Review of Deadly Force Training and Policies

of the Dallas Police Department

A Report to the City of Dallas, Texas

Geoffrey P. Alpert

October 1987

1. REVIEW OF DEADLY FORCE TRAINING AND

POLICIES OF THE DALLAS POLICE DEPARTMENT:
AN INTRODUCTION AND PERSPECTIVE

Recommendations for revisions in the Dallas Police Department's policies and procedures
regarding the use of deadly force are best viewed in the context of the City's historical background. A
major strength of the City of Dallas lies in its established ability to rise to the occasion of those rare
opportunities when crossroads are faced and choices can result in direction which lasts for generations.
The current circumstances involving the Dallas Police Department provide another challenge where an
important and long-lasting destiny can be determined.
In the 1930's when Texas wanted the best Centennial celebration, Dallas created it in style with
an eye toward how the city would be perceived from that time forward. In the 1950's, when it was time
to desegregate the department stores and luncheon counters, Dallas did so without the rancor and
confrontation which was experienced in other locations. In creating the Arts District and a mass transit
program in the 1970s and 1980s, Dallas has enhanced its reputation as a 'can-do' city.
Although the city is changing, certain institutions lag behind. As recently as 1985, influential
businessmen and leaders of an important center of higher learning, Southern Methodist University,
were improperly paying students to play football and telling the inquiring President to go run the
university. By implementing major changes, Southern Methodist University will most probably resolve
its crisis for the better. In 1987, the Dallas Police Department faces a similar situation.
The problem faced by this Consultant in studying and recommending changes in police policies
regarding the use of deadly force is not, then, one of merely identifying technical revisions which are
required. True, there are such procedures and regulations which should be revised, and they will be
identified in the body of this report. But those changes skirt the basic problem: The Dallas Police

Department is an institution mired in the past. The pervasive attitude is a holdover from the days when
Dallas was a smaller, less important city. To reduce the police use of deadly force in Dallas, and at the
same time to protect the safety of the citizens and officers, a new philosophy and a new approach will
be required. In order for Dallas to enter the 1990's with a set of police policies, procedures and customs
commensurate with its high set of municipal values, a conscious decision must be made to overhaul a
system creaking with age and tradition, and made obsolete by the challenges of a new generation of
citizens. This is not to be critical of the current police hierarchy. To the contrary, given a system in
place for decades, and considering that the nature of any bureaucratic organization is to move slowly,
we conclude that Chief Prince and his staff have, in general, responded reasonably well to the
individual incidents which have occurred. These events which have outraged many citizens, are not
examples of police vindictiveness or meanness, except in the most isolated cases. The problem is with
the system. Use of force and shootings, as tragic and unfortunate as they obviously are for the people
involved, their families, and the community, are mere symptoms.
Even if the City adopts each of the specific recommendations presented in this report, citizens of
Dallas can not expect a radical overnight change in the incidence of police shootings. As with the
Brown vs. Board of Education of Topeka, the landmark Supreme Court decision which mandated an
end to racial segregation in our schools, the order and its implementation will be two different things. It
will literally take years to accomplish effective changes which will achieve optimal results. A change in
policy cannot alter deeply-ingrained attitudes and thought processes in an instant. In fact, a real danger
in the implementation of our recommendations is that expectations for immediate change could run
high. Raised expectations when not fulfilled foster dissatisfaction. The next time a police shooting
occurs (and it will, because even the most ardent police critics must recognize and acknowledge that

these men and women put their lives on the line in hundreds of potentially violent situations on a daily
basis in which they are forced to make split-second decisions) there could be, and probably will be a cry
that nothing has changed. Therefore, we recommend that a method of monitoring the new policies be
adopted in the community. The first step, however, is to acknowledge that a problem exists.
Methods and Procedures of the Dallas Study
The Dallas City Council, which authorized this study outlined the five major areas to be
examined. These include:
1) The Police Officer Applicant Selection Process;
2) Teaching Methods and Materials on the Use of Deadly Force;
3) "Shoot-Don't-Shoot" Training;
4) Weapons' Training; and
5) Policies Relating to the Use of Deadly Force.
The City required a thorough examination and analysis of relevant written orders and policies.
Although it is not within the scope of the study to design new programs or to design a new written
directive system, recommendations for improvements, where appropriate, are included.
To analyze and evaluate properly, the hiring, training and policies which relate to the use of
deadly force, substantially more information was necessary than could be gained by examining and
analyzing only the written directives. Although it would have been informative to conduct opinion
surveys of both citizens and police officers, such surveys were not feasible. However, a limited survey
was conducted of police officers who made the decision to use deadly force. This study was conducted
to assure that police officers were given the same opportunity as others to introduce issues relating to
the use of deadly force to be examined. Further, it was necessary to observe the customs and practices
of members of the Dallas Police Department, and analyze data from shooting incidents in which Dallas
police officers were involved.

In each of the five areas of study, a content analysis of all available written materials was
performed, while observations and informal interviews with police personnel and community members
were conducted. Finally, the City of Dallas requested that a representative of the National Organization
of Black Law Enforcement Executives (NOBLE) participate in the study. Mr. Fred Crawford has served
as the official liaison between NOBLE, The Alpert Group and the City of Dallas. His report has been
included as an Appendix to this report.
Members of the investigating team divided their time between analyzing written materials,
observing the practices of the Dallas Police Department, interviewing members of the community,
analyzing data from shooting incidents and conducting a formal survey of police officers who used
deadly force; the most serious choice a police officer can make. Hundreds of hours were spent
discussing practices of the Dallas Police Department with officers and civilians. Similarly, large blocks
of time were dedicated to observing the police as they were trained and performed their duties.
Additionally, thousands of pages of documents were reviewed for content and substance.
The information which was collected from the investigation has been analyzed within the
context of other studies and investigations, and standards accepted by other nationally recognized
departments and associations. The content of this Report represents the efforts of police personnel and
citizens who contributed information to the Group's researchers. This report will begin with an
overview of police shootings in Dallas, and move to a discussion of the specific findings and
recommendations.

2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

An empirical analysis of police shootings between January 1, 1985 and June 30, 1987 reveals a
trend of unbiased and non-discriminatory shootings on the basis of ethnicity, gender or age of the
suspects. While the justification or necessity of several shootings has been questioned by citizens and
the media, the overall trend of these shooting incidents does not deserve the criticism it has received.
A close review of the recruitment and selection processes, police officer training, and deadly
force policy, however, reveals many issues which require change, modification, elimination or addition,
if community confidence in the police is to increase. The implementation of the following
recommendations will decrease the incidence of unjustified or questionable shootings. Through the
successful implementation of these recommendations there will be increased support of the Dallas
Police Department and its officers by all segments of the community.
In the area of recruitment and selection, the following recommendations are made:

1.

It is recommended that the Department implement computerized scoring to reduce the

possibility of error and enhance the easy scoring of additional supplementary scales.
2. It is recommended that a written report on the results of each applicant's psychological test
be prepared and available.
3. It is recommended that a research effort be undertaken to establish local norms by ethnicity
and gender and review and upgrade entry level testing methods as indicated by results of the research.
4. It is recommended that an evaluation of the standards and interpretations which are used to

determine the results of the psychological tests be conducted.

5. It is recommended that a formal procedure such as an Early Warning System be developed
and implemented to identify officers who are prone to emotional instability or behavior problems.
6.

Since the BIFO (Best-In First Out) Score is the single most important criterion for

measuring applicants' competitiveness relative to other applicants, it is necessary to update and review
this formula on a continuing basis.
7. It is recommended that administrative and organizational changes be made to combine the
functions of recruitment, selection and training.
8. It is recommended that the assessment center concept be adopted for promotional testing and
appointment.
9. It is recommended that the City create `exempt ' management positions and appoint officers
to fill these positions based upon internal needs and community concerns.
10.

It is recommended that the Chief create `exempt' management positions and appoint

officers to fill these positions based upon internal and external needs.
In the area of teaching methods in the use of deadly force, the following recommendations are
made:
1.

It is recommended that discipline and structure be increased significantly in the

academy.
2.

It is recommended that incentives be established to upgrade the status of officers who

work in the academy.

3. It is recommended that violence-reduction training be instituted and evaluated.
4. It is recommended that cultural awareness training be modified to include understanding the

multi-ethnic groups living in Dallas and their differences. Such training should be provided to
supervisors as well as recruits.
5.

It is recommended that communication with other departments and professional

organizations be enhanced, and relevant training programs be evaluated and instituted where
appropriate.
6. It is recommended that supervisors be required to attend seminars and courses outside of the
Dallas area.
7. It is recommended that the current structure which was intended to provide the basis for the
Field Training Program be enforced and that an effective method of evaluation of both recruits and
trainers be implemented and utilized.
8. It is recommended that the experience at Fair Park be modified and re-structured to provide
recruits the opportunity to make other realistic decisions. Such training should include life-threatening
situations which can be resolved by utilizing techniques of violence reduction and de-escalation, as well
as the use of deadly force. This training should incorporate the emotional and mental stress which has
been created by the `shoot-don't shoot' training.
9.

It is recommended that appropriate measures be taken to upgrade the status and

compensation to officers who become field trainers.

10. It is recommended that all officers be required to participate in at least 40 hours of in-service
training each year which is selected and designed to update them on departmental philosophy,
procedures, skills and techniques.
11. It is recommended that all training programs be reviewed for their consistency with existing
policies and procedures.

After review of the "shoot-don't-shoot" training scenarios, the following recommendations are
made:
1. It is recommended that the City continue and expand such training and incorporate it into a
complete role-play exercise with at least three stages of decision making. This training would add a
significant dimension to the training which is provided at Fair Park.
2. It is recommended that any training which places recruits or officers in stressful situations
should be used to assist in improving the individual's performance.
The following recommendations are made in the area of weapons training:
1. It is recommended that a study be conducted to determine the usefulness of purchasing a
F.A.T.S. simulator as one aspect of firearms training. This simulator is portable and could be moved to
various locations. The use of computerized training must be only one component of an integrated
curriculum.
2.

It is recommended that recruits and officers are trained with the type of weapon and

ammunition which they will use. It is further recommended that all officers be required to carry the
same type of weapon. This recommendation is not intended to apply to officers assigned to Tactical
Units.
3.

It is recommended that the color of targets be changed and more life-like targets are

considered.
4. It is recommended that the Firearms Training Center curriculum be modified to include data
from actual shooting incidents. The number of rounds fired in incidents and the distance between
officer and suspect are examples of important information which could be used to modify training.
5.

It is recommended that use of deadly force philosophy and policy be reviewed at the

Firearms Training Center each time an officer qualifies with his or her weapon.
6. It is recommended that shotguns be secured while carried in patrol cars.

Our review of the deadly force policy results the following recommendations:
1. It is recommended that discretionary decisions, such as what constitutes imminent danger or
the appropriateness of shooting at a vehicle, which are included in the deadly force policy be welldefined, and explicit training be required which evaluates their intended and unintended consequences.
2. It is recommended that the philosophy statement concerning use of force, and especially the
use of deadly force be reviewed and updated as necessary to reflect contemporary requirements of the
Department.
3. It is recommended that the statement of philosophy precede the policy of the use of deadly
force in the GENERAL ORDERS, and that the policy of the use of deadly force be the subject of
substantial training.
4. It is recommended that the policy reduce uncertainties and emphasize when deadly force is
necessary. The policy should include alternatives which might be considered.
5. It is recommended that any modifications or changes made in the philosophy statement or
policy must be included in recruit and in-service training.
6. It is recommended that the Firearms Discharge Review Board be given the option to find a
shooting "Justifiable but Avoidable."

10

3. POLICE USE OF DEADLY FORCE: A SUMMARY

A police officer's decision to use deadly force is the most serious choice he or she will ever have
to make. Once that decision is made, the officer may become the judge, jury and executioner. If the
officer does not protect himself, hesitates, or makes the wrong decision he may become the victim. The
seriousness and possible consequences of this action or inaction suggests that the use of deadly force
should not be analyzed in a vacuum. It further suggests that it is reasonable to investigate situations or
circumstances which indirectly affect police behavior in confrontations which may require the use of
deadly force. There are many situations and circumstances which must be reviewed when analyzing use
of deadly force. At least five levels of analysis, or explanatory approaches, are necessary to understand
general police behavior and specifically, the police use of deadly force. These levels include individual,
situational, organizational, community and legal.
The individual approach explains differences in police shootings in terms of the characteristics
of individual police officers. Characteristics such as age, length of experience, and ethnicity, among
others can be reviewed to determine if one type or group of officers are more inclined to use deadly
force than another. The situational approach looks at the characteristics of the police-citizen encounters
in which deadly force is used. These include the type of complaint made to the police, or the type of call
to which the officer is responding, as well as the options available to both citizen and officer. The
organizational approach to police use of deadly force focuses upon the characteristics of the police
organization under study, including the type of training, the degree of decentralization, the proportion

11

of minority officers, command staff, etc. The community approach analyzes police behavior in terms of
community characteristics. These include the rate of unemployment, demographic composition of the
neighborhoods, racial tensions, respect for the police among minorities, housing, educational and
economic opportunities, among others. Finally, the legal approach reviews the restrictions placed on
police by the law, and the policies under which they operate.
The available research on police use of deadly force is not conclusive and provides only
tentative answers. The relationship between the characteristics of individual officers and their shooting
behavior requires far more research before an absolute response can be given. Some empirical findings
from studies which have been conducted both in Dallas and other cities, can be generalized and
demonstrate that members of minority groups are disproportionately represented as victims of police
use of deadly force compared to their representation in the community, that the nature and extent of
police shootings vary across communities, and that police departments can reduce the number of police
shootings by tightening-up their firearms policies.
Increasing the control over police departments and increasing the supervision and accountability
of officers may be desirable but it is not always sufficient to reduce police use of deadly force. For
example, an Early Warning System which can assist in the identification of officers who are
experiencing stress, could eliminate harmful consequences of stress or performance problems before
they occur. Although no particular set of criteria can determine stress or performance problems, a
system can be established to identify those officers who may be experiencing problems. An early
warning system makes no conclusions or determination about stress or performance, but does assist
supervisory personnel in evaluating potentially troublesome behavior. Simple criteria including
complaints made against the officer, number of times officer has used force, involvement in traffic

12

accidents can be among the factors used to identify officers who may be heading for trouble.
Beyond supervision and accountability of officers, citizens must be educated. Confrontations
will occur where police officers must use deadly force to protect themselves and others. Citizens must
recognize this fact and understand that such action often ends with tragic consequences for all
concerned. Citizens must use common sense when interacting with police officers. Any life-threatening
action may be responded to with the use of deadly force. It is a joint responsibility of both citizens and
police officers to diffuse potentially violent situations. A effort by the community and government is
the only way to reduce those situations in which police use of deadly force.
Another critical area of citizen participation involves the ability to commend officers and to
make complaints about them. When citizens commend or complain about officers, the information can
be important indicators of officer performance or departmental policy. As officers often work without
the benefit of direct supervision, citizen feedback can assist administrators in officer evaluations.
On the one hand, most commendations result from officers going out of their way to assist
citizens, and are honest reflections of their good faith. On the other hand, many complaints against
officers are unsubstantiated allegations of unnecessary or improper behavior. Some of these complaints
are the result of proper aggressive police work and some are malicious attempts to harm officers.
Regardless of the nature of this citizen participation, it must be viewed constructively and as a means by
which the Department can improve.
Citizen complaints, if substantiated, may be used specifically to evaluate officers and correct
their behavior, but the major purpose of the complaint process is to generate information for
management. If an officer or group of officers, or even officers who work in a specific location
establish a pattern of misconduct, complaints or poor work habits, further investigation may be

13

warranted.
Citizen participation is an important aspect of policing, and must be encouraged. The integrity
of the complaint handling mechanism must be beyond reproach. Periodic and random checks of the
system should be made to assure that citizens can file complaints without prejudice, and that the
complaints are handled appropriatly and used for management decisions.
The Data on Police Use of Deadly Force
The events which have occurred in the past must be evaluated before we attempt to predict or
prepare for the future. Unfortunately, as with many social statistics, the data on crime and police
shootings which are available are not appropriately comparable among cities or even within cities over
a period of time. Changes in the police department, community, and laws, all impede the proper
interpretation of the information. Additionally, the statistics do not explain why events occur or suggest
solutions to reduce or change them.
Unless and until comparative statistics on police use of deadly force are collected and
maintained, and methods are devised to interpret properly the data, too many methodological problems
exist to reach a conclusive decision about the nature of police use of deadly force. In other words, there
are many ways to compare the use of deadly force by Dallas police officers to officers in other cities, or
to Dallas in prior years. These methods all provide interesting comparisons, but each is flawed and must
be considered merely a small part of the total picture.
For example, the media in Dallas has cited studies in which the Dallas Police Department ranks
as the nations leading department in the use of deadly force, on the basis of police shooting incidents
per 100,000 population. Other studies rank Dallas lower when police shootings are viewed as a percent
of all homicides, or when they are ranked by number of sworn officers, or compared to the crime rate or

14

calls for service. In his sworn testimony before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, U.S. House of
Representatives in Dallas on May 8, 1987, Professor Lawrence Sherman testified:
You have come to a city that in the early 1980s ranked number 3 in the nation in citizens killed
by police per 100,000 population, and number 4 in citizens killed per 100 officers. Yet Dallas was only
ranked number 20, or about in the middle of all cities over 250,000, in the rate of citizens killed by
police divided by the total homicides. This seems to be a much more appropriate way of judging where
Dallas stands in overall police use of guns. For the hard fact is that Dallas is an extremely violent city.
The place to begin any inquiry into gun use by police in Dallas is gun use in the population.
Examination of any one incident, without considering the context of those incidents, would be
misleading. If police have on occasion reacted quickly to the sight of a gun, one would also want to
know how often they have responded to potential threats by means other than shooting the gunholder.
From all indications, guns are freely and widely used in Dallas to settle disputes, make threats,
or comfort the fearful when they open their front doors. Such cultural practices may be strongly
supported by the voters, but they have inescapable consequences. One cannot expect the Dallas police
to shoot in such a cultural context at the same rate as police in St. Paul, a city of 270,000 people and
very few guns where police killed no one from 1980 to 1984.
Prompted by the Congressional Hearings, the Planning and Research Division, the research arm
of the Dallas Police Department, has conducted several studies which respond to Dr. Sherman's queries.
In the June 19, 1987 issue of The Dallas Police News, it is reported that, "Results of a six-month study
regarding officer involved shootings reveal that for 1986 the Dallas Police Department did not lead the
nation in a single comparison category." Another story which appeared in the July 6, 1987 The Dallas
Morning News titled, "Some Choose Not To Shoot," describes twenty-four incidents in which police
officers could have fired their weapons, but did not.
Perhaps the most important study was the one reported by Chief Prince at the Congressional
Hearings. The question had been raised that police might treat minority members more severely than
non-minorities. In other words, it was asked whether police shoot at members of minority groups in
situations which are less dangerous than when the police shoot at non-minorities? The data reported by
15

the police indicate that there is no difference in types of shootings based upon ethnicity. In other words,
there are no data to suggest that members of minority groups are being treated differently than nonminorities in police use of deadly force situations.
In sum, there are a variety of statistics available which tell parts of the story. The second section
of this report will place in perspective what is known about police use of deadly force in Dallas, using a
variety of explanatory variables. The data on police use of deadly force was combined for 1985, 1986
and the first six months of 1987. The information from the shooting incidents, police personnel records
and officers who used deadly force was computer analyzed.

16

4. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF POLICE SHOOTINGS

Information on discharge of weapons by Dallas police officers during the two and one-half year
period studied was available only from a combination of sources and from the officers who fired their
weapons. The first analysis reviews the data from the official shooting reports, while the second
analysis reviews perceptions reported by officers who fired their weapons. The data reveal a total of
128 discharges. These data are presented in Table 1. There were 43 in 1985, 68 in 1986 and 17 during
the first half of 1987. Of the 128, 26 discharges (20%) were accidental. Two officers were involved in
13 discharge incidents each, three officers were involved in six incidents each and four officers were
involved in two incidents.

Table 1
Incidents Involving Discharge of Weapons
Intentional
(except lights & dogs)

Accidental

Total

1985
1986
1987

31
58
13

12
10
4

43
68
17

TOTAL

102

26

128

17

The information in Table 2 summarizes the age of the officers who intentionally discharged a
weapon, and compares age categories with the average ages of officers in the Patrol Bureau during the
study period. The Patrol Bureau data include investigators, supervisors and commanders which bias
statistics toward older and more experienced officers, but offer the best comparison available.
Comparing the mean age of officers discharging weapons with the mean age of officers in the Patrol
Bureau indicates that younger officers do more of the shooting than older officers. The officers in the
21 to 26 year old category, who represent fifteen percent of all officers, were involved in 26 percent of
the incidents. This is nearly twice the percentage expected by chance. To offset the over-representation
of the youngest officers in discharging weapons, the category of officers 39 to 57 years of age was
under-represented. These officers comprise 31 percent of the Patrol Bureau, but were involved in only
19 percent of the discharges.
The average age of police officers in the Dallas Police Department is getting younger. In 1985,
the average age of officers in the Patrol Bureau was 36 years, and only 7 percent of the officers were in
the 21 to 26 year old category. In contrast, in 1986 and 1987 the mean age of officers in the Patrol
Bureau was 34 years, and 19 percent of the officers were in the 21 to 26 year old group. This same
pattern holds for the average years of experience of officers in the Patrol Bureau. In 1985, the average
years experience was 10.6 and 18 percent of the officers were in the category having between 0 and 4
years experience. In 1986, the mean years experience dropped to 9.4 and 31 percent of the officers had
0 to 4 years experience. In 1987, the trend continues. The average years of experience dropped to 8.5
and nearly 39 percent of the officers had 0 to 4 years experience.

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Table 2
Age Categories of Officers Discharging Weapons
and Age Breakdowns for the Patrol Bureau

Age
21-26
27-32
33-38
39-57

% Discharging
Weapon

Patrol Bureau
Age Breakdown

26%
31%
24%
19%
X=32.6 S.D.=7.5

15%
31%
22%
31%
X=34.5 S.D.=7.7

The data in Table 3 reveal that the average age and average years' experience of officers
intentionally discharging their firearms while off-duty are significantly higher than those intentionally
firing their weapons while on-duty. The average age of the off-duty officers is 38 compared to the onduty officers, whose average age is 32. This same pattern holds for years of experience. The mean years
experience for off-duty officers is 12.2 compared to 7.7 years for on-duty officers.
Although no figures were reported separately for officers discharging their weapons while offduty, these older, more experienced officers may be using their firearms in situations and circumstances
which differ from their younger and less-experienced counterparts. Further investigation into off-duty
shootings should be conducted.

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Table 3
Average Age and Years Experience of Officers
Discharging Weapons While On-Duty, Off-Duty and Accidentally
Mean Age
Off-Duty
38.1
On-Duty
32.3
Accidental 33.8
TOTAL

33.3

S.D.

Mean Yrs. Exp.

S.D.

10.0
7.1
7.4

12.2
7.7
8.5

8.8
6.2
6.4

7.5

8.4

6.6

In Table 4, the percentage of officers discharging their weapon by different years of

experience as a police officer are compared. The data reveal a similar pattern which was observed
in Table 2. When we compare the mean years experience of officers discharging weapons with
the mean years experience of officers in the Patrol Bureau, the officers with the fewest years
experience are the ones most likely to discharge their weapons intentionally. Officers with zero to
four years experience comprise only 30% of the force, yet comprise 44% of the group which has
intentionally discharged their weapons. Officers with the most years experience (ten years or
more) comprise 39% of the force but only 28% of the group which discharged their weapons
during the time period being studied.
Table 4
The Years of Experience of Officers Discharging Weapons
20

and Seniority Breakdowns for the Patrol Bureau

Years
Experience
0-4
5-10
10+

% Discharging
Weapon

Patrol Bureau
Seniority Breakdown

44%
28%
28%

30%
31%
39%

X=7.8 S.D.=6.4

X=9.5

S.D.=7.3

Thirteen percent of the intentional discharges take place while an officer is off duty, sixtyseven percent occur while the officer is on duty, and twenty percent of the discharges are
accidental. The data in Table 5 indicate that most of the incidents involve anglo officers. Out of
the 154 discharges where the ethnicity of the officer is reported, 129 or 84% were by anglo
officers. Only 13 shots were taken by hispanic officers and 12 were taken by Black officers.
Table 5
Frequency of Weapon Discharge for
Anglo, Hispanic and Black Officers

Anglos
Hispanics
Blacks
Total

Frequency of
Discharges

Percent of
Discharges

129

84%
13
12

8%
8%

154

100%

Our analysis will now turn to characteristics of the subjects of the shootings. Most of the
subjects are male (90%) whose ages range from 15 years of age to 81. The mean age of the
subjects is 30, but the subjects most often shot at are in their 20's. In situations where the
ethnicity of the subject is known, 51% of the subjects are Black, 25% are anglos, and 24% are

21

Hispanic. In cases where it was reported, 78% of the subjects had a weapon, while 22% had no
weapon. In 67% of these cases, the weapon was in-hand.
In cases where both the ethnicity of the officer and of the subject are known, there is no
significant relationship between the two (see Table 6). The number of Hispanic and Black
officers discharging a weapon is so low, that a statistically significant relationship is unlikely.
However, about 50% of the firearm discharges of anglo and Black officers involved Black
subjects, while 75% of the shots fired by Hispanic officers involved Black subjects.

Table 6
Ethnicity of Officer Discharging Weapon
and Ethnicity of Subject

Ethnicity of Officer
Anglo
Anglo Subject
Hispanic Subject
Black Subject
Total

Hispanic

Black

16 (24%)
17 (25%)
34 (51%)

0 (0%)
1 (25%)
3 (75%)

1 (50%)
0 (0%)
1 (50%)

67

Table 7 examines the relationship between the ethnicity of the officer and of the subject,
and does so separately for situations where the subject had a weapon in-hand and no weapon inhand. As in Table 6, neither of the relationships between the ethnicity of the officer and the
ethnicity of the subject was statistically significant.
The situations where there is a weapon in-hand and where their is no weapon in-hand
deserves further analysis. For anglo officers, the only group with enough shootings to analyze,

22

the highest percentage of shootings involve anglo subjects, when there is no weapon in-hand
(46%), compared to 14% of the shootings involving anglos when there is a weapon in-hand. Just
the opposite it true for Blacks. The highest percentage of shootings involve Black subjects when
there is a weapon in-hand (61%), compared to 29% when there is no weapon in-hand.
These data demonstrate that officers shoot at suspects with weapons in-hand more than
twice as often as suspects without weapons in-hand, and that Black suspects with no weapon inhand are involved in shooting incidents at a significantly lower rate than other suspects.
Table 7
Ethnicity of Officer Discharging Weapon
and Ethnicity of Subject by Weapon In-Hand
Officer' Ethnicity
Anglo

Hispanic

Black

No Weapon In-Hand
Anglo Subject
Hispanic Subject
Black Subject

11 (46%)
6 (25%)
7 (29%)

Total 24

0 (0%)
0 (0%)
2 (100%)

0 (0%)
0 (0%)
0 (0%)

Weapon In-Hand
Anglo Subject
Hispanic Subject
Black Subject

8 (14%)
14 (25%)
34 (61%)

Total 56

1 (20%)
1 (20%)
3 (60%)

2 (50%)
1 (25%)
1 (25%)

Because of the problems encountered coding and interpreting the official shooting data, it
should be a priority of the Internal Affairs Division to create a summary form which includes

23

important information to be entered onto a computer file and maintained for periodic review and
analysis.

5. AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE POLICE OFFICER QUESTIONNAIRE

A total of 69 police officers completed the police officer questionnaire with information
concerning the shootings in which they were involved. The responding officers averaged 8.9
years experience and 32.1 years of age. These figures compare very well with the average of all
officers discharging weapons purposefully as discussed earlier. The average years of experience
of the population of all officers discharging weapons is 7.8 and the average age is 32.6. The
averages of the sample are just a little higher than the population because many of the officers in
the sample were questioned a year or more after their shooting occurred. The sample closely
represents the overall population with respect to age and years of experience.
A comparison of the ethnic breakdown of the sample with that of the population of
officers discharging weapons provides further evidence of the representativeness of the sample of
officers completing questionnaires (see Table 8).

Table 8
A Comparison of the Ethnic Breakdown of the Sample of Officers Completing Questionnaires
with the Population.
24

Percent of Actual
Shootings
Anglos
Hispanics
Blacks

Sample Percent

84%

82%
8%
8%

15%
3%

The hispanic officers are slightly overrepresented in the sample and the Black officers are
slightly underrepresented. However, the numbers of hispanic and Black officers are so small,
that the mis-representation is insignificant. For example, two Black officers were represented in
the sample, just three less than what is expected by chance.
There were five questions in the questionnaire which asked officers to give their opinions.
Responses ranged from strongly agree (1) to strongly disagree (5). The officers' responses are
summarized in Table 9.

Table 9
Mean Responses to the Opinion Questions
Mean

S.D.

This shooting has had an impact upon my life.

2.33

1.17

The academy training I received prepared me for

this shooting.

2.38

1.24

The in-service training I received prepared me

for this shooting.

2.78

.98

I thought about the deadly force policy just

before the shooting.

3.48

1.39

25

The Dallas Police Department's use of deadly force

policy provided guidelines that I understood.
1.83

.75

Since a score of three represents being undecided, any mean below `three' represents some
degree of agreement with the statement. The lower the number, the stronger the agreement with
the statement. Any mean greater than three is in the disagree range, and the higher the number the
stronger the disagreement. The strongest agreement is with the statement that the officers
discharging weapons understood the deadly force policy. Ninety-one percent of the officers
reported that they understood the guidelines. Only four officers (6%) in the sample disagreed
with that statement, indicating that they did not understand the guidelines. A majority of officers
agreed with the statements that the shooting had an impact upon their life (67%), and that
academy training had prepared them for the shooting (64%). Officers were less certain about the
helpfulness of in-service training. Forty-four percent indicated that it did prepare them for the
shooting, thirty percent were undecided and twenty-six percent said it did not prepare them. The
only statement that has a mean response above three is "I thought about the deadly force policy
just before the shooting." A majority of officers disagreed with this statement (65%).
The data in Table 10 list the types of threats which led the officer to use deadly force.
Table 10
Types of Threats that Led to the Use of Deadly Force
Frequency
Physical Threat
Club, Baton, Broken Bottle
Knife

3
3
2
26

Percent
4%
4%
3%

Hand Gun
Rifle, Shotgun
Vehicle
Other

33

48%

16

23%
10
2

15%
3%

The most common threats were hand guns, rifles and shotguns and vehicles. Ninety
percent of the officers said that the subjects had a deadly weapon.
When these officers were asked what was the first thought to go through their mind after
the shooting, the most common response was the possibility of administrative discipline (33%).
The remaining officers gave numerous types of responses to this question. Only three percent
thought of criminal charges or peer rejection.
When asked what was the most important type of assistance the Dallas Police Department
provided after the shooting, the responses were evenly distributed between reassignment,
psychological services, time off, and other types of services. Seventeen percent indicated that no
services were provided for them.
In Table 11 we summarize the responses to the question, "What do you consider to be the
most important factor which helped you prepare to use deadly force when required to do so".

Table 11
Most Important Factor in Preparing Officer to Use Deadly Force

Frequency
21
13
1
3

Academy Training
In-service Training
Counseling
Stress Control
27

Percent
31%
19%
1%
4%

Simulation Exercises

30

44%

Simulation training received the most responses (44%) while academy training received thirtyone percent of the responses. Nineteen percent indicated that in-service training was most
important in preparing for the use of deadly force. Sixty-five percent of the officers indicated that
`shoot-don't-shoot' training was helpful, but only forty percent found it helpful in training officers
when not to shoot.
Thirty-two percent of the officers who discharged their weapon, said that the thought of
taking another's life went through their mind just before the shooting. The most common feeling
of officers at the time of the shooting was fear (46%) and anxiety (33%). Seven percent of the
officers reported that they felt nothing.
Only sixty-one percent of the officers remembered how many shots they fired. Twenty-six
percent did not hear the noise of the shot(s). Of those who did hear the shots, most remembered
the noise as muffled.
Forty-one percent of the officers were fired upon, and only nine percent reported that their
use of deadly force could have been avoided. Thirty percent of the officers indicated that they
could not judge how many times the use of deadly force could be avoided. Of those willing to
estimate, the average was that ten percent of the time the use of deadly force could be avoided.
When asked how the use of deadly force could have been avoided in their incident, nearly all
officers said it could have been avoided by the suspect. However, most felt there was little they
could do to avoid using deadly force, an attitude indicated by the following suggestions to avoid
using deadly force: not showing up for work, failing to do their job, let the suspect escape, and

28

retreating. The officers who reported that something could be done to avoid the use of deadly
force gave the following suggestions: use avoidance techniques, wait, a better use of cover, be
non-confrontational, and be less aggressive in arresting suspects. Some officers thought that
banning handguns in the city might help officers avoid using deadly force because the city has
become so violent. Others thought that the public should be better educated not to confront
police officers, and officers should be better trained in deadly force policy, including when and
how to shoot.
One concern which was unsolicited, but reported by several officers, was that after their
shooting, they were concerned with the integrity of the investigation. Several officers commented
that they were insulted by Internal Affairs investigators who suggested that they would help by
interpreting facts and writing the report to make the shooting more justifiable. These officers
apparently felt that the justification of their shootings did not need anything other than a fair and
impartial investigation.

29

6. THE POLICE OFFICER APPLICANT SELECTION PROCESS

This section will include a review of the police officer applicant process, as well as a
comment on available psychological services, and methods to increase minority representation in
supervisory ranks. Information on these areas was obtained by an analysis of written documents,
materials provided and extensive interviews with community representatives and members of the
Dallas Police Department. The comment on the status of minorities in supervisory ranks was
prompted by questions raised by several individuals and members of groups representing both
majority and minority citizens.
All applicants for the Dallas Police Department are required to undergo psychological
screening. The purpose of this evaluation is to discriminate between applicants who will be
successful police officers and those who will not. Generally, candidates' personality profiles are
analyzed to screen out emotionally unstable applicants. Unnecessary aggression, ethnic
discrimination and unnecessary confrontational behavior are among the characteristics which
could lead to problems including the unnecessary use of deadly force, and should eliminate an
applicant. The evaluation is typically administered after the preliminary interview, but before the

30

applicant interview board process and polygraph examination. The psychological evaluation
procedure includes a three-hour written exam and an interview by a psychologist. The
disqualification of applicants based solely on the psychological tests is 2% of all persons tested.
No formal psychological report is written for each applicant and the applicant either passes the
psychological test or is told by the interviewing psychologist that he is not suited for the Dallas
Police Department. Since there is no formal written report, subsequent police screening personnel
participating in the selection process are not aware of an applicant's negative or positive attributes
observed during the psychological evaluation.
The psychological test battery primarily consists of the following instruments and
procedures:
1.

Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory - (MMPI);

2.

California Personality Inventory - (CPI);

3.

Thematic Apperception Test (T.A.T.) Projective

Instrument - abbreviated form; and

4.

Clinical Interview.

The above instruments are hand scored by members of the Psychological Services Unit. The
clinical evaluation and interpretation of the results are made by Dr. Somodevilla, who reviews all
applicant profiles. Although he may discuss with an applicant the reason for his or her
disqualification, there is no formal appeal of this decision. Once an applicant is rated
unacceptable on the psychological evaluation, the application is terminated.
Selection
The Dallas Police Department has a sophisticated and systematic approach to processing
and selecting police officer applicants. A review of materials related to the selection process
31

indicates a careful and thorough approach to processing of applicants. The selection process
consists of two layers of procedures. First, applicants are processed to determine if they possess
any factors which would automatically terminate their application. These basic disqualification
factors are based upon such items as past criminal violations, illicit drug usage, driving record,
etc. Other basic factors which would disqualify an applicant are failure to pass the Interview
Board, polygraph examination, psychological evaluation, physical fitness test, background
investigation or medical examination. Applicants must also be 19 1/2 years of age at the time of
application and must have at least 45 semester hours from an accredited College or University,
with at least a "C" average. If an applicant fails to meet any of the minimal standards set forth for
any of the above selection procedures he or she is disqualified as a police applicant.
Approximately 93% of Dallas Police Department applicants are disqualified as a result of failing
to meet minimum standards. This rate of disqualification is consistent with rates of other large
police departments.
The second layer, or phase of the selection process

determines among all qualified

applicants, which ones are to be hired and placed into the Academy. This is accomplished
through the use of a formula known as the Best In - First Out (BIFO) Score. This score is
determined by a statistical procedure developed by LWFW, Inc. & Consultants for the City of
Dallas. This formula was created to predict applicants who would succeed in the academy and the
field training program. The score which results from this statistical procedure (BIFO) weights an
individual's scores from the Interview Board, physical fitness test, psychological evaluations, as
well as scores on selected academic achievement and aptitude tests. Based on an applicant's final
BIFO Score, he or she is placed in rank order relative to ethnicity and sex, and offered admission

32

to the academy.
Psychological Services
The Dallas Police Department provides psychological and related counseling services to
department employees. These services are provided by the same unit which screens prospective
police officers.
As described by Dr. Somodevilla, the programs available to personnel are extensive and
well utilized. It is reported that over 200 employees of the department utilize these services
yearly. This amounts to close to 10% utilization each year by employees. The services appear to
fall under the general categories of educational/preventative groups and traditional one-to-one
counseling interventions. The educational programs range from mandatory stress management
training to alcohol support groups. There is a post-traumatic shooting program where all officers
involved in a shooting must undergo a confidential debriefing session with one of the unit's staff.

Increasing the Representation of Minorities in Supervisory Ranks

There are several methods which can increase minority representation in supervisory ranks,
an important step to make the Dallas Police Department more acceptable to all segments of the
community it serves. Although studies conducted by the Dallas Police Department reveal a high
level of support from the community, the results of these studies are not reported in ways which
distinguish ethnic, class, age or gender differences.
After officers are sworn into service, new and challenging issues arise to integrate minorities
fairly and appropriately into supervisory ranks. Two types of promotional methods are popular
among police departments. These include objective tests and Assessment Centers. To protect the

33

integrity of any objective test, including promotional exams, it is always important to create and
grade them outside the department and often outside the city. In any case, some procedure for
challenging questions must be available to the officers. Once exams are created in a fair and
appropriate manner, several methods exist to increase the percentage of minority promotions.
Some departments have active affirmative action programs which require one minority promoted
for every majority officer. Other departments are changing scored results to pass/fail and
promoting a specified percentage of qualified minorities.
Assessment Centers are characterized by the use of multiple testing techniques; multiple
observers representing ethnic backgrounds evaluating the candidates' performance in the various
tests, and the use of exercises simulating important sometimes stressful activities which are job
related. This multi-method approach to promotions can balance the scores of objective tests with
observed behavior, scored in a blind process by multiple reviewers.
Assessment Centers traditionally include a written exam and simulated exercises. The data
from an analysis of job-related activities can be used to weight the importance of different areas
of evaluation. The written test is often created and graded by an outside agency based upon a
specified reading assignment. Questions are created for each area of evaluation and sampled
randomly to be included in different testing cycles. Passing scores can be set at specified levels,
or percentage scores can be used to rank the candidates. The second type of testing includes the
simulation exercises. Similarly, exercises are created which relate to the analysis of job-related
activities. Each candidate is evaluated on a set of exercises. The evaluation is conducted by at
least three reviewers, representing ethnic and gender groups. After observing a candidate, the
reviewers discuss the performance and submit anonymous scores for each candidate on each

34

scenario. Areas of testing, materials assigned, and the content of the role play scenarios are
reviewed and revised to remain relevant. Adverse impact statements are continually updated to
assure no discrimination.
Another method to increase the representation of minorities in supervisory ranks is for the
City to create "exempt" positions which offer opportunities to all qualified members of the
department. The Chief can promote officers into these positions based upon internal needs and
expectations of the community. While this process may result in some disappointment among
those not promoted, this is an effective means to correct a long-standing under representation of
minority group members in the command staff of the department. Many other departments have
completed this inevitable process and as a result have moved on to solve other critical problems
in law enforcement.

FINDING #6-1
The current psychological screening process was implemented in the early 1980's. Before
this period there was some form of psychological evaluation of police applicants conducted, but
the results were not officially used as a disqualifier during the selection process. Instead there
appears to have been an informal procedure where Dr. Somodevilla communicated some concern
to background investigators regarding particular applicants. It was then up to the others involved
in the selection process to use Dr. Somodevilla's feedback, to eliminate unacceptable applicants.
Police officers hired before 1980 did not undergo what would now be considered an appropriate
psychological evaluation process to determine disqualification.
FINDING #6-2

35

The psychological test battery currently utilized is appropriate and adequate for the
purpose of screening Dallas police applicants. The MMPI and CPI are the most frequently used
instruments for police selection purposes and there exists a extensive research literature which
supports their continued use for police selection.
Therefore, the basic psychological screening battery is adequate and certainly meets the
commonly accepted standards of practicing police psychologists. A suggestion for consideration
is the substitution of the Rorschach projective test for the T.A.T. The Rorschach is a more
established instrument for detecting psychopathology and is not as susceptible to "faking good"
response as the T.A.T.
FINDING #6-3
There has been no recent research and development of local normative data on the
psychological tests. The development of these local norms is particularly important to determine
if, for example, there are significant ethnic differences on the various test scale scores. More
recent information regarding the rejection rate of applicants was not readily available by ethnicity
and sex. In general, Dr. Somodevilla's division provides adequate interpretation of profiles, but
updated research activities to improve validity of the testing system is not a priority.
FINDING #6-4
The reported rejection rate of applicants disqualified solely by the psychological
evaluation is 2%. This is a low rejection rate especially since the psychological evaluation is
given early in the selection process and before the polygraph examination. Although it is clinical
judgment which determines pass or fail on the psychological examination, the reported rejection
rate is still unusually low. Dr. Somodevilla eliminates another 6% of the applicants when he

36

compares marginal results on the psychological test with other findings which support his
concerns. Nonetheless, the overall use of the psychological examination seems to indicate an
overly conservative approach to disqualification of applicants based on their psychological
examinations.
FINDING #6-5
There is no policy or practice for fitness-for-duty evaluations of veteran officers. The
psychological services unit primarily is involved in providing treatment of a confidential nature.
In fact, only five officers were mandated to counseling by the department in the past year.
Therefore, it is unclear by what criteria and procedures a veteran officer could be or is
psychologically evaluated. Since pre-employment psychological screening does not guarantee
emotional stability over many years, it is necessary to determine how officers, who have
demonstrated proneness towards emotional instability are identified and possibly evaluated in
terms of job assignment or potential termination from the department. At present, the department
seems to deal with these issues on an informal and subjective individual case-by-case basis,
without the assistance of periodic evaluations, mandatory use of force reports, or other
evaluations of performance.
FINDING #6-6
Since a differential selection system based on ethnic groups is currently used by the
department, and no minimal or failing point exists on an applicant's BIFO Score, many
applicants, particularly Blacks, enter the Academy with very low BIFO Scores relative to their
Hispanic and anglo counterparts. It is established that many applicants who do not succeed in the
academy or in field training are those with the lowest BIFO Scores.

37

FINDING #6-7
The selection system is divided into three distinct entities consisting of the Personnel
Division, the Academy and the Field Training Officer program. These three entities appear to
function independently from each other. There seems to be little feedback or coordination
between the three which can result in confusion or misunderstandings about each others function
and role.
FINDING #6-8
Some of the available services, such as post-shooting interviews which were reported by
staff as available or mandatory were reported confidentially by officers as not mandatory and
often not available. No records were available on which services were utilized by ethnic group,
age or gender. No user evaluations were available.
FINDING #6-9
Minorities are not represented adequately among the supervisory ranks. Increasing the
representation of members of minority groups is important for the department's internal
operations and the image of the department within the community it serves.
RECOMMENDATION #6-1
The MMPI and CPI test instruments are hand scored, a tedious as well as inefficient use
of staff time. When hand scoring these instruments it is easy to make errors or plot profiles
incorrectly. Additionally, supplementary scales of the MMPI such as the Wiggins Content Scales
are particularly useful in augmenting interpretation of the basic clinical scales. Therefore, it is
recommended that the Department implement computerized scoring to reduce the possibility of
error and enhance the easy scoring of additional supplementary scales.

38

RECOMMENDATION #6-2
It is recommended that a written report on the results of each applicant's psychological
test be prepared and available.
The psychological testing which is comprehensive in nature, should not simply be used to
classify applicants into a rigid rating system. Certainly, there are many applicants who pass the
psychological but have tendencies or characteristics which may be or become problematic in their
performance as a police officer. These general areas of concern could be confidentially and
cautiously used by background investigators, academy staff and field training officers as relevant
information to obtain a more complete and accurate picture of the applicant. A psychologist's
direct participation in assisting others in understanding an applicant's background and behavior
can further enhance the selection process.

RECOMMENDATION #6-3
Since the primary emphasis of Dr. Somodevilla's duties and the Psychological Services
Unit in general, are counseling and training activities, the psychological screening of police
applicants is neither systematically reviewed nor upgraded. It is recommended that a research
effort be undertaken to establish local norms by ethnicity and gender and review and upgrade
entry level testing methods as indicated by results of the research.
RECOMMENDATION #6-4
Since only 2% of the total applicants tested are disqualified based upon the psychological
testing, the psychological screening process does not discriminate significantly among applicants.

39

It is recommended that an evaluation of the standards and interpretations which are used to
determine the results of the psychological tests be conducted.
RECOMMENDATION #6-5
It is recommended that a formal procedure such as an Early Warning System be
developed and implemented to identify officers who are prone to emotional instability or
behavior problems. This information could assist in job assignment and personal needs. A
computerized Early Warning System, which tracks mandatory use of force forms, quarterly
evaluations, and complaints made against the officer, would indicate officers who require a
supervisor's review.
RECOMMENDATION #6-6
Since the BIFO (Best-In First Out) Score is the single most important criterion for
measuring applicants' competitiveness relative to other applicants, it is necessary to update and
review this formula on a continuing basis.
RECOMMENDATION #6-7
There must be some continuity among recruitment, selection and training of police
officers. It is recommended that administrative and organizational changes be made to combine
the functions of recruitment, selection and training. If individuals are recruited according to
different criteria, then there must exist a method to equalize the opportunities for all recruits. For
example, if some recruits have lower reading scores than others, some access to remediation must
be available. If some individuals require more basic skill training than others, it should be made
available under the same administrative umbrella.
RECOMMENDATION #6-8

40

It is recommended that the assessment center concept be adopted for promotional testing
and appointment.
RECOMMENDATION #6-9
It is recommended that the City create `exempt' management positions and appoint
officers to fill these positions based upon internal needs and community concerns.

7. TEACHING METHODS AND MATERIALS

IN THE USE OF DEADLY FORCE

Once a police recruit is accepted to the academy, his or her learning begins officially. The
recruit is taught in the formal setting of the classroom and field training as well as the informal
setting of friendship groups which grow out of mutual attractions and concerns.
The Dallas Police Department's training academy offers a good curriculum and a qualified
and concerned staff, but is confined to facilities which do not encourage learning. The training
which specifically addresses the use of deadly force is sufficient, and provides a recruit with
technical knowledge and skills.
In general, training reflects the goals and values of the department, and currently, that
training emphasizes technical skills. The seven-hundred and twenty hours spent at the academy
provides the recruit with a wealth of information. Certainly the academy time spent on the U.S.
Constitution, Bill of Rights, Texas Code of Criminal Procedures and the Texas Penal Code is
valuable and sufficient. According to the Training Advisory Board, the overall content of training
and level of instruction is more than adequate. One area which can always be increased is the
41

training and testing concerning specific policies. As in any educational or training facility, there
is room for growth and improvements.
Toward the end of the academy training, recruits are exposed to the simulation of real-life
situations. This training conducted at Fair Park can be an excellent tool for the learning and
practice of skills taught in the class-room setting of the academy. The express purpose of this
training is to introduce recruits to realistic field situations. The routine as well as the exceptional
can be experienced, and recruits can be evaluated in general, and for specific behavior. This
training can serve as the introduction to policing, and the Field Training Program.
After graduation from the academy, the new police officer enters the Field Training
Program. The officer remains on probation until the successful completion of this twenty-four
week phase of training. The Field Training Program is probably the most important phase of
training a recruit will receive. It is this experience which should discriminate between those who
can place into practice what has been learned, and those who are unable to act and react
appropriately. In theory, field training should be a formal system of education and evaluation,
providing the young officer will learn and utilize all the benefits and experience of successful,
dedicated and committed police officers. The new Field Training Manual provides the recruits
and the trainers with sufficient information to make this program a successful experience for the
officers and department.
The officers who successfully complete the field training program should evolve as
confident, efficient and professional police officers. Although they will have been exposed to
extensive training, more is to come. In-service training is necessary for officers to keep current
with the philosophy, values and guiding principles of the department as well as new strategies,

42

tactics, policies and procedures.

One aspect of in-service training is supervisor training. As the field sergeant is in the
position to translate departmental directives and policies into practices, it is this person on whom
the success of the day-to-day operations of the police is based. The sergeant is the police
administrator's representative on the street, and his abilities and working style are more
significant to patrol officers than any other individual, including the chief. Since the sergeant
holds a pivotal position in the department, the training this person receives can influence officers
under his supervision.
Perhaps the career step with the most significant change is from patrol officer to sergeant.
For the first time the new sergeant assumes responsibility for the behavior and performance of a
number of officers and must give orders and view himself as a leader. Just as important is the idea
that one's authority can easily be compromised if a sergeant views himself as merely an officer
with stripes. Performing effectively as a sergeant requires formal preparation and reorientation
towards police work. This is not easily accomplished and it is appropriate that supervisors learn
how to supervise.
If sergeants and other supervisors receive thorough training in leadership and supervisory
skills, the department will experience an increase in supervisory effectiveness, accountability,
and a reduction in the unknown areas of what will and what will not be tolerated.
The 1987 Action Plan for the Dallas Police Department includes numerous
recommendations for training, and we acknowledge that some of our findings and
recommendations have been addressed by that Plan.
FINDING #7-1

43

The academy is based upon a junior college model. In fact, the atmosphere at the academy
resembles a college campus. While all recruits enter the academy with some college experience,
relatively few have military experience compared to recruits of previous years. This combination
of an atmosphere which permits too much informality and a lack of military training can have
negative consequences.
FINDING #7-2
Academy training does not draw upon the wealth of experience which is available in the
ranks of the department. Appointment to the academy as a trainer or instructor is not seen as a
high-status job and is not a highly desirable assignment.
FINDING #7-3
While conflict management training is covered, there is insufficient training in deescalating and avoidance techniques as well as education and training in violence reduction.
FINDING #7-4
The cultural awareness training presented to recruits is not thorough or comprehensive.
Often, the cultural awareness training does not teach the significant differences which exist
among the various cultural groups. Similarly, differences in communication, its importance, and
the interpretations of verbal and non-verbal communication are not covered adequately. This
training is not mandatory for supervisors.
FINDING #7-5
Insufficient time and resources are spent discovering what and how other police
departments are training, and little is done to incorporate the best of those programs into the
academy.

44

FINDING #7-6
The exercises at Fair Park have the structure and opportunity to serve as an excellent
introduction into the real world of policing. The exercises can be a sound simulation of what the
recruit will experience when he or she becomes a police officer.
FINDING #7-7
The Field Training Program offers an opportunity for young police officers, in a
structured setting, to be monitored and evaluated while still learning the basics of police work.
The Field Training Manual is well-written and comprehensive. However, there is expressed
concern that the manual is not followed and that adherence to the manual would significantly
increase the benefits of the program.
FINDING #7-8
Although many police officers need training beyond the academy and the field training
experience, insufficient opportunities for in-service or supervisory training are available to police
officers.
RECOMMENDATION #7-1
It is recommended that discipline and structure be increased significantly in the academy.
As noted in the 1987 Action Plan, most police departments operate strict and structured
academies. This is especially important for Dallas as it requires recruits to have some college
education. This is not to recommend a military academy, only a middle ground between a college
atmosphere and unnecessary structure.
RECOMMENDATION #7-2
Many officers have years of valuable experience and have formed excellent police habits.

45

It is recommended that incentives be established to upgrade the status of officers who work in the
academy. This may require some modification in the duties and responsibilities of the academy
staff. It must be realized that assignment to the academy is one of the most prestigious and
important jobs. The future of the Dallas Police Department is in the hands of its recruits.
RECOMMENDATION #7-3
One of the most important methods to reduce the use of deadly force is the defusion and
de-escalation of potentially violent situations. It is recommended that violence-reduction training
be instituted and evaluated. No one knows how many times police officers avoid the use of
deadly force. There exist well-known methods of teaching officer restraint, de-escalation of
potentially violent situations, violence reduction and ways which have proved successful in
handling armed and dangerous suspects. A contemporary training program should be instituted
and constantly monitored and evaluated.
RECOMMENDATION #7-4
Cultural awareness is a necessary part of policing in the 1980s. It is recommended that
cultural awareness training be modified to include understanding the multi-ethnic groups living
in Dallas and their differences. Such training should be provided to supervisors as well as
recruits. It is important to have representatives of the many ethnic and cultural groups explain to
the police how they differ from the majority and officer. Experts as well as civilian
representatives could be used as instructors, but in either case, it is imperative that the groups'
true customs and `style' are made familiar to the police. Such information can often be used to
reduce tensions and de-escalate potentially violent situations.
RECOMMENDATION #7-5

46

Training needs of any given group change and must be improved over time. It is
recommended that communication with other departments and professional organizations be
enhanced, and relevant training programs be evaluated and instituted where appropriate. It is
important to determine in what areas other departments are training, and the methods they are
finding successful. Similarly, it is necessary to recognize when a particular training program or
method has outlived its usefulness.

RECOMMENDATION #7-6
It is recommended that supervisors be required to attend seminars and courses outside of
the Dallas area. Important information from these educational experiences can be integrated into
training and practice.
RECOMMENDATION #7-7
Although the Field Training Program and its manual have promise, it is important to
ensure that all rules and procedures in the manual are followed. It is recommended that the
current structure which was intended to provide the basis for the Field Training Program be
enforced and that an effective method of evaluation of both recruits and trainers be implemented
and utilized.
RECOMMENDATION #7-8
The Fair Park training has great promise to introduce young recruits to realistic situations.
It is recommended that the experience at Fair Park be modified and re-structured to provide
recruits the opportunity to make other realistic decisions. Such training should include lifethreatening situations which can be resolved by utilizing techniques of violence reduction and de-

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escalation, as well as the use of deadly force. This training should incorporate the emotional and
mental stress which has been created by the `shoot-don't shoot' training (see Recommendation #81).
RECOMMENDATION #7-9
The officers who serve as field trainers along with the training officers in the academy,
are some of the most influential officers in the department. It is recommended that appropriate
measures be taken to upgrade the status and compensation to officers who become field trainers.
RECOMMENDATION #7-10
In-service training is the only method to assure that experienced officers are aware of new
procedures, techniques and skills, as well as any change in departmental philosophy or values. It
is recommended that all officers be required to participate in at least 40 hours of in-service
training each year which is selected and designed to update them on departmental philosophy,
procedures, skills and techniques.
RECOMMENDATION #7-11
One of the most important rules in training is to teach to the policies and procedures
which are required. It is recommended that all training programs be reviewed for their
consistency with existing policies and procedures.
RECOMMENDATION #7-12
It is recommended that a formal school for supervisors is established which emphasizes
leadership and supervisory skills.
RECOMMENDATION #7-13
It is recommended that the scope and authority of the Training Advisory Board be defined

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to encourage further in-depth analysis of the training curricula and instruction. Further, this Board
should be utilized to monitor change, and report its findings to the Chief of Police.

8. REVIEW OF "SHOOT-DON'T SHOOT" TRAINING

The "shoot-don't shoot" training which was initiated for police recruits and experienced
officers and suspended in 1986, was reviewed in its written form and by observing the trainingin-action. The `shoot-don't-shoot' training incorporates some necessary elements of police work,
but also includes training and conditioning which may not be in the best interests of the police
officer, the suspect or the community. There is no question that a police officer must be taught
how to shoot, and when and how to react to stressful situations. Therefore, an officer may be
forced by a suspect to make a such a decision at any time in his or her career. An officer must be
prepared to handle any situation which threatens his life or the life of another. At the same time,
an officer must be educated to use alternatives to deadly force.
The opportunity to place recruits or officers in simulated violent, volatile, quick-moving
situations which create emotional and mental stress should not be abandoned. When such an
experience provides the opportunity for an officer to gain insights into his response to stressful
situations, it can be an important training tool. Additionally, the opportunity to evaluate and

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correct an inappropriate response is important. However, situations which begin close to a final
frame, and which require an immediate split-second decision do not realistically simulate the
majority of situations a police officer will encounter. Similarly, scenarios which almost always
end in shootings, and situations from which recruits and officers can not retreat or practice
methods of violence reduction are not realistic.
It has been demonstrated that in a substantial percentage of shootings, a sequence of
decisions is available to an officer before he makes the final decision to fire his weapon. This
analysis of the last decision, or the "final-frame" of a situation, limits the possible alternatives and
methods to avoid the shooting. Although, in many situations these phases are not distinct and
overlap, or occur in a different order, they are necessary to learn. Three phases of decisions
should be included in training in the use and avoidance of deadly force before the final-frame
decision is made. Although not all of the phases will be available to officers in all situations, it is
likely that at least one of them will be available to most officers before they decide to discharge
their weapon.
The first phase has been called the anticipation phase. This is the time period from when
the officer first acknowledges the need for intervention. The critical element of this phase
includes the nature, extent and accuracy of information the officer receives. From this
information, either provided or anticipated, the officer forms expectations and prepares for the
encounter. Prior tactical knowledge of a location or suspect can increase the officer's advantage.
The second phase is the initial confrontation. This is when the officer approaches the
scene or suspect. The decisions made during this stage can greatly increase or decrease the
officer's later options. For example, the decision to take cover, or remain behind a car door, etc.

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can influence later decisions.

The third phase is one of informational exchange. At this time, the officers and suspects
through forms of communication, define the situation. This can range from an officer's command
to `halt' to a threat on the officer by the civilian.
The final decision is the one to shoot.
If a shooting occurs, the officer must know what is expected of him or her and what are
the procedures to be followed.
FINDING #8-1
The "shoot-don't-shoot" training provides simulated examples of violent, volatile, quick
moving situations to which officers must respond and react. In addition, this training places
recruits and officers in emotionally and mentally stressful situations to which they must respond
and react.
FINDING #8-2
The `shoot-don't-shoot' training is limited to situations which emphasize the final frame of
a situation. There is little or no opportunity to practice other skills, tactics and techniques to avoid
the shooting.
FINDING #8-3
The results of the `shoot-don't-shoot' training have not been used for evaluations,
predictions, further training or remediation.

RECOMMENDATION #8-1
It is appropriate and necessary to train officers in stressful situations which mount in

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intensity. It is recommended that the City continue and expand such training and incorporate it
into a complete role-play exercise with at least three stages of decision making. This training
would add a significant dimension to the training which is provided at Fair Park.
RECOMMENDATION #8-2
It is recommended that any training which places recruits or officers in stressful situations
should be used to assist in improving the individual's performance.

9. REVIEW OF ALL WEAPONS TRAINING

The Firearms Training Center provides adequate instruction in firearms safety and
proficiency. The recruits and officers who are trained at the Center are primarily taught and
practice what actions to take and what procedures to follow once the decision to discharge a
firearm has been made. The training course offered is traditional, with the safety of officers and
civilians emphasized. The overall training goal of officer safety and proficiency is accomplished
by the training center staff if the written standards and training are achieved.
Recruits and officers are supplied with practice ammunition which is reloaded at the
Training Center. They practice at stationary and turning black targets. The facilities are old and
marginally adequate.
The total firearms training consists of the curriculum offered at the Firearms Training
Center and the suspended `shoot-don't-shoot' training.
One of the controversial issues in weapons training is the use of computer simulated
training. Several years ago, the Planning and Research Division recommended purchase of the

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Firearms Training Systems, Inc. (FATS) shooting simulator. The more recent Action Plan
recommends against the purchase of this mechanical training. While the computer simulated
training provides some worthy exercises, it lacks job relevance and typically places the trainee in
the final frame of situations. Additionally, this type of training lacks realism and makes it
impossible for officers to employ many appropriate tactics and techniques for approaching and
structuring confrontations.

FINDING #9-1
The Planning and Research Division recommended purchase of the Firearms Training
Systems, Inc. (FATS) shooting simulator, but the more recent Action Plan recommended against
such a purchase. No mechanical training devices are currently available.
FINDING #9-2
Recruits and officers are conditioned to shoot with reloaded ammunition provided by the
Firearms Training Center, and to shoot at stationary and turning black targets.
FINDING #9-3
Data on actual shootings are not used to up-date the training curriculum or modify the
emphasis of firearm training.
FINDING #9-4
While the training with the shotgun is adequate, the storage while in patrol cars is not. In
fact, it was reported that shotguns have been stolen while stored under seats of police cars.
Unsecured storage under seats is also dangerous in the event of an accident or when the officer is
in a hurry to retrieve it.

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RECOMMENDATION #9-1
It is recommended that a study be conducted to determine the usefulness of purchasing a
F.A.T.S. simulator as one aspect of firearms training. This simulator is portable and could be
moved to various locations. The use of computerized training must be only one component of an
integrated curriculum.
RECOMMENDATION #9-2
The Firearms Training Center provides only reloaded ammunition for practice and
training, yet police officers are permitted to carry numerous firearms and use eight types of
ammunition. It is recommended that recruits and officers are trained with the type of weapon and
ammunition which they will use. It is further recommended that all officers be required to carry
the same type of weapon. This recommendation is not intended to apply to officers assigned to
Tactical Units.
RECOMMENDATION #9-3
Recruits and officers are conditioned continually to shoot at black targets. It is
recommended that the color of targets be changed and more life-like targets are considered.
RECOMMENDATION #9-4
It is recommended that the Firearms Training Center curriculum be modified to include
data from actual shooting incidents. The number of rounds fired in incidents and the distance
between officer and suspect are examples of important information which could be used to
modify training.

RECOMMENDATION #9-5

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It is recommended that use of deadly force philosophy and policy be reviewed at the
Firearms Training Center each time an officer qualifies with his or her weapon.
RECOMMENDATION #9-6
It is recommended that shotguns be secured while carried in patrol cars.

10. REVIEW OF DEADLY FORCE POLICIES

The primary goal of a police officer and the policies which he or she follows, is the
protection of life. Any policy on the use of deadly force must place the highest priority on the
moral responsibility for protecting human life, the right of people to be secure in their person and
property, and the constitutional right of trial and due process. On the one hand, any policy
concerned with the use of deadly force by a police officer must be structured with the utmost
caution. On the other hand, police officers must be able to protect themselves and the lives of
others.
This balance must consider the possible social consequences of the criminal who is
permitted to commit crimes without concern of capture, and the rights of law-abiding citizens to
live without danger or perceived fear. Therefore, the only decisions which should be made by a
police officer are those of self-preservation and the protection of others. Others, in this case,
include law-abiding citizens and accused law violators. This defense of life standard is well
accepted, and appropriately forms the basis for the Dallas Police Department's policy on the use

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of deadly force.
The departmental policy substantially limits deadly force to defense of life. But the
wording of the policy is complex and can be misleading and misunderstood. It needs to be more
specific and detail the necessity of shooting to defend life. Deputy Chief Price, in his testimony
before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice on May 8, 1987, demonstrated the complexities and
the ambiguities of the Dallas Police Department's policy on deadly force. For example, the policy
that deadly force can be used when an officer or another is in "imminent danger of death or
serious bodily injury." The use of the word imminent needs clarification. If this is intended to
reflect a fear of life, then it should be so stated. If it is intended to mean "likely to occur," then a
problem of definition exists and needs to be clarified. Additionally, training is necessary to teach
the officers what is meant and what is expected. Another question concerns the use of deadly
force directed at occupants of vehicles. It is not clear when this is appropriate and when it is
forbidden. Again, a problem of definition and a need for training exist.

FINDING #10-1
The policy is appropriate as it substantially bases the use of deadly force on defense of
life.
FINDING #10-2
A problem of definition and training exists concerning the phrase "imminent danger of
death or bodily injury," and when the use of deadly force should be used against occupants of
vehicles who are using deadly force against an officer or another.

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FINDING #10-3
The use of force - philosophy statement, which is included in the GENERAL ORDERS, is
vague and does not set forth a system of ideas on which the use of deadly force is predicated.

FINDING #10-4
The policy is confusing and does not integrate the stated philosophy of the department.
The policy is too complex and ambiguous.
FINDING #10-5
The majority of the policy informs the officer when not to use deadly force, but does not
direct the officer how to avoid its use.
FINDING #10-6
The training received by recruits and officers is relevant to the current deadly force
policy, but does not cover the intent of the philosophy statement (see Sections 7 and 9).

RECOMMENDATION #10-1
It is recommended that discretionary decisions, such as what constitutes imminent danger
or the appropriateness of shooting at a vehicle, which are included in the deadly force policy be
well-defined, and explicit training be required which evaluates their intended and unintended
consequences.
RECOMMENDATION #10-2
The statement of philosophy on the use of force is weak. It is recommended that the
philosophy statement concerning use of force, and especially the use of deadly force be reviewed

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and updated as necessary to reflect contemporary requirements of the Department.

RECOMMENDATION #10-3
It is recommended that the statement of philosophy precede the policy of the use of deadly
force in the GENERAL ORDERS, and that the policy of the use of deadly force is the subject of
substantial training.

RECOMMENDATION #10-4
The policy on the use of deadly force establishes necessary limits on the justifiable use of
deadly force. It is recommended that the policy reduce uncertainties and emphasize when deadly
force is necessary. The policy should include alternatives which might be considered.
RECOMMENDATION #10-5
It is recommended that any modifications or changes made in the philosophy statement or
policy must be included in recruit and in-service training.
RECOMMENDATION #10-6
It is recommended that the Firearms Discharge Review Board be given the option to find
a shooting "Justifiable but Avoidable." This category will include shootings which were justified
but could have been avoided by the police officer. From the results of this procedure, academy
and in-service training can be formulated to make officers familiar with alternatives to the use of
deadly force. Additionally, training can encourage the use of these alternatives. The civil liability
implications of this recommendation need to be reviewed by the City Attorney.

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