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On: 04 February 2013, At: 20:10
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered
office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
To cite this article: Lana Trick & Albert N. Katz (1986): The Domain Interaction Approach to Metaphor
Processing: Relating Individual Differences and Metaphor Characteristics, Metaphor and Symbolic
Activity, 1:3, 185-213
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1207/s15327868ms0103_3
Katz, 1982), or varying the context in which the metaphor is presented (e.g.,
McCabe, 1983).
These research traditions for the most part have progressed independently
of one another. Clearly this separation is inappropriate. The meaning of metaphors is neither "in" the words nor "in" the people. The interpretation that a
person gives a metaphor, and the degree of appreciation a person has for a
metaphor, will depend in part on the characteristics of the metaphor and on
the characteristics of the person. What is needed are analyses that relate individual abilities to the relationship between metaphor characteristics and metaphor ratings, done in the spirit of the aptitude treatment interaction research (Cronbach & Snow, 1977). This was attempted in our study.
The ability variable studied in our research was analogic reasoning. This
variable is particularly germane since a major approach to the study of metaphors assumes that, in metaphor comprehension, people find or create a similarity between conceptuaIly disparate items in a fashion similar to how analogical relationships are inferred. Indeed, according to Aristotle (cited in
Sternberg, 1982), metaphors are a form of analogy. Though there has been
some research on the relationship between analogic reasoning and metaphor
(Pollio & Smith, 1980; Tourangeau & Sternberg, 1981), none of it has been
very successful. For this reason, it was deemed important that analogic reasoning be examined in our study.
One of the most sophisticated theories of metaphor processing, Sternberg's domains interaction theory (Sternberg, 1982), is based on the notion
that metaphors are implicit analogies, and that metaphor processing proceeds in a manner similar to that observed in processing analogies, The domains interaction theory was investigated in our study. The major test of the
model, performed by Tourangeau and Sternberg (1981), investigated both
the effects of metaphor characteristics and the effect of individual differences on metaphor comprehension and appreciation. Unfortunately, the individual difference aspect of Tourangeau and Sternberg's study failed to provide the expected convergent support for the theory. We modify and extend
the basic Tourangeau and Sternberg methodology in order to better examine
the role of individual differences. Before describing our design, a review of
the domains interaction theory is in order.
DOMAINS INTERACTION THEORY
According to the domains interaction theory, metaphor involves the correlation of two systems of concepts from diverse domains (or categories). For
example, consider the metaphor "The Ayatollah Khomeini is a praying mantis." In this metaphor the object being described (i.e., the metaphor's tenor),
the Ayatollah Khomeini, from the domain of world leaders, is compared to
an object (i.e., the metaphor's vehicle), a praying mantis, from the domain of
insects. The model works as follows: The domain of the vehicle (insects)
serves as a template through which the domain of the tenor (world leaders) is
viewed. A common within-domain factor is found that gives a sense of the
relative position of tenor and vehicle within their respective domains. In the
example, the common within-domain factor could be "aggression" because
aggression is a factor relevant for mantises that differentiates some world
leaders from others. Both similarity and dissimilarity are important in metaphor processing according to the model: the similarity between relative positions of tenor and vehicle within their respective domains and the dissimilarity between the domains.
Implicit in this account of metaphor are assumptions about how items are
represented within domains and how domains are represented relative to one
another. Two assumptions are made about the nature of these representations (Sternberg, Tourangeau, & Nigro, 1979). First, it is assumed that information can be represented by means of a multidimensional feature space that
is much like Euclidean space. Concepts are represented in terms of points
in this semantic space in which each dimension represents some graded characteristic of the concept. To use a simple example, the concept "praying mantis" could be represented as a point on a plane with two dimensions, one dimension corresponding to aggression and the other corresponding to beauty.
Concepts that are similar are closer together in semantic space. Consequently, the representation for "butterfly" is closer to the representation
for "moth" than it is to the one for "praying mantis" because butterflies are
more similar to moths than mantises with respect to both aggression and
beauty.
Second, it is assumed that semantic space is organized into different levels
of abstraction (orders). High-order spaces map onto lower order subspaces.
Lower order spaces are points embedded within a high-order space. The
higher order space "animal" might contain points embedded in it representing the lower order subspaces "birds," "mammals," and "insects." Similarly, the space "insects" might contain points in it representing the still lower
order subspaces "mantises," "moths," and "butterflies." Thus, just as butterfly and moth can be seen as more similar to one another than either is to a
mantis, at a higher order space the concept domains of birds and mammals
might be represented as more similar than either is to insects.
The domains interaction theory implies that understanding metaphor involves the same component processes that a number of other inductive tasks
require; most specifically, the processes involved in comprehending analogy
(cf. Sternberg, 1977a, 1977b). The processes involved in metaphor comprehension are as follows:
1. Tenor and vehicle are encoded.
2. Domains of the tenor and vehicle are inferred.
3. Structures to be seen as parallel are inferred.
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4. The correspondence between these structures is mapped between domains of the tenor and vehicle.
5. The tenor and vehicle of the metaphor are compared and the match is
evaluated.
In the example, "The Ayatollah Khomeini is a praying mantis," the tenor (the
Ayatollah Khomeini) and the vehicle (praying mantis) are "found" in semantic space (encoded). Next, the relevant domains are found. The Ayatollah
Khomeini is found in the domain of world leaders, whereas praying mantis is
found in the insect's domain. Dimensions or characteristics of the tenor and
vehicle that are likely to be relevant are chosen next. This involves constraining the possible dimensions the tenor and vehicle could share to those
that would give a sense of their relative positions within their respective domains. Of course, if the characteristics of the tenor are not known, people
will no doubt employ dimensions that give a sense of the relative position of
the vehicle within its domain (Sternberg, 1982). Similarly, if the characteristics of the vehicle are not known, people may resort to dimensions relevant to
the tenor when trying to understand the metaphor. Regardless, a candidate
within domain factor is found, if possible. Next, the relative standing of the
vehicle compared to its domain on this factor is mapped onto the domain of
world leaders. The relative positions of the Ayatollah Khomeini and praying
mantises are compared with respect to the dimension "aggression." If the
subspaces of the two domains were superimposed, points for the Ayatollah
Khomeini and mantises would lie very close to each other - they are similar in
that respect. Finally, the correspondence between tenor and vehicle is
evaluated.
Two parameters of metaphor structure are relevant, between-domain distance (the dissimilarity of the categories to which the tenor and vehicle belong) and superimposed within-domain distance (the dissimilarity between
tenor and vehicle on the relevant dimensions that the categories share).
Sternberg predicted that comprehension of metaphors would be facilitated
when either between-domain or within-domain distances are minimized.
Hence, it was expected that a metaphor such as "The Ayatollah Khomeini is a
falcon" would be better understood than "The Ayatollah Khomeini is a Spitfire," because birds are thought to be more similar to humans than are aircraft. In this example, between-domain distances are minimized. Also, metaphors such as "The Ayatollah Khomeini is a praying mantis" would be better
understood than "The Ayatollah Khomeini is a butterfly," because the Ayatollah Khomeini and mantises are perceived as more similar on the relevant
dimension "aggression" than the Ayatollah Khomeini and butterflies. In
"The Ayatollah Khomeini is a praying mantis," the superimposed withindomain distance is minimized.
Appreciation of metaphors was also predicted to be enhanced when superimposed within-domain distances are minimized. However, appreciation
was predicted to be improved when the between-domain distances are relatively large. Presumably, a pleasurable shock is produced when two highly
incongruous terms are juxtaposed. Hence, the metaphor "The Ayatollah
Khomeini is a praying mantis" might be better received that "The Ayatollah
Khomeini is a Genghis Khan," because the domains of current world leader
and insect are farther apart than world leader and historical figure.
In summary, two metaphor characteristics are implicated by the domains
interaction theory -between-domain distance and within-domain distance.
Analogic reasoning is the individual difference variable of importance.
Tourangeau and Sternberg (1981) provided some empirical support for the
domains interaction theory. Their experiment was conducted in two stages.
First, semantic distances were calculated from semantic differential data,
using a method originated by Osgood, Suci, and Tannenbaum (1957). The
authors generated 20 members from each of eight categories. Each of eight
groups of subjects were required to rate the generated members from one category on a semantic differential. Data from these eight groups were used to
derive within-domain distances between words. A ninth group of subjects
rated the category names on the semantic differential and provided the data
for the calculation of between-domain distances.
Metaphors were created from the category members rated in the scaling
study, and several months later yet another group of subjects rated their appreciation and comprehension of these metaphors. An analogy test and a test
of literary sophistication (Rigg, 1937, cited in Sternberg, Tourangeau, &
Nigro, 1979) were also administered to these subjects.
The Tourangeau and Sternberg (1981) study provided only limited confirmation of the theory. Although statistically significant relationships between
metaphor appreciation and semantic distance were found, no relationship
was found for metaphor comprehension. Further, the significant effects did
not account for appreciable amounts of the variance in the metaphor ratings
(9% for between-domain distance and 16% for within-domain distance). In
addition, the individual difference measures both turned out to be unreliable
and unrelated to the experiment variables, so investigation of the effects of
individual abilities had to be abandoned. It is our contention that methodological problems with the Tourangeau and Sternberg study made for a weakened test of their theory. These problems are (a) use of an inappropriate
measure of analogies skills, (b) measure of semantic distance based on
norming and not individualized data, and (c) failure to provide a control for
several potential confounds. The first two issues are discussed, in turn, with
the need for control of confounds introduced where necessary.
Consider first the appropriate analogies test to employ. Tourangeau and
Sternberg (1981) scrapped the individual difference portion of their study
when they found their tests to be unreliable. In the present study, different,
more reliable, tests were used.
The Verbal Reasoning subtest of the Differential Aptitudes Test (DAT,
Form T; Bennet, Seashore, & Wesman, 1966) is an analogy test that is well
documented and has high validity and reliability ratings. Further, the constructors of the DAT have made an effort to ensure that the Verbal Reasoning subtest measures relational ability rather than vocabulary knowledge.
Words in the test analogies are all fairly easy. Moreover, we introduced a vocabulary test, the Word Meaning scale of the Iowa Silent Reading Test (Advanced, Form Cm; Greene, Jorgensen, & Kelley, 1943); in this article we
sometimes refer to this scale as the Iowa vocabulary test. The vocabulary test
was used as a control; it was added to demonstrate the discriminant validity
of analogic reasoning as a predictor of the relationship between semantic distance and metaphor ratings. There is a need not only to demonstrate that
analogy scores are correlated with the strength of the relationship between semantic distances and ratings, but also to show that analogic reasoning is
more related to the strength of the relationship than other theoretically
unrelated measures, such as vocabulary. If this is not demonstrated, it could
be argued that any correlation between analogic reasoning and metaphor
comprehension or appreciation is not caused by analogic reasoning per se,
but rather subjects' general vocabulary skills.
The second issue, measurement of semantic distance, is somewhat more
complex. The Tourangeau and Sternberg approach is weak here on several
grounds. The major problem is that they had one group of participants fill
out the rating scales from which distances were computed and a different
group fill out the scales from which measures of metaphor appreciation and
comprehension were derived. In essencethey used average semantic distances
computed from one group of participants to predict the metaphor reactions
of another group of participants. If one is interested in individual differences, it would be essential to get measures of an individual's semantic distances and to see if these distances relate to the same person's reactions to
metaphors and indices of individual differences (such as analogy scores).
This approach was taken in the present study. We also added a control variable, word familiarity, missing from Tourangeau and Sternberg. It is highly
likely that word familiarity has a strong effect on metaphor comprehension
(and appreciation). Consequently, it would be important to partial out the effects of familiarity before looking for the effects of semantic distance on metaphor ratings. This change was implemented in our study.
In summary, we decided to conceptually replicate the Tourangeau and
Sternberg (1981) experiment; modifications were incorporated to emphasize
individual (and not group) data. More reliable individual difference measures were employed; tests to permit the examination of both convergent and
discriminant validity were presented; scaling of semantic differences was
based on the same sample who rated the metaphors and on whom individual
differences measures were obtained. Finally, word familiarity effects were
controlled to provide cleaner indices of semantic distances.
Some more specific differences from Tourangeau and Sternberg were also
191
Subjects
192
Verbal ability tests. The two tests employed were the Verbal Reasoning subtest of the DAT and the Word Meaning scale of the Iowa vocabulary
test. Answers were recorded on machine-scorable cards. A stopwatch was
used to time the Iowa test.
Scaling booklets. Scaling booklets were necessary to compute the semantic distances between concepts in the metaphors. A semantic differential
was used to accomplish the scaling, as in the original Tourangeau and
Sternberg (1981) study. Nouns to serve in the metaphors were selected from
six familiar domains. Three of these domains came from the original
Tourangeau and Sternberg study -"bird," "aircraft," and "world leader."
"Insect," "car," and "movie actor" domains were added for this study. Three
members from each domain were chosen to be rated. The nouns and their respective domain and cluster names were rated in the semantic differential
booklets; the nouns rated are listed at the top of Table 1.
These 27 concepts were rated on 17 different dimensions, each scale
consisting of a 9-point semantic differential scale. The semantic differential
dimensions were selected to reflect, as much as possible, characteristics relevant in the comparison and contrast of the metaphor nouns. A list of 17
scales was generated and then revised on the basis of a canvass of 10 colleagues who were asked to list a few important ways that pairs of metaphor
nouns were similar and different. The 18th scale, which explored the familiar-unfamiliar distinction, was added so that the effects of familiarity
could be partialed out later in the analysis. The 18 scales are presented at the
bottom of Table 1. Metaphor nouns appeared first in the booklets, followed
by domain and cluster names. The order of each was randomized across
booklets.
Metaphor rating booklets. The booklets contained metaphors made
from combinations of the scaled nouns, followed by 9-point Likert rating
scales. Metaphors were of the form: The A is the B of the A domain (e.g.,
"The Concorde is the mosquito among aircraft"), Every permutation of the
18 nouns was used, except identity comparisons; thus, 306 metaphors were
generated. These metaphors were divided into two sets. In each set, every
noun appeared only once in combination with every other noun. Hence, a
given metaphor, "The Concorde is the mosquito among aircraft," and its
converse, "The mosquito is the Concorde amang insects," appeared in different metaphor sets.
Set 1, consisting of 153 metaphors, appeared in half the booklets, and Set 2
(the 153 converse set) appeared in the rest. Metaphors were presented in one
of three random orders. Consequently, there were six forms of the metaphor
booklet. (Given the strong effect of context on word interpretation, careful
item randomization was thought important in this experiment.)
TABLE 1
Metaphor Nouns and Their Respective Domains and Clusters
Cluster
Domain
Human
Movie actor
Alan Alda
Woody Allen
Sylvester Stallone
World leader
Leonid Brezhnev
The Ayatollah Khomeini
Francois Mitterand
Bird
Crow
Falcon
Sparrow
Insect
Butterfly
Mosquito
Spider
Car
Rolls-Royce
Trans Am
Volkswagen
Airplane
Biplane
Concorde jet
Spitfire fighter plane
Animal
Vehicle
Familiar
Living
Not thinking
Predatory
Ugly
Tiny
Passive
Humanlike
Likable
Fragile
Inanimate
Heavy
Classy
Not cute
Powerful
Small
Fast
Bad
Metaphor Noun
Scaling Dimensions
3 4 5 6 7 8
3 4 5 6 7 8
3 4 5 6 7 8
3 4 5 6 7 8
3 4 5 6 7 8
3 4 5 6 7 8
3 4 5 6 7 8
3 4 5 6 7 8
3 4 5 6 7 8
3 4 5 6 7 8
3 4 5 6 7 8
3 4 5 6 7 8
3 4 5 6 7 8
3 4 5 6 7 8
3 4 5 6 7 8
3 4 5 6 7 8
3 4 5 6 7 8
3 4 5 6 7 8
Unfamiliar
Not living
Thinking
Not predatory
Beautiful
Immense
Violent
Not humanlike
Not likable
Tough
Animate
Light
Not classy
Cute
Powerless
Large
Slow
Good
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Each metaphor was followed by four 9-point Likert scales exploring the
comprehensible-not comprehensible, not apt-apt, hard to interpret-easy to
interpret, and like-dislike distinctions.
Procedure
Subjects were first required to sign in, specifying their sex and native language. They were informed briefly then of the purpose of the study and the
agenda for the experimental session. Four tasks faced them. They were to
complete the Verbal Reasoning subtest and the Word Meaning scale. Each
person also completed both a scaling booklet and one of the six forms of the
metaphor-rating questionnaire. Subjects were allowed 2 hr to complete these
four tasks and were tested in groups of up to 20. To control for task-order effects, the sequence in which the four tasks were performed was counterbalanced.
RESULTS
Major Analysis
Recall that the aim of the study was to compute individualized measures of
the semantic distance between concepts, separately, for between-domain and
within-domain distances. These individualized distances will then figure in
subsequent analyses.
Computing semantic distances between metaphor terms. Three
steps are required to find the semantic distances (or dissimilarities) between
the terms serving as tenor and vehicle in the metaphors. First, factors underlying subjects' perceptions about the metaphor terms were uncovered by factor analysis of the semantic differential data. Second, based on individual
factor loadings and factor scores for stimuli, individualized factor scores
were computed for each subject, for each stimulus. Third, the Euclidean distance formula was used to calculate the distances between metaphor terms,
between-domain and within-domain, for each subject.
To accomplish the first step, PARAFAC (Harshman & De Sarbo, 1984)
was performed on the semantic differential data. Orthogonalization constraints were imposed in the scale mode of the data in order to improve the
interpretability of the solution and to simplify later calculations. A unique,
reliable four-factor solution was produced that accounted for a respectable
amount of the variance (R2= .5512, R = .7424, stress = .6700, mean square
error = .4508). The full four-factor solution is presented in our Appendix,
with a more detailed description of PARAFAC.
195
Of the four factors, two were found to be domain distinguishing. That is,
for two factors domain members tended to have similar loadings. In one, all
machines had strong positive loadings, whereas all members of the "human"
and "animal" clusters showed relatively weak negative loadings. In the second, animals loaded strong positive, whereas humans and vehicles loaded
negatively. Each factor loaded high on semantic differential scales that
would tend to differentiate the clusters, such as living-not living, thinking-not thinking for the first factor and humanlike-not humanlike, fastslow, and predatory-not predatory for the second. Loadings from the two
domain-distinguishing factors were used to calculate between-domain distances.
In contrast, the other two factors seemed domain insensitive. They tapped
dimensions that cut across the cluster boundaries, that is, they measured
characteristics that different members of the same domain would have to different degrees. For example, in one factor "mosquito" had a fairly strong
negative loading and "butterfly" had a weak positive loading. In the other,
"Sylvester Stallone" had a moderately high positive loading and "Woody
Allen" had a strong negative loading. Each factor loaded heavily on semantic
differential scales that members of the same domain might have to different
degrees. The first factor seemed to tap the ugly-beautiful and classy-not
classy distinction of the stimuli, whereas the second seemed to reflect a
passive-violent or predatory-not predatory distinction. Loadings from the
two domain-insensitive factors were used to calculate within-domain
distances.
The subject mode of the analysis contained information about how important each factor was for each subject, as indicated by the subject loading on
that factor. In summary, the factor analysis revealed two factors that differentiated between concept domains and two factors that differentiated between members of a given domain. Moreover, for each factor, subject loadings were obtained.
Step 2 of the analysis, the calculation of individualized factor scores, was
accomplished using the PARAFAC subject loadings. Individualized factor
scores were calculated for each of the 138 subjects, for each of 24 stimuli
(i.e., the 18 metaphor words and 6 domain names), for each of the four
factors.
Between-domain distances were calculated by finding the difference between factor loadings for the respective domain names of the two metaphor
terms on the two domain distinguishing factors (Factors 2 and 4). The Euclidean distance formula- distance (A, B) = J(a - b)* ,
,,,,, + (a - b)2 Fac,or4was employed. Within-domain distances were computed in an analogous
manner, that is, they were computed by finding the differences between factor loadings for the metaphor terms (vehicle and tenor) on the two domaininsensitive factors (Factors 1 and 3) via the distance formula.
196
The two types of semantic distance were calculated for each of the 138 subjects, for each of the word pairings. Examples of pairings with very small, or
very large between-domain and within-domain distances (averaged across
subject) are presented in Table 2.
Thus, in general, the metaphor "The Spitfire is the falcon of aircraft" has a
low within-domain distance, whereas "The Ayatollah Khomeini is the RollsRoyce of world leaders" would have high within-domain distance. In an analogous manner, the metaphor "Leonid Brezhnev is the Alan Alda of world
leaders" is a metaphor with minimal between-domain distance and "Sylvester
TABLE 2
Listing of Comparisons With the Lowest and Highest Semantic
Distances Between Terms
Between-DomainDistance
(Listed From Lowest Between-Domain Comparison to Highest)
1. Same domain comparisons (e.g., actor-actor)
2. Leader-actor
3. Airplane-car
Butterfly-bird
Actor-bird
Bird-leader
Insect-actor
8. Insect-leader
9. Leader-car
10. Bird-car
11. Insect-car
12. Actor-car
13. Leader-airplane
14. Bird-airplane
4.
5.
6.
7.
Within-DomainDistance
Comparisons With the SmaNest
Distance Within Domain
Spitfire-falcon
Woody Allen-Volkswagen
Sylvester Stallone-Trans Am
Biplane-Francois Mitterand
Woody Allen-sparrow
Volkswagen-sparrow
Sylvester Stallone-falcon
Concorde-Sylvester Stallone
Rolls-Royce-Alan Alda
Spitfire-Leonid Brezhnev
1. Khomeini-butterfly
2. Concorde-mosquito
3. Rolls-Royce-mosquito
4. Mosquito -butterfly
5. Butterfly-Spitfire
6. Leonid Brezhnev-butterfly
7. Concorde-butterfly
8. Concorde-spider
9. Sylvester Stallone-mosquito
10. Khomeini-Rolls-Royce
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
197
Stallone is the Concorde jet of actors" is a metaphor with great betweendomain distance.
TABLE 3
Partial Correlations Between Semantic Distance Variables
and Metaphor Ratings
.50
.42
.42
.45
- .21
- .24
.61
- .59
--
200
Between-domain distance
Comprehension scales
Comprehensibility scale
Interpretation scale
Appreciation scales
Aptness scale
Liking scale
Within-domain distance
Comprehension scales
Comprehensibility scale
Interpretation scale
Appreciation scales
Aptness scale
Liking scale
Note. DAT scores have the effects of Iowa vocabulary partialed out; similarly, Iowa scores are
equated for differences on DAT ability.
.05. * * p i.01. ***p < .005. ****p < ,001.
*p
201
tialed out. Thus, compared to their low scoring counterparts, high DAT scorers tended to show greater dislike for metaphors with small between-domain
distance and greater pleasure for those metaphors which compared concepts
coming from distant semantic domains.
When we examine the effects of within-domain distance a different picture
emerges. Generally, the DAT did not correlate with the distancehating data.
The sole exception was the negative correlation of r = - .21, p < -01, that
emerged when aptness was examined, even after the effects of vocabulary
were partialed out. Thus, individuals talented in analogic reasoning tend to
find metaphors with great dissimilarity between the tenor and vehicle (in
terms of within-domain factors) particularly unsuitable, or not apt. In contrast, these same high DAT scorers tend to find metaphors that have small
withindomain distance more apt than do their cohorts with poor analogic
reasoning ability. As with the earlier analyses, the Iowa vocabulary score did
not correlate with any of the indices when the effects of the DAT had been
partialed out.
DISCUSSION
The goals of this study were simple: first, to see whether the domain interaction approach to the processing of metaphor would be supported when
greater control was placed on the underlying scaling procedure and when
unwanted variance due to verbal ability or item familiarity was eliminated;
second, to see whether converging evidence could be obtained for the approach through the addition of an individual difference variable. Each goal is
discussed in turn.
Domain interaction effects. The model proposed by Tourangeau
and Sternberg (1981) was an extension of an earlier model for analogic reasoning (Sternberg, 1977a). Basically, the model assumes that the tenor and
vehicle are encoded, and, through a process akin to analogic reasoning, that
the relevant conceptual domains are found. Thus, if "dog" were the tenor of a
metaphor, the relevant domain ("animals") would be inferred. Next, relevant
dimensions for both the tenor and vehicle are abstracted; these are called
within-domain factors. Through analogic reasoning processes a mapping between domains occurs next such that a correspondence is found in which the
relationship between vehicle and vehicle domain parallels the relationship between tenor and tenor domain. Finally, the mapping is evaluated.
This model permits one to make two strong statements. First, the withindomain and between-domain distances inherent in a metaphor should be of
prime importance in how the metaphor is processed. Second, people who differ in analogic reasoning abilities should also differ in the efficiency with
which they can process metaphors.
202
The first claim is clearly supported by our data. The magnitude of our correlations for both average comprehension and aptness with the semantic distance variables are quite impressive, especially when compared to those obtained by Tourangeau and Sternberg (1981). Moreover, our findings, unlike
the earlier ones, could not be attributed to differences in familiarity for the
tenor and vehicle terms employed, since variation due to familiarity was partialed out. The effect for within-domain distance (i.e., dissimilarity between
tenor and vehicle on the dimensions shared by disparate conceptual categories) replicated that obtained by Tourangeau and Sternberg (1981). Greater
within-domain distance was related to greater difficulty with metaphor interpretation. That is, there was evidence of a linear relationship between comprehension and within-domain distance. Metaphors such as "Sylvester
Stallone is the Trans Am among actors," in which the within-domain distance
is extremely small, tended to be easier to understand than those in which
within-domain distance was great. In a similar manner, items with small
within-domain distance tended to be much more appreciated than those with
greater distance; this effect was quite strong (rs = - .61 and - .59 for aptness and liking, respectively). These findings are, by themselves, not surprising and have been demonstrated many times in the past (e.g., Johnson &
Malgady, 1980; Katz, Paivio, & Marschark, 1985; Marschark, Katz, &
Paivio, 1983), with distance along dimensions defined in other ways.
The emphasis given to between-domain distance and the consideration of
the conjoint effect of within- and between-distances are both unique to the
domain interaction approach. With respect to between-domain distance, the
relationship we observed differed from that predicted (but not obtained) by
Tourangeau and Sternberg. They expected that similarity between the domains of tenor and vehicle should enhance comprehension, and that dissimilarity should enhance likability. Thus, one prediction should be for a negative correlation between the average comprehension and between-domain
distance; instead, the correlations we obtained were positive, indicating that
people tended to find metaphors comparing terms from dissimilar domains
easier to understand. That is, metaphors comparing dissimilar domains such
as actors and aircraft (e.g., "Sylvester Stallone is the Spitfire among actors")
are more easily comprehended than metaphors comparing similar or identical domains (e.g., "Alan Alda is the Leonid Brezhnev among actors").
Analogous results obtained with the aptness measures-that is, metaphors
with greater between-domain distance- were judged more apt and liked.
This last finding, of course, is consistent with the domains interaction
approach.
In summary, metaphors with large betweendomain distance and small
within-domain distance were easier to comprehend and were more highly appreciated than were metaphors with low between-domain and high within-
domain distance. These results are for the most part consistent with the findings of Tourangeau and Sternberg; the major discrepancy is the present
finding of higher comprehensibility with greater between-domain distance.
One possible resolution of the discrepancy was offered by Krumhansl
(1978), who stated that in order to discriminate between objects in a spatially
"dense" area of semantic space (as would occur for objects from the same or
similar domains), it may be necessary to exaggerate within-domain differences. For example, more subtle distinctions are required when comparing
one actor to another actor than when comparing an actor to an automobile.
With objects coming from different domains, the dimensions (or features)
shared in common would be much more salient, hence more available for the
drawing of inferences and thus easier to comprehend. Moreover, if one accepts the argument of Feder Kittay (1982) that, in metaphoric speech, one
chooses a vehicle to emphasize the dissimilarity with the tenor in order to
highlight the few commonalities, one would argue that the expected findings
would have greater comprehensibility related to greater between-domain distance, as indeed we found. In any event, the independent effects of withindomain and between-domain distances we observed in the present study
clearly support the general domains interaction approach.
Analogic reasoning and metaphor processing. Unlike the earlier
Tourangeau and Sternberg work, reliable correlations were obtained between analogic reasoning scores and metaphor structure-rating data. Presumably our success is due to the use of a better analogies test and a scaling
procedure sensitive to individual differences. The findings provide converging evidence for the importance of analogic reasoning ability in solving the
type of metaphor studied here. Individuals talented in analogic reasoning are
more responsive to between-domain distance when making comprehension
and aptness ratings: high DAT scorers find it especially easy to comprehend,
and appreciate, metaphors in which the topic and vehicle come from semantically distant domains. Analogic reasoning ability was generally less important for either comprehending or appreciating metaphors that differed on
within-domain factors. A weak effect was found for the aptness rating, but
because it accounted for only 4% of the shared variance and because the "liking" scale did not exhibit the effect, it can be concluded that analogic reasoning ability plays a minor role, at best, in the processing of within-domain
characteristics. In any event, the observation that anologic reasoning is
important - at least in processing between-domain information-confirms
the importance of inductive reasoning in the processing of metaphors and in
a more general way confirms the basic domain interactional model. This confirmation is all the more striking in that it emerged with an analogies test and
not for a test of verbal comprehension.
204
Limitations of the present study. Although our results are the first
to show a clear relationship between characteristics of metaphors (semantic
distance) and of individuals (analogic reasoning) on measures of comprehension and aptness, it should be noted that the generalization of these results is
nonetheless limited. The aim of this study was to improve on the methodology used by Tourangeau and Sternberg. Although we feel we were successful
in that attempt, the model itself will have to be elaborated before it can be applied to metaphors in general. The two main problems have to do with the
representational scheme adopted by Tourangeau and Sternberg. They assume, first, a static universe of word relationships, and second, a geometric
model of semaatic space that is symmetric. Consider first the assumption of
fixed conceptual representation. One has to adopt this assumption for pragmatic reasons: The requirements of scaling restricted the types of nouns that
could serve as tenors and vehicles to those that came from clearly defined domains, and domains that in turn came from well-defined clusters. For our experimental purposes we followed Tourangeau and Sternberg and limited the
domains that would be employed further by use of metaphors which are plain
and which resemble analogies with terms missing. These conditions can be
contrasted with the ecological conditions in which metaphors are typically
encountered, where it could be argued that word meaning is not fixed to a
single domain, but rather that any word belongs to an indefinitely large number of different domains. From this perspective a major problem in metaphor theory becomes one of understanding which domain a person chooses
in order to make interpretation. Context (e.g., McCabe, 1983) and linguistic
markers (e.g., Grice, 1975) are probably involved in this selection process.
The domains interaction approach is mute on how, in natural contexts, the
domains to be mapped onto one another are selected and, by implication,
suggests the problem is a negligible one. It clearly is not, and must be
addressed.
The second structural problem involves how one conceptualizesthe meaning relationships of concepts in semantic space. Any scaling procedure is
based on a set of assumptions. The scaling employed here is superior to that
performed in the past because we took into account the relevance of betweendomain and within-domain factors for each subject. Nonetheless, our scaling, like that employed by Tourangeau and Sternberg (1981), is based on a geometric model of similarity which assumes that similarity in meaning is
symmetric. This is a problematic assumption. Ortony (1979a; 1979b)stressed
that asymmetry may be especially prevalent with metaphors. For instance,
consider these metaphors: (a) The surgeon is a butcher, and (b) The butcher is
a surgeon. In the domains interaction model tested by Tourangeau and
Sternberg and by ourselves, the semantic distance between concepts (e.g.,
surgeon, butcher) is assumed to be symmetric. The symmetric position would
be that the sentences listed above should possess the same within-domain and
205
This research was supported by two Natural Science and Engineering Research Council grants, a research grant (A7040) to the second author and a
postgraduate scholarship to the first author. Parts of this article were written
while the second author was a visiting scholar at the Institute of Personality
Assessment and Research, University of California at Berkeley; the aid of the
staff at IPAR is gratefully acknowledged.
We thank Drs. Richard Harshman and Allan Paivio for their useful suggestions and comments on the research and on earlier versions of the manuscript. Special thanks are also due Dr. R. Bryan (Department of Mathematics, University of Western Ontario) and a trio of gifted graduate students:
Kathy Bowler, Andrew Patrick, and Mike Dawson.
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APPENDIX
PARAFAC Analyses and Complete
Four-Factor Solution
The reason that factor analysis was done in our study was to derive a few basic dimensions responsible for most of the variation in the way the metaphor
In our study, semantic differential scales are in the A mode, metaphor words
are in the B mode, and subjects are in the C mode of the analysis. Hence, xij,
represents the rating on semantic differential scale "in of metaphor word "J"
by individual "k".
To perform a PARAFAC analysis, several steps must be taken to ensure
that the solution is meaningful and valid. First, data preprocessing may be
necessary. There are two types of data preprocessing. The first is centering,
or taking out the mean. Centering is important because PARAFAC assumes
ratio scale data (i.e., data with a neutral zero point). When data are not ratio
scale, PARAFAC's simple multiplicative procedures may be inappropriate,
and difficulties in finding a unique solution may result. Moreover, in
uncentered data, two-way interactions may occur and may cause rotational
difficulties. In our study, centering is done in both Mode A (the scale mode)
and Mode B (the metaphor word mode). Centering was done in the scale
mode because the center point on the semantic differential scales was 5 instead of 0.Centering was done in the stimuli mode in case subjects in general
gave all the metaphor words high or low ratings. After preprocessing, the
mean semantic differential scale rating and the mean stimuli rating would be
0.
Second, the data can be standardized to have unit variance. Standardizing
is done for two reasons: first, to remove variation sources that may obscure
differences of interest, and second, to equate the weighting of levels of a
mode in terms of its contribution to the factor solution. In the scales mode,
standardization is done to remove differences in variance between semantic
differential scales due to wording of the scale. For example, there were semantic differential scales exploring tiny-immense and small-large distinctions. The first scale sounds more "drastic" than the second; consequently
there might be more variance in the second scale because the end markerssmall and large - do not sound so extreme. Variance was standardized in the
subject mode to remove response variance differences that would probably
reflect response style. For example, some subjects were quite flamboyant in
their use of the semantic differential sctdes; they tended to give extreme ratings to all stimuli. Others were more conservative and tended to use the middle of the rating scale more often.
Once the data had been adequately preprocessed, factor analysis was done
at a number of different dimensionalities. It rapidly became apparent that
the application of orthogonalization constraints might improve the interpretability of the derived factors. Solutions were produced in which there
were several highly correlated factors. Consequently, orthoganalization constraints were applied in Mode A (the scales mode). This would ensure that the
factors would be more distinct in terms of their interpretations. Imposing
orthogonality constraints did not seem to adversely affect the fit of the solutions to a great extent. The fit of the orthogonalized four-factor solution was
almost identical to that of the nonorthogonalized solution (RSQ = 3 5 1
compared to RSQ = 554).
To determine whether an appropriate number of factors had been extracted, a number of diagnostic techniques were used. First, a fit-versusdimensionality graph was constructed. Measures of fit, such as R*, were
compared between solutions with different numbers of dimensions extracted. Generally, as the number of factors extracted increases, the fit increases. The size of the improvement in fit bought by an increase in
dimensionality decreases, however. By graphing the relationship between fit
and the number of dimensions, it is sometimes possible to discern a point beyond which increases in dimension only produce gradual increases in fit. At
this point there will be an "eIbow" in the curve. Second, by comparing solutions from different starting points, and from different subsamples of the
dataset, the reliability of the solutions was established. Only solutions that
were highly replicable would be considered valid. Finally, the surface
validities or interpretabilities of the factors from different solutions were
compared.
There was an elbow in the fit-versus-dimensionalitygraph at the fourth dimension. Further analysis revealed that the four-dimensional solution was
replicable both from different starting points and in different halves of the
dataset. (Factors derived from one solution correlated in excess of .9 with the
factors derived from other solutions.) At higher dimensionalities, the solutions were not as replicable within the same dataset, let alone between halfdatasets. Finally, the four-factor solution seemed meaningful. The first factor seemed to reflect aesthetic considerations such as beauty, classiness,
goodness, and likability. The second tapped animacy, and the third seemed
to measure power/aggression. The last factor seems to measure humanness.
In addition, because the four-factor solution also accounted for a respectable
proportion of the variance in the data (53%), the four-factor solution was
chosen.
209
Three of the four factors accounted for approximately the same proportion of the variance, as testified by their nearly identical root mean square
contribution for each factor (Factor 1 = .4147, Factor 2 = .4084, Factor 3 =
.3697). The fourth factor was somewhat weaker (.2764). The full four-factor
solution is now presented.
Full Four-Factor PARAFAC Solution
Mode A Loadings
Factor I
Living
Thinking
Predatory
Beautiful
Immense
Passive
Humanlike
Likable
Fragile
Animate
Heavy
Classy
Cute
Powerful
Large
Fast
Good
Factor 2
Factor 3
Factor 4
- 2.285
- 1.864
- .8872
- .2150
.4097
.2741
- 1.499
- .2980
- .3951
- 1.891
.7493
- .I 0
- .4881
,2258
.3701
,3663
- .I699
.2884
,3016
1.523
- .4003
1.142
- 1.814
.0346
- .9625
- 1.459
.2953
.699 1
- ,1216
- ,9235
1.410
1.152
,9987
- .9699
.4768
- .9012
1.395
.8665
- .8680
- ,5639
- 2.255
- ,4727
,6192
.5784
- 1.233
- .0089
.I565
- ,6946
- .a850
1.826
.I424
Mode B Loadings
Stimulus
Factor I
Factor 2
Factor 3
Factor 4
Alan Alda
Woody Allen
Sylvester Stallone
Leonid Brezhnev
Francois Mitterand
The Ayatollah Khomeini
Butterfly
Spider
Mosquito
Falcon
Crow
Sparrow
Concorde jet
Spitfire fighter plane
Biplane
Trans Am
(Continued)
Mode B Loadings
Stimulus
Factor 2
Factor I
Factor 3
Factor 4
Rolls-Royce
Volkswagen
Actors
Leaders
Insects
Birds
Aircraft
Cars
Humans
Animals
Vehicles
Mode C Loadings
Subject
Factor I
Factor 2
Factor 3
Factor 4
Mode C Loadings
Subject
Factor 1
Factor 2
Factor 3
Factor 4
.3240
.2742
.2936
.3356
,2100
.I722
,3274
.2712
.I841
.2735
.3368
.2334
.2911
.3037
.I755
,2619
.2798
.2092
,3434
.2580
.2463
,2888
,3413
.I972
.2030
.2542
.3174
.2615
.I318
,1605
.3694
.3303
.I908
,2394
.I681
.2712
.2924
,3362
.2479
.2172
.2990
.3045
.2905
,2773
.2939
.3001
(Continued)
21 1
Mode C Loadings
Subject
Factor I
Factor 2
Factor 3
Factor 4
Mode C Loadings
Subject
Factor 1
Factor 2
Factor 3
Factor 4