Professional Documents
Culture Documents
A. Invalidation of State Laws- The power of the federal courts to invalidate state laws to nullify actions of
state and local officials as unconstitutional.
1.
b.
c.
d.
B.
Facts: Hunter claims ownership of track of land given to him by Virginia land confiscation act.
Martin claims ownership of the same land because he inherited it from Lord Fairfax who got
it from England when they owned that land. The Court of Appeals of Virginia held that the
land Martin Inherited was considered null and void by the 1989 VA statute and the 1794
treaty confirming British land titles did not affect the seizure. The USSC reversed the VA
courts holding. But the VA court refused to obey the Supreme Court because the Appellate
power of the USSC does not extend to VA Appeals under the sound construction of the
th
Constitution of the US. The 25 section of the act of congress to extend the appellate
jurisdiction of the supreme court to the state court is not in line with what the constitution
says.
Issue: Whether the Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction over state courts?
Holding: Yes, Article III says in all other cases before mentioned the USSC shall have
appellate jurisdiction.
Reasoning: (J Story) The federal power was given directly by the people and not by the state.
It is the case then and not the court that gives the jurisdiction. The Supremacy Clause states
that the federal interpretation trumps the States interpretation. Art I Sec 10 Courts cannot
create Ex Post Facto laws. Constitution does not serve as a restrain on states. State judges
are pound to uphold the constitution. Federal courts are better at protecting individual
rights.
Interpretive Choices: the Second Amendment- Does the Second Amendment guarantees a citizen an
individual right to carry firearms?
1. District of Columbia v. Heller (2008)
a. Facts: D.C. bans Handgun possession. Heller is a special police officer in DC. The District
refused Hellers application to register a handgun he wanted to keep at home. Heller sought
an injunction against the DC law baring handgun registration, the licensing requirement
prohibiting the carrying of firearms at home without a license, and the trigger lock
requirement. The Federal district court dismissed Hellers complaint. The court of appeals of
the DC Circuit court reversed and directed the District Court to enter into a summery
judgment in favor of DC. The court of Appeals held that the entire ban on handguns violated
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the individual right to possess firearms under the 2 amendment. The
nd
b. Issue: What rights are protected by the 2 amendment?
c.
C.
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d.
Limits on the Judicial Power- The court cannot impress its decisions against the will of elected officials
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and the people. Congress and the court impose limits on the exercises of federal judicial power. 11
Amendment imposes limits on cases Congress may authorize courts to hear.
Habeas Corpus-a writ employed to bring a person before a court, most frequently to ensure
that the partys imprisonment or detention is not illegal.
Sec 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 allows federal courts to issue a writ to free those held, in
custody under ot by colour of the authority of the U.S.
1867 Reconstruction Congress passed an act which gave federal courts the power to grants
writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in
violation of the Constitution or of any treaty by law of the U.S.
Congress adopted the Military Reconstruction Act, which devided the south into districts
subject to military command
1. Ex Parte McCardle (1869)
Congress has the power to change appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court
a.
2.
Facts: McCardle was a news paper editor arrested by a Major General for the nonmilitary
offense of disturbing the peace, inciting to insurrection and disorder, libel, and impeding
reconstruction. McCardle filed a petition of Habeas corpus under the 1867 act, his petition
was denied. He appealed to the Supreme Court. In March 1868 Congress repealed the act of
1867.
b. Issue: 1. Whether the act of 1868 takes away the jurisdiction defined by the act of 1867?
c. Holding: (Chief Justice) Yes, The act of 1868 does not except from that jurisdiction any case
but appeals from the Circuit Court under the act of 1867. It does not affect the jurisdiction
which was previously exercised.
d. Reasoning: Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only
function remaining to the court is that of announcing the facts and dismissing the cause.
When an act is repealed, it must be considered, except as to transactions past or closed, as if
it never existed.
i. Norris v. Crecker and Insurance Company v. Ritchie, No judgment could be rendered
in a suit after the repeal of the act under it was brought and prosecuted.
Felker v. Turpin (1996)
Congress can place limits on second and subsequent habeas corpus petitions.
a. The court considered the Constitutionality of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996. Act places several restrictions on second and subsequent habeas petitions. This
petition is only granted after a special appellate panel granted a motion for leave to file a
petition.
b. Court held that Congress had not infringed on the judicial power to hear cases on an
original writ of habeas corpus and that the limit on second and later writs did not
unconstitutionally cause a suspension of the writ.
3.
Facts: Boumediene was a class action suite by several alians captured on the battlefield all
over the world and detained in Guantanamo Bay Naval Station. None of them were U.S.
citizens. Congress has enacted a statute, the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 that provides
certain procedures for review of the detainees status.
b. Issue: Whether they have the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus, a privilege not to be
withdrawn except in conformance with the Suspension Clause Art I Sec 9 cl. 2
c. Holding: Yes they do have a right to habeas corpus. And the Detainee Treatment Act doesnt
make up for it.
d. Reasoning: The framers saw habeas corpus a basic liberty to enjoy the freedoms of unlawful
restraint. The Suspension Clause ( Art 1 Sec 9 cl. 2) protects this as well, providing that it may
be suspended only in cases of a threat to public safety as in rebellion or invasion. However it
is clear that Gmo Bay has been under U.S. control for more than 100 years. The citizens are
all aliens, captured outside the U.S. and Gmo is in the U.S. jurisdiction. The petitioners are
entitled to a writ of habeas corpus.
D. Reversal of Judicial Decisions
1. Miller v. French (2000)
Final Judgments are final other branches of government cannot reopen them.
a.
E.
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Facts: 1975 class action. Prisoners received an injunction to remedy violations of the 8
amendment regarding conditions of confinement. In 1995 Congress enacted the Prison
Litigation Reform Act, which sets a standard for the entry and termination of prospective
relief in civil actions challenging prison conditions. (allows for them to terminated
injunctions that does not meet the standard. Sec 3626 (e)(2) dictates that the motion to
terminate the injunction could act as automatic stay of that relief beginning 30 days after
the motion is filed and ending when the court rules on that motion. The Prisoners moved to
enjoin the operation of the automatic stay, arguing that it violated the due process and
separation of powers principles
b. Issue: Whether 3626 (e)(2) us constitutional under the separation of powers principle?
c. Holding: No, it does not violate the separation of powers principle.
d. Reasoning: Article III gives federal courts the power not just to rule on cases but to decide
them, subject to review only by superior courts in the Article III hierarchy. Congress cannot
retroactively command Article III courts to reopen final judgements. The PLRA does not
deprive courts of their adjudicatory role, but merely provides a new legal standard for relief
and encourages courts to apply that standard promptly.
Standing and Mootness
i. Constitutional and Prudential Limits on Constitutional Adjudication: The Case or
Controversy Requirements
ii. Justiciability doctrines
iii. Advisory opinion (prohibited)
iv. Ripeness
v. Mootness
vi. Standing
Political Question
Sources: Article III; Prudential limits (Congress can override this)
Advisory Opinions: question about legality or Constitutionality of an act or actions. Provides
early guidance. BUT with advisory opinions there is no case or controversy.
1.
iv. A case might become moot if behavior could not reasonably be expected to recur.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Hollingsworth v. Perry(2013)
a. Facts: California citizens passed Proposition 8, which amended the California Constitution to
provide that only marriage between a man and a woman is valid or recognized by California.
The respondents, a gay couple and a lesbian couple, sued the state officials responsible for the
enforcement of Californias marriage laws and claimed that Proposition 8 violated their
Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection of the law. When the state officials originally
named in the suit informed the district court that they could not defend Proposition 8, the
petitioners, official proponents of the measure, intervened to defend it. The district court held
that Proposition 8 violated the Constitution, and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
affirmed.
b. Issue: Do the petitioners have standing under Article III of the Constitution to argue this case?
Does the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibit the state of California
from defining marriage as the union of one man and one woman?
c. Holding: No, the petitioners do not have standing. The Court did not reach the question on the
merits of the case
d. Reasoning: The Supreme Court held that federal courts only have the authority to decide cases in
which there is an actual controversy, which means that the complaining party must have
suffered a concrete and particularized injury that can be redressed through court action. In this
case, because the petitioners had only a generalized grievance in the form of a desire to defend
Proposition 8, they did not have standing under Article III. The Court also held that the
petitioners could not invoke the standing of the state to appeal because a litigant must assert
his/her own rights and cannot claim relief through the intervention of a third party. Because the
petitioners did not have standing to appeal to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, that
court did not have jurisdiction to reach a decision on the case.
U.S. v. Windsor (2013)
a. Facts: Edith Windsor is the widow and sole executor of the estate of her late spouse, who died in
2009. The two were married in Toronto, Canada, in 2007, and their marriage was recognized by
New York state law. Thea Syper left her estate to her spouse, and because their marriage was not
recognized by federal law, the government imposed $363,000 in taxes. Had their marriage been
recognized, the estate would have qualified for a marital exemption, and no taxes would have
been imposed. Windsor filed suit in district court seeking a declaration that the Defense of
Marriage Act was unconstitutional. At the time the suit was filed, the governments position was
that DOMA must be defended. The district court denied the motion, and later held that DOMA
was unconstitutional. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.
b. Issue: Does the executive branchs agreement with the lower court that the act is
unconstitutional deprive the Supreme Court of jurisdiction to decide the case?
c. Holding: The Supreme Court held that the United States Government, despite the executive
branchs agreement regarding DOMAs unconstitutionality, retains a significant enough stake in
the issue to support Supreme Courts jurisdiction
d. Reasoning: Because the judgment in question orders the U.S. Treasury to refund tax money, the
Government stands to suffer a real economic injury and therefore maintains standing in the case.
The Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group (BLAG) presented substantial arguments for the
constitutionality of DOMA that reflected an actual controversy under Article III, which allowed
the Supreme Court to address the case without needing to decide whether BLAG would have had
standing before a lower court. The Court also held that states have the authority to define
marital relationships and that DOMA goes against legislative and historical precedent by
undermining that authority. The result is that DOMA denies same-sex couples the rights that
come from federal recognition of marriage, which are available to other couples with legal
marriages under state law. The Court held that the purpose and effect of DOMA is to impose a
disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma on same-sex couples in violation of the Fifth
Amendments guarantee of equal protection.
F.
Political Questions-- The case or controversy requirement of Article 3, Section 2 limits federal
jurisdiction to only justiciable cases: cases w/ substantial disputes affecting legal interests of genuinely
opposed parties, where specific relief can be obtained through judicial decision. Court will leave to
resolution to one of the other political branches. Purely political questions have been determined to be
nonjusticiable and should be left to other govt branches, under separation of powers.
i. - 4 factors are weighed in determining whether there is a political question:
1. A textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to political
branches f/ resolution,
2. the appropriatenes of attributing finality of action to political branches
3. lack of adequate standards for judicial resolution of the issue
4. the lack of adequate judicial remedies.
1. Baker v. Carr (1962)
a. TN voters seeking injunction and reapportionment of general assembly, arguing that
violation of equal protection clause of the 14th A.
b. S.Ct: justiciable question that federal court can intervene and decide.
c. Reapportionment is not a political question that would require non-justifiability.
d. Claim asserted here is an equal protection claim under the 14th A.
that retreated from the Court's political question doctrine, deciding that redistricting
(attempts to change the way voting districts are delineated) issues present justiciable
questions, thus enabling federal courts to intervene in and to decide reapportionment cases.
Brennan reformulated the political question doctrine, identifying six factors to help in
determining which questions were "political" in nature. Cases that are political in nature are
marked by:
1. "Textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordinate
political department;" as an example of this, Brennan cited issues of foreign affairs and
executive war powers, arguing that cases involving such matters would be "political
questions"
2. "A lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it;"
3. "The impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion;"
4. "The impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing
lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government;"
5. "An unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;"
6. "The potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question."
Guarantee Clause always means the court will dismiss the case because it is a political question
2.
a.
3.
4.
I.
impermissibly gave the President of the United States the power to unilaterally amend or repeal
parts of statutes that had been duly passed by the United States Congress. The bill must be
approved or rejected by the President in its entirety. Clinton v. NY
In some situations, Congress authorizes and appropriate funds for various programs but the
President impounds-refuses to send-the money. When congress has expressly directed that sums
be spent, the president has no constitutional power not to spend them. If congress does not
make such an explicit command to spend appropriated funds, Train appeared to agree that the
President could impound the funds. If the statute gives the President discretion to spend, no case
has rejected a Presidental Power.
Clinton v. City of New York (1998)
i. Return to Chadha Analysis against exec Prez cant law-make
ii. FACTS: Line item veto act enabled prez clinton to cancel/change certain spending items
of his own volition.
iii. HOLDING: Court invalidated federal line item veto act - Predictable based on Chada.
Same principal as Chada bicameral processes for creating law w/ line item veto,
prezs altered legislation qualifies as NEW law (different spending budgets, etc) the
Framers intentionally meant to withold the power to veto particular items (esp
expenditures) in particular legislation..
iv. NOTES: Why was the court divided if this was an obvious case?
1. The way the line item veto was enacted was a delegation
2. Delegation all delegations of the last 70 yrs have been permissible
3. How can we say that bicameral passage is only way to create law when
agencies create law all the time?
4. b/c agencies are acting under direct order from Congress to accomplish a
certain goal, and laws created under that premise are considered as getting
Congressional approval.
5. no delegation doctrine- agencies need specific doctrine outdated last 70 yrs
of delegation have been permissible.
6. Scalias argument- the cancellation permitted to prez under line item veto act is
same as permissible delegation lawmaking other than in specifically
prescribed for (via agency)
2. Field v. Clark (p 130)
a. Court upheld the constitutionality of the Tariff Act of 1890
i. The exercise of the suspension of power was contingent upon a condition that did
not exist when the tariff Act was passed.
ii. Under the tariff act, when the President determines that the contingency had
arisen, he had a duty to suspend.
iii. Whenever the President suspended an exemption under the tariff act, he was
executing the policy that Congress had embodied in the statute.
b. In the foreign affairs arena, the President has a degree of discretion and freedom from
statutory restrictions which would be admissible were domestic affairs alone are involved.
Foreign Affairs
U.S. v. Curtiss-Wright (1936)
i. Facts: Congress passed a Joint Resolution authorizing the President to ban the sales of
arms to countries involved in the border dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay. The
President immediately made an Executive Order banning such sales. The Defendant was
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indicted for conspiracy to sell fifteen machine guns to Bolivia in violation of the Joint
Resolution and the Executive Order.
ii. Issue: Whether the joint resolution as applied to the situation, is vulnerable to attack
under the rule that forbids a delegation of the lawmaking power.
iii. Holding: The Court agreed that the President was allowed much room to operate in
executing the Joint Resolution; it found no constitutional violation. Making important
distinctions between internal and foreign affairs, Justice Sutherland argued because
"the President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation,"
Congress may provide the President with a special degree of discretion in external
matters which would not be afforded domestically.
iv. Reasoning: The US Gov. has inherent powers when it comes to foreign/international
issues that is not proscribed in the constitution. It has inherent powers because it is a
state/gov according to international law. There is a fundamental difference in the role of
government in foreign affairs and domestic affairs. The federal government has both
constitutional and inherent authority to conduct foreign affairs as it sees fit. The
President is the United States sole representative to foreign nations. In order to achieve
the United States foreign policy aims, the President is better able than Congress to
judge conditions that exist in foreign nations and is afforded substantial discretion and
wide latititude in those decisions. The President has confidential information as well as
consular, diplomatic and foreign affairs officers to help in his decision.
Dames & Moore v. Regan (1981)
i. Facts: Iran hostage crisis. Deal worked out to return hostages. In exchange for the
hostages, Irans frozen funds in the US would be unfrozen AND any suits against Iran
would be dropped. All Iranian assets would be transferred to the Bank of England.
ii. (A) The Court uses Justice Jacksons framework.
iii. The Court has power under AEPA to allow second and third parts of agreement. The
harder issue is about the Presidents effort to suspend litigation.
iv. (H) Court upholds the Presidents efforts
v. Historical practice of Presidents suspending claims concurrent to settlement
agreementssupports broad executive discretion
vi. Congressional acquiescencethe President had this power because Congress never
questioned it before
vii. **In this case you see the Court willing to read in an ambiguous historical record,
congressional acquiescence. This is probably because we are in a foreign affairs context.
viii. Court wont do this in Youngstown Steel because of domestic context.
ix. Foreign affairs does not require reading this opinion in the absolute broadest sense.
Rather it is rooted in a very particular set of circumstances.
x. Executive Discretion in Times of War or Terrorism
xi. War Powers: The Constitution suggests the President and Congress share war powers.
xii. The dominant authority is vested in the legislaturedeclare war, finance defense.
xiii. President also has powersCommander in Chief, laws faithfully executed, use military
to protect national interest.
xiv. The President some say has an inherent power to defend the country against sudden
attack
xv. With war on terror Congress removed the need to answer the full scope of the
Presidents powers.
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J.
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iii. Executive Priviledge Defense - Nixon tries to exert executive priviledge, citing that since
he is President he is ABOVE THE LAW (he has absolute privacy b/c he is Commander and
Chief).
iv. Also, since executive branch has absolute power to decide which cases to try and what
evidence to use, therefore Prez has final decision in what evidence to be brought in
crimc case.
v. Court responds by citing Marbury v. Madison is it the function of the Court to decide
what the law is. STERN doesnt find this a strong argument, as the court equated their
ability to interpret the law w/ some sort of of restriction on presidential power.
vi. Separation of Powers defense - Also, invokes separation of powers b/c matter was
between members of the executuive branch, and therefore was not subject to judiciary
interference.
vii. HOLDING: Give up the tapes asshole the judiciary and the appointed special
investigator and Constitutionally-based rights that override Presidential general right to
privacy w/o special excuse (national security secret, etc)
viii. BALANCING TEST OF BOTH SIDES
ix. Constitutionally-endowed rights of justice in criminal law proceeding is greater than
general Presidential privacy right and claimed right of priviledge.
x. NOTES
xi. Court acknowledges that Prez has qualified executive priviledge, esp concerning nation
defense while this is not laid out in Const, its structurally inferred from separation of
powers and Article 2.
xii. NIXONS EFFICIENCY ARGUMENT
xiii. that allowing everything said in Oval Office to go to the press would compromise candor
and efficiency of executive function court dmisses that argument, saying it wouldnt
effect communicative openness b/c judiciary will not
xiv. COURT PROTECTING JUDICAL POWER by not letting the Prez dictate what evidence we
can and cannot hear.
xv. SCARCITY OF OTHER EVIDENCE
xvi. If special prosecutors couldnt get their hands on the tapes, there are no other sources
of evidence i.e. no case. Also, need for evidence in criminal suit is greater than that in
civil suit (b/c of higher degree of proof necessary).
xvii. see insider trading example with Attorney General in notes
xviii. COURTS AND OVERRIDING EXECUTIVE PRIVILEDGE while in this case P attempted and
overcame exec privileged, in other
Clinton v. Jones (1997)
i. Facts: Paula Corbin Jones sued President Bill Clinton. She alleged that while she was an
Arkansas state employee, she suffered several "abhorrent" sexual advances from then
Arkansas Governor Clinton. Jones claimed that her continued rejection of Clinton's
advances ultimately resulted in punishment by her state supervisors. Following a District
Court's grant of Clinton's request that all matters relating to the suit be suspended,
pending a ruling on his prior request to have the suit dismissed on grounds of
presidential immunity, Clinton sought to invoke his immunity to completely dismiss the
Jones suit against him. While the District Judge denied Clinton's immunity request, the
judge ordered the stay of any trial in the matter until after Clinton's Presidency. On
appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal denial but reversed the trial deferment
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14
1.
15
judicial intrusion into matters that are more properly within the Executives
authority.
2. Theres no separation of powers problem with regard to the Act because the
statute (1) appropriately puts the removal power in the hands of the Executive
Branch: an independent counsel may only be removed by the Attorney General
for good cause and (2) does not impermissibly interfere with the functions of
the Executive Branch.
Free Enterprise Fund v. Pcaob (2010)
i. Facts: The Free Enterprise Fund, a non-profit organization, brought suit challenging the
constitutionality of Title I of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. It alleged that the creation of the
Public Company Oversight Board (the Board) by the Act violated the Appointments
Clause because it deprived the President from exercising adequate control over the
Board. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the creation of the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board did not violate either the Appointments Clause or
the separation of powers principle. It reasoned that the Boards members were inferior
officers under the supervision of the SEC and thus were not obligated to be appointed
by the President. Also, the court noted that the Presidents ability to remove members
of the SEC, who in turn could remove members of the Board, preserved the
Constitutions separation of powers.
ii. Issue: 1) Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act violate the the separation of powers doctrine
by giving broad powers to the Board while simultaneously preventing the President of
the power to appoint or remove Board members?
1. 2) Did the court of appeals correctly hold that the Board members were inferior
officers under the direct supervision of the SEC even though the SEC cannot
supervise those members individually and can only remove them for just
cause?
2. 3) Does the Sarbanes-Oxley Act violate the Appointments Clause even if the
Boards members are inferior because the SEC is not an official department or
because the commissioners are not the head of the SEC?
iii. Holding: Yes. Yes. Not answered. The Supreme Court held that the "for-cause" limitation
on the removal of Board members is unconstitutional because it contravenes the
Constitution's separation of powers.
iv. Reasoning: the Court reasoned because the Act protects Board members from removal
except for good cause, but withdraws from the President any decision on whether good
cause exists, the Act deprives the President the power to hold Board members
accountable. Such an arrangement contradicts Article II's vesting of the executive power
in the president. The Court further held that the unconstitutionality of the removal
provision did not make unconstitutional the entire Board. The Court concluded that the
Board may continue to function as before, but its members may be removed at will by
the Commission. Lastly, the Court held that the Board's appointment is consistent with
the Appointments Clause of the Constitution. The Court reasoned that Board members
are inferior officers, and, thus, their appointment may permissibly be vested in the
"Head of the Department." Here, the Commission constitutes the "Head of the
Department."
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L.
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the United States, nor to taxes on the proprietary interest which the citizens of that State
may hold in this institution, in common with other property of the same description
throughout the State.
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Ogden (P) brought this lawsuit seeking an injunction to restrain Gibbons (D) from
operating steam ships on New York waters in violation of his exclusive privilege.
Ogden was granted the injunction and Gibbons appealed, asserting that his
steamships were licensed under the Act of Congress entitled An act for enrolling
and licensing ships and vessels to be employed in the coasting trade and fisheries,
and for regulating the same. Gibbons asserted that the Act of Congress superseded
the exclusive privilege granted by the state of New York.
The Chancellor affirmed the injunction, holding that the New York law granting the
exclusive privilege was not repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United
States, and that the grants were valid. Gibbons appealed and the decision was
affirmed by the Court for the Trial of Impeachments and Correction of Errors, the
highest Court of law and equity in the state of New York. The Supreme Court
granted certiorari.
Issue: May a state enact legislation that regulates a purely internal affair regarding
trade or the police power, or is pursuant to a power to regulate interstate
commerce concurrent with that of Congress, which confers a privilege inconsistent
with federal law? Do states have the power to regulate those phases of interstate
commerce which, because of the need of national uniformity, demand that their
regulation, be prescribed by a single authority? Does a state have the power to
grant an exclusive right to the use of state waterways inconsistent with federal law?
Holding: No. A state may not legislation inconsistent with federal law which
regulates a purely internal affair regarding trade or the police power, or is pursuant
to a power to regulate interstate commerce concurrent with that of Congress.
a. No. States do not have the power to regulate those phases of interstate
commerce which, because of the need of national uniformity, demand that
their regulation, be prescribed by a single authority.
b. No. A state does not have the power to grant an exclusive right to the use
of state navigable waters inconsistent with federal law.
Reasoning: The laws of New York granting to Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton
the exclusive right of navigating state waters with steamboats are in collision with
the acts of Congress. The acts of Congress under the Constitution regulating the
coasting trade are supreme. State laws must yield to that supremacy, even though
enacted in pursuance of powers acknowledged to remain in the States. A license,
such as that granted to Gibbons, pursuant to acts of Congress for regulating the
coasting trade under the Commerce Clause of Article I confers a permission to carry
on that trade.
The power to regulate commerce extends to every type of commercial intercourse
between the United States and foreign nations and among the States. The
commerce power includes the regulation of navigation, including navigation
exclusively for the transportation of passengers. It extends to vessels propelled by
steam or fire as well as to wind and sails.
The power to regulate commerce is general, and has no limitations other than
those prescribed in the Constitution itself. It is exclusively vested in Congress and no
part of it can be exercised by a State.
19
While the commerce power does not stop at the external boundary of a State, it
does not extend to commerce which is completely internal. State inspection laws,
health laws, and laws for regulating transportation and the internal commerce of a
State fall within the state police power and are not within the power granted to
Congress.
20
When prices are high the wheat may flow into the market and check price
increases. Furthermore wheat grown for personal consumption supplies
the need of the grower who would otherwise purchase wheat in the open
market.
o
21
o
o
Holding: Yes,
Reasoning:
22
23
outside the state. Appellant contends that Congress has overreached its authority
under the Commerce Clause in enacting the Act
o Issue: May Congress prohibit racial discrimination in hotel lodging under the
Commerce Clause?
o Holding: Yes. Appeals court ruling affirmed.
Congress heard testimony from many sources describing the hardships blacks face
in securing transient accommodations throughout the United States. With an
increasingly mobile populace, this brought increasing difficulties to many United
States citizens. It does not matter that Congress was addressing a moral issue (see
the dissent in Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918) and the Supreme Court of
the United States (Supreme Court) opinion in Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). What the
Supreme Court is examining is Congress power to enact the legislation, not the
impetus behind the Act. Concurrence. Justice William Douglas (J. Douglas) concurs
in the judgment, but he is uneasy resting the decision on the Commerce Clause,
rather than Section: 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution (Constitution). He feels that it is more appropriate to rest civil rights
legislation on the constitutional status of the individual, than the impact on
commerce. The Court held that the Commerce Clause allowed Congress to regulate
local incidents of commerce, and that the Civil Right Act of 1964 passed
constitutional muster. The Court noted that the applicability of Title II was "carefully
limited to enterprises having a direct and substantial relation to the interstate flow
of goods and people. . ." The Court thus concluded that places of public
accommodation had no "right" to select guests as they saw fit, free from
governmental regulation.
United States v. Lopez (1995)
o Facts: The Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990 (GFSZA) made it unlawful for any
individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that he knew or had reasonable
cause to believe was a school zone. Alfonso Lopez, Jr. (D), a 12th-grade student,
carried a concealed and loaded handgun into his high school and was arrested and
charged under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The next day,
the state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating
the Act. The District Court denied Lopezs motion to dismiss the indictment,
concluding that the GFSZA was a constitutional exercise of Congress power
pursuant to the Commerce Clause of Article I. The Fifth Circuit reversed, holding
that the Act exceeded Congress power under the Commerce Clause and was
therefore unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted cert.
o Issue: Does the GFSZA exceed Congress authority under the Commerce Clause?
What categories of activity may Congress regulate under its commerce power?
o Holding: Yes. The GFSZA exceeded Congress authority under the Commerce Clause.
o The three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its
commerce power are: a) the use of the channels of interstate commerce; b)
Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of interstate
commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat
may come only from intrastate activities; and c) Congress commerce authority
includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to
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25
1994 (VAWA), which provides a federal civil remedy for the victims of gendermotivated violence. Morrison and Crawford moved to dismiss Brzonkala's suit on
the ground that section 13981's civil remedy was unconstitutional. In dismissing the
complaint, the District Court found that that Congress lacked authority to enact
section 13981 under either the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment,
which Congress had explicitly identified as the sources of federal authority for it.
Ultimately, the Court of Appeals affirmed.
o Issue: Does Congress have the authority to enact the Violence Against Women Act
of 1994 under either the Commerce Clause or Fourteenth Amendment?
o Holding: the Court held that Congress lacked the authority to enact a statute under
the Commerce Clause or the Fourteenth Amendment since the statute did not
regulate an activity that substantially affected interstate commerce nor did it
redress harm caused by the state. Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for the Court that
[i]f the allegations here are true, no civilized system of justice could fail to provide
[Brzonkala] a remedy for the conduct of...Morrison. But under our federal system
that remedy must be provided by the Commonwealth of Virginia, and not by the
United States." Dissenting, Justice Stephen G. Breyer argued that the majority
opinion "illustrates the difficulty of finding a workable judicial Commerce Clause
touchstone." Additionally, Justice David H. Souter, dissenting, noted that VAWA
contained a "mountain of data assembled by Congress...showing the effects of
violence against women on interstate commerce."
Gonzales v. Raich (2005)
o Facts: In 1996 California voters passed the Compassionate Use Act, legalizing
marijuana for medical use. California's law conflicted with the federal Controlled
Substances Act (CSA), which banned possession of marijuana. After the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) seized doctor-prescribed marijuana from a
patient's home, a group of medical marijuana users sued the DEA and U.S. Attorney
General John Ashcroft in federal district court.
o The medical marijuana users argued the Controlled Substances Act - which
Congress passed using its constitutional power to regulate interstate commerce exceeded Congress' commerce clause power. The district court ruled against the
group. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and ruled the CSA
unconstitutional as it applied to intrastate (within a state) medical marijuana use.
Relying on two U.S. Supreme Court decisions that narrowed Congress' commerce
clause power - U.S. v. Lopez (1995) and U.S. v. Morrison (2000) - the Ninth Circuit
ruled using medical marijuana did not "substantially affect" interstate commerce
and therefore could not be regulated by Congress.
o Issue: Does the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 801) exceed Congress' power
under the commerce clause as applied to the intrastate cultivation and possession
of marijuana for medical use?
o Holding: No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice John Paul Stevens, the Court held
that the commerce clause gave Congress authority to prohibit the local cultivation
and use of marijuana, despite state law to the contrary. Stevens argued that the
Court's precedent "firmly established" Congress' commerce clause power to
regulate purely local activities that are part of a "class of activities" with a
substantial effect on interstate commerce. The majority argued that Congress could
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ban local marijuana use because it was part of such a "class of activities": the
national marijuana market. Local use affected supply and demand in the national
marijuana market, making the regulation of intrastate use "essential" to regulating
the drug's national market. The majority distinguished the case from Lopez and
Morrison. In those cases, statutes regulated non-economic activity and fell entirely
outside Congress' commerce power; in this case, the Court was asked to strike
down a particular application of a valid statutory scheme.
NFIB v Sebelius (2012)
o Facts: Congress passed The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA)
known as Obamacare. The law requires individual citizens not covered by a
corporate plan, Medicare, Medicaid, or a government sponsored plan to buy into a
federally approved plan or face a penalty imposed by the federal government. The
law creates a health insurance exchange at each state level, where individual
consumers and corporations offering healthcare can compare their rates with other
plans and potentially purchase such plans, with a government subsidy in certain
cases. Low income individuals and families at a particular rate of poverty may
purchase within these exchanges and receive such a subsidy if they purchase within
the exchange. The law also establishes minimum standards for health insurance
policies.
o Issue: 1) Whether Congressional law that requires states to choose between
complying with the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act or loss of federal
funding for Medicaid is constitutionally valid; and
(2) Whether, Congressional law requiring all citizens to obtain health
insurance or pay a penalty is unconstitutional
o Holding: 1) Yes, this provision violates the 10th amendment through the provision
that withdraws all Medicaid funding unless the state adheres to the parameters of
the Acts Medicaid expansion program. The court stated that while such a
mechanism is unconstitutional, the correct solution for the court is to redact such a
penalty, thereby giving states a choice as to whether they want to create the
exchange without the threat of Medicaid funding being lost. The court held that
the grant withholding provision was unconstitutionally coercive. He wrote that the
threat of withdraw of 10% of funds which make up a states budget represents a
gun to head scenario for states.
o (2) No. The Act is not justified under the commerce clause. The court has never
permitted congress to use its power to regulate interstate commerce so as to
mandate the purchase of a particular product. He noted that in order for congress
to regulate interstate commerce, there must be something to regulate. The Act
creates commerce, essentially, by regulating inactivity into activity; it summons or
creates commerce.
o The court looks at the tax and used the substance and application test to
determine whether it met the parameters necessary to fall under the taxing and
spending clause. Finding that it did meet such a definition, recognizing that the fine
is imposed by the IRS and levied on individual taxpayers through their income
taxes. Moreover, the fine is collected by the Treasury and produces revenue for the
government. The individual mandate is much more a tax than a penalty, according
to the court. The court interpreted a penalty to mean a fine imposed on unlawful
27
conduct. Because the individual mandate leaves consumers with a rational choice
between fine or payment, it can hardly be seen as a penalty. As an aside, the
court also held that it was not a direct tax imposed equally on all individuals and
therefore neednt be struck down due to lack of apportionment among the
states.
o The court held that the notion of taxing inactivity is a legitimate power of
Congress. This did not create a limitless taxing power, according to the court,
because the court would not support such a tax that was so severe as to be
putative. The attendant law was not putative, as it gave citizens a reasonable
and rational choice between activity or inactivity. The court did not clarify at what
point a tax on inactivity becomes putative as opposed to remaining a rational
choice.
SOUTH DAKOTA V. DOLE (1987)
o FACTS: South Dakota permits persons over 19 to purchase beer containing up to
3.2% alcohol. In 1984, Congress enacted 23 U.S.C. 158, which directs the Secretary
of Transportation to withhold a percentage of federal highway funds otherwise
allocable from States "in which the purchase or public possession . . . Of any
alcoholic beverage by a person who is less than twenty-one years of age is lawful."
o ISSUE: Does Congress have the ability to place conditions on grants to state and
local governments? Does 158 violate the constitutional limitations on
congressional exercise of spending power and violate the 21st Amendment
o HOLDING: Congress has the ability to place conditions on grants to state and local
governments as long as:
The exercise of the spending power is in pursuit of "the general welfare";
The conditions are unambiguous;
The conditions are related to the federal interest or goal of a particular
project or program;
Does not violate any other constitutional doctrines.
o REASONING: Congress may attach conditions on the receipt of federal funds.
However, there are some conditions: First, it must be in pursuit of the general
welfare. Here, courts should defer substantially to the judgment of Congress.
Second, the condition must be unambiguous and allow the states to exercise their
choice cognizant of the consequences of participation or nonparticipation. Third,
the conditions must be related to the federal interest or goal of the particular
program. Finally, the conditions and exercise of power must not violate any other
constitutional doctrines. South Dakota does not claim that 158 is inconsistent with
the first three restrictions above. The 10th Amendment limitation of congressional
regulation of state affairs did not concomitantly limit the range of conditions
legitimately placed on federal grants. In some circumstances, it is possible that the
financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point
at which "pressure turns into compulsion." This is not the case here, however, since
SD would only lose a relatively small percentage of funds. SDs argument regarding
the coercive nature of the program is much more rhetoric than fact.
NFIB V. SEBELIUS (2012)
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29
Reasoning: The Tenth Amendment is a truism that simply directs the court to
examine what are the internal limitations to the powers granted to Congress in
Article I. So the court must examine the Commerce Power, the Spending Power,
and the Supremacy Clause. The basic premise is that under Hodel, Congress may
not simply commandeer the state governmental processes. Nothing in the
Constitution implies that Congress has the ability to require states to govern by
federal coercion. This premise is supported by looking at the Framers intent when
they chose the structure that the Congress would exercise its power directly over
individuals rather than over states as intermediaries. Although Congress can
motivate or encourage states to regulate in a certain way by making federal
assistance conditional or by giving them the choice between doing it themselves or
having the federal government do it for them by preemption, it can not directly
compel. This enables state governments to be directly responsive and accountable
to the local electorate. Where the federal government compels regulation, the
state officials take the brunt, while the federal officials remain insulated, thus
reducing accountability in the political process. Construing the Act in a light most
favorable to the United States, the take title provision is still clearly beyond
Congress power because Congress neither has the power to force states to take
title to the waste (thereby subsidizing the generators) nor does it have the power to
compel regulation. That there is a very strong federal interest in controlling waste
does not allow Congress to go beyond the Constitution. Even if New York state itself
agreed to the bargain, the state is powerless to waive the Constitutional limits on
Congressional power because the Constitution is for the protection of individuals.
The other parts of the Act are Constitutional because neither monetary incentives
nor access denials can reasonably be said to deny a State a republican form of
government.
Printz v United States (1997)
o Facts: The Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Bill) required "local chief
law enforcement officers" (CLEOs) to perform background-checks on prospective
handgun purchasers, until such time as the Attorney General establishes a federal
system for this purpose. County sheriffs Jay Printz and Richard Mack, separately
challenged the constitutionality of this interim provision of the Brady Bill on behalf
of CLEOs in Montana and Arizona respectively. In both cases District Courts found
the background-checks unconstitutional, but ruled that since this requirement was
severable from the rest of the Brady Bill a voluntary background-check system could
remain. On appeal from the Ninth Circuit's ruling that the interim background-check
provisions were constitutional, the Supreme Court granted certiorari and
consolidated the two cases deciding this one along with Mack v. United States.
o Issue: Using the Necessary and Proper Clause of Article I as justification, can
Congress temporarily require state CLEOs to regulate handgun purchases by
performing those duties called for by the Brady Bill's handgun applicant
background-checks?
o Holding: No. The Court constructed its opinion on the old principle that state
legislatures are not subject to federal direction. The Court explained that while
Congress may require the federal government to regulate commerce directly, in this
case by performing background-checks on applicants for handgun ownership, the
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Necessary and Proper Clause does not empower it to compel state CLEOs to fulfill
its federal tasks for it - even temporarily. The Court added that the Brady Bill could
not require CLEOs to perform the related tasks of disposing of handgun-application
forms or notifying certain applicants of the reasons for their refusal in writing, since
the Brady Bill reserved such duties only for those CLEO's who voluntarily accepted
them.
Seminole tribe of Florida v. Florida (1996)
o Facts: Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act in 1988. This Act
authorized Indian tribes to conduct gaming activities as long as they abided by
terms agreed upon by the tribe and the state the gaming activities occurred in.
Under this act the Seminole Tribe brought suit against Florida because it had failed
to negotiate this compact. Attorneys for Florida moved to have to case dismissed
on the grounds that it violated the states sovereign immunity from suits in federal
court as well as the Eleventh Amendment. The federal district court dismissed this
motion. After the Court of Appeals reversed this ruling, the Seminole Tribe
appealed to the Supreme Court.
o Issue: whether the Eleventh Amendment provided Florida with immunity from the
suit filed by the Seminole Trib?.
o Holding: Chief Justice Rehnquist delivering the opinion of the Court. Justices
Stevens and Souter filed dissenting opinions and Justices Ginsburg and Breyer
joined with Justice Souter. In the opinion of the Court, Chief Justice Rehnquist
declared that the Eleventh Amendment restricted the power of Congress to
authorize suits against States. They declared that Florida was the injured party
because the Seminole Tribe had no standing. Aside from distinguishing differences
from many precedents, the ruling overturned Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. (1989)
which held that Congress could abrogate States Eleventh Amendment immunity
under the Interstate Commerce Clause. The Courts opinion points out flaws in the
reasoning in the Union Gas case stating that using the fact that sometimes Congress
may have power over the States implies that in situations where Congress has less
authority the States have more. The difference between the Indian Commerce
Clause and the Interstate Commerce Clause is that the Indian Commerce Clause
transfers more power from the State to the Federal Government than does the
other
. Other precedents that are mentioned include Blatchford v. Native Village
of Noatak (1991) Hans v. Louisiana (1890), Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer (1976), as
well as the doctrine of Ex parte Young (1908) Blatchford held that the
Eleventh Amendment restricted only certain jurisdiction of the federal
court and Hans held that each State is a sovereign entity in the federal
system and that that sovereignty cannot be amended without that beings
consent. Fitzpatrick held that Congress can abrogate States immunity in
pursuit of its powers under the Fourteenth Amendment. Due to this
however, there is not an established precedent here to be applied. The
doctrine of Ex parte Young does also not apply here because it relinquishes
State sovereignty for a state official and not the state itself. Justice Souter
dissents because he, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, feel that the
Court was mistaken in overturning Union Gas . They believe that the
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Seminole Tribe of Florida was the injured party in this case. In Article I,
Section 8, Clause 3, the Constitution gives Congress to regulate commerce
with the Indian Tribes. If the Framers of the Eleventh Amendment had
wanted to protect States from this type of suit they would have worded it
differently. Congress chose to enact its power with the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act. I concur with Justice Souters dissent here. The meaning of
the Eleventh Amendment is clear and Congress was acting well within its
power in enacting the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. Since under that Act
the Seminole Tribe was allowed to bring suit against Florida when it didnt
negotiate a compact under good faith, they were the injured party. I would
contend that there is no significant legal difference between the Interstate
Commerce Clause and the Indian Commerce Clause and creating such
is just a means to overturn Union Gas. As the dissent points out there is no
point in the majority opinion to deal with the issue of federal jurisdiction.
They seemed to have ignored this issue much as they did later in Elk Grove
Unified School District v. Newdow. Instead of ruling on the issue at hand,
the majority voted to deny the appellant standing.
Alden v. Maine (1999)
o Facts: A group of probation officers sued their employer, the State of Maine, in
1992 alleging that the state had violated the overtime provisions of the 1938 Fair
Labor Standards Act. Following the Court's decision in Seminole Tribe v. Florida
(1996)which held that States are immune from private suits in federal court and that
Congress lacks the authority to abrogate that immunitythe probation officers' suit
was dismissed in Federal district court. Alden and the other probation officers then
sued Maine again for violating the Fair Labor Standards Act, this time in state court.
The state trial court and the state supreme court both held that Maine had
sovereign immunity and could not be sued by private parties in their own court.
o Issue: May Congress use its powers under Article I of the Constitution to abrogate a
state's sovereign immunity from private suits in its own courts?
o Holding: No. A sharply divided court held in a 5-4 decision that Congress may not
use its Article I powers to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity. Both the terms
and history of the eleventh amendment suggest that States are immune from suits
in their own courts. And more generally, the original understanding of the
Constitution's structure and the terms of the tenth amendment confirm that states
retained much of their sovereignty despite their agreeing that the national
government would be supreme when exercising its enumerated powers.
Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Posts Authority (2002)
o Facts: South Carolina Maritime Services, Inc. (Maritime Services), asked the South
Carolina State Ports Authority (SCSPA) five times for permission to berth a cruise
ship, the M/V Tropic Sea, at the SCSPA's port facilities in Charleston, South Carolina.
Some cruises offered by Maritime Services would allow passengers to participate in
gambling activities while on board. The SCSPA repeatedly denied Maritime Services'
requests, contending that it had an established policy of denying berths in the Port
of Charleston to vessels whose primary purpose was gambling. Maritime Services
file a complaint with the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC), arguing that SCSPA
violated the Shipping Act by its denials. The complaint was referred to an
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Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), who found that the SCSPA, as an arm of the State of
South Carolina, was entitled to sovereign immunity and thus dismissed the
complaint. Reversing on its own motion, the FMC concluded that state sovereign
immunity covers proceedings before judicial tribunals, not Executive Branch
agencies. In reversing, Court of Appeals fund that the proceedings were an
adjudication and thus subject to state sovereign immunity.
Issue: Does a State's sovereign immunity preclude the Federal Maritime
Commission from adjudicating a private party's complaint that a state-run port has
violated the Shipping Act of 1984?
Holding: Yes. In a 5-4 opinion delivered by Justice Clarence Thomas, the Court held
that state sovereign immunity bars the FMC from adjudicating a private party's
complaint against a nonconsenting State. Historically, the Court noted, states were
not subject to private suits in administrative adjudications when the Constitution
was adopted, and states were thus presumptively immune from such actions.
Moreover, the Court pointed to the similarities between the FMC's proceedings and
civil litigation to conclude that there was no basis for distinguishing between the
actions for purposes of sovereign immunity. "Although the Framers likely did not
envision the intrusion on state sovereignty at issue in today's case, we are
nonetheless confident that it is contrary to their constitutional design," wrote
Justice Thomas.
th
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iv. Reasoning: Section 5 of the 14th amendment confers the same power on Congress as
the Necessary and Proper Clause since they use the same language. Section 4(e) may be
readily seen as plainly adapted to further the aims of the Equal Protection Clause. It
enables the PR minority to better obtain equality. It was for Congress, as the branch that
made the judgment, to assess and weigh the various conflicting considerations. It is not
for the court to review the congressional consideration of factors.It is enough that the
Court can perceive a basis upon which Congress might resolve the conflict as it did.
(problem - disenfranchised Spanish speakers, solution - preempting state law through
VRA)
City of Boerne v. Flores (1997)
o Facts: The Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 prohibits the government from
substantially burdening a person's exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule
of general applicability. The Gov't is forbidden unless it can demonstrate that the burden is
in furtherance of a compelling gov't interest and is the least restrictive means of furthering
that compelling gov't interest. A church wanted to expand; it applied for a building permit.
The city council had previously passed a law requiring the city's Historic Landmark
Commission to preapprove construction affecting landmarks or buildings in a historic district.
The commission denied the building permit. The church filed suit under the RFRA.
o Issue: What is the appropriate scope of Congressional power under Section 5 of the 14th
amendment?
o Holding: Congress may only enact legislation under Section 5 of the 14th amendment which
is remedial or preventative in nature and that is designed to have congruence and
proportionality with the substantive rights the Court has defined
o Reasoning: Congress's power under Section 5 extends only to enforcing the provisions of the
14th amendment, it is remedial in nature.
The design of the amendment and the text are inconsistent with the suggestion
that Congress has the power to decree the substance of the 14th amendment's
restrictions on the states.
There is a thin line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional
actions and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law; that
line must be preserved.
The history of the amendment confirms that the power given to Congress was
remedial, not plenary. Congress is allowed to correct the unjust legislations of the
states.
Precedent also confirms the remedial nature of the power.
"Congruence and proportionality" requirement: While preventative rules are
sometimes appropriate remedial measures, there must be a congruence between
the means used and the ends to be achieved. The appropriateness of the remedial
measures must be considered in the light of the evil presented.
The RFRA is so out of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventive object that it
cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent, unconstitutional
behavior.
It appears instead to attempt a substantive change in constitutional protections.
Preventative measures prohibiting certain types of laws may be appropriate when
there is reason to believe that many of the laws affected by the enactment have a
34
significant likelihood of being unconstitutional. Most state laws to which the RFRA
applies are not ones which will have been motivated by religious bigotry.
B.
35
Holding: Yes., the Court held that State employees may recover money damages in federal
court in the event of the State's failure to comply with the FMLA's family-care provision. The
Court reasoned that Congress both clearly stated its intention to abrogate the States'
Eleventh Amendment immunity from suit in federal court under the FMLA and acted within
its authority under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by enacting prophylactic, rather
than substantively redefining, legislation. "In sum, the States' record of unconstitutional
participation in, and fostering of, gender-based discrimination in the administration of leave
benefits is weighty enough to justify the enactment of prophylactic [section] 5 legislation,"
wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justices Antonin Scalia and Anthony M. Kennedy, who was
joined by Justices Clarence Thomas and Scalia, filed dissents.
Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland (2012)
o Facts: Former Maryland Court of Appeals employee Daniel Coleman filed a lawsuit under the
self-care provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act, alleging that he was fired after
requesting sick leave for a documented medical condition. The lower court dismissed
Coleman's claim and the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit affirmed, holding that
the claim was properly dismissed because his employer is a state agency.
o Issue: Did Congress constitutionally abrogate states' Eleventh Amendment immunity when it
passed the self-care leave provision of the Family and Medical Leave Act?
o Holding: No, , the Court held that the self-care provision, standing alone, did not validly
abrogate Marylands immunity from suits for damages. Justice Kennedy argued that
Congress evidence failed to show a pattern of state constitutional violations when it wrote
the self-care provision; instead, Congress considered evidence that men and women are on
medical leave in roughly equal numbers. In contrast, Congress often referred to its concerns
about discrimination against women when constructing the family-care portion of the act.
Hence, the self-care leave provision was not a congruent and proportional response to
discriminatory conduct under 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and did not abrogate
Marylands sovereign immunity.\
Shelby County v. Holder (2012)
o The Fourteenth Amendment protects every persons right to due process of law. The
Fifteenth Amendment protects citizens from having their right to vote abridged or denied
due to race, color, or previous condition of servitude. The Tenth Amendment reserves all
rights not expressly granted to the federal government to the individual states. Article Four
of the Constitution guarantees the right of self-government for each state.The Civil Rights
Act of 1965 was enacted as a response to the nearly century-long history of voting
discrimination. Section 5 prohibits eligible districts from enacting changes to their election
laws and procedures without gaining official authorization. Section 4(b) defines the eligible
districts as ones that had a voting test in place as of November 1, 1964 and less than 50%
turnout for the 1964 presidential election. Such districts must prove to the Attorney General
or a three-judge panel of a Washington, D.C. district court that the change neither has the
purpose nor will have the effect of negatively impacting any individuals right to vote based
on race or minority status. Section 5 was originally enacted for five years, but has been
continually renewed since that time. Shelby County, Alabama, filed suit in district court and
sought both a declaratory judgment that Section 5 and Section 4(b) are unconstitutional and
a permanent injunction against their enforcement. The district court upheld the
constitutionality of the Sections and granted summary judgment for the Attorney General.
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that Congress did not
36
exceed its powers by reauthorizing Section 5 and that Section 4(b) is still relevant to the
issue of voting discrimination
Issue: Does the renewal of Section 5 of the Voter Rights Act under the constraints of Section
4(b) exceed Congress authority under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, and
therefore violate the Tenth Amendment and Article Four of the Constitution?
Holding: Yes, Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional. Chief Justice John G.
Roberts, Jr. delivered the opinion of the 5-4 majority. The Court held that Section 4 of the
Voting Rights Act imposes current burdens that are no longer responsive to the current
conditions in the voting districts in question. Although the constraints this section places on
specific states made sense in the 1960s and 1970s, they do not any longer and now
represent an unconstitutional violation of the power to regulate elections that the
Constitution reserves for the states. The Court also held that the formula for determining
whether changes to a states voting procedure should be federally reviewed is now outdated
and does not reflect the changes that have occurred in the last 50 years in narrowing the
voting turnout gap in the states in question.
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