Challenging a Unipolar World

The United States is still the big dog on the block, columnist Conn Hallinan
argues, but it can no longer just bark to get its way.
By Conn Hallinan. Edited by John Feffer, January 21, 2008.
One of the more interesting phenomena to emerge from the U.S. debacle in
Iraq is the demise of the unipolar world that rose from the ashes of the Cold
War. A short decade ago the United States was the most powerful political,
economic, and military force on the planet. Today its army is straining under
the weight of an unpopular occupation, its economy is careening toward
recession, and the only allies we can absolutely depend on in the United
Nations are Israel, Palau, and the Marshall Islands.
Rather than the American Century the Bush administration neo-conservatives
predicted, it is increasingly a world where regional alliances and trade associations
in Europe and South America have risen to challenge Washingtons once
undisputed domination.
When Argentina thumbed its nose at the U.S.-dominated World Bank and
International Monetary Fund, it had the powerful Mercosur trade association to
back it up. When the United States tried to muscle Europe into ending agricultural
subsidies (while keeping its own) the European Union refused to back down.
And now India, China, and Russia are drifting toward a partnership alliance is too
strong a word that could transform global relations and shift the power axis from
Washington to New Delhi, Beijing, and Moscow. It is a consortium of convenience,
as the interests of the three countries hardly coincide on all things.
Partners in Energy
In security matters, for instance, the Chinese look east toward Taiwan, the Indians
north to Pakistan, and the Russians west at an encroaching North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO). There are still tensions between China and India over their
1962 border war, and bad feelings between Russia and China go all the way back
to the Vietnam War.
But growing trade, convergent security concerns, and an almost insatiable hunger
for energy have brought the three together in what Russian President Vladimir
Putin calls a trilateral relationship.
The initial glue was a common interest in the gas and oil supplies of Central Asia.
In 2001, China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, and
Kyrgyzstan formed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) to challenge
U.S. moves to corner Central Asias gas and oil reserves and to counter the

growing presence of NATO in the Pacific Basin. SCO has since added India and
given observer status to Iran, Pakistan, Mongolia, and Afghanistan.
Access to energy is almost an existential issue for China and India. China imports
half its oil, and energy shortages could derail the highflying Chinese economy.
India imports 70% of its oil, and, unlike China, has no strategic reserves. Both
nations have made energy a foreign policy cornerstone. China is pumping billions
of dollars into developing Caspian Sea oil and gas fields and building pipelines,
while India is busy negotiating a pipeline deal with Iran.
The India-Iran deal has come under considerable pressure from Washington.
Nicholas Burns, U.S. undersecretary of state for political affairs, told the Council on
Foreign Relations that Washington hoped very much that India will not conclude
any long-term oil and gas agreements with Iran.
However, Indian Finance Minister Palaniappan Chidambaram says, We should do
it Iran has the gas and we need the gas. India is estimated to have up to $40
billion in gas and oil interests in Iran, and the pipeline is projected to cost $10
billion.
To much unhappiness in Washington, China just inked a $2 billion deal to develop
Irans Yadavaran gas and oil field.
The International Energy Agency predicts that energy needs will be 50% higher in
2030 than they are today, and that developing countries will soak up 74% of that
rise. China and India will account for 45% of those energy needs, and by sometime
after 2010, China will be the largest energy user in the world.
Ties of Security and Trade
Trade is increasing among China, India, and Russia. For instance, trade between
India and China was $24 billion in 2007, the same as trade between India and the
U.S., and is projected to jump to $40 billion by 2010. Both nations have agreed to
reopen an overland route through the Himalayas that has been closed for 44 years.
In 1992 India launched its Look East policy, and Asia now constitutes 45% of
Indias trade. India is the third largest economy in the region, followed by China
and Japan.
India desperately needs up to $500 billion in investments to upgrade its
infrastructure. South Korea and Singapore are already major investors, and the
Russians have shown interest as well. India would love a piece of Russias $1
trillion in foreign exchange reserves.
There are growing security ties as well. This past October, the nations which
border the Caspian Sea Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan
jointly declared that they will not allow other countries to use their territories for
acts of aggression or other military operations against any party. The declaration
was directly aimed at U.S. bases in Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, and Turkmenistan.

Some of these security relations have a down side: increased arms trade. China is
relying on Russia for many of its new weapons, including the high-performance
SU-33 fighter, which can be adapted for use on aircraft carriers. The Chinese
government says it plans to build several carriers, which would allow it to challenge
the current U.S. domination of the Taiwan Straits.
India has just concluded an agreement to buy and jointly assemble Russias new
fighter, the SU-30, which in recent war games outmaneuvered and outfought the
U.S. F-16. New Delhi will buy Russias fifth generation fighter, the Future Tactical
Aviation Concept, rather than the U.S. F-22 or the European F-35. Russia is also
modernizing Indias Vikramaditya aircraft carrier and has agreed to a joint
production agreement to build the new Russian tank, the T-90.
While none of the three countries military budgets approach U.S. military
spending, never-the-less, tens of billions of dollars are being funneled into
armaments at a time of growing economic inequity in all three nations.
Terrorism and Unipolarism
Another troubling side to this increasing trilateral cooperation is that the three
countries have agreed to support one another on the issue of terrorism and
separatism. In practice, that may give China a free hand in its largely Muslim
Xinjiang Province, and in Tibet. It might mute criticism of Moscows war in
Chechnya, and give cover for India to step up its military actions against Maoist
Naxilites and put the clamps on restive minorities on its northwest border.
The relationship among the three countries can hardly be called an alliance. The
Indian military regularly takes part in joint military maneuvers with the United States
and, so far, military cooperation among India, China, and Russia is low level. But
all have common interests in securing energy resources and, if not confronting the
United States, at least not allowing Washington to dictate to them on international
and internal issues.
Such a trilateral relationship might have some immediate impacts.
First, it might put a crimp into Washingtons anti-ballistic missile system (ABM),
which the United States has been selling in Asia as a defense against rogue
states like Iran and North Korea. Australia, India, and Japan have all signed on to
take part in the project. China, however, views the ABM as a direct threat to its
modest ICBM deterrent, and sees it, along with the expansion of NATO into the
Pacific, and U.S. bases in South and Central Asia, as an effort to encircle China.
In a choice between annoying the United States or China over the ABM, New Delhi
may decide the neighbor next door trumps distant Washington. Before arriving in
Bejing on January 15, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh made it clear that India has
no intention of joining any alliances that would aim at containing China, and said
that there is enough space for both India and China to grow and prosper while
strengthening our cooperative engagement.

In addition, the United States may find that the new Labor government in Australia
begins to hedge its bets on deploying a U.S. ABM, particularly since China is now
Canberras number one trading partner.
The United States will also find it harder to isolate Iran. New Delhi is already
pushing for a pipeline that will bring gas to Indias expanding economy, and China
and Russia are helping to develop Irans hydrocarbon industry. Irans enormous oil
and gas reserves are simply too important to be held hostage to Washingtons
jihad against Teheran.
The United States is still the big dog on the block, but it can no longer just bark to
get its way.
Conn Hallinan is a Foreign Policy In Focus (www.fpif.org) columnist.