1.G.R.No.

152392May26,2005

EXPERTRAVEL&TOURS,INC.,petitioner,
vs.
COURTOFAPPEALSandKOREANAIRLINES,respondent.

DECISION

CALLEJO,SR.,J.:

BeforeusisapetitionforreviewoncertiorarioftheDecision1oftheCourtofAppeals(CA)in
CAG.R.SPNo.61000dismissingthepetitionforcertiorariandmandamusfiledby
ExpertravelandTours,Inc.(ETI).

TheAntecedents

KoreanAirlines(KAL)isacorporationestablishedandregisteredintheRepublicofSouth
KoreaandlicensedtodobusinessinthePhilippines.ItsgeneralmanagerinthePhilippinesis
SukKyooKim,whileitsappointedcounselwasAtty.MarioAguinaldoandhislawfirm.

OnSeptember6,1999,KAL,throughAtty.Aguinaldo,filedaComplaint2againstETIwiththe
RegionalTrialCourt(RTC)ofManila,forthecollectionoftheprincipalamountof
P260,150.00,plusattorneysfeesandexemplarydamages.Theverificationandcertification
againstforumshoppingwassignedbyAtty.Aguinaldo,whoindicatedthereinthathewasthe
residentagentandlegalcounselofKALandhadcausedthepreparationofthecomplaint.

ETIfiledamotiontodismissthecomplaintonthegroundthatAtty.Aguinaldowasnot
authorizedtoexecutetheverificationandcertificateofnonforumshoppingasrequiredby
Section5,Rule7oftheRulesofCourt.KALopposedthemotion,contendingthatAtty.
AguinaldowasitsresidentagentandwasregisteredassuchwiththeSecuritiesand
ExchangeCommission(SEC)asrequiredbytheCorporationCodeofthePhilippines.Itwas
furtherallegedthatAtty.AguinaldowasalsothecorporatesecretaryofKAL.Appendedtothe
saidoppositionwastheidentificationcardofAtty.Aguinaldo,showingthathewasthelawyer
ofKAL.

DuringthehearingofJanuary28,2000,Atty.Aguinaldoclaimedthathehadbeenauthorized
tofilethecomplaintthrougharesolutionoftheKALBoardofDirectorsapprovedduringa
specialmeetingheldonJune25,1999.Uponhismotion,KALwasgivenaperiodof10days
withinwhichtosubmitacopyofthesaidresolution.Thetrialcourtgrantedthemotion.Atty.
Aguinaldosubsequentlyfiledothersimilarmotions,whichthetrialcourtgranted.

Finally,KALsubmittedonMarch6,2000anAffidavit3ofevendate,executedbyitsgeneral
managerSukKyooKim,allegingthattheboardofdirectorsconductedaspecial

teleconferenceonJune25,1999,whichheandAtty.Aguinaldoattended.Itwasalsoaverred
thatinthatsameteleconference,theboardofdirectorsapprovedaresolutionauthorizingAtty.
Aguinaldotoexecutethecertificateofnonforumshoppingandtofilethecomplaint.SukKyoo
Kimalsoalleged,however,thatthecorporationhadnowrittencopyoftheaforesaid
resolution.

OnApril12,2000,thetrialcourtissuedanOrder4denyingthemotiontodismiss,giving
credencetotheclaimsofAtty.AguinaldoandSukKyooKimthattheKALBoardofDirectors
indeedconductedateleconferenceonJune25,1999,duringwhichitapprovedaresolution
asquotedinthesubmittedaffidavit.

ETIfiledamotionforthereconsiderationoftheOrder,contendingthatitwasinappropriatefor
thecourttotakejudicialnoticeofthesaidteleconferencewithoutanypriorhearing.Thetrial
courtdeniedthemotioninitsOrder5datedAugust8,2000.

ETIthenfiledapetitionforcertiorariandmandamus,assailingtheordersoftheRTC.Inits
commentonthepetition,KALappendedacertificatesignedbyAtty.AguinaldodatedJanuary
10,2000,wordedasfollows:

SECRETARYS/RESIDENTAGENTSCERTIFICATE

KNOWALLMENBYTHESEPRESENTS:

I,MarioA.Aguinaldo,oflegalage,Filipino,anddulyelectedandappointedCorporate
SecretaryandResidentAgentofKOREANAIRLINES,aforeigncorporationdulyorganized
andexistingunderandbyvirtueofthelawsoftheRepublicofKoreaandalsodulyregistered
andauthorizedtodobusinessinthePhilippines,withofficeaddressatGroundFloor,LPL
PlazaBuilding,124AlfaroSt.,SalcedoVillage,MakatiCity,HEREBYCERTIFYthatduringa
specialmeetingoftheBoardofDirectorsoftheCorporationheldonJune25,1999atwhicha
quorumwaspresent,thesaidBoardunanimouslypassed,voteduponandapprovedthe
followingresolutionwhichisnowinfullforceandeffect,towit:

RESOLVED,thatMarioA.AguinaldoandhislawfirmM.A.Aguinaldo&Associatesoranyof
itslawyersareherebyappointedandauthorizedtotakewithwhateverlegalactionnecessary
toeffectthecollectionoftheunpaidaccountofExpertTravel&Tours.Theyarehereby
specificallyauthorizedtoprosecute,litigate,defend,signandexecuteanydocumentorpaper
necessarytothefilingandprosecutionofsaidclaiminCourt,attendthePreTrial
Proceedingsandenterintoacompromiseagreementrelativetotheabovementionedclaim.

INWITNESSWHEREOF,Ihavehereuntoaffixedmysignaturethis10thdayofJanuary,
1999,intheCityofManila,Philippines.

(Sgd.)


MARIOA.AGUINALDOResidentAgent

SUBSCRIBEDANDSWORNtobeforemethis10thdayofJanuary,1999,Atty.MarioA.
AguinaldoexhibitingtomehisCommunityTaxCertificateNo.14914545,issuedonJanuary
7,2000atManila,Philippines.

Doc.No.119
PageNo.25
BookNo.XXIV
Seriesof2000.

(Sgd.)
ATTY.HENRYD.ADASA
NotaryPublic
UntilDecember31,2000
PTR#889583/MLA1/3/20006

OnDecember18,2001,theCArenderedjudgmentdismissingthepetition,rulingthatthe
verificationandcertificateofnonforumshoppingexecutedbyAtty.Aguinaldowassufficient
compliancewiththeRulesofCourt.Accordingtotheappellatecourt,Atty.Aguinaldohad
beendulyauthorizedbytheboardresolutionapprovedonJune25,1999,andwasthe
residentagentofKAL.Assuch,theRTCcouldnotbefaultedfortakingjudicialnoticeofthe
saidteleconferenceoftheKALBoardofDirectors.

ETIfiledamotionforreconsiderationofthesaiddecision,whichtheCAdenied.Thus,ETI,
nowthepetitioner,comestotheCourtbywayofpetitionforreviewoncertiorariandraises
thefollowingissue:

DIDPUBLICRESPONDENTCOURTOFAPPEALSDEPARTFROMTHEACCEPTEDAND
USUALCOURSEOFJUDICIALPROCEEDINGSWHENITRENDEREDITSQUESTIONED
DECISIONANDWHENITISSUEDITSQUESTIONEDRESOLUTION,ANNEXESAANDB
OFTHEINSTANTPETITION?7

ThepetitionerassertsthatcompliancewithSection5,Rule7,oftheRulesofCourtcanbe
determinedonlyfromthecontentsofthecomplaintandnotbydocumentsorpleadings
outsidethereof.Hence,thetrialcourtcommittedgraveabuseofdiscretionamountingto
excessofjurisdiction,andtheCAerredinconsideringtheaffidavitoftherespondents
generalmanager,aswellastheSecretarys/ResidentAgentsCertificationandtheresolution
oftheboardofdirectorscontainedtherein,asproofofcompliancewiththerequirementsof
Section5,Rule7oftheRulesofCourt.ThepetitioneralsomaintainsthattheRTCcannot
takejudicialnoticeofthesaidteleconferencewithoutpriorhearing,noranymotiontherefor.
Thepetitionerreiteratesitssubmissionthattheteleconferenceandtheresolutionadvertedto

bytherespondentwasamerefabrication.

Therespondent,foritspart,aversthattheissueofwhethermoderntechnologyisusedinthe
fieldofbusinessisafactualissuehence,cannotberaisedinapetitionforreviewon
certiorariunderRule45oftheRulesofCourt.Onthemeritsofthepetition,itinsiststhatAtty.
Aguinaldo,astheresidentagentandcorporatesecretary,isauthorizedtosignandexecute
thecertificateofnonforumshoppingrequiredbySection5,Rule7oftheRulesofCourt,on
topoftheboardresolutionapprovedduringtheteleconferenceofJune25,1999.The
respondentinsiststhat"technologicaladvancesinthistimeandageareascommonplaceas
daybreak."Hence,thecourtsmaytakejudicialnoticethatthePhilippineLongDistance
TelephoneCompany,Inc.hadprovidedarecordofcorporateconferencesandmeetings
throughFiberNetusingfiberoptictransmissiontechnology,andthatsuchtechnology
facilitatesvoiceandimagetransmissionwitheasethismakesconstantcommunication
betweenaforeignbasedofficeanditsPhilippinebasedbranchesfasterandeasier,allowing
forcostcuttingintermsoftravelconcerns.ItpointsoutthateventheECommerceLawhas
recognizedthismoderntechnology.Therespondentpositsthatthecourtsareawareofthis
developmentintechnologyhence,maytakejudicialnoticethereofwithoutneedofhearings.
Evenifsuchhearingisrequired,therequirementisneverthelesssatisfiedifapartyisallowed
tofilepleadingsbywayofcommentoroppositionthereto.

Initsreply,thepetitionerpointedoutthattherearenorulingsonthematterof
teleconferencingasameansofconductingmeetingsofboardofdirectorsforpurposesof
passingaresolutionuntilandafterteleconferencingisrecognizedasalegitimatemeansof
gatheringaquorumofboardofdirectors,suchcannotbetakenjudicialnoticeofbythecourt.
Itassertsthatsafeguardsmustfirstbesetuptopreventanymischiefonthepublicorto
protectthegeneralpublicfromanypossiblefraud.Itfurtherproposespossibleamendments
totheCorporationCodetogiverecognitiontosuchmannerofboardmeetingstotransact
businessforthecorporation,orotherrelatedcorporatemattersuntilthen,thepetitioner
asserts,teleconferencingcannotbethesubjectofjudicialnotice.

ThepetitionerfurtheraversthatthesupposedholdingofaspecialmeetingonJune25,1999
throughteleconferencingwhereAtty.Aguinaldowassupposedlygivensuchanauthorityisa
farce,consideringthattherewasnomentionofwhereitwasheld,whetherinthiscountryor
elsewhere.ItinsiststhattheCorporationCoderequiresboardresolutionsofcorporationsto
besubmittedtotheSEC.Evenassumingthattherewassuchateleconference,itwouldbe
againsttheprovisionsoftheCorporationCodenottohaveanyrecordthereof.

Thepetitionerinsiststhattheteleconferenceandresolutionadvertedtobytherespondentin
itspleadingsweremerefabricationsfoistedbytherespondentanditscounselontheRTC,
theCAandthisCourt.

Thepetitionismeritorious.

Section5,Rule7oftheRulesofCourtprovides:

SEC.5.Certificationagainstforumshopping.Theplaintifforprincipalpartyshallcertify
underoathinthecomplaintorotherinitiatorypleadingassertingaclaimforrelief,orina
sworncertificationannexedtheretoandsimultaneouslyfiledtherewith:(a)thathehasnot
theretoforecommencedanyactionorfiledanyclaiminvolvingthesameissuesinanycourt,
tribunalorquasijudicialagencyand,tothebestofhisknowledge,nosuchotheractionor
claimispendingtherein(b)ifthereissuchotherpendingactionorclaim,acomplete
statementofthepresentstatusthereofand(c)ifheshouldthereafterlearnthatthesameor
similaractionorclaimhasbeenfiledorispending,heshallreportthatfactwithinfive(5)days
therefromtothecourtwhereinhisaforesaidcomplaintorinitiatorypleadinghasbeenfiled.

Failuretocomplywiththeforegoingrequirementsshallnotbecurablebymereamendmentof
thecomplaintorotherinitiatorypleadingbutshallbecauseforthedismissalofthecase
withoutprejudice,unlessotherwiseprovided,uponmotionandafterhearing.Thesubmission
ofafalsecertificationornoncompliancewithanyoftheundertakingsthereinshallconstitute
indirectcontemptofcourt,withoutprejudicetothecorrespondingadministrativeandcriminal
actions.Iftheactsofthepartyorhiscounselclearlyconstitutewillfulanddeliberateforum
shopping,thesameshallbegroundforsummarydismissalwithprejudiceandshallconstitute
directcontempt,aswellasacauseforadministrativesanctions.

Itissettledthattherequirementtofileacertificateofnonforumshoppingismandatory8and
thatthefailuretocomplywiththisrequirementcannotbeexcused.Thecertificationisa
peculiarandpersonalresponsibilityoftheparty,anassurancegiventothecourtorother
tribunalthattherearenootherpendingcasesinvolvingbasicallythesameparties,issuesand
causesofaction.Hence,thecertificationmustbeaccomplishedbythepartyhimselfbecause
hehasactualknowledgeofwhetherornothehasinitiatedsimilaractionsorproceedingsin
differentcourtsortribunals.Evenhiscounselmaybeunawareofsuchfacts.9Hence,the
requisitecertificationexecutedbytheplaintiffscounselwillnotsuffice.10

Inacasewheretheplaintiffisaprivatecorporation,thecertificationmaybesigned,forand
onbehalfofthesaidcorporation,byaspecificallyauthorizedperson,includingitsretained
counsel,whohaspersonalknowledgeofthefactsrequiredtobeestablishedbythe
documents.ThereasonwasexplainedbytheCourtinNationalSteelCorporationv.Courtof
Appeals,11asfollows:

Unlikenaturalpersons,corporationsmayperformphysicalactionsonlythroughproperly
delegatedindividualsnamely,itsofficersand/oragents.

Thecorporation,suchasthepetitioner,hasnopowersexceptthoseexpresslyconferredonit
bytheCorporationCodeandthosethatareimpliedbyorareincidentaltoitsexistence.In

turn,acorporationexercisessaidpowersthroughitsboardofdirectorsand/orits
dulyauthorizedofficersandagents.Physicalacts,likethesigningofdocuments,canbe
performedonlybynaturalpersonsdulyauthorizedforthepurposebycorporatebylawsorby
specificactoftheboardofdirectors."Allactswithinthepowersofacorporationmaybe
performedbyagentsofitsselectionandexceptsofaraslimitationsorrestrictionswhichmay
beimposedbyspecialcharter,bylaw,orstatutoryprovisions,thesamegeneralprinciplesof
lawwhichgoverntherelationofagencyforanaturalpersongoverntheofficeroragentofa
corporation,ofwhateverstatusorrank,inrespecttohispowertoactforthecorporationand
agentsonceappointed,ormembersactingintheirstead,aresubjecttothesamerules,
liabilitiesandincapacitiesasareagentsofindividualsandprivatepersons."

ForwhoelseknowsofthecircumstancesrequiredintheCertificatebutitsownretained
counsel.Itsregularofficers,likeitsboardchairmanandpresident,maynotevenknowthe
detailsrequiredtherein.

Indeed,thecertificateofnonforumshoppingmaybeincorporatedinthecomplaintor
appendedtheretoasanintegralpartofthecomplaint.Theruleisthatcompliancewiththe
ruleafterthefilingofthecomplaint,orthedismissalofacomplaintbasedonits
noncompliancewiththerule,isimpermissible.However,inexceptionalcircumstances,the
courtmayallowsubsequentcompliancewiththerule.12Iftheauthorityofapartyscounselto
executeacertificateofnonforumshoppingisdisputedbytheadverseparty,theformeris
requiredtoshowproofofsuchauthorityorrepresentation.

Inthiscase,thepetitioner,asthedefendantintheRTC,assailedtheauthorityofAtty.
Aguinaldotoexecutetherequisiteverificationandcertificateofnonforumshoppingasthe
residentagentandcounseloftherespondent.Itwas,thus,incumbentupontherespondent,
astheplaintiff,toallegeandestablishthatAtty.Aguinaldohadsuchauthoritytoexecutethe
requisiteverificationandcertificationforandinitsbehalf.Therespondent,however,failedto
doso.

Theverificationandcertificateofnonforumshoppingwhichwasincorporatedinthecomplaint
andsignedbyAtty.Aguinaldoreads:

I,MarioA.Aguinaldooflegalage,Filipino,withofficeaddressatSuite210GediscoCentre,
1564A.Mabinicor.P.GilSts.,Ermita,Manila,afterhavingsworntoinaccordancewithlaw
herebydeposesandsay:THAT

1.IamtheResidentAgentandLegalCounseloftheplaintiffintheaboveentitledcaseand
havecausedthepreparationoftheabovecomplaint

2.Ihavereadthecomplaintandthatalltheallegationscontainedthereinaretrueandcorrect

basedontherecordsonfiles

3.IherebyfurthercertifythatIhavenotcommencedanyotheractionorproceedinginvolving
thesameissuesintheSupremeCourt,theCourtofAppeals,ordifferentdivisionsthereof,or
anyothertribunaloragency.IfIsubsequentlylearnedthatasimilaractionorproceedinghas
beenfiledorispendingbeforetheSupremeCourt,theCourtofAppeals,ordifferentdivisions
thereof,oranytribunaloragency,Iwillnotifythecourt,tribunaloragencywithinfive(5)days
fromsuchnotice/knowledge.

(Sgd.)

MARIOA.AGUINALDO
Affiant
CITYOFMANILA

SUBSCRIBEDANDSWORNTObeforemethis30thdayofAugust,1999,affiantexhibitingto
mehisCommunityTaxCertificateNo.00671047issuedonJanuary7,1999atManila,
Philippines.

Doc.No.1005
PageNo.198
BookNo.XXI
Seriesof1999.

(Sgd.)

ATTY.HENRYD.ADASA
NotaryPublic
UntilDecember31,2000
PTRNo.320501Mla.1/4/9913

Asgleanedfromtheaforequotedcertification,therewasnoallegationthatAtty.Aguinaldo
hadbeenauthorizedtoexecutethecertificateofnonforumshoppingbytherespondents
BoardofDirectorsmoreover,nosuchboardresolutionwasappendedtheretoorincorporated
therein.

WhileAtty.AguinaldoistheresidentagentoftherespondentinthePhilippines,thisdoesnot
meanthatheisauthorizedtoexecutetherequisitecertificationagainstforumshopping.
UnderSection127,inrelationtoSection128oftheCorporationCode,theauthorityofthe
residentagentofaforeigncorporationwithlicensetodobusinessinthePhilippinesisto
receive,forandinbehalfoftheforeigncorporation,servicesandotherlegalprocessesinall
actionsandotherlegalproceedingsagainstsuchcorporation,thus:

SEC.127.Whomaybearesidentagent.Aresidentagentmayeitherbeanindividual
residinginthePhilippinesoradomesticcorporationlawfullytransactingbusinessinthe
Philippines:Provided,Thatinthecaseofanindividual,hemustbeofgoodmoralcharacter
andofsoundfinancialstanding.

SEC.128.Residentagentserviceofprocess.TheSecuritiesandExchangeCommission
shallrequireasaconditionprecedenttotheissuanceofthelicensetotransactbusinessin
thePhilippinesbyanyforeigncorporationthatsuchcorporationfilewiththeSecuritiesand
ExchangeCommissionawrittenpowerofattorneydesignatingsomepersonswhomustbea
residentofthePhilippines,onwhomanysummonsandotherlegalprocessesmaybeserved
inallactionsorotherlegalproceedingsagainstsuchcorporation,andconsentingthatservice
uponsuchresidentagentshallbeadmittedandheldasvalidasifserveduponthe
dulyauthorizedofficersoftheforeigncorporationasitshomeoffice.14

Underthelaw,Atty.Aguinaldowasnotspecificallyauthorizedtoexecuteacertificateof
nonforumshoppingasrequiredbySection5,Rule7oftheRulesofCourt.Thisisbecause
whilearesidentagentmaybeawareofactionsfiledagainsthisprincipal(aforeign
corporationdoingbusinessinthePhilippines),suchresidentmaynotbeawareofactions
initiatedbyitsprincipal,whetherinthePhilippinesagainstadomesticcorporationorprivate
individual,orinthecountrywheresuchcorporationwasorganizedandregistered,againsta
PhilippineregisteredcorporationoraFilipinocitizen.

Therespondentknewthatitscounsel,Atty.Aguinaldo,asitsresidentagent,wasnot
specificallyauthorizedtoexecutethesaidcertification.Itattemptedtoshowitscompliance
withtherulesubsequenttothefilingofitscomplaintbysubmitting,onMarch6,2000,a
resolutionpurportingtohavebeenapprovedbyitsBoardofDirectorsduringateleconference
heldonJune25,1999,allegedlywithAtty.AguinaldoandSukKyooKiminattendance.
However,suchattemptoftherespondentcastsveritabledoubtnotonlyonitsclaimthatsuch
ateleconferencewasheld,butalsoontheapprovalbytheBoardofDirectorsoftheresolution
authorizingAtty.Aguinaldotoexecutethecertificateofnonforumshopping.

InitsApril12,2000Order,theRTCtookjudicialnoticethatbecauseoftheonsetofmodern
technology,personsinonelocationmayconferwithotherpersonsinotherplaces,and,
basedonthesaidpremise,concludedthatSukKyooKimandAtty.Aguinaldohada
teleconferencewiththerespondentsBoardofDirectorsinSouthKoreaonJune25,1999.
TheCA,likewise,gavecredencetotherespondentsclaimthatsuchateleconferencetook
place,ascontainedintheaffidavitofSukKyooKim,aswellasAtty.Aguinaldoscertification.

Generallyspeaking,mattersofjudicialnoticehavethreematerialrequisites:(1)thematter
mustbeoneofcommonandgeneralknowledge(2)itmustbewellandauthoritativelysettled
andnotdoubtfuloruncertainand(3)itmustbeknowntobewithinthelimitsofthejurisdiction
ofthecourt.Theprincipalguideindeterminingwhatfactsmaybeassumedtobejudicially
knownisthatofnotoriety.Hence,itcanbesaidthatjudicialnoticeislimitedtofacts

evidencedbypublicrecordsandfactsofgeneralnotoriety.[15]Moreover,ajudiciallynoticed
factmustbeonenotsubjecttoareasonabledisputeinthatitiseither:(1)generallyknown
withintheterritorialjurisdictionofthetrialcourtor(2)capableofaccurateandready
determinationbyresortingtosourceswhoseaccuracycannotreasonablybequestionable.16

Thingsof"commonknowledge,"ofwhichcourtstakejudicialmatterscomingtothe
knowledgeofmengenerallyinthecourseoftheordinaryexperiencesoflife,ortheymaybe
matterswhicharegenerallyacceptedbymankindastrueandarecapableofreadyand
unquestioneddemonstration.Thus,factswhichareuniversallyknown,andwhichmaybe
foundinencyclopedias,dictionariesorotherpublications,arejudiciallynoticed,provided,they
areofsuchuniversalnotorietyandsogenerallyunderstoodthattheymayberegardedas
formingpartofthecommonknowledgeofeveryperson.Asthecommonknowledgeofman
rangesfarandwide,awidevarietyofparticularfactshavebeenjudiciallynoticedasbeing
mattersofcommonknowledge.Butacourtcannottakejudicialnoticeofanyfactwhich,in
part,isdependentontheexistenceornonexistenceofafactofwhichthecourthasno
constructiveknowledge.17

Inthisageofmoderntechnology,thecourtsmaytakejudicialnoticethatbusiness
transactionsmaybemadebyindividualsthroughteleconferencing.Teleconferencingis
interactivegroupcommunication(threeormorepeopleintwoormorelocations)throughan
electronicmedium.Ingeneralterms,teleconferencingcanbringpeopletogetherunderone
roofeventhoughtheyareseparatedbyhundredsofmiles.18Thistypeofgroup
communicationmaybeusedinanumberofways,andhavethreebasictypes:(1)video
conferencingtelevisionlikecommunicationaugmentedwithsound(2)computer
conferencingprintedcommunicationthroughkeyboardterminals,and(3)
audioconferencingverbalcommunicationviathetelephonewithoptionalcapacityfor
telewritingortelecopying.19

Ateleconferencerepresentsauniquealternativetofacetoface(FTF)meetings.Itwasfirst
introducedinthe1960swithAmericanTelephoneandTelegraphsPicturephone.Atthat
time,however,nodemandexistedforthenewtechnology.Travelcostswerereasonableand
consumerswereunwillingtopaythemonthlyservicechargeforusingthepicturephone,
whichwasregardedasmoreofanoveltythanasanactualmeansforeveryday
communication.20Intime,peoplefounditadvantageoustoholdteleconferencinginthe
courseofbusinessandcorporategovernance,becauseofthemoneysaved,amongother
advantagesinclude:

1.People(includingoutsideguestspeakers)whowouldntnormallyattendadistantFTF
meetingcanparticipate.

2.Followuptoearliermeetingscanbedonewithrelativeeaseandlittleexpense.

3.SocializingisminimalcomparedtoanFTFmeetingtherefore,meetingsareshorterand

moreorientedtotheprimarypurposeofthemeeting.

4.Someroutinemeetingsaremoreeffectivesinceonecanaudioconferencefromany
locationequippedwithatelephone.

5.Communicationbetweenthehomeofficeandfieldstaffsismaximized.

6.Severeclimateand/orunreliabletransportationmaynecessitateteleconferencing.

7.ParticipantsaregenerallybetterpreparedthanforFTFmeetings.

8.Itisparticularlysatisfactoryforsimpleproblemsolving,informationexchange,and
proceduraltasks.

9.GroupmembersparticipatemoreequallyinwellmoderatedteleconferencesthananFTF
meeting.21

Ontheotherhand,otherprivatecorporationsoptnottoholdteleconferencesbecauseofthe
followingdisadvantages:

1.Technicalfailureswithequipment,includingconnectionsthatarentmade.

2.Unsatisfactoryforcomplexinterpersonalcommunication,suchasnegotiationorbargaining.

3.Impersonal,lesseasytocreateanatmosphereofgrouprapport.

4.Lackofparticipantfamiliaritywiththeequipment,themediumitself,andmeetingskills.

5.Acousticalproblemswithintheteleconferencingrooms.

6.Difficultyindeterminingparticipantspeakingorderfrequentlyonepersonmonopolizesthe
meeting.

7.Greaterparticipantpreparationtimeneeded.

8.Informal,onetoone,socialinteractionnotpossible.22

Indeed,teleconferencingcanonlyfacilitatethelinkingofpeopleitdoesnotalterthe
complexityofgroupcommunication.Althoughitmaybeeasiertocommunicatevia
teleconferencing,itmayalsobeeasiertomiscommunicate.Teleconferencingcannotsatisfy
theindividualneedsofeverytypeofmeeting.23

InthePhilippines,teleconferencingandvideoconferencingofmembersofboardofdirectors

ofprivatecorporationsisareality,inlightofRepublicActNo.8792.TheSecuritiesand
ExchangeCommissionissuedSECMemorandumCircularNo.15,onNovember30,2001,
providingtheguidelinestobecompliedwithrelatedtosuchconferences.24Thus,theCourt
agreeswiththeRTCthatpersonsinthePhilippinesmayhaveateleconferencewithagroup
ofpersonsinSouthKorearelatingtobusinesstransactionsorcorporategovernance.

EvengiventhepossibilitythatAtty.AguinaldoandSukKyooKimparticipatedina
teleconferencealongwiththerespondentsBoardofDirectors,theCourtisnotconvincedthat
onewasconductedeveniftherehadbeenone,theCourtisnotinclinedtobelievethata
boardresolutionwasdulypassedspecificallyauthorizingAtty.Aguinaldotofilethecomplaint
andexecutetherequiredcertificationagainstforumshopping.

Therecordsshowthatthepetitionerfiledamotiontodismissthecomplaintonthegroundthat
therespondentfailedtocomplywithSection5,Rule7oftheRulesofCourt.Therespondent
opposedthemotiononDecember1,1999,onitscontentionthatAtty.Aguinaldo,itsresident
agent,wasdulyauthorizedtosueinitsbehalf.Therespondent,however,failedtoestablish
itsclaimthatAtty.AguinaldowasitsresidentagentinthePhilippines.Eventheidentification
card25ofAtty.Aguinaldowhichtherespondentappendedtoitspleadingmerelyshowedthat
heisthecompanylawyeroftherespondentsManilaRegionalOffice.

Therespondent,throughAtty.Aguinaldo,announcedtheholdingoftheteleconferenceonly
duringthehearingofJanuary28,2000Atty.Aguinaldothenprayedfortendays,oruntil
February8,2000,withinwhichtosubmittheboardresolutionpurportedlyauthorizinghimto
filethecomplaintandexecutetherequiredcertificationagainstforumshopping.Thecourt
grantedthemotion.26Therespondent,however,failedtocomply,andinsteadprayedfor15
moredaystosubmitthesaidresolution,contendingthatitwaswithitsmainofficeinKorea.
ThecourtgrantedthemotionperitsOrder27datedFebruary11,2000.Therespondentagain
prayedforanextensionwithinwhichtosubmitthesaidresolution,untilMarch6,2000.28It
wasonthesaiddatethattherespondentsubmittedanaffidavitofitsgeneralmanagerSuk
KyooKim,stating,interalia,thatheandAtty.Aguinaldoattendedthesaidteleconferenceon
June25,1999,wheretheBoardofDirectorssupposedlyapprovedthefollowingresolution:

RESOLVED,thatMarioA.AguinaldoandhislawfirmM.A.Aguinaldo&Associatesoranyof
itslawyersareherebyappointedandauthorizedtotakewithwhateverlegalactionnecessary
toeffectthecollectionoftheunpaidaccountofExpertTravel&Tours.Theyarehereby
specificallyauthorizedtoprosecute,litigate,defend,signandexecuteanydocumentorpaper
necessarytothefilingandprosecutionofsaidclaiminCourt,attendthePretrialProceedings
andenterintoacompromiseagreementrelativetotheabovementionedclaim.29

Butthen,inthesameaffidavit,SukKyooKimdeclaredthattherespondent"do[es]notkeepa
writtencopyoftheaforesaidResolution"becausenorecordsofboardresolutionsapproved
duringteleconferenceswerekept.Thisbeliedtherespondentsearlierallegationinits
February10,2000motionforextensionoftimetosubmitthequestionedresolutionthatitwas

inthecustodyofitsmainofficeinKorea.Therespondentgavethetrialcourttheimpression
thatitneededtimetosecureacopyoftheresolutionkeptinKorea,onlytoallegelater(via
theaffidavitofSukKyooKim)thatithadnosuchwrittencopy.Moreover,SukKyooKim
statedinhisaffidavitthattheresolutionwasembodiedintheSecretarys/ResidentAgents
CertificatesignedbyAtty.Aguinaldo.However,nosuchresolutionwasappendedtothesaid
certificate.

TherespondentsallegationthatitsboardofdirectorsconductedateleconferenceonJune
25,1999andapprovedthesaidresolution(withAtty.Aguinaldoinattendance)isincredible,
giventheadditionalfactthatnosuchallegationwasmadeinthecomplaint.Iftheresolution
hadindeedbeenapprovedonJune25,1999,longbeforethecomplaintwasfiled,the
respondentshouldhaveincorporateditinitscomplaint,oratleastappendedacopythereof.
Therespondentfailedtodoso.ItwasonlyonJanuary28,2000thattherespondentclaimed,
forthefirsttime,thattherewassuchameetingoftheBoardofDirectorsheldonJune25,
1999itevenrepresentedtotheCourtthatacopyofitsresolutionwaswithitsmainofficein
Korea,onlytoallegelaterthatnowrittencopyexisted.ItwasonlyonMarch6,2000thatthe
respondentalleged,forthefirsttime,thatthemeetingoftheBoardofDirectorswherethe
resolutionwasapprovedwasheldviateleconference.

Worsestill,itappearsthatasearlyasJanuary10,1999,Atty.Aguinaldohadsigneda
Secretarys/ResidentAgentsCertificateallegingthattheboardofdirectorshelda
teleconferenceonJune25,1999.Nosuchcertificatewasappendedtothecomplaint,which
wasfiledonSeptember6,1999.Moreimportantly,therespondentdidnotexplainwhythe
saidcertificatewassignedbyAtty.AguinaldoasearlyasJanuary9,1999,andyetwas
notarizedoneyearlater(onJanuary10,2000)italsodidnotexplainitsfailuretoappendthe
saidcertificatetothecomplaint,aswellastoitsCompliancedatedMarch6,2000.Itwasonly
onJanuary26,2001whentherespondentfileditscommentintheCAthatitsubmittedthe
Secretarys/ResidentAgentsCertificate30datedJanuary10,2000.

TheCourtis,thus,moreinclinedtobelievethattheallegedteleconferenceonJune25,1999
nevertookplace,andthattheresolutionallegedlyapprovedbytherespondentsBoardof
Directorsduringthesaidteleconferencewasamereconcoctionpurposefullyfoistedonthe
RTC,theCAandthisCourt,toavertthedismissalofitscomplaintagainstthepetitioner.

INLIGHTOFALLTHEFOREGOING,thepetitionisGRANTED.TheDecisionoftheCourtof
AppealsinCAG.R.SPNo.61000isREVERSEDandSETASIDE.TheRegionalTrialCourt
ofManilaisherebyORDEREDtodismiss,withoutprejudice,thecomplaintoftherespondent.

SOORDERED.

2.G.R.No.171814May8,2009

SOUTHDAVAODEVELOPMENTCOMPANY,INC.(NOWSODACOAGRICULTURAL
CORPORATION)AND/ORMALONEPACQUIAOANDVICTORA.CONSUNJI,Petitioners,
vs.
SERGIOL.GAMO,ERNESTOBELLEZA,FELIXTERONA,CARLOSROJAS,MAXIMO
MALINAO,VIRGILIOCOSEP,ELEONORCOSEP,MAXIMOTOLDA,NELSONBAGAAN,
andTRADEUNIONOFTHEPHILIPPINESandALLIEDSERVICES(TUPAS),Respondents.

DECISION

TINGA,J.:

BeforeusisaRule45petition1whichseeksthereversaloftheCourtofAppealsdecision2
andresolution3inCAG.R.SPNo.68511.TheCourtofAppealsdecisionreinstatedthe
NLRCsResolution4dated23March2001whichreversedthelaborarbitersdecision.5

PetitionerSouthDavaoDevelopmentCompany(petitionerorpetitionercorporation)isthe
operatorofacoconutandmangofarminSanIsidro,DavaoOrientaland
Inawayan/Baracatan,DavaodelSur.OnAugust1963petitionerhiredrespondentSergioL.
Gamo(Gamo)asaforeman.Sometimein1987,petitionerappointedGamoasacopramaker
contractor.RespondentsErnestoBelleza,CarlosRojas,MaximoMalinaowereallemployees
inpetitionerscoconutfarm,whilerespondentsFelixTerona,VirgilioCosep,MaximoTolda,
andNelsonBagaanwereassignedtopetitionersmangofarm.Alloftheabovenamed
respondents(copraworkers)werelatertransferredbypetitionertoGamoasthelatters
copraceros.From1987to1999,Gamoandpetitionerenteredintoaprofitsharingagreement
wherein70%ofthenetproceedsofthesaleofcoprawenttopetitionerand30%toGamo.
ThecopraworkerswerepaidbyGamofromhis30%share.

Petitionerwantedtostandardizepaymentstoits"contractors"initscoconutfarms.On2
October1999,petitionerproposedanewpaymentschemetoGamo.Thenewscheme
providedaspecificpriceforeachcopramakingactivity.Gamosubmittedhiscounter
proposal.6PetitionerdidnotacceptGamoscounterproposalsinceitwashigherbyatleast
fiftypercent(50%)fromitsoriginaloffer.Withoutagreeingtothenewpaymentscheme,
Gamoandhiscopraworkersstartedtodoharvestingwork.Petitionertoldthemtostop.
Eventually,petitionerandGamoagreedthatthelattermaycontinuewiththeharvestprovided
thatitwouldbehislast"contract"withpetitioner.Gamosuggestedtopetitionertolookfora
new"contractor"sincehewasnotamenabletothenewpaymentscheme.7

Gamoandpetitionerfailedtoagreeonapaymentscheme,thus,petitionerdidnotrenewthe
"contract"ofGamo.Gamoandthecopraworkersallegedthattheywereillegallydismissed.

Ontheotherhand,respondentEleonorCosep(Eleonor)wasemployedasamangoclassifier
inthepackinghouseofpetitionersmangofarminSanIsidro,DavaoOriental.Sometimein
October1999,shedidnotreportforworkasshehadwantedtoraiseandsellpigsinstead.

Petitioner,throughMalonePacquiao,triedtoconvinceEleonortoreportforworkbuttono
avail.

On22March2000,respondentsfiledacomplaint8forillegaldismissalagainstpetitioner.
TheyallegedthatsometimeinDecember1999,petitionerverballyterminatedthemenmasse.

Thelaborarbiterdismissed9thecomplaint.Heruledthattherewasnoemployeeemployer
relationshipbetweenpetitionerandrespondents.AstoEleonor,heruledthatshehad
voluntarilystoppedworking.

RespondentsappealedtotheNationalLaborRelationsCommission(NLRC).TheNLRCs
Resolution10reversedthearbitersdecisionandruledthatrespondentswerepetitioners
employees.Petitionermoved11forreconsideration.TheNLRCgranted12themotionfor
reconsiderationandruledthatthenatureofthejoboftherespondentscouldnotresultinan
employeremployeerelationship.Respondentsmovedforreconsiderationwhichwas
denied.13

Respondentsfiledapetitionforcertiorari14underRule65withtheCourtofAppeals.The
CourtofAppealsruledthatthereexistedanemployeremployeerelationship.Itdeclaredthat
respondentswereregularseasonalemployeeswhocanbedismissedbythepetitioneratthe
endoftheseasonprovideddueprocessisobserved.15WithregardtoEleonor,theCourtof
Appealsruledthatshedidnotabandonherwork.

Hencethispetition.

Petitionerraisesthefollowingissues:(1)whethertheCourtofAppealsfailedtotakejudicial
noticeoftheacceptedpracticeofindependentcontractorsinthecoconutindustry(2)whether
thereisavalidjobcontractingbetweenpetitionerandGamoand(3)whetherEleonorhad
effectivelyabandonedherwork.

Thelaborarbitertookjudicialnoticeoftheallegedprevailingbusinesspracticesinthe
coconutindustrythatcopramakingactivitiesaredonequarterlythattheworkerscancontract
withotherfarmsandthattheworkersareindependentfromthelandowneronallwork
aspects.PetitionerwantsthisCourttotakejudicialnoticeofthecurrentbusinesspracticein
thecoconutindustrywhichallegedlytreatscopracerosasindependentcontractors.In
Expertravel&Tours,Inc.v.CourtofAppeals,16weheld,thus:

Generallyspeaking,mattersofjudicialnoticehavethreematerialrequisites:(1)thematter
mustbeoneofcommonandgeneralknowledge(2)itmustbewellandauthoritativelysettled
andnotdoubtfuloruncertainand(3)itmustbeknowntobewithinthelimitsofthejurisdiction
ofthecourt.Theprincipalguideindeterminingwhatfactsmaybeassumedtobejudicially
knownisthatofnotoriety.17Hence,itcanbesaidthatjudicialnoticeislimitedtofacts
evidencedbypublicrecordsandfactsofgeneralnotoriety.Moreover,ajudiciallynoticedfact

mustbeonenotsubjecttoareasonabledisputeinthatitiseither:(1)generallyknownwithin
theterritorialjurisdictionofthetrialcourtor(2)capableofaccurateandreadydetermination
byresortingtosourceswhoseaccuracycannotreasonablybequestionable.18

Thingsof"commonknowledge,"ofwhichcourtstakejudicialmatterscomingtothe
knowledgeofmengenerallyinthecourseoftheordinaryexperiencesoflife,ortheymaybe
matterswhicharegenerallyacceptedbymankindastrueandarecapableofreadyand
unquestioneddemonstration.Thus,factswhichareuniversallyknown,andwhichmaybe
foundinencyclopedias,dictionariesorotherpublications,arejudiciallynoticed,provided,they
areofsuchuniversalnotorietyandsogenerallyunderstoodthattheymayberegardedas
formingpartofthecommonknowledgeofeveryperson.Asthecommonknowledgeofman
rangesfarandwide,awidevarietyofparticularfactshavebeenjudiciallynoticedasbeing
mattersofcommonknowledge.Butacourtcannottakejudicialnoticeofanyfactwhich,in
part,isdependentontheexistenceornonexistenceofafactofwhichthecourthasno
constructiveknowledge.19

AninvocationthattheCourttakejudicialnoticeofcertainfactsshouldsatisfytherequisites
setforthbycaselaw.Amereprayerforitsapplicationshallnotsuffice.Thus,inthiscasethe
Courtcannottakejudicialnoticeoftheallegedbusinesspracticesinthecopraindustrysince
noneofthematerialrequisitesofmattersofjudicialnoticeispresentintheinstantpetition.
Therecordisbereftofanyindicationthatthematterisofcommonknowledgetothepublic
andthatithasthecharacteristicofnotoriety,exceptpetitionersselfservingclaim.

ArelatedissueiswhetherGamoisanindependentcontractor.InEscariov.NLRC,20we
ruledthatthereispermissiblejobcontractingwhenaprincipalagreestoputoutorfarmout
withacontractororasubcontractortheperformanceorcompletionofaspecificjob,workor
servicewithinadefiniteorpredeterminedperiod,regardlessofwhethersuchjoborwork
serviceistobeperformedwithinoroutsidethepremisesoftheprincipal.21Toestablishthe
existenceofanindependentcontractor,weapplythefollowingconditions:first,thecontractor
carriesonanindependentbusinessandundertakesthecontractworkonhisownaccount
underhisownresponsibilityaccordingtohisownmannerandmethod,freefromthecontrol
anddirectionofhisemployerorprincipalinallmattersconnectedwiththeperformanceofthe
workexcepttotheresultthereofandsecond,thecontractorhassubstantialcapitalor
investmentsintheformoftools,equipment,machineries,workpremisesandothermaterials
whicharenecessaryintheconductofhisbusiness.22

TheImplementingRulesandRegulationoftheLaborCodedefinesinvestmentastools,
equipment,implements,machineriesandworkpremises,actuallyanddirectlyusedbythe
contractororsubcontractorintheperformanceorcompletionofthejob,work,orservice
contractedout.23Theinvestmentmustbesufficienttocarryoutthejobathand.

Inthecaseatbar,Gamoandthecopraworkersdidnotexerciseindependentjudgmentinthe
performanceoftheirtasks.ThetoolsusedbyGamoandhiscopraworkerslikethekarit,bolo,

pangbunot,panglugitandpangtapokarenotsufficienttoenablethemtocompletethejob.24
Relianceontheseprimitivetoolsisnotenough.Infact,theaccomplishmentoftheirtask
requiredmoreexpensivemachineriesandequipment,likethetruckstohaultheharvestsand
thedryingfacility,whichpetitionercorporationowns.

Inordertodeterminetheexistenceofanemployeremployeerelationship,theCourthas
frequentlyappliedthefourfoldtest:(1)theselectionandengagementoftheemployee(2)
thepaymentofwages(3)thepowerofdismissaland(4)thepowertocontroltheemployees
conduct,orthesocalled"controltest,"whichisconsideredthemostimportantelement.25
Fromthetimetheywerehiredbypetitionercorporationuptothetimethattheywere
reassignedtoworkunderGamossupervision,theirstatusaspetitionercorporations
employeesdidnotcease.Likewise,paymentoftheirwageswasmerelycoursedthrough
Gamo.Astothemostdeterminativetestthepowerofcontrol,itissufficientthatthepower
tocontrolthemannerofdoingtheworkexists,itdoesnotrequiretheactualexerciseofsuch
power.26Inthiscase,itwasintheexerciseofitspowerofcontrolwhenpetitionercorporation
transferredthecopraworkersfromtheirpreviousassignmentstoworkascopraceros.Itwas
alsointheexerciseofthesamepowerthatpetitionercorporationputGamoinchargeofthe
copraworkersalthoughunderadifferentpaymentscheme.Thus,itisclearthatan
employeremployeerelationshiphasexistedbetweenpetitionercorporationandrespondents
sincethebeginningandsuchrelationshipdidnotceasedespitetheirreassignmentsandthe
changeofpaymentscheme.

Astothelastissue,petitionerseeksourindulgencetodeclarethatEleonorhasabandoned
herwork.PetitioneradmittedthatEleonorwasitsregularemployee.27However,itclaimed
thatsheabandonedherwork,preferringtosellandraisepigsinstead.

Itiswellsettledthatabandonmentasajustandvalidgroundfordismissalrequiresthe
deliberateandunjustifiedrefusaloftheemployeetoreturnforwork.Twoelementsmustbe
present,namely:(1)thefailuretoreportforworkorabsencewithoutvalidorjustifiable
reason,and(2)aclearintentiontosevertheemployeremployeerelationship.Thesecond
elementismoredeterminativeoftheintentandmustbeevincedbyovertacts.Mereabsence,
notbeingsufficient,theburdenofproofrestsuponthe

employertoshowthattheemployeeclearlyanddeliberatelyintendedtodiscontinueher
employmentwithoutanyintentionofreturning.28InSamarcav.ArcMenIndustries,Inc,we
heldthatabandonmentisamatterofintentionandcannotlightlybepresumedfromcertain
equivocalacts.1awphi1

Toconstituteabandonment,theremustbeclearproofofdeliberateandunjustifiedintentto
severtheemployeremployeerelationship.Clearly,theoperativeactisstilltheemployees
ultimateactofputtinganendtohisemployment.29However,anemployeewhotakessteps
toprotestherlayoffcannotbesaidtohaveabandonedherworkbecauseachargeof
abandonmentistotallyinconsistentwiththeimmediatefilingofacomplaintforillegal

dismissal,moresowhenitincludesaprayerforreinstatement.30WhenEleonorfiledthe
illegaldismissalcomplaint,ittotallynegatedpetitionerstheoryofabandonment.

Also,toeffectivelydismissanemployeeforabandonment,theemployermustcomplywiththe
dueprocessrequirementofsendingnoticestotheemployee.InBrahmIndustries,Inc.v.
NLRC,31weruledthatthisrequirementisnotamereformalitythatmaybedispensedwithat
will.Itsdisregardisamatterofseriousconcernsinceitconstitutesasafeguardofthehighest
orderinresponsetomansinnatesenseofjustice.32Petitionerwasnotabletosendthe
necessarynoticerequirementtoEleonor.Petitionersbelatedclaimthatitwasnotableto
sendthenoticeofinfractionpriortothefilingoftheillegaldismissalcasecannotsimply
unacceptable.33Basedontheforegoing,Eleonordidnotabandonherwork.

WHEREFORE,thepetitionisDENIED.TheDecisionoftheCourtofAppealsisAFFIRMED.
Costagainstpetitioner.

3.G.R.No.13063
May31,2000
ELIGIOMADRID,petitioner,
vs.
COURTOFAPPEALS,REGIONALTRIALCOURTandPEOPLEOFTHEPHILIPPINES,
respondents.

MENDOZA,J.:

Thisisapetitionforreviewoncertiorariofthedecision1oftheCourtofAppealsaffirmingthe
convictionbytheRegionalTrialCourt,Branch9,Aparri,Cagayan,ofpetitionerEligioMadrid2
andhiscoaccusedArsenioSunidoofthecrimeofhomicide,forthekillingonMay21,1992of
AngelSunidoinBuguey,Cagayan.

Theinformationagainstthemcharged

ThatonoraboutMay21,1992,inthemunicipalityofBuguey,provinceofCagayan,and
withinthejurisdictionofthisHonorableCourt,thesaidaccused,ArsenioSunidoySilosand
Eligio(Melencio)Madrid,armedwithasharppointedinstrument,conspiringtogetherand
helpingeachother,withintenttokilldidthenandtherewilfully,unlawfullyandfeloniously
attack,assaultandstaboneAngelSunidoandinflictinguponhi[m]stabwoundsonhisbody
whichcausedhisdeath.

CONTRARYTOLAW.

WhenarraignedonOctober6,1992,petitionerandArsenioSunidopleaded"notguilty"tothe
crimecharged,3whereupontrialensued.Theprosecutionpresentedthreewitnesses,namely:
RemediosSunido,wifeofthevictimMerdelynSunido,thevictim'sdaughterandDr.Teddy
Unida,medicolegalexaminer.


RemediosSunidoadoptedashertestimonyondirectexamination,theaffidavitexecutedby
herattheBugueyPoliceStationonJune1,1992.Insaidaffidavit,shenarratedthatArsenio
andAngelSunidowerebrotherswho,previoustoMay21,1992,hadaquarreloverafighting
cockwhichArsenioclaimedwashis.Ataround12noonofMay21,1992,AngelSunidoand
JerryEscobarhaddrinksintheformer'shouse.Undertheinfluenceofalcohol,Angel
provokedafightwithArsenio.Asaresult,asAngelwaswalkingbacktohishouseaftertaking
Escobarhome,hewasstoppedbyArsenioandtwocompanions,oneofwhomwaspetitioner.
Arsenio'scompanionsheldAngelbythearmsasArseniostabbedhimseveraltimeson
differentpartsofthebody.Arsenioandhiscompanionsafterwardsfledusingpetitioner's
tricycle.4

RemediosSunidowascrossexaminedonthebasisofheraffidavit.ShetestifiedthatArsenio
didnotpassbytheirhouseonMay21,1992.Onfurtherquestioning,however,shetestified
thatArseniocametotheirhouseataroundseveno'clockinthemorningofthatdayasAngel
andsomefriendswerehavingdrinks.ItwasduringthatvisitthatAngelprovokedaquarrel
withArsenioconcerningthefightingcock.5Onredirectexamination,itwasstipulatedthatthe
familyofAngelincurredP4,000.00asexpensesforhisdeath.6

MerdelynSunidoalsoexecutedanaffidavitbeforethepoliceonJune2,1992.7Shestated
thatherfather,heruncleArsenio,andsomevisitorsweredrinkingintheirhouseonMay21,
1992.ThebrothersquarrelledoverafightingcockwhichsheclaimedArseniotookfromtheir
yard.AngelthenaccompaniedJerryEscobartohishome.Becauseofthebadbloodbetween
thebrothers,onhiswaybackfromEscobar'shouse,AngelwasattackedbyArsenioSunido,
withthehelpofpetitionerandanunidentifiedman,andstabbedAngeltodeath.8Onthe
witnessstand,MerdelyntestifiedthatataroundnoonofMay21,1992,herfatherAngeland
thelatter'sfriends,JerryEscobarandacertainRudy,wereintheirhousehavingdrinks.9At
12noon,AngeltookJerryEscobarhome.EitheronthewaytoorbackfromEscobar'shouse,
AngelwasstoppedbyArsenioSunidowhowaswithpetitionerandanotherperson.Petitioner
andhiscompanionheldAngel'shands,raisingthemupwards,withpetitionerholdinghimby
therighthand,whilehiscompanionheldAngelbythelefthand.Andthen,Arseniostarted
attackingAngelwithaknife.AfterseriouslywoundingArsenio,thethreefled.Merdelynsaid
shewitnessedtheincidentbecauseshewasjustapproximatelyfivemetersawayfromthe
placewhereithappened.10

TheotherwitnessfortheprosecutionwasDr.TeddyA.Unida,municipalhealthofficerof
Buguey,whoconductedtheautopsyonthebodyofAngelSunido.Hisfindingswere
embodiedinamedicalcertificate,11whichshowedthefollowingwoundssufferedbyAngel
Sunido:

DIAGNOSIS:

1.
Incisedwound6cm.inlength1cm.deep,locatedatthelefttemporalregion.


2.
Stabwound3cm.inlength,8cm.deep,locatedatrightanteriorlowerthorax.

3.
Stabwound4cm.inlength6cm.deep,locatedatrightanteriorlowerthorax.
DirectionAnteroposterior.

4.
Stabwound3cm.inlength6cm.deep,locatedatleftanteriorlowerthorax.
DirectionAnteroposterior.

5.
Stabwound6cm.inlength6cm.deep,locatedattherightupper[quadrant]of
theabdomenanterior.DirectionAnteroposterior.

6.
Stabwound3cm.inlength6cm.deep,locatedatleftupper[quadrant]ofthe
abdomenanterior.DirectionAnteroposterior.

7.
Stabwound11/2cm.inlength3cm.deep,locatedattherightsideofthe
abdomenlateral.DirectionRighttoleft.

8.
Stabwound21/2cm.5cm.deep,locatedatleftlower[quadrant]ofthe
abdomen.DirectionAnterocaudal.

9.
Stabwound2cm.inlength8cm.deep,locatedattheleftsideofthe
abdomenlateral.DirectionLefttoright.

Dr.Unidatestifiedthatbasedonthesewounds,itcouldbeconcludedthattheassailantwas
infrontofthevictimandthatheusedasharpedgedinstrument,likeabolowithapointedtip,
inkillingthelatter.Itispossiblethateithertheassailantandthevictimwereinastanding
positionfacingeachotherorthevictimwaslyingonthegroundwithhisfaceupwards.Stab
woundnos.2,3,4,5,6,7and8werefatalinjuriescausingthevictim'sdeathintheabsence
ofmedicalattendance.Astohowmanyassailantswereresponsibleforthewounds,hesaid
thatjudgingfromthevarianceinthesizeandshapeofthewounds,itwaspossiblethatthere
wasmorethanoneassailantorthatmorethanoneweaponwasused.However,Dr.Unida
stressedthattherewasnocertaintyastothisbecausetheelasticityoftheskinmakesit
difficulttoconcludeexactlywhattypeofinstrumentwasusedonthebasisofthelengthofthe
stabwoundsalone.12

Ontheotherhand,thedefensepresentedaswitnessesJerryEscobar,1petitioner,Arsenio
SunidoandAlipioValdez.

JerryEscobarwasthepersonwho,accordingtothewifeanddaughterofthevictim,thelatter
tookhomeafterhavingdrinksintheirhouse.Jerrytestifiedthathedroppedbythehouseof
AngelSunidobetweensixandseveno'clockinthemorningofMay21,1992,onhiswayto
buychickenfeeds.AccordingtoJerry,heandAngelhaddrinksuntil12o'clocknoonwith

anotherpersonswhomAngelintroducedasguestsfromtheIlocosprovince.Ataround10
o'clockinthemorning,ArsenioSunidoandpetitionerarrivedinArsenio'shouseinaTamaraw
vehicle.Angel'shousewaslocatedbehindthatofArsenio,approximately10metersaway.
Uponseeinghisbrotherandhiscompanion,AngelprovokedArseniotoafightoverafighting
cockwhichAngelclaimedbelongedtohim.Hedrewalineonthegroundwithhisknifeashe
continuedtoprovokeArsenio.Thetwobrothersthengrappledwitheachotherandfelltothe
ground.ArseniowasabletolandontopofAngelandfromthisvantagepointwasableto
wresttheknifewithwhichhestabbedAngelseveraltimes.Jerrysaidhethenranaway.
PetitionerwasneartheTamarawvehicleatthetimeoftheincident.JerrydeniedRemedios
Sunido'sclaimthatAngelaccompaniedhim(Jerry)tohishouse.HesaidAngelwastoodrunk
tohavedoneso.HefurtherbeliedRemedios'claimthatpetitionerheldAngelbythearmwhile
ArseniostabbedAngel.Jerrysaidthathewasbotheredinhisconsciencebyallegationsof
otherwitnessesthatAngeltookhimhome.14Whencrossexamined,Jerryclarifiedthat
neitherArsenionorpetitionerdrankliquorwiththem.HeonlysawArsenioandpetitionerat
around10o'clockinthemorningwhentheywenttoArsenio'shouseontheirwaytohaul
palay.ItwasthenthatAngelchallengedArseniotoafightasAngeltookouthisknife.Several
peoplewitnessedthefightbetweenthetwobrothers,butnooneintervenedbecauseoffear.
JerryfurtherclarifiedthatpetitionerrantotheTamarawvehiclewhenthebrothersstarted
fighting.Jerrysaidthathedidnotreportwhathewitnessedtoanyonebecausehewasnot
directlyinvolvedinthecase.Buthedecidedtotestifyandrelatewhathewitnessedashis
consciencebotheredhim.15

Petitionertestifiednext.Hesaidhewasabusinessmanwithsevenchildren,allofwhom
finishedcollege.Hisbusinessconsistedofthreericemills,onelocatedinMaddaleroandtwo
inCabanbunan,Gonzaga.ThemanageroftheMaddaleroricemillwasArsenioSunido.On
May21,1992,ataround10o'clockinthemorning,Arsenioinformedhimthattheyneededto
buypalay,forwhichreasontheygotintohisTamarawjeep,withArseniodriving.They
proceededtoArsenio'shouseinMaddalero.Arsenioparkedthevehicleinfrontofhishouse.
WhenArsenioalightedfromthevehicle,Angelrantowardshimwithaknife.Whenhesaw
this,petitionersaidheranawayfromthesceneandtowardthefarm.Whileinhiding,he
heardthebrothersarguing.PetitionerdeniedthatheheldAngel'shandsasArseniostabbed
Angel.16Duringcrossexamination,petitionerexplainedthatheonlyknewAngelasthe
brotherofArsenio.Hereiteratedthatheranawaybecausehewasfrightenedbythesightof
theknife.Heneversawwhathappenedtothebrothers.Nordidheinquireabouttheincident.
HejustheardfromotherpeoplewhathadhappenedsincehedidnotreturntoMaddalerountil
amonthlater.17

TheotherdefensewitnesswasArsenioSunido,whotestifiedthathemanagedthericemillof
petitionerinMaddalero,Buguey,Cagayan.OnMay21,1992,ataround10o'clockinthe
morning,helefthishousetoseepetitioner.Henoticedseveralpersons,includingAngel,
drinkingginintheyardoutsidethelatter'shouse.Angelsawhimandbeganchallenginghim
toafight.ItappearsthatArseniohadlostafightingcockabouttwoweeksbefore.Heclaimed
thatthefightingcockinAngel'syardbelongedtohim.Despiteprovocationfromhisbrother,

ArseniosimplywentabouthiswayandleftthehousetofetchpetitionerinGonzaga,Cagayan
wherethelatterwasresiding.Uponarrivinginpetitioner'shouse,Arsenioinformedhimthat
theyneededmoneytobuypalay.Forthisreason,petitionerdispatchedhisTamarawjeepney
andaccompaniedArseniotoSta.Teresitawheretheyboughtpalay.Theythenproceededto
Arsenio'shouseinMaddalero,arrivingthereataround11to12o'clocknoon.Theyweremet
byAngelSunidowhowasdrunk.Armedwithaknife,AngelrushedtowardsArseniowith
intenttokillthelatter,saying"Iwillkillyounow."WhenAngelwasaroundtwometersaway
fromhim,ArsenioalightedfromthevehicleandchargedtowardAngel.

Oncrossexamination,Arseniotestifiedthathedidnotseepetitioneranymoreduringthe
incidentbecausethelatterranaway.AfteralightingfromtheTamaraw,Arsenioslippedand
fell.AstruggleensuedandArseniowasabletowresttheknifeawayfromAngel.Arseniothen
stabbedAngelseveraltimes.Whenherealizedwhathedid,Arseniodroppedtheknife,
wantingtoembracehisdeadbrotherforheneverreallyintendedtokillhim.Heimmediately
surrenderedtoAlipioValdez,thevicemayor,whobroughthimtothepoliceprecinctof
Buguey.18Onfurthercrossexamination,Arsenioexplainedthatthemisunderstanding
betweenhimandhisbrotheraroseoutofafightingcocktheninAngel'spossession.He
claimedthatthefightingcock,abreeder,washisbuthenolongerpaidanyattentiontohis
brother'sclaim,beingawareofthelatter'stemperament.However,onthedateinquestion,
Angelchallengedhimtoafightashewasleavinghishouse.WhenArsenioreturnedtohis
house,togetherwithpetitioner,AngelmetthemandthreatenedtokillArsenioasthelatter
wasabouttoalightfromthevehicle.WithhisbackagainsttheTamarawjeepney,Arseniolost
hisbalanceandfelldown.Angeljumpedonhim.Aftertakingtheknifeawayfromhisbrother,
ArseniostabbedAngel.Angelrantowardsamangotreeanddiedthere.Arseniothenwentto
ViceMayorValdez'houseandtoldValdezthathestabbedhisbrother.Uponrequestof
Arsenio,ViceMayorValdezaccompaniedhimtothepolicestation.Onredirectexamination,
Arsenioreiteratedthathisbrotherwasanexconvict,havingbeenconvictedofrapewith
homicide.He,ontheotherhand,hadneverbeenchargedofanycrimebeforethepresent
case.19

AlipioValdez,vicemayorofBuguey,Cagayan,testifiedthatArseniowenttohishouseon
May21,1992,informinghimthathestabbedsomeone.SinceArseniowaswillingto
surrenderhimselftotheproperauthorities,hence,ViceMayorValdezaccompaniedhimto
theBugueyPoliceDepartment.20Whencrossexamined,ValdezrepeatedthatArsenio
askedforhisprotectionand,thus,hepersonallyaccompaniedhimtothepolicestation.21

Forpurposesofrebuttal,RemediosSunidodeniedArsenio'sclaimthattheknifeusedin
killingAngelbelongedtothelatter.Sheexplainedthatitcouldnothavebeenherhusband's
knifebecauseAngeldidnotcarryaknifewhenheaccompaniedJerryhome.22

Aftertrial,thelowercourtrenderedadecisionconvictingArsenioSunidoandEligioMadridof
thecrimeofhomicide.Thedispositiveportionreads:

WHEREFORE,theCourtherebyfindstheaccusedguiltybeyondreasonabledoubtofthe
crimeofhomicide,thepenaltyforwhichisreclusiontemporal(Art.249,RevisedPenalCode)
attendedbyevidentpremeditation,abuseofsuperiorstrengthandavailmentofmeansto
weakenthedefense(Art.14,pars.13and15,R.P.C.).Thereismorethanampleevidenceto
establishconspiracy.Therefore,theactofoneistheactofall(Peoplev.Noguero,Jr.,218
SCRA85,96).Theaccusedareherebysentencedtoserveimprisonmentofnineteen(19)
yearsseven(7)monthsandnine(9)daystotwenty(20)yearsofreclusiontemporal
maximum,includingallitsaccessory,penalties.Theyarefurtherdirectedtoindemnifythe
heirsofthedeceasedjointlyandseverallyP50,000.00forthelatter'sdeathP25,000.00for
moraldamagesandP50,000.00forexemplarydamages,therebeingmorethanone
aggravatingcircumstanceandconsideringthemannerthecrimewascommitted,toserveas
deterrenttoothers,withprejudicetothegrantofparoleorpardon.

Costsagainsttheaccused.

SOORDERED.2

PetitionerappealedtotheCourtofAppealswhichrenderedadecision,datedSeptember17,
1997,affirmingthetrialcourt'sdecision,subjecttomodifications,viz.:

WHEREFORE,foregoingconsidered,theappealeddecisionisherebyAFFIRMEDwiththe
followingmodification:

1.
TheaccusedappellantArsenioSunidoissentencedtosuffertheindeterminate
penaltyofsix(6)yearsandone(1)dayofprisionmayor,asminimum,tofourteen(14)years,
eight(8)monthsandone(1)dayofreclusiontemporal,asmaximum,withthemitigating
circumstanceofvoluntarysurrenderappreciatedinhisfavorthusoffsettingtheaggravating
circumstanceofuseofsuperiorstrengthand

2.
TheaccusedappellantMadridissentencedtosuffertheindeterminatepenaltyofsix
(6)yearsandone(1)dayofprisionmayor,asminimum,toseventeen(17)years,four(4)
monthsandone(1)dayofreclusiontemporalasmaximumwiththeaggravatingcircumstance
oftheuseofsuperiorstrengthconsideredagainsthim.

TheappealeddecisionisAFFIRMEDinallotheraspects.

SOORDERED.24

Petitionerassignsthefollowingissuesinhispetition:

1.
DidtheCagayanRTCboltsofarfromSCbearings

(a)
innotsatisfyingtheconstitutionalstandardofclearanddistinctarticulationofthefacts

andlawintrialcourtdecisionwriting?

(b)
innotcorrectlyinterpretingSec.1,Rule132oftheRevisedRulesonEvidenceby
sayingitheardtheprosecutionwitnesses'testimoniesevenwhenalltheprosecutionoffered
forRemediosandMerdelyn'sdirectexaminationweretheiraffidavitsandinsettingasidethe
requirementoforaltestimonyfordirectexamination(which,unlikeaffidavits,givesoccasion
forjudicialobservationofwitnessdeportment?

(a)
infailingtoapplytheSC'stimegaptest?

(b)
indisregardingtheSC'snaturaltendencyrule?

(c)
inglossingovertheSC'sunacceptableidentificationtest?

(d)
inignoringtheSC'scommonexperiencestandard?

(e)
inpassingovertheSC'smotivetest?

(f)
inneglectingtherelative'scontratestimonytestpointedoutbytheSC?

(g)
innotmakingastatementversusphysicalevidencecomparisonordainedbytheSC?

(h)
innotapplyingtheSC'schronologytest?

(i)
inoverlookingthenohide,noappearance,nosurrenderfactorspointedoutbythe
SC?

(j)
inslightingthevictimofidentificationbyassociationpossibilitysingledoutinaSC
decisionbefore?

(k)
innotapplyingtheSC'sequipoisetestinfavorofpetitioner?

(l)
innotadheringtotheSC'ssearchfortruthstandard?

(m)
innotrecognizingtheoperativelegaleffectofapleaofselfdefensebycoaccused
ArsenioSunidointhathealoneowneduptothekilling?

2.
DidtheCourtofAppealssofarsanctionallthose15departuresbytheCagayanRTC
astocallfortheSupremeCourt'sexerciseofthepowerofsupervision?25

Asisoftenthecase,thequestionhereiswhethertheprosecutionevidenceissufficientto
provebeyondreasonabledoubtpetitioner'sguilt.Ingeneral,weadheretotheprinciplethat
theassessmentmadebythetrialjudgeofthecredibilityofwitnesseswillnotbedisturbedon

appeal.26Havingheardthetestimonyofthewitnessesandobservedtheirdemeanoronthe
witnessstand,thejudgeisinabetterpositiontodeterminetheissueofcredibility.27
However,wherethereisashowingthatsomefactsorcircumstancesofweightandsubstance
whichwouldhaveaffectedtheresultofthecasehavebeenoverlooked,misunderstoodor
misapplied,wewillnothesitatetomakeourownevaluationoftheevidence.28Suchisthe
casehere.

First.Thetrialcourt'sdecision,forallitslength23pagescontainsnoanalysisofthe
evidenceofthepartiesnorreferencetoanylegalbasisinreachingitsconclusion.Itcontains
nothingmorethanasummaryofthetestimoniesofthewitnessesofbothparties.Theonly
discussionoftheevidenceisbefoundinthefollowingparagraphs:

TheirtestimonyconvincedtheCourt.Ontheotherhand,accused'sevidencebearstheindicia
offabrication.Defensewitnessesfromtheirdemeanor,manneroftestifyingandevasive
answerswerefarfromcredible.

Fromtheevidenceonrecord,theCourtbelievesandsoholdthattheprosecutionhas
satisfactorilyprovedtheaccused[guilty]beyondreasonabledoubt.Prosecution'switnesses
testifiedinastraightforwardmanner.

Consideringthecircumstancesimmediatelypriortothecommissionofthecrime,andthe
mannerthesamewascommitted,theCourtbelievesthattheaggravatingcircumstancesof
evidencepremeditationandabuseofsuperiorstrength,aswellasavailmentofmeansto
preventthedeceasedfromdefendinghimselfweresufficientlyestablished.Theseverality,
locationandseverityoftheinjuriesinflictedaswellastheirnature,provedthattherewere
morethanoneassailants.Murdershouldhavebeentheproperoffensecharged.However,
wecanonlyconvicttheaccusedforhomicide.29

Thedecisiondoesnotindicatewhatthetrialcourtfoundinthetestimoniesoftheprosecution
witnessestoconsiderthesame"straightforward"when,aswillpresentlybeshown,theyare
infactcontradictoryandconfused.Nordoesthedecisioncontainanyjustificationforthe
appreciationofaggravatingcircumstancesagainsttheaccused,muchlesssomebasisfor
findingconspiracyamongthem.

Inviewoftheweightgiventoitsassessmentofawitness'credibilityonappeal,thetrialcourt
shouldexertefforttoensurethatitsdecisionspresentacomprehensiveanalysisoraccountof
thefactualandlegalfindingswhichwouldsubstantiallyaddresstheissuesraisedbythe
parties.

Art.VIII,14oftheConstitutionprovides:

Nodecisionshallberenderedbyanycourtwithoutexpressingthereinclearlyanddistinctly
thefactsandthelawonwhichitisbased.


Nopetitionforreviewormotionforreconsiderationofdecisionofthecourtshallberefused
duecourseordeniedwithoutstatingthebasistherefor.

Inthesamevein,Rule120,2oftheRulesofCriminalProcedureprovides:

Formandcontentsofjudgments.Thejudgmentmustbewrittenintheofficiallanguage,
personallyanddirectlypreparedbythejudgeandsignedbyhimandshallcontainclearlyand
distinctlyastatementofthefactsprovedoradmittedbytheaccusedandthelawuponwhich
thejudgmentisbased.

Ifitisofconviction,thejudgmentshallstate(a)thelegalqualificationoftheoffense
constitutedbytheactscommittedbytheaccused,andtheaggravatingormitigating
circumstancesattendingthecommissionthereof,ifthereareany(b)theparticipationofthe
accusedinthecommissionoftheoffense,whetherasprincipal,accomplice,oraccessory
afterthefact(c)thepenaltyimposedupontheaccusedand(d)thecivilliabilityordamages
causedbythewrongfulacttoberecoveredfromtheaccusedbytheoffendedparty,ifthereis
any,unlesstheenforcementofthecivilliabilitybyaseparateactionhasbeenreservedor
waived.

Incaseofacquittal,unlessthereisaclearshowingthattheactfromwhichthecivilliability
mightarisedidnotexist,thejudgmentshallmakeafindingonthecivilliabilityoftheaccused
infavoroftheoffendedparty.

Thedecisionfailstocomplywiththeseconstitutionalandstatutoryrequirements.Aswesaid
inourdecisioninPeoplev.Bugarin:30

Therequirementthatthedecisionsofcourtsmustbeinwritingandthattheymustsetforth
clearlyanddistinctlythefactsandthelawonwhichtheyarebasedservesmanyfunctions.It
isintended,amongotherthings,toinformthepartiesofthereasonorreasonsforthedecision
sothatifanyofthemappeals,hecanpointouttotheappellatecourtthefindingoffactsorthe
rulingsonpointsoflawwithwhichhedisagrees.Morethanthat,therequirementisan
assurancetothepartiesthat,inreachingjudgment,thejudgedidsothroughtheprocessesof
legalreasoning.Itis,thus,asafeguardagainsttheimpetuosityofthejudge,preventinghim
fromdecidingbyipsedixit.VouchsafedneithertheswordnorthepursebytheConstitution
butnonethelessvestedwiththesovereignprerogativeofpassingjudgmentonthelife,liberty
orpropertyofhisfellowmen,thejudgemustultimatelydependonthepowerofreasonfor
sustainedpublicconfidenceinthejustnessofhisdecision.Thedecisionofthetrialcourtin
thiscasedisrespectsthejudicialfunction.

Second.TheCourtofAppealssustainedpetitioner'sconvictiononthestrengthofthe
testimoniesgivenbyRemediosandMerdelynSunido.Noindependentevidence,however,
incriminatingpetitioneronthedeathofArsenioSunidohasbeenpresentedbythe

prosecution.Althoughtheyclaimedthatpetitionerheldthevictim'srighthandwhileArsenio
stabbedhim,theirtestimonyshouldhavebeengiventhestrictestscrutinyinviewofthefact
thatRemediosandMerdelynSunidoarethewifeanddaughter,respectively,ofthevictim.31

Infact,MerdelynSunidogavecontradictoryaccountsofhowherfatherwasstabbedby
Arseniowhilepetitionerallegedlyheldthevictim.Thesecontradictionsraisedoubtson
whethershereallywitnessedtheincidentandonthepartallegedlyplayedbypetitioner.More
specifically,thecontradictionsandinconsistenciesrelatetothefollowingquestions:Did
Arseniogotothevictim'shouseinthemorningofMay21,1992?Didthevictimprovokehis
brotherArseniointoaquarrel?Wasthereorwastherenotaquarrel?Whenwasthevictim
attackedbyArsenioandthelatter'scompanions,whichallegedlyincludedpetitioner,while
allegedlytakingJerryEscobartohishouseorafterhehaddonesoandthevictimwas
returningtohishouse?Aftertheincident,whatvehicledidtheassailantusewhilefleeing,
Arsenio'sTamarawvehicleoratricycle?

InheraffidavitbeforetheBugueypolicewhichformedherdirectexamination,Merdelyn
stated:

Q04WhydidyouruncleArsenioSunido,stabyourfather?

A BeforetheincidentmyuncleArsenioSunido,cametoourhouseandforciblytookthe
rooster(fightingcock)insideourpoultryandtherewhenmyfatherAngelSunidoarrivedmy
mothertoldhimthathisroosterplace[d]insideourpoultrywastakenbyhisbrotherArsenio,
soonMay21,1992,myfatheranduncleArsenioandsomevisitorshavedrinkingsessionat
ourresidenceandtherenotlongafter,myfatherinquiremyuncleregardingtheroosterwhich
wastakenbymyunclewhichbeguntheirquarrelandafterthedrinkingspree,myfather
accompaniedhisfriendJerryEscobartohishouseandwhenmyfatherreturnthatwasthe
timewhenwhen(sic)MelencioMadridandonecompanionholdmyfatherwhileuncleArsenio
Sunidostabbedseveraltimesthatcauseshisdeathalongtheroadnearthehouseofmy
uncle.32

However,Merdelynalsotestifiedandhertestimonyisshotthroughandthroughwith
contradictionsandinconsistencies,asthefollowingportionsofthetranscriptofstenographic
notesshow:

Q:
Letusmakeitclear,yousaidthatyourfatheraccompaniedJerryEscobartotheir
house,inwhosehousedidyourfathercamefrom?

A:
Fromourhouse,sir.

Q:
Now,whenyourfatheraccompaniedJerryEscobartotheirhouse,whathappened
next?

A:
HewasmetbyMelecioMadrid,acompanion.

Q:
Andyousaidtheymetyourfather,whatdidtheseMelecioMadridandacompanion
do?

A:
Theyheldmyfather,sir.

Q:
Howdidtheyholdyourfather?

A:
Witnessraisedherbotharms.

Q:
Now,yousaidthese2personsnamingMelecioMadridandacompanionheldthe
handsofyourfather,whathandwhenthisMelMadridheld?

A:
Lefthand,sir.

Q:
Whathandalsodidthe[companion]ofMelecioMadridhold?

A:
Righthand,sir.

Q:
Whenthese2personsMelecioMadridandacompanionheldthehandsofyourfather
upward,whathappenednext?

A:
Myunclestabbedmyfather,sir.

Q:
Wasyourfatherhit?

A:
Yes,sir.3

Butwhenoncrossexamination,Merdelyntestified:

Q:
Yousaidawhileagothatwhileyourfather[was]accompanyingGerryEscobarin
goinghome,twopersonsonewasMelecioMadridandunidentifiedpersonaccostedyour
father,amIcorrect?

A:
Yes,sir.

Q:
ThatwasthetimewhentheywerestillgoingtothehouseofGerryEscobarasalleged
byyouawhileago,amIcorrect?

A:
No,sir.

xxxxxxxxx


Q:
DidyoueverseeyouruncleArsenioSunidobetween7:00o'clockinthemorningand
immediatelybeforetheallegedstabbingincident?

A:
Yes,sir.

Q:
Wherewasyouruncleatthetimewhenyousawhim?

A:
Outsidetheirhouse.

Q:
DidyourfatherdoanythingwhenyousawyouruncleArsenioSunido?

A:
Therewas,sir.

Q:
Whatdidyourfatherdo?

A:
Heinquiredaboutalostchicken.

Q:
Then,whatdidyourfatherdoafteraskingArsenioSunidoaboutalostrooster?

A:
Nothing.

xxxxxxxxx

Q:
HedidnotevenprovokehisbrotherArsenioSunido?

A:
Hedidnotsir,heonlyinquiredalostchicken.

Q:
YouwanttoimpresstheCourtthatyourfatherdidnotprovokeArsenioSunido,isthat
whatyoumean?

A:
Yes,sir.34

OnwhetherArseniowenttothevictim'shouseinthemorningofMay21,1992andthe
brothershadanaltercation,Merdelynmadestatementsevenmoreirreconcilablefromthe
previousonesshemade,manifestingatendencytoimproviseandembellishherstorywhen
confrontedwithherinconsistencies.Toquote:

Q:
ConsideringthatyouinsistthatyouruncleArsenioSunidowaspresentinyourhouse
inthatmorningofMay21,1992,asappearinginyouraffidavitandyoualsoinsistduringthe
directandcrossexaminationthatyouruncleArsenioSunidowasnottherepresent,whichis
correctnow,yourstatementinyouraffidavitoryourstatementinthedirectexaminationandin
thecrossexamination?


A:
Mystatementintheaffidavit,sir.

Q:
Sowhatiscorrectthenwastheoneincorporatedintheaffidavitandyouconfirmed
thatthebrothersArsenioSunidoandyourfatherquarrelledeachother?

A:
Hejustinformedhimsomething,sir.

xxxxxxxxx

COURT:

Q:
Didtheyquarrel?

A:
No,sir.

ATTY.BULSECO:

Q:
Soyouareagainchangingyouranswerinyouraffidavitparticularlyasappearingin
paragraph8thatyourunclequarrelledwithyourfather?

A:
No,sir.

Q:
Whichiscorrectthen,theyquarreledortheydidnotquarrel?

A:
Theyquarrelled,sir.

Q:
Howlongdidyourfatherandyourunclequarreleachother?

A:
Alongwhile,sir.

Q:
YousaidthatGerryEscobarandoneRudystayedinyourhousefrom6:00o'clockin
themorningupto11:00o'clockonMay21,1992,buttheyonlystarteddrinkingat11:00
o'clockinthemorningisthatcorrect?

A:
Yes,sir.

Q:
Andfromthatperiodoftime,wasyourunclepresent?

A:
Hewasnottherepresent,sir.35

Thus,inheraffidavitdatedJune2,1992,36Merdelyntestifiedthatheruncle,ArsenioSunido,
joinedAngelSunido,JerryEscobarandacertainRudyindrinkingliquoratAngel'shouse.

But,severaltimesduringhercrossexamination,Merdelyntestifiedthatherunclewasnot
presentduringherfather'sdrinkingsessionwithhisfriends.37Whenconfrontedwiththe
discrepancyinheraffidavitandhertestimony,Merdelynansweredthatherstatementinher
affidavitwasthetruth,thatherunclewasindeedintheirhouseinthemorningofMay21,
1992,38onlytodenylaterthatherunclewasintheirhousefromsixo'clockto11o'clockin
themorning.39Thatwasnottheendofheranswertothequestion.Inthenextbreath,
Merdelynassertedherunclewaspresentatthedrinkingsession,althoughhestayedfora
shortwhileonlyataround10:30inthemorningofthatdate.40

Merdelynshowedthesametendencytovacillatebetweentwocontradictorystatementswith
regardtothequarrelwhicharosebetweenherfatherandheruncle.Inheraffidavit,Merdelyn
statedthatduringthedrinkingsession,herfatherinquiredabouttheroosterwhichArsenio
hadtaken,thusprovokingaquarrelbetweenthetwobrothers.41Butwhenaskedlater
whetherherfatherandunclehadanaltercationoverthesamesubjectmatter,Merdelyn
deniedthattheyhad.Whenaskedagainwhetherherfatherandunclequarrelled,Merdelyn
laterrepliedthatthey,infact,quarrelledforalongwhile.42

EventhevehicleallegedlyusedbyArsenioSunidoandpetitionerinfleeingfromthesceneof
thecrimeisuncertain.Merdelynnarratedinheraffidavitthataftertheincident,petitionertook
atricycletoescape.4However,nowhereinhertestimonydidshementionthetricycle.
Instead,shesaidshesawpetitioner'sTamarawjeepneyparkedinfrontofArsenio'shouse.
44ConsideringthatMerdelyntestifiedthatshewasonlyfivemetersawayfromtheplace
whereherfatherwasallegedlystabbed,45shecouldnothavefailedtonoticethatpetitioner
alightedfromajeepney.

EvenmoretellingistheinconsistencyinMerdelyn'stestimonywhenArsenioSunido,
allegedlywiththeassistanceofpetitionerandanothercompanion,attackedAngel.Inher
affidavit,Merdelynnarratedthatherfatherwasattackedwhilereturningtotheirhouseafter
accompanyingJerryEscobarhome.46However,onthestand,Merdelynchangedherstory
andtestifiedthatitwasonthewaytoJerryEscobar'shousethatherfatherwasassaulted.47
Severaltimesmoreafterthisinhertestimony,Merdelynvacillatedastotheactualtimeher
fatherwasattacked,whetherbeforeorafterAngelallegedlybroughtJerryEscobarhome.48

Inconsistenciesonnegligibledetailsdonotdestroythetruthofawitness'testimony,solong
astheyreferonlytocollateralorincidentalmatters.Butbynomeanscantheinconsistencies
andcontradictionsinMerdelyn'stestimonybecharacterizedastrivialorinsignificant.Her
propensitytomakecontradictorystatementsreflectsherownuncertaintyastotheactual
eventsleadingtoherfather'sdeath.Itisclearthatshespeaksnotfrommemoryor
experience.Shecannotevengiveadefinitechronologyoftheeventsthattranspiredbefore
herfatherwaskilled.Weareconvincedthatshewassimplyfashioningherstoryandmaking
spurofthemomentimprovisationsinanattempttorenderhertestimonycredible.Insteadof
sodoing,sheexhibitedadispositiontofabricatethatmakeshertestimonyunworthyofbelief
andcredence.


Wehaveheldthatswornstatementsexecutedbeforepoliceofficersareusuallyincomplete
and,therefore,contradictionsintheswornstatementofawitnessandhertestimonyare
frequentlybrushedasideasinconsequentialsolongastheyrefertominorandreconcilable
matters.Butthisruledoesnotapplywhenthediscrepanciestouchonsubstantialmattersas
inthecaseatbar.49

FurthererodingMerdelyn'stestimonyisherrecitalofpetitioner'sparticipationinthekillingof
herfather.Sheclaimedthatpetitionerandanotherpersonheldthevictimbyraisinghisarms,
withpetitionerholdingtherighthandwhilehiscompanionheldthelefthandofthevictim.50
Petitionerisanoldman,almost64yearsold.51Ittaxesone'scredulitytobetoldthat
petitionercouldholdthemuchyoungervictimsothatthelattercouldbemoreeasilyattacked
byArsenio.Itisnoteworthythatnoattemptwasevenmadetoidentifythethirdpersonwho
allegedlyheldtheotherarmofthevictimtofacilitatetheattackbyArsenio.Merdelyndidnot
evendescribehisappearance.Indeed,theinformation52onlymentionsArsenioSunidoand
EligioMadridashavingconspiredtokillAngelSunido.Nomentionwasmadeofthis
mysteriousman,evenasaJohnDoe,leadingustothinkthatheexistsonlyasafigmentof
MerdelynandRemediosSunido'simagination.

Evidence,tobebelieved,mustnotonlyproceedfromthemouthofatrustworthywitnessbut
mustlikewisebecredibleinitself.Whilethereisnohardandfastruletodeterminethe
truthfulnessofone'stestimony,thatwhichconforms,however,tothequotidianknowledge,
observationandexperienceofmanisoftendeemedtobereliable.5

NorcanthetestimonyofRemediosSunidobegivencredenceanymorethanMerdelyn's
testimonycanbebelieved.Inlieuofdirectexaminationincourt,theprosecutionpresented
theaffidavitwhichRemediosexecutedbeforethepoliceonJune1,1992.54Insaidaffidavit,
Remediosstated:

Q WhysaidArsenio[Sunido],yourbrotherinlawstabhisbrother,yourhusbandwhich
causedhisdeath?

A Theyhaveamisunderstandinginconnectionwithachickenonly.

Q Whenandwherethisincidenthappened?

A OnMay21,1992,at12:00o'clocknoonmoreorlessatBrgy.Maddalero,Buguey,
Cagayanparticularlyattheroadeastofourhouse.

Q Willyounarrateinbrief[surrounding]circumstanceshowtheincidenthappened?

A Thatpriortotheincident,myhusbandandhisbrotherArsenio[Sunido]haveaquarrel
regardingtothechickenwhichweplacedinsideourpoultry,becausemybrotherinlaw

Arsenio[Sunido]claimedtobetheowner,however,onthatdaytheyjuststop[their]quarrel,
butonMay21,1992,wehaveavisitorandhaveadrinkingspreeandthereaftermyhusband
Angel[Sunido]isunderthe[influence]ofliquorhemadeprovocationtohisbrotherArsenio
[Sunido]andtheretheybegun[their]quarrel.

Q Afterthatwhathappenednextifany?

A Aftertheyhavefinishedtheirdrinkingspreewith[our]visitorhewentand
accompaniedhimintheir[residence]andtherewhenmyhusbandcamebackthatwasthe
timethatmybrotherinlawArsenio[Sunido]togetherwithhiscompaniontookholdandstab
myhusbandseveraltimescausinghisdeath.

Q DoyouknowthecompanionofArsenio[Sunido]atthattime?

A OneonlyofthemwhomIknowhisnameMELENCIOMADRIDwhiletheotherIdon't
knowhisname,buttheyarebothresident[s]ofCasiitan,Gonzaga,Cagayan.

Q WhatwastheparticipationofthecompanionofArsenio[Sunido]atthattime?

A TheytookholdofmyhusbandwhereArsenio[Sunido]stabmyhusbandseveraltimes,
onthedifferentpartsofhisbody.

Q Afterthatwhathappenednextifany?

A Isawhimrideonthe[tricycle]ofMelecioMadridandtheywentaway.55

Butduringhercrossexamination,RemediosSunidotestifiedasfollows:

xxxxxxxxx

ATTY.BULSECO:

Q:
YousaidinyouraffidavitthatonMay21,1992,yourhusbandandvisitorhavea
drinkingspree,andyousaidthatArsenioSunidowasnotthere,howdidheprovokeAngel
Sunido?

A:
Yes,sir.

Q:
Andyoualsosaidthattheybeguntheirquarrelthere,isthatcorrect?

A:
Yes,sir.

COURT:


Q:
Whendidyourhusbandprovokeyourbrotherinlaw?

A:
ItwasMay,sir.

Q:
Whatdate?

A:
May22,sir.

Q:
AreyousurethatyourhusbandwasstabbedonMay21,1992inwhatoccasion?

A:
Therewasnooccasion,sir.

Q:
Isitnotafactthatatthetimeofthedrinkingspreeyourhusbandprovokedyour
brotherinlaw?

A:
Yes,sir.

Q:
Therefore,yourbrotherinlawwasalsopresentinthedrinkingspree?

A:
No,sir.Hewasintheirhousehedidnotparticipateinthedrinkingspree.

Q:
Inwhatparticularplacedidyourhusbandprovokeyourbrotherinlaw?

A:
Inourbackyard,sir.

Q:
Andthiswasafterthedrinkingsession?

A:
Yes,sir.

Q:
Whyyourhusbandprovokedyourbrotherinlaw?

A:
Becauseofthechicken,sir.

Q:
Whenyourhusbandprovokedyourbrotherinlaw,wereyourvisitorsstillaround?

A:
Yes,sir.

Q:
Whowasthatvisitor?

A:
Cousin,sir.

Q:
Whatisthename?


A:
JerryEscobarandonecompanion,sir.

xxxxxxxxx

ATTY.BULSECO:

Q:
Youstatedinyouraffidavit,thatoneoftheaccusedEligioMadridallegedlyheldyour
husbandwhentheaccusedArsenioSunidostabbedyourhusband,isitnotafactthat
immediatelypriortothestabbingincident,yousawMelencioMadridandArsenioSunido
insideatamaraojeepney?

A:
No,sir.

Q:
HowfarwereyouwhenyousawEulogioMadridheldyourhusbandandArsenio
Sunidoallegedlystabbedyourhusband?

A:
7to10metersaway,sir.

Q:
Andyouwerebesideyourhouseatthattime,isitnot?

A:
No,sir.

Q:
WillyoupleasetelltheHonorableCourtthenwherewastheaccusedallegedlycame
frombeforethestabbingincident?

A:
Fromtheirhouse,sir.

Q:
ForhowlongatimedidyoulearnthatyourlatehusbandprovokedArsenioSunido?

A:
Ididnotwitness,sir.56

Whenfurtherquestionedduringherredirectexamination,RemediosSunidorelated:

FISCALMIGUEL:

Q:
InyouranswertoquestionNo.8,thattherewasaquarrelbetweenyourhusbandand
yourbrotherinlawregardingwithachicken,whenwasthequarrelstarted?

A:
May21,1992,sir.

Q:
Whattime?

A:
Icannotremember,sir.

Q:
Wasitbeforeyourhusbandstarteddrinkingorafter?

A:
After,sir.

Q:
Howmanytimesdidyourhusbandprovokeyourbrotherinlaw?

A:
Onlyonce,sir.

Q:
Yousaidthatthequarrelstartedinconnectionwithachicken,whatwasthechickenall
aboutthatstartthequarrel?

A:
Mybrotherinlawclaimedthatthechickenwashisown,sir.

Q:
Andwhenyourbrotherinlawclaimedthatthechickenwashisown,whatdidyour
husbandtellhimif[you]know?

A:
Hetoldmewhyhetookhischicken,sir.

Q:
AndthisconfrontationbetweenyourhusbandandyourbrotherinlawwasinMa[y]21,
1992?

A:
Yes,sir.

Q:
Andthisstartedwhatyoucalledtheprovocationinthepartofyourhusband?

A:
Itwasnotaprovocation,sir.

Q:
Whatdoyoumeanthen?

A:
Heinsistedclaimingthechicken,sir.

COURT:

Q:
Whoinsisted?

A:
Myhusband,sir.57

Ascanbeseen,RemediosSunido'stestimony,likethatofherdaughterMerdelyn,isreplete
withinconsistenciesandcontradictionsthatrenderitsveracitydoubtful.Heranswers
oftentimesarenotresponsivetothequestionspropoundedtoher.Sheevencommitteda
mistakeastothedatewhentheprovocationwasmadebyherhusband,statingadatewhich

isadayafterhedied.

Moreover,inheraffidavit,shestatedthatpetitionertookatricycleinescapingafterthe
incident.But,asstatedearlier,ithasalreadybeenproventhatpetitionerusedaTamaraw
jeepneyfortransportation.ConsideringthatRemediostestifiedthatshewasonlysevento10
metersawayfromtheplacewhereherhusbandwasattacked,shecouldnothavefailedto
noticewhattypeofvehiclepetitionerwasusingifsheactuallywitnessedtheevent.Remedios'
dubiousnarrativeofherhusband'skillingfailstoconvinceus.Thetenorofhertestimony
suggeststhatitisbasednotonwhatsheremembersbutmoreonwhatsheimaginestohave
occurredatthetimeherhusbandwaskilled.InPeoplev.Lucero,weheldthattheunnatural
andcontradictorytestimonyofawitness,coupledwithsubstantialdiscrepanciesbetweenhis
testimonyandhisswornstatement,makeshimunreliableasawitness.58

Likewise,theconsiderablelengthoftimewhichlapsedbeforeMerdelynandRemedios
Sunidomadetheirstatementsbeforethepoliceputsintoquestiontheclaimthattheyactually
witnessedthekillingofAngelSunido.Itistruethatdelayinreportingacrime,ifadequately
explained,isnotsufficienttocastdoubtonthetruthfulnessofawitness'testimonyas,for
instance,thedelaymaybeexplainedbythenaturalreticenceofmostpeopleandtheir
abhorrencetogetinvolvedinacriminalcase.59

Buttheeyewitnessesinvolvedinthiscasearethewifeanddaughterofthevictim.Onewould
naturallyexpectthattheywouldnotbeanxioustohelpthepolicearrestthepersonorpersons
responsibleforthekillingoftheirlovedone.Insteadofdoingso,however,Remediosand
MerdelynSunidoonlymadetheirstatementstothepoliceonJune1,199260andJune2,
1992,61respectively,morethanoneweekaftertheincidenttheyallegedlywitnessed.This
factismadeevenmorestrangebythestatementsofRemediosandMerdelynSunidothatnot
longaftertheincident,BarangayCouncilmanAmordelosSantosarrivedfollowedby
membersoftheBugueyPolice.62Inasimilarcasewhereadaughterdelayedinreportingto
theproperauthoritieswhowasresponsibleforherfather'sdeath,theCourtheld:

...Shehadaveryearlyopportunitytodosobecausethepoliceofficersofthetownwere
thereatthesceneofthecrime,whereshewasalso,justtwohoursafterherfatherwasshot
andkilled.Themostnaturalreactionofawitnesstosuchanincident,indeedaresgestae,
wouldhavebeentotellhermotheraboutit,andsubsequentlythepoliceauthorities,whohad,
asearlieradvertedto,respondedtothesummonsforhelptwohoursafterthereported
murder.Humannaturewouldhavecompelledhertodeclarethatshehadseen,andinfact,
couldidentify,theassailantofherfather.Butshewithheldthatvitalinformationfrom
everybodyforanunreasonablelengthoftime(atleastfourdaysafterthecommissionofthe
crime,byherownstatement),whichmakeshertestimonysuspect.Teresita'stestimony
smacksoffabricationand,therefore,cannotsupporta
conviction.6

ThetestimoniesofMerdelynandRemediosSunidodonotprovebeyondreasonabledoubt

thatpetitionerparticipatedinthekillingofAngelSunido.Wecannotacceptsuchtestimonies
asestablishingtheguiltofpetitioner.AswesaidinPeoplev.Comesario:64

...Anaccusedenjoysthepresumptionofinnocence.Heneednotprovewhatislegally
presumed.Ifhesodesireshemaypresentevidenceonhisbehalf,butnomatterhowweakit
is,hestilldeservesanacquittal.Thisisbecausetheprosecutionmustnotrelyonthe
weaknessoftheevidenceforthedefensebutonthestrengthofitsownevidence.Unlessthe
prosecutionhasoverturnedthepresumptionofinnocence,acquittalisinevitable.

Indeed,ArsenioSunidoadmittedthathewassolelyresponsibleforthedeathofhisbrother
AngelSunido.Thus,hetestified:

Q:
WhattimedidyouarriveinMaddaleroparticularlyonMay21,1992?

A:
Between11:00o'clockto12:00o'clock.

Q:
Whatunusualincidentifanythattranspiredjustimmediatelyafteryouarrivedat
Maddalero,Buguey,Cagayanbetween11:00to12:00ofMay21,1992?

A:
Atthattimewearrivedtheplace,wenoticedthedeceasedalreadyprovoking.

Q:
Towhomwasheprovoking?

A:
Anybodythatpassesbyatthattime.

Q:
Andwhenyounoticedthathewasprovokinganybodythatpassesby,what
happened?

A:
Becausehewasverynearwherewewere,hemetuswiththeintentionofstabbingus
withhisknife.

Q:
Weretherepersonspresentwhenheattemptedtostabyou?

A:
Therewereotherpeoplesir,oneisJerryEscobarwhowaswithhimindrinking.

Q:
CanyoutelltheCourttheidentityornamesoftheotherpersonspresentwhenthe
deceasedattemptedtostabyou?

A:
Icannamesomeofthem,sir.

Q:
CanyounametothisHonorableCourt?

A:
RudywhoisfromIlocosGerryEscobarIcannotidentifytheothers.


Q:
HowfarwereyouinrelationtoAngelSunidoatthefirsttimeheattemptedtostab
you?

A:
Four(4)metersawayfromme,sir.

Q:
YousaidyoudrovetheTamarawjeepney,wheredidyouparktheTamarawjeepney
inrelationtothehouseofAngelSunido?

A:
Nearmyyard,sir.

Q:
AndhowfarthatpassengerjeepneyinrelationtoyouwhenAngelSunidoattemptedto
inflictinjuriestoyou?

A:
Aroundfive(5)metersonly.

Q:
Andwhatdidyoudowhenheattemptedtostabyou?

A:
BothofuswithEligioMadridalightedfromtheTamaraw.

COURT:

Q:
Whatdidhethreatenyouwith?

A:
"Immuco"knifewith8inchesmoreorlesslong.

xxxxxxxxx

Q:
Youdemonstratehowhethreatenedyouwiththatknife?

A:
Witnessdemonstratedrushingtowardsme(CourtInterpreter)saying"Iwillkillyou
now"patayenkatatta,withtheknifeswininginanupwardmotion(Witnessassumingthathe
isAngelSunido).Andwiththeknifewithhisrighthandindownwardmotiondirectedtowards
me(CourtInterpreter).

APPMIGUEL:

Q:
Howfardidthedeceasedreachyou?

A:
Abouttwo(2)meters.

Q:
Now,whenhereachedtwometersawayfromyou,yousaidyoualightedfromthe
Tamarawjeepney,isthatright?


A:
Yes,sir.

Q:
Youalightedtowardshimorawayfromhim?

A:
WhenIalightedfromtheTamarawjeepneyImovedback.

Q:
DoestheTamarawjeepneyhaveadoor?

A:
Itsanopendoor.

Q:
Youjumpedusingthatopendoorwhilestoppeddriving?

A:
Yes,sir.

Q:
Andnecessarilyyourmovementwastowardsthedeceasedorwhenyoualightedfrom
theTamarawjeepneyyourdirectionwastowardsthedeceased?

A:
Yes,sir,Ihavenootherchoice.

xxxxxxxxx

COURT:

Crossexamination?

xxxxxxxxx

ATTY.BULSECO,JR.:

Q:
Atthatprecisemoment,whenyoualightedfromtheTamarawjeepneywherewas
EligioMadridseated?

A:
Attherightside.

Q:
YouwanttoimpresstheCourt,beforehealightedhewasseatedrightbesideyou,is
thatright?

A:
Yes,sir.

Q:
Whathappenedafteryoualighted?

A:
IdidnotseeMr.EligioMadridbecauseheranaway.


Q:
Mypointis,yousaidthatyoualightedfromtheTamarawjeepneywhenthedeceased
wasgoingtowardsyouwithaknife,afteralightingfromthatTamarawjeepney,what
happenednext?

A:
WhenIwasretreatingIkeptmywatchonhim.

COURT:

Q:
YouretreatedtowardstheTamarawjeepney,isthatright?

A:
YesbecauseIwasencircledandafterthatI[slipped]andfell.

Q:
Andafteryoufelldownfacingupward,whathappenednext?

A:
WhenIfell,IkeptonanticipatingwhatmovewouldhedonextandthatwasthetimeI
wasableto[grab]him,sir.

Q:
Washedr[u]nkatthattime?

A:
Yes,sir.

Q:
Now,whenyouwereanticipatingtheattempt,whathappenednext?

A:
Afterwrestedpossessionoftheknifefromhim,Ilostmycool.Ihaveamental
blockoutandstabbedhim.

Q:
Howmanytimesdidyoustabhim?

A:
Icannotrecallanymore.

Q:
Now,whenyoufirststabbedhim,washeontopofyouoryouwereontopofhim?

A:
Hewasontop,sir.

Q:
Andhewasverydrunk?

A:
ThatswhatInoticed,sir.

Q:
Didyounotpushhimwhenyouwereabletowrestlepossessionoftheknife?

A:
IdidnotknowhowmanytimesIstabbedhimbecauseIhaveamentalblockout.

xxxxxxxxx

COURT:

Q:
Now,wereyoulyingdownatalltimeswhenyoukeptonstabbingyourbrother?

A:
Yes,sir.

Q:
Therewasneveranytimethatyouwerestanding?

A:
None.WhenIgotbackmysensesIdroppedtheknife.

Q:
Myquestionis,inallthesenine(9)stabwoundsthatyouinflicted,wasthereanytime
thatyouwerestanding?

A:
NonethatIknow,ofthesewhereIstabbedmybrotherwhileinstandingposition.

ATTY.BULSECO,JR.:

Q:
Andafterrecoveringyoursenses,whatdidyoudoifany?

A:
AfterstabbingmybrotherIwantedtoembracehimforthereasonthatIdidnotreally
intendtokillhim.

Q:
Andwhathappenednext?

A:
AfterdroppingtheknifeIimmediatelysurrenderedmyselftoViceMayorAlipioValdez.

COURT:

Q:
Onthatsamedate?

A:
Yes,sir.65

ArsenioSunido'stestimonyiscredible.Therewasanimositybetweenhimandthedeceased
concerningthelossofafightingcock.Thedeceasedprovokedhimandhereactedby
stabbingthevictim.Thequarrelwasthusbetweenbrothers.Thereisnothingintherecordto
suggestthatpetitionerhadanypartinthatquarrel.HewasArsenio'semployer.Hehadno
reasontofeelaggrievedbythelossofthefightingcock.Andif,astheprosecutiontriedto
prove,Arseniohadmerelybeenprovokedbythedeceasedwhowasthendrunk,howcould
Arsenioandpetitionerhaveconspiredtocommitthecrime?Thefactisthatpetitionerand
ArseniohappenedtodropbyAngel'shousebecausetheywerebuyingpalaytomill.
Petitionerwastheownerofthreericemills,andArseniowasthemanagerofoneoftherice

mills.WhateverbusinesstiesexistedbetweenArsenioandpetitionerhavenobearingonthe
fightbetweenthebrothersAngelandArsenio.Nothavingparticipatedinanymannerinthe
fightbetweenthebrothers,petitionercannotbeheldresponsibleforAngel'sdeath.

WHEREFORE,thedecisionoftheCourtofAppealsisherebyREVERSEDandpetitioneris
herebyACQUITTEDofthecrimeofhomicide.

4.OfficeoftheCourtAdministratorvs.LOURDESF.BERMEJO,COURTSTENOGRAPHER
II,MUNICIPALTRIALCOURTINCITIES,PUERTOPRINCESACITY,March14,2008

DECISION

PERCURIAM:

BeforethisCourtisanadministrativecaseforDishonestyagainstLourdesF.Bermejo,Court
StenographerII,stationedattheMunicipalTrialCourtinCities(MTCC),PuertoPrincesaCity,
Palawan.

OnJanuary20,2004,thenCourtAdministratorPresbiteroJ.Velasco,Jr.[1]receivedaletter
fromConsolacionC.Santos,DirectorIVoftheCivilServiceCommission(CSC)Regional
OfficeNo.3,SanFernando,Pampanga,referringtotheOfficeoftheCourtAdministrator
(OCA)anundatedletterfromaconcernedcitizenaccusingBermejoofusinganothername
intakingherCivilServiceEligibilityExamination,whileanotherpersontookthesameexam
usingBermejosname.AttachedtotheletterisaMemorandumdatedAugust14,2003of
NoraS.Castro,ChiefPersonnelSpecialistofthesameCSCregionaloffice,reportingthat
uponverificationofthepicturesattachedtotheanonymousletterandthatofthePictureSeat
Planusedduringtheexam,thepersonwhopurportedlyimpersonatedBermejoandthe
pictureofthepersonintheseatplanusingthenameofBermejowasthesameperson.The
letteralsostatesthatbecauseofthisimpersonation,Bermejopassedtheexamandwasable
tousesaideligibilitytoobtainapermanentappointmentasastenographeratthePuerto
PrincesaCityMTCC.TherealBermejoallegedlyalsotookthesameexamunderadifferent
name,butfailed.

InanIndorsementdatedMarch15,2004,CourtAdministratorVelascoreferredthe
anonymouslettertoBermejoforcomment.InherhandwrittenComment,Bermejodeniedthe
allegationsandsaidthatshewentthroughtheproperprocesstoobtainhercivilservice
eligibility.Sheallegedthatthechargeswerethehandiworkofherhusbandsmistresswho
hadbeenthreateningtohaveherremovedfromtheservice.Asregardsthephotographs
attachedtotheletter,Bermejosaidthatshehadinquiredintotheidentityofthepersonwho
allegedlyusedhernameintheexamandfoundthatshewasachildhoodfriendofher
husband,butwascurrentlyservingsentenceforadulteryattheCorrectionalInstitutefor
Women.

BermejoalsoexplainedwhyshetookthetestinSanFernando,Pampanga.Sheallegedly
appliedtotaketheexaminManilasinceherappointmentwassettoexpireonJuly15,1998.
However,shewasinformedthatthenextexamwasonJune16,1998.Learningthatthere
wasanexamscheduledearlierinSanFernando,shewenttheretoseeifshecouldtakethe
examthereinstead.Andshedid.

Subsequently,onJuly16,2004,DeputyCourtAdministratorJoseP.PerezdirectedBermejo
toexplainthediscrepancybetweenthepictureonherpersonnelfileandthepictureofthe
personwhotooktheexaminationusinghername.AccordingtoDCAPerez,recordsofthe
OCAandoftheCSCshowedthatBermejowasnotthesamepersonwhousedBermejos
nameandtookthesubprofessionalexaminationonMay27,1998inSanFernando,
Pampanga.

Inherreply,Bermejoallegedthatshecouldnotexplainthediscrepancy.Shesaidthatshe
personallytooktheexamandattachedproofofhertravelfromPalawantoManilaandfrom
ManilatoPampanga,aswellasherApplicationReceipttotaketheMay27,2008examin
SanFernando,withhernameandpictureappearingtherein.

Bermejostatedthatthepersonshesuspectedtobebehindthecase,herhusbandsmistress,
hadalreadypassedaway.Shemaintainedthatshedidnotknowthepersoninthepictureand
saidshecouldnotfindthesameperson,astheplacewherethelatterallegedlylivedhad
beenrazedbyfire.Shesaidthattheonlydiscrepancyshecouldownuptowasthat
pertainingtoherbirthdate,listedinherCertificateofEligibilityasMay13,1965,whileher
birthcertificateindicatedMay13,1968.

Afterinvestigation,theOCAsubmitteditsevaluationandrecommendation,[2]statingthus:

EVALUATION:Thefocalissuehereisfactuali.e.,whetherornotanotherpersonactually
tooktheCivilServiceCommissionSubProfessionaleligibilitytestatSanFernando,
Pampangaon27May1998,usingthenameLourdesF.Bermejo.Intheaffirmative,the
corollarylegalissueproceedsi.e.,whetherornotitconstitutesdishonestyaswouldmerita
findingofadministrativeliabilityonthepartofrespondent.

Atbarisananonymouscomplaint,whichrespondentsuspectsisthehandiworkofher
husbands[]otherwoman[.]InevidenceisacertifiedcopyoftheSeatPlanofthe
examinationconcerned.Saiddocumentisofpublicrecordandindicatesthatitwasduly
checkedandcertifiedbytheroomexamineraswellascountercheckedbythesupervising
examiner.Thesameindubitablybearsoutadifferentpersonappearingtotaketheexam
usingthenameLourdesF.Bermejo,whereastherealLourdesF.Bermejo(whosepicture
matchestherespondents)istheoneseatedbesideher.Respondentfailstoovercomethis
evidence.Asidefromthepresumptionofregularityintheexecutionofofficialdocuments,
respondentinhertwolettersdidnotcategoricallydenythegenuinenessanddueexecutionof
theSeatPlan.Instead,sheimpliedlyadmittedthesamebyherdefensethatshecouldnot
anymorelocatethepersonappearingatophername.

Wenotethatittookmorethanfive(5)yearsforthesupposedconcernedcitizentoassailthe
anomaly,andthattheallegedmotiveimputedtocomplainantprobablyholdswater.However,
these,atbest,aremerelypersuasive,circumstantial,anddonotsufficetodiscountan
evidencewhichtenddirectlytoprovethefactinissue.

Comingtothenextissue,itisourconsideredopinionthatthecircumstancesconstitute
dishonesty,giventhefollowingconsiderations:

1)Respondentsinsistentlineisthatsheactuallytooktheexamwhichis
misleadingsincesheindeedtookthesamebutshekeptmumonthat(sic)sheletanother
personusehernameintakingthecivilserviceexamination

2)Respondentassertsthatthepersonwhopurportedlytooktheexamusingthe
nameLourdesF.Bermejowasherhusbandschildhoodpeerwhoisnowallegedlyserving
sentenceforadulteryandwhoselocalityoforiginwasrazedbyfire.Howshewasableto
figureoutthedetailsofsaidperson,whensheonlysupposedlymetherbrieflyduring[the]
examthattookplacemorethanfiveyearsago,atafarplacewhererespondentwasa
completestranger,issuspect

3)Itshouldbestressedthatasamatterofprocedure,theroomexaminers
assignedtosupervisetheconductofaCivilServiceexaminationcloselyexaminethepictures
submittedandaffixedonthePictureSeatPlan(CSCResolutionNo.953964,Obedencio,
JaimeA.).Theexaminerscarefullycomparetheappearanceofeachoftheexamineeswith
thepersoninthepicturesubmittedandaffixedonthePictureSeatPlan.Incaseswherethe
examineedoesnotlooklikethepersoninthepicturesubmittedandattachedon(sic)the
PSP,theexaminerwillnotallowthesaidpersontotaketheexamination(CSCResolutionNo.
955195,Taguinay,Ma.Theresa).

Hence,itisclearthatsomebodyelsetooktheCSCexamforrespondentLourdesF.Bermejo.
Forhertodenyitandactuallyreapthebenefitsofpassingthesame,wheninfactsomebody
elsetookitforher,constitutesdishonesty.

Insimilarcases,theHonorableCourtisconsistentinimposingthesternpenaltyofdismissal,
pursuanttoSection23,RuleXIVoftheOmnibusRulesImplementingBookVofExecutive
OrderNo.292.[Pls.see:CSCvs.ZenaidaT.Sta.Ana,A.M.No.P031696(April20,2003)
CruzandPaitimvs.CSC,G.R.No.144464(Nov.27,2001)Floriavs.SungaA.M.No.
CA0110PI(Nov.14,2001)].

RECOMMENDATION:RespectfullysubmittedforconsiderationoftheHonorableCourtisour
recommendationthat:

1.theinstantcomplaintbedocketedasaregularadministrativematterand

2.respondentLourdesF.Bermejo,(sic)befoundguiltyofdishonestyand
accordinglyDISMISSEDasCourtStenographerII,MTCC,PuertoPrincesaCity,with
forfeitureofallherretirementbenefits,exceptaccruedleavecredits,andwithprejudiceto
reemploymentinanybranchorinstrumentalityofthegovernment,including
governmentownedorcontrolledcorporations.

TheOCAsrecommendationiswelltaken.

ThisCourthashadoccasiontoruleonsimilarcasesinthepast.InCivilServiceCommission
v.Sta.Ana,[3]theCourtfound,thus:

Afterathoroughreviewofthematter,theCourtfindsthatrespondentisindeedguiltyof
dishonesty.AnexaminationofrespondentsPersonalDataSheetrevealsthathersignature
andpictureonitaredifferentfromthoseinherCATApplicationandPictureSeatPlan.
Respondentattributessuchdiscrepancytounknownpersonswhomayhavebeen
committingsuchanomalyandirregularityintheexaminationprocedureoftheCSC.
However,thisCourtagreeswiththeobservationoftheexecutivejudgethattheirregularity
shouldnotbeattributedtotheCSCwhichhadnomotiveintamperingwithsuchdocuments.
Evenifsuchirregularitywasattributabletoerrororoversight,respondentdidnotpresentany
proofthatitoccurredduringtheexaminationand,thus,theCSCofficialswhosupervisedthe
examenjoyedthepresumptionofregularityintheperformanceoftheirofficialduty.Besides,
fortheCSCtocommitsuchamistakemixingupthepicturesandsignaturesofexaminees
wasunlikelyduetothestrictproceduresitfollowsduringcivilserviceexaminations.Ina
similarcase,thisCourtapprovedthefindingsoftheCSCregardingproceduresduring
examinations:

Itshouldbestressedthatasamatterofprocedure,theroomexaminersassignedto
supervisetheconductofaCivilServiceexaminationcloselyexaminethepicturessubmitted
andaffixedonthePictureSeatPlan(CSCResolutionNo.953694,Obedencio,JaimeA.).
Theexaminerscarefullycomparetheappearanceofeachoftheexamineeswiththepersonin

thepicturesubmittedandaffixedonthePSP.Incaseswheretheexamineedoesnotlooklike
thepersoninthepicturesubmittedandattachedonthePSP,theexaminerwillnotallowthe
saidpersontotaketheexamination(CSCResolutionNo.955195,Taguinay,Ma.Theresa).

Thus,theirregularityinrespondentsPersonalDataSheet,CATApplicationandPictureSeat
PlancannotbeattributedtoerrorontheCSCspart.Itisclearthatsomebodyelsetookthe
CSCexamforrespondentSta.Ana.

ForrespondenttoclaimthatsheherselftooktheCSCexamwheninfactsomebodyelsetook
itforherconstitutesdishonesty.

Ontheotherhand,inDonatov.CivilServiceCommissionRegionalOfficeNo.1,[4]Alejandro
Donato,Jr.waschargedwithdishonestyandfalsificationofpublicdocumentsforrepresenting
himselfasGilArceandtakingthecivilserviceexamunderthatname.TheCSCandtheCourt
ofAppealsbothfoundthatthepictureofDonatoappearedonthePictureSeatPlanontopof
thenameGilArce.Ontheotherhand,Arceadmittedthathemighthavemistakenlysubmitted
Donatospictureduringtheexam.TheCourtrejectedDonatosclaimthatthecasewas
merelythehandiworkofhisformerprincipalwhoallegedlyhadanaxetogrindagainsthimin
thefaceofpositiveevidenceagainsthimandArce.Accordingly,theCourtupheldthe
dismissalofbothArceandDonato.

Inthecaseatbar,respondentBermejoattributestheanonymouscomplainttoherhusbands
mistressandallegesthatthewomanwhosepictureappearswithhernameontheSeatPlan
isherhusbandschildhoodfriend.However,shefailstoexplainhowthetwo,whoapparently
alsoliveinPalawan,wereabletomanipulateandinfluencetheCSCpersonnelinSan
Fernando,Pampangainordertocomeupwiththechargesagainsther,orhowtheywere
abletocoaxanotherpersonallegedlyherhusbandschildhoodfriendintoimpersonating
hertotaketheexam.Besides,itseemstousalittletooconvenientforrespondenttopinthe
blameonpersonswhoarenolongeraroundtodefendthemselves.

Respondentalsofailstorefutethedocumentaryevidenceagainsther.Itisasettledrulein

ourjurisdictionthatthedulyaccomplishedformoftheCivilServiceisanofficialdocumentof
theCommission,which,byitsverynature,isconsideredinthesamecategoryasthatofa
publicdocument,admissibleinevidencewithoutneedoffurtherproof.Asanofficial
document,theentriesthereofmadeinthecourseofofficialdutyareprimafacieevidenceof
thefactsstatedtherein.[5]

Instead,respondenttriestosupportherargumentswithdocumentsofherown.Unfortunately,
theevidencesheadducesdoesnotnegatetheveracityoftheCSCsPictureSeatPlan.
Worse,thesedocumentsevenstrengthenthecaseagainsther.Thepictureinherpassportis
thatofthepersonwhosenameintheSeatPlanisindicatedasJulietaM.Padrones,who
happenstobeseatedbesidethepersonpurportedlynamedLourdesF.Bermejo.

Itisdifficulttobelievethatrespondentcouldnothavenoticedthatherpicturewasputontop
ofadifferentnameandthathernamewasaccompaniedbythepictureofanotherperson.
Therewasaspaceprovidedforthesignatureoftheexaminee.Thus,respondentcouldnot
havemissedthatshewassigningifindeedshewassigningherownnametheboxwitha
differentpicture.Sheproffersnosufficientexplanationforthisdiscrepancy.

InDonato,thisCourtquotedwithapprovaltheCSCsfindings,towit:

Intheoffenseofimpersonation,therearealwaystwopersonsinvolved.Theoffensecannot
prosperwithouttheactiveparticipationofbothpersons(CSCResolutionNo.946582).
Further,byengagingorcolludingwithanotherpersontotakethetestinhisbehalfand
thereafterbyclaimingtheresultantpassingrateashis,clinchesthecaseagainsthim.In
casesofimpersonation,theCommissionhasconsistentlyrejectedclaimsofgoodfaith,forit
iscontrarytohumannaturethatapersonwilldo(impersonation)withouttheconsentofthe
personbeingimpersonated.(CSCresolutionNo.940826)[6]

Finally,respondentsallegationsfailtocontrovertthepresumptionofregularityinthe
performanceofofficialdutiesoftheCSCpersonnel.TheCourthasnotedinpreviouscases
theprocedurefollowedduringtheconductoftheCivilServiceExams,asquotedbytheOCA

initsevaluation.[7]RespondentdoesnotevenallegethattheCSCRegionalOfficeNo.3
personnelwhoadministeredtheexamdepartedfromthisestablishedprocedureorthatany
irregularityattendedtheconductoftheexam.

Dishonestyisdefinedasintentionallymakingafalsestatementonanymaterialfact,or
practicingorattemptingtopracticeanydeceptionorfraudinsecuringhisexamination,
appointmentorregistration.[8]Dishonestyisaseriousoffensewhichreflectsapersons
characterandexposesthemoraldecaywhichvirtuallydestroyshishonor,virtueandintegrity.
Itisamalevolentactthathasnoplaceinthejudiciary,asnootherofficeinthegovernment
serviceexactsagreaterdemandformoralrighteousnessfromanemployeethanapositionin
thejudiciary.[9]

Weconcludethatthereissubstantialevidencetoholdthatrespondentcommittedtheactof
dishonestyimputedtoher.UndertheUniformRulesonAdministrativeCasesintheCivil
Service,[10]dishonestyisclassifiedasagraveoffensepunishablebydismissalforthefirst
offense.

WHEREFORE,theforegoingpremisesconsidered,respondentLOURDESF.BERMEJOis
foundGUILTYofdishonestyandDISMISSEDfromtheservice,withforfeitureofallretirement
benefits,exceptaccruedleavecredits,andwithprejudicetoreemploymentinanybranchor
instrumentalityofthegovernment,includinggovernmentownedorcontrolledcorporations.

5.REPUBLICOFTHEPHILPPINESvs.PEDROO.ENCISO
G.R.No.160145November11,2005

DECISION
CALLEJO,SR.,J.

BeforeusisapetitionforreviewoncertiorariunderRule45oftheRulesofCourt,as
amended,assailingtheDecision[1]oftheCourtofAppeals(CA)datedSeptember26,2003,
whichaffirmedtheDecision[2]oftheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC),Iba,Zambales,Branch71,
promulgatedonJuly31,2001inLRCCaseNo.RTCN75I.TheCAandthetrialcourt
adjudicatedLotNo.2278A,Cad.652D,MasinlocCadastreinfavorofrespondentPedroO.
Enciso,pursuanttoSection29ofPresidentialDecree(P.D.)No.1529.

Thefacts,asculledfromtherecordsofthecase,showthatonApril24,2000,therespondent,
allegingtobetheownerinfeesimpleofaparcelofresidentiallandlocatedinBarangaySouth

Poblacion,Masinloc,Zambales,filedapetitionforlandregistrationbeforetheRTCofIba,
Zambales.Thelotisdescribedasfollows

Aparcelofland(Lot2278AofthesubdivisionplanCsd03012562DbeingaportionofLot
2278,Cad.652DL.R.C.Rec.No.),situatedintheBarrioofSouthPoblacion,Municipalityof
Masinloc,ProvinceofZambales.BoundedontheNW.,alongline12bySta.LuciaStreeton
theNE.,alongline23byCapt.AlbrightStreetontheSE.&SW.alongline341byLot
2278Bofthesubd.plan.Beginningatapointmarked1onplanbeingN.39deg.35E.,
12.05m.fromBLLM.1,

Cad.652D

thenceN.16deg.13E.,32.48m.topoint.2

thenceS.75deg.05E.,44.83m.topoint.3

thenceS.16deg.19W.,33.36m.topoint.4

thenceN.73deg.57W.,44.76m.topoint.of

beginningcontaininganareaofONETHOUSANDFOURHUNDREDSEVENTYFIVE
(1,475)squaremeters.Allpointsreferredtoareindicatedontheplanandaremarkedonthe
groundbyP.S.cyl.conc.mons.15x40cms.BearingstruedateoforiginalsurveySept.
1927July1928andthatofthesubdivisionsurveyJuly22,1999andwasapprovedonJan.
20,2000.[3]

Therespondentaverred,interalia,thatheacquiredtitletothesaidlotbyvirtueofan
extrajudicialsettlementofestateandquitclaimonMarch15,1999thesaidpropertyisnot
tenantedoroccupiedbyanypersonotherthantherespondentandhisfamilywhoarein
actualphysicalpossessionofthesameandtherespondentandhispredecessorsininterest
havebeenincontinuous,peaceful,open,notorious,uninterruptedandadversepossessionof
thelandintheconceptofanownerfornotlessthan30yearsimmediatelyprecedingthefiling
oftheapplication.[4]

PetitionerRepublicofthePhilippines,throughtheOfficeoftheSolicitorGeneral(OSG),
opposedtheapplicationonthefollowinggrounds:(a)neithertherespondentnorhis
predecessorsininteresthavebeeninopen,continuous,exclusive,andnotoriouspossession
andoccupationofthesubjectlandsinceJune12,1945orpriorthereto(b)therespondent
failedtoadduceanymunimentoftitleand/orthetaxdeclarationwiththeapplicationtoprove
bonafideacquisitionofthelandappliedfororitsopen,continuous,exclusiveandnotorious
possessionandoccupationthereofintheconceptofownersinceJune12,1945orprior
thereto(c)theallegedtaxdeclarationadvertedtointheapplicationdoesnotappeartobe
genuineandthetaxdeclarationsindicatesuchpossessiontobeofrecentvintage(d)the

claimofownershipinfeesimpleonthebasisofSpanishtitleorgrantcannolongerbeavailed
ofbytherespondentconsideringthathefailedtofileanappropriateapplicationfor
registrationwithintheperiodofsixmonthsfromFebruary16,1976asrequiredbyP.D.No.
892and(e)thesubjectlandisaportionofthepublicdomainbelongingtotheRepublicofthe
Philippineswhichisnotsubjecttoprivateappropriation.[5]

Afterascertainingthatthejurisdictionalrequirementsfortheapplicationweredonein
accordancewiththelawduringtheinitialhearing[6]onNovember9,2000,thetrialcourt
issuedanOrderofDefault[7]onJanuary3,2001againstallpersonswiththeexceptionof
thegovernment.

Therespondentpresentedtaxreceiptstoshowthatthepropertywasdeclaredfor
taxationpurposesinhisname.Healsotestifiedthatheacquiredthepropertybyinheritance
fromhisdeceasedfather,VicenteEnciso,whodiedonMay18,1991.Hethenimmediately
tookpossessionofthepropertyandconstructedahousethereonin1991.OnMarch15,
1999,heandhissiblingsexecutedanextrajudicialsettlementofestatewherethelandwas
adjudicatedinhisfavor.

Therespondentfurthernarratedthatthepropertywasoriginallyownedbythe
MunicipalityofMasinloc,Zambales.OnOctober5,1968,themunicipalitypassedResolution
No.71,[8]undertakingtoconstructaroadalongtheshorelineofthepoblacion,butrequiring
landownersadjoiningtheroadstoshareintheexpensesforaninnerwalladjacenttotheir
lots.Inviewofthis,thesameresolutionprovidedthat:

WHEREAS,wheretheabovelandownersshareintheconstructionoftheroads,thesame
maybegiventheprioritytoacquiresuchadditionalavailableareasbypurchase,ifsuch
additionalareasarenotneededbythegovernmentforpublicuse,theadvancesofthe
landownersasaresultofhis[sic]construction(innerwall)beconsideredaspriceoftheland,
providedthatthecostandvalueoftheinnerwallexceedstheassessedvalueoftheland,and
ifthecostoftheinnerwallislessthantheassessedvalueoftheland,thelandownerswill
havetopaythecorrespondingbalancetothegovernment[9]

OnMarch8,1969,theMunicipalityofMasinloc,Zambalespassedsupplementary
ResolutionNo.102,[10]whichstatedthatinconsiderationofthefinancialassistance
extendedbytheabuttingpropertyowners,andbecausethegovernmentnolongerneeded
theadditionalareasforpublicuse,themunicipalitywasauthorizingtheMunicipalMayorto
enterintoandsigndeedsofpurchasebetweenthemunicipalityandthelandowners
concerned.Consequently,theMunicipalCouncilofMasinloc,Zambalesunanimously
approvedResolutionNo.102A[11]datedMarch15,1969,authorizingitsmayortoexecutea
deedofsaleinfavorofHonoratoEdao,coveringaportionofthereclaimedlotsnolonger
neededforpublicuse.Honoratowasthusentitledtobuythelotforhishelpincarryingoutthe
projectenvisionedinResolutionNo.71,andafterthesubmissionofanitemizedstatementof
thecostoftheconstructionoftheinnerwallalongSta.LuciaStreet.


Immediatelythereafter,theMunicipalityofMasinloc,Zambales,representedbyitsMayor,
P.A.Edao,executedaDeedofAbsoluteSale[12]coveringapieceofreclaimedland
containingmoreorless2,790squaremetersinfavorofHonoratoEdao.Thedeedstated
thatthevendeeconstructedtheinnerwallneededtofacilitatethefabricationofaportionof
Sta.LuciaStreet,whichwasoppositehislot,andtheextensionsofMagsaysayandCapt.
AlbrightStreetsatatotalexpenseofP1,683.80.Consideringthattheassessedvalueofthe
lotwasP2,092.50,orP408.70

morethanthevendeespentfortheconstructionoftheinnerwall,thevendeepaidP408.70to
thevendor.

TherespondentadmittedthatHonoratowashisuncle,beinghisfathershalfbrother.[13]He
furthernarratedthatonDecember9,1980,thespousesHonoratoandEsperanzaEdaosold
thelottoVicenteB.EncisoforP2,092.50viaaDeedofAbsoluteSale.[14]OnJanuary17,
1981,VicenteEnciso,NatividadEdaoAsuncionandThelmaA.EdaoenteredintoaDeed
ofPartition[15]involvingthesameparcelofland.Vicentewasawardedonehalfofthetotal
areaoftheproperty,1,398squaremeters,moreorlessNatividadandThelmagotonefourth
each,orapproximately697.5squaremetersindividually.

Nocrossexaminationwasconductedandnoevidencewasadducedbythegovernmentto
controverttheapplicationforregistration.

OnMay8,2001,DirectorFelinoM.CortezoftheDepartmentonRegistrationsubmittedthe
Report[16]oftheLandRegistrationAuthority,informingthetrialcourtthatitwasnotina
positiontoverifywhethertheparceloflandsubjectofregistrationwasalreadycoveredbya
landpatentandpreviouslyapprovedisolatedsurvey.Actingonthisreport,thetrialcourt
directedtheLandsManagementBureau,theCommunityEnvironmentandNatural
ResourcesOfficeofIba,Zambales,andthe

DepartmentofEnvironmentandNaturalResourcesRegionalExecutiveDirectorforRegion
III,SanFernando,Pampanga,tosubmitareportonthestatusoftheparcelofland.[17]

Withoutwaitingforthefinalreport,thetrialcourtgrantedtheapplicationforregistrationon
July31,2001,thedispositiveportionofthedecisionreads:

WHEREFORE,thisCourt,afterconfirmingtheOrderofGeneralDefaultenteredintothe
recordofthiscaseonJanuary3,2001herebyadjudicatesLotNo.2278A,Cad.652D,
MasinlocCadastre,containinganareaof1,475squaremeters,situatedatBrgy.South
Poblacion,Masinloc,Zambales,Philippines,asappearingontheapprovedPlanNo.
Csd03012562D(ExhibitM)andalsointheTechnicalDescriptionofsaidlot(ExhibitK)in
favoroftheapplicantwhoseaddressisatBrgy.SouthPoblacion,Masinloc,Zambales,

Philippines,inaccordancewithSection29ofPresidentialDecreeNo.1529.Thisadjudication
howeverissubjecttothevariouseasements/reservationsprovidedforunderpertinentlaws,
PresidentialDecreeand/orPresidentialLettersofInstruction,whichshouldbe
annotated/projectedinthetitletobeissued.

Oncethisdecisionbecomesfinal,letthecorrespondingdecreeandtitlebeissued.

SOORDERED.[18]

Thetrialcourtruledthattherespondentsatisfactorilyprovedhisownershipinfeesimple,as
wellastheidentityofthelandsoughttobetitled.Likewise,thetrialcourtfoundthatthe
respondent,aswellashispredecessorsininterest,hadbeeninopen,peaceful,continuous,
public,adverse,andunderabonafideclaimofownership.Accordingtothetrialcourt,there
wasnoevidencethatthesubjectparceloflandwaswithinanygovernmentreservation,or
thattheapplicantwasdisqualifiedfromowningrealpropertyundertheConstitution.[19]

TheRepublicofthePhilippinesappealedthecasebeforetheCA,contendingthatthetrial
courterredingrantingtheapplicationdespitehisfailuretoproveregistrabletitleoverLotNo.
2278A.

TheCAdisposedoftheappealonSeptember26,2003andaffirmedthedecisionofthe
trialcourt.Thefalloofthedecisionreads:

WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,theassaileddecisiondatedJuly31,2001oftheRTC,
Branch71ofIba,ZambalesinLRCCaseNo.RTCN751isherebyAFFIRMED.

SOORDERED.[20]

Thepetitionerdispensedwiththefilingofamotionforreconsiderationandforthwithfiledthe
instantpetition.

TheOSGassignedthefollowingerrortotheappellatecourt:

THECOURTOFAPPEALSERREDONAQUESTIONOFLAWINGRANTING
RESPONDENTSPETITIONFORREGISTRATIONSANSANYSHOWINGTHATTHE
SUBJECTPROPERTYWASPREVIOUSLYDECLAREDALIENABLEANDDISPOSABLE
LANDSOFTHEPUBLICDOMAIN.[21]

Thepetitionercontendsthatthefirstandprimordialelementinordertowarrantthe
registrationoftitleistoshowthatthelandmustbeanalienableanddisposablelandofthe
publicdomain.Onthisnote,thepetitionerbelievesthattherespondentfailedtoadduceany
evidencetoshowthatthesubjectlandwasalreadypreviouslydeclaredpartofsuchalienable
anddisposablelandofthepublicdomain.Furthermore,thepetitioneraddsthatunderthe

Regaliandoctrine,alllandsofthepublicdomainbelongtotheState,andthosenototherwise
appearingtobeclearlywithinprivateownershiparepresumedtobelongtoit.

Inhiscommenttothepetition,therespondentassertsthattheCAwascorrectinaffirmingthe
decisionofthelandregistrationcourt.Therespondentcitesthefollowingjustificationofthe
CAinsupportinghisclaimoverLotNo.2278A:

RecordsrevealthatsubjectlandisaresidentiallandownedbytheMunicipalityofMasinloc,
Zambales.TheMunicipalityofMasinloc,throughResolutions71,102and102A29soldthe
subjectlandtoHonoratoEdaoasevidencedbytheDeedofAbsoluteSaledatedMarch31,
1969executedbytheMunicipalMayor.

Article423oftheCivilCodeprovidesthat:

Art.423.Thepropertyofprovinces,cities,andmunicipalitiesisdividedintopropertyfor
publicuseandpatrimonialproperty.

Propertiesofpoliticalsubdivision[s]whicharepatrimonialincharactermaybealienated.By
analogy,whenamunicipalityspropertiesforpublicusearenolongerintendedforsuchuse,
thesamebecomepatrimonialandmaybethesubjectofacontract.Thus,theDeedof
AbsoluteSaleexecutedbyandbetweentheMunicipalMayorofMasinlocandHonorato
Edaowasavalidcontract.SubjectlandwaslikewisesoldbyHonoratoEdaoto
petitionerappelleesfather,VicenteEnciso,byvirtueofaDeedofAbsoluteSale.Fromthen,
subjectlandchangedhanduntilitwasacquiredbypetitionerappelleewhenhissiblings
executedanExtrajudicialPartitionassigningsaidlandtohim.Itwasdeclaredfortaxation
purposesinhisnameunderTaxDeclarationNo.0070700R.

Subjectlandwasreclassifiedasresidential.Itwasalreadysegregatedfromthepublicdomain
andassumedthecharacterofprivateownership.ItwasreclaimedbytheMunicipalityof
MasinlocandeventuallyadjudicatedtoHonoratoEdao.TheMunicipalityofMasinlocmust
havebeeninpossessionofthesubjectlandevenbefore1969consideringthatitwas
originallysurveyedwaybackin19271928.Intheexerciseofitsproprietaryright,the
MunicipalityofMasinlocvalidlyconveyedthesubjectlandtopetitionerappellees
predecessorsininterest.Petitionerappelleespossessionandoccupationofthesubjectland
iscontinuous,public,adverseanduninterruptedandintheconceptanownerandnoother
personclaimedpossessionandownershipofthesame.Article1137oftheCivilCode
provides:

Art.1137.Ownershipandotherrealrightsoverimmovablesalsoprescribed(sic)through
uninterruptedadversepossessionthereofforthirtyyears,withoutneedoftitlesorofgood
faith.

Parenthetically,petitionerappelleespossessiontackedwiththatofhis

predecessorsininterestalreadycompliedwiththethirty(30)yearrequirementofopen,
continuous,exclusiveandnotoriouspossessionrequiredunderthelaw.

Prescindingfromtheforegoing,petitionerappelleesufficientlyandsatisfactorilyprovedhis
realandabsoluteownershipinfeesimplethathehasaregistrabletitleoverthesubjectland
andthathecompliedwiththerequirementsunderthelawtowarrantregistrationoftitleover
thesubjectland.[22]

Thepetitionismeritorious.

WhileitistherulethatfindingsoffactofappellatecourtsareconclusiveuponthisCourt,
amongtherecognizedexceptionsiswherethefindingsoffactarenotsupportedbytherecord
orareconspicuouslyerroneousastoconstituteaseriousabuseofdiscretion.[23]Thisisthe
situationinthiscase.

Section14(1)ofP.D.No.1529,otherwiseknownasthePropertyRegistrationDecree,
provides:

SEC.14.Whomayapply.ThefollowingpersonsmayfileintheproperCourtofFirst
Instanceanapplicationforregistrationoftitletoland,whetherpersonallyorthroughtheirduly
authorizedrepresentatives:

(1)Thosewhobythemselvesorthroughtheirpredecessorsininteresthavebeeninopen,
continuous,exclusiveandnotoriouspossessionandoccupationofalienableanddisposable
landsofthepublicdomainunderabonafideclaimofownershipsinceJune12,1945,or
earlier.

Applicantsforregistrationoftitlemustthereforeprovethefollowing:(a)thatthelandforms
partofthedisposableandalienablelandsofthepublicdomainand(b)thattheyhavebeenin
open,continuous,exclusive,

andnotoriouspossessionandoccupationofthesameunderabonafideclaimofownership
eithersincetimeimmemorial,orsinceJune12,1945.Itisnotdisputedthatthelandsoughtto
beregisteredwasoriginallypartofthereclamationprojectundertakenbytheMunicipalityof
Masinloc,Zambales.Theprevailingruleisthatreclaimeddisposablelandsofthepublic
domainmayonlybeleasedandnotsoldtoprivateparties.Theselandsremainedsuigeneris,
astheonlyalienableordisposablelandsofthepublicdomainwhichthegovernmentcould
notselltoprivatepartiesexceptifthelegislaturepassesalawauthorizingsuchsale.
Reclaimedlandsretaintheirinherentpotentialasareasforpublicuseorpublicservice.[24]
TheownershipoflandsreclaimedfromforeshoreareasisrootedintheRegaliandoctrine,
whichdeclaresthatalllandsandwatersofthepublicdomainbelongtotheState.[25]On
November7,1936,theNationalAssemblyapprovedCommonwealthActNo.141,alsoknown
asthePublicLandAct,compilingalltheexistinglawsonlandsofthepublicdomain.This

remainstothisdaytheexistingandapplicablegenerallawgoverningtheclassificationand
dispositionoflandsofthepublicdomain.TheStatepolicyprohibitingthesaleofgovernment
reclaimed,foreshoreandmarshyalienablelandsofthepublicdomaintoprivateindividuals
continuedunderthe1935Constitution.

Indeed,thereisnothingtosupporttherespondentsclaimthatthepropertywasreclassified
asresidentialalreadysegregatedfromthepublicdomainandassumedthecharacterof
privateownership.Atthe

moment,itisnotclearastowhentheproperauthoritiesclassifiedthesubjectasalienable
anddisposable.Itmustbestressedthatincontrovertibleevidencemustbepresentedto
establishthatthelandsubjectoftheapplicationisalienableordisposable.[26]

AccordingtotheCA,theMunicipalityofMasinlocmusthavebeeninpossessionofthe
subjectlandevenbefore1969consideringthatitwasoriginallysurveyedwaybackin
19271928.Thisisnotthekindofpossessionandoccupationcontemplatedunderthelaw.
Whilethesubjectpropertywasstillinthehandsofthemunicipality,itwasundeniablypartof
thepublicdomain.Themunicipalitycannotthenbeconsideredapredecessorininterestof
theapplicantfromwhomtheperiodofpossessionandoccupationrequiredbylawmaybe
reckonedwith.Anyotherinterpretationwouldbedangerouslydetrimentaltoournational
patrimony.

EvenassumingthatHonoratoEdao,therespondentsearliestpredecessorininterest,
possessedthepropertyasearlyas1969,therespondentsclaimmuststillfail,ashewas
unabletoproveopen,continuous,exclusive,andnotoriouspossessionandoccupationofthe
subjectlandunderabonafideclaimofacquisitionofownership.AstheCourtruledin
Republicv.Alconaba:[27]

Thelawspeaksofpossessionandoccupation.Sincethesewordsareseparatedbythe
conjunctionand,theclearintentionofthelawisnottomakeonesynonymouswiththeother.
Possessionisbroaderthanoccupationbecauseitincludesconstructivepossession.When,
therefore,thelawaddsthewordoccupation,itseekstodelimittheallencompassingeffectof
constructivepossession.Takentogetherwiththewordsopen,continuous,exclusiveand
notorious,thewordoccupationservestohighlightthefactthatforanapplicanttoqualify,his
possessionmustnotbeamerefiction.Actualpossessionofalandconsistsinthe
manifestationofactsofdominionoveritofsuchanatureasapartywouldnaturallyexercise
overhisownproperty.

Therespondentspossessionandthatofhispredecessorsininterestwillnotsufficefor
purposesofjudicialconfirmationoftitle.Whatiscategoricallyrequiredbylawisopen,
continuous,exclusive,andnotoriouspossessionandoccupationunderabonafideclaimof
ownershipsinceJune12,1945orearlier.

Theevidenceonrecordshowsthatahousewasconstructedonthesubjectpropertyonlyin
1991.Certaindiscrepancieslikewisesurroundtheapplicationforregistration:Honorato
Edaosoldaparceloflandconsistingof2,790squaremetersonDecember9,1980to
VicenteEncisoaloneonJanuary17,1981,VicenteEnciso,NatividadEdaoAsuncionand
ThelmaEdaoexecutedadeedofpartitioncoveringthesamelot.Whywasthereaneedto
partitionthepropertyiftheentirelandhadalreadybeensoldtoVicente?TheCourtalsonotes
thatinthesaiddeedofpartition,onehalfofthetotalareaoftheland,whichwas1,398square
meters,wasadjudicatedinfavorofVicentehowever,intherespondentsapplicationfor
registration,thelandsoughttoberegisteredconsistsof1,475squaremeters.

Wellentrenchedistherulethattheburdenofproofinlandregistrationcasesrestsonthe
applicantwhomustshowclear,positiveandconvincingevidencethathisallegedpossession
andoccupationwereofthenatureanddurationrequiredbylaw.Bareallegations,without
more,donotamounttopreponderantevidencethatwouldshifttheburdentothe
oppositor.[28]

Evidently,therespondentfailedtoprovethat(1)LotNo.2278Awasclassifiedaspartofthe
disposableandalienablelandofthepublicdomainand(2)heandhis
predecessorsininteresthavebeeninopen,continuous,exclusive,andnotoriouspossession
andoccupationthereofintheconceptofownerssincetimeimmemorial,orfromJune12,
1945.

WHEREFORE,thepetitionisGRANTED.TheDecisionoftheCourtofAppealsdated
September26,2003inCAG.R.CVNo.72859isREVERSEDandSETASIDE.Respondent
PedroO.EncisosapplicationforregistrationandissuanceoftitletoLotNo.2278A,Cad.
652D,MasinlocCadastre,isherebyDISMISSEDforlackofmerit.

6.G.R.No.127382August17,2004

DR.JESUSSERIAandENRIQUETASERIA(deceased),representedbyDR.JESUS
SERIA,JR.,ANTONIOSERIA,VIOLETASERIATAN,REYNALDOSERIAand
EMMANUELSERIA,petitioners,
vs.
VICTORCABALLERO,TEODORODONELA,OLIVERDONELA,COURTOFAPPEALS,and
THEHONORABLEREGIONALTRIALCOURT,BRANCH20,MISAMISORIENTAL,
respondents.

DECISION

CALLEJO,SR.,J.:

BeforeusisapetitionforreviewoncertiorarioftheDecision1oftheCourtofAppeals(CA)
datedAugust23,1996,affirmingthedismissalofthecomplaintforquietingoftitle,recoveryof
possession,anddamagesbytheRegionalTrialCourt(RTC)ofMisamisOriental,Cagayande
OroCity,inCivilCaseNo.8716.

TheAntecedents

OnAugust11,1982,Dr.JesusSeriaandhiswife,EnriquetaSeriafiledaComplaintfor
quietingoftitle,recoveryofpossession,anddamageswithaprayerforawritofpreliminary
mandatoryinjunctionagainstrespondentsVictorCaballeroandhistenants,TeodoroDonela
andOliverDonela.WhenDr.SeriadiedonAugust6,1983,hewassubstitutedbyhis
children,petitionersJesus,Jr.,Antonio,Violeta,ReynaldoandEmmanuel.2

Thepetitionersallegedintheircomplaintthattheyaretheabsoluteownersandhavebeenin
actualandconstructivepossessionforthirtyfive(35)yearsofaparceloflanddescribedas
follows:

LotNo.3533A,Cad237,CagayanCadastre

TaxDeclarationNo.02161

LocationMantadiao,Opol,

MisamisOriental

Area2.5000has.

Boundaries:

NorthAlejoSeria

SouthT.Sabornido

EastA.Seria&T.Sabornido

WestF.Caballero3

ThepetitionersaverredthatsometimeinMarch1982,theydiscoveredthatrespondent
Caballerowasclaimingownershipoverthesaidlandandofferingitforsaleormortgageto
thirdparties.TheyalsodiscoveredthattherespondentsDonelaswereoccupyingthelandas
tenantsandcaretakersoftheland.4

Thepetitionersclaimedthattheirfather,Dr.Seria,boughtthelandfromLuciaVda.de

Marbellawhoinheriteditfromherfather,RamonNeri.5TheypresentedaDeedofSale6
datedAugust23,1947showingthatDr.Seriabought5hectaresofricefield,boundedonthe
NorthbyRaymundoSeria,ontheEastbyTeofiloSaburnido,ontheSouthbyObdelio
Caballero,ontheWestbyObdulloCaballero,fromLuciaVda.deMarbella.Dr.Seriawas
issuedTaxDeclarationNo.4029allegedlyforthesaidproperty.Asindicatedinthetax
declarationandsubsequenttaxdeclarationsissuedinthenameofDr.Seria,theywere
issuedforCadastralLotNo.3533andcovereda2.5hectarericefieldwiththesameboundary
ownersasthoseinthecomplaint.7Thepetitionersalsoaverredthattheyregularlypaidtaxes
thereonsince1947uptothepresent.8

Inhisanswer,respondentCaballeroallegedthathewasthelawfulowner,andhadbeenin
actualphysicalpossessionofthedisputedlandsincetimeimmemorial.Heaverredthatthe
disputedlandispartofCadastralLotNo.3533,C7oftheCagayanCadastreandoriginally
ownedbyhisgrandfather,EustaquioCaballero.9

TherespondentsaverredthatEustaquioCaballerodeclaredtheentireparceloflandfortax
purposesevenbeforethewar.TaxDeclarationNo.2442wasissuedinlieuoftherecordsthat
weredestroyedduringthewar.

Thistaxdeclarationindicatedthatthe119,490squaremeterparceloflandwaslocatedat
Pontacon,Iponan,CagayandeOroCity,boundedonNorthbyRusticoDablio,ontheEastby
J.SeriaandT.Saburnido,ontheSouthbyVictorObsioma,andontheWestbyVictorino
Caballero.10

EmilianaIbarat,respondentCaballerossister,testifiedthatwhenEustaquioCaballerodiedin
1944,thelandwasdividedamonghisthreechildren,Vicenta,BenitaandVictorino,thefather
ofrespondentCaballero.LotA,withanareaof39,625squaremeters,wasgiventoVictorino,
whichwaslaterinheritedbytherespondent.LotB,withanareaof71,450squaremeters,
wasgiventoBenitaandLotC,withonly7,938squaremeterswasgiventoVicenta.LotsB
andCwere,thereafter,soldtooneGagaYasay.Becauseofthetroublebetweenthe
petitionersandtherespondents,YasayagreedtobuyonlyaportionofLotA.11

Thelandwassurveyedduringthetrialanditwasdeterminedthatitnowconsistedofonly
23,373squaremeters,12andnot25,000squaremetersasclaimedbythepetitioners.
GliceriaLegaspi,respondentCaballerosothersister,alsotestifiedthatthedisputedlandwas
nowboundedontheNorthbySeriaandNangcas,ontheEastbyTeofiloSaburnido,onthe
SouthbyGagaYasay,andontheWestbyNangcas.13

TheRTCrenderedjudgment14onJanuary21,1992,dismissingthecomplaint,andupholding
therightoftherespondentsovertheland.Thedispositiveportionreads:

WHEREFORE,judgmentisherebyrenderedinfavorofthedefendantVictorCaballeroand
againsttheplaintiffsherein,towit:


1.Orderingthedismissalofthecomplaintwithcosts.

2.OrderingthedefendantVictorCaballeroastheabsoluteandlawfulownerandpossessorof
thelandinquestion.

3.Orderingtheplaintiffs,theirheirs,lawyers,servantsorpriviesnottodisturbormolestthe
possessionandownershipofVictorCaballerooverthelandinquestion.

4.OrderingtheplaintiffstopaytodefendantVictorCaballero,jointlyandseverallythesumof
FIVETHOUSAND(P5,000.00)pesosforexpensesoflitigation,andTHREETHOUSAND
(P3,000.00)pesosforandasattorney'sfeeshavingbeencompelledtoretaintheservicesof
counseltoprotecthisinterestherein.

SOORDERED.15

ThetrialcourtruledthatitwasnotclearlyshownthatthelandboughtbyDr.SeriafromLucia
Vda.deMarbellawasthesamelandownedbyVictorCaballero,andthatthepetitionersfailed
toshowthatLuciaVda.deMarbellaboughtthelandfromEustaquioCaballero,theoriginal
ownerandcadastralclaimantoftheland.ItalsonotedthatthedeedofsalebetweenLucia
Vda.deMarbellaandDr.Seriashowedthatthelandhadanareaof5hectares,whereas,
thepetitionersonlyclaimed2.5hectares.Furthermore,theboundariesofthelandstatedin
thecomplaintdidnotcoincidewithwhatwasstatedintheDeedofSale,orinTaxDeclaration
No.2442inthenameofEustaquioCaballero.Thetrialcourtruledthatthepetitionersfailedto
explainthesediscrepancies,andthattherewasnoshowingthatTaxDeclarationNo.2442
wascancelledbyTaxDeclarationNo.4029inthenameofDr.Seria.Thetrialcourt
interpretedthistomeanthatEustaquioCaballero'srightasownerofthelandremained.

Dissatisfied,thepetitionersappealedthecasetotheCA,whichrenderedaDecision16
affirmingintotothedecisionoftheRTC.ThepetitionersfiledaMotionforReconsiderationon
September30,1996.17TheCAdeniedthemotion.18

Hence,theinstantpetition.

Thepetitionersassignthefollowingerrors:

1.THATITISERRORFORTHEHONORABLECOURTOFAPPEALSTOUPHOLDTHE
HONORABLERTCONTHEISSUETHATTHEALLEGEDIDENTITYOFTHELANDIN
LITIGATIONISUNESTABLISHEDBETWEENTHEPARTIESLITIGANTS.

2.THATITISERRORFORTHEHONORABLECOURTOFAPPEALSTOFAILTO
APPRECIATETHE35YEARACQUISITIVEPRESCRIPTIONINFAVOROFTHE
PLAINTIFFSAPPELLANTS.19


Theissuesinthispetitionare,therefore,thefollowing:(1)whetherthepetitionerswereableto
establishtheidentityofthelandbeingclaimedbythemand(2)whetheracquisitive
prescriptionshouldbeappreciatedinfavorofthepetitioners.

TheRulingoftheCourt

ThefirstissuedealsclearlywithaquestionoffactwhichisbeyondtheprovinceofthisCourt
inapetitionforreviewoncertiorari.WellentrenchedistherulethattheCourt'sjurisdictionin
apetitionforreviewislimitedtoreviewingorrevisingerrorsoflawallegedlycommittedbythe
appellatecourt.FactualfindingsoftheCourtofAppealsareconclusiveonthepartiesandnot
reviewablebythisCourtandtheycarryevenmoreweightwhentheCourtofAppealsaffirms
thefactualfindingsofthetrialcourt.20Theexceptionstothisrulearethefollowing:

(1)whentheconclusionisafindinggroundedentirelyonspeculations,surmisesor
conjectures(2)whentheinferencemadeismanifestlymistaken,absurdorimpossible(3)
whenthereisgraveabuseofdiscretion(4)whenthejudgmentisbasedonmisapprehension
offacts(5)whenthefindingsoffactsareconflicting(6)whentheCourtofAppeals,in
makingitsfindings,wentbeyondtheissuesofthecaseandthesameiscontrarytothe
admissionsofbothappellantandappellee(7)whenthefindingsoftheCourtofAppealsare
contrarytothoseofthetrialcourt(8)whenthefindingsoffactareconclusionswithoutcitation
ofspecificevidenceonwhichtheyarebased(9)whentheCourtofAppealsmanifestly
overlookedcertainrelevantfactsnotdisputedbytheparties,which,ifproperlyconsidered,
wouldjustifyadifferentconclusionand(10)whenthefindingsoffactoftheCourtofAppeals
arepremisedontheabsenceofevidenceandarecontradictedbytheevidenceonrecord.21

WefindnocogentreasontoreversethefindingsoftheCA.Noneoftheaforementioned
exceptionsispresentinthiscase.TheCAwascorrectinconcludingthatthepetitionersfailed
toestablishthattheparceloflandinthepossessionoftherespondentsisthesameasthat
subjectoftheircomplaint.

TheCAnotedthatthelandsubjectofthecomplainthasboundariesdifferentfromthelandin
possessionoftherespondents.Infact,thelanddescribedinthecomplaintappearstobe
differentfromthelanddescribedintheDeedofSalewhichthepetitionersinvokeasthebasis
oftheirownership.

First.Thepetitionersallegedintheircomplaintthattheboundariesoftheirpropertyareas
follows:

NorthAlejoSeria

SouthT.Sabornido

EastA.Seria&T.Sabornido

WestF.Caballero22

Ontheotherhand,theDeedofSaleprovidesthatthepropertysoldtothemhasthefollowing
boundaries:

NorthRaymundoSeria

SouthObdulloCaballero

EastTeofiloSaburnido

WestObdulloCaballero23

Second.Thecomplaint24ofthepetitionersstatesthatthepropertytheyareclaiminghasan
areaof2.5hectares.Ontheotherhand,theDeedofSale25providesthatthesubject
propertyhasanareaof5hectares.

Third.Thecomplaintallegedthatthepropertyislocatedin"Mantadiao,Opol,Misamis
Oriental,"26whiletheDeedofSaleshowsthatthepropertypurchasedislocatedin
"Puntakon,Igpit,CagayanOr.Misamis."27

WeagreewiththeCAthattherewasnoshowingthatTaxDeclarationNo.2442inthename
ofEustaquioCaballerowascancelled.Absentanyspecificstatementthereintothateffect,it
cannotbepresumedthatTaxDeclarationNo.4029inthenameofDr.SeriacancelledTax
DeclarationNo.2442.

Moreover,thelandcoveredbyTaxDeclarationNo.2442isdifferentfromthatcoveredbyTax
DeclarationNo.4029forthefollowingreasons:

TheboundaryownersofthelandasindicatedinTaxDeclarationNo.2442differfromthose
statedinTaxDeclarationNo.4029.TheboundaryownersasindicatedinTaxDeclarationNo.
2442areasfollows:

NorthRusticoDablio

SouthVictorObsioma

EastJ.Seria&T.Saburnido

WestVictorinoCaballero28

UnderTaxDeclarationNo.4029,ontheotherhand,theboundaryownersareasfollows:

NorthAlejoSeria

SouthTeofiloSaburnido

EastA.Seria[and]T.Saburnido

WestEustaquioCaballero29

Moreover,TaxDeclarationNo.2442coversanareaof119,490squaremeters30whileTax
DeclarationNo.4029coversonly25,000squaremetersor2.5hectares.31

ThepetitionersarguethattheDeedofSaleandTaxDeclarationNo.4029shouldnotbe
comparedtoTaxDeclarationNo.2442andtheTechnicalDescriptionofCadastralLotNo.
3533becausetheformerrefersonlytoaportionoftheareareferredtobythelatter.32While
thepetitionersarecorrectonthispoint,suchmistakewouldstillnotjustifyadifferent
conclusion.Thefactremainsthatthedocumentaryandtestimonialevidencepresentedbythe
petitionersdidnotprovetheidentityofthelandbeingclaimed.Thepetitionersdidnotpresent
evidencetoprovethatthelandregisteredinthenameofEustaquioCaballerowassoldto
LuciaVda.deMarbellaorherpredecessorininterestfromwhomtheypurchasedtheland
subjectoftheircomplaint.

Thefailuretoestablishtheidentityofthelandisobviouslyfataltothepetitionerscase.InBeo
vs.CourtofAppeals,33acasewhichalsoinvolvesanactionforpossessionandquietingof
title,theCourthadtheoccasiontostate:

[B]ecausepetitionersfailedtoexplainthediscrepancyorpresentotherevidencetoprove
withcertaintythelocationandareaofthelandtheyseektorecover,respondentcourt
correctlyappliedtheinvariablerulethatapersonwhoclaimsownershipofrealpropertyis
dutyboundtoclearlyidentifythelandbeingclaimed,inaccordancewiththetitleonwhichhe
anchorshisrightofownership.Whentherecorddoesnotshowthatthelandsubjectmatterof
theactionforrecoveryofpossessionhasbeenexactlydetermined,suchactioncannot
prosper,asinthecaseofpetitioners.Insum,proofofownershipcoupledwithidentityofthe
landisthebasicrule.

Corollarily,theruleislikewisewellsettledthatinorderthatanactionforrecoveryof
possessionmayprosper,itisindispensablethathewhobringstheactionfullyprovesnotonly
hisownershipbutalsotheidentityofthepropertyclaimed,bydescribingthelocation,area
andboundariesthereof.Astheappellatecourtsuccinctlystated,hewhoclaimstohavea
betterrighttothepropertymustclearlyshowthatthelandpossessedbytheotherpartyisthe
verylandthatbelongstohim.34

Onthesecondissue,theCAruledthatinasmuchasthepetitionersfailedtoestablishthatthe
parceloflandinpossessionoftherespondentsisthesameasthesubjectoftheircomplaint,
theirclaimofacquisitiveprescriptionisclearlyuntenable.

Thepetitionersarguethattheywouldnothaveregularlypaidtaxesonthelandsince1947
hadtheynotbelievedthattheyownedthesame.35Therespondents,fortheirpart,averthat
thepetitionerswereonlyabletoproveseven(7)yearsofactualpossessionoftheland
throughcultivationbytheirtenants.Theyarguethatsuchsevenyearperiodofcultivation
cannotbeconsideredinthepetitionersfavor,sincethewitnesswhotestifiedonthisfactdid
notpersonallyknowtheboundariesofthelandcultivated,orwhetheritwasthesameland
boughtbyDr.Seria.Therespondentscontendthatacquisitiveprescriptionappliesonly
whenthereisnodisputeastotheidentityoftheproperty.36

Weagreewiththerespondents.Sincethepropertyhasnotbeenclearlyidentifiedbythe
petitioners,theirclaimofacquisitiveprescriptioncannotbeconsidered.Insufficient
identificationoftheportionoflandclaimedinabsoluteownershipcannotripenintoownership.
Possessionasameansofacquiringownership,whileitmaybeconstructive,isnotamere
fiction.37

Assuming,however,thatthedisputedlandhasbeenclearlyidentified,acquisitiveprescription
willstillnotlieinfavorofthepetitionersbecausetheywerenotabletoprovethattheyhave
beeninpossessionofthepropertyfortherequisitenumberofyears.Prescriptionrequires
public,peaceful,uninterruptedandadversepossessionofthepropertyintheconceptofan
ownerfortenyears,incasethepossessionisingoodfaithandwithjusttitle.38

AsidefromthetestimonyofLeonardoVacalaresthatcertaintenantsofthepetitioners
cultivatedthelandforatotalofsevenyears,thepetitionersdidnotpresentanyother
evidencetoshowthattheyhavebeeninactualpossessionofthepropertyforatleastten
years.

ThepetitionersargumentthatthepaymentoftaxesonthepropertysinceMay31,1948
constitutesproofoftheirpossessionofthesubjectlandforthirtyfiveyearsisuntenable.Tax
declarationsandreceiptsarenotconclusiveevidenceofownership.Atmost,theyconstitute
mereprimafacieproofofownershipofthepropertyforwhichtaxeshavebeenpaid.Inthe
absenceofactual,publicandadversepossession,thedeclarationofthelandfortaxpurposes
doesnotproveownership.39

INLIGHTOFALLTHEFOREGOING,thepetitionisDENIED.TheDecisionoftheCourtof
AppealsisAFFIRMED.Nocosts.

7.G.R.No.126586February2,2000

ALEXANDERVINOYA,petitioner,
vs.
NATIONALLABORRELATIONSCOMMISSION,REGENTFOODCORPORATIONAND/OR
RICKYSEE(PRESIDENT),respondents.

KAPUNAN,J.:

ThispetitionforcertiorariunderRule65seekstoannulandsetasidethedecision,1
promulgatedon21June1996,oftheNationalLaborRelationsCommission("NLRC")which
reversedthedecision2ofthe,LaborArbiter,renderedon15June1994,orderingRegent
FoodCorporation("RFC")toreinstateAlexanderVinoyatohisformerpositionandpayhim
backwages.

PrivaterespondentRegentFoodCorporationisadomesticcorporationprincipallyengagedin
themanufactureandsaleofvariousfoodproducts.PrivaterespondentRickySee,onthe
otherhand,isthepresidentofRFCandisbeingsuedinthatcapacity.

PetitionerAlexanderVinoya,thecomplainant,workedwithRFCassalesrepresentativeuntil
hisserviceswereterminatedon25November1991.

Thepartiespresentedconflictingversionsoffacts.

PetitionerAlexanderVinoyaclaimsthatheappliedandwasacceptedbyRFCassales
representativeon26May1990.Onthesamedate,acompanyidentificationcard3wasissued
tohimbyRFC.PetitionerallegesthathereporteddailytotheofficeofRFC,inPasigCity,to
takethelatter'svanforthedeliveryofitsproducts.Accordingtopetitioner,duringhisemploy,
hewasassignedtovarioussupermarketsandgrocerystoreswherehebookedsalesorders
andcollectedpaymentsforRFC.Forthistask,hewasrequiredbyRFCtoputupamonthly
bondofP200.00assecuritydeposittoguaranteetheperformanceofhisobligationassales
representative.PetitionercontendsthathewasunderthedirectcontrolandsupervisionofMr.
DanteSoandMr.SadiLim,plantmanagerandseniorsalesmanofRFC,respectively.He
aversthaton1July1991,hewastransferredbyRFCtoPeninsulaManpowerCompany,Inc.
("PMCI"),anagencywhichprovidesRFCwithadditionalcontractualworkerspursuanttoa
contractforthesupplyofmanpowerservices(hereinafterreferredtoasthe"Contractof
Service").4AfterhistransfertoPMCI,petitionerwasallegedlyreassignedtoRFCassales
representative.Subsequently,on25November1991,hewasinformedbyMs.SusanChua,
personnelmanagerofRFC,thathisserviceswereterminatedandhewasaskedtosurrender
hisIDcard.PetitionerwastoldthathisdismissalwasduetotheexpirationoftheContractof
ServicebetweenRFCandPMCI.Petitionerclaimsthathewasdismissedfromemployment
despitetheabsenceofanynoticeorinvestigation.Consequently,on3December1991,
petitionerfiledacaseagainstRFCbeforetheLaborArbiterforillegaldismissaland
nonpaymentof13thmonthpay.5

PrivaterespondentRegentFoodCorporation,ontheotherhand,maintainsthatno
employeremployeerelationshipexistedbetweenpetitioneranditself.Itinsiststhatpetitioner
isactuallyanemployeeofPMCI,allegedlyanindependentcontractor,whichhadaContract
ofService6withRFC.Toprovethisfact,RFCpresentsanEmploymentContract7signedby
petitioneron1July1991,whereinPMCIappearsashisemployer.RFCdeniesthatpetitioner
waseveremployedbyitpriorto1July1991.ItaversthatpetitionerwasissuedanIDcardso
thatitsclientsandcustomerswouldrecognizehimasadulyauthorizedrepresentativeof
RFC.WithregardtotheP200.00pesosmonthlybondpostedbypetitioner,RFCassertsthat
itwasrequiredinordertoguaranteetheturnoverofhiscollectionsincehehandledfundsof
RFC.WhileRFCadmitsthatithadcontrolandsupervisionoverpetitioner,itarguesthatsuch
wasexercisedincoordinationwithPMCI.Finally,RFCcontendsthattheterminationofits
relationshipwithpetitionerwasbroughtaboutbytheexpirationoftheContractofService
betweenitselfandPMCIandnotbecausepetitionerwasdismissedfromemployment.

On3December1991,whenpetitionerfiledacomplaintforillegaldismissalbeforetheLabor
Arbiter,PMCIwasinitiallyimpleadedasoneoftherespondents.However,petitioner
thereafterwithdrewhischargeagainstPMCIandpursuedhisclaimsolelyagainstRFC.
Subsequently,RFCfiledathirdpartycomplaintagainstPMCI.Afterconsideringbothversions
oftheparties,theLaborArbiterrenderedadecision,8dated15June1994,infavorof
petitioner.TheLaborArbiterconcludedthatRFCwasthetrueemployerofpetitionerforthe
followingreasons:(1)PetitionerwasoriginallywithRFCandwasmerelytransferredtoPMCI
tobedeployedasanagencyworkerandthensubsequentlyreassignedtoRFCassales
representative(2)RFChaddirectcontrolandsupervisionoverpetitioner(3)RFCactually
paidforthewagesofpetitioneralthoughcoursedthroughPMCIand,(4)Petitionerwas
terminatedperinstructionofRFC.Thus,theLaborArbiterdecreed,asfollows:

ACCORDINGLY,premisesconsideredrespondentRFCisherebydeclaredguiltyofillegal
dismissalandorderedtoimmediatelyreinstatecomplainanttohisformerpositionwithoutloss
ofseniorityrightsandotherbenefitsandpayhimbackwagesintheamountofP103,974.00.

Theclaimfor13thmonthpayisherebyDENIEDforlackofmerit.

Thiscase,insofarasrespondentPMCI[isconcerned]isDISMISSED,forlackofmerit.

SOORDERED.9

RFCappealedtheadversedecisionoftheLaborArbitertotheNLRC.Inadecision,10dated
21June1996,theNLRCreversedthefindingsoftheLaborArbiter.TheNLRCopinedthat
PMCIisanindependentcontractorbecauseithassubstantialcapitaland,assuch,isthetrue
employerofpetitioner.TheNLRC,thus,heldPMCIliableforthedismissalofpetitioner.The
dispositiveportionoftheNLRCdecisionstates:

WHEREFORE,premisesconsidered,theappealeddecisionismodifiedasfollows:


1.PeninsulaManpowerCompanyInc.isdeclaredasemployerofthecomplainant

2.PeninsulaisorderedtopaycomplainanthisseparationpayofP3,354.00andhis
proportionate13thmonthpayfor1991intheamountofP2,795.00orthetotalamountof
P6,149.00.

SOORDERED.11

SeparatemotionsforreconsiderationoftheNLRCdecisionwerefiledbypetitionerandPMCI.
Inaresolution,12dated20August1996,theNLRCdeniedbothmotions.However,itwas
onlypetitionerwhoelevatedthecasebeforethisCourt.

Inhispetitionforcertiorari,petitionersubmitsthatrespondentNLRCcommittedgraveabuse
ofdiscretioninreversingthedecisionoftheLaborArbiter,andasksforthereinstatementof
thelatter'sdecision.

Principally,thispetitionpresentsthefollowingissues:

1.WhetherpetitionerwasanemployeeofRFCorPMCI.

2.Whetherpetitionerwaslawfullydismissed.

Theresolutionofthefirstissueinitiallyboilsdowntoadeterminationofthetruestatusof
PMCI,whetheritisalaboronlycontractororanindependentcontractor.

Inthecaseatbar,RFCallegesthatPMCIisanindependentcontractoronthesoleground
thatthelatterisahighlycapitalizedventure.Tobuttressthisallegation,RFCpresentsacopy
oftheArticlesofIncorporationandtheTreasurer'sAffidavit13submittedbyPMCItothe
SecuritiesandExchangeCommissionshowingthatithasanauthorizedcapitalstockofOne
MillionPesos(P1,000,000.00),ofwhichThreeHundredThousandPesos(P300,000.00)is
subscribedandSeventyFiveThousandPesos(P75,000.00)ispaidin.AccordingtoRFC,
PMCIisadulyorganizedcorporationengagedinthebusinessofcreatingandhiringapoolof
temporarypersonneland,thereafter,assigningthemtoitsclientsfromtimetotimeforsuch
durationassaidclientsmayrequire.RFCfurthercontendsthatPMCIhasaseparateoffice,
permitandlicenseanditsownorganization.

Laboronlycontracting,aprohibitedact,isanarrangementwherethecontractoror
subcontractormerelyrecruits,suppliesorplacesworkerstoperformajob,workorservicefor
aprincipal.14Inlaboronlycontracting,thefollowingelementsarepresent:

(a)Thecontractororsubcontractordoesnothavesubstantialcapitalorinvestmenttoactually
performthejob,workorserviceunderitsownaccountandresponsibility


(b)Theemployeesrecruited,suppliedorplacedbysuchcontractororsubcontractorare
performingactivitieswhicharedirectlyrelatedtothemainbusinessoftheprincipal.15

Ontheotherhand,permissiblejobcontractingorsubcontractingreferstoanarrangement
wherebyaprincipalagreestoputoutorfarmoutwithacontractororsubcontractorthe
performanceorcompletionofaspecificjob,workorservicewithinadefiniteorpredetermined
period,regardlessofwhethersuchjob,workorserviceistobeperformedorcompletedwithin
oroutsidethepremisesoftheprincipal.16Apersonisconsideredengagedinlegitimatejob
contractingorsubcontractingifthefollowingconditionsconcur:

(a)Thecontractororsubcontractorcarriesonadistinctandindependentbusinessand
undertakestoperformthejob,workorserviceonitsownaccountandunderitsown
responsibilityaccordingtoitsownmannerandmethod,andfreefromthecontrolanddirection
oftheprincipalinallmattersconnectedwiththeperformanceoftheworkexceptastothe
resultsthereof

(b)Thecontractororsubcontractorhassubstantialcapitalorinvestmentand

(c)Theagreementbetweentheprincipalandcontractororsubcontractorassuresthe
contractualemployeesentitlementtoalllaborandoccupationalsafetyandhealthstandards,
freeexerciseoftherighttoselforganization,securityoftenure,andsocialandwelfare
benefits.17

Previously,inthecaseofNerivs.NLRC,18weheldthatinordertobeconsideredasajob
contractoritisenoughthatacontractorhassubstantialcapital.Inotherwords,once
substantialcapitalestablisheditisnolongernecessaryforthecontractortoshowevidence
thatithasinvestmentintheformoftools,equipment,machineries,workpremises,among
others.TherationalforthisisthatArticle106oftheLaborCodedoesnotrequirethatthe
contractorpossessbothsubstantialcapitalandinvestmentintheformoftools,equipment,
machineries,workpremises,amongothers.19ThedecisionoftheCourtinNeri,thus,states:

RespondentBCCneednotprovethatitmadeinvestmentsintheformoftools,equipment,
machineries,workpremises,amongothers,becauseithasestablishedthatithassufficient
capitalization.TheLaborArbiterandtheNLRCbothdeterminedthatBCChadacapitalstock
ofP1millionfullysubscribedandpaidfor.BCCisthereforeahighlycapitalizedventureand
cannotbedeemedengagedin"laboronly"contracting.20

However,indeclaringthatBuildingCareCorporation("BCC")wasanindependentcontractor,
theCourtconsiderednotonlythefactthatithadsubstantialcapitalization.TheCourtnoted
thatBCCcarriedonanindependentbusinessandundertooktheperformanceofitscontract
accordingtoitsownmannerandmethod,freefromthecontrolandsupervisionofitsprincipal
inallmattersexceptastotheresultsthereof.21TheCourtlikewisementionedthatthe

employeesofBCCwereengagedtoperformspecificspecialservicesforitsprincipal.22
Thus,theCourtruledthatBCCwasanindependentcontractor.

TheCourtfurtherclarifiedtheimportoftheNeridecisioninthesubsequentcaseofPhilippine
FujiXeroxCorporationvs.NLRC.23Inthesaidcase,petitionerFujiXeroximploredtheCourt
toapplytheNeridoctrinetoitsallegedjobcontractor,Skillpower,Inc.,anddeclarethesame
asanindependentcontractor.FujiXeroxallegedthatSkillpower,Inc.wasahighlycapitalized
ventureregisteredwiththeSecuritiesandExchangeCommission,theDepartmentofLabor
andEmployment,andtheSocialSecuritySystemwithassetsexceedingP5,000,000.00
possessingatleast29typewriters,officeequipmentandservicevehicles,anditsownpoolof
employeeswith25clerksassignedtoitsclientsonatemporarybasis.24Despitetheevidence
presentedbyFujiXeroxtheCourtrefusedtoapplytheNericaseandexplained:

PetitionerscitethecaseofNeriv.NLRC,inwhichitwasheldthattheBuildingCare
Corporation(BCC)wasanindependentcontractoronthebasisoffindingthatithad
substantialcapital,althoughtherewasnoevidencethatithadinvestmentsintheformof
tools,equipment,machineriesandworkpremises.ButtheCourtinthatcaseconsiderednot
onlythecapitalizationoftheBCCbutalsothefactthatBCCwasprovidingspecificspecial
services(radio/telexoperatorandjanitor)totheemployerthatinanothercase,theCourthad
alreadyfoundthatBCCwasanindependentcontractorthatBCCretainedcontroloverthe
employeesandtheemployerwasactuallyjustconcernedwiththeendresultthatBCChad
thepowertoreassigntheemployeesandtheirdeploymentwasnotsubjecttotheapprovalof
theemployerandthatBCCwaspaidinlumpsumfortheservicesitrendered.Thesefeatures
ofthatcasemakeitdistinguishablefromthepresentone.25

NothavingshowntheabovecircumstancespresentinNeri,theCourtdeclaredSkillpower,
Inc.tobeengagedinlaboronlycontractingandwasconsideredasamereagentofthe
employer.

Fromthetwoaforementioneddecisions,itmaybeinferredthatitisnotenoughtoshow
substantialcapitalizationorinvestmentintheformoftools,equipment,machineriesandwork
premises,amongothers,tobeconsideredasanindependentcontractor.Infact,
jurisprudentialholdingsaretotheeffectthatindeterminingtheexistenceofanindependent
contractorrelationship,severalfactorsmightbeconsideredsuchas,butnotnecessarily
confinedto,whetherthecontractoriscarryingonanindependentbusinessthenatureand
extentoftheworktheskillrequiredthetermanddurationoftherelationshiptherightto
assigntheperformanceofspecifiedpiecesofworkthecontrolandsupervisionofthe
workersthepoweroftheemployerwithrespecttothehiring,firingandpaymentofthe
workersofthecontractorthecontrolofthepremisesthedutytosupplypremises,tools,
appliances,materialsandlaborandthemode,mannerandtermsofpayment.26

Giventheabovestandardsandthefactualmilieuofthecase,theCourthastoagreewiththe
conclusionoftheLaborArbiterthatPMCIisengagedinlaboronlycontracting.


Firstofall,PMCIdoesnothavesubstantialcapitalizationorinvestmentintheformoftools,
equipment,machineries,workpremises,amongothers,toqualifyasanindependent
contractor.WhileithasanauthorizedcapitalstockofP1,000,000.00,onlyP75,000.00is
actuallypaidin,which,toourmind,cannotbeconsideredassubstantialcapitalization.Inthe
caseofNeri,whichwaspromulgatedin1993,BCChadacapitalstockofP1,000,000.00
whichwasfullysubscribedandpaidfor.Moreover,whentheNericasewasdecidedin1993,
therateofexchangebetweenthedollarandthepesowasonlyP27.30to$127while
presentlyitisatP40.390to$1.28TheCourttakesjudicialnoticeofthefactthatin1993,the
economicsituationinthecountrywasnotasadverseasthepresent,asshownbythe
devaluationofourpeso.Withthecurrenteconomicatmosphereinthecountry,thepaidin
capitalizationofPMCIamountingtoP75,000,00cannotbeconsideredassubstantialcapital
and,assuch,PMCIcannotqualifyasanindependentcontractor.

Second,PMCIdidnotcarryonanindependentbusinessnordiditundertaketheperformance
ofitscontractaccordingtoitsownmannerandmethod,freefromthecontrolandsupervision
ofitsprincipal,RFC.TheevidenceathandshowsthattheworkersassignedbyPMCItoRFC
wereunderthecontrolandsupervisionofthelatter.TheContractofServiceitselfprovides
thatRFCcanrequiretheworkersassignedbyPMCItorenderservicesevenbeyondthe
regulareighthourworkingdaywhendeemednecessary.29Furthermore,RFCundertookto
assistPMCIinmakingsurethatthedailytimerecordsofitsallegedemployeesfaithfully
reflecttheactualworkinghours.30Withregardtopetitioner,RFCadmittedthatitexercised
controlandsupervisionoverhim.31ThesearetelltaleindicationsthatPMCIwasnotleftalone
tosuperviseandcontrolitsallegedemployees.Consequently,itcanbe,concludedthatPMCI
wasnotanindependentcontractorsinceitdidnotcarryadistinctbusinessfreefromthe
controlandsupervisionofRFC.

Third,PMCIwasnotengagedtoperformaspecificandspecialjoborservice,whichisoneof
thestrongindicatorsthatanentityisanindependentcontractorasexplainedbytheCourtin
thecasesofNeriandFuji.AsstatedintheContractofService,thesoleundertakingofPMCI
wastoprovideRFCwithatemporaryworkforceabletocarryoutwhateverservicemaybe
requiredbyit.32SuchventurewascompliedwithbyPMCIwhentherequiredpersonnelwere
actuallyassignedtoRFC.Apartfromthat,nootherparticularjob,workorservicewas
requiredfromPMCI.Obviously,withsuchanarrangement,PMCImerelyactedasa
recruitmentagencyforRFC.SincetheundertakingofPMCIdidnotinvolvetheperformance
ofaspecificjob,butratherthesupplyofmanpoweronly,PMCIclearlyconducteditselfas
laboronlycontractor.

Lastly,inlaboronlycontracting,theemployeesrecruited,suppliedorplacedbythecontractor
performactivitieswhicharedirectlyrelatedtothemainbusinessofitsprincipal.Inthiscase,
theworkofpetitionerassalesrepresentativeisdirectlyrelatedtothebusinessofRFC.Being
inthebusinessoffoodmanufacturingandsales,itisnecessaryforRFCtohireasales
representativelikepetitionertotakechargeofbookingitssalesordersandcollecting

paymentsforsuch.Thus,theworkofpetitionerassalesrepresentativeinRFCcanonlybe
categorizedasclearlyrelatedto,andinthepursuitofthelatter'sbusiness.Logically,when
petitionerwasassignedbyPMCItoRFC,PMCIactedmerelyasalaboronlycontractor.

Basedontheforegoing,PMCIcanonlybeclassifiedasalaboronlycontractorand,assuch,
cannotbeconsideredastheemployerofpetitioner.

However,evengrantingthatPMCIisanindependentcontractor,asRFCadamantlysuggests,
still,afindingofthesamewillnotsavethedayforRFC.AperusaloftheContractofService
enteredintobetweenRFCandPMCIrevealsthatpetitionerisactuallynotincludedinthe
enumerationoftheworkerstobeassignedtoRFC.Thefollowingaretheworkersenumerated
inthecontract:

1.Merchandiser

2.PromoGirl

3.FactoryWorker

4.Driver33

Obviously,theaboveenumerationdoesnotincludethepositionofpetitionerassales
representative.Thisonlyshowsthatpetitionerwasneverintendedtobeapartofthosetobe
contractedout.However,RFCinsiststhatdespitetheabsenceofhispositioninthe
enumeration,petitionerisdeemedincludedbecausethishasbeenagreeduponbetween
itselfandPMCI.Suchcontentiondeservesscantconsideration.Haditreallybeenthe
intentionofbothpartiestoincludethepositionofpetitionertheyshouldhaveclearlyindicated
thesameinthecontract.However,thecontractistotallysilentonthispointwhichcanonly
meanthatpetitionerwasneverreallyintendedtobecoveredbyit.

Evenifweusethe"fourfoldtest"toascertainwhetherRFCisthetrueemployerofpetitioner
thatsameresultwouldbeachieved.Indeterminingtheexistenceofemployeremployee
relationshipthefollowingelementsofthe"fourfoldtest"aregenerallyconsidered,namely:(1)
theselectionandengagementoftheemployeeorthepowertohire(2)thepaymentof
wages(3)thepowertodismissand(4)thepowertocontroltheemployee.34Ofthesefour,
the"controltest"isthemostimportant.35Acarefulstudyoftheevidenceathandshowsthat
RFCpossessestheearmarksofbeingtheemployerofpetitioner.

Withregardtothefirstelement,thepowertohire,RFCdeniesanyinvolvementinthe
recruitmentandselectionofpetitionerandassertsthatpetitionerdidnotpresentanyproof
thathewasactuallyhiredandemployedbyRFC.

Itshouldbepointedoutthatnoparticularformofproofisrequiredtoprovetheexistenceofan

employeremployeerelationship.36Anycompetentandrelevantevidencemayshowthe
relationship.37Ifonlydocumentaryevidencewouldberequiredtodemonstratethat
relationship,noschemingemployerwouldeverbebroughtbeforebarofjustice.38Inthecase
atbar,petitionerpresentedtheidentificationcardissuetohimon26May1990byRFCas
proofthatitwasthelatterwhoengagedhisservices.Toourmind,theIDcardisenoughproof
thatpetitionerwaspreviouslyhiredbyRFCpriortohistransferasagencyworkertoPMCI.It
mustbenotedthattheEmploymentContractbetweenpetitionerandPMCIwasdated1July
1991.Ontheotherhand,theIDcardissuedbyRFCtopetitionerwasdated26May1990,or
morethanoneyearbeforetheEmploymentContractwassignedbypetitionerinfavorof
PMCI.Itmakesonewonderwhy,ifpetitionerwasindeedrecruitedbyPMCIasitsown
employeeon1July1991,howcomehehadalreadybeenissuedanIDcardbyRFCayear
earlier?WhiletheEmploymentContractindicatestheword"renewal,"presumablyanattempt
toshowthatpetitionerhadpreviouslysignedasimilarcontractwithPMCI,noevidenceofa
priorcontractenteredintopetitionerandPMCIwaseverpresentedbyRFC.Infact,despite
thedemandmadebythecounselofpetitionerforproductionofthecontractwhichpurportedly
showsthatpriorto1July1991petitionerwasalreadyconnectedwithPMCI,RFCnevermade
amovetofurnishthecounselofpetitioneracopyoftheallegedoriginalEmployment
Contract.Theonlylogicalconclusionwhichmaybederivedfromsuchinactionisthatthere
wasnosuchcontractendthattheonlyEmploymentContractenteredintobetweenPMCIand
petitionerwasthe1July1991contractandnoother.Since,asshownbytheIDcard,
petitionerwasalreadywithRFCon26May1990,priortothetimeanyEmploymentContract
wasagreeduponbetweenPMCIandpetitioner,itfollowsthatitwasRFCwhoactuallyhired
andengagedpetitionertobeitsemployee.

Withrespecttothepaymentofwages,RFCdisputestheargumentofpetitionerthatitpaidhis
wagesonthegroundthatpetitionerdidnotsubmitanyevidencetoprovethathissalarywas
paidbyit,orthathewasissuedpayslipbythecompany.Onthecontrary,RFCassertsthat
theinvoices39presentedbyit,showthatitwasPMCIwhopaidpetitionerhiswagesthrough
itsregularmonthlybillingschargedtoRFC.

TheCourttakesjudicialnoticeofthepracticeofemployerswho,inordertoevadethe
liabilitiesundertheLaborCode,donotissuepayslipsdirectlytotheiremployees.40Underthe
currentpractice,athirdperson,usuallythepurportedcontractor(serviceormanpower
placementagency),assumestheactofpayingthewage.41Forthisreason,thelowlyworker
isunabletoshowproofthatitwasdirectlypaidbythetrueemployer.Nevertheless,forthe
workers,itisenoughthattheyactuallyreceivetheirpay,obliviousoftheneedforpayslips,
unawareofitslegalimplications.42Applyingthisprincipletothecaseatbar,eventhoughthe
wageswerecoursedthroughPMCI,wenotethatthefundsactuallycamefromthepocketsof
RFC.Thus,intheend,RFCisstilltheonewhopaidthewagesofpetitioneralbeitindirectly.

Astothethirdelement,thepowertodismiss,RFCaversthatitwasPMCIwhoterminatedthe
employmentofpetitioner.Thefactsonrecord,however,disprovetheallegationofRFC.First
ofall,theContractofServicegaveRFCtherighttoterminatetheworkersassignedtoitby

PMCIwithoutthelatter'sapproval.Quotedhereunderistheportionofthecontractstatingthe
powerofRFCtodismiss,towit:

7.TheFirstparty("RFC")reservestherighttoterminatetheservicesofanyworkerfoundto
beunsatisfactorywithoutthepriorapprovalofthesecondparty("PMCI").43

Infurtheranceoftheaboveprovision,RFCrequestedPMCItoterminatepetitionerfromhis
employmentwiththecompany.InresponsetotherequestofRFC,PMCIterminatedpetitioner
fromservice.AsfoundbytheLaborArbiter,towhichweagree,thedismissalofpetitionerwas
indeedmadeundertheinstructionofRFCtoPMCI.

Thefourthandmostimportantrequirementinascertainingthepresenceof
employeremployeerelationshipisthepowerofcontrol.Thepowerofcontrolreferstothe
authorityoftheemployertocontroltheemployeenotonlywithregardtotheresultofworkto
bedonebutalsotothemeansandmethodsbywhichtheworkistobeaccomplished.44It
shouldbeborneinmind,thatthe"controltest"callsmerelyfortheexistenceoftherightto
controlthemannerofdoingthework,andnotnecessarilytotheactualexerciseoftheright.45
Inthecaseatbar,weneednotbelaborourselvesindiscussingwhetherthepowerofcontrol
exists.RFCalreadyadmittedthatitexercisedcontrolandsupervisionoverpetitioner.46RFC,
however,raisesthedefensethatthepowerofcontrolwasjointlyexercisedwithPMCI.The
LaborArbiter,ontheotherhand,foundthatpetitionerwasunderthedirectcontroland
supervisionofthepersonnelofRFCandnotPMCI.Weareinclinedtobelievethefindingsof
theLaborArbiterwhichissupportednotonlybytheadmissionofRFCbutalsobythe
evidenceonrecord.Besides,toourmind,theadmissionofRFCthatitexercisedcontroland
supervisionoverpetitioner,thesamebeingadeclarationagainstinterest,issufficientenough
toprovethatthepowerofcontroltrulyexists.

We,therefore,holdthatanemployeremployeerelationshipexistsbetweenpetitionerand
RFC.

Havingdeterminedtherealemployerofpetitioner,wenowproceedtoascertainthelegalityof
hisdismissalfromemployment.

Sincepetitioner,duetohislengthofservice,alreadyattainedthestatusofaregular
employee,47heisentitledtothesecurityoftenureprovidedunderthelaborlaws.Hence,he
mayonlybevalidlyterminatedfromserviceuponcompliancewiththelegalrequisitesfor
dismissal.UndertheLaborCode,therequirementsforthelawfuldismissalofanemployee
aretwofold,thesubstantiveandtheproceduralaspects.Notonlymustthedismissalbefora
validorauthorizedcause,48therudimentaryrequirementsofdueprocessnoticeand
hearing49must,likewise,beobservedbeforeanemployeemaybedismissed.Withoutthe
concurrenceofthetwo,theterminationwould,intheeyesofthelaw,beillegal.50

Astheemployer,RFChastheburdenofprovingthatthedismissalofpetitionerwasfora

causeallowedunderthelawandthatpetitionerwasaffordedproceduraldueprocess.Sadto
say,RFCfailedtodischargethisburden.Indeed,RFCneverpointedtoanyvalidor
authorizedcauseundertheLaborCodewhichallowedittoterminatetheservicesof
petitioner.Itsloneallegationthatthedismissalwasduetotheexpirationorcompletionof
contractisnotevenoneofthegroundsforterminationallowedbylaw.NeitherdidRFCshow
thatpetitionerwasgivenampleopportunitytocontestthelegalityofhisdismissal.Infact,no
noticeofsuchimpendingterminationwasevergivenhim.Petitionerwas,thus,surprisedthat
hewasalreadyterminatedfromemploymentwithoutanyinklingastohowandwhyitcame
about.Petitionerwasdefinitelydenieddueprocess.Havingfailedtoestablishcompliance
withtherequirementsonterminationofemploymentundertheLaborCode,thedismissalof
petitioneristaintedwithillegality.

Anemployeewhohasbeenillegallydismissedisentitledtoreinstatementtohisformer
positionwithoutlossofseniorityrightsandtopaymentoffullbackwagescorrespondingtothe
periodfromhisillegaldismissaluptoactualreinstatement.51Petitionerisentitledtonoless.

WHEREFORE,thepetitionisGRANTED.ThedecisionoftheNLRC,dated21June1996,as
wellasitsresolution,promulgatedon20August1996,areANNULLEDandSETASIDE.The
decisionoftheLaborArbiter,renderedon15June1994,isherebyREINSTATEDand
AFFIRMEd.

8.WALKERv.HALLIBURTONSERVICES,INC.NO.93722.

CourtofAppealofLouisiana,ThirdCircuit.

OrderAmendingDecreeonRehearingMay15,1995.

LawrenceN.Curtis,GregoryKarlKlein,Lafayette,forJohnnyWalker.

JamesE.Diaz,Lafayette,forHalliburtonServices.

BeforeLABORDE,COOKSandWOODARD,JJ.

WOODARD,Judge.

Thisisaworkers'compensationcase.Theissuesonremandfromthesupremecourtare:(1)
whetherthehearingofficerimproperlytookjudicialnoticeofthefactthatallsofttissueinjuries
healinsixweeks(2)whetherplaintiffhasdisablingsymptomsthatwerecausedbythework
accident(3)whetherplaintiffisentitledtomedicalexpensesand(4)whetherdefendant
actedarbitrarily,capriciously,andwithoutprobablecauseinterminatingplaintiff'sbenefits.

FACTS

OnJune13,1991,theplaintiff,JohnnyWalker,whowasemployedbythedefendant,
HalliburtonServices,Inc.(Halliburton),wasinjuredwhenhelosthisbalancewhileattempting
toopenahatchonthetanktruckhewasdriving,fallingapproximatelytenfeet,strikinga
concretefloor.Thereisnodisputethathesuffereddisablinginjuriestohisleftelbow,right
knee,andbothwrists.HalliburtonpaidWalker$282.00perweekintemporarytotaldisability
benefitsfromJune14,1991untilSeptember12,1991,whenDr.CliftonShepherd,Jr.,an
orthopedicsurgeon,andDr.JackHurst,aneurologicalsurgeon,releasedhimbacktowork.

Subsequently,Walkerbroughtthissuitallegingthathewasdisabledfromaneckandback
injurycausedbytheworkaccident,requestingthathisbenefitsbereinstated,andseeking
recoveryformedicalexpensesfortreatmentoftheseinjuries.Thehearingofficerrendered
judgmentonApril14,1993,findingthatWalkerwasnotdisabled,becauseinher
"experience,"thesofttissueinjuryinhisneckandlowbackshouldhaveresolveditselfinsix
weeks.Thehearingofficeralsodeniedhisrequestformedicalexpenses,attorney'sfees,and
penalties.

Walkerthenappealedtothiscourt,andinaffirmingthehearingofficer'sjudgmentinone
paragraph,westated:

"Whilewewouldmakeadifferentdenovorulingonthiscase,wefindthattherecordsupports
thatthehearingofficer'sholdingofnodisabilityregardingtheneckandbackcouldbebased
onhergivingmoreweighttoDr.Shepherd'stestimonythathedidnotbelievetheneckand
backproblemswerecausedbytheaccident.Thus,wefindnomanifesterror."
Next,WalkerappliedforawrittotheLouisianaSupremeCourt,whichwasgranted.The
supremecourtsetasideourdecision,andremandedthecasetousforreconsiderationanda
fullopinion.644So.2d627.

Onremand,Walkerassignsthefollowingassignmentsoferror:Thehearingofficererredin
(1)takingjudicialnoticeofafact,whichwasdisputed,anddoesnotformpartofthecommon
knowledgeofeverypersonofcommonunderstandingandintelligence(2)failingtoaward
temporarytotaldisabilitybenefitsandmedicalexpensesand(3)failingtoawardattorney's
feesandpenalties.

LAW

JUDICIALNOTICE

Walkerarguesthatthehearingofficercommittedaclearerroroflawwhenshetookjudicial
noticeofthefactthatallsofttissueinjurieshealinsixweeks.Hethenassertsthat,asaresult
ofthiserror,weshoulddeterminetheessentialfactsofthiscasedenovo.Weagree.

Courtscanonlytakejudicialnoticeofafactthatmayberegardedasformingpartofthe
commonknowledgeofeverypersonofordinaryunderstandingandintelligence,StateBlock,

Inc.v.Poche,444So.2d680(La.App.5Cir.1984),andafactthatisnotsubjecttoreasonable
dispute,La.CodeEvid.art.201(B).Notonlydowebelievethattheintricatemedical
knowledgeofwhenasofttissueinjuryhealsdoesnotmeettheformerrequirement,thisfact
wasclearlyindispute.Dr.MichelE.Heard,anorthopedicsurgeonwhotreatedWalkeron
severaloccasions,unequivocallytestifiedthatwhileeightypercentofsofttissueinjuriesheal
withineightweeks,twentypercentdonotthatWalker'ssofttissueinjuriesinhisneckand
backhadnothealedasofAugust3,1992andtherefore,hefellwithinthelattergroup.
Additionally,Dr.ThomasLaBorde,aspecialistinphysicalmedicineandrehabilitationwho
treatedWalker,declaredthathestillsufferedfromasofttissueinjuryonAugust13,1992,
wellbeyondsixweeksaftertheworkaccident.

TheonlyfindingofmaterialfactthatthehearingofficermadewasthatWalkerwasnot
disabled,basedonhererrorintakingjudicialnoticethatallsofttissueinjurieshealinsix
weekstherefore,sheneverreachedtheissuesofwhetherWalker'sneckandbackinjuries
werecausedbytheaccident,andifso,whetherheisentitledtomedicalexpensestotreat
theseinjuries.Itisclearthatthiserrorwasprejudicialbecauseitmateriallyaffectedthe
outcomeofthiscase.Whensuchaprejudicialerroroflawskewsthecourt'sfindingofa
materialissueoffactandcausesittopretermitotherissues,theappellatecourtisrequired,if
itcan,torenderjudgmentontherecordbyapplyingthecorrectlawanddeterminingthe
essentialfactsdenovo.Lashav.OlinCorp.,625So.2d1002(La.1993).Sincewefindthatthe
recordiscomplete,wewillreviewdenovotheissuesofdisability,causation,medical
expenses,attorney'sfees,andpenalties.

DISABILITY/CAUSATION

Anemployeeinaworkers'compensationcaseinitiallyhastheburdenofprovingbya
preponderanceoftheevidencethathisemploymentaccidentcausedhisdisability.Pelousv.
Guidry,520So.2d1042(La.App.3Cir.1987),writdenied,522So.2d565(La.1988).Inorder
foranemployeetorecover,itmustbedeterminedthattheemploymentsomehowcausedor
contributedtothedisability,butitisnotnecessarythattheexactcausebefound.Pattersonv.
GNBBattery,Inc.,569So.2d640(La.App.2Cir.1990),writdenied,573So.2d1134
(La.1991).Theissueofdisabilitypresentsalegal,notpurelymedicalquestion,whichmustbe
determinedthroughaconsiderationofbothlayandmedicaltestimony.Taylorv.
LouisianaPacificCorp.,602So.2d48(La.App.3Cir.),writsdenied,606So.2d541,542
(La.1992).Theemployee'sworkaccidentispresumedtohavecausedhisdisabilitywhenthe
employeeprovesthat:(1)beforetheaccident,hehadnotmanifestedhisdisablingsymptoms
(2)commencingwiththeaccident,thedisablingsymptomsappearedand(3)thereiseither
medicalorcircumstantialevidenceindicatingareasonablepossibilityofcausalconnection
betweentheaccidentanddisablingcondition.Waltonv.NormandyVillageHomesAss'n,Inc.,
475So.2d320(La.1985).

Inthecasesubjudice,Walkertestifiedthatbeforetheworkaccidenthehadworkedat
Halliburtonforabouttenyearsthatduringthistimehenevermissedasignificantamountof

workandthathewasingoodhealthandneversufferedfrompaininhisneckandlowback.
Immediatelyaftertheaccident,hewastakenbyambulancetotheemergencyroomat
LafayetteGeneralHospital.Walkerunequivocallytestifiedthatwhilehewasthere,his"whole
body"hurt,includinghisneckandlowback.Hefurtherstatedthathisneckandbackbeganto
hurt"alot"approximatelytwoweekslater.ThisiscorroboratedbytheJuly1,1991reportof
MannyR.Gala,aphysicaltherapistwhotreatedWalker,statingthathehadan"increasein
sorenessofbothupperextremities,rightlowerextremity,andbothscapularegions."The
scapularegionistheareaintheback,justbelowtheneck,wheretheshoulderbladesare
located.Mr.GalaalsonotedinaJuly31,1991reportthatWalkerhadbeencomplainingofan
increaseinpaininthecervicalandlumberregionsinceJuly21.

Dr.LaBorde,whofirstexaminedWalkeronSeptember10,1991,statedthathefound"trigger
points,"whicharewelllocalizedareasoftendernesswhichindicatemyofascialabnormalities,
inhisneckandlowback.Dr.LaBorde'sfindingswerecorroboratedwhenWalkerlater
completedathermogram,whichrevealedthatthepaininhisneckandshoulderareawas
"compatiblewithmusclespasmormyofasicialabnormality"andthatthepaininhislowback
was"suggestiveofanL5nerverootirritation."Finally,Dr.LaBordedidnothesitatetoopine
that"inallmedicalprobability,"theworkaccidentcausedWalker'sinjuriesinhisneckandlow
back.

Dr.Heard,whotreatedWalkerforaboutfourmonths,diagnosedhimwithaposttraumatic
softtissueinjurytotheneckandlowbackareathatwas"confirmedbymultipleexaminations
andmultipletesting."Dr.HeardclearlystatedthatifWalkerhadnopreexistingneckorback
problems,whichtherecordclearlysubstantiates,hewouldopinethattheneckandback
injurywascausedbytheworkaccident.

Onceanemployeeestablishesthepresumptionofacausalrelationship,theemployermust
produceevidenceandpersuadethetrieroffactthatitismoreprobablethannotthattheinjury
wasnotcausedbytheaccident.Walton,supra.Theeffectofthepresumptionisnotsoslight
andevanescentthatitisspentanddisappearsuponthemereproductionofevidencebythe
employer.Id.

Inthecasesubjudice,Halliburtonattemptedtorebutthepresumptionthattheworkaccident
causedWalker'sneckandlowbackinjurybyintroducingintoevidencethedepositionsofDrs.
ShepherdandHurst,whoreleasedWalkertogobacktoworkonSeptember12,1991and
August7,1991,respectively.

Dr.Shepherd,Halliburton'sphysician,whotreatedWalkerfromthedateoftheworkaccident
untilSeptember12,1991,testifiedthathewouldnotrelateWalker'sneckandlowbackpain
totheaccidentbecauseheassumed,basedonMr.Gala'sreports,thatWalkerdidnotsuffer
anysymptomsofneckandbackpainuntilJuly21,morethanfiveweeksaftertheaccident.
However,Dr.ShepherdstatedthatifWalkerhadthesymptomsearlier,whichtherecord
substantiates,this"could"changehisopinionwithrespecttocausation.Further,Dr.Shepherd

candidlyadmittedthatthetypeoffallwhichWalkersufferedcould"easily...causeneck
and/orbackinjury."

Dr.HurstdidnotdenythatWalkerexperiencedneckandlowbackpainshemerelyconfirmed
thathecouldnotfindaneurologicaldeficittoexplainit.Dr.Hurstalsonotedthathedidnot
inquirewhethertherewasanytypeofmuscleinjurytoWalker'sneckandlowback.

WefindthatthistestimonywasnotsufficienttorebutthepresumptionthatWalker'sneckand
lowbackinjurywerecausedbytheworkaccident.

DISABILITYBENEFITS

TheundisputedtestimoniesofDrs.HeardandLaBordeindicatethatWalkeristotallydisabled
fromworkuntilhesuccessfullycompletesarecommendedrehabilitationprogram.Thus,we
awardhimtemporarytotaldisabilitybenefits,attheundisputedrateof$282.00perweek,from
September12,1991untilhesuccessfullycompletestherehabilitationprogramrecommended
byhistreatingphysicians.SeeLa.R.S.23:1221(1)(A).

MEDICALEXPENSES

La.R.S.23:1203(A)provides,inpertinentpart,that"IneverycasecomingunderthisChapter,
theemployershallfurnishallnecessarydrugs,supplies,hospitalcareandservices,medical
andsurgicaltreatment,andanytypeofnonmedicaltreatmentrecognizedbythelawsofthis
stateaslegal,...."Underthisstatute,aworker'smedicalexpensesarecompensableonlyif
theyareoccasionedbytheworkrelatedinjury.Charlesv.AetnaCas.andSur.Co.,525
So.2d1272(La.App.3Cir.),writdenied,531So.2d480(La.1988).Theclaimantmust
establishhisclaimformedicalbenefitsandshowthattheyarerelatedtotheworkaccidentto
areasonablecertaintyandbyapreponderanceoftheevidence.Id.

Inthecasesubjudice,wefindthatWalkerhasproventhathisexpensesincurredinobtaining
treatmentfromthefollowinghealthcareproviderswerenecessarynamely,(1)Drs.Heard
andLaBordefordiagnosisandtreatment(2)theOccupationalandPhysicalTherapyClinic
andtheOrthopedic&SportsPhysicalTherapyClinicforphysicaltherapy(3)St.Thomas
DiagnosticCenterforradiologicalexaminations(4)Medlog,Inc.whichleasedhimaTens
Unitforreliefofpainand(5)AcadianAmbulancewhichtransportedWalkertoLafayette
GeneralHospitalonthedayoftheworkaccident.

Walkerassertsthatthesemedicalexpensesamountto$16,799.14however,weconclude
thattherecordonlysupportsanawardof$14,466.77.WalkerhaslistedDr.LaBorde'sbillat
$3,684.00,butDr.LaBordestatedthathisbillwasonly$2,780.00.Additionally,Walkerlisted
Occupational&SportsPhysicalTherapyClinic'sbillat$5,495.37,butwefindtheactual
invoicesintherecordonlysupportanawardof$4,067.00.

ATTORNEY'SFEESANDPENALTIES

Itiswellsettledthataworkers'compensationclaimantisnotentitledtoattorney'sfeesand
penaltiesunlesstheemployeractsarbitrarily,capriciouslyorwithoutprobablecausein
terminatingbenefits.La.R.S.23:12011201.2.Inthecasesubjudice,EugeneParks,a
workers'compensationclaimsmanagerforHalliburton,testifiedthatHalliburtonterminated
Walker'sbenefitsonSeptember12,1991because(1)Dr.Hurstreleasedhimbacktoworkon
August7and(2)Dr.Shepherd,whofeltWalker'sneckandlowbackpainswerenotrelated
totheaccident,releasedhimtogobacktoworkonthatday.Subsequenttotheterminationof
benefits,however,Mr.ParksadmittedthathereceivedcopiesofDr.LaBorde'smedical
reportswhichclearlyindicatedthatWalkerhaddisablingsymptomsinhisneckandlowback,
andthatheneededtoundergorehabilitation.Wheresubsequenttoaninitialoptimisticreport,
anemployerreceivesinformationindisputablyshowingaclaimanttobedisabled,the
employercannotrelyupontheearlierreporttoavoidpenaltiesandattorney'sfees.Cormierv.
SaveTime,Inc.,497So.2d404(La.App.3Cir.1986).

Atthatpoint,attheleast,HalliburtonhadadutytofurtherinvestigatewhetherWalker'sclaims
ofdisabilitywerevalid.Instead,Halliburtondidnotact.Inchoosingacourseofinaction
followingWalker'sdemand,supportedbymedicalreportsevidencingcompensabledisability,
Halliburtonactedatitsownperil.Id.Therefore,wefindthatWalkerisentitledtoattorney's
feesandpenalties.

Giventheextensivetimespentonthiscase,andthenumberofbriefsfiledwiththehearing
officer,thiscourt,andthesupremecourt,wefeelWalkerisentitledtoanawardof$7,500.00
inattorney'sfees.Additionally,Halliburtonisassessedwithstatutorypenaltiesoftwelve
percentofthetotalamountofpastduetemporarytotaldisabilitybenefits.

CONCLUSION

Fortheforegoingreasons,thejudgmentofthehearingofficerisreversedandsetaside.Itis
ordered,adjudged,anddecreedthatJohnnyWalkerisentitledto:(1)temporarytotaldisability
benefitsintheamountof$282.00perweekfromSeptember12,1991untilhesuccessfully
completesarecommendedrehabilitationprogram(2)medicalexpensesof$14,466.77(3)
anawardofattorney'sfeesof$7,500.00and(4)statutorypenaltiesoftwelvepercentofthe
totalamountofpastduetemporarytotaldisabilitybenefits.Finally,itisorderedthatallcosts
atthetriallevelandonappealbebornebyHalliburton.

REVERSEDANDRENDERED.

ONREHEARING

PERCURIAM.

Ourformerdecreeisamendedtoreadasfollows:Plaintiff,JohnnyWalker,isentitledtolegal
intereston(1)eachinstallmentofdisabilitybenefitsfromtheinstallment'sduedateuntilpaid
and(2)medicalexpenses,attorney'sfees,andpenaltiesfromthedateofjudicialdemand
untilpaid.Chisholmv.L.S.Womack,Inc.,424So.2d1138(La.App.1Cir.1982)LeDouxv.
Robinson,568So.2d244,248(La.App3Cir.1990)Watsonv.LouisianaPavingCompany,
441So.2d31(La.App.3Cir.1983).

Inallotherrespects,ouroriginaldecreeisaffirmed.