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THOMAS AQUINAS ON
THE RELATION BETWEEN LIFE ON EARTH
AND 'LIFE' AFTER DEATH
Managing Editor
Dr. H.J.M. Schoot (Thomas Instituut, Utrecht)
PEETERS
Stichting Thornasfonds - Nijrnegen
ISBN 90-6831-966-3
D.1997/0602n5
LEUVEN
1997
""
,-.'.>,-.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
1
4
CHAPTER!
To Mieke,
.-
8
8
9
13
17
20
20
25
25
30
35
41
46
48
49
54
61
62
63
CHAPTER II
1""uNiVrAim ."1
67
TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTERll
141
CHAPTER IV
207
1. The nature of the reflection on the consummated life with God . 207
1.1 Eternal life .................................. 208
1.2 Ultimate end ................................... 209
1.2.1 The order of execution ................... 210
1.2.2 The order of intention ...................... 212
1.3 God's glorifying work: the tract of ~schatology .......... 213
2. Living with God in the mode of perfection ............ 217
2.1 Eternal life ................................... 217
2.1.1 The glorified ,soul ........................... 217
2.1.2 The glorified body ......................... 225
2.1.3 The glorified creation ...................... 230
232
2.2 Eternal death ................................
2.2.1 The 'logic' of hell ..... : .................... 233
2.2.2 The limits of reflection ...................... 238
3. The impact of eternal life on ~arthly l.ife ................. 244
3 1 Eternal life as consummation of life of grace ............ 244
3:2 The communication between the living and the dead ..... 247
CHAPTER v
254
INTRODUCTION
From its very beginning human life, in its inexhaustible beauty and
riches, is accompanied by the dreadful perspective of death. We know
that one day all of us will die; we know that one day we will be
separated from our beloved ones - insofar as this is not already the case;
we know that we cannot pass on life to our children without, at one
and the same time, condemning them to the same fate. This inescapable
cruelty makes us players in a tragedy from the moment we are born.
In the Christian traqition the evil of death is interpreted from the
perspective of the 'Good News'. In Holy Scripture we are told about
the Living God, who is a God of Life, wanting us to live and be happy.
We are told about God The Father, Son and Holy Spirit, working in
history and revealing Himself in order to communicate life, Eternal
Life. We are told about the Son Incarnate, Jesus Christ, who lived
among us and gave His life for the sake of our well-being. We are told
that Christ resurrected from the dead in order to enjoy a blessed life
eternally and that we may hope to share this Eternal Life.
Nevertheless, the perspective of death remains a daily reality. The
many ways in which Death shows its horrible face display a cruelty one
never becomes inured to; a cruelty which raises serious questions for the
believer who searches for the understanding of his or her faith. One of
the most widespread of these is the question as to how God's goodness
is compatible with all the suffering in the world - since the 17th century
known as the problem of theodicee. Closely related to this, though
deliberately put in different terms, is the question which is central to
this study. Given the suffering entailed in human life on earth; given the
promise of Eternal Life; and given the insights that both are related to
God, the question is: what is this all good for? If we are created for
happiness in Eternal Life, what is the sense of this earthly mixture of
happiness and misery? Why the cruelty and the pain? Why earthly life
anyway? In other words: what is the meaning of human life and how
does it relate to the promise of another 'life' after death?
In order to deal with this last question, the work of one of the great
Teachers of the Church: Saint Thomas Aquinas (1224/5-1274) has been
studied. Special attention is paid to the way he approaches the matter at
hand; the perspective he adopts when dealing with life and death in
relation to the incomprehensible triune God. To a large extent this
specific interest is due to the context within which this study was
written: the research group 'Thomas Aquinas' of the Catholic
INTRODUCTION
INTRODUCTION
,
,
This group includes the following authors quoted in this study: J. van den Eijnden,
H. Goris, F. de Grijs, H. Rikhof, H. Schoot, W. Valkenberg, F. Vosman and J.
Wissink. For a short characterisation and determination of the position of this
approach in the 'landscape' of research on Aquinas, cf. H. Rikhof, 1995[a].
M. Grabmann, 1922.
On death, cf. A- lippi, 1965 and 1966; A- Pegis, 1974; T. Janez Barrio, 1978; M.
Rousseau, 1978 and 1979; B. de Margerie, 1983; L. Dewan, 1988j A. Zimmermann,
1992; The most comprehensive are the studies of L.F. Mateo-Seeo, 1974, 1975, 1978,
1982[a] and [b], who, however, is never quoted (whieh is probably due to the fact
that he writes in Spanish). On Aquinas and life, the only articles I found are those
of G. Kreiing, 1928 and I. Yarza, 1987. Apan from these StUdies, which explicitly
deal with life and death, a lot of material can be found in Studies on Aquinas'
anthropology, esehatology, Christology and other tracts and themes.
CONVENTIONS
CONVENTIONS
De virt card
Quodl
In Div Nom
In De causis
Other writings
De per!
De perfectione spiritualis vitae (1269-1270), Leonina.
CImp
Contra impugnantes Dei cultum et religionum (1256),
Leonina.
Compendium Theologiae (1269-1273), Leonina.
CompTh
De substantiis separatis (1271-1273), Leonina.
De sub
De reg princ De regno (or De regimine principum) ad regem Cypri
(1265-1267), Leonina,
CONVENTIONS
Deform
De art
In Orat
In duo praec
In Symb
CONVENTIONS
All abbreviations, even those in the Latin texts quoted, are following the
,j
New Jerusalem B i b l e : !
Co
Col
Dt
Ep
Ex
Ezk
Ga
Gn
Hab
Heb
Is
Jb
Jm
Jn
K
Corinthians
Colossians
Deuteronomy
Ephesians
Exodus
Ezekiel
Galatians
Genesis
Habakkuk
Hebrews
Isaiah
Job
James
John (lJn= 1" letter)
Kings
Lk
Lv
Ml
Mt
P
Ph
Ps
Rm
Rv
Sg
Si
Th
Tt
Ws
Luke
Leviticus
Malachi
Matthew
Peter
Philippians
Psalms
Romans
Revelation to John
Song of Songs
Ben SiralEcclesiasticus
Thessalonians
Titus
Wisdom
Other conventions
Patrologia cursus completus, series latina, J.-P. Migne (ed),
DH
Paris 1844-1890.
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Quaestio
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ii
(Leon:
CHAPTER!
CHAPTER I
IN SEARCH OF
AN APPROPRlATE PERSPECTIVE:
. AQUINAS ON GOD AND LIFE
In this chapter we will establish the foundations on which the rest of
this book is based. Firstly, our interpretation of Thomas Aquinas is
sketched (1). This may be helpful in locating our approach from within
the variety of interpretations the work of Aquinas has witnessed since
th~ thirteenth century. Having done this, a first investigation in the field
thiS stU?y covers ~ollows (2). Our aim is to find an appropriate
perspective from which the theological question of the relation between
life .on earth and 'life' ~er de.ath can be dealt with. Once this perspective IS settled, our question wdl be rephrased in terms of the concepts
that are relevant for Aquinas and a framework is proposed within which
the various aspects of the question can be examined (3).
The portrait which inspired our investigation is not that of the thinker
who wrote the definitive "tourist guide to the highways and byways of
divinity".' It is the portrait of a Dominican Mendicant Friar whose
theological activities should be seen within the framework of his life
dedicated to God.' The relationship with the triune God was the centre
of Aquinas' life of prayer and study and this is reflected in his theology.
How this influences the perspective from which the questions
concerning God, life and death are asked, will become clear as we
proceed by sketching the features of Aquinas' theology.'
1.1 The incomprehensihle God as the core of theology
Theology for Aquinas is what the word already says: God-talk, sermo
de Deo.' More precisely: theology is about God and everything else
insofar as it is related to God.' The same ardour we perceive in
Aquinas' tracing every possible question in theology back to its relation
with God, can, however, be observed in his allegiance to a second
principle: the fundamental impossibility of knowing, in this mortal life,
what God is. This sounds strange for a theologian who is famous for his
penetrating philosophical reflections and systematic rigour. To what
degree is Aquinas clinging to this principle? How can he proceed as a
theologian on this basis? What kind of incomprehensibility is at stake
here?'
11
CHAPTER I
10
12
Aquinas compares the rdation betWeen the human mind and God with a bat
blinded by the light of the sun: S7b I.12.1.co: dieendum quod, cum un~ue sit
cognoscibi/e secundum 'qlXi est in actu, Deus, qui est actus purus absque omni
permixlione potentiae, quantum in se est, maxime cognoscibilis est. Sed quod est maxime
cognoscibile in se, aiieui intellectui cognoscibile non est, propter excessum intel/igibilis
supra intellectum, skut soi, qui est maxime visibilis, videri non potest a vespertilione
propter excessum luminis. Cf. also S7b I 2.1.
, This statement is made by Aquinas throughout his works: Cf. S7b II-II 87 .CO: elSi
non videamm de Deo quid est, videmus tamen quid non est, et tanto in hac vita Deum
perfoctius cognoscimus quanta magis intelligimus eum excedere quidquid intellectu com
prehenditur; De pot 7.S.rat4: iIlud est ultimum cognitionis humanae de Deo quod seiat
se Deum nescire, in quantum cognoscit, iI/ud quod Deus est, omne ipsum quod de eo
intelligimus, excedere; Cf. also In De Trin 1.2.ra1; seC I 30.5; ScG ill 49.8; In De
causis 6; De 'VeT 2.1.ra9.
" J. WLSSink, 1992, p. 46-48 and 1994, p. 32-33.
" W. Hoye, 1988, p. 121-122.
II
13
5Th I 12.13.ral: licet p reve1ationem gratiae in hac vita non cogtWscamus de Deo quid
est, et sic ei quaSi igoo coniungamur; tamen plenius ipsum cognoscinuls, inquantum
plures et excellentiores ectus eius nobis demonstrantur; et inquantum ei aliqua attribui
mus ex revelatione div' dt/ quae ratio naturalis non pertingit, ut Deum esse trinum et
unum.
H. Schoot, 1993, p. 2 2. The distinction between God and creation as a fundamental
insight determiniug
uinas' procedure has been stressed by J. Pieper, 1953.
Recendy it has been
Iy expouuded by R. Sokolowski, 1982, whose book has
been a great inspiratio for this study. Cf. also 2.2.1.1 in this chapter, p. 30ff.
,. In this respect I am uch debted to the interpretation of Aquinas proposed by D.
Burrell, 1979 and 198 . What Burrell works out with regard to God's essence is
adopted and applied
the manner in which God actS by K. Tanner, 1988 and M.
Dodds, 1993. The sam is worked out with regard to Aquinas' Christology by H.
Schoot, 1993.
.
" Cf. F. de Grijs, 1988, . 35: "The incomprehensibility of the living God should,
therefore, not be underst od as one of God's many attributes or propenies. Rather
CHAPTER I
13
----
sent).
18
19
20
"
Both verses play an imponant role in Aquinas' reflection on the perspective of life,
and are often quoted in 5Th I 12. We will come back to this in chapter N, p. 217f!.
In 5Th I 12.7.ral Aquinas points out that the word comprehernio may be used in two
ways: Uno modo. striete et proprie. secundum quod aliquid includitur in comprehendenIe. Et sic nullo modo Deus comprehenditur, nee intellectu nee aliquo alia, quia, cum sit
infinitus, nullo finito includi potest, ut aliquid /initum eum infinite capiat, skut ipse
infinite est. Et sic de comprehensione nunc quaeritur. Alio modo comprehensio largius
sumitur, secundum quod comprehensio insecutioni opponitur. Cf. also STh In 4.3.ral
and 5cG m 55.
5Th I 1.1: Utrum sit necessarium praeter philosophicas disciplinas aliam doctrinam
haber;.
5Th I 1.1.co: Resporuleo dicendum quod necessarium foi' ad humanam salurem, esse
doctrinam quandam secundum reveiatronem divinam, praeter philosophicas discipfinas.
quae ratione humana investigantur. Primo quidem, quia homo ordinatur ad Deum skut
ad quendam finem qui comprehensionem rationis excedit. secundum ii/tid Js 64,4:
"Oculus non vidit Deus absque te, quae praepariasti diligentibus te." Finem autem
CHAPTER I
15
and the beatified." By putting it this way, Thomas underlines that the
divine subject of theology is also the source and the centre of theology.
In the first place this is shown by the relation bet:",ee? sacra doctri~
and sacra scriptura. The content of the sacred doc~rlOe IS what ~d. IS
teaching us through Scripture. The sacred doctrIne IS first and pn.marlly
handed down to us in Scripture, which makes this book normative for
all that is part of or springs from the sacred doctrine. Th~ connection
between the two is so close, that Thomas uses sacra doctrtna and sacra
scriptura side by side, sometimes using the one when the reader would
expect the other."
.
In the Christian traClition, the sacred doctrine has been summarized
in the Articles of Faith, since the knowledge of the content of Sc~ipture
is too important to remain reserved for only those who have time to
occupy themselves with the difficult study. of Script~re.~ But sa::ra
doctrina is broader than Scripture and the ArtIcles of FaIth: It comprISes
all manner of instructive communication from God to man, directly or
.,
.
indirectly."
.
1beologia, as a part of the sacra doctrina, IS the sClentI~c reflection. on
the content of faith. Drawing an analogy between the SCIences, AqulOas
considers the Articles of Faith as the principles of theology. Since these
articles are nothing more than the summary of the content of ~cripture,
the eminent position of Scripture in the process of theology IS beyond
oportet esse praecognieum hominibus, qui SUdS intentiones et actiones debent ordinare in
jinem.
"
"
Z4
S7b I I.l.co: Unde necessarium foil homini ad salutem, qund ei nota /ierint quaedam
per revelationem divittatn, quae rationem humanam excedunt. Ad ea etiam quae de Deo
ratkme humana investigm possunt, necessarium foit hominem instrui revelatione divina
quia veritds de Dea, per rationem investigata, a paucis, et per longum tempus, et cum
admixtione multorum erro~ homini proveniret, a (uius tamen 'fJeritatis cognitione
dependet tota hominis salus, quae in Deo est.
S7b I 1.!.ra2: Unde nihil prohibet de eitdem rebus, de quibus philosophicae disciplinae
tradam secundum quod Junt cognoscibilia tumine natura/is ratum~ et aliam scientiam
tractare secundum quod cognoscuntur lumine Jivinae revelationis. Unde theologia quae
ad sacram doctrinam peninet, differt secundum genus ab ilIa theologia quae pars phi
25
"
27
losophia< ponitur.
M. C;:orbin, 1974, has ~ollowed the shifts in Aquinas' account of theology and its
rdatlon to philosophy m four stages (In Sent, In De 7nn, ScG, S7b). The book has
met some serious critique (lv.!. Jordan, 1981) but for the character of theology as
intellectus fidei its analy';' remains valid; Cf. also T. Gilby, 1964, p. 58-66; J.
Wa1grave, 1982/1976, p. 315; B. Davies, 1992, p. 1014; M. Jordan, 1993, p. 232.251;
J. Wissink, 1993, p. 1536; H. Rikhof, 1995[b], p. 435-439.
28
5Th I 1.2.co: Et hoc modo sacra doetrina est screntia, quia proeedit ex principiis notis
lumine superioris scientiae, quae scilicet est sCientia. Dei et beatorum. J. WlSSu:.k , 1994,
p. 18, paraphrases sacra doctrina as "the doct:rmal content of Holy SCrJpture as
taught by the Church and in university classes by magistri".
Cf. J. Wissink, 1994, p. 17, footnote 4.
5Th IT-IT 1.9.ral: veritas fidei in sacra Scriptura di}fose continetur et variis modis. et in
quibusdam obscure, ita quod ad eliciendum fidei veritatem ex ~a 5criptura. ~uir~tur
longum studium et exercitium, ad quod non possunt pervenn-e omnes illt qutbus
necessarium est cognoscere fidei writatetn, quorum plerique. aliis negotiis occupatio studio
'Vacare non possunt. Et ideo foit necessarium ut ex sententiis sacrae 5cripturae aliquid
manifestum surnmarie co//igeretUT quod proponeretur omnibus ad credendum. Quod
quidem non est additum sacrae Scripturae, sed podro ex sacra Scriptura assumptum.
Cf. T. Gilby, 1964, p. 63: nSacra doctrina, then, is expressive in all manner of w~ys,
and should not be restricted to the rational exposition of a system of widelyrangmg
yet consistent propositions, on which score alone the Summa has been sometimes
admired, by those, however, who have not gone beyond its outward appearance."
16
17
CHAPTER!
any doubt." In Aquinas' days this was reflected in the official title of
the professor of theology at the university: Magister in Sacra Pagina. The
first task of the Magister was reading and explaining Holy Scripture,
guided by the tradition centered around the Anicles of Faith and with
the help of the finest tools natural reason (i.e. philosophy) can offer.
The entire undenaking of theology is centered around the bener
understanding of the revealed sacred doctrine. The' fact that the first
principles of this doctrine are revealed, deeply influences its mode of
procedure. The principles - the Anicles of Faith - can not be proved,
since they are directly related to the incomprehensible God." They can
only be approved of, defended and clarified in their interrelation, their
unity and their connection with God."
This leads us to a second manner in which God is at the centre of
theology. For Aquinas, theology is the understanding of faith (intellectus
fidei) and God is also the source and core of faith." Faith is a gift from
God, by which the intellect is illuminated by a light of a quality
differing from the light of natural reason. Thus the mystery of God,
once again, appears at the core of theology: this time not as the formal
subject of theology, but as guiding and helping those whose faith
searches for understanding.
2' All. elaborate study of the place and function of Scripture in the theology of Aquinas
:JO
is: w. Valkenberg, 1990. In his concluding reflections Valkenberg states: "In its
primary function, Scripture functions as the source aod framework of theology. As
the Word of God, it is received and interpreted in theology; as presupposition of
Christian theology it determines the theological horizon." (p. 300).
On 'the clear-cut role of natural reason in theology, d. 5Th I 1.8.ra2: Utitur tamen
sacra doctrina etiam ratione humana, non quidem ad probandum fidm; quia per hoc
tollere_ meritum fide~ sed ad mani/estandum aliqua alia quae <raduntur in hac
doctrina. Cum enim gratia non tolla: naturam, sed perficiat, aportet quod natura/is
ratio subserviat fide~' SKut et natumlis inclinatio wluntatis obsequitur caritati; Cf. ].
Walgrave, 1982/1976: 11. Jordao, 1993.
In the still valid words of Vancao ! (DH 3016): Ac ratio quidem, fide iIIus<rata, cum
sedldo, pie et sobrie quaerit, aliquam Deo dante mysteriorum intelligentittm eamque
fructuosissimdm assequitur tum ex eorum, quae natura/iter cognoscit, analogia, tum e
mysteriorum ipsorum nexu inter se et cum fine hominis ultima, numquam tamen idonea
redditur ad ea perspicienda instar veritatum, quae proprmm ipsiu,s obiectum ~onstituunt.
Divina enim mysteria suapte natura intelle~tum creatum sic excedunt, ut etiam
revelatione tradita et [tde sus~epta ipsius tamen }idei velamine contecta et quadam quasi
caligine obvoluta maneant, quamdiu in hac mortal; vita. peregrinamur.4 Domino: per
fidem enim ambuiamus et non per speciem" (2Co 5,6). Cf. also J. Wissink, 1994, p. 24.
" Cf. J. Walgrave, 1982/1974[.]. We will come back to this in chapter m, 2.1, p. 156ff.
"
)4
35
fonder ni j~tifier
un appel dont il n'est point Ie maltre et qu'il ne peut jamatS se, donn~ deter~e et
revendique, dans toUS les domaines de sa vie, .par la Parole de I Autre, il ~olt s~~
ment permission et commendement de se Sltuer et rec:onnrut.re comme un temaln
parmi d'autres."
. . .
5Th I Ij.co: Quia igitur sacra Scriptura consU/erat aliqua secundum quod sunt d~v~n~tus
Yevelata, secundum quod dictum est [STh I 1.2fi omnia quaecumque sunt dzvtnttus
reveJabi/ia, communicant in una ratione formali obiecti hums scientiae. Et ideo comprehenduntur sub sacra doctrina sieut sub scientia una.
5Th I 1.4.co: Respondeo dicendum quod sacra doctrina, ut dictum est, una exist~, se
extendit ad ea quae pertinent ad diversas scientias philo~0f"icas, f1!Opter ratt~~~
formalem qUtfnJ- in diversis attendit, scilie~t prout ~unt dwt~o lumlr:e cognosCtbilza.
Unde licet in scientiis philosophicis ali4 Stt speculattva et al~ J7r.actzc~ sacra. &amen
doctrina comprehendit sub se utTamque; sicut et
scu:nt~ s~ cogn?sctt, et ea
quae facit. Magis tamen est speculativa quam practtctt, quta pnnctpaltus aglt de rebus
neu: eaden:
19
CHAPTER I
18
as
38
"
divinis quam de actibus humanis, de quibus agit secundum quod per eos ordinatur homo
"
"
This, as well as the 'unity of tracts', has a direct bearing on the limits of this study
which covers, roughly the whole field of theology Aquinas knew: the secondary
literature on the varied subjects, tracts and sub-disciplines has become highly specia
lized and comprehensive. In this respect we do not mean to be exhaustive.
As L. Sentis (1992, p. 286) puts it, "Ie but de la theologie est de donuer accOs aux
Ecritures Saintes, et non de proposer un ensemble doctrinal qui les remplace". The
kind of misinterpretations Senrls warns us against is obvious in our days in which a
widespread aversicn for and suspicicn of toralitarian systems of thinking can be
observed. Aquiuas' theology is easily identified with such a s)"tem, and played off
against a more Biblical narrative theology in which the sense of mystery is claimed
to be safeguarded in a better manner. M. Corbin (1974) has urged, rightly, that most
wanting in our days, is a speculative theology in which the various results of the
different specialties are confronted with each other and brought into relation with
one another.
On the connection of the virtues cf. STh 111 65.15; In STh I 1.6.co and raJ Aquinas
explains that judgement in matters of faith may be the result of either the wisdom
(sapientia) which is a gift from the Holy. Spirit or the wisdom which is the result of
studying the sacred doctrine. The former is higher, like the judgement, with regard
to moral affairs, of the vinuous person is higher than that of the moral philosopher
who knows everything about virtues but possesses none of them. Cf. J. Walgrave,
1982/1974(a1, p. 119; Cf. also 5Th 1111 45.2.co.
20
CHAPTER I
meanings the words 'life' and 'death' can have. Throughout his works
Thomas consequently discerns three meanings of vita which can all be
traced back to distinctions Aristotle makes."
In a first meaning of the word, vita refers to the existence of a being
which possesses the ability to move itself in a certain manner. In this
first meaning vita is a substantial predicate, referring to the being of the
subject, as is reflected in Aristotle's definition vivere viventibus esse
est.43
In a second- meaning, which is less familiar to us than the first and
the third, vita refers to a specific act of a living substance which is
characteristic for its mode of being. Thus the volitional and cognitive
acts of human beings can be called their 'life': these acts are
characteristic for the human mode of being regarded as self-
21
Which Aquinas practices in his account of the theological vinues and the gifts of the _
Holy Spirit. Cf. M. Corbin (1974, p. 901) who remarks as a conclusion of his
reading of STh III 68.2: "ces trois modes mltapbysique, the%gique, mystique devien.
~t les troIS degres d'une echelle unique qui trouve son point culminant dans la
VlSlon de Dieu face face qui' rejouit- les bienheureux. La faute de l'interpretation
couran~e est d'oublier ~uune. distinction n'est point une separation figee mais une
dyn~l9.ue, q~'une ~l&archre n'est point une repanition statique de diverses
posslbilites maIS une ligne ascendante dialectique qui maintient la fois la consistence
de la niveau inferieur et sa tendence a se depasser pour s'egaIer au niveau superieur."
movement.44
In a third meaning, with the word vita the chief occupation or
"
4)
n De anima
autem sensus vel intel/eetus. Potentia autem. ad operationem reducitur; principaJe autem
in operatione. Vuietur autem vivere esse principalieer sentire vel intelligere. Aquinas
comments (In IX Eth 11 [Leon: 30D: in omnibus animdJibus communiter determinatur
vivere secundum potentiam sensus, in hominibus autem determinatur secundum
potentiam sensus, quantum ad itt quod habet commune cum aliis animalibus, vel
secundum potentiam inte/lecms, quantum ad id quod est proprium sibL Omnis autem in
potentia reducitur ad operationem skut ad propriam peifectionem: uOOe id quod est
principale consistit in operatione et non in potentia nuda, actus enim est potior quam
potentia, ut probatur in IX Mtaphysicae. Et ex hoc patet quod principaliter Viflert
anima/is vel hominis est sentire vel intellig~.
" I Eth 5 (1095bl4-19): Bonum enim et felicitatem non irrationabiJiter videntur ex his
quae huius 'Vitae sunt "existimare. Multi quidem et gravissimi voluptatem. Ideo et vitam
diJigunt voluptuosam. Tres enim sunt maxime excellentes. et quae nunc dicta est et quae
civilis est et tertia quae contemplativa est. Aquinas comments (!n I Eth 5 [Leon: 62]:
unusquisque id ad quod maxim< aflicitur reputat vitam suam, sicut phiJosophus
phiJosophar~ "venator venari et sic de allis. Et quia homo maxime afficitur ad ultimum
finen; necesse est quod vitae diversificentur secundum diversitatem ultimi finis.
22
23
CHAPTER 1
These three meanings in which the word vita is used are closely
connected by the notion of 'self-movement'. Since the human mode of
being is an intelligent mode of being, one could even say that, in the
case of human beings, these meanings of the word 'life' imply each
other. The species homo is differentiated from the genus animal by the
predicate rationale which refers to the intellectual operations; the nature
of these operations determine the specific nature of human existence. In
other words: the life (in the third meaning) we lead follows from our
free deliberate choices flife' in the second meaning) which follow from
our mode of being ('life' in the first meaning)."
Generally speaking, Aquinas considers mors as the opposite of vita.
The logical definition of death is privatio vitae. Taken as a privation
mors is called a malum and like any malum can only be known insofar
as the bonum in which it inheres is known, mors can only be known
insofar as vita is known. Therefore, in these paragraphs we will mainly
concentrate on Aquinas' use of life.
The three meanings of vita just mentioned may serve as a first
orientation in the matter. When we turn to Aquinas' actual use of the
word, however, a somewhat more complicated picture takes shape. The
word vita, taken in each of the meanings, functions in a variety of
contexts, with a variety of applications."
With regard to vita in the first meaning, Aquinas speaks of vita
animae or spiritualis on the one hand and vita corporis or corporalis on
the other hand. He distinguishes vita temporalis from vita aeterna.
Theologically he makes a distinction between vita naturae or naturalis,
vita gratiae and vita gloriae or gloriosa. With regard to the human soul
he discerns vita nutritiva, vita sensibilis and vita intellectiva or rationalis.
He speaks of vita angeli and vita Dei, of vita praesens and vita !utura,
46
In In IX Eth 7 the connection of the different meanings can be detected [Leon: 74]:
Esse autem nostrum consistit in quodam actu, esse enim nostrum est vivere et per
consequens operari (non enim est vita absque vitae operatione quacwnque), unde unimi-
que est amabiJe operari opera vitae,' {adem autem in actu est quodam modo ipsum opus
facientis. actus enim moventis et agentis est in moto et patiente; ideo itaque diJigunt opus
mum et -artifices et poetae et bene/aclores, quia diligunt suum esse.
" For an introductory overview the lists of R. Deferrari, 1948, p. 117()'1172 (vita) and
p. 703 (mays) are a useful guide. On these pages the references to the works of
Aquinas can be found as well. For a full consideration of the matter one should also
take intO account words like vivus, vi'lJijicare, mortalis (culpa morta/is, peccatum
martdeO and monifer. Since aile these words are derived from the meanings of vita
and t1WYS as they are introduced here, they will be discussed later in this study.
more.
24
25
CHAPTER!
God is the formal subject of theology. But how does this relate to God's
incomprehensibility which we noticed at the centre of Aquinas'
theological reflection?
In order to proceed, we will have to take a closer look at the way in
which Aquinas attributes 'life' to God, what this reveals regarding his
perception of God's mode of being and what this entails for the human
mode of being. Before we take a closer look, however, at the procedure
Aquinas follows two observations are of importance.
In the first place we must bear in mind the context of Thomas'
work: the exposition of Holy Scripture. The variety of meanings in
which vita and mars occur in the writings of Aquinas are the result of
his close reading of Scripture. At first sight this may seem strange, since
we started our orientation on the use of the word 'life' with the
observation that the distinctions Aquinas makes are all to be traced back
to Aristotle. As we will see later in this study, however, Aristotle does
nothing more than provide an instrument which helps Aquinas to make
a meticulous analysis of what is told in Holy Scripture.
One of the main sources of Aquinas' theological reflections on life is
the gospel of Saint John" in which the word 'life' is one of the key
words. so In this gospel Christ Himself is called vita as well as panis
vitae, knowing God is called vita aeterna, Christ is said to be giving
aqua viva and the Father is said to have vita in semetipso. In the gospel
of Saint John questions arise as to what exactly is meant by 'life' and
how it is related to God: Father, Son and Spirit. Apart from the fourth
Gospel the word vita as a divine name is found in various places in
Holy Scripture.'1
In the second place, since we aim to give an interpretation of
Aquinas as a theologian and a thinker close to Scripture, our intention is
to take into account, from the outset, that the God he speaks about is
the triune God: Father, Son and Spirit. For the sake of clarity, however,
Aquinas often treats first the one nature of the triune God and later the
three Persons in the one God." We will do the same by focusing on
'life' as a name for the divine nature in the first place.
2.2 'Life' as a name for God's essence
The question of the life of God is treated within the context of the
knowledge of God, since Aquinas considers knowing to be a kind of
living. This knowledge of God is situated within the larger framework
"
52
., Apart from Scripture, Aquinas' attention for 'life' as a name of God, seems to be
raised also by the fact that pseudo-Dionysius dedicates a chapter to vita in his
famous De divinis nominibus; which was a highly esteemed work with authority
close to Holy Scripture in Aquinas' days. Cf. G. Rocca, 1993, p. 642-649.
" The most important passages are in the words of the vulgata: (Tn 1,4) in Ipso "ita
era., (Tn 1,4-5) et "ita erat lux Imminum; et lux in tenebris luret. .. ; (Tn 3,16) sic enin>
duexit Deus mundum. ..ut omnis... habeat vitam aeternaTnj
3,36) qui credit in Pi/ium
habet vitam aeternatnj (In 4,10) tu forsitan petisses ab Eo et dedisset tim aquam vi'lJd.mj
5,21) sicut enim Pater suscitat mortuos et vivificat... ;
5,26) sicut enim Pater habet
"itam in semet Ipso; (Tn 6,35) Ego sum panis "itae...; (Tn 6,52) panis quem ego dabo earo
mea est pro mundi vita;
6.58) skUI mis;t Me vivens Pater et Ego vivo propter
Patrem. .. ; (Tn 11,25) Ego sum resurrectio et "ita; (Tn 12,24) nisi granum frumenti eadens
in terram mortuum fomt;
14,6} Ego sum via et veritas et vita;
17,3} haec est
autem vita aeterna ut cognoscant Te solum verum Deum.
an
an
ern
an
an
an
53
Cf. e.g. p, 35,10: apud Te fons 'Vitae, a verse which Aquinas often quotes as referring
to Christ who is with the Father; and Ps 83,3: cor meum et earo mea exultavit in
Deum vivum, quoted in 5Th I 18.3.sc.
According to K. Rahner, this distinction of two perspectives on the triune God is
found for the first time in Aquinas' work. In the history of theology it was a major
factor for the development of a division of the doctrine of God into twO treatises: de
deo uno and de deo trino. This separate treatment, with negative side-effects, became
common practise aher the Summa Theologiae had ousted Peter Lombard's IV Libri
Sententiarnm (K. Rahner, 1967, p. 323-324). In contemporary theology the observation and warning of Rahnec have been acknowledged and taken to heart. Cf. N. Lash,
1993.
Other places of interest are: SeC I 97-99, I~ XII Met 8, In Joan 14.2, In Div Nom 6.
We have chosen for S'Ih I 18 because it is Aquinas' most mature work, here he
treats the subject more extensively than in other places and he is not bound by any
texts on which he has to comment. In Div Nom 6 would be a good alternative
because of the unique condense enumeration of the various kinds of life which God
bestows. The text of pseudo-Dionysius. however. forces Aquinas to place all
emphasis on the causality and pre-existence of God's life: a position which Thomas
corrects in his own systematic works.
26
CHAPTER!
meaning can be detected. Not all natural things, however, exist in this
way. Water, for instance, does not have the ability to move itself. It can
be moved by something else, and thus be called 'living': not in the
proper meaning but having a similitude with life.
. . .
In this approach we see how one word, VLta, may be applied In lts
proper meaning to different realities on the basis of a common ratio of
self-movement." When the element of 'movement' in the ratio of vita
is taken in a wider meaning (as in the case of the operatio) we still speak
of 'life' in the proper meaning, but when the element of 'self is taken
away, there can only be talk of 'life' by means of similitude.
One may observe tfrat Aquinas, in this article, moves between the
logical and the (meta)physical order in his analysis of what life is. He
gains insight by scrutinizing the implicit rules we adopt in our common
sense language and by testing these rules with the help of metaphysical
distinctions. The reason why Aquinas proceeds in this way is that in his
view our naming of things is determined by our mode of knowing.
Thomas explicitly brings this into discussion in the second article of the
question (utrum vita sit quaedam operatio). In this article the question
posed is whether life is an activity (secunda perfectio) or a mode of being
(prima perfectio)- In his reply Aquinas states that our intellect is apt to
know the essence of things, but that it can do so only after having
received information from the senses." The information the senses
provide is restricted to the external, accidental qualities of the object.
We name things as we know them: with regard to life this becomes
apparent by our use of the word 'life'. Sometimes the word refers to
54 5Th I 14.prol: Quia vero inte/ligere quoddam vivere est, post comider4tionem divinae
scientiae, considerandum erit de vita divina. Thomas reflects on the operations of God
after he has taken God's substance into consideration (STh ! 2-13). In these first
questions of the Summa Tbeologiae, after an inquiry about the nature of
sacred
doctrine, Aqoinas asks whether God is (STh ! 2), how God is (or rather, how He is
not, since we cannot know God's essence) (5Th I 3-11), how God is known to us
(STh ! 12) and how God can be named by us (STh ! 13). In the questions regarding
God's substance (STh ! 2-13), the mOst fundamental decisions about our knowing
and speaking of God are made; decisions which heavily influence the rest of the
Summa Theologiae. We will therefore return to these initial questions in our interpretation of STh! 18 when necessary.
S5
5Th I 18.1.eo: Respondeo dicendum quod ex his quae manifoste vivum, accipere
possumus quorum sit 'Oivere, et quorum non sit vivere. Vivere autem manifeste
anima/ibus convenit... Primo autem dicimus animal vivere, quando ineipit ex se motum
habere... Ex quo patet quod ilia proprie sunt viventia, quae seipsa secundum aliquam
speciem motus movent,' sive accipiatur motus proprie, situt matus dicitur actus imperfecti, idest existentis in potentia; sive motus accipiatur communiter, prout motus dicitur
actus perfect~ prout intelligere et sentire dicitur nu)'Ver~ ut dicitur in III De anima 7
{431a6} ut sic viventia dicantur quaecumque se agunt ad motum vel ,operationem
aliquam...
27
me
S6
57
STh I 13.4.co: Ratio enim quam significat nomen, est conceptio intellectus de re
significata per nomen. Cf. R. McInerny. 1961, p. 6164 who underscores that the ratio
or definition is produced by the intellect.
5Th I 18.2.co: Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut ex dietis patet, intel/ectus noster, qui
proprie est cognoscitivus quidditatis rei ut proprii obiect~ accipit a sensu, cuius propria
obiecta sunt accidentia exteriora. Et inde est quod ex his qU4e exterius apparent de re,
devenimus ad cognoseendam essentiam reL Sic ergo dicendum est et de vita. Nam
'vitae' nomen sumitur ex quodam exterius apparenti circa rem, quod est movere seipsum,
non tamen est impositum hoc nomen ad hoc signifzcandum, sed ad significandam
substantiam cui convenit secundum suam naturam movere seipsam, vel agere se
quocumque modo ad operationem. Et secundum hoc, 'vivere' nihil aliud est quod esse in
tali natura. et 'vita' significat hoc ipsum, sed in abstracto; sicut hoc nomen 'CW'sus'
significat ipsum CurTere in abstracto. Unde 'vivum' non est praedicazum accidentale, sed
substantiale. Quandoque tamen 'vita' sumitur minus proprie pro operationibus vitae, a
quibus nomen 'Vitae assumitur,' situt dicit Philosophus, in IX Ethicorum 9 [1170a18],
quod vivere principaliter est sentire, vel inteJligere.
28
activities such as willing and knowing (by which the essence of a living
substance is made known) and sometimes to the essence of the substance
itself. Both meanings of the word 'life' are proper, but the second is the
more proper meaning, being the term of our knowledg~.
In the third article, Aquinas arrives at the central Issue of SIb I 18:
whether life can be attributed to God (utrum Deo conveniat vita). He
begins the article with three arguments that seem to contradict the view
that life can be attributed to God. All the arguments are based on the
seeming discord between the simplicity of God and .certain eleme.nts that
are to be found in all living substances mentioned m the precedmg two
articles (movement, a soul as principle of life and corp orality). As an
argument in favour only Psalm 83,3 is quoted: Cor meum et cr:ro mea
51
5Th I 18.3.co: Respondeo dicendum quod vita rnaxime proprie in Deo est. Ad tuius
e'Uidentiam, considerandum est quodJ cum vivere dicantur aliqua secundum quod
operantur ex seipsis, et non quasi ab diu mota,' quanta perfectius competit hoc alicui,
tanto perfectius in eo in-venitur vita ... lnveniuntur igitur quaedam, quae movent seipsa,
non habita respectu ad formam vel fin~ quae inest eis a natura, sed solum ad
executionem motus, sed forma per quam agunt, et finis propter quem agunt,
determinantur eis a natura. Et huiusmcdi sunt plantae...
CHAPTER I
29
30
Vivere viventibus esse est, Thomas learns from Aristotle and he says
that 'life', in its proper meaning, refers to the act of being. Asking for
the nature of God's life, therefore, is inevitably connected with the
question of God's mode of being. Thinking in terms of being, in all the
objects we come to know through our senses the 'being' is determined
by the essence.62 The distinction between the esse of a substance and its
essentia is, ontologically, the most fundamental distinction one can
make. Therefore, asking for God Thomas begins to ask for the being or
existence of God (STh I 2) followed by an investigation into His essence
(STh I 3-11).
The triune God who revealed Himself through Holy Scripture,
however, is not exactly an object which we come to know directly by
our senses. Though Thomas builds up his argument according to the
distinction between God's being and His essence, in q.3 he blurs that
distinction by saying that in God, being and essence cannot be
separated. How is this to be interpreted? Beginning with q.2,
interpreting the five ways as proofs of God's existence and reading the
following questions as providing information about the object, the
existence of which has just been proved, Aquinas' claim about the iden
tification of being and essence in God could be interpreted as a
confirmation of having the possibility to know God's essence.
At the very beginning of STh I 3, however, Aquinas explicitly states
that we cannot know God's nature or essence and that we should rather
62
Here we touch upon a long discussion about the relation between esse and essence in
Aquinas' thinking. For literature d. R. te Velde, 1995.
CHAPTER!
31
investigate how God is not." Taking this remark seriously, the identification of God's being with His essence takes the shape of a prohibition
sign. Moreover, after this identification of being and essence, q.2 should
be read again, in order to see what exactly Aquinas is up to here.
Thus, in order to gain insight into Thomas' view on God's life we
will, firstly, ask what he intends with the identification of being and
essence in God and, secondly, ask how this identification affects the
reading of Aquinas' remarks on God's being.
It has been argued, and I hold this to be the most elucidating and
theologically coherent i(lterpretation of Aquinas that, with the identification of God's existence and His essence he articulates the most
fundamental insight that determines his entire theological undertaking:
the distinction between creatures and Creator." Thus, by blurring the
most basic distinction in the ontological order Aquinas intends to make
a new distinction, one between God and creatures. What is at stake here
for Thomas is the possibility for maintaining the Biblical idea that God
is at one and the same time Creator of all creatures (which implies that
He cannot be part of creation and has to be radically distinguished from
it) as well as the One who is intimately linked with all creatures as their
final goal (which implies that He is present in creation as its sustainer,
redeemer and the One who perfects it). In fact it is the reflection on the
triune God, Father, Son and Spirit, articulated by the Councils and
recognized in Holy Scripture, that causes Aquinas to modify the use of
Aristotle's philosophical instruments. How the life of God is articulated
in the doctrine of the three Persons of God will be treated in the next
paragraph. For the moment we are concerned with showing the
63
STb I 3.prol: Cognito de a1iquo an sit, inquirendum restat quomodo sit. ut sciatur de eo
quid sit. Sed quia de Deo scire non possumus quid sit, sed quid non sit, non possumus
considerare de Deo quomodo sit, sed poems quomodo non sit. Primo ergo considerandum
est quomodo non sit; secundo, quomodo a nobis cognoscatur [q.12], tertia quomodo
nominetur [q.13j..
.. 10 a compact and penetrating book D. Burrell (1986) shom the history of
development of this distinction by thinkers of the three great monotheistic religions:
"The candidate proposed Mthe distinction between essence and existence- finds its
roots in Alfarabi, its firSt aniculation in IbnMSina, is approved by Maimonides, and
brought to a refined status by Aquinas." (po 35) With this interpretation Burrell is in
line with J. Pieper's observation of creation as the hidden key in Aquinas'
philosophy (quoted by Burrell on p. 34, the note on p. 119 fails however). Pieper
makes his observation in: J. Pieper, 1953, 1974 and 1978, among other places.
Pieper's position is also adopted by O.H. Pesch (1988), and worked out by R.
Sokolowski (1982) in what he C3lls 'the Christian distinction'.
32
33
CHAPTER I
world, He being the first cause and ultimate end of creation. As its first
cause and ultimate end God cannot be a part of creation. At the same
time, since God's working is at the basis of the existence as well as the
perfection of everything that is, a close connection is suggested. This
coincidence of continuity and discontinuity in the distinguishability of
the relation between God and the world is expressed in the verbs
intelligere, nominare, dicere. Thus, in a way, God's existence can be
demonstrated and, in a way, His existence escapes our grasp because the
manner in which God moves, causes, understands and orders remains
unknowable to us."
The consideration of God's essence as it is in itself is undertaken in
STh I 3-11." Aquinas begins these quaestiones with the words: "But
because we cannot know what God is, only what He is not, we cannot
consider of God what He is, but better what He is not." Thus in the
very beginning of the undertaking a reversal is made and the analytical
distinctions," that were designed for an analysis of the created reality
in terms of being, are declared to fall short when they are used in order
to get a grip on God's nature. Metaphysics and logic cannot help us to
know positively what God's essence is. In fact, all distinctions used in
philosophy so as to get a grip on created reality, are declared invalid
when the formal subject of theology is approached according to its
essence.72
This 'negative theology' of Aquinas, however, does not lead to
dicimus Deum.
On the basis of the connection of causa and finis in Aquinas, I regard this to be in
line with Aquinas' response to the first objection of STh I 2.1, where it is suggested
that God would be known to us as a prime principle. Thomas explains: ... homo enim
natura/iter desiderat beatitudinem> et quod natura/iter desideratur ab homine,
natura/iter cognoscitur ab eodem. Sed hoc non est simpliciter cognoscere Deum esse,' sicut
cognoscere venientem, non est cognoscere Petrum, quamvis sit Petrus veniens...
" Thus STh I 213 is organized according to the structure res (211), ratio (12) and
69
verbum (13) moving away from the metaphysical consmeratioll of what God is
towards the logical investigation of our God-talk. Since our naming of things is
determined by our mode of knowing, the ratio of the word in the intellect mediates
between the res and the verbum.
" These analytical distinctions (called 'formal features' by D. Burrell, 1979, p. IS)
imply all metaphysical distinctions like act-potence, materia-forma, substanceaccident, being-essence and all logical distinctions like subject-predicate, verb-noun,
'1
etc.
Thus in STh I 3 all compositions are denied of God: forma et materia (a.2),
quidditas/essentia et natura/subiectum (a.3), essentia et esse (a.4), genus et differentia
34
35
CHAPTER!
that every possible perfection can be ascribed to God." At one and the
same time, however, by blurring this most fundamental ontological distinction, the possibility of knowing what God is disappears. Thus, after
the so-called 'proofs of God's existence' Aquinas explicitly states that we
cannot know that God is." The restriction caused by the essence,
which supplies the object with the specific differences that make it
discernible, has vanished. By the identification of esse and essence, the
question 'what God is' from now on points to the question 'how God
is' and vice versa. We become imprisoned by the limitations of our
created concepts and philosophical instruments. Even calling God ipsum
esse subsistens does not tell us anything more about God's nature than
we already knew: that He is the prime cause of our being and that we
participate in esse whereas He does not!' The gap between Creator and
creatures is localized and not bridged. The nature of God's incomprehensibility becomes specified.
By denying all logical and metaphysical distinctions with regard to
God, Aquinas tries to express how God "differs differently". How can
he maintain that this does not lead to agnosticism? As we have seen,
with the characterization of God as causa prima and finis ultimus,
Thomas sets out to distinguish God from creation and, at the same time,
to link Him with creation. In the history of interpretation of Aquinas
the connection of God with the world has, for centuries, been thematized in his so-called 'doctrine of analogy'. How does this relate to the
metaphysical procedure just described? Can analogy provide us with a
procedure that can help us to gain more insight in God's nature?
2.2.1.2 God's essence: the logical order
Considering analogy, we are moving away from Summa Theologiae I
2-11 to STh I 13. In other words, we are shifting from the metaphysical
"
76
7'
1"
5Th I 3.4.co: Respondeo dicendum quod Deus non solum est sua essentia. ut ostensum est
fa.3], sed etiam suum esse. Quod quidem multipliciter ostendi potest.
D. Burrell, 1986, p. 45; Burrell comments here on De pot 7.2.ra9. Since the work is
contemporary to the Summa 1beologiae and Burrell's interpretation in accordance
tum essendi; alio modo, significat compositiQnem propositionis, quam anima adinvenit
coniungens praedicatum subiecto. Primo igitur modo acCipiendo 'esse', non possumus scire
esse De~ sieut nec eius essentiart; sed solum secundo modo. Scimus enim quod haec
propositio quam formamus de Deo, cum dicimus 'Deus est~ vera est. Et hoc scimus ex
with his reading of SIb ! 3 (D. Burrell, 1979), both instances can elucidate each
other; Cf. also D. Burrell, 1979, p. 115179 where he investigates the "master
metaphor actus, showing that it is apt to be used in divinis because of its nondescriptive formal quality.
eius e/foctibus, ut supra [S7b I 2.2J dictum est Cf. E. Scbillebeeckx, 1964/1952, p. 206.
n Cf. R. te Velde, 1995, p. 119-125; p. 120: "By saying that God's essence consists in
being itself, we are not in the possession of an insight into God's essence, just as we
36
78
For centuries the interpretation of Aquinas' account and use of analogy has been
practised with Cajetan de Vio's De nominum analog;" et de conceptu entis (1498) as a
guide. Based on a combined reading of In I Sent 19.5.2.ral and De ver 2.11. Cajetan
distinguishes four analogical types in Aquinas: analogy of inequality, of attribution/proportion, of improper metaphorical proportionality and of proper proportionality. The last type of analogy is considered the only genoine analogy. providing
knowledge of God on the basis of the univocity of the concept of being. Cajeran's
leading interpretation has been heavily criticized in our century. G. Kreling
(1979/1941) shows that not the analogy of proportionality but the analogy of
proponion is the prime and decisive analogy, and that the preference of CaJetan is
based on the misplaced observation that in the analogy of proponion only one of
the analogates containes the res signi[U:4ta in essence. Because analogy .is a matter of
relation, Kreling argues, only the division between analogy of proporuon and
analogy of proportionality (a proportion of proportions) is valid. In a remarkable
article. which is sddom quoted. E. Schillebeech (1964/1952) demonstrates that the
be seen as a logical doctrine, blaming Cajetan for having obscured the concept by
confusing the logical order with the real order. D. Burrell {1973 and 1979 ['Aquinas
is perhaps best known for his theory of analogy. On closer inspection it turns out
he never had one.", p. 55] works out' the observations of McInerny applying them
to Aquinas' God-talk in general. He confirms the observation (Schillebeeckx.
Walgrave) that once haviug clarified his view on the analogical use of words.
Aquinas, in his mature works, hardly pays attention to the theoretical background
of analogy and is more interested in the theological question of its foundation. K.
Miiller (1983) argues that analogy in Aquinas is not primarily logical or
metaphysical. but can be characterised as semiotica1. G. Rocca (1993). in line with
Burrell, argues that Aquinas' reflection on analogy should be seen as "in Thomas's
eyes the only valid way of explaining epistemologically. in a secondaty. after-the-fact
reflection, what takes place in the primary ontological and theological judgements
that bear upon God's very being.... (p. 653). From this overview. it may be clear that
Aquinas' account of aua10gy has nothing to do with the conceptualistic Cajetan
version with its univocal core of being that was attacked in the protestaut tradition.
37
CHAPTER I
STk
The expression analogia entis does not occur in Aquinas and. appears only at .the end
of the fifteenth century. Speaking anachronistitally in terms of analog;" entlS versus
analog;" fidei one should say that Aqoinas. analogy ultimatdy captures the latter (Cf.
E. Jiinge1. 1977. p. 357-408; J. Wissink. 1983. p. l3l-~5? .and.377-388; H. Rilthof.
1990); With regard to the aualogical use of the word life with regard to God d.
also O.H. Pesch. 1967. p. 606-628. aud especially 613617. where he stresses - ill
accordance with Lyttkens, Schillebeeckx, McInerny, and. others . the 'agnostic
moment' in our knowledge of God.
n For a Dutch translation, introduction and clarifying commentary on STh I 13 d. H.
Rilthof. 1988.
38
bring light to the divine 'darkness'. Let us turn back to our subject, the
'life' of God, and see what Thomas tells us about our actual speaking
about God's 'life' in quaestio 13.
In the first article, Aquinas takes the Aristotelian epistemological
stand that we can name things insofar as they are known by our
intellect." Since God can be known in this life only from creatures,
according to the relation of His being the principle of all creatures,
excelling them all and lacking all created imperfections, the words we
have can never express the essence of God as it is in itself. The only
words available are the words which stem from our perception of
creatures. They consignify compositeness and temporality, they carry
the overtOnes of a created world, a world in process."
With this restriction in mind, Aquinas proceeds by asking whether
we can use words for God substantia/iter, expressing what He is. The
problem here seems not to arise with regard to words which are said
negatively about God (as e.g. 'infinite'), or words expressing a relation
(as e.g. 'causality'), but with words which are said of God in an absolute
and affirmative way. 'Good' and 'wise' are such words, but also the
word 'life' in which here we are primarily interested.
Aquinas makes his position clear in contrast with two other positions: the first is the stand of Moses Maimonides who understands 'God is
living' as expressing the conviction that God is not an inanimate thing:
thus the word 'living' is said affirmatively, but is in fact used to deny
something of God rather than to assert anything. The other position
which can be identified as the account of pseudo-Dionysius who
explains 'God is life' as 'God is the cause of life'." Thomas rejects
these positions for three reasons. 8J In his own account, Aquinas then
"
"
"
nominari.
8)
CHAPTER!
39
40
CHAPTER!
" Cf. G. Rocca, 1993, who characterises Aquinas' approach as hovering over the abyss
of God's incomprehensibility, an abyss between the cliff of univocity and the cliff of
equivocity; Cf. H. Rikhof, 1988; J. Wissink, 1994.
17
Aquinas' account of analogy is a modified version of what he learns from Aristode.
Cf. E. Schillebeeckx, 1964/1952, p. 214; B. Montagnes, 1963, p. 2+25; D. Burrell,
1973, p. 68-91; J. Walgrave, 1982/1974[c], p. 1720.
41
BS
8?
42
life. 90
In STh I 9.1 the question is raised by a seeming discord between
CHAPTER I
43
highest degree on the formula that God's nature is His act of knowing.
In other words, the concept of motion which is necessaty in order to be
able to ascribe 'life' to God, is connected with God's knowing." In the
M. Dodds, 1986, after his analysis of the various places in which motus functions
with regard to creatures and God, arrives at the conclusion that motion as well as
immutability as such can be ascribed to God, as long as they are purged from their
connotations of imperfection. He writes {po 224}: "Although both motion and
immutability may be predicated of God, immutability seems to signify divine being
(c,si) more appropriate since it more clearly indicates that the distinction of divine
being from all other things and the ttansceodeoce of divine being above all our
human concepts and knowledge.'
" 511> I 9.1.co: Respondeo dicendum quod ex praemissis [S11> I 2.3] ostendiEuT Deum esse
omnino immutabiJem. Primo quidem, quia supra ostensum est esse aJiquod primum ens,
quod Deum dicimus, et quod huiusmodi primum ens oportet esse purum actum absque
permixtione alicuius potentiae, eo quod potentia simpliciter est posterior actu. Omne
autem quod quocumque modo mutatur, est aliquo modo in potentia. Ex quo patet quod
impossibile est Deum aliquo modo mutari. The other two arguments are based on
God's simplicity and His perfection.
92 STh I 9.2.co: Respondeo dicendum quod solus Deus est omnino immutabilis, omnis
autem ere.tUT. "'iquo """'" est mutahiiis. Cf. D. Burrell, 1979, p. 36-38.
"
In S11> I 9.1 as wdl as S11> I 18.3 the fust objections and the responses to them deal
with God's 'Velie and intelligere. Remember funhermore that STh I 18 is treated
within the context of God's intelligere.
.. 511> I 18.3.ra1: skut dicitur in IX Metapbysicae 8 [1050.22], duplex est actio, una, quae
transit in exteriorem materiam, ut calefacere et secare. alia, quae manet in agente, ut
intelligere, sentire et wile. Quarum haec est differentia, quia prima actio non est
perfectio agentis quod movet, sed ipsim moti; secund4 autem actio est perfectio agentis.
Unde, quia motus est actus mobilis, secunda.actio, inquantum est actus operantis, dkitur
motus eOO,' ex hac similitudine, quod, sicut matus est actus mobilis, ita huiusmodi actio
est actus agentis; lket motus sit actus imperfecti, scilicet existentis in potentia, huiusmodi
autem actio est actus perfecti, idest existentis in acta, III dicitur in m De anima 7
[431a6J, Hoc igitur modo quo intelligere est matus, id quod se inte1ligit, dicitur se
movere. Et per hunc modum etiam Plato posit quod Deus movet seipsum [ef. STh I
9.1.ral], non eo modo quo motus est actus imperflcti.
" Cf. M. Dodds, 1993, p. 219220.
CHAPTER!
have observed, he deals with the question of God's life within the
context of God's knowing. Can the wider context of our question bring
us some more information about the nature of motion involved here?
We cannot give an elaborate reading of STh I 14-25 here". For our
purpose it may be sufficient to pay attention to the central 'reversions'
Aquinas maltes with regard to God's knowing and willing; 'reversions'
which stem from a consequent consideration of God as prima causa and
finis ultimus of creation. With regard to God's knowing this entails that
operations, in which the intellect is informed by any object, do not talte
place." All possible objects are created by God and thus we should say
that they are in God's mind before they come into being. The potentiaactus scheme does not fit God's pure actuality. God's essence remains
incomprehensible and with regard to creation a reversal is observed in
the primacy of the knower above the object known." The same
reversal is to be observed with regard to God's willing. In the created
world the goodness of an object which is known raises the desire of the
will. As prima causa God is at the basis of all being and goodness. Thus
He constitutes the goodness of the object by willing it." The
investigation in both, God's intelligere and His velie, only maltes clear
that we are dealing here with the same modifications. of words that we
come across in our investigation in God's 'life'. A full account of Aquinas' view on God's knowing and willing would at least take as much
space as our present sketch of his views on God's life and provide us
with no more insight into the strict incomprehensibility of God's
"
91
98
"
comeroari quod habet, et addi quod non habet, et ad hoc operamur. Sed amor Dei est
infundens et creans bonitatem in rebus.
45
essence. What becomes clear, however, is that Aquinas works out his
analysis of God's operations along the line of God's pure actuality. Thus
he retains the element of the potentia-actus scheme which is decisive in
the analysis of motion (namely: actus) without being obliged to ascribe
potentiality to God. Doing this, Thomas seems to achieve two things at
the same time. By denying potentiality of God, actus is bereaved of its
correlate and becomes incomprehensible. It retains, however, the
connotation of perfection at which Aquinas aims.
Summarizing the procedure Aquinas adopts, we see a double shift
taking place in the definition of 'life'. With regard to the element of
'self we see an increase in freedom ending at the incomprehensible selfdetermination of God who is not bound by anything outside Himself..
With regard to the element of 'movement' we observe a shift from
'movement' proprie dicta (first perfection) to communiter dicta (second
perfection), ending at intellectual operations which are called movement
per similitudinem. When this last step is applied to God, we end up with
an incomprehensible kind of movement, as we are reminded of by the
identification of God's nature and operation!OO
Thus Aquinas opens the way to a fuller understanding of why 'life'
can be ascribed to God. But at the crucial moment, when God is arrived
at, he does two things at one and the same time: he explains that God is
to be called 'life' in the most proper sense and he c.uts off all further
understanding by reminding us of the essence of God which does not
allow for any of the distinctions we use for our understanding. Thus the
analogical use of the word 'life' leaves us with a direction being pointed,
based on the created effects of God we know.'Ol In fact the procedure
is that of the three viae by which Aquinas modifies the position of
pseudo-Dionysius: God is 'life', (via positiva/causaliratis), however not in
the mode of created life (via negativa) but in an infinitely higher mode
{via eminentiae).'02
tOO
101
102
SIb I 18.3.co: Illud igitur cuius sua natura est ipsum ems intel/igere, et cui id quod
natura/iter habet, non determinatur ab alio, hoc est quod obtinet summum gradum
vitae.
Cf. E. Schillebeech, 1964/1952, p. 211-212.
Cf. M. Jordan, 1983, p. :167; G. Rocca, 1993, p. 642-649; M. Dodds, 1986, p. 196-197,
notes tbat tbe three viae keep eacb otber balanced: 'Since all three of tbe ways of
causalityI negation and eminence are involved in any knowledge which we have of
God, none may be omitted without jeopardizing tbe integrity of our knowledge of
God. If tbe way of causality were omitted, then tbe metaphysical foundation of tbe
otber ways would be lacking, and tbey would no longer be able to answer tbe
46
CHAPTER!
With all this in mind, the fourth article of STh I 18 is relatively easy
to read. At first sight the question "whether everything in God is life"
looks like a grammatical mistake. The question is raised, however by
John 1, 3-4 which indeed had raised some grammatical difficulties in the
ages before Aquinas.1O' When it is read against the background of
God's simplicity, however, the sentence Quod factum est in ipso vita erat
becomes intelligible. Since the intellect, the object known and the act of
knowing are the same in God secundum rem, the content of what is
known by God is identical with His essence. In fact, all creatures are
known by God even before they come into existence, as we have seen.
Thus, all created being, as it is known by God, cannot be distinguished
from God's essence secundum rem. Since God's essence is life, all creatures are life in God.">! With the fourth article of this quaestio the life of
God is brought in relation to creation by the identification of God's
essence and His intelligere. The relation is discussed insofar as the living
and non-living creatures share in the life of God according to an
incomprehensible mode of being which is God's 'mode of being'.I05
arguments of those who claim that knowledge of God is nothing more than a
projection of knowledge of self. Without the via negatioIDs, which underlines the
radical difference between God an creatures, the God affirmed in the via causalitatis
would become nothing more than a son of benificent creature "writ large". And
without the via eminentiae. we would know none of the attributes which may
properly be predicated of God. God would then remain for us a son of faceless
enigma Standing somehow behind the created world."
to) Aquinas examines the different possible punctuations in In Joan 1.2 [Busa: 615-781].
104
lOS
5Th I 18.4.co: Respondeo dkendum quod. skut dictum est. vivere Dei est eOO intelligere.
In Deo autem est idem intelleetus et quod intelligitur, et ipsum intelligere eOO. Unde
quidquid est in Deo ut intellectum, est ipsum vivere vel vita ems. Untie, cum omnia
quae facta sunt a Dea, sint in ipso ut intellecta, sequitur quod omnia in ipso sunt ipsa
'Oita divina.
Cf. STh I 18.4.ral: Ad primum ergo dicendum quod creaturae in Deo esse dicuntur
dupliciter. Uno modo, inquantum continentur et conservantur virtute divina... Alio
modo dicuntur res esse in Deo sicut in cognoscente. Et sic sum in Deo per proprw ratio.
nes, quae non sum aliud in Deo ab essentia divina. Unde res, prout sic in Deo sunt, sunt
essemitt divina. Et quia essentia divina est vita, non autem motus, inde est quod res, hoc
modo loquend~ in Deo non sunt motus sed vita; ra2: in mente divina habent esse
divinumj ra3: quia in mente divina habent esse increatum, in seipsis autem esse creatum.
47
48
49
CHAPTER!
lOB
liendum de salute generis human;, quae perficilUY per Filium incarnatum, et per donurn
10')
110
", STh ! 32.1.co: Respondeo die,ndum quod impossibile esl per ralionem naluralem ad
cognitionem Trinitatis divinarum personarum peruenire. Ostensum est enim supra [STb
I 12.4+12J quod homo per rationem natura/em in cognitionem Dei peroenire non potest
nisi ex creaturis. Creaturae autem ducunt in Dei cognitionem, skut efJectus in causam.
Hoc igitur solum ratione naturali de Deo cognosci potest, quod competere ei necesse est
secundum quod est omnium entium principiutn, et hoc fundamento usi sumus supra (STb
I 12.12], in consideratione Dei. Vtrtus autem creativ(J Dei est communis toti Trinitat~
unde pertinet ad unitatem essentiae, non ad distinctionem personarum. Per rationem
igieur naturalem cognosci possunt de Deo ea quae pertinent ad unitatem essentiae, non
autem ea quae pertinent ad distinctionem personarum. For this reason Aquinas deals
with God's esseoce in ScG! and with the divine Persons in ScG IV.
STh I 32.1.ra3: cognitio divinarum Personarum fuit necessaria nobis dupliciter. Uno
modo, ad reete sentiendum de creatione rerum. Per hoe enim quod dicimus Deum omnia
/ecisse Verbo suo, excluditur error ponentium Deum produxisse res ex necessitate naturae.
Per hoc autem quod ponimus in eo processionem amoris, ostenditur quod Deus non
propter aliquam indigentiam creaturas produxit, neque propter aliquam aliam causam
extrinsecam,' sed propter amorem sui bonitatis... Alio modo, et principalius, ad ncte senSpiritus saneti.
. .
Cf. SeG N 2.1: Principium autem considerationis a secreto divinae generatwnu
sumentes, quid de ea secundum sacrae Scripturae documenta teneri de'beat,
praetermittamus. Dehine vero ea quae contra veritatem fidei infideJitas adinvenit
argumenta ponamus.
STh I 27.1.eo: Cum autem Deus sit super omn~ ea quae in Deo dicuntur, non sunt
inteJligenda secundum modum infimarum creaturarum, quae sunt corpora; sed
secundum similitudinem suprema-rum creaturarum, quae sunt intellectuales substantiae, a
quibus etiam similitudo aeeepta deficit a repraesentatione divinorum. Non ergo
accipienda est processio secundum quod est in corpora/ibus, vel per matum loea/em, vel
per actionem alicuius causae in exteriorem effectum, ut calor a ealefaciente in ealefactum;
51
CHAPTER!
stresses that the three divine Persons can only be thought of in terms of
relations of origin.'"
The first line of thought is possible because Scripture tells us that
God has created man after His image and likeness (Gn 1,26).112 The
processio of the Son from the Father, mentioned in In 8,42, can be
understood with the help of the similitude to the intellectual operation
of the human mind. In the act of understanding one can discern a
processio of a conception of the thing understood. This conception
(verbum interius) is an internal product of the intellect.ll3 Thus by the
50
111
112
in
actionem quae tendit in exteriorem materiam> est aliqua processio ad extra; ita secundum
actionem quae manel in ipso agente, attenditur processio quaedam ad intra. Et hoc
maxime patet in intellectu, cuius actio> scilicet intelligere, manet in intelligente.
Quicumque enim intelligit, ex hoc ipso quod intelligit> procedit aliquid intra ipsum>
quod est conceptio rei intellectat? ex vi intellectiva proveniens, et ex eius notitia
nature. 1l4
114
lts
116
Ultima igitur perfectio vitae competit Deo, in quo non est aliud intelligere et aliud esse>
ut supra ostensum est, et ita oportet quod intentio "intellecta in Deo sit ipsa divina
essentia (5cG IV 11.5). Cf. H. Berger, 1990.
STh I 27.3.co: Processio autem verbi attenditur secundum actionem intelligibilem.
Secundum autem operationem voluntatis invenitur in nobis quaedam alia processio,
scilicet processio amoris> secundum quam atnatum est in amante, sicut per conceptionem
verbi res dicta vel intellecta, est in intelligente.
STh I 27.4.co: Processio autem quae attenditur secundum rationem voluntatis> non
consideratur secundum rationem similitudinis, sed magis secundum rationem impellentis
et moventis in aliquid. Et ideo quod procedit in divinis per modum amoris, non procedit
ut genitum vel ut filius, sed magis procedit ut spiritus, quo nomine quaedam vita/is
motio et impulsio designatur, prout aliquis ex amore dicitur moven vel impe/li ad
aliquid faciendum.
52
CHAPTER I
assigned to God's nature (being the prima causa), while on the other we
see, e.g. in the Nicene Creed, different aspects of causality attributed to
different divine Persons122 Aquinas deals with this problem by
explaining, firstly, that creare refers to the Trinity according to the one
nature of God. Subsequently, he investigates how, in the common
causality of the three Persons, different aspects can be distinguished
which can be connected to the relations of origin by which the divine
Persons are distinguished. Thus, the Father creating through the Son
and the Spirit is compared with a craftsman who designes and produces
by his intellect and will."'. In the response to the second obiectio
Aquinas explains how 'this can clarify the various attributions in the
Nicene Creed. It can be explained either from the relations of origin of
the three Persons, or with reference to the attribution of essential
attributes.
This second approach is of special interest for our inquity since it
can provide us with a heuristic matrix which can help us in the rest of
our study. As Thomas explained before (in STh I 39.8.co) one can, with
Augustine, appropriate potentw. to the Father, sapientia to the Son and
bonitas to the Spirit.'" This appropriation is in line with the different
relations of origin of the divine Persons. The Father is distinguished as
117
lIB
III
123
and processio.
l19
12.0
U1
Thus ingenitus is a proprium of the Father, for He is the one who is distinguished by
the notion innascibililds, being the first principle of the processiones (STh I 33.4).
Imago is a proprium of the Son, being the Word by which the Father knows Himself
(STh I 35.2).
Cf. Ezk 37,6: Dabo 'VObis Spiritum et vivetis, In 6,64: Spiritus est qui vivificatj 2eo
3,6: Littera enim occUit Spiritus autem vivificatj Nicene Creed: et in Spiritum
sanctum. Dominum et vivijicantem.
5Th I 39.7.co: SKut igitur similizudine vestigii vel imaginis in creaturis inventa utimur
ad manifestationem divinarum Personarum, ita et essentialibus attributis. Et haec
manifestatio Personarum per essentialia attributa, 'appropriatic' nominatur.
U4
53
STh I 45.6.ag2: nam in Symbolo Fidei Patri attribuitur quod sit "Creator omnium
visibilium et invisibilium~' Filio autem attribuitur quod "per eum omnia facta sunt~
sed Spiritui sancto. quod sit "Dominus et vivijicator".
STh I 45.6.co: Respondeo dicendum quod creare est proprie causare sive producere esse
rerum.. Unde creare non est proprium alicui Personae. sed commune toti Trinitati. Sed
tamen divinae Personae secundum rationem suae processionis habent causalitatem respectu creationis rerum. Ut enim supra [STh [ 14.8 and 19.4J ostensum est, cum de Dei
scientia et voluntate ageretur. Deus est causa rerum per suum intellectum et voluntatem,
sicut artifex rerum artificiatarum. Artijex autem per verbum in intellectu conceptum, et
per amorem suae voluntatis ad aliquid relatum. operatur. Unde et Deus Pater operatus
est creaturam per mum Verbum. quod est Filius.' et per suum Amorem qui est Spiritus
sanctus. Et secundum hoc processiones Personarum sunt rationes productionis creaturarum. irzquantum includunt essentialia attrihuta, quae sunt scientia et voluntas.
STh I 39.8.co: 'Potentia' enim habet rationem principii. Untie habet similitudinem cum
Patre cae/est;' qui est principium totius divit1;itatis... 'Sapientia' vera similitudinem habet
cum Filio cadesti, inquantum est Verbum, quod nihil aliud est quam conceptus sapienti
ae... 'Bonitas' autem, cum sit ratio et obiectum amoris. habet similitudinem cum Spiritu
divino. qui est Amor.... Once this similitude is appreciated. a foreshadowing of the
Trinity seems to be perceivable in the quaestiones of the Summa (STh I 14-25) where
the operations which pertain to the one divine essence are treated: STh I 14-18 God's
knowing (the Son), STh I 1924 God's willing (the Holy Spirit) and STh I 25 God's
power (the Father).
54
55
CHAPTER!
the origin, associated with being and creating. The Son is distinguished
as the one springing from the Father. He is the one who became a man,
Jesus Christ who lived among us in order to reveal the Father. The
Spirit is the one who proceeds from the Father and the Son. The Holy
Spirit is the one known by us as the Spirit of Christ and working
through the power of the Father and the Son.
By spelling out the relations of the divine Persons in this way, we are
shifting from the trinitarian point of view to the involvement of the
same triune God with His creatures. This shift in perspective, which
Thomas often makes, is a legitimate one: in accordance with God's 'via
revelationis', the reflection on the history of salvation through Christ
leads towards the reflection on God's trinitarian life. For only as a result
of the stories of the life and death of Christ in Scripture has the Church
been forced to reflect on the triune mystery of Father, Son and Spirit.
But apart from being legitimate, the shift is theologically significant:
God has revealed Himself as being involved in creation as Father, Son
and Spirit. That both perspectives are views on the same triune God is
reflected in Aquinas' use of the same word, processio, for the procession
of the Son from the Father, as well as for the presence of the Son by
consideration of the life of the three Persons and that of the life of the
creatures.
129
125
temporaJiter, nam Filius ab aeterno processit ut sit Deus, temporaliter autem ut etiam sit
homo, secundum misswnem visibilem; vel etiam ut sit in homine, secundum invisibilem
missionem.
56
57
CHAPTER I
130
5Th I 43.3.co: Est enim unus communis modus quo Deus est in omnibus rebus per
;pslus.
m 5Th I 8 and especially the third article, Utrum Deus sit ubique per essentiam,
praesentiam et potentiam. Cf. 5Th I 8.3.co: Sic ergo est in omnibus per potentiam,
inquantum omnia eOO potestati subduntur. Est per praesentiam in omnibus, inquantum
omnia nuda sunt et aperta oculis eius. Est in omnibus per essentiam, inquantum adest
omnibus ut causa essendi, sicut dictum est (a.1). The triad refers to the expression
praesentia, potentia et substantia by Gregory the Great, d. 5Th I 8.3.sc. The
expression occurs 27 times in Aquinas. works, half of which are in his commentary
on Peter Lombard's Sentences. Cf. also F. de Grijs, 1967, p. 66-71 and 447451.
m STh I 8.1.eo: Quandiu igitur res habet esse, tandiu aportet quod Deus adsit e~ secundum
modum quo esse habet. Esse autem est iilud quod est magis intimum cui/ihet, et quod
J1Y.ofi!ndius omnibus inest, cum sit formale respectu omnium quae in re sunt, ut ex supra
dtctzs patel [STh I 4.1.ra3J. Unde aportet quod Deus sit in omnibus rebus, et intime.
'" STh I 8.3.co: Respondeo dicendum quod Deus dicitur esse in re a1iqua dupficiter. Uno
modo, per modum causae agentis, et sic est in omnibus rebus. creatis ab ipso. Alia modo
sieut obiectum operatwnis est in operante, quod proprium est in .operationibus animae,
secundum quod cognitum est in cognoscente, et desideratum in desiderante. Hoc igitur
secunda modo, Deus speciaJiter est in rationali creatura, quae cognoscit et diligit ilium
actu vd habitu. Et quia hoc habet ratkina/is creatUTa per gratiam, ut infra patebit [STh
43.3], dicitur esse hoc modo in sanctis per gratiam; and STh I 8.3.ra4, where apart from
these two modes a third unique mode of presence is referred to: the union of the
divioe and the human nature in Christ. Cf. H. Schoot, 1993, p. 133-134.
13+
135
134
STh I 43.S.co: Respondeo duendum quod per gratiam gratum /acientem tota Trinitas
inhabitat mentem, secundum illud In 14,23: "Ad eum veniemus, et mdnsionem apud
eum faciemus. "
STh I 43.5.ra3: Ad tertium dicendum quod. cum missio importet originem Personae
missae et inhahitationem per gratiam, ut supra dictum est, si loquamur de missione
quantum ad originem, sic missio FiJii distinguitur a missione Spiritus saneti. fiatt et
gener-atro a processione. Si autem quantum ad effectum gratia; sic communicant duae
missiones in ratlice gratiae, sed distinguuntur. in effectibus grtttiae, qui sunt illuminatio
intelleetus, et injlamm4tio affectus. Et sic manifestum est quod una non potest esse sine
alia, quia neutra est sine watia gratum faciente, nee una persona separatur ab alia.
STh I 43.5.ra2: Ad secundum dicendum quod anima per gratiam confonnatur Deo.
Unde ad hoe quod aliqua Persona divina mittitur ad aJiquem per gratiam, oportet quod
fiat assimilatio illius ad divinam Personam quae mittitur per aliquod gratiae donum Et
quia Spiritus sanctus est Amor. per donum eantatis anima Spiritui saneta assimilatur,
unde secundum donum caritatis attenditur missio Spiritus saneti.
59
CHAPTER I
earthly life, is glorified in vita aeternaY' In this process, specific effects that spring from the divine essence are appropriated to the Son and
the Spirit.
58
1'7
Thomas uses the words assimi/atw, unio, conformatio, participatio referring to the
ultimate end of creation in general and of human beings in panicu1ar. Cf. e.g. 5Th I
50.l.eo: ld enim quod praecipue in rebus creatis Deus intend;t est bonum quod consist;t
in assimilatione ad Deum, and STh I 103.4.co: Finis autem gubernationis mundi est
141
142
143
Cf. 5Th IT-IT 4.l.co; De ver 14.2.co; In 5ymb pro!.; In Hebr l1.l.
Cf. In 17,3: Haec est autem vita aeterna ut cognoscant Te solum verutn Deum et quem
misisti Iesum Christurn.
We will examine the special nature of the ultimate end (finis ultimus) in chapter ill,
1.2, p. 145fl. We will deal with the visio beata in detail in chapter IV, 2.1.1, p. 217fl.
60
CHAPTER!
t+l
ScG IV 20.6: Item. Vita maxime in motu mani/estatur: move:ntia enim seipsa vivere
61
62
CHAPTER!
with divine life. The human soul is capax Dei as far as its intellectual
part is concerned, a capacity which is gradually realized and brought to
its fulfilment by the activity of the divine Persons.
Thus, this life of grace (vita gratiae), this quality of the soul by which
the conversation with God is established and developed, appears as the
central element in our investigation on life. The life of grace is the
perfection of natural life and the beginning of eternal life.
What does this entail for our initial question of "the relation between
life on earth and 'life' after death?" In the first place, the question can
now be rephrased in terms that are relevant for Thomas: "what is the
relation between vita 'natura/is and vita aeterna?"I" In the second
place, a first answer can be given: the relation between the two, the
connection of both is called vita gratiae. But then, of course, an entire
network of questions emerges, regarding different l~vels o~ the?logi~al
reflection and covering different tracts: how can thiS relationship With
the incomprehensible God take place in this earthly life? How do the
natural life of man and the life of grace relate to one another? What
does the perspective of an eternal life mean for the value and meaning of
life on earth? What is the use of this earthly life anyway? What does the
perspective of eternal life mean for our interpretation of death? What is
the impact of death on our relationship with God? How is God's
relation to the death of man to be interpreted? Does the perspective of
eternal life have any influence on the impact of death in life on eanh?
What do the life and death of Christ (man and God) mean for our
interpretation of life and death? Etc, etc.
In order to deal with these questions, we have chosen to organize
them from the theological perspective we have found in this chapter: the
relationship with God. With this choice we arrive at the last issue that
we will have to explain in this chapter: the framework of this study.
3.1
Thomas uses the formula of God as prima causa and finis ultimus of
all creation in order to distinguish the Creator from His creation and, at
one and the same time, indicate a close connection between both of
them. The fact that Aquinas presents God as the ultimate end of human
life should be explained with the outcome of our previous section in
mind. Participating in the incomprehensible life of the eternal God is
the finis ultimus, the vita aeterna of human beings, it is proclaimed in
Scripture. Human beings are designed for this: the creation of man is
directed at sharing God's life. Once this is seen, the same radical
apophatic or negative strain we perceive in Thomas' God-talk can be
expected with regard to his eschatology. Knowing what vita aeterna is,
means knowing what God is and as we have seen, in this earthly life
this kind of knowledge cannot be obtained.
The ultimate end, incomprehensible as it is, consequently has a great
impact on all that precedes it. Once the glorified union with God is
believed and hoped for to be the ultimate end of man, natural life is
appreciated within the larger framework of God bestowing life on man.
This bestowal takes place within different orders (the orders of nature,
grace, and glory) and, in accordance with the human condition, in
different stages. From the perspective of the ultimate end of human life,
natural life of man (vita natura/is) is discovered to be directed at the
perfection of vita aeterna. The natural potencies of the soul are recognized to be open for a gratuitous perfection by God, a perfection by
which the relationship with God is established and strengthened.
Earthly life of man is appreciated as being open towards a process of
development, a gracious and gratuitous growth towards a glorified union
63
147
The exact equivalents of 'life on earth' and 'life after death' in Aquinas' theology are
haec vita and alia vita; or vita praesens and vita jittura. When the question is
rephrased in termS of 'Vita naturae and vita aeterna one has to keep in mind that haec
vita is broader than vita naturae: it comprises both vita naturae and vita r;ratiae.
65
CHAPTER!
content the structure of our study reflects the core of it. In this way we
hope t~ do justice to Aquinas' theological reflections on the life ~nd
death of man in relation to the 'life' of God, discussing every questlOn
within the framework of the central and modifying element: the
communion or life with God.
64
ISO
1St
As M. Dodds (1986, p. 39) remarks with regard to the concept of motion which is
intrinsically connected with vita.
I will use the word 'relationship' for what Aquinas means with conversatio, the 'life'
in the sense of 'living together with someone'. This is what is referred to by the tide
of this study 'Living with God'. Cf. S7h III 65.5.co: cari,., non so/urn signijicat
amorem De~ sed etiam amicitiam quandam ml ipsum. .. Haec autem societas hominis ad
Deum, quae est quaedam fomiliaris conversatio cum ipso, inchoatur quidem hie in
praesenti. per gratiam, pe:rficietur autem in foturo per g/oriam... Thomas also speaks of
convivere of God and man, using Aristotle's analysis of friendship so as to examine
the charity which God bestows on man. Cf. STb nIT 25.3.00: quia omnis amicitia
Jundatur super aliqua communicatione vitae, nihil enim est ita proprium amicitiae sicut
convivere, ut patet per Philosophum, VIII Eth 5.3 (1151b19), and In m Sent 21.2.2.co,
oportuit haberi quattu:Ltm amicitiam ad Deum, ut sibi conviveremus; et haec est ,aritas.
For the sake of clarity it might be appropriate to stress that this 'relationship'
cannot be equalled with Thomas' concept relado. 5Th I 13.7.co e.g., where Aquinas
denies a relatro realis from God to His creatures, should not be interpreted as a
denial of God's commitment to creatures (Cum igitur Deus sit extra totum ordinem
creaturae, et omnes creaturae ordinentur ad ipsum, et non e converso, manifestum est
quod c:reaturae rea/iter rf/eruntur ad ipsum Deum; sed in Deo non est aliqua realis
relatio eius ad creaturas, sed secundum rationem taneum, inquantum c:reaturae
reforuntur ad ipsum). Thomas ensures God's otherness here, stating that between
Creator and creatures there is an asymmetrical relation. The relation of the creatures
to God as their finis ultimus is given with their nature, God's relation to His
creatures is not given with His nature but the result of His choice. Cf. D. Burrell,
1979, p. 7889; R. Sokolowski, 1982, p. 34: "This should not be taken psychologically, it should not be taken in terms of human emotions, and it does not mean that
God is unconcerned with the world; it describes how God exists."j F. de GrijSi 1984,
who offers a reading of S7h I 13.7 as a correction of P. Schoonenberg's interpretatton of thIS arucle; M. Dodds, 1986, p. 235240 (p. 240, "Thus we affirm that God,
w~o as Creator is most intimately present to each creature, has no real relationship
WIth any of them. For he is much more intimately involved with each one of them
than would be possible in a real rdationship of transcendental causal motion.") and
1993, p. 222227; Cf. also H. Rilthof, 1988, p. 8293 and H. Goris, 1996, p. 24-31.
66
. The fourth chapter is called 'perfection of life with God' and this
~me ,;e can ~ra~slate the term perfectio as Aquinas uses the word The
r0rd( h~1ec~lOn, how~ver, does not refer to the perfection of spi~itual
Ie. w ~c IS treated 1o. chapter IIl) but with, what may be called
tt~u1Ofh e~~tology. Th~ chapter mainly examines the final stage of
.w t .
from whIch we are separated by death Th
consIderatIOn of the dimensions of the relationship with ~do~r
completed.
IS
CHAPTER II
Y. Congar and M. Corbin are right. Y. Congar (1958, p. 282) states that the place is
motivated by a culmination in unionesj STh I deals with the union by creation, STh
II with the operative union and STh III with the hypostatic union of God and man.
M. Corbin (1974, p. 782-806) argues from the shifts in the plans of the systematic
works of Aquinas, that only after having dealt with God (STh 1) and man (STh IJ),
Aqninas is prepared to deal with Christ, Mediator betWeen God and man (STh IIJ).
Both argumentations are confirmed by H. Schoot (1993) whose stUdy can be read as
an attempt to show how the language-rules in divinis developed in STh I are applied
in the reflection on Christ in STh III (for the hierarchy of unions cf. p. 197). The
reason for the place of the sacraments in the Summa Theologiae, I suggest, is their
complexity. A profound understanding of what they are and what they embody
presupposes all previous tracts, especially Christology. Nevertheless, as acts of cult,
they constitute the context of the relationship with God upon which the theologian
66
fifttfte~ ~av~ng~onsidered
CHAPTERlI
68
CHAPTERll
FOUNDATIONS
It should be noticed from the outset that not all possible aspects of
Aquinas' discussion of Original Sin, Christ and the sacraments are taken
into account. This study concentrates on the lines that emerge when the
key-word 'life' is focused on in Aquinas' theology.
1. The human condition and the tradition of living with God
reflects. Cf. L. Walsh, 1993, p. 328: "The sacraments are, in fact, the concrete and
historically current practice of that christiana religio that Thomas has wanted to
study from the outset of the Summa. For this reason we study them in this second
chapter, entided 'Foundations of life with God'.
M
69
Cf. In H De Anima 3 [leon: 135], ponit autem quatuor modo, 'Vi'Vend~ quorum unus
est per,'imeJlectum, secundus per sensum, tertius per matum et statum local~ quartus
per matum alimenti, decrementi et augmenti. ". [Leon: 144J in qui~ ~nim 'Viv.en~i.
urn inveniuntuT tantum alimentum, augmentum et decrementumJ scilzcet In plantzs; m
quibusdam autern, cum his invenitur sensus sine motu local~ sicut in animalibus
imperfectis sicut sunt ostreae; in quibusdam autem ulterius in'lfeni~ur motus secundum l~.
cum, sicut in animalibus perfectis, quae moventur motu progresstVO, ut 1m et equus; In
quibu.sdam 'Vero. cum his ulterius invenitur intellectm, scilicet in hominibus.
Cf. ScG IV 11, where these four levels are surpassed in perfection by a fifth: the
uncreated life of God.
Cf. e.g. SIb I 62.3.ag3: gratia sit medium inter naturam et gloriam ordine naturae...
Cf. R. Sokolowski, 1982; d. also chapter I, 1.1, p. 11 and 2.2.1.1, p. 30.
STh I 44A.co! orrz,ne agens agit propter finem, alioquin ex actione agentis non magis
sequeretur hoc quam illud, nisi a casu. .. Sed primo agenti, qui est agens tantum..non
convenit agere propter- acquisitionem alicuius finis; sed intendi~ solun: comm".nzeare
suam perfectionem, quae est eOO bonitas. Et unaquaeque creatura tntendtt consequ: suam
perfectionem, quae est simiJitudo perfectionis et bonitatis divin4e. Sic ergo divina bonitas
70
CHAPTER II
FOUNDATIONS
est finis rerum omnium. Cf. also rah Et ideo Ipse [-Deus] solus est maxim< libera/is,
quia non agit propter suam utilitatem, sed solum propter suam bonitatem.
Rm 1,20 is quoted explicitly 80 times in Aquinas works, 20 of which in the Summa
Theologiae. It is interesting that the verse appears at crucial places, e.g.: 5Th I 2.2.sc,
STh I 12.3.ra2, STh I 13.5.00, STh I 43.7.co. STh I 65.1.ra3. STh I-II 111.4.co. STh II-II
2.3.ag3, STh II-II 175.1.ral, S1b II-II 180.4.00, STh ill !.losc and STh ill 60.2.agl; F.
de Grijs (1969) makes clear that Aquinas did not understand the verse in the
epistemological opposition between natura/is ratro and fides divina, as it was
interpreted by the constitution Dei Filius (1870) of Vatican I and later ecclesiastical
documents. The interpretation of Aquinas, as well as that of Peter Ahelard and the
Commentarius Cantabrigensis, is more in line with the constitution Dei Verbum
(1965) of Vatican II in which the history of salvation is the framework for
understanding.
STh I 89.1.co: Manifostum est autem inter subslantias intellectuales, secundum naturae
ordinem, infimas esse animas humanas. Hoc autem perfectio universi exigebat. ut diversi
gradus in rebus essent. On the perfection of the uni.verse according to Aquinas, d. O.
Blanchette, 1992.
71
"
11
iam dictum est. Haec igitUY perfectw ultimc acddit re~ ut aliorum causa existat. Cum
igitur per multa tendat res creata in di'tJinam similitudinem, hoc ultimum ei restat, ut
. di'tJinam similitudinem quaerat per hoc quod sit a!wrum causa. Unde Dionysius dicit, 3
cap. Cae/estis Hierarchiae, quod "omnium divinius est Dei cooperatorem fieri";
secundum quod Apostolus dicit, lCo 3,9: "Dei adiutores sumu.s".
72
FOUNDATIONS
CHAPTER II
the same final end as human beings: vita aetema which consists in knowing and loving God as He is in Himself. Both, their way of being as
well as their way of knowing, are not subjected to materiality and,
therefore, exempted from the influence of the heavenly bodies which
constitute time. 12 Two important consequences follow from this. In the
first place, the angelic way of knowledge is not by abstraction from
phantasmata which are obtained by perception of the senses. Being
exempted from the process of acquiring knowledge by abstraction, their
knowledge is free from the flaws that possibly arise during the human
process of knowledge. Angels are born with perfect natural knowledge.
In the second place, with regard to their way of being, their 'life' does
not take the shape of a process: on the basis of their perfect natural
knowledge their free will - endowed with grace - decides for or against
God the instance in 'time' after they are created. 13 Thus, from the
perspective of their intellectual powers human beings are less perfect
than angels. In fact, in accordance with the idea of the perfection of the
universe, angels vary in the degree of perfection of their intellects. As a
result, a scale of perfection can be discerned within the range of all
intellectual creatures. The human mind holds the lowest rank on this
scale. 14
From another point of view, however, the nature of man - being part
of both the spiritual and the material world - is broader than the angelic
one. Human beings share the dimension of embodiment with all other
animales that are in the same genus. The spiritual dimension of man is
distinctive for its species, animal rationale. This unique position of man
"
12
13
A~as works out the idea of angelic 'time' in the concept of 'aevum', being the
middle between time and eternity. Cf. STb I 10.5-6. Cf. also H. Goris, 19%, p. 43
and 217-218.
STh. I ~2.5.co: Re5fondeo dicendum quod angelus post prim-urn actum caritatis quo
heatztudznem meruIt, statim heatus foil. Cuius ratio est, quia gratia perflcit naturam
secundum. modum naturae, sicut et amnis peifectio recipitur in perfectibili secundum
modum ems. Est autem hoc proprium naturae angeJicae, quod natura/em perfectionem
non per discursum acquirat, sed statim per naturam habeat, sicut supra [STh I 58,)}
ostensum est... Cf. also ra1: homo secundum suam naturam ncn statim natus est
ultimam perfectionem adipisc~ simt angelus. Et ideo homini longior via data est ad
Although they are separated substances, they are composed of being and essence like
:my o~er creature,. As a consequence, Thomas holds that the angelic genus is divided
lD.to different speCles which contain no more than one member, or putting it the
other way round: every individual angel has an unique nature (STh I 50).
Thus, in STb I, after having consideted the spiritual creature quae in Scrip~a Sacra
angelus nominalur (STh I 5064) and the COIpOral creatures (STh I 65-74, In fact an
componitur (STb I 75-102). The expression horizon el confinmm is used only three
times by Thomas, at different stages of his career of writing: In m Sent prol, ScG II
68.6, STh I 77.2.co. Cf. also G. Verbeke, 1976, who sketches the genesis of this
account in the works of Plato, philo, Plotinus, Simplicius and the Fathers of the
Early Churth.
16
Since angels are purely spiritual creatures, their nature is not individuated by matter.
73
17
Aquinas follows Aristode in the opinion that the soul is that by which creatures
live. Cf. e.g. In II De anima 1 [Leon: 207]: per animam enim inteiJigimus id quo
habens 'Vitam vivit; and [Leon: 228]: materia autem corporis vi'Vi est id quod
comparatur ad vitam sicut potentia ad acturn, et hic actus est anima, secundum quam
corpus vivit.
,
STh I 96.2.co: Respondeo dicendum quod in homine quodammodo sunl omnia... Est
autem in homine quatuor considerare, scilicet rationem, secundum quam convenit cum
angelis; vires sensitivas, secundum quas convenit cum animaiibus,' vires naturales
secundum quas convenit cum plantis; et ipsum corpus, secundum quod convenit cum
rebus inanimatis.
74
75
FOUNDATIONS
CHAPTER II
"
Cf. A. Pegis, 1934, 1974, 1978; A. Lipp~ 1965 and 1966; T. Schneider, 1972, p. 173;
W. Kluxen 1974, 1984; L.F. MateoSeco, 1974, 1975, 1978, 1982[al and 1982[b}, R.
Heinzmann 1965, 1986; O.H. Pesch, 1988, p. 187207; 1. Scheffczyk 1989; The
various studies on the subject show that the position of Aquinas is a creative
innovation of his own. It is not simply a choice for. an Aristotelian point of view
instead of a neoPlatonisticlAugustinian theory. In fact Aquinas uses Aristotle's
distinctions so as to serve the theological goal for which Augustine was heading.
Thus Schneider speaks of a fusion of two traditions of thinking. "Diese
Verschmelzung ist allerdi.ngs keine Kreuzung zu gleichen Teilen, sondem, wenn man
so will, das augustinische Menschenbild in aristotelischer Gewandung. Wir stehen
hier an einer seltsamen Uberschneidung der geistgeschichtlichen Linien: Thomas
steht, zwar unter Berufung auf Aristoteles, gerade in der Sieht des Menschen
Augustinus vie! nah.e.r a1s manche franziskanische Theologen, die 'unter der
from Augustine, his solution means a deviation from the viewpoint of Aristotle and
especially the Averroistic interpretation of the latter (Pegis, 1974, p. 13; Heinzmann,
1986, p. 251). Apan from the resistence which was aroused by the novdty of
Aquinas' position, in his days his view was controversial because it reduces the
materia prima to potentiality. Were the rational soul to be the only substantial form
of man, and the body have no forma corporeitatis, then some important traditional
views seem to be threatened: How to justify that children have congeniality with
their parents for the rational soul is directly created by God? How to think of the
traduction of Original Sin? What about the veneration of relics when the corpse of
the saint is not identical with the body of the living saint? What about the identity
of the resurrected Christ? etc. (Cf. T. Schneider, 1972, p. 57-63).
" In II De anima 1 [Leon: 265]: Oportet enim secundum praemm. dicere quod una et
eadem forma substamialis sit per quam hoc indi1liduum est hoc aliquid sive substantia et
per quam est corpus et animatum corpus et sic de aliis: forma enim perfectior dat
"
"
materia< hoc quod dat forma minus perftcta et adhuc amplius. Unde anima non soium
facit esse substantiam et corpus, quod etiam facit forma /apidis, sed etiam facit esse
animatum corpus: non est ergo sic intelligendum quod anima sit actus corporis et quod
corpus sit eius materia et subiedUm, quasi corpus. sit constitutum per unam formam quae
faciat eum esse corpus et superveniat ei anima fadens ipsum esse vivum corpus, sed quia
ab anima est et quod sit et quod corpus sit et quod sit corpus vivum; sed hoc quod est esse
corpus, quod est imperfectius, est quasi materiale Tespectu vitae. Cf. also QD De anima
9.co [Busa: 98]: Sic igitur cum anima sit forma substantia/is, quia constituit hominem in
determinata specie substantiae, non est aliqua alia forma substantia/is media inter
animam et materiam primam; sed homo ab ipsa anima rationali perficitur secundum
diversos r;radus perfectionum, ut sit scilicet corpus, et animatum corpus, et animal
rationale.
In II De anima 5 [Leon: 248ff].
In the genesis of each human being the different levels subsequently emerge in the
embryo. Cf. S7b IIII 6U.co (in generationis via natura ab imperftctis ad perftcta
procedit. Et inde est quod sicut in generationt hominis prius est vivum, deinde animal,
ultimo autem homo) and ScG m 22.7, quoted in foomote 24. Cf. also E.H.W. Kluge,
1981, who, however, draws some questionable conclusions on the basis of Aquinas'
texts.
22
Cf. ScG
inquantum
76
77
FOUNDATIONS
CHAPTERIl
time.
23
24
In II Sent 1.2.3; Cf. sc2: Ordo universi est finis totius creaturae. Sed in homine est
quaedam simiJitudo ordinis universi; unde et minor mundus dicitur: quia omnes naturae
quasi in homine confluunt. Ergo videtur quod ipse sit quodammodo finis omnium; Cf.
also 5Th I 91.1.co: Et propter hoc homo dicitur minor mundus, quia omnes creaturae
mundi quodammodo inveniuntur in eOj For the background of this teaching, d. M.D. Chenu, 1957, p. 34-43.
ScG m 22.7: In actibus autem formarum gradus quidam inveniuntur. Nam materia
prima est in potentia primo ad /onnam elementi. Sub forma vero elementi existens est in
potentia ad formam mixti: propter quod elementa sunt materia mixt;. Sub forma autem
mix!i considerata, est in potentia ad animam vegetabilem: nam talis corporis anima
actus est. Itemque anima vegetabilis est potentia ad sensiti'Vam; sensitiva vero ad
intellectivam. Quod processus generationis ostendit: primo enim in generatione est fetus
vivens vita plantae. postmodum vera vita anima/is. demum vero vita hominis. Post hanc
autem formam non invenitur in generabilibus et corruptibilibus posterior forma et
dignior. Ultim.us igitur finis generationis tatius est anima humana, et in hane tendit
materia situt in ultimam formam. Sunt ergo elementa propter corpora mixta; haec 'Vero
propter viventia; in quibus plantae sunt propter hominem animaJia; anima/ia 'Vero
propter hominem. Homo igitur est finis. totius generationis. After having worked out
the use of inanimated, vegetative and sensitive creatures, Thomas continues: [8J Et
super hoc omnibus sensibilibus utitur ad ineellectualis cognitionis pe-tfectionem. Unde et
de homine in Psalmo dicitur. ad Deum directo sermone: "Omnia subiecisti sub pedibus
eius" [Ps 8.8J Et Aristoteles dicit, in I PoUticorum 5. quod "homo habet naturale
dominium super omnia animalia". [9J Si igitur motio ipsius caeU ordinatur ad
generationem. generatio autem tota ordinatur ad hominem sicut in ultimum finem hums
generis. mani/estum est quod finis motionis caeli ordinatur ad hominem sicut in
26
et
4,19
dicitur
beatitudinis ipsorum, diffundere enim perflctionem habitam in alia, hoc est de ratione
petfocti inquantum est perflctum. lu this respect the ange1ic service reflects God's
'motive' of creation; On the conversation of the angels with man, cf. STh I 110-113.
STh I 114.1.co: ordo impugnationis ipsius est a Deo, qui ordinate novit malis ut~ ad
bona ea ordinando. Thus the demons can be brought in by God, functioning within
the larger framework of creation in which creatures cooperate in order to bring
about the perfection of the universe. This does not exclude the motives of the
demons as being malicious. Cf. 5Th I 114.1.ral: Et tamen daemones ad puniendum
miss~ alia intentione puniunt, quam mittantur, nam ipsi puniunt ex odio vel invidia;
mittuntur autem a Deo propter eius iustitiam.
78
79
FOUNDATIONS
CHAPTER II
21
Cf. In 1II Sent 21.1.3.sc2: Nul/us homo dicitur mortuus nisi ex eo quod anima eOO a
corpore separata est; co: Mors autem in nobis est secundum separationem animae a
corpore; Comp 1b I 229 [Leon: 71: Mors enim corporis nihil est aliud quam separatio
animae ab ipso; QD De anima 8.ag4: poena autem peccati mors est, id est separatio
animae a corpore.
d. QD De (lnima 14.ag8: moTS est priv4tio vitae; 5Th m 53.1.ral: Skut peccatum est
casus a iustitia, ita moTS est casus a vita.
QD De anima 8.co; Dicendum quod cum materia sit propter formam, et non e
converso, ex parte animae aportet accipere rationem, quaJe debeat esse corpus cui unitur.
Unde in II De anima dicitur quod anima non solum est corporis forma et motor, sed
etiam finis.
30
31
"
Cf. W. Kluxe.n, 1974 and 1984; R. Heinzmann 1986; The definition of Boethius is
found in his De duabus naturis, cpo 3 [PL 64,1343]. Cf. also In I Cor 15.2 [Busa: 236]:
constat quod homo natura/iter desiderat sa/utem sui ipsius, anima autem cum sit pa:rs
corporis hominis, non est totus homo, et anima mea non est ego; unde licet anima
consequatur salutem in a/ia vita, non tamen ego 'Vel quilibet homo.
" Thus, within the larger picture of entire creation the death of corporal living
creatures is natural. Cf. A. Zimmermann, 1992.
34
ScG m 48.6: Homo natura/iter refugit mortem, et tristatur de ipsa: non solum ut nunC,
cum earn sentit, earn rejugiens, sed etiam cum earn recogitat. Hoc autem quod non
moriatur, homo non potest assequi in hac vita. Non est igitur possibiJe quod homo in hac
vita sit felix.
35
Since things can only be pursued insofar as they are good, and things are only good
insofar as they have beinj;, death (as privatio "itae lacking any ratio hom) cannot be
pursued for its own sake. It can, however, be pursued and even regarded as
attractive, as a means that is used in order to reach a goal. In this way death can be
attractive, as a way of escaping from the misery of this eanhly life, or because of the
beatitude which is expected after this life. Cf. In IV Sent 49.1.1d.ra4: quam"is homo
natura/iter desideret finem, non :amen natura/iter desiderat est quae sunt ad finem ... nee
est incon'Veniens, aliquid quod secundum se est odibile, esse appetibile in ordine ad finem,:
skut sectio membri est appetihilis propter sanitatem; et hoc modo morS, quam natura/iter
80
81
FOUNDATIONS
CHAPTER II
appears only as the side-effect of something else and if any cause at all
should be assigned to it, this cause should be called causa dejiciens. In the
second place and this also follows from the ontological privative status
of death - death cannot be known immediately. Since things can only be
known insofar as they have esse, death can only be known by the
mediated knowledge of the ens of which it is a privation.
This negative line in Aquinas' account of death should be taken very
seriously. It is maintained throughout his reflection on what happens
when a human being dies and should not be forgotten when reading his
account of what comes after death.
Focusing on the first definition, mors est separatio animae a corpore,
death again appears as evil. Because Thomas underscores the unity of
man, the separation of body and soul - by which human nature is
destroyed . is contrary to any natural tendency of a substance to
maintain its own existence and strive for its own perfection." The
separation of body and soul is contrary to the nature of man. As a
privation, the separation of body and soul is not a positive act. It can be
effected indirectly by severe injury to the body, but the separation as
such is endured passivily.
This negative approach towards dying - negative according to the
possibility of knowing as well as performing the actual separation of
body and soul - is reflected in Thomas' use of talking either about the
process of dying (mors in jim) or about the situation of death (mors in
esse)." Because it is not knowable as such, nowhere is the moment of
dying (articulus mortis) examined. We can recognize the process of
dying; being a process of a living creature and pertaining to the realm of
being. We can recognize a corpse; a body bereft of its natural form. The
transition between the two of them is not open to our knowledge.
Therefore nowhere does Thomas speculate about it."
No matter how 'negative' (in the sense of 'apophatic') Thomas'
account of death may be, he focuses on the anima separata in various
"
40
<41
36
quiJibet refogi~ est appetibilis propter beatitudinem, sku, dici'ur Ph 1,23: "Desiderium
habens disso/v;, et esse cum Christo. "
Cf. M. Rousseau, 1979, p. 602: "His [- Aquinas] pessimism about death is thus not
only consistent with. but a reflexive confirmation of, his optimism about the unity
of man.
>7
<42
82
CHAPTER II
FOUNDATIONS
worked out in chapter IV, the separated soul is no longer in via. It has
lost the human flexibility of willing which makes it possible that the
process of a growing relationship with God does take place. Thanks to
Thomas' stern focusing on the subject the present reader of his
reflections on the separated soul easily forgets that the separated soul, in
Aquinas' view, is always in purgatory, in heaven or in hell. Its mode of
being is totally determined by its relationship with God.
In the situation of the separated soul a tension comes to the fore
which, according to Aquinas' Aristotelian inspired metaphysics, cannot
remain forever. Thomas uses this philosophical insight as an argument
to indicate that it is not unreasonable to believe in a resurrection of the
body." In order to understand this, we will have to broaden our scope
and consider the more comprehensive theological framework."
83
4' Cf. SeC N 79.10: anima corpon natura/iter unitur: est enim secundum suam essentiam
corporis forma. Est igitur contra naturam animae absque corpore esse. Nihil autem quod
est contra naturam, potest esse perpetuum. Non igitur perpetuo erit anima absque
46
corpore. Cum igitur perpetuo maneat, oport~t eam corpori iterato coniungi: quod est
resurgere. Immortalitas igitur animttrum exigere videtur resurrectionem corporum
+f
jUturam.
We have already noticed that Thomas calls the situation of the separated soul praeter
naturam. This should warn us that here something is at stake which he considers to
be deviant from the original institution by God in creation. Indeed, the situation of
the anima separata is a result of the separation of body and soul which has been
inflicted upon humankind within the process of the relationship of humankind with
God. Since the philosophical oudook of the issue is determined by this theological
framework, the anima 'eparata is dealt with again in chapter N, 1.3, p. 213ff.
Considering the 'perfection of life with God' we will be able to discuss the issue
from the decisive perspective.
STh I t02.1.eo: Ea enim quae de Paradiso in Scriptura dicuntur, per modum narrationis
historicae proponuntur, in omnibus autem quae sic Scriptura tratiit, -est pro jUndamento
tenenda veritas historiae, et desuper spirituales expositiones flbricandae. In this study we
will concentrate on Thomas' spiritual exposition of the story of the first man in
Paradise. As Thomas himself explains, knowledge of Paradise is still useful for
humankind in order to get to know the origins of the actual human condition.
Funhermore it serves as instruction for what penains to the heavenly destination of
man. 5Th lI-lI 164.2.ra4: locus ille Paradisi terrestris, quam'Vis non serviat homini ad
~ servit tamen ei ad documentum, dum cognoscit propter peccatum se tali loco fuisse
privatum; et dum per ea quae corporaliter in ilia Paradiso sunt, instruuntur de his quae
pertinent ad Paradisum cae/estern, quo aditus homini praeparatur per Christum. Thus
the stories of Paradise have the same function as the eschatological ones, as
shown in chapter N, 1.2.1, p. 210.
<47
Cf. STh I-IT 82.1.co: ,.. harmoniae in qua consistebat ratio origina/is iustitiae...
will be
84
85
FOUNDATIONS
CHAPTERll
a minor mundus - between the different faculties of the soul. In the ordo
thus consituted, a hierarchy can be discerned according to which
everything is directed at the goal for which man is created: the vision
and enjoyment of God. In this way the state of original justice reflects
the place and purpose of the elements pertaining to the hierarchy,
showing how all elements contribute to the core of material creation:
the human relationship with God. 48
The harmony of the state of original justice is warranted by God's
commitment to His creation. Being material, man is bound to live in a
material surrounding. This location, Paradise, is entirely directed at the
good of man, providing him with the necessities of material life and
contributing to the optimum functioning of the sou!." This entails that
in paradise food is easily obtainable and that there is no threat or danger
of whatsoever nature. With regard to living creatures the same harmony
reigns as between the different powers of the human sou!." With
regard to inanimated creation, no danger is to be expected in the form
of possible natural disasters (malum naturae), because partially the
perfection of his intellect makes him avoid possible dangers, and
partially God's providence ensures that no man will be harmed."
With regard to the human soul, the different powers are organised
according to their contribution to the relationship with and enjoyment
of God." The sensitive part of the soul is in complete harmony with
and under total control of the intellective part. Thus the soul, as rational
form of the body, contains the soul completely, and nothing occurs
<48
STh I 96.2.co: Respondeo dicendum quod in homine quodammodo sum omnia. et ideo
secundum mcdum quo dominatur his quae in seipso sunt, secundum hunc modum
STh II-II 163.1.co: Sie autem homo erat in statu innocentiae institutus ut. nulla esset
rebellio camis ad spiritum. Unde non potuit esse prima inordinatio appetitus humani ex
hoc quod appetierit aliquod sensibile bon.um, in quod camis concupiscentia tendit praeter
ordinem rationis.
,. Cf. 5Th I 94-95.
" STb I 96.3-4; A;; we learn from STb llll 164.2.00, there was also originally no
dominion of the spouse over his wife in d.omestic life: Quantum vera ad domesticam
conversatwnem, punitur [mulier1 secundum hoc quod suhiicitur dominationi viri, per
5'
STh I 91.3.00: Finis autem proximus humani corporis est anima rationalis et operationes
ipsius, materia enim est propter formam, et instrumenta propter actiones agentis. Dieo
ergo quod Deus instituit corpus humanum in optima dispositione secundum convenien
86
57
CHAPTER II
FOUNDATIONS
STh I-IT 85.6.co: Similiter corpus humanum est materia electa a natura quantum ad hoc,
est temperatae complexionis, ut possit esse convenientissimum organum tactus et
ai14rum virtutum sensitivarum et motivarutn [on this convenientia cf. al$o 5Th I
91.3.ral]. Sed quod sit corrnptibile, hoc est ex conditione materiae, nee est electum a
natura, quin potius natura digeret mater-iam incorruptibilem, si posset. Sed Deus, cui
subiacet omnii natura, in ipsa institutione hominis supplevit defectum naturae, et dono
iustitiae originalis dedit carpon in~ptibilitatem quandam, ut in Primo [97. I} dictum
est. Et secundum hoc dicitur quod "Deus mortem non fecit" [WS 1,13, quoted. in the sed
~n~a1 e~ quod n:ors est poena peecati; 5Th I 97.1.00: Non enim corpus eius erat
mdlSSolubiie per alzquem immortalitatis vigorem in eo existentent, sed inerat animae vis
quaedam supernaturaliter divinitus dataj per quam poterat corpus ab omni corruptiOne
praeseroare, quandiu ipsa Deo subiecta mansisset. Quod rationabiliter factum est. Quia
e~im anima ratio~is excedit proporticnem corporalis materiaeJ ut supra [STh I 76.t}
dICtum estJ convenrens fuit ut in principic ei virtus dareturJ per quam corpus cOTlServare
posset supra natur4m corporalis materiae.
In.l Sent 17.1.1.ag2: sicut anima se habet ad corpus ut vita ipsius, ita se habet Deus ad
anIma",!, ut dicit Augustinus, De verbis Apostol; serm. xvm et XXV7llj STh I-IT 2.8.sc:
Augustmus dicit, XIX De civitate Dei 26: I/Ut vita cami! anima est ita beata vita
hominis Deus est"; STh IT-ll 23.2.ag2: Deus est spiritualiter vita animae, ;icut anima vita
corporisJ secundum iiluti Dt 30,20: I/Ipse est vita tua 1/; ScG N 17.4: Skut vita naturae
corporis est per animam, ita vita iustitlae ipsius animae est per Deum; De malo 7.1.00
[L~on: 303]: Per caritatem enim anima coniungitur Deo, qui est vita animaeJ sicut
a~tma, est vi~ c0Y'fJ!J~is; In Rom 1.6 [Bnsa: 196]: sicut corpus vivit per animam naturali
VIta, tta amma VWlt per Deum vita gratiae; Cf. also De car 1.ag1+2; Cf. also P.
O'Callaghan, 1987, p. 395396.
87
habitual form added to the natural powers, causing the life of grace in
the sou!." As habitual form, perfecting the powers of the soul, the life
of grace is accidental. This does not mean, however, that it is less
important or less valu~ble ~han the ~u?st~ce. in wh.ich it inhe:~.
Because the life of grace IS a kmd of partICipatiOn m the hfe of God, It IS
more worthy than the soul that has received it.60 As far as the mode of
being is concerned, grace is an accidens and thus less worthy than t~e
substantia in which it is inherent. As far as the nature of grace IS
concerned, it is a participation in divine nature: because divine nature is
infinitely higher than human nature, grace is far more worthy than the
human soul which is endowed!' Thus Aquinas can state that compared
to the life of grace, natural life is almost nothing. 62
In these considerations vita gratiae, the relationship with God,
emerges as the core of human existence. It is conceived as something of
infinite value, qualifying the natural life of man in a new way. an~ i?
such a manner that this creature is brought to the goal for whlch It IS
designed. By charity the soul receives a new form, a form which
operates a conformity with God in the soul and plants the seeds of VIta
q~
58
STh ll-II 23.2.00: Unde maxime necesse est quod ad actum caritatis existat in nobis
aliqua habitualis forma superaddita potentiae natural; inclirums ipsam. ad car.itatis
actum, et facrerzs earn prompte et delectabiliter operarij and tal: Deus est VIta e/fecllve et
animae per caritatem et corporis per animam, sed /orr;zaiiter c~itas es.t vit~ anWz:te,
sieut et anima corporis. Unde per hoc potest concludt quod, su:ut amma unmedtate
unitur corpori, ita caritas animae. Cf. also In I Sent 17.1.1.ra2j Cf. also STh I-II
llQ.2.ra1: gratia, secundum quod est qualitas, dicitur agere in animam non per modum .
causae e}ficientis, sed per modum causae formalis, sicut albedo facit album, et iustitia
iustum.
60
STh II-IT 23.3.ra3: omne accidens secundum suum esse est inferius substantia, quia
substantia est ens per Sf, accidens autem in alio. Sed secundum rationem suae speciel,
accidens quidem quod causatur ex principiis subiect; est indignius subiecto, sicut eJfictus
causa. Accidens autem quod causatur ex participaticne alicuius supericris naturae est
dignius subieclO, inquantum est similitudo superioris naturaeJ skut lux diaphano. Et hoc
modo caritas est dignior anima, inquantum ~t participatio quaedam Spiritus saneti.
" Cf. STh I-II llO.2.ra2: Secundum hoc ~, quia anima imperfecte participat di"inam
bonitatem, ipsa participatio divinae bonitatis quae est gratia, imperfectiori .modo habet
esse in anima quam anima in seipsa subsistat. Est tamen nobilior quam natura animae,
inquantum est expressio vel participatic divinae bonitatisJ non autem quantum ad
modum essendi.
Ii2
In duo praec 6 (de quarto praecepto [Busa: 124J): vita naturalis quasi nihil est in
comparatione ad vitam gratiae.
51
88
FOUNDATIONS
aet:errJ463
CHAPTER II
89
man and the devil] Deo aequiparari appetiit, inquantum scilicet uterque sibi inniti voluit, contempto divinae regulae ordine.
66 De malo S.l.co: Cum autem aliquis peccando abiicit a se illud per quod disponebatur ad
aiiquod bonum acquirendum, meretur ut ei subtrahatur iJlud bonum ad quod
obtinendum disponebatur, et ipsa subtractio iI/ius boni est conveniens poena eius: et ideo
conveniens poena peecati originalis est subtractio gratiae, et per consequens visionis
divinae, ad quam homo per gratiam ordinatur, J.-M. Dubois, 1983, p. 290, stresses the
character of privation of both Original Sin ?-D.d its effects: "il n'y a pas de corruption
positive de la nature, mm un deaut strictement privatif. L'homme se trouve
simplement reduit ases principes naturels. Get optimisme relatif de saint Thomas est
profondement original." Cf. also p. 293.
" S7b II-II 164.1-2.
68
5Th II-II 164.2.co: Tertio, quantum ad commemorationem Juturae mortis, secundum
quod ei dictum est: "Pulvis est et in pulverem reverteris" [Gn 3,19]. Ad quod etiam
pertinet quod "Deus fecit eis tunicas pelliceas" [Gn 3,21]. in signum mortalitatis eorum.
90
FOUNDATIONS
CHAPTERll
life is cut off from the objective .for which it was designed and, in a
way, loses its reason for being. Visible natural life no longer serves the
invisible life of grace, the relationship with God for which it was
designed. Thus - though Aquinas never puts it this way explicitly - one
could say that corporal death reflects and signifies the spiritual death of
grace, of which it is an effect.
Corporal death is the most horrible of the effects of Original Sin. It
is, however, part of the various forms of evil that determine the human
condition after Original Sin. These evils are interpreted as punishments
from God. What does this mean, and how does this affect the
appreciation of suffering'after the Fall of Man?
69
In Rom 1.8 [Busa: 356]: Dignum est enim quod anima, quae deserit Deum, It corpore
suo deseratur per mortem corporalem, et fina/iter deseratur a Deo per mortem aeternam.
The same view is expressed in the thought of the double death of man, moTS corporis
and mOTS animae, the second of which is worse and compared to annihilation: STh I~
IT 87.4.ral: omnirro redig; in nihilum eum qui peccat, non convenit divinae iustitiae,
quia repugnat perpetuitati poenae. quae est secundum divinam iustitiam, ut dictum est
[art. 3). Sed in nihilum redigi dicitur qui spiritualibus bonis pt7.v4tur: secundum illuti
91
leo 13,2: "Si non habuero caritatem, nihil sum"; Cf. also P. O'Callaghan, 1987, p.
401-403.
70
71
Notice that 'nature' is used here in contrast with 'morality' and not with 'grace'.
With regard to malum poenae one must distinguish between punishment in this life
and punishment after death. The first is medicinal and pe4agogical, the second is not
(cf. ScG ill 144). Whereas the first leads to God in the sense that by this punishment
92
FOUNDATIONS
CHAPTER II
according to which all moral evil is regarded as guilt and all natural evil
as punishment.
When natural evil is focused on - leaving the moral order for the
following chapter - death can be placed within the hierarchy of evils by
which the human condition is marked. As we have seen in the previous
paragraph corporal mortality is not the greatest evil of the punishments.
It is the effect and sign of the infinitely more horrible death of grace.
The relationship with God in grace, vita gratiae, is seen as the highest
good for man. According to the hierarchy of elements, the integrity of
the soul is the second greatest good, followed by corporal welfare and
external goods."
Aquinas notices that many people are more afraid of corporal than of
spiritual punishments." That the loss of the life of grace is infinitely
more undesirable than that of corporal life, is not evident for those who
are only familiar with the sensible and corporal goods. For humankind
in the human condition after the Fall, the faculties of his soul being in
disorder, the appreciations of the order of punishments according to the
initial order of creation, implies a process. It takes a growth, a
development towards being able to appreciate and understand the order
of punishments according to its relation to the life with God. We will
devote the next chapter to the dynamism of this development, which
must be passed through by each individual human being. In the shifts
that occur in this process one recognizes the movement from material to
immaterial. The more ~ch individual man learns to 'read' creation as
pointing to its Creator, and the more his life is directed a~ the
relationship with the Invisible, the more he learns to apprecIate cognitively as well as affectively - what human existence is really about.
Acknowledging this, the view that God punishes humankind for
Original Sin by corporal death has. a special dimension: corporal death is
the evil which is feared most by those who prefer corporal above
spiritual goods. By corporal death those who are cut off from the life of
grace are striken in their deepest fears."
The need for developing the relationship with God in order to
understand the function of evil is of basic importance for anyone who
seeks to understand Aquinas' treatment of the questions which have,
from the 17th century onwards, been subsumed under the term 'theodicee'." According to Thomas, all natural evil is interpreted as malum
poenae and - in accordance with the pedagogical function of punishment
- aimed at the restoration of the relationship of grace between man and
God. Thus he retraces all evil to human sin. This line of reasoning
me second
only leads to God in the sense of pointing to God's justice (and eventually
motivating other subjects in this life to change their behaviour). We will come back
to this in chapter IV, 2.2, p. 232ff, where Aquinas' reflections on hell and eternal
72
93
supradicto. Apud hos enim maxima poena aestimantur laesiones corporis, et damna
rerum exteriorum; deordinatio autem animae, et damnum virtutis, et amissio fruitionis
divinae, in qua consistit ultima hominis felicitas. aut modicum aut nihil reputatur ah
eis.
,. The reversal of this motif is expressed in Ph 1,23: "I desire to depan and be with
7S
Christ, which is better by far:' We will return to this wheu discussing the perfection
of earthly life with God, in the second section of chapter ill, p. 164ff.
L. Sentis, 1992, convincingly shows that Thomas Aquinas does not offer a theodicee
in the sense G.W. Leibniz {1646-1716} and later philosophers speud much effon on
achieving. After having sketched the devdopments in the work of Aquinas, he
stresses the fact that Aquinas does not offer a system of thinking in which the providence of the incomprehensible God can be calculated. For a survey and evaluation of
Seutis' study, cf. C. Leget, 1994.
94
FOUNDATIONS
CHAPTER II
human body at the service of the soul; the soul is directed at the perfection of its operations by the life of grace. Thus the relat.ionship with
God emerges as the destination for w!llch ?,-an !s created. This hier~rc~y
of elements, organized from the relationship With God, appears agam m
Thomas' account of Original Sin and the punishments which result
from it. Within this theological framework of the human history of the
relationship with God, Thomas is able to integrate the classical interpretation of death as natural to man in a new framework. 80 By
interpreting the malum and privatio . which death is - as punishment,
the death of the body emerges as a sign which refers to the spiritual
death of grace which is'infinitely. more horrible. It takes, however, a
development of one's relationship with God in ord~r to fu~ly appreciate
and understand this ordo. The development of thiS relationship takes
place in a world marked by the punishments of Original Sin.
A first appreciation of Aquinas' interpretation of death is obtained.
Nevertheless we are still unable to give an answer to our initial question
concerning the relation between vita naturae and vita aeterna, for the
historical process in which the relationship of human beings with God
is embedded, has reached a climax and a new start with God's
incarnation in human nature. By the life and death of Christ, human life
and death have received new possibilities for the restoration of the
relationship with God in grace."
76
"
78
95
quaedam res patris, umie frequenter parentes puniuntur in prole; vel etiam propter
remedium salutis eills qui huiusmodi poenalitatibus subditur, Itt scilicet per hoc a peccatis
arceatur, vel etiam de virtutibus non superbiat, et per patientiam coronetur. One may
suspect the influence of Job example par excellence of the just who has blind faith
in divine providence - who interprets his suffering as being put to test by God in
order to be purified by inflictions and help others to carry their suffering; Cf. M.
Yaffe, 1989.
,~ STh I 21.4.ra3: in hoc etiam quod iusti puniuntur in hoc mundo, apparet iustitia el
misericordia; inquantum per huiusmodi afflictiones aliqua le1Jia in eis purgantur, et ab
affectu terrenorum in Deum magis eriguntur; secundum illud Gregorii (XXVI Moralia
9): "Mala quae in hoc mundo nos premunt, ad Deum nos ire compellunt . .
10
ScC IV 52.4: Sic igitur huiusmodi defectus, quamvis naturales homini videantur,
absolute considerando humanam naturam ex parte ems quod est in ea infer~ tamen,
considerando divinam prO'Oidentiam et dignitatem superioris partis humanae naturae,
satis probabilite7 probaYi potest huiusmcdi defoctus esse pomales. Et sic coUigi potest
91
humanum genus peccato aliquo originaliter esse tnfectumj De malo 5.4-5; NotiCe also
ScC IV 81.3: Est igitur moTS quasi per accidens superveniens homini per peccatum, consi
derata institutione humanae naturae.
Cf. M.-M. Labourdette, 1985, p. 390, footnote 45: "Pour Ie chretien, les souffrances
et Ia mort ne sont plus d'abord peines du peche originel; elles Ie sont aussi,
radicalem.enti mais, plus profondement, elles ont change de sensi elles sont d~abord
moyen d'assimilation Jesus Christ Sauveur, souffrant et mourant sur la crolX. Cf.
STIJ III 85.5.r.2...S71:> III 69.3.co+ra3."
96
97
FOUNDATIONS
CHAPTER II
No longer able to attain its ultimate end, the human species seemed to
be created in vain, left alone with its monal natural life. Therefore God
sent a mediator between God and man in order to restore the relationship and remove the impediments which were effected by Original
Sin.1l2
In Christ, God's nature - which is His blessed Life, the same vita
aeterna man is created to share in - is united with human nature. By this
union of two natures in one Person (unio hypostatica), the situation of
mankind regarding the relationship with God is changed. In this second
section of the chapter 'Foundations of life with God' we will investigate
how the human condition is changed by the life and death of Christ.
The discussion of the life and work of Christ is opened by gaining
insight into Aquinas' account of the motives for incarnation. This
enables us to perceive the gratuitous character of the Word becoming
flesh and establish some connections with the previous chapter, in
which the relation between the divine Persons and the one 'Life' of God
was studied (2.1). Subsequently, the hypostatic union is focused on,
working out some lines from the same initial chapter, by considering
this unio from the point of view of the distinction between Creator and
creatures (2.2). Having studied the esse of Christ, in the following
paragraph the work of Christ is dealt with, in accordance with the
scholastic adagium agere sequitur esse." Here we discover how the
suffering and dying of Christ operated and revealed a new relationship
between humankind and God (2.3). In the final paragraph, the
resurrection of Christ and its significancy for the renewed approach to
life and death is examined (2.4).
more and more wondrous reasons for this mystery are made manifest." Aquinas considers the mystery of the incarnation not only to be
the work of God which most exceeds the human intellect, he also
considers it - as the most marvellous event - to be the central marvel at
which all other miracles are ordered." This central place of incarnation
among the other marvels of faith is explained with the help of the
Aristotelian saying "that which is greatest in any genus seems t.o be the
cause of the others."" And indeed, in the theology of Aqulllas, the
incarnation is the foundation for Christian life with God, the ground
for all marvels which are involved in this relationship.
Confronted with this central mystery, the attitude of the theologian
is one ot diligenter et pie considerare.87 Seeking understanding of one's
faith, the appropriate approach towards this mysterr: is endeavouri~g to
elucidate its fitness or suitability (convenientia). In thIS procedure neIther
the mystery itself is comprehended (as we will see in 2.2), nor are God's
'motives' screened. Aquinas is very clear about his conviction that those
gratuitous operations which stem solely from God's will and which are
beyond what He 'owes' to creatures, can only be ~nov:n by man insof~
as they are revealed by Holy Scripture. IncarnatIon IS a truth of thIS
kind and thus our knowledge of its suitability must be guided by what
Scripture tells."
82
S}
De malo S.lora!: homo jrustra et vane Jactus esset si beatitudinem consequi non posset,
sicut quae/ihet res quae non potest consequi ultimum finem. Unde ne homo jtustra et
vane foctus fieret cum peccato originali nasCen5, a principio human; _generis proposuit
Deus homini remedium per quod ab hac vanitate liberaretur, scilicet ipsum mediatorem
Deum et hominum Iesum Christum, per CHius fidem impedimentum peecati originalis
subtrahi posset.
Cf. e.g. ScG ill 69.20: agere sequitur esse in actu.
ScG N 54.1: Si quis autem diJigenter et pie incarnationis mysteria consideret, inveniet
tantam sapientiae profunditatem quod humanam cognitionem excedat, secundum illud
Apostoli: "Quod stu/tum est De~ sapientius est hominibus" [I Co 1,25J. Unde fit ut pie
consideranti semper magis ac magis admirabiles rationes huius mysterii manijestantur.
Cf. also STh m 1.2.co, where Thomas, after having enumerated ten reasons for the
suitability of the incarnation, ends saying! Sunt autem et aliae pturimae utilitates quae
consecutae sunt, supra comprehensronem sensus humani.
85
ScG IV 27.1: de ipso nunc incarnationis mysterio restal dicendum. Quod quidem inter
divina opera maxime rationem excedit: nihil enim mirabilius excogitari potest divinitus
factum quam quod verus Deus, Dei FiJius, fieret homo verus. Et quia inter omnia
mirabilissimum est, consequitur quod ad hums maxime mirabilis fidem omnia alia
mfracuJa ordinentur: cum id quod est in unoquoque genere maximum, causa aliorum
esse videatur.
" Aristode, II Metaphysica 1 (993b25).
87 Note that the word diligenter in Latin is derived from diJigere; this overtone of love
is lost in the translation "attentively".
as S1b ill 1.3.co: Ea enim quae ex sola Dei voluntate proveniunt, supra omne debitum
creaturae, nobis innotescere non possunt nisi quatenus in sacra Scriptura traduntur, per
quam divina w/untas innotescit. Umie, cwn in sacra Scriptu~a ub!<Jue inc.~tionis
ratio ex peccato primi hominis assignetur, convenrentius dicttur tncarnatroms opus
8i
98
FOUNDATIONS
CHAPTER II
discern 'before' and 'after', 'sooner' and 'later', 'means' and 'ends'.89
89
hoth motifs do not contradict one another, but interlock: according to Scripture and
sed non propter hoc vult hoc; and De pot 3.15.ra14 (written in the same years):
quod Deus earn communicare vult: non enim agit propter suam bonitatem quasi
"
91
appetens quod non habet, sed quasi volens communicare quod habet: quia agit non ex
appetitu finis, sed ex anum finis. Cf. also G. Kreling, 1979/1939, p. 248257; M.
Corbin, 1980, p. 145148; H. Goris, 1996.
Cf. In ill Sent 4.3.1.ro3; In IV Sent 10.1.1.ro3; In IV Sent 43.1.2.1.ra2; ScG N 54;
Comp 7b I 210; S7b ill 1.2; In Psalm 45.
In In 1II Sent 1.1.3.co Aquinas starts with the reparatio-motif and after having
sketched the consummatio-motif he comments: Et hoc etiam probabiliter sustineri
potest. In S7b ill 1.3.co he chooses for the opinion of those who decide for the
reparatio-motif quorum assertioni magis assentiendum 'llidetur., M. Corbin, 1980, p.
111158 makes an analysis of the shifts that can be detected with regard to the place
that both motifs adopt in different stages of Aquinas' development. He shows that
ordinatum esse a Deo in remedium peccat~ ita quod, peccato non existente, incarnatio
non fumet.
Cf. 5Th I 19.5.co: ve/fe finem non est ei [.", God] causa va/endl ea quae sunt ad finem,
sed tamen vult ea quae sunt ad finem, ordinari. ad finem. Vult ergo hoc esse propter hoc,
communicatio bonitatis non est ultimus finis, sed ipsa divina bonitas, ex cuius amore est
99
91
100
101
FOUNDATIONS
CHAFTERII
faith." Our hope is raised by the fact that God showed how much He
loves us: and, as Augustine says, what more manifest indication of this is
thinkable than that the Son of God has worthied Himself to keep us
company in our nature?" Our love is raised by the fact that God
shows His love for us: in concordance with both the 'laws' of natural
love and that of grace, the divine initiative of love effectuates our loving
response. 9S
9'
'14
9S
m 1.2.co: Primo quit/em quantum ad fidem, quae magis certificatur ex hoc quod
ipsi Deo loquenti credit. Unde Augustinus dicit XI De Civitate Dei 2: "Ut homo
foientius ambulaTet ad veritatem, ipsa veritas, Dei Filius, homine assumpto, constituit
STh
96
97
98
9~
100
STh ill 1.2.co: Quarto, quantum ad rectam operationem, in qua nobis exemplum se
praebui'.
STh ill prol: Quia Salvator noster Dominus Jesus Christus, teste angelo, popu/urn suum
salvum faciens a peccatis eorum, 'Viam veritatis nobis in seipso demonstra'Vit, per quam
ad beatitudinem immortalis 'Vitae resurgendo pervenire possumus;.-.. For Christ as 'way',
cf. also Comp Th I 2: quia Christi humanitas 'Via est qua ad Di'Vinitatem pervenitur.
Oportet igitur et in 'Via 'Viam cognoscere, per quam possit perveniri ad finem; et i~
patria Dei gratiarum actio sufficiens non esset, nisi 'Viae per quam sa/vall sunt, cognttionem haberent.
STh I 2.prol: primo, tractabimus de Deo; secundo, de 11U)tu rationalis creaturae in
Deum; tenio, de Christo, qu~ secundum quod homo, via est nobis tendendi in Deum.
STh I.n 6.prol: Quia igitur ad beatitudinem per actus a/iquos necesse est pervenire,
oportet ,onsequenter de humanis actibus considerare, ut sciamus quibus actibus
perveniatur ad beatitudinem, 'Vel impediatur beatitudinis 'Via.
STh ill 1.2.co: Quinto, quantum ad plenam participationem Di'Vinitatis, quae 'Vere est
hominis beatitudo, et finis humanae vitae. Et hoc collaturn est nobis per Christi
humanitatem, dicit enim Augustinus, in quodam sermone De Nativ. Domine, [13 de
Temp.]: "Factus est Deus homo, ut homo freret Deus. "
102
103
FOUNDATIONS
CHAPTER II
double role: in the former He appears as the way, the example for
morally good action; in the latter He is conceived as the one bestowing
on us the beatified union with God. These roles are performed by
Christ on the basis of the union of divine and human nature, but in
different ways. Christ is exemplum because of His human nature.
According to His human nature (secundum quod homo), He is 'on the
way' (viator) within the coordinates of materiality and time. Christ can
make us share in divine life, thanks to His divine nature (secundum quod
Deus). He is auctor unionis, insofar as He has reached the goal
(comprehensor) or better: insofar as He is the goal Himself. These two
dimensions, exemplum and auctor, viator and comprehensor, are
recognized by Thomas in In 14,6: Ego sum via [secundum quod homo] et
the concept of missio. Being sent can only refer to the Son and the
Spirit, since it implie.s. a proc~ssi?~ fro,:,. an orig!~."3 Thomas
distinguishes between vlSlble and mVlSlble mISSIOns. InvlSlble mISSIOns
refer to sanctifying grace, the vita gratiae by which the human soul
participates in God's life. These missions can be ascribed to the Son as
well as to the Spirit.'" Visible missions refer to what is told in Holy
Scripture about the incarnation of the Son and the Spirit of God descending like a dove (Mt 3,16). Since it is connatural to man to arrive at the
invisibilia Dei by visible creatures, it is suitable that the invisible missions are disclosed by visibilia. Thomas argues that the visible mission of
the Son and that of the'Spirit have a different suitability. This difference
can be retraced to their relations of origin. The Son is sent by the
Father and both send the Spirit. Thus the Son is (together with the
Father) the principle of the Spirit. Towards the Spirit, the Son has a
relation of causation, production, effectuation. When the Son is visibly
sent by the Father, this 'effectuating' relation to the Spirit is maintained.
At the same time, however, the visible mission corresponds with the
fact that the cognitive (verum) aspects of divinity are appropriated to the
Son.'" Thus the Son simultanuously reveals the Father and produces
(together with the Father) the Spirit. In the visible mission of the Son
(the incarnation) these two dimensions can be recognized. The
incarnated Son shows who the Father is ern 14,9) and He is Originator
(Auctor) of the Spirit to whom sanctification (communication of vita
gratiae) is appropriated. The Spirit is regarded as a gift of sanctification.
101
102
Moreover, the Word especially fits human nature, since the latter is _~entially
Cf. In Joan 14.2. It should be taken into consideration that although. Christ is
exemplum according to His human. nature, He can be so only because this nature is
1o,
11)4
lOS
modo convenit sibi mitt;,- sed solum Filw et Spiritui sancto, quibus convenit esse ab alio.
5Th I 43.5. Because sanctifying grace is a gift, it "is primarily attributed to the Spirit.
Insofar as this grace produces effects which pertain to the intellect, these can be
appropriated to the Son: d. adl.
This is founded on the proprium 'Imago Patris' of the Son; Cf. 5Th I 3S.2.co.
104
105
FOUNDATIONS
CHAPTER II
unio hypostatica and what does his procedure entail for the consideration
of the work of Christ?
We will begin with the hypostatic union. It may not come as a
surprise that here at the core the same incomprehensibility is encountered which was sketched in the first chapter as a main characteristic of
Aquinas' reflection on God's nature. Considering the different attempts
made to think about the union of God and man in Christ that have
been rejected by the Councils of the Church, Aquinas eventually locates
the union of divine and human nature in the esse of Christ. Proceeding in this way, Thomas implies that the hypostatic union shares in the
same incomprehensibility as God's esse. And like the incomprehensibility of God's esse, the union of God and man in Christ is approached by
paying attention to the logical peculiarities that are at stake when the
two natures in one Person are discussed. 109 Thus, when we speak of a
union of human and divine nature, the word unio is used analogously.
We find the same procedure here as we discussed in the first chapter,
with regard to the word vita applied to God. On the one hand, with
regard to the res significata this union is of a kind that outreaches any
created union. Therefore, the word 'union' is said more appropriately of
this incomprehensible union than of any created union we know. On
on. 106
I"
108
109
Cf. Comp Tb I 211 [Leon: 39]: Sic igitur in aliis hominibus unio animae et corporis
constituit hypostasim et suppositum, quia nihil aJiud advenit praeter haec duo. In
Domino autem Iesu Christo paeter animam et corpus advenit tertia substantia divinitas:
non est seorsum suppositum 'Vel hypostasis, sicut nee persona, id quod est ex corpore et
anima consitutum. sed suppositum, hypostasis -vel persona est id quod constat ex tribus
substantiis, corpore scilicet, et anima et deitate: et sic in Christo sicut est una tantum
persona, ita- una hypostasis et unum suppositum. Alia autem ratione ad'Venit anima
corpori, et di'Vinitas utrique. Nam anima advenit corpori ut forma eius existens, unde his
duobus constituitur una natura, quae dicitur humana natura. Divinitas autem non
advenit an~mae et corpori per moduf11, formae neque per modum partis, hoc enim est
contra rationem divinae perfoctionis; unde ex divinitate et anima et corpore non
constituitur una natura, sed ipsa natura divina in sepsa integra et pura existens, sibi
quoc/dm incomprehensibii et ineffabili rmxlo univit humanam naturam ex anima et
corpore constitutam: quod ex infinita virtute.eOO processit. (Bold by C.L.)
Cf. H. Schoot, 1993, the main inspiration for this paragraph. Schoot makes clear
that - in accordance with the truth that the triune God reveals Himself through the
Word - eventually "(a) the union of Christ's created knowledge with the Word of
God is primordial and exemplary to all naming of God. This union is the hean of
all analogous naming of God" and "(b) naming Christ is analogous to the primordial
union of the Word of God and created human knowledge of Christ. Naming Christ
means to enter into this mystery and to as it were 'double' this mystery" (p. 189).
106
107
FOUNDATIONS
CHAPTERJI
the other hand, with regard to the modus significandi the word unio is
said inappropriately of the hypostatic union, having a mode of
signifying which is apt only for what is created. The union of created
human nature with uncreated divine nature in one Person, remains
beyond our intellectual grasp.
Since it is the most perfect union between God and man, Thomas
attributes to the unio bypostatica a central meaning which is in accordan
ce with the revealing and effectuating role of Christ. As is shown later
in this chapter, the unio bypostatica, being the highest in the genus of
unions, is the efficient cause of the unio operativa, for which man was
created. Apart from this effectuating aspect, the hypostatic union also
has a central position with regard to the revelation of the
incomprehensibility at stake when the relation between Creator and
creatures is considered. Thomas regards the union of two natures in
Christ as exemplaty for God's hidden presence in creation. He draws an
analogy between relations of the res significata and the modus significandi
as they can be considered with regard to Christ and the Old Testament,
the First Truth and the Articles of Faith, the suffering Christ and the
species of bread and wine and, finally, the Word and His human nature.
Thus, the way in which the latter is considered a mysterium is
fundamental and exemplary for the hidden presence of the divine in the
created mode of revelation. 110
110
111
ned.l13
Cf. H. Schoot, 1993, p. 9-40. In his concluding chapter Schoot shows that for
Aquinas the word mysterium always points to a kind of relation analogous to the
112
113
eim duas naturas, quaelihet tamen operationum est una numero in Christo, semel facta,
114
ll5
ScG IV 36: For the relation between divine and human knowledge in Christ, d. H.
Schoot, 1993, P' 169-191.
108
116
117
118
117
120
CHAPTERTI
FOUNDATIONS
humankind can be appreciated as a historical process. From De ver 27.4 onward the
model of instrumentum .is adopted in order to elucidate the efficacy of the
sacraments as well. De ver 27.4.co [Leon: 310]: Damascenus in III libro [cap. 13] dicit
quod humana natura in o,risto erat velut quoddam organum divinitatis,' et ideo
humana natura aliquid communicabat in operatione virtutis divinae, sicut quod Chris
tus tangendo leprosum mundavit; sic enim ipse tactus Christi causabat instrumentaliter
salutem leprasi. Sicut autem humana natura in Christo communicabat ad effectum
divinae virtutis instrumentaliter in corpora/ibus effectibus. ita etiam in spiritualibus,' ...
[Leon: 325] et sic humanitas Christi est instrumentalis causa iustificationis; quae quidem
causa nobis applicatur spiritualiter per fidem et corpora/iter per sacramentaj Cf. also P.
Crowley, 1991;
Cf. T. Schoof, 1974, p. 240-243: "It functions by grace of a certain indeterminateness,
a 'quodammodo' ... " and in footnote 80: "Just the rigid reconstruction of a system of
instrumentality renders the historical studies of one generation ago so hard to take. n
[trans1ation: C.L.]
For a more elaborate exposition on this issue d. K. Tanner, 1988.
STh m 18.1.ral: Sic ergo natura bumana in Christo juit instrumentum Divinitatis ut
moveretur per propriam voluntatem.
109
God works in the soul of the human being endowed with grace. 12! By
this analogy of the unio operativa with operations that stem from the
unio hypostatica a reciprocal clarification takes place. What is brought
about in secret by God's grace in the soul of the human being endowed
with grace, is, as it were, recognized and revealed in the being of Christ.
2.3 The suffering and dying of Christ: revelation and grace
After the introductory sketches of 2.1 and 2.2 we now come to the
heart of the matter: the importance of the suffering and dying of Christ
for the human relatioriship with God. We have shown that Christ is
via. veritas et vita, way and destination, viator and comprehensor.
Embodying the perfect union between God and man, Christ effectuates
and reveals the gracious relationship between man and God. Thus,
Christ's attitude towards death and the way He behaved at the moment
of His suffering and death have a double dimension for the Christian.
They are an example of how we should bear the misfortunes and
suffering of our vita natura/is, inspired by the faith, hope and charity of
vita gratiae. At one and the same time Christ's suffering is the principle
cause of vita gratiae which is bestowed on us in the sacraments, by
which the bodily presence of Christ is prolonged.!22
In this paragraph we first deal with the effecting aspect of Christ's
passion and death (2.3.1) and subsequently with its revealing dimension
(2.3.2).123
'" STh ill 18.1.ra1. In both contexts we find the image of the instrumentum. Cf. ScG ill
70.7: Patet etiam quod non sic idem effectus causae naturali et divinae vtrtuti attribuitur
quasi partim a Deo, et partim a naturali agente fiat, sed totus ab utroque secundum
alium modum: sicut idem eJfectus totus attrihuitur instrumento, et principali agenti
etiam totus; Cf. also P. Crowley, 1991, p. 454. For the imponance of this for
contemporary theology d. p. 474-475.
122
123
110
111
FOUNDATIONS
CHAPTERll
which the death and resurrection of Christ are connected with vita
naturae and vita gratiae as well as their counterparts, mors corporis and
mors spiritualis. '24 In this condensed 'chapter' we find the same
elements as in the story of Original Sin, however in reversed
perspective. In the story of the First Sin, corporal death is introduced as
a result of the punishment that. was inflicted on the first man when he
cut off his relationship with God in grace. In the death and resurrection
of Christ, the resurrection of the dead body results from the restoration
of the life of grace of man. Both perspectives point to the same core: the
relationship with God or vita gratiae.
The scheme that is provided by this condensed 'chapter' - a scheme
based on the Pauline opposition of Adam and Christ'" - makes us
sensitive for the core of the work of Christ at the cross. The external
{material and corporal} event is informed by a spiritual event in which
the life of grace occupies a central place. In Comp Th I 239 Thomas
specifies this life of grace as follows: et haec est per fidem, per quam Deus
inhahitat in nobis. By faith we are cognitively united with God. By
knowing, the object known is in the intellect {although according to an
immaterial intelligible form}: thus contact is made on the basis of which
the will is incited."6 But whereas the theological virtue of faith is
12~
Comp Th I 239: Sicut autem Christus sua mone mortem nostram destruxit, ita sua
resurrectione vitam nostram reparavit. Est autem hominis duplex mors et duplex vita:
una quidem mars est corporis per separationem ab an~ alia VeTO mars est animae per
separationem a Dea. ClJristus igitur. in quo secunda moTS locum non habuit, per
primam mortem quam subiit, scilicet corporalem, utramque in nobis mortem destrUXit,
scilicet corporalem et spiritualem. Similiter autem per oppositum intelligitur duplex vita:
IV
una quidem corporis ah anima, quae dicitur vita naturae, alia animae a Deo, quae
125
126
dicitur vita iustitiae vel ~ita gratiae: et haec est per fidem, per quam Deus habitat in
nobis. secundum iiluti Hab 2,4: "Justus autem meus ex fide vivit", et secundum hoc
etiam est duplex resurrectio: una corpora/is, qua anima iterato coniungitur corpor;; alia
spiritualis, qua iterato coniungitur Deo. Et haec quidem secunda resurrectw in Christo
locum non habuit, quia numquam eius anima fuit per peccatum separata a Deo. Per
resurrectionem igitur suam corpora/em utriusque resurrectionis, scilicet corpora/is et
spiritualis, nobis est causa.
Cf. Rm 5,12-21.
Aquinas firmly holds to the tenet nihil amatum quod non cognitum. Hence the
primacy of the Word before the Spirit in via processionis. In fact, however, the
cognitive and the volitional cannot be separated: without knowledge the will would
128
be locked within itself and could not be attracted to any object; without volition the
intellect would not be incited to know. Thus, .intellectual life comprises both and
necessarily does so; Cf. In m De anima 15.
It also plays a central role in the dynamism (ch. Ill) and the perfection (ch. IV) of
the relationship with God. Cf. In Rom 1.6 [Bus", 200], Nee tamen est perfect.
habitatio [Christi in cordibus nostrisJ nisi fides per caritatem sit flrmata, quae per vinculum peifectionis nos unit Deo, ut dicitur Col 3,14; De perf 2 [Leon: 27]: Consistit
autem principaliter spiritualis vita in caritate, quam qui non habet nihil esse spiritualite:r
reputatur,' unde Apostolus lCo 13,2 dicit: "Si hahuero prophetiam .,. caritatem autem
non habuero. nihil sum. " Beatus etiam Johannes Apostolus totam spiritualem vitam in
dilectione consistere asserit, dicens IJn 3,14: "Nos scimus quoniam translati sumus de
morte in vitam, quoniam diligimus fratres. Qui non diligit manet in morte. " Simpliciter
igitur in spirituali vita perfectus est qui est in cantate peifectus; In Symb 8 [Busa: 40-47].
SIb m 48.6.ra3: Ad tertium dicendum quod passio Christi, secundum quod comparatur
ad divinitatem eiusJ agit per modum efficientiae; inquantum vero comparatur ad
voluntatem animae ChristiJ agit per modum merit;; secundum vera quod consideratur in
ipsa carne Christi, agit per modum satisfactionisJ inquantum per eam liberamur a reatu
poenae,' per modum VeTO redemptionis. inquantum per eam liberatnlfr a servitute culpae;
per nwdum autem sacriflCii, inquantum per eam reconciliamur Deo, ut infra [SIb m
49.4J dicetur. Cf. T. Schoof, 1974, p. 236, 'The traditional models of understanding
112
are not turned down, but acquire additional significance exactly in the light of
instrumentality." [translation: C.L.]
m For Thomas meritum is: an effect of grace and not a cause, as one might be inclined
to think staning from a false opposition between God's grace and human activity
(5Th 111 114). Cf. O.H. Pesch/A. Peters, 1981, p. 106, "Damit wird der tie/ste Sinn
der Verdiensdehre deudick Sie solI - in> Bild einer Art 'Kaufkraft' - die innere
Tele%gie der Gnade auf ihre Ent/altung zur ewigen Gemeinschaft mit Gott bin zur
5pracbe bringen. Cf. also G. Kreling, 1979/1959, p. 431-439; O.H. Pesch, 1967[a] p.
771-784 and 1967[b], p. 1882-1890.
1~
131
CHAPTER II
FOUNDATIONS
5Th m 8.1.ral: dare gratiam aut Spiritum sanctum convenit Christo secundum quod
Deus, auctoritative, sed instrumentaliter ei convenit. secundum quod est homo, inquantum scilicet eOO humanitas foit instrumentum divinitatis eOO. Et ita actiones ipsius ex
virtute divinitatis fuerunt nobis salutiferae. utpote gratiam in nobis causantes, et per
meritum et per effidentiam quandam. Note how the verumaspect ascribed to Christ
and the bonum-aspect to the Spirit appear again with regard to Christ as capu" 5Th
m 8.1.ra3: caput habet manifestam eminentiam respectu exteriorum membrorum, sed
cor habet quandam inf/uentiam occultam. Et ideo cordi comparatur Spiritus sanctus, qui
invisibiJiter Ecclesiam vivicat et unit, capiti autem comparatur Christus, secundUm
visibilem naturam, qua homo hominibus jJraefertur.
STh ill 48.1.co: Christo data est gratia non solum sicut singulari personae, sed
inquantum est Caput Ecdesiae, ut scilicet ab ipso redundaret ad membra. Et ideo opera
Christi hoc modo se hahent tam ad se quam ad sua membra, sicut se habent opera
alterius hominis in gratia constituti ad ipsum.
113
life which is offered as satisfaction - not human life, but human life
united with divine life - and the extent and amount of suffering.'"
Sacrificium (STh ill 48.3) is also used to express the magnitude of
Christ's caritas at work. A sacrifice is an action which is performed in
honour of God - an honour which is particularly due to God - so as to
be reconciled with Him. Thomas quotes Augustine who says that in a
true sacrifice we adhere to God by a holy union, and through being
related to that end we can be truly happy. By suffering Christ gives
Himself for us. This is utmost worthy of acceptance by God, since it is
motivated by the greatest charity, which is - as grace - of course
connected to the One 'who makes us truly happy. Christ's sacrifice is
recognizable as sacrifice par excellence. In every sacrifice one can discern
four things: the one adressed to, the one sacrifying, that which is sacrified and those who are benefited. As one and true Mediator, Christ is
one with Him to whom the sacrifice is addressed (God), one with those
who are benefited (man), and He himself is the one who performs the
act and who is sacrificed. 133
STh ill 48.2.co: Cbristus autem, ex caritate et obedientia patiendo, maius aliquid Deo
exhibuit quam exigeret recompensatio totius ofJensae humani generis. Primo quidem,
propter magn#udinem caritatis ex qua patiebatur. Secundo, propter dignitatem vitae
suae, quam pro satisfoctione ponebat, quae erat vita Dei et hominis. Tertio, propter
generalitatem passionis et magnitudinem doloris assumpti. In Aquinas' view, the
dignity of the life which is offered confirms the amount of cmtas, according to the
Aristotelian saying that the vinuous person loves his life the most. How suffering
shows the amount of caritas is worked out in chapter ill, 2.4, p. 176~.
'" 5Th ill 48.3.co, Respondeo dicendum quod sacri/icium proprie dicitur aliquid factum in
honorem proprie Deo debitum, ad eum placandurn. Et inde est quod Augustinus dicit, in
X De Civitate Dei: "Verum sacrificium est omne opus quod agitur ut saneta societate
Deo inhaereamus, relatum scilicet ad illum finem boni quo veradter beati esse
possumus." ... hoc ipsum opus, quod wluntarie passionem sustinuit, foit Deo maxime
acceptum, utpote ex caritate proveniens. Unde mani/estum est quod passio Christi fuit
verum sacrificiurn. .. et, "cum quatuor considerentur in omni samficw", ut Augustinus
dicit in IV De Trinitate, scilicet "cui offeratur, a quo offeratur, quid offeratur, pro
quibus offeratur, idem ipse qui unUS verusque mediator per sacrificium pads reconciliat
nos Deo, unum cum illo maneret cui offerebat, unum in se faceret pro quibus offerebat,
unus ipse esset qui offerebat, et quod offerebat. "
132
114
FOUNDATIONS
Ii:'
CHAPTER II
115
,",
'*'
of His eternal will the passion of Christ was directed at the liberation of
humankind; insofar as God inspired Him with the will to suffer for us,
infundendo ei caritatem; and insofar as God did not protect Him from
suffering, exposing Him to His persecutors. l3' Especially the second
way is revealing as to the relationship between the Father and the Son
incarnate. The line of thought is prolonged in the answer to the second
obiectio in which the argument is based on the premise that someone
cannot be delivered to death by himself and by someone else at one and
the same time. In his response, Aquinas answers that Christ, insofar as
God, surrenders according to the same will as the Father delivers Him;
insofar as man, He su'rrenders according to a will inspired by the
Father.'"
By determining the proportion of the Father to the Son incarnate
with the help of the procedure of reduplicative statements, Aquinas
twice implicitly touches upon the involvement of the Spirit.
In the first place he does so, where the relation of the Father with
Christ secundum quod Deus is considered. Christ is said to deliver
Himself according to the same will and action as the Father delivers
Him. This identity can be accounted for, seeing that the oneness of the
divine nature cannot allow for separating the operations of different
Persons of the triune God (operatio sequitur naturam).'" When we
think of the distinction between the divine Persons by their origin, a
striking coincidence comes to the fore: the third Person, originating
STh ill 47.3.co! Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, Christus passus est
voluntarie ex obedientia Patris. Unde secundum tria Deus Pater tradidit Christum
passioni. Uno quidem modo, secundum quod sua aeterna volun!4te praeordinavit
passionem Christi ad humani generis liberationem, secundum illud quod dicitur Is 53,6:
"Dominus posuit in eo iniquitatem omnium nostrum"; et iterum, "Dominus wluit
conterere eum in infinnitate". Secundo, inquantum inspiravit ei 'Voluntatem patiendi pro
nobis, ;n/undendo ei caritatem. Unde ibidem sequitur, "Oblatus est, quia voluit". Tertio,
non protegendo eum a passione, sed exponendo persequentibus. Unde, ut legitur Mt 27,46,
pendens in cruce Christus dicebat: "Deus meus, ut quid dereliquisti
quia scilicet
potestati persequentium eum exposuit, ut Augustinus dicit.
tJa STh ill 47.3.ra2: Christus, secundum qwxl Deus, tradidit semetipsum in mortem eadem
voluntate et actione qua et Pater trdidit eum. Sed inquantum homo, trdidit seipsum
voluntate a Patr:e inspirata. Unde non est contrarietas in hoc quod Pater tradidit Chris
tum, et ipse tradidit semetipsum.
m Cf. In Joan 5.4 [Busa: 147]: nam non aliud vult Filius quam Pater: sicut enim est illis
una substantia, sic est illis una voiuntas,' For this reason, as was explained in chapter I,
p. 52, the procedure of appropriatio is applied: in order to do justice to both the
oneness of God and the mode of speaking of Holy Scripture.
n7
1)4
S10 ill 48.4.co: Oristus autem satisjecit, non quidem pecuniam danda aut aliquid
huiusmod~ sed dando id quod fuit maximum, seipsum, pro nobis. Behind this one.. can
hear the words of In 15,13: Mawretn hac dilectionem nemo habet ut animam suam
qu~ ponat pro amicis suis. The same thought is worked out in the corpus of the next
article (SIb m 48.5.co), Pretium autem redemptionis nostrae est s,tnSUinis amst~ vel
Vlta elUS corporalis, quae "est in sanguine" {Lv 17,11], quam ipse Christus exsolvit. Unde
~trumque
'mz.uantum est homo, sed ad totan: Trinitatem sicut ad causam primam et remotam,
erat et ipsa vita Christi skut prim; auctoris. et a qua impiratum foit ipsi homini
o,risto ut pateretur pro nobis.
~1h ill 47.1.co: Quia ergo anima Christi non repulit It proprio corpore nocumentum
iIlatum, sed wluit quod natura corporalis ilti nocumento succumberet, dicitur suam
animam posuisse, vel 'voluntarie mortuus esse.
5Th ill 47.2.ra3: eadem ratione ,Christus passus est ex caritate, et obedientia, quia et
praecepta caritatis nonnisi ex obedientia implevit,' et obet/iem foit ex dilectione ad
Patrem praecipientem.
CUUIS
1)5
1)6
mer
116
117
FOUNDATIONS
CHAPTER II
from the Father and the Son, is conceived as the Love between the
Father and the Son. This Love is none other than the Holy Spirit and
associated with God's will. Thus, the common will of the Father and
the Son can be none other than the third divine Person: the Holy
Spirit!'"
In the second place, where the relation of the Father with Christ
inquantum homo is considered, attention is drawn to the involvement of
the Spirit by words like inspirare, caritas and infondere. The language
used here is that of caritas as infused virtue being a participation in the
love of the Son and the Father and rendering the will to be in conformity with the divine will'''. Again the Spirit appears at the core of the
work of Christ, the latter now considered according to his human
nature.
'" In this reading I disagree with D. Wiederkehr, 1974, who holds the thesis that in
Aquinas' Christology the inner-Christological perspective of the two natures of
Christ overrules the relational trinitarian perspective in which the relations between
the Son and the Father are studied. Reading STh m 18.45 (among other places)
Wiederkehr observes a shift according to which the will of God is identified with
the will of Christ: "Es bleibt nicht mehr unbestimmt, wer der personale Trager auch
dieses gotdichen Willens ist: es ist die g1eiche Person Christi. Damit ist aber die
trinitarische Perspektive durch cine christologische abgeiOst worden." (p. 401). I do
not see how Aquinas could accept Wiederkehr's objections without ending up with a
threefold will in God.
H1 Cf. STh IT-IT 24.2.co: Unde caritas non potest neque natura/iter nobis inesse, neque per
vires naturales esse acquisita, sed per infosionem Spiritus sanct~ qui est arnoT Patris et
Filii, cuius participatio in nobis est ipsa caritas creata.
H2 The same running together of 'slides' can be found at the end of STh ill 1.2.co
where Thomas follows Anselm by sketching the reparatio-motif which is appropriate
for Christ secundum quod Deus, combined with the satisJacticrmotif which fits Him
secundum quod homo.
'" Cf. STh m 7.5.co: dona proprre sunt qUd<dam ptrfectiones potentiarum animae
secundum quod sunt natae moveri a Spiritu sancto. Manifestum est autem quod anima
Christi perfectissime a Spiritu sancto 11UYVebatur, and ra2: Christus non secundum idem
est recipiens et dans dona Spiritus sanct~ sed dat secundum quod Deus, et accipit
secundum quod homo.
" Cf. also J. Wissink, 1996, p. 247-253; Wissink states th.t by the death of Christ a
modification takes place in the missio of the Spirit: the Spirit receives the shape
("gestalte") of Christ, it becomes His Spirit (p. 250). It goes without saying that this
'modification' refers to the created history of humankind with God and leaves intact
God's immutabilitas.
HS A structure parallel to this can be found in STh m 23.2.ra3: fe/iatio adoptiva est
quaedam similitudo filiationis aeternae, sicut omnia quae in tempore facta sunt,
similitudines quaedam sunt eorum quae ab aeterno foerunt. AssimiJatur autem homo
splendori aeterni Filii per gratiae claritatem, quae attribuitur Spiritui sancto. Et ideo
adoptatio, licet sit communis toti Trinitat~ appropriatur tamen Patri ut auctori, Filio ut
exemplari, Spiritui sancto ut imprimenti in nobis huius similitudinem exemplaris.
H6 Considering Aquinas' account of the passion and death of Christ, caritas appears in
STh m 46.3.co; STh m 46.6.ra4; STh m 46.9.ra4; STh m 47.1.ra2; STh m 47.1.ra3;
STh m 47.3.co; STh m 47.3.ra3; STh m 47.4.ral; STh m 47.4.ra2; STh m 48.l.ag3;
STh m 48.1.ral; STh m 48.2.co; STh m 48.2.r.1; STh m 48.2.ra2; STh m 48.3.co;
STh m 48.3.r.1; STh m 48.3.ra3; STh -m 48.4.ra1; STh m 49.1.co; STh m 49.3.ra1;
STh m 49.4.ag2; STh m 49.4.ra3; STh m 49.5.co; STh m 49.6.ra2.
119
FOUNDATIONS
CHAPTER II
Garden of Eden.'" The inobedientia and mors gratiae of the first man
is answered by obedientia and caritas of the First Man. Again corporal
life and death are interpreted and dealt with within the larger
framework of the life of grace, but now in a new way. The punishment
of death is suffered in connection with the life of grace.'" Thus
corporal death, once a sign of the death of grace, is transformed from
punishment into sacrifice. The curse is transformed into an expression
of love for God!" This exemplary transformation, to which all men
are called, is performed by Christ. By this work of Him being God
and man - the perfect love of God, the centre of what life (in any sense)
is about, is effectuated and revealed in terms of flesh and blood. In
accordance with the human condition in materiality and time, this
perfect love has the shape of an historical event, perceivable by the
sensitive powers.
. _
By restoring the relationsh!~ ~etween ~u~ankmd .and God, Chnst
roots the reception of the SPirit m maten~l~ty and tim,: ..I:Ie effects a
new beginning of this relationship by provIdmg the possIbIlIty for each
human being to enter into it, taking. into ac::ount the freedo~ of the
human wiII and the human condmon wIth.m the c.oordmates. of
materiality and time. Thus Thomas speaks of thIS restoration by ChrIS.t,
as a restoration that has been achieved in causa: :he r~stora:lOn tn
individual human bemg, IS arrIved at
ef/ectu, with regard to feach
150
gradually, in the course 0 hIStory.
.
.
Within this procesS- of restoration, t~e other Ime of. thought,
according to which Christ's work is conceIved ~ exempium, IS also of
great interest. We now turn to this line of revelatIon.
118
H$
149
A Pauline line of thought which has been worked out in Patristic exegesis. Cf. e.g.
the parallel1ism of the tree and the cross in STh m 46.4.00 and other 'suitabilities' in
STh ill 46.4-11; Cf. also the three gardens (Eden-Gethsemane-Revdation) in: N. Lash,
1993, p. 121-124.
'My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?' Christ exclaims on the cross,
according to Mt 27,46. In Thomas' view this exclamation cannot refer to a
separation from God's grace. Cf. Aquinas' exposition of the verse in In Mat 27.2
[Busa: 597]: ideo cum dicit 'Deus mem, Deus meus' etc. manifestum est quod secundum
quod est homo, loquitur; ideo ingeminat, ut magnitudinem ajfectus human; designel. Et
quod dicitur 'Derelequisti me', dicitur per similitudinem, quia quod habemus, a Deo
habemus; untie sicut cum aliquis alicui malo exponiturl dicitur derelictusl sic quando
Dominus dereliquit hominem cadere in malum poenae vel culpael dicitUr dere/iclusl' ideo
Chrislus dicitur derelictus non quantum ad unioneml nec quantum ad gratiam. sed
quantum ad passionem. In STh ill 46.5-8 it is said that the passion of Christ secundum
quod homo is more comprehensive and intense than the suffering of other human
beings (viator-motil), whereas secundum quod Deus His rational soul enjoys the 'Visio
beata (comprehensor-motif). Aquinas' view is based on three considerations: (1)
Offering redemption for the malum culpae of humankind, it is suitable that Christ
suffers all malum poenae which is the result of Original Sin: bodily as well as spiritual suffering. (2) The perfection of Christ secundum quod homo makes His body and
soul more sensitive than those of other human beings. (3) The perfection of Christ
secundum quod Deus does not render His passion as human being less painful; Cf.
also Comp 71J I 231-232.
Cf. B. de Margerie, 1983, p. 403: "La mon a donc un sens radicalement different
chez celui qui a ~ (m~e avant l'usage de la raison, en etat d'enfance, par Ie
baptfune) et chez cdui qui n'a pas r"9lla gclce de la justification par Ie juste Jesus,
chez Ie premier, elle consUme un moyen de satisfaction coredemptrice; chez Ie
second, un signe de condamnation, - sans qu'on puisse jamais, de l'exterieur, lire
pareille signification puisque Dieu peut toujours accorder invisiblement une gclce
interne et efficace de conversion au dernier moment."
ISO
Thomas uses the image of Christ who has prepared a medicine waiting to be applied
so as to be effective: STh ill 49.!.ra3. G. Krding, 1979/1944, p. 294-305, argues that
Aquinas' manner of speaking in terms of :e:t~Ptio in
rtx!en;ptio ~n e/fect~ ~
more precise and less confusing than the diy,ision between ?bJ~ ~d subJect1ve
redemption which came into use in later ~es. I ~ WIth ~ op~u;'~' Because
this study is focused on vita I choose for 'restoration of a relauonship InStead of
cau:" :
151
'redemption'.
.
.
.. . .
.
ScG IV 55.20: licet hominis ad humilitatem tnJormart potue:rtnt dz'VtnlS sermombus
instructi ut decimaocta'iJ4 ratio proponebat tamen ad agendum magis pro'()ocant facta
quam v~ba et tanto efficacius facta 11UJ'Vt!nt, quanta certior opinio boni~~is ~abetur de
eo qui huiusmodi operatur. Unde, licet aliorum homin~ mufta humilttatts exempla
invenirentur) tamen expedientissimum foit ut adhuc homtnlS Del provocarentur exemp/o,
J
120
FOUNDATIONS
CHAPTER II
152
153
ts.
quem constat errare non potuisse; et cuius humilitas tanto est mirabilior quanta maiestas
sublimior.
ScG IV 54.6, quoted. above in footnote 95.
STh ill 46.3.co: Primo enim, per hoc homo cognoscit quantum Deus hominem diligat, et
per hoc prowcatur ad eum diligendum, in quo perfectio humanae sa/utis .consistit. Unde
Apostolus dicit, Rm 5,8-9: "Commendat suam caritatem Deus in nobis, quoniam, cum
inimici essemus, Christus pro nobis mortuus est. "
SIb m 46.3.co: Secunda, quia
hoc dedit nobis exemplum obedientiae. humilitatis,
constantiae, iustitiae et ceterarum virtuturn in passione Christi ostensarum, quae sunt
necessariae dd humanam salutem. Unde dicitur IP 2,21: "Christus passus est pro nobis,
nobis relinquens exemplum, ut sequamur vestigia eOO. It (Apart from these Thomas
gives three other reasons in this corpus). Again we see how with these_first two
reasons Thomas builds on the Secunda Pars: charity'being the essence of morailife,
and the other virtues as cornerstones of the Christian life inspired by charity; Cf.
also In Symb 4 (passus sub Pontio Pilato, etcJ where we encounter the double neces-
121
sity for the suffering of Christ: remedium contra peccata (effectuating) and exemplum
quantum ad agendum (revealing). [Busa: 166], Quicumque enim vult perfecte vivere,
nihil aliud faciat nisi quod conremnat quae Christus in cruce contempsit, et appetat quae
iSS
per
156
Christus appetiit. Nullum enim exemplum virtutis ahest a cruce. Consequendy Thomas
distinguishes a five-fold exemplarity in the suffering and death of Christ: exemplum
caritatis, patientiae, humilitatis, obedientiae et contemnendi terrena.
STh ill 46.4.co: Respondeo dicendum quod convenientissimum fuit Christum pati
mortem crucis. Primo quidem, propter exemplum virtutis. Dicit enim Augustinus, in
libra Octogintatrium quaest. [q. 25: PL 40,17J: "Saprentia Dei hominem, ad exemplum
quo Tecte viveremus, suscepit. Pertinet autetn ad vitam rectam ea quae non sunt metuenda, non metuere. Sunt autem homines qu~ quam-vis mortem ipsam non timeant, genus
tamen mortis horrescunt. Ut ergo nul/urn genus mortis Tecte viventi homini metuendum
esset, illius hominis cruce ostendendum foit, nJhil enim erat, inter omnia genera mortis,
illo genere execrabilius et fonnidabilius. This exemplum-character of the passion and
death of Christ can also be found in: STh III 1.2.co, STh III 14.l.co and STh III
46.3.00.
Cf. STh ill 46.5.co: secundum genus, passus est omnem passumem humanam. Quod
quidem potest considerari tripliciter. Uno modo, ex parte hominum... Alia modo patet
idem ex parte eorum in quibus homo potest pati... Tertio potest considerari quantum ad
corporis membra. ..
122
123
FOUNDATIONS
CHAPTER II
with the Word in the unio bypostatica and subsequently to all those who
are united with Christ.'"
As it was shown in the first section of this chapter, corporal life is
proportioned to spiritual life as materia to forma. Thus, the fact that
Christ is causa efficiens and causa exemplarn of corporal resurrectIOn
implies that He is the same for the resurrection of the soul. In order t?
clarify this, Aquinas uses a formula that has been Introduced before: It
stems from God that the soul lives by grace and that the body lives by
the soul. '60 This clarification is completed by referring to the character
of process which the restoration of corporal and spiritual life has: the
exemplary character of-Christ's resurrection of the soul implies that
Christians should grow towards conformity with Christ. This process of
conformity refers not only to the perfection of the human soul by
grace, but also to a conformity with the suffering and dying Christ in
this mortal life.'"
The exemplary character of Christ's resurrection functions in the
manner of a revelation of the destination of those who are united with
Christ. The members of Christ's body are informed about their
destination by what happens to the Caput Ecclesiae.'62 This 'information' has a special character: it has an impact on the moral conduct of
Christians. Not in the manner of displaying an exemplum of moral
conduct, but in the manner of indicating a perspective of life. The
resurrection of Christ is necessary as a commendation of divine justice, a
resurrection.1ss
We have seen that Aquinas speaks of corporal and spiritual life. Both
are involved in the restoration of Christ and the aspects of effectuation
and revelation can be distinguished with regard to both of them.
With regard to the restoration of corporal life the resurrection of
Christ is causa efficiens and causa exemplaris. Thomas explains this with
the help of the Aristotelian principle that what is first in a genus, is the
cause of what comes after. That Christ is the first who resurrected can
be understood from the union of human nature with divine nature. The
Word of God is the principle of human vivification: thus it is rational
that this vivification is first applied to the human body that was united
159
157
158
Word.
160
161
162
STh ill 56. Leo: principium humanae vivijicationis est Verbum De~ de quo dicitur in Ps
35,10: "Apud Te est Jons vitae", uOOe et ipse dicit, In 5,21: "Sicut Pater suscitat mortuos
et vivificat, sic et Filius quos vult vivificat." Habet autem hoc natura/is ordo rerum
divinitus institutus, ut quaelibet causa primo operetw in id quod est sim propinquius, et
per id operetur in alia magis remota... Et ideo Verbum Dei primo attribuit vitam
immortalem corpori sibi naturaliter unito, et per ipsum operatur resurrectionem in
omnibus aliis. Cf. also STb ill 56.!.ra3 and Comp Tb I 239.
STh ill 56.2.co: a Deo enim est quod anima vivit per gratiam, et quod corpus vivit per
animam; Cf. also Comp Tb I 239.
STh ill 56.2.co: Similiter autem habet rationem exemplt+ritatis respectu resurrectionis
animarum. Quia Christo resurgenti de~us. etiam secundum animam conJormari, "ut
sicut", secundum Apostolum [Rm 6,4], "Christus resurrexit a mortuis per gloriam Patris,
ita et nos in novitate vitae ambuJemus"; et sicut ipse resurgens ex mortuis iam non
montur, ita et nos existememus nos mortuos esse peccato, ut iterum vivamus cum illo.
J.~M. Dubois, 1983, p. 300-305, points to a development in Aquinas' work regarding
the unus homo-motif which is used in order to consider the connection of
humankind with the Original Sin of the first man. Parallel with this runs the
development of the Caput Ecciesiae-motif in Christology.
124
FOUNDATIONS
STh m 53.1.co: Respondeo dicendum quod necessarium foit Christum resurgere, propter
quinque. Primo quidem, ad commendationem divinae iustitiae, ad quam pertinet
exaJtare illos qui se propter Deum humiJiant... Secundo, ad rulei nostrae instructionem.
Quia per ems resilrrectwnem confirmata est fides nostra circa divinitatem Christi...
Tertio, ad sublevationem nostrae speL Quia. dum videmus Christum resurgere, qui est
caput nostrum, speramus et nos resurrecturos... Quarto, ad informationem vitae fidel;um... Quinto, ad complementum nostrae salutis...
16-4 STh ill 51.1.co: Secundo, quia per hoc quod Christus de se:pulcro resurrexit. datur spes
resurgendi per ipsum his qui sum in septdcro: secundum illud In 5,2528: "Onmes qui in
monumentis sunt, audient vocem Filii Dei. et qui audierim, vivent. "
'" STh ill 57.1.ra3: licet praesentia corporalis Christi fuerit subtracta fiddibus per
ascensionem, praesentia tamen divinitatis ipsius semper adest fide/ihus, secundum quod
ipse dicit, Mt 28,20.... Sed ipsa ascensio Christi in cael~ qua corporalem suam
praesentiam nobis subtraxit, magis foit utiJis nobis quam praesentia corporalis foisset.
Primo quidem, propter fidei augmentum, quae est de non visis... Secundo, ad spe
sublevationem... Per hoc enim quod Christus humanam naturam assumptam in cae/o
col/ocavit, dedit nobis spem iIluc perveniendi. .. Tertia, ad erigendum caritatis affectum in
caelestia... One easily recognizes the theological vinues - faith, hope and charity here by which the rdationship with God in grace is established.
163
CHAPTERll
125
restoration in causa of life with God. Christ gave new access to God
when He rooted the Spirit, God's vivificating power, in a new way in
the history of humankind. This act of salvation needs to be applied to
each individual Christian in the form of an internal restoration. By this
internal restoration the soul is restored with regard to life with God,
vita gratiae, waiting and hoping to be once united with God and be
restored with regard to corporal life.
With regard to the revealing aspect of Christ's restoration, three
things have been demonstrated. In the first place, we have shown that
according to His being (esse) Christ is a revelation of the incomprehensible God in the 'language' of human nature, thus indicating and revealing
how God works the life of grace iIi the human soul. In the second place,
we have examined how Christ is the way to God by giving the perfect
example of moral action through which human beings attain their
ultimate end and happiness. In the third place, it has been indicated how
the eschatological impact of what happened after the death of Christ has
its impact on the moral life of the Christian by raising the theological
virtue of hope.
With exception to the first aspect of revelation, all these lines will be
recurred to in the remainder of this study. Aquinas' eschatology is the
subject of chapter IV where the perfection of life with God is examined.
The theological virtue of hope is dealt with in chapter ill In that
chapter moral life, as the human 'way' to God, is focused on and the
passion and death of Christ emerge again as the eminence of moral
perfection.
.
"
.
As for the effectuating dimenSIOn - the restoration tn causa of bfe
with God - we have observed that this restoration needs to be applied to
each individual human being. That leads us to the last section of this
chapter.
3. The participation in the work of Christ through the sacraments
In accordance with the human condition - marked by the coordinates
of materiality and time - the restoration of the relationship with God in
grace is effectuated and revealed in an historical event. These same
coordinates, however, raise the question as to how the effect of the
work of Christ is received by each individual human being. The answer
to this question is the sacraments, which mediate between the work of
Christ in causa and the salvation of the individual human being in
126
FOUNDATIONS
-lII'
,~
CHAPTER II
127
'~
iii
:~~
effectu.
In this third section firstly the suitability of the sacraments as
mediation between the work of Christ and our life with God is
examined. It is shown that sharing in the fruits of the passion of Christ
is partial and part of a process in which the Christian is involved (3.1).
Subsequently, the double dimension of effectuation and revelation of the
sacraments is focused on, thus prolonging the two dimensions that were
discovered in the work of Christ as causa instrumentalis and exemplaris
(3.2). Finally, the place of the sacrament as foundation and framework
for the relationship with God is considered. This makes it possible to
study the conformities Aquinas notices between natural life and life of
grace effectuated by sacraments (3.3).
3.1 The partial sharing in the fruits of Christ's passion
Christ has liberated us from the punishments which have been
inflicted upon humankind after Original Sin and which culminate in
corporal death. Nevertheless people are still mortal and actually dying as
though nothing has changed. How does Thomas account for this?
According to Aquinas the passion and death of Christ is a sort of
universal cause of salvation which needs to be applied to every individual. '66 This application to individual human beings is realized through
the sacraments, for which every human being can choose freely. Thus, it
is understandable that the work of Christ does not change the condition
of every individual.
Nevertheless, even baptised Christians, sharing in the life of grace
effected by the sacraments, are not exempted from inescapable death.
How does Thomas deal with this observation? In his answer to this
question Aquinas refers again to the proportion between vita gratiae and
vita naturae. As we showed in the preceding sections of this chapter, the
rupture between God and man at the level of the life of grace (mors
gratiae) resulted in a rupture between the disgraced soul and its body
(mors corporalis), by which man was cast in a condition as opposed to
'"
Cf. S,G IV 55.28 (answer to the 26th obiectio): Mors enim Christi est quasi quae;l,un
universalis causa salutis: sicut peccatum primi hominis foit quasi universalis causa
damnationis. Oportet autem universalem causam app/ican ad unumquemque speciaJiter,
ut efJectum universalis causae percipiat. This line of thought is repeated when Thomas
inttOduces the sacraments. Cf. S,G IV 56, STh m 49.1.ra3+4, STh m 49.3.ral3, STh
m 52.1.ra2.
:~,
!Ii his original destination. The passion and death of Christ brought about
the restoration of vita gratiae by a renewed communication of the
Spirit. Thus the core of human life was restored, and man was
reinstalled in the context of his original destination of life with God.
With regard to this restoration, however, Thomas distinguishes between
culpa and poena. Thus he is able to account for the fact that the spiritual
restoration remains hidden for what concerns the corporal life of man.
Aquinas follows the tradition of the Church, according to which the
satisfaction of Christ has removed the guilt of Original Sin, in accordance with the order of justice, whereas the punishment remains
intact. l67 We will take 'a closer look at. this thought in order to get a
better understanding of the role of the sacraments in the Christian
attitude towards life and death.
Thomas acknowledges that it is hard to understand why the punishments for Original Sin remain intact after the passion of Christ.''' The
fact that Christ's restoration in causa is not immediately followed by an
abolishment of all the effects of Original Sin is to be ascribed to divine
ordination.''' As in the case of the motivum incarnationis one can
only try to elucidate the suitability (convenientia) of this ordination. The
arguments that Thomas puts forward show the same pattern we
discovered in 1.3 of this chapter where we dealt with the interpretation
of malum naturae as effect of Original Sin: everything is considered as
pointing at and contributing to the relationship with God.
In ScG IV 55 Thomas gives three reasons of suitability for the fact
that the punishments continue after the work of Christ. The first reason
is that in this way there is a conformity between the faithful (membra)
and Christ (Caput Ecclesiae). Christ reached the glory of immortality
Stricdy speaking for those who are baptised the discomforts that remain are not
poenae, but poenaiitates. Cf. B. de Margerie, 1983, p. 402-404.
168
Cf. ScG IV 53.26 (25th argumentum): Si Christus pro peccatis humani generis
sufficienter satisfecitl iniustum videtur esse quod homines adhuc poenas patiantur, quas
pro pcccato Scriptura divina inductas esse commemoratj Aquinas deals with this issue
in: In 11 Sent 44.2.2.ra2+3j In m Sent, 19.3.2j In IV Sent 4.2.1.1; In IV Sent
46.2.2a.ra3; S,G IV 55; STh I-II 85.5.ra2; STh III 87.7.ral; STh m 49.3.ra3; STh m
52.5.ra2; STh m 69.3; STh m 69.7.ra3; De malo 4.6.ra4; QtrodI6.9.1.
STh m 56.1.ral: resurrectio Christi causa est nostrae resurrectionis per virtutem Verbi
uniti. Quod quidem operatur secundum voluntatem. Et ideo non oportet quod statim
sequatur ejfectus. sed secundum dispositicnem Verbi De~ ut scilicet primo con/ormemur
Christo patienti et morienti in hac vita passibili et mortal~ deinde perveniamus ad
participandum similitudinem resurrectionis [Rm 6,5}.
169
128
129
FOUNDATIONS
CHAPTER II
incorruptibility: many would enter the Church for the sake of these
corporal benefits, whereas Christ's precise intention was to transfer
people's love for corporal matters to that of spiritual affairs,v'
According to this pedagogical argument, closely connected with the
revealing aspect of Christ's work, the access to glory by imitation. of the
passion of Christ forces one to focus on the proportion between corporal and spiritual affairs and to acknowledge that the core of this sharing
in Christ's glory lies in its spiritual side. Corporal incorruptibility
without sharing in the relationship with God in grace is a horrible
perspective and in fact, as will be shown in chapter N, a definition of
hell.
'
The third argument, continuing the line of reasoning of the second,
is based on the importance of human freedom. If those who come to
Christ would be immortal immediately, people would, in a way, be
compelled to accept faith in Christ and its merit would be diminished. v, By its insistence on human freedom the argument is closely
connected with the specific human mode of being: life as self-movement.
Man is designed to move freely - with the help of God's grace - towards
his final destination, the knowledge and love of God. In this free love
for God the glory of God is manifested and the effectuating and
revealing work of Christ is exactly proportioned to the integrity of this
freedom.v'
Apart from these arguments in the Summa contra Gentiles, in various
texts Aquinas adopts a fourth argument in which we recognize a motif
mentioned earlier in this chapter (1.3, p. 94), where the impact of
Original Sin on the appreciation of evil in the world was examined. The
SeC N 55.27: Quamvu autem Christus pro peccato originali sua mone sufficienter
satisfocerit, non est tamen inconveniens quod poenalitates ex peccato originali
consequentes remaneant adhuc in omnibus qui eliam redemptionis Christi participes
jiunt, ut vigesimaquinta ratio procedebat. Hoc enim congruenter et utiliter factum est ut
poena remaneret, etiam culpa sublata, Primo quidem, ut esset con/onnitas fidelium ad
Christum, SicUl membrorum ad caput. Untie, skU: Christus prius multas passiones sustinuit, et sic ad immortalitatis gloriam pervenit,' sic decuit ut [tdeles eOO prius passionibus
subiacerent, et sic ad immortalitatem pervenerint, quasi portantes in seipsis insignia
passionibus Christ~ ut simiJitudinem gloriae eius consequerentur; skut Apostalus, Rm
8,17, dicit. Cf. also 5Tb ill 49.3.ra3.
'" Which explains why they fed no pity for the misery of the damned, this would not
be compatible with the perfection of their beatitude, d. e.g. Comp Tb I 232; We will
return to this in chapter IV, 2.2.2, p. 242.
'" Cf. 5Tb I-II 27.3.sc where Si 13,19 is quoted, Omne animal diligi' simile sibi. In his
Ethica Nico1l14Cheia (VIII.I, 1155b67) Aristotle mentions the same thought and
attributes it to Empedocles.
VJ Cf. 5cG IV 22.
170
V4
17.5
176
transforret.
SeG IV 55.27: Tertio quia,-si accedentes ad Christum statim impassibiles et immorta/es
130
FOUNDATIONS
:I
,)
177
178
v,
180
Cf. STh ill 69.3.co: Secundo, hoc est conveniens propter spirituale exercitium, ut
videlicet contra concupiscentiam et alias passibiJitates pugnans homo victoriae coronam
acciperet... ; Cf. also In IV Sent 4.2.1.3.co: Sed per gratiam baptismalem efficitur ut hae
poenae remanentes non dominentur in personam, sed magis ei subiiciantur, et in
utilitatem ipsius cedant, inquantum sunt materia virtutis, et occasio humiJitatis et
exercitii.
SeC N 56.2: Est autem ta/is hominis conditio quod ad spiritualia et intelJigibilia
capienda natura/iter per sensibilia deducitur. Oportuit igitur spiritualia remedia
hominibus sub signis sensibilibus dari. Cf. also S1b III 60.4 and S1b III 61.1.
Cf. E. Schillebeeckx (1959, p. 50) who considers sacraments as encounters C"ontmoetingen") with Christ.
5Th
m 60.2.00.
CHAPTERll
131
1&1
1U
18)
5Th ill 62.1..ral: Et secundum hoc, sacramenta novae legis simul sunt causa et signa. Et
inde est quod, sicut communiter dicitur, "efficiunt quod figurant".
ScG N 56.2! instrUmenta oportet esse primae causae proportionata. Prima autem et
universalis causa humanae salutis est Verbum incamatum, ut ex praemissis apparet.
Congruum igitur foit ut remedia quibus universalis causae virtus pertingit ad homines,
iilius causae similitudinem haberent: ut scilicet in eis virtus divina invisibiliter
operaretur sub visibilibus signis; H. Schoot (1993, p. 28.35) aIgUes that the analogy
between the sacrament and the union of divine and human nature in Christ should
be seen within the framework of Aquinas' theology of nexus mysterwrum.
STh III 62.1; Cf. also 5Th ill 62.5.co: Sacramentum operatur ad gratiam causandum
per modum instrumenti. Est autem duplex instrumentum, unum quidem separatum, ut
baaJus; aliud autem coniunctum, ut manus. Per instrumentum autem conciunctum
movetur instrumentum separatum, fieut baculus per manum. Principalis autem causa
efficiens gratiae est ipse Deus, ad quem comparatur humanitas Christi sicut. instrumentum coniunctum, sacramentum autem sicut instrumentum separatum. Et ideo oportet
quod virtus salutifera derivetur a divinitate Christi per eius humanitatem in iifa
sacramenta. The development in Aquinas' use of the concept of instrumentum Wlth
regard to Christ (cf. above, footnote 117) resulted in a development in his apprecia
tion of instrumental causality of the sacraments. Cf. L.M. Chauvet, 1994, p. 103105.
133
FOUNDATIONS
CHAPTER II
refers to the ultimate end of our life: vita aeterna. 18' Thus, by the
sacraments earthly life of man is placed in a new context in a double
way. On the cognitive side (verum: the Son) man is given the
orientation of the history of life with God; a history in which
foundations are established. for one's own growth in grace towards the
perfect union with God which is revealed as perspective. Simultaneously
with the revelation of this new context, man is effectively placed within
it (bonum: the Holy Spirit, originating from the Father and the Son). Sacraments effect the life of grace: the beginning of eternal life, founded
on the passion of Christ. This central significance of the sacraments for
earthly human life is brought to the fore by Thomas in his considerati
ons of the isomorphy between vita naturae and vita gratiae.
132
Dealing with
Church, in most
natural life and
perfection of the
18-1
m 60.3.co. The reader may recognize a similarity with the structure of this
study: signum rememorativutn (foundations, ch. ll), signum demonstrativum
(dynamism ch. Dl) and signum prognosticum (perfection, ch. IV).
sTh
may be connected with Thomas' predilection for the Gospel. of Saint John and Ps.D~onysius' De divinis nominibus in which vita is explicidy used for the relationship
With God. Cf. also M. Grabmann, 1922, p. 75-78; I am not sure whether this consi-
deration of the sacraments against the' background of the parallellism between 'Vita
naturae and vita gratiae is an invention of Aquinas himself. It is, however, at least a
choice of his which is significative and fitting from the perspective of the remainder
of his theology. Moreover, in most secondary literature, this division is presented as
the position of Aquinas (cf. J. Finkenzeller, 1967).
STh m 65.1.00: Vita enim spiritualis conformitatem aliquam habet ad vitam corpora
lem, sicut et cetera corporalia similitudinem quandam spiritualium habent. In vita
autem corporali dupliciter aliquis perfteitur, uno modo, quantum ad personam propriam;
alio modo, per respectum ad totam communitatem societatis in qua 'Vivit, quia hom~
natura/iter est animal sociate. Respectu autem sui ipsius perficitur homo in 'Vita corporalt
dupliciter, urw modo, per se, acquirendo scilicet aliquam 'Vitae perjectionem,' 'alio modo,
per accidens, scilicet. removendo impedimenta vitae, puta aegritudines, 'Vel aliquid
huiusmodi. Per se autem perficitur corporalis vita tripliciter. Primo quidem, per
generationem, per quam homo incipit esse et 'Vivere. Et loco hums in spirituali 'Vita est
baptismNs, qui est spiritualis regeneratio, secundum illud Tt 3,5: "Per /a'Vacrum
regenerationis, etc." Secundo, per augmentum, quo aliquis perducitur ad perfectam
quantitatem et virtutem. Et loco huius in spirituali vita est confirmatio, in qua datur
Spiritus sanctus ad robur. Unde dicitur discipulis iam baptizatis, Lk 24,49, "Sedete in
ci'Vitate, quousque induamini 'Virtute ex alto. " Tertio, per nutritionem, qua conservatur
in homine vita et vireus. Et loco huius in spirituali 'Vita est eucharistia. Unde dicitur In
6,54: "Nisi manducaveritis carnem Filii hominis, et biberitis eius sanguinem non
habebitis -vitam in vobis." Et hoc quidem sufficeret homini si haberet et corporaliter et
spiritualiter impassibilem 'Vitam, sed quia. homo incurrit interdum et corporalem
infirmitatem et spiritualem, scilicet peccatum, ideo rrecessaria. est homini curatio ab
infirmitate. Quae quidem est duplex. Una quidem est sanatio, quae sanitatem restituit.
Et loco huius in spirituali 'Vita est poenitentia, secundum illuti Ps 40,5: "Sana animam
meam, quia. peccavi tibi". Alia. autem est restitutio 'Valetutiinis pristinae per co~venien
tern diaetam et exercitium. Et loco hums in spirituali vita est extrema ImdW, quae
removet peccatorum reliquias, et hominum. paratum reddit ad finalem gloria.m. Unde
dicitur Jm 5,15: "Et si in peccatis sit, dimittentur ei. " Perficitur autem homo in ordin~
totam communitatem dupliciter. Uno modo, per hoc quod aceipit potestatem regendt
multitudinem, et exercendi actus pub/icos. Et loco hums in spirituali 'Vita est
SdCTamentum ordinis, secundum illud Heb 7, quod sacerdotes hostias offerunt non solum
pro se, sed etiam pro populo. Secunda, quantum ad naturalem propagationem. Quod fit
per matrimonium, tam in corporali quam in spirituali vita, eo quod est non solum
sacramentum, sed naturae officium. [Bold by C.L.]
134
135
FOUNDATIONS
CHAFTERII
189
181
Cf. 5Th ill 65.3.co: Respondeo dicendum quod. simpliciter [oquendo, sacramentum
eucharistiae est potissimum inter alia sacramenta. Quod quidem triplkiter apparet...
Alrorum autem sacramentorum comparatio ad invicem potest esse multipliciter. Nam in
via necessitatisi baptismus est potissimum sacramentorum; in via autem perfection is,
190
188
192
Cf. F. de Grijs, 1996[a], p. 279: "That communion with God, however, is so real
that entire life is transformed by it. In the sacrament of baptism really a different
histoIY is joined and the old one is even forsworn, it is renounced. By the
connection with Christ, each baptised getS. a new biography, .in which, from day to
day, he is asked to tum and convert to the calling God." [T11lllSiation: C.L.]
In Joan 3.1 [Busa: 427]: Secundo propter humanam cognitionem ... Naturalis autem
modus huius cognitionis est ut spiritualia per sensibilia cognoscat, cum omnis nostra
cognitio a sensu incipiat. Oportuit ergo ad hoc quod intelligamus id quod spirituale est in
hac regeneratione, quod esset in ea aliquid sensibile et materiale, scilicet aqua: per quod
intelligamus quod sicut aqua lavat et purgat corporaliter exterius, ita et per baptismum
homo lavatur et purgatur interius spiritualiter.
136
137
CHAFTERII
FOUNDATIONS
Spirit towards fides, caritas and repentance. for sins. ." .Baptismus
sanguinis is the best of these three: her: the passlOn of Christ IS brou~ht
about by an imitation of operations mstead of a figural representatIOn
~ (baptismus aquae) or a desire (baptismus flaminis vel P?enitentiae):
nowherecaritas is effected and revealed more ardently than m one who
.~. lays down his (corporal) life f~r hi~ friends. 195 Thu~, the Baptism of
Z Bl.ood shows, in a paradox, the mfimte value of the hfe of grace above
. that of natural life: the regeneration by the Spirit is accomplished by the
loss of corporal life.'''
I'
STh ill 66.11.co: Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut supra dictum est, baptismus aquae
efficaciam habet a passione Christi, cui aliquis configuratur per baptim1:um; et ulterius,
sicut a prima causa, a Spiritu sancto. Licet autem effietus ~ependeat a prmz'! causa, causa
tamen superexcedit efJectum. nee dependet ab effectu. ~t ideo, rr.ae. ter. baptmnum tUJ.uae,.
potest aliquis consequi sacramenti efJectum ex passtone ChnstJ, mquantum qU.lS. et
conformatur pro Christo patiendo... Eadem etiam ratione aliquis per virt~tem ~ptyttus
saneti consequitur effectum baptismi, 'non solum sine baptismo aquae, sed etram sine bapad
tismo sanguinis, inquantum scilicet alicuius cor per Spiritum sanctum
credendum et diligendum Deum, et poenitendum de peccatis; unde ethtm dmtur
baptismus poenitentiae.
.
. .
..
us STh m 66.12.00: Baptismus autem aquae ejJzcaciam habet a p~zone ~lStt et a SPt;ttu
sancto, ut dictum est. Quae quidem duae causae operantur tn quolzbet horum trtum
baptismatum, excellentissime autem in baptismo sanguinis. Nam pas:io Chr~ti oper~tur
quidem in baptismo aquae per quandam, figura/em repraesentatronem; tn bapttsmO
autem flaminis vel poenitentiae per quandam affectionem; sed in baptismo s~nguin~ per
imitationem operis. Similiter etiam virtUS Spiritus saneti operatui... In bapttsmO
sanguinis per potissimum dilectionis et affec~ionis jervorem, secu~um ilI~ In. 1:,13:
"Maiorem hac dilectionem nemo habet, ut anunam suam ponat qulS pro amtcts SUIS.
196 Cf. chapter m, 2.4-, p. 176 where martyrdom is studied as the perfection of moral
114
n:ovetw:.
193
In Joan 3.1 [Busa 443]: Tertio propter causae congruitatem: nam causa nostrae
regenerationis est verbum incarnatum. Supra In 1,12: "Dedit eis potestatem filiDS Dei
fieri." Congruit e1'Xo quod in sacramentis, quae efficaciam habent ex virtute Verbi
incarnati, sit aliquid correspondens Verbo, et aliquid correspondens carni, seu corpori. Et
hoc
spiritualiter aqua in sacramento baptismi, ut scilicet per earn configuramu:r morti
Chrzm, dum submergimur in ea, quando baptizamur, sicut Christus tribus diebus foit in
ventre ,terra,!: Rrr: 6,4: "Consepulti enim sumus cum ilIo per baptismum." Hoc etiam
mystenum tn puna rerum productione signatum est, Gn 1, quando Spiritus Domini
Jerebatur super aquas. Sed per tactum mundissimae carnis Christi maior virtus collata est
aqu~: quia in prineipio producebant aquae reptile animae viventis; sed ex quo aristus
baptlZatus est in Iordane, animas spirituales aqua reddit.
:st,
1'7
life.
s10
m 73.1.co.
138
FOUNDATIONS
I
f;
c"
.rum
;,
ill " - - . . : :
meant when Christ is called the Bread of Life and what is at stake when
the Eucharist is considered as spiritual food. Receiving the Sacrament of
the Eucharist, the union with Christ is intensified. R~c~iving t?e
consecrated bread and wine, one receives Christ. Recelvmg Christ
means: being transformed into Him with regard to the capacities by
which life with God in grace takes place.''' This transformation has
the character of intellect and will, receiving new forms: the theological
virtues of caritas and fides which are, as we have seen, participations in
the life of God attributed to the working of the Holy Spirit. Thus the
Eucharist contributes to the growth of the Christian towards a greater
conformity with Christ, who secundum quod Deus is the Life of God.
This union with Christ, by the theological virtue of fides, emerges as the
beginning of vita aeterna.
Studying Aquinas' account. of Baptis~. and Eu~haris~ we. begin t?
understand how, in Thomas' View, the spiritual relatIOnship With God IS
cultivated with the help of corporal events which are familiar to man.
Church: Sic ergo spiritualiter manducat' carnem et bibit sanguinem per compar~tionem
l?B
5Th ill 73.4.co: Respondeo dicendum quod hoc sacramentum habet triplkern
ad Christum contentum et signatum, qui coniungitur ei per fidem et caritatem, lta quod
signiflCationern. Unam quidem respectu praeteriti: inquantum scilicet est commemorativum Dominicae passionis, quae foit verum sacrificium, ut supra [STb m, 48.3]
dictum est. Et secundum hoc nominatur 'sacrificium'. Aliam significationem habet
respectu rei praesentis, scilicet ecclesiastiae unitatis. cui homines congregantur per hoc
sacramentum. Et secundum hoc nominatur 'communio' 'Vel 'synaxis... Tertiam
significationem habet respectu futur~
praefigurativum fruitionis Dei, quae erit in patria. Et secundum hoc dicitur ''Viaticum~
quia hoc praebet nobis viam illue perueniendi. Et secundum hoc etiam dicitur
1?9
2.00
'Eucharistia~ idest 'bona gratia': quia "gratia Dei est 'Vita aeterna", ut dicitur Rm 6,23;
vel quia realiter continet Christum, qui est "plenus gratia" Un 1,14},
I am indebted here to the penetrating reading of Aquinas' In Joan 6 in: M. Corbin,
1980, p. 161209.
In Joan 6.3 [Busa: 158]: Unde sciendum est circa hoc, quod corporalia sunt quaedam
similitudines spiritualium, utpote ab eis causata et deri'Vata, et ideo imitantuT ipsa
spiritualia aliquo modo. Unde sicut corpus sustentatur dbo, ita iilud quo sustentatUT
spiritus, dicitur eius cibus, quidquid sit illud. Illud autem quo sustentatur corpus, cum
transeat in corporis naturam, corruptibiie est; sed cihus quo sustentatur spiritus est
incorruptibilis, quia non mutatur in ipsum spiritum, sed potius e converso spiritus in
cibum. Unde dictum est, Augustini: "cihus sum grandium. cresce et manducabis me. Nec
tu me mutaberis in te, ut cibum carnis tuae, sed mutaberis in me", ut dicitur VII Jib.
Con/essionum 10 [PL 32,742). Cf. also In Joan 6.7 [Busa: 186) where the thought is
worked out with regard to the mystical body of Christ, the community of the
2.01
transformatur in ipsum, et ejfICitur eOO merr:~: non enim cihus. iste c~n~itur. in
eum qui sumit, sed manducantem con'Verttt zn se... [Busa 2141 Ule qUt sptrttualtter
manducat et bibit, fit particeps Spiritus sanct~ per quem unimur Christo unio.ne Julei et
ca~itatis, et per quem efficimur membra EccJesiae. The same thought (refernng t~ ~e
same text of Augustine) can be found in S7b m 73.ha2; The reversal IS In
accordance with Aquinas' teaching of the asymmetrical relation between Creator and
creature: by consuming the body of Christ not God is changed, but the human
being who receives the sacrament (Cf.. c:hapte~ I, footnote 15~ on p. 64).
In Joan 6.6 [Busa: 24]: Panis autem vwificat tnquantum sumltur. Constat autem quod
qui credit in Christum, sumit eum intra seipsum, secundum illud Ep 3,17: "habitare
christum per fidem in cordibus nostris." Si ergo Ule qui credit in Christum habet vitam,
manifestum est quod manducando hun~ panerr: vivificatu:: .ergo ist; panis ~t. panis 'Vitae.
Et hoc est quod dicit: "Amen, amen dleo vobis, qUI cred,t In me... ,.(ide sciJt~et fo.rmata,
quae non solum perficit intelJectum, sed etWr; affec.tum (non em": tend~tur tn.
creditam nisi ametur) "habet 'Vitam aeternam. Chr~tus autem est zn nobrs duplzezter:
scilicet in intellectu per fidem, inquantum Jules est: et in affectu per cari~tem, quae.
informat fidem: lJn 4,16 "Qui manet in caritate, in Deo. manet, et ~eu: In eo." QU'.
ergo credit sic in Christum ut in eum tendat, ~~bet Ipsum In ~ffect~ et '~ tntellect~: e~ Sl
addamus, quod Christus est vita aetern:z, ut dICltu: lJn 5,20: Ut smu:; t~ 'Vero fil,O em;
lesu Christo: hie est Veru5 Deus et 'Olta aeterna ; et supra Jn 1,4: In 'pso Vtta erat )
possumus inferre, quod quicumque credit in Christum, habet vitam aeternam. Habet,
inquatl; in causa et in spe, quandoque habiturus in reo
r:m
.,
140
FOUNDATIONS
Thus the relationship with God has the form of a familiaris conversatio.
Baptism and Eucharist are only two of seven sacraments by which life
of grace is bestowed on human beings. Each of the other five sacraments
has its own special contribution to Christian life.''' Together they
constitute the foundation and framework of life with God in a manner
which is suitable for creatures whose mode of being is determined by
the coordinates of materiality and time. They are the foundation of life
with God since they establish (repair, promote) and reveal the life of
grace in the human soul. They are the framework of this life as they
effectuate and reveal - with regard. to different aspects of life - that the
life of each individual is connected with the restoration of Christ
(signum rememorativum), the life of God f2ignum demonstrativum) and
the perspective of eternal life (signum prognosticum).
Gratia supponit naturarn et perficit earn: by the sacraments natural life
is perfected with regard to its relationship with God, and it is revealed
how natural life is directed at life with the incomprehensible God.
Asking for the relation between life on earth (vita naturae) and 'life'
after death (vita aeterna) - which is the central question of this study,
the role of the sacraments can be determined as embodying the
cultivation of vita gratiae, the middle between natural and eternal life.
Being a mediation, however, entails being part of a larger whole. As
foundation and framework of life with God, and having conformity
with natural life, the sacraments are fitting for functioning in a process
of development and growth, which human life ultimately is. The
foundations, framework and coordinates of this process have been
sketched in this second chapter. We have shown how natural life and
death receive their Christian meaning within the history of the relationship between God and man (i), how the life, death and resurrection
of Christ have an impact on the Christian meaning of life and death (2)
and how the sacraments mediate between Christ and Christian (3). The
next chapters will be focused on life on earth (chapter III) and 'life' after
death (chapter IV), from the perspective of the foundations sketched in
this chapter. Thus, after having examined the two terms of the question,
we will be able to deal with the relation between the two in chapter V
and obtain an answer to the initial question.
201
CHAPTERID
STh I 1.4.co: Untie licet in scientiis philosophicis alia sit speculativa et alia practica, sacra
tamen doctrina comprehendit sub se utramq~ej Thomas lived and worked long before
dogmatics and moral theology developed. into two separated sciences. Therefore,
speaking of the 'moral theology' of Aquinas one must be cautious so as to avoid an
anachronistic interpretation of the term. In the Secunda Pars of the Summa Theologi.
at Thomas concentrates on God (the formal subject of theology) insofar as He
works in human actions, leading human beings towards Himself. In the following
sections the word 'moral theology' is put in quotation marks as a reminder of this
historical shift; Cf. D. Eickelschulte, 1963, p. 172-173; R. Guindon, 1956, p. 269-278_
142
DYNAMISM
with human actions as they take place within the moral order.
Following Aristotle, Thomas considers speculative science to be unfit
for dealing with human actions: in order to determine the good to be
done one needs practical science.' Since practical knowledge differs
from speculative with regard to its nature and mode of procedure, this
section is opened by presenting basic observations concerning the
difference between the two (1.1). Next attention is focused on the
incomprehensible God, who is the subject of theology and who is
presented in the moral order as finis ultimus humanae vitae (1.2). Finally
Aquinas' account of the virtues is introduced and it is shown how the
incomprehensible God works as a transforming power through human
action (1.3).
In In I Eth 1 Thomas deals with the division of the sciences and the special nature of
mora/is philosoph.,. Cf. the classical study of W. K1uxen, 1964, p. 21107. On
Aquinas' division of the sciences in general, cf. M. Jordan, 1986[.].
Until now a distinction has been made between the natural order and the order of
grace. Following Aquinas' division in genus naturae and genus moris (or the ordo
iustitiae), a new distinction is introduced. distinguishing the natural from the moral
order. The first distinction, between nature and grace, is more basic and can be used
with regard to both genus moris and genus naturae.
CHAPTERll
143
The distinction between the natural and the moral order is so basic
that it is easily overlooked. The importance of the distinction, however,
emerges when one realizes that two actions which are identical
according to the natural order, can be opposed with respect to their
evaluation ilccording to the moral order. Aquinas gives the example of
the killing ofa human being which can be justified when it is performed
in defense of justice, whereas it is a sin when it is done out of anger. 5
Elsewhere he makes clear that the marital act, which is a duty towards
one's own spouse, is a sin when it is enjoyed with the spouse of one's
neighbour.
Goodness in the moral order is dependent on four elements: the
perfotlnance of the action considered at the pre-moral level (actiO), the
chosen end !finis), the object which is involved (obiectum) and the
circumstances that are an hand (circumstantiae).' An action which is
morally good demands that all four kinds of goodness are present.'
Because of the immense variability of these four factors, it is impossible
to map out all variations that can possibly OCcur in human life. One can
formulate some general rules or maxims but what is really indispensable
" STh I-ll 1.1.co: Differt autem homo ab aliis irrationalibus creaturis in hoc. quod est
suorum actuum dominus. Unde iI/ae so/ae actiones 'VOcantur proprie humanae, quarum
homo est dominus. Est autem homo dominus suorum actuum per rationem et
vo/untaten:, unde et liberum arbitrium esse dicitur focultas voluntatis et rationis. lllae
ergo actiones proprie humanae dicuntur, quae ex voluntate deli'berata procedunt. Si quae
autem aliae actiones homini conveniant, possunt did quidem hominis actiones; sed non
proprie humanae, cum non sit hominis inquantum est homo.
S
STb I-IT 13.ra3: Possibile
est quod unus tus secundum speciem naturae,
ordinetur ad diversos fines voIuntatis, sicut hoc ipsum quod est occidere hominem, quod
est idem secundum speciem naturae, potest ordinari sicut in flnem ad conservationem
iustitiae, et ad satisfaciendum irae. Et ex hoc erunt diversi actus secundum speciem moris,
quia uno modo erit actus virtutis. alia modo erit actus vitii. Non enim motus recipit
speciem ab eo quod est terminus per accidens. sed solum ab eo quod est terminus per se.
Fines autem morales accit/unt rei naturali; et e converso ratio naturalis finis accidit
nwrali. Et ideo nihil prohibet actUS qui sunt iidem secundum speciem naturae, esse
diversos secundum speciem moris, et e converso.
Cf. STh I-ll 18.1-4, where the four elements are introduced.
7
STh Ill 18.4.ra3: nihil prohibet actioni habenti u114m praedictarum bonitatum, deesse
aliam. Et secundum hoc, contingit actionem quae est bona secundum speciem suam vel
secundum circumstantias. ordinari ad /inem malum, et e converso. Non tamen est actio
bona simp/iciter, nisi omnes bonitates" concurrant, quia "quilibet singularis defectus
causat malum, bonum autem causatur ex integra causa" ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. De
divinis nominibus.
tamen
DYNAMISM
CHAPTERll
God. Since they both structure the different goods which play .a role in
moral life, both orders are relevant for moral life. Both point to God as
highest good and ultimate end. How then does the incomprehensible
Gad function as summum bonum and finis ultimus in moral life? How
does this relate to what we studied in the preceding chapters?
144
5Th I-II 6.prol: Sed quia operationes et actus circa singularia sunt, ideo omnis operativa
scientia in particulari consideratione perficitur; 5Th II-II prol: sermones enim morales
universales sunt minus utiles, eo quod actiones in particularibus sunt; In this study
attention is focused on the manner in which life and death are related to the life
with God. When moral affairs are discussed in this chapter, the main objective is not
to provide criteria for moral action but to give insight into the theological considerations OJ}. which Aquinas' viewpoints on moral matters of life and death are based.
One could say that we focus on the speculative aspects of practical science.
, STh I-II 18.6.co.
" Cf. J. Aertsen, 1993, p. 75-89.
145
When these ends are considered within the larger framework of one's
life, they appear to be functioning as a means (ad finem) towards a
greater end. This dynamism is crowned by one final end of human life
ljinis ultimus humanae vitae) by which all human actions are set iri
motion. Considered in connection with the intellectual faculties of man,
this final'end must be an end by which the potentiality of intellect and
will is fulfilled. Thus Thomas arrives at the identification of the ultimate
end of man with the highest good (summum bonum) and the first truth
(primum verum). This, of course, is none other than God.
In the first chapter of this study we demonstrated how Aquinas uses
the formula causa prima et finis ultimus in order to determine God's
relation with creation. The formula is used not only to make a
distinction between God and creation but also, at one and the same
time, to connect them. God is distinguished from creation in a way
which differs from the way creatures are distinguished from each other:
God differs differently. As a consequence, when Gad is regarded as finis
ultimus He ,is not considered as just an end among other ends. The
ultimate end and the proximate (created) ends are in the proportion of
the highest good (which is good in itself) to the created goods (which
are good by participation). In other words: all created ends are attractive
because of their relation to the ultimate end. This entails that the
ultimate end has a certain inevitability: whichever end a human being
strives for,this very striving is only possible because of the goodness of
created ends, which partiCipates in the goodness of the ultimate end.
How then, does this ultimate end, which is God, play its major role
147
DYNAMISM
CHAPTER ill
146
"
"
"
17
15
18
19
Cf. STh I 73.1.co: Ultima autem perfectio, quae est finis totius universi, est perfecta
beatitudo sanctorum; quae erit in ultimo consummatione saeculi.
149
DYNAMISM
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and will." Thus Thomas states that man can be considered as image of
God, again, insofar as he is - with the help of God's grace - actually
knowing and loving God."
Life of grace is open towards perfection by life of glory. This
perfection is'regarded as the ultimate end of man, or man's happiness."
Thus by the fact that man actually reaches eternal felicitas or beatitudo,
once again man appears as image of God." God's perfect knowledge
and love can be called his 'beatitude', since the word beatitudo refers to
nothing else than the perfect good of an intellectual nature. 27 The
beatitude of man, his happiness, is nothing else than sharing in this
eternal life of God."
Thus we see that - though gratuitdus - the ultimate end of man, his
happineis or beatitudo is to share in God's life (by knowing and
willing). This sharing has to be effected through a process within the
coordinates of materiality and time. In order to show how this is
realized through singular human actions, we will introduce the central
element in Aquinas' consideration of moral action and life of grace:
148
virtue.
23
25
26
21
STh I~II prol: Quia, sicut Damascenus dicit, homo Jactus ad imaginem Dei dicitu?',
secundum quod per imaginem significatur 'inteltectuale et arbitrio liberum et per se
poteslati'IJum~
22
postquam praedictum est de exempiari, scilicet de Dea, et de his quae processerunt ex divina potestate secundum eius voluntatem; restal ut comideremus de eOO
imagine, idest de homine, secundum quod et ipse est suorum operum principium, quasi
liberum arbitrium habens et suorum operum potestatem.
STh I 93.4.co: Respondeo dicendum quod, cum homo secundum intellectualem naturam
ad imaginem Dei esse duatur, secundum hoc est maxime ad imagineTn Dei, secundum
quod intellectualis natura Deum maxime imitari potest. Imitatur autem intellectualis
natura maxime Deum quantum ad hoc, quod Deus seipsum intelligit et amat. Unde
imago Dei tripliciter potest consideran in homine. Uno quidem modo, secundum quod
homo habet aptitudem naturalem ad intelligeudum et amaudum Dewn, et haec aptitudo
consistit in ipsa natura mentis, quae est communis omnibus hominibus.
27
lS
The difference with God's knowledge and love is that in this case faculties,
operations and object coincide secundum rem. Cf. chapter I, 2.2.2, p. 43.
STh I 93.4.co: Afio modo, secundum quod homo actu vel habitu Deum cognoscit et
amat, sed tamen imper{ecte, et haec est imago per confonnitatem gratiae.
STh I93.4.co: Tertio modo, secundum quod homo Deum actu cognoscit et tUnat perfecte,
et sic attenditur imago secundum similitudinem gforiae.
Looking back in the Summa Theologiae, one can see the imago Dei motif (intellectuale
et arbitrio liberum et per se potestativum) prepared in Aquinas' examination of the
operations of the' Exemplar: after God's knowledge (STh I 14-18), will (STh I 19-24)
and power (STh I 25) Aquinas closes the section focusing on Gods beatitudo (STh I
26).
STh I 26.1.co: Nihil enim aiiud sub nomine beatitudinis intelligitur, nisi bonum
per{ectum intellectualis naturaej cuius est suam sufficientiam cognoscere in bono quod
habet; et cui .competit ut ei contingat aiiq,uid vel bene vel male, et sit suarum opera
tionum domina. Utrumque autem istorum excelfentissime Deo convenit, scilicet
per{ectum esse, et intelfigentem. Unde beatitudo maxime convenit Deo.
Thus in STh In 3.1.co Aquinas distinguishes between two meanings of beatitudo:
beatitudo dt res, id in quo consistit beatitudo, which is God; and beatitudo ut adeptio
rei, the operation of the soul by which God is attained. Only in God . in whom
there is no distinction in re between His essence and His operations do these two
coincide; Cf. B. Bujo, 1984, p. 77; On the identification of beatitudo, finis uttimus,
summum bonum d. D. Ei<:kdschulte, 1963, p. 158-160.
150
DYNAMISM
Z~
)0
In fact,. in 5Th IlII law, grace and virtues are reconsidered from the perspective of
the virtues. Each vinue is treated with its opposed vice, the corresponding gih(s) of
the Holy Spirit (grace) and the precepts that ate related to it ~aw).
Even the first man, who possessed all virtues, was created in order to augment his
grace: d, STh I 95.4.
CHAPTER III
151
31
,)2
II
153
DYNAMISM
CHAPTERll
which possesses the virtue is confirmed in its habit. Thus the human
faculty is changed, not essentia/iter but accidentaliter. This means that
human action according to the moral order, has a bearing on the state of
affairs with regard to the goodness of the soul in the natural order. By
moral action human beings are enabled to develop and grow towards
(imperfect) happiness.
Aquinas distinguishes four main or cardinal virtues which can come
into existence by repeating good actions: prudence (prudentia), which
consists in the ability of the intellect to determine how to act according
to reason; justice (iustitia), which is the ability of the will to give each
person his due; temperance (temperantia), which is the perfection of the
vis concupiscibile by which this sensitive faculty is able to deal with its
emotions according to reason; and courage !fortitudo), which does the
same for the vis irascibile;' Via the four cardinal virtues human beings
have entrance to the right human life." They are enabled to act
according to human reason and to do so prompte, faciliter et
delectabiliter. Acting virtuously, they use their natural capacity for
human action at its best and contribute to the happiness man can reach
by his natural powers (beatitudo imperfecta).
Having distinguished' and classified the virtues into four cardinal
virtues, Aquinas places emphasis on their interrelation: the virtues are
connected with each other and influence one another. In moral
perfection the entire soul is involved." Nevertheless, from different
points of view, different virtues reveal their importance. Iustitia is the
greatest of the virtues which concern moral action, since in this perfection of the will the good of reason is most evident. 37 Religio - a virtue
connected with iustitia and which was not even listed among the
cardinal virtues - excels all other moral virtues. The reason for this is
that of all virtues which are subsumed under the four cardinal virtues, it
is the one most directly concerned with the ultimate end at which all
virtues are ordered: the reverence of God Himself."
152
:H
DYNAMISM
CHAPTERll
with regard to human action has been indicated. Thus the hierarchy of
elements (world body - soul - God, cf. chapter Il) was related to the
moral order.
Secondly, extending the finismotif, attention was focused on
Aquinas' account of God as finis ultimus humanae vitae. After a
clarification of the relation between the natural human striving for
happiness and God as the ultimate end of man, the dynamic nature of
human life was presented, taking Aquinas' consideration of man as
threefold image of God as point of departure. The intellectual nature of
man (imago Dei according to the natural order) is designed to know and
love God. These operations are to be bestowed on man by the gift of
grace (imagogratiae, manifesting itself through theological virtues and
gifts of the Spirit) and perfected after life on earth by sharing in God's
blessed'life (imago gloriae, man's perfect beatitude).
In the third place attention was focused on the central element of
Aquinas' account of moral life: virtue. Virtues are accidental perfections
of the sensitive and intellectual faculties of the soul, developed by moral
action. By Baptism natural life is placed in a new context: the acquired
virtues are adopted en perfected by functioning under guidance of the
theological virtues and the gifts of the Spirit.
154
155
DYNAMJSM
CHAPTERll
this life, is only the beginning of the perfect knowledge of God, face to
face, in 'life' after death. For the relation between life on earth and 'life'
after death, this entails that fides names something which displays a
continuity, viz. the relationship or life with God considered with regard
156
~8
Cf. In Symb pro! [Busa: 24]: per [uJem inchoatur in nobis vita aeterna: nam vita
aetema nihil aJiud est quam cognoscere Deum ... [BUIlt.: 29] Haec autern cognitio Dei
ineipit hie per fidem. sed perficitur in vita jutUTtt, in qua cognoscemus eum sicuti est...
[Busa: 38J fides dirigit vitam praes,.tem: nam ad hoc quod home bene vivat, opart"
quod seial necessaria ad bene viveruium. With regard to caritas as 'life' d. STh II-II
23.2.ra2.
49
157
159
DYNAMISM
CHAPTERll
158
Cf. SeC ill 152; Cf. also chapter IT, 2.1, p. 100 where the elevation of spes is
considered as one-oaf the convenrentiae incarnationis.
6J
5Th II-II 17.1.co: obiecturn spei est bonum futurum arduum possibile haberi.
.. Spes as theological vinue (SIb 1111 1722) must be distinguished from pes as passion
of the soul (Sn 111 40). On spes as theological vinue, d. E. Schockenho, 1987, p.
U
"
57
6.S
66
67
161
DYNAMISM
CHAPTERID
this common basis, the double opposition between fear and hope" can
be elucidated. This enables Aquinas to show the connection between
hope and fear and distinguish between different meanings in which the
word 'fear' is used in Holy Scripture. These different meanings can be
recognized as referring to different stages of development of the relationship with God. Thus a telling shift appears, characteristic for the
development of life with God.
A first kind of fear is timor humanus or mundanus according to
which one withdraws from God because of the evil that He might
inflict upon one. This kind of fear can never be good: it springs from
love for created goods and turns away from the highest good for
wanting lower goods." A second kind of fear has the opposite effect: as
a result of the evils which are feared, one converts to God and clings to
Him. Because evil can be divided into malum culpae and malum poena.,
two variants of this fear can be distinguished. When God is clung to out
of fear for punishment, Aquinas speaks of timor servilis. When He is
adhered to out of fear for sinning against Him, it is called timor filialis,
as it resembles the attitude of the son who is afraid to offend his father.
A mixture of both motives results in a third variant: timor initialis.
In S7b II-II 19 Thomas subsequently deals with these different kinds
of fear and examines how they interrelate. He notices a development
which is connected with the growth of caritas. Timor servilis is a kind of
fear which is not yet informed by charity, but leads towards the love
for God.'o Timor initialis is the medium between timor servilis and
filialis, but in such a manner as the imperfect being is the middle
between being and non being: substantially it equals the former and
differs from the laner. Likewise, timor servilis is inspired by charity."
To the degree that caritas grows, however, timor initialis decreases and
timor filialis increases: the more one loves God, the less one fears
punishment." Thomas gives two reasons for this. In the first place: the
more one loves God, the less one minds about one's own good, which is
possibly threatened by punishment. In the second place, the more one
clings to God, the'more confidence one has in the reward and the less
one worries about punishment. These shifts are characteristic for the
development of the relationship with God. They express a shift
according to which the centre of one's life is gradually placed outside
oneself and which will be discussed later in this chapter. 7J The
dynamism of this shift, as we have seen, is ascribed to charity.
160
STh II-II 19.8.ra1: timor qui est initium dilectionis est timor seroilis. qui "introducit
caritatem sicut seta introducit Unum", ut Augustinus dicit [Tr 9, on I In 4,18; PL
35,2047].
71
STh II-II 19.8.sc+ra3.
72
STh II-II 19.10.co: Timor autem jiJiaiis necesse est quod crescat crescente caritate, simt
elfectus crescit crescente causa: quanto enim aJiquis magis diJigit a/iquem, tanto magis
timet tum offendere et ab eo separari. Sed timor serviJis. quantum ad servitatem,
tota/iter wllitur caritate adveniente: remanet amen secundum substantiam timor
poenae. ut dictum est [a.6}. Et iste timor diminuitur caritate crescente, maxime quantum
ad actum; quia quantum aliquis magis diJigit Deum, tanto minus timet poenam. Primo
quidem, quia minus attendit ad proprium bonum, cui contrariatur poena. Secunda, quia
firmius inhaerens magis confidit de praemio, et per consequens minus timet de poena;
The reversal of this 'is: timor mundanus, roOted in false selflove: cf. STh IIII 19.6.co:
secundum quod a/iquis refugit poenam contrariam bono suo naturali simt principale
malum contrarium bono quod di/igi<ur ut /inis. Cf. also 5Th 1111 19.3.
" Cf. bdow, 2.2, p. 167: charity and the hierarchy of objects; For this shift by which
servile fear is transformed intO filial fear, d. also F. de Grijs, 1996[b], p. 42-43.
,. Cf. E. Schockenhoff, 1987, p. 476-Sn.
1$
This central place of charity in the theology of Aquinas is only natural, considering
that, as T. Gilby (1964, p. 66) remarks: 'Divine charity, this and nothing else, is the
final purpose of all theology.'
70
The relation between spes and timOr, both belonging to the potentid irascibiJis and
bom dealing with the future, is one of double opposition: spes is the passion which
concerns the approach (accessus) of a good under the formal consideration of being
difficult to reach (fecundum arduum), timor is the passion which concerns the
withdrawal (recessus) from an evil under the same formal consideration. Cf. STh I-II
25.4 and 5Th 111 40.12.
6' STh II-II 19.2.co: de timore nunc agimus secundum quod per ipsum aJiquo nwdo ad
68
Deum convertimur vel ab eo avertimur. Cum enim ohiectum timoris sit malum,
quandoque homo propter mala quae timet a Dea reeed;t, et iste dicitur timor humanus
vel mundanus. Quandoque autem homo per mala quae timet ad Deum convert;tur et ei
ihhaeret. Quod quidem malum est duplex, scilicet malum poenat; et malum culpae. Si
igitur aJiquis convertatur ad Deum et ei inhaereat propter timorem poenae. erit timor
servilis. Si autem propter. timorem culpae, erit timor fiJialis. nam fdiorum est timere
of1ensam patris. Si autem propter utrumque. est timor initialis. qui est medius inter
utrumque timorem. For the argument that timor mundanus is always bad, d. sTh II-II
19.3.
163
DYNAMISM
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tues." As has been shown earlier, Thomas calls caritas created part!c!pation in the love between the Father and the Son, which is infused in
us by the Spirit." Thus, the Spirit is recognized at the core of Aquinas'
'moral theology', by the central role of charity in moral life. Or, to put
it differently: the heart of Thomas' 'moral theology' is friendship with
God; a friendship which is, as an effect, appropriated to the Holy Spirit
and which is called caritd"
Characteristic for the Spirit, in its relation to 'life', is the aspect of
movement and liveliness. This has been observed in Aquinas' account of
the gifts of the Holy Spirit which make the faculties of the soul fit to be
moved, by the impulse of the Spirit (instinctus Spiritus sanctt), more
easily. By caritas man is moved towards his ultimate end as long as he is
in via. By charity we approach God, we are united to Him, we
participate in the likeness of the Holy Spirit." This process of
development involves a dynamism according to which acts of charity
increase the theological virtue."
Thomas discerns three degrees of charity: the love of those who
begin, those who' advance and those who are perfect." In the first
degree one is occupied with avoiding sin and everything else which
threatens ihe love fcir God. The second degree is dominated by striving
162
SIb I.n 62.4.co: OpoTlet quod ordine .generationis, Jules praecedat spem et caritatem ...
Ordine vera perfectionis, caritas praecedit fidem et spem, eo quod tam fides quam spes
per caritatem formalur, et perfectionem virtutis quirit. Sic enim caritas est mater
omnium virtutum et radix, inquantum est omnium virtutum forma, ut infra dicetur;
Cf. also STh 1111 23.7-8. The ceotral position of charity is in line with the ceottal
place of arnoT in the theology of Aquinas. On the various levels at which arnor is
found, d. A. ilien, 1974 and]. Aumann, 1978.
" Cf. STh I-II 67, especially art. 6. The thought is based on ICo 13,8 (Caritas
numquam acidit) quoted in the sed contra of an. 6.
" STh 1111 23.l.co: secundum Phaosophum, in VIII EthicoTum 2 [l155b31] non quaibet
arnOT habet rationem amicitiae. sed amor qui est cum benevolentia. quando scilicet sic
amamus aJiquem ut ei bonum velimus... Sed nee benevolentia sufficit ad rationem
amicitiae. sed requiritur quaedam mutua amatio, quia amicus est amico amicus. Talis
autem mutlftt benevolentia fUndatur super aliqua communicatione. Cum igitur sit aliqua
communicatio hominis ad Deum secundum quod nobis suam be4titudinem communicat,
super hac communicatione oportet aliquam amicitiam fUndari. De qua quidem
communicatione dicitur tCo 1.9: "Fidelis Deus. per quem vocati estis in societatem Filii
eius. "Amor autem super hac communicatione Jundatus est caritas. Unde mani/estum est
quod caritas amicitia quaedam est hominis ad Deum. E. Schockenhoff, 1987, p. 501526 shows that the interpretation of caritas in connection with amicitia js an inven-
76
tiOl~
of Aquinas. On this point one can discern a development in his writings. Cf.
also G. Mansini 1985[a]j On the central place of caritas .in Aquinas' account of
beatitudo d. B. Bujo, 1984, p. 137182. As is remarked with regard to beatitudo above
in footnote 14, it has to be streSSed that Aquinas' examination of charity is not
psychological. Cf. Th. Beemer, 1983 and 1973, p. 39-40 with refereoces to S.
Pinckaers and ]. Maritain.
STh II-IT n.6.co: Fides autem et spes attingunt quit/em Deum secundum quod ex ipso
provenit nobis vel cognitio veri vel adeptio boni; sed caritas attingit ipsum Deum ut in
ipso sistat, non ut ex eo aliquid rwbis proveniat. Et ideo caritas est excellentior fide et spej
et per consequens omnibus aliis virtutibus.
so STh IT-II 24.2.co: Unde caritas non potest neque naturaliter nobis inesse, neque per vires
naturales esse acquisita, sed per in/usionem Spiritus saneti, qui est arnor Patris et Filii,
cuius participatione in nobis est ipsa caritas creata, sicut supra dictum est [STh DD 23.2};
Cf. also chapter I, 2.3.2, p. 61 and chapter II, 1.3.1, p. 86.
U
A beautiful analysis of caritas on the model of amicitia is offered in ScC IV 21-22,
where Thomas discusses the effects of the Holy Spirit.
82
STh IIII 24.4.00: Ex hot enim dicimur esse viatores quod in Deum tendimus, qui est
ultimus finis nostrae beatitudinis. In hac autem via tanto magis procedimus quanto Deo
magis appropinquamus,- cui non appropinquatur passibus corporis. sed affectibus mentis.
Hane autem propinquitatem facit caritas, quia per ipsam mens Deo unitur. Et ideo de
ratione caritatis viae est ut possit augeri, si enint. non posset auger;, iam cesserat viae
processUSj STh II-II ~4.5.ra3: quod perfectius similitudo Spiritus sancti participetur in
anima.
" STh 1111 24.6-8.
.. R. Garrigou-Lagrange (1923, p. XDI) identifies these three degrees with the vw
purgativa, via illuminiti'Va and 'Via unitiva. On the problem of discerning stages of
spiritual perfection d. K. Rahner, 1957', p. 11-34.
7'J
165
DYNAMISM
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164
85
16
87
88
a~
De car 1Lra8: in--homine sunt duo affectus; unus caritatis, quo anima desiderat esse cum
Christo; a/ius autem naturalis, quo anima refugit separationem a corpore, qui adeo est
homini natura/is, quod nee etiam Petro senectus abstuJit. ut Augustinus dicit super loan.
[tract. 123]. Ex coniunctione ergo horum duorum a/fectuum veIJet anima sic coniungi
Deo, quod non separa:retur a corpore; secundum ilIud Apostoli, 2eo 5,4: "Nolumus
expoliari, sed supervestiri,' ut absorbeatur quod mortale est a vita." Sed quia hoc est
impossibile ("quamdiu enim sumus in corpore, peregrinamus. a Domino"[2 Co 5,6]),'
insurgit quaedam contrarietas inter praedictos affectus, et quanta caritas est perfectior,
tanto sensibilius a/fectus caritatis vineit affectum naturae; et hoc ad perfectionem caritatis
pertinet. Unde et Aposto/us ibidem subtiit: "Audemus autem, et bonam vo/untatem
habemus magis peregrinari a corpore; et praesentes esse ad Dominum" [2eo 5,8]. Sed in
his in quibus est caritas imperfecta, si tantum a}fectus caritatis vincat, ex repugnantia
tamen natura/is aJfectus redditur insensibilis victoria caritatis. Quod ergo aperte et
indubitanter, sive audacter, Aposto/us dicit: "Cupio disso/vi, et esse cum Christo" [Ph
1,23], hoc perfectae caritatis est; sed quod qualitercumque, licet insensibiliter, praeferat
anima fruitionem Dei unioni corporis, est de necessitate caritatis.
STh II-II 24.7.co: est "enim [caritas] participatio quaedam infinitae caritatis. quae est
Spiritus sanctus. Similiter etiam causa augens caritatem est infinitae virtutis, scilicet
Deus. Similiter etiam eX parte subrecti terminus huic augmento praefigi non potest, quia
semper caritate excrescente, superexcrescit habilitas ad ulterius augmentum. Unde
relinquitur quod caritatis au~nto nullus terminus praefigi possU in hac vita.
STh II-II 24.7.sc: Sed contra est quod Aposto/us dicit ad Ph 3,12: "Non quod iam
acceperim, aut iam perfectus sim, sequor autem si quo modo comprehendam ",' ubi diett
Glossa [PL 192,246]: "N,mo [zdeliwn, 'lSi muitum profecerit, dieat: 'sufficit mihi~ Qui
enim hoc dicit, exit de via ante /inem. "Ergo semper in via caritas potest magis ae magis
augeri.
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DYNAMISM
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love on earth. A line will never gain the quantity of a square, however
much it is augmented. 90
The virtue of charity is perfected by the gift of sapientia. The gift of
wisdom enables one to consider the highest cause by which all other
things can be judged and at which they can be directed." The
surprising fact that sapientia is a perfection of the cognitive part of the
soul - whereas carita:; belongs to the volitional part - may be explained
by pointing to the close interrelation of the two faculties which cannot
operate apart from each other." Thomas regards sapientia as a kind of
connaturality with God, resulting from the union by carita:;. This
connaturality provides one with the knowledge how to act according to
God's will." It is, in fact, the theological explanation of the experience
that one does not need to acquir~ the expertise of a 'moral theologian'
166
5Th II~n 24.7.raJ: skut linea, quantumcumque crescat, non 4ttmgtt quantitatem
supeifteiei. Non est autem eadem ratio quantitatis caritatis viae, quae sequitur
cognitionem fide~ et cltY'itatis patriae, quae sequitur visionem apertam.
'.il
i4
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DYNAMISM
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inclination of the part to love the whole to which it belongs more than
itself. The first man was endowed with the same natural inclination, a
state of affairs disturbed by Original Sin." In the state of corrupted
nature, in which: we live, the will prefers the private good above the
highest good, which (or rather: who) is God. The result of this is, that
'loving God more than oneself' is easily misunderstood as a disguised
self-interest: God is loved above everything else, because union with
Him effectuates the greatest happiness." Thomas makes clear that the
love by which God is loved for the sake of Himself, is greater than the
love by which He is loved for the enjoyment which is caused by union
with Him. The former is the desinterested amor amicitiae, which
concernS the infinite goodness of God for the sake of Himself; the latter
is the self-interested amor concupiscentiae which is confined to the
goodness in which is participated by the creature." This means that by
charity man is not primarily interested in his own profit: one submits to
God's will (cf. Mt 26,39: the passion of Christ is exemplary) however
difficult and painful this might be. In fact - as the fact that caritas is
based on the communicatio beatitudinis shows - by charity God is loved
with God's love, The love for God is basically love of God. The 'centre
of gravity' has shifted from oneself towards God.lOO
Next to God, man ought to love himself more than anything else.
Again, however, this love is qualified by the relationship with God..
Thus self-love according to caritas must be distinguished from natural
self-love. The latter is the amor sui according to which each being
wishes to maintain itself in his existence. This self-love is natural and
not necessarily opposed to charity. It can be so, however, when one
considers this self-preservation as ultimate end. Self-love according to
caritas is based on love for God. One loves oneself from a new centre,
168
"
"
~1
~7
100
STh I-II 109.3; Angels also love God more than themselves by natural inclination:
S11> I 60.5.
.
This interpretation was put forward by H. Reiner, 1963, and was refuted by S.
Pinckaers, 1963. For an evaluation of the discussion d. B. Bujo, 1984. In STh II-II
26.3.ag3 the argument is close to Reiner's positionj For an elaborate account of the
relation between amor amicitiae and conc"piscentiae cf. G. Mansini, 1995[b].
STh II-II 263m: hoc quod aliquis velitfrui Dea, pmmet ad amorem quo Deus amatur
amore concupiscentiae. Magis autem amamus Deum amore amicitiae quam amore
concupiscentiae. quia maius est in Se bonum Dei quam panieipare possumus jruendo ipso.
Et ideo simpliciter homo magis diligit Deum ex caritate quam seipsum.
Cf. G. Mansini, 1985[a}, p. 26, to whom lowe this expression. Cf. also what has
been said of spes in the preceding paragraph, p. 159ff.
170
171
DYNAMISM
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happiness is closer and a stronger reason for loving than enjoying such
happiness as a kind of overflow (which is why we love our own
body).1O'
The view that the spiritual well-being of our neighbour is of greater
value than our own corporal life confirms the primacy of vita gratiae in
moral life. Considering the ordo caritatis (God - soul of oneself - soul of
one's neighbour - body), one can recognize the order of creation which
was worked out in chapter II (God - soul - body - world). Only the last
element (world) is left out here, because only rational creatures have a
capacity to share in God's life directly.!OS
Although the hierarchy of the objects of charity might be equally
simple as it is clear106 and although I consider it to be the 'backbone'
of Aquinas' 'moral theology', living and acting according to this
hierarchy is a matter of development and grace. The ultimate
consequence of the primacy of spiritual well-being of one's neighbour
above one's own body coincides with the perfection of moral behaviour.
This becomes dear when attention is focused on the Evangelical Counsels.
that goodness. Charity comprises natural self-love: one loves oneself for
the sake of God and in God.1O!
From this perspective, the sinner does not really love himself. His
self-love is based on a false estimation of what he is. The rational soul that which Saint Paul calls the interior man - is the principle part of
man by which he distinguishes himself from other corporal animalUt.
From this perspective, the corporal and sensitive dimension of man - the
external man - is secundary. The sinner reverses the hierarchy of the
two; the false appreciation of what he essentially is prevents him from
really loving himself.!02
The reason for this primacy of the soul above the body is not the
metaphysical consideration that ~ the soul is the stronger part,
'containing' the body and determining what human nature is, but the
theological insight that according to the rational soul man is united with
God. By their intellect and will human beings have a capacity for God
(capacitas Del). Sharing in God's beatitude by life of grace renders an
infinite value to the soul. Participation in God's life is more worthy
than the soul in which this takes place. 1O' Whereas the soul participates directly in the life of God, the body does so only by an 'overflowing' (redundantia) of the beatitudo of the soul. On the basis of this
consideration Thomas draws the radical theocentric conclusion that although self-love has priority over the love for one's neighbour - (the
soul of) one's neighbour ought to be loved more than one's own body:
the association with our neighbour in the full enjoyment of eternal
101 STh II-II 19.6.co: ArnOT ~utem sui tripliciter se potest habere ad caritatem. Uno enim
modo contrariatur caritati, secundum scilicet quod aliquis in amore propii boni finem
constituit. Alio vero modo in caritate includitUT. secundum qucd homo se propter Deum
et in Deo diligit. Tertia modo a caritate quidem distinguitur, sed caritati non
contrariatur... Cf. also 5Th II-II 25.4.co: Et sic inter cetera quae ex caritate diligit quasi
ad Deum pertinentia, etiam seipsum ex caritate diligit.
102 STh IT.IT 25.7.co: non omnes aestimant se esse iii quod sunt. Principale enim in homine
est mens rationalis, secundarium autem est natura semitiva et corporalis, quorum
primum Aposto/us nominat "interiorem hominem ", secundum "exteriorum~, ut patet
2eo 4,16. Boni autem aestimant principale in seipsis rationaiem naturam, sive
.interiorem homin~ unde secundum hoc aestimant se esse quod sunt. Mali autem
aestimant principaie in seipsis naturam sensitivam et corporal~ scilicet exteriorem
hominem. Unde non recte cognoscentes seipsos, non vere diligunt seipsos, sed diligunt it!
quod seipsos esse reputant. Boni autem, '/Jere cognoscentes seipsos, vere seipsos diligunt. On
the 'interior man' d. also In Rom 7.4.
103 STh II-II 23.3.ra3. quoted in chapter II, footnote 60.
104
lOS
106
STh IT-II 26.5.co: ii/ud magis est ex cantate diJigendum quod habet pleniorem rationem
diligibilis ex caritate, ut dictum est [STh lUI 26.2+4J Consociatio autem in plena
participatione beatitudinis, quae est ratio diligendi proximum, est maior ratio diJigendi
quam parricipatio beatitudinis per redundantiam, quae est ratio diligendi proprium
corpus. Et ideo proximum, quantum ad salutem animae, magis debemus diligere quam
proprium corpus,' ra2: corpus nostrum est propinquius animae nostrae quam proximus
quantum ad constitutionem propriae naturae. Sed quantum ad participationem
beatitudinis maior. est consociatio animae proximi ad animam nostram quam etiam
corporis proprii.
STh ITII 25.3 .
For the sake of completeness it must be stressed that this account of Aquinas'
consideration de ordine carita tis is based on his discussion in the Summa Tbeologiae,
leaving out the part on the hierarchy within neighbours (friends, enemies, relatives),
by which the natural love is taken into account. Altqpugh this does not alter the
essence of what has been said, it offers some complkations and nuances. Cf. G.
Maruini 1995[.].
172
173
DYNAMlSM
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107
107
STh I-IT t08A.co: Rfjpondeo dicendum quod haec est differentia inter consilium et
praeceptum, quod praeceptum importat necessitatem consilium autem in optione ponitur
eius qui datur. Et ideo convenienter in lege nova, quae est lex libertatis, supra praecepta
sunt addita cansi/ia: non autem in veter; lege, quae erat lex seroitutis. Oportet igitur
103
quod praecepta novae legis intelligantur esse data de his quae sunt necessaria ad
consequendum finem aeternae beatitudinis, in quem lex nova immediate introducit.
Camilia vera aportet esse de iIlis per quae melius et expeditius potest homo consequi
finem praedictum. Cf. also STh I 19.12, where the difference between both categories
is introduced; Cf. J. van den Eijnden, 1994, p. 84-86, who bases his account on
Quodl 4 and 5, where Aquinas .is more precise than in earlier works.
De perf 9 [Leon: 11]: Prius enim relinquenda occurrunt quae minus nobis coniuneta
existu:nt,' unde in primo loco occUTTil ad perfectionem tendentibus exttrior4 bona
relnquere, quae 4 nostra natura< sunt separata. Post haec vero relinquenda occurrunt'ea
quae nobis naturae communione et affinitatis cuiusque necessitate coniunguntur. Unde
Dominus dicit Lk 14,26: "Si quis venerit ad me, et non odit patrem suum et matrem et
uxorem et foios et Fratre! et sorores, non potest meus esse discipulus".
110
1n
IU
De perf 11 [Leon: 3]: Non solum autem necessarium est ad perfeclionem cantatlS
consequendam qupd homo exteriora abiiciat, sed etiam quodammodo se ipsum
dereJinquat. Dicit enim Dionysius 4 cap. De divinis nominibus, quod divinus amor est
extasim fadem, id est hominem extra seipsum ponem, non sinens hominem sui ipsius
esse, sed eius quod amatur. Cuius rei exemplum in se ipso demonstravit ApOSIOlus dicens
Ga 2j20: "Vivo ego iam non ego, vivit vero in me Christus", quasi suam vitam non
suam aestimans, sed Christi; quia quod proprium sibi erat contemnens, totus Christo
inhaerebat. Hoc etiam in quibusdam esse completum ostendit, cum dicit Col 3.3: "Mortu;
estis, et vita vestra abscondita est cum Christo in Deo".
De perf 11 [Leon: u 4]: quanto aliquid magis naturaliter amatur, tanto perfoctius
contemnitur propter Christurn. Nihil enim est homini amabilius tibertate propriae
voluntatis; per hane enim homo est aJiorum dominus, per hane aliis uti vel frui potest,
per hane etiam S#is actibus dominatur. Unde sicut homo dimittens divitias vel personas
eoniunet4S. eas abnegat,' ita deserens propriae voluntatis arbitriurrt, per quod ipse sui
dominus est, se ipsum abnegaTe invenitur. Nihilque est qSJd homo naturali affectu magis
refugiat quam servitutem,' unde et nihil posset homo pro alio amp/ius impendere, post hoc
quod se ipsum in mortem pro eo tradere4 quam quod se servituti eius subiugaret. Cf.
also De perf 12 and S17> nn 186.8.
De perf 12; Cf. J. van den Eijnden, 1994, p. 156169.
Cf. J van den Eijnden, 1994, p. 144-148.
175
DYNAMISM
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174
113
114
s11) n~n 186.1.ra2: si aliquis totam vitllm suam divino se'fVitio deputet, tota vita sua
ad
re/igionem pertinebit. Et secundum hoc, ex vita religiosa quam ducunt, religiosi dicuntur
qui sum in statu perfoctionis.
115 De caT 11.ra6: After having compared the amicitia honesti and delectabilis, Aquinas
applies
result to charity. Hos igitur tres gradus considerare possumus in caritate.
Deus autem maxime propter seipsum est diligendus. Sum enim quidam qui libenter, vel
sine Tnag#a molestia, separantur a vacatione divinae contemp/ationis, ut terrenis negotiis
implicentur, et in his vel nihil vel modicum ,aritatis apparet. Quidam verum in tantum
delectantur in vacatione divinae ,onrempiationis, quod eam deserere nolunt, etiam ut
divinis obsequiis mancipentur ad salutem proximorum. Quidam vero ad tantum culmen
,mtatis ascendunt, quod etiam di'Vinam contemplationem, !icet in ea maxima
delectentur, praetermittunt, ut Deo serviant in salutem proximorum; el haec p~dio in
Paulo apparel, qui dicebat Rm 9,3: "Optabam ego ipse anathema", id est separatus, "esse
a Christo pro Jratribus meis"; et Ph 1,2324: "desiderium habens dissolv4 et esse cum
Christo; permanere autem in ,arne necessarium propter vos".
116 'STh II-II 182.2.co: ex suo genere ,ontempiativa vita est maioris meriti quam activa f. ..j
Potest tamen contingere qwxJ aliquis in operibus vitae activae plus meretur quam alius
in operibus vitae ,ontemplativae, puta si propter abundantiam divini amaris, ut eius
voluntas impleatur propter ipsius gloriam, interdum sustinet a duicedine divinae
contemplationis ad tempus separari. Sicut ApoSlolus dicebat, Rm 9,3: "Optabam ego ipse
anathema esse a Christo pro fratribus meis."; STh II-II 188.6.co: Sicut enim maius est
illuminare quam lucere so/urn, ita maius est contemplata aliis tradere quam solum
coneemplari... Sic ergo summum gradum in religionibus tenent quae ordinantur ad
docendum et praedicandum. Quae et propinquissimae sunt perfectioni episcoporum ...
Secundum autem gradum tenent iIlae quae ordinantur ad contemplationem. Tertius est
earum quae occupantur circa exteriores actiones.
117 STh ill 4O.1.ra2: vita contemplativa simpliciter est melior quam activa quae occupatur
circa corporales actus, sed vita activa secundum quam aliquis praedicando et docendo
contemplata aliis tradit, est p~ctior quam vita quae solum contemplatur, quia talis
vita praesupponit abumlantiam contemplationis. Et ideo Christus talem vitam eligit. Cf.
also M.D. Chenu, 1974, p. 3+43.
me
176
177
DYNAMISM
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paradox what human life is really about. To this action of highest moral
perfection, the following paragraph is dedicated.
danger - is connected with the intellect. In this way the corporal-sensitive impulse is interpreted within a larger framework. Thus a coherence
of the different parts of the soul emerges; a coherence which Thomas
works out in detail in STh II. At the level of the passiones, courage
(audacia) is connected with fear and hope."2 At the level of virtues
one can equally find a connection between the different faculties. The
virtue of prudentia is important in order to discern whether one should
flee, endure or aggress the danger which menaces. The virtue of hope is
connected with regard to the support of God in whom one has
confidence.!23 Fides is intimately linked with martyrdom, since the
martyr testifies to the invisible truth of Christ by despising the greatest
visible good: his corporal life.'" The theological virtue of charity is
intimately linked with martyrdom, qualifying the action of fortitudo in
terms of relationship with God.
Thomas discusses the relation between fortitude and caritas explicitly
in a text where he examines whether martyrdom is an act of highest
perfection. 125 He argues that the act of bravely undergoing one's death
2.4 Martyrdom
Of all good things, people naturally cling more to their life than to
anything else. Of all corporal evils, death is feared the most because it
deprives one of all natural goods.!18 Therefore, a human being who
despises his life for the sake of God, is called most perfect in his love for
God.'" From the first followers of Christ onwards, this deed of
highest perfection is known as martyrdom." Aquinas links martyrdom with the virtue of fortitudo and caritas. Because it shows how love
for God transforms the attitude towards one's own life and death, we
will examine this action of highest moral perfection in detail.
In Aquinas' account of moral life, fortitudo is the cardinal virtue
which concerns fear of death. 121 It is the perfection of a sensitive part
of the soul which human beings share with animals: the vis irascibilis.
This is the faculty which' is tied up with the human body and which
comprises fear (timor), despair (desperatio), hope (spes), boldness (audacia)
and anger (ira). As we -have explained before, the vis irascibilis is
concerned with the approach towards the good insofar as it is difficult
to attain (bonum secundum arduum). Thus the fear of death is deeply
rooted in human nature: as deep as the passiones animae by which the
corporal dimension of man is directly connected with the sensitive part
of the soul. In animals the passiones are recognized as instincts, directed
at self-preservation. In the human soul they are coloured by the
intellectual part of the soul. Although the sensitive part is not perfectly
subject to the control of the rational part - as was the case before the
Fall of man - the passiones are qualified and controlled by intellect and
will. In the human soul the aestimatio - by which animals recognize a
5Th II~II 123.4.00: Mttxime autem terribile inter omnia corporalia mala est moTS, quae
tollit omnia corporalia bona.
m De Perf 11 [Leon: 100]: Hoc autem perfectissimum ideo diximus, quia martyres illud
propter Deum contemnunt, scilicet propriam vi~ propter quam omnia temporalia
quaerumur, et cuius conservatio, etiam cum omnium aliorum amissione, omnibus diu
praefertUT. Magis enim homo vult et divitias perdere et arnicos, adhuc autem corporis
infirmitati succumbere et in servitutem redig;' quam vita privari.
120 For minyrdom in the first centuries, d. Th. Baumeister. 1983. For the same in the
history of theology and Aquinas' view, cf. R. HOOde, 1928.
121 S1b II.II 123.4.co.
111'
178
179
DYNAMISM
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is not yet an act of moral perfection. Stunt men are brave, but when
they die on the filmset their death is not regarded as a matter of moral
perfection. This perfection depends, among other factors, on the object
for the sake of which one is willing to die. When someone dies out of
love for God, the highest good, this can be seen as an" action of moral
perfection.
Yet, not every act of fortitude motivated by charity is an act of
moral perfection according to Aquinas. We have seen that one is obliged
to love the spiritual well-being of one's neighbour more than one's own
body. Thus, in cases of emergency when a neighbour is threatened with
regard to his faith (vita spiritualislgratiae) - viz. when a non-believer
seduces him - one is obliged to risk one's life (vita corporalis). Only
risking one's life in favour of the welfare of one's neighbour, apart from
cases of direct emergency, pertain:s to the perfection of the Evangelical
spiritual joy.12? Thus Aristotle says that it is enough for the brave man
to lack sorrow. To enjoy the act cannot be asked. Nevertheless, God
may strengthen the soul of the brave man who adheres more to God
than to his own life: love for God is so strong that one is gtanted to
undergo, readily and delightfully, that which is most feared in this
life. m
In chapter II, 1.3.1 (p. 87) it was explained that life of grace is an
accidental perfection of the soul. Life of grace qualifies a substance, the
human soul, which is the form of the human body. Human nature is
composed of body 'and soul; natural life of man consists in a soul giving
life to a body. When the body is separated from the soul, natural life
ends and Aquinas speaks of natural death. The corrupting corpse cannot
be called a human being, as little as the separated soul can so be called.
Although the body (materia) is the weaker part, it is indispensable for
the functioning of the human soul: for natural knowledge the latter is
dependent on the information provided by the senses, which are
corporal. Now, when corporal life is sacrificed for the sake of life of
grace, natural life of man is sacrificed. The paradox then consists in the
fact that the substance (natural life, dependent on the integrity of
corporal life) is sacrificed for the sake of the accident (life of grace), and
precisely this action reveaIs what natural life (including corporal life) is
all about. Yet this is not unreasonable: life of grace is of infinitely
greater value than natural life, as was shown in the same paragraph of
chapter II. Vita gratiae is a kind of participation in God's life. When
natural life is given up for the sake of the life of grace, all confidence is
placed in God's life. The end of natural life implies the end of the status
merendi, the state in which man develops his relationship with God
through moral action. The separated soul is entirely dependent on God.
Thus, this act of faith, hope and charity is ultimately eschatological and
Counsel. 126
It is characteristic for the virtues that they make one act prompte,
/aciliter et delectabiliter. In the case of martyrdom Aquinas asks whether
the brave man delights in his act. Thomas is quite realistic here and does
not hIde the fact that corporal afflictions are more manifest than
doloribus corporalium tormentorum, quorum metu etiam bruta animalia "a maximis
voluptatibus absterrentur", ut Augustinus dicit, in libra Octoginta trium quaest [q. 36,
PL 40,25]. Et secundum hoc patet quod martyrium inter cetero! actus humanos est perftctior secundum suum genus, quasi m4ximae caritatis signum, secundum illud In 15,13:
"Maiorem caritatem nemo habet quam ut animam suam ponat quis pro amicis suis".
126 De pe:rf 16 [Leon: 88]: Aliud autem consideratUT in anima secundum quod viviftcat
corpus et est primipium vitae humanae; et secundum hoc pro Jratribus animam ponere
debemus: plus enim debemus proximum duigere quam corpora nostra. Unde vitam
corporalem pro salute spiritual; proximorum ponere convenit, et cadit sub necessitate
praecepti in necessitatis articulo: puta si aliquis videret aliquem ab injideJibus seduci,
deberet se mortis periculo exponere ut eum a seductione liberaret. Sed ut aliquis extra hos
necessitatis casus pro salute aliorum mortis periculis se exponat, pertinet ad peifectwnem
iustitiae vel ad perfectionem consilii,' cuius exemplum ab Apostolo accipere possumus...
Aquinas' view that martyrdom pertains to the perlection of the Evangelical
. Counsels, does not entail that it is seen as an other Counsel. Manyrdom outreaches
the perfection of those who live according to the Counsels, for natural corporallie
itself is offered, above which nothing else can be given. There is, however a congruity with obedience which is also out of love, comprising everything one has and
is. The big difference with the Evangelical Counsels, however, is that one cannot
commit oneself to martyrdom by a V9W (votum). Aquinas speaks of 'counsel' here
so as to bring to the fore that it is an action which does not pertain to the
commandments. Cf. STh I-II 108.4 and E. Dublanchy, 1938, p. 1176-1182.
127
128
180
181
DYNAMISM
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the greatest expression of love for and confidence in God that can be
thought of. In the action of the martyr the highest degree of charity (ph
1,23 and 2Co 5,4-8) is directly related to the greatest sign of love one
can exhibit for one's neighbour
15,13}.'"
This action of highest perfection is to be recognized as the work of
the Spirit: an invisible mission or new inhabitation in the human
sou!.'" By giving up one's corporal life in this manner, one directly
enters the life of God. It is the most perfect way of imitating Christ and
it makes one share directly in the effects of his passion as is made clear
by the fact that martyrdom is considered as baptismus sanguinis.l3l
an
Summarizing this second section, it has been shown that vita gratiae
implies a dynamism by which thp appreciation of and attitude towards
vita naturalis is changed. Firstly, we demonstrated how this dynamism
unfolds itself within the three theological virtues faith,' hope and
charity . and the gifts of the Holy Spirit, by which the virtues are
perfected. After that, we focused on the 'backbone' of Aquinas' moral
theology: the hierarchy of objects of charity which reflects the hierarchy
of elements examined in the preceding chapter. Thus it was shown how
moral life is organised from the perspective of the relationship with
God, the centre of love shifting from oneself to God. In accordance
with the dynamism of the Holy Spirit leading man towards perfection
by endowing him with charity . the state of perfection was examined.
Again the hierarchy of 'world . body soul' was recognized, together
with a movement towards the summit of perfection: martyrdom. We
studied this last issue in order to bring to light how the working of the
Spirit transforms natural life in all its dimensions and how it roots the
primacy of vita gratiae by which one participates in God's life.
3. Living with God and dealing with life and death
In the preceding section we examined how developments in vita
gratiae bring about shifts in the appreciation of vita and mars corporalis.
In this third section attention is focused on moral action with regard to
life and death. Aquinas' discussions about the killing of human beings
129
112
Aquinas uses differeJlt words for 'killing' in this anicle. The most general is occisio
which is the killing of a living substance (plant, animal or human being).
Homicidium refers to the killing of a human being. As verbs occidere and interficere
are used. Although occisio seems to be more neutral than homicidium (d. STh IMII
lOO.8.ra3: nee talis occisio est homicidium, quod praecepto DecaJogi prohibetur) it is also
used in the neutral meaning of 'killing'. In this section I prefer the term 'killing' and
I sometimes use the term 'homicide' according to its neutral meaning in English of
'killing'. I consider 'murder' and 'manslaughter' too far qualified by legal ovenones.
183
DYNAMISM
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beings. Apart from Aristotle (I PoUt 5 and 7), this view is endorsed by
Gn 1,29 and Gn 9,3.'36
The central position of man in the universe again emerges when the
question is answered whether the fifth commandment concerns all living
creatures. The principle imperJectum ordinatur ad perfecrum is used in
order to argue that the Biblical prohibition to kill refers to human
beings. In the next article, however, the same principle is used in order
to formulate an exception to this general rule: the sinner.
182
m 5Th II-II 64.prol: Deinde considerandum est de 'Uitiis oppositis commutativae justitiae. Et
primo considerandum est de pe"4tis quae committuntur circa involuntarias
commutationes... et pritm>, de homicidio, per quod maxime nocetur proximo; On the
relation between homicide and the social order cf. also J. Porrer, 1990, p. 124-154.
1)4 Here I agree with J. Rojas, 1995, p. 112 who refers to V. Alonso, 1937, p. 217. 'The
latter explains that the principle of organisation is introduced in 5Th I-II 73.8, where
Aquinas deals with the question whether the seriousness pf sin is augmented to the
.-degree that the damage done is greater.
13S sTh II-II 64.1.sc: Sed contra est quod Augustinus dicit, in I De Civitate Dei 20 {PL
41,35]: Cum audimus Won occides~ non accipimus hoc dictum esse de fructetis, quia
nullus eis est sensus. nec de irrationalibus animaJibus. quia nulla ncbis ratione sociantur.
Restat ergo ut de homine intelligamus quod dictum est Won occides~. "
1'6
U1
Aquinas interprets qn 9) in the sense that only after the Flood man began to use
animals as food: 5Th I-ll 102.6.ra2.
STh II-II 64.2.co: Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est {a.l~ licitum est occidere
animalia bruta inquantum ordinantur ad hominum mum, sicut imperfictum ordinatur
ad perfectum. Omnis pars ordinatur ad totum ut'imperficmm ad perfectum. Et ideo
omnis pars naturaJiter est propter totum. Et propter hoc videmus quod si saluti totius
corporis humani expediat praecisio aJicuius membri, puta cum est putridum vel
corruptivum aJiorurn, laudabiJiter et saJubrieer abscinditur. Qu4eJibet autem persona
singularis comparatur ad totam communitatem skut pars ad totum. Et ideo si aliquis
homo sit periculosus communitati corruptivus ipsius propter aliquod peccatum, laudabiliter et salubriter (Jccidituy. ut bonum commune conservetur. "Modicum" enim
"Jermentum totam massam corrumpit", ut dicitur lCo 5.6. The theologians and
canonists of the tweJ.#h and thirteenth century practically unanimously agreed upon
the legitimacy of me, death penalty when imposed by public authority. Discussion
on the subject did no more than clarify its circumstances or requirements
Rojas.
1995, p. 99; S. Sullivan, 1976, p. 14-17). Aquinas did not differ from his contempora
ries in this respect. Because of his great influence in later centuries, however, he has
become known as one of the authorities endorsing the view that capital punishment
is legitimate (N. Blazquez, 1983 and 1985).
a.
185
DYNAMISM
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184
STh II-II 64.2.ra2: Deus, secundum ordinem suae sapientiae, quandoque statim peccatQres
occidit, ad liberationem bonorum,' quandoque autem eis poenitendi tempus ,oncedit;
secundum quod ipse nov;t suis electis expedire. Et hoc etiam humana iustitia imitatw pro
posse, il/os enim qui sunt perniciosi in alios, occidit,' eos 'Vera qui peccant aliis graviter
non nQcentes, ad poenitentiam reservat.
'" On this point I disagree with the analysis of N. BI""!uez, 1983 and 1985. Although I
share his passionate plea for the abolition of capital punishment I think that he
misinterprets Aquinas' comparison and underestimates the importance of the
community for the private person.
138
140
STh II-IT 64.7.co: nihil pYohibet unius actus esse duos eJfectus, quorum alter solum sit in
intentiom; alius vera sit pratter intentionem. Morales autem actus recipiunt speciem
secundum id quod intenditur, non autem ab eo quod est praeter intentionem, cum sit per
accidens, ut ex supradictis patet [STh [ll 721]. Ex actu igitur alicuius seipsum defendentis
duplex effectus sequi potest, unus quidem conservatio propriae vitae; alius autem occisio
invadentis. Actus igitur huiusmodi ex hoc quod intenditur conservatio propriae vitae,
187
DYNAMISM
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186
non habet rationem illiciti: cum hoc sit cui/ihet ruttwale quod se conservet in esse
quantum potest. Potest tamen aliquis actus ex: bona intentione prO'lJeniens il/icitus reddi
si non #: proportionatus fini. Et ideo si aliquis ad defendendum propriam vitam utatur
mawri violentia quam oporteat, erie illicitum. Si vera moderate violentia repeJJat, erit
!idta defensio, nam secundum iura [Deer. Greg. IX 5.12.18J "vim vi repellere licet cum
moderamine inculpatae tutelae. Nee est necessarium ad salutem ut homo actum
moderatae tutelae praetermittat ad evitandum occisionem alterius, quia plus tenetur
homo vitae suae providere quam vitae aJienae. Sed quia occidere hominem non licet nisi
publica auctoritate propter bonum commune, ut ex supradictis patetj illicitum est quod
homo intendat occidere hominem ut seipsum ,defendat, nisi ei qui habet publicum
auctoritatem, qu~ intendens hominem occidere ad sui defensionem, re/ert hoc ad
publicarn bonum, ut patee in muite pugnante contra hostes, et in ministro iudicis
pugnante contra latrones. Quamvis et isti etiam peccent si privata libidine 11U)veantur.
On the history of interpretation of this anicle d. J. Rojas, 1995.
141 STh 11-11 64.6.ra3.
,n STh 1I.1I 42.2.ra3; In II Sent 44.2.2.ra5: De reg prine 1.7 and 11. Cf. also F. de Gri;s.
1974, p. 28()'287.
14) Aquinas himself suggests that war and homicide can be compared to each other. Cf.
STb II-II 40.1.00: Et sieut lkite defendunt eam materiali gladio contra interiores quidem
perturbatores, dum male/actores puniunt (..J ita etiam gladia bellico ad eos pertinet
rempublicam tueri ab exteriarihus hostibus. War concerns the combat of a community
against an external agressor. Nevertheless, the word is used in a wider meaning for
private fights, d. STh ll-ll 123.5.co: in particular; impugnatione, quae communi,
nomine bellum did potest.
Cf. 5Th II-l1 37.prol: Deinde considerandum est de peccatis quae opponuntur paci. Et
primo. de discordia, quae est in corde; sea4ndo, de contentione, quae est in are,' tertio de
his quae pertinent ad opus. scilicet. de schismate. rixa et bello.
m STh 1I1I 40.1.eo: RespondeD dicendum quod ad hoc quod aJiquad bellum sit iust_ tria
requiruntur. Primo quidem, auctoritas principis, cuius mandato bellum est gerendum.
Non enim pertinet ad personam privatam bellum movere... Cum autem cura rei publi
cae commissa sit principibus, ad eos pertinet rem pub/icam civitatis vel regni seu
provinciae sibi subditae tueri... Secunda, requiritur causa iusta, ut scilicet illi qui
impugnantur propter a/iquam culpam impugnationem mereantur... Tertio, requiritur ut
sit intentio bellantium rec~ qua scilicet intenditur vel ut bonum promoveatur, vel ut
malum vitetur... Potest autem contingere quod etiam si sit legitima auctoritas indicentis
bellum et causa iusta,_ nihilominus propter pravam intentionem belJum reddatur ut
illicitum. A founh criterion, that the innocent people may not be endangered is not
mentioned. Presumably because in the case of war out of self-defense the innocent
people are already endangered.
H6 STh l1.n 40.4.co, where the question is put forward as to whether one is allowed to
wage war on days of feast: Multo autem magis est conservanda salus rei publicae, per
quam impediuntur occisiones plurimorum, et innumera mala et temporalia et spiritualia,
quam sa/us corpora/is unius hominis. Et ideo pro tuitione reipuhlica fuielium licitum est
Hi
188
CHAPTERlli
DYNAMISM
1+9
1SO
iusta bella excercere in diebus festis, si tamen hoc necessitas exposeat, hoc enim esset
tentare Deum, si quis, imminente tali necessitate, a bello vellet abstinere. On the sin of
tempting God cf. STb nn 97.
.
147 STh II-II 11.1.agl: Dicit enim Hieronymus, et habetur in Decretis x.:rav; q.3: "Haeresis
graece ab electione dicituy, quod scilicet earn sibi unusquisque eligat disciplinam quam
putat esse mdiorem". Hieronymus is quoted from In Gal. 3 [PL 26,445).
14~ STh II-II 11.1.co: intendit quidem Christo assentire, sed defoit in eJigendo ea quibus
Christo assentiat, quia non eligit ea quae sunt vere a Christo :radita, sed ea quae sibi
propria mens suggerit. Ee ideo haeresis est infuJeJitatis species pertinens ad eos qui fidem
Christi profitentuy, sed eius dogmata eorrumpunt.
189
151
SIb I l.1.co: a euius tamen veritatis eognitione dependet tota hominis salus, quae in Deo
est.
STh II.II 11.3.co: Ex parte quidem ipsorum est peecatum per quod meruerunt non solum
ab &desia per excommunicationem se:parari, sed etiam per mortem a mundo excludi.
Multo enim gravius est corrumpere luiem, per quam est animae vUa, quam falsare peeu
niam, per quam temporali vitae subvenitur. Unde si falsarii peeuniae, vel alii
maiefactores, statim per saeeu/ares principes iuste morti tradunturj multo magis haeretic~
statim cum de haeresi convincuntur, possent non solum excommunicari, sed et iuste oceidL The par;illel betweeu heresy and forgery is less successful with regard to the
intention underlying both actions: (possible) sincerity versus deliberate deceit.
STh II.II 11.3.co: Ex parte autem Ecclesiae est misericordia., ad errantium conversionem.
Et idoo non statim condemnat, sed "post primam et secundam correctionem") ut
Apostolus docet (Tt 3,10). Postmodum vera, si adhuc pertinax inveniamr, &desia,' de eius
conversione non sperans, aliorum saluti providet) eum ab Ecelesia separando pey
excommunicationis sententiam; et ulterius reJinquit eum iudicio saeculari a mundo
exterminandum per mortem.
191
DYNAMISM
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underlying the position towards heretics one can detect the hierarchy of
elements which was discovered in chapter II, continued to its extreme
consequence. Aquinas explains that according to Mt 5,44 the charity of
the Church is extended to all people: friends, enemies and persecutors.
To want and to operate the good for one's neighbour belongs to caritas.
The good, however, is twofold. The spiritual good, the salvation of the
soul (in other words: the relationship with God) is mainly related to
charity: one ought to wish for every human being this vita gratiae out
of charity and therefore the Church has mercy on those who are
misguided. 15' Secondary to charity are the temporal goods, to which
corporal life, wordly possesions, a good name and ecclesiastical or
secular dignity belong. These ought to be wished insofar as they are
directed at eternal salvation of thQSe who enjoy them and others. Now,
when the possession of one of these temporal goods hinders eternal
salvation of many people, out of charity one no longer wants this
person to possess that good. One rather wants him to do without it for
two reasons: because eternal salvation is to be preferred above temporal
goods and because the good of many ought to be chosen above the good
of the individual. When heretics are always received back into the
Church, when time after time their life and other temporal goods are
preserved, other faithful may be damaged: when they relapse they may
(spiritually) kill other people, and when they escape their punishment
they may surely bring others to commit heresy.'53
This hierarchy of goods (possessio mundana . vita corporalis . salus
animae) according to which the attitude towards heretics is determined,
190
152
153
STh II-II l1.4.co: Pertinet autem ad caritatem ut aliquis bonum proximi et veiit et
opereeur. Est autern duplex bonum. Unum quidem spirituale, scilicet salus anim4e, quod
principa/iter Yespicit caritas> hoc enim quiJibet ex caritate debet alii velie. Untie quantum
ad hoc, haeretid reuertentes, quotiescumque Telapsi juerim, ab Ecclesia recipiuntur ad
poenitentiam, per quam impend;tur eis via salutis.
STh II-II l1.4.co: Aliud autem est bonum quod secundario respicit caritas. scilicet bonum
temporaie: situt; est vita corporaiis, possessio mundana, bona foma, et dignitas
ecclesiastic-a sive saecularis. Hoc enim non tenemur ex caritate allis velie nisi in ordine
ad salutem aeternam et eorum et aliorum. Untie si aliquid de huiusmodi bonis existens
in uno impedire POSSil atternatn salutem in mullis, non oponet quod ex caritate
huiusmodi bonum ei velimus, sed potius quod velimus eum illo carere, tum quia salus
temportd~
1>1
193
DYNAMISM
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basis for the rule that no one, under any circumstance, is allowed to kill
192
an innocent person.
159
156
157
ISS
SIb ll-TI 64.6.co: a1iquis homo dupliciter considerari potest: uno modo, secundum Ie; alia
modo per comparationem ad aliud. Secundum se quidem considerando hominem,
nul/urn occidere Iicet, quia in quolibet, etiam pcatore, debemus amare naturam quam
Deus fecit, quae per occisionem corrumpitur. Sed sicut supra dictum est, occisio peccatoris
fit licita per comparationem ad bonum commune, quod per peccatum corrumpitur. Vita .
autem iustorum est conservativa et promotiva boni communis, quia ipsi sum principalior pars multitudinis. Et ideo nullo modo licet occidere innocentem.
STh I-II 100;1.co: Quaedam [praecepta mora/fa] enim sunt quae statim per se ratio
natura/is cuiuslibet hominis diiudicat esse facienda vel non facienda; sicut: Honora
patrern tuum, et matrem tuam, et: "Non occides", "Non furtum/acies" et huiusmodi
sunt absolute de lege naturae.
This does not mean that natural sympathy and connaturality do not play a
constitutive role in the process in which people learn to see the theological
foundation. Both natural love of friends and relatives (Cf. STh IIII 26.6-12) as well as
Natural Law are the bw for the via inventionis.
STh II-II 25.6.00: in peccatoribus duo possunt considerar4 scilicet natura, et culpa.
Secundum naturam quidem, quam a Deo habent, capaces sum beatitudinis, super cuius
communicatione caritas jundatur, ut supra dictum est,' et ideo secundum naturam suam
sunt ex caritate diligendi... Debemus enim in peccatoribus odire quod .peccatores sunt, et
diligere quod homines sunt beatitudinis capaces. Ee hoc est eos vere ex caritate diligere
propter Deum.
160
195
DYNAMlSM
CHAPTERID
beings have no other ultimate end in life than being united with God by
charity; this, can now be attained in different ways. Thus a diversity of
states and offices can be discerned in the Church. Aquinas considers this
diversity appropriate for at least three reasons: it pertains to the
perfection of the Church itself that the plenitude of grace overflows
from the head (Christus Caput) to the limbs in a variety of manners .
like the perfection of the one God is. found in creation in multiple
forms and ways. Moreover, it is better that the different kinds of actions
which are necessary in the Church are performed by different people so
that they are more free and less hindered by confusion in their work.
Finally, it pertains to the dignity and beauty of the Church that there is
an order.l64
The diversity of states is directed at the perfection. of Christian life.
As was explained before, some human beings commit themselves to
living with God in such a way that they are entirely free for the
development of the relationship with God. By making a vow to live
according to the Evangelical Counsels, they enter a religious order
which is, because of its stability, called a religious state. The diversity of
offices, however, is based on the diversity of actions that need to be
performed. Thus, Thomas discerns seven offices which are directed at
the ministry of the Church: sacerdos, diaconus, subdiaconus, acolythas,
lector, exorcista, ostiarius.'" Those of them who are directly concerned
with the Sacrament of the Eucharist are also called clerici.'"
With regard to dealing with life and death, it is important to take
into consideration the distinction between state (status) and office
(officium). Namely, on the basis of this distinction does Aquinas
consider it suitable that a religious order is occupied with waging war,
but not appropriate that clerics are involved in the shedding of blood.
This position of Aquinas shows the ambivalent character homicide has
as malum secundum se and sometimes simultaneously bonum secundum
194
'" Ultimately the private good 01 each individual is nothing else than the perfection 01
the rdationship with God, at which all other goods are directed. Cf. Aquinas'
discussion in 5Th 111 19.10 where he takes pains to keep in halance the multiplicity
of perspectives and interests on the one hand and the unity of God as highest good
on the other.
197
DYNAMISM
CHAPTERm
quid. At the same time it affirms that Aquinas regards self-defense as the
196
.
only reason for the legitimacy of homicide.
The fact that a religious order can be directed at waging war is
explained by the fact that the opera vitae activae pertain to the aid of
one's neighbour and obedience to God. The military office (officium) is
also directed at the aid of fellow human beings. Thus the two may
overlap in objective, when the aid and defense of people is related to the
defense of the divine service, the public safety or the poor and
oppressed. 167 In the military religious order the killing of sinners is
related to the perfection of one's relationship with God. This is done
under the formal consideration of help and defense.''' The religious
who fight in such an order, do so out of love for their neighbour. Out
of this motive they, in fact, risk their lives in the danger of warfare, and
come close to the perfection of the martyr, as does the soldier in a just
war.169
All this, however, does not mean that clerics are not involved in
warfare; they definitely are, but in accordance with their office:
171
172
167
161
169
STb II-II 188.3.co: religio institui potest non solum ad opera contemplativae vitae, sed
etiam ad opera vitae activae, inquantum pertinent ad subventionem proximorum et
obsequium Dei, non autem inquantum pertinent ad aliquid mundanum tenendum.
Cf. the words which are used in STh IIII 1883: resistere, tueri, defendere, CUTa,
subsidium. The same words appear within another context within which warfare and
life with God are related: the man who makes a vow to take up the cross in support
of the Holy Land. For this d. in chronological order. In W Sent 20.1.3b, In W Sent
32.1.4, In W Sent 38.1.4, amp 6.6.raI2, De form 5 [Leon: 20], Quod/ 2.8.2, De p<if
13 [Leon: 182], Quod/ 4.7.2, Quod/ 5.7.2 and STh II-II 88.12.
STh II-II 124.5.ra3: bonum reipublicae est praecipuum inter bona humana. Sed bonum
di'Vinu~ quod est proprium causa martyrii, est potius quam humanum. Quia tamen
bonum humanum potest efjici divinum, ut si re/eratur in Deum; potest esse quodcumque
bonum humanum martyni causa secundum quod in Deum refertur.
173
Cf. also STh II-II 40.2".raJ: Non enim interdicitur eis bellare quia peccatum sit, sed quia
tale exercitium eorum personae non congruit.
On this point I do not share the conclusion of F. de Grijs, 1987. p. 3-4, who ascribes
to Thomas aan approach of fragmentiza:tion" as regards the interdiction for
clergymen to kill. For Aquinas the incompatibility of ordination and homicide is a
matter of functionality and representation as will be shown.
STh II-II 40.2.co: ad bonum societatis humanae plura sunt necessaria. Diversa autem a
diversis melius et expeditius aguntur qUtfm ab uno; ut patet per Philosophum, in sua I
Politica 1.5 [1252b3J... Bellica autem exercitia maxime repugnant illis officiis quibus
episcopi et cleric; deputantur, propter duo. Primo qu~ generali ratione, quia bellica
exercitia maximas' 'inquietudines habent... Et ideo sicut negotiationes, propter hoc quod
nimis implicant animum, interdicuntur clericis, ita et bellica exercitia. .. Secunda, propter
speciaJem rationem. Nam omnes clericorum ordines ordinantur ad altaris ministerium,
in quo sub Sacramento repraesentatur passio a,rist~ secundum iIlud leo 11,26;
HQuotrescumque mt:tnducabitis panem hunc et calicem bibetis, mortem Domini
anuntiabitis, donee venial. " Et ideo non competit eis occidere vel effundere sanguinem,
sed magis esse paratos ad propriam sanguinis effusionem pro On-isto, ut imitentur opere
quod gerunt ministerio.
198
and free to decide with regard to the things of this life. But the transition from this life to another more happy one is not subjected to the
free will, but to God's power. A human being, therefore, is not allowed
to kill himself in order to pass to a more happy life.17' Thomas does
not give an argumentation by which it is made clear why only God may
decide about life and death. The examples he gives all come down to
fleeing from natural (miseriae) or moral evil (peccatum commissum, ab
alia corrumpari, timor consentiendi in peccatum). Killing oneself is the
greatest natural and moral evil one can do to oneself and thus it never
outweighs any evil in either of the two categories. V7
All four examples seem to reflect the thought which is expressed at
the beginning of the responsio: deciding to leave this life for another
more happy life is not up to man. Earlier we have read the expression
that a person who causes his own death 'leaves the road before the
end.'v, The examples given here all endorse this view: natural and
moral evil are pan of this eanhly life, part of the process of living, with
God within the coordinates of materiality and time. Leaving these
coordinates means leaving the human mode of being and reaching for a
176
177
interesting observations concer.o.ing the way suicide was approached in the Middle
Ages: in contrast with contemporuy approaches (c!. Th. Beemer, 1984) the suicide is
considered as author rather than as victim (p.5). The 'psychological' approach to
suicide took place within the moral framework of vinues, vices and the Sacrament
01 Penance (p. \3.17).
5Th IT-IT 64.5.ra3: Ad tertium dicendum est quod homo constituitur dominus sui ipsius
per liberum arbitrium. Et ideo !iefte potest homo de seipso disponere quantum ad ea quae
pertinent ad ba.nc 'Vi~ quae hominis limo arbitrio regitur. Sed transitus de hac vita
ad aliam feliciorem non suhiacet libero arbitrio hominis sed potesta:i divinae. Et ideo
non licet homini seipsum inteiflCere ut ad feliciorem transeat vitam.
5Th II-IT 64.S.ra3: Similiter etiam nee ut miserias quasJibet praesentis vitae evadat, quia
ultimum malorum huius vitae et maxime terribile est moys. ut patet per Philosophum in
m Ethicorum 6 [1115a26}. Et ita inferre sibi mortem ad alias huius vitae miserias
e7Jadendas est maius malum assumere ad minoris mali vitationem. Similiter etiam non
lice: seipsum occidere propter aliquod peccatum commissum. Tum quia in hoc sibi
maxime nocet quod sihi adimit necessarium poenitentiae tempus. Tum etiam quia male
Jactorem occidere non licet nisi per iudicium publicae potestatis. Similiter etiam non licet
mulieri seipsam occidere ne ab alia corrum-patur. Quia non debet in se committere
crimen maximum. quod est sui ipsius occisio, ut vitet minus crimen alienum (non enim
est crimen mulieris per violentiam violatae, si consensus non adsit, quia "non inquinatur
corpus nisi de CQnsensu mentis", ut Lucia dixit}... Constat autem minus esse peccatum
fornicationem -vel adulterium quam homicidiJ.tm, et praecipue sui ipsius, quod est
gravissimum, quia sibi ipsi nocet, cui maximam dilectionem debet. Est etiam
periculosissimum, quia non restat tempus ut per poenitentiam expietur. Similiter etiam
nulli licet seipsum oecidere ob timorem ne comentiat in peecatum. Quia non sunt
focienda mala ut veniant bona, vel ut vitentur mala, praesertim minora et minus ceria.
Incertum enim est an aliquis in futurum camentiat in peecatum, patens est enim Deus
hominem quacumque tentatione superveniente, liberare a peecata.
J
,,. SIb
1l$
199
CHAPTERID
DYNAMISM
171
200
201
DYNAMISM
CHAPTERll
life (vita gloriae) which can only be hoped for as the perfection of a
relationship which began in this earthly life, however miserable it may
be.
This interpretation of the respondo may be sustained by what was
examined in chapter IT (especially the first section). A more positive
determination of why killing oneself is such a great sin in Aquinas'
view, can also, however, be obtained by reading the corpus of the article.
Here Thomas lists three reasons why it is illegitimate to kill oneself;
they concern oneself, the community and God.
Killing oneself is an evil against oneself in two respects. Within the
natural order man loves himself and tries to evade his corruption for as
long as possible. Thus killing oneself is against one's natural inclination
and against Natural Law. But nature is open towards perfection by grace
and, according to the order of grace, killing oneself is also a mortal sin.
In the hierarchy of objects of charity, it was shown that after the love
for God man ought to love himself. Loving oneself out of caritas is the
perfection of natural self-love by which one loves oneself as a creature
made by and directed at God. Killing oneself goes against all this and is
thus a major evil against oneself.'"
At the same time, killing oneself is committing an evil towards the
community. The importance of the community for the life of the
individual has as its counterpart the importance of the individual for the
community. Every good individual contributes to the common good
and thus' promotes the life of himself and his fellow human beings. A
person can be considered apart from the community, but he is always
connected with it in reality. By killing oneself, one deprives the
community of a constituting member. Thus one causes damage to the
means killing someone who in this respect does not belong to himself
but to God who decides about life and death.l8l
In contrast with the ra2, the three lines of reasoning in the corpus
seem to imply that the one who kills himself is an innocent person. The
three parties against whom is sinned are: oneself, one's neighbour
(represented by the community) and God"': the three objects of the
ordo caritatis (considering one's spiritual well-being and one's body as
one). This makes clear that killing oneself is a major sin since it is
contrary to life in all its meanings and at all levels: it appears as the
opposite of the good of nature and grace. Like the negative of a
photograph it reveals the reverse image of what human life is heading
for: the love for God, oneself and one's neighbour. The picture of a
person killing oneself seems, superficially, considered as being almost
identical with the sacrifice of the martyr"': the willingness to give up
one's life seems to connect the ultimate act of charity with the greatest
sin against oneself. The great difference, however - in which they are
diametrically opposed - is the attitude towards oneself, one's neighbour
and God. In the case of the martyr the perfection of caritas entails that
the centre of love has shifted outside oneself, to God (Ga 2,20: non ego
vivo, sed Christus in me). This love for God flows over to being of a
total availability to one's neighbour. In the case of the one who kills
himself, the centre of love has disappeared and is, even, no longer in
oneself (5Th IT-IT 64.5.co: contra inclinationem natura/em). For what
concerns the relationship with his neighbour, this person is unavailable
and closed in himself.
Thus killing oneself is a double murder: not only corporal life is
destroyed, but spiritual life as well.'" The relationship with God,
STh II-II 64.S.co: Tertia, quia vita est quoddam donum divinitus homini attributum, et
eius potestati subiectum, qui occidit et vivere facit. Et ideo qui seipsum vita privat in
Deum peccat, sicut qui alienum servum inter/kit peccat in dominum cuius est serous,' et
sicut peccat ille qui usurpat sibi iudicium de re sibi non commissa. Ad solum enim
Deum pertinet iudicium mortis et vitae, secundum iI/ud Dt 32,39: "'Ego occidam, et ego
vivere faciam".
182 Cf. also STh IT-II 59.3.ra2 where me same three appear.
'" This thought is workM out by Gabrid Marcel: d. P.-F. Ruelius, 1995, p. 168-197,
especially p. 196.
184 In duo praec 7 (de quinto praecepto [Busa: 96]: Et- sciendum, quod aliqui occidunt
solum corpus, de quo dictum est; alii animatn, auferendo vitam gratiae, trahendo scilicet
ad peccatum morta/e. In 8,44 "me homii:ida erat ab initio", inquantum scilicet ,traxit ad
peccatum. Alii autem utrumque, et hoc dupliciter. Primo in destructione praegnantium,'
181
179
5Th II-II 64.5.co: seipsum occidere est omnino illicitum triplice ratione. Primo quidem
quia natura/iter quaelibet res seipsam llmat, et ad hoc pminet quod quaelibet res
natura/iter conservat se in esse et corrumpenti'bur resistit quantum potest. Et ideo quod
ttlitjuis seipsum oceidat est contra inclinationem natura/em, et contra Cilritatem, qua
180
qui/ihet debet seipsum diligere. Et ideo occisio sui ipsius semper est peccatum mortale,
utpate contra natura/em legem, et contra caritatem existens.
STh ll-II 64.s.co: Secunda, quia quae/ibet pars id quod est, est. totius. QuUibet autem
homo est pars communitatis, et ita id quod est, est communitatis. Unde in hoc quod
seipsum inter[tCit, iniuriam communitati tacit, ut paw per Philosophum, in V Ethicorum 9 [1138411J.
202
DYNAMISM
CHAPTER III
however, remains aod since this core of humao life is qualifying 'life'
after death, the damage done to oneself is the greatest one cao imagine.
(vita gratiae) is seen as the core of earthly life. But what if God kills ao
innocent human being? Does this fit in with what we have learned so
far? Probably the thought would never have come to mind were it not
that in Genesis 22 the story is told of Abraham who is charged by God
to sacrifice his only son Isaac. Aquinas mentions the story in a number
of places aod contexts.'" Usually Aquinas' interpretation of the story
is dealt with in the context of the Decalogue or Natural Law.'"
Although this context is evident from the examination of Aquinas
himself, we study Thomas' interpretation of the story for the sake of
what it reveals about the relationship between God and mao, and what
it entails for the relation between vita naturae aod vita gratiae.
In STh I-IT 100.8 the question is discussed whether the commaodments of the Decalogue are dispensable. In the third ohiectio it is argued
that the fifth commaodment of the Decalogue is legitimately dispensed
in the case of criminals aod enemies. In the corpus, Aquinas explains that
a commaodment can be dispensed when, in a particular case, observing
the words of the law would be in opposition to the intention of the
legislator. The commaodments of the Decalogue, however, contain the
very intention of the legislator, who is God. The precepts of the First
Table (1-3) contain the order at the common aod final good, which is
God. The precepts of the Second Table (4-10) contain the order of
justice which ought to be observed among humao beings and which is
organised according to the principle that each mao is given his due
Summarizing the first part of the third section, it was shown how
the relationship with God (vita gratiae) is the larger framework as well
as the ultimate criterion within which Aquinas deals with corporal life
and death. First, we demonstrated that, although homicide is a natural
and moral evil, according to Aquinas it is sometimes legitimate as selfdefense of the community of innocent people. For what concerns the
strict conditions to which it is tied, capital punishment can be compared
with the criteria which are applied to the justification of waging war
and killing tyrants. Secondly, by examining Thomas' view on the killing
of heretics, it was shown how the' life of grace determines dealing with
corporal life aod death: life with God is such a great good that the
temporal good of corporal life is subject to it. In situations of conflict
the latter is to be sacrificed in order to safeguard the first. After having
focused on the killing of heretics, we were able, in the third place, to
appreciate that also the interdicton to kill innocent people is based on
the fact that corporal life is the place to live aod develop humao life
with God. In the fourth place, from ao examination of the difference
between the cleric aod the religious with regard to the involvement of
the shedding of blood, we ascertained that corporal life is for the benefit
of life with God. The prevalence of the latter over the former is so great
that, in Aquinas' view, even the killing of sinners in defense of spiritual
well-being of one's neighbour can be included in religious life. In the
light of what was found, in the fifth place, killing oneself appears as the
negative-picture of martyrdom aod the greatest harm one cao do
towards oneself.
3.2 God and homicide
So far, homicide has been examined from the perspective of the
community of humao beings. It was shown that the criteria which are
listed in STh IT-IT 64 are meaot to safeguard the living together of people
in a community. In this sense they establish the preconditions of natural
life. Within the context of a safe community, people are called to live
with God and develop their relationship with God. Thus life with God
203
(debitum).187
The distinction between the precepts of the First Table and those of
the Second Table is importaot so as to appreciate what is at stake when
185
186
117
In the Summa Theologiae the sacrifice of Isaac is mentioned in 5Th I 114.2.00; 5Th III 94.5.ra2; STh I-II 100.8.ra3; STh I-II 102.4.ra2; STh I-II 112.5.ra5; STh II-II
64.6.agl/ral; STh II-II 97.2.co; STh II-II 104.4.ra2; STh II-II 111.1.ra1; STh IIII 154.2.ra2; STh II-II 171.5.co; S1b III 10.2".1.
The question is then whether Natural Law can be changed, or whether the
commandments the Decalogue can be dispeosed. Cf. K. Hedwig, 1992.
STh I.IT 100.8.co: tum in praecepti debet fteri dispensatio, quando oceurri: aliquis
of
204
CHAPTER. ill
DYNAMISM
God kills a human being. The commandment "You shall not kill" is
part of the Second Table by which the relations between human beings
are arranged. Within this social context it is illegitimate to kill an
innocent human being. As we have seen, howeverJ there are situations
us 5Th I-IT lOO.S.ra3: occisio hominis prohibetur in Decalogo secundum quod habet
rationem indebiti; sic enim praeceptum continet ipsam ratwnem iustitiae. Lex autem
humana hoc concedere non potest, quod lieite homine indebite occidatur. Sed
malefactores accid;, vel hastes reipublicael hoc non est indebitum. Unde hoc non
contrariatur praecepti DecaJogi, nee talis occisio est homicidium, quod praecepto Decalogi
prohibetur, ut Augustinus dicit in I De libero arbit., cap. 4, ante med [PL 32,1226].
189 5Th I-II lOO.S.ra3: Similiter et iam Abraham, cum comensit Dcewere filium, non
comensit in homicidium, quia debitum erat eum accid; per mandatum Dei, qui est
Dominus vitae et mortis. Ipse enim est qui poerwn mortis infligit omnibus hominibus,
iustis et iniustis. pro peccato primi parentis, cuoo sententiae si homo sit executor
auctoritate divina. non erit homicida, simt nee Deus. Cf. also STh I-II 94.5.ra2: naturali
morte moriuntur omnes communiter. tam nocentes quam innocentes. Quae quidem
natura/is mcrs divina potestate inducitur propter peceatum originale; secundum iI/ud lK
2.6: "Dominus morti/icat et vivijicat". Et ideo absque alia iniustitia, secundum
mandatum Dei, palest inj/igi mors cuicumque homini, vel nocenti vel Innocenti. Cf.
also sn II-II 104.4.ra2, where God is called Auctor vitae et mortis, and In duo praec 7
205
190
sn I 21.1.ra3: Et /ieet Deus hoc modo debitum alieui det, non tamen ipse est debitor,
quia ipse ad alia non ordinatur. sed potms alia in ipsum. We Will return to this in
chapter IV, p. 242.
206
DYNAMISM
CHAPTER IV
208
CHAPTER IV
PERFECTION
In
1.1 Etema1life
In the first chapter it was shown that vita aetema is a name for
God's incomprehensible life as well as for the ultimate end of human
life. Thus, as we noticed in 3.1, the same 'negative' strain we perceive in
Thomas' God-talk can be expected with regard to his eschatology. In the
preceding chapters we indicated that the ultimate end of man is the visio
beata: the beatic vision in which God is seen face to face. This vision
exceeds the natural powers of the created intellect. It can only be
endowed by God Himself. Thus, not only the object of the beatific
vision is incomprehensible from the perspective of our life on earth, the
manner in which this vision is bestowed on us also shares this
incomprehensibility. Thomas speaks of this endowment as God's
glorifying work (opus glorificationis).' This entails at least three features
which qualify the perfection of life with God, as examined in this
chapter.
In the first place, the opus glorificationis is entirely God's work and
not that of creatures. The dynamism of the relationship with God,
which is characteristic for life in via, is radically transformed in patria.
During life on earth man is a free agent who is enabled, with the help
of God's grace, to direct his life at union with God. In patria man is no
longer a moral agent. The state of development in grace, the status
merendi, comes to an end at the moment of death. Thomas speaks of
status recipiendi: the state of receiving the fruits (reward or punishment)
of what has been sawn in earthly life.' In this state the will - the faculty
which is the motor of moral agency - is fixed and the glorifying work is
entirely in the hands of the triune God.
In the second place, glorification is the work of God according to
Cf. In Psalm.prol where Aquinas divides the matter of theology into four parts
[Busa: 15]: Est autem quadruplex opus Dei: scilicet creationis ... gubernationis ".
reparationis ... glorificationis ... Et de his omnibus complete in hac doctrina tractatur.
Aquinas does not know the word 'eschatology', Nevenheless I will use the term
when referring to his theological examination of God's glorifying work. In contrast
with 'moral theology' I will not put it in inverted commas because of the difference
in historical shifts.
In IV Sent 45.1.3.co; SIb nn 182.2.ag2.
209
which man is endowed with vita gloriae. The life of glory pertains to
the same genus as the life of grace. Grace is nothing else than the beginning of glory in us; glory is nothing else than the consummation of
grace.' Thus, and this will be worked out later in this chapter, vita
gloriae is first and foremost the perfection of the relationship with God.
This entails that, like the life of grace, this glorification of man is
simultaneously the genuine end of human life as well as purely a gift.
In the third place, the work of glorification escapes our grasp in a
way which differs from the life of grace, because it will take place in the
future. According to Aquinas' account of the human modus cognoscendi,
knowledge is dependent on being. Because future things have no being
(yet), they are not knowable.' The reason why God's glorifying work is
the object of theological reflection, is because in Holy Scripture various
stories are told in which the end of creation and the final destination of
humankind is discussed. We will return to this in the next paragraph. A
second reason, not less important, is because the glorification_ is the
ultimate end of creation, by which all that precedes it is placed in its
appropriate perspective. This leads us to a second access to eschatology:
the concept of finis ultimus.
STh II-II 24.3.ra2: Similiter etiam gratia et gloria ad idem genus referuntur, quia gratia
nihil est aliud quam quaedam inchoatio gloriae in nobis; SIb I 95.1.ag6: natura plus
distat a gratia quam gratia a gloria, quae nihil est aliud quam gratia consummataj STh I
95.1.ra6: gloriam meremur per actum gratia,; Cf. also SIb I-n 111.3.ra2 and SIb In
114.3.ro3.
Cf. H. Goris, 1996, p. 213254.
210
Cf. STh I-II l.1.ral: finis, elsi sit POStreTnUS in executione. est tamen primus in
intentione agentis. Et hoc modo habet rationem causae. On Thomas' account of causa
jinaJis in historical context, d. R. Spaemann/R. Low. 1991', p. 83-96; For the easy
misunderstanding of Aquinas' account of finality, cf. J. Decorte, 1993, p. 90-106.
Because of the central place of the end as causa jinaiis, Vatican I (DH 3016, quoted
in chapter 1, footnote 31) underscores the importance of the finis ultimus for the
elucidation of the nexus mysteriorum.
Cf. H. Rikhof, 1992.
211
CHAPTER IV
PERFECTION
world
->
body
body
->
soul
soul
->
This should be read as: the world is at the service of the corporal
dimension of man; the corporal dimension is at the service of the
spiritual one; the spiritual dimension is at the service of the union with
God. Sometimes Aquinas takes the three steps as one, saying that the
universe is created for the sake of the beatitude of the Saints.'
As creation theology, eschatology comprises the entire universe.
Thus we recognize the same elements, though in reversed order. This
time the connection is not one of finality, of 'being at the service of
something', but one beyond finality. Thus the scheme is:
union with God
soul
soul
=>
body
body
=>
world'
This should be read as: the union with God glorifies the soul; the
glorified soul expresses itself in a glorified body; the glorified body is
endowed with a glorified creation. In this scheme, the same elements
appear in a reversed order, this time organised radically from the central
point at which the elements in via are directed. This reversed order is
characteristic for the peculiar nature of God's 'opus glorificationis: the
structure, according to which everything is connected, no longer has a
character of finality (in the sense of showing a correlation of ends and
means) but one of overflowing, copious expression. This is hardly
thinkable from the perspective of a world in which everything is
moving towards the ultimate end. But taking the ultimate end seriously,
it cannot be conceived unless in terms of total arrival:. all striving comes
to total rest. In fact here we come close to the very same incomprehensible non-motion of God's own life. Indeed, it is vita aeterna of which
we are talking. Nevertheless, the distance between Creator and creatures
remains, as we will see in the next section where this character of overflowing expression of glorified creation is examined in detail.
STh I 73.1.co: Ultima autetn per{ectio, quae est finis totius univers~ est perfecta
beatitudo sanctorum,' quae erit in ultima consummatione saeculi.
212
CHAPTER IV
PERFECTION
213
of the Summa Tbeologiae: all 298 further questions are treated under the
formal consideration of ea quae sunt ad finem. Subsequently, the
perspective of finis ultimus continues to work through: the distinction
between mortal and venial sins is based on the possibility of missing the
ultimate end (mors aeterna); the theological virtues are directed at the
blessed communion with God in patria (d. chapter III, 2.1, p. lS6f);
only theological virtues are called virtues simpliciter, because they alone
make the ultimate end attainable; and within the context of the examination of the virtues, the question as to whether the virtue concerned
will remain in patria has a regular place.
In the Tertia Pars the eschatological dimension of the work of Christ
has already been mentioned. It will be given some more relief in the
next paragraph. In the consideration of the sacraments one may
remember their dimension as signum prognosticum, inherent in each of
the seven sacraments. And with this the final section of the work is
reached, eschatology, to which the next paragraph is devoted.
1.3 God's glorifying work: the tract of eschatology
In the prologue to the Terria Pars, Thomas formulates the intention
to close the Summa Tbeologiae by considering 'the end which is
inunortal life'.14 By placing this tract at the end of his work, he is in
line with Peter Lombard's Liber quattuor sentenriarum and the order of
the Creeds." From the perspective of the history of salvation the
location seems to be natural since it concerns the end of time.
When the place of this tract is examined more closely, one discovers
that Aquinas attaches the perspective of immortal life to the life, death
STh m.prol AquinaS did not finish the Summa Theologiae. He stopped writing after
5Th ill 90 (in the middle of his consideration of the Sacrament of Penance) due to an
experience he had while celebrating Mass on december 6th, 1273. Mer this experience he could. not write any further, for, as he said: "all that I have written seems
like straw to me". Three months later he ditd.
Weisheipl, 1983', p. 320-331).
After his death the so-called Supplementum was "put together with scissors and paste
from pieces cut out of AqUinas' writings on the Sentences"
Weisheipl, 1983'2, p.
362). Because of this indirect authorship the Supplementum .is left out of consideration in this study. Our main sources are In W Sent 43-50, ScG IV 79-97, Comp Th
I 149'184, 5Th I 12, 5Th III 1-5 aod sdected fragments of other works.
" On the history of the place of the eschatological tract before Aquinas, cf. N. Wicki,
1954, p. 7-56.
14
Cf. P. Kiinzle, 1965, p. 233, taking up the Pauline image of !Co 15,37.
Cf. P. Kiinzle 1961 aod 1965.
10
For what concerns the Tertia Pars this principle is covered by the fact that Christ is
via'or et comprehensor (cf. chapter II, 2.1, p. 102). The primacy of finis u/,imus again
points to the God-centered theology of Aquinas: the ultimate end is none other than
God.
11 STh I 1.1.00, quoted in chapter I, foomote 21 on p. 13.
12
STh I 1.2.co: sacra doctrina est seremia, quia procedit ex principiis notis lumine
superioris scientiae, quae scilicet est scientia Dei et beatorum.
U
STh I 73.1.00, quoted above in footnote 7.
a.
a.
214
215
PERFECTION
CHAPTERN
16
17
18
Cf. also the way in which Thomas opens his examination of eternal life in ScG IV
79: Quod per Christum resurrectio corporum sit futUTa.
STh m.prol: Quia sa/valor noster Dominus Iesus Christus .. ' viam veritatis nobis in
seipso demonstr4vit, per quam ad beatitudinem immortaJis 'Vitae resurgendo pervenire
possimus, necesse est ut, ad consummationem tatim theologici negotii .. , de ipso omnium
Salvatore ac benefuiis eOO humano generi praestitis nostra consideratio subsequatur..
Notice how In 14,6 is implicidy quoted. in order to connect Christology and
eschatology.
For the appropriateness of this, d. chapter II, 3.1, p. 126. Notice that in this manner
the elements of the scheme presented above in 1.2.1 (p. 211) show a reversal concerning the order of coming to being and that of recreation: Comp Th I 17.. [leon:
70]: nunc enim anima in/unditur corpori seminato, et ideo convenienter transmutationes
corporis sequitur; tunc vera corpus unietur animae praeexistenti, unde totaJiter sequetur
eius conditiones.
19
"
216
PERFECTION
11
Cf. what we said in chapter ill, 2.1, p. 156ff and 2.2, p. 167ff about the shifts in the
virtues according to which one increasingly loves oneself having God as
centre of gravity'.
In the last decennia various studies show that one cannot playoff Aquinas' account
of the incorruptibility of the soul against a so-called more Biblical idea of corporal
resurrection (R. Heinzmann, 1965; H.J. Weber, 1973; H. Sonnemans, 1984; L.
Schefczyk, 1989). It is also shown which influences have caused oppositions like
these (E. Lew3lter, 1935; J. Pieper, 1959 and 1968; H.J. Weber, 1973; G. Greshake/).
Kremer, 19922 , p. 237-239). I want to stress the imponance of appreciating, what J.
Ratzinger calls, the 'dialogical character of immortality' (T. Ratzinger, 1977, p. 127
129, followed by H. Sonnemans, 1984 and P.F. Ruelius, 1995, p. 346369) which, in
Aquinas' case, is entirely organised proceeding from the relationship with God.
theol~gica1
22
CHAPTER IV
217
219
PERFECTION
CHAPTER IV
218
tl
In IV Sent 49.1.2c.co; vita dicitur dupliciter. Uno modo ipsum esse viventis ... Ex hoc
autem dicitur aliquid vivens quod potest seipsum movere secundum aliquam actwnem ...
unde secunda trans/atum est nomen vitae ad significandum operationem ad quam aliquis
seipsum move4 skut sentire dicitUT vita anima/is, et inteltigere vita hominis; et
secundum hunc modum unusquisque ilJam operationem suam 'Vitam reputat cui maxime
intendit, quasi ad hoc sit totum esse mum ordinatum; This is in line with In 17,3,
quoted in sc2, where knowing God is called etemallife (d. Comp 7b I 163). Nome
that Thomas takes the second and the third meaning of the word 'life' (d. chapter I,
p. 21) as one. He is able to do so because the third meaning depends on the second.
Cf. what we said about the interrelation of the three meanings in chapter II, 1.1, p.
76.
2~
In IV Sent 49.1.2c.ra3: sicat homo fit particeps divinae operationis in q)idendo Deum, ita
fUJt particeps aeternitatis, qua divina operatio mensuratur; et sic ipsa eOO operatio dicitur
vita aeterna. Notice that here eternal life is not primarily eternal existence, but
eternal operation; an operation by which the relationship with God is constituted.
Vita refers primarily to operatio; of course operatio implies esse; On the notion of
'panicipated eternity', d. C. Peter, 1964.
Cf. STh I 10.2.co: ratio aetemitatis consequitur immutabilitatem, sicat ratio temporis
consequitur motum.
26 STh I 10.l.eo: sicut in eognitionem simplieium oponet nos venire per composita, ita in
eognitionem aetemitatis oportet nos venire per tempus ... Sic ergo ex duobus notijicatur
aeternitas. Primo. ex hoc quod id quod est in aeternitate, est interminabile, idest prindpio et fine carens (ut terminus ad utrumque re{eratur). Secundo, per hoc quod ipsa aeternitas successione caret, tota simul existens. For a more elaborate discussion of Aquinas'
account of eternity with regard to God, d. H. Goris, 1996, p. 34-52.
" Cf. chapter I, 1.1, p. 11.
28
In De causis 30 [Busa: 84]: duplex est perpetuitas vel perpetua durabilitas: una quidem
per modum aeternitatis, alia vero per modum totOO temporis. et differunt hae perpetuae
durationes triplieiter. Primo quidem quia perpetuitas aeternalis est fixa, stans. immobilis;
perpetuitas au.tem tempara/is est fluens et mobilis. in quantum tempus est mensura
motus, aeterni~ autem aceipitur ut mensura esse immobilis. Secundo quia perpetuitas
aeternalis est tota simul quasi in uno col/eela; perpetuitas autem temporalis habet
successivam extensionem secundum prius et posterius quae sunt de ratione temporis.
Tertio quia perpetuitas aeternalis est simplex, tota secundum seipsam existens; sed
universalitas sive totalitas perpetuitatis temporalis est secundum diversas partes sibi
succedentes.
2' Aquinas does, though not often, speak of vita perpetua, referring to the perpetuitas
of eternallif., d. In Rom 6.2 [Busa: 1181, In Rom 14.1 [Busa: 4794801, In Heb 7.3
[Busa: 254-2551.
:IS
220
PERFECTION
CHAPTERN
'0 Aeterm'td$ est interminabilis vitae tata simut et perfecta possessio (Boethius,
"
V De
consolatwne 6), quoted in STh I lO.1.ag!. For the tota simul character of vita aetenza,
d. also Ccmp Th I 149.
Cf. what is said in chapter I, 1.1, p. 9ff.
221
:J4
Cf. Aquinas' indication of the light of glory, STh I 12.2.co, diqua similitudo ex par"
vuivae potentiae ... confortans intellectum ad videndum Deum; SIb I 12.2.ral:
simiJitudine quae est per participationem luminis gloriae; STh I 12.6.co: lumen gloriae,
quod intellectUm in quadam deiformitate constituit; 5Th I 12.7.00: lumen gloriae creatum.
ScG m 51.2: divina substantia non potest videri per intelltum aliqua specie creata.
Unde oportet, si Dei essentia videatur, quod per ipsammet essentiam divinam intelleetus
ipsam videat.' ut sit in tali visione divina essentia et quod videtur, et quo videtur.
222
PERFECTION
many times before. The precise connection between caritas and finis
ultimus is established in the concept of lumen gloriae. By the conformity
of the human will with God's will - which charity basically is, as we
saw in the preceding chapter - the intellect is rendered fitting for
receiving the object desired. Thus the amount of charity determines the
degree of panicipation in the visio beata or vita aeterna."
Apart from this preceding and determining role of the will, it plays a
second role according to its function as potency of enjoyment_ Whereas
the appetitive motion of the will comes to rest by attaining the ultimate
end, at the same time the faculty is brought to its limits by enjoying a
pleasure which outreaches our desires and hopes_" Here we arrive at
the notion of ultimate end as beatitude. According to the volitional
order, the will reaches the ultimate end by attaining the highest good.
By attainig this summum bonum" desire comes to rest and the soul is
filled with enjoyment_ As we have seen, Thomas considers the intellect
as the faculty by which the contact with God is made, being the
potency by which the object is received in the potency according to the
manner of the latter. Thus, strictly speaking, visio beata is the core of
beatitude." Since beatitude is the ultimate end of entire man - and man
is more than his intellect - it is accompagnied by the perfection of the
will, which consists in its coming to rest and delighting in the good
,s 5Th I 12.6.co: intel/eetus unius habebit maiorem virtutem seu [acultatem ad videndum
Deum. quam alterius. Pacultas autem videndi Deum non compet;t intel/eetu; CYe4to
secundum suam naturam, sed per lumen g/oriae, quod imeIJectum in quadam deiformitate constituit, ut ex superioribus [STh I 12.5} patet. Unde intel/eetus plus participans
de lumine glariae, perfectius Deum videbit. Plus autem panielpabit de lumine gl~
qui plus habet de caritate. Quia ubi est malor caritas. ibi est maim desideriumi et
desiderium quodammodo facit desiderantem aptum et paratum ad susceptionem
desiderati. Unde qui plus habebit de caritate, perfectius Deum videbit, et beatior ent. For
the necessity of the recta 'VO/untas d. also STh I-ll 4.4 (ra2: recta inclinatio voluntatis
praeexigitur ad beatitudinem, situt rectus motus sagittae ad percussionem sigm). For the
question whether all beatified share equally in the vision of God (based on the exegesis of 1Co 15,41: stel/a differt a stella in claritate) preceding Aquinas' account, d. the
classical study of N. Wicki, 1954, p. 23$-255.
)6
Cf. In Symb 12 (vitam aeternam [Busa; 40D: Item in perfecta satietate desideni: nam ibi
habebit qui/ibet beatus ultra desiderata et sperala. Guius ratio est, quia nul/us potest in
vita ista imp/ere desiderium suum, nee unquam aliquod creatum satiat desiderium
hominis. Deus enim so/us satiat, et in infinitum excedit; et inde est quod non quiescit
nisi in Deo . ... Quidquid enim delectabile est, totum est ihi superabundanter.
" STh I-II 4.2.
CHAPTER IV
223
attained.l8
STh I-II 4.1.00: quadYUpliciter aI;quid requiritur ad aliud. ... Quarto modo, sicut aliquid
concomitans, ut si dicamus quod calor requiritur ad ignem. Et hoc modo delectatio
requiritur ad bea~itudinem. De1ectatio enim causatur ex hoc quod appetitus requiescit in
bono adepto. Unde, cum beatitudo nihil aliud sit quam adeptw summi boni, non potest
esse beatitudo sine de1ectatione concomitante.
n sTh I-II 4.4.co: Et ita .'VOluntas videntis Dei essentiam, ex necessitate amat quidquid
amat, sub ordine ad Deum; sicut voJuntas non videntis Dei essentiam, ex necessitate
amat quidquid amat, sub communi ratione bom quam novit. Cf. also ScG ill 62.
-40
In IV Sent 50.2.4a-c.
.
41
STh I-II 4.8.co: si loquamur de felicitate paesentis vitae ..., felix indiget amicis ... Sed si
loquamur de perfecta beatimdine quae erit in patria, non requiritur societas amicorum
de necessitate ad beatitudinem, quia homo habet totam plenitudinem suae peifectionis in
Deo. Sed ad bene esse beatitudinis facit societas amicorum.
42 In Symb 12 (vitam aeternam [Busa; 92D: quarto consistit [vita aeternaJ in omnium
beatorum iucunda societate. quae societas erit maxime delectabilis: quia qui/ihet habebit
omnia bona cum omnibus beatis. Nam qui/thet diliget alium sicut seipsum; et ideo
gaudebit de bone alterius skut de suo. Quo fit ut tantum augeatur laetitia et gaudium
unius, quantum est gaudium omnium. Cf. R. Petry, 1944, who is right in his
conclusion. though fails to appreciate the radical impact of the primacy of love for
God. Cf. also In IV Sent 49.1.2.
224
other beatified."
Eternal life is God's life in God's mode: it is knowing God with the
double help of God. It is a life of perfection according to which all
striving and desiring has come to rest. The ultimate end is arrived at and
there is no further end, nor further future." For this reason eternal life
has a character of overflowing expression to which we referred above in
1.2.1 (p. 211). The nature of this structure was already introduced in this
study, when we discussed creation in chapter II (p. 70). There we
noticed that God did not need to create for any goal. For the blessed
the same is true: there is no further end apart from sharing in God's
beatitude. Both motives flow together in the notion of eternal life: in
giving eternal life, the triune God gives Himself, and giving oneself, is a
sign of great love." In eternal lif~ man is assimilated to God's overflowing goodness (or love), sharing the same copious beatitude which is at
the origin of creation." In the state of glory everything is there as an
expression of this beatitude, and in the first place that which is by
nature closest to the glorified soul: the body.
43
CHAPTER IV
PERFECTION
In 5Th I-I[ 4.8.ra3 this is elucidated from the consideration that if friendship with
other human beings were essential to beatitude, a single soul could not be blessed:
perfectio caritatis est essentialis beatitudini quantum ad diJectionem Dei, non autem
quantum ad dilectionem proximi. Unde si esset una sola anima fruens DeD, beara essa,
non habens proximum quem diligent. Since this is not reality, Thomas continues: Sed
supposito proximo, sequitur dilectio eius ex perfecta dilectione Dei. Unde quasi
concomitanter se habet amicitia ad beatitudinem perfectam. A similar relation (quasi
concomitanttr, or as in the corpus: ad bene esse) is formulated with regard to the role
of the body, of which we will speak in the next paragraph.
+!
5Th ITll 18.2.ra2: beatitudo sanctorum dicitur 'Vita aetema, quia p~ hoc quod Deo
[ruuntur, efficiuntur quod4mmodo participes aeternitatis divinae, quae excedit omne
tempus. Et ita continuatio beatitudinis non diversijicatur per praesens, praeteritum et
futurum; Cf. also De spe 4.ra3: continuatio beatitudinis non habet rationem futliri: quia
inquantum aliquis homo fit betttus, aetemitatem participat, in qua non est praeteritum
et futurum; unde in betttitudine ilia dicitur vita aeterna.
"s Cf. In Joan 3.3 [Busa: 101]: In hoc autem quod dicit IIhabeat vitam aeternam" Un 3,16]
indicatur divini 411Wris immensitas: nam dando vitam aeternam, dat seipsum. Nam vita
aeterna nihil aliud est quam [rui Deo. Dare autem seipsum, magni amoris est indicium;
Ep 2,4-5: "Deus autem qui dives est in misericordia, convivificavit nos in Christo", idest
fecit nos habere vitam aeternam.
46
Although the infinite distance between the divine and the human nature remains in
patria: d. S7b ITIT 19.11.ra3.
225
"
STh I-II 4.5.ra2: Unde relinquitur quod post separationem a corpore perfictum esse
habettt, unde et peifectam operationem habere potest; licet non habettt peifectam naturam
speciei.
226
227
PERFECTION
CHAPTER IV
Thus, we come across the same view here as in the preceding article: the
body is indispensible for perfect beatitude, but nevertheless not
contributing to its essence. The relation between body and soul in the
state of consummated life with God is one of overflowing expression. In
'Vita acterna human life is still material, corporal, but now radically
'redefined' proceeding from the completed relationship with God. In
this 'redefinition' everything is consistently based upon the relationship
with God." The human capacity for God is located in the soul, not in
the body. The body which has helped us to grow unto eternal beatitude,
is not able to reach it directly. It can only receive it from the soul by
overflowing." In this God-centered eschatology the corporal dimension
of human existence is not denied, but radically subjected to its core: life
with God."
In the. glorified soul, as we have seen, the faculties are in perfect
harmony. Since the soul is forma corporis, the perfection of its faculties
results in a perfect operation of those powers which are connected with
After having reduced the role of the body as regatds the essence of
beatitude, Thomas, as it were, underscores the importance of corporal
resurrection in the next article in the Summa. He rejects a dualistic
anthropology according to which the soul can only be blessed when it is
separated from the body: the ukimate perfection of the soul cannot
exclude its natural perfection according to which it should be united to
the body. In his account of the precise role of the body, however, he
tries to keep a balance between two demands. On the one hand, the
perfect disposition of the body is necessary for a beatitude which is
perfect in every respect. On the other, this perfect disposition of the
body does not contribute to the essence of beatitude: its role is
antecedenter et consequenter. The perfection of the body precedes perfect
beatitude to the degree that it causes no hindrance for the operation of
the intellect; it is subsequent to perfect beatitude by the fact that it
shares in the perfection of the intellect by overflowing {redundantia}."
STh I-II 4.5.co: Cum enim operatio dependeat ex natura rei, quando 4.nima perfectior
erie in sua natura, tanto perj'ectius habebit suam propriam operationem, in qua felicitas
consistit. Cf. also STh I-II 4.5.ra2.
,. STh 111 4.5.ra4.
51
With regard to the determination of the relation between the glorified soul and the
glorified body one cannot hut take sides in an old controversy concerning a
discordance between two texts of Aquinas. Cf. appendix II on p. 272.
51
STh I-II 4.6.co: si loquamur de beatitudine perfecta, sic quidam posuerunt quod tUm
requiritur ad beatitudinem aliqua corporis dispositio, immo requiritur ad earn ut
omnino anima sit a corpore separata ... sed hoc est inconveniens ... Et ideo dicendum est
quod ad beatitudinem omnibus modis perfectam, requiritur perfecta dispositio c01pOYis et
antecedenter et consequenter. Antecendenter quidem, quia, ut Augustinus dicit XII super
ad Gen. ad litt. 35, si tale sit corpus, cuius sit difficiJis et gravis administratio, sicut caro
quae corrumpitur et aggravat animam, avert;tur mens ab iJIa visione summ; caeJi ...
Consequenter vero, quia ex beatitudine animae fiet redundantia ad corpus, ut et ipsum
sua perfectione potiatur, In In IV Sent 49.1.4 Thomas sketches a steadily increasing
line: eanhly life, where union with the body is a hindrance for the perfect operation
of the soul; after death, when the separated soul is liberated from the hindrance of
49
53
Sf
55
the body; after corporal resurrection, when the operation of the soul is intensively
increased by union with the body. In STh 111 4.6, the role of the body in the third
state is limited to a contribution to the beauty or perfection of beatitude (ra1:
aliquem beatitudinis decorem vel perfectionem), consisting in non-hindrance (ra2:
requiritur perfectio corporis, ut non impediat elevationem mentis) and total subjection
(ra3: non autem [requiritur abstractioJ a corpore spirituali, quod erit totaliter spiritu;
subiectum).
In I Cor 15.5 [Busa: 223]: sic ergo et in resurrectione erit alia qualitas corporis
resurgentis, quae tamen proportionabitWl' meritis morientis.
STh II-II 25.5.ra2: corpus nostrum quamvis Deo /rue non possit cognoscendo et amando
ipsu~ tamen per opera quae per corpus agimus ad perfectam Dei fruitionem possumus
venire. Untie ex fruitione animae redundat quaedam beatitudo ad corpus...
Cf. also the strong expressions in STh II-II 18.2.ag4: cum spes sit virtu,s theologica
habens Deum pro obiecto. principale obiectum spei est gloria animae, quae in fruitione
divina consistit, non autem gloria corporis. Gloria etiam corporis, etsi habeat rationem
ardui per comparationem ad natWl'am humanam, non habet tamen rationem ardui
habenti gloriam animae. Tum quia gloria corporis est minimum quiddam in compara
tione ad gloriam animae. Tum etiam quia habens gloriam animae habet iam su/ficienter
causam gloriae corporis; SIb m 7.4.ra2: gloria corporis non pertinet ad beatitudinem
sicut in quo principaliter beatitudo consistat, sed per quandam redundantiam a glOYia
animae ... Unde spes, secundum quod est 'linus theologica, non respicit beatitudinem
corporis, sed beatitudinem animae quae in divina fruitione consistit. Cf. also STb m
15.10.co+ ra2.
228
229
PERFECTION
CHAPTER IV
the body."
The passage of Holy Scripture which is most influential in the
appreciation of the resurrected body, is lCo 15,42-44. Here the
recreation of man, proceeding from his relationship with God, is
qualified as the resurrection of a spiritual body instead of an animal-like
one. The animal-like body - perfected by the soul - is the one which is
inherited from the first man, Adam. The spiritual body is the one which
is entirely directed at the spiritual dimension of human life. Moreover,
the word 'spiritual' simultanuously refers to the life of grace. Here
Christ is the ancestor, giving access to the life.giving Spirit."
The perfection of the glorified body is discussed under the notion of
dotes corporis. Thomas distinguishes four dotes corporis, dowries which
God gives to the glorified so that the body shares in the glory of the
soul: subtilitas, claritas, impassibilitas and agilitas." The dotes are not
descriptions of the glorified materiality of the body. The four concepts
describe the relation between soul and body: corporal dowries are the
dispositions in the glorified body by which the body is made perfectly
subjected to the sou!." The glory of the soul as forma is revealed in the
first three dotes, the function of the soul as motor is perfected in the
fourth. Subtilitas, or subtlety, is not a property which enables the resur
60
S6
5?
58
59
In I Cor 15.6 [Busa: 247]: sed in statu resurrectionis cessabunt operationes animates a
corpore, quia non ent generalia, nee augmentum aut nutrimentum, sed corpus absque
a1iquo impedimenta et fatigatrom incessanter serviet animae ad spirituales operationes
eius.
In I Cor 15.6 [Busa: 199]: Apostolus non dicit quod resurgat spiritus, sed spirituale
corpus. Ergo in resurrectione spirituale eril, non spiritus, sicut nunc est anima/e, non
anima. Ad horum autem differentiam cognoscendam considerandum est, quod unum et
idem in nobis est quod dicitur et anima et spiritus; sed anima dicitur secundum quod
perficit corpus, spiritus autem proprie secundum mentem, secundum quam spiritualibus
subslantiis assirnilamur; and funher: In I Cor 15.7 [Busa: 22]: Duo sunt principia
humani generis; unum secundum vitam naturae, scilicet Adam, aliud secundum vitam
gratiae, scilicet Chrisms, sed anima/itas est derivativa in omnes homines a prima
principio, scilicet Adam; ergo constat quod multo amplius a secundo principio, scilicet
Christo, spirituaJitas derivabitur in omnes homines; Cf. also In Joan 5.5 [Busa: 275ff]
where the resurrection of body and soul is connected with conformity to the Word.
Cf. In IV Sent 49.4.5a-c; ScG IV 86; Comp Tn I 168. For the developments which
have led to this exegesis, d. N. Wicki, 1954, p. 202237. Apan from the four dotes
corporis, Aquinas also distinguishes three dotes animae: visio, fruitio and dilectio. Cf.
In IV Sent 49.4.5, STb I 12.7.ra1, De art 2.
In IV Sent 49.4.5b.co: ita dispositiones quae sunt in corpore glorioso, ex quibus corpus
efficitur peifecte animae subiectum, dicuntur corporis dotes.
61
62
6J
In IV Sent 44.2.2a.co: [Busa: 2] nomen subtilitatis a virtute penetrandi est assumptum,' ...
/Busa: 86] dicta completio, ex quo corpora humana subtilia dicentur, erit ex dominio
animae glorificatae, quae est fonna corporis, super ipsum,' ratione cuius corpus gloriosum
spirituale dicitur, quasi omnino spiritui subiectum. Cf. also In IV Sent 44.2.2h-f.
ScG IV 86.1: Erit [corpus] enim tota/iter subiectum animae, divina virtute hoc fociente,
non solum quantum ad esse, sed etiam quantum ad actiones et passiones, et matus, et
corporeas qualitates. {2] Sicut igitur anima divina visione [mens quadam spirituali
claritate replebitur, ita per quandam redundantiam ex anima in carpus. ipsum corpus
suo mado claritatis gloriae induetur. Cf. In IV Sent 44.2.4a-c.
ScG N 86.4: Et corpus igitur perfoctum per animam proportionaiiter animae, immune
erit ab omni malo. et quantum ad actuni et quantum ad potentiam. Quantum ad actum
quidem, quia nulla in eis erit corruptio. nulla defonnitas, nulla delectus. Quantum ad
potentiam 'Vero, quia non poterunt pati aliquid quod eis sit malestum. Et propter hoc
impassibilia erunt. Quae tamen impassibiJieas non exdudit ab eis passionem quae est de
ratione sensus: utentur enim sensibus ad delectationem secundum iJla quae statui incorruptionis non repugnant. Cf. In W Sent 44.2.1a-d.
ScC IV 863: Anima etiam quae divina visione [metur, ultimo fine coniuncta, in
omnibus experiemr mum desiderium adimpletum. Et quia ex desiderio animae movetur
corpus, comequens erit quod corpus omnino spiritui ad nutum obediet. Unde corpora resurgentium beatorum fotura erunt agilia. Referring to the 'post-final' character of
overflowing of eternal life, Aquinas adds: non quod matus sit in eis propter
necessitatem, cum nullo indigeant qui Deum habent, sed ad virtutis dermmstrationem.
Cf. In IV Sent 44.2.3a-c.
In IV Sent 44.1.4<1; S,G IV 83; o,mp Tb I 156.
230
CHAPTER IV
PERFECTION
70
"
66
"
68
231
232
of Christ to the bodies of the glorified souls and the heavenly bodies."
In the glorified universe everything expresses the situation of
consummated relationship with God. Even the location of the body
within the glorified creation expresses this. The more noble the soul, the
higher and closer to God the body is. Thus the fitting place for the
glorified soul is high in heaven, just like Christ, "who went up above all
heavens to fill all things (Ep 4,10)."" Likewise, the location of those
who turn away from God is expressed by distance from heaven." This
brings us to eternal death, the opposite of glorification.
2.2 Eternal death
7~
CHAPTERN
PERFECTION
In IV Sent 48.2.1.co: omnia corporaJia propter hominem facta esse creduntur, unde et
omnia dicuntur ei esse subiecta. Seruiunt autem ei dupliciter. Uno modo ad
sustentationem vitae corpora/is; alio modo ad profectum divinae cognitionis, inquantum
homo "per fa quae facta sunt, invisibilia Dei conspicit", ut dicit Rm 1,20. Primo ergo
ministeno creaturarum, homo glorificatus nul/o modo indigebit ... Secunda etiam
ministerio non indigebit homo quantum ad cognitionem intellectivam; quia tali
cognitione Deum sanel; videbunt immediate per essentiam. Sed ad hane visionem
essentiae oculus carnis atlingere non poterit; et ideo, ut ei solatium congruens sib; de vis;
one divinitatis praebeatur, inspiriet divinitatem in suu eJfectibus corporalibus, in quibus
manifeste indicia divi.nae maiestatis apparebunt, et praecipue in carne Christi; et post hoc
in corporibus beatorum,' et deinceps in omnibus aliis corporibus... Cf. also QuodI8.9.2;
With regard to Rm 1,20, d. chapter II, footnote 7 on p. 70.
" Quoted in SeG N 87.1.
76
ScG IV 89: Sicut autem corpora beatcrum propter innovationem gloriae supra caelestia
corpora elwabuntur, ita et locus injimus, et tenebrosus, et poena/is, proportionaliter
deputabitur eorporibus damnatomm. .. This is connected with Ps 54,16 and Rv 20,910.
233
" STh 1111 10.12.ag2; STh 1111 24.12.sc; STh ill 68.11.ag3.
234
PERFECTION
CHAPTER IV
eternally.78
.
Theargument rests on the distinction between the status merendi and
the status recipiendi according to which the will is fixed after death. In
chapter II 1.1 (p. 75) it was shown that it is characteristic for the human
condition to grow towards the ultimate end within the coordinates of
materiality and time. This flexibility of the will, as we have seen in the
discussion of eternal life, is not compatible with the attainment of the
ultimate end. The ultimate end is not an end among other ends, but the
end of all ends. Whatever foJlows when flexibility has stopped, is the
perfection of what has begun in earthly life. Thus, the same quality
which makes eternal happiness secure and free from corruption, renders
hell its incomprehensible perpetuity. The consummated union with God
in eternal life is as fixed as the completed aversion from God in eternal
death: both are qualified by the same tota simul. Missing this point is
missing precisely the difference between human life on earth and 'life'
(or 'death')" after death.
After having listed the five arguments, Aquinas recurs to the error of
those who say that the punishments of the evil ones will eventually
come to an end. Thomas calls this position persuasive for its conformity
with what one is used to and what is reasonable. In human law
punishment is inflicted in order to correct bad behaviour; it functions as
medicine and as medium it can be placed within the framework of
finality. Moreover, if punishment were not directed at something else
(emendation, e.g.) it would seem that it is enjoyed for the sake of itself.
This is not compatible with God's goodness. Thus it seems that
punishment can only be inflicted for the sake of correction, which
10
78
79
SeC m 144.1: Oportet autem bane poenam qua quis privatur ultimo fine. esse
interminabilem. [2J Privatio enim alicuius non est nisi quando natum est haberi: non
enim catu/us max natus dicitur visu privatus. Ultimum autern finem consequi non est
homo aptus natus in hac vita, ut probatum est [c. 45) Privatw ergo huiusmodi finis
aportet quod sit poena post ham vitam. Sed post bane vitam non remanet homini
facultas adipiscendi ultimum finem. Anima enim indiget corpore ad consecutionem sui
finis: inquantum per corpus perf'ectwnem acquirit et in scientia _et in virtute. Anima
autem, postquam a corpore foerit separata. non red;t iterum ad hun, statum quod per
'corpus peif'ectionem accipiat. sicut dkebant transcorporationem- ponentes, contra quos
superius disputatum est. Necesse est igitur quod ilIe qui hac poena punitur ultirrw fine
privetur, in aetemum privatus remaneat.
Hence the expression 'second death', in Rv 2,11; Rv 20,6 and 14j Rv 21,8, quoted in
STh 1I-1I 125.3.sc.
235
236
237
PERFECTION
CHAPTER IV
UScG m 144.11: Nihil igitur prohibe4 etiam si poenae non nisi ad emendationem morum
ttdhibeantttr. quin, secundum divinum iudicium, aliqui debeant a societate bonorum
perpetuo separari et in aeternum puniri, ut ex perpetuae poenae tirnore homines peccare
desistant, et bonorum societas purior ex eorum separatione reddatur: sicut dicitur Rv
21,27.. "Non intrabit in earn ~ idest in Ierusa/em caelestt1'11, per quam designatur societas
bonorum, aLi4uid coinfluinatum, aut [adem abominationem et mendacium.
8.. Comp Th I 174: Quia igitur miseria ad quam dude malitia contrariatur felicitati, ad
quam dudt viytus, oportet ea quae ad miseriam pertinent sumere per oppositum eorum
quae de felicitate sunt dicta. Dictum est autem superius quod Ultima hominis /eJicitas,
quantum ad intellectum quidem consistit in plena Dei 'Visione, quantum ad affectum
'Vero in hoc quod 7J()luntas hominis in prima bonitate sit immohiliter firmata.. Erit igitur
extrema miseria hominis in hoc quod intel/ectus tota/iter di'Vino lumine pri'Vetur, et
,affectus a Dei bonitate obstinate a'fJe"ftaturj et haec est praecipua miseria damnatorum,
quae 'Vocatur poena damni.
85
In Symb 12 (vitam aeternam [Busa: l04D: Mali vero. qui erunt in mone aeterna, non
minus habehunt de dolore et poena quam boni de gaudio et gloria. Exaggeratur autem
poena eorum, primo ex separatione Dei et omnium bonorum. Et haec est poena damn~
quae respondet aversion;' quae poena maior est quam poena sensus.
18
In IV Sent 50.2.1d.co: sicut in beatis in patria erit perfectissima caritas. ita in damnatis
erit per/ectissimum odium; unde sicut sanctis gaudebunt de omnibus bonis, ita etiam
mali de omnibus bonis do/ehuntj unde et /elicitas sanctorum considerata eos maxime
ajJligiti and ra3: quamvis ex damnatorum multitudine poena singulorum augeatur,
tamen tantum superexcrescet odium et invidia. quod eligerent torqueri magis cum multis
quam minus soli.
In IV Sent 47.1.2d.co: sicut hominibus per angelos divinae i/luminationis de/eruntur, ita
etiam daenwnes sunt executores divinM! iustitiae in malos. Nec in hoc aliquid minuetUT
de daemonum poena,' quia in hoc quod etiam alios torquent. ipsi torquebuntur. Ihi enim
miserorum societas miseriam non minuet, sed augehit.
239
PERFECTION
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regard to sensible affliction. The fact that the soul is excluded from the
light of divine cognition, is reflected in an opaque and dark body,
lacking the claritas of the beatified." Thus the material dimension of
man - originally intended to lead towards God in accordance with the
human condition - becomes a source of suffering, leading further away
from God, because man used it contrary to what it was meant for.
238
89
90
ScG IV 89.2: Oportet enim et ilIa corpora animabus damnandorum propoYlionata esse.
.. _[3] Quia vero eorum anima erit secundum 'VOluntatem a Deo aversa, et fine proprio
destituttl, eorum corpora non erunt spiritU4iitt, quasi spiritui omnino subiecta, sed magis
eorum anima per affectum erit camalis. Nee ipsa corpora erunt aguia, quasi sine
difficultate animae obedientia: sed magis erunt ponderosa et gravia; et quodammodo
animae importabilia, skut et ipsae animae a Deo per inobedientiam sunt aversa. Renu, nebunt etiam passibilia sicuf nunc-. vel etiam magis: ita tamen quod patientur quidem a
rebus sensibilibus afflictionem, non tamen corruptionem: sicut et ipsorum animae
torquebuntur a naturali desiderio beatitudinis tota/iter frustratae. Erunt etiam eorum
corpora opaca et tenebrosa: sim: et eorum animae a lumine divinae cognitionis erunt
aliena<. CI. also In IV Sent 44.3.1.-c and Comp Tb I 176.
Cf. also STh I 21 where both are treated in a single quaestio.
In IV Sent 46.1.1a.co: {Busa: 41] iustitia commutativa, per quam aequalitas constituitur
inter Deum dantem et creatura recipientem, Deo competere non potest secundum
propriam acceptationem, quia beneficia Dei semper excedunt mentum creaturae,. sed
tamen servatur etiam praporttonis quaedam aequalitas inter Deum d4ntem et creaturam
recipientem, inquantum scilicet se habet ad suam superabundantiam, sicut creatura ad id
quod competit ei secundum suam parvitatem. Et sic etiam quidam modus commutativae
iustitiae invenitur in Deo respectu naturae, simt invenitur inter patrem et fiJium.
" In IV Sent 46.l.Ib.
n In the compact version of S1b I 21.3.co: elargiri perfectiones rebus pertinet quit/em et
ad bonitatem divinam, et ad iustitiam, et ad liberalitatem et misericordiam, tamen
secundum aliam et aliam rationem-. Communicatio enim perfeciionum absolute consi
derata, pertinet ad bonitatem, ut supra ostensum est [STh I 6.2+4]. Sed inquantum
pe:rfectiones rebus a Deo dantur secundum earum proportionem, pertinet ad iustitittm ut
dictum est supra fSTh I 21.2]. Inquantum vero non attribuit rebus perJectiones propter
utilitatem sua.n1, sed solum propter suam bonitatem, pminet ad liberalitatem.
Inquantum vera perflctiones datae rebus a Deo, omnem defectum expellunt} pertinet ad
misericordiam.
'1
240
241
PERFECTION
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certain circumstances. Someone who sins against can'taS, sins against the
?~
95
96
In W Sent 46.1.3.co: [Busa: 23] ita etiam secundum iustitiam divinam aliquis ex peecato
dignus redditur penitus a civitatis Dei consortia separttrij quod fit per omne peccatum
quo quis contra caritatem peccat, quae est vinculum uniens civitatem praedictam; et ideo
pro peccalo mortali, quod est contrarium em-itati, aliquis in aeternum a societale
sanctorum exclusus aeternae poenae adiicitur.
In IV Sent 46.1.3.co: [Busa: 48] inveniuntuy etiam aliae rationes a sanctis assignatae,
quare iuste pro percalo temporal; aliqui poena aeterna puniantur. Una est, quia
peccaverunt contra bonum aeternum, dum contempserunt vitam aeternam ... Alia ratio
est, quia homo in suo aeterno peccavit ... {Busa: 86] potest et alia ratio assigMYi quare
poena peccati mortalis sit aeternt4 quia per earn contra Deum, qui est infinitus, peccatur
... est et quarta ratio ad hoc idem: quia culpa manet in aeternum. cum culpa non possit
remitti sine gratia, quam homo non potest post mortem acquirere: nee debet culpa cware
quamdiu culpa "",net, Cf. also STh 111 87.3-4; STh ill 86.4; Comp Th I 183; In
content the texts are close to ScG m 144, which we discussed above. The differences
are due to the various perspectives which are taken.
In IV Sent' 46.2.2b.co: nee iustitia misericordiae repugrutt,' quia misericordia non est
laudabilis nisi sit secundum rationem rec~ quae est regula iustitiae, sive secundum
ordinem sapientiae in divinis; nee misericordia repugnat iustitiAe; quia dargiri a/iquid
91
9i
99
supra debitum de bonis, vel citra debitum de malis, non est contra iustitiam, sed praeter
earn, ut ex dictis patet.
In IV Sent .46.2.2b.co: Ex parte quidem [Dei] operantis exigitur ut sit superabundantia
in collatione bonorum et diminutione malorum, cum ipse Deus sit excellentissimus
operator, ut dictum est, et in hoc consistit divina misericordia, ex parte autem operati
requiritur receptiD, quae fit secundum proportionem recipiemis,' et in hoc ratio iustitia
consistit.
In IV Sent 46.2.2c.co: et ideo in quolibet opere divino supereminet misericordia iustitiae,
sicut materiali f0171"'l4ie.
In IV Sent 46.2.3a.co: error Origenis fuit, ut Augustinus 21 De civ. Dei dicit, quod
"daemones quandoque per Dei misericordiam liberandi sunt a poenis. " Sed iste error ab
Celesia est reprobatus, propter duo. Primo, quia manifeste auctoritati Scripturae
repugnat, quae habet Rv 20,9: "Diabolus qui seducebat eos, missus est in stagnum ignis et
sulphurts. ubi bestia et psemiopropheta cruciabuntur die ac nocte in saecula saeculorum ";
per quod in Scriptura significari aeternitas consuevit. Secunda, quia ex una parte Dei
misericordiam nimis extendebat, et ex alia parte nimis eam coarctabat: eiusdem enim
rationis esse videtur bonos angelos in aelerna beatitudine permanere, et maios angelos in
aeternum puniri. Unde skut ponebat daemones et animas damnatorum quandoque a
poena liberandas, ita pombal angelos el animas beatorum quandoque a beatitudine in
huius vitae miserias de1J{)lvendas.
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PERFECTION
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and conversion to God.lOO Thus when the demons and the souls of the
damned have the perspective of liberation, the angels and the souls of
the beatified have the perspective of falling back into the misery of this
life, which is in contradiction with the essence of beatitude. In the
following quaestiuncula Thomas discusses a modified version of
Origenes' view according to which at least all human beings are saved
eventually. Again the position is judged to be 'entirely irrational', because of the fixation of the will: for demons this fixation is the result of the
fall, human beings enter this state by death. '01
Summarizing Aquinas' procedure, we see that he consistently turns
all questioning towards the acknowledgement of God's supreme
goodness. This goodness is not only recognizable as justice, but,
foremost, as mercy. Thus he ar~ives at a position according to which
God's mercy is considered to be in total harmony with the suitability of
hell. By the infinite distance between Creator and creatures God is
placed beyond human accusations and all guilt is placed on the side of
man.102
Nevertheless, despite all efforts to show the appropriateness of
eternal punishment, one can observe that Thomas is aware of a tension
between the human efforts to accept the perspective of hell and God's
infinite wisdom. This gap can be traced when we observe his solution to
the question as to whether the knowledge of hell does not spoil the
complete happiness of the blessed. lO' At first sight this solution has the
character of a logical trick: eternal damnation does not spoil God's
beatitude, thus it cannot spoil the beatitude of those who share in God's
happiness by conformity of their will to God's will. In the preceding
In IV Sent "'6.2.3a.sc2: skut boni angel; effect; sunt beati per conversionem ad Deum,
ita mali angel; effecti sunt miseri per aversionem a Deo. Si ergo miseria malorum
ange/arum quandoque finietur; et beatitudo bonorum finem habebit; quod est inconveniens.
101 In IV Sent 46.2.3b.co: siCUl dicit Augustinus, 21 De civ. Dei, quidam in hoc ab errore
Origenis dedinaverum, quod daemones posuere in perpetuum puniri,' sed omnes homines
quandoque liberari a poena; etram info/e1es. Sed haec positio est omnino irrationabilis.
SieUl ,enim daemones sunt in malitia ohstinat;, et ita perpetuo puniendi; ita et animae
hominum qui sine caritate decedunt,' "cum hoc sit hominibus mors quod ange/is casus,
ut Damascenus dicit.
102 [n.W Sent 46.2.2b.ra5: Dico ergo, quod omnibus hominibus ex meritQ proprii peeeati
debetur poena aeternai sed quod aliqui liberentur, hoc est ex sola divina libera/itate:
posset enim omnes iuste damnare; et ideo nulla est iniustitia, si aliquos eligat et a/iquos
reprobat in quibus tamen nulla differentia meritorum praeeessit.
103 In IV Sent 50.2Aa--c.
100
Itl4
243
244
PERFECTION
CHAPTER IV
mentioned here. In the first place, they are human beings thought of as
inspired by charity. Their God-centred love makes them feel sorry for
their sinning neighbour, instead of being keen on their punishment by
God. Eventually, however, they give priority to God's wisdom, which
surpasses their own understanding. In the second place, these viatores
comprise the theologians who search for understanding o~ their faith,
and thus also Aquinas himself. In other words, the tenslOn between
what is felt and what is accepted in faith concerning damnation is
explicitly acknowledged and interpreted as belonging to life on the way
to God. Eventually, acceptance of hell is an eschatological reality. The
limits of faith in search of understanding are reached.
245
lOS
(3.2).
In Symb 11 (camis resurrectionem [Busa: 1811: tid quatuor est nobis utilis [ules et spes
resurrectionis. Primo ad tollendum tristitias qUItS ex mortuis concipimus. Impossibile est
enim quod homo non do/eat ad mortem can sui: sed per hoc quod sperat eum resurrectUrum, muJtum temperatur dolor mortis. ITb 4,12: "Nolumus vas ignorare, fratres, de
dormientibus, ut non conlristemini, sieut et ceteri qui spem non habent. Secundo, au/erl
timorem mortis. Nam si homo post mortem non speraret aliam 'Vitam meliorem, sine
1ubio mars esset valde timenda, et potius deberet homo quaecumque mala focere, quam
mcurrere mortem. Sed quia credimus esse aliam 'Vitam meJiorem, ad quam perveniemus
post mortem, constat quod nul/us debet mortem timere, nee timore mortis aJiqua mala
focere. Heb 2,14-15: "Ut per mortem destmeret ewn qui habebat mortis imperium, id est,
diabo/uni; et /iberaret eos, qui timore mortis per totam vitam obnoxii erant seroituti. "
Tertio, -reddit soOicitos et studiosos ad bene operandUm, si enim vita hominis esset
tanturn ista, in qua vi'Vimus, non inesset hominibus magnum studium ad bene operan*
dum: quia quidquid jaceret, parvum esset cum eius desiderium non sit ad bonum
determinaturn secundum certum tempus, sed ad aeternitatem. Sed quia credimus quod
per haec quae hic /acimus. redpiemus bona aeterna in resurrectione ideo studemus bona
operari. leo 15,19: "Si in hac vita tantum in o,risto sperantes sumus, miserabiliores
sumus omnibus hominibus. " Quarto retrahit a maio. Skut enim spes praemii ai/icit ad
bonum operandurn, ita timor poenae, quam credimus malis res~ retrahit a malo. In
5,29: "Et procedunt qui bona /ecerunt, in resurrectionem vitae; qui vero ma/a egerunt,
in resurrection em iudicii. "
L. Sentis, 1992, p. 286.
II
246
247
PERFECTION
CHAPTERlV
101
lOS
10'.1
This is sharply fdt in Thomas' view that unbaptized babies have no access to eternal
life: whereas they are free from personal gwlt, their relationship with God is
disturbed by the herited guilt of Original Sin: there .is no caritas which is to be glori'lied in eternal life. Cf. In W Sent 45.1.2c.
In- Symb 12 (vitam aeternam [Busa: 25]: in vita aetema primum est quod homo
coniungitur Deo. Nam ipse Deus est praemium et finis omnium laborum nostrorum.
Cf. F. de Grijs, 1983, who works this out as regards the question of the meaning of
history. This meaning is contained in God's relationship with each individual human
being; ,a suppon as small as the point of a needle.
3.2 The communication between the living and the dead ll2
In chapter II we indicated briefly that the dead are cut off from
communication with the living by divine ordination. ll3 This divine
ordination is taken very seriously by Aquinas. In this respect he follows
an ancient tradition, already present in the Old Testament, according to
which it is forbidden to seek contact with the spirits of the dead by
conjuring them up.!" Nevertheless, Thomas states that the Church
consists of three parts: one on earth, a second in heaven and a third in
purgatory.ll5 Thus he suggests a communion between the living and
the dead. How do these two approaches hang together and what do they
reveal with regard to our central question?
In order to understand both views, one should interpret them in
111
W. Goez, 1976. p. 122j J. Avril, 1983, p. 9395. The fear of a sudden death was
rooted in the conviction that the will was fixed at the moment of death. One was
afraid to die before having had the opponunity for confession. For a historical
survey of the impact of the Last Judgement in the Middle Ages (with a critical
approach towards the work of J. Delumeau), d. C. Viola, 1988.
112 On the historical roots of the communication with the dead in the Middle Ages, d.
O. Oexle, 1983 and (focusing on the thirteenth century:) K. Stiiber, 1976.
11)
Chapter II, 1.2, p. 81.
114 Cf. Dt 18,10-11, qUOted in SIb II-II 96.1.sc and ScG
154.17. One of the motives of
cautiowness seems to be the link with the world of the demons. In Aquinas' day
this fear for the deceased was widespread. Cf. W. Goo., 1976; Ch. Lebbe, 1991.
us In Symb 9 (oatholi<am [Busa: 114D: Habet autem haec Ecclesia Ires partes. Una est in
248
PERFECTION
CHAPTER IV
their proper framework. The separation of the living and the dead is. to
be understood within the framework of vita naturae.. CommurucatlOn
between human beings takes place within the coordinates of materiality
and time. The human body is. the instrument by which they are
perceptible and by which they can communicate according to the
human condition: via the material to the spiritual.'!' When natural life
is taken away, the disembodied soul is no longer within the range. of
human natural perception. Moreover, and here we enter t.he theological
framework the status merendi is over. The separated soul IS not a moral
agent in th~ sense of being in via and acquiring merit. Thus the dead are
isolated from the living, their fate having been decided upon.
The communion of the Church is to be understood within the
framework of vita gratiae, the relationship with God. From this
perspective the focus is on co~union rather than separation. The
central terms within this context are not 'the dead' or 'the separated
souls' but 'the beatified' or 'those who exist (rather than: live) in
purga;ory'. The framework of vita grariae is greater than that of v.ita
naturae. The bond by which the living and the dead are connected With
each other is the bond of caritas. l17 This bond forms the body of
which Christ is the Head; a body of which one becomes a member by
Baptism and which grows by the Sacrament of the Eucharist."8
Cf. ScG m 147.2: Datus est etiam ei loquelae usus, per cuius oJficium veritatem quam
aliquis mente coneipit, alteri manifestare possitj ut sic homines seipsos iuvent in
cognitione ventatis, sicu: et in aliis rebus necessariis vitae, cum sit homo animal
natura/iter socia/e.
'" Cf. ScG ill 144.3 (third argument) where Aquinas speaks of the theological vinue of
charity per quam est societas beatorum et tendentium in bea!itudinem. .
.
11a Cf. the third section of chapter nj remember that Aqwnas explam.s commumo as
name for the Eucharist referring to its dimension as signum demonstrativum (chapter
II, 3.3, p. 137).
.
m STh II-II 83.11.ag5: anima Petri non est Petrus. 5i ergo animae sanctorum pro nobzs
orarent quandiu sunt a corpore separatae, non deberemus interpeltare sanctum Petrum
ad orandurn pro nobis, sed animam eius.
249
116
llO
5Th II-II 83.11.ra5: quia saneti viventes meruerunt ut pro nobis orarent, ideo eos
invocamus nominibus quibus hic vocabantur, quibus etiam nobis magis innotescunt. Et
iterum propter fidem resurrection is insinuandam, sicut legitur Ex 3,6: "Ego sum Deus
Abraham, etc. lej Mt 22,31J. Cf. also W. Kluxen, 1974 and what is said on p. 79.
122
250
251
PERFECTION
CHAPTER IV
discussed the order of creation: the higher creatures help the lower ones
in their union with God. Thus they become helpers of God.'" This
mediation has a counter part: the living ask the Saints for intercession.
The Saints in heaven are free from all defects and needs, being
inebriated with the plenitude of God's house.'" Prayer to them has
the character of asking for their help in order to participate in their life
with God. For those who are in purgatory the situation is different.
They do not possess perfect beatitude and thus they cannot be asked to
help us to attain it.'" Because they lack the vision of God, they do
not even know when the living try to communicate with them.'"
They are, however, connected with us by the bond of charity. Those
who are in purgatory share the life of grace,. although some remnants of
sinfulness prevent them from the beatific vision of God.'" They can
be helped to overcome this defect on the basis of the principle that
those who are united by caritas can carry each other's burden. Thus
123
In W Sent 45.3.2.co: iste ordo est divinitus institutus in rebus, secundum Dionysium, ut
per media ultima reducantur in Deum. Untie cum sanet; qui sum in patria, sint Deo
124
125
124
121
propinquissimi, hoc divinae legis ordo requirit, ut noJ qui manentes in corpore
peregrinamur a Domino, in eum per sanctos medios retiucamur,' quod quidem contingit,
dum per eos divina bonitas suum eJfectum diffundit. Et quia reditus noster in Deum
respondere debet processu; bonitatum ipsius ad nos; skut mediantibus samtorum
sujfragiis Dei beneficia in nos deveniunt, ita DpOrtet nos in Deum reduci, ut iter-ata
beneficia eim sumamus mediantibus sanctis; et inde est quod eos intercessores pro nobis
ad Deum constituimus, et quasi mediatores. dum ab eis petimus quod pro nobis orent.
One can also recopUze another motif: conformity with Christ who is the Mediator
between. God and man.
In IV Sent 45.3.2.ra2.
In IV Sent 45.2.2d.co: cum saneti qui sun: in patria, sint ab omni indigentia immunes,
'inebriati ab ubertate domus Dei~ eis iU1Jari per suffragi4 non competit.
In IV Sent 15.4.5b.co: nihil petitur ab aliquo qui non habet ilJud. Unde cum beata vita
sit quae in orando petitur, ad illos solos sanctos dirigi aliquo modo oratio potest qui
bealam vitam habent, non autem ad ii/os qui in mundo sunt neque ad ilIos qui in
purgatorio sunt;
STh ll-ll 83.4.ra3: U/i qui sunt in hoc mundo aut in purgatorio, nondum jruuntur
visione Verb;' ut possint cognoscere ea quae nos cogitamus vel dicimus. Et ideo eorum
-suJlragia non implordmUS orando. sed a vivis petimus col/oquendo. Cf. also STh II-ll
83.1l.ra3.
128
In IV Sent 45.2.2b.ra3: purgatio animae per poenas purgatorii non est aliud quam
expiatio reatus impedientis a perceptione gloriae.
12~
252
253
PERFECTION
CHAPTER IV
incomprehensible life.
The same limits of reflection were reached when Aquinas' account of
mors aelerna was examined. Again every aspect of eternal death refers to
God's goodness, but now in the horrific distorting mirror of hell. The
three elements - soul, body, world - were encountered in a blown up
version of the punishments for Original Sin. We discovered two ways in
which Thomas recurs to God's incomprehensibility with regard to the
dark side of (re)creation. First, by taking God's justice and mercy as
point of departure: the infinite distance between Creator and creature
forces the theologian to take God's goodness for granted and pursue
elucidation in the direction of the (intellectual and moral) shortcomings
of man. Secondly, by stating that reconciliation with the thought of hell
is an eschatological reality, pertaining to the conformity of the will with
the incomprehensible God.
In the third section the central theme of the relationship with God
was affirmed again in two paragraphs in which the impact of eternal life
on earthly life was studied. First we learned that the reflection on
eternal life works like a magnifying mirror, elucidating the reading of
the Scriptures as well as human life on earth: the most intimate core of
both is displayed in full glory.135 Secondly, we observed how communication between the living and dead is entirely mediated by the
reIationship with God. Again charity, effect of the vivificating power of
the Spirit, turned out to be at the centre of communication.
In this chapter we have examined Aquinas' account of the consummated life with God. In the first section we studied the nature of the
reflection 'On the completed life with God, by surveying two concepts
which were introduced earlier in this study - vita aeterna and finis
ultimus -as well as the tract of eschatology as a whole.
In the second section we focused on vita aelerna and its counterpart,
mors aeterna. We discovered that eternal life is to be conceived as perfect
communion with God. By studying the three elements - soul, body,
world - under the consideration of how they are involved in eternal life,
we have been able to show how Thomas radically envisages all
dimensions of post-mortal existence as expressing the relationship with
God. Human life is recreated, reorganised from its most intimate core:
life with God in grace. By its character of overflowing expression,
eternal life is beyond the borders of human imagination, like God's own
~3'
n4
In IV Sent 4S.2.2a.ra5: de omnibus enim similiter dki oportet, quod non erant in
t'S
Eventually the perspective of eternal life reflects entirely on ea.n:hly life. Ii gives a
perspective for life on earmj a perspective beyond our grasp, but elucidat:ing and
directing life on eanh. In this sense, chapter IV of this study can be called the
chapter of hope, since it is concerned with the material object of hope, like the
'foundations' of the second chapter regard the object of faith and the 'dynamism' of
the third chapter that of charity.
CHAPTER V
255
CHAPTER V
The interesting thing about these two insights is, that their conteot
directly bears upon the formal side of what is at issue. The first insight
determines the perspective from which questions are approached, the
second qualifies the plausibility of its outcome. Thus Thomas' dealing
with the question displays an internal dynamism which is inherent in
his appreciation of the living God as the centre of his theology.
For the believer who searches for the understanding of his or her
faith, this dynaroism is of great importance. In this respect Aquinas'
view on the relation between life on earth and 'life' after death deserves
to be worked out a little further, recurring to that which was studied in
the previous chapters. This will be done against the background of the
question as to what the meaning of life is; a question having both a
formal and material similarity to the central question of this study.
Working out the central question of this study against the background
of the quest for meaning, we will be able to show that, as regard the
meaning of life and death, Aquinas' thoughts offer the opportunity to
take into account the different dimensions of what can be called the
theological meaning of human life and death. Thus a contribution can
be made to both the research on Aquinas and the theological reflection'
on the quest for the meaning of life. 1
This chapter is divided into two parts. We will begin by working out
the outcome of this study against the background of the question as to
what the meaning of life is (1). After that we will devote some words to
the 'meaning' of death (2).'
1. The meaning of life
In our day the expression 'meaning of life' is used with connotations
differing from those which Aquinas would have had, when he had been
I put the word 'meaning' between inverted commas when it is used as regards death
in order to remind one of the fact that as evil and privation of life - death has the
character of 'non-sense' rather than 'sense',
256
257
MEANING OF LIFE
CHAPTER V
Cf. G. Sauter, 1995, p. 14fi, S. Griffioen. 1994, p. 24, B. Vedder. 1990. p. 9-11.
For these shifts d. G. Sauter, 1995, Th. de Boer, 1991', H. de Knijff .1988, H.
Berger, 1986, E. Jiinge!, 1983, R. Mokrosch, 1982, M. Muller, 1978; H. Gollwitzer,
1970 and 1974.
Cf. J. van de Lao, 1995, B. Grom/J. Schmidt, 1988, J. de Valk, 1982, HJ. Pottmeyet, 1979, V. Frankl, 1978.
'Sons de la vie' (French), '=tido de la vida' (Spanish), 'Sinn des Lebens' (German),
'zin van het leven' (Dutch). The connection of 'meaning' and sensus is reflected in
the English 'sense' which is used in about the same instances as 'sens" 'sentido',
'Sinn' and 'zin', Thus we see that in English. the expression 'does life make sense?' is
Cf. C. Onions, 1966: 'mean' and 'sense'; A. Dauzet, 1938: 'sens'; P. van VeenlN.
van der Nijs, 1989: 'zin'; J. de Vries, 1987: lzin'j A. Walde, 1910: 'sentio',
Cf. e.g. R. Hepburn, 1981/1965 and M. Sarat, 1993.
Cf. e.g. O. Hanfling, 1988, p. 15-41.
258
MEANING OF LIFE
CHAPTER V
analysis, one cannot say that by creating the world God was pursuing a
goal, in the sense of striving for greater perfection or completeness.
Reasoned from the perspective of God's perfect nature, creation has no
other purpose than the reflection and manifestation of God's goodness.
Creation is purely a gift, the copious expression of God's abundant
perfection: a 'post-final' structure which has also been discovered in
Aquinas' reflection on God's glorifying work." As far as the goal of
human life is concerned, in Aquinas' view this can be none other than
the reflection of God's goodness within the coordinates of materiality
and time as a creature which is part of both the spiritual and the
material world. As was clarified in comparison with the angelic mode of
existence, this implies that human life has the character of a process.
Whereas God's relation to Elis creatures cannot be conceived in
terms of finality, the relation of creatures to God is dominated by the
latter as first cause and ultimate end." Every creature is regarded as
reaching God insofar as it is reaching its own perfection. In the case of
human beings this perfection consists in both the perfection of the
intellectual operations and the actual attainment of God in eternal life.
The ordo of elements (world . body - soul) which are relevant for
human life is directed at the consummation of the process within the
coordinates of materiality and time according to which man is designed
so as to proceed towards his destination. Therefore, when we consider
the end of human life on earth from the perspective of human beings,
this end can be none other than the consummated life with God, which
is nothing else but 'life' after death.
Both perspectives, the one reasoning from God and the one
proceeding from man, result in different answers to the question as to
what is the goal or end of human life? In the first case, what Thomas in
In II Sent 1.2.1 calls the finis operantis, the end of human life is the
entire process of earthly development and heavenly consummation of
the relationship with God. In the second case, the finis operis, the end of
human existence is the perfection of the earthly process. Although one
is inclined to conceive the question regarding the goal of human life in
the latter sense, for a genuinely theological appreciation of this question,
the theo-centric perspective is both more important and more
comprising. Moreover, as we learned in chapter ill, at the very core of
"
11
259
12
5Th ill l.1.sc: ii/Uti videtur esse convenientlSStmUtn ut per visibiJia monstrentur
invisibilia Dei, ad hoc enim totus munJus est jactus. ut patet per iilUti Aposto/i, Rm
1,20: "InvisibiJia Dei per ea quae facta sun; intellec... conspiciuntur"; 5Th m 12.3.ca2:
Skut autem wees ab homine formatae sum signa intelkctualis scientiae ipsim, ita
creaturae a Dea conditae sum signa sapitntiae eOO; 5Th m 65.1.co: Vita enim spiritualis
confonnitatetn aliquam habet ad vitam corpora/em, skut et cetera corpora/ia
,imiJitudinem quaruiam spiritualium habent. On the crucial places of Rm 1,20 in the
ID, d. chapter II, footnote 7 on p. 70.
260
261
MEANlNG OF LIFE
CHAPTER V
oneself and one's neighbour - more and more with the eyes of God.
Proceeding from the appreciation of the signifying dimension of
human existence, the possibility is offered to affirm this signifying
dimension of existence and operation. Man has the free use of his
capacities and he can choose to direct his entire existence in conformity
with the God-signifying dimension of his existence and operations.
When this happens, we encounter the third meaning of the word vita
which Aquinas adopts from Aristotle: one's chief occupation or
direction of living. Thus man is able to malte his life 'meaningful' in the
signifying sense: he is able to lead his entire life as referring to God.
Thus referring to God - given with existence and operations - can be
cultivated and made explicit. In this process, the God-referring meaning
of life, the experience of life as meaningful and the activity of giving
meaning to one's life are given the possibility to harmonize. When this
unity is accomplished we can spealt of a meaningful life in the fullest
sense. IS
What has been worked out according to both semantic fields can also
be formulated in terms of the relation between life on earth and 'life'
after death; Thus it can be made clear that, in Aquinas' view, human life
on earth has the 'intrinsic' ends of signifying God and growing in its
capacity to reflect God's goodness in the world. Thus each and every
"
18
"
14
"
16
Cf. A. Peg;', 1978. In the words of N. Lash, 1993, p. 82, "We are enabled, in the
Spirit's gift, to know our words, ourselves, all words and all the world, to be secure,
in their fragility, as traces of God's utterance, echoes of the Creator's speech, given
back to God."
These three levels, according to which human life can be said to have a meaning, can
still be encountered in the contemporary debate on the quest for meaning. For the
first level, where human existence is appreciated as referring to something beyond
itself (whether one is aware of it or not), d. M. Sarot, 1993; O. Hanfling, 1988; R.
Hepburn, 1981/1965j For the second, where meaning is understood as something
which is the result of a process of interpretation, d. P. Ricoeur, 1990, p. 180-193; A.
MacIntyre, 1990', p. 208~218; R. Solomon, 1990', p. 274j For the third, where the
aspect of actively giving shape to one's existence is take intO consideration, d. B.
Grom/J. Schmidt, 1988; J. Kruithof, 1968.
263
MEANlNG OF LIFE
CHAPTER V
262
l'
"
21
Cf. the arguments of suitability for the incarnation discussed in chapter IT, 2.1, p.
96ff.
22
Here lies the imponance of the the great saints and mystics for theology: they tell us
about how the world is to be appreciated from the perspective of the intimate life
with God for which we are all designed.
264
265
CHAPTER V
connatural to us, being 'signs' ourselves - seems to be more real than the
thing signified (God), the three theological virtues all display the
character of surrender to the incomprehensible triune God: faith implies
confidence in the Invisible and Ineffable One; hope implies surrender to
that which outreaches our expectations; charity is letting oneself be
moved by the Incomprehensible One.
The intrinsical relational character of life, the trinity of God, the
dynamic character of life with God and God's incomprehensibility - in
their interrelation - qualify from the outset the approach of the living
God. At the intersection of these four features with the human quest for
orientation and the material dimension of human existence, the
importance of Christian sacraments for the theological reflection on the
meaning of life imposes itself. According to the heuristic matrix of
appropriation we found in the first chapter, the semantic field of verum
is associated with the Son (or rather: the Word) and that of bonum is
connected with the Spirit." Both lines can be discerned in the revealing
and effectuating dimension of the sacraments,28 rooted in the revealing
"
"
"
26
Cf. chapter n, 1.3.3 (p. 91) and chapter Ill, 2.1 (p. 156) and 2.2 (p. 167).
Chapter ~ 2.2.2, p. 45.
Cf. D. Burrell, 1979, p. 73.
This state of affairs runs paralld to Aquinas' account of the material world which
"
. 30
21
11
18
32
266
267
MEANING OF LlFE
CHAPTER V
"
~
"
"
268
MEANING OF LIFE
extreme way. 40
The growth or sudden break-through of this total surrender effectuated by the augmentation of vita gratiae - can neither be enforced
nor hastened_ Letting the life of grace grow is precisely one of the goals
of earthly life, as we have seen. Experiencing suffering and death as
meaningful within the framework of the relationship with God belongs
to the part of meaning which cannot be made by oneself, but which,
nevertheless, calls for great pains to be taken." That this. total
surrender is a genuine possibility is displayed in the suffering of Christ
at the Cross and in the testimony of those who arrive at total
availability and transparency in relation to God's will during their life
on earth.42 For most of us, less gifted and less heroic, these testimonies
may serve to strenghten our confidence and invite us to be more
involved in the dynamism of life with God; a dynamism - as we have
learned - which is both entirely the work of the Holy Spirit and the
result of our cultivation of faith.
Now that we have found some understanding of this faith, it seems
appropriate to close this study performing what has been examined, by
joining the words of the famous hymn, which can now be understood
in their profundity: Praesta mea. menti de Te vivere."
40
42
43
Cf. M.-M. Labourdette, 1985, p. 390, quoted in chapter II, footnote 81 on p. 95. This
total surrender is characteristic for the way Christ died (chapter II, 2.3.1, p. 110ff,
especially p. 118) and the perfect act of cantas by which Christ is imitated:
martyrdom (chapter m, 2.4, p. 176).
On the relation between suffering and the augmentation of charity. d. In duo
praee.prol [Busa 403] Sunt autem et duo quae habitam caritatem augent. Primum est
cordis separatio a terrenis... [Busa: 432] Secundum est firma patientia in adversis. Man;
Jestum est enim quod quando gravia pro eo quem diligimus, sustinemus. amor ipse non
destruitur, immo cresci:. Sg 8,7: "Aquae multae" (id est tribulationes multae) "non
potuerunt extinguere caritatem ", Et ideo sancti viri qui adversitates pro Deo sustinent,
magis in eius dilectione fmnantur,' sicut ani/ex ilIud artificium magis diligit in quo plus
laboravit. Et inde est quod fideles quanto plures afJIictiones pro Deo sustinent. tanto magis elevantur in amore ipsius. Gn 7,17: "Multiplicatae !Unt aquae" (id est tribulationes)
"et elevaverunt arcam in sublime", idest Ecclesiam, vel animam viri iusti.
Cf. the autobiography of Saint Theresa of Lisieux (1873-1897), who is even more
radical than Aquinas in her passionate desire for suffering out of love for Christ: all
theodicee-like questions seem to evaporate entirely through her burning love for
Christ.
"Give my mind to live on You", from the ,hymn Adoro Te, ascribed to Thomas
Aquinas (on the authorship d. J. Weisheipl, 1983', p. 400.401).
APPENDIX I
270
271
APPENDIX !
APPENDIX!
has the choice that was offered the angels.") and T. Janez Barrio (1978,
p. 463: lIAqUl tiene lugar su 'decision metaffsica ultima', Es su opcion
definitiva, desprovista de accidentalidad. El acto que realice el hombre en
el momento de su muerte metaffsica deviene 'ser', la opclon 'estado', y
el tiempo 'eternidad'.). Also J. Pieper (1979, p. 125-149), spends much
effort on thinking about the moment of dying as "letzte Entscheidung"
and "auBerste Schritt auf dem Wege der Selbstverwirklichung", referring
to K. Rahner, 1. Boros, P. Glorieux, 1. Roure, R. Troisfontaines and E.
Mersch.
In all his studies on death in the works of Aquinas, L.F. Mateo-Seco
(1974, 1975, 1978, 1982[a] and 1982[bj) explicitly rejects this view:
Glorieux, Boros and Rahner are attacked for their 'romantic' view of
death. I agree with Mateo-Seco that Thomas interprets death explicitly
as malum; an evil which destroys the human person. It seems very
unlikely that the ultimat~ choice of human self-realization is made by a
mutilated soul, neither being a person nor possessing human nature. In
my opinion the sentence of John of Damascus - according to which
death is for man what the Fall is for angels - should not be interpreted
in the sense that the character of choice which resulted in the Fall of
angels should be assigned to death. Thomas quotes the sentence only in
order to determine the moment at which the will is fixed once and for
all. Thus the moment of death is the moment at which free choice
(characteristic for the status meremil) ends; this is the opposite of a
moment of free choice 'par excellence'.
For what concerns "the entire logic of Aquinas' reasoning" to which
Glorieux refers, some other considerations deserve it to be mentioned as
well. The fact that Thomas keeps silence with regard to the moment of
death - which does not increase the plausibility of the interpretation
proposed by Glorieux - concords with Aquinas' view that the very
insecurity and anxiety about what happens in the moment of dying
belongs to the character of death as punishment (ef. chapter II, 1.3.3, p.
93). This is supported by the historical observation that, in the thirteenth century, the process of dying was experienced as a struggle for
the choice for God up to the ultimate moments of earthly life (and not
after these moments). As K. Stuber (1976, p. 53-126) reports, the gift of
perseverantia played a large role in Christian spirituality with regard to
the process of dying. Confession, viaticum, oil, holy water, candles,
crucifix, prayer: all that was available was put to use so that the dying
person was enabled to be secured from turning away from God in the
last minutes of earthly existence.
APPENDIX II
273
APPENDIX II
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