Title Two

CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE STATE

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Arbitrary detention [art. 124]

Delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities [art. 125]
Delaying release [art. 126]
Expulsion [art. 127]
Violation of domicile [art. 128]
Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally obtained [art. 129]
Searching domicile without witnesses [art. 130]
Prohibition, interruption, and dissolution of peaceful meetings [art. 131]
Interruption of religious worship [art. 132]
Offending the religious feelings [art. 133]

Note: the offender in crimes against the fundamental laws of the state is a public officer or employee except in the crime of OFFENDING THE RELIGIOUS FEELINGS which may be committed by a
private individual or a public officer or employee.
Art. 124 arbitrary detention
Elements:
1.
That the offender is a public officer or employee
2.
That he detained a person
3.
That the detention is without legal grounds

The commission of a crime, or violent insanity or any other ailment requiring the compulsory confinement of the patient in a hospital, shall be considered legal grounds for the
detention of any person.

Penalties imposed:
1.
Arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period if the detention has not exceed three days
2.

Prision correccional in its medium and maximum period - if the detention has continued for more than three days but not more than 15 days

3.

Prision mayor if the detention has continued for more than 15 days but not more than 6 months

4.

Reclusion temporal if the detention shall have exceed 6 months

Offender in arbitrary detention is a public officer or employee

The public officers liable for arbitrary detention must be vested with authority to detain or order the detention of persons accused of a crime, but when they detain a person they have no legal grounds
therefor.
Such public officers are the policemen and other agents of law, the judge or mayors. A barangay captain and a municipal councilor are public officers. Even a barangay tanod.
Note:

if the offender is a private individual, the act of detaining another is illegal detention under Art. 267 or art. 268.

But private individuals who conspired with public officers in detaining certain persons are guilty of arbitrary detention.

Arbitrary thru imprudence

Pp vs Missa, CA, 36 OG 3496 the crime of arbitrary detention can be committed through imprudence. The chief of police rearrested a woman who had been released by means of a verbal order of the
justice of peace. The accused acted without malice, but he should have verified the order of release before proceeding to make the re-arrest.
Lawful warrantless arrest sec. 5, Rule 113
A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
a.
[flagrante delicto] - When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
b.

[probable cause based on personal knowledge] - When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances that the person to be arrested committed it; and

c.

[escaping prisoners] - When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his
case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Art. 125 delay in the delivery of detained persons to the proper judicial authorities Elements:
1.
That the offender is a public officer or employee
2.
That he has detained a person for some legal grounds
3.
That he fails to deliver such person to the proper judicial authorities within:
a.
12 hours for crimes or offenses punishable by light penalties

Arresto menor [art. 25] 1-30 days

b.
18 hours for crimes or offense punishable by correcional penalties

Prision correccional -6 mnths and 1 days to 6 yrs

Arresto mayor 1mnth and 1 day to 6 months

Suspension

destierro
c.
36 hours for crimes or offenses punishable by afflictive or capital penalties, or their equivalent

Death

Reclusion perpetua

Reclusion temporal 12 years and 1 to 20 years

Prision mayor 6yrs and 1 day to 12 years

Exempting circumstance:
Art. 12, par. 7 no criminal and civil liability
Any person who fails to perform an act required by law when prevented by some lawful or insuperable cause.
Therefore, when a person was lawfully detained on a Friday for a crime punishable by correccional penalty and was only brought to the proper judicial authorities on Monday, the next working, although
the period for his detention expired warranting his release, the public officer who detained the person is not liable for the crime under art. 125 because the public officer is prevented to perform act required
by law by some lawful or insuperable cause.
US vs Vicentillo, 19 Phil 118 the municipal president detained the offended party for 3 days because to take him to the nearest justice of peace required a journey for 3 days by boat as there was no
other means of transportation. The distance which required a journey for 3 days was considered an insuperable cause. Hence it was held that the accused was exempted from criminal liability.
Art. 125 does not apply when the arrest is by virtue of a warrant
If the arrest is made with a warrant of arrest, the person arrested can be detained indefinitely until his case is decided by the court or he posts a bail for his temporary release.
Reason: there is already a complaint or information filed against him with the court which issued the order or warrant of arrest and it is not necessary to deliver the person thus arrested to that court.
Delivery to the proper judicial authorities; constitutes
It does not consist in a physical delivery of the detained person but it consist in making an accusation or charge or filing an information against the person arrested with the corresponding court or judge,
whereby the latter acquires jurisdiction to issue an order of release or of commitment of the prisoner.
Art. 125 vs Art. 124
Art. 124 arbitrary detention

Art. 125 delay in the delivery of detained persons

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a.

The detention is illegal from the beginning because there was no crime committed or the
person detained is not violently insane or suffering of any other ailment requiring
confinement in a hospital.

a.

The detention is legal in the beginning but the illegality of the detention starts from the
expiration of any of the periods of time specified in art. 125, without detained prisoner
having been delivered to the proper judicial authority.

Art. 126 Delaying release Elements:

1.
That the offender is a public officer or employee
2.
That there is a judicial or executive order for the release of a prisoner or detention prisoner, or that there is a proceeding upon a petition for the liberation of such person.
3.
That the offender without good reason delays:
a.
The service of the notice of such order to the prisoner
b.
The performance of such judicial or executive order for the release of the prisoner
c.
The proceedings upon a petition for the release of such person
Period of delay: [see the corresponding penalties under art. 124]
1.
Delay has not exceed three days
2.
Delay has continued more than 3 days but not more than 15 days
3.
Delay has continued more than 15 days but not more than 16 months
4.
Delay shall have exceed 6 months
3 acts are punishable under art. 126
1.
By delaying the performance of a judicial or executive order for the release of a prisoner
2.
By unduly delaying the service of the notice of such order to said prisoner
3.
By unduly delaying the proceedings upon any petition for liberation of such person
Wardens and Jailers are the public officers most likely to violate art. 126
Art. 127 Expulsion Elements:
1.
The offender is a public officer or employee
2.
That he expels any person from the Philippines, or compels a person to change his residence
3.
That the offender is not authorized to do so by law
2 acts are punishable under art. 127:
1.
By expelling a person from the Philippines
2.
By compelling a person to change his residence
Villavicencio vs Lukban, 39 Phil 778 The Mayor and the Chief of Police of Manila cannot force the prostitutes residing in the City to go to and live in Davao against their will, there being no law that
authorizes them to do so. These women, despite their being in a sense, lepers of society, are nevertheless not chattels, but Philippine citizens, protected by the same constitutional guarantees as are other
citizens.
Art. 128 Violation of domicile
Elements:
1.
That the offender is a public officer or employee
2.
That he is not authorized by judicial order to enter the dwelling and/or make a search therein for papers or other effects
3 acts are punishable under art. 128:
1.
By entering any dwelling against the will of the owner thereof
2.
By searching papers or other effects found therein without the previous consent of such owner
3.
By refusing to leave the premises, after having surreptitiously [secretly, stealthily] entered said dwelling and after having been required to leave the same.
Note: if the offender is a private individual, the crime committed is TRESPASS TO DWELLING.
Against the will of owner It will be noted that to constitute a violation of domicile, the entrance by the public officer or employee must be against the will of the owner of the dwelling, which presupposes opposition or prohibition by
said owner, whether express or implied.
If the entrance by the public officer or employee is only without consent of the owner of the dwelling, the crime is not committed. Neither is the crime committed if the owner of the dwelling consented to
such entrance [pp vs Luis Sane, CA, 40 OG Supp. 5, 113].
Against the will must be equal to prohibition or opposition not lack of permission.
Bar: 2002
What is the difference between violation of domicile and trespass to dwelling?
Violation of Domicile
a.
The offender is a public officer or employee acting under color of authority;
b.

It is committed in 3 ways, namely:

1.
By entering any dwelling against the will of the owner thereof
2.
By searching papers or other effects found therein without the previous consent
of such owner
3.
By refusing to leave the premises, after having surreptitiously [secretly,
stealthily] entered said dwelling and after having been required to leave the
same.

Elements:
1.
That the offender is a public officer or employee
2.
That he is not authorized by judicial order to enter the dwelling and/or make a search
therein for papers or other effects

a.
b.

Trespass to Dwelling [art. 280]

Offender is a private person or public officer acting in a private capacity
Trespass to dwelling is committed only in one way, that is, by entering the dwelling of
another against the express or implied will of the latter.

Elements:
1.
2.
3.

That the offender is a private person

That he enters the dwelling of another
That such entrance is against the latters will

Art. 129 Search warrants maliciously obtained, and abuse in the service of those legally obtained Elements of procuring a search warrant without just cause:
1.
That the offender is a public officer or employee
2.
That he procures a search warrant
3.
That there is no just cause
Elements of exceeding authority or using unnecessary severity in executing a search warrant legally procured:
1.
That the offender is a public officer or employee
2.
That he has legally procured a search warrant
3.
That he exceeds his authority or uses unnecessary severity in executing the same

Example: if in searching a house, the public officer destroys furniture therein without any justification at all, he is guilty under art. 129, as having used unnecessary severity in
executing the search warrant.
Acts punishable in connection with search warrants:
1.
By procuring a search warrant without just cause
2.
By exceeding his authority or by using unnecessary severity in executing a search warrant legally procured
Requisites for issuing search warrant [sec. 4, Rule 126]
A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.

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IMPORTANT: There is no complex crime of search maliciously obtained with perjury although perjury is a necessary means for committing the crime of search warrant maliciously obtained. the
crime committed is PERJURY AND SEARCH WARRANT MALICIOUSLY OBTAINED because they are separate and distinct crimes, to be punished with their respective penalties.
Therefore, a public officer who made willful and deliberate assertion of falsehood in the affidavits filed in support of the application for search warrant and procures the same could be held liable for
PERJURY AND the crime of SEARCH WARRANT MALICIOUSLY OBTAINED.
When is search warrant said to have been procured without just cause? Example: A peace officer wanted to verify a report that some corpse was unlawfully in a monastery. Instead of stating to that
effect, the alleged in an affidavit that opium was hidden in the premises. If no opium was found, the officer is guilty under art. 129.
Art. 130 Searching domicile without witnesses Elements:
1.
That the offender is a public officer or employee
2.
That he is armed with search warrant legally procured
3.
That he searches the domicile, papers or other belongings of any person
4.
That the owner, or any of his family, or 2 witnesses residing in the same locality are not present
Sec. 8, Rule 126
No search of a house, room or any other premises shall be made except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family or in the absence of the latter, 2 witnesses of sufficient
age and discretion residing in the same locality.
Art. 131 Prohibition, Interruption, and dissolution of peaceful meetings
Elements:
1.
That the offender is a public officer or employee who is a stranger to the peaceful meeting
2.
That he performs the following acts:

a.

By prohibiting or by interrupting, without legal ground, the holding of a peaceful meeting, or by dissolving the same
To constitute a violation of the act the meeting must be peaceful, and there is no legal ground for prohibiting, or interrupting dissolving that meeting.

b.

By hindering any person from joining any lawful association or from attending any of its meeting

c.

By prohibiting or hindering any person from addressing, either alone or together with others, any petition to the authorities for the correction of abuses or redress of grievances

The offender must be a stranger, not a participant, in the peaceful meeting

Where during the meeting of municipal officials called by the mayor, the chief of police kept on talking although he had been asked by the mayor to sit down, and there was a heated exchange of words
among the mayor, a councilor and the chief of police, and in the ensuing confusion, the crowd watching the proceeding dispersed and the meeting was eventually dissolved, the chief of police is not guilty
under Art. 131, but under Art. 287, for unjust vexation.
Stopping the speaker who was attacking certain churches in public meeting is a violation of Art. 131
The chief of police who ordered the speaker in a public meeting of the Iglesia ni Cristo, then attacking the Catholic and Aglipayan churches, to stop and fired two shots in the air which dispersed the crowd
and stopped the meeting, is liable under art. 131 [Pp vs Reyes, et al., July 27, 1955].
If meetings to be held is not peaceful, there is a legal ground for prohibiting it
In the case, when the mayor denied the request of the Communist Party to hold a public meeting because previous meetings held by the said Communist Party, seditious speeches were delivered urging
the laboring class to unite in order to be able to overthrow the government. in this case, the denial of the request by the Mayor was sustained and there was no violation of art. 131 [Evangelista vs
Earnshaw, 57 Phil 255].
Art. 132 Interruption of religious worship Elements:
1.
That the offender is a public officer or employee
2.
That religious ceremonies or manifestations of any religion are about to take place or are going on
3.
That the offender prevents or disturbs the same
Qualified by violence or threats The Crime of Interruption of religious worship may be qualified and a higher penalty [prision correccional in its medium and maximum] shall be imposed if the crime is committed with violence or threats.
Pp vs Majica, Dec. 29, 1955 in a barrio chapel, a priest was ready to say a mass and a number of barrio folks were there to hear mass. The barrio lieutenant made an actual threat on the life of the priest
should the latter persist in his intention to say the mass. As a result, the mass was not celebrated. HELD: the barrio lieutenant was guilty of a violation of art. 132.
IMPORTANT: Pp vs Reyes, CA- GR no. 13633-R Reading of bible and then attacking certain churches in a public plaza is not a ceremony or manifestation of a religion, but only a meeting of a religious
act. Therefore, its interruption is not punishable under art. 132 but under art. 131, prohibition, interruption or dissolution of peaceful meetings.
Religious ceremonies
Religious ceremonies are those religious acts performed outside of a church, such as procession and special prayer for burying dead persons.
Note: if the offender is a private person the crime committed would either be:
1.
Unjust vexation
2.
Art. 153 tumults or other disturbance of public order
3.
Art. 133 offending the religious feelings
Art. 133 Offending the religious feelings Elements:
1.
Offender is anyone [could be public officer or employee, or a private individual]
2.
That the acts complained of were performed
a.
In a place devoted to religious worship, or
b.
During the celebration of any religious ceremony
3.
That the acts must be notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful
NOTE: ingun si JUDGE na cemetery is not a place devoted for religious worship; therefore, any notorious offensive acts perform in the celebration on nov. 1, all souls day, in the cemetery would
constitute the crime of unjust vexation.
There must be deliberate intent to hurt the feelings of the faithful
Pp vs Gesulga, CA, 57 OG 8494-8496 in this case, the Catholic a prayer vigil which continued outside the church with a procession. The procession has to pass along the barrio road in the middle of
which a Protestant meeting was being held. While the procession was thus passing near the meeting place, the defendant placed a picture of the Pope on the wall of the house of one Vivencia and
shouted: This criminal and devouring best; these parents are fools for having taught their children the sign of the cross for that is the big devil himself, troublesome; here again are the fools of the
devouring beast, the Pope or words of similar import.
HELD: the accused cannot be held guilty of the crime of offending the religious feelings because there was no deliberate intent to hurt the feelings of the faithful. It was the religious procession that
approached the place where he was preaching or delivering a sermon on matters offensive to the feelings of the Catholics.
NOT OFFENSIVE TO RELIGIOUS FEELINGS
1.
Construction of a fence in front of the chapel, even though irritating and vexations to those present in the pabasa, is not notoriously offensive to the feelings of the faithful. The crime
committed is only UNJUST VEXATION under art. 287.
2.

While the congregation of the Assembly of God was having its afternoon services in its chapel, accused who was allegedly drunk entered with uplifted hands and attempted to grab the song
leader who ran away from him. The other members of the sect also ran out of the church and the religious services were discontinued, even as one member held the accused and led him
outside the church.

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HELD: the accused is only guilty of unjust vexation penalized by the 2nd paragraph of art. 287, RPC.

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