1 -Hontiveros vs RTC

HONTIVEROS VS. RTC

FACTS:
O n D e c e m b e r 3 , 1 9 9 0 , p e t i t i o n e r s , t h e s p o u s e s A u g u s t o a n d M a r i a Hontiveros, filed
a complaint for damages against private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson before
the Regional Trial Court o f I l o i l o C i t y , B r a n c h 2 5 , w h e r e i t w a s d o c k e t e d a s
C i v i l C a s e N o . 19504. In said complaint, petitioners alleged that they are the owners o f a
parcel of land, in the town of Jamindan, Province of Capiz, asshown by
O C T N o . 0 - 2 1 2 4 , i s s u e d p u r s u a n t t o t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e Intermediate.
Appellate Court, dated April 12, 1984. That petitionerswere deprived of income from the
land as a result of the filing of the l a n d r e g i s t r a t i o n c a s e ; t h a t s u c h i n c o m e
c o n s i s t e d o f r e n t a l s f r o m tenants of the land in the amount of P66,000.00 per year from 1968
to1 9 8 7 ,
and
P595,000.00
per
year
thereafter;
and
that
p r i v a t e respondents filed the land registration case and withheld possession of the land from
petitioners in bad faith.In their answer, private respondents denied that they were marriedand alleged
that private respondent Hontiveros was a widower while p r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t A y s o n
w a s s i n g l e . T h e y d e n i e d t h a t t h e y h a d deprived petitioners of possession of and
income from the land. On thecontrary, they alleged that possession of the property in question
hadalready been transferred to petitioners on August 7, 1985, by virtue of a writ of possession, dated
July 18, 1985, issued by the clerk of court of the Regional Trial Court of Capiz, Mambusao, the return
thereof havingbeen received by petitioners' counsel; that since then, petitioners havebeen directly
receiving rentals from the tenants of the land, that thecomplaint failed to state a cause of
action since it did not allege that e a r n e s t e f f o r t s t o w a r d s a c o m p r o m i s e h a d b e e n
m a d e , c o n s i d e r i n g that petitioner Augusto Hontiveros and private respondent
GregorioH o n t i v e r o s
are
brothers;
that
the
decision
of
the
I n t e r m e d i a t e Appellate Court in Land Registration Case No. N-581-25 was null
andvoid since it was based upon a ground which was not passed upon by t h e t r i a l
c o u r t ; t h a t p e t i t i o n e r s ' c l a i m f o r d a m a g e s w a s b a r r e d b y prescription with
respect to claims before 1984; that there were norentals due since private respondent
Hontiveros was a possessor ing o o d f a i t h a n d f o r v a l u e ; a n d t h a t p r i v a t e
respondent Ayson had n o t h i n g t o d o w i t h t h e c a s e a s s h e w a s n o t
m a r r i e d t o p r i v a t e respondent Gregorio Hontiveros and did not have any
p r o p r i e t a r y interest in the subject property. Private respondents prayed for thedismissal
of the complaint and for an order against petitioners to paydamages to private
respondents by way of counterclaim, as well as reconveyance of the subject land to private
respondents.
ISSUE:
T h e R e g i o n a l T r i a l C o u r t p a l p a b l y e r r e d i n d i s m i s s i n g t h e complaint on the
ground that it does not allege under oath that earnestefforts toward a compromise were made
prior to the filing thereof as required by Article 151 of the Family Code.
HELD:
The trial court erred in dismissing petitioners' complaint on theground that, although it
alleged that earnest efforts had been made toward the settlement of the case but they proved
futile, the complaintwas not verified for which reason the trial court could not believe
theveracity of the allegation. T h e a b s e n c e o f t h e v e r i f i c a t i o n r e q u i r e d i n A r t . 1 5 1 d o e s
nota f f e c t t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n o f t h e c o u r t o v e r t h e s u b j e c t m a t t e r o f

t h e complaint. The verification is merely a formal requirement intended tos e c u r e a n a s s u r a n c e

t h a t m a t t e r s w h i c h a r e a l l e g e d a r e t r u e a n d correct. If the court doubted the
veracity of the allegations regarding efforts made to settle the case among members of the same
family, itcould simply have ordered petitioners to verify them. As this Court hasalready ruled, the
court may simply order the correction of unverified p l e a d i n g s o r a c t o n i t a n d w a i v e
strict compliance with the rules in o r d e r t h a t t h e e n d s o f j u s t i c e m a y b e
s e r v e d . O t h e r w i s e , m e r e suspicion or doubt on the part of the trial court as to the
truth of theallegation that earnest efforts had been made toward a compromise b u t t h e
p a r t i e s ' e f f o r t s p r o v e d u n s u c c e s s f u l i s n o t a g r o u n d f o r t h e dismissal of an action.
Only if it is later shown that such efforts had notr e a l l y b e e n e x e r t e d w o u l d t h e c o u r t b e
j u s t i f i e d i n d i s m i s s i n g t h e action.Moreover, as petitioners contend, Art. 151 of the
Family Codedoes not apply in this case since the suit is not exclusively among thefamily members.
Citing several cases decided by this Court, petitionersc l a i m t h a t w h e n e v e r a s t r a n g e r i s a
party in the case involving the f a m i l y m e m b e r s , t h e r e q u i s i t e s h o w i n g
t h e e a r n e s t e f f o r t s t o c o m p r o m i s e i s n o l o n g e r m a n d a t o r y. T h e y a r g u e t h a t
s i n c e p r i v a t e respondent Ayson is admittedly a stranger to the Hontiveros family,the case
is not covered by the requirements of Art. 151 of the Family Code.We agree with
petitioners. The inclusion of private respondentAyson as defendant and petitioner Maria
Hontiveros as plaintiff takes t h e c a s e o u t o f t h e a m b i t o f A r t . 1 5 1 o f t h e F a m i l y
Code. Under thisprovision, the phrase "members of the same family" refers to
t h e husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and descendants
Hontiveros vs. RTC
GR No. 125465, June 29, 1999
FACTS: Petitioner spouses Augusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint for damages against
private respondents Gregorio Hontiveros and Teodora Ayson. The petitioners alleged that they are the
owners of a parcel of land in Capiz and that they were deprived of income from the land as a result of
the filing of the land registration case. In the reply, private respondents denied that they were married
and alleged that Gregorio was a widower while Teodora was single. They also denied depriving
petitioners of possession of and income from the land. On the contrary, according to the private
respondents, the possession of the property in question had already been transferred to petitioners by
virtue of the writ of possession. Trial court denied petitioners motion that while in the amended
complaint, they alleged that earnest efforts towards a compromise were made, it was not verified as
provided in Article 151.
ISSUE: WON the court can validly dismissed the complaint due to lack of efforts exerted towards a
compromise as stated in Article 151.
HELD:SC held that the inclusion of private respondent Teodora Ayson as defendant and Maria
Hontiveros as petitioner takes the case out of the scope of Article 151. Under this provision, the phrase
members of the same family refers to the husband and wife, parents and children, ascendants and
descendants, and brothers and sisters whether full or half-blood. Religious relationship and
relationship by affinity are not given any legal effects in this jurisdiction. Teodora and Maria as spouses
of the Hontiveros are regarded as strangers to the Hontiveros family for purposes of Article 151.

2 - Martinez vs Martinez
Martinez vs Martinez
GR No. 162084, June 28, 2005
FACTS:
Daniel Martinez Sr. and Natividad de Guzman-Martinez were the owners of a parcel of land. The
former executed a last will and testament directing the subdivision of the property into 3 lots
bequeathed to each of his sons namely Rodolfo, Manolo (designated as administrator of the estate),
and Daniel Jr. In October 1997, Daniel Sr. died. Rodolfo then found a deed of sale purportedly signed
by his father on September 1996 where it appears that the land was sold to Manolo and his wife Lucila
and was also issued to them. Rodolfo filed a complaint against his brother Manolo and sister-in-law
Lucila for the annulment of the deed of sale and cancellation of the TCT. Spouses wrote Rodolfo
demanding him to vacate the property which the latter ignored and refused to do so. This prompted the
spouses to file a complaint for unlawful detainer against Rodolfo. This matter was referred to the
barangay for conciliation and settlement but none was reached. It was alleged in the position paper of
the spouses that earnest efforts toward a compromise had been made but the same proved futile.
ISSUE: WON spouses Martinez complied with the requirements of Art 151 of the Family Code.
HELD:
No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
complaint that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made, but the same have failed.
Lucila Martinez, the respondents sister-in-law was one of the plaintiffs in the case at bar. The petitioner
is not a member of the same family as that of her deceased husband and the respondent. Her
relationship with the respondent is not one of those enumerated in Article 150. It should also be noted
that the petitioners were able to comply with the requirements of Article 151 because they alleged in
their complaint that they had initiated a proceeding against the respondent for unlawful detainer in the
katarungan Pambarangay in compliance with PD1508 and that after due proceedings, no amicable
settlement was arrived at resulting in the barangay chairmans issuance of a certificate to file action.

3 - Ramos vs. pangilinan

JUANITA TRINIDAD RAMOS vs. DANILO PANGILINANG

Respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against E.M.Ramos Electric, Inc., a company owned
by Ernesto M. Ramos, the patriarchof herein petitioners. The labor arbiter ordered Ramos and the
company topay the respondents back-wages, separation pay, 13th month pay & serviceincentive leave
pay. The decision became final and executory so a writ of execution was issued which the Deputy
Sheriff of the National LaborRelations Commission (NLRC) implemented by levying a property in
Ramos name situated in Pandacan. Alleging that the Pandacan property was the family home,
hence,exempt from execution to satisfy the judgment award, Ramos and thecompany moved to quash
the writ of execution. Respondents argued that itis not the family home there being another one in
Antipolo and that thePandacan address is actually the business address. The motion was deniedand
the appeal was likewise denied by the NLRC.
Issue:
Whether or not the levy upon the Pandacan property was valid.
Ruling:
Yes. For the family home to be exempt from execution, distinctionmust be made as to what law applies
based on when it was constituted andwhat requirements must be complied with by the judgment debtor
or hissuccessors claiming such privilege. Hence, two sets of rules are applicable. If the family home
was constructed before the effectivity of the Family Code or before August 3, 1988, then it must have
been constituted either judicially or extra-judicially as provided under Articles 225, 229-231 and 233 of
theCivil Code. Meanwhile, Articles 240 to 242 governs extrajudicial constitution. On the other hand, for
family homes constructed after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need to
constitute extra judicially or judicially, and the exemption is effective from the time it was constituted and
lasts as long as any of its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually reside therein. Moreover, the family home
should belong to theabsolute community or conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse,its
constitution must have been with consent of the other, and its value must not exceed certain amounts
depending upon the area where it islocated. Further, the debts incurred for which the exemption does
not apply as provided under Art. 155 for which the family home is made answerablemust have been
incurred after August 3, 1988. In both instances, the claim for exception must be proved.
In the present case, since the petetioners claims that the family home was constituted before august 3
1988 and as early as 1944, they must comply to the procedures set by the civil code. That there is no
absolute truth that the Pandayan property was judicially or extra judicially constituted at the Ramos
Family home, the law protecting the family home cannot apply thereby making the levy in the pandacan
property valid.

4 MODEQUILLO VS. AUGUSTO BREVA

Mondequillo vs Breva
Mondequillo vs Breva
GR. No. 86355, May 31, 1990
FACTS:
The sheriff levied on a parcel of residential land located at Poblacion Malalag, Davao del Sur on July
1988, registered in the name of Jose Mondequillo and a parcel of agricultural land located at
Dalagbong Bulacan, Malalag, Davao de Sur also registered in the latters name. A motion to quash
was filed by the petitioner alleging that the residential land is where the family home is built since 1969
prior the commencement of this case and as such is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment
under Article 152 and 153 except for liabilities mentioned in Article 155 thereof, and that the judgment
sought to be enforced against the family home is not one of those enumerated. With regard to the
agricultural land, it is alleged that it is still part of the public land and the transfer in his favor by the
original possessor and applicant who was a member of a cultural minority. The residential house in the
present case became a family home by operation of law under Article 153.
ISSUE: WON the subject property is deemed to be a family home.
HELD:
The petitioners contention that it should be considered a family home from the time it was occupied by
petitioner and his family in 1969 is not well-taken. Under Article 162 of the Family Code, it provides that
the provisions of this Chapter shall govern existing family residences insofar as said provisions are
applicable. It does not mean that Article 152 and 153 shall have a retroactive effect such that all
existing family residences are deemed to have been constituted as family homes at the time of their
occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and are exempt from the execution for payment of
obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Code. The said article simply means that all existing
family residences at the time of the effectivity of the Family Code, are considered family homes and are
prospectively entitled to the benefits accorded to a family home under the FC. The debt and liability
which was the basis of the judgment was incurred prior the effectivity of the Family Code. This does
not fall under the exemptions from execution provided in the FC.
As to the agricultural land, trial court correctly ruled that the levy to be made shall be on whatever rights
the petitioner may have on the land. Petition was dismissed.

5 MANACOP VS/ CA

Manacop vs CA
Manacop vs. CA
GR No. 104875, November 13, 1992
FACTS:
Florante Manacop and his wife Euaceli purchased on March 1972, a residential lot with a bungalow
located in Quezon City. The petitioner failed to pay the sub-contract cost pursuant to a deed of
assignment signed between petitioners corporation and private respondent herein (FF Cruz & Co).
The latter filed a complaint for the recovery for the sum of money with a prayer for preliminary
attachment against the former. Consequently, the corresponding writ for the provisional remedy was
issued which triggered the attachment of a parcel of land in Quezon City owned by the Manacop
Construction President, the petitioner. The latter insists that the attached property is a family home
having been occupied by him and his family since 1972 and is therefore exempt from attachment.
ISSUE: WON the subject property is indeed exempted from attachment.
HELD:
The residential house and lot of petitioner became a family home by operation of law under Article 153
of the Family Code. Such provision does not mean that said article has a retroactive effect such that all
existing family residences, petitioners included, are deemed to have been constituted as family homes
at the time of their occupation prior to the effectivity of the Family Code and henceforth, are exempt
from execution for the payment of obligations incurred before the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988. Since petitioner incurred debt in 1987, it preceded the effectivity of the Code and his
property is therefore not exempt form attachment.
The petition was dismissed by SC.

6 ARRIOLA vs. ARRIOLA please read full case

Case Digest:
VILMA G. ARRIOLA and ANTHONY RONALD G. ARRIOLA,Petitioners, vs. JOHN NABOR C.
ARRIOLA, Respondent.[G.R. No. 177703, January 28, 2008]
Facts:
Fidel Arriola died and is survived by his legal heirs: John NaborArriola (respondent) ,his son with his
first wife , and Vilma G.Arriola, his second wife and his other son, Anthony Ronald
Arriola(petitioners).On Feb. 16, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision ordering thepartition of the parcel of
land covered by TCT No 383714 (84191)left by the decedent Fidel S. Arriola by and among his heirs
JohnNabor C. Arriola, Vilma G. Arriola and Anthony Ronald G. Arriola inequal shares of one-third (1/3)
each without prejudice to therights of creditors or mortgagees thereon, if any.However, the parties failed
to agree on how to divide the abovementioned property and so the respondent proposed to sell
itthough public auction. The petitioners initially agreed but refusedto include in the auction the house
standing on the subject land. The respondent then filed anUrgent Manifestation and Motion
for Contempt of Court but was denied by the RTC for lack of merit.When a motion of reconsideration
was still denied by the RTC, therespondent elevated the case to the CA with a petition forcertiorari and
prayed that he be allowed to push through with theauction of the subject land including the house built
on it. The CAgranted the petition and ordered the public auction sale of thesubject lot including the
house built on it. Petitioners filed amotion for reconsideration but the CA denied the said motion.Hence
this petition for review on Certiorari.

7 PATRICIO VS. DARIO

GR No. 170829
PATRICIO VS. DARIO
NOVEMBER 20, 2006
FACTS:
M died intestate and was survived by his wife and two children. The surviving heirs extrajudicially
settled his estate. One of the properties he left was the family home. A new title for the said property
was thereafter issued under the name of the wife and the two children as co-owners. After some time,
the wife and one of the sons expressed their desire to partition the family home and terminate the coownership. The other son opposed the partition on the ground that the family home should remain
despite the death of one or both the spouses as long as there is a minor beneficiary thereof. The
supposed minor beneficiary is oppositor's son, the grandchild of the decedent.
ISSUE:
Whether the partition of the family home is proper where one of the co-owners refuse to accede to such
a partition on the ground that a minor beneficiary still resides in the said home.
HELD:
To be a beneficiary of the family home, three requisites must concur: (1) they must be among the
relationships enumerated in Art. 154 of the Family Code; (2) they live in the family home; and (3) they
are dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
As to the first requisite, the beneficiaries of the family home are: (1) The husband and wife, or an
unmarried person who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants, descendants,
brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be legitimate or illegitimate. The term 'descendants'
contemplates all descendants of the person or persons who constituted the family home without
distinction; hence, it must necessarily include the grandchildren and great grandchildren of the spouses
who constitute a family home. Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemos. Where the law does
not distinguish, we should not distinguish. Thus, private respondent's minor son, who is also the
grandchild of the deceased satisfies the first requisite.
As to the second requisite, minor beneficiaries must be actually living in the family home to avail of the
benefits derived from Art. 159. The son of private respondent and grandson of the decedent has been
living in the family home since 1994, or within 10 years from the death of the decedent, hence, he
satisfies the second requisite.
However, as to the third requisite, the grandson cannot demand support from his paternal grandmother
if he has parents who are capable of supporting him. The liability for legal support falls primarily on his
parents, especially his father, herein private respondent who is the head of his immediate family. The
law first imposes the obligation of legal support upon the shoulders of the parents, especially the father,
and only in their default is the obligation imposed on the grandparents.