REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

SANDIGANBAYAN
Quezon City
-------------------First Division
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff,

Criminal Case No. 27101

- versus -

RENATO M. VIZCARRA, TERESA

R. CRUZ, VIRGINIA M.
HONORIO and MACARIA P. ANG
Accused.

PRESENT:
Leonardo-De Castro, PJ,
Chairman
Peralta and
Gesmundo, JJ.

Promulgated:
May 10, 2006
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

GESMUNDO, J.:
Before this Court is a Demurrer to Evidence filed by
accused-movants Macaria P. Ang, Teresa R. Cruz and Virginia
M. Honorio dated 26 January 2006.

On 10 October 2001, a case for Illegal Use of Public

Funds under Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) was

DECISION
Criminal Case No. 27101
People v. Vizcarra, et al.
Page 2 of 21
x-------------------------------x

filed against movants and their co-accused Renato M.

Vizcarra. The accusatory portion of the information reads:
That on or about December 1998 or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Ramon, Isabela,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above named accused, public officers, namely
RENATO VIZCARRA, a Municipal Mayor, TERESA R. CRUZ,
Municipal Treasurer, VIRGINIA M. HONORIO, Municipal
Accountant, and MACARIA ANG, Municipal Budget Officer,
all of Ramon, Isabela, taking advantage of their official
positions and in relation thereto, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, conspiring, confederating and
helping one another, incur overdrafts in appropriation
allocated for fuel and oil under the Maintenance and Other
Operating Expenses (MOOE) in the amount of P338,715.43
and offset the said overdrafts with funds pertaining to other
specific items as provided in Appropriation Ordinance No.
98-01 without authority from the Sangguniang Bayan of
Ramon, Isabela, thus, diverting and applying public funds in
the total amount of P338,715.43 to a public use other than
that for which said fund was appropriated by Appropriation
Ordinance No. 98-01, to the damage and prejudice of the
government.
CONTRARY TO LAW.1

The accused moved for reinvestigation on the ground that

there

was

discrepancy

between

the

findings

of

the

investigating prosecutor and the Ombudsman which would

cast doubt as to the existence of probable cause. 2 The Court
granted

the

motion

on

20

December

2001. 3

After

reinvestigation, the Office of the Special Prosecutor maintained

that there was probable cause to indict the accused. 4

1
2
3
4

Record Vol. 1, p. 1
Id. at 63-67.
Id. at 86-87.
Id. at 128-131.

DECISION
Criminal Case No. 27101
People v. Vizcarra, et al.
Page 3 of 21
x-------------------------------x

On 17 April 2002, the accused moved to quash the

information on the ground that the facts charged therein do
not constitute an offense.5

They contended that at bottom,

they are being charged for using the funds of the municipality
of Ramon, Isabela without obtaining the requisite authority
from the Sangguniang Bayan. However, as the Sangguniang
Bayan had subsequently passed Resolution No. 2002-11
confirming the use of the funds, the accused argued that said
resolution validated their earlier acts.

In a resolution dated 12 March 2003, the Court denied

the motion to quash as the legality or validity of Resolution
No. 2002-11 of the Sangguniang Bayan of Ramon, Isabela and
the legitimacy of the expenditures of fuel and oil, which
accused alleged to have been made in the best interest of the
service can only be resolved after the presentation of evidence,
which can enlighten the Court as to the factual circumstances
attending the disbursements of public funds in question and
the subsequent passing of Resolution No. 2002-11 by the
Sanggunian Bayan.6

Subsequently, their motion for reconsideration7 having

been denied on 16 June 2004 8, all the accused pleaded NOT

5
6
7
8

Id. at 154-163.
Record Vol. 1, pp. 326-327.
Id. at 343-354.
Id. at 389.

DECISION
Criminal Case No. 27101
People v. Vizcarra, et al.
Page 4 of 21
x-------------------------------x

GUILTY to the charge.9

At the pre-trial conference held

before the Division Clerk of Court, the parties stipulated on

the following facts which were later embodied in the Pre-Trial
Order dated 28 January 2005:
1.

At all times relevant to this case, all the accused were

public officers holding the following positions in the
Municipality of Ramon, Isabela, to wit:

Renato M. Vizcarra Municipal Mayor

Teresa R. Cruz Municipal Treasurer
Virginia M. Honorio Municipal Accountant
Macaria P. Ang Municipal Budget Officer

2.

The Municipality of Ramon, Isabela, has an

appropriation of P 23,390,317.00 for FY 1998 as per
Appropriation Ordinance No. 98-01.

3.

Out of this appropriated amount, P 335,000.00 was for

fuel and oil under the Maintenance and Other
Operating Expenses (MOOE).

4.

During the year, the only office that was given

budgetary allocation for fuel and oil under the MOOE
was the Office of the Mayor for its General Services
and Peace and Order Services at P 275,000.00 and P
60,000.00, respectively.

5.

For the period covering January 1, 1998 to June 30,

1998, during the administration of then Mayor
Angelino F. Vizcarra, the total cost of fuel and oil
charged to the fuel and oil allocation under the MOOE
were P 287,540.27 for the General Services, and P
58,764.14 for the Peace and Order Services, or a total
of P 346,286.42.

6.

Out of such amount, P 189,254.11 pertained to the

fuel and oil consumption in 1997 which was charged
to the 1998 appropriation and P 157,032.31 pertained
to 1998.

Accused Ang and Honorio were arraigned on 20 August 2004 (Record

Vol. 2, pp. 6-8) while accused Vizcarra and Cruz were arraigned on 07
September 2004 (Record Vol. 2, pp. 13-16).

DECISION
Criminal Case No. 27101
People v. Vizcarra, et al.
Page 5 of 21
x-------------------------------x

7.

Out of the 1998 Budget of P 335,000.00, the

remaining budget allocation for fuel and oil gas as of
the date of assumption of office as Mayor of accused
Renato Vizcarra on June 30, 1998 was a negative
balance of P 12,540.27 for the General Services and P
1,253.85 for the Peace and Order Services.

8.

For the period July 1, 1998 to December 31, 1998, the

total fuel and oil consumption charged to the 1998
appropriation was P 327,429.01.

9.

The overdraft in appropriation allocated for fuel and oil

in 1998 was P 338,715.43, where P 279,612.01 and P
59,103.42 were for the General Services and Peace and
Order Services, respectively.

10.

The overdrafts were offset from savings in other items

within the MOOE at year-end.10

Thereafter, trial ensued with the prosecution presenting

two witnesses. The first, State Auditor IV ELPIDIO COLOMA
(Coloma),

testified

that

he

conducted

special

audit

investigation into the financial transactions of the Municipality

of Ramon, Isabela pursuant to COA Office Order No. 2000-023
dated 23 March 2000.

He inspected documents and

interviewed officials involved in the financial transactions of

the municipality.

Upon the conclusion of the investigation,

Coloma drafted his Audit Investigation Report which he then

presented to all the accused during the exit conference held on
26 May 2001.

In said exit conference, the accused admitted

incurring overdrafts but submitted justifications therefore.

10

Record, Vol. 2, pp. 104-110.

DECISION
Criminal Case No. 27101
People v. Vizcarra, et al.
Page 6 of 21
x-------------------------------x

Coloma included said justifications in his final draft report

which he later submitted to his Regional Director.

Coloma further testified on how the overdrafts in the

allocation for fuel and oil were incurred and he identified the
documents to prove the same. He said that these overdrafts
were offset from the savings in other items within the MOOE
in a manner contrary to Section 336 of RA 7160 as said
provision of law requires the passing of an ordinance before an
item can be augmented from savings in another item.

In

keeping with his recommendation that there was a violation of

Section 336 of RA 7160, Coloma pointed to the accused as the
persons probably liable for the violation. Coloma qualified,
however, that as the violation comprised only of the accuseds
failure to first secure an ordinance before acting as they did,
the municipality did not actually suffer any financial loss from
their actions.

Coloma went on to state that during his investigation, he

had not come across the accuseds Exhibit 1 which is
Executive Order No. 2, series of 1998 pertaining to accused
Vizcarras order to use any unexpended appropriation of
particular

items

under

the

MOOE

to

augment

the

appropriation for fuel and oil. He opined that at the time of

his investigation, no such executive order existed because
when he asked the accused for their legal basis in disbursing

DECISION
Criminal Case No. 27101
People v. Vizcarra, et al.
Page 7 of 21
x-------------------------------x

funds for fuel and oil, they did not present said executive
order.

Finally,

Coloma

testified

that

neither

did

the

Sanggunian Bayan pass a supplemental budget for fuel and

oil.

The second and last witness for the prosecution was

Sangguniang

Bayan

member

and

one

of

four

private

complainants ABRAHAM ARRIOLA (Arriola) whose direct

testimony was dispensed with as he would testify on facts
already admitted during the pre-trial, e.g., as to the lack of an
ordinance and a supplemental budget that will justify the
offsetting of the overdraft in fuel and oil allocation from
savings. During cross-examination, Arriola stated that when
accused Vizcarra assumed office in July of 1998, the
budgetary allocation for fuel and oil was already depleted.
Arriola said, however, that he did not know about this fact
until probably before the end of 1998, after a concerned citizen
told him that there was already an overdraft in the fuel and oil
allocation.

After the results of the audit came out, Arriola

filed a complaint for illegal disbursement of funds simply

because there was no appropriated fund nor was there a
supplemental

budget

for

fuel

and

oil

expenses

yet

disbursements continued. Finally, Arriola remarked that other

services suffered as the funds appropriated therefore could not
be utilized as they were used instead to offset the overdraft.

DECISION
Criminal Case No. 27101
People v. Vizcarra, et al.
Page 8 of 21
x-------------------------------x

With the termination of the testimony of its last witness,

the prosecution formally offered Exhibits A to U inclusive of
sub-markings11 which were all admitted by the Court per its
Order dated 17 October 2005.12

On 25 November 2005, accused-movants Cruz, Honorio

and Ang sought leave of court to file demurrer to evidence 13
which the prosecution opposed on 29 November 2005. 14 In an
Order dated 11 January 2006, the Court allowed accusedmovants to demur to the prosecutions evidence. 15

The instant demurrer to evidence was filed on 27

January 2006.
February

200616

The prosecution opposed the same on 06

while

accused-movants

replied

to

the

opposition on 15 February 2006.17

Accused-movants

contend

that

the

prosecutions

evidence is insufficient to convict them since (a) they

performed their official functions in all good faith by
implementing the Mayors Executive Order No. 2; (b) Executive
Order No. 2 covered only savings from the maintenance and
other
11
12
13
14
15
16
17

operating

expenses

Record, Vol. 2, pp. 170-443.

Id. at 475.
Id. at 479-483.
Id. at 484-487.
Id. at 493.
Record, Vol. 3, pp. 3-31.
Id. at 35-37.

(MOOE)

to

augment

the

DECISION
Criminal Case No. 27101
People v. Vizcarra, et al.
Page 9 of 21
x-------------------------------x

appropriation for fuel and oil in order not to paralyze the

operations of the municipality; and (c) their acts do not violate
Article 220 of the RPC.

The prosecution negates the argument of good faith by

insisting that it has proven beyond reasonable doubt that
Executive Order No. 2 was a mere afterthought hatched by all
the accused to cover-up their criminal act. The prosecution
likewise maintains that as there was no ordinance authorizing
the accused to augment the item for fuel and oil, the
continued disbursements of the overdraft in the aggregate
amount of P 338,715.43 and the offsetting thereof from the
MOOE violates Section 336 of Republic Act No. 7160 18 which
violation amounts to technical malversation.

Finally, the

prosecution claims that it had sufficiently proved conspiracy

among the accused.

At the outset, it should be stressed that accusedmovants insistence that they acted in good faith and were
merely implementing Mayor Vizcarras Executive Order No. 2
dated 8 July 1998 in order not to paralyze the operations of
the municipality are ordinarily matters of defense which they
should raise during their own presentation of evidence.

18

The Local Government Code of 1991.

DECISION
Criminal Case No. 27101
People v. Vizcarra, et al.
Page 10 of 21
x-------------------------------x

From the stipulation of facts and the simplification of

issues embodied in the Pre-Trial Order, together with the
testimonial and documentary evidence presented by the
prosecution, however, we are constrained to rule that trial
need not go any further as the prosecution has failed to prove
even prima facie all the elements of the crime of technical
malversation such that accused-movants can no longer be
compelled to present evidence in their behalf.

The elements of technical malversation are:

1.

The offender is a public officer;

2.

There

is

public

fund

or

property

under

his

administration;
3.

Such public fund or property has been appropriated

by law or ordinance;

4.

The public officer applies the same to a public use

other than that for which such fund or property has
been appropriated by law or ordinance.19

Accused-movants concede the presence of the first two

elements.

The public use of the funds is likewise not in

dispute. It is the third element which they vehemently insist

the prosecution failed to prove. For its brevity, we quote their
discussion on the matter, thus:

19

Abdulla v. People, G.R. No. 150129, 06 April 2005, 455 SCRA 78, 92.

DECISION
Criminal Case No. 27101
People v. Vizcarra, et al.
Page 11 of 21
x-------------------------------x

To constitute a crime of illegal use of public funds,

there must be a diversion of funds from the purpose for
which such funds were originally appropriated by law or
ordinance. In the instant case, the questioned expenditures
were sourced from SAVINGS at the end of the fiscal year
from other items in the same expense class of their
respective appropriations (MOOE). The savings are to be
considered surplus and become free funds that may be
applied to any public use in the same class. Hence, there
could have been no violation of Article 220 of the Revised
Penal Code because the funds used were not specifically
appropriated for any other public use but were, in fact,
savings from other items within the same class. It is absurd
to insist that savings shall remain to be tied up to the public
use originally intended were (sic) the said public use has
already been completed. Xxx20

In other words, it is the contention of accused-movants

that the funds used to offset the overdraft had not been
appropriated by law or ordinance as they were in the nature of
savings which are considered surplus -- free funds that may
be applied to any public use in the same class. The funds not
having been appropriated by law or ordinance, there could be
no violation of Article 220 of the RPC.

It is beyond cavil that the overdrafts were offset from

savings in other items within the MOOE at the end of the 1998
fiscal year.

No less than the Audit Investigation Report

prepared by prosecution witness Coloma categorically state

such fact. Thus:
The Mayors 1998 annual budget allocation for gasoline at
P335,000.00 had been exceeded by P338,715.43 only and
not by P500,000.00 as alleged in the complaint. It was also
20

Record Vol. 2, pp. 515-516.

DECISION
Criminal Case No. 27101
People v. Vizcarra, et al.
Page 12 of 21
x-------------------------------x

noted that the overdraft in the 1998 budget allocation for

fuel and oil was offset from savings in other items within the
MOOE at year-end in the absence of an ordinance
authorizing it.21

As the facts essential to the proper disposition of this

case are not in dispute, what remains to be resolved is actually
a question of law, i.e., whether or not municipal funds
denominated as savings at the end of the year are in the
nature of free funds not otherwise earmarked or appropriated
for a specific public use.

The term savings under Article 417 of the Implementing

Rules of RA 7160 is well-defined. It refers to -Xxx portions or balances as of any given point in the
fiscal year of any programmed or allotted appropriation
which remain free of any obligation or encumbrance and
which are still available after the satisfactory completion or
the unavoidable discontinuance or abandonment of the
work, activity, or purpose for which the appropriation was
originally authorized, or which result from unobligated
compensation and related costs pertaining to vacant
positions and leaves of absence without pay.

The above-quoted definition of savings as a balance of

any programmed or allotted appropriation should be crossreferenced with Section 322 of RA 7160 which provides:
SEC. 322. Reversion of Unexpended Balances of
Appropriation, Continuing Appropriations. Unexpended
balances of appropriations authorized in the annual
appropriations
ordinance
shall
revert
to
the
unappropriated surplus of the general fund at the end of
the fiscal year and shall not thereafter be available for
21

Prosecutions Exh. D-1-a, Record, Vol. 2, p. 254.

DECISION
Criminal Case No. 27101
People v. Vizcarra, et al.
Page 13 of 21
x-------------------------------x

expenditure except by subsequent enactment.

However,
appropriations for capital outlays shall continue and remain
valid until fully spent, reverted or the project is completed.
Reversions of continuing appropriations shall not be allowed
unless obligations therefore have been fully paid or otherwise
settled.
The balances of continuing appropriations shall be
reviewed as part of the annual budget preparation and the
sanggunian concerned may approve, upon recommendation
of the local chief executive, the reversion of the funds no
longer needed in connection with the activities funded by
said continuing appropriations subject to the provisions of
this Section.22

The general rule, therefore, is that all unexpended

balances of appropriations -- e.g. savings -- revert to the
unappropriated surplus of the general fund at the end of the
year

and

the

only

exception

refers

to

continuing

appropriations23 or capital outlays24 which the MOOE, by

elimination, is not.25 As the MOOE is not in the nature of a
22

23

Emphasis supplied.
SEC. 306, Local Government Code. Definition of terms
(e)
"Continuing appropriation" refers to an appropriation available to
support obligations for a specified purpose or project, such as those for the
construction of physical structures or for the acquisition of real property or
equipment, even when these obligations are incurred beyond the budget year.

24

25

SEC. 306, Local Government Code. Definition of terms

(d)
"Capital Outlays" refers to appropriations for the purchase of
goods and services, the benefits of which extend beyond the fiscal year and
which add to the assets of the local government unit concerned, including
investments in public utilities such as public markets and slaughterhouses.
The Government Accounting and Auditing Manual (GAAM) Volume 1,
Chapter 6 enumerates the items comprising the MOOE, viz:
1.
Traveling expenses
2.
Communication Services
3.
Repair and maintenance of government facilities
4.
Use, repair and maintenance of government vehicles
5.
Transportation services
6.
Supplies and material
7.
Rents

DECISION
Criminal Case No. 27101
People v. Vizcarra, et al.
Page 14 of 21
x-------------------------------x

continuing appropriation or a capital outlay, any savings

therefrom revert to the general fund at the end of the fiscal
year and are considered as unappropriated surplus.

This

means that the savings from the MOOE at the end of the year
is taken out of the coverage of appropriated funds which they
originally formed part of.

In the cases of Parungao v. Sandiganbayan 26 and Abdulla

v. People,27 the Supreme Court had categorically declared that
in the absence of law or ordinance appropriating the public
fund allegedly technically malversed, the use thereof for
another public purpose will not amount to a violation of Article
220 of the RPC.

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

26
27

Interests
Grants, subsidies and contributions
Awards and indemnities
Loan repayments and sinking fund contributions
Losses/Depreciation/Depletion
Water, illumination and power services
Social security benefits, rewards and other claims
Auditing services
Training and seminar
Extraordinary and miscellaneous expenses
Confidential and intelligence expenses
Anti-insurgency/contingency/emergency expenses
Taxes and other duties
Trading/production
Advertising and publication expenses
Fidelity bond and insurance premium
Loss on foreign exchange
Commitment fees/charges
Other services
a.
Repair and maintenance
b.
Printing and binding
c.
Subscription to periodicals and magazines
d.
radiocast, telecast and documentary films
G.R. No. 96025, 15 May 1991, 197 SCRA 173.
G.R. No. 150129, 06 April 2005, 455 SCRA 78.

DECISION
Criminal Case No. 27101
People v. Vizcarra, et al.
Page 15 of 21
x-------------------------------x

As applied to herein case, as savings are unappropriated

surplus, accused-movants use thereof to off-set the overdraft
in the appropriation allocated for fuel and oil for fiscal year
1998 does not render them liable for technical malversation as
the third element of the crime which requires that the public
fund used should have been appropriated by law or ordinance
is missing.

The prosecution insists, however, that the accused are

still guilty of technical malversation as they violated Section
336 of RA 7160 requiring an ordinance before any item in the
approved annual budget can be augmented from savings in
other items within the same expense class. The prosecution
thus equates the violation of a provision of the Local
Government Code with the violation of a penal provision. This
is an obvious non-sequitur. Section 336 of RA 7160 states:
SEC. 336. Use of Appropriated Funds and Savings. -- Funds
shall be available exclusively for the specific purpose for
which they have been appropriated. No ordinance shall be
passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations from one
item to another. However, the local chief executive or the
presiding officer of the sanggunian concerned may, by
ordinance, be authorized to augment any item in the
approved annual budget for their respective offices from
savings in other items within the same expense class of their
respective appropriations.

It bears stress that accused-movants were charged under

the Information for violation of Article 220 of the RPC and not
Section 336 of RA 7160.

Section 336 of RA 7160 is not a

DECISION
Criminal Case No. 27101
People v. Vizcarra, et al.
Page 16 of 21
x-------------------------------x

penal provision and any violation thereof will only render the
accountable officer administratively and/or civilly liable. 28
Moreover, the acts constitutive of a violation of Section 336 are
not elements of the crime of technical malversation such that
an infraction of the former will not necessarily give rise to
criminal liability under the latter.

As above-discussed, when the accused used the savings

from the MOOE to offset the overdraft in the fuel and oil
allocation for fiscal year 1998 they were not in breach of
Article 220 of the RPC as savings cannot be considered as
having been appropriated by law or ordinance. This means
that an accountable public officer can utilize savings for any
public purpose and not run afoul of the provision on technical
malversation.

He can, with seeming impunity and without

incurring any criminal liability under Article 220 of the RPC,

by-pass the sanggunian concerned and augment the budget by
utilizing funds denominated as savings at the end of the year.
Our law-making body, perhaps aware of such an anomalous
situation, has mandated precisely in Section 336 of RA 7160
that the use of savings must be with the blessing of the
sanggunian concerned thru an ordinance for such purpose.
In other words, as it is not technical malversation to use the
savings from funds which have been originally appropriated for
another purpose sans an ordinance, RA 7160 has come to the
28

See penal provisions of RA 7160 (Sections 511 to 520) in relation to

Sections 340, 342 and 351 of the same Code.

DECISION
Criminal Case No. 27101
People v. Vizcarra, et al.
Page 17 of 21
x-------------------------------x

rescue by imposing civil and/or administrative sanctions upon

accountable public officials who use the savings of the local
government unit concerned without an ordinance authorizing
them to do so.

It is ironic therefore that Section 336 of RA 7160 provides

the clearest proof that savings are unappropriated surplus.
The first sentence thereof is a statement of the general rule
that funds shall be available exclusively for the specific
purpose for which they have been appropriated.

Corollarily,

the second sentence mandates that no ordinance shall be

passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations from one
item to another.

The last sentence, on the other hand,

contains the rule peculiar to savings, i.e. it recognizes the

nature of savings as unappropriated surplus which cannot fall
under the first and second sentences that deal exclusively with
appropriated funds.

Being unappropriated surplus, it is

necessary that savings have to be appropriated anew, so to

speak, before they can be utilized; hence, the requirement for
an ordinance.

The COA, in fact, was on the right track.

It did not

recommend the filing of a criminal case for technical

malversation

against

the

accused.

Instead,

it

merely

concluded that the accused violated Section 336 of RA 7160.

Interestingly, under the mandate of the COA, whenever the

DECISION
Criminal Case No. 27101
People v. Vizcarra, et al.
Page 18 of 21
x-------------------------------x

auditor or the audit team discovers in the course of its audit

that malversation or defalcation had probably been committed
by an accountable public officer, the former must submit to
the concerned provincial or city auditor for appropriate action
a report with verified findings of malversation of government
funds and/or property.29

And, while it is true that the

recommendations by the COA, or the lack thereof,

are not

binding upon us, still, the fact that no such recommendation

was made in this case cannot but bolster accused-movants
stance that they are not criminally liable. That civil and/or
administrative instead of penal sanctions are imposed for
violation of Section 336 of RA 7160 is an indication that our
lawmakers, in crafting the law, recognized the fact that the use
of savings to augment other expenses by local government
units is invariably brought to meet unexpected necessities.

IN SUM, although the accused may have been shown to

violate Section 336 of RA 7160 for their failure to procure an
ordinance before acting as they did, said violation is not
criminal as the funds, subject matter of the case, are not
appropriated funds.

The foregoing considered, the accused should be spared

from the unnecessary burden, expense and anxiety of having
to defend themselves in a public trial.
29

Considering that we

See COA Memorandum No. 83-81-B dated 21 November 1983.

DECISION
Criminal Case No. 27101
People v. Vizcarra, et al.
Page 19 of 21
x-------------------------------x

have already passed upon the sufficiency of the prosecutions

case and we have found the same to be wanting, there remains
no further reason to hold all the accused for trial under the
present indictment. The office of a demurrer to evidence, it
must be remembered, is to challenge the sufficiency of the
whole evidence presented to sustain a verdict. 30

When the

evidence crumbles in the face of the challenge against it, the

Court is left without any choice but to sustain such a
challenge.

In Katigbak v. Sandiganbayan,31 the Supreme Court, in

reversing the Sandiganbayans denial of the demurrer to
evidence filed therein, reiterated the fundamental right of the
accused

to

oppressive

be

protected

prosecution.

against
The

hasty,

Supreme

malicious
Court

and

likewise

emphasized that the State is similarly situated as it must be

shielded at all times from useless and expensive litigations
that only contribute to the clogging of court dockets and take a
heavy toll on its limited time and meager resources. 32

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the DEMURRER

TO EVIDENCE dated 26 January 2006 filed by accused
Macaria P. Ang, Teresa R. Cruz and Virginia M. Honorio is
GRANTED. Criminal Case No. 27101 is hereby DISMISSED.
30
31
32

Katigbak v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 140183, 10 July 2003, 405 SCRA 558.
G.R. No. 140183, 10 July 2003, 405 SCRA 558, 578-579.
Ibid.

DECISION
Criminal Case No. 27101
People v. Vizcarra, et al.
Page 20 of 21
x-------------------------------x

The bonds posted by the accused for their provisional liberty

are cancelled. The hold departure order issued by this Court
dated 26 November 2001 is set aside and the Order issued by
the Bureau of Immigration dated 12 August 2002 including
the names of the accused in the Hold Departure List is
ordered recalled and cancelled insofar as this case is
concerned.

SO ORDERED.

ALEXANDER G. GESMUNDO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE
CASTRO
Presiding Justice, Chairman

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

DECISION
Criminal Case No. 27101
People v. Vizcarra, et al.
Page 21 of 21
x-------------------------------x

ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Chairman, First Division

CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution,
and the Division Chairmans Attestation, it is hereby certified
that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Presiding Justice