Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1
Abarca and Dioso belonged to the Batang Mindanao gang, while Reyno and Gomez were part of the Happy Go Lucky
gang.
2
In their testimony, they did not say that Reyno and Gomez were the ones directly responsible for Balerios death, but they
[accused] committed the crime to avenge Balerio.
3
Hereinafter, the items in bold and underline shall be referred to as The Coins.
wrapped in paper. The articles were seized and brought to the station together with Kong Leon.
The police also searched Store No. 566, thinking that it was in that store that Kong Leon effected
the sales of his coins, but they found nothing material there.
Kong Leon was subjected to questioning with the help of a Chinese interpreter. In his
statement, he admitted having fabricated The Coins. The gold pieces, nuggets, and coins were
referred to a chemist of the Manila Police Department, who found that most of the gold dollar
coins were genuine, but The Coins were all counterfeit (made using molds and then filed away;
gold content only 16-17 karats instead of 18 karats).
Kong Leon admitted that he owned the goldsmith paraphernalia as well as the genuine
coins, but denied ownership of The Coins, and he also denied that these were found in his
person. Two witnesses corroborated his testimony.
CFI declared him guilty of a violation of RPC 163(3) (making and importing and uttering
false coins), and sentenced him to an indeterminate sentence of not less than 2 months of
arresto mayor, nor more than 1y/1m/11d of prision correccional, accessory penalties, P500 fine
with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and payment of costs.
ISSUES AND HOLDING Judgment affirmed.
WON the lower court erred in
1. Admitting in evidence Kong Leons admission of guilt because it is hearsay NO
2. Finding that the 8 pieces of $20 coins were found in Kong Leons pocket, and that the
other coins were found in his fitting room
3. Finding that the five coins in question belonged to Kong Leon; that he manufactured
some of them; that he sold them
4. Holding that Kong Leon is liable under RPC 163(3)
5. Not acquitting Kong Leon upon ground of reasonable doubt on the question of facts,
and/or in not dismissing the case outright of the question of law
DISCUSSION
Issue #1
Kong Leon made (through interpretation) and signed the statement himself, and that constitutes a
confession and NOT hearsay as he claims.
Issue #2
Kong Leon expressly admitted in his confession that he made the 8 pieces of $20 coins.
Detective Maloles believes that these were taken from the shop. Assuming Lt. Versozas
testimony is incorrect insofar as the place where these coins were found, it does not mean that
they were not found in Kong Leons possession. The discrepancy is immaterial because Kong
Leon possessed and controlled it anyway.
Lt. Versoza ordered Moro Arais Mansu to pretend to buy coins from Kong Leon, not to
induce the latter to counterfeit them and then sell them to him. Moro Arais Mansu was supposed
to buy legitimate coins, and Kong Leon was expected to bring out his counterfeit coins instead.
There is no inducement to commit an offense; it was a simple trick to catch Kong Leon in
flagrante.
Issue #3
At the time of investigation, Kong Leon admitted the room to be his, and that he owned the
implements found on the table in that room, and they could not have been anybody elses since
the tailor no longer occupied the room, and because the implements were those of a goldsmith
and not of a tailor. No one in the premises was a goldsmith except Kong Leon.
Issue #4
Regarding the contention that he did not manufacture the coins, he was a goldsmith by
profession; he had the implements and materials used in the trade; the making of coins is within
the scope of his knowledge and ability; counterfeit coins were found on his table, and he admitted
having made them in his statement. These constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt that he
made the counterfeit coins. It is not necessary that somebody testify to having seen Kong
Leon fabricating coins.
Issue #5
There is a legal contention that gold coins have ceased to be a US currency by the operation of
the provisions of the US Gold Reserve Act of 1934, and that Kong Leon may not be considered
guilty of a violation of RPC 163(3). No evidence was admitted as to the US statute in
question, and ordinarily, the Court cannot take judicial cognizance of it. In view of the fact that
RPC 163(3) punishes the fabrication or utterance of counterfeited coin which is currency of a
foreign country, the Courts duty to enforce this penal provision gives them the corresponding
authority and obligation to take judicial notice of the acts of the US Congress, and the EOs and
departmental regulations relating to US currency. US law on its currency became a part of the
general law (RPC 163(3)) which PH courts are bound to apply and enforce.
Provisions of the US Gold Reserve Act of 1934 (An act to protect the currency system of the
US, to provide for the better use of the monetary gold stock of the US, and for other purposes)
Their effect is to withdraw US gold coins from circulation, although there is no intent to outlaw
their use and possession under rules and regulations that may be promulgated. Other relevant
regulations cited in the case are EO 6260 issued by the US President, as well as an order issued
by the US Treasury Secretary.
In accordance with these regulations, US gold coins may be possessed or acquired
and transferred from one another without need to obtain a license, because they have a
recognized special value to collectors of rare and unusual coins.
Kong Leon claims that since gold coins have been withdrawn from circulation, they
ceased to be US currency within the meaning of RPC 163(3). This provision was derived from
Articles 296 and 297 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC), and when the RPC was enacted, it was
the Spanish text which was approved by the Legislature, so it is the one that controls in the
interpretation of the provisions. The term moneda was translated into currency (not coin). The
question is WON the Legislature intended to punish the fabrication of a foreign coin, even
if it has been withdrawn from circulation in the country to which it belongs.
If under SPC 296 and 297 the fabrication of a local coin withdrawn from circulation is
punishable, it stands to reason that the counterfeiting of a foreign coin, even if withdrawn
from circulation in the foreign country of its origin, should also be punishable, because
the reason for punishing such act is not alone the harm caused to the public by the fact
that it may go into circulation, but the danger that a counterfeiter produces by his stay in
the country, and the possibility that he may later apply his trade to the making of coins in
actual circulation.
The Court says that it has not lost sight of the fact that the prevailing rule in the US and in
England is that counterfeiting of currency withdrawn from circulation is not punishable, because
no person is defrauded if the coin is not in circulation. In the case at bar, collectors were to be
defrauded, as it was apparent by the imitation of the US gold dollars fabricated by Kong Leon
that they were to be passed to Moros who value them as relics or rare objects.
SERGIO DEL ROSARIO, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent. (1961)
Ponente: Concepcion
HELD: decision affirmed; guilty of counterfeiting
FACTS:
Sergio del Rosario, Alfonso Araneta and Benedicto del Pilar showed Apolinario del Rosario the
Philippine one-peso bills and the Philippine two-peso bill and induced him to believe that the
same were counterfeit paper money manufactured by them, although in fact they were genuine
treasury notes of the Philippine Government one of the digits of each of which had been altered
and changed, the aforementioned defendants had succeeded in obtaining P1,700.00 from said
complainant, in the City of Davao, on June 23, 1955, for the avowed purpose of financing the
4 ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and other instruments of credit. Unless the act be
one of those coming under the provisions of any of the preceding articles, any person who shall knowingly use or have in
his possession, with intent to use any of the false or falsified instruments referred to in this section, shall suffer the penalty
next lower in degree than that prescribed in said articles.
ART. 169. How forgery is committed. The forgery referred to in this section may be committed by any of the
following means;
1. By giving to a treasury or bank note or any instrument payable to bearer or to order mentioned therein, the
appearance of a true and genuine document.
2. By erasing, substituting, counterfeiting or altering by any means the figures, letters, words or signs contained
therein
5 Money after the war was called the Victory series, I think the difference is may nakalagay na
Victory sa likod ng bago while sa luma wala.
For a conviction of forgery to be valid, the Government must be defrauded or at the very least, the
culprit had the intention of defrauding the government. State in other worse, the act should
adversely affect the government's credit rating.
Forgery is not malum prohibitum.
Accused did not defraud the government. True, the bill was removed from circulation but it is
not disputed that the bill is still worth one peso. It may yet be presented to the proper government
officials for redemption and replacement. The placing of the word Victory did not make it any
more genuine/valid that it already is.
Castro finds him guilty instead under RPC 318 for estafa. In paying Lilia Cruz the bill, he
disturbed her property rights. If the bill would remain in her posession, she would not be able to
pass it as legal tender, its replacement by a bill that is legal tender would compel her to some
expense of time and money.
People vs Romualdez
1932 || Vickers, J.
Facts:
Estela Romualdez and Luis Mabunay were charged and convicted with the crime of falsification
of public and official documents by the CFI of Manila. Romualdez had changed the scores of
Mabunay in his compositions to make him pass the 1926 bar examination.
Romualdez was the appointed secretary of SC Justice Norberto Romualdez. For the 1926 bar
examination, the SC designated SC Justice Romualdez as the chairman of the examination
committee for admission. He made 2 committees: examination (preparation of questions and
answer keys) and correctors (reviewing and correcting compositions). Estela Romualdez was one
of the correctors.
Mabunay, a candidate in the 1926 bar exam, seemed to have received a general average of 75%
(just enough to pass). However, upon examination of his compositions, grades of 73 in Civil Law,
and 64 in Remedial Law had been written on the first page of said compositions after striking out
the grades of 63 (Civil Law) and 58 (Remedial Law). This was allegedly done by Romualdez to
raise his general average from 72% to 75%. This happened after the SC refused to admit the
candidates who scored higher than 70% but less than 75% to the bar.
Romualdez allegedly received P600 in exchange. It was alleged that Mabunay made a
withdrawal of P600 from his savings account in the Philippine Trust Company on the March 2,
1927, or three days before the publication of the result of the examinations. This correlated with
the deposit of P400 made by Romualdez in her current account in BPI on March 7.
Romualdez admitted that it was she who revised the scores. As private secretary and corrector,
she claims she was given authority by Justice Romualdez to revise the compositions already
reviewed by the other correctors and to change the grades given by them.
- Testimony of Justice Romualdez: I gave her to understand that in order to do justice to
the compositions, she could review the compositions already graded by the other
correctors; provided, I want to add, that the new revision was done in order to do justice
to the compositions and before the names of the candidates were known.
- Mabunays compositions were the only ones she revised
- She claims never to have known Mabunay and only saw him in trial.
- Deputy Clerk Samson, who had equal powers and authority with Romualdez, was never
given the same instructions by Justice Romualdez.
- Romualdez never informed Justice Romualdez of her alterations, had no obligation to her
initials in the altered compositions (meaning, it looked as if the original corrector changed
the score) and claims that everything was left to her discretion.
SC agrees with arguments of the prosecution. Justice Romualdez was designated by the
Chief Justice to conduct the examination in accordance with the law and the Rules of
Court. He himself had no such authority as he is alleged to have given his secretary. He
is presumed to have discharged his duties in accordance with the law. It is inconceivable
that he would without any warrant of law give or attempt to give his secretary the
unlimited authority which she claims to have received, thereby enabling her to alter at will
any grade or any paper, without making any record thereof or any report to anybody.
- The testimony of Justice Romualdez to the effect that the accused acted within the
authority granted her in changing the grades in question was a mere expression of
opinion. It was clearly inadmissible and not binding on the court. No explanation given by
accused to justify her changes. No evidence of delegation of authority aside from
Justices testimony.
3. WON admissions of accused were made in good faith NO
Prosecution had to prove with 3 handwriting experts and 350 pages of testimony.
On the bribe:
The alterations in the grades made by Estela Romualdez were made for the sole use and
benefit of her coaccused Luis Mabunay. They were made willfully and illegally, and after
the Supreme Court had rejected those candidates that had received less than 75%. The
alterations were therefore made after Mabunay had failed, and he withdrew the money
after he had time to learn from his coaccused that he had failed.
*Mabunay is not an accomplice but a conspirator.
Decision AFFIRMED. They are both guilty.
BERADIO VS. COURT OF APPEALS
Salud Beradio, vs. the Court of Appeals and the People of the Philippines
30 March 1981, Justice De Castro
Facts:
Salud P. Beradio is a lady-lawyer appointed as an election registrar of the COMELEC. In
1972 and 1973, she was stationed in Rosales, Pangasinan, as Chief of Office of the Office of the
Election Registrar, holding office beside the municipal building from 8:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and
from 1:00 o'clock to 5:00 o'clock in the afternoon. As the nature of her job was field work, she was
required to fill up and submit to the COMELEC's main office in Manila her daily time records after
having been counter-signed by her provincial supervisor.
On 29 March 1973, the COMELEC by resolution granted Beradios request for
permission to appear as counsel for her cousins and cousins-in-law in the case before the Court
of Agrarian Relations.
During her assignment as Election Registrar of Rosales, Pangasinan, one Raymundo
Valdez filed with the COMELEC, an administrative complaint charging her of unauthorized
practice of law. Afterwards, Salud Beradio tendered her resignation, which was accepted by the
COMELEC.
Raymundo Valdez made an inquiry with the COMELEC on the status of his administrative
case against Salud P. Beradio, and upon being informed of her separation from the service, he
initiated the filing of criminal charges against Salud Beradio on grounds of falsification of daily
time records defined and penalized under Article 171, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code as
falsification of public documents.
On 4 August 1975, the Provincial Fiscal of Pangasinan filed seven (7) separate
Informations all dated July 7, 1975 charging Beradio with falsification of public or official
documents for making false entries in her daily time records.
The separate Informations allege that Beradio was absent the whole day on the days
mentioned but to the "damage and prejudice of the National Government," she made it appear in
her time records that she was not so absent from the office, when in fact she well knew that on
such date or time she was in the CFI of Pangasinan appearing as counsel.
CFI found Beradio guilty in the 4 out of 7 informations filed against her. CA affirmed.
Issues and Holding:
Whether or not all the elements of falsification of public documents or official documents are
present in the case at hand. NO
a) Whether or not the petitioner has a legal obligation to submit her daily time records NO
b) Whether or not act of the alleged false narration of facts in the daily time records bears,
under the law, some semblance of colorable truth.
c) Whether or not the alleged acts of the petitioner are tainted with criminal intent. NO
Ratio:
The requisite elements under Par. 4 of RPC 171:
1) The offender makes in a document false statements in a narration of facts;
2) He has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him;
3) The facts narrated by him are absolutely false, and
4) The perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of
injuring a third person
The Court finds that the second, third and fourth element is not present in the case at
hand.
On Legal Obligation
Section 4, Rule XV of the Civil Service Rule exempt from requirements of keeping and
submitting the daily time records three categories of public officers, namely:
1) Presidential appointees;
2) Chiefs and assistant chiefs of agencies; and
3) Officers in the three branches of the government.
The petitioner, as Chief of Office of the Office of Election Registrar, would fall under the
third category aforementioned.
Notwithstanding such an exemption, the election registrars of the various municipalities
all throughout the country, who occasionally work more than ordinary eight-hours on the last day
of the registration or on election day, are keeping and submitting the daily time records to the
main office in Manila for the sake of administrative procedural convenience or as a matter of
practice, but not by reason of strict legal obligation.
On Colorable Truth
Under the attendant facts and circumstances in the instant case, no criminal intent to
commit the crime with which she is charged can be imputed against the petitioner. In the
information, it was alleged that the petitioner was not in her office for the full office hours from
8:00 a.m. to 12:00 noon and from 1:00 p.m. to 5:00 p.m. on the specified dates therein as she
was then busy attending her cases in court. On the contrary, the evidence of the prosecution
belies its allegation of the whole-day absence in office as Election Registrar for the records reveal
that petitioner had stayed in court for only 5, 30, 40 or 45 minutes a day for her appearances
therein, at no instance exceeding one (1) hours. Such is possible for the courtroom where
petitioner made her appearance is only two meter away.
The entries in petitioner's daily time records were not absolutely false. The alleged false
entry may be said to have a color of truth, not a downright and willful falsehood which alone
would constitute falsification as a crime.
On Wrongful Intent of Injuring a Third Party
Although the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person is unnecessary in cases of
falsification of public documents, the Court emphasized that it must, nevertheless, be borne in
mind that the change in the public document must be such as to affect the integrity of the same or
change in the public document must be such as to affect the integrity of the same or change the
effects which it would otherwise produce. For, unless that happens, there could not exist the
essential element of the intention to commit the crime which is required by Article 1 (now Article 3)
of the Penal Code.
The integrity of the daily time record as an official document, however, remains
untarnished if the damages sought to be prevented has not been produced. While it is true that a
time record is an official document, it is not criminally falsified if it does not pervert its avowed
purpose as when it does not cause damage to the government.
In the instant case, the time records have already served their purpose. They have not
caused any damage to the government or third person because under the facts duly proven,
petitioner may be said to have rendered service in the interest of the public, with proper
permission from her superiors. They may now even be condemned as having no more use to
require their continued safe- keeping. Public interest has not been harmed by their contents, and
continuing faith in their verity is not affected.
JUDGMENT REVERSED. ACCUSED AQUITTED.
PILAR LUAGUE VS CA (1982)
j. Abad Santos
appeal from CA
F: Iluminado Luague (wife of petitioner Pilar) was a teacher at Northern Samar. He was confined
in the Tan Memorial Hospital on 3 January 1972. He died there 24 January. Thereafter the district
supervisor Infante distributed the salary warrants of the employees of Bureau of Public schools in
his district including Iluminado's. Pilar Luague received the salary warrant. She signed the name
of her deceased husband on the warrants for the purpose of endorsement. She went to a Mr.
Guillermo to claim the salary.
Pilar Luague was charged with the crime of estafa through falsification of commercial document.
She was convicted of falsification ONLY.
Pilar's defense in this appeal:
-she acted in good faith and had no criminal intent when she cashed the paychecks of her
deceased husband.
She has her own version of facts which are not rejected by the CA:
During the confinement of her husband, the District Supervisor Infante visited. Infante gave the
check to Iluminado who in turn handed it to Pilar. Before leaving, Infante informed the Luague
spouses that Luague's check for the second half of January arrived and advised Mrs Luague to
get it from Guillermo so that she could use it to pay for husband's medical bills.
Mrs Luague went to Guillermo in 23 January. Guillermo asked her to sign the name of her
husband. Guillermo then handed her the checks. Iluminado died on 24 January.
ISSUE: WON Mrs Luague is indeed guilty of falsification. NO
CA did not reject petitioner's version of facts. CA followed a very simplistic procedure of literally
applying the law. They found her guilty of falsification simply because she signed the name of
her husband in a commercial document.
SC: CA failed to take into account the ff facts:
Some of the checks were delivered to her personally by the District Supervisor long after
husband's death was known; she used the proceeds to pay for the medical bills of husband;
Also, it was brought out that the govt did not sustain any financial loss due to the encashment of
the checks. This is because the husband accumulated vacation and sick leaves the money value
of which exceeded the value of the three paychecks and the value of the checks was simply
deducted from the money value of the leaves.
No damage does not automatically imply no falsification. BUT absence of damage is an elemtn to
be considered to determine criminal intent. (see: page 238 sa Reyes)
Lack of compassion on the part of the prosecutor, CFI, and CA.
A compassionate order repeatedly urge by first lady imelda Marcos would have been in order
under the circumstances.
Petition granted. CA reversed. Petitioner acquitted.
CABIGAS V. PEOPLE
03 July 1987 / Paras / Petition to review Sandiganbayan decision
FACTS
Land Banks Fund Management Department (FMD) is engaged in money market and securities
trading transactions. The securities in form of treasury notes and bills are deposited with the
Securities Section (SS) of the Land Bank of the Philippines, Makati branch. Dario Cabigas is a
Securities Custodian, and he is assisted by Reynes, the securities receiving clerk.
On 9 Mar, FMD delivered to SS for safekeeping 112 pieces of treasury notes and bills
worth P46M, and for which a copy of the Securities Delivery Receipt (SDR) was issued to the
FMD, while the original was retained by the SS. Included in the received securities are 19 pieces
of treasury bills with Serial Nos. A-000064 to A-000082, 795th series, in the denomination of
P500k each (total is P9.5M). After receiving the securities, Cabigas would prepare the Daily
Report on Securities / Documents Under Custody (DR SDUC) evidencing the securities
transactions and operations of his branch.
On 29 Mar, Cabigas and Reynes discovered the loss of six treasury bills of the 795th
series with a total value of P3M. Upon verification that the SDR of 9 Mar 1982 was the source
document of the missing securities, Reynes crossed out with red ink in that document the
last two digits 82 and added 76 on the serial numbers (making it Serial Nos. A-000064 to
A-000076). At the bottom of the SDR, Cabigas placed the notation for adjustment and
affixed the date. Upon Cabigas suggestion, Reynes reported the incident to their branch
manager Pigram. When the DR SDUC for 29 Mar was prepared, the number of treasury bills of
the 795th series stood at 1,539 pieces with a total face value of P610,095,000.
The next day, Reynes prepared a draft report for 30 Mar 1982 by carrying forward the
ending balance of the treasury bills of the 795th series reflected in the DR SDUC of 29 Mar.
However, instead of following Reynes draft, Cabigas prepared his own report (DR SDUC of
30 Mar) wherein he indicated 1,533 pieces of treasury bills (6 pieces less) with a total amount
of P607,095,000 (P3M less). At the bottom of this DR SDUC, Cabigas placed the notation
adjustment on erroneous entry (incoming) dated 9 Mar as legend of the asterisk sign
appearing after the figure 1,533.
On 20 May, Rosie Chua was found to be authenticating with the Central Bank of the PH
a treasury bill of the 795th series with Serial No. A-000082 for P500k (this particular bill was one
of those six bills that went missing). It was discovered that it was Land Bank Makati branch
manager Pigram who negotiated this treasury bill with the Gainsbo Commodities. (The other five
missing treasury billsSerial Nos. A-000077 to A-000081were negotiated by Pigram with the
Home Savings Bank to secure a loan).
The Land Bank sought NBIs assistance in the cases investigation, so Cabigas and
Reynes were investigated, and they were arrested for having allegedly conspired in the
falsification of the 9 Mar SDR and the 30 Mar DR SDUC, and for which corresponding
informations were filed with the Sandiganbayan. Both were acquitted in Criminal Case 6529 (re: 9
Mar SDR), but Cabigas was convicted in Criminal Case 6938 (re: 30 Mar DR SDUC) while
Reynes was acquitted therein.
6
The elements of falsification of a public or official document under RPC 171(4), by making untruthful statements in a
narration of facts are the following:
1. Offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts
2. He has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him
3. Facts narrated by offender are absolutely false
4. The perversion of truth in the narration of facts was made with the wrongful intent of injuring a third person
The three are accused of conspiring to misappropriate government funds allocated for projects
like repair of bridges, roads, etc. The trial court acquitted the auditor. However, Sendaydiego and
Samson were convicted of the complex crime of malversation through falsification of public
documents. Both of the convicts are now appealing to the SC. Pending this appeal, Sendaydiego
died. The cashier, Ulanday, who could be a witness also died. The court continued to hear the
case. However, Sendaydiegos criminal liability is extinguished.
According to the findings of the court, they falsified six vouchers. The middle part of the voucher
contains five numbered printed paragraphs. P1- Signature of creditor to attest that it was
actually and necessarily incurred This was not signed because the nature of the expense is
for public work projects. P2- Signature of the provincial engineer to attest that it was lawfully
incurred. P3- Signature of provincial treasurer to attest that it was Approved for pre-audit. P4Signature of Auditor that certifies that the amount has been pre-audited. P5- Signature of
provincial treasurer again to certify that it was paid on the date indicated.
The six vouchers are:
(1) V # 10724 Php 16, 727.52 to CCS Co. for the repair of the bridge in Barrio Libertad at the
Umingan-Tayug road in Pangasinan along Nueva Ecija boundary
(2) V # 11995 Php 14,571.81 for the repair of Bayaoas bridge at Urbiztondo-Pasibi Road
(3) V# 11869 Php 5,187.28 for the repair of Pangasinan bridge at Umingan-Tayug Road
(4) V # 11870 Php 6,290.60 for the repair of Cabatuan bridge at the Umingan-Cuimba Road
(5) V # 11871 Php 9,769.64 for the repair of Casabar bridge at the Binalonan-San Manuel Road
and
(6) V # 11872 Php 4,501.38 for the repair of Barabac bridge at the Umingan-Cuimba Road.
Samson was the one who hand-carried and delivered these. He also signed on the left margin to
indicate that he presented them to the provincial treasurers office.
It has to be noted that Sendaydiego and Quirimit admit the authenticity of their signatures.
Sendaydiego signed before the assistant provincial treasurer. Samson claims that his signature is
not genuine and presents a handwriting expert to testify that they have fundamental differences.
However another handwriting expert said that they were written by one and the same person.
Sendaydiego testifies that Samsons signature is genuine. In addition, the deceased cashier also
left a letter to the provincial treasurer that he paid to Samson the amounts covered by five
vouchers in the presence of Salazar K. Misal and Josefina E. Pulido. The CCS Co. said that they
did not receive the payments and that the transactions are fictitious since there is no such project
with them and they never delivered the materials. The charge invoices mentioned in the said
vouchers were actually cancelled invoices to the Mountain Agricultural College. The companys
cashier also testified that the receipts evidencing payments are fake official receipts. For Voucher
No. 10724, Oropilla, Mencias and Primicias declared that their signatures are not genuine.
Sendaydiegos first and second contention is rendered by the court moot and academic
due to his death. These two contentions are:
(1) reclusion perpetua is a cruel and unusual penalty
(2) there is no complex crime of malversation through falsification committed by negligence.
(3) The third contention is that the proceeding was marked by undue publicity, pre-judgment, bias
and political self-interest since private prosecutors Millora and Urbiztondo were allowed to
prosecute the case instead of the provincial fiscal. The other seven assignments of error made
refer to the RTCs conclusion that Sendaydiego and Samson are guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of malversation through falsification. One of these is the contention that he signed the
vouchers in the honest belief that the signatures were genuine because the vouchers had been
pre-audited and approved by the auditor. His last contention is that the acquittal of the auditor will
lead to his acquittal also.
On the other hand, Samson says that
(1) Judge Bello should have inhibited himself because he conducted the preliminary investigation,
condense it but this way: Whatever the total penalty is, it should not exceed 40 years for sure
(People v. Alisub).
SIQUIAN VS. PEOPLE
Manuel L. Siquian, vs. the People of the Philippines and the Court of Appeals
13 March 1989, Justice Cortes
Facts:
Sometime in June 1975, Jesusa Carreon, 20 years old, single and a resident of Ilagan,
Isabela, went to Manuel L. Siquian, Mayor of the Municipality of Angadanan, Province of Isabela,
to apply for employment in the office of the Mayor.
The Mayor must have agreed to appoint her because he accompanied her to the office of
the Municipal Secretary, Emilio Valenzuela. The Municipal Secretary, however, was not there.
Even so, Mayor Siquian told Carreon to report for work the following day and that she should be
included in the budget.
On 1 July 1975, Carreon was appointed clerk to the Municipal Secretary in the Office of
the Municipal Secretary by Mayor Siquia
Accompanying her appointment is the certification, among others, of the availability of
funds (CS Form No. 203) dated, issued by the Mayor Siquian, pursuant to the requirements of
Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1975, addressed to the Commissioner of Civil Service,
Manila.
Carreon took her oath of office and worked from July-December. She was not, however,
paid and was consistently told that there was no money yet for her salary. So, Carreon went to
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan to ask information regarding her unpaid salaries. Hereafter, she
filed her verified complaint against Mayor Siquia.
It appears that there was no new item for appropriation for the position of Carreon.
After trial, the Court found Mayor Siquian guilty beyond doubt. CA affirmed.
Issues and Holding:
1. Whether or not all the elements of the fourth kind of falsification are present in the case at
hand. YES
2. Whether or not petitioner is in good faith. NO
3. Whether or not the accused took advantage of his position. YES
Ratio:
Issue #1: Elements of the Fourth Kind of Falsification
It is settled that in this fourth kind of falsification, the following requisites must concur:
(a)
That the offender makes in a document untruthful statements in a narration of facts;
(b)
That he has a legal obligation to disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and
(c)
That the facts narrated by the offender are absolutely false
1st Element: Narration of Facts
Petitioner's stance that the certification which he issued contained no narration of facts
but rather a conclusion of law is not meritorious. The CA, upholding the Solicitor General's
arguments, correctly ruled as follows: Conclusion of law is defined as a proposition not arrived at
by any process of natural reasoning from a fact or combination of facts stated but by the
application of the artificial rules of law to the facts pleaded
From the above-cited definition, it can be deduced that the certification by the appellant
that 'funds for the position are available' does not require the application of the artificial rules of
law. To certify that funds are available for the position what one should do is to refer to the budget
and plantilla of personnel of the applicable fiscal year and ascertain if such item exists and funds
are allocated therefor.
In the present case, despite the presence of the records which shows that there is no
position and funds therefor referred to in the certification, the appellant, fully aware of the data
provided by the records, certified falsely that "funds for the position are available".
On 28 March 1974, more than ten (10) years after the registration of the SPA and
mortgage contract in the Registry of Deeds, a criminal case for estafa thru falsification of a public
document was filed against private respondent in the then Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.
The information alleges that de Guzman falsified and forged the signature of Mariano Carrerra in
the SPA.
On 16 December 1975, de Guzman filed a motion to dismiss, wherein it was alleged that:
The crime charged would not lie due to the partial testimony of complainant allegedly to
the effect that he authorized private respondent to mortgage the said one-half portion of
the land owned by him and his brother. And as such, there is no sufficient basis for the
charge
The crime has prescribed since more than ten (10) years had elapsed from the time the
crime was committed
On 28 January 1976, CFI dismissed the case on the ground that the crime has
prescribed. The motion for reconsideration was later denied.
Issues and Holding:
1. Whether or not the charge of estafa through falsification of a public document filed
against private respondent has sufficient ground to exist in law and in fact. YES
2. Whether the offense charged in the aforementioned case is already extinguished by
prescription. YES
Ratio:
Issue #1: On Estafa through Falsification of a Public Document
The falsification of a public document may be a means of committing estafa because
before the falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has
already been consummated, damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the
crime of falsification of public, official or commercial documents. The damage to another is
caused by the commission of estafa, not by the falsification of the document, hence, the
falsification of the public, official or commercial document is only a necessary means to commit
the estafa
A cursory study of the answer made by the witness complainant clearly shows that what
was intended to be mortgaged was the one-half (1/2) portion pertaining only to Severo Carrera,
excluding that portion pertaining to said complainant.. In other words, the alleged authorization
given to Federico de Guzman to get a loan from the Bank on the half portion of the land referred
to the share of Severo Carrera only
Issue #2: On Prescription
Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisition on the sufficiency of the charge of estafa thru
falsification of a public document, the resolution of the issue on prescription is, however,
determinative of the validity of the impugned orders of public respondent.
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty for a complex crime is that
for the most serious component offense, the same to be applied in its maximum period. In the
crime of estafa thru falsification of a public document, the more serious crime is the falsification
which carries with it the correctional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum
periods and a fine not more than P5,000.00 imposed by Article 172 of the Code. Crimes
punishable by correctional penalties prescribe in ten (10) years pursuant to Article 90 of the Code,
and Article 91 thereof states that the prescriptive period commences to run "from the day on
which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents . . ."
Registration in a public registry is a notice to the whole world. The record is constructive
notice of its contents as well as all interests, legal and equitable, included therein. All persons are
charged with knowledge of what it contains. On these considerations, in the crime of falsification
of a public document the prescriptive period commences from the time the offended party had
constructive notice of the alleged forgery after the document was registered with the Register of
Deeds is not without legal basis.
PETITION DISMISSED.
DAVA VS PEOPLE (1991)
cj Fernan
October 19, 1975: Petitioner was driving along Shaw Blvd when he hit Clamor and Roxas. This
resulted in Clamor's death and phys injuries to Roxas. He was brought to the Mandaluyong police
headquarters and his license was confiscated and consequently submitted as evidence for the
prosecution in a case against him. He was charged with homicide thru reckless imprudence in
Pasig court.
April 1978: Victims' relative saw Dava driving a violet Beetle. Knowing that Dava's license was
submitted as evidence in a pending case, the relative asked the help of then Defence Minister
Enrile to charge Dava with driving without a license. Enrile endrosed the request for assistance to
the
Constabulary
Highway
Patrol
Group.
July 1978: Said car was seen by CHPG agents Lising and Viduya outside a theater in Cubao.
When the owner arrived, Lising asked for his license. The agents were shown a non-professional
driver's license No. 2706887 with official receipt No. 0605870 ssued by Agency 2L Pampanga in
the name of Michael T. Dava. When asked about the source of his license, Dava informed them
that his officemate had secured it for him. Lising concluded that Dava's driver's license was fake
because when he compared it with the xerox copy of Dava's license which was attached to the
record of the criminal case in Pasig, the signatures and the dates of birth indicated in the two
licenses did "not tally.
Info for falsification of a public document was filed against Dava in the then CFI of Rizal.
Prosecution presented Carolino Vinluan of the Angeles City branch of the Bureau of Land
Transportation (BLT). found out that it was "fake or illegally issued" because:
-form No. 2706887 was one of the 50forms which had been reported missing from their office.
-although the form used for the license was genuine, the signature of the issuing official was fake.
-the form was issued by the central office to the Angeles agency, the license appeared on its face
to have been issued the San Fernando agency.
Dava convicted. He appeals. Contention: the lower court had no jurisdiction to try the case.
CA agrees. Sets aside CFI decision for lack of jurisdiction.
Manalili went to the San Fernando office of the Land Transportation Commission (LTC) where he
used to secure own license. There, he was helped by fixers who obtained a license for him in just
an hour for 70pesos. (legit price is just 15pesos).
Judgment: Guilty of falsification. Dava is a principal by inducement.
IAC affirms.
Present appeal:
Dava's main contention: the courts heavily reliance on deceased Vinuan's testimony should have
been held inadmissible.
ISSUES:
WON Vinluan's testimony is admissible. NO. IT IS INADMISSIBLE.
WON there is sufficient evidence to convict dava for falsification. YES PA RIN.
Re: Testimony of Vinluan in the CFI Rizal case.
Dava is correct. The CFI did not have jurisdiction. Being worthless in itself all the proceedings
founded upon it are equally worthless. Hence, the testimony of Vinluan is not only inadmissible in
evidence but may well be considered as totally nonexistent.
So, does the prosecution have sufficient evidence? YES.
The evidence do not pinpoint the petition as the actual falsifier. Unfortunately, there are pieces of
evidence which prove beyond reasonable doubt at he caused the falsification and made use of
the falsified driver's license knowing it to be so.
Elements of Article 172 are following: (a) the offender knew that a document was falsified by
another person; (b) the false document is embraced in Article 171 or in any of subdivisions Nos. 1
and 2 of Article 172; (c) he used such document (not in judicial proceedings), and (d) the use of
the false document caused damage to another or at last it was used with intent to cause such
damage
Dava knew document is falsified.
His got confiscated. He kenw it was not legally possible to obtiain another one, that's why he had
to misrepresent to Manalili the urgency of his need to get a license (ie because he needed it agad
for his job).
A driver's license is a public document within RPC 171and 172.
Dava used the false document.
proven by the fact that when petitioner was apprehended by Lising on April 12, 1978 it was in his
possession and it was what he presented Lising to show that he had a license. Because he was a
detailman who did his job with the use of a car, it is probable that from November 4, 1976 (its date
of issuance) until April 12, 1978.
Driver's license being a public document, proof of the 4 th element (damage caused to
another person) is immaterial. In falsification of public or official documents, the principal thing
being punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth proclaimed
therein.
Further: The rule is that if a person had in his possession a falsified document and he made use
of it (uttered it), taking advantage of it and profiting thereby, the presumption is that he is the
material author of the falsification. Exception: If accused explains how he obtained the material
satisfactorily.
Dava does not fall with the exception
His explanation is unsatisfactory as it consists mainly in passing the buck to his friend, Manalili.
As stated above, Manalili himself could not have acted on his own accord without the prodding of
petitioner.
decision of the respondent appellate court is hereby affirmed.