Professional Documents
Culture Documents
29
DEEP WATER
©1973 Patton Fire Protection and Research, Inc.
THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON FIRE PREVENTION But there is something vitally important that the Com-
AND CONTROL HAS COMPLETED ITS STUDY ON FIRE mission did not do. What the Commission did not do con-
SAFETY MATTERS IN THE UNITED STATES. THE sisted of two parts. The Commission did not do the follow-
COMMISSION GOT ITS FEET WET — BUT AVOIDED ing:
DEEP WATER. a. Explore the question as to why these conditions in fire
protection (faulty tests and faulty concepts) have not
been corrected previously. Why has the fire protection
I was reading the report by the National Commission On Fire community, knowing full well the extent of the phony
Prevention And Control entitled "America Burning" when I testing and phony safety concepts — why did the fire
came across the discussion in Chapter 9 entitled "The protection community fail to correct these conditions —
Hazards Created Through Materials". This section sym- conditionswhich we know to be causing human deaths —
bolized to me the underlying problem with the Com- of its own volition? This is the most important thing
mission's overall findings. In Chapter 9 the Commission that the Commission did not do.
detailed some of the faulty test procedures currently in b. The Commission also failed to produce good solutions to
vogue in fire safety, which procedures envolved from the the problem other than to recommend broad programs
fire safety theories of the 1800's. What the Commission did generally to be administered by those who failed to cor-
not do, however, was to probe the reasons why these faulty rect these known and most serious deficiencies in the past.
test procedures are being maintained in force today.
The Commission got its feet wet on the subject of improper
In Chapter 9 the Commission noted all of the following testing and labelling of the combustibility of materials and
existing conditions as contributors to our fire problem. (See other matters. Now let's take the Commission out into the
page 64 of the report). deeper water and see what there is there to find out there.
1. Our existing fire tests, which we rely on for human fire
safety, in reality do not simulate the complexities of A FRIGHTENED COMMUNITY
real fires. I have looked upon the facade of fire protection. To me, it's
2. There is no nationally recognized test method for like a movie set. When you stand in front looking straight
on —it has the appearance of solidity and substance. It makes
measuring smoke production.
a pleasing appearance to the public which does not realize
3. Building codes do not cover interior furnishings.
that it sees only the surface.
The Commission went on to note, for example, that the
tunnel test will "register a low rate of flame spread for a But walk behind the facade and the substance is gone. There
particular plastic, whereas, in a real fire environment, the is nothing but the framework to hold the illusion together.
same material will burn with explosive speed". And even the framing is decaying. The rot is there and it is
only a matter of time until the facade crumbles.
Now this is a very significant matter. On the one hand we
have laboratory testing applying labels to materials that will For more than 20 years I have challenged the fire protection
make them appear to be safe to the public. On the other community to lopk upon the framework and recognize the
hand, in a real fire environment these supposedly "safe" conditions. But like frightened men they closed their eyes
materials become almost explosively flammable and pro- and dream on — dream on as tho all the world is a fantasy.
duce huge quantities of toxic gases. It would seem that So the Commission finds that our fire tests produce "non-
there is something seriously and fundamentally wrong when combustible", "slow burning" or "self extinguishing" classi-
the fire tests we rely on show one set of conditions — and fications for materials that are "explosive" under fire con-
fire itself shows an entirely different set of conditions. ditions. NOW ISN'T THAT AMAZING! But can we take
However, these particular findings by the Commission, as this one step further — can we assume that faulty testing
most or perhaps all of their other findings, have been "open methods are directly or indirectly causing loss of human life
secrets" in the fire protection community for all of the in fires? Is this a fair assumption?
years I can remember (my experience goes back to 1951). Now let's take it one more step. Can we say that those who
Yes, the Commission told us about those problems of fire know the tests are inadequate — those who have known
safety which virtually all of us in the field of fire safety have these inadequacies have existed for all these years — can we
known to exist. The Commission told us what we already properly assume that they who know of these conditions —
knew. and have done nothing about them — or even worse — have
acted to hide the ugly facts — can we assume that they have is faulty and that materials that are labelled "safe" based on
directly or indirectly contributed to the loss of human life? the tests actually become "explosively flammable" when
Now, of course, this is where I lose my fire safety associates. subjected to a real fire environment. The Commission
It's alright for some thing or some condition to be causing recognized the fault — but it failed to recognize the reasons
children to die — but under no circumstances may we even why this faulty system of testing has been intentionally
hint that some people are causing children to die — oh retained in existence.
heavens no. I will now suggest a proper and sound system of fire testing
The fire protection community is a saintly crew. Only the with the full knowledge that such testing methods and the
relating underlying concepts will not be acceptable to the
conditions are bad.
fire protection establishment.
I would venture that over the past 20 years that somewhere
between 500 and 1000 individuals associated with fire I suggest that combustibles be divided between two classes
safety have sought me out specifically to say something like, based not only on their characteristics but also upon their
"Damn it Patton, you're right — what you're saying is true — location within the fire environment. I suggest two classes of
I agree with you 100% — keep it up — I'm with you all the combustibles namely:
way". Class I Combustible —
Yes, privately, I have had an army of support for my beliefs. which is a combustible that is dangerous in the
But invariably, when it comes to getting up and publicly PREFLASHOVER fire environment, and which will con-
fighting for change—my supporters are few and far between tribute to FLASHOVER developing.
indeed. Class II Combustible —
Why is this so? In a society where we have almost absolute which is a combustible material that enters the overall
freedom of expression, where almost no one fears to criti- fire condition after FLASHOVER has already taken place.
cize the President or the political power structure, why are FLASHOVER
so many people afraid to speak out against known and At this point we must once again explain FLASHOVER.
terribly serious deficiencies in our fire protection technology? FLASHOVER occurs after a localized fire in an area has
Can it be that within the ft arnewot k of a free society there heated the walls and ceiling, and combustible contents to a
can be a subpower structure, of an economic-technological temperature where suddenly, explosively, all of the com-
nature, that is so politically and financially entrenched that bustibles in the area simultaneously flash into fire.
almost no person who earns his living within the system will Prior to FLASHOVER, fire is generally a relatively innoc-
speak out against the deficiencies of the system? uous event. A room fire is not too much different from a fire
Why is it that some years back the few of us who had some- in a fireplace (except that the heat is not escaping to the
outdoors but is accumulating at the ceiling level). Usually a
thing new to say in fire safety had to publish our own
man can stand beside burning furnishings in a room and
newsletter to say it?
roast a marshmallow at the fire, or, for that matter, put the
Why is it that otherwise fine citizens — who love their own fire out with proper equipment. Many PREFLASHOVER
children and who would do almost anything to save the life fires actually are quiet and rather lazy fires. A person dis-
of a young child — are so reluctant to challenge a fire safety covering the fire often will not be unduly alarmed assuming
technology that all but turns its back on the problem of that the fire can be quickly extinguished.
children in the dwelling fire?
But let the fire go to the FLASHOVER stage, and suddenly
So, the first thing that the Commission did not do is to find it is like the ignition of the atomic bomb where the energy
out why deficiencies that have been known to be deadly is forming more rapidly than it is dissipating. The result is an
serious deficiencies have not been corrected by the fire pro- exponential increase in the destructive levels.
tection community itself. That's the big story but perhaps it
was too big for the Commission. FLASHOVER represents the turning point in fire. Prior to
FLASHOVER the fire generally is not overly dangerous and
SPECIFIC CURES can be readily extingusihed by an amateur fire fighter, pro-
The second thing the President's Commission did not do was vided he has proper equipment (which usually he doesn't).
to recommend specific cures. Generally, the solutions recom- Once FLASHOVER occurs the whole ball game of fire
mended extend across the entire spectrum of existing fire control by an amateur fire fighter, or finding one's way to
techniques, and contemplate countless millions of dollars an exit, or saving lives may be over.
being spent on vaguely defined programs. Now there are some combustibles that will very rapidly
This business of pouring countless sums of money into enter the initial fire condition and help the fire to build
vaguely defined programs in the velief that the sheer weight toward FLASHOVER. These combustibles are the ones
of dollars will produce viable solutions has generally proven that are primarily dangerous from the viewpoint of initiating
to be unsuccessful in the past. What is needed is concrete a dangerous fire.
solutions of specific problems; plus a quality of leadership Once FLASHOVER occurs — virtually all combustibles in
in fire safety that is not afraid to separate the wheat from the environment will then enter the combustion process.
the chaff. The past performances of our fire protection es- After FLASHOVER occurs designations of "slow burning",
tablishment offers little likelihood, in my estimation, that and "self extinguishing" become meaningless.
such qualitites of leadership can be anticipated.
So, when the National Commission on Fire Safety com-
As an example of the type of solution that we should look plains about improper fire testing, what it is really com-
for I will go back to the specific problem cited by the Com- plaining about is that our existing fire tests are generally
mission and offer a specific solution to that problem (but predicated on pre FLASHOVER conditions. Some com-
then, in turn, I will go even further and explain why a real bustibles that seem safe prior to FLASHOVER actually
solution to such a problem is an anathema to our existing become horrible actors in the post F LASHOVER environ-
fire protection community). ment.
The Commission correctly pointed out that our fire testing All of which is simply stating that when you place some
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combustibles in a 2500°F fire environment they behave our fire deaths occur) the National Fire Protection Asso-
a lot different than they do at room temperature. So what ciation is fond of recommending escape plans and emergency
else is new? training so that the family may happily escape the fire be-
fore the fire becomes deadly. All of this is based on an
THE BEST KEPT SECRET IN FIRE SAFETY assumed steady but slow build up of fire which presumably
But what the Commission failed to note is that the failure
permits the family adequate time to set their emergency
to recognize the post FLASHOVER fire conditions in the
plans into motion.
fire test procedures is really a small part of the larger
problem — failure to recognize FLASHOVER as a normal But what happens to these theories of escape when we place
phenomenon in fire to begin with. FLASHOVER into the picture? Prior to FLASHOVER no
For example, the National Fire Protection Association has one in the dwelling — assuming they are asleep in bed — will
been in existence since the 1890's and has been the "high be likely to be aware that the fire even exists. But within
Priest" of fire safety matters since that time. The NFPA has seconds after FLASHOVER occurs it may be completely
been investigating all major fires in this country for more impossible for the father to even cross the hallway to the
than 70 years now, and there are thousands of reports on children's room.
fires in back issues of the NFPA Fire Journals (and previously Like the physicians who closed their eyes to the microbes
the NFPA Quarterlys). because their pet theories were in danger — so our fire safety
experts continue to reject the realities of FLASHOVER
I now suggest that the National Commission on Fire
Safety (and also all the readers of this Patton Report) get because this phenomenon destroys their expertise.
out all of their previous issues of NFPA Fire Investigation The Commission must realize that it is unlikely that the fire
Reports and see when (if ever) these reports deal with — or protection community will structure the fire testing to
even mention — the FLASHOVER phenomenon. differentiate between the pre and the post FLASHOVER
I will be most surprised if anyone finds any NFPA fire fire condition when the fire protection community refuses
investigation report issued in all the previous 70 years or so to recognize the FLASHOVER phenomenon to begin with.
of NFPA that effectively deals with the role that FLASH- WHAT TYPE OF RESEARCH
OVER has played in the creation of deadly fire conditions. The Commission recommends fire research to solve our fire
Incidentally, I would especially like the readers and the problems. This is all well and good. But who will perform
Commission to go back to the Marietta Nursing Home Fire the research? Those who wish to find new solutions? Or
of Jan 9, 1970 (NFPA Fire Journal — May 1970) and see those who wish to preserve their challenged theories?
what the NFPA investigation had to say with regard to the The Marietta Nursing Home fire was a very interesting fire
FLASHOVER phenomenon. that had the potential to devastate the existing theories of
fire safety. Essentially the nursing home was a modern,
THE RAMIFICATIONS OF FLASHOVER code complying, "fireproof" home, equipped throughout
Many years ago scientists peering through their early crude with a fire detection system, and it was served by a nearby
microscopes discovered a strange new world — the world of good quality fire department. But, between the sounding of
microbes and bacteria (later viruses). This discovery event- the fire detector and the arrival of the fire department 33
ually represented a very profound shift in medical science. lives were snuffed out. Why?
The discovery of microbes as a cause of disease voided many The answer was undoubtedly FLASHOVER. A room fire
of the pet theories of some of the most famous physicians can approach the FLASHOVER stage prior to the operation
of the time. In effect, the discovery of the microbe as a of a fire detector (actually visual discovery of this fire pre-
cause of disease challenged the expertise of the most ceded the detector operation). Once FLASHOVER had
renowned physicians. occurred probably most of the damage was done in the
But this could not be allowed. So for a very long time the next 120 to 180 seconds.
medical profession closed its eyes to the findings of these The natural assumption as to the cause of the very rapid
early scientists, ignored them, and stubbornly rejected all loss of human life in the fire resistive Marietta Nursing Home
evidence that ran counter to their own pet theories. was FLASHOVER. Since the post FLASHOVER fire can
A very similiar condition exists in the fire safety com- kill over a wide area in as little as 1 to 3 minutes obviously
munity today. The obsolete fire safety theories, originally the damage was done before the responding fire department
advanced by the fire insurers of the 1800's, are still very could achieve fire control or rescue.
much in vogue today. A very significant percentage of the But an alternate "cause" for the rapid destruction of lives
National Fire Codes as prepared by the National Fire was suggested. It was the carpeting on the floor. The car-
Protection Association are structured on these early theories peting was seized upon as the primary cause of human
of the fire insurers. And, of course, so are the fire test pro- death in this fire despite the fact that research indicates a
cedures which the commission is so concerned with. The floor covering usually is the last element in a room to enter
problem with FLASHOVER, in a nutshell, is that it de- the FLASHOVER stage. There is adequate evidence to
molishes most of the theories upon which our current indicate that by the time the heat build-up at the ceiling
fire safety concepts depend. radiates to the carpeting with such intensity as to vaporize
Take for example the NFPA Life Safety Code — NFPA 101. the carpeting and involve it in the combustion environment,
This code is primarily oriented toward exits plus "fire- that if any person was located between the ceiling and the
proof" construction as the guarantors of human fire safety. carpeting he would be already dead by the time the car-
But when you realize that all fireproof buildings can be peting flashes.
internally loaded with combustible furnishings — and when Following this Marietta Nursing Home fire hundreds of
you realize that from the time FLASHOVER occurs until thousands of dollars were spent in "researching" the role of
all who will die will be dead, may be only 60 seconds — the carpeting in fire. As far as I know all of the tests conducted
exit and the fireproof building as a guarantor of fire safety to evaluate the role of the carpet in the fire were conducted
rapidly lose their charm. under a post FLASHOVER fire condition (where death
When it comes to safety in a dwelling (where the majority of would be likely regardless of whether or not there was
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,
carpeting on the floor). To my knowledge none of the tests phenomenon demolish the theories behind the NFPA
conducted were designed to explore the question as to Life Safety Code.
whether or not the carpeting that was in place in the Mari-
The combustible content fire and the FLASHOVER
etta Nursing Home actually contributed significantly to the
phenomenon void the fireproof building and compart-
pre FLASHOVER fire build-up.
mentation theories of human fire safety.
In other words, there was a very strong possibility that the
carpeting was not the primary cause of the fire deaths at The combustible content fire and the FLASHOVER
Marietta — that the deadly conditions could have occurred phenomenon raise serious questions regarding the validity
in the same manner even though there was no carpeting on of the fire insurance rating systems that are based on the
the floor. assumption that the structure itself is the primary ingred-
ient in fire development.
But think of the ramifications of this discovery. Without
carpeting as a "deviation" from code compliance — the The combustible content fire and the FLASHOVER
conclusion would have to be that the code itself (NFPA phenomenon place many of our fire test procedures,
101) is flawed. But this startling discovery would be impos- and the testing laboratory profits derived from such test
sible if the carpeting was tested only under post FLASH- procedures, in danger.
OVER fire conditions. Under such testing it would be The combustible content fire and the FLASHOVER
impossible to evaluate the precise role of the carpet in the phenomenon threaten to reduce the current practice of
pre FLASHOVER fire environment. Therefore no data was excessively fireproofing structures, and imply that reduced
developed that could be used to prove that the carpeting was construction costs are in order.
not the chief killer. So, when we talk of fire research we
The combustible content fire and the FLASHOVER
must first explore the parameters of what the researchers phenomenon threaten to reveal that our fire safety technol-
are trying to prove.
ogy, as it exists today, is primarily oriented toward pro-
DEEP WATER tecting structures and that it most seriously neglects
The Commission got its feet wet in fire safety matters. It human safety needs.
waded out deep enough to find that there are a great And perhaps most devasting of all, the recognition of the
number of flaws in our current fire safety techniques. But interior content fire and the FLASHOVER phenomenon
the Commission did not go out into the deep water to would prove that our foremost fire safety experts of
explore the reasons why these flaws, which we have all today are not quite so accurate in their theories as they
known about for oh so many years, continue in existence. appear to be.
The combustible content fire and the FLASHOVER
phenomenon, if allowed to surface, will have a most pro- The Commission believes that it is possible to redecorate
found and far reaching effect on our fire technology. the facade of fire safety with green paint. I personally
believe that the facade must be demolished and replaced
The combustible content fire and the FLASHOVER by a structure of more substance.