Analysis

December 3, 2014

Summary: More Turks are now

saying they support their country
being part of the EU than at
any time since 2006. Centerleft voters who are discouraged
by the ruling partys policies
make up a large percentage of
these supporters. They view a
closer connection to Europe as
a possible source of protection
for the liberties they see their
government as encroaching
upon. The questions are will
these center-left voters be
content with the revival of the
membership negotiations and
related gains only, and not actual
membership, and will opposition
parties shift their platforms to try
to attract these voters.

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In Search of an Anchor for Rights and

Liberties: The Return of Secular and CenterLeft Voters to Turkeys EU Vocation?
by zgehan enyuva

Introduction
The latest Turkish public opinion
figures on the European Union
revealed in the Transatlantic Trends
2014 survey created a wave of enthusiasm and started an extensive debate
regarding the surge in the positive
opinion of the EU.1 The percentage
of those who stated that Turkeys
membership in the EU would be a
good thing increased by eight points,
from 45 percent to 53 percent, the
highest level since 2006 and also
passing the 50 percent threshold for
the first time since that year. It is also
important to note that this increase
mainly comes from a shift from those
who said it would be a bad thing,
which dropped from 36 to 29 percent,
the lowest level since 2009. The Trends
findings were in line with those of
the June 2014 Eurobarometer, which
showed those with a positive image
of the EU increased from 20 percent
in November 2013 to 43 percent, an
unprecedented increase.2
1 The German Marshall Fund of the United States, Transatlantic Trends Key Findings 2014, September 2014,
http://trends.gmfus.org/
2 Standard Eurobarometer 81 The Key Indicators results
for Turkey, QA10, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/
archives/eb/eb81/eb81_fact_tr_en.pdf

The Return of True Europeans?

Different studies on determinants of
public support for EU membership in
Turkey revealed that center-left voters
were the most devoted supporters of
integration with the EU and Turkeys
membership over the last three
decades. For many of those, this was
an issue of identity, an approval stamp
of Turkeys European-ness and the
last step in the modernization of the
Republic of Turkey as laid forth by
Kemal Atatrk. This same group of
people is also considered to be the likeliest potential winners in a membership scenario due to the perceived
compatibility of their education, life
styles, and professions with those in
Europe. For many years, they offered
their support to any government
and policy that would contribute to
Turkeys European orientation.
The 2002 election results radically
changed the Turkish political scene,
also affecting Turkey-EU relations.
It was difficult for center-left and
secular circles to comprehend the
strong commitment to and ownership
of European affairs by the Justice and
Development Party (AKParty) leader-

Analysis
ship. When the AKParty took over the government in 2002,
it strongly championed the European cause, undertaking
numerous reforms and succeeding in starting the accession negotiations, the pinnacle of Turkey-EU relations.
Considering their roots in the National Outlook Movement
and its anti-European, anti-Western rhetoric, then Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoans strong European messages
were received with suspicion and their sincerity was questioned by the traditionally pro-European center-left and
secular individuals. While witnessing unprecedented waves
of reforms and progress in Turkey-EU relations, culminating in the start of negotiations, secular and center-left
circles could not drop their suspicions that the AKParty
was merely using the EU as a cover for their real agenda
of a complete takeover and transformation of the political
establishment in Turkey.
Witnessing the increasing domination of the AKParty
in all aspects of social, economic, and political life in
Turkey on one hand and the increasing lack of commitment to Turkeys membership by the EU on the other led
to increased feelings of isolation and skepticism in centerleft and secular circles from 2002 onwards. The traditional
supporters of EU membership became increasingly Euroskeptic while traditional critics of Europe and West started
to take over the ownership of EU membership, following
the strong political cues from the AKParty leadership along
with an interest-focused not identity-focused approach.
It is not a surprise that according to a 2004 survey,3 support
for the EU was higher in Yozgat, a small traditional conservative central Anatolian city, than zmir, the most European city in Turkey according to its residents.
The current jump in pro-European attitudes can be read
as a change of heart by the center-left and secular circles
in Turkey. These groups seem to have returned to the EU
membership process once again to anchor them following
their increased sense of insecurity and concern regarding
individual rights and liberties. This is particularly true
following the massive Gezi protests of 2013 and the harsh
government reaction to them, and among those who disapprove of the AKParty governments foreign policy, specifically its handling of Syria.
3 Level of support for full EU membership across clusters of provinces, March 2004,
calculated by Prof. Ali arkolu, presentation available at http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/
esi_turkey_Carkoglu_Popular%20Bases%20of%20Support%20and%20Resistence.pdf

Secular and center-left circles

could not drop their suspicions
that the AKParty was merely using
the EU as a cover for their real
agenda of a complete takeover
and transformation of the political
establishment in Turkey.
The EU as an Anchor for Democracy
and Individual Rights
The evaluation of the EU and support for Turkeys membership in it has fluctuated intensively over time. In the Trends
data, for instance, the support for membership reached
as high as 73 percent in 2004 and as low as 40 percent in
2010. These ups and downs cannot be explained through
the classical perceptions of public opinion, that the public
is emotional rather than rational or people dont have the
time, capacity, and interest in foreign affairs. It is important
to understand that Turkish public opinion does not function in a vacuum. It is highly receptive to signals and cues
both from domestic and European sources and tends to
adjust and readjust its position according to developments.
A very strong determinant of Turkish public attitudes
toward the EU is also a stable and consistent one: the
perception of the EU as an anchor for democracy, rule of
law, human rights, and individual rights and liberties. This
factor has been influential in explaining the high levels of
support for the EU membership among the Kurds in Turkey
throughout the 1990s and 2000s. When faced with oppression and systematic exclusion in the second half of the
1990s, political Islam also changed its traditional anti-European, anti-Western rhetoric and turned to the EU membership process as a safeguard for their rights and liberties.
The current shift to a more positive evaluation of the EU
makes sense when looked from this perspective. Indi-

Analysis
viduals who are not happy with the government and its
recent policies regarding the individual rights and liberties
appear to have turned toward the EU once again. Following
the Gezi protests that swept the country in the summer of
2013 and other significant events such as the graft scandal
in December 2013 and the illegal recording of high level
government officials, the Turkish political scene became
very agitated and extremely polarized. The disgruntled
individuals who do not feel the government is on their side
and feel increasingly oppressed and excluded are mainly the
secularists, social democrats and liberals.
The increased anxiety of certain groups with the changing
political and social climate became apparent with another
major study of Turkish public attitudes toward identity
and the Kurdish issue, published in 2014 by Prof. Hakan
Ylmaz.4 Ylmaz and his research team discovered that
individuals identifying themselves as followers of Atatrk/
secular are the second largest group after Kurds who feel
that they are being mistreated and excluded. One person
out of five in this group feels mistreated in public institutions, police stations, and in job applications, particularly. Another group of individuals who feel extensively
mistreated are those classified as modern and educated.
The feeling of mistreatment and exclusion is over 10 percent
among this group, reaching close to 20 percent for being
mistreated in public institutions and in job applications. The
same study suggests that those who identify themselves as
religious/conservative report minimal mistreatment and
exclusion, forming the lowest figures for being mistreated
in public institutions and in job applications. This clearly
demonstrates the fault lines in the increasing polarization of
Turkey. This polarization is most visible in terms of trust for
national government. According to Eurobarometer 81 findings, while 52 percent of the respondents trust the national
government, 44 percent do not.5
In addition to the domestic political scene, the foreign
policy decisions and outcomes of the actions by the government are also heavily criticized by opposition groups, and
foreign policy preferences closely correlate with opinions
of the EU. The government has been criticized for gradu4 Hakan Ylmaz, Trkiyede Kimlikler, Krt Sorunu ve zm Sreci: Algilar ve Tutumlar,
Short Analysis, September 2014, http://hakanyilmaz.info/yahoo_site_admin/assets/
docs/OSI_Yurttaslik_2014_Cozum_Sureci_Kisa_Analiz_v08.259182752.pdf.
5 Standard Eurobarometer 81 The Key Indicators results for Turkey, QA9, http://
ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb81/eb81_fact_tr_en.pdf

The disgruntled individuals who

do not feel the government is on
their side and feel increasingly
oppressed and excluded are
mainly the secularists, social
democrats and liberals.
ally shifting the foreign policy priorities from Europe to the
Middle East and for failing to handle relations with Egypt,
Syria, and Israel rationally. The governments Syria policy
and the continuously increasing number of Syrian refugees
in Turkey, reaching to 1.5 million, in particular continue to
create waves of criticism. One finding from Trends is quite
telling: Turkish citizens who disapprove of the governments foreign policy also became more supportive of the
EU membership, increasing from 32 percent in 2013 to 50
percent in 2014.
Overall, the 2014 figures indicate a surge in a positive
opinion of the EU by the Turkish public. Cross data examination indicates that this increase originates with opposition groups within Turkey who feel they are being excluded
and their individual liberties are being jeopardized by
recent government policies. As recent history suggests,
these oppressed groups tend to turn to EU membership
as a potential source of protection. However, one should
approach this surge with caution. Despite some minor
improvements, the EU still suffers from a severe lack of
trust among the Turkish public. According to 2014 Eurobarometer findings, 57 percent of the Turkish public tends
not to trust the EU, down from 65 percent in 2013. It seems
that the increasing levels of criticism by the EU toward the
Turkish government regarding individual rights and liberties resonated among opposition groups. However, it is too
soon to judge whether the EU can or will meet the expectations of these groups, considering the current situation of
the negotiation phase and the clear lack of commitment by
EU members to eventually admit Turkey.

Analysis
The question remains whether the secular, social-democrat,
liberal, and other opposition circles would be content with
the revival of the membership negotiations and related
gains only, and not actual membership. And will the Republican Peoples Party (CHP), which is contending for the
votes of these groups, realize that such a shift is taking place
and revisit its EU policy, which had become skeptical over
time, and try to reclaim the ownership of the process?

The views expressed in GMF publications and commentary are the

views of the author alone.

About the Author

zgehan enyuva works extensively on public opinion, Turkey-European relations and the politics of European football. He is an associate
professor in the international relations department at Middle East
Technical University, Ankara. His recent book (co-authored), Turkish
Public and Elite Perceptions on Turkey-NATO Relations (in Turkish),
was published by Bilgi University Press in 2014.

About GMF
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