CARLETON

UNIVERSITY
AEROSPACE
ENGINEERING
FALL 2014

AEROSPACE SYSTEMS DESIGN

Deliverable 5
FMEA Analysis

BY: Group 2
DATE: 24 NOV 2014
Page 1 OF 3

Introduction
This document presents the failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA) for the take-off landing system (TLS) of the Insitu
Integrator. The TLS is divided into subsections and the potential failure mode of each subsection and their effects on the
overall TLS are identified. Once potential design and process failures are identified, design changes that are necessary to
prevent such failure will be determined.
System Overview
The take-off and landing system (TLS) discussed in this report employs two independent systems for take-off and
landing procedures. The take-off system, Subsystem A, is a bicycle configuration landing gear commonly seen on gliders.
The landing system, Subsystem B, is a vehicle launch take-off mechanism. In this report, failure mode and effects analysis
is shown for Subsystem A.
In Subsystem A, both the forward and aft wheels are fully retractable via a metal-geared stepper motor, and only
used upon landing. When extended, the wheels push open a spring-loaded door which is held open by the extended wheel.
This door is closed by the spring when the gear is retracted and is no longer holding it open. Since the retraction is done on
the ground, the pilot or the maintenance personnel can ensure that the doors are properly retracted. Consumable skid
plates that are adhered to the lower surface of the wingtips prevent the wingtips from striking the ground and incurring
damage as the aircraft comes to rest after landing. Additionally, to prevent the propeller from striking the ground upon
landing, a folding propeller is employed.
System Breakdown and Categorization

System Breakdown and Categorization

The landing system of the Integrator consists of three main subassemblies which are the skid plates, landing gear and the
folding propeller. The three subassemblies were then broken down to their respective components that can fail
independently and cause the whole assembly to fail. These components were then further divided into individual parts that
are needed to construct these components which make up the whole subsystem. FMEA was performed on each individual
part to identify potential process and design failures thereby minimizing the risk of failure during flight by implementing
any necessary design changes. This is shown in detail by Table 1 in the following page.

CARLETON
UNIVERSITY
AEROSPACE
ENGINEERING
FALL 2014

AEROSPACE SYSTEMS DESIGN

Deliverable 5
FMEA Analysis

BY: Group 2
DATE: 24 NOV 2014
Page 2 OF 3

Table 1: Failure Mode and Effects Analysis Table

Identification
No.
A.1.1

Item/Functional
Identification
Wingtip protection

Failure Mode

A.2.1.1

Retracts and
deploys wheel

Stripped gear

A.2.2.1

Attach gear frame

to fuselage

Loose bolt

A.2.2.2

Landing load
distribution and
landing gear
placement module
Mount servo motor
to gear frame

Column
buckling

A.2.3.1

Secures landing
gear position
during deployment

Shear failure

A.2.3.2

Attachment of
wheel to gear
frame

Buckling

A.2.3.2

Absorb landing
impact

Tire Puncture

Presence of
foreign object
debris (FOD)
on landing
runway

A.3.2

Folds propeller
upon landing

Propeller does
not fold

Increased
hinge joint
friction due to
corrosion

A.2.2.3

Delamination

Loose bolt

Failure
Cause
High peel
stress
Excessive
torque
Vibration
from cyclic
loading
Compressive
stress from
landing
impact
Vibration
from repeated
landing
impact
Shear stress
due to
landing
impact
Compressive
stress from
landing load

Failure
Event
Wingtip
damage
Landing gear
does not
deploy
Frame
detachment
from aircraft
Fracture of
gear frame
structure

Target
D

Action Required
Frequent
inspection

Implement lock
wire

Frequent
inspection

Landing gear
does not
deploy

Bolt inspection
prior to every
flight

Landing gear
collapse upon
touchdown

Increase safety
factor or
thickness of pin

Sudden
collapse of
wheel strut
upon
touchdown
Loss of
control during
ground roll

Increase strut
thickness

Propeller
strike during
landing

Selection of tire
with increased
thickness and
inspection for
FOD on landing
area.
Frequent
lubrication

Target code: A - Aircraft, D - Downtime

FMEA Summary
Table 1 above shows the details of the failure modes analysis that was performed on each individual part which
include possible causes and modes of failure and how these failures will affect the landing system which was designed.
As can be observed, the most critical subsystem is the landing gear subsystem as most of the parts that were analyzed are
part of this subsystem. It should also be noted that only one fail safe, the locking pins, was designed for the landing gear
subsystem and that this is the most critical part of the landing gear subsystem as it prevents the wheel-tire from being
forced into retraction during touchdown. The main reason for this decision is the assumption that the Integrator, although
utilized for civilian application, will be operated from a safe location away from the landing area and that failure of the
landing system itself will cause damage only to the Integrator and not the operator. Another driving factor for this decision
is the fact that the landing gear subsystem itself is a single module that is designed to be replaceable with a new unit if
structural defects and electrical system failure are detected from visual inspection and control system test prior to flight.
Table 1 also indicated that the gear frame and wheel-tire assemblies are more critical than the electrical system assembly
and as they are more likely to fail during operation by virtue of having more parts which can fail. It should also be noted
that although the two aforementioned assemblies have more failure modes, the nature of these failures are structural in

CARLETON
UNIVERSITY
AEROSPACE
ENGINEERING
FALL 2014

AEROSPACE SYSTEMS DESIGN

Deliverable 5
FMEA Analysis

BY: Group 2
DATE: 24 NOV 2014
Page 3 OF 3

nature and can be reduced by increasing the safety factor of the individual parts designed and by having a more rigorous
inspection prior to every flight.
Table 1 also indicated that the failure of adhesive and propeller hinges will only result in downtime since failures
of these parts will not result in a catastrophic failure of the Integrator but only damage to the wingtip and propeller upon
landing. Therefore, in terms of criticality, the skid plates (ID A.1) and folding propeller (ID A.3) subsystems are not
critical compared to the landing gear subsystem which was designed to absorb the impact energy due to landing loads.
Therefore, based on the results of FMEA performed on the landing system, the most critical subsystem is the landing gear
subsystem and the two most important assemblies of this subsystem are the gear frame and wheel-tire assembly and
finally, the most critical part in the landing system is the locking pins which prevents forced retracting of the wheel strut
upon touchdown.