PATTON REPORT NO.
51
C) 1977 Patton, Inc.
Compartmentation
A Curse on the Hospitals
Architects design hospitals today in much the same manner
of medieval jails. The patient room is designed as a dungeon, a
small masonry enclosed cubicle. Does it matter that the
ancient dungeon was designed for security, the patient room as
a fire refuge? The net result is the same.
Studies have shown that compartmenting and isolating the
sick person in the fireproof cubicle actually can depress and
delay recovery, especially with children who need to see what
is going on so at least their minds can be active while their
bodies are confined.
The hospital traditionally is a winged building. Long appen-
dages, with fireproof corridors extending the length of the
wings, feed the fireproofed rooms. Enclosed fireproof stair-
ways are strategically spaced along the fireproof corridors with
the presumption that the best solution to fire is to be able to
run for your life to the outdoors. The futility of attempting to
move the sick down these shafts apparently is overlooked by
all.
THE COSTS
The construction cost of a hospital is from $75 per sq. ft.
upward. The hospital is among the most costly of buildings
ind the fire regulations are a primary cause of these high costs.
The total cost of the fire protection component is almost
impossible to calculate because there is such a multitude of
hidden charges. But conservatively, it must equal at least $20
per square foot, and may possibly account for a full 50% of
the total cost of the construction price. The use value of the
lost space can increase "payout" time on an investment by
50% to 100% or more. Useable space is lost thru excessive
compartmenting, extra wide corridors, severe restrictions on
dead end corridors, excessive number of stairways and other
factors. The compounded cost of only one stairway in a 5
story high building can be $1,500,000.00 over a 30 year
period (counting the initial cost, the lost useful area, and the
cost of money).
Above the suspended ceilings the maze of fire walls and
partitions are extended to the floor slab above thus making it
necessary to chop through a multitude of walls to run a pipe,
duct or conduit. The ceiling plenum was originally considered
to be a free route for such utilities, but it is nearly becoming
less troublesome to put a highway through a mountain range
than it is to route a pipe through a hospital.
Based on the traditional belief that the best solution to fire
is to run away, and giving due cognizance to the fact that
many of those in a hospital are confined to bed, the fire codes
have specified that doors and corridors must be designed so
that patients, beds and all, can be rolled out of the rooms and
down the corridors.
But in the next set of rules, the code writers (presumably
recognizing the idiocy of rolling the beds down the corridors
while the fire department is laying the hose lines) have decreed
that the doors must be fire rated and automatically closed so
as to isolate the patient in the room. Thus, the codes seem to
be saying, in a hospital evacuation is impractical, and isolation
unreliable, so we'll do both.
If you believe that two systems that don't work are better
than one system that doesn't work, then compartmentation is
for you, provided you also believe that spending one dollar is
not nearly so desireable as spending 10 dollars.
The fantastically high costs of the compartmentation solu-
tion could be justified if compartmentation actually was a
good solution to fire. But it isn't. Bluntly speaking, it is either
a fool's solution, or a profiteers solution, depending on the
motivations. Those who promote compartments because its
the way they make their money, may be unscrupulous but at
least they know the score. Those who think that compart-
ments save lives are the pawns of those who write the codes —
not to save lives — but to maximize profits.
COMPARTMENTS DON'T WORK
The fire safety traditionalists have persisted with compart-
ments as the basic "solution" to fire life safety arguing that:
1. Those within the compartment on fire can escape.
2. The door to the compartment can be closed, thus trapping
the fire.
3. Others (if mobile) can flee through the exit ways, or if
non-mobile, can close the door to their own particular
compartment and "ride out" the fire and survive.
This basic concept of fire safety has a record of more than
100 years of failure because:
1. Even if fire is trapped within one compartment to begin
with (with the door closed) almost with certainty we can
depend upon someone under panic conditions to open the
door (to attempt to fight the fire or evaluate it). This will
allow fire to escape to the corridor.
2. Even if the door trapping the fire does remain closed (some-
how), the fire compartment is not a smoke tight compart-
ment (See P. R. No. 24). Toxic gases will spread despite the
fire compartments. Smoke tight compartmentation still
 remains a dream of illogical thinkers.
3. When fire and/or toxic gases escape to the corridor, theoret-
ically a person who remains within a closed room can sur-
vive. However, a percentage of those who are trapped are
al most certain to panic, try to leave the room and run into
trouble in the corridor.
4. Even if the compartmentation advocates are able to persist
in current objectives to force the selling of equipment to
close the doors automatically, there is still no true guaran-
tee of safety for the person trapped and frightened within
the room. The room is never smoke tight. Given time toxic
gases will enter. However, by this time the panicked occu-
pant may well have gone out the window anyway.
HOW COMPARTMENTS STARTED
(SUBDIVISION OF RISK)
The 19th century fire insurance underwriters invented our
present hospital fire safety plan. They applied the plan not
only to hospitals and nursing homes, but other institutional
buildings, hotels, apartments, high rise buildings, etc.
In its earliest form the underwriters called the concept
"subidivision of risk" (don't put all your eggs in one basket).
When sailing ships were frequently lost at sea, 19th century
underwriters demanded that only a part of an insured cargo be
placed on board any one ship. If the cargo was sent in three
shipments, odds were that at least two would get there. This is
the principle of "subdivision of risk".
The great conflagurations of the 18th and 19th century left
a trail of bankrupt insurance companies. Why? Because these
city wide conflaguration fires were so large that an entire
year's premium income did not equal the single catastrophic
loss payout. One single catastrophic loss could deplete the
reserves and bankrupt the insurer.
The insurance industry accordingly began to promote struc-
tural compartments, not as solution to fire, but as a solution to
the catastrophic fire. Building codes were developed that
required clear space or fire walls between adjoining buildings.
Where a block of row houses was constructed with a masonry
fire wall dividing each two units, it was certain that only one
unit would burn at a time.
Note that compartmentation is an ideal solution for the
underwriter because only one small loss occurs at a time. Small
random losses are actuarially predictable. The insuring system
is designed to handle small random losses. It is only the un-
planned for catastrophic loss that is a problem.
The best thing about compartments as a fire solution (from
the 19th century fire underwriters viewpoint) was that the
compartment plan did not reduce the frequency of random
losses. The fire frequency was not reduced! Small fires con-
tinued at the same rate. Compartmentation did not reduce the
need for insurance. ( A true solution to fire would reduce the
need for insurance).
Thus, before the beginning of the 20th century, conipart-
mentation became the preferred fundamental fire solution
because it was a "non solution" to fire.
The compartment concept of fire safety was extended to
large buildings vertically (fire floors) and horizontally (fire
walls) so that although loss potential remained, it was a con-
trolled loss potential.
This fundamental plan of limiting — but not eliminating fire
loss remains with us today. The hospital is built to comply
with this plan of fire safety.
COMPARTMENTS ADAPTED TO LIFE SAFETY
For the 19th century fire insurance underwriter compart-
mentation was the perfect solution because it greatly reduced
the potential for a catastrophic loss (Which could bankrupt the
insurer) but did nothing to reduce the frequency of small
losses (which were the lifeblood of the insurance industry).
The compartment plan was then extended into a complex
set of code regulations (which included exiting systems, and
construction material controls) so that the occupant would
have a "fair" chance to "escape" before the fire spread beyond
the compartment of origin. But, being fundamentally a "non
solution" to fire to begin with, the plan never achieved a signi-
ficant reduction in fire deaths. Therefore after each major loss
of life and well publicized fire a new round of code provisions
were enacted. Each new round of regulations created new mar-
kets for new fire safety hardware. In turn, this enlarged the
number of organizations making profits from fire. In turn, this
further increased the number of supporters of the "compart-
mentation solution".
This practice of amending the codes to build new costs into
buildings every time a major fire occurred created a condition
where the more the failures, the greater the profits.
Today the compartmentation plan of fire safety represents
a vast multibillion dollar market place. The "compartmenta-
tion plan" has never been more popular or more complicated
than it is today; it has never been less successful, or more
profitable.
In the 19th century, only the insurance industry fully
recognized the advantages of not putting the fire out. Today,
there is a coalition of manufacturers and installers of
"approved" materials and systems stretching from coast to
coast, and to a man they are advocates of not putting the fire
out. It is this vast network of fire safety profiteers that pro-
vides the great bulk of the "volunteer" code writers who write
the "concensus codes" of the NFPA.
THE ANCILLARY SYSTEMS
OF COMPARTMENTATION
The "compartmentation plan of fire safety" requires auxil-
iary systems as explained below.
1. Fireproofing: The compartment walls must be constructed
so as to resist a long duration fire. This requires fireproof
materials. These materials must be tested and approved by
Underwriters Laboratory.
2. Flame Spread Ratings: In order to give humans a reasonable
chance to reach exits (or close doors) before fire spreads
too extensively, all interior finish materials must be tested
for flame spread ratings. This is done by U.L.
3. Materials Controls: In recent years it has become increas-
ingly apparent that flame spread ratings for interior finish
materials are of only limited value because the primary
combustibles are the furnishings. Therefore, there is a
massive effort underway at present to require all furnishings
to be regulated, tested and controlled by the laboratories.
4. Smoke Movement Controls: Since the plan is to trap the
fire (not put it out) a full compartment size fire is ex-
pected. With an entire compartment on fire special controls
and systems must be built into the air handling equipment
to slow smoke spread.. This includes the running of com-
partment walls through the drop ceilings to the slab above,
and automatic dampers at all points where the ducts pene-
trate these walls or floors. This equipment and construction
requires testing, labeling and regulation by the U.L. Lab.
5. Alarm and Communication Systems: Once fire reaches al
out of control stage within one compartment, regardless of
whether it remains confined or escapes, the situation is
extremely dangerous. Usually there will be a population on
the verge of panic. Therefore, complex and costly systems
2 can be mandated for detecting fire, sounding alarms, trans-
 mitting information, and communication. A family of fire
detection, alarm and communication systems have evolved,
and all are tested, labeled, and regulated by U.L.
6. Manual Control Equipment: The out of control fire,
whether it is still confined to one compartment or covering
many compartments, must be brought under control with
manual equipment. Therefore, a generous supply of Under-
writer Laboratory labeled fire fighting equipment must be
installed in every building. Incidentally, the U.L. listed
equipment usually consists of two types, one type is too
small to control a compartment size fire (fire extinguisher)
and the other is too large and cumberson to be handled
effectively in a compartmentated building (VA" standpipe
hose).*
These are the ancillary systems of compartmentation. In
total, these systems increase the cost of constructing and
equipping a hospital by more than $20.00 per square foot.
They also decrease the useful square foot area of a hospital
by an amount estimated to be at least 20% of the gross
floor area. None are designed to efficiently and promptly
terminate the fire.
The Compartmented Hospital of Tomorrow: Today's compart-
mented hospital is a nightmare. I don't think there is a hospital
administrator in the country who will deny it. But what these
gentlemen of the medical profession apparently do not yet
realize is that the fire protection establishment already has
elaborate new plans which are presently moving through the
code making process. (And they have the majorities on the
committees to carry the votes). There are at least three major
schemes of frightening proportions already brewing. They are:
1. Materials Controls — The regulation and control of all fur-
nishings and materials brought into the hospital (on a toxic-
ity of combustion products basis) will be a horror in that it
will give the "authorities having jurisdiction" control over
virtually all purchasing. It will also give the inspectors rea-
sons to continuously monitor the facility. Further, it will
provide dishonest suppliers a method by which competition
can be reduced or eliminated. The testing, labeling, and
regulation of "combustible contents" of hospitals will be a
multi-billion dollar boondoggle for the fire testing labora-
tories.
2. The Smoke Tight Building — Although present buildings are
compartmented firewise (if and when doors are closed),
from a smoke viewpoint, the compartments leak smoke like
a sieve leaks water. So, there are plans underway now to
correct this. The plans include smoke detectors and auto-
matic door closers throughout, plus smoke detector
operated motorized dampers in the mechanical air handling
systems between each and every compartment. This will
produce absolutely fantastic costs because already compart-
ments are being carried slab to slab. Also, there will be
additional new restrictions on running piping and electrical
systems. Maintenance of these future systems will be hor-
rendous.
3. The Exotica — Just as the finding of a gold mine in a
previously unexplored area will result in a mad rush of
unscrupulous opportunists, so has the "gold mine" of mar-
keting via the fire codes brought a wealth of new and
potentially lucrative schemes.
Included in this catagory are schemes to computerize and
regulate the air delivery systems to use fresh air to control
The garden size hose, which research has proven to be the most effec-
tive manual fire control tool for the non professional fire fighter lit is
flexible, easily put into use, and can control a full compartment size
fire, even after flashover has occurred) is not allowed.
fire (God help us!) — schemes to computerize the building
so as to be able to monitor fire spread electronically, open-
ing and closing doors to compartments from a remote loca-
tion as necessary, directing people from one compartment
to another with pre-programmed taped messages — exotic
methods of removing people from buildings including heli-
copters, machines that will climb the side of buildings,
foam rubber cushions to drive into, etc. They are thinking
up new and further out schemes even as you read this.
THE ECONOMICS OF FIRE
If hospital administrators have any hope at all of heading
off the nightmares coming down the tube, the first step must
be to realize that the fire protection market place is an econo-
mic ballgame — not an exercise in humanitarianism. "Human
safety" is not an objective, it's a marketing tool. Fire is the oil
that lubricates the sales machines.
The frightening thing about the fire situation today is that
virtually the entire team that has control of the code writing
process makes profits from fire. As the complexity and the
costs of the ancillary systems increase, so the cash flow in-
creases. The Underwriters Laboratory, the National Fire Pro-
tection Association and those who supply the "free" talents to
write the codes are generally on the receiving end of the cash
flow.
Methods and systems which could essentially eliminate fire
as a serious problem in America exist today. The primary
objective of the fire safety community has been to systemati-
cally prevent these solutions from gaining increased recog-
nition.
As the cavalry officer fought the tank, and as the admiral of
the battleship fought the airplane, so do those who market the
present products of fire safety fight to prevent progress against
fire.
Unless we can somehow break through soon with reliable
and economically sound fire safety solutions — the octopus
that is expanding now may well soon be forever beyond
control.
HOW IT'S DONE
The fire protection establishment is a self created kingdom
within a democracy. Through the NFPA, which produces and
publishes 200 fire codes, there is close to an absolute control
over the technology marketed for fire safety in the U.S. and
Canada. Although the code writing process is extensively
advertised as a "consensus" operation; in truth, the NFPA can
readily control the contents of the codes through appoint-
ments and other means. With rare exceptions those who are
selected as committee members are "part of the system". The
committee majority is almost invariably composed of people
who make their living or their profits from the fire safety
market place. Those who are forced to purchase the products
or services (building owners for example) are almost as rare on
the committees as hens' teeth. Thus, the entire fire code
writing establishment is predominantly "like" oriented.
Underwriters Laboratory controls the products sold.
Without UL approval, it is virtually impossible to market a fire
safety product in the United States. At the bottom rung of the
market control price structure, a plumbing valve (without UL
approval) may sell for $44.15. The same size valve, but termed
a "fire protection valve" (with the UL listing) can self for
$117.32. But this is not a true picture of the cost difference.
Where a 2" pipe and valve will do the job, the NFPA standard
will require a 4" valve. This will cost $244.80 (or more than
3 five times the price necessary). In fact, costs in the range of 5
people who are directly exposed to the interior
fire and/or gases can be killed. Therefore, life
safety requires more than a building code, it re-
quires a solution to the interior fire problem.
Thus, for years there has been an interest on the
part of those who are concerned with life safety to
revise the sprinkler requirements so that these sys-
tems would be applicable to residential and institu-
tional structures.
This philosophy of fire safety, that the sprinkler
system is the key to saving lives, is not novel or new.
It is probably safe to say that the vast majority of
those in the fire services (Fire Chiefs, Fire Marshals)
fully support this concept, and have done so for
years.
However, the fire insurance men have consistently
held that sprinkler design must be maintained the
province of the insurers, and that the requirements
must be structured as they see necessary for the
industrial risk.
And so, there has been a conflict within NFPA. I
have personally written to NFPA, as far back as
1965, asking that the hold the insurers have on the
sprinkler committee would be broken. But let us
look at the facts.
In March of 1964, Dave Warren of the Kaiser Corn-
pany, wrote in his NEWSLETTER FOR FIRE PRO-
TECTION ENGINEERS IN INDUSTRY, the fol-
lowing:
"Did you know that the NFPA Committee
on automatic sprinklers is composed 72%
of persons employed by the insurance in-
dustry? If you combine those working in the
sprinkler manufacturing industry the figure
rises to 90%. In organizations of our acquain-
tance, this amounts to a controlling interest.
It is our opinion that better representation
should be secured from the consumer — the
man who pays the bills. How about it NF PA?"
Despite this "open letter" to NFPA, the many fur-
ther efforts on the part of Dave Warren, and my-
self, and many others, we have not yet been able
to break the hold of the fire insurers on this sprink-
ler committee. As of the latest listing I have, the
insurance representation has dropped from its
1964 level, but the insurance representation is still
approximately 50% which is more than enough to
control the requirements.
Now let us look at this situation from a view of its
total ramifications. From the NFPA viewpoint it is
extremely important that they maintain an impres-
sion of being an independent standards making
body working purely in the public interest.
When NFPA permits a key committee to be dom-
inated by one industry, this strikes right at the
heart of the public interest facade. It is contrary to
the organization's own policies of structuring com-
mittees. Theoredically, any standard that is
"loaded" in favor of one special interest group
should be automatically disqualified for adoption
by all legal entities and code enforcing organizations.
Thus, in its ability to dominate the NFPA sprinkler
committee, and thwart the desires of those who
want to see a greater role for sprinklers for pro-
tecting human life, it would seem that the fire
insurers are demonstrating an ability to control
NFPA itself in a manner that must be very damaging
to the overall interests of NFPA.
Is this apparent ability of fire insurers to dominate
NFPA being manifest in other areas?
Does it explain why the NFPA "Life Safety Code"
(NFPA 101) is structure oriented rather than
directed toward protecting human life from the
interior fire. (I consider NFPA 101 to be an ex-
cellent formula for building land based battleships
complete with "fireproof" bulkheads in lieu of the
"watertight" bulkheads usual to the ocean going
variety.)
If NFPA does not have the ability to function
effectively in the area of life safety from fire,
should we look elsewhere?
WHO WI LL DO THE JOB?
But where do we look?
The fire services, in my opinion, rank number one
in having a tremendous desire to improve life
safety from fire. But so far they have played a very
minor role in the NFPA code making operation
and have not become united and dynamic in sup-
port of their beliefs.
The model code organizations and the state and city
building authorities have concentrated on building
codes, and have left the fire prevention standards,
including the fire detection and sprinkler regula-
tions, and most other fire safety activities in the
hands of NFPA. Building codes are very limited in
their ability to deal with the interior combustible
content fire that is the chief killer of people.
The Federal Government could be a very dynamic
force. But the government seems to have a perva-
sive desire for absolute uniformity in safety matters
— a desire for a single master building code, if
you will. How do you convince the government
that absolute uniformity is the very worst thing?
History proves that the ability to innovate and
create is the secret of progress — but there is
nothing that is more deadly to creativity than
absolute federal controls. There are many bureau-
crats in the Federal Government who want stan-
dards to enforce — any standards to enforce — and
they want the power that goes with such enforce-
ment regardless of the long term consequences of
such controls.
 I have heard that the National Safety Council has
a "gentlemen's agreement" with NFPA to the
effect that fire is the province of NFPA. Whether
or not this is true, for whatever reason, the NSC
has been very colorless in fire safety matters.
The ASTM is potentially a force in the fire safety
field — but I believe they look too much to fire
tests of building assemblies, and too little to the
human tolerance for fire.
I would like to see each organization that has an
interest in fire life safety pursue its own course.
The government likes uniformity. I believe in
originality. An ability to try something new, an
ability to do something different and unique, is
the prime requisite of progress in all fields of human
endeavor, including safety.
I would like to see everyone speak for human fire
safety — each in his own way.

There are other organizations that also have func- I would like to see an era of almost total domina-
tions in the fire safety field. But I believe that all tion of the fire safety field by one organization
of them tend to follow the lead of NFPA. and its supporters come to an end.

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to 10 times that which is necessary are common in fire safety.
But, if this overpricing produced real safety, perhaps it would
all be justified.
But the overpricing is only half the picture. The other half
is the advancement of inferior systems combined with prohibi-
tions against better systems. It is common to find that the high
priced systems that have been put to the forward part of the
line, have as their greatest appeal to the controllers the charac-
teristic that they do not do the job (or do it poorly).
The NFPA—UL system provides a method to sell fire pro-
tection equipment at a fantastic price that is almost assured to
not put fires out. This is the ultimate of market control capa-
bility — to eat the cake and have it too — to sell the products
that are going to control fire — knowing full well that the net
result will be a sustained fire experience, new fires, and new
chances to promote more products.
The hospital and nursing homes are at the very top of the
economic exploitation ladder. There are no other facilities sub-
jected to more regulations — more restrictions — and a higher
total cost of protection. And, despite the vast array of ex-
tremely costly fire control systems in these facilities, all
systems are built around the compartment plan, which is an aid
rather than a deterrent to the FLASHOVER stage of fire. The
potential for a major fire is thus sustained despite the protec-
tion array. It only takes one occasional "good" fire to produce
sufficient pressures for the next level of sales.
THE SUPPRESSION CONCEPT
Before we became technologically sophisticated, man had a
si mple solution to fire, put it out.
PATTON, INC.
The amount of water that is needed to put out an incipient
fire is less than 50 GPM. With only crude engineering, auto-
matic sprinkler systems are 99.9% reliable against fire (and the
reliability could be greatly improved with but modest re-
search). The cost of reducing serious fires to near zero by
installing water base fire suppression systems could be about
50 cents per square foot. The total cost of compartmentation
and the ancillary systems runs to at least $20 per square foot,
and is going up rapidly.
Recently I personally designed a fire life safety sprinkler
system for a hospital being constructed in Kansas City, which
protected 1,600,000 sq. ft. of facilities at a cost of 28 cents
per square foot of protected area. Because the entire facility
was then protected with a life safety suppression system it was
possible to reduce the other fire protection costs by more than
$5 million. Five million dollars was saved and safety was
i mproved at the same time!
This is the story in a nutshell as to why the many organiza-
tions that control the fire regulations have combined their
forces to regulate the sprinkler system out of being a competi-
tive system. A $400,000 sprinkler system of advanced engi-
neering design went into a hospital building and over five
million dollars worth of other fire protection costs came out.
But even so, only some of the costs of the compartmentation
plan came out. Most remained!
This example tells the whole story. There are such vast and
fantastic profits that are now structured into the NFPA fire
codes and the U.L. product controls that a true solution to fire
is absolutely abhorrent to the Fire Safety Monopoly. A solu-
tion to fire would represent billions of lost revenues. The best
fire solutions are simply not tolerated by the Fire Monopoly.