Barrier Philosophy for Wells on Gas lift

and
Ways of Reducing HSE Risks
Alan Brodie Feb 2011
For more info visit www.ptc.as

Introduction

Gas Lifted Well Integrity Management

Incremental HSE risks
Case histories
The impact of getting it wrong
Solutions to incremental HSE risks

Image used with the permission of J Bellarby

Oil and Gas Well Integrity Management

Basic Requirement
Risk of hydrocarbon release from a well is ALARP
(As Low As Reasonably Practicable)
Which means using:
Best available equipment
Current industry best practices
To achieve this most OPCOs usually adopt:
Double independent barrier pressure containment envelope
In natural flow example shown:
Primary barrier outlined in red
Secondary barrier outlined in blue
With Acceptance criteria defined for each element e.g:
ISO 13679 procedures for testing tubing connections
Leak criterion for gas: 9 cc/15 min
Image used with the permission of J Bellarby

Gas Lifted Well Integrity Management

Key differences # 1 ( tubing integrity)

With many gas lift valves

Primary well containment barrier is compromised
ISO 17078-2 Flow control devices for side-pocket mandrels

These devices are designed and intended to prevent reverse flow

through a flow control device. They are not designed nor intended to
provide a tight shut-off pressure safety seal or to be a part of the
safety system.

Allowable leak rate 6883 ml/10 mins

Compare this to acceptance criteria for packers
ISO 14310-- Downhole equipment -- Packers and plugs
Allowable leak rate 20cc /10 mins

ISO 14310

Image used with the permission of J Bellarby

Gas Lifted Well Integrity Management

Key differences # 2 ( High pressure gas inventory)

High pressure gas in tubing / production casing annulus

Question:
What precautions are taken at well sites re gas bottles:
Store safely away from areas with:
High risk of dropped objects
Potential sources of radiant heat
The first
Carefully manage logistic and numbers
gas bottle
Potential volume of gas in annulus of each well:
explodes
Equivalent of > 1000 industrial gas bottles
Even where DHASVs used typically >100
Lift gas lines / valves from HP header to annulus:
Pass thru area with
Relatively high risk of dropped objects
Many potential sources of radiant heat
Other risks associated with leakage from inner to outer annulus
Are production casing threads gas tight?
Image used with the permission of J Bellarby

Gas Lifted Well Integrity Management

Getting it wrong (1)

Piper Alpha Disaster N Sea 1988:

Gas lift was widely used,
Wasnt the root cause but it exacerbated the situation
SCSSSVs generally closed
But Gas lift check valves didnt
Gas lift lines parted between isolation valve and wellhead
Due to radiant heat from nearby fires
Wells flowed naturally via annulus
NB It appears the wells structural integrity
was relatively unaffected despite the
severity of the incident

Image used with the permission of J Bellarby

Gas Lifted Well Integrity Management

Getting it wrong (2)

Outer Annulus Pressure build up

Onshore gas lifted well shut in
Lift gas leaked from the inner to the outer annulus
Outer annulus pressure built up to lift gas pressure (1700-1950 psi)
Well restarted and heated up by 76 F
Trapped pressure increased to 7700psi
Outer annulus casing ruptured
Flying debris damaged the HP gas line
Contents of inner annulus vented and ignited
Question
How easily could this happen on your wells?

#1 Source of info: www.wellintegrity.net

Gas Lifted Well Integrity Management

Reducing the HSE risks (1) ( tubing integrity)

Employ qualified well barrier gas lift valves

Operating Valves
Unloading Valves
Tested to the same allowable leak rate as packers etc
Erosion test the valves to ensure:
They will remain well barrier valves for the life of well
Not just to pass a factory acceptance test (FAT)

Image used with the permission of J Bellarby

Gas Lifted Well Integrity Management

Reducing the HSE risk (High pressure gas inventory)

Down-hole Annulus Safety Valves (DH ASVs)

Introduced after Piper Alpha in some parts of world
To reduce the volume of gas topsides is exposed to
Still typically equivalent of >100 gas bottles !!
Shallow set dual path packers
Integral check valve or sliding sleeve
Usually not designed to be gas tight
Always requires a full workover to replace on failure
DH ASV reliability issues
Apparently many wells closed in due to failed DH ASVs
Problems with packer technology in thermal cycling
Integral check valve reliability challenges
Reputedly often difficult to retrieve

Gas Lifted Well Integrity Management

Reducing the HSE risk (High pressure gas inventory)

PTCs fresh approach to DH ASVs

Dual Packer technology designed for thermal cycling 4 110 deg C
Client supplied SCSSSV attached above
ISO-14310-V1 equivalent leak rate on gas side
Solid body compact packer design
Up to 10 control lines pass-through
Single trip retrieval using Sondex cutter

Gas Lifted Well Integrity Management

Reducing the HSE risk (HP lift gas inventory)

Eliminate the potential for annulus venting

Using Surface Annulus Safety (SAS) valve
Set in the wellhead VR profile
Employs PTC Safelift GLV check valve design
No erosion across metal / metal seal faces
Performance exceeds that delivered by DH ASV
Valves tested to API 6A PSL 3G PR2
Fire tested to API 6FB and API 6FD
Achieving V0 with gas as test medium
Valves replacable without workover

Image used with the permission of J Bellarby

Gas Lifted Well Integrity Management

Reducing the HSE risk (HP lift gas inventory)

Actuator module holds check valve open throughout life

Protecting seal faces from chattering
Modular design facilitates actuator detachement
In case of annulus line damage
Leaving check valve intact in wellhead

Image used with the permission of J Bellarby

Gas Lifted Well Integrity Management

Reducing the HSE risk (HP lift gas inventory)

> 250 SAS valves installed

In use in GOM and N Sea
Gas lifted wells with failed DH-ASVs previously had to be closed in
Awaiting workover
Now permitted to remain on stream
If SAS valves are installed
And if well barrier accredited gas lift valves are used
Increasingly recognised by OPCOs as:
required for achieving ALARP risk in gas lifted wells
Some OPCOs even using them in combination with DH ASVs
Their interpretation of ALARP

Gas Lifted well integrity Mgt

Reducing the HSE risk (trapped annulus)

Automated annulus pressure management

Unique VR Plug / sensors can be installed on all annuli

Continual annulus P&T measurement

Wireless (HART protocol) / wired link to control room

Wireless module detaches safely under impact

Leaving VR plug / sensor in wellhead

Annuli can be bled down automatically via M-SAS valves

Before closing again to ensure well integrity

Gas Lifted well integrity mgt

Reducing the HSE risk

Automated annulus pressure bleed down

PTC gas lift valve derivatives

One way (outer to inner) valves

Pre set opening pressures (MAASP)

Installed in special casing pups below wellhead

New wells only

Not just for gas lifted wells

Ideal for subsea wells

Typically casings are not cemented into previous shoe track

To provide option for pressure to bleed off into formation

Deploying annulus bleed valves would reduce this HSE risk

Conclusions

HSE risks in well completions are managed to be ALARP

Gas lift introduces significant additional HSE risks cf any other lift method:
GLVs can be primary well containment envelope weak link
Enormous inventory of high pressure gas introduced to hazardous area
Potential for lift gas leakage into outer annuli
New technologies developed to address these concerns:
Well barrier gas lift valves and unloading valves
Wellhead VR profile actuated Surface Annulus Safety (SAS) valves
ISO-14310-V1 equivalent leak rate DH ASVs
Wellhead VR profile pressure temperature sensors
Trapped annulus pressure relief valves

Final thought

Lets do a little role playing exercise :

Youre sat in the office next month and your phone rings
Its your CEO on the line
He tells you he has been invited to a meeting with the government
To discuss a recent safety incident involving a gas lifted well
He asks you
Can I confidently say our designs ensured the risks were ALARP
Whats your answer .................

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