Page 1

2 of 5 DOCUMENTS
Dorothy Haag, Also Known as Dorothy Hawthorne, Appellant, v. Norman Barnes,
Respondent
[NO NUMBER IN ORIGINAL]
Court of Appeals of New York
9 N.Y.2d 554; 175 N.E.2d 441; 216 N.Y.S.2d 65; 1961 N.Y. LEXIS 1222; 87 A.L.R.2d
1301
April 24, 1961, Argued
May 18, 1961, Decided
PRIOR HISTORY: Haag v. Barnes, 11 A D 2d 430.
Appeal, by permission of a Justice of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the First Judicial Department,
from an order of said court, entered November 29, 1960, which affirmed an order of the Court of Special Sessions of the
City of New York (Alfred J. Cawse, Jr., Joseph V. Loscalzo and Joseph A. Martinis, JJ.) granting a motion to dismiss
the complaint pursuant to section 63 of the New York City Criminal Courts Act and section 121 of the Domestic
Relations Law, in a proceeding under section 64 of the New York City Criminal Courts Act.

DISPOSITION: Order affirmed.

CASE SUMMARY:

PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant sought review of the judgment of the Appellate Division of the Supreme
Court in the First Judicial Department (New York), affirming the dismissal of appellant's complaint pursuant to New
York City, N.Y., Crim. Cts. Act 63 and N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law 121, in a proceeding under New York City, N.Y.,
Crim. Cts. Act 64 against respondent.
OVERVIEW: Appellant entered into an agreement with respondent for the support of a child born out of wedlock. The
parties agreed that the laws of the state of Illinois would govern their agreement. In opposition to the court's grant of
respondent's motion to dismiss, appellant contended that New York, not Illinois, law applied; and that the agreement in
question was not a sufficient basis for a motion to dismiss under either New York City, N.Y., Crim. Ct. Act 63 or
N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law 121. The court held that the motion to dismiss was properly granted. Appellant could not upset a
support agreement, which was itself perfectly consistent with the public policy of New York, which was entered into in
Illinois with the understanding that it would be governed by the laws of that state and which constituted a bar to a suit
for further support under Illinois law. The agreement, in so many words, recited that it "shall in all respects be
interpreted, construed and governed by the laws of the state of Illinois" and, since it was also drawn and signed by
appellant in Illinois, the traditional conflicts rule would treat those factors as conclusive and result in the application of
Illinois law.
OUTCOME: The judgment granting respondent's motion to dismiss appellant's complaint was affirmed because
appellant New York public policy was not offended by the support agreement and because use of the traditional
conflicts rule showed that application of Illinois law was agreed upon between the parties.

Page 2
9 N.Y.2d 554, *; 175 N.E.2d 441, **;
216 N.Y.S.2d 65, ***; 1961 N.Y. LEXIS 1222
CORE TERMS: public policy, resident, support agreement, present proceeding, significant contacts, matter in dispute,
place of business, persons designated, properly granted, indemnification, designated, conclusive, paternity, recites,
drew, bare, agreement provides, present action, sexual relations, marry, birth
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes
Family Law > Child Support > Obligations > General Overview
[HN1] Both N.Y. Dom. Rel. Law 121 and N.Y. City Civ. Ct. Act 63 provide: An agreement or compromise made
by the mother shall be binding only when the court shall have determined that adequate provision has been made.
Contracts Law > Contract Conditions & Provisions > Forum Selection Clauses
Contracts Law > Contract Interpretation > General Overview
[HN2] The law governing a contract is to be determined by the intention of the parties.
Civil Procedure > Jurisdiction > Personal Jurisdiction & In Rem Actions > In Personam Actions > General
Overview
Civil Procedure > Federal & State Interrelationships > Choice of Law > Significant Relationships
Contracts Law > Contract Conditions & Provisions > Forum Selection Clauses
[HN3] The courts, instead of regarding as conclusive the parties' intention or the place of making or performance, lay
emphasis rather upon the law of the place which has the most significant contacts with the matter in dispute.
Contracts Law > Contract Conditions & Provisions > General Overview
Family Law > Child Support > Obligations > General Overview
[HN4] New York Paternity Law requires something more than the provision of the bare necessities otherwise required
to be supplied by the community, that, although providing for indemnification of the community, it is chiefly concerned
with the welfare of the child.
HEADNOTES
Conflict of laws -- support of child -- agreement by defendant to support child of plaintiff governed by Illinois
law -- agreement valid under Illinois law and bar to present action for support not in conflict with New York
public policy.
1. Complainant became a resident of New York in 1947. Defendant is and was, during the period involved in this
litigation, a resident of Illinois. The parties became acquainted in New York and, when a child was born to complainant
in Chicago in 1955, they executed an agreement in Chicago which provided for support of the child and that the
agreement should be interpreted, construed and governed by the laws of the State of Illinois. Complainant lived in
California for two years after the agreement was signed and she then returned to New York where she and the child
have since been supported by defendant in compliance with the terms of the agreement. Whether the parties' intention,
or the place of making or performance of the agreement, or the place which has the most significant contacts with the
matter in dispute is applied as a test, the internal law of Illinois applies. The agreement provides that Illinois law shall
apply and it was drawn and signed by complainant in Illinois. Both parties are designated in the agreement as being "of
Chicago, Illinois", and defendant's place of business is and always has been in Illinois; the child was born in Illinois; the
persons designated to act as agents for the principals are Illinois residents, as are the attorneys for both parties who drew
the agreement, and all contributions for support always have been and still are being made from Chicago. The New
York contacts are of less weight and significance.
2. Under applicable Illinois law, the agreement is a bar to the present action for support.
3. Enforcement of the agreement does not conflict with our public policy. The agreement as a whole and the provisions
for monthly payments fully protect the welfare of the child.

Page 3
9 N.Y.2d 554, *; 175 N.E.2d 441, **;
216 N.Y.S.2d 65, ***; 1961 N.Y. LEXIS 1222
4. The motion to dismiss the complaint in a paternity proceeding under section 64 of the New York City Criminal
Courts Act was properly granted.
COUNSEL: Alfred A. Rosen, for appellant. I. The laws of New York relied on by respondent do not bar this
proceeding but impose conditions on him. II. The Illinois statute relied on by respondent is no bar to the instant
proceeding. The factual context out of which the agreement arises has the most significant contacts in New York. New
York law therefore applies to the case at bar. ( Auten v. Auten, 308 N. Y. 155.) III. Appellant's stay in California prior
to the birth of the child and two years after the signing of the agreement does not break her chain of residence in New
York. Appellant's designation of Illinois law to govern the agreement was not effectively made. IV. The Illinois statute
expresses a policy which is different from and contrary to ours and need not be enforced in our forum. ( People ex rel.
Hansen v. Ciemeniecki, 221 Ill. App. 275; People v. Tice, 272 Ill. 516; Hauskins v. People, 82 Ill. 193; People v. Dile,
347 Ill. 23; Schaschlo v. Taishoff, 2 N Y 2d 408; Straus & Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., 254 N. Y. 407; Anonymous
v. Anonymous, 14 Misc 2d 622; Lynch v. Bailey, 275 App. Div. 527; Roth v. Patino, 185 Misc. 235; Matter of Landau,
172 Misc. 651; Holzer v. Deutsche Reichsbahn Gesellschaft, 159 Misc. 830; Rhyne v. Katleman, 206 Misc. 202, 285
App. Div. 1140.) Assuming, arguendo, that the agreement is governed by the laws of Illinois, nevertheless, it does not
come within the purview of the statute relied upon by respondent. Hence, the instant proceeding is not barred.
Phoenix Ingraham, for respondent. I. A contract which is valid where made is valid everywhere unless it is against the
public policy of the forum. ( Straus & Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., 254 N. Y. 407.) II. The agreement relied upon
by respondent is an Illinois agreement, validly drawn in conformity with the laws of Illinois. ( Auten v. Auten, 308 N.
Y. 155.) III. Since the agreement was good where made, it is valid in New York unless it is against the public policy of
this State. ( Biddy v. Blue Bird Air Serv., 374 Ill. 506; Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397; Lynch v. Bailey, 275 App.
Div. 527.) IV. The Illinois agreement is not against the public policy of New York. ( Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 280
App. Div. 348, 305 N. Y. 288; Straus & Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., 254 N. Y. 407; Schaschlo v. Taishoff, 2 N Y
2d 408; Rhyne v. Katleman, 206 Misc. 202, 285 App. Div. 1140; Roche v. McDonald, 275 U.S. 449; Davis v. Davis,
305 U.S. 32; Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U.S. 562.)
JUDGES: Fuld, J. Chief Judge Desmond and Judges Dye, Froessel, Van Voorhis, Burke and Foster concur.
OPINION BY: FULD
OPINION
[*556] [**442] [***66] This appeal is concerned with the effect in New York of an agreement made in another
State for the support of a child born out of wedlock.
The complainant Dorothy Haag alleges that in 1947 she moved from Minnesota and took up residence in New York
City and that since then she has been a resident of this State. The defendant [*557] Norman Barnes, on the other hand,
is now and was, during the period involved in this litigation, a resident of Illinois.
According to the statements contained in the complainant's affidavits, she met the defendant in the spring of 1954 in
New York. She was a law secretary and had been hired by the defendant through an agency to do work for him while
he was in New York on one of his business trips. The relationship between the man and the girl soon "ripened into
friendship" and, on the basis of representations that he loved her and planned to divorce his wife and marry her, she was
"importuned" into having sexual relations with him.
[***67] The complainant further alleges that she became pregnant as a result of having sexual relations with the
defendant and that, upon being informed of this, he asked her to move to Illinois to be near him. She refused and,
instead, went to live in California with her sister to await the birth of her child. Fearing that the defendant was losing
interest in her, however, she returned to Chicago before the child was born and, upon attempting to communicate with
the defendant, was referred to his attorney. The latter told Dorothy to choose a hospital in Chicago, which she did, and

Page 4
9 N.Y.2d 554, *557; 175 N.E.2d 441, **442;
216 N.Y.S.2d 65, ***67; 1961 N.Y. LEXIS 1222
the baby was born there in December, 1955, the defendant paying the expenses.
Shortly after the birth of the child, her attempts to see the defendant in New York failed and she was advised by his
attorney to return to Chicago in order that an agreement might be made for the support of her and her child. Returning
to that city, she procured an attorney, recommended by a friend in New York, and signed an agreement on January 12,
1956. The agreement provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
1. It recites payment to the complainant by the defendant of $ 2,000 between September, 1955 and January, 1956 and a
willingness on his part to support her child in the future, on condition that such payments "shall not constitute an
admission" that he is the child's father;
2. The defendant promises to pay $ 50 a week and $ 75 a month, i.e., a total of $ 275 a month, "continuing while [the
child] is alive and until she attains the age of sixteen years";
3. The complainant agrees "to properly support, maintain, educate, and care for [the child]";
[*558] 4. The complainant agrees to keep the child in Illinois for at least two years, except if she marries within that
period;
5. The complainant "[remises], [releases] and forever [discharges] Norman Barnes * * * from all manner of actions * *
* which [she] now has against [him] or ever had or which she * * * hereafter can, shall or may have, for, upon or by
reason of any matter, cause or thing whatsoever * * * including * * * the support of [the child]"; and
6. The parties agree that their agreement "shall in all respects be interpreted, construed and governed by the laws of the
State of Illinois".
[**443] Shortly after the agreement was signed, the complainant received permission, pursuant to one of its
provisions, to live in California where she remained for two years. She then returned to New York where she and her
child have ever since been supported by the defendant in full compliance with the terms of his agreement. In fact, he
has provided sums far in excess of his agreement; all told, we were informed on oral argument, the defendant has paid
the complainant some $ 30,000.
[***68] The present proceeding was instituted in 1959 by the service of a complaint and the defendant was thereafter
arrested pursuant to section 64 of the New York City Criminal Courts Act. A motion, made by the defendant, to
dismiss the proceeding was granted by the Court of Special Sessions and the resulting order was affirmed by the
Appellate Division.
The ground urged for dismissal was that the parties had entered into an agreement providing for the support of the child
which has been fully performed; that in this agreement the complainant relinquished the right to bring any action for the
support of the child; and that, in any event, the action is precluded by the laws of the State of Illinois which, the parties
expressly agreed, would govern their rights under the agreement. In opposition, the complainant contended that New
York, not Illinois, law applies; that the agreement in question is not a sufficient basis for a motion to dismiss under
either section 63 of the New York City Criminal Courts Act or section 121 of the Domestic Relations Law, since both
of these provisions provide that [HN1] "An agreement or compromise made by the mother * * * shall be binding only
when the court shall have determined [*559] that adequate provision has been made"; and that, even were the Illinois
law to apply, it does not bar the present proceeding.
The motion to dismiss was properly granted; the complainant may not upset a support agreement which is itself
perfectly consistent with the public policy of this State, which was entered into in Illinois with the understanding that it
would be governed by the laws of that State and which constitutes a bar to a suit for further support under Illinois law.
The complainant is correct in her position that, since the agreement was not court approved, it may not be held to be a

Page 5
9 N.Y.2d 554, *559; 175 N.E.2d 441, **443;
216 N.Y.S.2d 65, ***68; 1961 N.Y. LEXIS 1222
bar to her suit under New York internal law. (See N. Y. City Crim. Cts. Act, 63; Domestic Relations Law, 121.) On
the other hand, it is clear that the agreement is a bar under the internal law of Illinois since it provides, in the language
of that State's statute, for a "sum not less than eight hundred dollars". (See Ill. Rev. Stat., former ch. 17, 18, amd. by
former ch. 17, 52 [now ch. 106 3/4, 65].) The simple question before us, therefore, is whether the law of New York
or of Illinois applies.
The traditional view was that [HN2] the law governing a contract is to be determined by the intention of the parties.
(See Wilson v. Lewiston Mill Co., 150 N. Y. 314, 322-323; Stumpf v. Hallahan, 101 App. Div. 383, 386, affd. 185 N.
Y. 550; Grand v. Livingston, 4 App. Div. 589, affd. 158 N. Y. 688.) The more modern view is that [HN3] "the courts,
instead of regarding as conclusive the parties' intention or the place of making or performance, lay emphasis rather upon
the law of the place 'which has the most significant contacts with the matter in dispute'". [***69] (See Auten v. Auten,
308 N. Y. 155, 160; see, also, Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 305 N. Y. 288, 305.) Whichever of these views one applies in
this case, however, the answer is the same, namely, that Illinois law applies.
The agreement, in so many words, recites that it "shall in all respects be interpreted, construed and governed by the laws
of the State of Illinois" and, since it was also drawn and signed by the complainant [**444] in Illinois, the traditional
conflicts rule would, without doubt, treat these factors as conclusive and result in applying Illinois law. But, even if the
parties' intention and the place of the making of the contract are not given decisive effect, [*560] they are nevertheless
to be given heavy weight in determining which jurisdiction "'has the most significant contacts with the matter in
dispute'". ( Auten v. Auten, 308 N. Y. 155, 160, supra.) And, when these important factors are taken together with other
of the "significant contacts" in the case, they likewise point to Illinois law. Among these other Illinois contacts are the
following: (1) both parties are designated in the agreement as being "of Chicago, Illinois", and the defendant's place of
business is and always has been in Illinois; (2) the child was born in Illinois; (3) the persons designated to act as agents
for the principals (except for a third alternate) are Illinois residents, as are the attorneys for both parties who drew the
agreement; and (4) all contributions for support always have been, and still are being, made from Chicago.
Contrasted with these Illinois contacts, the New York contacts are of far less weight and significance. Chief among
these is the fact that child and mother presently live in New York and that part of the "liaison" took place in New York.
When these contacts are measured against the parties' clearly expressed intention to have their agreement governed by
Illinois law and the more numerous and more substantial Illinois contacts, it may not be gainsaid that the "center of
gravity" of this agreement is Illinois and that, absent compelling public policy to the contrary (see Straus & Co. v.
Canadian Pacific Ry. Co., 254 N. Y. 407, 414), Illinois law should apply.
As to the question of public policy, we would emphasize that the issue is not whether the New York statute reflects a
different public policy from that of the Illinois statute, but rather whether enforcement of the particular agreement
before us under Illinois law represents an affront to our public policy. (Cf. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 224 N. Y. 99,
111; Mertz v. Mertz, 271 N. Y. 466, 471; Restatement 2d, Conflict of Laws, Tentative Draft No. 6, 332a, comment g.)
It is settled that the [HN4] New York Paternity Law requires something more than the provision of [***70] "the bare
necessities otherwise required to be supplied by the community", that, "although providing for indemnification of the
community, [it] is chiefly concerned with the welfare of the child". (See Schaschlo v. Taishoff, 2 N Y 2d 408, 411.) In
our judgment, enforcement of the support agreement in this case under Illinois law and the refusal to allow its
provisions to be reopened in the present proceeding does not do violence to this policy.
[*561] As matter of fact, the agreement before us clearly goes beyond "indemnification of the community" and the
provision of "bare necessities". Whether we read it as a whole, or look only to the financial provisions concerned ($
275 a month until the child reaches the age of 16), we must conclude that "the welfare of the child" is fully protected.
(See Rhyne v. Katleman, 285 App. Div. 1140, affg. 206 Misc. 202 [$ 10,000 lump sum held sufficient].) The public
policy of this State having been satisfied, there is no reason why we should not enforce the provisions of the parties'
support agreement under Illinois law and treat the agreement as a bar to the present action for support.
The order of the Appellate Division should be affirmed.

Page 6
9 N.Y.2d 554, *561; 175 N.E.2d 441, **444;
216 N.Y.S.2d 65, ***70; 1961 N.Y. LEXIS 1222
Order affirmed.