Case 3:13-cv-00762-HEH Document 55 Filed 09/10/14 Page 1 of 3 PageID# 574

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division

STAT LTD.,

Plaintiff,
Civil Action No. 3:13CV762-HEH

BEARD HEAD, INC., etai,

Defendants.
MEMORANDUM ORDER

(Granting Plaintiffs Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss)

THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff STAT, Ltd.'s ("Plaintiff) Motion

to Voluntarily Dismiss (ECF No. 49), filed on September 8, 2014, whereby Plaintiff

moves to voluntarily dismiss Count One of Plaintiffs Complaint against all defendants,

pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("Rule 41(a)(2)"). In
light of Defendant's pending motion for summary judgment, the Court will consider the
potential prejudice of granting the Plaintiffs Motion for Voluntary Dismissal pursuant to
Rule 41(a)(2). For the reasons set forth herein, the Motion is GRANTED.

Rule 41(a)(2) provides that once the opposing party has filed a summary judgment
motion, "an action may be dismissed at the plaintiffs request only by court order, on
terms that the court considers proper." Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2). Rule 41(a)(2)
"empowers] district courts to exercise discretion over voluntary dismissals." Go

Computer, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 508 F.3d 170, 177 (4th Cir. 2007). The "purpose of
Rule 41(a)(2) is to freely allow voluntary dismissals unless the parties will be unfairly

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prejudiced." Davis v. USX Corp., 819 F.2d 1270, 1273 (4th Cir. 1987). "A district court
should grant a Rule 41(a)(2) motion absent plain legal prejudice to the defendant."
Bridge Oil, Ltd. V. Green Pacific A/S, 321 F. App'x 244, 245 (4th Cir. 2008).
The Fourth Circuit has identified four general factors this Court will consider in

assessing prejudice: "(1) the opposing party's effort and expense in preparing for trial; (2)
excessive delay or lack of diligence on the part of the movant; (3) insufficient explanation
of the need for a dismissal; and (4) the present stage of the litigation, i.e., whether a

motion for summary judgment is pending." Gross v. Spies, 133 F.3d 914, 1998 WL
8006, at *5 (4th Cir. 1998) (unpublished table decision). But the pendency of a summary

judgment motion or the prospect of subsequent litigation does not constitute plain legal
prejudice of the sort to defeat a Rule 41(a)(2) motion. Bridge Oil, 321 F. App'x at 245.
Considering these factors, granting Plaintiffs motion will not unfairly prejudice
the Defendant. Proceedings in the case have been stayed to facilitate settlement
discussions (ECF No. 48). When negotiations proved futile, Plaintiff punctually filed its

motion to voluntarily dismiss Count One of the Complaint and has presented a reasonable
explanation as to the need for dismissal. Specifically, Plaintiff explains that dismissal will

streamline this litigation and will not harm the remaining trademark infringement or

cybersquatting claims of the Defendant (ECF No. 50). By Order (ECF No. 41) the Court
stayed all proceedings, discovery, and deadlines pursuant to the parties' Joint Motion
(ECF No. 40).

While the Court has now partially lifted the stay (ECF No. 46) to allow the
Defendants to file a motion for summary judgment, such a limited advance of this case

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does not constitute the plain legal prejudice envisioned by the Fourth Circuit when
balanced against the opposing party's effort and expense in preparing for trial.
Moreover, as the Fourth Circuit has explained, merely filing a motion for summary

judgment is not enough to establish unfair prejudice. Most importantly, this Court by

Order (ECF No. 43) granted Defendant's motion to voluntarily dismiss its Antitrust
counterclaim against Plaintiff after Plaintiff fully briefed its 12(b)(6) motion (ECF No.
15). There is simply no basis for finding that Defendant will be unfairly prejudiced by

granting the Plaintiffs motion to voluntarily dismiss its patent infringement claim.
Accordingly, Count One of Plaintiff s Complaint is DISMISSED WITHOUT
PREJUDICE; Defendant's motion for summary judgment is denied as MOOT regarding

only Count One of Plaintiff s Complaint. Any other claims discussed therein shall be

developed and fully briefed in accordance with the Order (ECF No. 53) of this Court.
The Clerk is DIRECTED to send a copy of this Memorandum Order to all counsel
ofrecord.
It is so ORDERED.

40

1st

Henry E. Hudson
United States District Judge

Richmond, Virginia