De Guzman v.

CA
Facts:
Respondent Ernesto Cendana was a junk dealer. He buys scrap materials and brings those that he
gathered to Manila for resale using 2 six-wheeler trucks. On the return trip to Pangasinan, respondent
would load his vehicle with cargo which various merchants wanted delivered, charging fee lower than
the commercial rates. Sometime in November 1970, petitioner Pedro de Guzman contracted with
respondent for the delivery of 750 cartons of Liberty Milk. On December 1, 1970, respondent loaded the
cargo. Only 150 boxes were delivered to petitioner because the truck carrying the boxes was hijacked
along the way. Petitioner commenced an action claiming the value of the lost merchandise. Petitioner
argues that respondent, being a common carrier, is bound to exercise extraordinary diligence, which it
failed to do. Private respondent denied that he was a common carrier, and so he could not be held liable
for force majeure. The trial court ruled against the respondent, but such was reversed by the Court of
Appeals.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not private respondent is a common carrier
(2) Whether private respondent is liable for the loss of the goods
Held:
(1) Article 1732 makes no distinction between one whose principal business activity is the carrying of
persons or goods or both, and one who does such carrying only as an ancillary activity. Article 1732 also
carefully avoids making any distinction between a person or enterprise offering transportation service
on a regular or scheduled basis and one offering such service on an occasional, episodic or unscheduled
basis. Neither does Article 1732 distinguish between a carrier offering its services to the "general
public," i.e., the general community or population, and one who offers services or solicits business only
from a narrow segment of the general population. It appears to the Court that private respondent is
properly characterized as a common carrier even though he merely "back-hauled" goods for other
merchants from Manila to Pangasinan, although such backhauling was done on a periodic or occasional
rather than regular or scheduled manner, and even though private respondent's principal occupation
was not the carriage of goods for others. There is no dispute that private respondent charged his
customers a fee for hauling their goods; that fee frequently fell below commercial freight rates is not
relevant here. A certificate of public convenience is not a requisite for the incurring of liability under the
Civil Code provisions governing common carriers.
(2) Article 1734 establishes the general rule that common carriers are responsible for the loss,
destruction or deterioration of the goods which they carry, "unless the same is due to any of the
following causes only:
a. Flood, storm, earthquake, lightning, or other natural disaster or calamity;
b. Act of the public enemy in war, whether international or civil;
c. Act or omission of the shipper or owner of the goods;
d. The character of the goods or defects in the packing or in the containers; and

e. Order or act of competent public authority."

The hijacking of the carrier's truck - does not fall within any of the five (5) categories of exempting
causes listed in Article 1734. Private respondent as common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or
to have acted negligently. This presumption, however, may be overthrown by proof of extraordinary
diligence on the part of private respondent. We believe and so hold that the limits of the duty of
extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods carried are reached where the goods are lost as a
result of a robbery which is attended by "grave or irresistible threat, violence or force." we hold that the
occurrence of the loss must reasonably be regarded as quite beyond the control of the common carrier
and properly regarded as a fortuitous event. It is necessary to recall that even common carriers are not
made absolute insurers against all risks of travel and of transport of goods, and are not held liable for
acts or events which cannot be foreseen or are inevitable, provided that they shall have complied with
the rigorous standard of extraordinary diligence.