Republic of The Philippines

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 73002 December 29, 1986
THE DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ACME PLYWOOD & VENEER CO. INC., ETC., respondents.
D. Nacion Law Office for private respondent.
NARVASA, J.:
The Director of Lands has brought this appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Intermediate
Appellate Court affirming a decision of the Court of First Instance of Isabela, which ordered registration
in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc. of five parcels of land measuring 481, 390 square meters,
more or less, acquired by it from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat tribe.
The registration proceedings were for confirmation of title under Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No.
141 (The Public Land Act). as amended: and the appealed judgment sums up the findings of the trial
court in said proceedings in this wise:
1. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario is a
corporation duly organized in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines
and registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission on December 23, 1959;
2. That Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario can acquire
real properties pursuant to the provisions of the Articles of Incorporation particularly on the
provision of its secondary purposes (paragraph (9), Exhibit 'M-l');
3. That the land subject of the Land Registration proceeding was ancestrally acquired by
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., on October 29, 1962, from Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel,
both members of the Dumagat tribe and as such are cultural minorities;
4. That the constitution of the Republic of the Philippines of 1935 is applicable as the sale
took place on October 29, 1962;
5. That the possession of the Infiels over the land relinquished or sold to Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc., dates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan as the
ancestors of the Infiels have possessed and occupied the land from generation to generation
until the same came into the possession of Mariano Infiel and Acer Infiel;
6. That the possession of the applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., is continuous,
adverse and public from 1962 to the present and tacking the possession of the Infiels who
were granted from whom the applicant bought said land on October 29, 1962, hence the
possession is already considered from time immemorial.
7. That the land sought to be registered is a private land pursuant to the provisions of
Republic Act No. 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes
on land occupied by them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable
public land or within the public domain;
8. That applicant Acme Plywood & Veneer Co. Inc., has introduced more than Forty-Five
Million (P45,000,000.00) Pesos worth of improvements, said improvements were seen by
the Court during its ocular investigation of the land sought to be registered on September
18, 1982;
9. That the ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered by the applicant
was duly recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela,
have negotiated for the donation of the townsite from Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc.,
and this negotiation came to reality when the Board of Directors of the Acme Plywood &
Veneer Co., Inc., had donated a part of the land bought by the Company from the Infiels for
the townsite of Maconacon Isabela (Exh. 'N') on November 15, 1979, and which donation
was accepted by the Municipal Government of Maconacon, Isabela (Exh. 'N-l'), during their
special session on November 22, 1979.
The Director of Lands takes no issue with any of these findings except as to the applicability of the 1935
Constitution to the matter at hand. Concerning this, he asserts that, the registration proceedings have
been commenced only on July 17, 1981, or long after the 1973 Constitution had gone into effect, the
latter is the correctly applicable law; and since section 11 of its Article XIV prohibits private corporations
or associations from holding alienable lands of the public domain, except by lease not to exceed 1,000
hectares (a prohibition not found in the 1935 Constitution which was in force in 1962 when Acme
purchased the lands in question from the Infiels), it was reversible error to decree registration in favor
of Acme Section 48, paragraphs (b) and (c), of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, reads:
SEC. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public
domain or claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where
the land is located for confirmation of their claims, and the issuance of a certificate of title
therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when
prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed
all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
title under the provisions of this chapter.
(c) Members of the National Cultural minorities who by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open. continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or
not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights
granted in subsection (b) hereof.
The Petition for Review does not dispute-indeed, in view of the quoted findings of the trial court which
were cited and affirmed by the Intermediate Appellate Court, it can no longer controvert before this
Court-the fact that Mariano and Acer Infiel, from whom Acme purchased the lands in question on
October 29, 1962, are members of the national cultural minorities who had, by themselves and through
their progenitors, possessed and occupied those lands since time immemorial, or for more than the
required 30-year period and were, by reason thereof, entitled to exercise the right granted in Section
48 of the Public Land Act to have their title judicially confirmed. Nor is there any pretension that Acme,
as the successor-in-interest of the Infiels, is disqualified to acquire and register ownership of said lands
under any provisions of the 1973 Constitution other than Section 11 of its Article XIV already referred
to.
Given the foregoing, the question before this Court is whether or not the title that the Infiels had
transferred to Acme in 1962 could be confirmed in favor of the latter in proceedings instituted by it in
1981 when the 1973 Constitution was already in effect, having in mind the prohibition therein against
private corporations holding lands of the public domain except in lease not exceeding 1,000 hectares.
The question turns upon a determination of the character of the lands at the time of institution of the
registration proceedings in 1981. If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be answered
in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then already private lands, the constitutional
prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously does not apply.
In this regard, attention has been invited to Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, et
al, 1 where a similar set of facts prevailed. In that case, Manila Electric Company, a domestic
corporation more than 60% of the capital stock of which is Filipino-owned, had purchased in 1947 two
lots in Tanay, Rizal from the Piguing spouses. The lots had been possessed by the vendors and, before
them, by their predecessor-in-interest, Olimpia Ramos, since prior to the outbreak of the Pacific War in
1941. On December 1, 1976, Meralco applied to the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati Branch, for
confirmation of title to said lots. The court, assuming that the lots were public land, dismissed the
application on the ground that Meralco, a juridical person, was not qualified to apply for registration
under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act which allows only Filipino citizens or natural persons to apply
for judicial confirmation of imperfect titles to public land. Meralco appealed, and a majority of this
Court upheld the dismissal. It was held that:
..., the said land is still public land. It would cease to be public land only upon the issuance of
the certificate of title to any Filipino citizen claiming it under section 48(b). Because it is still
public land and the Meralco, as a juridical person, is disqualified to apply for its registration
under section 48(b), Meralco's application cannot be given due course or has to be
dismissed.
Finally, it may be observed that the constitutional prohibition makes no distinction between
(on the one hand) alienable agricultural public lands as to which no occupant has an
imperfect title and (on the other hand) alienable lands of the public domain as to which an
occupant has on imperfect title subject to judicial confirmation.
Since section 11 of Article XIV does not distinguish, we should not make any distinction or
qualification. The prohibition applies to alienable public lands as to which a Torrens title may
be secured under section 48(b). The proceeding under section 48(b) 'presupposes that the
land is public' (Mindanao vs. Director of Lands, L-19535, July 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 641, 644).
The present Chief Justice entered a vigorous dissent, tracing the line of cases beginning with Carino in
1909 2thru Susi in 1925 3 down to Herico in 1980, 4 which developed, affirmed and reaffirmed the
doctrine that open, exclusive and undisputed possession of alienable public land for the period
prescribed by law creates the legal fiction whereby the land, upon completion of the requisite
period ipso jure and without the need of judicial or other sanction, ceases to be public land and
becomes private property. That said dissent expressed what is the better and, indeed, the correct,
view-becomes evident from a consideration of some of the principal rulings cited therein,
The main theme was given birth, so to speak, in Carino involving the Decree/Regulations of June 25,
1880 for adjustment of royal lands wrongfully occupied by private individuals in the Philippine Islands. It
was ruled that:
It is true that the language of articles 4 and 5 5 attributes title to those 'who may prove'
possession for the necessary time and we do not overlook the argument that this means
may prove in registration proceedings. It may be that an English conveyancer would have
recommended an application under the foregoing decree, but certainly it was not calculated
to convey to the mind of an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in
danger, if he had read every word of it. The words 'may prove' (acrediten) as well or better,
in view of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any
litigation. There are indications that registration was expected from all but none sufficient to
show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by
the decree, if not by earlier law. ...
That ruling assumed a more doctrinal character because expressed in more categorical language,
in Susi:
.... In favor of Valentin Susi, there is, moreover, the presumption juris et de jure established
in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary
requirements for a grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in actual
and physical possession, personally and through his predecessors, of an agricultural land of
the public domain openly, continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1984, with a
right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of Chapter VIII of said Act. So
that when Angela Razon applied for the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already
acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for
it is not necessary that a certificate of title should be issued in order that said grant may be
sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient, under the provisions of
section 47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in
question by a grant of the State, it had already ceased to be of the public domain and had
become private property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the
Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land in question of Angela Razon, the Director
of Lands disposed of a land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale
thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not thereby acquire any right. 6
Succeeding cases, of which only some need be mentioned, likeof Lacaste vs. Director of Lands, 7 Mesina
vs. Vda. de Sonza, 8 Manarpac vs. Cabanatuan, 9 Miguel vs. Court of Appeals 10 and Herico vs. Dar, supra,
by invoking and affirming the Susi doctrine have firmly rooted it in jurisprudence.
Herico, in particular, appears to be squarely affirmative: 11
.... Secondly, under the provisions of Republic Act No. 1942, which the respondent Court
held to be inapplicable to the petitioner's case, with the latter's proven occupation and
cultivation for more than 30 years since 1914, by himself and by his predecessors-ininterest, title over the land has vested on petitioner so as to segregate the land from the
mass of public land. Thereafter, it is no longer disposable under the Public Land Act as by
free patent. ....
xxx xxx xxx
As interpreted in several cases, when the conditions as specified in the foregoing provision
are complied with, the possessor is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to
a grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The
land, therefore, ceases to be of the public domain and beyond the authority of the Director
of Lands to dispose of. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the lack of which
does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the
Torrens title to be issued upon the strength of said patent. 12
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability of considering possession of public land
which is of the character and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express grant from
the State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that the possessor(s) "... shall be conclusively presumed
to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a
certificate of title .... " No proof being admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation
proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the most limited to ascertaining whether
the possession claimed is of the required character and length of time; and registration thereunder
would not confer title, but simply recognize a title already vested. The proceedings would
not originally convert the land from public to private land, but only confirm such a conversion already
affected by operation of law from the moment the required period of possession became complete. As
was so well put in Carino, "... (T)here are indications that registration was expected from all, but none
sufficient to show that, for want of it, ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if
not by earlier law."
If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infiels had a legally
sufficient and transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must
also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such acquisition, there being nothing in the
1935 Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973 Constitution which came into effect
later) prohibiting corporations from acquiring and owning private lands.
Even on the proposition that the land remained technically "public" land, despite immemorial
possession of the Infiels and their ancestors, until title in their favor was actually confirmed in
appropriate proceedings under the Public Land Act, there can be no serious question of Acmes right to
acquire the land at the time it did, there also being nothing in the 1935 Constitution that might be
construed to prohibit corporations from purchasing or acquiring interests in public land to which the
vendor had already acquired that type of so-called "incomplete" or "imperfect" title. The only limitation
then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of
1,024 hectares. The purely accidental circumstance that confirmation proceedings were brought under
the aegis of the 1973 Constitution which forbids corporations from owning lands of the public domain
cannot defeat a right already vested before that law came into effect, or invalidate transactions then
perfectly valid and proper. This Court has already held, in analogous circumstances, that the
Constitution cannot impair vested rights.
We hold that the said constitutional prohibition 14 has no retroactive application to the sales
application of Binan Development Co., Inc. because it had already acquired a vested right to
the land applied for at the time the 1973 Constitution took effect.
That vested right has to be respected. It could not be abrogated by the new Constitution.
Section 2, Article XIII of the 1935 Constitution allows private corporations to purchase public
agricultural lands not exceeding one thousand and twenty-four hectares. Petitioner'
prohibition action is barred by the doctrine of vested rights in constitutional law.
xxx xxx xxx
The due process clause prohibits the annihilation of vested rights. 'A state may not impair
vested rights by legislative enactment, by the enactment or by the subsequent repeal of a
municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate

exercise of the police power'(16 C.J.S. 1177-78).
xxx xxx xxx
In the instant case, it is incontestable that prior to the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution
the right of the corporation to purchase the land in question had become fixed and
established and was no longer open to doubt or controversy.
Its compliance with the requirements of the Public Land Law for the issuance of a patent had
the effect of segregating the said land from the public domain. The corporation's right to
obtain a patent for the land is protected by law. It cannot be deprived of that right without
due process (Director of Lands vs. CA, 123 Phil. 919).<re||an1w> 15
The fact, therefore, that the confirmation proceedings were instituted by Acme in its own name must
be regarded as simply another accidental circumstance, productive of a defect hardly more than
procedural and in nowise affecting the substance and merits of the right of ownership sought to be
confirmed in said proceedings, there being no doubt of Acme's entitlement to the land. As it is
unquestionable that in the light of the undisputed facts, the Infiels, under either the 1935 or the 1973
Constitution, could have had title in themselves confirmed and registered, only a rigid subservience to
the letter of the law would deny the same benefit to their lawful successor-in-interest by valid
conveyance which violates no constitutional mandate.
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so holds, that the majority ruling
in Meralco must be reconsidered and no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as
enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable public land held by a possessor,
personally or through his predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for the
prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land Act, as amended) is converted to private
property by the mere lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule and on the basis
of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this appeal was already private property at the time it was
acquired from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable title, there being at the time no
prohibition against said corporation's holding or owning private land. The objection that, as a juridical
person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public
Land Act is technical, rather than substantial and, again, finds its answer in the dissent in Meralco:
6. To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the
Public Land Act allows only citizens of the Philippines who are natural persons to apply for
confirmation of their title would be impractical and would just give rise to multiplicity of
court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error not having filed the application for
registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors, still it is
conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant Meralco
and neither is there any prohibition against the application being refiled with retroactive
effect in the name of the original owners and vendors (as such natural persons) with the end
result of their application being granted, because of their indisputable acquisition of
ownership by operation of law and the conclusive presumption therein provided in their
favor. It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all
such applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the
Court can after all these years dispose of it here and now. (See Francisco vs. City of Davao)
The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the applications for
confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the
original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation
of the title that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public
Land Act and who thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino
corporations duly qualified to hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for
confirmation of title to the private lands so acquired and sold or exchanged.
There is also nothing to prevent Acme from reconveying the lands to the Infiels and the latter from
themselves applying for confirmation of title and, after issuance of the certificate/s of title in their
names, deeding the lands back to Acme. But this would be merely indulging in empty charades,
whereas the same result is more efficaciously and speedily obtained, with no prejudice to anyone, by a
liberal application of the rule on amendment to conform to the evidence suggested in the dissent
in Meralco.
While this opinion seemingly reverses an earlier ruling of comparatively recent vintage, in a real sense,
it breaks no precedent, but only reaffirms and re-established, as it were, doctrines the soundness of
which has passed the test of searching examination and inquiry in many past cases. Indeed, it is worth
noting that the majority opinion, as well as the concurring opinions of Chief Justice Fernando and
Justice Abad Santos, in Meralco rested chiefly on the proposition that the petitioner therein, a juridical
person, was disqualified from applying for confirmation of an imperfect title to public land under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. Reference to the 1973 Constitution and its Article XIV, Section 11,
was only tangential limited to a brief paragraph in the main opinion, and may, in that context, be
considered as essentially obiter. Meralco, in short, decided no constitutional question.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate
Court, the same is hereby affirmed, without costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.
Feria, Yap, Fernan, Alampay, Cruz, Paras and Feliciano, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:
I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the June,
1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld, "expressed what is the better. . . . and
indeed the correct view." My dissent was anchored on the landmark 1909 case of Carino 2 through the
1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is
established doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public
domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894
in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title' by amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private individual personally and through his
predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the
public domain and becomes private property." I hereby reproduce the same by reference for brevity's
sake. But since we are reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents and
discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which departed therefrom in the recent past, I feel
constrained to write this concurrence in amplification of my views and ratio decidendi.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to
a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. "
The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in the Act, the
rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory period "already acquired, by operation of law, not
only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title
should be issued an order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is
sufficient . . . . If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the
State, it had already ceased to be of the public domainand had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and beyond his authority to
sell to any other person]. " 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes for the U.S.
Supreme Court in the 1909 case of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral
family lands by the dismissal of his application for registration) which reversed the dismissal of the
registration court (as affirmed by the Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the
decree and regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view
of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are
indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it,
ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, whenever made, was not to confer
title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases subsequent thereto
which failed to adhere to the aforecited established doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently
applied up to June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco decision was promulgated). We reaffirm the established
doctrine that such acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes place ipso jure or by operation
of law without the necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title. The land ipso jure ceases to be of
the public domain and becomes private property, which may be lawfully sold to and acquired by
qualified corporations such as respondent corporation. (As stressed in Herico supra, "the application for
confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership is the public policy of the Act and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of
such conversion into private property, qualified corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is no
"alteration or defeating" of the 1973 Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or
acquiring title to lands of the public domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion, for the simple reason
that no public lands are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on October 16,
1962 under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which contained no prohibition against corporations
holding public lands (except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later 1973 Constitution which imposed
an absolute prohibition. Even on the erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite
the Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from time immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful
purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P 45million investments redounding presumably to the
welfare and progress of the community, particularly the municipality of Maconacon, Isabela to which it
donated part of the land for the townsite created a vested right which could not be impaired by the
prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso
jure converted into private land and they had a legally sufficient and transferable title conferred by the
conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which needed only to be established in confirmation of
title proceedings for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and validly
transferred to respondent corporation.
In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such applications for
judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable public lands
expressly reiterate that it has always been the "policy of the State to hasten the settlement,
adjudication and quieting of titles to [such] unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands
publicly and notoriously occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership
have ipso jure been converted into private property and grant the possessors the opportunity to
establish and record such fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing of such application which would have
originally expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively extended to December 31, 1941, then
extended to December 31, 1957, then to December 31, 1968, further extended to December 31, 1976
and lastly extended to December 31, 1987. 7
The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for confirmation of title is in
effect a technicality of procedure and not of substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is
properly applicable: "The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the
applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the
original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title
that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who
thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to
hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands
so acquired and sold or exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise
dissented along the same line from the majority ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion
of the Court would characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical
person rather than the natural persons-transferors, under the particular circumstances of this case, as
an insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy, although the facts could be
distinguished, the approach followed by us in Francisco v. City of Davao,where the legal question raised,
instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By legal fiction and in the
exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if
the application under Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from no such
disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while concurring in the procedural result,
likewise, in effect dissented from the therein majority ruling on the question of substance, and stated
his opinion that "the lots which are sought to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public
domain at the time they were acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are already private lands
because of acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the
confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no private corporation or
association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable. " 10
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural citizens who may
prove their undisputed and open possession of public lands for the required statutory thirty-year
period, tacking on their predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only natural persons, to the
exclusion of juridical persons such as corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess public
lands for the required statutory 30-year period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is
obvious. But when the natural persons have fulfilled the required statutory period of possession, the
Act confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to follow the letter of the
law that they file the applications for confirmation of their title, although they have lawfully transferred
their title to the land. But such procedural failure cannot and should not defeat the substance of the
law, as stressed in the above-cited opinions, that the lands are already private lands because
ofacquisitive prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution would be to
consider the application for confirmation as filed by the natural persons-transferors, and in accordance
with the evidence, confirm their title to the private lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully
transferred by them to the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the validity of the transfer and
sale of the private land to the corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and
have the corporation reassign its rights to the private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was
done after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying on
paper with the technicality of having natural persons file the application for confirmation of title to
the private land.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
(a) ...
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
are the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
(c) ...
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:
SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen
hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares ....
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision prevent a corporation
from directly applying to the Courts for the issuance of Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public
domain (Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799; Republic vs. Villanueva, 114
SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva
Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion that the literalism should be adhered to in this case.
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over the land involved in the
case.
(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME.
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to directly apply to the
Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS
should first apply to the courts for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title to ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila Electric
Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982]).
To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the
court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having filed the application
for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant
Meralco
favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such
applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all
these years dispose of it here and now." (Paragraphing supplied)
The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only citizens (natural
persons) can apply for certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the
constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which prohibits corporations from acquiring title to
lands of the public domain. That interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be
justified. "A construction adopted should not be such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention of the
legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507;
United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351).
It has also been said that:
In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature
intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done a
vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general principle that the courts
should, if reasonably possible to do so interpret the statute, or the provision being
construed, so as to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation should,
if possible, be avoided, under which the statute or provision being construed is defeated, or
as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or
rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible
of two constructions, one of which will give effect to the act, while the other will defeat it,
the former construction is preferred. One part of a statute may not be construed so as to
render another part nugatory or of no effect. Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule
against the enlargement of extension of a statute by construction, the meaning of a statute
may be extended beyond the precise words used in the law, and words or phrases may be
altered or supplied, where this is necessary to prevent a law from becoming a nullity.
Wherever the provision of a statute is general everything which is necessary to make such
provision effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d
456, 143 NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)
The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. The proper course for
the Court to take is to promote in the fullest manner the policy thus laid down and to avoid a
construction which would alter or defeat that policy.
In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114
SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I reiterate my concurrence in Meralco v. Castro-Bartolome, and, therefore, dissent here.
TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring:

I am honored by my brethren's judgment at bar that my dissenting opinion in the June,
1982 Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases, 1 which is herein upheld, "expressed what is the better. . . . and
indeed the correct view." My dissent was anchored on the landmark 1909 case of Carino 2 through the
1925 case of Susi 3 and the long line of cases cited therein to the latest 1980 case of Herico 4 that "it is
established doctrine....... that an open, continuous, adverse and public possession of a land of the public
domain for the period provided in the Public Land Act provision in force at the time (from July 26, 1894
in Susi under the old law [this period was reduced to 'at least thirty years immediately preceding the
filing of the application for confirmation of title' by amendment of Commonwealth Act No. 141,
equivalent to the period of acquisitive prescription 5 ]) by a private individual personally and through his
predecessors confers an effective title on said possessor, whereby the land ceases to be land of the
public domain and becomes private property." I hereby reproduce the same by reference for brevity's
sake. But since we are reverting to the old above-cited established doctrine and precedents and
discarding the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases which departed therefrom in the recent past, I feel
constrained to write this concurrence in amplification of my views and ratio decidendi.
Under the express text and mandate of the cited Act, such possessors "shall be conclusively
presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to
a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. "
The Court thus held in Susi that under the presumption juris et de jure established in the Act, the
rightful possessor of the public land for the statutory period "already acquired, by operation of law, not
only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title
should be issued an order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is
sufficient . . . . If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had acquired the land in question by a grant of the
State, it had already ceased to be of the public domainand had become private property, at least by
presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the control of the Director of Lands [and beyond his authority to
sell to any other person]. " 6
The root of the doctrine goes back to the pronouncement of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes for the U.S.
Supreme Court in the 1909 case of Carino (the Igorot chief who would have been deprived of ancestral
family lands by the dismissal of his application for registration) which reversed the dismissal of the
registration court (as affirmed by the Supreme Court) and adopted the liberal view that under the
decree and regulations of June 25, 1880, "The words 'may prove' (acrediten), as well, or better, in view
of the other provisions, might be taken to mean when called upon to do so in any litigation. There are
indications that registration was expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it,
ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof, whenever made, was not to confer
title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."
The Court's decision at bar now expressly overturns the Meralco and related cases subsequent thereto
which failed to adhere to the aforecited established doctrine dating back to 1909 and was consistently
applied up to June 29, 1982 (when the Meralco decision was promulgated).<re||an1w> We
reaffirm the established doctrine that such acquisitive prescription of alienable public lands takes place
ipso jure or by operation of law without the necessity of a prior issuance of a certificate of title. The
land ipso jure ceases to be of the public domain and becomes private property, which may be lawfully
sold to and acquired by qualified corporations such as respondent corporation. (As stressed in Herico
supra, "the application for confirmation is a mere formality, the lack of which does not affect the legal
sufficiency of the title.")
Such ipso jure conversion into private property of public lands publicly held under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership is the public policy of the Act and is so expressly stated therein. By virtue of
such conversion into private property, qualified corporations may lawfully acquire them and there is no
"alteration or defeating" of the 1973 Constitution's prohibition against corporations holding or
acquiring title to lands of the public domain, as claimed in the dissenting opinion, for the simple reason
that no public lands are involved.
It should be noted that respondent corporation purchased the land from the Infiels on October 16,
1962 under the aegis of the 1935 Constitution which contained no prohibition against corporations
holding public lands (except a limit of 1,024 hectares) unlike the later 1973 Constitution which imposed
an absolute prohibition. Even on the erroneous assumption that the land remained public land despite
the Infiels' open possession thereof as owners from time immemorial, respondent corporation's lawful
purchase from them of the land in 1962 and P 45million investments redounding presumably to the
welfare and progress of the community, particularly the municipality of Maconacon, Isabela to which it
donated part of the land for the townsite created a vested right which could not be impaired by the
prohibition adopted eleven years later. But as sufficiently stressed, the land of the Infiels had been ipso
jure converted into private land and they had a legally sufficient and transferable title conferred by the
conclusive presumption of the Public Land Act (which needed only to be established in confirmation of
title proceedings for formalization and issuance of the certificate of title) which they lawfully and validly
transferred to respondent corporation.
In fact, the many amendments to the Act extending the period for the filing of such applications for
judicial confirmation of imperfect and incomplete titles to alienable and disposable public lands
expressly reiterate that it has always been the "policy of the State to hasten the settlement,
adjudication and quieting of titles to [such] unregistered lands," i.e. to recognize that such lands
publicly and notoriously occupied and cultivated under bona fide claim of acquisition or ownership
have ipso jure been converted into private property and grant the possessors the opportunity to
establish and record such fact. Thus, the deadline for the filing of such application which would have
originally expired first on December 31, 1938 was successively extended to December 31, 1941, then
extended to December 31, 1957, then to December 31, 1968, further extended to December 31, 1976
and lastly extended to December 31, 1987. 7
The cited Act's provision that only natural persons may apply thereunder for confirmation of title is in
effect a technicality of procedure and not of substance. My submittal in Meralco, mutatis mutandis, is
properly applicable: "The ends of justice would best be served, therefore, by considering the
applications for confirmation as amended to conform to the evidence, i.e. as filed in the names of the
original persons who as natural persons are duly qualified to apply for formal confirmation of the title
that they had acquired by conclusive presumption and mandate of the Public Land Act and who
thereafter duly sold to the herein corporations (both admittedly Filipino corporations duly qualified to
hold and own private lands) and granting the applications for confirmation of title to the private lands
so acquired and sold or exchanged." 8 Indeed, then Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando likewise
dissented along the same line from the majority ruling therein and held: "I dissent insofar as the opinion
of the Court would characterize such jurisdictional defect that the applicant was Meralco, a juridical
person rather than the natural persons-transferors, under the particular circumstances of this case, as
an insurmountable obstacle to the relief sought. I would apply by analogy, although the facts could be
distinguished, the approach followed by us in Francisco v. City of Davao,where the legal question raised,
instead of being deferred and possibly taken up in another case, was resolved. By legal fiction and in the
exercise of our equitable jurisdiction, I feel that the realistic solution would be to decide the matter as if
the application under Section 48(b) were filed by the Piguing spouses, who I assume suffer from no such
disability." 9 Justice Vicente Abad Santos, now retired, while concurring in the procedural result,
likewise, in effect dissented from the therein majority ruling on the question of substance, and stated
his opinion that "the lots which are sought to be registered have ceased to be lands of the public
domain at the time they were acquired by the petitioner corporation. They are already private lands
because of acquisitive prescription by the predecessors of the petitioner and all that is needed is the
confirmation of the title. Accordingly, the constitutional provision that no private corporation or
association may hold alienable lands of the public domain is inapplicable. " 10
To my mind, the reason why the Act limits the filing of such applications to natural citizens who may
prove their undisputed and open possession of public lands for the required statutory thirty-year
period, tacking on their predecessors'-in-interest possession is that only natural persons, to the
exclusion of juridical persons such as corporations, can actually, physically and in reality possess public
lands for the required statutory 30-year period. That juridical persons or corporations cannot do so is
obvious. But when the natural persons have fulfilled the required statutory period of possession, the
Act confers on them a legally sufficient and transferable title. It is preferable to follow the letter of the
law that they file the applications for confirmation of their title, although they have lawfully transferred
their title to the land. But such procedural failure cannot and should not defeat the substance of the
law, as stressed in the above-cited opinions, that the lands are already private lands because
ofacquisitive prescription by the corporation's predecessors and the realistic solution would be to
consider the application for confirmation as filed by the natural persons-transferors, and in accordance
with the evidence, confirm their title to the private lands so converted by operation of law and lawfully
transferred by them to the corporation. The law, after all, recognizes the validity of the transfer and
sale of the private land to the corporation. It should not be necessary to go in a round-about way and
have the corporation reassign its rights to the private land to natural persons-(as I understand), was
done after the decision in the Meralco and Iglesia ni Cristo cases) just for the purpose of complying on
paper with the technicality of having natural persons file the application for confirmation of title to
the private land.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
Section 48 of the Public Land Act, in part, provides:
the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title
(a) ...
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years
are the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of
(c) ...
Article XIV, Section 11, of the 1973 Constitution, in part, provides:
SEC. 11. .... No private corporation or association may hold alienable lands of the public
domain except by lease not to exceed one thousand hectares in area; nor may any citizen
hold such lands by lease in excess of five hundred hectares ....
It has to be conceded that, literally, statutory law and constitutional provision prevent a corporation
from directly applying to the Courts for the issuance of Original Certificates of Title to lands of the public
domain (Manila Electric Company vs. Castro-Bartolome, 114 SCRA 799; Republic vs. Villanueva, 114
SCRA 875; Republic vs. Court of Appeals, 119 SCRA 449; Iglesia ni Cristo vs. Hon. Judge, CFI of Nueva
Ecija, Br. 1). It is my opinion that the literalism should be adhered to in this case.
The reasoning of the majority can be restated in simple terms as follows:
(a) The INFIELS can successfully file an application for a certificate of title over the land involved in the
case.
(b) After the INFIELS secure a certificate of title, they can sell the land to ACME.
(c) As ACME can eventually own the certificate of title, it should be allowed to directly apply to the
Courts for the Certificate of Title, thus avoiding the circuituous "literal" requirement that the INFIELS
should first apply to the courts for the titles, and afterwards transfer the title to ACME.
The majority opinion, in effect, adopted the following excerpt from a dissent in Manila Electric
Company vs. Castro-Bartolome (114 SCRA 799, 823 [1982]).
To uphold respondent judge's denial of Meralco's application on the technicality that the
court actions. Assuming that there was a technical error in not having filed the application
for registration in the name of the Piguing spouses as the original owners and vendors,
still it is conceded that there is no prohibition against their sale of the land to the applicant
Meralco
favor.
It should not be necessary to go through all the rituals at the great cost of refiling of all such
applications in their names and adding to the overcrowded court dockets when the Court can after all
these years dispose of it here and now." (Emphasis supplied)
The effect is that the majority opinion now nullifies the statutory provision that only citizens (natural
persons) can apply for certificates of title under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well as the
constitutional provision (Article XIV, Section 11) which prohibits corporations from acquiring title to
lands of the public domain. That interpretation or construction adopted by the majority cannot be
justified. "A construction adopted should not be such as to nullify, destroy or defeat the intention of the
legislature" (New York State Dept. of Social Services v. Dublino [UST 37 L. Ed 2d 688, 93 S Ct 2507;
United States v. Alpers 338 US 680, 94 L Ed 457, 70 S Ct 352; cited in 73 Am Jur. 2nd., p. 351).
It has also been said that:
In the construction of statutes, the courts start with the assumption that the legislature
intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not to be presumed to have done a
vain thing in the enactment of a statute. Hence, it is a general principle that the courts
should, if reasonably possible to do so interpret the statute, or the provision being
construed, so as to give it efficient operation and effect as a whole. An interpretation should,
if possible, be avoided, under which the statute or provision being construed is defeated, or
as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or
rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative, or nugatory. If a statute is fairly susceptible
of two constructions, one of which will give effect to the act, while the other will defeat it,
the former construction is preferred. One part of a statute may not be construed so as to
render another part nugatory or of no effect. Moreover, notwithstanding the general rule
against the enlargement of extension of a statute by construction, the meaning of a statute
may be extended beyond the precise words used in the law, and words or phrases may be
altered or supplied, where this is necessary to prevent a law from becoming a nullity.
Wherever the provision of a statute is general everything which is necessary to make such
provision effectual is supplied by implication. (Pliakos vs. Illinois Liquor Control Com. 11 III 2d
456, 143 NE2d 47; cited in 73 AM Jur. 2d pp. 422-423)
The statutory provision and the constitutional prohibition express a public policy. The proper course for
the Court to take is to promote in the fullest manner the policy thus laid down and to avoid a
construction which would alter or defeat that policy.
In fine, I confirm my adherence to the ruling of this Court in Meralco vs. Hon. Castro-Bartolome, 114
SCRA 799 [1982] and related cases.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 172011
March 7, 2011
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
TEODORO P. RIZALVO, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
On appeal under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, is the Decision1 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 73647 which affirmed the Decision2 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
of Bauang, La Union, in LRC Case No. 58-MTCBgLU, approving respondents application for registration
of an 8,957-square meter parcel of land located in Brgy. Taberna, Bauang, La Union.
The facts are undisputed.
On December 7, 2000, respondent Teodoro P. Rizalvo, Jr. filed before the MTC of Bauang, La Union,
acting as a land registration court, an application for the registration3 of a parcel of land referred to in
Survey Plan Psu-200706,4 located in Bauang, La Union and containing an area of 8,957 square meters.
Respondent alleged that he is the owner in fee simple of the subject parcel of land, that he obtained
title over the land by virtue of a Deed of Transfer5 dated December 31, 1962, and that he is currently in
possession of the land. In support of his claim, he presented, among others, Tax Declaration No.
222066 for the year 1994 in his name, and Proof of Payment7 of real property taxes beginning in 1952
up to the time of filing of the application.
On April 20, 2001, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed an Opposition alleging that neither
respondent nor his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject property since June 12, 1945 or earlier and that the tax
declarations and tax payment receipts did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of
ownership. The OSG also asserted that the subject property was a portion of public domain belonging
to the Republic of the Philippines and hence not subject to private acquisition.
At the hearing of the application, no private oppositor came forth. Consequently, the trial court issued
an Order of Special Default against the whole world except the Republic of the Philippines and entered
the same in the records of the case.
At the trial, respondent testified that he acquired the subject property by purchase from his mother,
Bibiana P. Rizalvo, as evidenced by a Deed of Transfer dated December 31, 1962.8 He also testified that
he was in adverse, open, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject property; that no one was
questioning his ownership over the land; and that he was the one paying the real property tax thereon,
as evidenced by the bundle of official receipts covering the period of 1953 to 2000. He also stated that
he was the one who had the property surveyed; that no one opposed the survey; and that during said
survey, they placed concrete markers on the boundaries of the property. Further, he stated that he was
not aware of any person or entity which questioned his mothers ownership and possession of the
subject property.
Respondents mother, Bibiana P. Rizalvo, was also presented during the trial. She stated that she
purchased the lot from Eufrecina Navarro, as evidenced by the Absolute Deed of Sale9 dated July 8,
1952. She confirmed that before she sold the property to her son, she was the absolute owner of the
subject property and was in possession thereof, without anyone questioning her status as owner. She
further stated that she was the one paying for the real property taxes at that time and that she even
installed improvements on the subject property.
After conducting an investigation and verification of the records involving the subject land, Land
Investigator/Inspector Dionisio L. Picar of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office
(CENRO) of San Fernando, La Union submitted a report10 on July 17, 2001. Aside from the technical
description of the land, the report certified that indeed the subject parcel of land was within the
alienable and disposable zone and that the applicant was indeed in actual occupation and possession of
the land.
On the part of the Republic, the OSG did not present any evidence.
As stated above, the MTC of Bauang, La Union, acting as a land registration court, rendered its
Decision11 on November 29, 2001, approving respondents application. The dispositive portion of the
trial courts decision reads-WHEREFORE, this Court, confirming the Order of Special Default, hereby approves the application and
orders the adjudication and registration of the land described in Survey Plan No. PSU-200706 (Exh. "A")
and the Technical Description of the land (Exh. "B") situated at Brgy. Taberna, Bauang, La Union
containing an area of Eight Thousand Nine Hundred Fifty Seven (8,957) square meters.
Once this decision becomes final and executory let the corresponding decree be issued.
SO ORDERED.12
On December 21, 2001 the Republic of the Philippines through the OSG filed a Notice of Appeal. In its
Brief,13 the OSG argued that the trial court erred in ruling that the applicant proved a registrable title to
the property. However, the CA found no merit in the appeal and promulgated the assailed Decision14 on
March 14, 2006, affirming the trial courts decision.
The Republic of the Philippines through the OSG now comes to this Court by way of petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, to seek relief.
In its petition, the OSG argues that the Republic of the Philippines has dominion over all lands of public
domain and that the grant to private individuals of imperfect title by the Republic over its alienable and
disposable lands is a mere privilege. Hence, judicial confirmation proceeding is strictly construed against
the grantee/applicant.15
The OSG further contends that respondent failed to show indubitably that he has complied with all the
requirements showing that the property, previously part of the public domain, has become private
property by virtue of his acts of possession in the manner and length of time required by law. The OSG
maintains that respondent and his predecessors-in-interest failed to show convincingly that he or they
were in open, continuous, adverse, and public possession of the land of the public domain as required
by law. The OSG points out that there is no evidence showing that the property has been fenced,
walled, cultivated or otherwise improved. The OSG argues that without these indicators which
demonstrate clear acts of possession and occupation, the application for registration cannot be
allowed.16
On the other hand, respondent counters that he has presented sufficient proof that the subject
property was indeed part of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain. He also asserts that
his title over the land can be traced by documentary evidence wayback to 1948 and hence, the length
of time required by law for acquisition of an imperfect title over alienable public land has been
satisfied.17
Further, he argues that although not conclusive proof of ownership, tax declarations and official
receipts of payment of real property taxes are at least proof of possession of real property. In addition,
he highlights the fact that since the occupancy and possession of his predecessors-in-interest, there has
been no question about their status as owners and possessors of the property from adjoining lot
owners, neighbors, the community, or any other person. Because of this, he claims that his possession
of the land is open, continuous, adverse, and public -- sufficient for allowing registration.
Verily, the main issue in this case is whether respondent and his predecessors-in-interest were in open,
continuous, adverse, and public possession of the land in question in the manner and length of time
required by law as to entitle respondent to judicial confirmation of imperfect title.
We answer in the negative.
Existing law and jurisprudence provides that an applicant for judicial confirmation of imperfect title
must prove compliance with Section 14 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 152918 or the Property
Registration Decree. The pertinent portions of Section 14 provide:
SEC. 14. Who may apply.The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
application for registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing
laws.
xxxx
Under Section 14 (1), applicants for registration of title must sufficiently establish first, that the subject
land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; second, that the applicant
and his predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the same; and third, that it is under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945,
or earlier.
The first requirement was satisfied in this case. The certification and report19 dated July 17, 2001
submitted by Special Investigator I Dionisio L. Picar of the CENRO of San Fernando City, La Union, states
that the entire land area in question is within the alienable and disposable zone, certified as such since
January 21, 1987.
In Limcoma Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. Republic,20 we have ruled that a certification and report from
the DENR-CENRO enjoys the presumption of regularity and is sufficient proof to show the classification
of the land described therein. We held:
In the recent case of Buenaventura v. Republic,21 we ruled that said Certification is sufficient to
establish the true nature or character of the subject property as public and alienable land. We similarly
ruled in Republic v. Court of Appeals22 and intoned therein that the certification enjoys a presumption
of regularity in the absence of contradictory evidence.
Both the DENR-CENRO Certification and Report constitute a positive government act, an administrative
action, validly classifying the land in question. As adverted to by the petitioner, the classification or reclassification of public lands into alienable or disposable, mineral, or forest lands is now a prerogative of
the Executive Department of the government. Clearly, the petitioner has overcome the burden of
proving the alienability of the subject lot.
Respondent has likewise met the second requirement as to ownership and possession. The MTC and
the CA both agreed that respondent has presented sufficient testimonial and documentary evidence to
show that he and his predecessors-in-interest were in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land in question. Said findings are binding upon this Court absent any
showing that the lower courts committed glaring mistakes or that the assailed judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts. In Buenaventura v. Pascual,23 we reiterated,
Time and again, this Court has stressed that its jurisdiction in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing only errors of law, not of fact, unless the findings of
fact complained of are devoid of support by the evidence on record, or the assailed judgment is based
on the misapprehension of facts. The trial court, having heard the witnesses and observed their
demeanor and manner of testifying, is in a better position to decide the question of their credibility.
Hence, the findings of the trial court must be accorded the highest respect, even finality, by this Court. x
x x.
However, the third requirement, that respondent and his predecessors-in-interest be in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the subject property since June 12,
1945 or earlier, has not been satisfied. Respondent only managed to present oral and documentary
evidence of his and his mothers ownership and possession of the land since 1958 through a photocopy
of the Deed of Absolute Sale24 dated July 8, 1958 between Eufrecina Navarro and Bibiana P. Rizalvo. He
presented Tax Declaration No. 1107825 for the year 1948 in the name of Eufrecina Navarro and real
property tax receipts beginning in 1952.26 In Llanes v. Republic,27 the Court held that tax declarations
are good indicia of possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying
taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession.28]However, even assuming that
the 1948 Tax Declaration in the name of Eufrecina Navarro and the tax payment receipts could be taken
in this case as proof of a claim of ownership, still, respondent lacks proof of occupation and possession
beginning June 12, 1945 or earlier. What is categorically required by law is open, continuous, exclusive,
and notorious possession and occupation under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.29
But given the fact that respondent and his predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the
subject land since 1948, is respondent nonetheless entitled to registration of title under Section 14 (2)
of P.D. No. 1529? To this question we likewise answer in the negative.
An applicant may be allowed to register land by means of prescription under existing laws.1avvphil The
laws on prescription are found in the Civil Code and jurisprudence. It is well settled that prescription is
one of the modes of acquiring ownership and that properties classified as alienable public land may be
converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least
thirty years.30
On this basis, respondent would have been eligible for application for registration because his claim of
ownership and possession over the subject property even exceeds thirty (30) years. However, it is
jurisprudentially clear that the thirty (30)-year period of prescription for purposes of acquiring
ownership and registration of public land under Section 14 (2) of P.D. No. 1529 only begins from the
moment the State expressly declares that the public dominion property is no longer intended for public
service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial.31 In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, the Court ruled,
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as
alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2)32, and thus
incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall
be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law.33
In the case at bar, respondent merely presented a certification and report from the DENR-CENRO dated
July 17, 2001 certifying that the land in question entirely falls within the alienable and disposable zone
since January 21, 1987; that it has not been earmarked for public use; and that it does not encroach any
area devoted to general public use.34 Unfortunately, such certification and report is not enough in order
to commence the thirty (30)-year prescriptive period under Section 14 (2). There is no evidence in this
case indicating any express declaration by the state that the subject land is no longer intended for
public service or the development of the national wealth. Thus, there appears no basis for the
application of the thirty (30)-year prescriptive period in this case.
Indeed, even assuming arguendo that the DENR-CENRO certification and report is enough to signify that
the land is no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth, respondent
is still not entitled to registration because the land was certified as alienable and disposable in 1987,
while the application for registration was filed on December 7, 2000, a mere thirteen (13) years after
and far short of the required thirty (30) years under existing laws on prescription.
Although we would want to adhere to the States policy of encouraging and promoting the distribution
of alienable public lands to spur economic growth and remain true to the ideal of social justice 35 we are
constrained by the clear and simple requisites of the law to disallow respondents application for
registration.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated March 14, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in
C.A.-G.R. CV No. 73647 affirming the Decision dated November 29, 2001 of the Municipal Trial Court of
Bauang, La Union, in LRC Case No. 58-MTCBgLU is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Respondents application
for registration is DENIED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 68946 May 22, 1992
DIRECTOR OF LANDS, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ANGELINA SARMIENTO, respondents.
Marvil Hill for private respondent
W. Topacio Garcia & Associates collaborating counsel for private respondent.
Dollete, Blanco, Ejercito & Associates for movants.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
Petitioner urges this Court to review and set aside the decision of 12 October 1984 of the then
Intermediate Appellate Court 1 (now Court of Appeals) in A.C.-G.R. CV No. 00126 which affirmed the
decision of 2 June 1982 of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan in Land Registration Case No. (SM) N-167
granting the registration of a parcel of land with an area of 376,397 square meters, located in San Jose
del Monte, Bulacan, in favor of private respondent.
After the filing of private respondent's Comment, this Court, in its resolution of 27 February
1985, 2 gave due course to the petition, considered the Comment as the Answer and required the
parties to submit their respective Memoranda. The petitioner moved for leave to adopt the petition as
his Memorandum 3 which this Court noted in its resolution of 17 April 1985. 4 Private respondent filed
her Memorandum only on 8 December 1986, 5 after her attorneys were held in contempt of court and
fined in the amount of P300.00.
The pleadings of the parties disclose the following factual antecedents in this case:
On 13 August 1970, private respondent and the spouses Placer A. Velasco and Socorro Busuego filed
with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Bulacan, Branch V, at Sta. Maria,
Bulacan, an application for the registration of title over Lot No. 1005 of the Cadastral Survey of San Jose
del Monte, Bulacan, with an area of 376,397 square meters.
On 18 January 1971, private oppositors Angeles and Cirilo Amador filed their opposition on the ground
that the land belongs to them.
On 19 January 1971, an Order of special default against the whole world, with the exception of
oppositors Angeles and Cirilo Amador and the municipal mayor of San Jose del Monte, was issued by
the trial court.
Upon the filing of an Opposition by the petitioner and upon motion by the Provincial Fiscal for the lifting
of the order of special default and for the admission of the Opposition, the trial court issued an Order
on 24 August 1971 granting the motion and admitting said Opposition. 6 Separate oppositions filed by
Feliciano Santos, Ciriaco Maningas and Simeon Albarico were also admitted by the court after the lifting
of the order of special default. 7
Subsequently, private respondent moved to drop as co-applicants spouses Placer Velasco and Socorro
Busuego on the ground that they were made co-applicants because of a contract of services 8 between
her and the spouses under which the latter agreed to shoulder all the litigation expenses and the cost of
survey and attorney's fees in this case; the spouses failed to comply with their commitment. The trial
court deemed said agreement validly rescinded by private respondent and considered her as "the only
applicant in this case." 9
After hearing the application on its merits, the trial court handed down on 2 June 1982 a decision in
favor of private respondent granting the registration of the lot in question, together with all the
improvements thereon, in her name:
. . . with the exception of the three (3) houses erected therein owned and possessed by her
predecessors-in-interest, who are claimed (sic) to be tenants of the property, namely: Macario Cruz,
Juan Reyes and Mariano Castillo. . . . subject, however, to the payment of real property taxes in arrears
since 1971 as well as to the provisions of Presidential Decree Nos. 65 and 296, with respect to those
portions of the perimeter bounded by the river, barrio and provincial roads, respectively.
The decision is based on the trial court's findings of fact, to wit:
. . . That the subject parcel of land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of Angelina
Sarmiento as early as 1965, under Tax Declaration No. 8388 (Exhibit J), with an assessed value of
P10,350.00. That the real property taxes from 1965 to 1970 were paid in full (Exhibit K). That a small
portion of the subject parcel of land consisting of 94,000 sq. m. is devoted to agriculture while the rest
is cogonland. That the subject parcel land was acquired by applicant Angelina Sarmiento from:
1) Juan Reyes, married to Avelina Emocling, who had been in possession of a portion of the subject land
consisting of 168,000 sq. m. for 41 years prior to the transfer of their rights, interests, and participation
over the same in favor of applicant Angelina Sarmiento, which transfer was made through a deed of
absolute sale (Bilihang Lampasan at Patuluyan Exhibits G and G-1), executed on April 7, 1969, for
and in consideration of P42,000.00.
2) Mariano Castillo, married to Petronila Robes, who had been in possession of a portion of the subject
land, consisting of 14 hectares since 1948, until on August 16, 1965 said spouses transferred their
rights, interests and participation over the eastern 1/2 portion of said 14-hectare property, in favor of
applicant Angelina Sarmiento, for and in consideration of P1,500.00 (Exhibits I and I-1 Bilihang
Lampasan at Patuluyan).
3) Mariano Castillo, married to Petronila Robes, who, by virtue of a deed if (sic) absolute sale executed
by them on November 15, 1965, sold the remaining 7-hectare property covered by Exhibits I and I-1, to
applicant Angelina Sarmiento, for and in consideration of P21,000.00; which deed of absolute sale,
having been lost, was confirmed by vendor Mariano Castillo thru a Confirmatory Deed of Sale executed
on April 18, 1969 (Exhibits H and H-1).
4) Macario Cruz, married to Antonia Guilalas, who had been in possession of a portion of the subject
land, consisting of 73,000 sq. m. more or less prior to the transfer of their rights, interest and
participation in favor of applicant Angelina Sarmiento on March 31, 1969, for and in consideration of
P18,750.00.
xxx xxx xxx
The testimonial evidence shows that the subject parcel of land was originally owned and possessed by
Macario Cruz, spouses Juan Reyes and Avelina Emocling, the spouses Mariano Castillo and Petronila
Robes, the two latter sets of spouses having been in possession as early as 1928 and 1948, respectively,
during which time they possessed, occupied and cultivated their respective portions unmolested,
openly, continuously, and in the concept of owners. That by virtue of the aforesaid deeds of sale
(Exhibits G, G-1, H, H-1, I and I-1), possessions over the same were transferred to the herein applicant.
That, thereafter, said spouses remained in the same property, maintaining their houses and acting as
tenants for the new owner, applicant Angelina Sarmiento. That applicant likewise introduced
improvements on the property by fencing the same with barbed wire, planting crops and other fruit
trees, and by constructing there a house of her own. The oral testimony of applicant Angelina
Sarmiento, insofar as location, possession and ownership over the said parcel of land is concerned, was
corroborated by the testimony (sic) of Victor Jarvinia and Enrique Buco, both claiming that they were
with the group who conducted the survey of the subject property; and said Enrique Buco also declaring
that he had known the subject land since 1932, he being the owner of an adjoining titled property.
Witness Enrique Buco likewise claimed that the subject land is way beyond the perimeter of the titled
property of oppositor 2nd Manila Newtown City Development Corporation, the latter's land being
situated far from the subject land.
xxx xxx xxx
The subject parcel of land appears not to be within any military, naval, civil or a government
reservation; nor is it traversed by any road, river or creek, except that it is bounded on the North and
East, along lines 4 to 33 by the Katitinga River; and on the Southeast, along lines 34 to 40 by Dean
Kabayo Barrio Road; on the South by Igay Provincial Road, along lines 40 to 44. 10
The Director of Lands, through the Office of the Solicitor General, seasonably appealed from said
decision to the then Intermediate Appellate Court which docketed the appeal as A.C.-G.R. CV No.
00126. The Director raised before it the following assignment of error:
The lower court gravely erred in holding that the applicant and her predecessors-in-interest have been
in open, continuous, and adverse possession in the concept of owner of the land applied for more than
30 years prior to the filing of the application. 11
In its decision promulgated on 12 October 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court found no merit in the
appeal and dismissed the same. It held follows:
We find no merit in the appeal. While it may be true that the vendors of the portion of the land in
question to the herein applicant did not show tax declaration, it has been clearly established that
Macario Cruz and spouses Juan Reyes and Avelina Sarmiento (sic) and also spouses Mariano Castillo and
Petronila Robes were in possession of the land in 1928 and 1948, respectively in concept of owners,
without anybody molesting them. They introduced improvements by planting different kinds of trees
and constructing houses thereon. When a person occupied (sic) a parcel of land under a claim of
ownership making improvements and generally held (sic) himself out as owner of the land, it is only
upon the most convincing testimony, in the absence of any competent documentary evidence, that the
courts would be justified in declaring him to be the real owner thereof.
A person in the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of a certain lands
(sic) for more than thirty years, in the concept of owner, is entitled to a confirmation of his title to said
land. (Molina vs. De Bacud, L-20195, April 27, 1967, 19 SCRA 956).
Accordingly, herein applicant continued the possession in concept of owner from her predecessors-ininterest.
Moreover, the land in question was surveyed as Lot 1005 for the herein applicant for the cadastral
survey of San Jose del Monte, without anybody else claiming ownership of said land.
It further appears that the land in question is within the alienable and disposable land as certified to by
the officials of the Bureau of Forest Development. It is for this reason that the oppositor Director of
Lands did not introduce any evidence opposition (sic) and merely submitted the case for decision.
We reiterate what we have said in previous decisions in similar cases that unless the government has
serious grounds of opposition such as the fact that the land applied for is within a forest zone or
government reservation, registration of agricultural lands within the alienable or disposable area should
be encouraged to give more value to the land and this promotes their development rather than remain
as idle lands. 12
Undaunted by this second defeat, the Director filed on 5 December 1984 this petition asserting that the
respondent Court had decided a question of substance in a way not in accord with law and the
applicable decisions of this Court. 13
The petition is impressed with merit. This Court will have to overturn the challenged decision, as well as
that of the trial court.
While the rule is well settled that findings of fact of the appellate court are conclusive upon this
Court, 14 there are recognized exceptions thereto, among which is where the findings of fact are not
supported by the record or are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute a serious abuse of
discretion. 15 This exception is present in this case insofar as the findings of the respondent Court and
the trial court on the character of possession are concerned.
It is not disputed that private respondent seeks registration of the questioned lot on the basis of
paragraph
(b),
Section
48
of
the
Public
Land
Act, 16 as amended by R.A. No. 1942, 17 which reads as follows:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing
of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war of force majeure. These shall
be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this chapter. 18
This section is the law on judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles. By its very nature, the
burden of proof is on the applicant to show that he as an imperfect or incomplete title. Such is the duty
of one who holds the affirmative side of an issue In Heirs of Jose Amunategui vs. Director of
Forestry, 19 this Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., held:
In confirmation of imperfect title cases, the applicant shoulders the burden of proving that he meets
the requirements of Section 48, Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942. . . .
Specifically, under paragraph (b) thereof, the applicant must prove that: (a) he or his predecessors-ininterest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notirious possession and occupation of an
agricultural land of the public domain; (b) such possession and occupation must be for a least thirty (30)
years preceding the filing of the application; and (c) such possession and occupation must be under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
It must be underscored that the law speaks of "possession and occupation." Since these words are
separated by the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with
the order. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive possession. When,
therefore, the law adds the wordoccupation, it seeks to delimit the all-encompassing effect of
constructive possession. Taken together with the words open, continuous, exclusive and notorious, the
word occupation serves to highlight the fact that for one to qualify under paragraph (b) of the aforesaid
section, his possession of the land must not be mere fiction. As this Court stated, through then Mr.
Justice Jose P. Laurel, in Lasam vs. The Director of Lands: 20
. . . Counsel for the applicant invokes the doctrine laid down by us in Ramos vs. Director of Lands (39
Phil. 175, 180). (See also Roales vs. Director of Lands, 51 Phil. 302, 304). But it should be observed that
the application of the doctrine of constructive possession in that case is subject to certain qualifications,
and this court was careful to observe that among these qualifications is "one particularly relating to the
size of the tract in controversy with reference to the portion actually in possession of the claimant."
While, therefore, "possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on
every square meter of ground before it can be said that he is in possession", possession under
paragraph 6 of section 54 of Act No. 926, as amended by paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874, is
not gained by mere nominal claim. The mere planting of a sign or symbol of possession cannot justify a
Magellan-like claim of dominion over an immense tract of territory. Possession as a means of acquiring
ownership, while it may be constructive, is not a mere fiction. . . .
Earlier, in Ramirez vs. The Director of Lands, 21 this Court noted:
. . . The mere fact of declaring uncultivated land for taxation purposes and visiting it every once in a
while, as was done by him, does not constitute acts of possession.
In the case of The Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 22 this Court also stated:
A mere casual cultivation of portions of the land by the claimant, and the raising thereon of cattle, do
not constitute possession under claim of ownership. In that sense, possession is not exclusive and
notorious so as to give rise to a presumptive grant from the State.
Possession is open when it is patent, visible, apparent, notorious and not clandestine. 23 It is continuous
when uninterrupted, unbroken and not intermittent or occasional; 24 exclusive when the adverse
possessor can show exclusive dominion over the land and an appropriation of it to his own use and
benefit; 25 and notorious when it is so conspicuous that it is generally known and talked of by the public
or the people in the neighborhood. 26
Use of land is adverse when it is open and notorious. 27
Under the law, the only kind of interruption which does not affect the continuity of possession is that
caused by war or force majeure.
Private respondent does not pretend to be the original possessor of the property in question. She relies
on the alleged possession of her predecessors-in-interest, namely: Juan Reyes, Mariano Castillo,
Macario Cruz and Feliciano Santos. From Juan Reyes, she acquired a parcel of land located in Karahumi,
San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, with an area of 168,000 square meters as evidenced in a deed of sale
executed on 7 April 1969. 28 From Mariano Castillo, she first acquired a portion, consisting of 7 hectares,
of a parcel of land located in Licau-licau, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, per a deed of sale executed on 16
August 1965. 29 She purchased the remaining portion thereof, with an area of 7 hectares, allegedly on
15 November 1965, but she lost the deed of sale; however, Mariano Castillo subsequently executed a
so-called Confirmatory Deed of Sale on 8 April 1969. 30 Per the findings of the trial court, the property
purchased from Cruz on 31 March 1969 for P18,750.00 consists of 73,000 square meters. 31 No deed of
sale was presented to prove this acquisition. There is no proof as to the area of the property allegedly
purchased from Santos.
None of private respondent's predecessors-in-interest declared for taxation purposes their alleged land
holdings. Accordingly, they had never paid taxes thereon. It was only the private respondent who
declared them in one (1) tax declaration, Tax Declaration No. 8388, on 18 September 1969. 32 Per this
tax declaration, the land covered is located at Gaya-Gaya, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, with an area of
37.6 hectares, of which 9.4 hectares are ricelands while the remaining 28.2 hectares are cogonal.
Juan Reyes, Mariano Castillo, Macario Cruz and Feliciano Santos were not presented by private
respondent as witnesses during the hearing of her application. There can be no question that they were
the best witnesses to identify the parcel they sold to the private respondent and prove the character of
their possession thereof. Instead, she presented Victor Jarvina and Enrique Buco, whose testimonies on
direct and cross examinations are partly summarized by the petitioner as follows:
Victor Jarvina testified that he knew the applicant (p. 4, tsn, June 20, 1977) who bought a parcel of land
with an area of more than 37 hectares, located in Licau-Licau, San Jose del Monte, Bulacan, from
Macario Castillo and Juan Reyes (pp. 5-6, ibid); that he was with the surveyor when the survey was
done; no person contested the survey; he identified the survey plan, Exhibit "F", the deed of sale
executed by Juan Reyes, Exhibits "G" and "G-1", the deeds of sale executed by Mariano Castillo, Exhibits
"H" and "H-1" and Exhibits "I" and "I-1" (pp. 7-11, ibid); the land was declared for taxation purposes by
Angelina Sarmiento and the taxes were paid; he identified Exhibit "J", the tax declaration, and Exhibit
"K", the tax receipt (pp. 12-13, ibid); after the properties were purchased by the applicant, her
possession was never disturbed by any other person (pp. 4-7, tsn, July 29, 1977). On cross-examination,
Victor Jarvina stated that he could no longer recall the date when the survey was made (pp. 14-19, ibid);
the land was bought by the applicant from different persons, including Mariano Castillo, Juan Reyes,
Macario Cruz and Feliciano Santos; he was present when the sales were made, and the vendors did not
show any written document to prove that they owned the property, but they claimed to have been in
possession of the same for ten (10) years (pp. 14-16, tsn, Sept. 16, 1977); the property is hilly and rolling
and full of cogon, but a portion was planted with camote, corn and seasonal crops by the vendors; he
came to know the (sic) property three (3) years before Angelina Sarmiento bought it in 1969 (pp. 2022, ibid); Castillo had a house on the land but it was wrecked by a storn (sic), so that there was no more
house existing on the land (p. 25, ibid).
Enrique Buco testified that he had known the land subject of the case since 1932 because he owned a
parcel of land adjoining it; he had known Angelina Sarmiento since 1950; since 1932, the land was in
the possession of the parents of Juan Reyes, Luis Pascual, Macario Cruz, Feliciano Santos, Mariano
Castillo, and a certain Arsenio, whose family name he did not know; the possession by the parents of
Mariano Castillo and Juan Reyes was never disturbed by anyone; Mariano Castillo and his parents
planted bananas, mango trees, palay and sweet potatoes, but he did not know how many hectares
were cultivated (pp. 2-7, tsn, October 24, 1977); Juan Reyes and his parents planted two (2) hectares
with palay, and the rest of the area with mango, caimito, avocado and langka trees, some of which were
already fruit bearing; Mariano Castillo and Juan Reyes sold their rights over the land to Angelina
Sarmiento; the land was surveyed by the cadastral team, and Mariano Castillo and Juan Reyes were
present during the survey; and Castillo and Reyes remained in possession of the land as tenants of
Angelina Sarmiento (pp. 7-13, ibid). On cross-examination, he admitted that in 1932, he and the parents
of Mariano Castillo and Juan Reyes were just starting to clear up the area, and that only around three
(3) hectares were cleared up by the parents of Castillo and Reyes (pp. 13-16, ibid); that Feliciano Santos
was still in possession of a small portion of the land in question; they were not able to take possession
of the land in question because it was already occupied by the Japanese forces; they returned to the
land only after liberation (pp. 16-18, ibid); that his land adjoined the land in question on the east,
adjoining the property of Isidro Cabacang and Roman Reyes, who were the ones appearing as adjoining
owners in Exhibit "F", the plan of lot 1005; that he left his land and stayed in Quezon City in 1973
because the security men of Puyat Enterprises were mauling many persons in the community; to avoid
trouble he transferred his family to Quezon City (pp. 19-23, ibid); that the parents of Juan Reyes and
Mariano Castillo cleared up a portion of the wooded area in 1932 and that was how they came into
possession of their respective portions of the property; that he did not know the extent, in terms of
square meters, of the land possessed by Castillo and Reyes; that the subject land was no longer
occupied since two years ago because the people ran away (pp. 27-30, ibid). On redirect examination,
Enrique Buco stated that at present only Mariano Castillo is staying on the land in question as an
overseer of Angelina Sarmiento; and that the last time he went there was in April, 1978 (pp. 3-5, tsn,
August 18, 1978). On re-cross-examination, he admitted that when he went to the land in question in
April, 1978, he did not see anyone cultivating the property, and that Puyat Enterprises had built a
factory near the property (pp. 6-7,ibid). 33
It was further established that from the Land Classification Report dated 8 August 1971, 34 only one-half
(.5) of a hectare is planted with banana and fruit trees, while 36 hectares are "grass land."
From the foregoing, serious doubts are cast on the claim of open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation by the predecessors-in-interest of private respondent. As earlier stated,
none of them even thought of declaring their respective areas for taxation purposes. While it is true
that tax receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership, they constitute at
least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property. 35 The voluntary declaration of a piece
of property for taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to
the property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties, but
also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an act strengthens
one'sbona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. Added to this, as certified to by Jarvina, who claimed
to have been present when the sales were made to private respondent, none of the vendors could
show any written document to prove their ownership of land; they merely alleged that they have been
possession of the same for ten (10) years. In the case of the 73,000 square meters (7.3 hectares)
purportedly purchased from Macario Cruz, no deed of sale from the latter was presented. Interestingly
enough, without this acquisition, private respondent would only have more or less 308,000 square
meters, or 30.8 hectares, which she acquired from Juan Reyes and Mariano Castillo, and not the
376,397 square meters, or 37.6 hectares which she applied for. No plausible explanation was offered as
to why Macario Cruz did not or could not execute a deed of sale. There is as well no evidence
concerning the area of the property purchased from Feliciano Santos and no explanation why no deed
of sale was executed by him. Then too, there is absolutely no credible testimony describing the
boundaries and extent of the areas each vendor had allegedly occupied before the sale to the private
respondent. On the contrary, the testimony of Enrique Buco throws more doubts thereon. He claims
that the land applied for was, since 1932, in the possession of the parents of Juan Reyes, Luis Pascual,
Macario Cruz, Feliciano Santos, Mariano Castillo and a certain Arsenio. If that be so, then the parents of
Luis Pascual and Arsenio have a claim on portions of the property applied for. Private respondent
miserably failed to show that she also acquired such portions or that they were earlier sold to any of
her vendors.
Respondent Court considered the year 1932 as the starting point of the possession of the predecessorsin-interest of private respondent. In the light of the aforesaid testimony of Enrique Buco, such a
conclusion has no basis. As a matter of fact, the trial court itself found and so held as follows:
The testimonial evidence shows that the subject parcel of land was originally owned and possessed by
Macario Cruz, spouses Juan Reyes and Avelina Emocling, and spouses Mariano Castillo and Petronila
Robes, the two latter sets spouses having been in possession as early as 1928 and 1948, respectively,
during which time they possessed, occupied and cultivated their respective portions unmolested,
openly, continuously, and in the concept of owners. . . . 36
If the Castillo spouses' possession actually commenced in 1948, as found by the trial court, it goes
without saying that their possession of the 14-hectare portion was only for seventeen (17) years since
they sold the same to the private respondent in 1965. Tacking this possession to that of the latter as of
the time the application was filed on 13 August 1970, it is obvious that the 30-year possession required
by paragraph (b), Section 48 of the Public Land Act was not satisfied.
Further, if indeed private respondent has a genuine claim of possession over the property in question,
We find no reason why, as reflected in the Land Classification Report dated 8 August 1971, 37 or barely a
year after the filing of the application, only one-half (1/2) hectare of the vast area applied for was in
fact planted with nothing but banana and fruit trees while thirty-six (36) hectares thereof are "grass
land". These fruit trees are not identified. If the testimony of private respondent to be believed, these
could be kamias, santol and mangoes which, according to her, were existing at the time she bought the
property. Also, if the testimony of Enrique Buco is to be believed, these fruit trees could be mango trees
allegedly planted by Mariano Castillo and his parents or, mango, kaimito, avocado and langka trees
planted by Juan Reyes and his parents. This Court can not accept these testimonies at face value. The
respondent court and the trial court should not have been credulous enough to have given them full
faith and credit. In her own Tax Declaration No. 8388 dated 18 September 1966 and which she secured
sometime after she allegedly purchased the property and almost a year before she filed the application,
private respondent merely declared that the property is comprised of riceland with an area of 9.4
hectares and cogonal land with an area of 28.2 hectares. the existence of this 9.4-hectare riceland is
even doubtful. Private respondent herself admitted that the land is not conducive to the planting of
palay, 38 the portions cultivated by her vendors Castillo, Reyes and Cruz were scattered in different
places and the area each cultivated could not be more than one (1) hectare. 39 Upon the other hand, as
earlier mentioned, Enrique Buco only mentioned two (2) hectares planted to palay by Juan Reyes and
his parents.
Another factor which impairs the bona fides of private respondent is her failure to pay the real estate
taxes after the filing of the application. She made a payment on 26 September 1969 40 after declaring
the property for taxation purposes on 18 September 1969, 41 and only for the taxable years 1965 to
1969. Evidently, such payment was made only for purposes of the application. A picayune amount was
involved annually. For the period beginning in 1965 and ending in 1969, she paid P517.50 only. She did
not want to part with any sum thereafter until it would become certain that the court would award the
property to her. Such an attitude is an execration of good faith.
One last point which bears heavily against the claim of private respondent is the fact that she had the
temerity to make it appear in the application that she and the spouses Placer Velasco and Socorro
Busuego are co-owners of the property who have registerable title thereto and who must, therefore, be
awarded the property. This claim is of course deliberate falsehood for, as private respondent later
revealed when she decided to drop the spouses as co-applicants, the latter do not have any claim of
either possession or ownership over the property. They were made co-applicants only because they
agree to shoulder all the expenses of litigation, including the cost of survey and attorney's fees. Even
granting, for the sake of argument, that such an agreement was in fact made with the spouses, it was
not necessary that they be made co-applicants. The interest of the spouses could still be effectively
protected without sacrificing the truth. To this Court's mind, there was a clear attempt on the part of
the private respondent and the spouses to deceive the trial court. Unfortunately, the trial court glossed
over this point and impliedly declared as validly rescinded the contract with the said spouses.
The foregoing disquisitions sufficiently prove that private respondent is a smart land speculator who
saw in the land applied for not just the blades of cogon grass, the color of which changes from green
during the rainy season to brown during summer, but huge profits as business, industry and the general
population move outward from the metropolitan area. It is incumbent upon land registration courts to
exercise extreme caution and prudent care in deciding so-called applications for judicial confirmation of
imperfect titles over lands of the public domain; if they are lax in these proceedings, they may, wittingly
or unwittingly, be used by unscrupulous land speculators in their raid of the public domain.
More deserving citizens should be given priority in the acquisition of idle lands of the public domain.
These could serve as relocation sites for the urban poor. They may be disturbed to landless farm
workers. In so doing, the ends of social justice, appropriately the centerpiece of the 1987 Constitution,
could be further enhanced.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the decision of the respondent Court of 12 October 1984 in
A.C.-G.R. CV No. 00126 is hereby REVERSED. The decision of the trial court of 2 June 1982 in Land
Registration Case No. (SM) N-167, LRC Record No. N-39192 is likewise REVERSED and said case it hereby
ordered DISMISSED.
Costs against private respondent.
SO ORDERED.

SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. 164408
March 24, 2014
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
ZURBARAN REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
An application for original registration of land of the public domain under Section 14(2) of Presidential
Decree (PD) No. 1529 must show not only that the land has previously been declared alienable and
disposable, but also that the land has been declared patrimonial property of the State at the onset of
the 30-year or 10-year period of possession and occupation required under the law on acquisitive
prescription. Once again, the Court applies this rule-as clarified in Heirs of Mario Malabanan v.
Republic1 in reviewing the decision promulgated on June 10, 2004,2 whereby the Court of Appeals
(CA) granted the petitioner's application for registration of land.
Antecedents
On May 28, 1993, respondent Zurbaran Realty and Development Corporation filed in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) in San Pedro, Laguna an application for original registration covering a 1,520 square meter
parcel of land situated in Barrio Banlic, Municipality of Cabuyao, Province of Laguna, denominated as
Lot 8017-A of Subdivision Plan CSD-04-006985-D, Cad. 455-D, Cabuyao Cadastre,3 alleging that it had
purchased the land on March 9, 1992 from Jane de Castro Abalos, married to Jose Abalos,
for P300,000.00; that the land was declared for taxation purposes in the name of its predecessor-ininterest under Tax Declaration No. 22711; that there was no mortgage or encumbrance of any kind
affecting the land, nor was there any other person or entity having any interest thereon, legal or
equitable, adverse to that of the applicant; and that the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest had
been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation of the land in the concept of an
owner.
Attached to the application were several documents, namely: (1) tracing cloth plan as approved by the
Land Management Division of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR); (2) blue
print copies of the tracing cloth plan; (3) copies of the technical description; (4) copies of Tax
Declaration No. 2711; and (5) copies of the Deed of Sale dated March 9, 1992.
The Republic, represented by the Director of Lands, opposed the application, arguing that the applicant
and its predecessors-in-interest had not been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of the land since June 12, 1945; that the muniments of title and tax declaration
presented did not constitute competent and sufficient evidence of a bona fide acquisition of the land;
and that the land was a portion of the public domain, and, therefore, was not subject to private
appropriation.4
The RTC directed the Land Management Bureau, Manila; the Community Environment and Natural
Resources Office (CENRO) of Los Baos, Laguna; and the Land Management Sector and Forest
Management Bureau, Manila, to submit a status report on the land, particularly, on whether the land
was covered by a land patent, whether it was subject of a previously approved isolated survey, and
whether it was within a forest zone.5
In his memorandum to the DENR, Region IV (Lands Forestry Sector), and the Provincial Prosecutor of
Laguna, a copy of which was furnished the trial court, CENRO Officer Arnulfo Hernandez stated that the
land had been "verified to be within the Alienable and Disposable land under Land Classification Project
No. 23-A of Cabuyao, Laguna, certified and declared as such pursuant to the provisions of Presidential
Decree No. 705, as amended, under Forestry Administrative Order No. A-1627 dated September 28,
1981 per BFD Map LC-3004." Attached to the memorandum was the inspection report declaring that
"the area is surrounded with concrete fence, three (3) buildings for employees residence;" that the
land was acquired through sale before the filing of the application; that the applicant and its
predecessors-in-interest had been in "continuous, open and peaceful occupation" of the land, and that
"no forestry interest is adversely affected."6
CENRO Land Management Inspector/Investigator Rodolfo S. Gonzales reported that: (1) the land was
covered by a survey plan approved by the Regional Land Director/Land Registration Authority on May
25, 1988 pursuant to PD No. 239 dated July 9, 1975; (2) it consisted of 22,773 square meters and was
located in Barangay Banlic, Cabuyao, Laguna; (3) the area was entirely within the alienable and
disposable area; (4) it had never been forfeited in favor of the government for non-payment of taxes,
and had not been confiscated in connection with any civil or criminal cases; (5) it was not within a
previously patented property as certified to by the Register of Deeds, Calamba, Laguna; and (6) there
was no public land application filed for it by the applicant or any other persons as per verification from
the records unit of his office. The report further stated that a verification at the Office of the Municipal
Assessor showed that: (1) the land was declared for the first time in 1960 under Tax Declaration No.
6712 in the name of Enrique Hemedez with an area of 23,073 square meters; (2) it was now covered by
Tax Declaration No. 2253 issued in the name of the respondent; (3) the real property taxes had been
paid since 1968; and (4) it had not been earmarked for public or quasi-public purposes per information
from the District Engineer.
After inspection, it was also found that (1) the land was residential; (2) the respondent was in the actual
occupation and possession of the land; and (3) the land did not encroach upon an established
watershed, riverbank/bed protection, creek, right-of-way or park site or any area devoted to general
use or devoted to public service.7
A certification was issued by the Records Management Division of the Land Management Bureau
stating that it had no record of any kind of public land applications/land patents covering the parcel of
land subject of the application.8
The respondent presented Gloria P. Noel, its Vice President and Treasurer, who testified that the
respondent had purchased the land from Jane de Castro Abalos on March 9, 1992 for P300,000.00; that
the land had been declared for taxation purposes in the name of Abalos under Tax Declaration No.
22711; that after the sale, a new Tax Declaration had been issued in the name of the respondent, who
had meanwhile taken possession of the land by building a fence around it and introducing
improvements thereon; that the respondent had paid the real property taxes thereon since its
acquisition; that the respondents possession had been continuous, open and public; and that the land
was free from any lien or encumbrance; and that there was no adverse claimant to the land.9
Engr. Edilberto Tamis attested that he was familiar with the land because it was a portion of Lot No.
8017 of Subdivision Plan Cad-455-D of the Cabuyao Cadastre, owned by Corazon Tapalla who had
acquired it from the Hemedez family; that Tapalla had sold a portion of Lot No. 8017 to Abalos and the
remaining portion to him; and that he had witnessed the sale of the land to the respondent.10
The respondents final witness was Armando Espela who declared that he was a retired land overseer
residing in Barangay Banlic from birth; that he was familiar with the land which was part of a bigger
parcel of land owned by the Hemedez family; that his father, Toribio Espela, with his assistance, and
one Francisco Capacio worked on the land since 1960; that the entire landholding had originally been
sugarland, but was later on subdivided, sold, and resold until it ceased to be agricultural land; that, in
1982, the land was sold to Corazon Tapalla who hired him as the overseer; that as the overseer, he
fenced and cleared the area; that he was allowed to use the grassy portion for grazing purposes; that in
1987, Tapalla sold part of the land to Abalos and the remaining portion to Engr. Tamis; that he
continued to oversee the land for the new owners; that Abalos then sold her portion to the respondent
in 1992; that since then, the respondent took possession of the land, and he then ceased to be the
overseer; that the possession by the Hemedez family and its successors-in-interest was open,
continuous, public and under claim of ownership; and that he did not know any person who claimed
ownership of the land other than those he and his father served as overseers.11
Decision of the RTC
On May 12, 1997, the RTC rendered its decision, holding that the respondent and its predecessors-ininterest had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive and adverse possession and
occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership even prior to 1960 and, accordingly,
granted the application for registration, viz:
WHEREFORE, taking into consideration the evidence submitted by the applicant, this Court hereby
orders the confirmation and registration of title of the land described as Lot 8017-A of subdivision plan
Csd-04-006985-D, being a portion of Lot 8017 of subdivision plan Cad-455-D, Cabuyao Cadastre situated
at Barangay Banlic, Cabuyao, Laguna with an area of 1,520 square meters to be entered under the
name of the applicant Zurbaran Realty and Development Corporation, a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the Philippines with office address at 33 M. Viola St., San Francisco del
Monte, Quezon City by the Land Registration Authority. After the decision shall become final, let an
order for the issuance of a decree of title be issued in favor of said applicant.
SO ORDERED.12
Judgment of the CA
The Republic appealed, arguing that the issue of whether the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest
had possessed the land within the required length of time could not be determined because there was
no evidence as to when the land had been declared alienable and disposable.
On June 10, 2004, the CA promulgated its judgment affirming the RTC, and concluded that the reports
made by the concerned government agencies and the testimonies of those familiar with the land in
question had buttressed the court a quos conclusion that the respondent and its predecessors-ininterest had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession and
occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership even prior to 1960.13
Issue
Hence, the Republic appeals the adverse judgment of the CA upon the following ground:
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW WHEN IT AFFIRMED THE TRIAL
COURTS GRANT OF THE APPLICATION FOR ORIGINAL REGISTRATION DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF
EVIDENCE THAT RESPONDENT AND ITS PREDECESSORS-IN-INTEREST HAVE COMPLIED WITH THE PERIOD
OF POSSESSION AND OCCUPATION REQUIRED BY LAW.14
The Republic contends that the respondent did not establish the time when the land covered by the
application for registration became alienable and disposable;15 that such detail was crucial because the
possession of the respondent and its predecessors-in-interest, for the purpose of determining whether
it acquired the property by prescription, should be reckoned from the time when the land was declared
alienable and disposable; and that prior to the declaration of the land of the public domain as alienable
and disposable, it was not susceptible to private ownership, and any possession or occupation at such
time could not be counted as part of the period of possession required under the law on prescription.16
The respondent counters that whether it established when the property was declared alienable and
disposable and whether it complied with the 30-year required period of possession should not be
entertained anymore by the Court because: (a) these issues had not been raised in the trial court and
were being raised for the first time on appeal; and (b) factual findings of the trial court, especially when
affirmed by the CA, were binding and conclusive on this Court. At any rate, the respondent insists that it
had been in open, public, peaceful, continuous, and adverse possession of the property for the
prescribed period of 30 years as evidenced by the fact that the property had been declared for taxation
purposes in 1960 in the name of its predecessors-in-interest, and that such possession had the effect of
converting the land into private property and vesting ownership upon the respondent.17
In reply, the Republic asserts that it duly opposed the respondents application for registration; that it
was only able to ascertain the errors committed by the trial court after the latter rendered its decision;
and that the burden of proof in land registration cases rested on the applicant who must prove its
ownership of the property being registered. The Republic maintains that the Court had the authority to
review and reverse the factual findings of the lower courts when the conclusion reached was not
supported by the evidence on record, as in this case.18
Ruling
The petition for review is meritorious.
Section 14 of P.D. No. 1529 enumerates those who may file an application for registration of land based
on possession and occupation of a land of the public domain, thus:
Section 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
(2) Those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under the provision of existing
laws.
xxxx
An application for registration under Section14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 must establish the following
requisites, namely: (a) the land is alienable and disposable property of the public domain; (b) the
applicant and its predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership; and (c) the applicant and
its predecessors-in-interest have possessed and occupied the land since June 12, 1945, or earlier. The
Court has clarified in Malabanan19 that under Section14(1), it is not necessary that the land must have
been declared alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945, or earlier, because the law simply requires
the property sought to be registered to be alienable and disposable at the time the application for
registration of title is filed. The Court has explained that a contrary interpretation would absurdly limit
the application of the provision "to the point of virtual inutility."
The foregoing interpretation highlights the distinction between a registration proceeding filed under
Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 and one filed under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. According to
Malabanan:
Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis of possession, while Section 14(2) entitles registration
on the basis of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under the aegis of the
Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under Section 14(2) is made
available both by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code.20
In other words, registration under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529 is based on possession and occupation
of the alienable and disposable land of the public domain since June 12, 1945 or earlier, without regard
to whether the land was susceptible to private ownership at that time. The applicant needs only to
show that the land had already been declared alienable and disposable at any time prior to the filing of
the application for registration.
On the other hand, an application under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 is based on acquisitive
prescription and must comply with the law on prescription as provided by the Civil Code. In that regard,
only the patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription pursuant to the Civil
Code.21 For acquisitive prescription to set in, therefore, the land being possessed and occupied must
already be classified or declared as patrimonial property of the State. Otherwise, no length of
possession would vest any right in the possessor if the property has remained land of the public
dominion. Malabanan stresses that even if the land is later converted to patrimonial property of the
State, possession of it prior to such conversion will not be counted to meet the requisites of acquisitive
prescription.22 Thus, registration under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 requires that the land had already
been converted to patrimonial property of the State at the onset of the period of possession required
by the law on prescription.
An application for registration based on Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529 must, therefore, establish the
following requisites, to wit: (a) the land is an alienable and disposable, and patrimonial property of the
public domain; (b) the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the land for
at least 10 years, in good faith and with just title, or for at least 30 years, regardless of good faith or just
title; and (c) the land had already been converted to or declared as patrimonial property of the State at
the beginning of the said 10-year or 30-year period of possession.
To properly appreciate the respondents case, we must ascertain under what provision its application
for registration was filed. If the application was filed under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, the
determination of the particular date when the property was declared alienable and disposable would
be unnecessary, inasmuch as proof showing that the land had already been classified as such at the
time the application was filed would be enough. If the application was filed under Section 14(2) of P.D.
No. 1529, the determination of the issue would not be crucial for, as earlier clarified, it was not the
declaration of the land as alienable and disposable that would make it susceptible to private ownership
by acquisitive prescription. Malabanan expounds thereon, thus Would such lands so declared
alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from property of the public dominion into
patrimonial property? After all, by connotative definition, alienable and disposable lands may be the
object of the commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things within the commerce of man are
susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further provides that patrimonial property of the
State may be acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that "[p]roperty of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State." It
is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial
property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those
property "which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth" are public dominion property. For as long as the
property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property
of the public dominion if when it is "intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth."
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no
longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has
been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as
alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and thus
incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and disposable lands are
expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for the development of
the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run. Such declaration shall
be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in cases where the
President is duly authorized by law.23
The respondents application does not enlighten as to whether it was filed under Section 14(1) or
Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529. The application alleged that the respondent and its predecessors-ininterest had been in open, continuous and exclusive possession and occupation of the property in the
concept of an owner, but did not state when possession and occupation commenced and the duration
of such possession. At any rate, the evidence presented by the respondent and its averments in the
other pleadings reveal that the application for registration was filed based on Section 14(2), not Section
14(1) of P.D. No. 1529. The respondent did not make any allegation in its application that it had been in
possession of the property since June 12, 1945, or earlier, nor did it present any evidence to establish
such fact.1wphi1
With the application of the respondent having been filed under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, the
crucial query is whether the land subject of the application had already been converted to patrimonial
property of the State. In short, has the land been declared by law as no longer intended for public
service or the development of the national wealth?
The respondent may perhaps object to a determination of this issue by the Court for the same reason
that it objects to the determination of whether it established when the land was declared alienable and
disposable, that is, the issue was not raised in and resolved and by the trial court. But the objection
would be futile because the issue was actually raised in the trial court, as borne out by the Republic's
allegation in its opposition to the application to the effect "that the land is a portion of the public
domain not subject to prescription." In any case, the interest of justice dictates the consideration and
resolution of an issue that is relevant to another that was specifically raised. The rule that only theories
raised in the initial proceedings may be taken up by a party on appeal refers only to independent, not
concomitant, matters to support or oppose the cause of action.24
Here, there is no evidence showing that the land in question was within an area expressly declared by
law either to be the patrimonial property of the State, or to be no longer intended for public service or
the development of the national wealth. The Court is left with no alternative but to deny the
respondent's application for registration.
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the
decision promulgated on June 10, 2004; and DISMISSES the respondent's application for original
registration of Lot 8017-A of Subdivision Plan CSD-04-006985-D, Cad. 455-D, of the Cabuyao Cadastre.
No pronouncement on costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 111141. March 6, 1998]
MARIO Z. TITONG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (4th Division), VICTORICO
LAURIO and ANGELES LAURIO, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Like a priceless treasure coveted by many, but capable of ownership by only one, this 20,592 squaremeter parcel of land located at Barrio Titong, Masbate, Masbate is claimed by two contestants in this
petition for review on certiorari. Unfortunately, legal title over the property can be vested in only one
of them.
The case originated from an action for quieting of title filed by petitioner Mario Titong. The Regional
Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 44[1] ruled in favor of private respondents, Victorico Laurio and
Angeles Laurio, adjudging them as the true and lawful owners of the disputed land. Affirmed on appeal
to the Court of Appeals, petitioner comes to us for a favorable reversal.
Petitioner alleges that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel of land with an area of 3.2800 hectares,
more or less, surveyed as Lot No. 3918, and declared for taxation purposes in his name. He claims that
on three separate occasions in September 1983, private respondents, with their hired laborers, forcibly
entered a portion of the land containing an area of approximately two (2) hectares, and began plowing
the same under pretext of ownership. Private respondents denied this allegation, and averred that the
disputed property formed part of the 5.5-hectare agricultural land which they had purchased from their
predecessor-in-interest,[2] Pablo Espinosa on August 10, 1981.
In his testimony, petitioner identified Espinosa as his adjoining owner[3], asserting that no controversy
had sprouted between them for twenty years until the latter sold Lot No. 3479 to private respondent
Victorico Laurio.[4] This was corroborated by Ignacio Villamor, who had worked on the land even before
its sale to Espinosa in 1962. The boundary between the land sold to Espinosa and what remained of
petitioners property was the old Bugsayon river. When petitioner employed Bienvenido Lerit as his
tenant in 1962, he instructed Lerit to change the course of the old river and direct the flow of water to
the lowland at the southern portion of petitioners property, thus converting the old river into a
riceland.[5]
For his part, private respondent anchors his defense on the following facts:
He denied petitioners claim of ownership, recounting that the area and boundaries of the disputed
land remained unaltered during the series of conveyances prior to its coming into his hands. According
to him, petitioner first declared the land for taxation purposes under Tax Declaration No. 2916, [6] which
showed that the land had an area of 5.5 hectares and was bounded on the North by the Bugsayon
River; on the East by property under the ownership of Lucio Lerit; on the South by property owner by
Potenciano Zaragoza; and on the West by property owned by Agapito de la Cruz. [7] Private Respondent
then alleges that, on December 21, 1960, petitioner sold this property to Concepcion Verano vda. de
Cabug, after which Tax Declaration No. 5339[8] was issued in her favor. In compliance with their mutual
agreement to repurchase the same, petitioner reacquired the property by way of sale[9] on August 24,
1962 and then declared it for taxation purposes in his name under Tax Declaration No.
5720.[10] However, the property remained in petitioners hands for only four (4) days because, on
August 28, 1962, he sold it to Espinosa[11] who then declared it in his name under Tax Declaration No.
12311.[12] Consequently, the property became a part of the estate of Pablo Espinosas wife, the late
Segundina Liao Espinosa. On August 10, 1981, her heirs executed an instrument denominated as
Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with Simultaneous Sale whereby the 5.5-hectare property under
Tax Declaration No. 12311 was sold to private respondent[13] in consideration of the amount
of P5,000.00. Thereafter, Tax Declaration No. 12738 was issued in the name of private respondent. In
all these conveyances, the area and boundaries of the property remained exactly the same as those
appearing in Tax Declaration No. 2916 under petitioners name.
It was proved at the proceedings in the court a quo that two (2) surveys were made of the disputed
property. The first survey[14] was made for petitioner, while the second was the relocation survey
ordered by the lower court. As anticipated, certain discrepancies between the two surveys surfaced.
Thus, contrary to petitioners allegation in his complaint that he is the owner of only 3.2800 hectares,
he was actually claiming 5.9789 hectares, the total areas of Lot Nos. 3918, 3918-A and 3606. On the
other hand, Lot No. 3479 pertaining to Espinosa, was left with only an area of 4.1841 hectares instead
of the 5.5 hectares sold by petitioner to him. Apprised of the discrepancy, private respondent filed a
protest[15] before the Bureau of Lands against the first survey, likewise filing a case for alteration of
boundaries before the municipal trial court, the proceedings of which, however, were suspended
because of the instant case.[16]
Private respondent testified that petitioner is one of the four heirs of his mother, Leonida
Zaragoza. In the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of Estate of the deceased Leonida
Zaragoza,[17] the heirs adjudicated unto themselves the 3.6-hectare property of the deceased. The
property involved is described in the instrument as having been declared under Tax Declaration No.
3301[18] and as bounded on the North by Victor Verano, on the East by Benigno Titong, on the South by
the Bugsayon River and on the West by Benigno Titong. On September 9, 1969, Tax Declaration No.
8723 was issued to petitioner for his corresponding share in the estate.
However, instead of reflecting only .9000 hectare as his rightful share in the extrajudicial
settlement[19] petitioners share was bloated to 2.4 hectares. It therefore appeared to private
respondent that petitioner encroached upon his (Laurios) property and declared it a part of his
inheritance.[20] The boundaries were likewise altered so that it was bounded on the North by Victor
Verano, on the East by Benigno Titong, on the South by property owner Espinosa, and on the West by
property owner Adolfo Titong.[21] Private respondent accordingly denied that petitioner had diverted
the course of the Bugsayon River after he had repurchased the land from Concepcion Verano vda. de
Cabug[22] because the land was immediately sold to Espinosa shortly thereafter.[23]
The lower court rendered a decision in favor of private respondents, declaring him as the true and
absolute owner of the litigated property and ordering petitioner to respect private respondents title
and ownership over the property and to pay attorneys fees, litigation expenses, costs and moral
damages.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision. On motion for
reconsideration, the same was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for review oncertiorari.
At the outset, we hold that the instant petition must be denied for the reason that the lower court
should have outrightly dismissed the complaint for quieting of title. The remedy of quieting of title may
be availed of under the circumstances enumerated in the Civil Code:
ART. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any
instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in
truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an
action may be brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real property or any
interest therein.
Under this provision, a claimant must show that there is an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow upon the owners title to or
interest in real property.[24] The ground or reason for filing a complaint for quieting of title must
therefore be an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding. Under the maxim expresio
unius est exclusio alterius, these grounds are exclusive so that other reasons outside of the purview of
these reasons may not be considered valid for the same action.[25]
Had the lower court thoroughly considered the complaint filed, it would have had no other course of
action under the law but to dismiss it. The complaint failed to allege that an instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding beclouded the plaintiffs title over the property involved. Petitioner
merely alleged that the defendants (respondents herein), together with their hired laborers and
without legal justification, forcibly entered the southern portion of the land of the plaintiff and plowed
the same:
He then proceeded to claim damages and attorneys fees. He prayed that, aside from issuing a writ or
preliminary injunction enjoining private respondents and their hired laborers from intruding into the
land, the court should declare him the true and absolute owner thereof. Hence, through his
allegations, what petitioner imagined as clouds cast on his title to the property were private
respondents alleged acts of physical intrusion into his purported property. Clearly, the acts alleged may
be considered grounds for an action for forcible entry but definitely not one for quieting of title.
When the issues were joined by the filing of the answer to the complaint, it would have become
apparent to the court that the case was a boundary dispute. The answer alleged, among other matters,
that petitioner, in bad faith, surreptitiously, maliciously and fraudulently had the land in question
included in the survey of his land which extends to the south only as far as the Bugsayon River which is
the visible and natural and common boundary between the properties.[26] Moreover, during the
hearing of the case, petitioner proved that it was actually a boundary dispute by evidence showing
what he considered as the boundary of his property which private respondents perceived as actually
encroaching on their property. In this regard, the following pronouncements of the Court are apropos:
x x x (T)he trial court (and likewise the respondent Court) cannot, in an action for quieting of title,
order the determination of the boundaries of the claimed property, as that would be tantamount to
awarding to one or some of the parties the disputed property in an action where the sole issue is
limited to whether the instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding involved constitutes a
cloud upon the petitioners interest or title in and to said property. Such determination of boundaries is
appropriate in adversarial proceedings where possession or ownership may properly be considered and
where evidence aliunde, other than the `instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding itself,
may be introduced. An action for forcible entry, whenever warranted by the period prescribed in Rule
70, or for recovery of possession de facto, also within the prescribed period, may be availed of by the
petitioners, in which proceeding the boundary dispute may be fully threshed out.[27]
Nonetheless, even if the complaint below were to be considered as a valid one for quieting of title, still,
the instant petition for review on certiorari must fail.
As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive upon this
Court. Such factual findings shall not be disturbed normally unless the same are palpably unsupported
by the evidence on record or the judgment itself is based on a misapprehension of facts. [28] Upon an
examination of the records, the Court finds no evident reason to depart from the general rule.
The courts below correctly held that when petitioner sold, ceded, transferred and conveyed the 5.5hectare land in favor of Pablo Espinosa, his rights of ownership and possession pertaining thereto
ceased and these were transferred to the latter. In the same manner, Espinosas rights of ownership
over the land ceased and were transferred to private respondent upon its sale to the latter. This finds
justification in the Civil Code, as follows:
ART. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the
ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money
or its equivalent.
A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional.
In other words, a sale is a contract transferring dominion and other real rights in the thing sold.[29] In the
case at bar, petitioners claim of ownership must of necessity fail because he has long abdicated his
rights over the land when he sold it to private respondents predecessor-in-interest.
Petitioners claim that he acquired ownership over the disputed land through possession for more than
twenty (20) years is likewise unmeritorious. While Art. 1134 of the Civil Code provides that
(o)wnership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by ordinary prescription
through possession of ten years, this provision of law must be read in conjunction with Art. 1117 of the
same Code. This article states that x x x (o)rdinary acquisitive prescription of things requires
possession in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by law. Hence, a prescriptive title to real
estate is not acquired by mere possession thereof under claim of ownership for a period of ten years
unless such possession was acquired con justo titulo y buena fe (with color of title and good
faith).[30] The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom
he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership.[31] For purposes of
prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property through
one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights but the grantor
was not the owner or could not transmit any right.[32]
Petitioners have not satisfactorily met the requirements of good faith and just title. As aptly observed
by the trial court, the plaintiffs admitted acts of converting the boundary line (Bugsayon River) into a
ricefield and thereafter claiming ownership thereof were acts constituting deprivation of the rights of
others and therefore tantamount to bad faith.[33] To allow petitioner to benefit from his own wrong
would run counter to the maxim ex dolo malo non oritur actio (no man can be allowed to found a claim
upon his own wrongdoing). Extraordinary acquisitive prescription cannot similarly vest ownership over
the property upon petitioner. Art. 1137 of the Civil Code states that (o)wnership and other real rights
over immovables prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years, without
need of title or of good faith. Petitioners alleged possession in 1962 up to September 1983 when
private respondents entered the property in question spanned twenty-one (21) years. This period of
time is short of the thirty-year requirement mandated by Art. 1137.
Petitioner basically anchors his claim over the property on the survey plan prepared upon his
request,[34] the tax declaration in his name,[35] the commissioners report on the relocation
survey,[36] and the survey plan.[37] Respondent court correctly held that these documents do not
conclusively demonstrate petitioner's title over Lot Nos. 3918-A and 3606.
A survey is the act by which the quantity of a parcel of land is ascertained and also a paper containing a
statement of courses, distances, and quantity of land.[38] A survey under a proprietary title is not a
conveyance. It is an instrument sui generis in the nature of a partition; a customary mode in which a
proprietor has set off to himself in severalty a part of the common estate. [39] Therefore, a survey, not
being a conveyance, is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A fortiori, petitioner cannot found his claim
on the survey plan reflecting a subdivision of land because it is not conclusive as to ownership as it may
refer only to a delineation of possession.[40]
Furthermore, the plan was not verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands in accordance with Sec.
28, paragraph 5 of Act No. 2259, the Cadastral Act, as amended by Sec. 1862 of Act No. 2711. Said law
ordains that private surveyors send their original field notes, computations, reports, surveys, maps and
plots regarding a piece of property to the Bureau of Lands for verification and approval.[41] A survey plan
not verified and approved by said Bureau is nothing more than a private writing, the due execution and
authenticity of which must be proven in accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The
circumstance that the plan was admitted in evidence without any objection as to its due execution and
authenticity does not signify that the courts shall give probative value therefor. To admit evidence and
not to believe it subsequently are not contradictory to each other. This Court cannot alter the
conclusions of the Court of Appeals on the credibility accorded to evidence presented by the parties.[42]
Similarly, petitioners tax declaration issued under his name is not even persuasive evidence of his
claimed ownership over the land in dispute. A tax declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive
evidence of ownership.[43] It is merely an indicium of a claim of ownership.[44] Because it does not by
itself give title, it is of little value in proving ones ownership.[45]Moreover, the incompatibility in
petitioners tax declaration and the commissioners report as regards the area of his claimed property is
much too glaring to be ignored. Tax Declaration No. 8717 states that petitioners property has an area
of 3.2800 hectares while the totality of his claim according to the commissioned geodetic engineers
survey amounts to 4.1385 hectares. There is therefore a notable discrepancy of 8,585 square meters.
On the other hand, private respondents claimed property, as borne out by Tax Declaration No. 12738,
totals 5.5 hectares, a more proximate equivalent of the 5.2433-hectare property as shown by the
commissioners report.
There is also nothing in the commissioners report that substantiates petitioners claim that the
disputed land was inside his property. Petitioner capitalizes on the lower courts statement in its
decision[46] that as reflected in the commissioners report dated May 23, 1984 (Exhibit 3-3-A), the area
claimed is inside lot 3918 of the defendants (Exhibit 2)[47] or theprivate respondents. A careful reading
of the decision would show that this statement is found in the summary of defendants (herein private
respondents) evidence. Reference to Lot No. 3918 may, therefore, be attributed to mere oversight as
the lower court even continues to state the defendants assertion that the 2-hectare land is part of their
5.5-hectare property. Hence, it is not amiss to conclude that either petitioner misapprehended the
lower courts decision or he is trying to contumaciously mislead or worse, deceive this Court.
With respect to the awards of moral damages of P10,000.00 and attorneys fees of P2,000.00, the Court
finds no cogent reason to delete the same. Jurisprudence is replete with rulings to the effect that
where fraud and bad faith have been established, the award of moral damages is in order.[48] This
pronouncement finds support in Art. 2219 (10) of the Civil Code allowing the recovery of moral
damages for acts enumerated in Art. 21 of the same Code. This article states that (a)ny person who
wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. The moral damages are hereby increased
to P30,000.00. We agree with the respondent court in holding that the award of attorneys fees is
justified because petitioner filed a clearly unfounded civil action.[49]
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED and the questioned Decision
of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. This Decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
EN BANC
HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN,
Petitioner,
G.R. No. 179987
Present:
- versus -
PUNO, C.J.,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
LEONARDO DE CASTRO,
BRION,
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
PERALTA, and
Respondent.
BERSAMIN, JJ.
Promulgated:
April 29, 2009
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------- x
DECISION
This decision inevitably affects all untitled lands currently in possession of persons and entities other
than the Philippine government. The petition, while unremarkable as to the facts, was accepted by the
Court en banc in order to provide definitive clarity to the applicability and scope of original registration
proceedings under Sections 14(1) and 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree. In doing so, the Court
confronts not only the relevant provisions of the Public Land Act and the Civil Code, but also the reality
on the ground. The countrywide phenomenon of untitled lands, as well as the problem of informal
settlement it has spawned, has unfortunately been treated with benign neglect. Yet our current laws
are hemmed in by their own circumscriptions in addressing the phenomenon. Still, the duty on our part
is primarily to decide cases before us in accord with the Constitution and the legal principles that have
developed our public land law, though our social obligations dissuade us from casting a blind eye on the
endemic problems.
I.
On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel
of land identified as Lot 9864-A, Cad-452-D, Silang Cadastre,[2]situated in Barangay Tibig, Silang Cavite,
and consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan claimed that he had purchased the property from
Eduardo Velazco,[3] and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and
continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years.
The application was raffled to the Regional Trial Court of (RTC) Cavite-Tagaytay City, Branch 18.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) duly designated the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cavite,
Jose Velazco, Jr., to appear on behalf of the State.[4] Apart from presenting documentary evidence,
Malabanan himself and his witness, Aristedes Velazco, testified at the hearing. Velazco testified that the
property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by his great-grandfather,
Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Estebanthe fourth being
Aristedess grandfather. Upon Linos death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among
themselves. But by 1966, Estebans wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the
properties inherited by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban
and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A,
which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo
Velazco to Malabanan.[5]
TINGA, J.:
One main reason why the informal sector has not become formal is that
from Indonesia to Brazil, 90 percent of the informal lands are not titled and registered. This is a
generalized phenomenon in the so-called Third World. And it has many consequences.
xxx
The question is: How is it that so many governments, from Suharto's in Indonesia to Fujimori's in Peru,
have wanted to title these people and have not been able to do so effectively? One reason is that none
of the state systems in Asia or Latin America can gather proof of informal titles. In Peru, the informals
have means of proving property ownership to each other which are not the same means developed by
the Spanish legal system. The informals have their own papers, their own forms of agreements, and
their own systems of registration, all of which are very clearly stated in the maps which they use for
their own informal business transactions.
If you take a walk through the countryside, from Indonesia to Peru, and you walk by field after field--in
each field a different dog is going to bark at you. Even dogs know what private property is all about. The
only one who does not know it is the government. The issue is that there exists a "common law" and an
"informal law" which the Latin American formal legal system does not know how to recognize.
- Hernando De Soto[1]
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Jose Velazco, Jr. did not cross-examine Aristedes Velazco. He further
manifested that he also *knew+ the property and I affirm the truth of the testimony given by Mr.
Velazco.[6] The Republic of the Philippines likewise did not present any evidence to controvert the
application.
Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001,
issued by the Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was verified to be within the
Alienable or Disposable land per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A
and approved as such under FAO 4-1656 on March 15, 1982.[7]
On 3 December 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of Malabanan, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court hereby approves this application for registration and thus places under the
operation of Act 141, Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law, the
lands described in Plan Csd-04-0173123-D, Lot 9864-A and containing an area of Seventy One Thousand
Three Hundred Twenty Four (71,324) Square Meters, as supported by its technical description now
forming part of the record of this case, in addition to other proofs adduced in the name of MARIO
MALABANAN, who is of legal age, Filipino, widower, and with residence at Munting Ilog, Silang, Cavite.
Once this Decision becomes final and executory, the corresponding decree of registration shall
forthwith issue.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove
that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC
had erred in finding that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of
time required by law for confirmation of imperfect title.
On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision[8] reversing the RTC and dismissing the
application of Malabanan. The appellate court held that under Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree any period of possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and
disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period of
possession. Thus, the appellate court noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified that
the property was declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the Velazcos
possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the period of possession. This
interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree was based
on the Courts ruling in Republic v. Herbieto.[9]
Malabanan died while the case was pending with the Court of Appeals;[10] hence, it was his heirs who
appealed the decision of the appellate court. Petitioners, before this Court, rely on our ruling
in Republic v. Naguit,[11] which was handed down just four months prior to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest
that the discussion in Herbieto cited by the Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictum since the
Metropolitan Trial Court therein which had directed the registration of the property had no jurisdiction
in the first place since the requisite notice of hearing was published only after the hearing had already
begun. Naguit, petitioners argue, remains the controlling doctrine, especially when the property in
question is agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to agricultural lands, any possession prior to the
declaration of the alienable property as disposable may be counted in reckoning the period of
possession to perfect title under the Public Land Act and the Property Registration Decree.
Based on these issues, the parties formulated their respective positions.

With respect to Section 14(1), petitioners reiterate that the analysis of the Court in Naguit is the correct
interpretation of the provision. The seemingly contradictory pronouncement in Herbieto, it is
submitted, should be considered obiter dictum, since the land registration proceedings therein was
void ab initio due to lack of publication of the notice of initial hearing. Petitioners further point out that
in Republic v. Bibonia,[14] promulgated in June of 2007, the Court applied Naguit and adopted the same
observation that the preferred interpretation by the OSG of Section 14(1) was patently absurd. For its
part, the OSG remains insistent that for Section 14(1) to apply, the land should have been classified as
alienable and disposable as of 12 June 1945. Apart from Herbieto, the OSG also cites the subsequent
rulings in Buenaventura v. Republic,[15] Fieldman Agricultural Trading v. Republic[16] and Republic v.
Imperial Credit Corporation,[17] as well as the earlier case of Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals.[18]
With respect to Section 14(2), petitioners submit that open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession of an alienable land of the public domain for more than 30 yearsipso jure converts the land
into private property, thus placing it under the coverage of Section 14(2). According to them, it would
not matter whether the land sought to be registered was previously classified as agricultural land of the
public domain so long as, at the time of the application, the property had already been converted into
private property through prescription. To bolster their argument, petitioners cite extensively from our
2008 ruling in Republic v. T.A.N. Properties.[19]
The arguments submitted by the OSG with respect to Section 14(2) are more extensive. The OSG notes
that under Article 1113 of the Civil Code, the acquisitive prescription of properties of the State refers to
patrimonial property, while Section 14(2) speaks of private lands. It observes that the Court has yet
to decide a case that presented Section 14(2) as a ground for application for registration, and that the
30-year possession period refers to the period of possession under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
and not the concept of prescription under the Civil Code. The OSG further submits that, assuming that
the 30-year prescriptive period can run against public lands, said period should be reckoned from the
time the public land was declared alienable and disposable.
Both sides likewise offer special arguments with respect to the particular factual circumstances
surrounding the subject property and the ownership thereof.
The petition was referred to the Court en banc,[12] and on 11 November 2008, the case was heard on
oral arguments. The Court formulated the principal issues for the oral arguments, to wit:
1.
In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under
Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree,
should the land be classified as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such
classification occur at any time prior to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is
established that the applicant has been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the
land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier?
2.
For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified
as alienable and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by
prescription in accordance with the Civil Code?
3.
May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because
its slope is below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration
Decree in relation to the provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?
4.
Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1)
or Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree or both?[13]
II.
First, we discuss Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. For a full understanding of the
provision, reference has to be made to the Public Land Act.
A.
Commonwealth Act No. 141, also known as the Public Land Act, has, since its enactment, governed the
classification and disposition of lands of the public domain. The President is authorized, from time to
time, to classify the lands of the public domain into alienable and disposable, timber, or mineral
lands.[20] Alienable and disposable lands of the public domain are further classified according to their
uses into (a) agricultural; (b) residential, commercial, industrial, or for similar productive purposes; (c)
educational, charitable, or other similar purposes; or (d) reservations for town sites and for public and
quasi-public uses.[21]
May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her name of alienable and disposable lands of
the public domain? Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands suitable for
agricultural purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles through
judicial legalization.[22] Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073, supplies the
details and unmistakably grants that right, subject to the requisites stated therein:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or
claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or
completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
xxx
(b)
Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945, or earlier,
immediately preceding the filing of the application for confirmation of title except when prevented by
war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions
essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this
chapter.
Section 48(b) of Com. Act No. 141 received its present wording in 1977 when the law was
amended by P.D. No. 1073. Two significant amendments were introduced by P.D. No. 1073. First, the
term agricultural lands was changed to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain. The
OSG submits that this amendment restricted the scope of the lands that may be registered.[23] This is
not actually the case. Under Section 9 of the Public Land Act, agricultural lands are a mere subset of
lands of the public domain alienable or open to disposition. Evidently, alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain are a larger class than only agricultural lands.
Second, the length of the requisite possession was changed from possession for thirty (30) years
immediately preceding the filing of the application to possession sinceJune 12, 1945 or earlier. The
Court in Naguit explained:
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession deemed necessary to
vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public domain commenced from July 26,
1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No. 1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of
ownership must have been for at least thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act was again amended, this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945.
xxx
occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. That circumstance may have led to the impression that one or the other
is a redundancy, or that Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act has somehow been repealed or mooted.
That is not the case.
The opening clauses of Section 48 of the Public Land Act and Section 14 of the Property Registration
Decree warrant comparison:
Sec. 48 [of the Public Land Act]. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but whose titles have not
been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is
located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
xxx
Sec. 14 [of the Property Registration Decree]. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the
proper Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether personally or
through their duly authorized representatives:
xxx
It is clear that Section 48 of the Public Land Act is more descriptive of the nature of the right enjoyed by
the possessor than Section 14 of the Property Registration Decree, which seems to presume the preexistence of the right, rather than establishing the right itself for the first time. It is proper to assert that
it is the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. No. 1073 effective 25 January 1977, that has primarily
established the right of a Filipino citizen who has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide
claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945 to perfect or complete his title by applying with
the proper court for the confirmation of his ownership claim and the issuance of the corresponding
certificate of title.
It bears further observation that Section 48(b) of Com. Act No, 141 is virtually the same as Section
14(1) of the Property Registration Decree. Said Decree codified the various laws relative to the
registration of property, including lands of the public domain. It is Section 14(1) that operationalizes the
registration of such lands of the public domain. The provision reads:
Section 48 can be viewed in conjunction with the afore-quoted Section 11 of the Public Land Act, which
provides that public lands suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of by confirmation of
imperfect or incomplete titles, and given the notion that both provisions declare that it is indeed the
Public Land Act that primarily establishes the substantive ownership of the possessor who has been in
possession of the property since 12 June 1945. In turn, Section 14(a) of the Property Registration
Decree recognizes the substantive right granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as well
provides the corresponding original registration procedure for the judicial confirmation of an imperfect
or incomplete title.
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
representatives:
There is another limitation to the right granted under Section 48(b). Section 47 of the Public Land
Act limits the period within which one may exercise the right to seek registration under Section 48. The
provision has been amended several times, most recently by Rep. Act No. 9176 in 2002. It currently
reads thus:
(1) those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Notwithstanding the passage of the Property Registration Decree and the inclusion of Section 14(1)
therein, the Public Land Act has remained in effect. Both laws commonly refer to persons or their
predecessors-in-interest who have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
Section 47. The persons specified in the next following section are hereby granted time, not to extend
beyond December 31, 2020 within which to avail of the benefits of this Chapter: Provided, That this
period shall apply only where the area applied for does not exceed twelve (12) hectares: Provided,
further, That the several periods of time designated by the President in accordance with Section FortyFive of this Act shall apply also to the lands comprised in the provisions of this Chapter, but this Section
shall not be construed as prohibiting any said persons from acting under this Chapter at any time prior
to the period fixed by the President.[24]
Accordingly under the current state of the law, the substantive right granted under Section 48(b)
may be availed of only until 31 December 2020.
Petitioner suggests an interpretation that the alienable and disposable character of the land should
have already been established since June 12, 1945 or earlier. This is not borne out by the plain meaning
of Section 14(1). Since June 12, 1945, as used in the provision, qualifies its antecedent phrase under
a bonafide claim of ownership. Generally speaking, qualifying words restrict or modify only the words
or phrases to which they are immediately associated, and not those distantly or remotely
located.[25] Ad proximum antecedents fiat relation nisi impediatur sentencia.
Petitioners make the salient observation that the contradictory passages from Herbieto are obiter
dicta since the land registration proceedings therein is void ab initio in the first place due to lack of the
requisite publication of the notice of initial hearing. There is no need to explicitly overturn Herbieto, as
it suffices that the Courts acknowledgment that the particular line of argument used therein
concerning Section 14(1) is indeed obiter.
It may be noted that in the subsequent case of Buenaventura,[26] the Court, citing Herbieto, again stated
that *a+ny period of possession prior to the date when the *s+ubject *property was+ classified as
alienable and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the period
of possession That statement, in the context of Section 14(1), is certainly erroneous. Nonetheless,
the passage as cited in Buenaventura should again be considered as obiter. The application therein was
ultimately granted, citing Section 14(2). The evidence submitted by petitioners therein did not establish
any mode of possession on their part prior to 1948, thereby precluding the application of Section 14(1).
It is not even apparent from the decision whether petitioners therein had claimed entitlement to
original registration following Section 14(1), their position being that they had been in exclusive
possession under a bona fide claim of ownership for over fifty (50) years, but not before 12 June 1945.
Thus, neither Herbieto nor its principal discipular ruling Buenaventura has any precedental value with
respect to Section 14(1). On the other hand, the ratio of Naguit is embedded in Section 14(1), since it
precisely involved situation wherein the applicant had been in exclusive possession under a bona
fide claim of ownership prior to 12 June 1945. The Courts interpretation of Section 14(1) therein was
decisive to the resolution of the case. Any doubt as to which between Naguit or Herbieto provides the
final word of the Court on Section 14(1) is now settled in favor of Naguit.
Besides, we are mindful of the absurdity that would result if we adopt petitioners
position. Absent a legislative amendment, the rule would be, adopting the OSGs view, that all lands of
the public domain which were not declared alienable or disposable before June 12, 1945 would not be
susceptible to original registration, no matter the length of unchallenged possession by the occupant.
Such interpretation renders paragraph (1) of Section 14 virtually inoperative and even precludes the
government from giving it effect even as it decides to reclassify public agricultural lands as alienable
and disposable. The unreasonableness of the situation would even be aggravated considering that
before June 12, 1945, the Philippines was not yet even considered an independent state.
We noted in Naguit that it should be distinguished from Bracewell v. Court of Appeals[27] since in
the latter, the application for registration had been filed before the land was declared alienable or
disposable. The dissent though pronounces Bracewell as the better rule between the two. Yet two years
after Bracewell, its ponente, the esteemedJustice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, penned the ruling
in Republic v. Ceniza,[28] which involved a claim of possession that extended back to 1927 over a public
domain land that was declared alienable and disposable only in 1980. Ceniza cited Bracewell, quoted
extensively from it, and following the mindset of the dissent, the attempt at registration
inCeniza should have failed. Not so.
Accordingly, the Court in Naguit explained:
To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, an applicant must establish
the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative
act or a statute.
B.
Despite the clear text of Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended and Section 14(a) of the
Property Registration Decree, the OSG has adopted the position that for one to acquire the right to seek
registration of an alienable and disposable land of the public domain, it is not enough that the applicant
and his/her predecessors-in-interest be in possession under a bona fide claim of ownership since 12
June 1945; the alienable and disposable character of the property must have been declared also as of
12 June 1945. Following the OSGs approach, all lands certified as alienable and disposable after 12
June 1945 cannot be registered either under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree or
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act as amended. The absurdity of such an implication was discussed
in Naguit.
[T]he more reasonable interpretation of Section 14(1) is that it merely requires the property sought to
be registered as already alienable and disposable at the time the application for registration of title is
filed. If the State, at the time the application is made, has not yet deemed it proper to release the
property for alienation or disposition, the presumption is that the government is still reserving the right
to utilize the property; hence, the need to preserve its ownership in the State irrespective of the length
of adverse possession even if in good faith. However, if the property has already been classified as
alienable and disposable, as it is in this case, then there is already an intention on the part of the State
to abdicate its exclusive prerogative over the property.
The Court declares that the correct interpretation of Section 14(1) is that which was adopted in Naguit.
The contrary pronouncement in Herbieto, as pointed out in Naguit, absurdly limits the application of
the provision to the point of virtual inutility since it would only cover lands actually declared alienable
and disposable prior to 12 June 1945, even if the current possessor is able to establish open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession under a bona fide claim of ownership long before that
date.
Moreover, the Naguit interpretation allows more possessors under a bona fide claim of ownership to
avail of judicial confirmation of their imperfect titles than what would be feasible under Herbieto. This
balancing fact is significant, especially considering our forthcoming discussion on the scope and reach of
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
In this case, private respondents presented a certification dated November 25, 1994, issued by Eduardo
M. Inting, the Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer in the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources Office in Cebu City, stating that the lots involved were "found to be
within the alienable and disposable (sic) Block-I, Land Classification Project No. 32-A, per map 2962 4I555 dated December 9, 1980." This is sufficient evidence to show the real character of the land subject
of private respondents application. Further, the certification enjoys a presumption of regularity in the
absence of contradictory evidence, which is true in this case. Worth noting also was the observation of
the Court of Appeals stating that:
[n]o opposition was filed by the Bureaus of Lands and Forestry to contest the application of appellees
on the ground that the property still forms part of the public domain. Nor is there any showing that the
lots in question are forestal land....
Thus, while the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that mere possession of public land for the period
required by law would entitle its occupant to a confirmation of imperfect title, it did not err in ruling in
favor of private respondents as far as the first requirement in Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
concerned, for they were able to overcome the burden of proving the alienability of the land subject of
their application.
As correctly found by the Court of Appeals, private respondents were able to prove their open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the subject land even before the year 1927. As a rule,
we are bound by the factual findings of the Court of Appeals. Although there are exceptions, petitioner
did not show that this is one of them.[29]
A.
Why did the Court in Ceniza, through the same eminent member who authored Bracewell,
sanction the registration under Section 48(b) of public domain lands declared alienable or disposable
thirty-five (35) years and 180 days after 12 June 1945? The telling difference is that in Ceniza, the
application for registration was filed nearly six (6) years after the land had been declared alienable or
disposable, while in Bracewell, the application was filed nine (9) years before the land was declared
alienable or disposable. That crucial difference was also stressed in Naguit to contradistinguish it
from Bracewell, a difference which the dissent seeks to belittle.
All things which are within the commerce of men are susceptible of prescription, unless otherwise
provided. Property of the State or any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the
object of prescription.
III.
The obiter in Naguit cited the Civil Code provisions on prescription as the possible basis for
application for original registration under Section 14(2). Specifically, it is Article 1113 which provides
legal foundation for the application. It reads:
It is clear under the Civil Code that where lands of the public domain are patrimonial in character,
they are susceptible to acquisitive prescription. On the other hand, among the public domain lands that
are not susceptible to acquisitive prescription are timber lands and mineral lands. The Constitution
itself proscribes private ownership of timber or mineral lands.
We next ascertain the correct framework of analysis with respect to Section 14(2). The provision
reads:
There are in fact several provisions in the Civil Code concerning the acquisition of real property through
prescription. Ownership of real property may be acquired by ordinary prescription of ten (10)
years,[32] or through extraordinary prescription of thirty (30) years.[33] Ordinary acquisitive prescription
requires possession in good faith,[34] as well as just title.[35]
SECTION 14. Who may apply. The following persons may file in the proper Court of First Instance an
representatives:
When Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree explicitly provides that persons who have
acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws, it
unmistakably refers to the Civil Code as a valid basis for the registration of lands. The Civil Code is the
only existing law that specifically allows the acquisition by prescription of private lands, including
patrimonial property belonging to the State. Thus, the critical question that needs affirmation is
whether Section 14(2) does encompass original registration proceedings over patrimonial property of
the State, which a private person has acquired through prescription.
xxx
(2) Those who have acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of
existing laws.
The Court in Naguit offered the following discussion concerning Section 14(2), which we did even then
recognize, and still do, to be an obiter dictum, but we nonetheless refer to it as material for further
discussion, thus:
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No. 1073 preclude the
application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain, possession over which commenced
only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree,
which governs and authorizes the application of those who have acquired ownership of private lands
by prescription under the provisions of existing laws.
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code.[[30]] There is a consistent
jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be converted into private
property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[[31]] With
such conversion, such property may now fall within the contemplation of private lands under Section
14(2), and thus susceptible to registration by those who have acquired ownership through prescription.
Thus, even if possession of the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945,
and such possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the right
to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
Naguit did not involve the application of Section 14(2), unlike in this case where petitioners have
based their registration bid primarily on that provision, and where the evidence definitively establishes
their claim of possession only as far back as 1948. It is in this case that we can properly appreciate the
nuances of the provision.
The Naguit obiter had adverted to a frequently reiterated jurisprudence holding that properties
classified as alienable public land may be converted into private property by reason of open, continuous
and exclusive possession of at least thirty (30) years.[36] Yet if we ascertain the source of the thirtyyear period, additional complexities relating to Section 14(2) and to how exactly it operates would
emerge. For there are in fact two distinct origins of the thirty (30)-year rule.
The first source is Rep. Act No. 1942, enacted in 1957, which amended Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act by granting the right to seek original registration of alienable public lands through possession in the
concept of an owner for at least thirty years.
The following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to
own any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may
apply to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land Registration Act, to wit:
xxx
xxx
xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous,
exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing
of the application for confirmation of title, except when prevented by war or force majeure. These
shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant
and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the provisions of this Chapter. (emphasis supplied)[37]
This provision was repealed in 1977 with the enactment of P.D. 1073, which made the date 12 June
1945 the reckoning point for the first time. Nonetheless, applications for registration filed prior to 1977
could have invoked the 30-year rule introduced by Rep. Act No. 1942.
The second source is Section 14(2) of P.D. 1529 itself, at least by implication, as it applies the rules on
prescription under the Civil Code, particularly Article 1113 in relation to Article 1137. Note that there
are two kinds of prescription under the Civil Codeordinary acquisitive prescription and extraordinary
acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1137, is completed through uninterrupted adverse
possession for thirty years, without need of title or of good faith.
Obviously, the first source of the thirty (30)-year period rule, Rep. Act No. 1942, became unavailable
after 1977. At present, the only legal basis for the thirty (30)-year period is the law on prescription
under the Civil Code, as mandated under Section 14(2). However, there is a material difference
between how the thirty (30)-year rule operated under Rep. Act No. 1942 and how it did under the Civil
Code.
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1942, did not refer to or call into
application the Civil Code provisions on prescription. It merely set forth a requisite thirty-year
possession period immediately preceding the application for confirmation of title, without any
qualification as to whether the property should be declared alienable at the beginning of, and continue
as such, throughout the entire thirty-(30) years. There is neither statutory nor jurisprudential basis to
assert Rep. Act No. 1942 had mandated such a requirement,[38] similar to our earlier finding with
respect to the present language of Section 48(b), which now sets 12 June 1945 as the point of
reference.
Then, with the repeal of Rep. Act No. 1942, the thirty-year possession period as basis for original
registration became Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which entitled those who have
acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws to apply
for original registration. Again, the thirty-year period is derived from the rule on extraordinary
prescription under Article 1137 of the Civil Code. At the same time, Section 14(2) puts into operation
the entire regime of prescription under the Civil Code, a fact which does not hold true with respect to
Section 14(1).
B.
Unlike Section 14(1), Section 14(2) explicitly refers to the principles on prescription under existing laws.
Accordingly, we are impelled to apply the civil law concept of prescription, as set forth in the Civil Code,
in our interpretation of Section 14(2). There is no similar demand on our part in the case of Section
14(1).
The critical qualification under Article 1113 of the Civil Code is thus: *p+roperty of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription. The identification
what consists of patrimonial property is provided by Articles 420 and 421, which we quote in full:
Art. 420. The following things are property of public dominion:
(1) Those intended for public use, such as roads, canals, rivers, torrents, ports and bridges constructed
by the State, banks, shores, roadsteads, and others of similar character;
(2) Those which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth.
Art. 421. All other property of the State, which is not of the character stated in the preceding article, is
patrimonial property
It is clear that property of public dominion, which generally includes property belonging to the
State, cannot be the object of prescription or, indeed, be subject of the commerce of man.[39] Lands of
the public domain, whether declared alienable and disposable or not, are property of public dominion
and thus insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
Let us now explore the effects under the Civil Code of a declaration by the President or any duly
authorized government officer of alienability and disposability of lands of the public domain. Would
such lands so declared alienable and disposable be converted, under the Civil Code, from property of
the public dominion into patrimonial property? After all, by connotative definition, alienable and
disposable lands may be the object of the commerce of man; Article 1113 provides that all things within
the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription; and the same provision further provides that
patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription.
Nonetheless, Article 422 of the Civil Code states that *p+roperty of public dominion, when no longer
intended for public use or for public service, shall form part of the patrimonial property of the State. It
is this provision that controls how public dominion property may be converted into patrimonial
property susceptible to acquisition by prescription. After all, Article 420 (2) makes clear that those
property which belong to the State, without being for public use, and are intended for some public
service or for the development of the national wealth are public dominion property. For as long as the
property belongs to the State, although already classified as alienable or disposable, it remains property
of the public dominion if when it is intended for some public service or for the development of the
national wealth.
Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is
no longer intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property
has been converted into patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if
classified as alienable or disposable, remains property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article
420(2), and thus incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is only when such alienable and
disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for public service or for
the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to run.
Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation
in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.
It is comprehensible with ease that this reading of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree
limits its scope and reach and thus affects the registrability even of lands already declared alienable and
disposable to the detriment of the bona fide possessors or occupants claiming title to the lands. Yet this
interpretation is in accord with the Regalian doctrine and its concomitant assumption that all lands
owned by the State, although declared alienable or disposable, remain as such and ought to be used
only by the Government.
Recourse does not lie with this Court in the matter. The duty of the Court is to apply the Constitution
and the laws in accordance with their language and intent. The remedy is to change the law, which is
the province of the legislative branch. Congress can very well be entreated to amend Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree and pertinent provisions of the Civil Code to liberalize the
requirements for judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles.
The operation of the foregoing interpretation can be illustrated by an actual example. Republic Act No.
7227, entitled An Act Accelerating The Conversion Of Military Reservations Into Other Productive Uses,
etc., is more commonly known as the BCDA law. Section 2 of the law authorizes the sale of certain
military reservations and portions of military camps in Metro Manila, including Fort Bonifacio and
Villamor Air Base. For purposes of effecting the sale of the military camps, the law mandates the
President to transfer such military lands to the Bases Conversion Development Authority
(BCDA)[40] which in turn is authorized to own, hold and/or administer them.[41] The President is
authorized to sell portions of the military camps, in whole or in part.[42] Accordingly, the BCDA law itself
declares that the military lands subject thereof are alienable and disposable pursuant to the
provisions of existing laws and regulations governing sales of government properties.[43]
From the moment the BCDA law was enacted the subject military lands have become alienable and
disposable. However, said lands did not become patrimonial, as the BCDA law itself expressly makes the
reservation that these lands are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the former
American bases at Clark and Subic.[44]Such purpose can be tied to either public service or the
development of national wealth under Article 420(2). Thus, at that time, the lands remained property
of the public dominion under Article 420(2), notwithstanding their status as alienable and disposable. It
is upon their sale as authorized under the BCDA law to a private person or entity that such lands
become private property and cease to be property of the public dominion.
C.
Should public domain lands become patrimonial because they are declared as such in a duly enacted
law or duly promulgated proclamation that they are no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth, would the period of possession prior to the conversion of such
public dominion into patrimonial be reckoned in counting the prescriptive period in favor of the
possessors? We rule in the negative.
The limitation imposed by Article 1113 dissuades us from ruling that the period of possession
before the public domain land becomes patrimonial may be counted for the purpose of completing the
prescriptive period. Possession of public dominion property before it becomes patrimonial cannot be
the object of prescription according to the Civil Code. As the application for registration under Section
14(2) falls wholly within the framework of prescription under the Civil Code, there is no way that
possession during the time that the land was still classified as public dominion property can be counted
to meet the requisites of acquisitive prescription and justify registration.
Are we being inconsistent in applying divergent rules for Section 14(1) and Section 14(2)? There is no
inconsistency. Section 14(1) mandates registration on the basis ofpossession, while Section 14(2)
entitles registration on the basis of prescription. Registration under Section 14(1) is extended under
the aegis of the Property Registration Decree and the Public Land Act while registration under Section
14(2) is made available both by the Property Registration Decree and the Civil Code.
In the same manner, we can distinguish between the thirty-year period under Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act, as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472, and the thirty-year period available through Section
14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to Article 1137 of the Civil Code. The period under
the former speaks of a thirty-year period of possession, while the period under the latter concerns
a thirty-year period of extraordinary prescription. Registration under Section 48(b) of the Public Land
Act as amended by Rep. Act No. 1472 is based on thirty years of possession alone without regard to
the Civil Code, while the registration under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree is
founded on extraordinary prescription under the Civil Code.
It may be asked why the principles of prescription under the Civil Code should not apply as well to
Section 14(1). Notwithstanding the vaunted status of the Civil Code, it ultimately is just one of
numerous statutes, neither superior nor inferior to other statutes such as the Property Registration
Decree. The legislative branch is not bound to adhere to the framework set forth by the Civil Code when
it enacts subsequent legislation. Section 14(2) manifests a clear intent to interrelate the registration
allowed under that provision with the Civil Code, but no such intent exists with respect to Section 14(1).
IV.
One of the keys to understanding the framework we set forth today is seeing how our land
registration procedures correlate with our law on prescription, which, under the Civil Code, is one of the
modes for acquiring ownership over property.
The Civil Code makes it clear that patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by private
persons through prescription. This is brought about by Article 1113, which states that *a+ll things which
are within the commerce of man are susceptible to prescription, and that *p+roperty of the State or
any of its subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.
There are two modes of prescription through which immovables may be acquired under the Civil
Code. The first is ordinary acquisitive prescription, which, under Article 1117, requires possession in
good faith and with just title; and, under Article 1134, is completed through possession of ten (10)
years. There is nothing in the Civil Code that bars a person from acquiring patrimonial property of the
State through ordinary acquisitive prescription, nor is there any apparent reason to impose such a rule.
At the same time, there are indispensable requisitesgood faith and just title. The ascertainment of
good faith involves the application of Articles 526, 527, and 528, as well as Article 1127 of the Civil
Code,[45] provisions that more or less speak for themselves.
On the other hand, the concept of just title requires some clarification. Under Article 1129, there is just
title for the purposes of prescription when the adverse claimant came into possession of the property
through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or other real rights, but
the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right. Dr. Tolentino explains:
Just title is an act which has for its purpose the transmission of ownership, and which would have
actually transferred ownership if the grantor had been the owner. This vice or defect is the one cured
by prescription. Examples: sale with delivery, exchange, donation, succession, and dacion in
payment.[46]
The OSG submits that the requirement of just title necessarily precludes the applicability of
ordinary acquisitive prescription to patrimonial property. The major premise for the argument is that
the State, as the owner and grantor, could not transmit ownership to the possessor before the
completion of the required period of possession.[47] It is evident that the OSG erred when it assumed
that the grantor referred to in Article 1129 is the State. The grantor is the one from whom the person
invoking ordinary acquisitive prescription derived the title, whether by sale, exchange, donation,
succession or any other mode of the acquisition of ownership or other real rights.
Earlier, we made it clear that, whether under ordinary prescription or extraordinary prescription, the
period of possession preceding the classification of public dominion lands as patrimonial cannot be
counted for the purpose of computing prescription. But after the property has been become
patrimonial, the period of prescription begins to run in favor of the possessor. Once the requisite period
has been completed, two legal events ensue: (1) the patrimonial property is ipso jure converted into
private land; and (2) the person in possession for the periods prescribed under the Civil Code acquires
ownership of the property by operation of the Civil Code.
It is evident that once the possessor automatically becomes the owner of the converted patrimonial
property, the ideal next step is the registration of the property under theTorrens system. It should be
remembered that registration of property is not a mode of acquisition of ownership, but merely a mode
of confirmation of ownership.[48]
Looking back at the registration regime prior to the adoption of the Property Registration Decree in
1977, it is apparent that the registration system then did not fully accommodate the acquisition of
ownership of patrimonial property under the Civil Code. What the system accommodated was the
confirmation of imperfect title brought about by the completion of a period of possession ordained
under the Public Land Act (either 30 years following Rep. Act No. 1942, or since 12 June 1945 following
P.D. No. 1073).
The Land Registration Act[49] was noticeably silent on the requisites for alienable public lands acquired
through ordinary prescription under the Civil Code, though it arguably did not preclude such
registration.[50] Still, the gap was lamentable, considering that the Civil Code, by itself, establishes
ownership over the patrimonial property of persons who have completed the prescriptive periods
ordained therein. The gap was finally closed with the adoption of the Property Registration Decree in
1977, with Section 14(2) thereof expressly authorizing original registration in favor of persons who have
acquired ownership over private lands by prescription under the provisions of existing laws, that is, the
Civil Code as of now.
V.
possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back
their possession, according to their own evidencethe Tax Declarations they presented in particular
is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject
property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no
longer intended for public use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably
with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable
land of the public domain does not change its status as property of the public dominion under Article
420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
We synthesize the doctrines laid down in this case, as follows:

VI.
(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the
Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that those who by themselves or through their predecessors
in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, since June 12, 1945 have acquired ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based
on the length and quality of their possession.
(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the
lands should have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor
is entitled to secure judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and
disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.[51]
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by
Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the
Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property.
However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these
are alienable or disposable. There must also be an express government manifestation that the property
is already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national wealth,
under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the
prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of
patrimonial property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof
under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary
and other extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a
patrimonial property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title.
Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a persons uninterrupted adverse possession of
patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into
ownership.
B.
We now apply the above-stated doctrines to the case at bar.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired
ownership over the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive
evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in
A final word. The Court is comfortable with the correctness of the legal doctrines established in this
decision. Nonetheless, discomfiture over the implications of todays ruling cannot be discounted. For,
every untitled property that is occupied in the country will be affected by this ruling. The social
implications cannot be dismissed lightly, and the Court would be abdicating its social responsibility to
the Filipino people if we simply levied the law without comment.
The informal settlement of public lands, whether declared alienable or not, is a phenomenon tied
to long-standing habit and cultural acquiescence, and is common among the so-called Third World
countries. This paradigm powerfully evokes the disconnect between a legal system and the reality on
the ground. The law so far has been unable to bridge that gap. Alternative means of acquisition of these
public domain lands, such as through homestead or free patent, have
proven unattractive due to limitations imposed on the grantee in the encumbrance or alienation of said
properties.[52] Judicial confirmation of imperfect title has emerged as the most viable, if not the most
attractive means to regularize the informal settlement of alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, yet even that system, as revealed in this decision, has considerable limits.
There are millions upon millions of Filipinos who have individually or exclusively held residential
lands on which they have lived and raised their families. Many more have tilled and made productive
idle lands of the State with their hands. They have been regarded for generation by their families and
their communities as common law owners. There is much to be said about the virtues of according
them legitimate states. Yet such virtues are not for the Court to translate into positive law, as the law
itself considered such lands as property of the public dominion. It could only be up to Congress to set
forth a new phase of land reform to sensibly regularize and formalize the settlement of such lands
which in legal theory are lands of the public domain before the problem becomes insoluble. This could
be accomplished, to cite two examples, by liberalizing the standards for judicial confirmation of
imperfect title, or amending the Civil Code itself to ease the requisites for the conversion of public
dominion property into patrimonial.
Ones sense of security over land rights infuses into every aspect of well-being not only of that
individual, but also to the persons family. Once that sense of security is deprived, life and livelihood are
put on stasis. It is for the political branches to bring welcome closure to the long pestering problem.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 23 February
2007 and Resolution dated 2 October 2007 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of The Philippines

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municipal ordinance, or by a change in the constitution of the State, except in a legitimate

TEEHANKEE, C.J., concurring: