Labor Standards Cases - 4

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. L-58674-77 July 11, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HON. DOMINGO PANIS, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of Zambales & Olongapo City, Branch III and
SERAPIO ABUG, respondents.
CRUZ, J:
The basic issue in this case is the correct interpretation of Article 13(b) of P.D. 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code, reading as
follows:
(b) Recruitment and placement' refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, hiring, or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for
a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
Four informations were filed on January 9, 1981, in the Court of First Instance of Zambales and Olongapo City alleging that Serapio
Abug, private respondent herein, "without first securing a license from the Ministry of Labor as a holder of authority to operate a feecharging employment agency, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally operate a private fee charging employment
agency by charging fees and expenses (from) and promising employment in Saudi Arabia" to four separate individuals named
therein, in violation of Article 16 in relation to Article 39 of the Labor Code. 1
Abug filed a motion to quash on the ground that the informations did not charge an offense because he was accused of illegally
recruiting only one person in each of the four informations. Under the proviso in Article 13(b), he claimed, there would be illegal
recruitment only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or offered any employment for a fee. " 2
Denied at first, the motion was reconsidered and finally granted in the Orders of the trial court dated June 24 and September 17,
1981. The prosecution is now before us on certiorari. 3
The posture of the petitioner is that the private respondent is being prosecuted under Article 39 in relation to Article 16 of the Labor
Code; hence, Article 13(b) is not applicable. However, as the first two cited articles penalize acts of recruitment and placement
without proper authority, which is the charge embodied in the informations, application of the definition of recruitment and placement
in Article 13(b) is unavoidable.
The view of the private respondents is that to constitute recruitment and placement, all the acts mentioned in this article should
involve dealings with two or mre persons as an indispensable requirement. On the other hand, the petitioner argues that the
requirement of two or more persons is imposed only where the recruitment and placement consists of an offer or promise of
employment to such persons and always in consideration of a fee. The other acts mentioned in the body of the article may involve
even only one person and are not necessarily for profit.
Neither interpretation is acceptable. We fail to see why the proviso should speak only of an offer or promise of employment if the
purpose was to apply the requirement of two or more persons to all the acts mentioned in the basic rule. For its part, the petitioner
does not explain why dealings with two or more persons are needed where the recruitment and placement consists of an offer or
promise of employment but not when it is done through "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring
(of) workers.
As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto but merely
to create a presumption. The presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and placement whenever he or it
is dealing with two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of employment is made in the course of
the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of) workers. "
The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of recruitment and placement of workers. Any of the acts
mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b) win constitute recruitment and placement even if only one prospective worker is involved.
The proviso merely lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected in consideration of a promise or offer of employment
to two or more prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be deemed to be engaged in the act of
recruitment and placement. The words "shall be deemed" create that presumption.
This is not unlike the presumption in article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, for example, regarding the failure of a public officer to
produce upon lawful demand funds or property entrusted to his custody. Such failure shall be prima facie evidence that he has put
them to personal use; in other words, he shall be deemed to have malversed such funds or property. In the instant case, the word
"shall be deemed" should by the same token be given the force of a disputable presumption or of prima facie evidence of engaging
in recruitment and placement. (Klepp vs. Odin Tp., McHenry County 40 ND N.W. 313, 314.)
It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the meaning of the questioned provision for lack of records of debates and
deliberations that would otherwise have been available if the Labor Code had been enacted as a statute rather than a presidential
decree. The trouble with presidential decrees is that they could be, and sometimes were, issued without previous public discussion
or consultation, the promulgator heeding only his own counsel or those of his close advisers in their lofty pinnacle of power. The not
infrequent results are rejection, intentional or not, of the interest of the greater number and, as in the instant case, certain esoteric
provisions that one cannot read against the background facts usually reported in the legislative journals.
At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign against illegal recruitment and placement,
which has victimized many Filipino workers seeking a better life in a foreign land, and investing hard- earned savings or even
borrowed funds in pursuit of their dream, only to be awakened to the reality of a cynical deception at the hands of theirown
countrymen.
WHEREFORE, the Orders of June 24, 1981, and September 17, 1981, are set aside and the four informations against the private
respondent reinstated. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 84082 March 13, 1991

HELLENIC PHILIPPINE SHIPPING, INC., petitioner,
vs.
EPIFANIO C. SIETE and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (NLRC), respondents.
Prudencio Cruz for petitioner.
Robiso, Chavez & Romero for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:p
Challenged in this petition is the decision of the respondent NLRC holding Hellenic Philippine Shipping Company liable for the illegal
dismissal of Capt. Epifanio Siete, herein private respondent, and awarding him salaries and other benefits corresponding to the
unexpired portion of his employment contract. Enforcement of this decision has meanwhile been held in abeyance pursuant to our
temporary restraining order dated August 3, 1988.
Siete was employed on May 22, 1985, as Master of M/V Houda G by Sultan Shipping Co., Ltd., through its crewing agent, herein
petitioner. He boarded the vessel on May 24, 1985, at Cyprus. From there, it sailed on June 1, 1985, to El Ferrol, Spain, where it
loaded cargo that it subsequently discharged at Tripoli, Lebanon, from June 25-29, 1985. It then proceeded back to Cyprus, arriving
there on June 30, 1985.
On July 8, 1985, Capt. Wilfredo Lim boarded the vessel and advised Siete that he had instructions from the owners to take over its
command. These instructions were confirmed by a telex sent by Sultan Shipping to Siete on July 10, 1985. Neither Lim nor the telex
indicated the reason for his relief. The private respondent claims this information was also withheld from him by the petitioner upon
his repatriation to Manila.
On July 12, 1985, Siete filed a complaint against the petitioner for illegal dismissal and non-payment of his salary and other benefits
under their employment contract. On September 6, 1985, the petitioner alleged in its answer that the complainant had been
dismissed because of his failure to complete with the instruction of Sultan Shipping to erase the timber load line on the vessel and
for his negligence in the discharge of the cargo at Tripoli that endangered the vessel and stevedores. Siete denied these averments
in his reply dated September 23, 1985, and reiterated that he had not earlier been informed of the cause of his dismissal and
repatriation, either in Cyprus or later in Manila.
After considering the position papers and documentary evidence of the parties, Administrator Tomas D. Achacoso of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) dismissed the complaint, holding that there was valid cause for Siete's removal. 2 The
decision placed much value on the various communications presented by the petitioner to show that Siete was indeed guilty of the
charges that justified his separation.
On January 4, 1988, the private respondent appealed to the NLRC, contending that the records presented by the petitioner were
prepared long after his dismissal and were especially suspect because they came from persons in the employ of Sultan Shipping.
He insisted that he was dismissed without even being informed of the charges against him or given an opportunity to refute them.
He added that, even assuming he was negligent in the unloading of the cargo at Tripoli, this shortcoming did not warrant such a
severe penalty as his dismissal.
In its decision dated June 27, 1988, 3 the public respondent reversed the POEA Administrator, holding that the dismissal violated
due process and that the documents submitted by the petitioner were hearsay, self-serving, and not verified. Accordingly, it
disposed as follows:
A new decision is entered finding the dismissal of complainant as illegal. Respondent is hereby ordered to pay to
the complainant his salaries, wages and other benefits corresponding to the unexpired portion of his employment
contract with Sultan Shipping Company, Ltd., dated May 22, 1985.
The petitioner now faults this decision as having been reached with grave abuse of discretion. It contends that the private
respondent had been instructed to erase the timber load line on the vessel; that he had indeed been negligent in supervising the
unloading of the cargo at Tripoli, resulting in the replacement of certain damaged equipment; and that he had not been denied due
process, considering the summary nature of the proceedings that had to be taken in view of the nature of his position. Moreover,
assuming the awards were justified, there was a mistake in their computation because the amount of $400.90 previously collected
by Siete had not been deducted.
Certiorari is denied.
The findings of fact of public respondent are conclusive on this Court, there being no showing that they were reached arbitrarily.
Substantial evidence has established that the private respondent was indeed not notified of the charges against him and that no
investigation was conducted to justify his dismissal. Moreover, the petitioner has failed to prove that Siete had been instructed to
erase the timber load lines and that he had been negligent in the cargo unloading at Tripoli.
The Court notes that the reports submitted by the petitioner to prove its charges were all prepared after the fact of Siete's dismissal
and were signed by its own employees. 4 Their motives are necessarily suspect. The mere fact that they have made such reports
does not itself prove the charges, which were investigated ex parte, if at all. It is not denied that Siete was not informed of the
charges beforehand or that he was given an opportunity to refute them. Even after his arrival in Manila, he was kept in the dark
about the reason for his dismissal. The excuse of the petitioner that it itself did not know why he was dismissed, being only a
crewing agent of Sultan Shipping, deserves no comment.
The Labor Code provides as follows:
Sec. 1. Security of tenure and due process. No worker shall be dismissed except for a just or authorized cause
provided by law and after due process.
Sec. 2. Notice of dismissal. Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice
stating the particular acts or omission constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work,
the notice shall be served at the worker's last known address.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. The worker may answer the allegations stated against him in the notice of
dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The employer shall afford the worker ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative, if he so desires.
Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. The employer shall immediately notify a worker in writing of a decision to dismiss
him stating clearly the reasons therefor.
The petitioner argues that whatever defects might have tainted the private respondent's dismissal were subsequently cured when
the charges against him were specified and sufficiently discussed in the position papers submitted by the parties to the POEA. That
argument is unacceptable. The issue before the POEA was in fact the lack of due process in Siete's dismissal. The law requires that
the investigation be conducted before the dismissal, not after. That omission cannot be corrected by the investigation later
conducted by the POEA. As the Solicitor General correctly maintained, the due process requirement in the dismissal process is
different from the due process requirement in the POEA proceeding. Both requirements must be separately observed.
While it is true that in Wenphil Corp. v. NLRC 5 and Rubberworld (Phils.) v. NLRC 6 the lack of due process before the dismissal of
the employee was deemed corrected by the subsequent administrative proceedings where the dismissed employee was given a
chance to be heard, those cases involved dismissals that were later proved to be for a valid cause. The doctrine in those cases is
not applicable to the case at bar because our findings here is that the dismissal was not justified.
The argument that the afore-quoted provisions are not applicable to the private respondent because he was a managerial employee
must also be rejected. It is not correct to say that managerial employees may be arbitrarily dismissed, at any time and without cause
as established in an appropriate investigation. Managerial employees, no less than rank-and-file laborers, are entitled to due
process. Loss of confidence, which is the usual ground for the removal of the managerial employee, must be established like any
other lawful cause. 7 Even if it be assumed that Siete was a managerial employee an issue which, incidentally, was not earlier
raised or resolved the petitioner has not satisfactorily proved the reason for its supposed loss of confidence in him.
It is not true that the vessel would be left unattended if the captain were to be placed under investigation because he would not have
a ready replacement. The petitioner forgets that under Article 627 of the Code of Commerce:
Art. 627. The sailing mate, as the second chief of the vessel and unless the ship agent does not order otherwise,
shall take the place of the captain in case of absence, sickness or death and shall then assume all Ins powers,
obligations and liabilities.
let alone the fact that in the particular case of Siete, there was actually a ready replacement for him. This was Capt. Lim who, on
instruction of Sultan Shipping, boarded the vessel on July 8, 1985, purposely to take over its command from Capt. Siete.
The Court reiterates the ruling that private employment agencies are jointly and severally liable with the foreign-based employer for
any violation of the recruitment agreement or the contract of employment. 8 As a requirement for the issuance to it of a license to
operate a private recruiting agency, a verified undertaking was made by the petitioner that it would "assume joint and solidary
liability with the employer for all claims and liabilities which (might) arise in connection with the implementation of the contract of
employment." It cannot now contend that as a mere crewing agent it cannot be made to answer for the liabilities of Sultan Shipping.
The reason for the above-mentioned requirement is obvious. Were the rule otherwise, employees with legitimate demands against
the employer would be helpless to enforce them because the latter has no office or properties in this jurisdiction. Violation of the
employment contract would remain unredressed. It was precisely to correct this difficulty that the recruiting agent is now required, as
a condition for the issuance to it of a license to operate, to assure the employee that he has remedies available in this country even
if the culpable employer is beyond the reach of our courts.
It need only be noted that there was a slight error in the computation of the award due the private respondent which he himself
acknowledges. This was the failure to deduct from his total award the amount of $400.90 he admitted having earlier collected in
Cyprus. As corrected, the computation of the total award should be as follows:
Monthly Basic Pay US$1,200.00
Monthly Allowance 500.00
Total Monthly Compensation US$1,700.00

One-Year Salary & Allowance
(US$1,700.00 x 12) US$20,400.00
Plus: One-Month Leave Pay 1,700.00
US$22,100.00
Less: Cash Advances:

Manila US$600.00
Spain 64.70
Lebanon 500.00
1,164.70
Slapchest 28.36
Bal. of ship
cash fund 400.90
Total Deductions 1,593.96
Total Amount Due US$20,506.04
We are not persuaded that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in reversing the findings of the POEA sustaining the
petitioner and dismissing the private respondent's complaint. On the contrary, we agree that the private respondent was illegally
dismissed because, first, he was not accorded a fair investigation as required by law, and second, because the grounds invoked for
his separation have not been proved by the petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the challenged decision as above modified is AFFIRMED and the petition DISMISSED, with costs against the
petitioner. The temporary restraining order dated August 3,1988, is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 113161 August 29, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LOMA GOCE y OLALIA, DAN GOCE and NELLY D. AGUSTIN, accused. NELLY D. AGUSTIN, accused-appellant.
REGALADO, J.:
On January 12, 1988, an information for illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate and in large scale, punishable under Articles
38 and 39 of the Labor Code (Presidential Decree No. 442) as amended by Section 1(b) of Presidential Decree No. 2018, was filed
against spouses Dan and Loma Goce and herein accused-appellant Nelly Agustin in the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 5,
alleging
That in or about and during the period comprised between May 1986 and June 25, 1987, both dates inclusive, in
the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating together and helping one another,
representing themselves to have the capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment
abroad, did then and there willfully and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement
abroad, to (1) Rolando Dalida y Piernas, (2) Ernesto Alvarez y Lubangco, (3) Rogelio Salado y Savillo, (4)
Ramona Salado y Alvarez, (5) Dionisio Masaya y de Guzman, (6) Dave Rivera y de Leon, (7) Lorenzo Alvarez y
Velayo, and (8) Nelson Trinidad y Santos, without first having secured the required license or authority from the
Department of Labor. 1
On January 21, 1987, a warrant of arrest was issued against the three accused but not one of them was arrested. 2 Hence, on
February 2, 1989, the trial court ordered the case archived but it issued a standing warrant of arrest against the accused. 3
Thereafter, on learning of the whereabouts of the accused, one of the offended parties, Rogelio Salado, requested on March 17,
1989 for a copy of the warrant of arrest. 4 Eventually, at around midday of February 26, 1993, Nelly Agustin was apprehended by the
Paraaque police. 5 On March 8, 1993, her counsel filed a motion to revive the case and requested that it be set for hearing "for
purposes of due process and for the accused to immediately have her day in court" 6 Thus, on April 15, 1993, the trial court
reinstated the case and set the arraignment for May 3, 1993, 7 on which date of Agustin pleaded not guilty 8 and the case
subsequently went to trial.
Four of the complainants testified for the prosecution. Rogelio Salado was the first to take the witness stand and he declared that
sometime in March or April, 1987, he was introduced by Lorenzo Alvarez, his brother-in-law and a co-applicant, to Nelly Agustin in
the latter's residence at Factor, Dongalo, Paraaque, Metro Manila. Representing herself as the manager of the Clover Placement
Agency, Agustin showed him a job order as proof that he could readily be deployed for overseas employment. Salado learned that
he had to pay P5,000.00 as processing fee, which amount he gave sometime in April or May of the same year. He was issued the
corresponding receipt. 9
Also in April or May, 1987, Salado, accompanied by five other applicants who were his relatives, went to the office of the placement
agency at Nakpil Street, Ermita, Manila where he saw Agustin and met the spouses Dan and Loma Goce, owners of the agency. He
submitted his bio-data and learned from Loma Goce that he had to give P12,000.00, instead of the original amount of P5,000.00 for
the placement fee. Although surprised at the new and higher sum, they subsequently agreed as long as there was an assurance
that they could leave for abroad. 10
Thereafter, a receipt was issued in the name of the Clover Placement Agency showing that Salado and his aforesaid co-applicants
each paid P2,000.00, instead of the P5,000.00 which each of them actually paid. Several months passed but Salado failed to leave
for the promised overseas employment. Hence, in October, 1987, along with the other recruits, he decided to go to the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to verify the real status of Clover Placement Agency. They discovered that said
agency was not duly licensed to recruit job applicants. Later, upon learning that Agustin had been arrested, Salado decided to see
her and to demand the return of the money he had paid, but Agustin could only give him P500.00. 11
Ramona Salado, the wife of Rogelio Salado, came to know through her brother, Lorenzo Alvarez, about Nelly Agustin. Accompanied
by her husband, Rogelio, Ramona went to see Agustin at the latter's residence. Agustin persuaded her to apply as a cutter/sewer in
Oman so that she could join her husband. Encouraged by Agustin's promise that she and her husband could live together while
working in Oman, she instructed her husband to give Agustin P2,000.00 for each of them as placement fee, or the total sum of
P4,000.00. 12
Much later, the Salado couple received a telegram from the placement agency requiring them to report to its office because the
"NOC" (visa) had allegedly arrived. Again, around February, or March, 1987, Rogelio gave P2,000.00 as payment for his and his
wife's passports. Despite follow-up of their papers twice a week from February to June, 1987, he and his wife failed to leave for
abroad. 13
Complainant Dionisio Masaya, accompanied by his brother-in-law, Aquiles Ortega, applied for a job in Oman with the Clover
Placement Agency at Paraaque, the agency's former office address. There, Masaya met Nelly Agustin, who introduced herself as
the manager of the agency, and the Goce spouses, Dan and Loma, as well as the latter's daughter. He submitted several pertinent
documents, such as his bio-data and school credentials. 14
In May, 1986, Masaya gave Dan Goce P1,900.00 as an initial downpayment for the placement fee, and in September of that same
year, he gave an additional P10,000.00. He was issued receipts for said amounts and was advised to go to the placement office
once in a while to follow up his application, which he faithfully did. Much to his dismay and chagrin, he failed to leave for abroad as
promised. Accordingly, he was forced to demand that his money be refunded but Loma Goce could give him back only P4,000.00 in
installments. 15
As the prosecution's fourth and last witness, Ernesto Alvarez took the witness stand on June 7, 1993. He testified that in February,
1987, he met appellant Agustin through his cousin, Larry Alvarez, at her residence in Paraaque. She informed him that "madalas
siyang nagpapalakad sa Oman" and offered him a job as an ambulance driver at the Royal Hospital in Oman with a monthly salary
of about $600.00 to $700.00. 16
On March 10, 1987, Alvarez gave an initial amount of P3,000.00 as processing fee to Agustin at the latter's residence. In the same
month, he gave another P3,000.00, this time in the office of the placement agency. Agustin assured him that he could leave for
abroad before the end of 1987. He returned several times to the placement agency's office to follow up his application but to no
avail. Frustrated, he demanded the return of the money he had paid, but Agustin could only give back P500.00. Thereafter, he
looked for Agustin about eight times, but he could no longer find her. 17
Only herein appellant Agustin testified for the defense. She asserted that Dan and Loma Goce were her neighbors at Tambo,
Paraaque and that they were licensed recruiters and owners of the Clover Placement Agency. Previously, the Goce couple was
able to send her son, Reynaldo Agustin, to Saudi Arabia. Agustin met the aforementioned complainants through Lorenzo Alvarez
who requested her to introduce them to the Goce couple, to which request she acceded. 18
Denying any participation in the illegal recruitment and maintaining that the recruitment was perpetrated only by the Goce couple,
Agustin denied any knowledge of the receipts presented by the prosecution. She insisted that the complainants included her in the
complaint thinking that this would compel her to reveal the whereabouts of the Goce spouses. She failed to do so because in truth,
so she claims, she does not know the present address of the couple. All she knew was that they had left their residence in 1987. 19
Although she admitted having given P500.00 each to Rogelio Salado and Alvarez, she explained that it was entirely for different
reasons. Salado had supposedly asked for a loan, while Alvarez needed money because he was sick at that time. 20
On November 19, 1993, the trial court rendered judgment finding herein appellant guilty as a principal in the crime of illegal
recruitment in large scale, and sentencing her to serve the penalty of life imprisonment, as well as to pay a fine of P100,000.00. 21
In her present appeal, appellant Agustin raises the following arguments: (1) her act of introducing complainants to the Goce couple
does not fall within the meaning of illegal recruitment and placement under Article 13(b) in relation to Article 34 of the Labor Code;
(2) there is no proof of conspiracy to commit illegal recruitment among appellant and the Goce spouses; and (3) there is no proof
that appellant offered or promised overseas employment to the complainants. 22 These three arguments being interrelated, they will
be discussed together.
Herein appellant is accused of violating Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code. Article 38 of the Labor Code, as amended by
Presidential Decree No. 2018, provides that any recruitment activity, including the prohibited practices enumerated in Article 34 of
said Code, undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39 thereof.
The same article further provides that illegal recruitment shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage if any of these
qualifying circumstances exist, namely, (a) when illegal recruitment is committed by a syndicate, i.e., if it is carried out by a group of
three or more persons conspiring and/or confederating with one another; or (b) when illegal recruitment is committed in large scale,
i.e., if it is committed against three or more persons individually or as a group.
At the outset, it should be made clear that all the accused in this case were not authorized to engage in any recruitment activity, as
evidenced by a certification issued by Cecilia E. Curso, Chief of the Licensing and Regulation Office of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, on November 10, 1987. Said certification states that Dan and Loma Goce and Nelly Agustin are neither
licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas
employment. 23 Appellant does not dispute this. As a matter of fact her counsel agreed to stipulate that she was neither licensed nor
authorized to recruit applicants for overseas employment. Appellant, however, denies that she was in any way guilty of illegal
recruitment. 24
It is appellant's defensive theory that all she did was to introduce complainants to the Goce spouses. Being a neighbor of said
couple, and owing to the fact that her son's overseas job application was processed and facilitated by them, the complainants asked
her to introduce them to said spouses. Allegedly out of the goodness of her heart, she complied with their request. Such an act,
appellant argues, does not fall within the meaning of "referral" under the Labor Code to make her liable for illegal recruitment.
Under said Code, recruitment and placement refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for
profit or not; provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement. 25 On the other hand, referral is the act of passing along or
forwarding of an applicant for employment after an initial interview of a selected applicant for employment to a selected employer,
placement officer or bureau. 26
Hence, the inevitable query is whether or not appellant Agustin merely introduced complainants to the Goce couple or her actions
went beyond that. The testimonial evidence hereon show that she indeed further committed acts constitutive of illegal recruitment.
All four prosecution witnesses testified that it was Agustin whom they initially approached regarding their plans of working overseas.
It was from her that they learned about the fees they had to pay, as well as the papers that they had to submit. It was after they had
talked to her that they met the accused spouses who owned the placement agency.
As correctly held by the trial court, being an employee of the Goces, it was therefore logical for appellant to introduce the applicants
to said spouses, they being the owners of the agency. As such, appellant was actually making referrals to the agency of which she
was a part. She was therefore engaging in recruitment activity. 27
Despite Agustin's pretensions that she was but a neighbor of the Goce couple, the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses paint a
different picture. Rogelio Salado and Dionisio Masaya testified that appellant represented herself as the manager of the Clover
Placement Agency. Ramona Salado was offered a job as a cutter/sewer by Agustin the first time they met, while Ernesto Alvarez
remembered that when he first met Agustin, the latter represented herself as "nagpapaalis papunta sa Oman." 28 Indeed, Agustin
played a pivotal role in the operations of the recruitment agency, working together with the Goce couple.
There is illegal recruitment when one gives the impression of having the ability to send a worker abroad." 29 It is undisputed that
appellant gave complainants the distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send people abroad for work such that the
latter were convinced to give her the money she demanded in order to be so employed. 30
It cannot be denied that Agustin received from complainants various sums for purpose of their applications. Her act of collecting
from each of the complainants payment for their respective passports, training fees, placement fees, medical tests and other sundry
expenses unquestionably constitutes an act of recruitment within the meaning of the law. In fact, appellant demanded and received
from complainants amounts beyond the allowable limit of P5,000.00 under government regulations. It is true that the mere act of a
cashier in receiving money far exceeding the amount allowed by law was not considered per se as "recruitment and placement" in
contemplation of law, but that was because the recipient had no other participation in the transactions and did not conspire with her
co-accused in defrauding the victims. 31 That is not the case here.
Appellant further argues that "there is no evidence of receipts of collections/payments from complainants to appellant." On the
contrary, xerox copies of said receipts/vouchers were presented by the prosecution. For instance, a cash voucher marked as Exhibit
D, 32 showing the receipt of P10,000.00 for placement fee and duly signed by appellant, was presented by the prosecution. Another
receipt, identified as Exhibit E, 33 was issued and signed by appellant on February 5, 1987 to acknowledge receipt of P4,000.00
from Rogelio and Ramona Salado for "processing of documents for Oman." Still another receipt dated March 10, 1987 and
presented in evidence as Exhibit F, shows that appellant received from Ernesto Alvarez P2,000.00 for "processing of documents for
Oman." 34
Apparently, the original copies of said receipts/vouchers were lost, hence only xerox copies thereof were presented and which,
under the circumstances, were admissible in evidence. When the original writing has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced
in court, upon proof of its execution and loss or destruction, or unavailability, its contents may be proved by a copy or a recital of its
contents in some authentic document, or by the recollection of witnesses. 35
Even assuming arguendo that the xerox copies presented by the prosecution as secondary evidence are not allowable in court, still
the absence thereof does not warrant the acquittal of appellant. In People vs. Comia, 36 where this particular issue was involved, the
Court held that the complainants' failure to ask for receipts for the fees they paid to the accused therein, as well as their consequent
failure to present receipts before the trial court as proof of the said payments, is not fatal to their case. The complainants duly
proved by their respective testimonies that said accused was involved in the entire recruitment process. Their testimonies in this
regard, being clear and positive, were declared sufficient to establish that factum probandum.
Indeed, the trial court was justified and correct in accepting the version of the prosecution witnesses, their statements being positive
and affirmative in nature. This is more worthy of credit than the mere uncorroborated and self-serving denials of appellant. The lame
defense consisting of such bare denials by appellant cannot overcome the evidence presented by the prosecution proving her guilt
beyond reasonable doubt. 37
The presence of documentary evidence notwithstanding, this case essentially involves the credibility of witnesses which is best left
to the judgment of the trial court, in the absence of abuse of discretion therein. The findings of fact of a trial court, arrived at only
after a hearing and evaluation of what can usually be expected to be conflicting testimonies of witnesses, certainly deserve respect
by an appellate court. 38 Generally, the findings of fact of the trial court on the matter of credibility of witnesses will not be disturbed
on appeal. 39
In a last-ditch effort to exculpate herself from conviction, appellant argues that there is no proof of conspiracy between her and the
Goce couple as to make her liable for illegal recruitment. We do not agree. The evidence presented by the prosecution clearly
establish that appellant confabulated with the Goces in their plan to deceive the complainants. Although said accused couple have
not been tried and convicted, nonetheless there is sufficient basis for appellant's conviction as discussed above.
In People vs. Sendon, 40 we held that the non-prosecution of another suspect therein provided no ground for the appellant
concerned to fault the decision of the trial court convicting her. The prosecution of other persons, equally or more culpable than
herein appellant, may come later after their true identities and addresses shall have been ascertained and said malefactors duly
taken into custody. We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule and course of procedure should not apply in this case.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the court a quo is hereby AFFIRMED in toto, with costs against accused-appellant Nelly
D. Agustin.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 115350. September 30, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RESTITUTO PABALAN y CALILONG, accused-appellant.
[G.R. Nos. 117819-21. September 30, 1996]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RESTITUTO PABALAN y CALILONG, accused-appellant.

DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
Accused-Appellant Restituto C. Pabalan was charged with illegal recruitment in large scale and three counts of estafa in separate
informations filed before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 171.i[1]
The information in each case reads as follows:
Criminal Case No. 3089-V-93:
That during the period from April up to June 1993 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, representing himself to have the capacity to contract, enlist and recruit workers for employment abroad, did
then and there wilfully and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise employment/job placement in a large scale to HENRY LUCIANO
y PALLASIGUE, JUNE BARRERA Y PINEDA and MANUEL GARCIA Y RAGUA, without said accused having secured first the
necessary license or authority to engage in recruitment activity from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), in
violation of the aforementioned provision of law.
Contrary to law.
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, August 18, 1993.ii[2]
Criminal Case No. 3090-V-93
That sometime in the month of May, 1993 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, defrauded and deceived one JUNE D. BARRERA, in the following manner to wit: said accused, by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representation which (he) made to the said complainant to the effect that he has the capacity and
power to recruit and employ complainant abroad and facilitate the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, knowing
said manifestations and representation to be false and fraudulent and w(e)re made only to induce said complainant to give, as in
fact, the latter did give and deliver to said accused cash money amounting to P100,000.00, but said accused, once in possession of
the same, with intent to defraud and deceive the herein complainant, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misapply,
misappropriate and convert to his own personal use and benefit, despite demands made upon him to return the said amount of
P100,000.00 said accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the complainant in
the aforementioned amount of P100,000.00.
Contrary to law.
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, August 18, 1993.iii[3]
That sometime in the month of April, 1993 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, defrauded and deceived one MANUEL R. GARCIA, in the following manner to wit: said accused, by means of false
manifestations and fraudulent representation which (he) made to the said complainant to the effect that he has the capacity and
power to recruit and employ complainant abroad and facilitate the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof, knowing
said manifestations and representation to be false and fraudulent and w(e)re made only to induce said complainant to give, as in
fact, the latter did give and deliver to said accused cash money amounting to P26,000.00 and $1,600.00, said accused failed and
refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of the complainant in the aforementioned amount of
P26,000.00 and $1,600.00.
Contrary to law.
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, August 18, 1993.iv[4]
That sometime in the month of May, 1993 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, defrauded and deceived one HENRY LUCIANO y PALLASIGUE, in the following manner to wit: said accused, by
means of false manifestations and fraudulent representation which (he) made to the said complainant to the effect that he has the
capacity and power to recruit and employ complainant abroad and facilitate the necessary amount to meet the requirements thereof,
knowing said manifestations and representation to be false and fraudulent and w(e)re made only to induce said complainant to give,
as in fact, the latter did give and deliver to said accused cash money amounting to P100,000.00, but said accused, once in
possession of the same, with intent to defraud and deceive the herein complainant, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously misapply, misappropriate and convert to his own personal use and benefit, despite demands made upon him to return
the said amount of P100,000.00, said accused failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of
the complainant in the aforementioned amount of P100,000.00.
Contrary to law.
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, August 18, 1993.v[5]
Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged. As said indictments are founded on the same facts, the
cases were tried jointly. The prosecution presented the three complainants in the criminal cases and they identified appellant as the
person who perpetrated the crimes of illegal recruitment and estafa against them.
According to June D. Barrera,vi[6] he met appellant on May 9, 1993 in Lacmit, Arayat, Pampanga. Appellant told him that he could
send him abroad and promised him a job in a construction company in Japan. On that assurance, Barrera gave an initial amount of
P2,000.00 on that same day to appellant for the processing of his passport. Thereafter, he gave another P5,000.00 on May 15,
1993. On May 19, 1993, Barrera went to appellants residence in Marulas, Bulacan and gave him P20,000.00 for the airplane ticket
for the trip to Japan. These three amounts were covered by a receipt for P27,000.00 breaking down the expenses as follows:
services rendered, round-trip plane ticket, travel tax and hotel reservations.vii[7]
Appellant subsequently explained to Barrera that they would have to use Saipan as an entry point to Japan. Accordingly, Barrera
gave appellant $500.00 as an additional payment for the plane ticket to Saipan.
Accompanied by appellant, he and other job-seekers were able to reach Saipan where they stayed for six days in a hotel. In
Saipan, Barrera gave appellant another $2,000.00, supposedly required as show money attesting to his financial capacity, in order
to obtain an airplane ticket to Japan. They were able to reach Japan but were detained immediately upon arrival for want of a job
order to work in that country. On the following day, they were sent back to the Philippines.
Back in this country, appellant kept on assuring Barrera that he would send him back to Japan, but nothing materialized from his
promises. Barrera disclosed to the court that he only borrowed money and mortgaged his land to raise the necessary amounts
demanded by appellant.
Henry Luciano testifiedviii[8] that he met appellant on May 9, 1993 in Lacmit, Arayat, Pampanga through his cousin, June Barrera.
Appellant told him that he could arrange employment for him abroad for P100,000.00 and once he shall already be working, he
should give him an additional P20,000.00. To start the processing of the documents needed for his travel, Luciano gave P3,500.00
to appellant.ix[9] Then on May 19, 1993, in the company of his cousin, Luciano gave P28,900.00 to appellant for the following
expenses services rendered, round-trip plane ticket, travel tax and hotel reservations.x[10] Then, on May 27, 1993, he gave
P12,000.00 more to appellant as additional payment for his airplane ticket.
Luciano, appellant and other job-seekers left Manila for Saipan on June 2, 1993 and stayed in said territory for six days. In Saipan,
Luciano again gave $2,000.00 to appellant for his airplane ticket to Japan. However, upon reaching Japan, they were detained by
the immigration officers at the airport in Narita because they had no working visas. After staying overnight in a detention house,
they were deported to the Philippines.
Just like his cousin, Luciano declared that he had borrowed money and mortgaged his land just to raise the amount needed for his
placement overseas.
Manuel Garcia testifiedxi[11] December 3, 1993, 2-10.11 that he was introduced by a friend to appellant sometime in March, 1993.
Appellant promised him in that meeting that he could get him a job abroad. On April 3, 1993, Garcia gave P26,000.00 to appellant
as payment for the latters services in finding him employment overseas.
Together with Barrera, Luciano, one Emerito Isip, one Aquilino Espino, Jr., and appellant himself, Garcia left the Philippines for
Saipan sometime in June of that year. In Saipan, he gave an additional $1,600.00 to appellant as requested by the latter.
Thereafter, upon instructions of appellant, he and Espino left one day ahead of the group in going to Japan. Just like the misfortune
that would befall their other companions, the two were apprehended upon reaching the airport in Japan and were later deported to
the Philippines.
It is undisputed that appellant was not qualified to recruit workers. He admitted the authenticity and due execution of the
certification issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to the effect that he was not licensed or
authorized by the Administration to recruit workers for overseas employment.xii[12]
However, he anchored his defense on a total denial of the illegal acts imputed to him. Appellant contended that he was never
engaged in illegal recruitment when he dealt with Barrera and Luciano, and that he had no transaction whatsoever with Garcia.
In his testimony in the lower court,xiii[13] appellant claimed that he first met Barrera and Luciano in the last week of April, 1993 when
the duo came to his house with a letter from a former mayor of Arayat requesting him to help them get tourist visas for Japan. They
told him that they wanted to go to Japan as tourists.
Knowing that it was hard to get a tourist visa at the Japanese Embassy, he advised them to first go to Saipan and then proceed
from there to Japan. He explained that it was easy to go to Japan through Saipan because foreigners who stay in Saipan for one
week can enter Japan as transit passengers for seventy-two hours and secure short pass visas for their use.
After the two had gotten their passports, appellant accompanied them to the Philippine Travel Agency at Ermita, Manila to buy their
round-trip airplane tickets for Saipan. Appellant also bought a ticket for himself because he allegedly had a friend in Japan whom
he wanted to visit.
In Saipan, they stayed at the MMF Hotel for seven days and paid for their own expenses. It was also in Saipan where they bought
their tickets for Japan. Upon entering Japan, however, they were brought to the Narita rest house immigration jail. They were
denied short pass visas because of tight security in connection with the preparations for the wedding of the Emperors son.
Subsequently, they were expatriated from Japan.
Appellant, on the other hand, claimed that it was only in Saipan that he met Garcia and disclaimed having promised a job to the
latter. He further denied having received any money from complainants, but admitted that the signatures in the receipts are his.
After joint trial duly conducted, the lower court found appellant guilty of all the charges and rendered the following judgment:
WHEREFORE, finding accused Restituto Pabalan y Calilong:
CRIMINAL CASE NO. 3089-V-93
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment (in) large scale, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA and to pay a fine of ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) and the costs of suit.
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa defined and punished under Article 315 (2) (a) of the Revised Penal Code, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to
FOURTEEN (14) YEARS of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law and to pay the costs.
The accused is hereby ordered to pay the offended party the sum of P89,000.00.
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment from SIX (6) YEARS of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to TWELVE (12)
YEARS of Prision Mayor, as maximum, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law and to pay the costs.
The accused is ordered to pay the offended party the sum of P66,000.00
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate imprisonment from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE (10) DAY of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to
FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum, with the accessory penalties prescribed by law and to pay the costs.
The accused is ordered to pay the offended party the sum of P94,400.00.
SO ORDERED.xiv[14]
Hence, this appeal, on the ground that the trial court erred in convicting appellant of the crimes of illegal recruitment in large scale
and estafa despite the absence of evidence showing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.xv[15] Upon motion of appellant, the First
Division of this Court ordered the consolidation of G.R. Nos. 117819-21 (the appeal in Criminal Case Nos. 3090-V-93, 3091-V-93
and 3092-V-93) with G.R. No. 115350 (the appeal in Criminal Case No. 3089-V-93).xvi[16] His brief filed thereafter presents a slew of
arguments seeking to overturn his conviction in the aforementioned cases.
Firstly, appellant posits that he cannot be convicted of illegal recruitment because of the absence of receipts indicating that
complainants did pay him fees in consideration of his services.xvii[17]
Although not all of the amounts testified to by complainants were covered by receipts, the fact that there were no receipts for some
of the amounts delivered to him does not mean that appellant did not accept or receive such payments. This Court has ruled in
several cases that the absence of receipts in a criminal case for illegal recruitment does not warrant the acquittal of the accused and
is not fatal to the case of the prosecution.xviii[18] As long as the witnesses had positively shown through their respective testimonies
that the accused is the one involved in the prohibited recruitment, he may be convicted of the offense despite the want of receipts.
The Statute of Frauds and the rules of evidence do not require the presentation of receipts in order to prove the existence of a
recruitment agreement and the procurement of fees in illegal recruitment cases. The amounts may consequently be proved by the
testimony of witnesses.
The finding of illegal recruitment in large scale is justified whenever the following elements are present: (1) that the offender
engages in the recruitment and placement of workers as defined in Article 13(b) of the Labor Code or in any prohibited activities
under Article 34 of the same code; (2) that the offender does not have a license or authority to recruit and deploy workers, either
locally or overseas; and (3) that the offender commits the same against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group.xix[19]
Article 13(b) characterizes recruitment and placement as any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring
or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether
for profit or not.
It will readily be noted, as earlier explained, that the exhibition of receipts is not necessary for the successful prosecution of the
offense of illegal recruitment in large scale. Since all of the above elements were satisfactorily proven by the prosecution before the
court a quo through the testimonies of its witnesses and by competent documents, then the non-presentation of receipts should not
in any way hinder the conviction of appellant.
Secondly, appellant faults the lower court for giving credence to the testimony of complainant Garcia. He claims that aside from the
testimony of Garcia, there is no other evidence presented by the prosecution to show that there was a recruitment agreement
between them and that money was received by appellant. His alleged companion in Saipan, Aquilino Espino, was not even
presented to corroborate his story.xx[20]
The fact that no additional evidence was presented, aside from the testimony of Garcia, will not militate against his credibility.
Corroborative evidence is necessary only when there are reasons to warrant the suspicion that the witness falsified the truth or that
his observations are incorrect.xxi[21] Complainant Garcias straightforward and clear testimony renders unnecessary the
presentation of documents and other evidence to prove that appellant was the one who engaged him to work abroad.
Neither will the failure of the prosecution to present Espino diminish the credibility of Garcia. It has been held that the nonpresentation of certain witnesses by the prosecution is not a plausible defense and the matter of whom to present as witnesses for
the prosecution lies in the sound discretion of the prosecutor handling the case.xxii[22] Thus no adverse inference against the case of
the People can be deduced from the failure of the prosecution to present Espino. Besides, if the prosecution had opted to present
Espino, his testimony would merely be corroborative and can thus be dispensed with. xxiii[23]
Appellant further attacks the credibility of Garcia by theorizing that it was preposterous to buy the latters airplane ticket on March
29, 1993 when, according to his own testimony, he met appellant only on April 3, 1993.xxiv[24] It is, however, well settled that minor
discrepancies in the testimony of a prosecution witness do not affect his credibility.xxv[25]
The alleged inconsistencies are too insignificant to adversely affect the testimony of witness Garcia. Given the natural frailties of
the human mind and its incapacity to assimilate all material details of a given incident, slight inconsistencies and variances in the
declarations of a witness hardly weaken their probative value.xxvi[26]
Lastly, appellant asserts that his version should have been believed by the court below since the fact that complainants reached
Japan indicates that he did not recruit them.xxvii[27] It will be observed therefrom that appellants arguments seeking to disprove the
conclusion on illegal recruitment actually assail the stamp of confidence placed by the court a quo upon the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses.
The best arbiter on the issue of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses and of appellant is the trial court. When the inquiry is
one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will generally not disturb the findings of the trial court, considering that the latter is in
a better position to decide the question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying during the trial, unless it plainly overlooked certain facts of substance and value which, if considered, might affect the
result of the case.xxviii[28]
After a thorough and painstaking review, the Court is satisfied that there is nothing in the records of these cases which signify that
the trial court might have ignored or misappreciated substantial facts as would warrant a reversal of its findings and conclusions.
All the witnesses for the prosecution categorically testified that it was appellant who promised them that he could arrange for and
facilitate their employment abroad. We quote with approval the conclusion of the lower court that x x x the narration of the
prosecution witnesses Henry Luciano, June Barrera and Manuel Garcia are the more believable story. Their testimonies appeared
credible. There is no reason not to believe or discard their testimonies. There is no sign that they testified falsely against the
accused.xxix[29]
Denials of an accused cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the positive declarations of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters.xxx[30] Verily, the trial court was correct in accepting the version of the prosecution witnesses as their statements
are positive and affirmative in nature. Their testimonies are more worthy of credit that the uncorroboratedxxxi[31] and self-serving
denials of appellant.
Just like the lower court, we find it hard to believe the story presented by appellant that he merely helped Barrera and Luciano in
going to Japan as tourists. Barrera was without gainful work and Luciano was merely a farmerxxxii[32] at the time they met appellant.
It is incompatible with human behaviour and contrary to ordinary experience that people already in dire financial straits will make
their lives more miserable by borrowing money and mortgaging their properties just so they can visit and tour a foreign land.
Appellant finally stresses that if indeed he was guilty of illegal recruitment, he could have simply changed his residence to evade
prosecution.xxxiii[33] This argument is, unfortunately, purely hypothetical and clearly non sequitur. It cannot, by itself, strengthen his
credibility or weaken those of the prosecutions witnesses. We have already ruled that non-flight is not a conclusive proof of
innocence because such inaction may be due to several factors.xxxiv[34]
We now come to appellants supporting arguments on his supposed innocence in the estafa cases. On these charges, appellant
claims that the evidence and circumstances on record do not show any act of deceit on his part, and that the money received from
Barrera and Luciano were utilized in procuring their passports and were therefore not misappropriated.xxxv[35]
Appellant was charged with and convicted for violating Article 315(2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code which provides for one of the
modes of committing estafa, thus:
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously with the commission of
the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or
imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits.
Deceit in the instant cases is shown by the false pretenses by which appellant deluded complainants into believing that he had the
power and qualifications to send people abroad for employment.xxxvi[36] Through this hoax, he was able to convince complainants to
surrender their money to him in the vain hope, as it turned out, of securing employment abroad.
The reliance of appellant on the absence of the element of misappropriation is sorely misplaced and decidedly off-tangent. A
reading of the law on estafa will readily show that misappropriation or conversion is referred to and is applicable in estafa under
Article 315 (1)(b), and not to that in Article 315(2)(a).
He also avers that his conviction in the second estafa case was without legal basis because there was no other evidence,
documentary or testimonial, establishing the crime of estafa except for the testimony of Garcia.xxxvii[37]
Although this contention has already been disposed of in the discussions above, it also bears mention that the testimony of a single
prosecution witness, where credible and positive, is sufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused.xxxviii[38]
There is no law which requires that the testimony of a single witness has to be corroborated, except where expressly mandated in
determining the value and credibility of evidence. Witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered.xxxix[39]
A final observation and reminder on the penalties imposed by the lower court.
When the offense of illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage, as in the present case of illegal recruitment in large scale,
the penalty provided by law is life imprisonment and a fine of one hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00).xl[40] Reclusion perpetua
was never prescribed by the law as the punishment for such crime. This Court has repeatedly emphasized the differences between
the penalty of reclusion perpetua and life imprisonment in numerous decisions and administrative circulars. We do not wish to
again belabor such distinctions in this decision, but we do expect all judges to take note of the difference and impose the proper
penalty with the correct nomenclature.
On the imposable penalty for the particular felony of estafa in the present cases, we are constrained to discuss the pertinent
provision of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code. Under the said article, an accused found guilty of estafa shall suffer:
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the fraud is
over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph
shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos, but the total penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such case and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for
the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may
be.xli[41]
The amount of the fraud in Criminal Case No. 3090-V-93 is P88,500.00;xlii[42] Criminal Case No. 3091-V-93, P66,000.00; and in
Criminal Case No. 3092-V-93, P94,400.00. Subtracting P22,000.00 from each of the aforesaid amounts will leave P66,500.00
P44,000.00 and P72,400.00 in the respective criminal cases. To determine the additional years of imprisonment prescribed in the
above article, each of the latter amounts shall be divided by P10,000.00, disregarding any amount below P10,000.00. Thus, in the
foregoing estafa cases, the incremental penalties of six (6) years, four (4) years and seven (7) years should be correspondingly
added to the maximum period of the basic penalty provided in the aforequoted paragraph of Article 315.
Applying the mandate of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall therefore be taken from the maximum period
of said basic penalty in Article 315 as augmented by the additional years of imprisonment, while the minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence shall be within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to that provided by law without considering the
incremental penalty for the amounts in excess of P22,000.00. That penalty immediately lower in degree is prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods,xliii[43] with a duration of six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months.
Based on the foregoing considerations, the lower court incorrectly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua in the illegal
recruitment case, and likewise erred in fixing the minimum terms of the indeterminate sentences in the estafa cases.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo finding accused-appellant Restituto Pabalan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crimes of illegal recruitment in large scale (Criminal Cases No. 3089-V-93) and estafa (Criminal Cases Nos. 3090-V-93, 3091-V-93
and 3092-V-93) is hereby AFFIRMED, but the respective penalties in said cases are hereby MODIFIED, to wit:
1. In Criminal Case No. 3089-V-93, the penalty of life imprisonment is imposed on accused-appellant, instead of reclusion perpetua
which is deleted by amendment.
2. In Criminal Case No. 3090-V-93, the award of P89,000.00 is reduced to P88,500.00. Accused-appellant shall serve an
indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
3. In Criminal Case No. 3091-V-93, accused-appellant shall serve an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
4. In Criminal Case No. 3092-V-93, accused-appellant shall serve an indeterminate sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of
prision correccional, as minimum, to fifteen (15) years of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
In the service of the aforementioned sentences, the provisions of Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code shall be observed.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 109583 September 5, 1997

TRANS ACTION OVERSEAS CORPORATION, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR, ROSELLE CASTIGADOR, JOSEFINA MAMON, JENELYN CASA, PEACHY
LANIOG, VERDELINA BELGIRA, ELMA FLORES, RAMONA LITURCO, GRACE SABANDO, GLORIA PALMA, AVELYN
ALVAREZ, CANDELARIA NONO, NITA BUSTAMANTE, CYNTHIA ARANDILLO, SANDIE AGUILAR, DIGNA PANAGUITON,
VERONICA BAYOGOS, JULIANITA ARANADOR, LEONORA CABALLERO, NANCY BOLIVAR, NIMFA BUCOL, ZITA
GALINDO, ESTELITA BIOCOS, MARJORIE MACATE, RUBY SEPULVIDA, ROSALIE SONDIA, NORA MAQUILING, PAULINA
CORDERO, LENIROSE ABANGAN, SELFA PALMA, ANTONIA NAVARRO, ELSIE PENARUBIA, IRMA SOBREQUIL, SONY
JAMUAT, CLETA MAYO, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
The issue presented in the case at bar is whether or not the Secretary of Labor and Employment has jurisdiction to cancel or revoke
the license of a private fee-charging employment agency.
From July 24 to September 9, 1987, petitioner Trans Action Overseas Corporation, a private fee-charging employment agency,
scoured Iloilo City for possible recruits for alleged job vacancies in Hongkong. Private respondents sought employment as domestic
helpers through petitioner's employees, Luzviminda Aragon, Ben Hur Domincil and his wife Cecille. The applicants paid placement
fees ranging from P1,000.00 to P14,000.00, but petitioner failed to deploy them. Their demands for refund proved unavailing; thus,
they were constrained to institute complaints against petitioner for violation of Articles 32 and 34(a) 1 of the Labor Code, as
amended.
Petitioner denied having received the amounts allegedly collected from respondents, and averred that Aragon, whose only duty was
to pre-screen and interview applicants, and the spouses Domincil were not authorized to collect fees from the applicants.
Accordingly, it cannot be held liable for the money claimed by respondents. Petitioner maintains that it even warned respondents not
to give any money to unauthorized individuals.
POEA Regional Extension Unit Coordinator Edgar Somes testified that although he was aware that petitioner collected fees from
respondents, the latter insisted that they be allowed to make the payments on the assumption that it could hasten their deployment
abroad. He added that Mrs. Honorata Manliclic, a representative of petitioner tasked to oversee the conduct of the interviews, told
him that she was leaving behind presigned receipts to Aragon as she cannot stay in Iloilo City for the screening of the applicants.
Manliclic, however, denied this version and argued that it was Somes who instructed her to leave the receipts behind as it was
perfectly alright to collect fees.
On April 5, 1991, then Labor Undersecretary Nieves R. Confesor rendered the assailed order, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, respondents are hereby ordered to pay, jointly and severally, the following claims:
1. Rosele Castigador P14,000.00
13. Cynthia Arandillo 1,000.00
2. Josefina Mamon 3,000.00
14. Sandie Aguilar 3,000.00
3. Jenelyn Casa 3,000.00
15. Digna Panaguiton 2,500.00
4. Peachy Laniog 13,500.00
16. Veronica Bayogos 2,000.00
5. Verdelina Belgira 2,000.00
17. Sony Jamuat 4,500.00
6. Elma Flores 2,500.00
18. Irma Sobrequil 2,000.00
7. Ramona Liturco 2,500.00
19. Elsie Penarubia 2,000.00
8. Grace Sabando 3,500.00
20. Antonia Navarro 2,000.00
9. Gloria Palma 1,500.00
21. Selfa Palma 3,000.00
10. Avelyn Alvarez 1,500.00
22. Lenirose Abangan 13,300.00
11. Candelaria Nono 1,000.00
23. Paulina Cordero 1,400.00
12. Nita Bustamante 5,000.00
24. Nora Maquiling 2,000.00
25. Rosalie Sondia 2,000.00
30. Nimfa Bucol 1,000.00
26. Ruby Sepulvida 3,500.00
31. Nancy Bolivar 2,000.00
27. Marjorie Macate 1,500.00
32. Leonora Caballero 13,900.00
28. Estelita Biocos 3,000.00
33. Julianita Aranador 14,000.00
29. Zita Galindo 3,500.00

The complaints of Ma. Luz Alingasa, Nimfa Perez, and Cleta Mayo are hereby dismissed in view of their
desistance.
The following complaints are hereby dismissed for failure to appear/prosecute:
1. Jiyasmin Bantillo 6. Edna Salvante
4. Teresa Caldeo 9. Rosie Pavillon
2. Rosa de Luna Senail 7. Thelma Beltiar
5. Virginia Castroverde
3. Elnor Bandojo 8. Cynthia Cepe
The complaints filed by the following are hereby dismissed for lack of evidence:
1. Aleth Palomaria 5. Mary Ann Beboso
2. Emely Padrones 6. Josefina Tejero
3. Marybeth Aparri 7. Bernadita Aprong
4. Lenia Biona 8. Joji Lull
Respondent agency is liable for twenty eight (28) counts of violation of Article 32 and five (5) counts of Article 34
(a) with a corresponding suspension in the aggregate period of sixty six (66) months. Considering however, that
under the schedule of penalties, any suspension amounting to a period of 12 months merits the imposition of the
penalty of cancellation, the license of respondent TRANS ACTION OVERSEAS CORPORATION to participate in
the overseas placement and recruitment of workers is hereby ordered CANCELLED, effective immediately.
SO ORDERED. 2 (Emphasis supplied)
On April 29, 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Temporary Lifting of Order of Cancellation alleging, among other things, that to deny
it the authority to engage in placement and recruitment activities would jeopardize not only its contractual relations with its foreign
principals, but also the welfare, interests, and livelihood of recruited workers scheduled to leave for their respective assignments.
Finally, it manifested its willingness to post a bond to insure payment of the claims to be awarded, should its appeal or motion be
denied.
Finding the motion to be well taken, Undersecretary Confesor provisionally lifted the cancellation of petitioner's license pending
resolution of its Motion for Reconsideration filed on May 6, 1991. On January 30, 1992, however, petitioner's motion for
reconsideration was eventually denied for lack of merit, and the April 5, 1991, order revoking its license was reinstated.
Petitioner contends that Secretary; Confesor acted with grave abuse of discretion in rendering the assailed orders on alternative
grounds, viz.: (1) it is the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) which has the exclusive and original jurisdiction
to hear and decide illegal recruitment cases, including the authority to cancel recruitment licenses, or (2) the cancellation order
based on the 1987 POEA Schedule of Penalties is not valid for non-compliance with the Revised Administrative Code of 1987
regarding its registration with the U.P. Law Center.
Under Executive Order No. 797 3 (E.O. No. 797) and Executive Order No. 247 (E.O. No. 247), 4 the POEA was established and
mandated to assume the functions of the Overseas Employment Development Board (OEDB), the National Seamen Board (NSB),
and the overseas employment function of the Bureau of Employment Services (BES). Petitioner theorizes that when POEA
absorbed the powers of these agencies, Article 35 of the Labor Code, as amended, was rendered ineffective.
The power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit employees for overseas employment is vested upon the
Secretary of Labor and Employment. Article 35 of the Labor Code, as amended, which provides:
Art. 5. Suspension and/or Cancellation of License or Authority The Minister of Labor shall have the power to
suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit employees for overseas employment for violation of rules and
regulations issued by the Ministry of Labor, the Overseas Employment Development Board, and the National
Seamen Board, or for violation of the provisions of this and other applicable laws, General Orders and Letters of
Instructions.
In the case of Eastern Assurance and Surety Corp. v. Secretary of
Labor, 5 we held that:
The penalties of suspension and cancellation of license or authority are prescribed for violations of the above
quoted provisions, among others. And the Secretary of Labor has the power under Section 35 of the law to apply
these sanctions, as well as the authority, conferred by Section 36, not only to "restrict and regulate the recruitment
and placement activities of all agencies," but also to "promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives
and implement the provisions" governing said activities. Pursuant to this rule-making power thus granted, the
Secretary of Labor gave the POEA, 6 "on its own initiative or upon filing of a complaint or report or upon request
for investigation by any aggrieved person, . . (authority to) conduct the necessary proceedings for the suspension
or cancellation of the license or authority of any agency or entity" for certain enumerated offenses including
1) the imposition or acceptance, directly or indirectly, of any amount of money, goods or services, or any fee or
bond in excess of what is prescribed by the Administration, and
2) any other violation of pertinent provisions of the Labor Code and other relevant laws, rules and regulations. 7
The Administrator was also given the power to "order the dismissal of the case of the suspension of the license or
authority of the respondent agency or contractor or recommend to the Minister the cancellation thereof." 8
(Emphasis supplied)
This power conferred upon the Secretary of Labor and Employment was echoed in People v. Diaz, 9 viz.:
A non-licensee or non-holder of authority means any person, corporation or entity which has not been issued a
valid license or authority to engage in recruitment and placement by the Secretary of Labor, or whose license or
authority has been suspended, revoked or cancelled by the POEA or the Secretary. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the Court's disposition on the matter, we rule that the power to suspend or cancel any license or authority to recruit
employees for overseas employment is concurrently vested with the POEA and the Secretary of Labor.
As regards petitioner's alternative argument that the non-filing of the 1987 POEA Schedule of Penalties with the UP Law Center
rendered it ineffective and, hence, cannot be utilized as basis for penalizing them, we agree with Secretary Confesor's explanation,
to wit:
On the other hand, the POEA Revised Rules on the Schedule of Penalties was issued pursuant to Article 34 of
the Labor Code, as amended. The same merely amplified and particularized the various violations of the rules
and regulations of the POEA and clarified and specified the penalties therefore (sic). Indeed, the questioned
schedule of penalties contains only a listing of offenses. It does not prescribe additional rules and regulations
governing overseas employment but only detailed the administrative sanctions imposable by this Office for some
enumerated prohibited acts.
Under the circumstances, the license of the respondent agency was cancelled on the authority of Article 35 of the
Labor Code, as amended, and not pursuant to the 1987 POEA Revised Rules on Schedule of Penalties. 10
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the decision of the Secretary of
Labor dated April 5, 1991, is AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 125044 July 13, 1998

IMELDA DARVIN, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
ROMERO, J.:
Before us is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. No. 15624 dated January 31, 1996, 1 which
affirmed in toto the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite, convicting accused-appellant, Imelda Darvin for
simple illegal recruitment under Article 38 and Article 39, in relation to Article 13 (b) and (c), of the Labor Code as amended.
Accused-appellant was charged under the following information:
That on our about the 13th day of April 1992, in the Municipality of Bacoor, Province of Cavite, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, through fraudulent representation to
one Macaria Toledo to the effect that she has the authority to recruit workers and employees for abroad and can
facilitate the necessary papers in connection thereof, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, hire,
recruit and promise a job abroad to one Macaria Toledo, without first securing the necessary license and permit
from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration to do so, thereby causing damage and prejudice to the
aforesaid Macaria Toledo.
Contrary to law. 2
The evidence for the prosecution, based on the testimony of private respondent, Macaria Toledo, shows that sometime in March,
1992, she met accused-appellant Darvin in the latter's residence at Dimasalang, Imus, Cavite, through the introduction of their
common friends, Florencio Jake Rivera and Leonila Rivera. In said meeting, accused-appellant allegedly convinced Toledo that by
giving her P150,000.00, the latter can immediately leave for the United States without any appearance before the U.S. embassy. 3
Thus, on April 13, 1992, Toledo gave Darvin the amount of P150,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt stating that the "amount of
P150,000.00 was for U.S. Visa and Air fare." 4 After receiving the money, Darvin assured Toledo that she can leave within one week.
However, when after a week, there was no word from Darvin, Toledo went to her residence to inquire about any development, but
could not find Darvin. Thereafter, on May 7, 1992, Toledo filed a complaint with the Bacoor Police Station against Imelda Darvin.
Upon further investigation, a certification was issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) stating that
Imelda Darvin is neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment. 5 Accused-appellant was then charged
for estafa and illegal recruitment by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite.
Accused-appellant, on the other hand, testified that she used to be connected with Dale Travel Agency and that in 1992, or
thereabouts, she was assisting individuals in securing passports, visa, and airline tickets. She came to know Toledo through
Florencio Jake Rivera, Jr. and Leonila Rivera, alleging that Toledo sought her help to secure a passport, US visa and airline tickets
to the States. She claims that she did not promise any employment in the U.S. to Toledo. She, however, admits receiving the
amount of P150,000.00 from the latter on April 13, 1992 but contends that it was used for necessary expenses of an intended trip to
the United States of Toledo and her friend, Florencio Rivera 6 as follows. P45,000.00 for plane fare for one person; P1,500.00 for
passport, documentation and other incidental expenses for each person; P20,000.00 for visa application cost for each person; and
P17,000.00 for services. 7 After receiving the money, she allegedly told Toledo that the papers will be released within 45 days. She
likewise testified that she was able to secure Toledo's passport on April 20, 1992 and even set up a date for an interview with the US
embassy. Accused alleged that she was not engaged in illegal recruitment but merely acted as a travel agent in assisting individuals
to secure passports and visa.
In its judgment rendered on June 17, 1993, the Bacoor, Cavite RTC found accused-appellant guilty of the crime of simple illegal
recruitment but acquitted her of the crime of estafa. The dispositive portion of the judgment reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, accused Imelda Darvin is hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Simple Illegal Recruitment for having committed the prohibited practice as defined by paragraph (b)
of Article 34 and punished by paragraph (c) of Article 39 of the Labor Code, as amended by PD 2018.
Accused Imelda Darvin is hereby ordered to suffer the prison term of Four (4) years, as minimum, to Eight (8)
years, as maximum; and to pay the fine of P25,000.00.
Regarding her civil liability, she is hereby ordered to reimburse the private complainant the sum of P150,000.00
and attorney's fees of P10,000.00.
She is hereby acquitted of the crime of Estafa.
SO ORDERED. 8
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court in toto, hence this petition.
Before this Court, accused-appellant assails the decision of the trial and appellate courts in convicting her of the crime of simple
illegal recruitment. She contends that based on the evidence presented by the prosecution, her guilt was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
We find the appeal impressed with merit.
Art. 13 of the Labor Code, as amended, provides the definition of recruitment and placement as:
. . .; b) any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers, and
includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment locally or abroad, whether for profit
or not: Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or
more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.
On the other hand, Article 38 of the Labor Code provides:
a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of this Code, to be
undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable under Article 39
of this Code. The Ministry of Labor and Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate complaints under
this Article.
xxx xxx xxx
Applied to the present case, to uphold the conviction of accused-appellant, two elements need to be shown: (1) the person charged
with the crime must have undertaken recruitment activities; and (2) the said person does not have a license or authority to do so. 9
In this case, private respondent, Macaria Toledo alleged that she was offered a job in the United States as nursing aide 10 by
accused-appellant. In her direct examination, she testified as follows:
Atty. Alejandro:
Q : How did you come to know the accused?
Witness : I was introduced by my two friends. One of whom is my best friend. That according to
them, this accused has connections and authorizations, that she can make people leave for
abroad, sir.
Court : What connections?
Witness : That she has connections with the Embassy and with people whom she can approach
regarding work abroad, your Honor.
xxx xxx xxx
Q : When you came to meet for the first time in Imus, Cavite, what transpired in that meeting of
yours?
A : When I came to her house, the accused convinced me that by means of P150,000.00, I will
be able to leave immediately without any appearance to any embassy, non-appearance, Sir.
Q : When you mentioned non-appearance, as told to you by the accused, precisely, what do
you mean by that?
A : I was told by the accused that non-appearance, means without working personally for my
papers and through her efforts considering that she is capacitated as according to her I will be
able to leave the country, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx
Atty. Alejandro : What transpired after the accused told you all these things that you will be able
to secure all the documents without appearing to anybody or to any embassy and that you will
be able to work abroad?
Witness : She told me to get ready with my P150,000.00, that is if I want to leave immediately,
Sir.
Atty. Alejandro : When you mentioned kaagad, how many days or week?
Witness : She said that if I will able to part with my P150,000.00. I will be able to leave in just
one week time, Sir.
xxx xxx xxx 11
The prosecution, as evidence, presented the certification issued by the POEA that accused-appellant Imelda Darvin is not licensed
to recruit workers abroad.
It is not disputed that accused-appellant does not have a license or authority to engage in recruitment activities. The pivotal issue to
be determined, therefore, is whether the accused-appellant indeed engaged in recruitment activities, as defined under the Labor
Code. Applying the rule laid down in the case of People v. Goce, 12 to prove that accused-appellant was engaged in recruitment
activities as to commit the crime of illegal recruitment, it must be shown that the accused appellant gave private respondent the
distinct impression that she had the power or ability to send the private respondent abroad for work such that the latter was
convinced to part with her money in order to be so employed.
In this case, we find no sufficient evidence to prove that accused-ppellant offered a job to private respondent. It is not clear that
accused gave the impression that she was capable of providing the private respondent work abroad. What is established, however,
is that the private respondent gave accused-appellant P150,000.00. The claim of the accused that the P150,000.00 was for
payment of private respondent's air fare and US visa and other expenses cannot be ignored because the receipt for the
P150,000.00, which was presented by both parties during the trial of the case, stated that it was "for Air Fare and Visa to USA." 13
Had the amount been for something else in addition to air fare and visa expenses, such as work placement abroad, the receipt
should have so stated.
By themselves, procuring a passport, airline tickets and foreign visa for another individual, without more, can hardly qualify as
recruitment activities. Aside from the testimony of private respondent, there is nothing to show that accused-appellant engaged in
recruitment activities. We also note that the prosecution did not present the testimonies of witnesses who could have corroborated
the charge of illegal recruitment, such as Florencio Rivera, and Leonila Rivera, when it had the opportunity to do so. As it stands,
the claim of private respondent that accused-appellant promised her employment abroad is uncorroborated. All these, taken
collectively, cast reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused.
This Court can hardly rely on the bare allegations of private respondent that she was offered by accused-appellant employment
abroad, nor on mere presumptions and conjectures, to convict the latter. No sufficient evidence was shown to sustain the conviction,
as the burden of proof lies with the prosecution to establish that accused-appellant indeed engaged in recruitment activities, thus
committing the crime of illegal recruitment.
In criminal cases, the burden is on the prosecution to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, the essential elements of the offense with
which the accused is charged; and if the proof fails to establish any of the essential elements necessary to constitute a crime, the
defendant is entitled to an acquittal. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding the
possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces conviction in
an unprejudiced mind. 14
At best, the evidence proffered by the prosecution only goes so far as to create a suspicion that accused-appellant probably
perpetrated the crime charged. But suspicion alone is insufficient, the required quantum of evidence being proof beyond reasonable
doubt. When the People's evidence fail to indubitably prove the accused' s authorship of the crime of which he stands accused, then
it is the Court's duty, and the accused's right, to proclaim his innocence. Acquittal, therefore, is in order. 15
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15624 dated January
31, 1996, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Imelda Darvin is hereby ACQUITTED on ground of reasonable doubt.
Accordingly, let the accused be immediately released from her place of confinement unless there is reason to detain her further for
any other legal or valid cause. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 129577-80. February 15, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. BULU CHOWDURY, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
In November 1995, Bulu Chowdury and Josephine Ong were charged before the Regional Trial Court of Manila with the crime of
illegal recruitment in large scale committed as follows:
"That sometime between the period from August 1994 to October 1994 in the City of Manila, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, representing themselves to have the
capacity to contract, enlist and transport workers for employment abroad, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit the herein complainants:
Estrella B. Calleja, Melvin C. Miranda and Aser S. Sasis, individually or as a group for employment in Korea
without first obtaining the required license and/or authority from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration."xliv[1]
They were likewise charged with three counts of estafa committed against private complainants.xlv[2] The State Prosecutor,
however, later dismissed the estafa charges against Chowduryxlvi[3] and filed an amended information indicting only Ong for the
offense.xlvii[4]
Chowdury was arraigned on April 16, 1996 while Ong remained at large. He pleaded "not guilty" to the charge of illegal recruitment
in large scale.xlviii[5]
Trial ensued.
The prosecution presented four witnesses: private complainants Aser Sasis, Estrella Calleja and Melvin Miranda, and Labor
Employment Officer Abbelyn Caguitla.
Sasis testified that he first met Chowdury in August 1994 when he applied with Craftrade Overseas Developers (Craftrade) for
employment as factory worker in South Korea. Chowdury, a consultant of Craftrade, conducted the interview. During the interview,
Chowdury informed him about the requirements for employment. He told him to submit his passport, NBI clearance, passport size
picture and medical certificate. He also required him to undergo a seminar. He advised him that placement would be on a firstcome-first-serve basis and urged him to complete the requirements immediately. Sasis was also charged a processing fee of
P25,000.00. Sasis completed all the requirements in September 1994. He also paid a total amount of P16,000.00 to Craftrade as
processing fee. All payments were received by Ong for which she issued three receipts.xlix[6] Chowdury then processed his papers
and convinced him to complete his payment.l[7]
Sasis further said that he went to the office of Craftrade three times to follow up his application but he was always told to return
some other day. In one of his visits to Craftrades office, he was informed that he would no longer be deployed for employment
abroad. This prompted him to withdraw his payment but he could no longer find Chowdury. After two unsuccessful attempts to
contact him, he decided to file with the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) a case for illegal recruitment
against Chowdury. Upon verification with the POEA, he learned that Craftrade's license had already expired and has not been
renewed and that Chowdury, in his personal capacity, was not a licensed recruiter.li[8]
Calleja testified that in June 1994, she applied with Craftrade for employment as factory worker in South Korea. She was
interviewed by Chowdury. During the interview, he asked questions regarding her marital status, her age and her province. Toward
the end of the interview, Chowdury told her that she would be working in a factory in Korea. He required her to submit her passport,
NBI clearance, ID pictures, medical certificate and birth certificate. He also obliged her to attend a seminar on overseas
employment. After she submitted all the documentary requirements, Chowdury required her to pay P20,000.00 as placement fee.
Calleja made the payment on August 11, 1994 to Ong for which she was issued a receipt.lii[9] Chowdury assured her that she would
be able to leave on the first week of September but it proved to be an empty promise. Calleja was not able to leave despite several
follow-ups. Thus, she went to the POEA where she discovered that Craftrade's license had already expired. She tried to withdraw
her money from Craftrade to no avail. Calleja filed a complaint for illegal recruitment against Chowdury upon advice of POEA's legal
counsel.liii[10]
Miranda testified that in September 1994, his cousin accompanied him to the office of Craftrade in Ermita, Manila and introduced
him to Chowdury who presented himself as consultant and interviewer. Chowdury required him to fill out a bio-data sheet before
conducting the interview. Chowdury told Miranda during the interview that he would send him to Korea for employment as factory
worker. Then he asked him to submit the following documents: passport, passport size picture, NBI clearance and medical
certificate. After he complied with the requirements, he was advised to wait for his visa and to pay P25,000.00 as processing fee. He
paid the amount of P25,000.00 to Ong who issued receipts therefor.liv[11] Craftrade, however, failed to deploy him. Hence, Miranda
filed a complaint with the POEA against Chowdury for illegal recruitment.lv[12]
Labor Employment Officer Abbelyn Caguitla of the Licensing Branch of the POEA testified that she prepared a certification on
June 9, 1996 that Chowdury and his co-accused, Ong, were not, in their personal capacities, licensed recruiters nor were they
connected with any licensed agency. She nonetheless stated that Craftrade was previously licensed to recruit workers for abroad
which expired on December 15, 1993. It applied for renewal of its license but was only granted a temporary license effective
December 16, 1993 until September 11, 1994. From September 11, 1994, the POEA granted Craftrade another temporary authority
to process the expiring visas of overseas workers who have already been deployed. The POEA suspended Craftrade's temporary
license on December 6, 1994.lvi[13]
For his defense, Chowdury testified that he worked as interviewer at Craftrade from 1990 until 1994. His primary duty was to
interview job applicants for abroad. As a mere employee, he only followed the instructions given by his superiors, Mr. Emmanuel
Geslani, the agencys President and General Manager, and Mr. Utkal Chowdury, the agency's Managing Director. Chowdury
admitted that he interviewed private complainants on different dates. Their office secretary handed him their bio-data and thereafter
he led them to his room where he conducted the interviews. During the interviews, he had with him a form containing the
qualifications for the job and he filled out this form based on the applicant's responses to his questions. He then submitted them to
Mr. Utkal Chowdury who in turn evaluated his findings. He never received money from the applicants. He resigned from Craftrade
on November 12, 1994.lvii[14]
Another defense witness, Emelita Masangkay who worked at the Accreditation Branch of the POEA presented a list of the
accredited principals of Craftrade Overseas Developerslviii[15] and a list of processed workers of Craftrade Overseas Developers
from 1988 to 1994.lix[16]
The trial court found Chowdury guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale. It sentenced him
to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00. It further ordered him to pay Aser Sasis the amount of P16,000.00, Estrella
Calleja, P20,000.00 and Melvin Miranda, P25,000.00. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the prosecution having proved the guilt of the accused
Bulu Chowdury beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal Recruitment in large scale, he is hereby
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P100,000.00 under Art. 39 (b) of the New Labor
Code of the Philippines. The accused is ordered to pay the complainants Aser Sasis the amount of P16,000.00;
Estrella Calleja the amount of P20,000.00; Melvin Miranda the amount of P25,000.00."lx[17]
Chowdury appealed.
The elements of illegal recruitment in large scale are:
(1)
The accused undertook any recruitment activity defined under Article 13 (b) or any prohibited practice
enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code;
(2)
and
He did not have the license or authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers;
(3)
He committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group.lxi[18]
The last paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act (RA) 8042lxii[19] states who shall be held liable for the offense, thus:
"The persons criminally liable for the above offenses are the principals, accomplices and accessories. In case of
juridical persons, the officers having control, management or direction of their business shall be liable."
The Revised Penal Code which supplements the law on illegal recruitmentlxiii[20] defines who are the principals, accomplices and
accessories. The principals are: (1) those who take a direct part in the execution of the act; (2) those who directly force or induce
others to commit it; and (3) those who cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without which it would not have
been accomplished.lxiv[21] The accomplices are those persons who may not be considered as principal as defined in Section 17 of
the Revised Penal Code but cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous act.lxv[22] The accessories are
those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or
accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manner: (1) by profiting themselves or assisting the
offenders to profit by the effects of the crime; (2) by concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments
thereof, in order to prevent its discovery; and (3) by harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal of the crime,
provided the accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide,
murder, or an attempt at the life of the chief executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other crime.lxvi[23]
Citing the second sentence of the last paragraph of Section 6 of RA 8042, accused-appellant contends that he may not be held
liable for the offense as he was merely an employee of Craftrade and he only performed the tasks assigned to him by his superiors.
He argues that the ones who should be held liable for the offense are the officers having control, management and direction of the
agency.
As stated in the first sentence of Section 6 of RA 8042, the persons who may be held liable for illegal recruitment are the principals,
accomplices and accessories. An employee of a company or corporation engaged in illegal recruitment may be held liable as
principal, together with his employer,lxvii[24] if it is shown that he actively and consciously participated in illegal recruitment.lxviii[25]
It has been held that the existence of the corporate entity does not shield from prosecution the corporate agent who knowingly and
intentionally causes the corporation to commit a crime. The corporation obviously acts, and can act, only by and through its human
agents, and it is their conduct which the law must deter. The employee or agent of a corporation engaged in unlawful business
naturally aids and abets in the carrying on of such business and will be prosecuted as principal if, with knowledge of the business,
its purpose and effect, he consciously contributes his efforts to its conduct and promotion, however slight his contribution may be.lxix
[26] The law of agency, as applied in civil cases, has no application in criminal cases, and no man can escape punishment when he
participates in the commission of a crime upon the ground that he simply acted as an agent of any party.lxx[27] The culpability of the
employee therefore hinges on his knowledge of the offense and his active participation in its commission. Where it is shown that the
employee was merely acting under the direction of his superiors and was unaware that his acts constituted a crime, he may not be
held criminally liable for an act done for and in behalf of his employer.lxxi[28]
The fundamental issue in this case, therefore, is whether accused-appellant knowingly and intentionally participated in the
commission of the crime charged.
We find that he did not.
Evidence shows that accused-appellant interviewed private complainants in the months of June, August and September in 1994 at
Craftrade's office. At that time, he was employed as interviewer of Craftrade which was then operating under a temporary authority
given by the POEA pending renewal of its license.lxxii[29] The temporary license included the authority to recruit workers.lxxiii[30] He
was convicted based on the fact that he was not registered with the POEA as employee of Craftrade. Neither was he, in his
personal capacity, licensed to recruit overseas workers. Section 10 Rule II Book II of the Rules and Regulation Governing Overseas
Employment (1991) requires that every change, termination or appointment of officers, representatives and personnel of licensed
agencies be registered with the POEA. Agents or representatives appointed by a licensed recruitment agency whose appointments
are not previously approved by the POEA are considered "non-licensee " or "non-holder of authority" and therefore not authorized to
engage in recruitment activity.lxxiv[31]
Upon examination of the records, however, we find that the prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant was aware of
Craftrade's failure to register his name with the POEA and that he actively engaged in recruitment despite this knowledge. The
obligation to register its personnel with the POEA belongs to the officers of the agency.lxxv[32] A mere employee of the agency
cannot be expected to know the legal requirements for its operation. The evidence at hand shows that accused-appellant carried
out his duties as interviewer of Craftrade believing that the agency was duly licensed by the POEA and he, in turn, was duly
authorized by his agency to deal with the applicants in its behalf. Accused-appellant in fact confined his actions to his job
description. He merely interviewed the applicants and informed them of the requirements for deployment but he never received
money from them. Their payments were received by the agency's cashier, Josephine Ong. Furthermore, he performed his tasks
under the supervision of its president and managing director. Hence, we hold that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable
doubt accused-appellant's conscious and active participation in the commission of the crime of illegal recruitment. His conviction,
therefore, is without basis.
This is not to say that private complainants are left with no remedy for the wrong committed against them. The Department of
Justice may still file a complaint against the officers having control, management or direction of the business of Craftrade Overseas
Developers (Craftrade), so long as the offense has not yet prescribed. Illegal recruitment is a crime of economic sabotage which
need to be curbed by the strong arm of the law. It is important, however, to stress that the government's action must be directed to
the real offenders, those who perpetrate the crime and benefit from it.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the assailed decision of the Regional Trial Court is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant is hereby
ACQUITTED. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to RELEASE accused-appellant unless he is being held for some
other cause, and to REPORT to this Court compliance with this order within ten (10) days from receipt of this decision. Let a copy of
this Decision be furnished the Secretary of the Department of Justice for his information and appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 103144
April 4, 2001
PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and SERVICES CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, VIVENCIO DE MESA, RODRIGO MIKIN and CEDRIC LEYSON,
respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari from the Order dated November 25, 1991 issued by public respondent Secretary of Labor and
Employment. The November 25, 1991 Order affirmed in toto the August 29, 1988 Order of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (hereinafter the "POEA") which found petitioner liable for three (3) counts of illegal exaction, two (2) counts of
contract substitution and one count of withholding or unlawful deduction from salaries of workers in POEA Case No. (L) 85-05-0370.
Petitioner Philsa International Placement and Services Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Philsa") is a domestic corporation
engaged in the recruitment of workers for overseas employment. Sometime in January 1985, private respondents, who were
recruited by petitioner for employment in Saudi Arabia, were required to pay placement fees in the amount of P5,000.00 for private
respondent Rodrigo L. Mikin and P6,500.00 each for private respondents Vivencio A. de Mesa and Cedric P. Leyson.1
After the execution of their respective work contracts, private respondents left for Saudi Arabia on January 29, 1985. They then
began work for Al-Hejailan Consultants A/E, the foreign principal of petitioner.
While in Saudi Arabia, private respondents were allegedly made to sign a second contract on February 4, 1985 which changed
some of the provisions of their original contract resulting in the reduction of some of their benefits and privileges.2 On April 1, 1985,
their foreign employer allegedly forced them to sign a third contract which increased their work hours from 48 hours to 60 hours a
week without any corresponding increase in their basic monthly salary. When they refused to sign this third contract, the services of
private respondents were terminated by Al-Hejailan and they were repatriated to the Philippines.3
Upon their arrival in the Philippines, private respondents demanded from petitioner Philsa the return of their placement fees and for
the payment of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their contract. When petitioner refused, they filed a case before the POEA
against petitioner Philsa and its foreign principal, Al-Hejailan., with the following causes of action:
1. Illegal dismissal;
2. Payment of salary differentials;
3. Illegal deduction/withholding of salaries;
4. Illegal exactions/refund of placement fees; and
5. Contract substitution. 4
The case was docketed as POEA Case No. (L) 85-05 0370.
Under the rules of the POEA dated May 21, 1985, complaints involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of
any law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas employment, including money claims, are adjudicated by the Workers'
Assistance and Adjudication Office (hereinafter the "WAAO") thru the POEA Hearing Officers.5 On the other hand, complaints
involving recruitment violations warranting suspension or cancellation of the license of recruiting agencies are cognizable by the
POEA thru its Licensing and Recruitment Office (hereinafter the "LRO"). 6 In cases where a complaint partakes of the nature of both
an employer-employee relationship case and a recruitment regulation case, the POEA Hearing Officer shall act as representative of
both the WAAO and the LRO and both cases shall be heard simultaneously. In such cases, the Hearing Officer shall submit two
separate recommendations for the two aspects of the case. 7
In the case at bench, the first two causes of action were in the nature of money claims arising from the employer-employee relations
and were properly cognizable by the WAAO. The last two causes of action were in the nature of recruitment violations and may be
investigated by the LRO. The third cause of action, illegal deduction/withholding of salary, is both a money claim and a violation of
recruitment regulations and is thus under the investigatory jurisdiction of both the WAAO and the LRO.
Several hearings were conducted before the POEA Hearing Officer on the two aspects of private respondents' complaint. During
these hearings, private respondents supported their complaint with the presentation of both documentary and testimonial evidence.
When it was its turn to present its evidence, petitioner failed to do so and consequently, private respondents filed a motion to decide
the case on the basis of the evidence on record. 8
On the aspects of the case involving money claims arising from the employer-employee relations and illegal dismissal, the POEA
rendered a decision dated August 31, 1988 9 , the dispositive portion of which reads:
"CONFORMABLY TO THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered ordering respondent PHILSA INTERNATIONAL
PLACEMENT AND SERVICE CORPORATION to pay complainants, jointly and severally with its principal Al-Hejailan, the
following amounts, to wit:
1. TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED TWENTY FIVE SAUDI RIYALS (SR2,225.00) to each complainant, representing
the refund of their unpaid separation pay;
2. ONE THOUSAND SAUDI RIYALS (SR1,000.00) for V.A. de Mesa alone, representing the salary deduction from his
March salary;
3. TWO THOUSAND SAUDI RIYALS (SR2,000.00) each for R.I. Mikin and C.A.P. Leyson only, representing their
differential pay for the months of February and March, 1985; and
4. Five percent (5%) of the total awards as and by way of attorney's fees.
All payments of the abovestated awards shall be made in Philippine Currency equivalent to the prevailing exchange rate
according to the Central Bank at the time of payment.
All other claims of complainants as well as the counterclaims of respondent are dismissed for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED." 10
Under the Rules and Regulations of the POEA, the decision of the POEA-Adjudication Office on matters involving money claims
arising from the employer-employee relationship of overseas Filipino workers may be appealed to the National Labor Relations
Commission (hereinafter the "NLRC)11 . Thus, as both felt aggrieved by the said POEA Decision, petitioner and private respondents
filed separate appeals from the August 31, 1988 POEA Decision to the NLRC.
In a decision dated July 26, 1989 12 , the NLRC modified the appealed decision of the POEA Adjudication Office by deleting the
award of salary deductions and differentials. These awards to private respondents were deleted by the NLRC considering that these
were not raised in the complaint filed by private respondents. The NLRC likewise stated that there was nothing in the text of the
decision which would justify the award.
Private respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution dated October 25;
1989.
Private respondents then elevated the July 26, 1989 decision of the NLRC to the Supreme Court in a petition for review for certiorari
where it was docketed as G.R. No. 89089. However, in a Resolution dated October 25, 1989, the petition was dismissed outright for
"insufficiency in form and substance, having failed to comply with the Rules of Court and Circular No. 1-88 requiring submission of a
certified true copy of the questioned resolution dated August 23, 1989." 13
Almost simultaneous with the promulgation of the August 31, 1988 decision of the POEA on private respondents' money claims, the
POEA issued a separate Order dated August 29, 1988 14 resolving the recruitment violations aspect of private respondents'
complaint. In this Order, the POEA found petitioner guilty of illegal exaction, contract substitution, and unlawful deduction. The
dispositive portion of this August 29, 1988 POEA Order reads:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office finds herein respondent PHILSA International Placement and Services
Corporation liable for three (3) counts of illegal exaction, two (2) counts of contract substitution and one count of
withholding or unlawful deduction from salaries of workers.
Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered to refund the placement fees in the amount of P2,500.00 to Rodrigo L. Mikin,
P4,000.00, each, to Vivencio A. de Mesa and Cedric A.P. Leyson plus restitution of the salaries withheld in the amount of
SR1,000.00 to Vivencio A. de Mesa.
Moreover, respondent's license is hereby suspended for eight (8) months to take effect immediately and to remain as such
until full refund and restitution of the above-stated amounts have been effected or in lieu thereof, it is fined the amount of
SIXTY THOUSAND (P60,000.00) PESOS plus restitution.
SO ORDERED."
In line with this August 29, 1988 Order, petitioner deposited the check equivalent to the claims of private respondents and paid the
corresponding fine under protest. From the said Order, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was subsequently denied
in an Order dated October 10, 1989.
Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the decision of the POEA thru the LRO suspending or canceling a license or authority to
act as a recruitment agency may be appealed to the Ministry (now Department) of Labor and Employment. 15 Accordingly, after the
denial of its motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed the August 21, 1988 Order to the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
However, in an Order dated September 13, 1991,16 public respondent Secretary of Labor and Employment affirmed in toto the
assailed Order. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was likewise denied in an Order dated November 25, 1991.
Hence, the instant Petition for Certiorari where petitioner raises the following grounds for the reversal of the questioned Orders:
I
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN HOLDING PETITIONER GUILTY OF ILLEGAL EXACTIONS. THE FINDING IS NOT SUPPORTED BY
EVIDENCE AND IN ANY EVENT, THE LAW ON WHICH THE CONVICTION IS BASED IS VOID.
II
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN PENALIZING PETITIONER WITH CONTRACT SUBSTITUTION. IN THE PREMISES, THE CONTRACT
SUBSTITUTION IS VALID AS IT IMPROVED THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS'
EMPLOYMENT.
III.
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT HAS ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN HOLDING PETITIONER LIABLE FOR ILLEGAL DEDUCTIONS/WITHHOLDING OF SALARIES FOR
THE SUPREME COURT ITSELF HAS ALREADY ABSOLVED PETITIONER FROM THIS CHARGE.
With respect to the first ground, petitioner would want us to overturn the findings of the POEA, subsequently affirmed by the
Secretary of the Department of Labor and Employment, that it is guilty of illegal exaction committed by collecting placement fees in
excess of the amounts allowed by law. This issue, however, is a question of fact which cannot be raised in a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65. 17 As we have previously held:
"It should be noted, in the first place, that the instant petition is a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules of Court. An extraordinary remedy, its use is available only and restrictively in truly exceptional cases
wherein the action of an inferior court, board or officer performing judicial or quasi-judicial acts is challenged for being
wholly void on grounds of jurisdiction. The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction
including the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It does not include
correction of public respondent NLRC's evaluation of the evidence and factual findings based thereon, which are generally
accorded not only great respect but even finality." 18
The question of whether or not petitioner charged private respondents placement fees in excess of that allowed by law is clearly a
question of fact which is for public respondent POEA, as a trier of facts, to determine. As stated above, the settled rule is that the
factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the POEA, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to
specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect, but at times even finality if such findings are supported by substantial
evidence. 19
On this point, we have carefully examined the records of the case and it is clear that the ruling of public respondent POEA that
petitioner is guilty of illegal exaction is supported by substantial evidence. Aside from the testimonial evidence offered by private
respondents, they also presented documentary evidence consisting of receipts issued by a duly authorized representative of
petitioner which show the payment of amounts in excess of those allowed by the POEA. In contrast, petitioner did not present any
evidence whatsoever to rebut the claims of private respondents despite the many opportunities for them to do so.
Petitioner insists, however, that it cannot be held liable for illegal exaction as POEA Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of 1983,
which enumerated the allowable fees which may be collected from applicants, is void for lack of publication.
There is merit in the argument.
In Taada vs. Tuvera 20 , the Court held, as follows:
"We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition
for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of
legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution: Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement
existing law pursuant to a valid delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the administrative
agency and the public, need not be published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letter of instructions issued
by the administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance
of their duties."
Applying this doctrine, we have previously declared as having no force and effect the following administrative issuances: a) Rules
and Regulations issued by the Joint Ministry of Health-Ministry of Labor and Employment Accreditation Committee regarding the
accreditation of hospitals, medical clinics and laboratories; 21 b) Letter of Instruction No. 416 ordering the suspension of payments
due and payable by distressed copper mining companies to the national government; 22 c) Memorandum Circulars issued by the
POEA regulating the recruitment of domestic helpers to Hong Kong; 23 d) Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 issued by the
Philippine International Trading Corporation regulating applications for importation from the People's Republic of China;24 and e)
Corporate Compensation Circular No. 10 issued by the Department of Budget and Management discontinuing the payment of other
allowances and fringe benefits to government officials and employees. 25 In all these cited cases, the administrative issuances
questioned therein were uniformly struck down as they were not published or filed with the National Administrative Register as
required by the Administrative Code of 1987. 26
POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 must likewise be declared ineffective as the same was never published or filed
with the National Administrative Register.
POEA Memorandum Order No. 2, Series of 1983 provides for the applicable schedule of placement and documentation fees for
private employment agencies or authority holders. Under the said Order, the maximum amount which may be collected from
prospective Filipino overseas workers is P2,500.00. The said circular was apparently issued in compliance with the provisions of
Article 32 of the Labor Code which provides, as follows:
"ARTICLE 32. Fees to be paid by workers. Any person applying with a private fee-charging employment agency for
employment assistance shall not be charged any fee until he has obtained employment through its efforts or has actually
commenced employment. Such fee shall be always covered with the approved receipt clearly showing the amount paid.
The Secretary of Labor shall promulgate a schedule of allowable fees." (italic supplied)
It is thus clear that the administrative circular under consideration is one of those issuances which should be published for its
effectivity, since its purpose is to enforce and implement an existing law pursuant to a valid delegation. 27 Considering that POEA
Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has not as yet been published or filed with the National Administrative Register, the
same is ineffective and may not be enforced.
The Office of the Solicitor General argues however that the imposition of administrative sanctions on petitioner was based not on
the questioned administrative circular but on Article 32 and Article 34 (a) 28 of the Labor Code.
The argument is not meritorious. The said articles of the Labor Code were never cited, much less discussed, in the body of the
questioned Orders of the POEA and Secretary of Labor and Employment. In fact, the said Orders were consistent in mentioning that
petitioner's violation of Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 was the basis for the imposition of administrative sanctions
against petitioner. Furthermore, even assuming that petitioner was held liable under the said provisions of the Labor Code, Articles
32 and 34 (a) of the Labor Code presupposes the promulgation of a valid schedule of fees by the Department of Labor and
Employment. Considering that, as, previously discussed, Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 embodying such a schedule
of fees never took effect, there is thus no basis for the imposition of the administrative sanctions against petitioner. Moreover, under
Book VI, Chapter II, Section 3 of the Administrative Code of 1987, "(r)ules in force on the date of the effectivity of this Code which
are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons."
Considering that POEA Administrative Circular No. 2 was never filed with the National Administrative Register, the same cannot be
used as basis for the imposition of administrative sanctions against petitioner.
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise argues that the questioned administrative circular is not among those requiring
publication contemplated by Taada vs. Tuvera as it is addressed only to a specific group of persons and not to the general public.
Again, there is no merit in this argument.
The fact that the said circular is addressed only to a specified group, namely private employment agencies or authority holders,
does not take it away from the ambit of our ruling in Taada vs. Tuvera. In the case of Phil. Association of Service Exporters vs.
Torres,29 the administrative circulars questioned therein were addressed to an even smaller group, namely Philippine and Hong
Kong agencies engaged in the recruitment of workers for Hong Kong, and still the Court ruled therein that, for lack of proper
publication, the said circulars may not be enforced or implemented.
Our pronouncement in Taada vs. Tuvera is clear and categorical. Administrative rules and regulations must be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant to a valid delegation., The only exceptions are interpretative regulations,
those merely internal in nature, or those so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and
guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties. Administrative Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 has
not been shown to fall under any of these exceptions.
In this regard, the Solicitor General's reliance on the case of Yaokasin vs. Commissioner of Customs 30 is misplaced. In the said
case, the validity of certain Customs Memorandum Orders were upheld despite their lack of publication as they were addressed to a
particular class of persons, the customs collectors, who were also the subordinates of the Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs.
As such, the said Memorandum Orders clearly fall under one of the exceptions to the publication requirement, namely those dealing
with instructions from an administrative superior to a subordinate regarding the performance of their duties, a circumstance which
does not obtain in the case at bench.
With respect to the second ground, petitioner would want us to review the findings of fact of the POEA regarding the two counts of
alleged contract substitution. Again, this is a question of fact which may not be disturbed if the same is supported by substantial
evidence. A reading of the August 29, 1988 Order of the POEA shows that, indeed, the ruling that petitioner is guilty of two (2)
counts of prohibited contract substitution is supported by substantial evidence. Thus:
"2. As admitted by respondent, there was definitely a contract of substitution in the first count. The first contract was duly
approved by the Administration and, therefore, the parties are bound by the terms and condition thereof until its expiration.
The mere intention of respondents to increase the number of hours of work, even if there was a corresponding increase in
wage is clear violation of the contract as approved by the Administration, and notwithstanding the same, the amendment is
evidently contrary to law, morals, good customs and public policy and hence, must be shunned (Art. 1306, Civil Code of
the Philippines, Book III, Title I, Chapter 1, Article 83, Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended). Moreover, it would
appear that the proposed salary increase corresponding to the increase in number of work bonus may just have been a
ploy as complainant were (sic) thereafter not paid at the increased rate.
As to contract substitution in the second part, a third contract was emphatically intended by respondent to be signed by
complainants which, however, was not consummated due to the adamant refusal of complainants to sign thereon. Mere
intention of the respondent to commit contract substitution for a second time should not be left unpunished. It is the duty of
this Office to repress such acts by teaching agencies a lesson to avoid repetition of the same violation." 31
With respect to the third ground, petitioner argues that the public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in holding
petitioner liable for illegal deductions/withholding of salaries considering that the Supreme Court itself has already absolved
petitioner from this charge. Petitioner premises its argument on the fact that the July 26, 1989 Decision of the NLRC absolving it
from private respondent de Mesa's claim for salary deduction has already attained finality by reason of the dismissal of private
respondents' petition for certiorari of the said NLRC decision by the Supreme Court.
Petitioner is correct in stating that the July 26, 1989 Decision of the NLRC has attained finality by reason of the dismissal of the
petition for certiorari assailing the same. However, the said NLRC Decision dealt only with the money claims of private respondents
arising from employer-employee relations and illegal dismissal and as such, it is only for the payment of the said money claims that
petitioner is absolved. The administrative sanctions, which are distinct and separate from the money claims of private respondents,
may still be properly imposed by the POEA. In fact, in the August 31, 1988 Decision of the POEA dealing with the money claims of
private respondents, the POEA Adjudication Office precisely declared that "respondent's liability for said money claims is without
prejudice to and independent of its liabilities for the recruitment violations aspect of the case which is the subject of a separate
Order." 32
The NLRC Decision absolving petitioner from paying private respondent de Mesa's claim for salary deduction based its ruling on a
finding that the said money claim was not raised in the complaint. 33 While there may be questions regarding such finding of the
NLRC, the finality of the said NLRC Decision prevents us from modifying or reviewing the same. But the fact that the claim for salary
deduction was not raised by private respondents in their complaint will not bar the POEA from holding petitioner liable for illegal
deduction or withholding of salaries as a ground for the suspension or cancellation of petitioner's license.
Under the POEA Rules and Regulations, the POEA, on its own initiative, may conduct the necessary proceeding for the suspension
or cancellation of the license of any private placement agency on any of the grounds mentioned therein. 34 As such, even without a
written complaint from an aggrieved party, the POEA can initiate proceedings against an erring private placement agency and, if the
result of its investigation so warrants, impose the corresponding administrative sanction thereof. Moreover, the POEA, in an
investigation of an employer-employee relationship case, may still hold a respondent liable for administrative sanctions if, in the
course of its investigation, violations of recruitment regulations are uncovered. 35 It is thus clear that even if recruitment violations
were not included in a complaint for money claims initiated by a private complainant, the POEA, under its rules, may still take
cognizance of the same and impose administrative sanctions if the evidence so warrants.
As such, the fact that petitioner has been absolved by final judgment for the payment of the money claim to private respondent de
Mesa does not mean that it is likewise absolved from the administrative sanctions which may be imposed as a result of the unlawful
deduction or withholding of private respondents' salary. The POEA thus committed no grave abuse of discretion in finding petitioner
administratively liable of one count of unlawful deduction/withholding of salary.
To summarize, petitioner should be absolved from the three (3) counts of illegal exaction as POEA Administrative Circular No. 2,
Series of 1983 could not be the basis of administrative sanctions against petitioner for lack of publication. However, we affirm the
ruling of the POEA and the Secretary of Labor and Employment that petitioner should be held administratively liable for two (2)
counts of contract substitution and one (1) count of withholding or unlawful deduction of salary.
Under the applicable schedule of penalties imposed by the POEA, the penalty for each count of contract substitution is suspension
of license for two (2) months or a fine of P10,000.00 while the penalty for withholding or unlawful deduction of salaries is suspension
of license for two (2) months or fine equal to the salary withheld but not less than P10,000.00 plus restitution of the amount in both
instances.36 Applying the said schedule on the instant case, the license of petitioner should be suspended for six (6) months or, in
lieu thereof, it should be ordered to pay fine in the amount of P30,000.00. Petitioner should likewise pay the amount of SR1,000.00
to private respondent Vivencio A. de Mesa as restitution for the amount withheld from his salary.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the September 13, 1991 and November 25, 1991 Orders of public respondent Secretary of
Labor and Employment are hereby MODIFIED. As modified, the license of private respondent Philsa International Placement and
Services Corporation is hereby suspended for six (6) months or, in lieu thereof, it is hereby ordered to pay the amount of
P30,000.00 as fine. Petitioner is likewise ordered to pay the amount of SR1,000.00 to private respondent Vivencio A. de Mesa. All
other monetary awards are deleted.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
ROSA C. RODOLFO,
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 146964

Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
- versus -
PEOPLE OF
PHILIPPINES,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
THE
Respondent.
Promulgated:
August 10, 2006
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati for illegal recruitment alleged to have been
committed as follows:
That in or about and during the period from August to September 1984, in Makati, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused representing herself to have the
capacity to contract, enlist and transport Filipino workers for
employment abroad, did then and there willfully
and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit
and promise employment/job placement abroad to VILLAMOR ALCANTARA,
NARCISO CORPUZ,lxxvi[1] NECITAS R. FERRE, GERARDO H. TAPAWAN and JOVITO L. CAMA, without first
securing the required license or authority from the Ministry of Labor and Employment.lxxvii[2]
After trial on the merits, Branch 61 of the Makati RTC rendered its Judgment on the case, lxxviii[3] the decretal portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES ABOVE CONSIDERED, the Court finds the accused ROSA C. RODOLFO
as GUILTY of the offense of ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT and hereby sentences her [to] a penalty of imprisonment
of EIGHT YEARS and to pay the costs.lxxix[4] (Underscoring supplied)
In so imposing the penalty, the trial court took note of the fact that while the information reflected the commission of illegal
recruitment in large scale, only the complaint of the two of the five complainants was proven.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals correctly synthesized the evidence presented by the parties as follows:
[The evidence for the prosecution] shows that sometime in August and September 1984, accusedappellant approached private complainants Necitas Ferre and Narciso Corpus individually and invited them to
apply for overseas employment in Dubai. The accused-appellant being their neighbor, private complainants
agreed and went to the formers office. This office which bore the business name Bayside Manpower Export
Specialist was in a building situated at Bautista St. Buendia, Makati, Metro Manila. In that office, private
complainants gave certain amounts to appellant for processing and other fees. Ferre gave P1,000.00 as
processing fee (Exhibit A) and another P4,000.00 (Exhibit B). Likewise, Corpus gave appellant P7,000.00 (Exhibit
D). Appellant then told private complainants that they were scheduled to leave for Dubai on September 8, 1984.
However, private complainants and all the other applicants were not able to depart on the said date as their
employer allegedly did not arrive. Thus, their departure was rescheduled to September 23, but the result was the
same. Suspecting that they were being hoodwinked, private complainants demanded of appellant to return their
money. Except for the refund of P1,000.00 to Ferre, appellant was not able to return private complainants money.
Tired of excuses, private complainants filed the present case for illegal recruitment against the accused-appellant.
To prove that accused-appellant had no authority to recruit workers for overseas employment, the
prosecution presented Jose Valeriano, a Senior Overseas Employment Officer of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Agency (POEA), who testified that accused-appellant was neither licensed nor authorized by the then
Ministry of Labor and Employment to recruit workers for overseas employment.
For her defense, appellant denied ever approaching private complainants to recruit them for
employment in Dubai. On the contrary, it was the private complainants who asked her help in securing jobs
abroad. As a good neighbor and friend, she brought the private complainants to the Bayside Manpower Export
Specialist agency because she knew Florante Hinahon,lxxx[5] the owner of the said agency. While accusedappellant admitted that she received money from the private complainants, she was quick to point out that she
received the same only in trust for delivery to the agency. She denied being part of the agency either as an owner
or employee thereof. To corroborate appellants testimony, Milagros Cuadra, who was also an applicant and a
companion of private complainants, testified that appellant did not recruit them. On the contrary, they were the
ones who asked help from appellant. To further bolster the defense, Eriberto C. Tabing, the accountant and
cashier of the agency, testified that appellant is not connected with the agency and that he saw appellant received
money from the applicants but she turned them over to the agency through either Florantino Hinahon or
Luzviminda Marcos.lxxxi[6] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
In light thereof, the appellate court affirmed the judgment of the trial court but modified the penalty imposed due to the trial courts
failure to apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law.
The appellate court thus disposed:
WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the appeal, this Court DISMISSES it and AFFIRMS the appealed
Decision EXCEPT the penalty
x x x which is hereby changed to five (5) years as minimum to seven (7) years
as maximum with perpetual disqualification from engaging in the business of recruitment and placement of
workers.lxxxii[7] (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration having been denied,lxxxiii[8] the present petition was filed, faulting the appellate court
I
x x x IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONIES OF THE COMPLAINING WITNESSES, [AND]
II
x x x IN FINDING THE PETITIONER-ACCUSED GUILTY WHEN THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE HER
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.lxxxiv[9] (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner bewails the failure of the trial court and the Court of Appeals to credit the testimonies of her witnesses, her
companion Milagros Cuadra, and Eriberto C. Tabing who is an accountant-cashier of the agency.
Further, petitioner assails the trial courts and the appellate courts failure to consider that the provisional receipts she issued
indicated that the amounts she collected from the private complainants were turned over to the agency through Minda Marcos and
Florante Hinahon. At any rate, she draws attention to People v. Seoronlxxxv[10] wherein this Court held that the issuance or signing
of receipts for placement fees does not make a case for illegal recruitment.lxxxvi[11]
The petition fails.
Articles 38 and 39 of the Labor Code, the legal provisions applicable when the offense charged was committed, lxxxvii[12]
provided:
ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated
under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal
and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. x x x
Article 39. Penalties. x x x x
(c) Any person who is neither a licensee nor a holder of authority under this Title found violating any
provision thereof or its implementing rules and regulations shall, upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than four years nor more than eight years or a fine of not less than P20,000 nor more than
P100,000 or both such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court;
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)
The elements of the offense of illegal recruitment, which must concur, are: (1) that the offender has no valid license or
authority required by law to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) that the offender undertakes any
activity within the meaning of recruitment and placement under Article 13(b), or any prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34
of the Labor Code.lxxxviii[13] If another element is present that the accused commits the act against three or more persons,
individually or as a group, it becomes an illegal recruitment in a large scale.lxxxix[14]
Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as [a]ny act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting,
transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment,
locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. (Underscoring supplied)
That the first element is present in the case at bar, there is no doubt. Jose Valeriano, Senior Overseas Employment Officer
of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, testified that the records of the POEA do not show that petitioner is
authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment.xc[15] A Certification to that effect was in fact issued by Hermogenes C.
Mateo, Chief of the Licensing Division of POEA.xci[16]
Petitioners disclaimer of having engaged in recruitment activities from the very start does not persuade in light of the
evidence for the prosecution. In People v. Alvarez, this Court held:
Appellant denies that she engaged in acts of recruitment and placement without first complying with the
guidelines issued by the Department of Labor and Employment. She contends that she did not possess any license
for recruitment, because she never engaged in such activity.
We are not persuaded. In weighing contradictory declarations and statements, greater weight must be given
to the positive testimonies of the prosecution witnesses than to the denial of the defendant. Article 38 (a) clearly
shows that illegal recruitment is an offense that is essentially committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority.
A non-licensee means any person, corporation or entity to which the labor secretary has not issued a valid license or
authority to engage in recruitment and placement; or whose license or authority has been suspended, revoked or
cancelled by the POEA or the labor secretary. A license authorizes a person or an entity to operate a private
employment agency, while authority is given to those engaged in recruitment and placement activities.
xxxx
That appellant in this case had been neither licensed nor authorized to recruit workers for overseas
employment was certified by Veneranda C. Guerrero, officer-in-charge of the Licensing and Regulation Office; and
Ma. Salome S. Mendoza, manager of the Licensing Branch both of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration. Yet, as complainants convincingly proved, she recruited them for jobs in Taiwan. xcii[17] (Italics in the
original; underscoring supplied)
The second element is doubtless also present. The act of referral, which is included in recruitment, xciii[18] is the act of
passing along or forwarding of an applicant for employment after an initial interview of a selected applicant for employment to a
selected employer, placement officer or bureau.xciv[19] Petitioners admission that she brought private complainants to the agency
whose owner she knows and her acceptance of fees including those for processing betrays her guilt.
That petitioner issued provisional receipts indicating that the amounts she received from the private complainants were
turned over to Luzviminda Marcos and Florante Hinahon does not free her from liability. For the act of recruitment may be for profit
or not. It is sufficient that the accused promises or offers for a fee employment to warrant conviction for illegal recruitment. xcv[20] As
the appellate court stated:
x x x Sec. 13(b) of P.D. 442 [The Labor Code] does not require that the recruiter receives and keeps the
placement money for himself or herself. For as long as a person who has no license to engage in recruitment of
workers for overseas employment offers for a fee an employment to two or more persons, then he or she is
guilty of illegal recruitment.xcvi[21]
Parenthetically, why petitioner accepted the payment of fees from the private complainants when, in light of her claim that
she merely brought them to the agency, she could have advised them to directly pay the same to the agency, she proferred no
explanation.
On petitioners reliance on Seoron,xcvii[22] true, this Court held that issuance of receipts for placement fees does not make
a case for illegal recruitment. But it went on to state that it is rather the undertaking of recruitment activities without the necessary
license or authority that makes a case for illegal recruitment.xcviii[23]
A word on the penalty. Indeed, the trial court failed to apply the Indeterminate Sentence Law which also applies to offenses
punished by special laws.
Thus, Section 1 of Act No. 4103 (AN ACT TO PROVIDE FOR AN INDETERMINATE SENTENCE AND PAROLE FOR ALL
PERSONS CONVICTED OF CERTAIN CRIMES BY THE COURTS OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS; TO CREATE A BOARD OF
INDETERMINATE SENTENCE AND TO PROVIDE FUNDS THEREFOR; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES) provides:
SECTION 1.
Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal
Code, or its amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term
of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of
the said Code, and the minimum which shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by
the Code for the offense; and if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall sentence the accused to
an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the
minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same. (As amended by Act No. 4225)
(Underscoring supplied)
While the penalty of imprisonment imposed by the appellate court is within the prescribed penalty for the offense, its
addition of perpetual disqualification from engaging in the business of recruitment and placement of workers is not part thereof.
Such additional penalty must thus be stricken off.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that the accessory penalty imposed by it consisting of perpetual disqualification from engaging in the business of
recruitment and placement of workers is DELETED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,
G.R. No. 181245

Present:
Ynares-Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
Austria-Martinez,
Chico-Nazario,
Nachura, and
Reyes, JJ.
- versus -
JIMMY ANG @ ANG TIAO LAM

and HUNG CHAO NAN,
Appellant.
Promulgated:
August 6, 2008
x ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the September 20, 2007 Decision xcix[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CRH.C. No. 02374, affirming the Judgmentc[2] of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 12, in Crim. Case No. 00-184050, finding
appellant Jimmy Ang @ Ang Tiao Lam & Hung Chao Nan guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) plus actual damages, ci[3] with the
modification that appellant is further ordered to pay legal interest on the award of actual damages from the time of the filing of the
Information until fully paid.
The facts of the case are as follows:
On June 28, 2000, appellant was charged with violation of Section 6 (l) and (m) of Republic Act No. 8042 or the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That in or about and during the period comprised between November 1999 and June 23, 2000, inclusive,
in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, conspiring and confederating with another whose true name,
real identity and present whereabouts is unknown and mutually helping each other, representing themselves to
have the capacity to contract, hire, enlist and transport Filipino workers for employment abroad, did then and
there willfully and unlawfully, for a fee, recruit and promise employment as factory workers in Taiwan, and in
consideration thereof charge and accept, directly or indirectly from the following:
PHEX M. GARLEJO
EDNA PARAGAS
SPOUSES MAGDALENO DIOSDADO S.
ORDONIO & MARLENE G. ORDONIO
ELLEN B. CANLAS
P 20,000.00
P115,000.00
P150,000.00
P 50,000.00
as placement and/or processing fee for overseas employment which amounts are greater than that specified in
the schedule of allowable fees prescribed by the Secretary of Labor and Employment and failed to actually deploy
them without valid reasons and failed to reimburse expenses incurred by them, despite demands and in spite of
the fact that the deployment of the said PHEX M. GARLEJO, EDNA PARAGAS, Sps. MAGDALENO DIOSDADO
S. ORDONIO & MARLENE G. ORDONIO and ELLEN B. CANLAS did not actually take place without their fault.
Contrary to law.cii[4]
Appellant pleaded not guilty when arraigned.
Ellen Canlas testified that on January 17, 2000, she was introduced to appellant who promised her a job as factory worker
in Taiwan. Canlas was interested in working abroad thus, she gave appellant the amount of P50,000.00 which would be used
allegedly to defray the expenses for the processing of her papers. Appellant issued Canlas a receipt for P50,000.00.
Edna Paragas also testified that she met appellant in November, 1999. Lured by the promise of a job in Taiwan, Paragas
gave appellant a total amount of P115,000.00 for which she was issued a receipt. She was told that the money would be spent for
the processing of her papers.
Marlene Ordonio also applied for a job in Taiwan through appellant. She gave him the amount of P150,000.00 to be used
allegedly for the processing of her papers. Appellant issued a receipt for the said amount.
Phex M. Garlejo also paid P20,000.00 to appellant who promised him a job as a factory worker in Taiwan.
When appellant failed to deploy the private complainants as factory workers in Taiwan, they decided to file a complaint
before the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) who endorsed them to the Philippine Anti-Organized Crime Task Force
(PAOCTF). Since appellant was asking for additional funds from Garlejo, an entrapment operation was planned.
On June 23, 2000, Canlas, Paragas, Ordonio and Garlejo met appellant inside Universal Restaurant along Rizal Avenue,
Manila. After Garlejo handed to appellant the envelope containing the marked money, appellant issued a receipt for P30,000.00.
Thereafter, he proceeded to count the money whereupon he was arrested by the PAOCTF operatives.
Appellant, who was the sole witness for the defense, testified that he was a factory worker in Taiwan. Sometime in
October 1999, he met Erolyn Bello and Marlene Ordonio who requested him to look for a broker in Taiwan who will affiliate with a
local recruitment agency for the deployment of factory workers. When he returned to Taiwan, he allegedly met a certain Leo Liao
who agreed to act as broker.
He admitted meeting private complainants and receiving money from them. However, he alleged that the amounts were in
payment for the expenses he incurred in scouting for a broker in Taiwan. He also argued that private complainants did not meet
Liao, the alleged broker, because during their scheduled meeting, the private complainants suddenly felt shy.
Finally, he alleged that during the entrapment operation, he was forced by the PAOCTF to sign the acknowledgement
receipt; and that he never received the money because he was handcuffed.
After trial on the merits, the trial court rendered judgment, the dispositive portion of which provides:
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused JIMMY
ANG also known as ANG TIAO LAM and HUNG CHAO-NAN guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Illegal Recruitment (in Large Scale). Accordingly, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE
IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00). Moreover, he is hereby
ordered to pay actual damages, to the complainants in the following amounts, to wit:
PHEX M. GARLEJO
EDNA PARAGAS
SPOUSES MAGDALENO DIOSDADO S.
ELLEN B. CANLAS
P 20,000.00
P115,000.00
P150,000.00
P 50,000.00
SO ORDERED.ciii[5]
Appellant filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals raising the following as errors:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE

CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE PROSECUTIONS FAILURE TO ESTABLISH HIS GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE

CRIME CHARGED SINCE NO EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED BY THE PROSECUTION SHOWING
THAT HE HAD NO LICENSE OR AUTHORITY TO RECRUIT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND

EMPLOYMENT (DOLE).civ[6]
In his Brief, appellant conceded that the prosecution satisfactorily established that he engaged in the act of recruitment and
placement of workers for deployment abroad; however, he argued that he cannot be held liable for illegal recruitment because it was
not shown that he has not secured a license or authority to recruit or deploy workers.cv[7]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) countered that the testimony of the PAOCTF agents that upon investigation with
the POEA, they discovered that appellant is a non-licensee or non-holder of authority to recruit and deploy workers abroad, is
sufficient proof that indeed, he is not authorized to engage in recruitment activities. The OSG also recommended that the penalty of
fine imposed upon appellant be increased from P100,000.00 to P500,000.00 and that the award of actual damages should earn
interest from the time of the filing of the information until fully paid.
On September 20, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered the herein assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which
provides:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit. The judgment of the court a quo
dated April 5, 2006 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant is ORDERED to pay the
private complainants legal interest on the following amounts from the time of the filing of the Information until fully
paid:
1. PHEX M. GARLEJO
2. EDNA PARAGAS
3. SPOUSES MAGDALENO DIOSDADO S.
4. ELLEN B. CANLAS
P 20,000.00
P115,000.00
P150,000.00
P 50,000.00
SO ORDERED.cvi[8]
Hence, the instant petition.
On March 5, 2008, this Court resolved to notify the parties to file their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desire,
within 30 days from notice.cvii[9] On May 2, 2008, appellant filed a Manifestation and Motion that he is dispensing with the filing of
the supplemental brief.cviii[10] On May 7, 2008, the OSG likewise manifested that it is no longer filing its supplemental brief. Hence,
this case is now deemed submitted for resolution.
The petition lacks merit.
Appellant was charged with violation of Section 6 (l) and (m) of Republic Act No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, which provides:
SEC. 6. Definition. For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers and includes referring contract services,
promising or advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit of not, when undertaken by a non-licensee or
non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise
known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided, That any such non-licensee or non-holder who, in any
manner, offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged. It
shall likewise include the following acts, whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non holder,
licensee or holder of authority:
xxxx
(l)
Failure to actually deploy without valid reason as determined by the Department of Labor
and Employment; and
(m)
Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation
and processing for purposes of deployment, in cases where the deployment does not actually take place
without the workers fault.
x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
Appellant conceded in his Brief that the prosecution satisfactorily established that he engaged in the act of recruitment and
placement of workers for deployment abroad. It was likewise proven that the private complainants were never deployed to Taiwan
as factory workers. Moreover, it was also settled that he received certain amounts allegedly to be used to cover the expenses for
the documentation and processing of the complainants papers, but said amounts were never reimbursed to them despite their nondeployment and repeated demands. However, appellant argued that he cannot be held liable for illegal recruitment because it was
not shown that he has not secured a license or authority to recruit or deploy workers.
This contention lacks basis. It is clearly provided in Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 that any person, whether a nonlicensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority may be held liable for illegal recruitment for certain acts as enumerated in
paragraphs (a) to (m) thereof. Since appellant was charged with violation of Sec. 6 (l) and (m), there is no more need to prove
whether he is a licensee or not because it is no longer an element of the crime. The trial court and the Court of Appeals therefore
correctly found appellant guilty as charged.
In the instant case, appellant is guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale because it was committed against the four private
complainants. This is in accordance with the penultimate paragraph of Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 which provides, thus:
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more
persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against
three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.
The trial court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, imposed upon the appellant the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine
of P100,000.00 plus actual damages, with interest thereon. However, the fine of P100,000.00 should be increased to P500,000.00
pursuant to Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042 which reads, thus:
(b)
The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand pesos
(P500,000.00) nor more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes
economic sabotage as defined therein.
Illegal recruitment committed by a syndicate or in large scale is considered an offense involving economic sabotage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 20, 2007 in CAG.R. CR-H.C. No. 02374, affirming with modification the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 12, in Crim. Case
No. 00-184050, finding appellant Jimmy Ang @ Ang Tiao Lam & Hung Chao Nan guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay actual damages with legal interest thereon, is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION that the penalty of fine is INCREASED to P500,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Appellee,
G.R. No. 178204

[Formerly G.R. No. 156497]
Present:
- versus -
MARCOS GANIGAN,
Appellant.
QUISUMBING, J.,
Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
VELASCO, JR., and
BRION, JJ.
Promulgated:
August 20, 2008
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Before us for automatic review is the Decisioncix[1] dated 14 November 2006 of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment
of convictioncx[2] for the crime of illegal recruitment rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 21.cxi[3]
In an Information filed before the RTC, accused Ruth, Monchito, Eddie, Avelin Sulaiman and Marcos (appellant), all
surnamed Ganigan, were charged with illegal recruitment committed as follows:
That sometime between the period from July and August 1998 in Plaridel, Bulacan and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, representing themselves to have the capacity to
contract, enlist and transport workers for employment in New Zealand, conspiring, confederating and mutually
helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously recruit for a fee the following persons
namely: MAURO EUSEBIO, VALENTINO CRISOSTOMO and LEONORA DOMINGO, all residents of Sto. Nio,
Plaridel, Bulacan for employment in New Zealand, without first obtaining the required license and/or authority from
the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration.
CONTRARY TO LAW.cxii[4]
Only appellant was arrested. The other accused remained at large.
Appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty on arraignment. Trial ensued.
The three private complainants, Leonora Domingo (Leonora), Mauro Reyes (Mauro), and Valentino Crisostomo
(Valentino), testified for the prosecution.
They narrated that they first met appellant in the house of Manolito Reyes in Plaridel, Bulacan in June 1998. Appellant
allegedly made representations to private complainants, among others, that his brother, Monchito, and his sister-in-law, Ruth, had
the capacity to recruit apple and grape pickers for employment in New Zealand.cxiii[5]
On 5 July 1998, the group, composed of the three private complainants and 35 others, cxiv[6] went to La Union where they
met with Monchito and Ruth. Ruth proceeded to explain their prospective employment with a $1,200.00 monthly salary. Ruth also
required the group to attend bible study sessions every Sunday because their prospective employer is a devout Catholic. Pursuant
to their desire to work in New Zealand, the group attended bible study from 5 July to December 1998.cxv[7]
Each member of the group was asked to pay P2,000.00 as assurance fee.cxvi[8] Leonora paid an additional P400.00 for
her National Statistics Office-issued birth certificate,cxvii[9] P500.00 for physical examination and P320.00 for medical fee.cxviii[10]
Mauro gave an additional P320.00 for medical expensescxix[11] whereas Valentino shelled out P180.00 for pictures, P1,000.00 for
bio-data and P350.00 for medical examination.cxx[12] The three attested that appellant received their payment and a document was
prepared by one of their companions as evidence of the receipt. cxxi[13] The exhibits submitted by the prosecution show that
Monchito acknowledged having received a total of P101,480.00 from various applicants.cxxii[14] Other documents showed that
appellant and Ruth received payment from the applicants.cxxiii[15]
Ruth and appellant allegedly promised them that they would leave for New Zealand before October 1998. When they were
unable to leave, however, they were told that their prospective employer would arrive in the Philippines on 22 November 1998. On
the designated date, they were informed that their prospective employer fell down the stairway of the airplane. An interview was
then scheduled on 29 December 1998 but on that day, they were told that their prospective employer had been held up. This
prompted the complainants to go to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) to check on the background of
the accused.
They learned that appellant, Ruth and Monchito do not have the authority to recruit workers for employment abroad. cxxiv[16]
Certifications to that effect were issued by the POEA.cxxv[17]
Appellant denied having recruited private complainants for work abroad. He claimed that he himself was also a victim as
he had also paid P3,000.00 for himself and P2,000.00 for his daughter. He likewise attended the bible study sessions as a
requirement for the overseas employment.cxxvi[18] He contended that he was merely implicated in the case because he was the only
one apprehended among the accused.cxxvii[19]
The trial court rendered judgment convicting appellant of the crime of illegal recruitment. The dispositive portion of the
decision reads:
Wherefore, all premises considered, this Court finds and so holds that the prosecution was able to
establish by proof beyond reasonable doubt the criminal culpability of the accused Marcos Ganigan on the
offense charged against him. Accordingly, this Court finds him guilty of the crime of illegal recruitment in large
scale resulting in economic sabotage as defined under Section 6 and penalized under Section 7(b) of Republic
Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995. Accordingly, he is
sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.
Accused Marcos Ganigan is also directed to pay complainants Leonora Domingo, Mauro Reyes and
Valentino Crisostomo the amounts of P2,400.00 each plus the sum of P500.00 for Leonora Domingo for actual
damages and P25,000.00 as and for moral damages.
With regard to accused Ruth Ganigan, Monchito Ganigan, Eddie Ganigan and Avelin Sulaiman Ganigan,
who remain at large until this time, the case against them is ordered archived. Let an alias Warrant of arrest be
issued for their apprehension.
SO ORDERED.cxxviii[20]
The trial court found that all elements of illegal recruitment in large scale had been established through the testimonial and
documentary evidence of the prosecution.
In view of the penalty imposed, the case was elevated to this Court on automatic review. However, this Court resolved to
transfer the case to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review in light of our ruling in People v. Mateo.cxxix[21]
On 14 November 2006, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts decision.
Upon receipt of the unfavorable decision, appellant filed a notice of appeal. On 15 October 2007, this Court resolved to
accept the case and to require the parties to simultaneously submit their respective supplemental briefs. The Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG) filed a Manifestation and Motioncxxx[22] stating that it would no longer file any supplemental briefs and instead adopt
its appellee's brief filed on 12 January 2006. Appellant likewise manifested that he would merely adopt his appellant's brief.cxxxi[23]
Appellant argues that the prosecution has failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He maintains that he did
not participate in any recruitment activity and that the alleged payments made by private complainants were for membership in the
Christian Catholic Mission, as shown by the fact that private complainants have regularly attended bible study sessions from 5 July
to November 1998. He also points out that nothing on record would show that the necessary training or orientation seminar
pertaining to the supposed employment has ever been conducted.
Assuming arguendo that the Christian Catholic Mission was only a front to an illegal venture, appellant avers that he was
not part of the conspiracy because he was a victim himself as he in fact also paid assurance fees for membership in the Christian
Catholic Mission. He laments that aside from introducing private complainants to Ruth, he has not done any other act tantamount to
recruitment.
The OSG defended the decision of the trial court in giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of the complaining
witnesses. It contends that there is no showing that the victims were impelled by any ill motive to falsely testify against appellant. It
asserts that the collective testimony of the witnesses has categorically established appellants participation in the crime.cxxxii[24]
The crime of illegal recruitment is committed when these two elements concur: (1) the offenders have no valid license or
authority required by law to enable them to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) the offenders
undertake any activity within the meaning of recruitment and placement defined in Article 13(b) or any prohibited practices
enumerated in Article 34 of the Labor Code. In case of illegal recruitment in large scale, a third element is added that the accused
commits the acts against three or more persons, individually or as a group.cxxxiii[25]
Article 13(b) defines recruitment and placement as "any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring or procuring workers; and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or abroad,
whether for profit or not. In the simplest terms, illegal recruitment is committed by persons who, without authority from the
government, give the impression that they have the power to send workers abroad for employment purposes.cxxxiv[26]
Since appellant, along with the other accused, made misrepresentations concerning their purported power and authority to
recruit for overseas employment, and in the process collected from private complainants various amounts in the guise of placement
fees, the former clearly committed acts constitutive of illegal recruitment. In fact, this Court held that illegal recruiters need not even
expressly represent themselves to the victims as persons who have the ability to send workers abroad. It is enough that these
recruiters give the impression that they have the ability to enlist workers for job placement abroad in order to induce the latter to
tender payment of fees.cxxxv[27]
It is clear from the testimonies of private complainants that appellant undertook to recruit them for a purported employment
in New Zealand and in the process collected various amounts from them as assurance fees and other fees related thereto.
Private complainants testified in a clear, positive and straightforward manner. Leonora testified that appellant recruited her
to work in New Zealand as a fruit picker and was promised by Ruth a monthly salary of $1,200.00. She was required to pay an
assurance fee of P2,000.00. She later learned that appellant and his cohorts had not been licensed by the POEA to recruit for
overseas employment.cxxxvi[28] On cross-examination, she confirmed that she turned over the amount of fees to appellant with the
understanding that such payment was for employment abroad.cxxxvii[29]
Mauro similarly recounted that he was introduced to Monchito and Ruth by appellant as an applicant for farm work in New
Zealand. He was told to prepare P2,000.00 as assurance fee, which he paid to appellant. When he was unable to leave, he
checked with the POEA and found out that appellant had no license to recruit. cxxxviii[30] During the cross-examination, Mauro was
firm in his stance that he paid the amount of P2,000.00 as assurance of employment in New Zealand. Furthermore, he regularly
attended the bible study as a requirement for said employment.cxxxix[31]
Valentinos testimony corroborated that of Leonora and Mauro.cxl[32]
The trial court found these testimonies credible and convincing.

Well-settled is the doctrine that great weight is accorded to the factual findings of the trial court particularly on the
ascertainment of the credibility of witnesses; this can only be discarded or disturbed when it appears in the record that the trial court
overlooked, ignored or disregarded some fact or circumstance of weight or significance which if considered would have altered the
result.cxli[33] In the present case, we find no reason to depart from the rule.
Verily, we agree with the OSG that the testimonies of private complainants have adequately established the elements of
the crime, as well as appellants indispensable participation therein. Appellant recruited at least three persons, the private
complainants in this case, giving them the impression that he and his relatives had the capability of sending them to New Zealand
for employment as fruit pickers. The OSG adds that appellant went to Bulacan to invite the victims and accompanied them to a
fellowship and briefing in La Union; that appellant misrepresented that joining the religious group would ensure their overseas
employment; and that appellant without any license or authority to recruit, collected various amounts from private complainants.
Appellant miserably failed to convince this Court that the payments made by the complainants were actually for their
membership in the religious organization. He did not present any document to prove this allegation.
For their part, private complainants were adamant that the payments made to appellant were for purposes of employment
to New Zealand. They further explained that their participation in the bible study sessions was but a requirement imposed by
appellant because their prospective employer was also a member of the same religious group.
Moreover, appellant has failed to rebut the evidence presented by the prosecution consisting of a receipt of payment
signed by him.cxlii[34] His flimsy denial that the signature on the receipt was not his own does not merit consideration in light of the
trial courts contrary finding.
As between the positive and categorical testimonies of private complainants and the unsubstantiated denial proffered by
appellant, this Court is inclined to give more weight to the former.
In sum, appellant is correctly found guilty of large scale illegal recruitment tantamount to economic sabotage.
Under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 8042, the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than P500,000.00 nor
more than P1,000.000.00 shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00867 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
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Labor Standards Cases - 4

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Labor Standards Cases - 4

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Republic of the Philippines

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 84082 March 13, 1991

Total Monthly Compensation US$1,700.00

Less: Cash Advances:

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 113161 August 29, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RESTITUTO PABALAN y CALILONG, accused-appellant.

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 109583 September 5, 1997

13. Cynthia Arandillo 1,000.00

2. Josefina Mamon 3,000.00

14. Sandie Aguilar 3,000.00

3. Jenelyn Casa 3,000.00

15. Digna Panaguiton 2,500.00

4. Peachy Laniog 13,500.00

16. Veronica Bayogos 2,000.00

5. Verdelina Belgira 2,000.00

17. Sony Jamuat 4,500.00

6. Elma Flores 2,500.00

18. Irma Sobrequil 2,000.00

7. Ramona Liturco 2,500.00

19. Elsie Penarubia 2,000.00

8. Grace Sabando 3,500.00

20. Antonia Navarro 2,000.00

9. Gloria Palma 1,500.00

21. Selfa Palma 3,000.00

10. Avelyn Alvarez 1,500.00

22. Lenirose Abangan 13,300.00

11. Candelaria Nono 1,000.00

23. Paulina Cordero 1,400.00

12. Nita Bustamante 5,000.00

24. Nora Maquiling 2,000.00

25. Rosalie Sondia 2,000.00

30. Nimfa Bucol 1,000.00

26. Ruby Sepulvida 3,500.00

31. Nancy Bolivar 2,000.00

27. Marjorie Macate 1,500.00

32. Leonora Caballero 13,900.00

28. Estelita Biocos 3,000.00

33. Julianita Aranador 14,000.00

29. Zita Galindo 3,500.00

4. Teresa Caldeo 9. Rosie Pavillon

2. Rosa de Luna Senail 7. Thelma Beltiar

3. Elnor Bandojo 8. Cynthia Cepe

Republic of the Philippines

G.R. No. 125044 July 13, 1998

He committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group.lxi[18]

Republic of the Philippines

PHILSA INTERNATIONAL PLACEMENT and SERVICES CORPORATION, petitioner,

G.R. No. 146964

G.R. No. 181245

JIMMY ANG @ ANG TIAO LAM

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE

THAT HE HAD NO LICENSE OR AUTHORITY TO RECRUIT BY THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR AND

G.R. No. 178204

The trial court found these testimonies credible and convincing.

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