-t

his special edition of "Helsinki Charter" includes

texts published in the bulletin of the Helsinki

Co.rnmittee for Human Rights in Serbia during 1998.

Tbese texts are related to the current situation in
Kosovo, sources of the crisis which brought about the
escalation of violence, and attempt at offering adequate solutions for this complex problem which is
very important for the stability of the Balkan region.
Apart from texts written specially for "Helsinki Charter", this issue also includes parts of speeches delivered at the first Serbian-Albanian dialogue held in Ulcinj in June 1997, and apart of the
Annual Report of the Helsinki Committee for Human ~ights in Serbia for 1996, which is related to the
situation on Kosovo.
We hope that these texts will be helpful for getting a closer insight into the Kosovo issue, i-t s complexity and many sides that make it.
Editor

3
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49

A shClrecl feClr / Denisa Kostovic

''lJrenicCl" homogent:ZCltion ofAlbcmicms / Behlul Beqaj
ThreClt of new stClge of iso!Cltion / Novak Pribicevic
lnternC1tionC1!1:ZCltion is not Cl prececlent / Milenko Markovic
From protectomte to preventive m1!itmy intervention / Shkelzen Maliqi
Tricky cosmetics /!gor Mesner
Chi/clren Clre innocent / S!obodanka Ast
ConversCltion with bogeym@ / Sandra Sljepcevic
Albcmic:rns Cls Cl metClphor/ Aleksandar Boskovic
FC11th in mecl1ators / Novak Pribicevic
PrepClrations for the final so/ution / Sonja Biserko
We shal/ retaliate by stronger force / Novak Pribicevic
Ten yeClrs of life / Vesna Kostic
Paradox of inclirect pressure / Novak Pribicevic
The wor/cl mustn't renounce Serb1a / Milica Pejanovic-Durisic
The !Clst stClge of clefeClt / Sonja Biserko
In the mountC11ns, on unfClmi!tar pClths... / Natasa Novovic
New co/umns of refugees / Sandra S!jepcevic and Ksenija Lazovic
I hacl better tel/you the truth
Conference - the quiekest WClY out of agony / Novak Pribicevic
The WClr reloCCltes to Serb!Ct / Stipe Sikavica
Non-existent peop/e / Vukan Simonovic
A pass for granclmother's coffee / Sandra S/jepcevic
From textbooks to RCl!Clshnikovs / Denisa Kostovic
Most certCltn/y - Cl feclera/ !tnk / Novak Pribicevic
Emigration - a viab/e so/ution / Sandra S/jepcevic
Mtlofevic - the only w1nner / Stipe Sikavica
Twilight in Montenegro/ Natasa Novovic
Romany refugees from Kosovo/ Sandra S!jepcevic
Interna/ crisis 1n AlbClniCl Clncl Kosovo/ Behlul Beqaj
A cleCClcle-/ong time !Clg / Milenko Markovic
The Kosovo mora/ /an open fetter
The !Clst chClnce / Sonja Biserko
Risks ofposterior Clssessments / Novak Pribicevic
NATO Clncl foreign "tomClhawks" / Stipe Sikavica
Winter is com1ng: where will refugees go / Natasa Novovic
Montenegro between NATO bombers cmcl stClte of emergency / O/ja Obradovic
OClngerous fClscist potential/ Vladimir J/ic
The forms ofSerbtan natioM/ism / Vladimir J/ic

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ECf UCl! feclera/ unit / Novak Pribicevic

Discrimination - an integral element of the regime's mle / Azem Vlasi
Kosovo, Albamans, Serbs: ta/ks are necessmy /Ivan Duric
Illusions ancl rea/ity / !lija Dukic
Conflict of national projects / Sonja Biserko
Compromise 1nsteClcl of encl/ess hoptng / Behlul Beqaj
Much-neeclecl so/ution to the Kosovo lmpClsse a republic 1n refecleratecl FRY/ Gazmend Pula

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Report on nCltionCll minorities tn Kosovo

1996 Annual report

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~H~E~L~S~l~N~K~I~ Helsinkl Charter, Special English Edition

Eelgrade, January 1999

CF ~ RMHMLJIMTTAENE
~

Bulletin of the Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia,

Zmaj Jovina 7, Beigrade, tel/fax: 637 542 i 639 481
e-mail: helsodb@opennet.org,
--'-'-'-~-'-'-"'-~--"'-"''--'---'-"":..!!...-'--visit our web-site: http://www.helsinki.opennet.org

RIGHTS IN SERBIA

nalysts have for years described the situation in

Kosovo as "dangerous, but stable". But all illusions
that the conflict might be avoided because of its potential
frightening proportions, and even totality, were dispelled
overnight after the recent Serbian police raid on Drenica
and the resultant images of the fresh Albanian graves,
endless columns of Albanian refugees and burials of
Serbian policemen.
The March casualties on both sides, although not the
first ones since the end of Eighties and the last escalation
of the Kosovo crisis, in a brutally realistic way indicated
the price of a forcible solution to the Kosovo problem.
Everybody is also aware that words of caution that the
Kosovo status quo might not be tenable for a long time are
not sheer rhetoric. Both sides reiterated their mutually
exclusive demands, although it seems that both Serbs
and Albanians were aware that they had to favor a political
and peaceful settlement. The biggest challenge to this
peaceful resolution is the imperative overcoming of the
"terror of territory."
Once again Serbs and Albanians took their demands
to the streets of Kosovo cities. Various slogans and
demands were heard, but there was also a converging
point. Namely both Albanian and Serbian demonstrators
shouted: "We shall not give Kosovo!" Both sides are still
trapped by the belief that an exclusive political control of
only their ethnic group over the Kosovo territory is the only
right solution. Obviously both sides overlook the fact that
sovereignty over the Kosovo territory, established by each
side in a specific way after 1990, is in fact a self-delusion:
Serbia in its gist is not united (although legally and
formally it purports to be unified,) and the self-styled
Kosovo republic is just a dead letter. By extension
international community expressly bans any change of
borders. They confronted Albanian and Serbian
sovereignties over Kosovo absolutely obliterate each
other.
"We ate from the same dish, and now we behave as
strangers, 11 says an Albanian about his Serbian colleague,
with whom he worked in the same power plant. Fragile
Serbian-Albanian bonds established in the time of
communism are broken. Kosovo is not Bosnia, and
nobody will tell you stories about great inter-ethnic love.
But the co-existence which once had been a reality,
morphed into total confrontation.
By its unilateral abolition of the Kosovo autonomy, the
state of Serbia has shoved away Albanians, the most
important national group in Serbia, after Serbs, and
consequently eliminated the possibility to accept any
future solution of the Kosovo problem within the legal
framework of Serbia. By this move it has also the
destroyed a fragile and vulnerable embryo of the SerbAlbanian coexistence at the individual and general level.
The ensuing massive lay-offs of Albanians eliminated the
possibility of physical contacts between grown-up

January 1999

members of both nations, and the segregation in

education meant that walls of distrust were built even
between children.
Serbs have taken over all state and public matters,
and by proclaiming the independent "Republic of Kosovo"
Albanians created the space for their own state and public
affairs. Thanks to a high-level of organization, the Albanian
community quickly reacted by relocating its social
institutions in private buildings. All levels of education
were soon organized, as were the sports league and
cultural events. The Albanian media were established.
Private entrepreneurship flourished.
Life continued on two parallel tracks with the caveat
that the Albanian parallel world continued to function on
the social margin with Albanians firmly convinced that this
inferior status was unjustifiably imposed to them. The
Serbian world took center-stage, without meriting such a
superior status. Hence the Albanian criticism that the
attribute "parallel" is not adequate, because a legitimate
system was in fact forcibly pushed aside.
An important aspect of the Kosovo knot is the very
moment of marginalization. Self-organization, as an
essential, if not defining element of the passive, nonviolent resistance of Kosovo Albanians in the post-1990
period, imposed itself as the way of life, and credible
alternative to violence. Under the new circumstances the
energy was channeled into the reorganization of Albanian
political, economic and social life instead into war effors.
This successful self-organization gratified the Albanian
pride and self-assertion. lt also served as a permanent
reminder of resistance to the Serbian policy and its
domination, as weil as of the marginalized position of
Albanians both as a national group and individuals.
Marginalization of Albanians as individuals is visible
even within the framework of their self-organized society,
which is a direct consequence of an essentially political
personalization of the Serbian-Albanian confrontation. As
a social strata only education workers continued their
professional careers in the Albanian school system, from
the pre-school level to the university one. Medical workers
who stayed in the state hospitals and health centers, or
found jobs in private medical institutions are in the same
position.
However, the majority of laid-off labor-fit Albanians
were compelled to find alternate ways of survival. Many
have succeeded in providing minimal livelihood for their
families, but with a deeply-felt grudge, as engineersturned-nightwatchmen, and TV journalists-turned-taxidrivers. They blame Serbs, that is the Serbian state which
promoted nationally intolerant policy, for the loss of their
personal dignity. They find equally humiliating the money
which they receive from relatives living abroad, although
they welcome it as means of sustenance. Initial
confrontation over the constitutional position of Kosovo in
the meanwhile has became a deeply personal matter.
But the Serbian domination ceased to be something
faceless and abstract, and became a physical, fearinstilling reality, only when the police started raiding cafes
and restaurants, haphazardly checking IDs on the streets,
searching of houses for the weapons in the middle of the
night, arresting and imprisoning people. Such a reality
gives importance and weight to the demand for secession

osovo
from Serbia. On the other hand, the Serbian police and
Kosvo Serbs do not feel safe. They have the authority and
status, but intimately they know they the days of their
privileged status in Kosovo are numbered. They say that
the majority of their fellow-nationals have already left for
Serbia. They also feel that Beigrade, to which they would
relocate only if they could, has not only cuased their
predicament but also forgotten them.
Both communities in Kosovo, namely Serbs and
Albanians, enclosed in their ethnic cocoons, share the
same feelings of fear and uncertainty. Every constitutional
change in Kosovo brought about only the change of roles,
sometimes Albanians were a more-intimidated-party,
sometimes that happened to Serbs. All the while neither
side was completely satisfied with such changes, despite
nominally having the power. The post-1990 situation is no
exception to that rule.
Serbs and Albanians have been separated for eight
years now, and the only bonds between them are the
territory of Kosovo and a shared fear. After the Drenica
bloodbath it is more than clear that both Serbs and
Albanians will have to renounce their maximalist
objectives to the mutual benefit, and with a view to
avoiding a shared disaster.
Problems of Serbs and Albanians are problems of
double national minorities and majorities. Albanians are
an ethnic minority in Serbia, but they constitute a majority
in Kosovo, while Serbs are the majority people in Serbia,
but constitute a minority in Kosovo. In their statements
and communiqus the Serbian authorities and opposition
parties mention Albanians exclusively as an ethnic
minority, that is, present only one facet of this complex
relationship. At the same time they are aware how much
Albanians resent the term minority, as it was often
linguistically misused with the far-reaching political
consequences. That is why the first goodwill gesture
towards Albanians should be the use of the term Kosovo
majority. This would be a small linguistic gesture with a
deep significance, and not an attempt to prejudge a
political solution.
Because of a shared feeling of uncertainty with which
Serbs and Albanians await a final settlement of the Kosovo
status, it should be devised from bottom-up, and not from
top-down, contrary to all previous, overnight, radical
constitutional changes. Through a series of well-pondered
measures in social and economic sectors a potentially
negative shock-effect of the ultimate political solution
could be avoided. But each improvement or change
should satisfy both sides. In other words neither Serbs or
Albanians should feel unjustly damaged or unjustly
rewarded. A concrete progress feit in every day life of
Kosovo citizens could create a critically needed support
for normalization and become the strongest argument
against extremists.
A positive step forward could be the announced
implementation of the Education Agreement. lts hopefully
successful implementation could serve as a model for
other spheres of life in Kosovo. Maintained sovereignty
over activities proper by each community should not be
interpreted as endorsement of ethnic division, but rather
as elimination of causes of the marginalization feeling and
the move aimed at equalizing statuses of both
communities. This, in turn, would be the most
11

11

advantageous starting point for putting forward and later

launching any future, reasonable forms of integration and
co-operation. The choice is apparently simple. The road of
co-operation and integration is lang, strenuous, full of
obstacles and challenges, but nonetheless promises
major improvement, at least with respect to the current
state of affairs.. The war and confrontation road is perhaps
shorter, but at its end there will be many lasses which will
not only outweigh any gains but also make them
senseless.
An Albanian woman tried to explain to me this
parallel-world situation. 1 have Serbian neighbours. We
know that we are enemies, but we get along. Until the
blind hatred swamps Kosovo it seems to me that it would
be wise to start with we get along.
11

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(Author is working at her doctoral thesis at the

Department of Geography, University of Cambridge
Great Britain)

11

Helsinki Charter, March 1998

11

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decade-long situation, resembling neither peace, nor

war, has entered the new stage after several days of
raids of the police-military units on Drenica, Prekaz,
Llausa, Polaci, Vojnik ... taking a heavy toll of innocent
children, warnen and the elderly, who defended their
homes. The exact death toll is still not known, but it is
likely to reach a three-digit figure. During the bloodbath
the authorities instead of reconsidering their moves, tried
to forcibly suppress peaceful demonstrations of citizens in
Pirstina and in some other areas. The end-result was- 700
injured people. Kosovo is unfortunately fast approaching
a real war. Like in other instances of the conditioned reflex,
the political life of Albanians in the Republic of Albania, in
Macedonia, in Diaspora, in Kosovo, by the sheer impact of
those events gained qualitatively new dynamics and
content. Today Albanians are competing in rendering
quick aid and support to the Drenica region. Contacts,
expressions of solidarity, meetings and communiqus of
political parties, associations and prominent personalities,
have been stepped up and they all unanimously condemn
all recent actions of the Serbian regime in Kosovo. The
alarming situation in Drenica area has unified all
Albanians.
For the first time the ruling and opposition parties in
the Republic of Albania, despite the continuing chaos in
the country, and obvious divisions between the parties
and their mutual resentment (the opposition boycotted the
parliamentary work until the Drenica event), responded
unanimously to the dramatic situation in Kosovo. Liders of

Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

KosovA
both the ruling party and the opposition ones for the first
time stood together on Skender-beg Square in Tirana
before several thousands-strong crowd. The Albanian
Prime Minister, Fatos Nano, stated that "Albanians are not
afraid of confrontation," while Salji Berisha, the leader of
the opposition Democratic Party said that "Albanians
wanted peace ... but they also knew how to wage war."
President of the Republic of Albania, Rexhep Meidani,
said that "the party flags were lowered to make place for
the well-hoisted national banner." Many analysts were
surprised by such responses, for Kosovars received
backing not only from the North of Albania, a traditional
stronghold of pro-Kosovar sentiments, but also from the
southern parts of Albania, notably Gjirokastra, deemed a
champion of pro-Greek interests, rather than the Kosovar
ones. At an emergency session of the Albanian
Parliament, with Kosovo topping the agenda, a resolution,
indicating MPs readiness to respond unanimously in the
defense of the national being, in solidarity and in support
of their Albanian brothers in Kosovo, was adopted. The
government also called on the UN Security Council to
urgently discuss the crisis in Kosovo, with a view to taking
preventive and stabilizing steps. Same other measures
were suggested and undertaken, for example the level of
military readiness was raised, and the lists of volunteers
ready to go to Kosovo in case of an open armed conflict
were spontaneously made.
This dramatic situation also jolted out of inactivity the
Albanian political leaders in Macedonian, Arben Dfaferia
and Abdurahman Haiti, who quickly staged pro-Kosovar
rallies attended by tens of thousands of Albanians in
Tetovo and Skopje, in sign of support of Kosovars and in
solidarity with them. Their message was similar to the one
voiced in Albania: "if it is necessary all Albanians in
Macedonia will defend the threatened national integrity."
Demonstrators shouted "the Liberation Army of Kosovo ...
we shall rather give our lives, than Kosovo." Although
Kosovars expected some reactions from their fellownationals, who have finished schools in Kosovo and have
strong bonds there, they were nonetheless surprised by
the reaction of the Macedonian government to the Kosovo
crisis.
Albanians in Montenegro, Presevo, Bujanovac and
Medveda also reacted to the crisis. The Albanian Diaspora
who has been following with undivided attention
developments in Kosvo and in the Albanian ethnic
territory, reacted strongly and promptly. lt organized
massive and intense demonstrations in several Western
countries (Switzerland, Germany, Belgium, England,
Canada, the United States) and immediately extended
large financial aid to Kosovo. Judging by the
aforementioned, and the regular 3% of earnings of all
Albanians (except those in Albania) allocated to the aid, it
can be said loud and clear that Albanian Diaspora is an
important factor in internationalization of the Albanian
issue, and also an important financial and social lever,
counted upon equally by political and nonpolitical factors.
In view of the current situation in Kosovo and five-year
lang inefficiency of its political factors, by all accounts the
nonpolitical factors will soon hold sway. On the basis of
information received to date, one gains the impression
that due to such a dramatic Situation a financial
mobilization, concentrated in the republican, rather than in

January 1999

the party fund (DSK) in Aachen, was effected. Albanian

Diaspora is also important because it cannot be controlled
as easily as other Albanian organizations in Kosovo.
Moreover, the influence of an impatient, Kosovo
government headed by Mr. Bukoshi, which for a long time
has not been on the same wave length with Mr. Rugova,
is ever-increasing.
Finally, the terrible images from the Drenica area have
unified the Kosovo political factors, although, contrary to
the above mentioned cases, much less than Kosovars
reasonably and objectively expected. This unified stand is
indicated by demands of several parties making up the
Coordinating Committee of the Political Parties of Kosovo
(PPK, PSDK, UNIKOMB) that, due to the crisis, some
changes be introduced in the political life, and by
president lbrahim Rugova's message that "despite the
state of emergency there is no need to establish the crisis
headquarters, for 'Kosovo has its institutions.' Because of
the new situation an apparent peace and unity were
preserved, alghouth some personalities, for example
Luljeta Pula-Be6iri, vice president of the PSDK wing, Mr.
Demaci, president of PPK, Mr. Kasumi, vice president of
PPK, Mr. Hidajet Hiseni, an influential member and the
former vice president of LOK, and some UNSPU leaders,
clearly manifested their dissatisfaction with the way
president Rugova led his fellow-nationals in a very
dramatic situation. Similar antagonism towards Mr.
Rugova's policy was noticeable during massive
demonstrations of citizens in Pristina several days ago.
Namely the protesters made it clear that they were on the
side of those who fought, rather than on the side of those
"who watch and wait for the others to do their jobs."
In a nutshell, the alarming crisis in Kosovo, unlike in
previous crises, mobilized and homogenized all Albanians
with respect to the Serbian regime. Realistic
psychological, national, ideological, political and financial
prerequisites for supporting the engagement of Kosovars
in their secession efforts, were created. lt is widely agreed
that Kosovo should be "liberated" from the Serbian rule,
but not from the SRY. As regards the modes necessary for
the attainment of that goal, it seems that the belligerent
option is gaining more followers, at the expense of the
peaceful one. On the basis of the above we can only
conclude that if the conflict escalates the Albanian people
will react as a whole.
Helsinki Charter, March 1998

n an attempt to anticipate future reactions of the main

March 9-25 period,
namely the one between the two meetings of the Contact
Group, was marked, as expected, by exceptionally
intensive diplomatic activities, in Beigrade, Podgorica and
Pristina, as well as in the capitals of the neighboring
countries. All those activities were designed to bring
pressure to bear on all the key protagonists to make them
comply with the categorical demands of the London
meeting within the prescribed time-limit.
We witnessed separate activities of various countries
manifested on the following occasions: a two-day visit of
the Russian Foreign Secretary, Primakov, several visits of
the US Special Envoy, Gelbrand, to Beigrade and Pristina,
then visits of the US Deputy Foreign Secretary to Skopje,
Sophia and Tirana, and the joint visit of French and
German Foreign Secretaries, Kinkel and Vedrin. lt is
noteworthy that the Russian First Deputy Foreign
Secretary, Afanisjevski, who was a member of Primakov's
team during the latter's talks in Beigrade, stayed on in
Beigrade to brief the German and French foreign
secretaries on Mr. Primakov's talks with the leading
Serbian and Yugoslav officials, and subsequently to
hammer our with them a joint, trilateral platform for the
forthcoming Contact Group meeting on 25 March in
Berlin.
All these activities were covered by scant public
communiquAs. Hence a carefui observer can try to fathom
the course of dialogue on the topic, that is, efforts to
secure a political solution to the Kosovo crisis through
talks on its status, only on the basis of brief statements
and naturally, his common sense.
The state-controlled media are tasked with creating
dilemmas over what is indeed happening and a future
course of events by running specific commentaries and
statements of the regime high-ranking officials and if
necessary, numerous local officials. Hence the official
chorus continues to glorify in unison Kosovo as an
exclusively internal question of Serbia, rejects any kind of
its internationalization, condemns "Shiptari terrorist
gangs" and "separatist political leaders," and argues for
dialogue and the political resolution of this complex issue,
within the framework of the Serbian Constitution.
The most odd and recurring phenomenon are the
statements of the most influential Serbian and federal
officials, including both Presidents of the respective
republics, issued after Kosovo-centred talks with ministers
of the Contact Group countries. All officials calmly state
that they are satisfied with an open exchange of opinions,
and furthermore, that they still oppose any
internationalization of the issue, which in actual fact began
a decade ago.
However, it can be deduced that some repeated

1protagonists of the Kosovo crisis,

requests of the Contact Group were acknowledged as

meriting a kind of response. This is proved by several
coerced half-steps, such as invitation extended to the
expert group of the International Red Cross to visit
Kosovo, announcement of an imminent implementation of
the education agreement, and launching of initiative for
the dialogue with representatives of Kosovo Albanians.
But as this initiative threatened to turn into a political
circus, in view of peaceful and massive demonstrations of
Kosovar warnen and youth, the authorities decided to
engage more seriously in the dialogue. To that effect
President of the Republic of Serbia, Milan Milutinovi6,
issued a declaration, indirectly supported by the FRY
President and praised by many "loyalists." According to
some information Milosevi6 told the French-German
ministerial duo, that he, as the Federal President, had no
authority over Kosovo and that Mr. Milutinovi6 was tasked
with the resolution of this troublesome, internal problem of
Serbia.
Although, the media-hyping of Mulutinovi6's
declaration was expected by all who know how the
government propaganda machinery works, the
statements of foreign politicians and diplomats, speaking
of "considerable progress" which could allegedly
contribute to the resolution of the problem, were deemed
surprising. Although 1 analyzed the text of declaration in
good faith and without any prejudices, 1could not help but
notice that it only reiterated the old and warn-out
solutions. The only positive exception was the positive
evaluation of the former, permanent OSCE mission, which
was bluntly denied hospitality by the SRY in 1992. In other
words, Milutinovi6 mentioned that the mission then acted
on a contractual basis, hence a new one should regulate
its engagement in the same way, which, by extension,
would entail an urgent re-admission of the SRY to the
OSCE.
But, judging by what has been achieved on the
ground, one can say that many requested and expected
concrete steps, giving rise to any optimism, are yet to be
made. The most important Contact Group demand,
directly made to President Milosevi6, namely "to pull-out
special police units and halt the security forces actions
which are detrimental to the civilian population" has yet to
be met, while Felipe Gonzalez mediation was bluntly
rejected and international investigation into possible
crimes against civilians was allegedly offered to the
International Red Cross, an organization with no mandate
over such issues. Although some reports on Milosevi6Kinkel& Vedrin talks indicated that the former pledged to
pull-out his special police units from Kosovo, to date no
such steps were noticed on the ground.
The time is running out. Despite sporadically
favorable, or as 1would call them-encouraging-statements
of some international protagonists, the Bonn ministerial
meeting will essentially assess the genuine progress,
measured by concrete steps and actions. lf it is generally
assessed that little was done, punitive measures will
ensue. They will be of such nature that no Security
Counci! resolution (more likely to be opposed by China
than Russia) will be indispensable for their enforcement.
A threat of a new, deeper stage of isolation will be
strengthened
serious measures to be initiated by the
Contact Group with respect to our neighbors in SouthHelsinki Charter - Special Edition

East Europe. Namely all such measures will aim at

strengthening the security barriers, thus making them
impervious to possible armed conflicts spill-over from
Kosovo, with their undesirable side-effects such as
destabilization of regional peace and stability. The fact is
that following the Bonn meeting of the Contact Group on
25 March, the ministers of the big powers will meet their
counter-parts from South-East of Europe to discuss
possibilities, be it necessary, for the creation of a genuine
sanitary cordon.
While 1 am penning this article (Saturday, 21 March) 1
find it difficult to predict the next steps of the Beigrade
regime. However, l am convinced that they will have to be
concrete and in full compliance with the Contact Group
demands. Albanians reacted to the pressures, promptly
and without any conditions, by announcing that their
negotiating team would be established early next week. A
clear position on the acceptance of Gonzales mission is
the minimum expected from Serbian and Yugoslav
authorities, the minimum without which any progress
would not be feasible.
Helsinki Charter, March 1998

ecently the idea on calling an international conference

has been gaining ground. In the last eight months the
situation deteriorated so much that a more expedient and
decisive engagement of international community is
indispensable.
Such an engagement is justified in situations when
protagonists of a domestic conflict are not able or willing
to hammer out a compromise solution, or when the
situation threatens to escalate to an armed conflict
endangering the world peace. The question is: can
international community shirk its responsibility,
particularly in the light of tragic experiences in Croatia and
Bosnia and Herzegovina in the situation when domestic
protagonists act irresponsibly towards their own people
and the world peace?
Efforts to prevent engagement of international
community in a dangerous European flashpoint, justified
by the position that the Kosovo problem is an internal
issue and the one upholding the 19th century concept of
sovereignty, are equal to problem-dodging, the ostrichlike attitude or invoking the devil. The Kosovo issue was
internationalized lang time ago. In other words due to the
complexity of its ethnic conflict, rampant repression, the
scope of human rights violations and threats to the world
peace, it ceased to be a domestic issue and instead
morphed into an international one.
This is not the first time that international community
interferes in internal issues of a sovereign country. The

January 1999

political history of Europe knows such precedents. In

1920's the Oland islands dispute between Sweden and
Finland was taken to the League of Nations despite streng
protests of Finland which claimed that its relations with
this island were an entirely domestic issue. Following the
two reports of the expert Commission, the Council of the
League backed the sovereignty of Finland over the Oland
islands, but also demanded that Finland guaranteed
national identity of the Swedish minority under the Act on
Oland lslands Autonomy. In that spirit a bilateral
agreement between Sweden and Finland was signed. The
League was a guarantor of the agreement and tasked with
international monitoring of its implementation.
The second example dates back to the post-WW2
period and concerns the South Tyrol dispute between
ltaly and Austria. At one stage Austria, impotent to solve
the issue otherwise, took it to the United Nations. ltaly
opposed this move, (similarly to Finland's reaction) as it
deemed the problem of autonomy of this region an
internal issue. United Nations accepted to engage in the
dispute and subsequently issued a resolution binding ltaly
to negotiate with Austria. The end result was a bilateral
agreement ensuring satisfactory guarantees for the
German minority-the Act on South Tyrol Autonomy.
In both cases the engagement of international
community contributed to the easing of tension and
normalization of relations between the two sovereign
countries. (Hence it is no accident that Austria and ltaly
offered to as act hosts to the negotiating teams of the
confronted sides in northern lreland!). Clearly there are no
absolute guarantees that international community will be
third-time successful. One mustn't idealize it, for it can
sometimes make serious errors. But in the current
circumstances are there better and more secure
guarantees? One could also ask the following question:
what would harm the sovereignty of Serbia and the SRY
more- the war-prevention assistance of international
community or the war in Kosovo?
Those who have in their hands the power to choose
between the war and peace should understand firstly that
in Europe, at the end of 20th century not even a part of
population can be subordinated or held in captivity,
secondly, that the state borders cannot be changed by
force and thirdly, that ethnic conflicts cannot be resolved
by armed interventions. Any side in the Kosovo conflict
which disrespects those messages will not enjoy the
backing of international community. We cannot keep
saying that we are a part of Europe and at the same time
wage a war in the spirit more characteristic of the tribalwarrior mind-set.
One should not accept the thesis that Serbs in Kosovo
are best protected by the military and police forces, nor
the one expounded by the Albanian extremists, that is,
"there is only one way to defend the Albanian rights, and
it is the armed warfare." A peaceful solution should be
persistently championed. Once it is reached and
enforced, there will be both gains and lasses, while in the
war there are only lasses.
In recent times we have witnessed a host of
suggestions and proposals put up by the Serbian side,
which deviate from the dominant centralist-unitarist
positions. The Serbian Renewal Movement (SPO) for
example made public a platform envisaging the territorial-

osovo
political autonomy of Kosovo with two assemblies, of
which the assembly of nationalities would function on the
principle of consensus. President of the Socialist Party of
Serbia promptly stated that the SPO stole its Kosovo
program. In recent past Socialists used to "borrow" the
nationalist programs from the SPO, now the latter did the
same by "borrowing" the Kosovo platform. The roles have
changed, whether for the better remains to be seen. Now
when SPO and SPS might form the government some
progress can be expected, that is a change of muchreiterated position that Kosovo is an internal issue.
lrrespective of the identity of coalition parties in the
government, it is high time that a highly inflammable
situation in Kosovo be treated seriously.
Two things must be done prior to launching dialogue
and initiating search for a compromise solution. Firstly, as
Mahmut Bakali stated recently, readiness to initiate a
dialogue, without prior conditions and maximalist
platforms, must be manifested, secondly, it must be
admitted that Kosovo needs a political solution, and
thirdly, an agreement must be reached on a presence of
the third party (international community).
In any case the final resolution should not be
prejudged. But a compromise would have to envisage
such a political-legal independence of Kosovo which
would firstly neutralize demands for independnet state,
secondly, make Serbs equitable constituent people of
Kosovo and thirdly, ensure internal and international
guarantees of Kosovo's independence. A name of that
form of political independence is less important...and
such a question should not stood in the way of the
dialogue-launching process.
Helsinki Charter, March 1998

rom the standpoint of interests of international

community and regional security, an instrument of
preventive actions must be used in crisis like the Kosovo
one; if fast and effective preventive measures are not
und~rtaken a hardly containable conflict will erupt in
Kosovo. Many strategic analyses have given detailed
elaborations of the following catastrophic scenario: the
chain-reaction of armed conflicts in South East Europ,
embracing the southern flank of NATO, with Kosovo
serving only as the ignition key.
lt is obvious that preventive measures limited to
diplomatic pressures and economic embargo will not be
able to rein in Milosevic's regime. Hence they must
include the announcement of the instrument of
humanitarian military intervention as a concrete and real
threat, if the Beigrade authorities continue to act

irresponsibly and belligerently.

The objective of the military intervention would be to:
a) prevent new massive police and military reprisals
against and massacres of the Albanian people in Kosovo;
b) energetic prevention of ethnic-cleansing campaign
aimed at Kosovo Albanians;
c) laying the groundwork for initiating serious political
negotiations between the relevant political factors in
Beigrade and Pristina.
The military intervention threat should be the ultimate
measure, that is the one preceded by efforts of the
Contact Group and other international institutions (for
example, OSCE) to hammer out a concrete plan of
political measures to include:
a) formulation of clear political frameworks for the
denouement of the crisis through dialogue;
b) establishment of guarantees that international
factors will ensure implementation and time-limits of
agreed solutions;
c) elaboration of urgent, confidence-restoring
measures, such as the implementation of Agreement on
Normalization of Education in Albanian language, reestablishment of complete and efficient health system,
granting of operational licenses to the Albanian electronic
media, normalization of activities of Albanian sports
societies and sports competitions, etc.
All diplomatic demands addressed to Beigrade must
have strict time-limits. lf Beigrade does not manifest its
readiness to collaborate within the prescribed time-limits,
then a concrete plan, including streng and efficient
political and economic sanctions, should be activated.
The best solution for Kosovo would be the
establishment of a temporary protectorate, not with an
open mandate in the sense of someone's territory the fate
of which would be ultimately decided at a later-stage
referendum (this is today unacceptable for Serbia), but
rather with a strictly recovery mandate, during which the
negotiations would be held and confidence instruments
and institutions would be built.
One of the possible models is the European
intervention in Mostar. That is a foreign mandate
commission could be sent to Kosovo to mediate in local
disputes. The other possibility is the establishment of an
interim civil administration and mixed (Serb-Albanian)
police.
One of the more pragmatic models of halfprotectorate would be the establishment of trilateral
commission, composed of representatives of Serbs,
Albanians, and international community, with the mandate
to help resolve conflicts and organize local authorities
while negotiations on the final status of Kosovo are under
way.
Trilateral commission could have a more complex
structure, or the following composition:
a) a representative of Kosovo Albanians
b) a representative of Kosovo Serbs
c) a representative of the Republic of Serbia or the SR
Yugoslavia
d) a representative (optional) of the Republic of
. Albania
e) foreign guarantors (for example, delegated
representatives of the Contact Group, all five of them, or
as it is agreed).
Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

KosovA
The commission could be headed by a governor or a
neutral administrator (from an European country).
This administration would be of technical character
and would not prejudge the questions of ethnicity and
sovereignty. Under this commission Kosovo would
continue to have economic links with the FR Yugoslavia (a
key concession to Beigrade), while its political status
would be frozen (Kosovo would no langer directly
influence elections in Serbia and Yugoslavia.) lf a
temporary solution of the issue how to proportionally
represent Kosovo in the Federal and Serbian Parliament
(Albanians will not easily accept it) were found, for which
there are no legal possibilities under the current
constitution, it could help transfer the dialogue in the
parliaments.
The next possibility is the constitution of Kosovo
Parliament and formation of inter-parliamentary
commission for the settlement of controversial legal
issues and those related to Kosovo administration.
The first ask of the commission would be to organize
elections for local authorities, in line with the principle of
provisional division of power. The commission would also
arbitrate local disputes.
As regards the Yugoslav army and police, the SRY
could be guaranteed a certain army presence in the
barracks, but the presence of Yugoslav police would exact
a compromise solution or international supervision.
Helsinki Charter, March 1998

en-year long anti-Albanian campaign in Serbia, from

early March this year gained momentum. Serbian
media initiated a major competition which could be titled 11
All you ever wanted to say about Albanians but did not
have a chance . 11 The right opportunity presented itself
with the start of the brutal police action in Drenica region,
which as soon turned out, was primarily aimed at civilians,
that is the people who could not be suspected of
belonging to any army. The government-run media
however paid no heed to that: in the mind-set of the
media, the authorities and the majority of Serbian
population all Albanians quickly morphed into terrorists, or
to put it mildly into extremists, separatists, that is
separatist terrorists, terrorist separatists, etc.
But whence "terrorists" and "separatists" in Kosovo?
Politika Ekspres ran a serialized feature titled "The roots of
Shiptari terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija," which, inter
alila claimed that 11 in early stages of W.W.11 Albanians,
seduced by occupiers' propaganda and the promise of
Greater Albania, only sporadically joined the units of the
National Liberation Army. 11 Vecernje Novosti also tried to
give a reply to that question by running a three-part
feature proving that "Shiptari were brought as mercenaries
to Europe by Arabs, 11 and that "many place-names of
Serbian origins in Kosovo and Metohija and Albania

January 1999

confirm that Shiptari were not the original population of

the Balkan peninsula." Relja Novakovic concludes: "Even
today we are naive and we subscribe to Greater Albania
pretensions when we use the name Kosmet, an acronym
of Kosovo and Metohija. From the time immemorial
Metohija, a region west of mountian Cicevica always
differred from Kosovo, a region in the valley of river
Sitnica, east of Cicevica. One should tell them apart them,
for behind their unification first in the word Kosmet, then in
Kosovo, are hidden Albanians aspirations towards the
greater territory. 11 Hence the basic thesis of this feature is
that Albanians came to the Balkan peninsula after Serbs,
and consequently, Serbs can lay "historical claim" on
Kosovo and (why not) on Albania.
Serbs have been persistently using also another
principle to prove that "Kosovo is Serbian"- namely the
"state principle. 11 However if we accept this principle, we
must renounce our aspirations towards Albania, but that is
precisely why we hold on to Kosovo so tight. To put it
briefly this principle is reduced to the inviolability of the
state borders. One cannot help but wander the extent of
double-standards applied by Serbs: they revere this
principle but only as concerns Serbia. They did not
recognize it in Bosnia and Croatia.
The first principle of "historical right" is closely linked
to the "mythical principle," which recognizes that there are
Serbs in Kosovo ( by all accounts today in negligible
numbers), but also insists that the main characteristic of
Kosovo is its "Serbhood. 11 And all this because Kosovo
represents "the cradle of Serbian spirituality," and even
"the cradle of Serbian people." This principle was most
clearly expressed by a recent sentence penned by Kosta
Cavoski (Demokratija, 5 March):
"Serbs cannot think of themselves as a nation, let
alone survive, without Kosovo." This magical or mythical
interpretation of bonds with Kosovo is purported to
indicate that Serbs will be faced with perdition without
Kosovo. the fate will not allow the survival of their
spirituality without Kosovo. Simply, there are these
magical bonds which do not allow Serbs to let go of their
"cradle" and finally grow-up.
Vecernje Novosti and Politika Ekspres, alike in the
propaganda "golden age" of war in Croatia and Bosnia,
resorted to interesting features attempting to prove a lot of
nonsense (this immediately brings to mind a feature of
several years ago which tried to prove that Serbs came to
the Balkan peninsula before Greeks and Romans, and
that the old Greece in fact spread on the territory of
current Serbia). Politika also adhered to its tradition of
running lengthy "echoes and reactions" of various
associations (war veterans of Jablanica area, "citizens" of
Zlatibor area, the Youth Alliance of Kosovo, the Pofarevac
Municipal Committee of Military Recruits, fighters of the
Ninth Serbian Brigade of the National Liberation War."
Independent media, more or less, resist this antiBalkan and war-mongering propaganda, but some of
them failed to evade the artificial equalizing of the
responsibility for the conflict. Hence the Serbian
authorities and Albanian leaders are frequently described
as equally responsible for the Kosovo crisis. Milosevic is
responsible for the "rash" police action and use of
"excessive" force, which will cause sanctions hurting
mostly "innocent" people, while Rugova is responsible for

osovo
wanting independence, declining to openly condemn
11
terrorism 11 and refusing negotiations without international
mediation. In an article ran recently by an independent
weekly, "pacifist interventionism 11 advocated by 11 some
groups 11 in Beigrade was condemned. These groups, as it
seems, urge the deployment of international military
troops in Kosovo, tasked with preventing further conflicts,
like the one in Drenica. This condemnation fits the general
picture of Serbian society opposing 11 internationalization 11
of the Kosovo issue. lt also indicates the lack of
elementary empathy: the author of this article and other
supporters of his opinion would probably advocate
11
pacifist interventionism 11 if they were the victims, like
Albanians in Kosovo.
Admittedly the Serbian pro-regime media have a
difficult task to carry out. Namely on the one hand they
must convince the Serbian population of a great danger in
the shape of Albanian terrorism and separatism and on
the other hand they must indicate that the maximum
Albanians can get (in Serbia) is the cultural autonomy or a
kind of self-management. The media must also create a
favorable atmosphere motivating every Serb to defend
Kosovo until the last Albanian (of course) dies. The
situation is additionally complicated by the fact that
international community must be depicted in two ways:
namely international community sporadically condemns
Albanian 11terrorists 11 and opposes 11 secession 11 of Kosovo,
but also sporadically (barring China and Russia) plots
conspiracies against the Serbian people and dreams of its
downfall and destruction of its spirituality. On the other
hand international public opinion must be convinced that
the Serbian authorities sincerely wish to solve the Kosovo
problem and it also must be proved to all international
factors that Albanians are guaranteed all human and civic
rights.
Thus Slobodan Milosevic (as authority per se, but also
as the editor-in-chief of all the state-run media) is shown to
international community as Dr. Jackyll, and to the Serbian
community as Mr. Hyde. However the trouble is that this
schizophrenia cannot remain hidden for lang, particularly
in view of the fact that the patient has a lang history of
ailment
Helsinki Charter, March 1998

Serbfa

Afania

10

housand words cannot describe happiness,

particularly great happiness as genuinely as a single
photograph. 1 thought that the most moving photograph
was issued in 11 Vreme 11 a couple of months ago: a
schoolboy held at gunpoint by special pocemen with
masks and helmets. The boy had a terrified and tearful
face, and an imploring look in his eyes. lt reminded me of
a historic photograph: a boy from the Warsaw ghetto with
his hands held up high. But then even more poignant
photographs started arriving from Kosovo: just a kilometer
away from Srbica center, on the building material dump
site 49 corpses of different sex and age lied. Among them
were 12 warnen and 13 children aged 3-15. According to
the official Serbian police report casualties were
11
terrorists" killed in 11 ground-cleansing operation 11 in the
village Donji Prekazi, near Srbica.
The world was swamped by photographs of the killed
warnen, children and elderly. The 11 bad guys 11 image of
Serbs, dating back to the 11 war in which Serbia did not take
part, 11 was once again confirmed. The world now wants to
know who the perpetrators of this heinous crime are and
when the official, independent international investigation
will begin.

CHILDREN OF CATASTROPHE
In this context maybe citizens of Serbia would like to
know more about the life of young Albanians, a generation
called "the children of catastrophe 11 by an Albanian
schoolboy. The regime-controlled media have been
disregarding them for a decade now. The exception were
of course the excess situations (peaceful students'
demonstrations this fall) when the younger generation
bare the brunt of the media-bashing.
11
The children of catastrophe" have been educated for
years now in cellars, garages, sheds, private apartments
with dirty walls, and outdoors, in summer months. lf in
early Nineties there was enthusiasim for this alternative
way of studying, if some boys and girls were still 11turned
on" by the romantic ideas of "national liberation, 11 an icy
reality, an increasing pauperization, the cold walls of
abandoned and windowless houses which have not been
whitewashed, have definitely contributed to cooling off of
such efforts. Albanians came to understand that it was
futile for them to persist in their parallel system of
education.
At the parallel university the conditions of studying
were of course inadequate: many students became aware
that their diplomas would be worthless. They probably
came to realize that they could not become doctors if they
had not seen an operation, chemists, if they had never
seen chemical instruments, or electrical engineers without
ever using a powerful computer. The were faced with the
following questions: who will recognize diplomas of the
parallel university? Where will all these young people find
jobs tomorrow?
Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

against constitutional changes Albanian teachers and

professor worked a whole year without receiving salaries.
In the meanwhile the parallel political institutions
established their Education Ministry which passed many
provisions on educational school work and pupilsevaluation, as weil as teachers-selection criteria. The
Serbian Ministry of Education declared illegal the entire
Albanian parallel education system: institutions, curricula,
plans, textbooks, manner of evaluation, and finallydiplomas. All teachers and professors who failed to abide
by the new educational provisions of the Republic of
Serbia were dismissed: 18,000 educational workers and
school personnel lost their jobs.
When on 1 September 1996 the much-heralded
THE PARALLEL WORLDS
Milosevic-Rugova Education Agreement was signed
opinions were voiced that the situation in this field would
A public opinion poll in Kosovo (Agency Argument,
improve, but unfortunately, to
1966)
indicated
that
disappointment
of
the
communications
between
The poorest, the youngest
Serbs and Albanians in Kosovo
international community, it was
reached a zero-point, namely
Accorcling to the officia/ figttre of the Feclera!
just a dead letter. Namely the
that they represented two
Statistics lnstitttte Kosovo in /ate 1994 hacl 2. 09~ 044 two
sides,
so-called
parallel worlds, having contacts inhabitants. Alban/ans boycottecl the censtts_, ancl all
Negotiations 3 plus 3 only
only in the case of conflict. lt is
agreed that "education system
e!ections he!cl by Serbia after the consttttttiona!
quite certain that the official
for Albanian children and
amenclments. Alban/an poptt!ation in Kosovo is very
policy, a decade-long, both
youth should be normalized in
yottng:
70% /s ttncler thirty. A!banicms make ttp the
institutional and uninstituional,
Kosovo."
policy contributed to such a ma/ority ofpoptt!ation-90% or 1; 800. ooo citizens_, Serbs
situation. Albanians and Serbs make ttp 7% ofpoptt!ation (;40;000) whi!e Montenegr/ns_,
THE SCHOOL WALL
are socially divided. Serbs do Mttslims_, Tttrks ancl others make ttp 3% (60/000).
not want to learn the language
The parallel educational
Kosovo has the highest birth rate in Ettrope (27-2
of the other ethnic community chi!clren per 1; ooo citizens_, figure from 1989) ancl its
system is financed through
(only 5% of Serbs say that they poptt!ation clottb!es every thirty years! Kosovo has the
self-contribution of Albanians
speak enough Albanian to have highest Infant mortality in Ettrope (Ju per 1.000
working abroad, who allocate
a normal conversation with
3% of their salaries to that
inhabitants).
Albanians.) On the other hand
purpose. According to the
Kosovo Cl/so ho!cls some other recorcl: gross income
54% of Albanians declare that
Albanian
sources
DM
per cC1pita in 1994 WCIS US/ 350/ whi!e the nC1tionC1!
they speak Serbian.
62,700,000 were spent for
salaries
of
teachers,
Dangerous deepening of income per capitCI in Serb!C1wC1s/1;000. Kosovo hC!s the
professors
and
nonthe inter-ethnic ritt began after highest ttnemp!oyment rate, which is 75% C1ccorcling to
1990 some estimates. In 1990-1996 per/ocl 150;000 peop!e lost
the
1989
and
educational personnel and
constitutional amendments and their /obs_, the fact which affectecl C1pproximC1tely 1
other material investments
Milosevic's
nationalist mi!lion peop!e (C1n C!Verage Kosovo /C!mily has 6.5
(school
reconstruction,
campaign. lt was a response to members.)
whitewashing) in the 1992-95
the systematic repression of
11/iteracy is one of the major prob!ems in Kosovo.
period. The parallel education
Albanian
rights,
their
is also financed from the local
lt
is
estimatecl
that
abottt
25?;
ooo
A!bC1mans
are
illiterate.
marginalization and political,
sources:
parallel political
social and economic discrimination. All this measures
Kosovo institutions levied a 3% tax on profits of private
were designed to step up Albanian emigration and
entrepreneurs, farmers, craftsmen. In the same way
Serbian immigration, but none of this happened.
Kosovo Albanians financed their health system, and
Educational authorities then started insisting on joint plans
cultural and sports activities. The Fund of Mother Theresa
and curricula. Albanians adhered to their own plans and
and
different
other
international
humanitarian
curricula while Beigrade stubbornly rejected all their
organizations also financed all the aforementioned
arguments about specific educational features of this
activities.
large ethnic group. Albanians refused radical changes in
There are no reliable data on the number of Albanian
the group of so-called national subjects: mother tongue
children attending parallel schools, but some Albanian
and literature, history, geography and musical education
sources claim that their number in primary education has
and continued to impart interpretations from their
been steadily decreasing. What is alarming is the fact that
Albanian-lllyrian angle.
one third of pupils, notably girls, does not complete
The 1991-92 school-year began with the delay of
primary education. According to the official figures the
several months. At the end of 1991 the Educational
parallel educational system in Kosovo in the school-year
Council of Kosovo decided to launch the parallel Albanian
1989/1990 covered 304,000 pupils of Albanian ethnicity
educational system: schoolchildren entered their school
attending 959 schools. Only two years later the number of
buildings in January and February. In sign of protest
pupils in the parallel system decreased to 295,800, and in

Last year students protested against their absurd and

difficult situation and demanded only to "return to the
premises which belonged to them. Rector of Pristina
University Radivoj Popovic, one of the national hard-liners,
defended the status qua and made public the official, but
hardly believable figures, namely that Pristina University
had 180,000 students of all nations and nationalities,
naturally except Albanians. The fact is that since the
beginning of the last year's unrest a number of students
packed up their suitcase and went home. Even last year
Albanian students called for dialogue, agreement. But
there was no response. Perhaps it is too late now!?
11

11

11

11

11

11

January 1999

11

11

1995/96 to 268,500 .. .What happened to ten thousands of

children? lt is believed that due to deteriorated
circumstances a number of children left shools, but many
have also left the country with their parents, recent
asylum-seekers in West European countries (350,000
Kosovo Albanians emigrated from the SRY.)
The Kosovo paradox frequently affects innocent
children: both the official and parallel systems function in
197 school buildings. However in some schools, in the
middle of buildings new walls were built to visually and
physically separate Serbian and Albanian pupils! As
Albanian pupils are banned entry to 29 primary schools,
they receive education in private houses. In seven
Albanian schools education is carried out in four shifts.
Half of those schools are very old buildings without
elementary sanitary installations.
lf public opinion polls indicate that Albanians and
Serbs live in parallel worlds, if everything indicates that
Albanian and Serbian nationalism are complementary and
often feed on each other, the question is whether those
two peoples have anything in common. And the answer is,
yes, they have something in common - sweeping poverty
and lack of prospects.
Helsinki Charter, March 1998

When I was little they tr/ecf to intimiclate me w/th

stories about bogeyman/ ancf now I am supposecf to sit
ancf talk with the same bogeyman. Weil I am not that
crazyl Ancf I tel! you that I have no Intention
whatsoever to talk to bogeyman/ !et alone live with
him.~~1

ive months have passed since 1 spent five joyful days

in the now turbulent Kosovo. In late October last year 1
participated in the seminar on non-violent conflict
resolution. lt was one in a series of seminars held in the
SRY by Pax Christi organization, but the topic was
specific-Kosovo.
1 left for Kosovo, ignorant as 1 was about "our"
southern province and even more about its people. The
first "close encounter" with Kosovo locals happened in
Beigrade, that is in the private bus taking us to Prizren. In
addition to the participants of the seminar the bus
passengers were mostly Albanians and Turks from the
Prizren area. Neither the bus nor the passengers looked
promising. However the driver's and co-driver's kindness,
fruit juices and sweets they kept offering us, and their
efforts to find us a taxi in the downpour at the Prizren bus
station, were something to write home about, and
pleasant surprise, particularly compared to my awful
return journey to Beigrade, five days later, in the state-

owned "lasta" Bus.

When we arrived in Prizren, all participants have been
already there. lt was a motley crew: Albanian students, an
American girl, two men, one from Nis and other from
Kragujevac and Belgian and Dutch organizers. The
program covered a host of lectures on the art of
communication, hearing, giving and receiving information,
on how to dodge taking either inferior and superior
position while communicating with someone, and related
exercises. An interesting agenda, definitely worth
mastering. What the program did no cover, but we
nonetheless did- was our carousing and friendly banter.
Those were sleepless, but mirthful nights. have been
always told that Serbs and Albanians are different, but
unless my memory fails me, we listened to the same
music, talked about identical, cherished books. We were
similarly dressed, and the jokes in all languages made us
laugh. Maybe somebody older and wiser could explain to
me why we cannot live together? 1 want somebody to teil
me why M. cannot study in Beigrade, although it has been
his childhood dream, eversince his parents told him
stories about their student' days. 1 do not know whether
the "I am the Beigrade University" badge he bought in
Beigrade (on the occasion of the January seminar) gives
him some comfort, but 1 hope that "ours" and "theirs" future
children will wear the same badge.
Our cheertul group was also affected by recent
Kosovo "practice." 1 was one of the victims of Kosovo
"watchers," and my message to them would be very brief:
"Mr. 'watcher' in plainclothes it is not fair to 'borrow"' from
a guest's room the seminar program. You should first
learn some English as it could help you decide whether
something is worth taking-or leaving. lf not, then you
could nicely ask me to give you the desired material. But
as the things stand now 1 hope that during the translation
you also managed to learn something from it. Joking
apart, it is never pleasant to be tailed and "watched" and 1
suppose it must be pretty nasty if it lasts for years.
After the seminar we went to Pristina to visit several
Albanian schools. As it was only one-day stay, 1 can only
speak about what 1 saw, and 1 saw one elementary and
one secondary school. 1 don't know how the other
Albanian schools look, but the two mentioned looked
awful. 1 admire children and teachers who work under
such conditions. The building of elementary school was
divided in "their" and "our" school. Albanians were given
the groundfloor level with several classrooms, and Serbs
got the first and second floor. There are 880 Albanian and
50 Serbian children. Albanian classes have on average
40-45 pupils and Serbian- i 5. Luckily enough children are
small, so 5-6 of them can squeeze in a bench. When they
grow up they will get bigger benches, as Albanian pupils
were given, but still five of them will have to sit together.
School shifts were organized in such a way to prevent any
contacts between Serbian and Albanian children, who
cannot meet even during the breaks. The wise elders are
afraid that chi!dren, if they meet, as it befits their age, will
start talking, fighting or playing games. Jean Jacques
Russeau in his book on education says: "We do what a
child likes, or we demand that a child acts as we like, we
either fulfill his wishes, or we subject a child to our wishes;
it seems that there is no middle-of-the-road solution,
hence a child must command, or be commanded.
Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

Because of this the first notions a child learns are those of

authority or subjection." don't know if "the wise elders"
who are "concerned" about our lives read Russeau, but it
seems to me that that the general desire is to teach every
citizen of this country, since his infancy, where his "real
place" is. 1 deeply apologize to the wise eiders if my
impression is wrang, but nonetheless they should try to
dissuade me. would also like to know how people who
are next door neighbors, and so ignorant about each
other, can sit and talk. When was little they tried to
intimidate me with stories about bogeyman, and now 1 am
supposed to sit and talk with the same bogeyman. Weil 1
am not that crazy! And teil you that 1 have no intention
whatsoever to talk to bogeyman, let alone live with him! ! !
And finally 1 just want to say that do not know much
about politics, that 1 am politically ignorant because 1 am
not interested in it. just know that 1 love people, children
and animals. but not when
are dead.
Helsinki Charter, March 1998

Albanians, through their representatives had the

opportunity to declare whether they wanted to join that
state or not. Since the 1878 Berlin Congress and the 19121913 Balkan Wars Albanians were treated as "addendum"
to conquered (or "liberated") territories.
The problem of relations with Albanians is the problem
of relations with the Others and Different. As different
Albanians always aroused suspicions. During the Balkan
wars, one of the principal strategic goals of the Serbian
policy (and one of the official war goals of the Kingdom of
Serbia in the First World War) was the attainment of the
access to the Adriatic Sea, through Northern Albania. The
local population was to be "pacified" or "cleansed." Even
before, that is in the immediate Post-Berlin Congress
period, the first "ethnic-cleansing" was carried out in the
territories of today's municipalities of Bujanovac, Presevo
and Medveda. Albanians and the local Muslim population
were encouraged" in many ways to leave those areas,
and mostly frequently by blackmail, burning-down of
entire villages and murders. The killing of the Muslim and
non-Slav population was not considered a crime, but
rather as a necessary "inconvenience. As the others"
they have already posed a potential threat to the then
dominant ethnic groups. Of course, this threat was utterly
imaginary and irrational. The elementary anthropological
fact is that only with respect to the Others we determine
our own status, position, and symbolic place. ff the
Others did not exist, we would have no idea of our own
origins and identity, for the others are a symbolic
guarantee and genuine confirmation of "our" identity.
In the light of the above constant conflicts with
Albanian aspirations on the local political scene are
understandable. Hence Albanians are not even allowed to
have education in their mother tongue (although in
Kosovo it entailed the Serbian non-compliance with an
already signed agreement on the return of Albanian pupils
and students to their school buildings; and in Macedonia
it was manifested by the authorities' rejection to recognize
the independent Albanian university and by the anger of
the Macedonian students at the fact that Albanians were
allowed to have lectures in their mother tongue at the
Pedagogical Faculty). Non-Albanians view the Otherness
of Albanians as a threat. When the Student Union of the
Independent Albanian University in Pristina won the
prestigious award for tolerance (of the Beigrade
opposition daily "Nasa Borba') the paper and the award
board were vilified by the Serbian opposition parties and
public opinion. Even relatively independent media, for
example Radio B92, refused to open a relevant panel
discussion on the causes of such hysterical reactions.
This phenomenon could be explained in the following
way: the awarding of ethnic Albanians is at a symbolic
level equal to "accepting" the others as possible winners
of "our" awards and also a symbolic acceptance of the
0thers" and "Different" as our" potential peers or equals.
This goes against the grain, that is, the firmly established
notion that Albanians in the Balkans embody the 0thers.
Albanians present a problem because their
otherness" affects almost all Balkan people. Let's for a
moment consider the obsession with tradition. Tradition is
of course only a construction. The notion of "tradition,"
although related to the past, is rarely used in explanation
of the past events, but almost always for justifying things
11

11

ecent statement of President Kiro Gligorov that

Macedonia was ready to organize the "humanitarian
corridor" towards Albania for 400,000 (potential) refugees,
in case of open conflicts in Kosovo, was unanimously
criticized by an overwhelming majority of Albanian
politicians, both in Kosovo and Macedonia. At the same
time rumors started circulating in Beigrade that the
authorities were ready to launch the "scorched earth"
policy in Dreneca and Srbica areas, as the casualties
would be minimal in nearly Serbless Drenica area. Also
the rumors spread that that the "normal" police units
withdrew from the areas in which the Kosovo Liberation
Army operated. They were allegedly replaced by the
special police units with adequate equipment including
tanks, choppers and armed carriers (the Serbian police in
recent year morphed into a powerful armed force,
according to some source even better equipped than the
Yugoslav Army.) A recent strong police intervention
corroborated those rumors.
Therefore Gligorov only publicly confirmed recent
rumors to the effect that the explosion of violence was to
be expected in Kosovo. Hence the neighboring countries
had to prepare for direct consequences thereof. However
the angry response of Albanians should be interpreted as
their protest against the others who constantly talk about
their destiny and make pertinent decisions; Albanians in
the Balkans have been postulated as the Others and
Different (linguistically and culturally within the framework
of the former Yugoslavia, and as the largest non-Slav
ethnic group or people in the Balkans.) and in view of that
were rarely consulted about anything. The good example
of the above is the creation of the first and second
Yugoslavia, when all peoples and ethnic groups, except

January 1999

11

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11

11

11

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osovo
happening now or objectives to be attained in the future.
This notion (tradition) is used as an intrument for making
distinction between akin ethnic groups, which have been
living in peace and harmony for centuries (for example to
every good ethnologist or at least a careful observer it is
clear that Serbs from Croatia in many aspects (except
religion) are more similar to Croats than to Serbs from
Serbia.) Particularly problematic are constructions which
compound tradition and (national) history, for in thusimagined history some past events favoring "our causes"
are interpreted selectively. This concept of "our cause" is
very problematic in the Balkans (and in South East
Europe) where "peoples" like to vaunt about their long
tradition and unique origins. Additional problem is the fact
that all authorized representatives of "peoples" of this part
of Europe, either do not know, or do not want to know
what "ethnic identity" is.
The notion of ethnic identity is something
"understood" in every day discourses (notably in the
political sphere), or as Humpty Dumpty explains to Alice
"those who use it consider that the notion means exactly
what they think it means-neither more nor less." Ethnic
identity is in fact a construction and as such it is
completely artificial and arbitrary. This notion is
constructed with respect to the other "imagined" ethnic
identities as their opposite and as a symbolic denotation
of one community with respect to the other. This
practically means that the protagonists of the former and
current Yugoslavia's conflicts operate with imagined
notions and act (and believe) that their conduct is based
on something "real." Ethnic identity constitutes what is
understood as "Croatian," "Macedonian," or "Serbian
nation," and what is based on centuries-long tradition. lt
disregards certain historical and anthropological facts, for
example the fact that nations and national states in the
Balkans were formed in late Nineteenth century (in
Albanian and Macedonian case in early Twentieth
century.) Any mention of Serbian (or Greek, Bulgarian,
Croatian) nation (or national state) before Nineteenth
century is nonsensical.
Such stances cause a greet degree of
misunderstanding
between
representatives
of
"international community" and authorized representatives
of the Balkan peoples. lt is noteworthy that the much-used
concept of ethnic identity, considered "real" by the Balkan
nations, is viewed as a construction by the rest of the
world. What the Balkan countries establish as the product
of "blood and land," the world treats as an established fact
that people live in certain areas and respect laws and
norms of behavior of a certain community. For example,
anthropology views the notion of "nation" as the notion of
"race," in other words as something used in theory, but not
established in reality (although people often act in
conformity with such concepts and thus consequences of
their behavior are real. Sarajevo, Vukovar, and Mostar are
very real indicators of such consequences.) As the
authorized negotiatiors from this territory truly believe that
they represent the nation with the great (the greatest?)
freedom-loving tradition, which constitutes the basis of
their centuries-long ethnic identity, it is very difficult to
convince them that they are operating only with
constructions.
When tracing back their origins, many nations

discover that before the arrival of Slavs and lllyrians other

ethnic groups lived in the Balkan peninsula. Although
Albanians are not lllyrians, from all the peoples from this
peninsula, they are the Glosest to lllyrians. As such they
symbolically represent a link with the past, which the other
(Slav) peoples are trying to establish now. As the "Others"
they practically remind "us" (as the "others" with respect to
Albanians) of tradition (the Old Age when Mediterranean
and South East Europe were indeed "cradles" of European
civilization) to which we want to belang. At the same time
they warn us (with their hardly understandable culture,
language, customs, social mores, etc.) that we have
nothing to do with that tradition. Albanians are a threat to
our assumed or desired mythological links with the past,
that is, to the mythologized basis of our "tradition" and
"origins." In a sense all Slavic inhabitants of the Balkans
envy Albanian links with the glorious (heroic past.) and
covet them for themselves.
The notion "Otherness" does not only apply to
Albanians. Croats determine Serbs as "the Others" and
vice versa. In Bosnia and Herzegovina Muslims were
called "the Others" with the terrible consequences
witnessed by the whole world. As all these peoples are of
Slav origins they can easily fit in mutually understanding
(but not necessarily mutually acceptable) cultural
patterns. The main reason for excessive resentment and
disrespect between Slav ethnic groups is the fact that they
recognize in the other groups many similar characteristic.
By extension their dislike of Albanians is even stronger, as
the "otherness" of the latter is completely alien, and
consequently, subversive. One could even maintain that
"to be Albanian" in the Balkan conditions is the clearest
metaphor for subversion and "otherness." In other words
we are all in fact Albanians.
Helsinki Charter, March 1998

uthorities acting in collusion with the opposition use

an extremely manipulative vocabulary while writing
the most recent pages of the Kosovo drama. The state-run
media distort the Kosovo-related facts so much, that every
single sentence has to be decoded in order to discover its
real meaning.
There is this resounding, chorus-like demand
addressed to responsible representatives of Kosovar
Albanians that they must condemn the newly-emerged
terrorism in Kosovo. All the while not a single attempt has
been made to explain what motivated people, devoted to
passive resistance for almost a decade, to suddenly take
up arms. To elucidate this phenomenon it is necessary to
admit the continuous police, administrative and judicial
terror of central authorities in Kosovo. Consequently such
a violence and repression ultimately had to produce
radicalization of an increasing number of young people
resolved to defend themselves by force of arms.
Many responsible representatives of Albanian people
Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

have often pleaded that such a violence be stopped. Even

today they are against the use of force and in favor of a
political process leading to a solution. But how can one
expect them to mark as terrorists families Ahmeti, Sejdiju,
all other civilians, warnen and children massacred last
weekend in the area of Drenica. lt can hardly be expected
that they label as terrorists all the peaceful demonstrators
in Pristina and Kosovo-wide, brutally dispersed by the
police.
Although representatives and leaders of so-called
democratic opposition have also strongly urged cessation
of violence, one can hardly recall any example of their
condemnation of or protest against the massive lay offs,
arrests, maltreatment of Kosovar Albanians in the past.
They have also failed to protest against scandalous trials
of alleged Albanian perpetrators and the ensuing
draconian prison sentences, anticonstitutiona ban on
Albanian property use and administrative misuse made
every Kosovar Albanian the victim of an apartheid policy
and the second-rate citizen.
The federal parliament recently acted in a similar
fashion by paying tribute to the security forces members
perished in recent clashes, and ignoring the fact that
some twenty FRY citizens lost their lives in the same
locality and at the same time. The latter is an insult to all
Albanians in our country and widens the gap created by
the policy of denigration.
In recent times the highest representatives of
authorities and all opposition leaders advocate in unison
the political dialogue as the way out of the current Kosovo
crisis. In principle nobody can be against such advocacy.
But behind the rhetoric favoring the dialogue, nobody can
even glimpse the real topic of talks. There isn't a single
indicator of possibly acceptable option, be it the
autonomy of Kosovo any other kind of status. As regards
human rights it is persistently reiterated that they are
already guaranteed in Kosovo in keeping with the highest
international standards. Hence human rights ought not to
be the topic of any agenda, unless one considers that
proposals on regionalization of Kosovo, containing the
covert idea of division of Kosovo, accompanied by new,
massive ethnic-cleansing, can be the topic of any agenda.
One must also wonder why dialogue has become an
option only now. But there are also other other questions,
for example, why nothing was done to patiently rebuild
mutual confidence, limited by mutual mistakes in the past
decade, and why the Education Agreement, brokered by
foreign mediators, has not been implemented to date.
The kick-oft of a serious political dialogue on Kosovo
is not feasible today without foreign mediation. Hence the
vehement rejection of such mediation is tantamount to
absence of will to embark upon genuine negotiations.
Under the current conditions any talk about "protection of
sovereignty" and adamant rejection of "foreign
interference" can be only interpreted as the intention to
preserve the status quo, which in fact cannot be
sustained.
There are two reasons behind such a great interest of
international community in the problem of Kosovo and its
readiness to get involved in the process of denouement.
Firstly it is interested in the protection of human rights, an
area which stopped being an internal issue of any country
since the adoption of the Helsinki Charter. Secondly, there

January 1999

is a real danger of further escalation of tension and

eruption of armed conflicts, which could consequently
endanger the regional peace. The latter is accepted in
international politics and legal science as a valid reason
for the engagement of international factors and bodies
with a view to permanently eliminating such a danger. As
the Kosovo drama contains both reasons for international
involvement, insistence on the preservation of "the reserve
of domestic issues" can lead to an even deeper
international
isolation
along with
strengthened
international presence and influence in this crisis area.
lnstead of rejecting such engagement, demands of the
most influential international factors should be met, and
furthermore their pronounced readiness to contribute
constructively to the just political resolution be tested.
Our widely-shared assumption that international
mediation or participation in the quest for a solution to the
Kosovo crisis would benefit only the Albanian side-is
wrang. Albanians have serious objections to some
aspects of the concept put forward by the majority of
international factors. Such objections have been also
raised by the Beigrade authorities and even Kosovo
Serbs. Neither side will be able to ensure in advance
backing for all its viewpoints. Only a well-intentioned
dialogue and serious and realistic arguments can break
the impasse.
lf the political dialogue is indeed viewed as the way
out of the crisis, than it is logical to contemplate possible
forms and framework of international engagement. lt is
difficult to imagine a country equally acceptable for both
sides, but on the other in any future dialogue it is
imperative that international factors take an impartial
position. Hence orientation towards an international body
or organization, as the OSCE, would be logical, for it could
mediate and encourage substantive progress and through
its proposals also facilitate the agreement-reaching, and
more importantly ensure its full implementation. But the
nature of the final resolution depends on negotiators, who
will be successful only if they initiate and conduct their
dialogue without preconditions and intransigence.
But the first condition for overcoming the current
stalemate is synchronized cessation of violence. But in
that regard the Beigrade authorities should make the first
move by stopping their war-mongering policy and the
current repression in Kosovo. They should do that
immediately in view of possible escalation of
confrontation, and announcement of international
intervention. lf the former happens developments will be
difficult to control, and if the latter comes about, it will not
be possible to influence its course.
"Nasa Borba", March 1998

or ten years now, since the ascent of Slobodan

Milosevic, Serbia has been resolving its internal
problems and those of the former Yugoslavia, and now
problems with the world and again in Serbia,
by
institutional and non-institutional measures. Referendum
on mediation of international community in Kosovo is in
fact a genuine crystallization of position of this regime on
its 37% citizens of other ethnicities and an open
confrontation with them. Citizens of Serbia, obviously
those of Serbian ethnicity, declare themselves "for" or
"against" citizens of Serbian of other ethnic origins.
In view of ethnic structure of Serbia such a
confrontation can last for a long time. As things stand now
this regime will open fronts against all minorities, for in
addition to ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, other minorities in
Serbia also await solutions of their statuses, infringed
seriously in the past ten years. Solutions guaranteed by
the former Yugoslavia were seriously derogated. Although
the SRY is trying to be recognized the continuity of the
former state, it cannot be said that it is trying to achieve
high-quality solutions in some areas, notably as regards
the resolution of the minority issue. In the wake of the SRY
disintegration, some peoples, Albanians, Muslims and
Croats lost their well-defined status.
Regime"s and opposition parties neglect of minorities
generated their genuine radicalization. lnstead of looking
for solutions in the civil options, all minorities started
founding their parties (even several of them.) which due to
their small following can hardly achieve the census and
consequently secure seats in the Serbian Parliament.
Closing of minorities on the model of the majority people
brought about the general entrenchment of all ethnic
groups expecting solutions from international community.
lt is obvious that the minorities-related solution is not
possible at this moment of time due to considerable
fascization of the majority people. The rise of the Radical
Party, and now their participation in the government
weakens hopes that serious dialogue on Kosovo,
Vojvodina, Sumadija and Sandfak and other key issues of
this country can be initiated in Serbia.
Judging by actions of the regime and opposition the
Serbian elite is bent on completing the concept of ethnic
state, of using this "historical moment" to be rid once and
for all of other ethnicities, and the challenges of living in a
complex state. In the light of such aspirations the muchvoiced opinion that "Albanians have the right to expand,"
but also "we cannot cohabitate with them" should be
interpreted. An ever-increasing number of panel
discussion and public speeches of prominent Serbian
intellectua!s indicate that preparations for "the final
solution" are under way. Simulated negotiations are
obviously designed to show to Serbian people that
Albanians do not want any dialogue. The last wave of antiAlbanian propaganda removes these two peoples from

dialogue even more, and aims at preparing the conflict

similar to the one in Croatia and Bosnia.
lf one takes into account the general position on the
return of refugees to all the newly-emerged states, it
becomes clear that the fates of refugees and minorities
are closely interwoven. Minorities are suppressed to make
room for "our Dwn" refugees.
Unfavorable political and economic conditions
intensify migrationary processes in all directions. For
example Muslims who cannot go back to Sand:Z:ak easily
get their documents in Sarajevo. The Croatian authorities
settle Croats from Bosnia (and even from Kosovo) in
Krajina and prevent their return to Posavina and central
Bosnia. Through administrative obstructions the Serbian
authorities halt the return of Albanians, Muslims, Croats
and Hungarians and make very difficult the return of Serbs
to Croatia.
The three largest national movements in the former
Yugoslavia, Serbian, Croatian and Albanian, at this
moment are trying to carve up Bosnia and Herzegovina
and Macedonia. By creating new realities they manage to
present to international community the fait accompli
situation, whereby they mercilessly and cruelly sacrifice
the lives and future of their fellow-nationals. Currently only
a decisive and unified policy of the Contact Group, the EU
and the US can stop this destructive process.
lf that does not happen, the process of fragmentation
will make the principle of ethnicity utterly absurd. Serbia"s
initial tackling of this principle backfired in Serbia proper.
Unfortunately as the Serbian elite has not abandoned the
ethnic principle it cannot prevent fragmeritation of Serbia
proper.
Helsinki Charter, April 1998

s 23 April approaches, dilemmas over possible

consequences of this unhappy event grow as do
suspicions about future behavior of Serbian and Yugoslav
authorities and steps to be undertaken by leading factors
in international political and security scene, represented
by the Contact Group. lt bears mentioning that all
conclusions of the Contact Group meeting (29 April in
Rome) will be undoubtedly supported by the OSCE in its
transatlantic version, the European Union and the Council
of Europe, and, if necessary, the UN Security Council.
representatives of the Contact Group countries
have already stated that the expected referendum results
would be considered irrelevant with respect to the future
developments in the resolution of the dramatic Kosovo
crisis. This statement must have been an assessment of
the real character of quasi-democratic manipulation
designed to fan nationalist hysteria and aggressive
xenophobia, as factors creating new national
Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

homogenization on a proven platform. Although this

humiliating treatment of pompously announced "the will of
people" can seem insulting to the main protagonists of the
referendum project, it, in its gist, offers an additional and
unexpected opportunity to the Serbian regime and
President Milosevic to put forward, according to a recent
Kinkel-Talbott formulation, "a reliable offer for the start-up
of dialogue with Kosovo Albanians."
This practically means that Milosevic is expected to
make an autonomous move which would ease a growing
tension and open chances for a serious and equitable
dialogue, without prior conditions. He should made that
move irrespective of "the popular will" which is certain from
the moment of referendum announcement, and which he
traditionally and notoriously disregards. Judging by
competent statements of all relevant representatives of
Albanian political parties and associations and clear
positions of all the key international factors dialogue is not
possible without participation of international mediators,
who should support and encourage positive
and
constructive talks, independent proposals and models,
and provide guarantees for implementation of possibly
adopted and mutually acceptable solutions. But the
referendum, accompanied
much-heralded patriotism
and condemnation of all those "traitors" who oppose this
transparent maneuver, is prepared by Beigrade
authorities to prove to "the third factor" that it is not needed
as a negotiator. Hence chances are very slim that
Milosevic will avail himself of opportunity, unexpectedly
provided by international community, to halt further
isolation of an already exhausted state, economy and
society.
According to available indications from the circles of
the ruling parties, it seems that a statute on the status of
Kosovo is prepared somewhere in the background to be
presented by representatives of the Serbian government
to Kosovo Albanians. But the fact is that Kosovo Albanians
will not sit at the same conference table with Serb
negotiatiors. They won"t turn up for talks because of
absence of international negotiators and also because
they are aware that a draft statute will be unfavorable, and
likely to breach the principle of equality and unconditional
dialogue. They know that it will represent a dictum instead
of a move towards tolerant dialogue.
lf the requested "step forward" is not made by the
Serbian authorities or President Milosevic (to whom the
request was directly addressed), and the dialogue does
not start, then on 29 April new sanctions against the SRY,
that is Serbia, will be imposed. However it was hinted
from the top political circles of France, United States and
Germany that they have reached an agreement to exclude
Montenegro from the sanctions, or its effects, in view of
the reformist cours.e of the Montenegrin authorities in
domestic, but also foreign arena. But unfortunately even
that "exclusion" can have only a limited protective effect, in
view of the current non-functioning of the federal
government.
This "exclusion" partly motivates President Milo
8ukanovi6 and his pro-European followers in their severe
criticism of the Serbian leadership for its stubborn refusal
to establish normal communication with Europe and the
world.
On the other hand the Montenegrin leadership and
January

1999

the pronounced "traitors" in the Serbian political scene,

have realistically assessed that a further irrational and
arrogant challenging of the political will and accepted
standards of international community, will cause not only
isolation, but also implementation of the war option,
which, judging by authorities' and army's moves is weil
under way. All the well-known mechanisms, applied
during disintegration of the former Yugoslavia, have been
set in motion. They start oft with announcements to the
effect that cohabitation is impossible and end up with
brutal destruction or massive persecution of unwanted
ethnic entity. Authors of this adventure have forgotten that
international community has gained enough experience
during its engagement in the resolution of the B&H war
and is consequently aware of direct consequences
resulting from its late and indecisive responses. lt is also
aware that any armed confrontation in Kosovo would lead
to the conficlt spill-over in the neighboring Balkan
countries, and would consequently threaten the regional
peace and stability. if that happens it is very likely that
Russia will not want or be able to veto the enforcement of
Resolution VII of the UN Charter, the one legitimizing the
NATO military intervention, as the lang arm of the United
Nations, with a view to preventing the spreading of conflict
and its elimination on the ground. Obviously that the
conflict and possible intervention would destroy the
infrastructure in Kosovo and affect all the citizens caught
in such a maelstrom of violence and destruction.
Which of these scenarios will be applied in Kosovo,
Serbia and Yugoslavia is entirely in the hands of Slobodan
Milosevic. Decisive international factors will not hesitate in
responding to any option which Serbia makes. In case of
peaceful option Serbia and Yugoslavia will be allowed to
gradually return to the circle of European countries and
their joint organizations. But if Serbia opts for a violent
solution, international community will retaliate by stronger
force, which will lead to a long exclusion of Serbia from
normal life and development, and the surrounding world.
Helsinki Charter, April 1998

lf the sanctions affected the ru.lers/ then their

battle and patriotic cries would probably die away
quickly
here is a morbid tale which says that for a prisoner
there is only one worse punishment than hanging, and
that is - impaling. Citizens of this country should bear in
mind this story when, while waiting for another round of
sanctions, they laconically say that the old sanctions have
not been suspended, so it could not be worse. But they
are wrong, fot it could be worse!
The situation does not look that bad at a cursory
glance. As it has already leaked the National Bank of
Yugoslavia sent a circular letter to the commercial banks
with the caveat that in order to prevent the blockade they
must transfer money deposited in foreign banks to safer

accounts. lt was learnt unofficially that all businessmen

have done that well in advance of the NBY"s warning, and
unannounced visits of high-ranking delegations from
Beigrade were reportedly seen in Cyprus and Beirut. They
reportedly had sackfuls of money, a part of which was
spent on a shopping-spree in the Lebanese capital (who
could resist the local closing-down sales? !) . Some
protagonists of financial transactions designed to offset
the effects of "old" sanctions maintain that it is impossible
to trace the money taken out of country, as with the help
of so called friendly nations, Russia, Ukraine, Belorus,
Cyprus, etc., it is moved quickly from account to account.
In the US Embassy in Beigrade we were told that the
moneyhunt is feasible if the search is organized on time
and from the right place.
The largest number of Serbian economic experts back
the thesis that new embargo will not affect the Yugoslav
economy. This position is often corroborated by
arguments that such moves even today have very little
impact on the economic development. This primarily
applies to foreign capital flow, financing of privatization by
foreign governments, money collection through financial
markets, and trade concessions (suspension of the EU
preferential treatment was commented as "useless ...
since they have not been used at all in recent past".)
Mladan Dinkic, coordinator of the G-17 (a group of
economists which has come up with an alternate package
of economic reforms), believes that the suspension of
balance of payments with foreign countries will be a major
blow to economy. Contrary to his opinion Ratko Banovic,
Governor of the NBY, maintains that the trade sanctions
represent a much heavier blow.
Lulled by their crafty avoidance of many restrictive
measures Serbs have forgotten two important, even key
things: the price of such embargo and the fact that current
economic situation is different from the one in 1992.
Contrary to general belief the objective of sanctions is not
-and cannot be- the halting of all economic activities of a
country, but rather slow draining of its economy and
undermining of its economic might, which according to
some contemporary theories, constitute the basis of
security. The 1992 sanctions have by and large achieved
that goal.
According to an assessment of Danko 8uni6, the
former Vice President of the Federal Government, earlier
sanctions cost the SRY USO 60 billion, and the new ones
would incur an additional USO 40 billion damage. To
make things clear we would like to underscore that the
above amount is equal to the total value of a country's
GNP in the ten year period. Hence the total cost would be10 years of our lives.
~et us remind our readers that in mid 1992, when the
UN embargo was imposed, all of us were considerably
richer. The SRY foreign currency reserves were ten times
superior to the current ones, and judging by the figures
released by the Basel-based International Settlement
Bank (BIS) the authorities managed from June 1991 to
June 1992 to spend and/or to move to "safer" accounts
and places about US$ 4 billion. This money helped the
state to wage the war and overcome the economic
isolation of the country. Eight years ago an average salary
started falling under DM 1,500-today it is DM 150.
Population not only earns less, but has also spent all its

savings - they were "eaten up" by Dafina and Jezda

"Banks," Loan for Serbia"s Recovery and covering of
everyday expenses. That is why the impact of the first
sanctions was less painful.
Although the speed and depth of the social collapse
resulted from sanctions, a large number of experts who
claim that sanctions were only a pretext for the economic
incompetence of the regime and the resultant economic
catastrophe, are probably right. No wonder that
Aleksandra Posarac, a prominent expert of the Institute of
Economic Sciences and the World Bank maintains that
"sanctions could be interesting to those who control the
national economy, for their enormous wealth originates
from that very source. The regime made political and
economic gains owing to the UN-imposed sanctions, as it
had no long-term economic strategy but only manipulated
the economic factors on a daily basis. Secondly the
authorities used sanctions as an excuse for and
justification of all the inevitable difficulties - recession is
looming, "unaided" by the economic embargo. Also
people tend to tie hyperinflation to embargo, but it is
forgotten that YU dinar was stabilized in 1994, while
sanctions were in place."
As such understanding of the situation is gaining
ground, many prominent personalities (from Vesna Pesic,
leader of the Civic Alliance, to economic experts close to
the regime) voiced their demand that possible new
sanctions should above all be targeted on the most
prominent member of the ruling clique (Slobodan
Milosevic, Mira Markovic, their children, Dragan Tomi6
One and Dragan Tomic Two and members of their
families, Mirko Mrjanovic, Gorica Gajevic, namely all those
who made a fortune in the situation which caused
misfortune of Serbian people). Although it is no mean feat
(the freezing of their private accounts abroad would hurt
them most) it is not impossible (on the basis of sanctions
the Danish authorities, for example, froze all private
accounts of citizens residing in the SR Yugoslavia). lf
those who advocate sanctions found the way to do the
same thing, the battle and patriotic cries of the regime
leaders would probably die away quickly.
Helsinki Charter, April 1998

Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

t is to be hoped that Milosevi6-Rugova meeting, held on

15 May 1998 in Beigrade, marked the beginniog of a
new stage in Serb-Albanian relations and the end of lang
process of non-communication threatening to deepen the
standstill and diminish outlook for a peaceful way-out from
this explosively dangerous crisis. But it bears stressing
that this first meeting is not the first joint venture of the two
main protagonists of the Serb-Albanian drama. Two years
ago Milosevic and Rugova signed the Agreement on
Albanian Language Education successfully brokered by
representatives of the "St. Egidio" organization. Although
this important agreement was for a lang time only a dead
letter, its discreet-mediation genesis demonstrated that
indirect dialogue and so-called "the third factor" role were
possible.
All the above was clearly evidenced by the
preparations for the Beli Ovar Meeting. The US tandem,
Holbrooke-Gelbrand, thanks to its considerable
experience in handling the Balkan chieftains, in an
incredible balancing act managed to reconcile two
seemingly irreconcilable approaches. Milosevic had to be
persuaded that his agreement to meet with Rugova he
could always present as his own decision, motivated by
the referendum results which refute foreign mediation,
and Rugova had to be persuaded that the meeting was in
line with the US initiative and involvement, so categorically
urged by the Albanian side (and irrespective of the
inevitable compromise regarding the venue of the
meeting).
However both leaders were faced with an unpleasant
task, namely how to interpret this sudden turnaround to
their followers. Milosevic's propaganda has already
launched odes to his presidential wisdom, peaceful
position and dignity in defense of national and state
interests, by which the negation of the referendum results
will be weil concealed. The regime-controlled media will
also resort to hyping possible kudos from international
sources, as weil as announcements of various
encouraging moves, from the suspension of punitive
measures to promised support to the SRY integration in
international organizations and bodies.
Rugova will neutralize his critics
reiterating that the
Beigrade meeting was brokered thanks to the US-led
initiative. The United States will continue to supervise the
future course of announced dialogue, which dynamics
and framework were in the first place designed by this
super power. In the face of political and still unidentified
KLA leadership opposition Rugova will adhere to his initial
demand (secession of Kosovo) and continue to hope for
the emergence of concrete results concerning the status
of and situation in Kosovo which could help him to more
convincingly justify his yielding to the US pressures.
President Mil.osevic is only interested in results which
could bring about better treatment of the SRY
the key
factors of international community. As regards Kosovo his
dearest option would be the status-quo preservation, as it

January 1999

would both strengthen and prove his absolute rule and

stubborn resistance to any positive evolution.
Manifestations of this approach of his were recent draft
solutions on the Kosovo status and autonomy produced
by the government of Serbia. Namely they contained only
cosmetic improvements and failed to present even an
initial basis for the kick-off of any serious talks.
But as all the key factors of international community,
including the Contact Group members, clearly and
decisively rejected both secession and the status-quo
preservation, it is to be hoped that future talks and
negotiations will reach a democratic, mutually acceptable,
politically stable and lasting solution. lt is highly
improbable that the confronted sides will te able to reach
a solution in keeping with civilized requirements of
contemporary age and standards adopted in principle
and implemented in practice by the majority of European
countries, and elsewhere in the world. That means that
active foreign assistance and support will have to remain
a lasting component in efforts to find peaceful solution.
But what are the prospects for this solution?
At its important meeting in Rome, the Contact Group
underscored that it could not offer a recipe for solution, as
the latter depended on the negotiations of the involved
parties. Representatives of international community will
effect continual supervision of the negotiating process by
combining encouraging rewards for those who actively
contribute to it, and punitive measures for those who
block it. Due to pure coincidence the Beigrade meeting
preceded the G-7 Summit (only Japan and Canada are
not members of the Contact Group.) Kosovo was also on
the summit agenda. Although they were short of detailed
information and pertinent evaluations, the Contact Group
members welcomed the Beigrade meeting as "the first
positive step" in the search for a peaceful solution.
lnterestingly enough they also underscored the fact that
President Milosevic "finally assumed responsibility in he
quest for the Kosovo solution." In actual fact only such a
briet statement could be expected.
The Birmingham meeting of the Contact Group
reiterated the principled readiness of this body to back
integration of Yugoslavia in international community at a
pace directly dependent on the progress of negotiations.
The Contact Group also temporarily postponed some of
the announced sanctions. But this does not mean that
international community has exhausted all it measures
and renounced its future engagement.
The successful shuttle-diplomacy of the US tandem
will be most surely continued, as its indirect approach
paradoxically enables stronger pressure on each side,
than the one exerted by a representative of international
community, for example Mr. Gonzales, during talks with
both sides in a conference room.
Holbrooke, Gelbrand and their team will do their
utmost to exploit Milosevic's principled agreement to get
personally involved in the negotiating process. With his
"assistance" they will try to achieve tangible progress
which could be acceptable to Albanian representatives. At
the same time they will pile pressure on Rugova to correct
his demands for independence by accepting a solution
within the Yugoslav federation. Rugova will be backed in
his opposition to more radical Albanian fractions within
Kosovo milieu, among other things by a strengthened

osovo
control of the Albanian side of the border which should
halt the arms smuggling.
Close and continual communication with both sides
will most probably positively channel the initial momentum
created by direct Milosevi6-Rugova meeting and their
expressed readiness to continue an unconditional search
for a political solution through dialogue. However one has
reservations that Milosevic's concession is just a
maneuver aimed at easing the Kosovo tension and laying
the groundwork for a showdown with reformist forces in
Montenegro, led and symbolized by Milo 8ukanovi6. lf
these premonitions come true, the survival of Montenegro
will be threatened, the future of Yugoslavia will be at stake,
Kosovo will be faced with a defeat and Serbia with all its
citizens with a tragedy.
Helsinki Charter, May i 998

esolution of the minorities status Europe-wide is

based on democratic principles, hence the Kosovo
problem is must be also treated as a democratic, and not
as a territorial question. Unfortunately the Serbian
authorities and legitimate representatives of Kosovo
Albanians identically view Kosovo as a territorial problem.
lt is not enough to establish that the problem has
escalated so much, that attempts to resolve it are
outdated, that methods of its resolution will not produce a
satisfactory result. What needs tobe done is the following:
the region must be democratized and consequently a
political environment propitious for the resolution of the
Kosovo problem created.
lf political positions of the Serbian authorities and
legitimate representatives of Kosovo Albanians get
entrenched, and if they continue to insist on the territorial
angle, then it is to expect that the spiral of violence will
escalate, innocent population will suffer, and poverty will
increase and expand. Serbia will be isolated from the
European civilization for a long time, and the victims will
be ordinary citizens, irrespective of their nationality.
Neither the principle of the historic right advocated by the
Serbian officials, nor the ethnic right principle championed
by Kosovo Albanians should be applied in the resolution
of the Kosovo issue.
As the things stands now it is quite certain that all
Serbs would be against the Kosovo secession and all
Kosovo Albanians against Kosovo's future in Serbia. On
the other hand any attempt at resolution of concrete
problems is interpreted as a loss of one side, and a gain
of the other. The Albanian side would interpret the
resumption of normal education of Albanian students as
the first move towards the attainment of their political
goals, while the Serbian side would deem it as a Serbian
defeat.
This is only an example of how a rational problem with

20

ethical, humane and human dimension, can be turned

into an absurdity. At the same time it is a sign and warning
that there are no easy and ready-made solutions for
Kosovo and that confidence between Serbs and
Albanians can be built only gradually, step-by-step, with
the well-intentioned mediation of international community.
In this way the pattern of "losers and winners" can be
avoided and in the long ran both sides might become
winners. The alternative is: an all-out defeat, that is, a war
in which both sides will suffer considerable lasses.
What stems from the aforementioned is that the first
and foremost precondition of settlement of the Kosovo
status is democratization of Serbia and admission ot the
SRY to all international organizations and notably
European integration processes.
lf the SRY were included in the European integration
the significance of borders and territorial sovereignty
would be relativized, or brought closer to the European
models. By all accounts the new embargo would be only
counterproductive and would remove us even further from
the much-needed admission to Europe. Sanctions would
strengthen the retrograde currents and factions in the
political body of the SRY, automatically bolster the
autocratic regime of Slobodan Milosevi6, encourage the
extremist demands of Kosovo Albanians and greatly
reduce the chances for compromise and satisfactory
solution.
lt can be easily assumed that open conflicts in Kosovo
would entail a new round of sanctions. Xenophobia and
resistance to the West, which unfortunately exist in Serbia,
would expand and increase, and stories about
international conspiracy against Serbia permanently
created by the neocommunist propaganda, would
additionally fan them. Xenophobia, fear, hatred and
distrust. which would then swamp Serbia could cause
additional, far-reaching problems in Europe.
International communtiy mustn't renounce Serbia,
although Milosevi6 would like that. Motivated by this
desire he will be shortly staging a referendum on the
presence of international mediators in the Kosovo
denouement. This referendum is a hoax by which he
wants to achieve the national homogenization, strengthen
his power and thwart democratic and reformist process in
Montenegro.
Although results of referendum are quite predictable,
international community must continue intensive
cooperation with Serbia, encourage and back concretely
all the reform potential in the SRY and in this way blunt the
blade of xenophobic and war-mongering forces in Serbia.
The first step in that direction should be an open
backing of democratic and reformist course in
Montenegro. On can maintain with all certainty that a
future course of deveiopment of democratic process in
Montenegro will depend on the fate of Kosovo, that is the
manner of resolution of this complex and neglected
problem.
if S. Milosevi6 succeeds in halting the Montenegrin
democratic reform through his lackey M. Bulatovi6 and his
political movement, it will not be too dramatic to predict
that the war will escalate in Kosovo. But if the democratic
forces embodied in DPS of Montenegro win the
forthcoming
elections, it can be expected that the
democratic reforms will take firmer roots also in the rest of
Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

the SRY, and consequently that the problem of Kosovo

would be tackled by democratic means, including an
active participation of international community.
Kosovo on-line - BETA News Agency
Helsinki Charter, May 1998

ince NATO put Kosovo on the agenda and indicated

its serious interest in regional developments, above
all, through its exercise "Determined falcon," Serbia
entered its final stage of defeat. Only the Yugoslav Army
reacted to the NATO-staged maneuvers over Macedonia
and Albania. The Serbian nation is hooked on the Mondial
events and with a fatal resignation awaits salvation. The
majority of population resorted to the rationalization that
the US were interested in controlling Eastern Europe
through Kosovo. Hence the NATO's decision. The
phenomenon of the collective immaturity pushed again
the nation into a collective delusion that crimes were not
committed in Kosovo.
Montenegro is adamant that it does not want to share
the fate of Serbia and uses every opportunity to prove it.
Djukanovic's victory is victory against Beigrade and its
arrogance. Possible withdrawal of the Montenegrin
draftees from the Yugoslav Army, if Montenegro gets
involved in the war actions in Kosovo will be another step
away from Beigrade.
Dismissal of Dragan Kalinic and Nikola Poplasen in
Republika Srpska is an encouraging sign. lt indicates that
the High Representative Carlos Westendorp decided to
get rid of all the nationalist leaders. Such a policy will
remove Republika Srpska from Serbia and open new
prospects for Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In Serbia nobody is concerned about the destiny of
ethnic Albanians. Only mothers of young recruits from
Kragujevac, Nis and Beigrade are concerned about their
destiny. Desperate mothers were not satisfied with the
military commander's words that "their children are good
children" and that the soldiers' task was to "prevent
incursions of Shiptari, arms-smuggling terrorists, into
Yugoslavia." At the same time the Serbian Sports Minister
criticized those mothers for their "lack of patriotism" and
using the situation "to hold political speeches."
The policemen, both Serbs and non-Serbs, are
desperately resisting the situation in Kosovo. Because of
this many have been suspended or have lost their jobs.
Suspension of Novi Pazar policemen of Muslim ethnicity is
under way. Allegedly 95% of non-Serb policemen have
been dismissed. Policemen were demobilized in Pancevo
andin some other Serbian cities. There was no criticism of
and opposition to the military-police action in Kosovo,
except for the police and a small-scale student-led antiwar campaign.
The Serbian opposition, for the umpteenth time, has
formed a new political group for democratic changes,

January 1999

whose main problem is "how to win the confidence of

people." Afteralmost ten years of existence the opposition
managed to discredit both the multi-party system and the
market economy. Speculations about "the winning
combination" are afloat. By touting Djukanovic as the
leader of the Yugoslav opposition the Serbian opposition
once again shows its ignorance of the basic political
process and its tendency to cherish illusions. By all
accounts Djukanovic's party reacted promptly by
eliminating all insinuations concerning its possible
leadership at the Yugoslav level. lt is obvious that
Djukanovic has better understanding of the mind-set of
this regime and that he "deals" very carefully with
Milosevic.
In recent months the Serbian Orthodox Church joined
the "Save Kosovo and Kosovo Serbs" campaign. Bishop
Artemije has been very active abroad and at harne. But
despite his objective concern for Serbs in Kosovo and the
fate they seemed to be destined to share with "Republika
Srpska Krajina" Serbs, he still adheres to the basic
position of the Orthodox Church on Kosovo. Both the
Church and all the opposition parties think that this
problem can be only resolved through democratization of
Serbia and the regime's toppling. No-one mentions the reestablishment of Kosovo autonomy and the new political
context within which this problem will be treated.
After many stressful years and atrocities committed in
the name of the Greater Serbia the whole nation is in a
regressive stage. This is the only plausible explanation for
this nation-wide decline and distancing from the civilized
world. Several days ago leaflets calling the patriotic forces
to cleanse Beigrade and Serbia of the "Afro-Asian
parasites" (Romany, Albanians and Muslims) were
distributed Serbia-wide.
Yeltsin-Milosevic Moscow meeting was assessed as
"the first positive step," but "demands of the Contact
Group" still have not been met. Yeltsin failed to talk
Milosevic into launching a dialogue with Rugova.
Diplomatie pressure is likely to continue until Milosevic's
meets his commitments towards international community.
lnstead of a timely implementation of the 1991 Hague
Document, international community opted for a stage-bystage defeating of Serbia. lt is to be hoped that Milosevic
will not be turned into anational scapegoat for all the past
events. Serbia does not have any prospects unless its
leaders and the whole nation assume responsibility for the
crimes committed during the war. In this effort Serbia
should be helped by international community.

21

n ever-increasing number of Kosovo refugees is

amving
in
Montenegro.
They
are
mostly
accommodated in houses of their relatives and friends.
Currently humanitarian organizations are providing them
with very modest aid.
According to the UNHCR figures 6,000 Kosovo
refugees arrived in Montenegro. Among them there are
2,614 Albanians, 1, 102 Serbs, 917 Muslims and 814
Montenegrins. The rest of refugees are considered "the
others." The Montenegrin authorities speak of 8,000
refugees, and unofficial estimates indicate that from early
February to the first decade of June 10,000 people fled
from Kosovo to Montenegro. In the first decade of June
over 3,500 people arrived in Plav and Rofaj, the northern
border areas with Kosovo. Nobody knows how many of
them are still arriving on foot across the mountains in the
vicinity of Pec and Decane.
"lf 1 had known that 1 would suffer so much, 1 would
have stayed in Kosovo and let them kill me," Arif Kuci
summed up his impressions on his travel from Decane to
Montenegro. In a single day, on 7 June, i 70 people
crossed the mountain Bogicevica on their way to
Montenegro. The procedure is regular- the police
registered their names and tailed the van which took them
along a 15-km long forest track to Plav. This procedure
was established following an incident in which the
Yugoslav Army beat up a group of Albanians. They broke
several ribs of the thirty-year old Ramadan Alimhaj so he
had to be taken to the hospital in Berane in a critical
condition. Several of his fellow-nationals suffered only
minor injuries. The local authorities reported this incident
to the Montenegrin Prime Minister and asked the police to
protect refugees from the army in the future.
"When our people in the mountains spot the refugees
we call the police and together with them go to pick them
up," says Sulja Rugova from the Plav Committee for the
Refugee Gare. "But some refugees are still handled
roughly by the army. Last night they held in detention two
refugees in the military camp in Treskavac. They were
unlucky enough to stumble upon the army check-point on
Treskavac. We tried to talk with the army representatives,
but it was nigh impossible," says Rugova. We were told in
Plav that the young soldiers (draftees) did not maltreat the
civilians, but that professional soldiers consider that such
"activities" are in line with their "patriotic" duty.
"When they started shelling the houses in Decane we
thought it would end quickly. Then the large-scale
bombardments started. They heavily shelled all the
houses from the plateau above Decane. They were all
heavily damaged. Then the machine-gun shooting
started, and when the houses were abandoned, the
looting began. Then they burned everything down.
house which took me 30 years to build was burnt to the
ground. When we left Decane, we stayed in a meadow ten
days. As we had no food we decided to go to the

mountains. lt took us a whole day and night to reach the

shepherds' huts. Luckily enough 1 knew the ground so we
continued along a mountain track. My wife said she would
jump from the first rock and kill herself. We don't know
where our two sons are," says Arif Kuci. His wife cries and
fearfully looks at the policemen who is trying to persuade
them that they are taking all their personal data just for the
statistics purposes.
The majority of refugees in Plav are accommodated in
houses of their relatives and friends. Humanitarian
organizations for the time being provide them with modest
aid. In the hotel used for the collective accommodation of
refugees there are three hundred people from Kosovo and
about a hundred "old" refugees from Bosnia. The former
hotel restaurant was converted into a collective bedroom
for warnen and children. lt is humid and cold inside, as the
mid-summer temperature in Plav is only 1O degrees
centigrade. Nurija Haradinaj, 64, came from the village of
Glodani. She apologizes: "l'm so tired that 1 can hardly
talk. Serbs did what they wanted to do in the municipality
of Decane. Three children and two grandfathers from my
families were killed. My son and relatives stayed in
Kosovo. We were told that in the area in which we had
lived 5-6 people were killed. My house was burnt down."
Arif Bostraj, a doctor, arrived several days ago from
Decane. "Fire was opened from all kinds of weapons. lt
was the army fire, and not the police fire. The entire population of Decane fled. We watched our houses burn. For
three days and nights there was fire and smoke over
Decane. We traveled the whole day and night. There were
50 of us in the group. We had with us a year-old child and
an eight month old baby. We spent a night in the mountain, on an unknown track," says Arif Bostraj, a doctor from
Decane. Then he went on to describe what had happened
in Decane before the shelling: "On the bank of river
Decanska Bistrica we found two strangled elderly men,
one was 65 and the other 70 years old. i examined them.
1 wound sand in their nostrils and ears. A 25-year old boy
was killed in his courtyard. When we went to bury him,
they opened sniper fire on us. We buried him during the
night. We buried the man called Ramo, in his courtyard."
Hajdar Red:Z.ahmetaj, a jurist from lstinic near Decane,
confirmed that the army took part in the Kosovo conflicts:
"The police has no 220 mm caliber guns. We had better
have someone to mediate for us in Kosovo, otherwise it
would be difficult for us all, not only for Albanians, but also
for all the other peoples living in Kosovo. The Kosovo
is a real force, and there are still citizens
Liberation
who have not joined it, but they are nonetheless willing to
protect themselves."
Although Albanian border was closer to them, all these refugees came to Montenegro because they thought it
would be easier for them to return home from that Repub!ic. They say they want to go back, but under shelling and
fire no-one can live in Kosovo. Albanians from Plav stress
that they had no problems with their Orthodox Serbs
neighbors. On the contrary. Vuceta Boskovic accommodated in his house an Albanian family. But there is also the
other side of the coin. There is a Serb who thanks to his
connections with the Serbian police is allowed to transport
in his van peopie from Pec, but he charges now DM 50 for
per ticket. The rumors are circulating
the formerly DM
that the Serbian police charges DM 500-1 ,000 for each
Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

exit from Decane and Pe6. Similar are the stories of refugees accommodated in Rofaje. Senija Zenuni, a Muslim
married to an Albanian, crossed the mountain Kula.
"Five days ago, ten of us, all adults, with thirty
children, tried to leave Pe6 in a bus. The police stopped us
with the following explanation: 'lf our children are dying,
than yours should die too'. They 1 saw them beating
several youngsters at the police check-point, and then
forcibly returning them to Pe6. The following day
managed with nine members of my family to leave Kosovo
in a bus with the Montenegrin license plate and to arrive
in Rofaje. When we left there was no shooting in Pe6, but
after 4 p.m. there wasn't a soul on its streets. Tanks were
passing frequently and Chetnic songs were heard from
them. In the wake of their night rounds the rumors
circulated that people again disappeared in small hours.
Lists with names of persons entitled to get bread, milk and
other staple products are attached to the drugstores'
windows. All these names are Serbian. When Albanian
shop-owners manage to
some
it is immediately
taken from them.
belongs to the
say.
Almost everybody left," says Senija Zenuni.
People somehow manage to arrive in Montenegro.
Bosniak family from Vitomirica near Pe6, is
accommodated in an ancillary facility of the plant "Dekor."
They recounted to us their plight: ''We bought tickets for
Beigrade. One had better not teil anybody that one is
leaving. Vitomirica is not burning, but all the other places
are. Notorious criminals are walking along the streets
dressed in the fatigue uniforms," says the father of the
family. A ten-year old boy told us that he saw soldiers,
who, like in the movies, had painted faces. They
threatened they would kill him and his father.
750 Romany from Kosovo were accommodated in the
shantytown where their relatives live. In Konik, near
Podgorica, in the improvised huts live 10-15, and
sometimes even 40 people. "We escaped both from
Shiptari and Serbs. When they started fighting we came
here, as we had nowhere eise to go. Some Romany
stayed in Kosovo, but as the lines were cut, we do not
know anything about them. We were allowed to go to
Montenegro. They just registered us, that is Sait Aljija from
Drenovac, Municipality of Klina, near Pe6."
President of the Romany Association of Montenegro
lsen Gasi struggles to to find accommodation for the
newly-arrived refugees. He claims that 7-8 families arrive
every day, hence the problem of accommodation is
becoming acute. "We asked the Commissariat for
refugees to provide us with tents. In the beginning we got
bread for refugees, but now
don't give us any food.
We receive two mattresses and two soaps for 10-member
families," says Gasi. Berisa Nezir ran away two days ago
with six children from Pecka Banja. "We did not have any
food. There's nothing there. At the last elections we voted
for Serbs. Recently two Albanians came to my house and
beat me up," says Nezir, showing bruises on his face.
told me: 'You must leave this place. lf you don't do
that we shall kill you. And that's it." The majority of Kosovo
refugees have only words of praise for the way the
Montenegrin authorities threat them.

Helsinki Charter, June 1998

January 1999

rom 15-17 June 1998 Helsinki Committee team visited

three collective centers for Kosovo refugees in
accommodating the
Montenegro: Rofaje, Plav and
!argest number of refugees. According to the UNHCR
Podgorica office data by 16 June 1998, 7,826 Albanian,
931 Montenegrin and ,245 Serb refugees were registered
''"'"-"-";'""''"' first arrive in Rofaje or Plav and then they
continue towards other
cities (Podgorica and
and Plav there are reception and
. In
collective centers, namely converted and disused
facilities, badly
humid and without windows. In
center refugees are accommodated in one
room, which has nothing only mattresses and blankets. In
Plav refugees are accommodated in a ruined hotel,
without windows and with wet walls. Beds are broken,
there are no mattresses. Upon arrival refugees try to make
these rooms as livable as possible. Humanitarian situation
in these two reception centers is catastrophic, there is no
cooked food and refugees subsist on meals brought by
the locals. There are no hygiene items. Mostly warnen and
children (infants, small children and those aged 7 and
18) are accommodated in these centers. In some rooms
with
3 beds there are even families with 20 or so
dependents. Added to that new refugees from Kosovo are
arriving in those localities every day.
Refugees now located in Montenegro are mainly from
the areas of Pe6 and Decane municipalities. They travel
on foot, in groups and only at night. They avoid main
roads which are full of the police check-points, and
instead opt for forest and mountain paths. During the day
hide from choppers controlling the border area
between Kosovo and Montenegro. Some arrive
cars
and trucks, and some even by regular buses. The latter
groups of refugees are often stopped and checked at the
police check-points. Several Albanian men were even
taken out, and beaten with rifle butts and fists. The police
forces
warnen and children to return to Kosovo
with
that "lf the Serbian children are dying then
so should also the Albanian children." Those forced
the
police to return to Kosovo, escape again, and head back
to Montenegro, traveling
mountain tracks. In the
majority of cases men
escort their families to
Montenegro and then return to their villages to
their
houses. A !arge number of Decane region refugees, who
were relocated from Ro:Zaje and Plav to Ulcinj, when
interviewed about the reason for their relocation, say that
they had to run away from the local Decane policemen
who had recognized them.
lnterviewed refugees also said that
had left their

osovo
homes because their lives and lives of their family
members had been threatened. According to them the
police and the army were accountable for their fleeing.
They also spoke of the presence of paramilitary men,
other uniformed men, and groups of men dressed in black
with black bands around their heads. All of them had
machine-guns. These men, together with the army and the
police after the heavy shelling, burn down houses and loot
them. Refugees from Decane told us they saw truckloads
of looted stuft and cattle heading towards the monastery
Visoki Deeani. Almost all refugees after the shelling of their
village fled to the neighboring village, and when the same
thing happened there, they fled to the next one. Whenever
they had a chance they left the region. Refugees said that
the army, the police and paramilitary formations used
heavy artillery (tanks, mortars, ground-to-ground
missiles). Both army planes and choppers opened heavy
fire and in towns there were snipers. The policemen were
armed with automatic weapons, bayonets, knives and
guns. When they leave reception centers refugees mainly
find accommodation with relatives or some other families.
This most often happens in Ulcinj, where there are no
collective center. Refugees first come to municipalities
where a special committee tasked with taking care of
them finds them accommodation in various families. Citizens accept refugees without any discrimination on national grounds. A large number of refugees still want to go
back to Kosovo, although their houses have been ruined
or burnt down. Nota single refugee has seen the Kosovo
Liberation Army members or had any contact with them.
AREA OF MUNICIPALITY OF DECANI
In the area of municipality of Decani there are every
day joint operations of the army, police and paramilitary
units. According to the statements of witnesses the army
has heavy artillery from which it constantly shells Decani
proper and the neighboring villages. There are four
shelling points around Decani. Albanians who have
stayed in their houses, once their food supplies are
finished - starve. Serbian civilians are armed and they
maltreat their Albanian fellow-citizens. Albanian refugees
often say that they "had to run away to save their lives."
A refugee from Decane came on foot from Pec to
Rofaje with his family. He said they left because they
feared the imminent shelling. He told us that the shelling
was effected from military bases, 80 km away. He also told
us that the army in Decani captured 200 women and
children and held them as hostages in an abandoned
building. He did not know what had happened to them.
According to him, in Decani many people died during the
shelling, and snipers hiding in many buildings in Decani
proper also killed many people.
He also told us that the army effected the shelling from
four points around the town. Two refugees from Decane,
a jurist and a doctor, once employed in Decani hospital,
told us that 250 shells feil on the elementary school in the
town. Refugees said that almost all Serbian houses
remained intact, while Albanian houses and public
facilities were completely destroyed. Albanians, in need of
the first aid, were banned access to hospital, which in the
meanwhile had been seized by the army. During the
shelling all Albanians stayed in their houses, mostly in
their cellars. They were too afraid to venture into the

streets, for soldiers, policemen and paramilitary members

patrolling the streets, harassed all Albanians found
outside. They rough-handled them and often beat them
with rifle-butts, fists and legs. People ate what they had at
home, and after the supplies had been depleted they
literally starved. A refugee from saw the vans, similar to the
ones for bread transportation, arrive in Decani. They were
full of weapons which were immediately distributed to the
local Serbs. A pediatrician from Deeane identified a
certain Mayor Bojic who commanded the shelling of
Decane by ground-to-ground missiles. After the first three
shells feil on his house he went down to his cellar with his
family. When another four hit the house he fled with his
family. He saw how the army looted his house, took his
tractor and then burned down the house. He and his
family hid again in the cellar for three weeks and then left
Decane. He tolld us that in the town center there was a
point protected by sand bags from which the snipers
opened fire. They shot every Albanian who ventured into
the streets.
THE AREA OF MUNICIPALITY OF PEC
In the town proper there were no armed conflicts.
Refugees left this town out of security and humanitarian
reasons. Albanians did not dare to leave their houses. The
police, the military and armed civilians harassed all the
Albanians who happened to be in the streets. Albanians
were not allowed to buy food. On windows of all shops in
Pec lists of those who were banned from purchasing food
were placed. Only Albanian and Muslim names were on
them. Albanians and Muslims hid in their cellars before
leaving the town.
A refugee from village Ljubenic, municipality of Pec,
came to Plav on June 3, together with 6 other men. They
traveled three days and nights. On 27 may i 998 he
witnessed the murder of 9 of his neighbors (men aged 23
to 65) by the men in military and police uniforms. They
were all killed in front of their houses. He buried all bodies.
Before arriving in Plav his group ran into the army unit,
which stopped them for ID-checking, harassed them, beat
them, threatened to slaughter them with knives. They kept
asking them if they had come from Albania. A man in
uniform broke one of his ribs. The army had called the
police who subsequently took them to the prison and held
them there for eight hours.
A certain Ahmeti, a refugee from Pec, came to Plav on
8 June, without family (they are still in Pec) but with four
Muslims. Three weeks before he was in Plav to settle
some business. On his way back to Pec, Skm from the
town, the police stopped him. A policemen asked him for
the 10 card, and when he produced it, the policeman
started beating him with fists and legs. The policeman told
him that he had to leave Pec. When he arrived in Pec, he
realized that he had to leave Kosovo. The policeman who
had beaten him was a local. On his journey from Kosovo
to Montenegro he was stopped by the police and
maltreated. He told us that in Pec the army, the police and
members of paramilitary formations every day beat and
maltreated Albanians. As the army captured the hospital,
Albanians were banned from receiving treatment there.
A refugee from Pec came to Montenegro about two
weeks ago. He walked all the way from Pec to Rofaje with
his family, 13 of them, mostly women and children (aged
Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

1-15). He said that the head to leave Kosovo because he

feared that all of them would be killed. He told us that
Serbian civilians in Pec were armed and that they
mercilessly looted the houses. According to him when the
army, police and civilians returned from the war zones, they
opened fire and sang Chetnik songs. He claimed that the
life in Pec was paralyzed, and that Albanians stayed behind
closed doors or hid in cellars. After the last protests, the
police and even the civilians maltreated Albanians, citizens
of Pec. In the town there were different armed men in
different uniforms. He told us it was almost impossible to
tell them apart. The police lost all credibility, as the
policemen joined the ranks of paramilitary formations. He

added that there were Arkan's, Seselj's and Captain

Dragan's men. All of them had shaved heads, were
dressed in black, and their faces were painted.
Our team wanted to talk to refugees irrespective of their
ethnicity. But as it happened we did not meet Serbian or
Montenegrin refugees. Albanians, whom we had
interviewed told us that Kosovo Serbs used to leave their
houses on the eve of the military and police actions
(Deeani). Albanians from Pec told us that those Serbs who
had stayed had no problems, in the sense that they moved
freely and could buy food (contrary to Albanians.)
Helsinki Charter, June 1998

The fetter of 21-year old soldier Du5an TasiC, who was killed in the vicinity of border check-point "Morina" in
Kosovo on 29 May, was sent to his brothers. When it was published in the Beigrade daily "Glas Javnosti" it shocked
the broad public and more than any other journalistic report indicated the proportions of drama unfolding in the
province.
Hi everybod.y,
This is my 218th day on the ground.
Darko's and mother's letters, which I received recently, made me very happy. In the meanwhile many things have happened and
changed. I have ran away from everybody and I am sitting near the brook and writing this fetter to you. Weather is indeed nice. Ufe
conditions are much better now. We are getting more food, enough, but not too much. The food is not so good, but at least the quantity.
You would probably like to know when I will return to the barracks, and then home. I would like to know that too. One thing is sure
and that is - it won't happen soon. The course I was supposed to attend in Prizren will be held here from 16 May to 15 June. Hopefully
after the course I will go back to the barracks.
In the past 28 days I had a bath only once. Then I called Darko and had. a talk with him. The second time I faked a skin disease, so
they had. to take me to the barracks. Our barracks are swarming with the military: police, infantry, scouts and. reconnaissance, reserve
units. There are also many tanks. What a confusion! Soldiers are sleeping in our dorms, so we had to move out. Our police are busy in
all villages, sometimes they shoot 24 hours. Jt's all happening just 5-6 km from the place where we are stationed. and. everything is heard
clearly. The army is at the moment neutral, but... Two days ago my camp and garrison were to attack the vilfage Ponosevac. As far as I
und.erstood that village was to be erased. Everybod.y was heavily armed (except me) and. we were told not to kill hostages. We were to
attack at 3 h at night. Being a member of the defense units I was not planned. for that action. Now they have postponed everything is
further commands are in the offing. Last night I was the errand boy of the duty officer so I saw furtively some plans and. charts and.
realized their plans. They wanted to attack the village with tanks, 120 mm artillery and all kinds of heavy weapons.
What a chaos! l'd rather teils you the truth instead of having someone lie to you. The army is helping the police. In Junik our heavy
artillery made minced meat of Shiptari. After that they were silent for two d.ays. lf they are smart they won't attack the army. tf that
happens half of Kosovo will be devastated. Shit, I must stop now.
Here I am again. lt is 10 May. The day before yesterday having heard the shooting behind the mountains I fled to the camp. But
everything was fine. When I went up there my colleagues were already in the shower, Now we take showers even on the ground. They
pitch a tent, fix 8 showers inside it and then !et 10-15 of us in. The night between 8 and 9 May I was in an ambush. We did. not go uphill
but close to our camp. The night was clear and it d.id. not rain. So everything was much easier forme. This is my sixth or seventh ambush
since we came here. What do I do! During the day I am on guard and then I wait in ambush. 10 soldiers are chosen, then heavily armed:
150 bullets, 2 bombs, tromblon shells and manual rocket-launchers. Burd.ened. as a horse ! have to go to the next hill. 1,150 meters above
the sea altitude. When I reach the peak I am soaked to the skin. The worst thing is that we climb in pitch-dark. They could. send. me to
A/bania, and I would not be aware of that. Near the peak we set the ambush. I make a cover of heaped-up stones, place bombs in front
of me, put bullets in the rifle, and I fie still until dawn. I have spasms the whole night. ! am stretched on wet soil, but lucki/y enough
the wind. which blows all the time dries up my clothes. But it is very difficult to protect one's kid.neys and. other equipment. Results of
ambushes are broad.cast. Nota word about my ambush. I must mention the parcel. I did not want to askyou, but the time passes quickly
and I need. some things. Above all! need socks, 2-3 pairs, not more. Darko should. buy the checkered ones, but of thicker fabric (my new
boots pinch me). I also need razor blades, shaving foam. and envelopes and stamps. I don't know how ! shall send this fetter. Mother
don't try to make some complicated. cakes. Make the most simple ones and buy me some biscuits.
Don't send me anything eise. I don't have a place to keep it. I hope I am not too demanding. But send mi this parcel as soon as
possib/e. Darko says i shou/d not mention the figure. I pray to God that everything turns out all right and that / don' have to stay in
this chaos severa/ years. Anyway 364 days is not too much and the time passes quickly.
Just to {et you know-this is my 219th d.ay.
Duci

January 1999

ituation in Kosovo, although still tense and on the

brink of general catastrophe, in recent weeks has
evolved in the way which had a direct impact on political
conduct and actions of the key factors of international
community. A strong rise of the Liberation Army of
Kosovo, which according to serious estimates controls
over 30% of the provincial territory, and is militarily able to
attack the safety points and communications Kosovowide, reflects a strong radicalization of a large part of
Albanian population, resulting from the repressive policy
of the Belgrade-regime. Nobody knows anything about
the hierarchy structure of the KLA, and even less so if the
KLA has a political nucleus and who composes it. The
extent to which the KLA alleged representatives at home
and abroad authentically represent this military formation
is also controversial. Do they represent only its leading
circle or other ranks of this organization? But the KLA
pronounced opposition to the peaceful, political
denouement of the crisis, as championed by lbrahim
Rugova and his negotiating team, obviously undermines
the once sacrosanct position of the leader of Kosovo
Albanians and causes much suspicion in international
community. The latter endeavors to get a more reliable
picture of the KLA character, but at the same time
continues to back Rugova as the principal representative
of Kosovo Albanians.
The Contact Group, NATO, the OSCE and the EU
recently have changed their approach. Once the Beigrade
visibly reduced the extent of its military operations,
representatives of the aforementioned bodies in a
balanced way started communicating with both sides in
the conflict, demanding an immediate cease-fire and
subsequently, an immediate kick-off of negotiations. The
KLA is invited to join these negotiations. The US shuttlediplomacy practices indirect negotiations between
President Milosevi6 and Kosovo leaders. International
presence and monitoring have been strengthened in the
SRY and particularly in Kosovo. A diplomatic monitoring
mission was established there, visits and movements of
foreign journalists now receive more liberal treatment and
there is a continued electronic surveillance from the
territories of neighboring countries. The large OSCE
mission had intensive talks with representatives of the
authorities, opposition, some NGOs, Kosovo Albanians
and local Kosovo authorities. The main purpose of their
visits, in addition to the investigation of the broadspectrum of facts, is the return of the
OSCE
mission for Kosovo, Sandfak and Vojvodina, with the
approximately identical mandate to the one
the decision of the Beigrade authorities in 992. At the
same time the mission headed
the German
Ambassador Hans
prepares the return of the
Gonzalez mission (OSCE) which
among other
will be to assess a
for the re-admission

of the SR Yugoslavia to the OSCE.

Under its mandate this mission has also an obligation
to examine the status of democracy in the country and
outlooks for democratic changes in all spheres of life,
compliance with international standards with respect to
the legal state, human rights, freedom of citizens and
ethnic communities and the course of negotiations on
Kosovo.
The Contact Group, skeptical about possibility of
denouement without foreign mediation and incentives,
announced its model of democratic and just solution to
the Kosovo crisis. lt reiterated the well-known position on
the unacceptability of status quo, but also rejected all
demands that Kosovo be granted independence. In their
Moscow meetings Foreign Secretaries Kinkel and
Primakov promised the "joint" contribution to the
negotiating process in an effort to demonstrate the unity of
the Contact Group.
The Contact Group members only have different
positions on the use of force, as the last and coerced
measure against this threat to international peace and
security. The West agreed to entrust the Security Council
with a possible decision on the NATO deployment as they
were sure that it would be made in case of dire escalation
of conflict and as such considered irrefutable even by
Russia. On the other hand the NATO representatives
repeat that all options are still possible, although its
Secretary General, Xavier Solana, pinpointed only four
scenarios, of which only one envisaged so-called
aggressive measures.
Before one even starts deliberating the mode of
guaranteeing a future agreement, one must discuss
possible modes of its attainment. lt seems that the
negotiations of the sides in the conflict, even in the case of
foreign meditation, could last forever, with very slim
chances of success. Hence a Dayton-like conference
would be the safest and quiekest way out of the Kosovo
agony. At such a conference a model of Kosovo
autonomy within Serbia would be elaborated. A
conference would be mediated by international
community as the Beigrade authorities
completely
devalued the results of the manipulative referendum which
they themselves had conceived.
Future confidence-building measures are also an
important issue. Many think that the enforcement of
recently renewed, but then again undermined, Agreement
on Albanian Language Education, would not produce any
results. By extension implementation of confidencebuilding measures in the areas of health services,
communal services, and the compromised judiciary is
equally unfeasible and -tardy.
However the issue which ought to be tackled first is
the issue of refugees and displaced persons as it affects
both ethnic Albanian and Serbs. While the suffering of
Albanian refugees made headlines world-wide, stories
about the exodus of Kosovo Serbs were hidden by veil, as
the authorities denied them.
all accounts, a
international action aimed at providing conditions
for a faster return of refugees, could encourage the kickoff of complex and
process of confidence-building
measures.
And
the entire process of normalization of interethnic ,..,,.t-.rnc- establishment of guarantees for a ceaseHelsinki Charter - Special Edition

fire agreement, and most

implementation
any future solution to the Kosovo crisis, will not be
possible without the presence of international forces. The
latter will pledge the safety of lives and
Kosovo, and at a later date free movement for all citizens
of Kosovo irrespective of their
religion and
Such an
regime,
be called any name, even a protectorate,
must last, in the interests of all citizens, until the
stabilization of social,
inter-ethnic and humane
relations in Kosovo, and
in the whole region
is achieved.

998

Helsinki

e same time

words it is
er in
air nor on
which precise!y reflects its status in
t the first glance it seems to be easy to determine the
role of the units of the
in the current
Kosovo crisis. But once this
is viewed
a
instrument
becomes clear that it is a
ditticult task. Both the national and
have trouble in
the
sum up all the
and destructive events in Kosovo.
1-JC>irh"J,nC' all these events ,.,,....,, . . '"'''"YY'l
calls "the
intensive
mutilations and
last six months. ls the
answer we must take into account
the Chiefs of Statt of the
Kosovo crisis.
Chiefs of Statt state that there is no war
but rather that "the SR
suppresses
the southern Serbian
is the
Kosovo Liberation
was made
Chiefs of Statt of

of ethnic Albanians" and "the

character of their actions aim at creating the impression
that
are numerous,
and exceptionally
mobile .in order to internationalize the Kosovo and
crisis."
a month later the Commander of the Pristina
a young and ambitious
Nebojsa
in his interview to the
contributed to the aforementioned
assertion: "In the
are no other armed forces,
and the

Albanian from the terrorists' incursions and arms- and

to that the
"will
to any attack of terrorists
members and facilities of the Yugoslav
But every informed citizen of Yugoslavia could easily
learn that that sporadic skirmishes in Kosovo escalated
and turned
armed conflicts which "needed
the
" The latter in no way could be
reduced to "routine and
activities."
Pristina corps makes
the "fist"
the
is
of
contract soldiers
professionai officers and divided
6
brigades with command seats
all the
cities of
Kosovo.
to the OSCE
has a
armored-mechanized
140 tanks
and 50 armoured carriers. The
circles estimate
that this
addition to the one of
is
The corps also has a
base at Pristina
of
and
anti-air missile
unit and some lesser unit.
the
tactic of the YA units in Kosovo
to
not
enemy.
"human factor" seems to be feit in the
acc-ordance with the war formation
it operates with
Otherwise innocent and unskilled
be sent
Head of Chief
Momcilo Perisic, in late
decided to stop
recruits to
least those who have not finished so-called olomant-::i

at the press

that army in not

"self-styled" and "terrorist" but is
of "notorious
corv::lr'".:lT!l~n'l and nationalism.
and methods of terrorism in a
1
l::ln Tn r " of the Drenica area." The army went on to
"Albanian terrorists do not
a
1

January 1999

June protests of recruits'parents

and
the death of five uniformed boys have shaken
the morale of the Kosovo
morale anyway has
not been very
Kosovo crisis had
escalated so
respectable forces would be stationed
in Kosovo out of three reasons. This was stated
the
aforementioned

osovo
predecessor Milovan Bojovic during his four-year
mandate in Kosovo earned all ranks of general and was
finally promoted from General-Colonel to the Assistant
Head of Chief of Staff): firstly due to an emphasis on
"Kosovo-the cradle of Serbhood" (Pavkovic: "... we
exclusively defend our homes, borders and graves of our
ancestors ... "); secondly, Yugoslav generals still adhere to
the geopolitical theory that "Kosovo and Metohija are a
geopolitical knot of the Balkans" without which Serbia and
the SRY would not have the strategic depth; and thirdly,
because Kosovo and Metohija have enormous mineral
and mining resources.
Currently the majority of the Corps troops are
"camping," as this was envisaged by the official plan and
program of training. This explanation is plausible, but even
more plausible is the assumption that the Chief of Staff
and Commander Pavkovic made a "protective" move in
order to avoid "the Slovenian and Croatian syndrome." In
other words they did no want their units to be surprised by
sudden actions of the opponent and find themselves
surrounded, like in a mouse-trap, in their barracks.
In the division of labor between the police and the
army the latter "protects the border belt" hence the focus
of its actions is along Pe6-8akovica-Prizren line. Since the
width of the belt is determined under special regulations
of every state, it is most certain that the Federal
Government passed an adequate act on the width of that
belt in Kosovo, without making it public. Judging by what
is happening on the ground, it can be concluded that the
belt extends approximately twenty kilometers from the
border with Albanian into the depth of our territory. In that
belt all actions of units are "legal and legitimate," for all of
them can be categorized as "the protection of border."
Deputy Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav Army, ColonelGeneral, Dragoljub Ojdanic, stated on 7 June that the
Yugoslav Army almost hermetically sealed off the border
with Albania, which of course is sheer nonsense. 1 am
mentioning this statement because it is indicative of an
initial "idea of maneuver" of the police and military
command in Kosovo: namely to "comb" the terrain
(Drenica being the first target) by fast actions of the antiterrorist units (and other special units), and force the
terrorists to flee to the "condensed network" of Corps in
the border area, where, the Army has already "destroyed
many terrorist bases." But the Drenica offensive indicated
that the Liberation Army of Kosovo is a tenacious
opponent, although its members were tagged as
"terrorists," "bandits" and "rogues." Speaking from the
military point of view the Yugoslav generals make the
mistake of underestimating their enemy. But we shall not
focus on that aspect in this analysis.
Information service continues to issue communiques
on "elimination of terrorists gangs" in actions of the border
battalions (they were probably reinforced by special units
from the Pristina Corps, but this is probably a military
secret). The most "famous operation" was the one carried
out in the vicinity of the border check-point "Kosava" when
on 23 April "200-strong terrorist formation was crushed."
Head of Information Service of the Chief of Staff, GeneralMayor Gradimir Zivanovic several times stated (as did the
other officials) that "the Yugoslav Army was not involved in
the Serbian police actions of suppression of terrorist
activities," as "under the Constitution it is not allowed to do

the police job." However alternate, notably foreign,

sources of information, indicate that the YA extended the
logistic and artillery support to the police units in all their
major actions. This is testified by photographs of ruins and
craters caused by large caliber missiles, which the police
unit, although they are the "parallel" army of Slobodan
Milosevic, don't have.
Hence it turns out that the army is both deployed and
non-deployed in Kosovo, depending on the observers and
their angles of observation, all of which precisely reflects
its status in the society. lt plays its role to the beat of
Milosevi6's music, in a very limited maneuvering room, as
expressed by run-of-the-mill phrases: "in the protection of
border" and "in retaliation of attacks and provocations."
However tanks and big caliber guns cannot fit into these
expressions: they are immediately noticed. At any rate the
army cannot massively use heavy artillery and tanks, for
they are counterproductive in such conflicts. lt it to be
hoped that the army has learnt this lesson on the ruins of
Vukovar, Sarajevo and other cities. Tanks and heavy
artillery, no matter how much it is desired, cannot defeat
Kosovo guerrillas, insurgents or terrorists. Of course not
because that side is technically or military superior, but
because of the other factors, which will not be discussed
in this analysis. Contrary to the other wars in the territory
of the former Yugoslavia, the air force is not deployed in
this one. But the fact is that the war has definitely
"relocated" to Serbia, and that fact is stubbornly denied by
both military and civilian authorities in Beigrade, headed
by Milosevi6. So much the worse for them-and us.
In Slovenia Slobodan Milosevi6 waged war under the
slogan "Let's Protect Yugoslavia" and exploited the stupidity, political immaturity and the nationalist sickness of the
military heads; in Croatia "the army of all our peoples and
nationalities" allegedly tried to save the Serbian people
from the "Ustashi dragon," and in Bosnia and Herzegovina
from - "the lslamic fundamentalists." During all those wars
military decisions on the misuse of the then SFRY army
were taken by Milosevi6's loyalists who occupied the most
prominent state and military positions, while he masterminded all the moves in the background Added to that
his big media and propaganda machinery kept repeating
"Serbia is not in war"! And what will happen now? Conflicts
in Kosovo are compelling the SRY President to take a
clear stand on the situation and publicly announce it. But
such gesture would be out of character, for he always feit
superior in the military and political chaos. On the other
hand the fact is that his army can no longer operate
successfully in an ambiguous situation.
lf Yugoslavia had been a legal state, if its authorities
had honorably dealt with the denouement of the bloody
Kosovo knot, then all relevant "institutions of the system,"
and above all the Federal Assembly would have given a
responsible assessment of the situation and made
corresponding decisions on future moves. lf the situation
had been clear, no Murat, Bajazit, terrorists or mudjahedins would have seized Kosovo from Serbs (on the other
hand in such circumstances no-one would have even tried
that!). Six-month long conflagration in Kosovo is a good
enough reason for the Supreme Defense Council to be in
session more often. But, unfortunately the Council met
only once, and moreover its decisions were not made
public. So, God - and peace-keeping forces - help us!
Helsinki Charter, July 1998
Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

ratislava Buba Morina is Head of the Commissariat for

Refugees of the Republic of Serbia. Judging by her
line of duty she is to be most "credited" for everything that
happened to people who in this country sought "the last
refuge" from all that had befallen them. This applies to all
those who had to "change their addresses" because the
state of Serbia could not provide them with conditions for
peaceful and tranquil life, befitting the loyal voters.
Kosovo is the place currently "producing" the largest
number of unhappy people who have to flee and leave
"their hearths," as the unimaginative press calls their
houses. The press writes about the flight of Albanians,
Serbs, Muslims, Romany and Montenegrins, instead of
"people." When the policy is created and pursued then the
press talks about nations and peoples, but when the
trouble comes, then it should mention real, concrete
people. lf they flee it means that they have serious reasons
to do that. Even people who are not involved in this
disaster see that they have serious reasons to escape.
However, the First Man of Serbia (Serbia is a state,
isn't it), the one whose duty is to take care of these people
and thus contribute to the preservation of Serbia as a state
(and it is a state, isn't it?) claims that there are no refugees
in Serbia!
Tobe perfectly truthful there's a catch there. A refugee
is a person who has fled from some trouble to other state.
Other refugees, in accordance with the internationally
accepted terminology, are called - displaced persons. But
there is no doubt that Buba Morina perfectly understood
the journalist's question. This was confirmed by their
press officer, Sandra lli6, by expressly saying that in
Morina's answer there were no terminological traps.
By the way, at the second press conference held this
month, Buba Morina was again very exact: "No, Serbia
has no refugees form Kosovo and its it doing its utmost
not to have them in the future. The second part of the
sentence sounded menacing, but it was in character with
the current Serbian policy towards Kosovo, which
includes the deafening clamor of arms.
But this current policy does not include only the use of
force in a limited part of territory, but also "terrible details
from the real life" as many humanitarian workers loudly
say. For example some-one saw that a bus full of Serbian
refugees was stopped in Pofarevac and "returned" to
Kosovo. lt is rumored that this was not the only incident of
that kind, but these stories are yet tobe checked.
All these stories are "interesting," but one can imagine
how all these happenings can interesting for the very
citizens of Kosovo (and Metohija.) But unfortunately Buba
Morina is busy these days with preparations for the
Congress of the Associated Yugoslav Left, so she has no
time to explain the irregularities within her scope of duty.
But her assistants have duly written down all the
journalistic inquiries. Allegedly she will answer all the
imponderables, as the broad public is entitled to learn
how many of her fellow-nationals have left Kosovo.

An important question is who has engendered this

conflict and when it has actually started. In 1968, 1987,
1991 or in some other year? One day it will be established
and disclosed. And then the voters will know who made
the dragon so powerful. And the history will undboutedly
have the final word.
In the meanwhile as long as the state refuses to admit
that its citizens escape from one part of the country to the
other-fugitives, or as we call them, refugees or displaced
persons, will be left without any support. They cannot
even ask the foreigners to give them humanitarian aid.
Hence, they get no food, for the Red Cross (International
Committee, Federation or the Serbian Red Cross) cannot
help those who do not exist. And they will exist only when
Serbia establishes that fact. Not before that. In the
meanwhile they will be hungry and without roofs above
their heads. Because many of them faced with
consequences of Milosevi6-Markovi6 were not skillful
enough to ensure accommodation for themselves and
their offspring somewhere in Serbian mainland.
Contrary to Serbia in (the neighboring and friendly)
Montenegro everything is different. The local authorities
there have all the relevant and even updated figures on
refugees. The state functions in Montenegro and provides
aid and care to them.
In Montenegro refugees are recognized and
registered. In Podgorica they have the UNHCR office,
Helsinki Committee, the Montenegrin Red Cross. The
employees of these organizations have all the figures and
they can (read: they are allowed) to help the misfortunate.
By Thursday, 16 July, the UNHCR registered 20,615
refugees who fled from Kosovo to Montenegro, and the
Montenegrin Red Cross put on file 19,405 persons who
asked for aid.
Helsinki Charter, July 1998

Visit to Kosovo refugees

11

January

1999

often wonder if these "collective centres" are in

fact "prisons for people who have lost everything
they had"
I

hile visiting Kosovo together with the delegation of

International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights 1
met and talked to refugees from Krajina who had come to
Kosovo in the wake of the "Storm" offensive, in 1995. 1
visited several collective centers in Pristina for which 1did
not need the Ministry of Information pass. In fact 1did not
even ask for it, as 1 was told the very day 1 arrived in
Pristina that l could visit "Boro and Ramiz" centre only if
the Ministry allowed it. Maybe 1was wrang, but 1thought

that the passes were needed only for prison visits and not
for seeing refugees who are, after all, free people,
although they were compelled to leave their homes for
one reason or another. Perhaps did something illegal,
but l thought it was important to inform them about the
ongoing projects of Helsinki Committee in Serbia, as the
latter concerned them, and not some gentleman in various
ministries "of our dear country."
Thanks to the assistance of Ms. Lucia Elmi, from the
"ltalian Consortium of Solidarity" 1 first visited eight old
people from Krajina, accommodated in the "Horne for
Elderly, no.2". This institute is a part of the hospital, and
the elderly refugees initially came there for a treatment
and then stayed on. i apologize to those old people for
using the word "home," as the premises in which they live
can be called anything but that. But unfortunately that is
the place where they will die too, owing to the "care"
extended to them by this country. These refugees are
living their last days in two rooms. Men and warnen sleep
and eat together and keep the little personal stuft they
have in those two premises. They spend their days
on "their" beds, that is mattresses which are placed on
several empty cases. They have a TV and a strange stove
which belongs to an antique shop. These sick and seedy
old people are a very sad sight, and they seem to have
lost any hope that one day they will lead a more dignified
and peaceful life, befitting their age. Only two women said
they wanted to go harne and try to renew their lives in the
places from which they had been banished three years
ago. Their courage in face of their current living conditions
is amazing, and even more so their wish to start their lives
anew. Their modesty is touching for they have asked
humanitarian organizations to cut down their milk rations
(i liter per day) as
have
milk.
complain
is awful.
that the food which they get frorn the
Many of thern have stomach ulcers and because of poor
quality of food are often more hungry than saturated. The
hygiene conditions are very low; they only have cold
and
water, when it is available, and walls are very
wet. But despite their terrible
they made rne a cup
urged
of "home-made" sweet coffee and a
me to drink it while it was still hot.
all kissed me on
my departure and 1feit so sad ...
In "Pupil's Horne Miladin Popovic" the picture is
almost identical.
conditions are
rnany
a classroom. One
families live in a
classroom, one harne. In this
there are several
hundreds of refugees of different ages. They all have hard
time there. At the entrance i was rnet
a group of middleaged wornen. The schoolyard rerninds them of their home
gardens, so they like to spend their summer afternoons
there.
were very hostile, for they did not like
"somebody from the external world-an alien" to corne and
"lecture" them on their predicament...as if they were not
aware of it. But
relaxed a bit when
to them
the
of the project "1 want to go harne."
their rooms and showed me how
washed their
clothes and dishes
the toilets. i asked them how
bathe at the
for

men and women work sornewhere in Pristina, but what will

happen this winter to the grandmother who does not have
stockings, but only home-made wool footwear? Male
refugees were by and !arge aggressive in their
cornmunication with me and suspicious about all
inforrnation which l had
from Beigrade. They told
me
were sick and tired of everything and did not trust
anyone. They blamed international cornrnunity and
organizations like Helsinki Cornmittee for their troubles.
But sorne of them were happy to learn that there was a
possibility, no matter how slirn, of their return. feit the
sarne hostility in the rneeting with Krajina refugees housed
in the hotel "Bo:Zur." There were also several hundred of
thern, but they lived under better conditions. Although
they have not received substantial hurnanitarian aid for
quite some, the little that arrives is imrnediately seized by
the reception desk personnel. The gentlernan at the desk
was very rude, and sorne people told rne later that was
lucky to get into the center at all. 1cannot help but wonder
whether the places in which refugees lived should be
called "prisons for people who have lost everything they
had" instead of "collective centers."?! They are scared
because of the situation in Kosovo and do not want to
experience another war. They hope that the Republic of
Serbia will let them relocate elsewhere or that they will be
able to emigrate. Many want to go harne, but are mad at
their forrner homeland and scared stiff because of
atrocities they have experienced.
How could one possibly conclude this report?
Nobody knows how many refugees are currently in
Kosovo, or maybe nobody wants to disclose that figure to
me. When 1 tried to get that
the gentleman in
charge of collective centres, told rne to go back to
Beigrade, and added that that
he was celebrating his
holiday. lndeed it was 7
but one rnust question the
of this country to celebrate this day when hundreds
of people are still sleeping on the floors of "Boro and
Ramiz Centre"? Which holidays shall we celebrate when
the columns of refugees get on the road again, this time
towards central Serbia?!
Helsinki Charter, July i 998

happy to have water. Hot water is a

They do not receive any humanitarian assistance.
Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

ules which in recent months carried loads of

kalishnikovs over the Prokletija mountains, more than
five years ago carried a completely different loadtextbooks for pupils of the first school-year of "the parallel
education system of Kosovar Albanians."
But Serbia was not satisfied with the suspension of
political institutions of Kosovo, it had to pursue its antiAlbanian policy to the bitter end. Hence what followed was
an overnight suspension of Kosovar school plans and
curricula and introduction of exclusively Serbian ones.
Albanians not only opposed the suspension of the
political autonomy but also the Serbian dictum in their
Albanian classrooms. In other words they continued their
Albanian language education, and subsequently started
using modified curricula with Albanian textbooks. But they
paid a dear price for their resistance.
The newly-found freedom had to be exercised in
cellars, garages, unfinished houses... Due to such
inadequate and marginal school facilities into which
young Kosovars were driven, '1the parallel shool system" of
Kosovara Albanians became a metaphor for "prisons."
Unfortunately after the completion of school they were
faced with bleak prospects. Depressive Kosovo reality
offered no hope, no way-out.
lt seemed that the only way-out was indicated by the
UCK (the Albanian acronym for the Liberation Army of
Kosovo.) The Serbian police raid in Drenica area in early
March meant the end of hesitation for many young
Kosovars. Active, non-violent resistance initiated by the
students'protests last fall soon proved to be utterly
ineffectual. Early Nineties slogan "To Europe with a Pencil"
was soon replaced by tacit support of the UCK, then
cheers and hoorays, and finally by full membership.
When the situation on the ground became radical
many were left with only once choice. Studying became
nonsensical when young Kosovars were compelled to
defend by arms their family homes in the critical areas of
Drenica and Malesevo and in the border belt with Albania.
"At this moment for me it is impossible to be only a
philosophy student," said a young man. That week his
close relative was killed, and his brother wounded. They
lived on the edge of the proclaimed "free territory" of
Malesevo and found themselves in a Malesevo street at
the wrong moment of time.
However it seemed that sooner or later Kosovar
Albanians would return to their school facilities by a
detour, namely, by their Kalishnikov-won independence.
In its most optimistic communiques UCK maintained
that it controlled as much as half of Kosovo's territory.
lndependence seemed to be within its reach. UCKpraising graffiti were everywhere: on buildings, in lifts, in
streets.
Those three letters for the first time struck fear in the
hearts of Kosovo Serbs. They suddenly became aware of
the predominance of the Albanian milieu. Reports on the

January

1999

police casualties indicated the fragility of their apparently

stable and privileged position in the province.
On the other side, among Kosovars, the feeling of
invincibility, was soon replaced with forebodings when the
news about an ever increasing-number of casualties in
Kosovo villages spread. 'War in villages is unlike the war
in city," was the often-voiced opinion in Pristina. People
started anxiously glancing at the rooftops, potential
snipers lairs An then the hostilities began in first urban
center. Orahovac.
A systematic offensive of the Serb forces, which these
days are crushing the last centers of the armed resistance
of Kosovars, indicated that violence would not lead to
denouement of Kosovo issue. By extension, Kosovo is still
far from peace. Serbs took control over territories nearly
cleansed from their Albanian locals. Some 200,000
Albanians have been driven out of their homes, but are still
in Kosovo. Even if they decided to return they would find
their homes burnt to the ground. However, for all of them
Kosovo was and remains their home.
A young pop group summed up that feeling in the
refrain: "This is my home! This is where l'm staying."
In the meanwhile Kosovo Serbs and Serbs from
Krajina, settled there in the wake of the Croatian "Storm"
offensive, are either leaving Kosovo or plan to do that.
In late Eighties and early Nineties two maximalistic
concepts-the Serb unitary one and the Albanian separatist
one- locked horns in Kosovo. Serbs realized their concept
through constitutional unification, while the Albanian
concept, embodied in the independent Kosovo, was and
remains unattainable. The crux of the Kosovo problem lies
in that asymmetry. A genuine normalization of SerbAlbanian relations will be feasible only if Albanians have a
state of their own.
Even before the armed conflict in Kosovo Albanians
were against the reinstatement of the old autonomy. They
considered independent Kosovo as the only solution
which could prevent a new collective humiliation similar to
the model "first give, and then take," as it happened with
the autonomy granted in 1974 and taken away, 15 years
later. At the moment UCK seems to be losing on the
ground. But is it still early for either party to proclaim a
total victory. Albanian community in Kosovo is not likely to
forget that the key development in attracting the world's
attention to the status and demands of Kosovars was the
emergence of the UCK.
lt is true that international community urged the change of their status in Kosovo, but it also rejected their demand for independence. The longer Serbia refuses to face
consequences of its policy, the more Kosovars will hope
that the "world" will accept their position, namely, de facto
accept the independent Kosovo, even in a legally odd
form of international protectorate or with a (very) special
status. That should be done to offset consequences of a
possible regional escalation of the crisis.
An American analyst recently commented the Kosovo
issue in the following fashion: "Milosevi6 did not create
that problem, but he certainly exacerbated it." In fact
Kosovo became an insoluble problem when its autonomy
was suspended. But the current "sword-crossing" in
Kosovo clearly indicated that the war option wou!d not
bring about the desired resolution, neither to Serbs nor to
Albanians.

osovo
Kosovo has again made the headlines. Like in the late
Eighties the hate speech was again set in motion. And
Serbia repeats its old mistake from the late Eighties. Then
it strove to divide Kosovars in bad counter-revolutionaries
and good communists, while currently the division
effected is between terrorists and loyalists. Such a division
in the Albanian society has never been accepted, so it is
not likely to happen now. For Serbs UCK are terrorists,
and for Albanians they are the defenders of their homes,
although currently not-so-succesful ones.
Serbia should now offer to Kosovars a political option
protecting Albanians primarily from Serbia proper. That
would be the strongest argument for the laying down of
arms by those Albanians compelled by the war in their
back yard to take up the arms for the first time in their
lives. Only an essential change of the political status of
Albanians with guarantees that it cannot be arbitrarily
reversed, would create an environment in which the
Kosovar radicals would be marginalized in the fold of
Albanian community.
Thousands of frustrated Albanians are a direct
consequence of a decade-long Serbian rule over Kosovo.
lf the cease-fire is not brokered soon, kalishnikovs, UCK
and long fighting till the secession is achieved will, most
likely remain the only option.
The emergence of UCK was accompanied by the
euphoria which one could liken to the Albanians "getting
rid of fear." For the first time Albanians retaliated in Drenica
the last November. However the current absence of
political solution will have only one outcome: Albanian full
acceptance of all the war atrocities and suffering in the
pursuit of their objective, that is, until its attainment. Hence
pragmatists ready to interpret the independence of
Kosovo as the independence from Serbia (although not
so vociferously) and not as full political and territorial
sovereignty in international relations, will be eliminated
from the political scene.
"I do not want independence, not because 1 want
Kosovo to be in Serbia, but because 1do no want Kosovo
to unite with Albania," says a young Albanian girl. This is
not a widely shared position in Kosovo. But she is also
likely to change her mind and join the ranks of the majority
of her fellow-nationals in the demand that Kosovo be
granted full independence from Serbia, even it led to the
direct union with Albania.
Helsinki Charter, August 1998

he Contact Group plan, presented last week by the

British Ambassador Brian Donnelley to the Beigrade
authorities and representatives of Kosovo Albanians, more
precisely to lbrahim Rugova, is one of the imponderables
which mostly intrigue the broad public both at home and
abroad. At the same time the Ambassador himself
stressed the secret character of the document, which in
turn gave rise to numerous speculations as to the possible
contents and extent of this initiative launched on behalf of
the most influential group of countries engaged in the
search for solution to the most explosive crisis in Kosovo
and its immanent threat to the regional stability.
Judging by many reliable indications the current
initiative evolved from an earlier Franco-German plan
(Kinkel-Vedrine plan) which also strove to end all
hostilities and encourage the start-up of political dialogue
on mutually acceptable solution, actively backed by
authorized representatives of international community,
either through their direct engagement or mediation.
The fact that the plan of the two important European
countries was supported by the whole Contact Group,
including the USA and Russia, meant that the plan was
subsequently elaborated to allow for a broader
agreement, but also to include a bigger compromise
potential. This is amply illustrated by so far publicized
reactions and commentaries of the most prominent
members of the Contact Group. The German Defense
Secretary, Foker Riehe, indicated that that the FrancoGerman plan was "a middle-of-the-road solution ...
somewhere between the 1989 autonomy and the status of
republic in the Yugoslav Federation." The Russian high
official, Vladimir Mihailovich Nesterushkin, hinted that the
proposed solution would require the amendments to the
FR Constitution and the Serbian alike. The US hyperactive
envoy Christopher Hili had his reservations about the
bilateral solution, terming it "a hotchpotch of various ideas,
some useful, and some useless." A high SPD official,
Verhoigen, explicated that the proposal envisaged the
highest-degree autonomy, and the status similar to the
Montenegrin one, in other words the status of the third
republic, but without the right to secession. Finally the
German Ambassador in Beigrade explicated the plan
even further by saying that the Contact Group proposal
was similar to solutions applied in other European regions
and to the one envisaged by the Z-4 plan for Serbs in
Krajina (the latter, arrogantly rejected by the Knin
leadership, resulted in serious consequences and relieved
Tudman of the same, utterly unpleasant task).
When one takes into account all hints, ideas and
proposals which have been circulating in recent months,
from the sudden escalation of the Kosovo crisis caused by
brutal actions of the police forces in late February and
Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

early March, then one could as weil guess what the still
secret Contact Group document contains. Firstly, it most
certainly includes universally accepted principles and
standards of conduct, upheld also by the members of the
Group. Secondly, several applied models of ethnic
minorities autonomy (lreland, Belgium, Chechenia, Tyrol)
are included in it. All those models are probably cited only
as "an encouragement and are not likely to be forcefully
implemented in Kosovo. Thirdly, what is most probably
offered is the highest-level autonomy in line with the
existing Euro standards. In view of the Contact Group
refusal of any change of the SRY borders due to inevitably
dangerous regional implications thereof, and the
simultaneous Kosovar refusal of any solution envisaging
Kosovo in Serbia, the plan undoubtedly includes the socalled federal link ensuring the status of Kosovo through
its defined position within the altered federation (as
verified by Nesterushkin's hints at the change of both
Constitutions). And finally in order to resolve the complex
issue of blocking the right to secession, which could make
Montenegro vote against the offered solution, 1 think that
the proposal avoids the terms "republic" and perhaps opts
for the term "special status," which of course can
sublimate any ultimately established form of autonomy.
But how to attain that form is still a major problem, and
until it is resolved tragical developements in Kosovo (the
number of civilian casualties is on the rise, and particularly
in Albanian villages, constantly under heavy artillery fire)
will not be halted.
The British Ambassador Donnelley was happy to see
that the Federal Government was "pleased with the quality
of documents" offered by the Contact Group. He added
that the Contact Group was perchance willing to mediate,
but was not ready to impose solutions. Maybe the Federal
Government was pleased with the quality of documents
precisely because of such a stance of the Contact Group.
The Albanian side responded in principle positively to the
proposal by immediately setting up its negotiating team. lt
is quite certain that both sides will avoid situations in
which they would be forced to reject the Contact Group
proposal and consequently cause the anger of
international community. As there is currently no minimal
confidence between the two sides, and moreover their
positions are confronted and very distanced, it is not
realistic to expect that Serbs and Albanians would make
efforts to find the mutually acceptable solution. Hence
some international "pressure" is inevitable, and it is most
likely to take the shape of an international conference
(similarly to the Dayton solution). Understandably enough
any solution must be followed by lasting and adequate
international guarantees, and most probably by protective
monitoring in the first stage of implementation.
Armed conflict must be stopped before that, or rather,
at once. That is conditio sine qua non, without which
either talks or solution are not feasible. That is why the
Security Council of the UN placed the demand for an
immediate cease-fire on the top of its agenda (albeit with
some vacillation). lt's a pity that the Council did no show
more readiness to back this justified demand by an
energetic action.

Helsinki Charter, August 1998

January 1999

e came from Glina (The Republic of Croatia).

Offensive "Storm" forced him to flee first to Kraljevo
(SR Yugoslavia), where he was thrice forcibly mobilized by
the Serbian police and sent to the Bosnian battlefields.
Then he decided of his own will to go to Kosovo, as the
was told in the Kraljevo collective center that he would not
be mobilized in that region. He wanted to settle in Kosovo
Polje, but when the train arrived there the police sent them
to Pec. When they left the train the police started
harassing them. The other refugees witnessing this
incident, left their stuft in the train, bought the tickets at the
station and-returned to Serbia. Although scared M.V.
decided to stay in Pec, when the municipal authorities
convinced him everything would be OK and that he would
get aid, job and accommodation in a Pec hotel. Then his
group was taken to the collective refugee center, the
sports facility "Karagac" in Pec. There were 500 people,
who slept together on mattresses and used only one
toilet. M.V and his family (wife and two children) stayed
there 15 days and then were re-accommodated in the Pec
railway station facility. Thereafter he left for Klina to look for
a job. He stayed in a single-room barrack. His wife got a
job with a private entrepreneur. She worked 10-12 hours a
day for a 600 dinar monthly pay. She worked there eight
months. V.M commuted form Klina to Pec to work as an
administrative assistant and a physical worker for a private
firm owned by a local (Montenegrin). His monthly pay was
250 dinars. When he left the job the Montenegrin
threatened him that he would never again get
humanitarian aid, for refugees were supposed to work and
not to live on dole. M.V. and his family ate in a soup
kitchen in Klina, as the international aid in kind never
reached them (it was seized by the local Red Cross and
municipal authorities). The Red Cross Secretary in Klina
distributed that aid to locals who voted for Slobodan
Milosevic. A sack of flour was worth three votes. Refugees
complained about this problem to various international
humanitarian agencies, but there was no response. The
Klina municipal authorities put pressure on M.V. to move
to Srbica, allegedly because they were short of money.
But he refused to go there. From 1995 to the start-up of
the armed conflict in Kosovo M.v's life was tolerable. He
had no problems with the locals, except with the
employers who tried to exploit him. He has only kind
words for Albanians in Kosovo, and claims that they paid
him weil for his work. The Serbian authorities disliked him
for being in friendly relations with Albanians, while the
latter, during his last days in Kosovo, feared that the
Albanian extremists might punish them because of that
friendship. M.V. says he has not fled kosovo because of
Albanians, but rather because of the Serbian repression.
Namely the Serbian authorities started harassing refugees
even before the beginning of the conflict, allegedly
because refugees knew what was happening with the

osovo
humanitarian aid. According to him many Krajina refugees
have left for Serbia, and about 700 of them emigrated to
the United States or Canada owing to the UNHCR efforts.
Unfortunately the Serbian government stopped this
emigration project.
M.V. was born in 1965, his wife M. in 1969, his
daughter M, born in 1993 has cerebral paralysis, and son
A., born in 1989, has asthma.
M.V. wants to emigrate due to his predicament.
Helsinki Charter, August 1998

IP

n mid September this year Zivadin Jovanovic, the

Foreign Secretary, invited representatives of diplomatic
offices accredited in Beigrade, and once again, but now
officially told them that "the security forces of Serbia" had
just "finished their job in Kosvo," namely "defeated socalled Liberation Army of Kosvo!." Rallied diplomats also
heard some objections of the host, for example, the "fact"
that Western Europe and the rest of rich nations in the
world should not apply double standards in treatment of
international terrorism: namely treat differently terrorism in
Kosovo and Metohija, that is in Serbia and Yugoslavia,
from the one which directly threatens the security of those
countries. In this diatribe Foreign Secretary was
successfully assisted by the Serbian Sports Minister, Mr.
Zoran Andelkovic.
Jovanovic
and
Andelkovic
are,
Ministers
chronologically speaking, ending a long list of officials,
followers of the ruling coalition, and numerous "delegates"
of a broad "fatherland front", who during the past summer,
ecstatic with patriotism, demonstrated their elocution
faculty by indefatigably repeating how "gangs of Shiptari
terrorists were crushed in Kosovo." lt is noteworthy than
nono of them mentioned the word "war," but rather
resorted to the "prescribed" terminology including
"curbing terrorism" or "fighting against Shiptari terrorist
gangs." lt is clear that "inadequate" or even "wrong
terminology" could undermine if not destroy the whole
propaganda engineered by the regime. They say (for
example, Dr. Vojis!av Seselj) that "the most important
stage of fighting against Shiptari terrorists or separatists
was completed", while "the final blow to the terrorist
dragon would be dealt soon."
Analysts of more sound mind, both at harne and
abroad, deny Seselj's thesis by arguing that the end of
"Milosevic's mid-summer offensive against so -called
Liberation Army of Kosvo" did not remove the war threat.
On the contrary, "Milosevic won the battle, but not the
war", hence the war could easily return to Kosovo, and
spill over into Montenegro and Sandfak, and even into
neighboring states. Of course such a dangerous scenario,
avidly desired by warring sides, could be avoided only if

NATO launched a corresponding intervention involving

international peace-keeping forces (NATO has been
preparing for this intervention for six months now!).
Some politicians, even military experts, probably
influenced by the generally accepted thesis that Kosovo
crisis cannot be resolved in the battlefield, tend to argue
that the last battle in Kosovo (officially called "the battle for
deblockade of communications") ended without a winner,
for neither side gained a decisive military advantage.
Hence it is maintained that "KLA will re-arrange and regroup its ranks and opt for the guerrilla combat tactic
(Adern Demachi, the political proxy of the KLA.)
There's indeed a possibility that the KLA will
reorganize itself and revitalize its ranks, plus change its
combat tactic, but they need time, money and "heavier"
arms than shell-launchers and kalishnikovs, and most
importantly better combat capability of both ordinary
soldiers and commanders. But, on the other hand, it is
stupid to claim that so-called Kosovo Liberation Army has
not been defeated, when it is obvious, at every step, that
the Yugoslav Army and the Serbian security forces control
the whole territory of Kosovo.
But the issue of winner is an entirely different matter. lt
is usually said that the winner is the "Serbian side" or
rather "the Serbian people," which is an absolute lie. The
only winner of this battle (but not of the final accountsettling which will happen shortly) is Slobodan Milosevi6,
President of the FR Yugoslavia, in the sense that his
personal power has been once again consolidated. He
has managed to defeat with his (literally- his) armed forces
(police and army) not only his nominally principal enemy,
so-called Liberation Army of Kosovo, but also to defeat
(and humiliate) all other direct, indirect, domestic and
foreign protagonists of the Kosovo war drama.
One can agree or disagree with Milosevic, feel
resentment or affinity for him, but nobody can deny some
of his qualities. For example those who are familiar with
his character and actions have long ago written that he
made the best moves (again for the sake of preservation
of his own power) under pressure and in a limited
maneuvering space. He demonstrated the same ability
even now: he opted for an offensive at the time when
many observers thought it was only question of day when
his combat order would fall apart (the rumors of the
fatigue of his 'war machinery' started circulating and there
were also strong indicators of dwindling morale among
the police and army ranks).
Milosevic has learnt his lesson from the erroneous
spring offensive in Drenica. He also made use of expert
analysis and advice of his military and intelligence experts,
notably Nebojsa Pavkovi6, Commander of Pristina Corps,
and Head of Statt Vladimir Lazarevic -who became
generals in the aftermath of the said offensive. Hence
Slobodan Milosevi6 decided to attack the KLA along the
depth of territory it had controlled (according to some
estimates between 30-40%, or between 3,000-4,000
square kilometers.)
This time Milosevi6 took a premeditated action, by
staging a partial mobilization through its Head of Statt
(officially called "military training summons") and by
revitalizing the Pristina corps commanding ranks and rearraning chain of command. He also sent respectable
reinforcements, in the shape of armored units and parts
Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

of special-units Corps, to Pristina. The combat echelons

always had enough ammo, and military units and
institutions tasked with logistics support were joined by a
number of textile and foodstuffs companies (the 'patriotic'
campaign, due to Milosevic's customary wariness was
quite a low-key one.)
As it is well-known offensive started in mid-July, and
this timing was not accidental. This Milosevic's timing first
had to do with the "surprise factor," as the enemy until the
offensive had initiative all along the front-line. But the
indecisiveness of relevant international factors (Security
Council, the OSCE, the Contact Group, the EU, the NATO
Council) to caution their elected main negotiator in the
Balkans against" the excessive use of force against the
Albanian innocent civilians in Kosovo"-although he was
allegedly continually threatened with the use of the NATOled force, played a major role in Milosevic's choice of his
"D-day."
Although it sounds paradoxical there are reasons to
believe that international factors gave their Negotiator a
green light to go ahead with his offensive against the
KLA, simultaneously signaling him that they would not
try to prevent the offensive.
The latter was due to their fear that the inflamed KLA
could kick up a fuss in Macedonia, Montenegro and even
in Greece in pursuit of its nebulous "Greater Albania"
project.
The offensive was planned for summer months, as S.
Milosevic and his political and military Chief of Staffs
logically calculated that the numerous army of
international observers, diplomats, humanitarians and
other missionaries, involved in denouement of the Kosovo
knot, had every right to take their well-deserved holidays.
After an easy crushing of the May and June protests
of soldiers' parents (who demanded safe return of their
children from Kosovo), and an apparent, June truce
between Slobodan Milosevic and Montenegrin President,
Milo 8ukanovi6, the former could have started the
offensive whenever he wanted: the idea of an all-out
defense of the "Serbian cradle" once again homogenized
Serbia.
International community was the first to capitulate to
Milosevic's action. America was too obsessed with the
Affair Lewinski, and did not pay enough heed to the
Kosovo crisis. Russia blocked by its poverty, in turn
blocked any hint of more resolute measures against
Milosevic dropped by the UN Security Council and other
international associations. The EU members, taken by
their own problems and selfish interests, could not
orchestrate a concerted action, as evidenced by harshworded diplomatic correspondence between Christopher
Hili, the main US negotiator and Klaus Kinkel, German
Minister of Foreign Affairs.
The disastrous campaign of the Liberation Army of
Kosovo began with its failure to capture Orahovac. The
latter had the snowballing effect as the KLA soon lost all it
other strongholds. All this indicated that the KLA was a
lesser political and military force than it was initially
thought. lf it was not stupid then it was suicidal to think
that than an extremely undefined military organization,
with a problematic structure and vague suboordination,
poorly armed and trained- that such a paramilitary
conglomerate could fare weil in urban fighting, or even in

January 1999

frontal conflicts with excellent combat formations of the

Army of Yugoslavia and police.
In addition to unattainable strategic goals, inscribed
on its flags (independence of Kosovo, 11 Greater Albania.")
Liberation Army of Kosovo resorted to some other foolish
acts. lt tried to mechanically copy the war developments
in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina on the Kosovo
11
war map." Moreover the "Chief of Statt of KLA not only
continuously called on NATO forces to intervene in
Kosovo, but openly anticipated that NATO would bring
victory to the KLA. In the KLA immature and ignorant
military calculations NATO featured as its partner.
lt is a great misfortune that masses of innocent
civilians, including Kosovar Albanians and a small number
of Serbs who still live in Kosovo, suffer at the hands of
armed forces. Montenegro was almost swamped by
refugees. Serbia has given Milosevic a free hand with
respect to both Kosovo and the question of life-and-death.
He has no political opposition, no public opposition and is
faced only with a few media which he could easily crack
down. lt is odd that so-called big world cannot see the
essential link between non-existence of elementary
conditions for development of democracy in Serbia and
Kosovo tragedy (or perhaps it is just turning a blind eye to
it). lf it were not so, why would some intellectuals then
claim that the only solution of Kosovo crisis is
democratization of Serbia? As if Slobodan Milosevic and
democracy were compatible!
Anyone with only superficial knowledge of the army
also knows that without tanks and guns-which, contrary to
the wars in Croatia and B&H, are now deployed more
carefully and cunningly-S.Milosevic would not succeed in
this offensive. The game in which the Yugoslav Army
officially only sealed off the border belt, while in fact its
artillery, tanks and choppers were deployed on the whole
territory-was not endorsed by the decision of the Supreme
Defense Council (who never seems to convene). Only one
man made all decisions, once again in the background.
Generals got promotions for this service to their
generalissimus, and the army got kudos. And everybody
is happy and pleased.
President Milosevic can now totally disregard the
international factors' umpteenth appeal to him to curb his
forces, particularly in the light of his announcement that
"terrorists were crushed," as in fact they were. But if NATO
decides to finally bring Milosevic to his senses by
launching its military intervention, he will be faced with two
tempting options: firstly the Federal Assembly could
proclaim the state of war, and secondly he could address
the nation to declare that that the state has effectively
crushed 11terrorists", but that the war against NATO is
nonsensical. In both cases he could physically and
psychologically survive, and ironically continue his
bargaining policy with his well-known partners in the
international scene, whom he has successfully deceived
to date. The rest of us cannot hope for a better future. But
Milosevic is our choice, not to say our sad destiny.
Helsinki Charter, August 1998

n Friday, 12 September, more than 3,000 people from

Kosovo after crossing the mountains arrived in village
Meteh, in the viciitny of Plav. They were 'welcomed' by the
Montenegrin police, who in line with the official decision
on the non-admission of new refugees kept them
outdoors for two days, in the rain. On Sunday they were
deported to Albania.
Then there was a succession of other examples of
'sheer humanity': 140 refugees were deported from
mountain Bogiecevica, in the vicinity of Plav, to Kosovo,
and 300 people were also forced to leave Rofaje and
return to Kosovo. "There were tears-and resistance, but
they had to comply with the government's decision" said
Semso Dedelji6, Head of Security Forces in Rofaje, an
eyewitness to the unpleasant event. "Twenty of them were
seen in a regular "Jugotrans bus" passing through
Rofaje." They arrived as far as Podgorica, but the
Montenegrin police was adamant... They offered kindly to
refugees to help them return to the "border between
Montenegro and Serbia," but when they refused to go
back to the "southern Serbian province," the police
"transported them to the Bofaj border crossing."
"Due to a chaotic situation in Albania, the freedom of
movement was limited and safety of Kosovo refugees was
in jeopardy. According to the available estimates, some
600 people who had crossed the border at Vrmosa,
managed to reach Skadar, where they awaited
assistance. Due to poor communication with our offices in
Albania, we do not have complete information on the fate
of all people who have been sent there," said Natalie
Carsenti, Deputy Head of the UNHCR office in Podgorica.
The UNHCR office asked the Montenegrin authorities
to reverse their decision on the non-admission of
refugees. They also sent a letter to the Montenegrin
President Milo 8ukanovi6. "Government has not yet
received the UNHCR official request to revoke its ban. lf
this request is well-grounded, Government will most
surely take it into consideration. But 1 do not believe that
we shall let the others run our state," said Vice President,
Dragisa Burzan.
The last news from Plav spoke of 150 people who
were stopped at the border crossing Vrmosa, and
ordered, without any justification, to return to Plav.
All this started when the emergency session of the
Montenegrin government concluded that "Montenegro
had no objective possibilities to further receive displaced
persons and refugees." The government also appealed to
"all those intending to enter Montenegro, as refugees or
displaced persons, not to do that."
'We cannot pull down our house in order to help the
others. Had we continued with the admission of displaced
persons, we would have set in motion a chaos-creating
mechanism in Montenegro," said Dragisa Burzan, in an
attempt to exp!icate the decision of Montenegrin
authorities.

"There was no political, humanitarian, physical limit,

but only the security one. Before passing the infamous
decision, the government received information on the
presence of !arger groups of armed men in refugees
columns. In order to avoid the Kosovo scenario, we were
compelled to take the unpopular measure," said Burzan.
He later explained that "we did not fear that they harbored
aggressive intentions towards Montenegro." He went on
to spin unconvincing tales: "But we feared that conflicts
might flare up between the newcomers, and the first
refugees in Plav, as it was widely thought that among the
latter there were ex-KLA members. Hence, after
negotiations, only women and children were allowed to
enter Plav." Mr. Burzan was also amazed at the reluctance
of Kosovar Albanian to accept such forcible family
divisions.
"The ground reports indicated nervousness, and
leaderships of municipalities hit by this influx warned us of
their shortage of accommodation facilities," said Vice
President Burzan, without specifying the identity of
nervous individuals. Representatives of five parties
forming the Plav municipality authorities, on the same day
issued a warning that they would leave the municipal
assembly if refugees were not allowed to enter the town.
But their appeal was futile.
Kudos went to the Montenegrin police. lt was said that
they "demonstrated high professional standards" by
staying outdoors, in the rain, like refugees. But, unlike
refugees, the policemen eventually went harne.
"All refugees, citizens of Yugoslavia, were deported in
an organized way to the other state! We demanded that
they be allowed to enter Plav. We wanted to provide them
with food and accommodation, without asking anything
from the state," said Hakija Ljesnjanin, Plav Officer for
Refugees. "When the border crossing was opened, the
locals' dream finally came true," said Ljesanin, adding that
"many previous appeals to that end had been turned
down both by Montenegrin and federal authorities.
According to him, their life would have been much easier
had it been done before. When asked if they had enough
food and blankets, Ljesnjanin answered: "We do. They are
staying with us, in our houses. We shall share everything.
This state should leave them alone. We shall feed them."
Albanian parties in Montenegro reacted also. "This
decision is not in keeping with international convention on
human rights," warned the Democratic Alliance of
Albanians in Montenegro and went on to assess that "the
humanitarian catastrophe is likely to happen in Kosovo, if
Montenegro closes its border." The Democratic Union of
Albanians hinted that "the decision is contrary to the
character and tradition of Montenegrin people." Both
parties called on government and Prime Minister Filip
Vujanovi6 to do the reappraisal of this decision. Ferhat
Dinosa, a DUA MP asked an unpleasant question: "Would
Montenegro treat in the same way refugees of other
ethnicity?"
To date 42,000 expelless from Kosovo arrived in
Montenegro, while some estimates speak of -45,000
people. 30,000 are Kosovar Albanians, 6,600 are Muslims,
2,000 Montenegrins, some 500 are Serbs and 3,000 are
"the others" including Romany members. Together with
30,000 refugees from Bosnia and Croatia they make up
11.6% of Montenegrin population. Commentaries range
Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

from "Montenegro cannot survive further influx of

refugees. it would be tantamount to 2 million people
suddenly entering France" to "Refugee camps should be
established.
International representatives and officials, during their
stay in the reformed part of the FRY often stated that
"Montenegro was an open country." But even before the
notorious decision, the situation was not so rosy. Namely
of 45,000 refugees only 1,500 were accommodated in
"collective centers," as 'the result' of official Montenegrin
efforts. Other refugees stayed with their relatives or rented
flats. Local population has played a major role in
accommodating and taking care of refugees. The state
efforts were limited to occasional registering of refugees
and distributing of international aid.
Many people know that bills for "collective
accommodation" of Bosnian and Croatian refugees were
regularly and solely footed by international humanitarian
organizations. In that sense, the state incurred no loss.
When Predrag Drecun, Labour and Health Care Minister
wails that "Montenegro must also take care of its social
cases," it is better to turn a deaf ear to such words, that is,
disregard the fact that for years now international aid
intended for refugees has been instead distributed to the
social cases in Montenegro.
The Democratic Union of Albanians has recently
assessed that "it is unjust and inhumane to consider
Kosovar Albanian refugees as people who would change
the ethnic set-up of Montenegro." But many calculations
are currently being done: how many Albanians live in
Montenegro, how many have arrived, how many children
will they have, etc. Rumors are circulating in northern
Montenegro that Milo will grant Montenegrin citizenship to
Kosovar Albanians to make them vote for him one day.
Probably to dispel an uneasy premonition, the authorities
decided that only children who had attended Serbian
schools in Kosovo can enroll in the Montenegrin ones.
This means that 10,000 enrollees of Albanian alternative
schools will be left without any education, as "they don't
have valid documents." Added to that the authorities state
that there is shortage of educational facilities and teaching
professionals ... Education Minister, Dragan Kujovic, was
flabbergasted at the mere hint that refugees could
organize the education of the children. "I am convinced
that Montenegro will not have to face this problem, for
such parallel education would not benefit either children
or their parents," he assessed.
"We have so far registered 4,847 pupils in Ulcinj, that
is approximately 180 classes. Among refugees there are
180 educational professionals, which means that we have
the necessary personnel. We shall find the adequate
facilitiesl We have ten years of experience and we know
that our people are willing to give all their money for good
education. But the Montenegrin Ministry of Education is
the real problem ... says Demo Murichi, educational
counselor, one of activists of the Ulcinj Centre for
Refugees. "Our hause is opposite the secondary school.
On 1 September my son was standing on the balcony and
watching children go to school. 1 saw him crying." says
Murichi and adds that for him it was one of the most
distressing moments of his life.
With some pride Ulcinj locals say that two hundred
refugee no langer live in the courtyard of the municipal
11

11

January 1999

assembly building. They stayed three months there. An

incomplete food emporium on the outskirts of town is
currently 'the home' of both 'old' and 'new' refugees from
Kosovo. We have three rooms and separate toilets for
men and warnen. Municipality gave us a loan to buy a
boiler and make a makeshift bathroom.
Some people tell us that they haven't had a decent
bath in twenty days. Newly arrived refugees had
wandered Kosovo for weeks. They have no clothes, no
money," says Djoka Skrenja from the Ulcinj Refugee
Centre.
Nota single refugee of 17, 394 of them in Ulcinj was
accommodated in a collective center. Some pay DM 200350 monthly for a three-bed room. Two people usually
sleep in one bed. A bed costs DM 3, while the UNHCR
allocates DM 2,5 a day. The most destitute refugees do
not pay for accommodation, they live with local hast
families. Some Albanians who live abroad "sponsor" the
refugees' accommodation. Some have given them their
houses, and some have rented houses for Albanian
families from Kosovo. The latter are paid for by the money
collected from emigrants.
"Once we received a handful of makaronis, some
sugar and several cans for 17-member family. That
quantity sufficed for several meals only. However, we
always had enough flour. We were also given ten
blankets, eight sponges. And that's it. Locals occasionally
give us foodstuffs," says D:Zevdet Musaj from Decane,
currently living in village Klezno near Ulcinj.
There isn't enough food for 8,000 refugees in Rofaje.
Many live in rooms without doors, windows, water and
electricity.
The way the media deal with this subject is a story
apart. A paper for example ran a photograph of a refugee
thanking Montenegro for a cup o milk given to him in
shepherd's hut. Manipulation at work. Never-ending
praises for the authorities. TV managed to interview
'adequate interlocutors' chosen from refugees on the
verge of being deported.
"Enraged at criticism of governments' decision Vice
President Burzan critically recommended international law
better be enforced in ltaly and France," reported "Vijesti" of
Podgorica. lt is not only ridiculous for someone who is
living in an isolated country to give such
recommendations, but his words are not even grounded
in reality. As a matter of fact the cruel reality is that
Montenegro deported citizens of its federal partner to the
other state. So much for the "humanitarian standards of
the modern federation.
Even if this was to be the proof of Montenegrin
'independence,' one cannot help but think that the
reformists' timing for flexing their muscle was quite
inappropriate. For example they could have shown their
decisiveness and firmness when the September class of
recruits was sent to defend their 'homeland.'!
11

Helsinki Charter, September 1998

by sandra Sljepcevic
elsinki Committee team in August 1998 visited several
Romany villages in Novi Sad, Pancevo, and Beigrade
to interview Romany refugees from Kosovo. Due to
escalation of violence in Kosovo the number of refugees is
on the rise. The Commissariat for Refugees of the
Republic of Serbia has not registered any Romany
refugees from Kosovo.
We found Romany refugees, mostly of Muslim
religion, in Romany enclaves in the aforementioned cities.
The majority of them found refuge in makeshift dwellings
of their relatives and friends. Wooden or tin 'houses' in
those shanty towns are without windows and floors and
have poor sanitary conditions. Refugees have not
received any humanitarian aid. Children don't have
clothes, footwear and have not been enrolled in schools.
We also found several pregnant women. They are not
entitled to medical care because they don't have their
health booklets (many of them left them in Kosovo). They
are all unemployed and have no income whatsoever. They
take food from containers or beg for it in town.
A female Romany refugee left Kosovo in July 1998
because of armed conflicts. She says that both the police
and Albanians opened fire. After that they had problems
with Albanian neighbors who kept stoning their houses.
They did not see Albanian army, but are convinced that its
soldiers also opened fire. Her family lived in a Serbian
village, and she claims that their houses were stoned from
the adjoining Albanian village. She and her family took a
train to Novi Sad and had no problems on their journey.
All Romany from her village fled to Serbia. She adds that
the police advised women and children to leave for Serbia
and men to stay on to defend their homes. Her father was
in the "war" for two weeks and then joined the family in
Novi Sad.
A male Romany refugee left his village in the vicinity of
Kosovska Mitrovica in July 1998. He lived in an Albanian
village and admittedly had problems with his Albanian
neighbors. They used to barge in his house, threaten him
and criticize him for voted for Slobodan Milosevi6 at the
last elections. He and his family told Albanains they were
loyal to Serbia and would not fight against the Serbian
police. Then the Albanians began stoning his house. They
broke all windows and doors. He and his family decided
to leave when Albanians started threatening them anew
and warned them they their lives were at stake. The police
defended them for a while, but one day told them they
could not langer come and protect them every night. The
police gave weapons to some Romany, but did not have
enough to hand it out to all of them. In their village there
were 300 Romany houses. Not all Romany fled to Serbia.
He and his family took a train to Serbia and had no
problems on their journey.
A female Romany refugee came from the locality of
Kacanik in July 1998. Albanians asked her son to join the

Kosovo Liberation Army, but he was not allowed to do that

as he and the others in the family were members of the
Socialist Party of Serbia. She says she has not seen the
police in their village. The fear of war made them all flee
Kosovo.
A Romany refugee came from Urosevac in June 1998.
He and his family, fearing the escalation of conflicts, left
Kosovo. They did not see the police and members of the
KLA, but the constant sound of shooting frightened them.
They took a train to Novi Sada and had no problems on
their journey. They had good relations with their Serbian
and Albanian neighbors in Kosovo.
A male Romany refugee came from Obili6 in May
1998. He was on good terms with his Albanian neighbors,
but when the police started shooting, he had locked
himself in his house and later decided to leave Kosovo. He
says he has not seen any KLA soldiers. Nobody
influenced his decision to leave Kosovo. He decided to do
that in order to protect the lives of his children. He had a
safe train journey to Serbia.
A male Romany refugee came from Urosevac area in
July 1998. He left Kosovo when the police started
shooting in Urosevac and its neighboring villages. He did
not see any member of the KLA, or of the Yugoslav Army
in his village. He personally had no problems with the
police, but knew that the police had shelled his village. He
had a safe train journey to Serbia.
A female Romany refugee came from Obili6 in July
1998. She left because of the war and rumors that women
and children were harassed. Her family did not suffer from
such indignity, but neighbors and friends told her such
harassment was commonplace. She did not know if the
perpetrators were the KLA soldiers or the Serbian
policemen. She and her ten family members left Kosovo to
save their lives. During their last weeks in Kosovo they
could not even find food. Neither she nor her family saw
any KLA member or policemen. Their journey to Serbia
was safe.
A male Romany refugee came from Kosovo in May
1998. He said he lived in a Serbian village. He decided to
leave when the KLA started shooting. While he was in the
village there were no casualties and all houses remained
intact. Police did not come to defend them. Nobody told
them to leave their house, but they did it to save their lives.
He told us that local Serbs had weapons and defended
themselves, while no weapons for the defense purpose
were given to Romany locals. He and his famly came by
train. The police checked their IDs, but did not harass
them.
A female Romany refugee came from Slatina in
August 1998. She and har family left Kosovo because they
feared the war. When conflicts started in Kosovo they
locked themselves in their house and after a few days had
no more food. She says that both Albanians and Serbs
opened fire. Nobody harassed them, but she got
frightened when she saw her Albanian neighbor in
uniform. The police came to teil them that they could not
defend their house. On the other hand Albanians
promised to defend them if their husbands joined the
Kosovo Liberation Army. When she came to Pancevo she
went to the Pancevo Red Cross for humanitarian aid. But
she was told that they had nothing for her and her family
Helsi11ki Charter - Special Editio11

and advised them to return to Kosovo. She and her family

had a safe train journey to Serbia, although they did not
have money to buy train tickets.
A male refugee from Srbica arrived in Serbia in July
1998. He told us that he left Kosovo when Albanians
started shooting around. His house was shot six times, so
he and his family dared not leave their house for several
days. Police came to promise them protection, but gave
them no weapons. When Albanians asked him to join the
KLA he told them that he was a member of the Serbian
Socialist Party and that he did not want any contacts with
Albanians and their parties. As he and his family did not
leave the house for several days they ate all their food.
Then they decided to leave Kosovo. His friend, a
policeman also advised him to find a refuge for his family
elsewhere. He and his family had a safe journey to Serbia.
Helsinki Charter, September 1998

xperts for Albanian affairs argue that Albanians in

Albania this time rose in revolt not only against their
fellow nationals, but also against Albanians living on the
other side of border. President of the Republic of Albania,
Red:Z.ep Meidani, personally warned the general public
that events in Albania took precedence over the Kosovo
crisis. The Albanian Foreign Secretary, Pascal Millo,
confirmed that "the current mayhem inflicted an additional
pain to Kosovar Albanians. Their capital, capital of
Albania, Tirana, is burning. Albania is undergoing a deep
crisis, instead of being a firm mainstay." At the same time
the Chief of Statt of the Kosovo Liberation Army in his
latest declaration no. 9, inter alia, stated: "lf political
subjects of Kosovo and Albania had spoken the same
language and acted as a single nation, the mayhem in
Albania would have never happened, Kosovo would have
not burnt or been destroyed and unfavorable solution
would not have been placed on agenda." The statement
also said: "We are convinced that the latest events in
Albania were staged to hurt the heroic struggle of people
of Kosovo."
Having in mind that the opposition's discontent with
Fatos Nano's policy, Sali Berisha, President of Democratic
Party, said that "Azem Hajdari was killed by Fatos Nano in
compliance with Belgrade's order that Albania had to be
destroyed". The regime retaliated by stripping Berisha of
his MP immunity and accusing him of trying to stage an
armed coup d' etait.
That Albanian crisis had its Kosovo connections was
confirmed by Veton Gjuliku, Deputy Director of
Metropolitan Police in Tirana. He stated that a !arge
number of Kosovar Albanians took part in recent protests.
He furthermore added. "not only their presence was
noted, but moreover all Kosovars were armed." Hence the

January 1999

current Albanian crisis does not only have a bearing on

the Kosovo situation but also some Kosovars, either as
ordinary citizens or members of the KLA, directly sided
with Sali Berisha in recent wave of protests which were
qualified as an attempted coup by the regime.
However the
KLA publicly
disclaimed
its
responsibility, and furthermore stated that the KLA had
nothing to with the internal political strife in Albania. The
KLA political representative publicly distanced himself
from all elements who got entangled in the anarchy, and
stressed that the right place for the KLA uniformed
members were Kosovo-wide fronts and not the streets of
Tirana. He also pointed out that nobody was allowed to
misuse the KLA emblem either in Kosovo or Albania. In
any case the current crisis in Albania will badly affect
Kosovo in several ways.
Firstly, Albanians have once again shown their
political immaturity in overcoming the consequences of
several decades long dictatorship. The very regime, which
now accuses the opposition of staging the armed coup d'
etait, has not done anything to create and strengthen
democratic institutions. Assassination of the leader of
students' anti-communist demonstrations, Azem Hajdari,
which triggered off massive protests in Tirana, indicated
that the regime, under the pretext of restoring peace and
order, in fact intended to installing a dictatorship in
changed circumstances. lt would prolong the life of the
ruling elite, and the fate of the country-well nobody seems
to care about it.
lnternationally recognized political and legal criteria
indicate that the state of Albania has not laid the
groundwork for the building of democratic institutions
either during the rule of Berisha or the one of Nano.
Morevoer one could say that the self-styled anticommunist regime in the transition period dragged the
country even deeper into the economic, political, ethical
and national crisis. This in turn made it more difficult for
Kosovar Albanians to resolve promptly and in a
democratic way their crisis. One of the most strident critics
of both the authorities and opposition in Albania, A.
Baleta, argued that "by acting the way they did, they sold
Kosovo to Serbia, and Albania to Greece." lf Albanians,
whose state was formed in 1912, have failed to create
democratic institutions and stability, the realistic skeptics
might say that Kosovar Albanians are even less likely to
achieve that, given their lack of state - forming experience!
However the subject of our discussion is not whether this
is correct from the political, legal and ethical standpoint!
However the pragmatic policy of the West policy is not
likely to ignore this situation in Albania. In the Western and
some other mind-sets this situation in Albania indicates a
possibility of similar scenario in Kosovo.
Secondly, the current Albanian crisis will have a
negative impact on Kosovo developments, and vice versa.
The same thing might happen to the Kosovo Liberation
Army, for the Albanian body politic had been divided even
before the revolt erupted. Pro-Kosovo politicians in
Albania and almost all politicians in Kosovo did not have
much faith in recent activities of the Tirana government.
Hence some statements of Fatos Nano, notably his last
statement in Lisabon, by which he decisively recognized
the sovereignty of the rump Yugoslavia over Kosovo, were
negatively assessed by some poticians in Albania and in

osovo
Kosovo. Gene Polo, Vice President of Democratic Party,
noted that Nano came to power with the idea of not
helping Kosovo and betraying the Albanian national
question.
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Helsinki Charter, September 1998

the principle of consensus on the key issues was

maintained as the fundamental principles underpinning
equitable relations within the federation remained the
same.
In respect of Serbia, the SFRY Presidency suggested
certain changes of several article pertaining to the
normative part of the SFRY Constitution to remove
obstacles in relations between the republic an provinces.
In other words remarks of the Presidency of the SR Serbia
that some provisions reduce Serbia to so-called central
part, while, contrary to constitutional principles, provinces
and republic are, equalized as the former are accorded
formal and essential characteristics of a state, (Gazette of
the Assembly of the SR Serbia, no. 334, 9 April 1987),
were taken into account. On that occasion, for example,
the amendment XXXVI reinstating Serbia's authority in the
field of international cooperation was put forward. While
article 271 of the SFRY Constitution spells out that
republics and provinces realize international cooperation
within the framework of the established foreign policy of
the SFRY, amendment XXXVI adds and also whitn the
framework of SR Serbia's international cooperation. In
other words the amendment duty-bound the provinces to
harmonize their international cooperation both with
federal and republican bodies.
As the initiatives for constitutional changes were
challenged and opposed both by the federation and the
republics, the only way out was a much-needed
consensus. The suggestion of the Presidency of the SR
Serbia to effect changes of the republican constitution
after lengthy discussions and negotiations got the green
light and all relevant factors in the Federation, the
Republic of Serbia and provinces agreed to proceed with
it. At the aforementioned session the Assembly of the SR
Serbia concluded that the suggestion and pertinent
justification of the then President of Presidency, Ivan
Stambolic, be submitted to all relevant factors in the
Republic (notably to the provincial assemblies) in order to
obtain their formal approval for the changes of the
Constitution. Deadline for approval and relevant opinions
was, at the latest, October 1987.
But this process was suddenty interrupted. Just ten
days after the aforementioned session of the Assembly of
the SR Serbia had adopted the justification of suggested
amendments to the Serbian Constitution, Slobodan
Milosevic, backed by the conservative nationalist and
military-police faction staged a party coup at the notorious
Eighth Session (23-24 September 1987.) lnstead of
pursuing the previous peaceful search for solution, in the
ensuing period he tried to resolve the Kosovo problem by
taking a set of coercive measures.
lt was fairly easy for him to do that, because there
were no objective and subjective prerequisites for a
democratic course of action. Decentralization of
federation was not backed by radical reforms or political
and economic system, while the existing reformist and
antinationalist forces were not mature and organized
enough to complete that ambitious task. Forces of
bureaucratic centralism and ethnic nationalism in the
republic and provinces were much strenger! And many
countries in the world were surprised by this
phenomenon.
The much-hyped slogan Hey, Serbia, your three
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eneral social crisis in the form er SFRY was caused by

some inadequate constitutional solutions related to
political and economic system, and also to relations within
the Federation. In view of the conflicts between the
Republic of Serbia and its two autonomous provinces,
Kosovo and Vojvodina, the former was very much
interested in effecting certain constitutional changes.
Contrary to the other republics of the former SFRY,
Serbia functioned as a complex state, being composed of
two provinces which were simultaneously the constituent
elements of the Yugoslav Federation. Provinces had the
same constitutional rights as the republics, barring the
right to secession.
Conflicts within Serbia were primarily caused because
the Constitution failed to clearly spell out some general,
state functions of the republic (defense, social plan,
territorial plan, judiciary, foreign policy, etc.). Due to
insufficiently determined relations between the Republic
and provinces under the constitution, Serbia also had
difficulty in presenting interests of republics as a whole
within the federation.
At the joint session of all three assemblies of the SR
Serbia (14 September 1987) the Serbian Presidency
proposal that the republican constitution be amended was
discussed. These amendments aimed at removing
possible conflicts between the Republic and provinces by
specifying the classical state prerogatives of the Republic
and higher degree of cooperation between the republican
and provincial bodies on issues of interests for the whole
republic. They were also designed to halt the process of
disintegration and achieve a higher degree of republican
unity without hurting the independence of the two
provinces. Hence two ambitious goals were set: to make
a clear distinction between the independence of provinces
and their separatism, and the one between the republican
unity and the Serbian unitarism.
Taking into account the constitutional aspect of social
crisis the SFRY Presidency also decide (on 21 January
1987) to adopt amendments to the Federal Constitution.
Amendments to the Constitution of 25 November 1988
(and those adopted in 1981) changed, complemented or
annulled some provisions of the 1974 Constitution.
Normative part of the Constitution expanded the basis of
a unique Yugoslav market and to a certain extent
enhanced the legislative authority of the Federation;
federal bodies were vested with broader competencies
and responsibilities in the federal laws enforcement. But

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Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

KosovA
parts will merge into a whole" heralded the next stage of
developments; namely the forcible suspension of Kosovo
autonomy and adoption of the new Serbian Constitution,
all of which was contrary to the principles of the existing
SFRY Constitution. Hence Serbia was the first republic of
the then Yugoslavia to take a secessionist position on the
AVNOJ Yugoslavia. The government then set out on a
deliberate policy of repression in Kosovo, which in turn
gave credibility to the Albanian ethnic nationalism and
secessionism, and recently resulted in the armed
denouement of the Kosovo crisis and suffering of both
Kosovar Albanian and Serbian people. Consequences of
this crisis can be indeed very serious if any side in the
conflicts continues to think that it will attain its objectives by
force of arms, for example, establish its central authority in
Kosovo (along with a kind of cultural autonomy) or
independence of Kosovo.
lt seems to me that we are faced with the some
manner of resolution of the Kosovo tangle (Kosovo as a
part of Serbia and subject of federalism) but with much

more uncertainty then 10 years ago. What is most

frequently proposed today is the highest degree of
autonomy, without the right to secession. Kosovo had
such a status in the former Yugoslav federation. My belief
is that an eventual solution at least should include such a
status. Even if Kosovo is granted a special or similar status,
it will also have to have a kind of double status. Kosovo will
be accorded a special status, similar but not identical to
the one it enjoyed in the former SFRY. Hence we are
convinced that some ideas, suggestions, and solutions
which circulated in the former Yugoslavia could be used in
the current search for the most adequate resolution of the
Kosovo knot. This particularly applies to suggested
amendments to the federal and republican constitution,
initiated by the then leadership of the Republic of Serbia,
which, by the way, were backed by the then Kosoov
leadership and general public.

Helsinki Charter, September 1998

OPEN LETTER OF A GROUP OF INTELLECTUALS FROM B&HJ CROAT!A AND SLOVENIA TO

WOLFGANG SCHI ESEL; PRESIDENT OF THE EU MINISTER/AL COUNCIL

E KOSOVO MORAL
Dear Mr. Schiese/,
we are turning to you in order to express our concern over dramatic developments in Kosovo. For all of us, whose
countries were victims of Mi/osevic's military campaigns, every new day in Kosovo is reminiscent of events we have
already witnessed. Despite dec/arations of European politicians that they would not al/ow another war in the
Balkans, which is tantamount to indirect admittance of the errors they made during the previous Belgrade's
aggression, we watch with disbe/ief how their new policy gets increasingly removed from the possibility to play an
active and positive rote in the denouement of the Kosovo conflict.
We take the liberty to point out at current errors which seem to be the mere repetition of the previous failures
of the European po/icy which additiona/ly affected developments caused by the destructive policy of S/obodan
MiloseviC. To put it succinctly these errors are tantamount to turning a blind eye to Milosevic's responsibility in the
past and present wanton destruction.
All the wars which happened during the disintegration of the former Yugos/avia resulted from Milosevic's
rejection of agreed solutions. Albanians set a precedent in the most recent European history by defending for ten years
their legitimate interests in a non-violent manner. Albanian politica/ representatives in Kosovo have unsuccessfully
tried to reach a peaceful solution. We woufd like to point out that it is unrealistic to expect from Albanian people in
Kosovo to negotiate with the con man from Beigrade, to whom the policy of international community gives the
legitimacy of negotiator. We would also like to stress that the basis for realistic solution must be the acceptance of
Kosovar Albanians as equitable community in the family of European political entities. Hence a priori and
indisputable dictators mustn't be imposed as negotiators to such a community.
By extension only if Albanians are recognized as an equitable community the end of armed conflicts can be
expected. We wanted to point out that above fact and also to express our hope that the aforementioned mistakes in
the EU's policy towards Kosovo would be soon rectified.

Krsto CviicJ Bora Cosic; Ales Debeljak; Slavenka Drakulic; Heni Erceg, Vlado Gotovac; Zdravko GreboJ
Dievad Karahasan; Ozren Kebo; Mirko Kova~ Ivan lovrenovi~ luka Markeiic; Tomai Mastnak;
Dunja Melcic; Slobodan P. Nova~ Senad Pecanin; Nenad Popovi~ Abdulah Sidran

January 1999

41

ilosevic-Holbrooke Agreement is an attempt of

international community to forestall a bigger crisis in
the region. lt was produced under enormous pressure
and a threat of NATO intervention, the latter being the only
efficient way to make Beigrade mollify its entrenched
position. Although the agreement was welcomed with
considerable relief because it removed the bombardment
threat, it does not mean that it was accepted by so-called
political opposition and general public.
Agreements signed with the NATO (M. Perisic-W.
Clark) and the OSCE (Z. Jovanovic-Geremek) have
increased animosity to the West which "tries to include
Serbia and the FRY in the new system of collective
security ... Serbia opposes this NATO-spearheaded
attempt of the United States." These agreements which
are a prologue to a political solution of the Kosovo crisis
have made the entire political elite in Serbia the hostage of
its ambivalent position on the Kosovo issue. Longstanding rhetoric which hyped Kosovo as the cradle of
Serbian statehood, culture and epic tradition has
completely blocked any rational approach to the offer of
the West, equal to the most painless formula for gradual
resolution of the issue currently 'topping' the agenda of
Serbian politics.
Serbian war objectives included expansion of Serbian
state to the north-west,
which entailed division or
abandonment of Kosovo to avert "demographic boom of
Kosovar Albanians." However defeats in Croatia and
Bosnia additionally encumbered the current Serbian
position on the Kosovo issue. International community
forbids the secession of Kosovo and contrary to the
wishes of both sides, thinks that Kosovo must stay under
the FRY umbrella. The issue of self-administration of
Kosovo has morphed from the Serbian internal issue into
a regional one. Hence international community must
make a concerted effort to find such a solution for Kosovo
which will prevent possible chain reactions in the
neighborhood and even elsewhere (Hungarians, Kurds,
etc).
This agreement has limited the scope of Milosevic's
maneuvering both in the country and abroad. lts
implementation has been slowed down and the
agreement has been already interpreted in a very
restrictive way. For example Seselj stated that "under
enormous pressure Milosevic gave only minimal
concessions which do not call into question the FRY
sovereignty." Essentially the agreement marks the
beginning of a new stage of the Serbian political life. New
internal dynamic has been already heralded by the new
Media (Public information) Act, which Seselj and the
nationalist block backed as "the late-shining star."
Milosevic will be soon faced with new problems in his
own coalition. His dilemma will be how to deal with Seselj.
Serbs from Kosovo together with the Orthodox Church will
have a special role in the future Kosovo developments. lt

is not likely that Kosovo Serbs, notably those in power

structures, will agree to any division of power giving
Kosovar Albanians the upper hand. Unfortunately apart
from the Greater Serbia program there is no other
alternative program in Serbia. Hence political struggle is
reduced to the power takeover. And consequently that is
why Milosevic's concessions to international community
are not backed.
Radicalization and frustration in Serbia will continue.
Relations with Montenegro will get worse, for Montenegro
is strategically more important, because of its coast, than
Kosovo.
The nationalistic block has not renounced its idea of
unification with Republika Srpska, and consequently
further undermining of the Dayton Agreement can be
expected with a view to achieving tailoring of the whole
Balkan area. In the context Macedonia, the newlyemerged country, is in most delicate position, as
aspirations of its northern neighbor and also aspirations of
some other Balkan protagonists might threaten its very
survival.
Economic situation will play an important role in
further conduct of the regime, which has only one
response to the existential problems of pauperized
population - the war economy, that is equal distribution of
poverty to all and sundry. This will open the way to further
elimination of the remaining liberal islets or their
marginalization. By the way Kosovo crisis has unmasked
all so-called democratic options which demonstrated their
full understanding for the military-police actions in
Kosovo.
Political scene thus laid bare indicated that Serbia had
no potential for changes and that the offer of international
community was the last attempt to save Serbia from its
dead-end position. Any delay in or avoidance of MilosevicHolbrooke implementation will be contrary to Serbia's
interests, and might also have a negative impact on the
future of this society.
Helsinki Charter, October 1998

ilosevic-Holbrooke Agreement on the resolution of a

long-standing crisis in Kosovo triggered off a series
of steps aimed at its subsequent implementation. Javier
Solana, Secretary General of NATO and Wesley Clark,
supreme commander of the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization visited Beigrade and had talks with the FRY
President Slobodan Milosevic. The manner of NATO's
engagement in the denouement of the Kosovo crisis was
on their agenda. Then Bronislaw Geremek, the OSCE
Chairman and Zivadin Jovanovic, the Yugoslav Foreign
Secretary, established the framework of action of the
OSCE monitoring and verification mission in Kosovo. On
Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

the basis of the. signed document the advance logistics

party of 2,000-strong, multinational mission has already
arrived. The main party will arrive in due course. Several
days later Stephen de Mistura, Special Envoy of Kofi
Anan, Secretary General of the UN, tasked with exploring
the possibilities and needs of further engagement of the
UN Secretariat, visited Beigrade and Pristina. In the next
few days representatives of foreign diplomatic missions
and statt of humanitarian organizations will return to
Beigrade. They left Serbia's capital some time ago faced
with retaliation threats announced by enraged radicals
and their closest, allegedly left-wing allie?. Journalists will
also come back to cover the latest stage of the Kosovo
drama, which heralds a possibly bloodless resolution,
without civilian casualties. lt is expected that in this stage
the consequences of long-standing cruel repression of the
Beigrade authorities will be eliminated.
What has been undoubtedly eliminated during the
latest coerced moves are the results of infamous
referendum on non-interference of foreign factors in the
internal issue of the FRY, which was staged by Milosevic
to get the popular backing. for this Kosovo policy. But that
interference was not only accepted, but also welcomed as
the only possible way out of tragical crisis, which had even
more isolated Serbia from the world and brought the
country on the brink of financial collapse. Moreover the
Kosovo drama has marginalized Serbia and disqualified it
from any normal integration into Europe and notably in
south-east Europe.
Judging by the publicized contents of MilosevicHolbroke Agreement, agreement with NATO and formal
contract with the OSCE, one could say that they are all
positive and merit backing of all well-intentioned people.
They are important primarily because they will bring about
the end of hostilities, mark the beginning of resolution of
refugees and displaced persons crisis, and contribute to
the kick-off of political dialogue in search of peaceful
solution to the Kosovo knot. However some steps and
moves of the ruling clique indicate that the agreement
might be compromised and its implementation thwarted.
President Milosevic in his televised address to the
nation disclosed this agreement in a conspicuously
triumphant way. According to his address Milosevic
single-handedly convinced his interlocutors that the
Kosovo crisis had to be resolved in a peaceful way. But
the opposite is in fact true ... The Beigrade regime,
unfortunately backed by the Serbian intellectual elite, for
the past ten years used repression in order to thwart the
very attainment of such solution, persistently urged by all
the relevant fora of international community. But the
political deadlock will not be removed unless the Serbian
authorities and general public recognize that truth.
Subsequent interpretation of signed agreements and
undertaken commitments is very frequent and cherished
practice in the Balkan. Such interpretations are in fact
tantamount to attempts to avoid implementation of all
preconditions which in the first place made possible the
reaching of Agreement, and which in posterior
assessments were established as unsuitable for the
imagined state, national and even party interests. Such
approach obviously threatens not only implementation of
undesirable paragraphs, but also blocks implementation

disclosure of Milosevic-Holbrooke Agreement, there were

evident attempts at non-compliance with the agreement.
This particularly applies to the competences of the Hague
Tribunal in investigation of crimes against humanity and
violations of human rights committed in Kosovo by both
sides in the conflict. Commitments related to the pull-out
of military and police forces are not treated seriously,
which raises concern with respect to true intentions of
those responsible for the implementation of this
agreement.
As only scant facts have been made public, it is not
quite clear in which way the safety of unarmed members
of the OSCE monitoring and verification mission will be
guaranteed. This is surely a very delicate issue, as the
extremist and radical groups on both sides can threaten
the safety of international envoys in many ways. Single
acts of violence against hlembers of the mission cannot
be excluded in advance, but nobody knows what kind of
reaction they might provoke. But any large-scale
retaliatory of threatening action would most certainly
produce a decisive response by the NATO rapiddeployment forces, to be stationed in the vicinity of our
borders. This fact should be taken into account when
taking a stance on how to respect the agreement.

of the entire agreement. Several days after the public

spokesman, is "a great victory of sense over the

January

1999

Helsinki Charter, October 1998

inally Beigrade and Serbia can breathe a sign of relief

(Montenegro probably was not under such pressure):
NATO bombers this time will not dump their lethal load on
the FRY. This was guaranteed by President of the federal
state, Slobodan Milosevic, (and he is the man who keeps
his ward, as it if often repeated in every dark corner of
corridors of power) in his televised address to the nation
on Tuesday, October 13, 1998, after the sixth round of
negotiations on the resolution of Kosovo crisis with
Richard Holbrooke: "We have agreed that the problems in
Kosovo and Metohija and those related to Kosovo and
Metohija be resolved in a peaceful way, by political
means. Agreement that we have reached removes the
danger of military intervention against our country."
Of course now the entire body politic and body
politicking have changed their tune: "We are overjoyed to
see that the bombardment threat has been removed, and
President Milosevic can take credit for this to a large
extent!" lt is understandable that the ruling and the
affiliated parties are extolling the wisdom of S. Milosevic,
because that is their political duty, but the question
remains why the opposition leaders do the same thing?
For example the New Democracy fully backed Milosevi6Holbrooke agreement,
according to the party

osovo
destructive forces in our country!
The aforementioned suggests that President of the
federal state played no role in the Kosovo drama, but that
the whole absurd game was initiated by forces of war and
chaos. And then the forces of sense, embodied in
Slobodan Milosevic interfered and -won! lt is quite all right
to identify S. Milosevic with "forces of sense," (as in the
negotiations Holbrooke was faced with Milosevic), but
then the New Democracy should also assume
responsibility for such interpretation.
On the other hand, Nebojsa Covic, the leader of the
Serbian Democratic Alternative, stressed that "Slobodan
Milosevic will not easily admit his total defeat. lf the extent
of Milosevic's policy were gauged by historical and
civilized meter than Mr. Covic's assessment would be
absolutely spot-on. But what kind of defeat is Milosevic
supposed to admit as concerns the effects of his own rule
if he does not have in his vocabulary the word "defeat
Today it is clear that he outmaneuvered all the other
factors in the Kosovo Rashomon (referendum on noninterference of foreign factors) irrespective of NATO's
moves or, as it had happened, victory of sense over the
forces of chaos and war."
The print media ran a host of comparative analysis by
qualified and less qualified military experts and
commentators. All of them talked about the number and
strength of famous cruise missiles called Tomahawks"
and the number of different types of bombers and fighterbombers of the NATO fleet which were to attack the
strategically important military targets in the FR
Yugoslavia. On the other hand they analyzed in depth the
domestic fleet and the capability of the Yugoslav antiaircraft defense. Although it is well-known that only i 5
Mig-29 of the Yugoslav Army are in the same league with
NATO's air force capability, both the civilian and military
authorities in Yugoslavia launched the thesis that the
Yugoslav Army can counter the terrible NATO" and also
inflict heavy lasses to this powerful organization. As it was
expected, most vociferous in response to the foreign
threats was Vice President of government of the Republic
of Serbia and leader of the Serbian Radicals, Dr. Vojislav
Seselj. We shall discuss his menaces at the end of this
article.
Hence a thesis is circulating in Beigrade that NATO
got cold feet in view of possible heavy losses, as it was
anticipated by General Mladen Karanovic, head of
Artillery-Missile Units of the Anti-Aircraft Defense of the
Army of Yugoslavia in his article ran by the issue of weekly
Vojska which had hit the news-stands on the eve of the
last round of Milosevic-Holbrooke negotiations. To make
the story even more convincing there were rumors that
Russians decided to stand by their Orthodox brethren by
backing them with their still "strong armada". This thesis
was eloquently explicated by retired General Radovan
Radovanovic, the pillar" of Institute of Geopolitical Studies
in Beigrade, before the BK TV auditorium, in prime-time
program, on Wednesday, 14 October. He also said that:
Russia's position on the Kosovo crisis and its relations
with Serbia and the FR Yugoslavia varied vary much: first
there was a condescending support for the UN Resolution
banning Yugoslavia to import arms, then a reluctant vote
for the Resolution 1199, and finally a decisive 'nyet' to
NATO bombardment." Suchtalk constitutes the basis of a
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widespread belief that the Yugoslav Army has deadly

Russian anti-aircraft missiles, known as S:300 PMU1 in
expert circles. And finally in a 'post festum' way 'celestial
parapsychological
missiles'
from
mystical
and
confabulations of astrologer Milja Vujanovic also played a
role in such beliefs.
But those who objectively view the renouncement of
force in the pacification of the Kosovo drama can draw
three conclusions from that: firstly, it is clear that NATO
has not decided to throw at any cost bombs on Serbia,
irrespective of outcome of Holbrooke-Milosevic talks;
secondly, there are indicators that NATO will not take
action to protect Shiptars, that is the KLA, and thirdly,
Slobodan Milosevic was once again given the role of
principal negotiator by the US Administration and Bill
Clinton and his political team were only interested in his
'good performance' in meeting their demands.
We have all kinds of trouble with our President and
that is our problem; we have chosen him and not the
Americans. Hence our President can do whatever he
wants with the domestic order of his country, so he can
play blindfold a simultaneous chess game with citizens of
the FR Yugoslavia, although his maneuvering space gets
smaller after every new crisis circle. The time is not on his
side too. But this waiting for his sand clock to run out is
not a big comfort for us.
But let us go back to the subject of this topic and
focus on some segments of mosaic of dramatic events
(excellently directed by Milosevic's assistants) on the eve
of and during Milosevic-Holbrooke negotiations. Although
the author of this text was aware that Milosevic was
bluffing (no special intuition was needed to detect it) he
nevertheless thought that President would make a step
closer to the edge of abyss and would tighten the
negotiating rope, thus forcing the NATO commanders to
launch their first "Tomahawks" against Kosovo targets.
Luckily it did not happen.
But some other "Tomahawks" were deployed. Dr.
Vojislav Seselj, President's closest ally in all shady
dealings threatened for the umpteenth time the West. He
said that he was not quite sure that he would be able to
down "all NATO planes deployed in the bombardment of
our country" but that he was 100% sure that "those at
close range would be all downed." How serious his
intentions were was soon demonstrated: he immediately
launched some missiles in the shape of a decree of
government of the Republic of Serbia on the independent
media in Serbia. In this first Seselj's air strike the editorial
offices of Beigrade dailies "Danas and "Dnevni Telegraf"
were hit, or- closed down. 'The Duke" also announced
"stealth bombers strikes on squadrons of traitors", that is
fifteen brave warnen who at Belgrade's Republic Square
occasionally demonstrated against contamination leaking
from the ranks of the Serbian Radical Party.
Although Seselj is known for his antidemocratic
positions, he would not be able to do whatever he wanted
in the domestic arena if doors of the highest judiciary
body of this poor country were not wide open to him. lt is
well-known that at the joint session of the two chambers of
the Federal Assembly, held on 5 October, the Federal
Prime minister Momir Bulatovic in his opening remarks
promoted a state of affairs unknown even to quite
unorthodox domestic legal and political practice. He
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Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

stated that the FR Yugoslavia was "in the state of imminent

war danger," but that he would not propose to the Federal
Assembly to declare it! And he kept his word.
In all these puzzling developments generals of the
Yugoslav Army played a key role, although general public
was not aware of that. Only a subtle analysis would prove
how the Yugoslav Army acted from the background and
all the while protected Milosevic's back. Hence he was
once again allowed to act as a behind-the scenes- puppet
master. Generals did a great service to their supreme
commander by "protecting the last inch in the border area
with Albania, by defending its homeland" as it was publicly
announced much to the liking of patriotic general public.
Hence it was suggested that combat activities of the
Yugoslav Army were limited to the border area, whereas,
the army was deployed Kosovo-wide.
Army's actions were not controversial, but what is
controversial is the fact that such an involvement was not
approved by the Supreme Defense Council nor the
Federal Parliament as both the Federal Constitution and
relevant laws specify. Only one man made all decisions.
General Perisic and other Chiefs of Statt are to be blamed
for not insisting that the Yugoslav Army's operations in
Kosovo be given legitimacy by decisions of the Supreme
Defense Council! But that is a story apart.
The pullout of all army and police units whose
barracks are elsewhere in Serbia still have not pulled out
of Kosovo, as demanded by General Secretary of NATO,
Javier Solana in mid-October. In the same period, that is
on 15 October, General Wesley Clark, supreme
commander of NATO, and Chief of Statt of the Yugoslav
Army, Momcilo Perisic, signed an agreement on Kosovo,
which envisaged the latter as a "demilitarized zone". lt will
be interesting to follow the implementation of this
agreement on the ground, governed until recently only by
'the law of outlaws.'
Helsinki Charter, October 1998

According to the Red Cross figures 47,000 refugees

from Kosovo came to Montenegro. But nobody knows
how many of them haue recentfy headed home...
ur activists on the ground
indicated that some
refugees might return to Kosovo, but we wou!d not
like to jump to conclusions. However it is quite certain that
a large number of people will decide to stay in
Montenegro at least during winter months. The Ro:Z:aje
police informed us that in the last few days that about
2,000 refugees went back to Kosovo through the border
pass Kula. 8ordije S6epanovi6, Commissioner for
Displaced Persons of government of Montenegro said that

Jariuary 1999

about 5,000 people returned to Kosovo. We got news

from Ulcinj that about 2,000 refugees left his town, but the
majority of them went abroad instead of returning to
Kosovo. Pier Francesko Nata, Head of the UNHCR
Podgorica Office, told Helsinki Charterthat some refugees
went to B&H from Podgorica.
The Montenegrin Commissariat informed us that they
didn't have exact figures on the arrival of displaced
persons, let alone now. Even less sure was their stay in
Montenegro. "Many of them return to Kosovo to check out
the situation, and only then they make the ultimate
decision, whereby some members of their families usually
stay here," clarified Commissioner Scepanovic. The
question remains why the policemen at the checkpoints,
who have so dutufully registered and ID-ed refugees on
their arrival in Montenegro, cannot do the same thing on
their departure?
UNHCR estimates that the current moment is "very
delicate" for them, as they have already made
accommodation arrangements and accordingly would
like to know what are the exact intentions of displaced
persons. In the next two weeks they will make more field
trips to finally establish the exact number and structure of
refugees. "We shall open offices in Ulcinj and Rofaje in
order to step up our cooperation with local authorities, to
help both refugee who intend to stay and those who
possibly want to leave."
According to local officials the temperature was 10
degrees centigrade in the morning hours of October 21 in
Plav. In Rofaje the temperature was - 7 degrees
centigrade. "Blankets are in short supply, even the Red
Cross doesn't have them. Albanians sent us i 4 tons of
food from Switzerland and we expect to receive another
22 tons soon," says Sulja Rugova from the Plav
Committee for Refugye Reception. In the Plav municipality
there are over 9,000 refugees from Kosovo. In Gusinje
their number exceeded the number of local population. In
the old hotel "Plavsko jezero" in which there are 256 beds,
there are more than 650 people. In some two-bed rooms
1O persons are accommodated. Rugova maintains that
only a few refugees have left Plav. Most of them did not
return to Kosovo but went elsewhere, some abroad, some
only to Ulcinj.
In mid-September there were almost 10,000 refugees.
After only a month their number has increased. Edita
Nokic, an official of the Montenegrin Commissariat for
Displaced Persons says: "People had started arriving
illegally after the government banned further admission of
refugees. lt is difficult to estimate their number, but l would
say that 2,000 or 3,000 of them came illegally. Nobody
had de-registered so 1 do not know if anybody is leaving."
Nokic is worried because winter is approaching and the
Commissariat still has not received any stove fuel, wood
and coal.
to UNHCR humanitarian organizations
have ensured food only for 40,000 people, but there are
also other problems. ''Winter is approaching and we must
provide fuel, clothes, footwear. We still cannot estimate
the number of people that we shall take care of this winter.
We shall try to get cooking ranges and fuel for collective
centers. So far we have managed to ensure wood for
about 2,000 households. In any case problem of
accommodation is our biggest problem. We might convert

osovo
90% of houses in ten villages of Plav municipalities into
collective centers. The problem is how to speed up this
process - it is already winter in Plav and Rofaje. lt is
1mportant to speed up the system of distribution of aid, so
that our aid reaches not only towns but also all villages in
which refugees are accommodated", says Nata.
Montenegrin authorities adhered to their original
decision that children of refugees could only enroll in the
first grade of elementary schools. The others are not fit
because they attended Albanian and not Serbian schools.
Despite the insistence of international organizations
agreement on implementation of pilot project envisaging
education of other children has not been reached with the
Montenegrin
Education
Minister.
Humanitarian
organizations warn that children who don't attend school
will become a problem not only for their parents but also
for the society. But nobody pays heed to warnings that
such children can turn into sociopaths and criminals,
because they come from foreign, and not domestic
organizations.
But everybody believed the story that some Albanian
warnen tried to flee Kosovo hidden in the
trunk
compartments of buses heading for Montenegro. Diligent
policemen while controlling a Pristina-Podgorica bus of
the private company "BoZ.Ur" at the Berane check-point
found out five warnen in the trunk compartment. Together
with their children seated in the bus they wanted to arrive
in Ulcinj. But the police took them back by the official
police car to the Montenegrin border with Kosovo.
The rumor has it that that policemen are only human,
so they occasionally tend to close a blind eye to similar
~ncidents. But, the border crossing at Rofaje is an
1nsurmountable obstacle only for those who happen to
Authorities are
have Muslim and Albanian names.
authorities and they are merciless even if such people
were born in Montenegro or came to the burial of their
relative. But doors of the country, which does not wish to
become "a refugee camp", are wide open only to those
who have "correct" Serbian or Montenegrin names.
"We know that despite the ban in force a number of
people entered Montenegro even after 11 September. As
regards incidents at the police check-points they were
caused by some policemen who did not act properly. We
are very concerned about this ban, but we hope that a
solution will be shortly found, and that everybody will be
able to exercise the right to freedom of movement " said
Pier Francesko Nata.
'
In 1992 the Montenegrin authorities made a similar
faux pas, by returning Bosnian Muslims to Karadzic's
'care'. They also gained notoriety for adopting an internal
police provision under which refugees of Serbian and
Mo.ntenegrin ethnicity could get a Montenegrin passport,
wh1le other peoples and nationalities were given only " a
travel document," equal to one-way ticket.
Helsinki Charter, October 1998

ontenegrin reformists have 'modestly' taken credit for

achievement of Holbrooke-Milosevic Agreement.
"lt is good that they have listened to our advice, because 1
believe that we shall save Kosovo," Svetozar Marovi6 said
in the aftermath of this momentous event Svetozar
Marovi6 and furthermore specified that "this was
tantamount to full affirmation of Montenegrin's efforts in
search for a political settlement for Kosovo." Milo
8ukanovi6, President of the Republic of Montenegro
expressed "satisfaction with the way principled and
constructive Montenegrin positions stood the test of time
and were thus asserted."
Torn between the wish to dispel the bombardment
threat and its impotence to stand up to Milosevi6, the
Montenegrin officials opted for the only thing they could
do: to lie low and wait. Since 8ukanovi6, on behalf of
people of Montenegro, pledged at the meeting at the
Supreme Defense Council that "if attacked the FRY would
defend itself by all available means", the Podgorica
government-controlled daily "Vijesti" dramatically
announced that President would address the nation to
make public his version of the course of the
aforementioned session which obviously was quite
different from the version given in the official communiquA
of Milosevic's cabinet. But 8ukanovi6 only admitted that
there was "a real danger that strategic facilities located in
Montenegro, due to their technological links with the
unique defense system, could be NATO's targets." He
also disclosed a military secret that "policy of
confrontation with the whole world was doomed" (this
magic formula was later reiterated by all prominent
Montenegrin officials). At the same time he announced
that the Montenegrin Parliament would reject all illegal
decisions of the illegitimate Federal Parliament and even
more illegitimate government of Momir Bulatovi6. The
drama peaked when Vice President of Montenegrin
government Novak Kilibarda called on Montenegrin
recruits and the Yugoslav Army soldiers to stand by their
legitimate authorities on D-day.
At the session of both chambers of the Federal
Parliament Srda Bo:Zovi6 from Momir Bulatovic's party
once again acted as President of the Council of Republics.
His party colleague, declared 'illegal MPs' after the May
elections, played once again federal MPs. The fact that
legally elected MPs from the Montenegrin ruling coalition
were not invited to Beigrade was the last straw which
made the republican government recommend, at the
republican parliament session, that all decisions taken by
the federal assembly were to be rejected.
Then that historical session of Montenegrin Parliament
took place and adopted the resolution calling on all
Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

"relevant factors of international community to reconsider

the intervention option and renounce possible air strikes
on the territory of the FRY, as bombs don't solve
problems." Decisions of the Federal Parliament were not
even mentioned. At the crucial hour, the former party
colleagues somehow naturally closed their ranks. "Our
party was always in favor of dialogue of Kosovo Albanians
and Serbian authorities," stated the Socialist Popular Party
delegates. "In principle were are in favor of an enhanced
Kosovo autonomy backed by international guarantees,"
stated the Democratic Party of Socialists. MPs of the SPP
and Popular Party jointly rejected amendments of the
Social Democratic Party calling on the Montenegrin
Parliament to proclaim Montenegro's neutrality in the
conflict between the FRY and the rest of the world and ban
the Yugoslav Army to use force in counteracting the NATO
engagement.
Montenegrin government once again declared
illegitimate the federal government's decision and
rejected the new act on war taxes. But it passed a similar
act under which all citizens of Montenegro would have to
pay the same tax for 'strengthening the defense capability
of the same army.' At the same time authorized military
departments, as it was convincingly interpreted, mobilized
Montenegrin tax-payers for "short drills." All planes were
hidden somewhere "in the North of the Republic" and all
military vessels were anchored somewhere in the Bay of
Boka Kotorska. In defiance of UNESCO's decision, one
frigate was anchored under the ancient Kotor fortification.
Noiselessly all hospitals in Montenegro adapted their
facilities to the 'new conditions.'
Montenegrin TV ran no comments on the situation
except for a late-night feature on capability of NATO
bombers. Thus general public was instructed that it
wouldn't be wise to challenge such force. The media had
a field day, after re-broadcasting of foreign radio
programs was banned in Serbia. The highest officials
were allegedly shocked at the "informative gloom"
established in the neighboring republic. Bozidar Jaredic,
Montenegrin Minister of Information, concluded that one
could only
a country which has Aleksandar Vucic as
its Information Minister.
On the other hand "richness" of freedom of
information was demonstrated by the state-controlled
"Pobjeda." An article headlined "From Referendum to
acceptance of all conditions pertaining to the resolution of
problems in Kosovo," was in fact an overview of all the
inconsistencies of the FRY President. "Pobjeda" at the end
of the article quit logically concluded: "As Milosevic had
agreed to all meet all foreign demands the propaganda
machinery was once again activated." A host of tolerant
and sound Djukanovic's deliberations on Kosovo were
also cited. But the fact that Djukanovic did not keep his
word that Montenegrin recruits would stay out of Kosovo
was obviously overlooked.
Summer rains washed away Djukanovic's pledge that
nobody will be able to decide on the fate of Montenegro
at secret White Court negotiations. While Milosevic
discussed earthly matters of life and death with
Holbrooke, 8ukanovi6 and Marovic devoted themselves
to enhancement of spiritual life. Their meeting with
representatives of the Orthodox Church, Patriarch Pavle
and Mitropolite Amfilohije, depicted in the best way that

January 1999

Montenegro under the current circumstances could only

rely on the God's mercy. Montenegro could not do
anything to alleviate its predicament. There was no legal
basis for preventing the recruitment of Montenegrin
citizens, or forbidding the Yugoslav Army to use its
territory for armed actions.
Montenegro could not even veto the federal
authorities' decision on the state of emergency. lt was
stripped of all such powers-ten years ago.
As disciplined people, representatives of the ruling
coalition remained singularly unruffled on the day when
NATO was to make its air raid decision. The Act on
Judicial Taxes was summarily discussed, while the Act on
Labor Protection was debated at length during the regular
parliamentary procedure. When the Liberal Party MPs
objected that "such an agenda on D-day belonged more
to the newspaper column 'Believe it or not'", then to the
parliamentary session, President of the Montenegrin
Parliament Svetozar Marovic, calmly responded that
"Everybody should do his own job".
One still wonders how the Montenegrin Parliament
mustered the strength to challenge the federal bodies.
Somehow overshadowed by the new Agreement on
Kosovo it managed to accuse the Constitutional Court that
its intention to call into question harmony between
Montenegrin and Federal Constitution and the
Montenegrin provision on the election of delegates to the
Chamber of Republics of the FRY Parliament was in
function of survival of Milosevic's regime, and not its legal
right. Added to that it reinstated to the Republic of
Montenegro the powers related to criminal legislation
which it had generously renounced in February 1995.
Prime Minister Filip Vujanovic (he was the Minister of
Justice in 1995), who then urged the strengthening of the
federal state, explained the evolution of this position in he
following way: "then the federal state functioned in
accordance with the rule of law, but now it has become a
political instrument at the expense of law."
A prosaic question has somehow timidly emerged
during those dramatic events: How shall we earn a living
until Milosevic or the new world order are toppled?
Montenegrin trade-unions held their congress. President
of this organization Danilo Popovic voiced his concern:
"We held the last congress four years ago, during the
'isolation stage'. We are holding this congress at the time
when we are all faced with the danger of NATO'
intervention. Between the two congresses the number of
poor people in Montenegro has tripled. We have over
70,000 unemployed, - and this is a whole army for
Montenegro. Almost half of Montenegro's population are
receiving some kind of welfare assistance." Trade-unions
posters had the following message: "We cannot go on like
this." But even those who heard this message pretended
that they did not understand it. On the other hand
humanitarian
squads of Momir Bulatovic tried to
make trade-union topics less mundane: namely,
Bulatovic's activists endeavoured to revive the old tradeunion-nationalist movement by organizing their cells
within the official trade unions. New columns of the hungry
are getting ready for another very dark night.

Helsinki Charter, October 1998

ationalisms in South East Europe

he status of different national groups in territories

which for some time made part of the so-called
"greater" Yugoslavia kept changing throughout history,
but at the same time was also characterized by some
relatively fixed aspects. Namely all those nations which
made part of the state of Yugoslavia cherished to some
extent their ethnic exclusive organization, although it was
not a dominant phenomenon. On this occasion we shall
discuss some lasting processes linked to the this
exclusive organization, and different manifestations
thereof in different historical circumstances.
ESTRANGED FELLOW-NATIONAL AS THE PRIMARY FOE

There were continual attempts to impose, preserve or

increase the hegemony of the so called leading (or
"political" nation) in the multi-ethnic states. In this respect
in the last hundred years most conspicuous were the
attempts to realize Austro-Hungarian (1867-1918) or
Serbian hegemony (1918-1941 and 1988-1998). These
attempts were enhanced in the aforementioned
"exclusive" sense by the impact of an intolerant Balkan
political tradition, which often overstepped Danube and
Sava borders. Exclusive ethnic positions and efforts to
treat ethnic minorities as foreign bodies were constant
characteristics of a long period, and they successfully
survived changes of state borders (1918) or social orders
(1945). The latter phenomenon brings to mind identical
Cubrilovic's plans on the "improvement" of the national
set-up in the border areas and relocation of a part of
minorities population, irrespective of their status in the
Thirties, during the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, or under the
communist rule ten years later. But this exclusive ethnic
organization is by no means the only essential
characteristic of the Balkan and Panonic chauvinisms.
These chauvinisms generally consider cosmopolitanism
and internationalism in their own ranks, and not the
nationalism of their ethnic rivals as the priority, or primary
enemy. An estranged fellow-national is a greater enemy in
the mind of a Balkan chauvinist than a member of a
competing ethnic group. An extremely ethnocentric and
chauvinistic political subject, like the Serbian Radical
Party considers as its principal enemy so-called "United
Democrats" or "Reformists," and not the ethnic rivals
unified in the parties like the Croatian Democratic
Community or the Party of Democratic Action. This
indicates a major difference between contemporary
Balkan fascist nationalism and their European
counterparts spearheaded by Le Pen's extreme right. The
latter treat as their first enemy the mixing of cultures and
Americanization and arabization of the European
civilization, and not the neighboring ethnicities or

"estranged" members of their own people. The difference

between the extreme right call "Europe to Europeans" and
demands that the Serbian ethnically homogenous state
be established, is not only the difference between the
marginal French and developed Serbian chauvinism, but
the one between modern and obsolete chauvinisms;
namely domestic chauvinism.
Serbs, Albanians and others demonstrate much more
the tribal narrow-mindedness and because of that they
always lag behind their European counterparts, That is
why the Balkan nationalisms have a more dangerous
fascist potential than the extreme European right. That is
why any nationalism in the Balkans is a high-risk one and
is similar to playing with matches next to the powder keg.
POLITICAL INTERESTS OF EXCLUSIVE ETHNIC GROUPS

The attempt to attain ethnic homogenization in a multiethnic state is regularly motivated by political and other
interests of some groups. lnterests which are often hidden
or lurk in the background. The fact is that thanks to an
exclusive nationalistic policy the groups affiliated with
militarized political circles and robber barons also reap the
full benefits of war, sanctions and related business
transactions. Some other groups, although they do not
directly profit from war and/or sanctions, in view of the
nature of their particular interest are forced to distance
themselves from ethnic pluralism and national equality.
These groups regularly present their particular interests as
the general-national ones. Currently ethnic Albanians in
Kosovo aspire towards the republic (or state) which could
provide much more administrative positions and
sinecures than the most enhanced autonomy. On the
other side Serbs aspire to keep such positions in Kosovo,
and fear that they would lose their ethnic monopoly if the
status of Kosovo were changed. Taking exclusive ethnic
positions is usually linked to monopoly on business gains
or the official and administrative position-hunt, and the
chauvinist policy is considered skillful if these particular
interests are convincingly presented as national interests.
DIFFERING ADAPTABILITY OF MINORITIES

The issue of ethnic minorities relations with the

domicile state is still of great interest today. These
relations have not changed historically: until 1903
Vojvodina Serbis did not care for Serbia, nor did Serbia for
them, if the 1848-49 episode is overlooked. Vojvodina
Hungarians under Titor's rule from 1956-1988 could not
view the Hungarian state as their political ideal and
stronghold irrespective of a relatively moderate policy of
Janosz Kadar. The status of minorities did not fully
correspond with concrete social and state framework.
Namely minorities very treated better in Austro-Hungary
than in Hungary, as the latter resorted to a stronger and
more violent assimilation. There were differences between
a state and its parts (entities would be the term of the
moment) in the Balkans, and also a state treated
differently its minorities. In the Kingdom of Yugoslavia the
Balkan political tradition shaped the position on ethnic
minorities until 1941, although Albanians and Turks, and
not Hungarians or Germans, bore the brunt of assimilation
and emigration. In the post-1945 period the German
Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

minority fared the warst under the Communists, while

some other ethnicities were treated better than in the
independent Serbia or between-the-wars Yugoslavia.
Positions of some countries on minorities varied and was
relatively autonomous from their similar social orders. In
this respect it is sufficient to compare the treatment of the
Hungarian minority in Causescu's Romania and Tito's
Yugoslavia. Both countries were ruled by Communists,
but each in a radically different way dealt with the status of
Hungarians.
IMPERATIVE OF NEW ALLJANCES

We shall be discussing the problem of different

adaptability of minorities, which includes their
expectations with respect to domicile states and the big
powers. However one should not jump to conclusions
when dealing with this matter. Tao great a faith in domicile
countries sometimes is not beneficial in the lang run, and
can even have catastrophic consequences as in the case
of the Danube countries Germans. Faith in standards
imposed by the big powers was also marked by a trace of
suspicion regarding the longevity of their good intentions
(or, more importantly regarding the permanence of their
interests). Not so lang ago the big powers calmly watched
the suppression of the minorities' rights; les us just
mention the position of Greece on ethnic Macedonians,
Turkey on Curds or General Franco's discrimination
against the Basques. All such violations were condemned
mildly by the big powers. In recent past there were either
periods of indifference towards ethnic tensions and
periods of fanning of ethnic conflicts in what are today
called multicultural societies. Change of relations between
the big powers sometimes suited some minorities. For
example in the Twenties a numerous Hungarian minority
in Erdelj (Transilvania) has greatly improved its status after
the homogenization of international community. But the
status of some ethnicities, for example Curds or
Palestinian Arabs indicates that the principled policy of
international community has limited interests when it
comes to the resolution of the minority issues. However
the standards which they impose in this resolution
represent a major step forward compared to situations in
the past. However the historical experience teaches us
that the big powers can cause rifts between small nations,
as successfully as they can succeed in pacifying their
ethnic rivalries (we have witnessed the latter phenomena
in recent years.)
The strategic solution which could overcome the
exclusive stances of the Balkan minorities undoubtedly
presupposes reliance on international community
standards in the resolution of the
issues. But this
solution should not only depend on such standards.
Historically mature resolutions of ethnic issues must also
presuppose integration of the Balkan and Panonic
peoples in the state alliances devoid of the leading people
or the leading member-state. Small states in the East and
South East of Europe are destined to be troubled
mutual antagonisms, permanent problems with minorities,
and to play the role of a minor chess figure in periodically
repeated games of the world powers. A
state or state
alliance can lastingly ease the tension between the mixed
ethnic groups and create autonomous status and

Ja11uary 1999

maneuvering space with respect to the big powers.

Forgotten slogans such as "The Balkan to the Balkan
peoples" of "Danube countries to Danube peoples" should
nor represent sheer relics of the past. To tha end politics
of small nations should be both visionary and pragmatic.
The leaders of today cannot offer anything new in that
sense. Politicians of the future should both take note of the
changed circumstances and be skillful tacticians.They
should depart from parochial, and out-dated approach,
adjust their positions to the spirit of the time and gain
international reputation. This can happen only if interYugoslav and inter-Balkan agreements, as well as modern
alliances, are made.
Helsinki Charter, 1998

THEORETICAL BARENESS OF ACADEMICIANS

ue to unavoidably emotional connotations linked to

practical approach to the nationalism-related issues,
it is not easy to rationally analyze this subject. On the other
hand a cold and subtle approach to nationalism is
needed if one wants to understand it and take relevant
measures. Contemporary Serbian nationalism has several
common denominators: open criticism of Marxist
internationalism, a pronounced thesis that the nation
proper is in jeopardy, weak criticism of conservative
influences and vales, and neglect of social-economic and
rational interest dimensions of social life.
Thus conceived nationalism represents a fertile
ground for the emergence and development of exclusive
ethnic positions and militant chauvinism. What is
characteristic of chauvinism is that it treats as its bigger or
priority foes not its ethnic rivals but rather the "estranged"
members of the nation proper. Every nationalism is not
chauvinism;
extension it can be said that nationalism
need not
into chauvinism. Specific characteristics
of territory and periods of time to a great extent determine
the level of threat, that is whether benign forms of
nationalism will turn into narrow-minded ethnic
chauvinism. Nowadays different extremely reactionary
racist and chauvinist efforts exhaust themselves in antiAmerican and anti-Arab sentiments in today's Western
Europe. Chauvinist advocate "Europe to Europeans," and
launch reactionary calls that "the European spiritual
of Charlemagne" be
be renewed and "new
established.
of such Western European

osovo
chauvinism are the global and the US-led trends, as weil
as the foreigners - migrants in Western European
countries. In the Balkans things are different: here
chauvinism presupposes a developed, ethnic-exclusive
position, "ousting" approach towards "foreigners" in the
country proper and a great risk of fascization.
Difference between the slogan "Europe to Europeans"
and concerted efforts to create "ethnically homogenous
states" represent the key difference between
contemporary European and the Balkan chauvinism. lt
bears stressing that different forms of the Balkan
nationalism (even of Serbian nationalism) are closely
interwoven in three modern ideologies: the liberal, the
socialist and the conservative one. A wider context of
these ideologies to some extent modifies their nationalistic
contents. Hence, in that sense, three nationalism can be
distinguished: the leftist, the liberal and the conservative
Serbian nationalism. Before we describe and comment
each of them, we shall indicate the criteria for the
distinction of the aforementioned modern ideologies.
The key criterion is the "enemy's design." Here we
shall cite a well-known example. The Serbian Radical
Party, as a markedly conservative party, in the following
way ranked its enemies: its first enemy is the Serbian
Renewal Movement (SPO), the second enemy are
cosmopolitan and liberal political organizations (UJDI and
SRSJ), and its third enemy is the "natural foe," that is the
ruling Croatian and Muslim parties. The enmity towards
the SPO, a moderate right-wing party was caused by
daily-political reasons. On the other hand branding of
domestic, political organizations with cosmopolitan
leanings as greater enemies than the Croatian HDZ or the
Muslim SDA, indicated a markedly reactionary form of the
basic conservative orientation of the Serbian Radical
Party. The extreme right in the past used to justify its main
ideas by religious reasons. Today a more reliable criterion
for its leanings can be its position on the nation. Some
classically conservative values are today incorporated into
chauvinism as a fundamental matrix, that is, traditionalism,
racism,
religious
intolerance,
xenophobia,
authoritarianism, anti-enlightenment, militant antisocialism,
etc.
lt is well-known that "the enemy design" can be used
in a more general context to the same end. To put it
briefly: some ideas are confronted with the enlightenment
heritage; they are advocated by the conservative forces.
Some other groups accept the enlightenment heritage,
but deny the ideas of socialism in general and of Marxism
in particular. They are represented by liberals. ldeologies
which are declaratively Marxism-based, independently of
their position on the real socialist heritage, in this context
are called the left-wing ones.
Now we have come to an important issue. lt is certain
that the left can be nationalistic, but this "charge" is usually
less permanent and more conditioned by daily-political
needs then in the case of the right, which is a staunch
upholder of such "nationalistic" values. In this context it
suffices to compare the nationalistic orientation of the
Socialist Party of Yugoslavia with the orientations
manifested by the Croatian HDZ or the Serbian Radical
Party. However the relations between the left and right
nationalisms are very complex. In the next part of my
expose 1 shall analyze the most developed form of the

Serbian nationalism espoused most blatanty by the

incomplete Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts
and Sciences publicized in the mid-80's.
NATIONALISM OF THE SERBIAN

lEFT

The Memorandum was a collective document, and as

such it was not fully harmonized. lt contains both criticism
of nationalism and ideas advocating human and civic
rights and strongly urging democratization of society. Why
is then this text called the most developed expression of
the leftist form of the Serbian nationalism?
Now we shall look into the "enemy design" as exposed
by the Memorandum. Namely the document strongly and
partially criticizes the national policy of Tito and other
Yugoslav Communists. In an additional commentary Tito's
rule is viewed as a long rule of an irrational, charismatic
authority which brought the Yugoslav society to the brink
of collapse (K. Mihailovi6, V. Kresti6, Memorandum of the
Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences, Answers to
Criticism, YAAS, Beigrade, 1995, page. 19). Criticism of
Titoism is expanded to include criticism of Bolshevism: "lt
is finally clear that Bolshevism is a residue of Jacobism
which led the communism straight into defeat." In the
similar vein it is maintained that "the Socialist, even
Communist idea is characteristic of at least some sects of
Early Christianity." The Memorandum warned of the
political and economic domination of Slovenia and
Croatia, established under a dominant influence of Tito
and Kardelj during the Yugoslav communist rule (page
128.) The emphasis on an alleged importance of Tito's
and Kardelj's anti-Serbian policy indicates a genuine
personalization of history, limited understanding of social
determinism and theoretical regression with respect to the
Yugoslav pre-Memorandum idea of nationalism. The
weakness of Serbia is explained by domination of nonSerb communist cadres over the Serbian; this theoretical
bareess should be seen in the light of the practical
approach to the problem of status of the Serbian nation,
which prevented a more subtle treatment of this question.
Personalization of political processes in the shape of
singling out satanized enemies represents a well-known
instrument of the political struggle, particularly by the
authoritarian political movements.
Authors of the YAAS Memorandum consider that the
roots of the anti-Serbian politics of the Yugoslav
communists are to be found in the pre-war period, when
the alleged communist discrimination against Serbs
started. They go on to claim that the Anti-Fascist Council
of the Yugoslav People's Liberation Struggle aimed to
destroy Serbia, and they state that the primary cause of
the crisis of the Yugoslav society in the Eighties was the
victory of nationalism over socialism (page 144.) The roots
of this defeat are found in the ideology of the Communist
Internationale (Comintern) andin the national policy of the
Communist Party of Yugoslavia before the war. lt is
maintained that an unjustified feeling of historicai guilt
was imposed on Serbs, and it if furthermore expounded
that "in the principled struggle against Serbian nationalism
the ideological and political distribution of historical guilt
cannot be accepted. Rejection of such a distribution,
which can be fatal for the spirit and morale, with its
accompanying injustice and untruths, is a prerequisite for
Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

attaining the mobility and effectiveness of a democratic,

Yugoslav, humanistic awareness in the contemporary
Serbian culture." (page 45) To this is related the criticism
of an alleged misuse of the thesis on exploiters and
exploited peoples and the demand that such a practice
must be stopped (page 30.) The first signs of the
destruction of the system of values and predominance of
the consumer
as the phenomena fatal for the
Serbian nation, ushered in the later conservative forms of
the Serbian nationalism from the 90's.
along with
these moral factors, it it
that "the biggest trouble is
the fact that the Serbian nation, unlike the other countries,
does not have a state of its own." (page 45.)
The criticism of the communist equal distribution of
in the ideological
modern Serbian
the

of conspiracy of evil men, but also in a

position on an
in fact changeable national policy of the Communist
of
(the League of Communist of
Added to that this idea failed to take note of the specific,
so-called charisma of reason advocated
which did not only oppose the nationalism
authoritarian
but also

when it is obvious that it is

the national
Yugoslavia, as weil as on the
stereotype that communism is a residue of Jacobinism.

A
leftist character of the discussed
variant of Serbian nationalistic ~~~~,~,
two elements: a desirable vision of
of "enemy.''
new model of inter-ethnic relations
after the downfall of A. Rankovic-led

argued that "decentralization, first envisaged as liberation

of economy from bureaucratic forces, morphed into
territorial and economic branches disintegration. In other
words eight economic regions were created, each of them
boasting national economy as an ideological basis."
Furthermore "those two forms of disintegration led
economy astray and stalled its contemporary
lt was a
blow to the then Yugoslav
economy." (page 03)
Solution of economic problems is sought in a new
resetting of centralist trends, which is once again a
deviation from the original Marxist idea of ultimate
supremacy of politics over economy. But this very
emphasis of
social relations, that is
efforts to separate them from their social and economic
basis,
not
a theoretical failure of the SAAS
official ideas of social
a common denominator of every
This means
an
role of economic issues within the
framework of this most
leftist form of Serbian
very nationalistic contents
the role
of economy within the mentioned framework and
it
closer to the
nationalistic one-sided
.-.rl,.._,..,+,..,,..... rl,, .... ,.., of social determinism. In other words the
is characterized
of this
roles of some historical personalities (for
Tito and
and overstressing the political
dimension in the creation of desirable social relations. In
this sense the condemnation of "persistent campaign
against overrated and
unitarism
08) is
linked to the affirmation of
alternative-democratic
federalism'
2).
Criticism of changes effected in the
966
is evident in the position that "the
of convincing
material
democratization and
was followed
social conflicts in late
Sixties, restoration of authoritarian
seventies, and as the final result-loss of
structural
economic
and a
disorientation"
2i). The Memorandum
era was halted
authors claim that "the 1953- i 965
in 965 when the ethics
of possessive individualism and
. The latter
of

view
its historical
state

January

1999

osovo
with a leading nation represents a risky invocation of interethnic conflicts. This idea is not openly espoused in the
Memorandum, but is nevertheless recognizable due to
repeated insistence that criticism of Serbian nationalism
must be renounced and a unique educational system in
multinational and multilingual community established.
The concept of "enemy" underpins the leftist form of
the Memorandum nationalism. In addition to satanized
historical personalities, whose accomplishments are
overrated, bureaucracy, is mentioned as the obligatory
enemy either in the shape of "its bureaucratic willfulness"
or as "a holder of privileges and champion of corruption.
This is a spin-off of the Trockist tradition in social thinking,
which through its official "inflationary antibureaucratism"
dominated the official doctrine of the League of
Communist of Yugoslavia and ideas of its leftists critics,
both the Praxis group with international leanings (in the
Sixties and Seventies) and the Serbian leftist nationalists
in the Eighties. Criticism of the ruling communist cadres
("bureaucracy") is a widespread form of leftist criticism of
communism. lts typical Serbian feature was the shift from
criticism of bureaucracy to criticism of communist
internationalism, in the shape of a facile disapproval of
national polices of the League of Communists of
Yugoslavia and the Communist Party of Yugoslavia. A
thesis that Serbian nationalism was engendered in
Beigrade is quite bizarre in the light of the fact that some
of its most influential proponents were not only the most
vociferous critics of Serbian nationalism, but also writers
who had a lot of understanding for different non-Serb
chauvinism in Yugoslavia, once new political "enemies"
emerged on the horizon. At this point it is worth
mentioning the position of one of the most prominent
authors of Memorandum, Mihajlo Markovic, who, at the
height of the Croatian Massive Movement advocating the
creation of confederation, in 1971, wrote that "there was a
realistic chance that the current nationalistic conflicts
would abate within a loose confederation ... the latter being
a better option than disintegration of the community or
vice versa, intervention of the "ruling conglomerate"'
(Power structure in Yugoslav society and dilemma of
revolutionary intelligentsia, Praxis 8, 1971, no. 6, page
823). Fear of intervention of the ruling conglomerate,
composed of the federal top leadership, the Yugoslav
People's Army and the B&H leadership, compelled the
author to back the Croatian nationalists demands. Not
much time has passed from insistence on loose federation
to insistence on strong federation, and experiences with
Yugoslav intellectuals compel us to assess that
fundamental positions are changed with some difficulty
only the first time, while, henceforth, a new set of
circumstance might induces some even more radical
changes thereof.
lt is evident that anticommunism and obsession with
nationalism are two interwoven dimensions of the same
syndrome afflicting the leftist form of nationalism. Laterstage forms of Serbian nationalism will strengthen both
aforementioned dimensions. Only the vestiges the thus
manifested leftist nationalism survived in late Nineties.
However its historical importance and liability of its
representatives should not be underrated. Through its
undiscriminating criticism of communist internationalism,
essential neglect of socio-economic basis of political and

inter-ethnic relations, excessive talk about "Serbs as

endangered nation" and personalization of history via
satanizing some individuals, this form of nationalism to a
great extent laid the groundwork for the emergence of a
very influential, liberal form of Serbian nationalism, in early
Nineties. lts single-minded cultural criticism of hedonism
and consumer society gave rise to the post-Dayton,
agonizing, xenophobic and a la Balkans post-modern,
conservative form of Serbian nationalism. The
aforementioned is related to its ideological role. The leftist
form of the Serbian nationalism with its personalization of
history and unprecedented simplification of the complex
social determinism represents a regressive trend both
with respect to serious theory and socially integrative
contents of the official ideology of the former single-party
regime.

LIBERAL NATIONAUSM

Liberal form of contemporary Serbian nationalism

emerged in the Eighties and flourished after the collapse
of the single-party regime. lt was propped by the
Memorandum, but it exposed its ideas more openly due to
changed social circumstances. lts kinship with a
conservative form of nationalism was manifested by its
unselective glorification of tradition and reliance on the
national Church and even, dynasties. lts specific feature is
its advocacy of liberal values, human and civic rights,
division of power, and legal state. But on the other hand it
has an undemocratic character, since it tends to treat
citizens of Serbia as easily manipulated electorate
incapable of autonomous and rational thinking. The latter
serves to justify political failures of liberal nationalism.
When it duplicitously urges democracy, it takes an
ethnically selective approach to it, by asserting that stable
democracy is only viable in nationally and religion-wise
homogenous
countries,
and that multinational
communities can be preserved only through terror and
manipulation. By extension, liberal nationalism views
ethnic homogenization of Serbia (and 'Serbian countries')
as a prerequisite for democratic development.
FASCISM IN BALKAN MANNER

lt was noted that the key thesis of liberal nationalists

was that nationally heterogeneous societies could
develop a stable democracy only under exceptional
conditions. Hence the representatives of this variant of
Serbian nationalism were compelled to accept some
markedly conservative ideas in order to reconcile their
position with their vision of realization of the national
interest. They continued to adhere to their liberal rhetoric
in order to stay in harmony with the prevailing spirit of the
time and to have more maneuvering room for promotion
of their views. They deny the possibility of existence of
consocietal democracy in a multinational country, by
arguing that it can survive only until the first, major crisis
emerges. They often cite the ideas of conservative
authors, notably Carl Schmidt, a classical antiliberal
author close to the ideas of nazism. He is popular among
our chauvinist liberals because of his views on political
homogeneity which provides the basis for advocating
exclusive ethnic (or) racial rights. Liberal nationalists
Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

consider that the state is the most important prerequisite

of democracy. They think that consocietal democracy is
ineffective and incapable of understanding the importance
of irrational aspects of political life, such as the communal
feeling, identical spirit etc. Serbian nationalist liberals
complement this anthropological pessimism, more
characteristic of nationalist than liberal position with their
advocacy of ethnically homogenous states, that is,
division of states or separation between ethnically
opposed groups. This is due to their opinion that ethnic
diversity is dangerous for democracy. ldeas on the
division of Kosovo and early advocacy of division of
Bosnia are based on this inclusion of conservative ideas
into liberal-nationalist standpoint, whereby liberal
nationalist are often unaware that the concept og
homogeneity was originally determined by biological,
blood and racial propinquity, at the time when attempts
were made to justify Nazism in the sphere of legal and
political theory. lt is noteworthy that the very Schmidt after
the W.W.11 abandoned this position and never again
mentioned racial kinship as the prerequisite for any
successful policy. Our liberal nationalists, who urge ethnic
homogenization for the sake of promotion of democracy,
overlook the fact that any nationalism in the Balkan has
today potentially more fascism-making elements than in
any other European country. To put it simply, the idea of
ethnically homogenous state as a fundamental
prerequisite of democracy in the Balkan is like playing
with a burning match close to the powder keg.
The example we have just' given you is very
instructive, as it indicates all difficulties which the liberal
thinking encounters in its attempt to build democracy in
semi peripheral countries of mixed ethnic set-up and
undemocratic political culture. Faced with heavy,
successive political defeats, nationalist liberals, desirous
of realizing their fundamental values, adopt the viewpoint
of their more successful conservative chauvinist
opponents (thas is, of Radicals in Serbia) and advocate
characteristically extremely chauvinistic solutions a la
Schmidt, engendered in the context of the fascist denial of
liberalism. Alike in the analysis of the leftist memorandumform of nationalism one could also here pose the
question how come that the indicated way of thinking,
which includes the idea of ethnic differentiation, (which in
the Balkan most often means "ethnic-cleansing") can be
called liberal!? The answer must be looked for in a
desired vision of society, marked by affirmation of
individual civil rights and political freedoms, division of
power and legal state. The indicated liberal-nationalistic
viewpoint anywhere in the world would be considered as
an example of "exclusive" conservative chauvinism.
Compared to the more extreme forms of Serbian
nationalism in the given context it justifies its more liberal
orientation. In a sense contemporary Serbian liberalnationalists are reminiscent of the German nationalist
liberals from the time preceding the rise of German
fascism. Serbian nationalists, although obsessed with
criticism of Milosevic's degenerative, socialist policy,
which they call Caesarist, in fact advocate the vision which
can be called a reactionary Utopia of liberal, ethnic,
exclusive Caesarism. Epistemological basis of such ideas
is reminiscent of today totally anachronistic Rickert's
personalism, which overemphasized the crucial

January 1999

importance of accidents and great personalities in the

history. While the reductionist aspect of social
determinism in this way of thinking is somewhat similar to
the position of the classical German historicism, it in
practice applies the memorandum-model of satanization
of communist leaders on the grounds
of their
internationalism, all the while laying the groundwork for
the ascent of an anticommunist, charismatic, nationalist
leader. However due to the poor offer on the political
market, this search has so far been futile. in other words
liberal nationalism with its obsolete epistemological
historicism and theoretically immature understanding of
history as conflict of elites, or even leaders, in a sense
prepares, alike in the case of the German irrationalism,
ideological basis for the "Nazi mystique of Fuhrer." But as
the objective circumstances in the late Nineties are not
propitious for the 'enactment' of such a venture, this nazi
liberalism, after a series of practical failures, is
disintegrating, making place for either cosmopolitan
liberalism or conservative nationalism.
Aspiration to homogenization, barring the one
manifested in the literature, is usually interpreted as a
feature of extreme nationalism. lt has been an element of
social ideas since Fichte. lt is sometimes said that the
division of Germany pushed the Germans towards the
idolatry of homogeneity and ethnic nationalism Alike in the
case of Germany, politically fragmented throughout its
modern history, except for the 1871-1945 period (its
aspiration to national homogenization was srtrenthened
during the Cold War division of the country) the current
division of the Serbian people objectively strengthens
aspirations to homogeneity both in practical policy and
political theory. But while in the Western Europe
ethnicization of politics is mainly reduced to open hatred
of foreigners, in the Balkan it presupposes the acceptance
of a very high risk of instigation of new wars between akin
ethnic groups.
DISSIDENT FRATERNIZATION AS AN BSTACLE
TO CRITICISM OF CHAUVINISM

lt became manifest that undemocratic exclusive

contents of classical liberalism (which included
discrimination of women, destitute males and black
slaves) and openly discriminating ideas of its radical, Nazilike, classical Schmidt criticism were compounded in an
apparently new viewpoint. The fundamental idea of this
very influential eclectic combination which dominates the
mind-set of the Beigrade intellectual circle is the insistence
that moral integration can be attained through elimination
of a foreign ethnic body from the state. This domestic
intellectual scene is interesting because in its opposition
to the ruling ideology it systematically minimizes
differences between nationally and "anationally" oriented
liberals. The common enemy embodied in the regime and
its ideology, has pacified differences between nationalistic
and non-nationalistic critics of socialism. lt was achived in
the way similar to the "pacification" of the massive protests
of citizens in the mid-Nineties or the suppression of the
"Mass Movement" in Croatia by Croatian authorities in the
early Seventies.
The largest number of chauvinist intellectuals has
evolved from the ranks of the former Marxist,

internationally-oriented ideologues. On the domestic front

an earlier polarization between the regime-oriented and
dissident authors can be likened today to the equally
politicized, but even more exclusive (due to investments in
essentially irrational chauvinistic option), division in
patriots and traitors. Hence the analysis of the Serbian
liberal nationalism remains incomplete, unless it
succinctly deals with the ideas of cosmopolitan liberals.
Many of them underestimate so much the right-wing
extremist danger that one gets the impression that Russia
is still ruled by Lenin, and not by Yeltsin. The fact that
domestic liberals are so much focused on the danger of
the left-wing extremism enables the ruling Serbian neosocialists not only to oscillate between chauvinism and
cooperative policy with neighbors and international
powers, but also to freely manipulate the right-wing
conservative, political forces, for example, the Serbian
Renewal Movement, and the extremely fascist parties, like
the Serbian Radical Party, by 'dosing' its relations with
such parties. The aforementioned particularly applies to
the former dissidents. lntransigence of dissidents authors,
which was equal to the one manifested by the regimeoriented authors, played a certain role in the process of
dissident groups integration, which on the one hand
strengthened the resistance to the communist,
authoritarian regime, and on the other hand reduced
differences between dissidents' groups. This is an
ongoing process, as there are still concerted efforts to
minimize differences between nationalistic and nonnationalistic viewpoints. This in turn will contribute to the
fact that in practice and theory very different critics of
Milosevic's regime somehow seem like a well-united
group of people. lt is interesting to note how the former
dissidents, in the wake of disappearance of the Yugoslav
communist regime, are still reluctant to engage in
principled criticism of their former ideological fellowcomrades. This phenomenon partly explains the absence
of fundamental and convincing criticism of ethnic
nationalism at the end of XXth century. lt seems that this
also results from the persisting feeling of "camaraderie" of
the former left-wing dissidents who have evolved into
liberals or nationalists. Added to that there is also the
important factor of the psychology of the threatenedgroup which has been united to combat its common
enemy, in the shape of the current neosocialist authorities.

BREAK

NATIONAUSM - PRECONDITION
OF DEMOCRACY
(Conservative Nationalism)

We have already mentioned that the key difference

between
contemporary
European
and
Balkan
chauvinisms is the following: the former urges "Europe of
Europeans, while the latter try to create "ethnically
homogenous states" characterized by major dispersion of
ethnically affiliated groups. This particularly applies to the
conservative variant of Serbian nationalism which, alike
the others previously discussed variants, has its specific
features.
Conservative Serbian nationalists, alike the liberal
nationalists, have been spawned
the group of former,
uncritical advocates of marxist internationalism.
of
them have had prominent official careers, and some were

officials during the time of undivided power. The' majority

of them passed through liberal stage in their evolution
from communist internationalism to the current nationalist
positions. Their later-stage deviation to the right is largely
due to their strong feeling of national oppression and the
outcome of the Serbian militarist policy, which produced a
large number of casualties and the loss of "large
territories." Both losses would have been even heavier if
the world powers, notably the United States did not halt
the offensive of Serbian enemies, by preventing the fall of
Banja Luka and the rest of "Western Serbian lands" in
1995. This humiliation caused complete disorientation of
impassioned nationalists, which later in revenge
embraced extremely conservative variants of chauvinism.
This position shared by quite a number of prominent
personalities in Serbia is characterized by denial of entire
rational tradition of the West, criticism of rational mind,
affirmation of intuitive views, aristocratic theory of
cognition, denial of social and historical progress and
adherence to mythological way of thinking.
In contrast to contemporary European extreme rightwinters, which oppose Americanization and lslamization
of Europe, and deny cosmopolitanism and alleged
decadence of the Modem times, considering them enemy
of Europe rather than enemy of particular ethnic identity,
domestic conservative nationalists favor myth and
tradition of the Pre-modern times, ethnicize their politics
and advocate militant East Christian views, along with
pronounced affirmation of exclusive (and not humanizing
and enlightening) contents of Orthodox religion and St.
Sava tenets. This selective use of domestic heritage is
linked to the denial of entire modern West European
tradition, which is viewed only as materialism of the West
not germane to the Serbian national being. Their
chauvinism is devoid of the state vision, and it ranks as its
number one enemy either communist internationalism or
"mondialism." This denotes major lagging behind, as the
European extreme
ten years ago completed its
criticism of communist internationalism and focused on
resistance to "Americanization" of Europe. Hence it turns
out that the domestic conservative nationalism has a
parochial character, and is intellectually inferior to its
European counterparts led by Le Penn and Anri de
Benoix. lts vision of self-sufficient Serbia befits the vision
of right-wing provincials.
Public appearances of conservative nationalists are
characterized by emotionally-charged terminology. They
tend to demonize any kind of cosmopolitanism and their
enemy-bashing and
is similar to the practiced' in
the Stalinist stage of Communism. They view national
enemies as homogenous entity, backed by a unified front
composed of United States and representatives of
communist internationalism and Catholic Church. Zionists
are occasionally mentioned as exponents of this
conspiracy. One gets the impression that this criticism of
internationalism has been taken over from the past. The
same applies to understanding of politics: domestic
conservative nationalists view politics as "sheer force"
unadorned by phrases. In contrast the European extreme
right-wingers eliminated its "tribalism" approach and were
,...,.,,..,...,...."' 11 rv-1 to adopt
and human and civic
rights rhetoric.
to its European counterparts,
whose conservative concept of people as ethnic
Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

community represents only a marginal viewpoint, and

European political scenes characterized by a fundamental
bipolar relation, that is a division in democratic and
authoritarian ("totalitarian," "left and right extremes)
protagonists of political action, the Serbian domestic,
conservative nationalism insists on division in patriots and
traitors. Likewise treatment of "estranged" fellow-nationals
as the biggest or 'priority' enemies is a common
denominator not only of conservative, but of all
nationalisms.
Prominent presence of conservative nationalism is a
specific feature of the Serbian political and intellectual
scene. As regards its future, and future of entire Serbian
nationalism, it seems to me that could be cautiously
optimistic at least in the domain of domestic political
theory. One of the main features of the Balkan scientific
and political culture is a quick and fundamental change of
positions. In this regard Serbian nationalists are as
corruptible' as proponents of other political currents.
Their morphing from apparently staunch champions of
communist authoritarian internationalism to creators and
proponents of chauvinistic policy makes me believe that
they are likely to make another 'salto mortale.' Hence after
the abating of the nationalistic
one could expect
those intellectuals, who from their comfortable armchairs
had designed the last wars, to have a change of heart and
get involved in a new political option. Their proven ability
for transformation if prompted by purely utilitarian motives,
promises that they will find comfortable' positions even in
a climate characterized by cosmopolitan and "mondialist"
contents. Challenges of positions, cushy jobs, grants,
publicity, as weil as the wish not to stand on the political
sidelines, in the aftermath of nationalist euphoria, will most
create new champions of anti-national and antiwar views and sentiments. When the current network of
non-governmental organizations in Serbia outgrows its
current status of marginal alternative, it is
to get a
!arge encumber of new recruits.
PROBLEM OF NATIONAUSM AS ISSUE OF

The issue of nationalism in the Balkan, and notably

the issue of Serbian nationalism, is among other things,
and
in the first place, the issue of democracy, but
the sense often
out
liberal nationalists.
criticize the authorities for
instigators of
popular movements,' which
liberal nationalists
from scoring better election results. This
turn has
created an anti-folk
not
in the
aforementioned parties but in the Beigrade intellectual
arena which designs their
activities. Because of
the liberal nationalists' criticism of
movements'
the broad strata of
became the prey of left and
conservative nationalist
and leaders who do not
fear
but rather
them. This quasiaristocratic criticism of
movements blames the
instead of
restricts the
influence of opposition to middle class and
any
efforts aimed at de-chauvinization. This weakness of
liberal nationalists is shared
some not so influential civil
parties.
the broad strata of vu110Lv
the impression that the entire liberal
and disoriented
composed of
1999

lawyers. This lack of courage to renounce the attainment

of national program through military means is justified by
assertion that criticism of nationalism represents a sure
path to political marginalization. This justification is denied
by ,5 votes which Panic got in 1992 as weil as by the
posterior Milosevic's Drina river embargo. Due to such
wrong assessments those domestic liberals who are not
nationalists often demonstrate a sterile ability to form
unprincipled coalitions with liberal, even conservative
(Serbian Renewal Movement) nationalistic parties, instead
of boldly advocating their own alternative program. These
coalitions regularly have poor election results, or are
dismantled even before elections. One gets the
impression that opposition is looking for its anticommunist
Milosevic, and that Parliament, as a value, is upheld in a
rather insincere way.
Criticism of popular movements is tantamount to a
political backlash:
openly expressing their fear of "folk"
the liberal parties distance the broad population strata
from them and make them fall prey to the nationalistic
leaders, either to the ruling socialists or to the
manipulative leaders of the Radical
and the Serbian
Renewal Movement.
extension criticism of 'popular
movements' as an expression of deep and permanent
lack of faith
populace, not
lays the groundwork for
proclaiming a new, this time, anticommunist, nationalistic
leader, but also demonstrates a kind of passe, dissident
vanguard viewpoints that the established left rather than
more or less openly fascist extreme right is a major threat.
This propensity to disregard the potential ethnic-national
danger because of the left-wing regime threat is
tantamount to an academic understanding of politics
characteristic of the former dissidents circles. Those
consistent critics of nationalism, who are not ready fo form
all kinds of coalitions with anticommunist nationalists and
don't have Milosevic fixation, are thus not only more
but also more pragmatic and more useful
politicans for the
In view of tenacity of nationalism
in the Balkan and the dear price that had to be paid for the
nationalistic policy in this
of Europe, the issue of
fundamental break with nationalism is the basic issue of
democratization; moreover the break with ethnic
nationalism is a necessary prerequisite for democratization and modernization of the whole country. An
dilemma between nation and democracy was
solved in different ways in Western Europe.
However
mind specific political tradition and
explosive
of ethnic conflicts, the creation of
democratic order in the Balkan presupposes a
fundamental break with
both in principle and

Helsinki Charter, 1998

1believe that this much-delayed meeting of ours, despite

1its spur-of-the-moment, forced change of venue, this
Serb-Albanian dialogue conceived a long time ago, now
stands a good chance of success. Firstly, its is worth
remembering that the two men, motivated by their mutual
trust, jointly proposed the Serb-Albanian direct talks, to
be held in the spirit of mutual respect and tolerance on the
home turf and welcomed the participation of wellintentioned observers from abroad. One of these
honourable men, Adern Demachi who is today among us,
tirelessly continues to advocate this kind of dialogue as
the only forum at which a civilized, just and mutually
acceptable solution can be found.
The other man, the late professor Miladin Zivoti6, is
unfortunately not among us. His absence is a great loss
for the goals to which we are committed. 1am hopeful that
a likely success of our meeting will be a special homage
to the memory of this humane and wise man. Secondly, 1
expect our meeting to be successful because of the
selection of participants, as all of them have confirmed
through their public activities that their rational approach
to this complex and often controversial topic, is conducive
to finding common ground, and eventually hammering out
a tentative, mutually acceptable solution.
We expect to make headway at this meeting, in
contrast with a host of recent meetings in New York,
Vienna, Athens, Munich, Rhodes, which, according to the
available information, have yielded no substantive results.
At this meeting, we, my dear friends and fellowparticipants, shall not negotiate. Representatives of the
Serbian and Yugoslav authorities and the legitimate and
empowered representatives of Kosovo Albanians are
entrusted with this task. But, what we can do, and should
do, is to promote mutual exchange of ideas, opinions,
proposals and initiatives in our search for the way out of
the current impasse, which, in my opinion, is detrimental
to interests of Serbian and Albanian people alike.
To embark upon such course of action it is necessary
to have a flexible mind-set. We shall not make progress if
we stick to fixed and unchangeable opinions and
positions. 1 think it is sensible to explore all the different,
available options, their advantages and shortcomings, all
the while keeping in mind our common goal - the quest for
modalities making the lives of both Serbs and Albanians,
in their historically shared territory, not only bearable, but
perhaps, at a later date, in the future, mutually enriching
and uplifting. Bearing in mind that very goal 1would like to
present to you my views and proposals, in a sincere hope
to make a contribution to our common efforts.
Now 1 shall try to provide answers to some key
questions. You know that the higher echelons of state and
political institutions in Serbia and the FRY actively
advocate the thesis that Kosovo is an internal issue of
Serbia, and some even admit, in a more tolerant vein - of
Yugoslavia. 1 think that such a position is utterly
inadmissible. The Kosovo question has been

internationalized, it is an international problem, hence the

positions of international factors must be taken into
account when discussing this problem. But here again 1
would like to reiterate that 1 deem dialogue as the only
possible forum for reaching a settlement. Dialogue is the
only path conducive to a democratic solution, but in
parallel with such a dialogue an end must be immediately
put to the repression, to which the Albanian people have
been mercilessly and massively subjected for a very long
time. That repression is multifaceted - military, police,
administrative and judicial. That repression is so violent
and far-reaching that common Albanian people are
harassed and intimidated even when they try to take a
certificate in a municipal court, have their driving license
issued in municipal administration offices, or travel to
some place in Kosovo and in the FRY. 1 propose that in
our final conclusion we demand that the first step in a
comprehensive search for a sensible, democratic solution
for Kosovo, must be an immediate cessation of a
repressive regime systematically applied against
Yugoslav citizens of Albanian ethnicity.
The question often posed is "who could take part in
such negotiations." Of course, Belgrade's negotiators
must be legitimate representative of the authorities. 1hope
that in a near future these negotiators will be of different
political provenance. As to the Albanian negotiators, it is in
my humble opinion, a far simpler question that some
people often present it. Only Albanian people can decide
on their representatives in such negotiations, and 1 am
sure that they will select personalities, which will best
represent them in a legitimate and legal way.
When it comes to the conduct of the international
community, 1think it has taken up two essential positions.
One position is that the solution to the Kosovo issue, and
1would hasten to add, to the status of Albanian people in
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, should be sought
within the borders of that country. lt is indisputable that the
said position has been adopted by all the relevant
international factors. The second position of the
international community is that the highest, internationally
accepted standards of individual and collective human
rights must be applied in the resolution of the status of
Albanian people. Hence we should endeavour to work out
a solution fine-tuned to these two thesis.
Those who have followed the recent history of this
topic, perhaps know that several years ago 1 publicly
disclosed my pertinent position on the pages of weekly
"Vreme". 1 shall repeat my thesis here, without going into
particulars. A solution to the Kosovo issue should be
sought within the Yugoslav federation in the form of the
statutory equal federal unit. 1 know that my view is not
shared by the majority of the Serbian population, and 1
know it will be harshly criticized, but all that should not
prevent me from persisting in my quest for such a
solution, and 1am all for it. 1think it is important to say that
the dialogue in question must be the one between Serbs
and Albanians. But, as the things stand now, 1 see no
possibility for the exclusion of the international factor.
International factor should neither administrate such talks
nor arbitrate them, but it can however extend a muchneeded backing and assistance in joint efforts aimed at
finding a settlement of such a complex problem,
additionally burdened with excessive historic layers. When
Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

it come to these historic layers l think it is wise to pose an

additional question: is it really true that relations between
Serbs, Montenegrins and Albanians have always been
encumbered with distrust, hatred, distancing, and
separation. lt we turn to history in a serious vein we shall
discover a tew encouraging and reassuring periods in our
common past, characterized by joint struggle ot Serbs
and Albanians against foreign invaders in their quest tor
freedom and independence. Untortunately the hard-won
freedom and independence were not equally distributed
to the tellow-fighters, as Albanians were short-changed in
the process. We shall draw on this lesson in the tuture.
And finally 1 would like to draw your attention to
another, rarely mentioned dimension, which this time
could enhance our discussion. 1 think that a stable and
lasting solution to the complex Serb-Albanian relations
must be characterized by a clear-cut and visible Yugoslav
policy ot good neighbourly, equitable and mutually usetul
relations with the neighbouring Albania. 1 think that this
component could play a crucial role in the search for a
stable and mutually satistying solution, for it is obviously a
legitimate question why Albanians, divided as they are
now, in two, three or even four states, are the only people
in the Balkans or in South East Europe deprived ot the
right to enjoy close communication with their fellownationals. lt we want to respect international standards,
the answer to that question should not be: "yes, they can
enjoy that close communication but in a single state." 1
think that the recent experiences in the territories ot form er
Yugoslavia were a sanguinary enough proot ot a
disastrous tutility ot a nationally-homogenous and
ethnically-pure state concept. But Europe-wide we are
now also witnessing a new, prevailing phenomenon, that
ot a regional concept which creates space and
close
communication
between
possibilities for
neighbouring countries. As this regional concept slowly
gains foothold in this region, by ensuring free tlow ot
people, ideas, commodities, personal and family
contacts, it will in turn enable modern, civilized, European
way ot living in the Balkan.
H. C. - Special Englis Edition, Sept. 1997

ugoslavia as an eight-unit tederation disintegrated

because of aspirations ot the 'Greater Serbian'
nationalism and the present Serbian regime to place it
under its 'Greater Serbian' domination.
The first step in this process was a torcible abrogation
ot the constitutionally-guaranteed autonomy of Kosovo,
which in turn signalled the destruction of the SFRY
constitutional construction. This was followed by an all-out
campaign against other federal units, resulting in the war
and marking the end not only of the former Yugoslavia,
but ot any Yugoslavia.
What is now called the FRY is only a residue of a failed
January

1999

attempt to create "Greater Serbia." But Serbia and

Montenegro in actual fact tunction as independent states.
The final outcome was the following: all former federal
units became independent states, except tor Kosovo
which was forcibly kept under the occupying regime (and
Vojvodina which has never aspired toward the state
independence.) Hence only the rights ot Albanians, the
third-largest population group in the former country, have
been suppressed to extremes.
In this search for a solution ot the Kosovo issue
starting points should be the tollowing: 1) Current
situation, caused by unconstitutional methods and the
1989 use ot torce, is not legitimate, and should be
proclaimed as such; by extension the Serbian side and
the international community should not accept the present
situation as a fait accompli or a given reality and or try to
base their solutions on such a reality. 2) Kosovo is not a
run-of-the-mill case ot human rights violations, as the
national discrimination against Albanians, and denial and
repression ot their democratic freedoms and human rights
are common vehicles ot the policy of the ruling SPS party,
and an integral element ot the system and the regime's
rule. Discrimination and repression are above all manifest
in the practical exercise ot power which in each and every
instance is discriminatory against Albanians, and also
unconstitutional. 3) Constitutional autonomy was
abolished in Kosovo in order to place Albanians both in
the democratic and national sense in an unequal position.
And consequently it is very unlikely that Albanians can
attain and enjoy their national and democratic freedoms
within the tramework of thus-established political and
constitutional system in Serbia. 4) Unless the issue ot
Kosovo's constitutional and political status is resolved,
Albanians cannot hope to attain and exercise their
national, democratic and human rights and freedoms, nor
achieve an equal footing with Serbs and other ethnicities
living in Kosovo. 5) Political process ot normalization ot
the Albanian-Serb relations and implementation ot the
final solution of the Kosovo issue can begin when the
Serbian
authorities demonstrate willingness to
unconditionally restore to Kosovo and Albanians their
1974 constitutional rights abrogated by force in 1989. This
in turn will lay the groundwork for the kick-oft ot the official
political dialogue on the future ot the Albanian-Serb
relations and status of Kosovo, in full compliance with the
free will of people ot Kosovo expressed at a reterendum.
6) The starting point should be also the fact that in the
aftermath ot the former Yugoslavia's disintegration,
nothing will be deemed as 'detinitely settled' in the present
FRY until a resolution ot the Kosovo issue is found. The
border question is still open, as the borders of
Montenegro remained unchanged when the FRY was
constituted in 1992, while Kosovo borders were in actual
fact erased when the 1974 Constitution was abrogated.
And it is a well-known fact that borders between republics
and provinces (federal units) were not only defined but
also sanctioned by the Penal Code (Article 116. para. 2 of
the Penai Code ot the SFRY specified as a criminal
offence any attempt at forcible changing of borders
between republics and provinces). 7) A form of
cohabitation within the current borders ot the FRY - be it
union of states, confederation, or loose tederation - can be
established only it Serbs, Albanians, Montenegrins, that is,

Serbia, Kosovo and Montenegro opt for such a form,

freely and without coercion. This obviously entails
adequate protection of civil freedoms and guaranteed
equality of other minorities in these three territorial units,
that is, states. 8) The task of the democratic forces in
Serbia and in Kosovo is to create a political climate of
mutual confidence, in which argumentative, open,
democratic, unbiased and tolerant talks on possible
solutions can unfold.
lt is important to understand that the situation created
by the i 989 acts, and disintegration of Yugoslavia, the
situation currently maintained by sheer force, cannot be
continued. lt is fraught with potential danger, and the
consequences of possible armed conflicts would be feit
by all and sundry. Hence all the chances for a political
solution should be immediately given priority.

H. C. - Special Eng/is Edition, Sept. 1997

would like to start off with a succinct summary. In order

remain true to this idea 1 shall be particularly brief
when speaking about the heritage from the past. That
heritage, so challenging for historians, and so difficult for
population of Kosovo, is something that am i entit!ed to
ponder, thanks to the very nature of my profession and
even more to my field of interest which specifically
embraces the Middle Ages, Balkans and formation of
national identities in this beautiful European peninsula.
1 shall begin my expose with some seemingly run-ofthe-mill facts: from the demographic aspect Kosovo had
been(and still is) the most populous part of former
Yugoslavia; to understand the full implication of this data
it bears stressing that Serbia itself (with or without Kosovo)
was the most populous member of former federation
(today it is virtually overpopulated due to the influx of
some 700,000 refugees, and despite recent, 400,000strong brain-drain); noteworthy are also the following
facts: a 30.2% birth rate in Kosovo, the highest in Europe,
the largest number of "ethnic Albanian economic emigres"
in proportion to their total population size, and finaliy, until
the end of the last 'Balkan' war, steady (and quite sizable)
immigration of Serbs from Kosovo to the so-called
"smaller Serbia", surpassing by far al the other migrations
of Serbian people. 1 am dwelling on the demographic
aspect precisely because in the backward Balkan mindset, characteristic of the traditional (post-feudal) society,
the number of square miles (more precisely acres of land),
as an alleged guarantee of a desired political and
economic well-being, is directly correlated to the degree
of individual and collective standing. lncidentally,
schizophrenic, fierce fighting for plots of land, forests and
stone-pits in Bosnia and Herzegovina (and to a lesser
extent in Croatia), in which my compatriots sadly enough
played the lead role, largely stemmed from the post-feudal
understanding of the state and economic well-being.
(More plots of land and meadows -more prosperity!). In

the light of the fact that the Western way of thinking has
been for quite some time evolving along different lines,
our mutual, sincere misunderstanding becomes thenunderstandable.
When speaking about economy the picture we are
faced with is at the first glance even bleaker. Kosovo was
the paarest part of the then Yugoslavia, and was
noticeably poorer than the so-called "smaller Serbia." This
was due to the fact that the Serbian GNP was well below
a relatively modest Yugoslav gross national product. The
alleged 'comparative advantages' of Serbian agriculture,
based as much on the local land cult and small, private
allotments of land, as on its genuine and important
agricultural potential, indicated that Kosovo had the
largest, and Vojvodina the smallest number of landdependent people. However, farming revenues (per
capita) in Vojvodina were three times superior to the one
in "smaller" Serbia, and five times to the one in Kosovo. In
actual fact this is in direct and perfect proportion to the
aforementioned demographic reality of Kosovo and to an
almost negligible emancipation (in Kosovo and Serbia)
from the post-feudal syndrome. T o be perfectly honest, in
our textbooks, steeped as they were in Lenin's ideological
understanding of economy and society (More factoriesmore prosperity, Do not trust 'kulaks') Kosovo agriculture
was not mentioned, but Trepca and other, incredibly rich
mines were, and that profusely. am quite sure that
Kosovo' s mining wealth was and still is a matter of
national (rather than nationalistic) pride for many
Albanians and Serbs. would say that this myth was and
is the myth of an early romantic, post-industrial mind-set.
But the reality is different: even if under improved
circumstances, the tapping of this wealth proves to be
lucrative, in the foreseeable future it can not remain a
privileged lever in macro strategy against unemployment,
because of labour costs, new technologies non-existent
in Kosovo mines, ecology, to name just a few reasons.)
Basically i would like to stress that the economic power of
Kosovo is beyond the slogans "We shall not give our
Serbian Trepca" or "Trepca's operations build Beigrade."
Paradoxically enough this power is hidden in the very
industrial backwardness of Kosovo. To avoid
unnecessary misunderstandings, ! shall quote the
statement made by Mr. Richard Holbrooke, in August
1995. On top of everything that statement had to do with
Montenegro, rather than Kosovo. At that time his
reasoning was of this nature: ''We (that is, the US
Administration) have analyzed Montenegro and noticed
that its coastline is almost as long as Cote d'Azur; but
Montenegro has three times less inhabitants than Cote
d'Azur and luckily enough, has no industry; therefore we
see no obstacles impeding its political and economic
emancipation from Beigrade." Unfortunately Kosovo has
twice the population of Cote d' Azur per square kilometer,
it has no coastline -and these are all handicaps. But
Kosovo has one advantage over Cote d' Azur, namely its
fantastic acumen for self-financing. Thanks to this
characteristic of patriarchal societies, !arge quantities of
sound money (cash) are accumulated in fast and efficient
ways. Solidarity principles of bloodline are much more
effective than the operations of the best banks. However
it would be better if that money was not spent on purchase
of farming land, but rather channeled into what the
Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

modern world calls "postindustrial investing." Bye the bye,

as 1 have indirectly suggested at the beginning of my
expose, demographic 'battle' in Kosovo was won by
Albanians, but it may as easily happen, if this and similar
warnings are ignored, that the "winners", that is the ethnic
majority in Kosovo, become the principal victim of their
demographic overconfidence. 1 simply want to point out,
with good intent, that, at least from the Western point of
view, the future rather belongs to those who try to 'trade',
for example, at the Prizren bazaar, than to those who
continue to daydream about the industrial giants of social
realism. The future thus belongs more to those who do not
consider demographic arguments as political, let alone,
economic vehicles.
The wording of my contribution to this meeting has to
do with a wilful attempt at making our dialogue less
dramatic and taking some weight off an already heavy
Kosovo burden. And Kosovo is a heavy burden as, in the
political sense, it has been subjected to the langest state
repression ever recorded in the more recent history of
Balkans. As a historian can claim that in the past Kosovo
was one of the most complex 'sub-sections' of the famous
Eastern question, and today is one of the principal issues
troubling our mentors ( big powers and particularly the
United States). In order to successfully 'qualify' for a
political discussion, must immodestly stress that as a
historian know everything about the past of Balkans (as
mush as it is possible to know) before the arrival of Slavs
in the peninsula in early VII century, that know something
about the Serbian Kosovo and population migrations
during the Ottoman
and am quite versed in the
age of some segments of Serbian and Albanian
population in Kosovo. And
know a thing or two
about the history of neighboring Albania and am weil
aware of the connotation that Kosovo has in the
historical collective consciousness of modern Serbia.
However, to gain the trust of those suspicious-minded,
should like to add haphazardly that know about Toplica
Albanians immigration to Kosovo in the wake of the Berlin
Congress (some even call it- ethnic-cleansing); that also
know that Vasojevic tribe emigrated to Albania (its
and extent), and consequently can und erstand a symbolic
connotation of Vitomirica; that understand, for example,
how Serbs, 'early settlers', and the so-called 'colonists'
differed in their migrational
perhaps
should
mention my knowledge about the origins of Goranac or
the so-called 'muhadjir'; perhaps could underscore that
Albanian approach to religion and Kosovo's to Islam is
unlike any other Balkan and European experiences (in the
past
noticed that Albanians are
who had not
religious
the
wars, as their ethnic
was
that any
relatively superficial confessional identification- am afraid
that this nice historical
is not
to be liked
both the so-called Albanian side and the so-called
Serbian side). lf this haphazard list of my fortes is not
good enough to
suspicions of those who suspect
my knowledge, then will not be able to convince them of
my knowledge even if state
the reasons
Gega, Toska or Kosovo Albanians behaved
the W.W.11 ltalian
or that Serbs
resorted to
that
tens of thousands of Albanians became colonists
1999

Kosovo in the same period. Even 1fail to convince you of

the above, 1 shall nonetheless continue to deal with the
above subject matters as a historian. 1am also inclined to
somewhat pretentiously maintain that my professional
knowledge is more an advantage than a shortcoming in
any political deliberation.
In Tito's Yugoslavia under the 1974 Constitution
Kosovo enjoyed the status which many would de facto
describe as that of a federal unit. Today in Kosovo there is
no trace of any elemental autonomy, akin to the European
standards, and thus
guaranteeing cultural rights to
Albanians. Repression, which Beigrade authorities do not
hide any more, has persistently been practiced in Kosovo
for a decade or so. Albanians are obviously the target
group of this repression, but without any intent of making
mechanical comparisons, 1 must say that its indirect
victims are Kosovo Serbs, whose feelings of
marginalization, temporariness and ghettoization have
grown, as has their animosity towards the Albanian
majority and the so called 'Beigrade' and Serbia.
However, on this occasion 1 shall not touch on different
cultural codes of Kosovo immigrants in 'smaller Serbia'
and local population. Ten years ago Mr. Slobodan
Milosevic promised Serbia (not Serbs, wherever they live,
but-Serbia) "serbization" of Kosovo and managed to
fatally seduce Serbia with this promise. This essentially
'anational aparatchik' was backed in late Eighties by the
entire nation, that is as much by those who identified
communist privileges (which they have inherited) with a
confusing amalgam of 'Yugoslavia-Serbia-communismRussia-orthodox religion, as by those who put forward an
even more stupid axiom that communism prevented
Serbian national daydreams from coming true. Hence, Mr.
Milosevic managed to attain a kind of national consensus
in Serbia although throughout its history the country was
disinclined toward Communists. But pragmatic as he is
he realized, unlike the still mesmerized Serbia, that this
'serbization' of Kosovo was an impossible venture, and
started looking for other 'consensual' topics, first in
Croatia, and then in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However,
the 'consensual topic' which brought about his genuine
glorification in Serbia was Kosovo, while the other two
'ventures'
added some spiee to it.
bears stressing that in recent years it was easier to
'survive'
criticizing and opposing the
arrogant Croatian and Bosnian policy of the
official Beigrade, than by a mere launching of a humble
appeal for daring talks on the Kosovo reality. There are
serious historical reasons for the above. lt would be too
superficial to overlook these reasons, and even more so,
at least from the Serbian angle, to hush them up.
Serbia still prefers to keep silent on Kosovo: an
of its citizens is aware of Kosovo's
but
a few dare speak about that
or in
Even those who would like to be
a democratic alternative to the current Beigrade regime do
not speak about Kosovo,
that issue should be a
of their programme, less because of
"rl"". . . . '""'/"',.,/"',,, and "alternative" and more because of
that Kosovo
for Serbia and for the
many
interests of our international guardians.
months of massive rallies
Serbia the coalition 'Zajedno'
said very little about Kosovo. its leaders
....,,..,,M

10

promising that with the advent of democracy all Serbia's

citizens, including Albanians, would live better. Without
denying the importance of democracy for both Serbs and
Albanians (1 am moreover convinced that Albanians,
under current repression which, in turn, generates their
necessary homogenization, need such democracy even
more than Serbs) 1 must say that to aspire to take over
power in Serbia, principally as a democratic alternative to
Mr. Milosevic's authoritarianism, with a political
programme for Kosovo reduced to "More democracy for
Serbs and Albanians'' is - to put it mildly, not very serious.
Kosovo is primarily a political problem which requires
political solutions. Although at any Kosovo talks or
negotiations none of the collocutors can hope to curry
favour with the new followers, all of them should
nonetheless fully engage in their dialogue, if they have
any sense of responsibility towards their fellow-nationals
and their future, as the future of Kosovo, Albanians and
Serbs is at stake. In a democratic environment (when it
emerges) collocutors will be elected in a truly democratic
fashion, they will be democratically responsible toward
their electorate, and whatsoever opinion they have, will
stri-ve for the protection of democratic society.
Kosovo Albanians reacted to repression by opting for
independence by plebiscite. The evolution was fast
defence of the 1974 Constitution, demand for 'KosovoRepublic' within the Yugoslav federation, and finally the
conviction that the state independence was the only
possible goal of their political struggle. Speaking without
any bias 1 would like to add that the official Beigrade
offered to Kosovo Albanians only the sintagm "repressionsecession" and did not intend to propose any other
alternate solution. During his ascent to the throne of
Serbia Mr. Milosevic played his Kosovo game, but since
early Nineties his only ambition was to maintain the status
qua, thus facilitating the choice of tactics to the leaders
of Kosovo Albanians. As their goal was to peacefully win
independence, they opted for the so-called 'political
parallelism' method, and non-participation in the political
life of Milosevic's Serbia. This resulted in their systematic
boycott of all Serbian elections, the consequence of which
was Mr. Milosevic's easy pocketing of 20% of votes even
before the start of his pre-election campaign.
lt is beyond any dispute that the tactics of Albanian
leaders and eminently Mr. Rugova, were initially very
advantageous, but as an onlooker 1 could not help but
notice that last year some weaknesses regarding their
proclaimed goal - state independence of Kosovo, were
suddenly revealed. The signs of weakness partially
resulted from Mr. Milosevic's proverbial non-compliance
with signed agreements: on the eve of the last elections in
Serbia and Montenegro, in September1996 he promised
Mr. Rugova that Albanians would return to their
workplaces, the Albanian educational institutions would
be re-opened, etc. However, the manifested weakness of
the Albanian tactics was also caused by the
disappointment of the followers of the Albanian leaders
with minor results achieved so far, growing economic
difficulties of Western Europe, whose first victims were
foreign guest-workers (including Albanians), and by a
dwindling understanding of international community
which, although sympathizing with Albanians as the
victims of repression, nonetheless found it increasingly

difficult to understand the equation in which Albanians

became the most reliable ally of their principal political
enemy, by abstaining from 'his' elections.
On the other hand the Yugoslav crisis amply
demonstrated that Europe had no common political
strategy, and consequently, that in the foreseeable future
it was not likely to offer us a political sponsor or controller
(as we unfortunately must have them). Hence, the US
involvement in Balkan. Americans came here with
baggagefull of geostrategic criteria deemed applicable
wherever their interests required it: from the Turkishspeaking republics of the former Soviet Union to former
Yugoslavia. We (Europeans, Serbs, Albanians) are thus
willy-nilly faced with the fact that Washington is very
attached to the doctrine ruling that it is not desirable to
formally, and even less so, unilaterally and forcibly,
change the state (republican) borders inherited from the
former Yugoslav federation. Within these borders, at least
according to that doctrine, anything can be done, and
sometimes, even ade facto independence acquired. Bye
the bye that doctrine was always dear to both communist
and, postcommunist Russia. However, 1 do not claim that
each and every political factor in Balkans must abide by
that US doctrine, but am only trying to say that only those
cultivating the most extreme forms of political romanticism
or overconfident ignorance can disregard what our
'guardians' have to say about us. 1 am also aware of the
fact that the Balkan peoples are rather fond of applying
either 'ethnic' or 'historical' criteria when embarking upon
the creation of new states. But, Europeans, Russians and
Americans find such criteria rather appalling. In the recent
war Serbs have amply demonstrated that the worst
scenario was the 'ethnic' and 'historic'criteria alternation
(something could be possibly learnt from that lesson!).
And finally 1 know that prior to embarking upon the
political dialogue it is essential to remove all the obstacles
impeding their progress and eventual, positive
denouement, such as repressive measures and violations
of human rights to which one of the negotiating sides is
subjected.
And when it comes to the very Albanian-Serb
negotiations, their timing is undoubtedly favoured by the
recent turn of events in neighboring Albania,
developments in Serbia, and genuine 'guardianship'
imposed upon former Yugoslavia by our mentors. lf the
current Beigrade authorities and Albanian representatives
do not negotiate, some other collocutors will certainly do
that. 1 hope that 1 will be forgiven for not wanting to
anticipate their agenda, contents, and possible outcome.
think that it we want the negotiations to succeed (and as
it usually happens, to end in some kind of compromise)
we'd better not talk in advance about the prerequisites,
conditions and concessions likely tobe put forward by the
negotiators. However, if 1 were a negotiator 1 would most
certainly propose that 'my' side unilaterally, before the
opening of the dialogue, makes some goodwill gestures
in the name of our sincere and common belief in
democracy and human rights: in the areas of health care,
schooling system, unlawful laying-off of workers, and
discrimination on ethnic and political grounds. This would
not prejudge the outcome of the dialogue but rather make
its beginning more successful. But now 1 must dispel your
nascent illusions: none of us present here is likely to
Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

become, for the time being, a negotiator, above all a

negotiator democratically empowered to make decisions.
Hence, all the while we are waiting for the start of genuine
negotiations we can shorten the distances between us,
only by talking, recommending and putting forward
proposals.

H. C. - Special Englis Edition, Sept. 1997

1n the light of serious and deep political, economic and

1social crisis in Serbia, Kosovo situation and its use and
abuse by the Serbian authorities, general situation in the
Balkan, and in the former Yugoslavia area, dramatic and
unhappy developments in the neighbouring Albania- our
meeting is not only justified, but should also be seen as an
important event. lt is important because it coincides with
renewed efforts of international community and its
institutions to ensure further and more comprehensive
stabilization of the former Yugoslavia area, and the entire
Balkan region. Solution of the Kosovo issue belongs to
that 'package' of new moves, expectations and demands.
Understandably enough this meeting has neither
means, nor intention to ascertain that solution, but it has a
justifiable ambition to ensure a democratic, that is
eminently, tolerant dialogue and exchange of opinions on
ways conducive to the Kosovo issue settlement, and on
building measures of mutual confidence and mutual
understanding of the opposed viewpoints. This is a longlacking and unmet precondition for the resolution of the
Kosovo knot. Democratic solution of this inter-ethnic knot
is of crucial importance for democratic development of our
common country. Recent meetings between Serbian and
Albanians intellectuals were a major incentive to that end.
By extension, the New York meeting of the Albanian and
Serbian party leaders was a ground-breaking event, which
also managed to produce a common approach (stated at
a joint press conference) that 'such meetings and
dialogue should be continued.'
The first illusion which has been persistently served to
us and the foreign factors is that Kosovo issue is nonextant. The premeditated use of this dangerous and
irresponsible illusion escalated drastically in recent times,
in the form of its propagation from the topmost position in
Yugoslavia.
The second illusion is that Kosovo has autonomy. lt
does not! What the Constitution of the FRY specifies is an
extremely restricted autonomy, a residue of a genuine
territorial and ethnic autonomy, and represents a 'fig's
leaf' of the centralized state and its authoritarian regime.
That the state does not care a fig about 'autonomy' is also
evident in Vojvodina.
The third, contrived illusion is that Kosovo is an
internal matter of Serbia and Yugoslavia, which as such
cannot and will not be internationalized. can not be an
internal matter of Serbia as it is reflected in a disturbing
way not only on all aspects of life in Serbia, but also on
that of its neighbours. This issue was 'internationalized'

January

1999

long time ago, when it became clear that human and

national rights, as well as the stability of a region could not
be treated as so-called 'internal matter.' That is clear even
to those who now increasingly spread such illusions.
The fourth illusion is that the present state of policeadministrative rule can be continued. The Dayton peace
for Bosnia and Herzegovina and the firm commitment of
the UN, the United States, the European Union and the
OSCE to implement it fully, have nullified such a
possibility. Hence continuation of such a situation in
Kosovo, would entail further isolation of Serbia, imply
major financial and other lasses for the country, and lastly,
fuel extremisms on all sides, putting in jeopardy the
Southern Balkan and the whole, geostrategically
important Balkan region. That is why the Kosovo question
entered the new stage, the one which brings us closer to
an emerging solution. The train is moving fast, but the
Serbian regime, instead of becoming its engine driver, still
prefers to stand hesitatingly on the platform.
All four illusions are deliberately encouraged. The
regime uses them in its daily politicking and wraps them
up in rustling, flimsy packaging of myths, legends and
intentional patriotism. Unfortunately a part of the Serbian
intellectual and political elite does the very same thing.
Unfortunately there are also other illusions. Illusions
cherished by the other side. One of them is laden with
dramatic repercussions. The idea that once a national
state is formed it will immediately act as a magic wand
curing all the ills and showing the way to the free,
democratic and developed society is somewhat
understandable, but on the threshold of the third
millennium such an idea is not conducive to democratic,
tolerant and lasting solution of the problem. Perception of
such an idea, its perfecting and actualization in the Balkan
are quite tardy, and the nations living in the peninsula are
the least guilty for that obsolescence. The pursuit of this
state-forming idea nowadays can only lead to further
isolation, separation, territorial disputes, political
geography re-tailoring and makeover, and national and
territorial wars. In the aftermath of the disintegration of the
second Yugoslavia that price has been paid and is still
being paid by Serbs in Croatia, in Bosnia and Herzegovina
and in the very Serbia. Added to that, Serbs have inflicted
many ills and calamities to the others, and in the process
received many ills which will take a long time to eure.
Successful policy has always been and will always be
the skill of the 'possible,' and possible is all that is realistic.
This consequently means that there are no final, fixed solutions. In any case such a finality is not determined only
by us. This particularly applies to the Balkan. Nothing was
ever final in the Balkan, although often conceived as such.
There were Dacians, Tracians, and llfiyrians; there was
Rome, Byzantium and the Ottoman Empire; there was the
first Yugoslavia, and the second one. None of them lastedfor ever. They lasted as long as they did. The regime we
have now is not final. That is the reality. Such a reality
makes for real politics. Today's modified single-party
regime in Serbia cannot last forever, no matter how long
it lasts.
serious thinker and analyst must consider it as
a short-term phenomenon, in view of the overall
acceleration of social developments and trends. lts end
has in actual fact, begun. Our reality is that we can discern
the end of that
as weil as the end of the Yugoslav

crisis. Such realities make possible the real policy. Each

human generation has its possibilities and its limitations,
and not a single one can do everything, at once.
There are three indicators ot an imminent end ot the
power-hungry Serbian regime. After its deteat on the
international scene, the regime has in the past seven or
eight months intensively generated contlicts and crisis on
the home turf, showing a particular kind ot selt-destructive
conduct, entailing only its turther isolation at home and
abroad. In contrast a democratic spirit and democratic
conscience in Serbia are ever-growing. Citizens
increasingly rebel against their pigeon-holed role ot 'mere
subjects,' thus essentially rejecting collectivist ideologies,
either ot national or social origin. The world and its
institutions, trom Washington and London to Paris, Bonn
and Brussels, in a resolute bid to bring an end to the
Yugoslav crisis and stabilize the Balkan peninsula, have
been stepping up its recommendations and demands tor
Serbia's democratization. All this pressure makes the
atorementioned illusions even more obsolete, and puts
the reality to the foretront.
The search for the Kosovo solution tops the list of
such categorical recommendations. lt it is true that the
Yugoslav crisis began in Kosovo, then it will likely end
there. lt it is true that the ascent ot the authoritarian rule
began in Kosovo by way ot the rampant nationalism, then
that nationalism and authoritarianism will bring it down in
Kosovo, although side-effects ot such policy are likely to
last for a long time.
When it comes to the Kosovo settlement we are all
willy-nilly faced (alike when democratic changes in Serbia
are discussed) with a distinct, not-to-be-ignored
consensus ot all the intluential international tactors, both
European and world institutions. Our satisfaction or
dissatisfaction with their understanding ot our problems,
and notably ot this problem, has no impact on this census.
Firstly, the international community is bent on endorsing
the status ot former republican borders as internationally
recognized borders, which excludes their changing, and
above all their forcible changing. Hence we are faced with
a categorical position on inviolability ot borders. Any new
re-composition ot the geopolitical map ot the Balkans is
ruled out. (This was recently stated by the European
Union, and has been reiterated by the United States).
Secondly, within a tully autonomy ot Kosovo, and human
and ethnic rights ot Albanians and ot other peoples must
be tully observed and respected. Hence we are faced with
a wide framework within which the talks, dialogue and
negotiations can untold, obviously it we are wise enough
to embark upon them. International community's position
implies the respect and application ot internationally
recognized standards of human and ethnic rights. But
although contents or legal status and level ot autonomy
are not detined, it is clear that such an autonomy does not
only imply only respect ot human and ethnic rights,but
also excludes Kosovo's secession from Serbia, that is
Yugoslavia. The arena tor talks, dialogue, negotiations, it
we are lucky enough to enter it, is quite wide, and it
enables discussions on the degree of autonomy, its
contents, legal position, form, name etc. Thirdly,
according to the international community's formulation a
peacetul, political settlement is to be negotiated in the
form of direct dialogue between the republican authorities

and legitimate representatives of Kosovo Albanians. Such

a dialogue obviously does not exclude talks of this kind,
but rather urges them, for any solution should not only
result from an inter-party agreement, but rather from
concerted efforts made by a wide circle of representatives
of both sides. The contents ot the dialogue are not
specified, but nobody expects them to be ot a short-term
character. This impending process, will obviously be a
long and difficult one. lt can not be delayed any langer
and must encompass all the points related to human and
ethnic rights, barring the one relating to the secession.
That is the reality ot the Kosovo question.
Understandably enough there is more to it than meets the
eye. Our reality is that due to the dialogue avoidance and
even its outright rejection by the regime, the present
situation has morphed into a status quo. Furthermore, the
regime tends to resolve the dire consequences ot the
status quo through a host ot dramatic measures. On the
other hand, the goals set by the Kosovo Albanian leaders
seem to me to be further away from their realization, much
turther than betore, and than one would normally expect.
Moreover these goals are confronted by an untoreseen,
many-sided misunderstanding, resulting from the
prevailing circumstances in the region and Europe, to
which we belang and want to belang truly, rather than
from the official Serbian policy toward Kosovo.
What is possible under the present circumstances?
Can something be done to move the things from the
stalemate laden with tension, mistrust and potential
tragedy. Will our togetherness and aspirations to
democratic solutions and democratic life bring us closer
to the present and tuture Europe, its values and
standards, or shall we continue to pay an outstanding
debt to obsolete historical aspirations and anachronistic
goals? This meeting and similar fora indicate the viability
of the former. Kosovo must not become the Gordian knot!

H. C. - Special Englis Edition, Sept. 1997

assive Serbia-wide civil protests in the wake ot the

rigged local elections, greatly influenced political
developments in the Republic. On the one hand, they
indicated the depth of the political crisis. On the other
hand, they demonstrated the unwillingness ot both the
regime and opposition to grapple with a host of problems,
and, in the first place, the problem ot Kosovo. As in the
past, Albanians again stood on the sidelines, primarily
because none ot the opposition parties programmes
included an explicit position on the situation in Kosovo.
But, in the aftermath ot recent protests Albanians were
faced with a serious dilemma over their future line of
action: to continue the passive resistance which so far has
not yielded tangible results, or to embark upon an active
resistance course fraught with dangers.
Recent developments in Albania have deepened a
!ingering feeling of unease amid Kosovo Albanians, for
Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

their implied a loss of mother country support. They

forced them to give a more thorough consideration to their
future tactics and strategy. The developments in Albania
also became a matter of serious concern for international
community. They were indicative of a possibility of a
similar scenario of regional destabilization in the FRY.
However, the international community, especially the
US, has taken a firm position that such scenario will not be
allowed. In her speech of 22 May 1997 Madleine Albright
has also expressed the readiness of the United States to
"prevent the area in and around Bosnia from serving as a
base for transnational crime and by dampening the revival
of the Balkan route for smuggling drugs".
Adern Demachi, who is heading the block of 'political
dynamism', put forward his political programme, but no
concrete activities leading to an accelerated institutionbuilding in Kosovo. He became a rising star of the Kosovo
politics when the broad strata of Kosovo population,
frustrated by the failure of the current passive resistance
policy, lent him support. Demachi does not know exactly
how far he can forge ahead with his "policy of dynamism".
As there is only a thin line between active resistance and
hazardous political gamble, the chance of the optimal
outcome is reduced.
Massive civil protests have weakened the position of
President Milosevic and helped him put the Kosovo issue
on the back burner. By extension, under the pretext of
more pressing issues (read: civil protests) he had also
postponed a more substantive implementation of the
Agreement on Education signed in September 1996. Even
a continued meditation of St. Egidio Catholic Mission from
Rome, in February 1997 and at a later date, did not yield
any new results.
Under mounting international pressure, the Serbian
opposition, in an effort to finally meet the challenge, has
only managed to articulate a mildly-worded formulation
that "Kosovo needs greater autonomy, in keeping up with
European human rights Standards." On the other hand,
Albanians have realized that they cannot expect much
from the Serbian opposition in view of its political
emphasis on democratization of Serbia, and secondary
importance of the Kosovo issue. For them the Serbian
opposition is also known for publicly touting its stand,
disguised in a seemingly democratic formula, that " the
territorial aspect of Kosovo issue should be treated
separately from the issue of observance of human rights."
The Serbian opposition elite did not put forward this view
in the war time when Serbs remaining in the newlyemerged states would have welcomed it as a sensible and
acceptable solution.
A growing frustration of Albanians has been is caused
by the lang crisis and the negotiations stalemate. Azem
Vlasi says: "Albanians cannot find any justification for this
continued and unacceptable status quo.
are
humiliated and revolted
the reluctance of both the
Serbian regime and international factors to seriously
consider the Kosovo issue, and an ever-worsening status
of Albanians". lf a more serious political initiative is not
launched soon, Albanians will lose the little hope they still
have in the possibility of reaching a solution through
political negotiations and dialogue. Under prevailing
conditions of complete political paralysis more radical
forces can easily gain the upper hand. Hence, the media

January

1999

are awash with speculations about the liberation army

whose activities could lead to radicalization of the Kosovo
political scene.
The information available about this army is often
inadequate and unreliable. According to a "New York
Times" story (May 1997), this army has won the support of
almost all Albanians. The highlights of the story were that
"the army's targets are the representatives of the Serbian
regime, notably the rank and file of the secret police",
and that " to all intents and purposes, it strives to become
a major political force in the Kosovo political scene".
Although Albanians in Kosovo know very little about the
Liberation Army of Kosovo, the serbian media has been
exaggerating its role. lts concrete actions are widely
covered and praised. Attention should be also paid to the
current stirrings of dissatisfaction among Albanians in
exile, who had financing "the parallel Kosovo state". Bujar
Bukoshi, Prime Minister of the Government in Exile, in a
special declaration (24 May 1997), sharply criticized "the
inefficiency and passivity" of the political leadership of
Kosovo, "whose moral mandate has expired".
The return of Albanian refugees to Kosovo, urged by
the EU states, in view of the prevailing political climate,
might contribute to the radicalization of political life in
Kosovo. In that respect, the implementation of the FRYGerman Agreement on return of 130,000 Albanians to
FRY, and the signing of similar agreements with
Switzerland and Sweden, can additionally aggravate the
situation.
The Serbian media attentively follow all developments
in Kosovo. Much prominence is given to a growing
number of incidents, for which the Kosovo Liberation
Army has purportedly claimed responsibility. In February
1997 the Ministry of the lnterior of Serbia reportedly
apprehended a number of members of the Kosovo
Liberation Army and of other Albanian groups. As the
political programmes of some organizations ( Popular
Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo and Popular
Movement of Kosovo) encompass the goal of "the armed
struggle against the regime," their members were arrested
on a charge of "secessionism" and committed for trial. The
Ministry of the lnterior of Serbia has made the case public,
by selectively disclosing some details, and only after" the
manifest police inefficiency in capturing the terrorists"
drew sharp criticism. In an interview to "Koha", Vukasin
Jokanovic, Federal Minister of the lnterior, pointed out that
the extremists in the province claimed responsibility for 17
murders and 35 heavy woundings in the past five years.
Jokanovic also warned of "the dire consequences of such
actions.", and stressed that "a large quantity of arms
intended for separatist military units was also seized."
Albanians deny the existence of such an army. lbrahim
Rugova condemned the assault on the Pristina rector, and
asked that " Interpol and FBI take over the investigation".
Fehmi Agani, Vice President of the LOK, distanced himself
from "the Liberation Army of Kosovo" by saying: "Under
the pretext of curbing the activities of this Army, the
regime plans to legalize new forms and various degrees of
intimidation and terror against Albanians".
The Prishtina District Court sentenced 20 Albanians
who according to the indictment belong to "the National
Liberation Movement of Kosova", to 107 years of prison for
"associating to commit hostile activities, terrorism, and

endangering territorial integrity". A trial against a group of

15 Albanians, members of "the Liberation Army of Kosovo"
is under way. They are accused of "acts of terrorism"
(murders of policemen and attack of refugee camps).
In an attempt to initiate a dialogue between the two
sides, Albanian-Serb meetings were held in New York (69 April 1997) and in Vienna (19 and 20 April 1997) under
the auspices of international institutions such as the
Project for Ethnic Relations and the Carnagie Endowment
for International peace.The representatives of the Serbian
Socialist Party did not attend the meetings in an effort to
avoid getting involved into the issue in the pre-election
period. They also resented the unfavourable treatment by
the US Administration (Madeleine Albright, the US
Secretary of State, received only representatives of the
Coalition 'Together'). After these developments the
Socialist Party of Serbia mounted a media campaign
aimed at discrediting the opposition because of the
'internationalization of an internal issue of Serbia'.
The opposition representatives were fully aware of the
sensitivity of the Kosovo topic and the trap prepared by
Milosevic. They limited themselves to giving only routine
statements in New York. Consequently, it seems that the
Kosovo issue remains a "hat potato" both for the regime
and the opposition. This fact accounts for the absence of
this issue in the pre-election campaign, which has
unofficially started, although the elections have not yet
been called. At the same time the treatment of Kosovo as
an internal issue would be by definition contrary to
relevant international
European
standards
and
documents.
Albanians and Serbs are equally ambivalent in their
approach. On the one side, they expect the international
involvement and understanding for specific positions of
both sides. On the other side, they keep delaying with
concessions expecting the fatigueness of the international
factor which would enable them to "resolve" the desired
option on the local level. However, the time is running out
and since both sides are lacking the political energy for
resolving the problem they might be expecting the
solution from the outside as the best way out of stalemate.
lt would also provide them with the necessary excuse at
harne. In both meetings Albanians acted in unison. They
continued to insist on "an independent Kosovo", neutral
with respect to Serbia and Albania. They refused to
discuss the option of Kosovo's autonomous status within
Serbia. As the Serbian opposition does not take a clear
stand on the Kosovo issue, Albanians know weil who to
talk to about their status. In all likelihood, President
Milosevic will be the one who will bring the standoff to an
end.
Recent meetings have not yielded substantive results
because of the extreme complexity of the situation and the
limited scope of such fora. The New York meeting was
important because it had pre-eminently shown that the
dialogue was possible, and that prior to rational analysis
and search for resolution, the process of taboo-ending
had to be initiated.
The Serbian body politic failed in its attempt to reach
a common public position on Kosovo, although there is a
tacit agreement on the issue between different political
parties and the Serbian intellectual elite and is reflected in
continuation of the status qua. No-one wants to take the

responsibility for the concessions as requested by the

international community in order to avoid political
compromising. Kosovo Serbs have for the second time
unsuccessfully tried to organize under the auspices of the
National-Political Council of All Serbian Church and
Popular Assembly of Kosovo and Metohija an interSerbian dialogue in Decani. The meeting was attended
only by the representatives of the New Democracy and the
Democratic Party of Serbia. In the meantime, Kosovo
Serbs headed by Momcilo Trajkovic made an effort to
internationalize the issue. At their request they met with
Elizabeth Rehn, the U.N. Special Rapporteur for Human
Rights and made several visits to European capitals.
President Jacques Chirak sent a reply to their letter
(march 6 1997). Several other initiatives aimed at
presenting the Serbian side of "truth" about Kosovo are
under way. BINA Agency and the Nis Students' Cultural
Centre published in 1997 a book "The Kosovo File" in
English. According to one of its authors, Goran llic, it is "a
polemical book arguing against the planetary illusions and
errors about Kosovo".
Kosovo Serbs are concerned that if the Serb
emigration from Kosovo continues unabated their plight
might due to their greatly reduced number in the region
become "a non-issue". Despite stringent regulations of a
highly discriminatory Kosovo Act on Banned Property
Transactions Under Special Conditions (1989), Serbs
have found ways to circumvent the law. Through legal
loopholes such as Gift Contracts and Contracts on
Property Utilization, they have continued to seil their
property to Albanians. The Serbian exodus is additionally
motivated by the lack of employment, as Kosovo has been
an economically dead region for almost a decade. Local
authorities have recently focused their attention on the
proper enforcement of the Act and, barring exceptional
cases, threaten with imprisonment both prospective
Albanian buyers and Serbian sellers.
international community is increasingly pressuring the
main Serbian protagonists to find solution to the Kosovo
issue. Serbia's access to international financial markets
will remain barred until that issue is resolved. Hence, the
media continue to spotlight Kosovo. The regime and the
opposition have an identical stand on Kosovo. In 1990
Milosevic's decision to introduce amendments to the
Constitution of the Republic of Serbia enjoyed the support
of the political and intellectual elite. The amendments
brought suspended the status Kosovo and Vojvodina as
constituent elements of the Republic and Federation (the
ex-Yugoslav Constitution of 197 4). Dobrica Cosic's
involvement in the above developments, arguably
motivated by 'higher Serbian interests,' is widely known.
In view of all that, both sides now find it difficult to
renounce their positions. However, it is harder for
Milosevic to do so, as that move was his only "political
success".
The European Union and the United States press for
the settlement within Serbia, in the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia, as stated in their numerous statements. The
European Union has also adopted a strategic paper on
political and economic conditions for cooperation with the
newly-emerged countries: FRY, Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina. A part of the chapter on the FRY specifically
deals with Kosovo. The EU envisages the highest-degree
Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

autonomy of Kosovo with a separate Constitution,

autonomous judiciary, administration, school system,
government and parliament. According to the paper,
Kosovo is to be proportionately represented in the
republican bodies of Serbia.
The firm commitment of the U.S. policy, and recently
of the European Union, that the Kosovo issue should be
resolved within the FRY has recently been confirmed by
the United States bringing pressure to bear on lbrahim
Rugova to postpone the May 1997 elections. Although the
Serbian Radical Party's criticism of the proposed elections
was vociferous. Rugova's idea was condemned by all
other parties, despite their more restrained reactions. The
Democratic Centre qualified the announced Kosovo
elections as "a dangerous act conducive to secession of
Kosovo." The Serbian Renewal Movement saw the
insistence on Kosovo elections as a major provocation
aimed at causing armed conflict. U.S. and German
diplomats particularly warned Rugova that "calling
separate Kosovo elections at the time when the AlbanianSerb dialogue has been initiated could cause serious
disagreement with unpredictable consequences". On the
eve of the fifth anniversary of Kosovo elections Rugova
stated that "the next elections will take place in the most
favourable conditions for us, and will not be related to
other elections in the region. Free elections, as five years
ago, will represent another great step towards the
establishment of independence and democratic
legitimacy of Kosovo".
The Serbian print media is awash with stories alleging
the responsibility of Albanians for the break-up of
Yugoslavia and their connections with the lslamic
countries. The interpretation by
circles that "the
objective of the current re-tailoring of the Balkans is a
further reduction of territories inhabited by ethnic Serbs",
is also given a wide exposure.
The Kosovo issue, as one of the central points of "the
Albanian question", has major implications for the present
and future of the Balkans. However, the Serbian issue
should also be addressed and resolved. What impedes
the launching of a genuine dialogue is a great
psychological burden shouldered
markedly
nationalistic movements. They are continually at
loggerheads, and frustrated
an uneasy coexistence in
same territory and history of their conflicts. There is no
imminent danger of confrontation as neither
wants it
nor would the international community allow it. lt did its
utmost to
the spill-over of the war to Kosovo.
the light of a regional potential for violence, such a
scenario should not be discarded, especially as a more
radical turn of events in Serbia is always possible. All
neighbors, particularly Macedonia, are interested in future
in turn,
developments in Kosovo, because
influence those on their home turf.
a recent interview to Kosovo weekly "Zeri", Kiro
Gligorov, President of Macedonia, stated that "the Balkans
will be included in the European integration process
when the Kosovo issue is resolved". He also stressed that
"people living in Kosovo should play a decisive role in the
resolution of the problem. which can
be achieved
through direct negotiations between the two factors, FRY
and Kosovo, and Albania respectively" He added that "the
status of Albanians in Macedonia can not be
to

January

1999

the one of their fellow-countrymen in Kosovo, as in the

latter case the police and the army are controlling the
situation and the minority by force and direct repression".
On the basis of the above facts following options
might be envisaged: (a) Autonomy - its first variant
presupposes a modification of the former autonomy
granted by the 1974 ex - Yugoslav Constitution in the
extent that the statehood be suspended. The regime
favours this variant. The second variant would be an
enhanced version of the autonomy enjoyed in the exSFRY: the emphasis is on strengthening the element of
statehood as a transitional solution leading to Kosovo's
independence. This variant is favoured by the Kosovo
Albanian "doves". (b) Balkania - a concept originally put
forward by A. Demachi favours a new or additional
federalization of the
in the sense that Kosovo would
be granted the status of a federal unit - a republic,
alongside Serbia and Montenegro. Interna! statehood is
underscored. (c) Regionalization of the FRY - a concept
most comprehensively expounded by the member of the
serbian Academy Miodrag Jovicic. Within a proposed
division of the FRY in thirteen regions, Kosovo and
Metohija would become two distinct regions, and their
regional assemblies would be bi-cameral. The Democratic
of Serbia backs this concept. (d) Unitary state transformation of the FRY into a unitary state and
subsequent fundamental constitutional rearrangement.
This idea enjoys the backing of the Serbian Radical Party,
headed by Vojislav Seselj. (e) Independent Kosovo - there
is a general consensus amongst Kosovo Albanians on this
option,which is fraught with potential dangers. lt provides
a platform for all Albanian negotiations on Kosovo. (f)
Union with Albania - an idea advocated by the most
radical fraction of the Albanian national movement,
symbolized by its most prominent 'hawk', Academician
Redjep Chosia. (g) Division of Kosovo - the idea to divide
Kosovo along ethnic, economic and cultural lines was
launched
Dobrica Cosic. In 1997 the public (Serbian
and Albanian) reacted with alarm to a similar, muchpublicized opinion of Academician Aleksandar Despic. lt
was strongly condemned both
the ruling party and the
opposition. On the other hand, Albanians might be
receptive to this idea if it meant division along the current
border.
Protectorate - an interim "modus vivendi"
solution which would enable painless integration, division
or some other solution. Rugova is the main advocate of
this model as it could also lead to the achievement of his
goal: a sovereign state. (i) Consociation - a notion
widely supported by those with civil and democratic
leanings, as a befitting form of democratic order for a
complex society with varied ethnic, national, cultural,
religious and ideological features.
At this juncture both sides would benefit from the
politically mature and nationally recognized forces that
would be able to
channel and translate their political
will into concrete activities in concert with their
assessments and prevailing circumstances. Both sides
would also profit from assistance analysis in and
assessment of the situation by professional teams of
analysts to
guide their activities towards more
tangible results.

H. C. - Special Englis Edition, Sept. 1997

he crisis of ethnic relatio~s in the :egion was caused by

many errors, the analys1s of wh1ch could help find a
common 'cause' denominator of the troubled AlbanianSerb relations. Numerous foreign factors, along with some
Serbian forces and personalities, maintain that
democratization of Serbia would solve the Kosovo issue.
But if we demystify the Serbian errors and errors about
Serbia, Kosovo errors and errors about Kosovo, as weil as
the role of the international factor, what will emerge will be
a well-founded impression that only self-determination of
Albanians can democratize Serbia and Kosovo.
Serbian errors and errors about Serbia: These errors
do not have a historical basis, for if we analyze in
continuum the consequences of the Serbian policy in
Kosovo and toward Albanians, we shall notice an
absurdity, resulting from the monistic system and the fact
that Serbia has never been a democracy, but also from
the fact that Serbia always had some reasons to treat
Kosovo and Albanians in an undemocratic way. The claim
that the very communist system was a generator of such
relations would have seemed a convincing one, had the
position and status of Albanians changed for the better in
post-communism. lnstead, as we can see, the situation
had worsened. Formally Kosovo was annexed in the
post-war period, in accordance with the 'political will' of
Albanians in the Assembly of Kosovo, in 1945, in an
atmosphere of military rule! Hence, Kosovo has not
objectively become a part of Serbia under democratic
circumstances. In that respect situation in Kosovo has not
changed an iota. Few joint and personal Albanian
accomplishments from the period of monism, were
destroyed with the advent of nationalistic and
hegemonistic ideology. Hence a continuous and intense
(depending on a degree of segregation and
discrimination) struggle of Albanians to leave the legal
framework of Serbia.
But the Serbian post-communist policy in its quest to
annex Kosovo, has stripped Kosovo Albanians of all their
powers on their very territory. In other words, Serbia was
not interested in Albanians or in building democratic
relations with them, but rather in their territory and in their
subjugation. When all other nationalities left Serbia and
Montenegro, Kosovo became the only source of the
Serbian nationalistic and mythological ideology.
Nationalism in Serbia is not a fortuitous inspiration, but
rather an inherent characteristic of its state policy. Hence
democratization of Serbia is hindered by Kosovo's
continuing presence in the country. But, on the other
hand, various political, scientific, religious and state
factors can ad continuum use Kosovo as a manipulative
vehicle and as a recompense for all Serbian losses and
humiliations.
Realistically speaking ever since Kosovo Albanians
were divested of their powers, the semi-legal Serbian
nationalism from the times of monism, has openly

morphed into a main programme pillar of all the relevant

political forces in the transition period. Programs and
positions of all the relevant, both pro-regime and
opposition political parties, the Orthodox church and the
Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, institutes, the
Writers' Association, army, police, state administration,
the electronic media, citizens' polls, etc., currently feature
aspirations inherited from the past. We are no longer
speaking about policy, but rather general social
orientation in Serbia. Hence, a long-standing inferior legal
and political status of Albanians amply proves that Serbia
has never been interested in creating equal conditions for
Albanians, but rather and only in divesting Albanians of
their rights on their territory, despite their increased
economic, social, political and notably, demographic
significance and role.
The prevailing political climate and political relations
among the Serbian people indicate that democratization
of Serbia pales in comparison with the rule over Kosovo.
By extension, as Kosovo, that is Albanians, can be kept
under Serbia's rule only through sheer pressure and
violence, the Serbian state will remain antidemocratic and
hegemonistic. Albanians are forced to live in their original
ethnic territory by laws and rules imposed by the Beigrade
regime. Hence the statements of the opposition parties
that 'Albanians are fearful of democratization of Serbia, as
such a turnaround would make them stay in it' are not only
fortuitous but also grounded in the prevailing Serbian
policy. In other words the Serbian opposition a priori
rejects and prejudges an eventual result of a democratic
right to self-determination, by setting a legal and political
framework within which Kosovo could stay even after
possible changes in Serbia.
The Serbian opposition, which is favoured by the
international factor as a democratic Serbian force, views
the Kosovo issue in an undemocratic way, just as it was
originally presented by the current Serbian regime.
Finally, this approach may be deemed paradoxical by
those political factors which have not closely followed
political actions of the Serbian opposition. Had they done
that they would have realized that they were just a fraction
better than the anti-Albanian activities of the regime.
Serbia encumbered with an anti-Albanian baggage,
has a stronger predisposition to remain undemocratic,
then to democratize itself and Kosovo. Kosovo errors and
errors about Kosovo: Judging by official statements, a
growing internationalization of the Kosovo issue has not
brought about a better understanding of the problem. lt
seems that the (inter) national centers of political decisionmaking in their misunderstanding of the Serbian politics
genealogy continue to harbour prejudices about the basic
causes of the Kosovo problem. Above all they do not
properly understand the connection between the insistence that Kosovo must stay at all costs within Serbia, and
democratization of Serbia. lf Kosovo was coerced to stay
within Serbia it would not be deemed as a democratic solution, nor Serbia would be seen as a democratic country,
partly because of the Serbian politics genealogy, partly
because the absolute majority of citizens and all main
political and social forces of Kosovo have as their proclaimed goal the creation of the Republic of Kosovo, that
is political self-determination, and not democra-tization of
Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

Serbia or Kosovo. The Kosovo issue by its nature a legal

and political issue. The idea of the republic cannot be
suppressed if the violence continues unabated. On the
contrary, such a violence fans the resolution to translate
into practice the idea of independence. Conflicting trends
of the national policies in Serbia and in Kosovo exclude
the possibility of mutual democratization. This is best demonstrated by the past Albanian-Serb experience. Hence
at possible joint elections in Serbia the programmes
advocating further exploitation, divisions, nationalism or
chauvinism would prevail over any programme pressing
for democratization of Serbia and Kosovo. Realistically
speaking if Kosovo were to stay in Serbia, an absolute
majority of Albanians would view and experience this as a
decision leading to the perpetuation of violence. Rampant
violence and democracy cannot co-exist. Albanians have
become aware that only their political self-determination
can guarantee them democracy, whereas any other
solution would be tantamount to the continuation of their
suffering and provide a reason for radicalization of
situation. The idea to create the Republic of Kosovo is a
compensation for the lost relationship with the Yugoslav
state. But the fact that Albanians still have not fully realized
that to accomplish a political goal they need not only their
legitimate right to it, but also a force to make it true, is an
entirely different matter. However, judging by the past
impressions and challenges, Albanians cannot renounce
their rights, which are being denied to them every day in
practice, although all the arguments speak in favor of the
respect of such rights.
Political modalities put forward by international
centers of political decision-making indicate the following,
possible, provisional settlement of the Kosovo issue:
Albanians in Kosovo will wield all the power, but shall be
nonetheless forced to institutionally coexist with the
Serbian state.
lt seems that international centers of political decisionmaking will in all likelihood opt for this compromise
solution, in view of the contrariness between the political
will and orientation of Albanians and the state and national
logic of Serbia. Kosovo Albanians keep proving their right
to independence in many ways, but it seem that in the
mind of the foreign factor the Serbian state and national
interest, that is an ethnic rule over citizens, takes
precedence over the independence. Hence it is more
important to define contents of the current political modus
then to waste energy in contending it! As the idea of
independence still seems to be unacceptable, it is better
to resort to internal decision-making as a possible
prerequisite for political self-determination then to keep
sticking to a passive stance, which if continued, could
seriously threaten the national being and identity.
Albanians have opted for independence, but they are still
in a neocolonized situation. This tense situation should
objectively raise the awareness of Albanians and make
them understand what their existential interests and life
goals are. Political forces of Kosovo should act in unison,
in a wise, decisive and deft way, but also in keeping with
international demands, to attain their real, existential
interests. Likewise all the rational political means should
be deployed to achieve higher goals. Some parameters
indicate that Albanians could successfully protect their
existential interests provided that demilitarization of

January 1999

Kosovo is carried out, freedom of political, legal,

economic and cultural system guaranteed, protection of
ethnic territories with a special emphasis on absolutization
of collective rights and freedoms fully ensured, the issue
of the border importance relativized, free and direct
cooperation with Albania allowed, etc.
lf the gist of the above operative contents is
disallowed (the Serbian Constitution hinders the
actualization of such contents) this in turn means that the
Constitution of the Republic of Serbia is used as a vehicle
directly threatening Albanian national identity and being.
Hence is it quite understandable that for some Albanians
strata the existing Serbian Constitution, and the existing
practice, are a bigger threat that the open front. lf this
situation is continued national movement will have to
reorganize itself and new forms of resistance will have to
emerge. In case of such scenario the only alternative will
be the change of border, for Albanians cannot continue to
live within borders of a country in which they are
threatened. Understandably enough Kosovo Albanians
must not renounce their declared political goal of
independence, but they should also take steps enabling
successful implementation of their most concrete activities
during the transition period. Life and position of Albanians
will be more sensible and stronger if instead of nursing
futile hopes of independence, they take concrete steps
with a view to implementing a compromise solution
related to the statehood and forms of empowerement, as
the international factor suggested. lt is much more
important to lay the groundwork for a state, then
persistently indulge in daydreaming about fictitious
power. International factor errors: Development of
political processes in the region is closely linked with the
influence of international factors. Some analysts even
claim that the crisis has been generated by the conflicting,
strategic interests of some international centers of
decision-making. In parallel there is also a general
agreement that the crisis cannot be resolved without more
active involvement of international factors. However, as
the crisis deepened, international factors started making
numerous errors. Likewise speculations grew as to the
real roi'e and importance of international factor, which was
often at cross-purposes with surprising activities and
behaviour of the main protagonists of the regional crisis.
Kosovo differs from other states which have
accomplished their goal, in the sense that in their struggle
for independence Albanian political and social factors
were more self-reliant than political factors in other states.
In the light of relatively modest potential of Kosovo versus
the superior one of its opponents, such an orientation is
understandable. By extension, due to this very orientation
Albanian struggle for independence depends more on the
external than internal factor. This in turn means that
independence of states and peoples of this region is partly
self-won, and partly won thanks to the external factor
backing. But, this conclusion does not apply to Kosovo
situation. However, the national self-denial is not at odds
with the expected contribution of the external factor to the
accomplishment of the Albanian political goal. On the
other hand, that contribution most surely will not live up to
excessive expectations of the Albanian political factors,
who tend to expect more from the foreign factor than from
themselves.

The strategic goal of Albanians in changed

circumstances is neither too small nor too big to make the
foreign factor put in jeopardy the integrity of the former
Yugoslavia, through which it controls Kosovo, and not vice
versa. Actions undertaken by the foreign factor in this
region create an impression that only when all the
possibilities are activated Albanians will show a manifest
interest in creating a new Albanian state. Had the foreign
factor been interested in such a possibility, it would have
created earlier a Kosovo state. Let us not forget that
thanks to the resolute influence of the foreign factor the
Macedonian state was established, although its territory
and nationality are persistently challenged by dissatisfied
Albanians! lt seems that international factors in this part of
the world need a parastate, a far cry from an independent
state, but the one easily influenced by international
factors. In view of this, the prospects of Serbia will largely
depend on the relations it establishes with the rest of the
world, and with Kosovo. By extension Kosovo's future will
depend on the relations it establishes with the rest of the
world and relations with Serbia.
Realistically speaking, although in the future the
majority of states in the Balkan region will have de jure
independence, none of them will have a de facto
independence, as the latter would be contrary to the USchampioned new world order precepts. Such orientations
relativize the idea of independence, and even more so
when it comes to the states which historically pose a
major threat and nations which are supposedly threatened
by such states. Judging by previous experiences,
independence of such and similar states will be maximally
relativized, while the self-rule of the threatened nations will
be largely increased.
What can be perceived as the only non-error is a likely
fine-tuning of Albanian and foreign factor interests, in the
sense that the latter will be recognized as the Balkan
peace-stabilizer and security-guarantor. On the other
hand thus assigned role can easily be turned into a
destabilizing one, if the Serbian state and Albanians do
not respect vested and established interests of the foreign
factor. Kosovo will be independent with respect to
Serbia, inasmuch as it will be dependent on foreign
factors. Although Albanian political goals, orientations and
potential cannot threaten the others, they are strong
enough to protect themselves from opponents and
enemies, with or without foreign backing. Thus,
independence of Kosovo and of many other states in the
region, who had waged the war in order to become
independent, will become a relative issue, since it seems
that interests of the key international factors in the Balkan
peninsula will take an absolute precedence. This was
amply confirmed by the denouement of the latest crisis in
the Republic of Albanian.
The most frequent error of the foreign factor was to
allow a disparity between its declared principles and
concrete interests, and to quickly change its declared
principles and decisions whenever its interests were at
stake. The Yugoslav crisis is a glaring example of such
shifting attitudes.
The aforementioned mistakes have not resulted so
much from the impossibility to thoroughly analyze the
regional crisis, but rather from the underlying interests of
international factors unable to resolve the crisis generated

both by their actions and inactions. International factors

suggest a solution which suits them, and not the one
which the very nature of the problematic Albanian-Serb
relations genuinely exacts. With this in mind my paper
aims at demystifying the errors made to date in the
aforementioned triangle, in order to facilitate an
argumentative approach enabling a genuine and just
solution to the Albanian-Serb dispute. We cannot
successfully remove causes of the aforementioned errors
if we keep proposing new, erroneous solutions to open
issues.

H. C. - Special Englis Edition, Sept. 1997)

ituation in Kosovo is fraught with potential danger of

interethnic conflict, yet to be adequately considered
by the international community. This potential conflict
could seriously threaten regional peace. The causes of
this conflict, discernible in the Balkan wars waged in early
twentieth century, still have not been removed. The main
cause of conflict is currently a continued, strong-arm
Serbia's colonization and occupation of Kosovo, that is, of
Albanian majority. Early this year the Kosovo crisis has
escalated. This escalation was characterized by a series
of politically motivated murders and bomb attacks,
commonplace features of the urban guerrilla war, until
recently unknown in Kosovo. The latest developments
underscore the importance of removing the long-standing
political impasse, as the situation might evolve into an
unwieldy confrontation. Potential escalation would in all
likelihood destabilize the entire region. Such potentially
explosive situation primarily stems from an insufficient
involvement of the international factor, that is,
unwillingness of Western powers to tackle the Kosovo
issue in a more resolute fashion. The lack of such an
essential commitment was manifest at the Dayton
Conference, which, alike some other international,
regional initiatives, skirted the Kosovo issue. The lack of
such commitment enables the continuation of the
merciless Serbian state repression.
The Serbian regime aims to break down the Albanian
strong-willed intent to achieve independence. The
repression has morphed into institutionalized ethnic
apartheid and resulted in massive and blatant violations of
human and ethnic rights of two million Kosovo Albanians.
In consequence of such repressive measures the
Albanian population in Kosovo feit existentially threatened,
which in turn caused its massive emigration mostly to
Western countries. In a decade - long rule of this Serbian
regime, an estimated 400,000 Albanians left Kosovo.
Aspirations of Albanian people, undergoing the
process of historical, social, political, ethnic and cultural
maturing, will be met only if Kosovo crisis is seriously
considered within the context of the right to seifHelsinki Charter - Special Edition

determination. Hence, a serious approach to Kosovo issue

and kick-oft of successful negotiations require full
application of independence framework and international
factor mediation. lf these prerequisites are met, a balancing
act between an expressed will of Albanian people and ciearcut international and Serbian positions on inviolability of
internationally recognized external borders of the selfproclaimed Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, could be kept
up.
Such an approach inevitably precludes the use of term
"minority" when Kosovo Albanians are concerned. This also
applied in case of the former Yugoslavia, in which the notion
'minority' had a seriously negative connotation, and an
essentially politically discriminating connotation for the
Albanians subjects. When Serbia imposed a minority status
over Albanians, it simultaneously embarked upon its most
blatant discrimination against Albanians. Since two million
Albanians from Kosovo live in 40% of compact Albanian
territory in Balkan, they cannot be treated as a minority.
Such a treatment is not permissible also in view of the size
of their population: as a constituting people of the former
Yugoslavia Albanians were the third largest nation in the
country (after Serbs and Croats.) Albanians were even
denied their right to independently decide on their internal
status, that is the status of republic within former Yugoslavia,
although such a status was enjoyed by less numerous
nations - Slovenians, Macedonians, Montenegrins and even
Muslims (who were recognized as the nation in the 70s).
Such a flagrant discrimination can be only attributed to the
fact that Albanians are a non-South Slav people. All Albanian
efforts to have a republic within multiethnic Yugoslavia were
repressed by way of the Serbian regime coercive methods,
which ultimately led to Yugoslav crisis and the forcible
break-up of the country.
This subordinate position of Kosovo Albanians is almost
century-long. In that long period only the intensity and the
scale of coercion, carried out under the pretext of
"pacification of disloyal separatist minority," varied. That is
why the term 'minority' in the minds of all Albanians is linked
with all the ills which they have experienced in the course of
this century. In this context it is worth mentioning that other
nations also experienced similar traumas. The war in the
former Yugoslavia was caused by real fear of several nations
that their state-forming status could be transformed into a
'minority' status. Such a perception is of foremost political
importance even in the resolution of the Kosovo issue,
although the terms 'minority' and 'nation' are not defined by
international law.
lt is also important to mention that the notion 'autonomy'
has a negative connotation for Albanians. They link
'autonomy,' even "the highest degree autonomy,' often
urged by the international factor, to the inferior status of
Kosovo and the past suffering of Albanian people. Any
serious political force in Kosovo should adopt a position in
relation to these terms, if it wants to be seriously backed by
the Albanian population. In that sense much more
acceptable are terms 'special status,' 'federal entity," "interim
protectorate.' .
This negative connotation of the term 'autonomy' is
strengthened when related to Serbia, a little less so, when
related to the so called Yugoslavia.
autonomy within
Serbia, even ' the highest degree one' is unacceptable for
Albanians and only intensifies radical options.
'Autonomy within federation' has a somewhat less
negative connotation. As the international factor is not

January 1999

backing the option of external borders change under the

present circumstances, a political option of Kosovo as a
republic within the FRY could be put forward. The mediation
of the third party, that is a strong international presence in
the negotiations, is of foremost importance. Albanian
consensus is that the United States shouid play the lead role
in negotiations. Rugova also demanded that America took
over the role of 'protector,' that is, the one of overseer of a
protectorate over Kosovo. Abortive implementation of the
Rugova-Milosevic Agreement on Normalization of Albanian
Language education, has strengthened the US resolve to be
the third party in the negotiations. lt is unrealistic to expect
Rugova to embark upon similar negotiations, as he was
much more adversely affected by the failure of the
Agreement than Milosevic.
The existing disharmony of the FRY is illustrated by its
three-nation (Serbs, Albanians and Montenegrins)
composition and two-unit (two republics) political
arrangement. Hence a visible incompatibility between the
national composition and constituent elements of the
federation threatens the regional stability. Such a situation
could be overcome by a relatively simple harmonization of
these components, by way of the FRY refederating to
ultimately consist of three equal republics-Serbia,
Montenegro and Kosovo. This concept is not at variance
with positions of the international community, the European
Union and the United States on inviolability of external
borders, nor is at odds with their commitment that Kosovo
be given 'the highest degree autonomy."
Although Albanians represent the second-largest nation
in the rump Yugoslavia, constitute 90% of total Kosovo
population, and outnumber Montenegrins four times, they
are still denied the status of republic in the recomposed
Yugoslavia. Aibanians are still denied the right to internally
self-determine their status within the
although this does
not pose the threat to external borders. lt is important to
stress that Albanians boast a modest statehood experience
from the 70s and 80s, when Kosovo was a constituent part
of Federation and had its direct representative in the Federal
Presidency. Kosovo has practically functioned as the other
republics of the former Yugoslavia, similarly to Serbia and
Montenegro, and wielded the veto power at a federal level.
This experience encourages Albanian aspirations to the
statehood of Kosovo. Hence no political power desirous of
better Kosovo prospects must overlook this fact. The federal
status of Kosovo was forcibly abolished at the beginning of
the crisis in former Yugoslavia, the crisis which resulted in
the break-up of the country and the bloody war.
When talking about the forcibly abolished status of
Kosovo, it bears mentioning that international law specifies
that "once acquired level of statehood and constitutional
order, which might be abrogated in emergencies, can only
be re-established at the same level, and not degraded in
other situations." The first step conducive to normalization of
Kosovo situation would be the reinstatement of its previous
legal and constitutional status. Such a step would be
accepted as a goodwill gesture and confirmation of a
serious commitment of the official Beigrade to the peaceful
denouement of the Kosovo crisis. However as a follow up
the international community must additionally guarantee the
irreversibility of such a solution.
(The author is President of Helsinki Committee for
Human Rights in Pristina) Nasa Borba, 17 March 1997
H. C. - Special Englis Edition, Sept. 1997

lt is interesting to note that the authorities often

willingly accepted the figures put forward by the
representatives of the minorities, as such claims led to the
formal reduction of the number of Albanians living in
Kosovo. Emigration from Kosovo was very intense in the
past decade, and the principal "victims" were the
minorities members.
ollowing the implementation of the peace accord and
normalization of situation in Croatia and Bosnia,
Kosovo has again emerged as a major problem.
Unfortunately Beigrade failed to treat the Kosovo issue
seriously and instead opted for measures leading to an
escalation of conflicts and aggravation of the security and
political situation. An increasing number of armed actions
by the Kosovo liberation Army, on the one hand and
repressive measures of the Serbian police forces as weil
as the new nationalistic homogenization of the Serbian
people inspired by the Kosovo myth and radicalization of
some Kosovar political parties, on the other hand are
prominent features of the current situation in Kosovo.
After abolition the autonomy of the southern province
of Serbia by dint of constitutional amendments in 1989
and consolidating his power, Milosevic's regime put the
issue on the back burner. Almost decade-long repression
and status quo led to an outbreak of violence in early
1998. The regime's lack of readiness to seriously deal with
the Kosovo problem is amply manifested by the fact that
the information on the Serbian police casualties in Kosovo
was only briefly mentioned in the prime time TV news
programmes or made public by only several lines in the
regime-controlled print media. As the focus is on the
conflict between the Kosovar and Serbian side, both
domestic and international public opinion seem to have
completely forgotten the fact that there are minorities
living in Kosovo. Beigrade occasionally manipulates this
fact by highlighting in the mass media "their opposition to
the Kosovar separatism." The latest example of this
manipulation were the Pristina "talks" of the negotiating
team of the Serbian government with representatives of
national minorities in Kosovo, initiated by the official
Beigrade. Namely after several days of waiting for the
official Kosovar representatives to take part in the talks,
they were finally attended only by representatives of the
Romany, Muslim and Turkish minorities. After the talks the
"negotiators" maintained that the said minorities backed
the official policy pursued in Kosovo.
According the last official census carried out in 1981
Kosovo had 1,584,440 inhabitants of whom there were
1,226,736 Kosovars or 77.4%, 220,947 or 13.2% Serbs,
while the national minorities made up 10% of the total
population. Then there were 58,562 Bosniaks-Muslims,
34,126 Romanies, 27,028 Montenegrins, 12,513 Turks
and 8, 718 Croats.
The official data were not accepted by the
representatives of the aforementioned nations and
minorities at the time when the census was completed, as
all of them claimed that a far !arger number of them lived
in Kosovo. In that respect the situation has not changed
much, as for example the parties representing BosniaksMuslims claim that in Kosovo, before the Bosnian war,
there were over 120,000 members of this nationality.
Representatives of the Romany parties also claims that
their number in Kosovo exceeds the official figure.

CROATS
Kosovo Croats were particularly pressurized to leave
the region. Hence of original 8,000 thousand Kosovo
Croats only 2,000 remained in the province. Croats in
Kosovo, named Janjevci, after their village, were the
autochthonous inhabitants of Kosovo, who had settled
there several centuries ago. All of them came from the
Dubrovnik area.
The largest number of Croats lived in Lipljane village
Janjevo (2.859), Sasare (1.569), Letnice (776), Vrnavolovo
(885) and Vrnez (787) in municipality Vitin. In 1991. and
1992. attacks on Croats and their property increased,
which in turn prompted their large-scale emigration. That
emigration trend continued, and now only 700 Croats live
in Kosovo. The manner of their emigration from other
Kosovo villages and their subsequent settlement in
predominantly Serb-populated areas in Croatia, indicates
that it was a planned move. For example 800 Croatian
families from Kosovo now live in Kistanja.

BOSNIAKS-MUSLIMS
NUMBER, ETHNOGENESIS AND EMIGRATION

According to the official 1981 census data there were

60,000 Bosniaks-Muslims, or 3.7%, in Kosovo. The
Kosovo Party of Democratic Action maintains that in this
province, before the crisis flared-up and a new wave of
emigration started, there were 100,000 or 120,000
Bosniaks-Muslims, making up 5% of the Kosovo
population.
According to the ethnogenesis Bosniaks-Muslims can
be divided in two groups. The first is made up by citizens
of Bosniak-Muslim nationality who had settled in Kosovo
in various periods after 1878. They all came from Bosnia,
Montenegro and Sandfak. The other group, made up of
original inhabitants, lives in Prizren region.
Bosniaks-Muslims from Sandfak and Montenegro live
in Pecko-lstocka region. They make up the majority of
inhabitants of the urban part of Pec, and the absolute
majority of the villages and settlements in the area, such
as Vitomirica, Ljubova and Dobrusa. Over 15,000
Bosniaks-Muslims live in a compact territory of a large part
of Pec municipality and the adjacent lstok municipality.
The Bosniak-Muslim urban population of Pec settled
there after the Balkan wars and the collapse of the
Ottoman empire, while Bosniaks in Vitomirica-Dobrusa
area are considered more recent settlers, as they came to
those villages from Sandfak after 1950. Bosniaks-Muslims
from Bosnia were the earliest settlers in Kosovo as they
came to the province after the Austro-Hungarian
occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1878. Their
population is concentrated in two suburbs of Kosovska
Mitrovica, the Bosniak one and Muhad:Zer one. In addition
Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

to Pec and Mitrovica Bosniaks from Sandfak and Bosnia

live in Pristina, 8akovica and other Kosovo places.
Bosniaks-Muslims continue to live in the places in
which their forefathers have settled, and they constitute
there the only population. Goranci or Torbesi live in Gora
and Dragas, in the area known as Prizrenska Z:upa or
Sredska Z:upa, while the autochthonous Bosniak-Muslim
population lives in Podgora and in Prizren. Same political
representatives of Goranci insist on the Serbian origins of
their fellow-natives and share the stance of the Serbian
regime that Kosovo Bosniaks-Muslims are Serbs of
lslamic religion. lt is interesting to note that the BosniakMuslim parties have not become popular among Goranci;
whose votes at all the recent elections went to the Serbian
Socialist Party and the Serbian Renewal Movement.
According to the reliable estimates there are at least
50,000-60,000 Bosniaks-Muslims in the Prizren area.
Due to assimilation and emigration in some parts of
Kosovo there are now less Bosniaks-Muslims that in the
past. On the eve of the W.W.11 the share of the BosniaksMuslims in total population ofl Pec was 23%, and similar
situation was in Kosovska Mitrovica. The majority of
artisans and merchants in these cities were of this
ethnicity. Now this share has fallen to 4,5%, that is 7,9%.
Quite a large number of autochthonous BosniaksMuslims used to declare themselves as Turks or
Albanians, but in recent times such cases have become
indeed rare. Bosniaks-Muslims used to hide their ethnic
identity because of the unresolved status of this nationality
under the Yugoslav constitution, which made them think
that as members of "recognized" nations they would be
safer. In early 70's all national rights were recognized to
Muslims, which encouraged Bosniaks-Muislims in Kosovo
to freely declare their ethnicity. The current legalconstitutional status of Bosniaks-Muslims in Kosovo and
in other parts of Serbia is not resolved. Legislators do not
mention them either as people/nation or national
minority/ethnic group in the FRY Constitution and in other
relevant legal acts.
Prior to the Yugoslav crisis, Bosniaks-Muslims
emigrated mainly to Turkey, but since early 90's, they
started moving to the West European countries.
According to the estimates of the Bosniak-Muslims parties
from Kosovo, 15,000 of their fellow-citizens left Kosovo at
the height of the Bosnian war. The latest escalation of
conflicts in Kosovo caused another emigration wave, as
many families in conflict-torn areas temporarily moved
their children elsewhere. More than 3,000 BosniaksMuslims left Kosovo and settled in the Montenegrin and
the Serbian part of Sandfak in the February and March
1998.
POLITICAL ORGANIZA TIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLA TIONS

The emergence of
Bosniaks-Muslims political
organizations coincided with the introduction of the
multiparty system in early 90's. The interests of this
nationality in Kosovo are currently represented by two
parties, the Democratic Action Party and the Muslim
Reform Party with the seat in Prizren.
The Democratic Action Party of Kosovo was founded
on 14 October 1990 in Pec. lts committees were founded
in other places in Kosovo and the DAP soon became the

January 1999

largest Bosniak-Muslim party in the province. Contrary to

the DAP, the Muslim Reform Party has a regional
character and indisputable influence among intellectuals.
According to the DAP's Acting President, Hilma Kandic,
advocates "a comprehensive settlement of the Kosovo
issue, including the recognition of the cultural autonomy
of Bosniaks-Muslims."
The Muslim Reform Party had one MP, Azar Zuljij, in
the first multiparty Assembly of Serbia. At the next
elections the party lost that seat, and at the last elections
the MRP list, due to allegedly incomplete data, was not
accepted.
The DAP stayed away from the Serbian elections, but
took part in the parallel elections for the Republic of
Kosovo. At the 1992 Kosovo elections the DAP won five
seats in the "Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo", and
this party, which cooperates closely with the Democratic
Alliance of Kosovo, also has its representatives in the
"Government of the Republic of Kosovo." The DAP took
part in the March elections for the Assembly of the
"Republic of Kosovo" and won one seat.
The Bosnian war had a major impact on the status of
Bosniaks-Muslims in Kosovo. Before the war the status of
this nationality was tolerable, despite constant violations
of human rights. Alike in the neighboring Sandfak the
target of the police and state repression were members
and leaders of the DAP Kosovo. But In November 1990 the
Public Prosecutor filed an indictment against Numan
Balic, President of DAP, for alleged fanning of religious
and national hatred. At the founding of the DAP committee
in Vitomirica, according to the charges brought against
him, Bali6 uttered many lies about the status of BosniaksMuslims and the Kosovo policy of the Serbian regime. In
November 1991 Numan Balic was found guilty and
sentenced to 6 month imprisonment.
In late October 1991 the DAP's Executive Committee
in Kosovska Mitrovica had a discussion on the holding of
referendum on Sandfak autonomy. At the end of meeting,
when the committee members tried to leave the town, the
police arrested the majority of the Executive Committee
members, namely the President, Secretary, and other
three members. They were released after 18 hours of
detention.
In 1992 and 1993 there were massive arrests of
activists and members of the DAP committees on
allegations that they "were in an unauthorized possession
of arms and engaged in the formation of paramilitary
units." Similar scenario crafted in Sandfak resulted in
notorious Bjelopolje and Novi Pazar trials of 45 DAP
members.
In February 1993 over 20 Bosniaks-Muslims were
detained. They were accused of "illegal possession of
arms," but due to the lack of evidence were released.
Similar action was repeated in April 1993, but then
ordinary citizens, and not party officials were detained. In
July 1993 there were also massive arrests, due to bomb
planted at the police check-point between Pe6 and
Virovitica. Thousands of citizens of predominantly
Albanian nationaiity were detained and harassed. Among
the detained there were ten Bosniaks-Muslims and
Numan Balic, DAP's President. Due to almost daily arrests
Balic left Kosovo at the end of July 1993. In late
September and early October there was another wave of

arrests of Bosniaks-Muslims, particularly in Vitomirica.

More than 100 people were arrested because of alleged
"illegal possession of arms," and among them were
Nuradin Ganic, Secretary of DAP, Ahmet Sijaric, member
of DAP's Executive Commitee and Dfafer Gutic, president
of DAP Pec. Police had "informative talks" and harassed
Hilma Kandic, President of DAP Pristina, Nazmija
Cirikovic, member of the DAP Executive Committee, but
also the DAP activists, Hasan Muri6, Ekrem Rastader, Alija
Bali6, Kadrija Musi6, Orle Musi6, Mulaz Dadrizovi6 and
others. The last wave of arrests of Bosniaks-Muslims on
grounds of "illegal possession of arms" happened in June
1995. Then 5 Bosnaiks and a group of Albanians were
arrested. One of them, a Bosniak-Muslim, Ahmet Sijartic
sentenced to 5,5 years imprisonment is still serving the
sentence.
EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM AND MEDIA

Barring a few exceptions, the majority of pupils and

students of Bosniak-Muslim nationality attend Serbianlanguage schools and faculties. The majority attend
Serbian-language schools and faculties. Most of them
complain of constant harassment, particularly by their
professors. Students of Bosniak-Muslim nationality
openly complain that educational curricula makes no
mention of Bosniak-Muslim arts and culture and are also
resentful of high examination fees. The latter are much
higher for the members of the Bosniak-Muslim people and
in some cases reach even DM 1,000.
In Kosovo there are no Bosniak-Muslim print and
electronic media, hence the members of ethnicity are
forced to watch either the state-controlled, pro-regime
media or the Albanian ones. There is only one Bosniak
paper "Selam" issued in Prizren, but it has small circulation
and negligible influence.

ROMANI ES
NUMBER, ETHNOGENESIS AND EMIGRATION

Contrary to other parts of Yugoslavia, the authorities

resolved some problems of the Kosovo Romanies. Hence
a better education and overall status of this nationality in
Kosovo. The state subsidized the founding of the first
schools, newspapers, radio and television stations
intended for the members of Romany minority. This in turn
made many members of this nationality openly declare
their ethnical identity, instead of hiding it.
Dragoljub Ackovi6, President of the Congress party of
Romanies, explains this phenomen by "the wish of the
state to distance Romanies from the majority, Albanian
people in Kosovo." According to him "the state did
everything to make the large majority of Romanies feel
good in Kosovo, to meet their fundamental nationalcultural needs. During the communist regime many
Romanies were members of the provincial bodies and
social-political workers, unlike in Vojvodina and Serbia.
The state wanted to distance Romanies from Albanians,
but has also managed to distance them from Serbs.
Thanks to their active role in political and social life of the
province Kosovo Romanies have a more marked national
awareness."

72

Romanies in Kosovo live in ethnically almest pure

settlements around Prizren, Pe6, Pristina, Kosovska
Mitrovica. According to the last census in 1991 there were
45,745 Romanies in Kosovo. Activists of Romany
organizations assume that there are in fact between
90,000 to 100,000 Romani es in Kosovo. The fact that
every second Romany in Kosovo declares himself/herself
as a Romany, contrary to every fourth citizen in other parts
of Serbia and Yugoslavia, also indicates that Kosovo
Romanies have a far strenger sense of national identity
than those elsewhere.
According to the census data there were 143,519
Romanies in the SFRY in 1991, while the Romany
Association of Yugoslavia puts that figure at 600,000700,000. Trifun Dimi6, President of Association, thinks that
the official statistics and ethnologists' findings do not
coincide because Romanies often resort to the national
and religious mimicry by declaring themselves the
members of the majority nation and predominant
confession in the milieu in which they live.
Although there are cases in Kosovo of Romanies
declaring themselves as Albanians or Serbs, in this
province we also noted the cases of Romanies declaring
themselves as Egyptians. Representatives of Association
of Egyptians in Kosovo claim that there are more than
100,000 members of this nation in the province, and that
figure coincides with the number of Romanies living in
Kosovo. Political representatives of Egyptians deny their
lndian-Romany origins and are very loyal to Beigrade and
critical of the Albanian parties.
Romanies began settling in Kosovo and in other parts
of Serbia in the fourteenth century. While Romanies in the
Central Serbia mainly speak Gurbet dialect and are
Orthodox Christians, the majority of their fellow-nationals
in Kosovo are of lslamic religion. The latter group speaks
Arlijski dialect, which is under the strong influence of the
Turkish and Albanian language.
The process of Romany emigration from Kosovo
started several decades ago and its intensity varied. The
reason for emigration was initially of economic character,
while now Romanies are moving elsewhere because of
political instability and fear of war. In the post-W.W.11
period characterized by large-scale industrial construction
of Yugoslavia, Romanies left Kosovo to work elsewhere as
a cheap labour force. The largest Romany settlements in
Sremcica, Rusanj, Zeleznik were inhabited by Romanies
when Beigrade plants started employing them as
seasonal works. Similar phenomenon occurred in other,
larger Serbian towns.
The status of Romanies in the entire FRY is
characterized by a social and educational backwardness.
The same is true of Romanies in Kosovo. This helps the
regime to easily manipulate the poor and illiterate
Romanies, who, according to the representatives of
Romany parties, give their votes to the ruling party for
such hand-outs as several kilograms of flour or two meters
of wood. Romanies oppose strongly the creation of an
independent Kosovo Republic, and the majority of them
think that in such a state, due to their backing of Serbs,
their status would worsen.
Alike the last SFRY Constitution from 1973, the new
FRY Constitution, has also accorded the status of ethic
group to Romanies. The Romany Congress Party
Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

launched a petition "Miliion signatures for Romanies"

aimed at pressurizing the state bodies to accord the
national minority status to Romanies. Serbian parties did
not render any support to this initiative, nor did the
majority of the non-governmental organizations. The
action was, however, backed by Helsinki Committee.
POUT/CAL ORGANIZA TIONS AND VIOLA TIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

According to the Romany party data and those of the

organizations for the protection of human rights, no
drastic violations of Romany human rights were noted in
Kosovo. According to Dragoljub Ackovic "there are
undoubtedly such violations, but the Romany activists
hide them." Miroslav Jovanovic, President of Democratic
Political Party of Romanies of Serbia and Yugoslavia,
claims that "the very Romanies do not want to speak
about attacks on them, fearing that if they disclose them,
they would lose the little rights they had been accorded in
Kosovo." In Kosovo there are no regional Romany parties,
while at the level of Serbia and Yugoslavia there are
officially five parties which allegedly represent the Romany
interests and citizens. The Romany Social-Democratic
Party was founded in 1991 by Rajko Djuric. Due to his
political engagement he was forced to leave the country,
and the new party leader became Muharem Alijevic.
Under his leadership the party joined the Associated
Yugoslav Left. Democratic Political Party of Romanies of
Serbia and Yugoslavia was founded in September 1990 in
Kragujevac and its leader is Miroslav Jovanovic.
Democratic Alliance of Romanies of Yugoslavia was
founded in 1992 in Aleksinac, and its President is
Dragomir Gvozdic. New Democratic Party of Romanies of
the World was founded in April 1997. lts President is
Miroslav BimbaSic. The Romany Congress Party was
founded in April 1977. lt is widely thought that it has the
best membership, and the party is headed by Dragoljub
Ackovic.
Although Romanies represent a major voters' group,
the Romany parties have no sway over the political life and
are completely marginalized. Their role is reduced to
regular participation in pre-election panel discussions.
Romanies have never actively participated in the political
life of Yugoslavia. In the Assembly of Serbia there is only
one MP of the Romany ethnicity (Ljuak Koka from the
Socialist Party of Serbia) but there are no MPs of Romany
ethnicity in the Federal Parliament. There are ethnic
Romanies in the municipal bodies in Kosovo, but all of
them are from the ranks of the Socialist Party of Serbia. lt
was also noted that the downsizing of the Kosovar
workers in many companies and plants coincided with an
increased employment of ethnic Romanies. That is, fired
Kosovars were replaced by Romany workers. However,
the latter did not stay lang in their new workplaces.
Another phenomenon is also noteworthy: the qualified
work-force keeps leaving Kosovo, while unqualified
Romany workers are simultaneously laid off.
EDUCA T/ONAL/SCHOOL SYSTEM AND THE MEDIA

As in Yugoslavia there are no Romany-language

schools, Romanies are forced to attend only Serbian
schools. Members of this nationality belang to the most
January

1999

illiterate part of the Yugoslav population, and the

percentage of illiterate Romanies exceeds 80%. There are
only a few Romanies with secondary school degree, and
there are almost no Romanies with university degree.
Large number of school drop-outs is due to extreme
poverty and also to the parental wishes, namely the
families need the help of children in order to survive. In
addition to economic reasons the low educational level of
Romanies is due to poor knowledge of language, different
lifestyle and traditional Romany disregard for education.
Dragoljub Ackovic noted that in the 80's a !arger
number of Romany children attended shools than now.
Contrary to the European trend, the number of Romany
children attending Yugoslav shools is dropping because
of the overall economic crisis. "In twenty years we shall be
classical slaves," he concluded.
In Kosovo special classes of Romany language were
introduced in some schools in 1984, but the lack of
programme, curriculum and adequate teaching statt,
reduced the effects of such classes. In the province the
first print and electronic media for Romanies were also
founded.
In Kosovo there are currently three Romany language
newspapers: "Nevipe Romani" (Romske novosti), "Rota"
(Wheel) and "Ahimsa" (Non-violence). "Nevipe Romani" is
the newspaper financed by the Ministry of Information and
its editor-in-chief is Ljuan Koka, the SPS (Socialist Party of
Serbia) MP. He is also the editor of the TV broadcast in
Romany language "Anglunipe" (Progress). "Rota" and
"Ahimsa" are private newspapers.
As all the three papers are faced with economic
problems they are issued irregularly. Along with the
"Anglunipe" broadcast, launched 12 years ago, there are
Romany language radio broadcasts in several Kosovo
towns (Prizren, Pec and Pristina). They mainly feature
entertainment and musical programmes.

TURKS
NUMBER, ETHNOGENESIS AND EMIGRATION

Although Turks are the smallest ethnic group in

Kosovo they belang to the earliest settlers in the region.
Their settlement in Kosovo began with the Turkish
occupation of this part of Serbia. After the collapse of the
Turkish rule and withdrawal of the Ottoman army the
majority of ethnic Turks left Kosovo and moved to other
parts of the current Republic of Turkey.
Massive emigration of Kosovo Turks started after the
Serb-Turkish war in 1875. A year later Turks left 700
villages in the then Lower Sandfak, which was then a part
of the territory of today's Kosovo. The exact number of
emigrants was never established. During the Balkan wars,
1912-1914, another wave of emigration occurred. 302,907
members of this nationality left Kosovo, which was then
"the liberated" part of Serbia.
According to the data presented by Turkish activists
from Kosovo, during the Kingdom ot Serbs, Croats and
Slovenians, 1918-1941, 276.489 Turks left Kosovo. As the
majority of Serbian population continued to consider
Turks " the remaining part of the occupiers' army," their
emigration process was never seriously studied. On the
other hand the very process was always encouraged by

EPORTS
Beigrade. The process of Turkish emigration was
continued in the former SFRY.
The number of emigrants has never beem established
but the Turkish activists assess that in the post-W.W.11
period 400,000 Turks left Kosovo and Serbia. Since the
beginning of the Yugoslav crisis, that is, during the wars in
Bosnia and Croatia and Kosovo unrest, according to the
assessment of the Turkish Popular Party, more than 1,000
Turks left the province.
In Kosovo today there are merely 15,000 members of
the Turkish minority. They live in Prizren and in the
neigbouring villages. In the vicinity of Prizren there are
some "pure" Turkish villages. Mamusa is one of them.
Similar villages are found in the vicinity of Gnjilane
(Dobrcan), and some ethnic Turks also live in Pristina,
capital of Kosovo.
Ethnogenesis of Turks in Kosovo is characterized by
their links to the peoples of the same religion. Turks, alike
ethnic Albanians and Bosniaks-Muslims, officially use
Turkish language. As Turks have cohabited with
Albanians and Bosniaks-Muslims for centuries, mainly
aristocratic families of these three nationalities are so
closely interrelated that sometimes it is difficult to
determine the ethnicity of their members. This
phenomenon was also boosted by the mixed AlbanianTurkish marriages, which were customary among the
higher classes during the Ottoman empire.
POLITICAL ORGANIZA TIONS AND VIOLA TIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS

Due to their small number Kosovo Turks did not

manage to set up politically important parties. Their
political engagement was often beset with divisions in proSerbian and pro-Albanian parties and the intention of the
regime to show its "care" for the members of national
minorities in Kosovo, by openly helping and supporting
the pro-regime parties and activists.
On the other hand activists of Turkish parties feel
strong antagonism towards their fellow-nationals and
colleagues who have different political. opinions. In such a
political climate it is impossible to expect the creation of a
more influential Turkish party. Formally there are three
parties of Turkish minority in Kosovo: Democratic Alliance
of Turks, Turkish Democratic Community and Turkish
Popular Party. The seats of all these parties are in Prizren.
While the first two have an allegedly pro-Serbian stance,
the third is known as taking the pro-Kosovar stand.
Democratic Alliance of Turks was founded in 1990 and it
is currently headed by Zejnelabidin Kureis. The party was
registered at the republican level, it recognizes the current
territorial order and status of Kosovo and its
representatives regularly take part in the Pristina
"negotiations" staged by the delegation of the Serbian
government. That participation was condemned by the
other Turkish parties, which also conveyed the following
message to the "negotiators: "You can represent your
party, but not the Kosovo Turks community."
Dissatisfied with the policy of its oldest national party,
Turks from Kosovo in the past few years established
Turkish Democratic Alliance and Turkish Popular Party.
While the first, headed by President Reif Krkulj is partially
distanced from the regime and Democratic Alliance of
Turks, the second one is totally distanced from both.

Turkish Popular Party is not registered in the

republican and federal register, but only in the register of
political parties of "Republic Kosovo." This party takes part
in the elections for "Republic Kosovo", and at the last
parliamentary elections in March won a seat in it.
According to one of its leaders Zijadin Sakman, the
party urges a peaceful creation of independent Kosovo.
Turkish Popular Party demands no special autonomy for
Kosovo Turks, but rather "equal rights for all citizens and
peoples of Kosovo". Sezeir Saip, the official representative
of this party, because of such stands was often detained
and harassed by the police. Due to his alleged role in the
creation of paramilitary formations two years ago Saip was
sentenced to three years of prison. He served only one
year in prison, and then left Yugoslavia. He is currently a
political exile in England.
Representatives of Turkish parties claim that apart
from the customary and general violations of human
rights, no drastic and blatant violations of human rights of
their ethnicity were registered. "We were not subjected to
any abnormal pressures, "says Zijadin Sakman, barring a
case of several policemen of Turkish ethnicity who were
fired, together with their Kosovar colleagues in early 90's.
Subsequently some of them were charged with
"associating in order to carry out hostile activities."
Political representatives assess favorably the stand of
Turkey towards the representatives of the Turkish minority
in Kosovo. The official Ankara does not back the
emigration of Turks and their resettlement in the
"homeland," but expresses great concern over the status
of Turks in Kosovo.
EDUCATIONAL SYSTEM AND THE MEDIA

The network of predominantly Turkish-language

primary schools is fairly developed, but representatives of
this minority are dissatisfied with the quality of lessons and
programmes and also complain of shortage of textbooks.
The official, republican programmes are applied in those
schools, although the classes are held in Turkish
language and translated textbooks are used.
There is also regular TV and radio programmes in
Turkish language. All these programmes are of proregime character since they are broadcast by the Radio
Television Serbia. The state finances the Turkish-language
weekly "Tan." There are no private Turkish-language
media in Kosovo.
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Although it is difficult to generalize the stands of each

social group it is noticeable that the politically national
minorities in Kosovo are tacitly divided in the pro-Serbian
and and pro-Kosovar groups. While Romanies belang to
the first group, and Bosniaks-Muslims to the second,
Turks take a neutral stand towards both Serbs and
Kosovars. Division into "our" and "their" minorities makes
for a somewhat better treatment of "loyal" Romanies and a
part of Turks.
More equitable treatment of all the minorities must be
first initiated on the information front by "liberation" of the
existing media for Romanies and Turks and the creation of
the media intended for the Bosniaks-Muslims. Although
Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

the state must play a major role in this, private print and
electronic media must be also created in Kosovo.
Putting an end to the armed conflicts and actions
easing of tension and the commencement of a seriou~
negotiations on Kosovo are basic prerequisites for the
settlement of accumulated problems in this province. The
Serb-Albanian dialogue between the representatives of
the official Beigrade and Kosovo Albanians on the status
of Kosovo is the only possible way out from the Kosovo
crisis. But within the framework of such negotiations the
problems of national minorities in Kosovo should be also
handled.
Although national minorities make up only 10% of
population, representatives of national minorities must be
included in the serious process of decision-making
related to the Kosovo issue.
In other words minorities should become active
participants in this process of of decision-making instead
of being used as vehicles for eliminating the Albanian
separatism. Albanian political parties, on the other hand,
must accept the existence of other nations in Kosova and
recognize them officially by taking a public stand on the
status and rights of non-Albanian population of Kosovo.
In the current climate of mutual intolerance and nonexistence of the genuine opposition, above all on the
Serbian side, the settlement of Kosovo issue and
regulation of status of Kosovo is not possible without
direct participation or mediation of international
community. The establishment of the permanent OSCE
monitoring mission in Kosov, debate on the Kosovo
problem in the European institutions and in the UN
Security Council are necessary steps in that direction.
International representatives should also attach
greater attention to the status of national minorities in
Kosovo. lf that does not happen, emigration waves similar
to the. one of Kosovo Croats might be expected. By
extens1on these large-scale emigration waves could have
serious consequences and cause numerous casualties.
May 1998

January

1999

Albanians are the largest non-Serb ethnic group in the

Republic of Serbia but their territorial distribution (Kosovo,
several south Serbian municipalities) is such that they
have the majority across those territories. The number of
Albanians in Serbia is largely disputable today because
they boycotted the population census of 1991. The
census of 1981 showed that there were 1,226,736
Albanians in Kosovo. The projections for 1991, that
is 1994, ranged between 1,750,000 and 1,930,000 (cf.
Shvidi Hivzi lsllami, Rrjedha demografike shquiptare,
Dukagjini 1994, p. 55). Albanians also live in three
municipalities in Southern Serbia (Presevo, Bujanovac,
Medvedja) and various towns and cities in Serbia
and Vojvodina; their estimated number in Serbia is
between 1,850,000 and 2,030,000. Because of their
geographical distribution and the total number, lbanians
believe that they are not a minority but rather a constituent
people, which the Yugoslav authorities refuse to
ad mit.

LEGAL STATUS
Ever since its integration into Serbia after the Balkan
Wars (1912-1913) and the constitution of the first
Yugoslavia (1918), the status of Kosovo and the status of
Albanians in a state where Serbs, associated with other
Yugoslav peoples, were a majority population, have been
a constant source of conflict and instability. In the first
Yugoslavia, Albanians were generally denied their ethnic
rights, and in the second, communist Yugoslavia (19451991) the Albanian problem in Yugoslavia and Serbia was
"solved" through various models of autonomy, from the
status of an autonomous region (1945) as a combination
of the cultural autonomy and some forms of limited
territorial and political autonomy to the highest-degree
auto~omy (Constitution of 1974) when it was only
nominally an autonomous province within Serbia,
whereas in fact it had all the state prerogatives and
functioned as one of 8 federal units of the so-called postBrioni Yugoslavia.
'.he Kosovo Assembly enjoyed high autonomy and
the nght of veto at the federal and republican level. in the
1970s and 1980s tendencies grew stronger in Kosovo to
have it recognised as the Republic of Kosovo, a federal
unit
of Serbia, with the right to secede. After
massive Albanian demonstrations in 1981, requesting the
of Kosovo, Serbia launched a forceful campaign
a rebellion of Kosovo Serbs and a largescale nationalistic movement across Serbia for the
annulment of the Constitution of 974, with a view to
restri.cting the Kosovo
and reintegrating it in
Serb1a. Beigrade realised these objectives in 1989 and
first
insistent and forcible amendments to
the Kosovo and Serbian constitutions, and then, in June
and
1
the introduction of "provisional
of the
and
Autonomous Province of Kosovo.

These measures are in force to this day. What it practically

meant was that Kosovo was placed under Belgradee s
direct administrative and military control.
Albanians were against those changes. On 2 June
1990 Albanian delegates in the Assembly of Kosovo first
pronounced the Declaration of lndependence of Kosovo,
and then, at a meeting in Kacanik on 7 July 1990,
promulgated the Constitution of the Republic of Kosovo.
In September 1991 they held a referendum on
independence, and in May 1992 held the elections for the
president of the Republic of Kosovo and its multi-party
parliament.
lt conduced to a specific parallel system of power, in
which, alongside the Serbian emergency administration,
there are also fragments of a "state within a state",
controlled by the Albanian majority. Although the
Government of the Republic of Kosovo resides abroad,
and the parliament elected in 1992 was never constituted,
the Albanians organised themselves and created their
parallel society and institutions, such as, for instance,
complete Albanian schooling system, a network of party
organisations, acting in the interests of the Albanian
population, a relatively independent media system, selffinancing system, elements of independent economic and
health care systems, independent cultural institutions and
republican and town sports leagues.
SCHOOUNG SYSTEM AND EDUCATION

Until 1990-1991 Kosovo had an autonomous

schooling system. Only certain things, such as,
for instance, plans and curricula, were co-ordinated with
the Republic and the Federation. All schooling-related
rights and duties rested with the then Assembly of the SAP
Kosovo, that is the relevant ministry in the Government of
SAP Kosovo. In 1990, after the Declaration of
lndependence, adopted by the Assembly of Kosovo on 2
July, and the subsequent decision of the Serbian
Assembly on the abolition of the Kosovo Assembly and
Government, the relations changed drastically. The
Serbian
authorities
decided
not
only
to
abolish the autonomy of the Albanian schooling system,
but also to completely suppress and abolish it as such. In
January 1990 laws were passed "regulating" the
educational system of Kosovo. New curricula were
adopted, drastically affecting the contents of a
number of subjects relative to the Albanian culture and
history. Linder the new curricula, the instruction in
Albanian history was only a supplement to the Serb and
South Slavic history. Of 244 history instruction units, only
17 addressed the Albanian history. In June 1990
secondary schools began to be shut down gradually
(general education secondary schools in Pristina, Kosovo
Polje, Kamenica, Malisevo, Kacanik, Orahovac, Suva
Reka, Dragas and Decani, secondary vocational schools
in Urosevac, Mitrovica and Djakovica etc. In August 1991
the Serbian Ministry of Education decided to dismiss
about 6000 teachers from Albanian official secondary
schools.
The secondary school buildings were taken over by
the authorities, thus effectively prohibiting their work.
Teachers and professors of the Albanian part of the
University were dismissed and the building taken over at
about the same time. Only a symbolical number of

Albanian tutors remained and although the abolition was

not officially announced, the Albanian part of the
University was abolished and ceased to exist for the
official authorities. Funds stopped arriving for primary
schools, and between September 1991 and the spring of
1992 school buildings were closed to Albanian pupils so
that the Albanian part of the school system went all but
dead between September 1991 and January 1992. During
that period of time the Albanian educational authorities
decided to reactivate the system and work under
emergency conditions.
Since the suspension of Kosovo autonomy the
Albanian schooling system has been operating under very
difficult conditions, as a "parallel" system, separated from
the state, and subsisting owing to self-organisation and
self-financing. According to data collected in 1995, the
Albanian schooling system comprises 185 pre-school
classes with 5,291 pupils, 418 primary (8-year) schools
with some 312,000 pupils, 65 secondary schools with
56,920 pupils, 2 specialised schools for handicapped
children with several hundred pupils, and 20 faculties and
colleges with about 12,200 students. There are some
23,000 teachers, professors and auxiliary administrative
and technical statt. The parallel system incorporates a
number of educational institutions, the administration
responsible for text-book publication and professional
associations and teacherse trade unions.
Albanian pupils and students use alternative and
adapted space, mostly in private houses, largely
inadequate for instruction purposes. The Serbian regime
has made a concession and allowed most primary
schools to reopen and continue their work. Nevertheless,
these schools are still a part of the parallel system. The
Serbian State has no financial obligations towards
institutions with instruction in Albanian, nor does it
concern itself with their equipment, maintenance or
heating.
Although the parallel schooling system in Albanian is
tolerated on the whole, there is omnipresent selective
police repression, school principals and teachers are
arrested and harassed, documentation is seized,
instruction interrupted and the like.
At the London Peace Conference tal!<s were
conducted between the Government and the Kosovo
educational authorities about the legalisation of the
Albanian schooling system. The negotiations went on for
ten months and did make a progress, but then were
abruptly discontinued after the fall of Milan Panices
government (1993), largely because Serbia refused the
mediation of the Geneva Conference on Yugoslavia,
deeming that it would conduce to the internationalisation
of the Kosovo question.
In 1996 the negotiations continued with the mediation
of a Catholic mission (St Egidio) from Rome, resulting in
the agreement between the President of Serbia Slobodan
Milosevic and the leader of Kosovo Albanians, Dr lbrahim
Rugova, and envisaging unconditional normalisation of
the Albanian schooling, while the details thereof await
solution by a special commission. The agreement was
reached owing to the mutual acceptance of a compromise
clause that the normalisation of the Albanian schooling
should not anticipate the future political status of Kosovo
in any way.
Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

Albanians need relatively large funds to finance their

parallel education. They are ensured through the socalled 3% parallel tax in Kosovo, levied also on Albanian
migrants in Western countries. The Kosovo governmentin-exile set up a national fund, whilst the levying of the
"national tax" in Kosovo is the concern of the so-called
Financing Committee. The Government and the Financing
Committee cover principal expenditures of the parallel
education. According to unofficial sources, the
government provides about 30% of the funds, and the
remainder is covered from Kosovo sources. Precise
information about the cost of the parallel schooling
system, however, has never been made public. lt is
certain only that at times it was very difficult to find funds
for the teacherse remuneration and other expenses.
According to some calculations, the minimum annual
budget of the parallel schooling system in Kosovo totals
about USO 45 to 50 million, but it is assumed that in
reality a little less than a half of this amount is spent: 20 to
25 million.
Whether the Rugova-Milosevic agreement will mean
corresponding financial obligations of the Serbian State
towards the Albanian schooling system, since Albanians
are Serbian tax-payers, remains to be seen. The protests
after the rigging of local elections in Serbia have delayed
the implementation of the agreement.
POLITICAL LIFE

Since 1990, when the Serbian Assembly suspended

the Kosovo autonomy, and the Assembly of Kosovo
proclaimed the Republic of Kosovo as a counter-measure,
the Albanians have been refusing to participate in the
political life in Serbia and Yugoslavia. They
boycotted all local, republican and federal elections held
meanwhile. The Albanian political parties, led by the ruling
Democratic Alliance of Kosovo (DSK) and the so-called
Co-ordinating Committee which brings together 5 largest
Kosovo parties (DSK, Parliamentary Party of Kosovo,
Agrarian Party of Kosovo, Albanian Christian Democratic
Party of Kosovo, Social Democratic Party of Kosovo) hold
that Kosovo is under occupation and that any form of
participation in the political life of the Republic of Serbia
and FR Yugoslavia is out of the question. In May 1992
"parallel" elections were held in Kosovo for the Parliament
of the Republic of Kosovo, alongside presidential
elections. Most seats elected directly were won by DSK
(96 out of 100), and the remaining seats contested on the
basis of the proportional system (44) were won by: PPK
(liberals) 12, Agrarian party 7, Christian Democrats 7,
Social Democrats 1 (in coalition with PPK), Party of
Democratic Action of Kosovo (Muslims in coalition with
DSK) 2, independent candidates 2. The remaining 13
seats are reserved for representatives of the Kosovo Serb
minority who did not take part in the elections. As regards
the presidential elections, the only candidate was Dr
lbrahim Rugova who won 99% of votes. The constituent
session of the Parliament of Kosovo and the inauguration
of the President of the Republic were to take place in
Medresa in Pristina on 20 July 1992, but the Serbian
police prevented the gathering.
There was heated debate as to whether the
constituent parliamentary session should be held
whatever the cost. Those who thought that one should not
January

1999

provoke the aggravation of the situation, prevailed. In May

1996, when the term of office of deputies elected in 1992
expired, President lbrahim Rugova issued a presidential
decree, extending their term of office for another year.
The Kosovo political parties decided not to take part in
the local and federal elections in Serbia and Yugoslavia (3
November 1996), holding that the Kosovo status needed
to be solved first.
Unlike the Kosovo parties, Albanian parties acting in
South Serbian municipalities (Presevo, Bujanovac,
Medvedja, with Albanian majority) and Albanian parties in
the Republic of Montenegro, decided to participate in the
local, republican and federal elections and won the local
elections.
CuLTURAL LIFE

For the most part, the cultural life in Kosovo follows

the parallel line of non-participation. Since 1990, the
Serbian authorities have substantially restricted and
precluded Albanian institutionalised culture. Although
they affirmed that the purpose was only the abolition of
the state prerogatives of the Kosovo autonomy and that
the cultural autonomy would not be abolished, they
applied drastic discriminatory measures to the Albanian
culture. In addition to prohibiting radio and television
programmes in Albanian, and restricting the press in
Albanian, the Serbian administration in Kosovo took steps
which conduced to the complete eradication of the
Albanian culture in Kosovo. In all institutions of culture,
such as the National and University Libraries of Kosovo,
Kosovofilm, the Museum of Kosovo, the National Theatre
of Kosovo, the Kosovo Art Gallery, Kosovo Cultural
Centre, Kosovo Cultural-Educational Community, Kosovo
Archives, the Institute of Albanology in Pristina, the
Academy of Sciences and Arts of Kosovo, the Institute for
Textbook Publication in Kosovo, Rilindja Publishing
House, discriminatory measures were taken, prohibiting
their work or radically "cleansing" them of Albanian
professionals and artists so that the institutionalised
Albanian culture in Kosovo ceased to exist. Save for the
Albanian Drama attached to the Theatre in Pristina,
managed by Serbian emergency directors since 1990,
Albanian artists have no access to any cultural institution
nor a say in cultural programmes.
The Serbian administration has discontinued almest
all funding of the Albanian culture although it diligently
levies culture dues. The Kosovo Academy of Sciences
and Arts was prohibited and its offices were taken away,
and the Institute of Albanology, even if not officially
abolished, was deprived of the building which it owns. Art
galleries and concert halls cannot be hired by Albanian
artists even on market terms because the executive posts
in cultural institutions are held by radical Serb nationalists;
Only of late, managers of cultural centres and other halls
have begun to permit their lease for concerts of popular
music with Albanian performers. Meanwhile, Albanians
have opted for self-organised forms of cultural activities:
concerts are held in churches and medresas, exhibitions
are organised in restaurants and pizzerias, private
publishing flourishes, cultural fora and book promotions
are organised, theatre life has moved to small institutions,
such as DodonaTheatre in Pristina. Cultural activities are
funded by private donors and sponsors.

Almost all publishers are private. Rilindja, which was

the chief publisher once (about 150 books per year), now
is all but dead. Private publishers such as Dukagjini in Pec
and Gjon Buzuku in Pristina are now in the lead. Dodona
Theatre in Pristina can work owing to a private firm FTD
(Fil,Teatar Dizajn). The only private art gallery in Kosovo is
Rada in Prizren. The major part of noteworthy cultural
activities in Kosovo in recent years were sponsored by the
Office of the Soros Foundation in Pristina, currently
operating under the name of the Fund for Open Society.
MEDIA

During the transition Kosovo media suffered radical

restriction both in terms of their quantity and their quality.
Since the summer of 1990 (The Suspension Law in the
Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia No. 33/90 of 5
July 1990) the Serbian authorities have largely destroyed
the autonomous media system in Albanian. Albanian
desks in Radio and TV Pristina and six local radio stations
(Kosovska
Mitrovica,
Pec,
Urosevac,
Gnjilane,
Prizren, Djakovica) are prohibited. The only Albanian daily
Rilindja is also prohibited. About 1300 journalists and
other staff in Albanian media lost their jobs.
RADIO AND TELEVISION

Radio and television are completely controlled by

RTS. As of 5 July 1990, the Albanian television and radio
network (RTV Pristina and local stations in !arger towns)
have been shut down and there is no possibility to replace
them at least in part by some smaller alternative and
private RTV network. The Serbian state television and
radio have full monopoly in Kosovo. Not one application
for a frequency, including a commercial one, has been
granted. The project for a commercial radio station Retina,
a private Pristina company owned by a former TV Pristina
editor-in-chief, for instance, has been waiting for a
frequency and work permit for three years.
To sustain the semblance of bilingual programmes,
the Serbian state television and radio have hired small
teams of Albanians to prepare news, music and films
subtitled in Albanian. These programmes are strictly
controlled and are purely propagandistic. Their ratings are
very low and their role small. Even musical programmes
and films do not attract much attention because they are
not suited to the present tastes and expectations of the
Albanian public. Basically, one may say that, after six
years, Albanians continue to boycott the state radio and
television, broadcast from Pristina and the local radio
network.
SATEWTE ALTERNATIVE

Meanwhile, Albanians have turned to the Albanian

Radio-Television (RTSH). In those parts of Kosovo which
receive its programmes directly (Prizren, Djakovica, Pec),
it has become the principle source of information. In other
parts of Kosovo where its programmes are jammed
by RTS Channel II (Pristina, Kosovska Mitrovica,
Urosevac, Gnjilane.), owing to a large number of satellite
dishes, the Albanian Television can be watched from
18:00 to 20:30 daily. RTSH broadcasts daily at 18:30 a 15minute news programme, devoted exclusively to Kosovo,
and its prime time news programme at 20:00 features
main news items from Kosovo. During the week, RTSH

satellite programme broadcasts also other special

programmes for Kosovo viewers (and Albanian migrants
in Western Europe). Needless to say, news and other
Radio Tirana programmes enjoy high ratings as well.
Other important alternative information sources are
the Voice of America, BBC and Deutsche Welle in
Albanian, and RFI and Radio Free Europe in Serbian.
They have their correspondents in Pristina and offer daily
a lot of information about developments in the region and
in Kosovo.
PRINTED MEDIA

Since 1990 only some press continued to come out

under very difficult conditions. Having lost state subsidies,
media turned to alternative financing sources. In 1990 and
1991, when the press was liberalised in the former
Yugoslavia, many private papers were started in
Kosovo, but most went of business in no time. Those
worth mentioning are the weekly Koha, editor-in-chief
Veton Suroi; fortnightly Epoka, editor-in-chief Migjen
Kelmendi (autumn 1990), weekly Ora, editor-in-chief
Mehmet Kraja (November 1990-summer 1991); paper
Dielli, editor-in-chief Jusuf Ferizi (intermittently 19901991 ). Similar was the fate of some private media projects
in Serbian. The weekly Lider survived for a few months
only. Unsteady financing affected their circulation, then
young
and
educated
people
left
the
country, and the inflation, especially in 1993 and 1994,
destroyed the market, which was small anyway. Under the
circumstances, only papers which succeeded to maintain
their quality and an adequate level of political topicality
survived as they managed to secure permanent foreign or
domestic sponsors.
DAJUES

Rilindja, the chief daily in Albanian, prohibited in

August 1990, continues tobe published by the same desk
under alias Bujku (Farmer, editor-in-chief Avni Spahiu),
but with much reduced circulation and number of pages.
lts price is prohibitive (2 dinars) because of high printing
costs. The status of Bujku, that is Rilindja, has not been
solved since the Assembly of Serbia decided to shut down
the former large socialist publishing media hause Rilindja
and establishment of a new state company called
Panorama, controlled by the editor of Jedinstvo, the daily
in Serbian. After the hunger strike of Rilindja and the
weekly Zeri journalists (May-June 1993) and the mediation
of the then still present Permanent OESC Mission in
Kosovo, a compromise solution was found, so that the
paper could be printed without strictly defining the
ownership, provided the Rilindja desk paid the rent for the
building it used to own once. Needless to say, it must also
pay for other services (its former printing hause,
telephones etc.). The paper is not subject to censorship
but the printing and distribution are under permanent
control. lt survives owing to the publication of two
separate foreign editions in Switzerland and Tirana, which
are relatively profitable (especially the Swiss edition), and
donations. Bujku (Rilindja) has kept the monopoly as the
only daily in Kosovo, but it is believed that it is fully
controlled by the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo, the main
political force on the Albanian political stage. lt has lost
much of its former quality, and internal censorship and
Helsinki Charter - Special Edition

REPORTS
one-sided approach to political and cultural events are
evident, testifying to the dominant DSK policy. Bujku
(Rilindja) continues as a paper which is intolerant and
aggressive towards different opinions and more flexible
and open treatment of current political, social and cultural
problems. Although during the critical period (1993 and
1994) it received help from the Soros Foundation (70
tonnes of paper), towards the end of 1994 and in 1995 it
launched a campaign against the Soros Foundation, a
typical reaction of media controlled by xenophobic and
autistic political circles.
In 1995 and 1996 there were attempts, or rather ideas,
to start another, competitive, daily in Kosovo. Under the
present conditions, however, it would be a costly and
highly uncertain project as the normal market conditions
are lacking. Nonetheless, this gave rise to a
competitive daily in Albanian in Western Europe. Agim
Mala, former manager of the Pristina Television and
former publisher of the weekly Zeri in Switzerland, and a
group of Albanian businessmen started a newspaper Bota
sot. lts staff are in Pristina and it is evident that
thought is given to its Kosovo edition. lt is curious that in
early September the police broke into its offices, otherwise
regularly registered, and seized all computer and other
equipment.
Note should also be made of a daily in Serbian:
Jedinstvo. lt comes out in a small number of copies and is
conceived as a combination of a Tanjug bulletin and local
news and comments. The editorial policy is pro-regime,
following the SPS line. As regards the Kosovo
question, it advocates largely the most radical and
extreme chauvinistic views.
WEEKLIES

Two noteworthy weeklies in Kosovo, Zeri and Koha

are faced with a similar situation as the daily Bujku
(Rilindja).
Zeri, the Albanian political weekly (editor-in-chief
Bardh Hamzaj) has not regulated its legal status with
Panorama, which usurped its former property, but there is
a compromise agreement to print and register the
company as an independent publisher. In point of fact,
Zeri is also registered as a publisher of a daily but it lacks
funds and outside help for such a project. lt addresses
topical, often even "hot" political issues, notably the
Balkan crisis and the Kosovo question (about 80% of its
pages), and the rest is devoted to cultural
events. lt is largely independent, but so far, in the internal
political strife on the Kosovo political stage, it was more
inclined to lbrahim Rugova, DSK leader, than to his
opponents (Qosja, Demaqi). lt cultivates the pluralism of
opinions, with a leaning to moderate thinking. Of late, it
has managed to bring together otherwise intransigent
adversaries (e.g. Qosja and Agani, offering them regular
columns on its pages).
In 1995 it suffered a rather severe crisis when Agim
Mala in Switzerland blackmailed the statt, wanting them to
embrace his concept of a daily and having failed in this, he
took over the complete publication of the weekly under a
different name, Euro-Zeri and with a different desk,
preventing then the distribution of the Pristina Zeri, which
continued to print its foreign edition in Tirana. Zeri
survived owing to good sales in Kosovo (average

January 1999

circulation about 6,000) and help of foreign foundations

(notably Soros Foundation).
Koha is a private and independent weekly (editor-inchief Veton Suroi), modelled on prestigious foreign news
magazines. One can find in it current news from the
former Yugoslavia (received largely through AIM agency)
and the world politics. lt cultivates the values of the civil
society and is in opposition to the Democratic Alliance of
Kosovo and lbrahim Rugova. lt sells some 2,000 copies in
Kosovo, but has also its foreign edition, printed in
Macedonia and distributed in Western Europe. lt is selffinanced, has proceeds from advertising and uses foreign
donations, notably Soros Foundation.
In May 1996, the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo
decided to launch again the weekly Ora, whose first series
appeared in 1990. The weekly is edited by a team heading
the Kosovo Information Centre, headed by Enver Maloku.
lt is a party propaganda bulletin, which sees it as its duty
to defend the political course of lbrahim Rugova in Kosovo
and Sali Berisha in Albania.
Other political papers worth mentioning are the
weekly Fjala Jone, which plays a small role and which is
suspected of surviving owing to "suspicious "funds.
namely it is suspected that it is supported by JUL or the
Serbian government. Although these suspicions are not
corroborated, the fact remains that its editoriai policy is
poor, sales are low and it nevertheless continues to come
out, although at increasingly regular intervals.
lt is interesting to note that a number of entertainment
publications appeared (pop and folk music, sports,
ladiese and erotic magazines, puzzies, supplements for
the young, such as Tung and Postpesimisti, literary
magazines) which, as a rule survived for a few months,
and then shut down mostly because of the same
difficulties which beset publishers of the leading political
media, but which, in addition to tradition, have also their
alternative distribution networks, some proceeds from
advertising and considerable donations.

GENERAL ASSESSMENT OF THE LBANIAN PRESS STATUS

In terms of the concept and orientation, the Albanian

press in Kosovo is in a paradoxical situation. lt is free in
relation to the Serbian regime, which it is harshly critical
of, disputing it and openly advocating independent
Kosovo or union with Albania. lt is not, however, quite free
in relation to the so-called parallel Albanian authority in
Kosovo (Albanians perceive it as the legitimate authority),
out to
establish
its
monopoly over
setting
information and whenever an opportunity presents itself,
introduce censorship or quiet suppression of the pluralism
of opinions. In relation to the Albanian press, the Serbian
regime adheres to the motto: maximum "tolerance" of
opinion, minimum tolerance of the right to exist. lt has
prohibited hat and fast media (TV and radio), but allows
some press, which has a much smaller mobilisation
power. The Serbian regime, however, keeps the Albanian
press under control and can suppress it at any time.

From Helsinki Committee's

1996 Annual Report on Human Rights in Serbia

79

Publications

of the Helsinki Co mittee for H11man Rights in Serbia

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Kosovo:
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