granted vendor Fadullon to redeem
the property and (2) the further circumstance that the said
property had already been mortgaged.
Neither the trial court and CA did expressly say in so many
words that the spouses were possessor in bad faith. But
from the reading of their decisions, one can logically infer
that it was the conclusion of the 2 courts that the spouses
were not possessors in good faith. Moreover, the very fact
that The CA sentence them to pay rentals is an indication
that the spouses were considered possessors and builders in
bad faith. A builder in good faith may not be required to pay
rentals. He has a right to retain the land on which he has
built in good faith until he is reimbursed. Possibly he might
be required to pay rental only when the owner of the land
chooses not to appropriate the improvement and requires
the builder in good faith to pay for the land, but that the
builder is unwilling or unable to buy the land, and then they
decide to leave things as they are and assume the relation
of lessor and lessee

16) Heirs of Navarro V. IAC (Accession)

FACTS:
Sinforoso Pascual desires to register land on the northern
section of his existing property. His current registered
property is bounded on the east by Talisay River, on the
West by Bulacan River and on the North by the Manila bay.
Both rivers flow towards the Manila Bay. Because of
constantly flowing water, extra land of about 17 hectares
formed in the northern most section of the property. It is
this property he sought to register.
The RTC - denied the registration, claiming this to be
foreshore land and part of public domain (remember,

accretion formed by the sea is public dominion). His Motion

for Reconsideration likewise denied. In 1960, he attempted
registry again, claiming that the Talisay and Bulacan rivers
deposited more silt resulting on accretion. He claimed this
land as riprarian owner. The Director of Lands, Director of
Forestry and the Fiscal opposed.
Then a new party surfaced. Mr Emiliano Navarro opposed
the same application, stating the he leased part of the
property sought to be registered. He sought to protect his
fishpond that rested on the same property. Sinforoso was
not amused and filed ejectment against Mr. Navarro,
claiming that Navarro used stealth force and strategy to
occupy a portion of his land. Pascual lost the case against
Navarro so he appealed. During the appeal, his original land
registration case was consolidated and tried jointly. (alas
Pascual died) The heirs of Pascual took over the case.
On 1975, the court decided that the property was foreshore
land and therefore part of public domain. The RTC dismissed
the complaint of Pascual for ejectment against Navarro and
also denied his land registration request. Pascuals heirs
appealed and the RTC was reversed by the IAC.
The Apellate court - granted petition for registration. The
reason? The accretion was caused by the two rivers, not
manila bay. Hence it wasnt foreshore land. (BUT the
confusion lies in the fact that the accretion formed adjacent
to Manila Bay which is sea!) Aggrieved, the Director of
Forestry moved for reconsideration (Government insists it is
foreshore and hence, public domain). The Apellate court
denied all motions of the Director and the Government.
The matter went to the SC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accretion taking place on property
adjacent to the sea can be registered under the Torrens
system.
HELD:
It cannot be registered. This is land of Public domain.
Pascual claimed ownership under Article 457 of the Civil
Code saying that the disputed 14-hectare land is an
accretion caused by the joint action of the Talisay and
Bulacan Rivers Art 457: Accretion as a mode of acquiring
property and requires the concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) that the accumulation of soil or sediment be
gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be the result of the
action of the waters of the river; and (3) that the land where
the accretion takes place is adjacent to the bank of the river.

Unfortunately, Pasucal and Heirs claim of ownership based

on Art 457 is misplaced. If theres any land to be claimed, it
should be land ADJACENT to the rivers Talisay and Bulacan.
The law is clear on this. Accretion of land along the river
bank may be registered. This is not the case of accretion of
land on the property adjacent to Manila Bay.
Furthermore, Manila Bay is a sea. Accretion on a sea bank is
foreshore land and the applicable law is not Art 457 but Art
4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of 1866. This law, while old,
holds that accretion along sea shore cannot be registered as
it remains public domain unless abandoned by government
for public use and declared as private property capable of
alienation.
Article 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of August 3, 1866
provides as follows: Lands added to the shores by accretions
and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form
part of the public domain. When they are no longer washed
by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for purposes
of public utility, or for the establishment of special
industries, or for the coast-guard service, the Government
shall declare them to be the property of the owners of the
estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.
The IAC decision granting registration was reversed and set
aside. Registration cannot be allowed.
Accretion along an area adjacent to the sea is public
domain, even if the accretion results from rivers emptying
into the sea. It cannot be registered.

17.Republic vs CA
Facts: Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of
land in Meycuayan, Bulacan. They subsequently filed an
application for the registration of three lots adjacent to their
property. The provincial fiscal however opposed said
application and the respondents subsequently filed a partial
withdrawal of their application and proceeded only upon
one lot (Lot 1) upon recommendation of the Commissioner
appointed by the court. The lower court then granted such
application finding the lands to be accretions top the
respondent"s land which the CA likewise approved of.
The petitioner submits that there is no accretion to speak of
under Article 457 of the New Civil Code because what
actually happened is that the private respondents simply
transferred their dikes further down the river bed of the
Meycauayan River, and thus, if there is any accretion to
speak of, it is man-made and artificial and not the result of
the gradual and imperceptible sedimentation by the waters
of the river.

Issue: WON there is accretion to the property of the

respondent
Held: Article 457 of the New Civil Code provides:
"To the owner of lands adjoining the banks of rivers belong
the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects
of the current of the water"
The above-quoted article requires the concurrence of three
requisites before an accretion covered by this particular
provision is said to have taken place. They are (1) that the
deposit be gradual and imperceptible; (2) that it be made
through the effects of the current of the water; and (3) that
the land where accretion takes place is adjacent to the
banks of rivers.
The requirement that the deposit should be due to the
effect of the current of the river is indispensable. This
excludes from Art. 457 of the New Civil Code all deposits
caused by human intervention. Alluvion must be the
exclusive work of nature. In the instant case, there is no
evidence whatsoever to prove that the addition to the said
property was made gradually through the effects of the
current of the Meycauayan and Bocaue rivers. We agree
with the observation of the Solicitor General that it is
preposterous to believe that almost four (4) hectares of land
came into being because of the effects of the Meycauayan
and Bocaue rivers. The lone witness of the private
respondents who happens to be their overseer and whose
husband was first cousin of their father noticed the four
hectare accretion to the twelve hectare fishpond only in
1939. The respondents claim that at this point in time,
accretion had already taken place. If so, their witness was
incompetent to testify to a gradual and imperceptible
increase to their land in the years before 1939. However,
the witness testified that in that year, she observed an
increase in the area of the original fishpond which is now
the land in question. If she was telling the truth, the
accretion was sudden. However, there is evidence that the
alleged alluvial deposits were artificial and man-made and
not the exclusive result of the current of the Meycauayan
and Bocaue rivers. The alleged alluvial deposits came into
being not because of the sole effect of the current of the
rivers but as a result of the transfer of the dike towards the
river and encroaching upon it. The land sought to be
registered is not even dry land cast imperceptibly and
gradually by the river's current on the fishpond adjoining it.
It is under two meters of water. The private respondents'
own evidence shows that the water in the fishpond is two

meters deep on the side of the pilapil facing the fishpond

and only one meter deep on the side of the pilapil facing the
river.
The reason behind the law giving the riparian owner the
right to any land or alluvion deposited by a river is to
compensate him for the danger of loss that he suffers
because of the location of his land. If estates bordering on
rivers are exposed to floods and other evils produced by the
destructive force of the waters and if by virtue of lawful
provisions, said estates are subject to incumbrances and
various kinds of easements, it is proper that the risk or
danger which may prejudice the owners thereof should be
compensated by the right of accretion. Hence, the riparian
owner does not acquire the additions to his land caused by
special works expressly intended or designed to bring about
accretion. When the private respondents transferred their
dikes towards the river bed, the dikes were meant for
reclamation purposes and not to protect their property
from the destructive force of the waters of the river.
The curt cannot order the registration of said lots.

18. Roxas v. Tuason, et al.

*Facts: Attorneys Rosado, Sanz and Opisso applied for the
registration of the estate owned by Roxas known as the
hacienda de San Pedro Macati. The said hacienda was
acquired by the petitioner by inheritance under the will of
his late father. The property was consist of 4 parcels of land:
A, B, C, and D. It does not appear that said hacienda is
mortgaged nor that any person has any right to or any
interest therein. It is almost wholly occupied at the present
time, under lease by about 429 tenants whose names,
residences and postal addresses are also stated in the
application. Petitioner, in his writing, requested the
summoning of the persons therein name. In another
writing, the petitioner amended his former application,
giving the postal address and names of several occupants of
the property. The owners adjoining properties having
summoned and notified by means of subpoenas and notices
published in the daily papers, one of them, Julia Tuason,
appeared and opposed the registration and authentication
of the title of the petitioner as regards to parcel C for the
reason that 2 old monuments which has separated their
respective properties had been pulled down and new ones
erected without her consent, and that in her opinion, the
petitioner included a considerable portion of the land
owned by her. The municipality of San Pedro Macati also
filed opposition alleging that the and occupied by the

municipal building and the public school had been in the

possession of the town from time immemorial, and that all
the land occupied by road, highways, lanes and public
landing places belonged to the palindromic and should be
excluded from the registration. The attorney for Alejandro
and Consolacion Aguirre also filed opposition alleging that 2
parcels of land owned by them had been improperly
included within the bounds of said hacienda in the parcel C.
The judge over-ruled the opposition made by Tuason, the
municipality of San Pedro Macati and by Aguirres and
ordered the registration of the hacienda in favor of the
petitioner.
*Issue: Whether or not the petitioners application can be
validly registered.
*Held:
(1) Opposition of Tuason- respondent maintains that the
boundary between the sitio called Suavoy and the hacienda
is determined by straight lines drawn between some old
monuments distant a few yards from the bank of the said
creek. The record does not show that the boundary of the
land of Tuason was inclosed by monuments belonging to
her or that the creek which divides the sitio of Suavoy from
the land of the said haceinda is included within Tuasons
land. From the fact that the land of Tuason was bounded on
2 sides by the haceinda it does not follow that the strip of a
few meters in width on the bank of the creek belonged to
her. No legal reason exist why the slow increase which has
taken place on the haciendas side should be considered as
belonging to Tuason, inasmuch as the latter does not own
the bed of the creek and because it may be assumed that
the slow decrease in the width thereof benefited both
propertied equally since Tuazon has not been able to show
or prove that her land has been gradually reduced. Art.366
of the Civil Code states that the accretions which banks of
rivers may gradually receive from the effects of the currents
belong to the owners of the estates bordering thereon.
Applying it to the case at bar, it is certain that the owner of
the hacienda has its possession and that Tuason has no title
to the accretion which by spontaneous increase formed the
strip of land between creek and the monuments and no
proof that the land of Tuason reached the other side of the
creek toward the hacienda.
(2) Opposition of municipality- the owner of the building
lots and portions of land to which the opposition refers is
the petitioner. The municipality has only usufruct of the plot
occupied. The municipality cannot dispose of it as a

property of its own because according to the documents

offered in evidence by the petitioner, the Spanish
Government had recognized the dominion of the
petitioners predecessor over the land occupied by the
municipality and the grant made by the owner was ever
understood as usufruct so long as used for public purposes.
(3) Opposition of Aguirres-time prescribed, the appellants
have not filed their brief therefore considered abandoned.

19. Cureg vs iac

Facts:
- on nov 5,1982, resp filed a complaint for quieting of the
title and damages with preliminary injunction against pet
with the Rtc Isabela. A tro was issued by Tc on nov 12
- complaint alleges that resp are the legal and the forced
heirs of the late domingo gerardo. That since time
immemorial, the late domingo gerardo together with his
predecessors-in-interest have been in actual open peaceful
and continuous possession under a bona fide claim of
ownership and adverse to all other claimants of a parcel of
land ("motherland") situated in isabela (2.5000heactares)
- the land was subsequently verbally sold by the heirs to
resp Domingo apostol.
- sept 10,1982 verbal sale was reduced into writing by the
vendors who executed an "extra-judicial partition with
voluntary reconveyance"; that about the time of the
execution of the extra-judicial partition, their "motherland"
already showed signs of accretions of about 3 hectares on
the birth caused by the northward movement of the
Cagayan river;
- that on about last week of sept or first week oct 1982,
when resps were about to cultivate the land together with
its accretion, they were prevented by pet. Stating that pet
(heirs of Antonio carniyan) was the owner of a piece of land
in Isabella (2790sqm more or less bounded on the north by
domingo Gerardo) that Antonio revised on 1968 his tax
declaration to conform with the correct area and
boundaries of his OCT; that the area under the new tax
declaration was increased from 2790 sqm to 4584 sqm and
the boundary in the north became Cagayan river, purposely
eliminating completely the original boundary on the north
which is Domingo Gerardo.
-pet alleged that the motherland claimed by resp is nonexistent; that the subject land is an accretion to their
registered land and the pet have been in possession and
cultivation of the accretion for many years now
- Tc held that resp thru his predecessor-in-interest had

already acquired an imperfect title to the subject land and

rendered judgment declaring resp absolute owner
- iac affirmed decision
Issue:
Won the subject land or accretion (which is bounded on the
north by the Cagayan river) belongs to the resp and not to
the pet when the pet OCT states clearly that the pet's Land
is bounded on its north by the Cagayan river
Won iac erred in awarding the accretion of 3.5 hectares to
the resp who incredibly claimed that the accretion occurred
only in 1982 and is a gift from The Lord
Held:
- pet claimed to be riparian owners who are entitled to the
"subject land" which is an accretion to thee registers land
while resp claimed to be entitled to the 3.5 hectares
accretion attached to their "motherland"
- resp claim of ownership is anchored mainly on 4 tax
declarations. Declaration of ownership for purposes of
assessment on the payment of the tax is not sufficient
evidence to prove ownership. Pet relied on their OCT issued
in the name of Antonio carniyan pursuant to free patent
clearly showing the boundary of let's land on the both is
Cagayan river and not the motherland claimed by
respondents.
- tax declaration, being of an earlier date cannot defeat an
original certificate of title which is of a later date. Since pet's
OcT clearly stated that subject land is bounded on the north
by the Cagayan river, resp's claim over their motherland
allegedly existing bet pet's land and the Cagayan river is
deemed barred and nullified with the issuance of the OCT
- rule: decree of registration bars all claims and rights which
arose or mag have existed prior to the decree of registration
- the subject land is an alluvial deposit left by the northward
movement of the Cagayan river and art 457 civil code: to
the owners of land adjoining the banks of river belong the
accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of
the current of the waters.
- the increase in the area of pet's Lang being an accretion
left by the change of course of the northward movement of
the Cagayan river does not automatically become registered
land because the lot which receives such accretion is
covered by a torrens title. Hence it must also be place under
the operation of the torrens system
- petition granted
20. C.N. Hodges vs Garcia

Facts:
A lot, which was formerly a part of Lot No. 908 of the
Cadastral Survey of Jaro, Iloilo, was plaintiff C.N. Hodges
from Salustiano Mirasol and subsequently registered in his
name as evidenced by a TCT issued by the Register of Deeds
of Iloilo. This property was bounded on the north by the
Salog River. Adjoining that river on the other side is Lot No.
2290, which was purchased by Amador D. Garcia from Dr.
Manuel Hechanova.
Garcia had the land he bought resurveyed. The survey
disclosed that the land, which was originally surveyed in
1912 and was then bounded on the SE and SW by the Salog
river, had increased in area by the river bank, and that the
added area, which bounds the land on the SE and SW, is in
turn bounded on the SE and SW by the Salog river.
In due time, defendant applied for the registration of the
additional area under the Land Registration Act. The
cadastral court rendered a decision holding that the land
sought to be registered is an accretion to Lot No. 2290 and
decreeing that the land be registered in his name. OCT was
issued in favor of Garcia.
CN Hodges filed an action with the CFI Iloilo for the
possession of a portion of land designated as Lot 908-Q with
an area of 5,931 sq. m., which he claims that the portion of
the area added to Lot No. 2290 was separated from his Lot
No. 908 by the current of the river when the Salog river
changed its course, and the separation was abrupt, like in
avulsion, so that under Art. 374 of the Civil Code (Art. 463 of
the new) he retains ownership thereof. The court ruled in
favor of Garcia.
Hodges appealed to the CA. The appellate court certified
the case to SC that it was decided upon a stipulation of facts
and for that reason question of facts can no longer be raised
on appeal.
Issue: who has better right over the lot in question
Held: It clearly appearing that the land in question has
become part of Garcia's estate as a result of accretion, it
follows that said land now belongs to him. The fact that the
accretion to his land used to pertain to Hodges's estate,
which is covered by a Torrens certificate of title, cannot
preclude Garcia from being the owner thereof. Registration
does not protect the riparian owner against the diminution
of the area of his land through gradual changes in the
course of the adjoining stream. Accretions which the banks
of rivers may gradually receive from the effect of the
current become the property of the owners of the banks.

(Art. 366 of the old Civil Code; art. 457 of the new.) Such
accretions are natural incidents to land bordering on
running streams and the provisions of the Civil Code in that
respect are not affected by the Land Registration Act.
(Payatas Estate Improvement Co. vs. Tuason, supra).

21 BAES vs CA
FACTS: The govt dugged a canal on a private parcel of land
to streamline the Tripa de Gallina Creek. This lot was later
acquired by Baes. The lot was divided into 3 parcels. The
government gave him another equivalent parcel as
compensation since the middle part (B) of Baes lot was
covered by the canal. Baes had the Aand C parcel
resurveyed. He submitted a petition for the approval of his
resurvey and subdivision plans, claiming that after the said
lots were plotted by a competent surveyor, it was found
that there were errors in respect of their bearings and
distances. This was approved by the CFI.
The Republic of the Philippines discovered that Lot B the
petitioners had erected an apartment building, covered Lot
3611 of the Pasay Cadastre, which is a filled-up portion of
the Tripa de Gallina creek. Moreover, lot C had been
unlawfully enlarged. The RTC then ruled that lot C be
reverted back to its status before the resurvey of the said
lot.
The only remaining dispute relates to lot B, which the
petitioners, relying on Article 461 of the Civil Code, are
claiming as their own. The government rejects this claim
and avers that the petitioners had already been fully
compensated for it
ISSUE:WON Baes owned Lot 1-B.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, with costs against the
petitioners. It is so ordered.
Art. 461, NCC
River beds abandoned through NATURAL CHANGE ipso
facto belong to owner whose lands are occupied by the new
course in proportion to the are lost. Owners of the land
adjoining the river bed have the right to acquire by paying
its value (must not exceed value of new beds area)
If change is due to concessioners authorized by the
Government, the concession may be granted to
concessioners. No grant = land belongs to owners of land
covered by the waters. Must not prejudice tge superior
rights of third persons with sufficient title.

If a riparian owner is entitled to compensation for

damage/loss due to natural reasons, there is no reson not to
compensate when the change was effected through
artificial means.
The loss was caused by a deliberate act of Government. The
Government is obliged to compensate Baes for the loss.
However, Baes has already been compensated through the
fair exchange of lots between him and the Government.

22. Santos v. Bernabe

*Facts: Urbano Santos deposited in Jose Bernabes
warehouse 778 cavans and 38 kilos of palay and Pablo
Tiongson 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of same grain. Tiongson
filed with CFI of Bulacan a complaint against Bernabe, to
recover from the latter 1,026 cavans and 9 kilos of palay
deposited in Bernabes warehouse. The application of
Tiongson for a writ of attachment was granted and the
attachable property of Bernabe including 924 cavans and 31
kilos of palay were attached and sold at public auction
and the proceeds were delivered to Tiongson. Santos
intervened in the attachment of the palay, but the sheriff
proceeded with te attachment. It does not appear that the
sacks of palay of Santos and Tionsgon deposited in the
warehouse of Bernabe bore any marks that they were
separated from one another. Santos claimed that Tiongson
cannot claim that the 924 cavans and 31 kilos of palay
were part of what he deposited to Bernabes warehouse.
*Issue: Whether or not Tiongson can claim the 924 cavans
of rice as his own.
*Held: No. Tiongson and Santos must divide the cavans and
palay proportionately.
The cavans belonging to Santos, having been mixed with
those belonging to Tiongson, the following rule prescribed is
Article 381 of the Civil Code shall be applied: If, by will of
one of their owners, two things of identical or dissimilar
nature are mixed, or if the mixture occurs accidentally, if in
the latter case, the things cannot be separated without
injury, each owner shall acquire a right in the mixture
proportionate to the part belonging to him, according to the
value of the things mixed or comingled.
The number of kilos in a cavan not having been determined,
the Court took the proportion only of the 924 cavans of
palay which were attached and sold, therby giving Santos,
who deposited 778 cavans, 398.49 and Tiongson, who

deposited 1,026 cavans, 525.51, or the value thereof at the

rate of 3Php per cavan.