Bharat Petroleum Corporation ... vs Khatanand Alias K. Anand Saraf And ...

on 11 May, 2005

Chattisgarh High Court

Bharat Petroleum Corporation ... vs Khatanand Alias K. Anand Saraf And ... on 11 May, 2005
Equivalent citations: AIR 2006 Chh 22, 2006 (2) MPHT 89 CG
Author: V K Shrivastava
Bench: V K Shrivastava
ORDER Vijay Kumar Shrivastava, J.
1. This is an appeal directed against the order dated 292002, passed by learned IIIrd Additional
District Judge, Bilaspur in Miscellaneous Civil Case No. 19/ 2002, rejecting an application under
Order XLI Rules 19 and 21 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
2. Facts material for disposal of this appeal are that, the plaintiffs had filed a civil suit for possession
of land bearing Khasra No. 748/2 area 0.76 acres situated at Village Tifra, District Bilaspur as also
for recovery of arrears of rent of Rs. 2,175/- and damages against, the defendant M/s. Bharat
Petroleum Corporation Limited, in the Court of Civil Judge Class-1, Bilaspur. The said suit was
registered as Civil Suit No. 69-A/ 1998. The defendant remained ex parte in the suit. Learned IVth
Civil Judge Class-I, Bilaspur, vide judgment and decree dated 1-12-1998, partly allowed the suit and
passed decree against the defendant, for payment of arrears of rent. Being aggrieved by the said
judgment and decree, the plaintiffs preferred Civil Appeal No. 7A/1999 in the Court of District
Judge, Bilaspur. The defendant M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited remained ex parte in
the appeal. By ex parte judgment and decree dated 21-9-1999, the District Judge, Bilaspur allowed
the appeal and for possession and mesne profit passed decree in favour of the plaintiffs.
3. The defendant M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited filed an application under Order XLI
Rules 19 and 21 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure through its Power of Attorney
Holder B. Krishna Murthy for setting aside the ex parte decree dated 21-9-1999 passed in Civil
Appeal No. 7A/1999 on the ground that it was not duly served with the notice of appeal and hence
could not appear and contest: the appeal before the Court. The defendant came to know about the
decree on 12-4-2000 when in execution proceedings process server came to execute the possession
warrant. Therefore, on 15-4-2000, the defendant filed an application for setting aside the ex parte
decree along with a separate application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of
delay. The plaintiffs opposed both the applications not only on merit but also on their
maintainability.
4. Learned Court below i.e. first appellate Court tried the issues involved in the matter, and after
appreciating the evidence, held that, the defendant M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited
failed to explain the delay in filing the application, as also the Power of Attorney executed by it bears
the signature of only one Director and one Secretary, whereas legally, it was required to be signed by
two Directors, as such, the said two applications were not filed by a competent person and,
therefore, by the impugned order dated 29-10-2002, dismissed those applications.
5. Heard learned Counsel for both the parties and perused the records of the Courts below.

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6. Learned Court below i.e. first appellate Court, vide impugned order, has held that, no notice
hearing of the appeal on 7-7-1999 was served on the defendant; Learned Counsel for the
respondents /plaintiffs, in arguments, contended that, the said finding of the Court below i.e. first
appellate Court is incorrect. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the appellant/defendant
supported the said finding.
7. On 3-4-1999, Civil Appeal No. 7A/ 1999 was admitted for final hearing and the plaintiffs were
directed to pay P. F. within 3 days for issuing notice to the defendant and the date for final hearing
was fixed for 7-7-1999. On 7-7-1999, the District Judge was on leave, therefore, the Court Reader
fixed the case for 16-7-1999. On 16-7-1999, learned District Judge held that, notice for 7-7-1999 was
served on the defendant and, therefore, he proceeded ex parte against the defendant. The defendant
has challenged the service of notice, and in its application, stated that, it was not duly served with
the notice, therefore, it remained absent in the appeal. Learned Court below i.e. first appellate
Court, after deeply examining the matter, found that, no order for issuance of notice by registered
post acknowledgment due was passed by the Court, and according to law, only in addition to service
of notice by ordinary process, it can be ordered and served by registered post. Neither notice for
service by ordinary process was issued by the Court nor the defendant was served with such notice.
Relying on Electric Construction and Equipment Co. Limited v. Parmali Vailes Limited, reported in
1991 Jab LJ 45, the Court below i.e. first appellate Court held that, the service of notice by registered
post is not a due service in accordance with law, and accordingly, held that, no legal notice for the
hearing date 7-7-1999 was served on the defendant.
8. For proper appreciation of the lis, the relevant provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure, which
were in force on the disputed date, are quoted below :
Order XLI Rule 14: "Publication and service of notice of day for hearing appeal.--(1) Notice of the
day fixed under Rule 12 shall be affixed in the Appellate Court-house, and a like notice shall be sent
by the Appellate Court to the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, and shall be served
on the respondent or on his pleader in the appellate Court in the manner provided for the service on
a defendant of a summons to appear and answer; and all the provisions applicable to such
summons, and to proceedings with reference to the service thereof, shall apply to the service of such
notice.
(2) Appellate Court may itself cause notice to be served.-- Instead of sending the notice to the Court
from whose decree the appeal is preferred, the Appellate court may itself cause the notice to be
served on the respondent or his pleader under the provisions above referred to."
Order V Rule 19-A : "Simultaneous issue of summons for service by post in addition to personal
service.-- (1) The Court shall, in addition to, and simultaneously with, the issue of summons for
service in the manner provided in Rules 9 to 19 (both inclusive), also direct the summons to be
served by registered post, acknowledgment due addressed to the defendant, or his agent empowered
to accept the service, at the place where the defendant, or his agent, actually and voluntarily resides
or carries on business or personally works for gain:

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Provided that nothing in this sub-rule shall require the Court to issue a summons for service by
registered post, where, in the circumstances of the case, the Court considers it unnecessary.
9. As per the law applicable on the disputed date, for valid service on the defendant, it was necessary
that, the notice, accompanied with copy of memorandum of appeal, should have been issued by the
means provided under Order V. Rules 9 to 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and if the Court had
ordered, in addition to and simultaneously with the issue of notice by those modes, notice for service
by registered post could have been issued, Here, it is pertinent to note that, the first appellate court
never asked the plaintiffs to pay P, F. and expenses for service by registered post in addition to
normal mode, therefore, neither the notice for service by registered post could have been issued nor
was required to be served. Therefore, when no order for issuance of notice by registered post, in
addition to ordinary mode, was passed by the first appellate Court, and no notice for service by the
modes provided under Order V Rules 9 to 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure was issued, the service of
notice, in violation of those rules, effected on the defendant by registered post, shall certainly be
held illegal and, therefore, learned Court below i.e. first appellate court, after minutely appreciating
the material on record, in holding the service illegal, did not commit any illegality or irregularity.
10. During the arguments, it has also been raised that, on 16-7-1999, the Court below i.e. first
appellate Court had no right or power to proceed ex parte against the defendant as the date
16-7-1999 was not the date fixed for hearing of the appeal. That date was fixed by clerical staff of the
Court. On 7-7-1999, the Presiding Officer was on leave, therefore, on that date also, the case could
not be called for hearing. From the record, it is apparent that on 7-7-1999, the Presiding Officer i.e.
District Judge was on leave, therefore, on that date, the case could not have been called for hearing.
Another date 16-7-1999 was fixed by the Clerk, that too not for hearing. Therefore, on 16-7-1999, the
case was not fixed for hearing therefore, on that date, the defendant could not have been proceeded
ex parte by the Court. Hence, the defendant was not required to appear on 7-7-1999 and 16-7-1999,
therefore according to Order XLI Rule 17(2) of the Code of Civil Procedure, the first appellate Court
had no power to proceed ex parte on those two dates against the defendant.
11. Learned Counsel for the appellant/ defendant vehemently contended that, the
respondents/plaintiffs, without preferring cross-appeal or cross-objection, have no right to raise the
dispute regarding finding given vide impugned order by the Court below i.e. first appellate Court on
the service of notice. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs urged that,
the plaintiffs are supporting the impugned order, therefore, in absence of any cross appeal or cross
objection, they have right to assail the finding of the Court below i.e. first appellate Court, which is
against them.
12. The relevant provisions, having vital impact on the case, contained under Order XLI, Rules 21
and 22(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure are quoted below :
Order XLI, Rule 21 : "Re-hearing on application of respondent against whom ex parte decree
made.-- Where an appeal is heard ex parte and judgment is pronounced against the respondent, he
may apply to the Appellate Court to re-hear the appeal; and, if he satisfies the Court that the notice
was not duly served or that he was prevented by sufficient cause from appearing when the appeal
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was called on for hearing, the Court shall re-hear the appeal on such terms as to costs or otherwise
as it thinks fit to impose upon him."
Order XLI. Rule 22(1) : "Upon hearing respondent may object to decree as if he had preferred a
separate appeal -- (1) Any respondent, though he may not have appealed from any part of the
decree, may not only support the decree but may also state that the finding against him in the Court
below in respect of any issue ought to have been in his favour; and may also take any cross-objection
to the decree which he could have taken by way of appeal provided he has filed such objection in the
Appellate Court within one month from the date of service on him or his pleader of notice of the day
fixed for hearing the appeal, or within such further time as the Appellate Court may see fit to allow.
Explanation. -- A respondent aggrieved by a finding of the Court in the judgment on which the
decree appealed against is based may, under this rule, file cross-objection in respect of the decree in
so far as it is based on that finding, notwithstanding that by reason of the decision of the Court on
any other finding which is sufficient for the decision of the suit, the decree, is, wholly or in part, in
favour of that respondent.
13. From bare reading of the aforesaid provisions, it is as clear as crystal that, if the defendant
satisfies the Court that the notice was not duly served on it and files application in accordance with
law, the court was bound to set aside the ex parte decree and re-hear the appeal. In the present case,
learned Court below i.e. first appellate Court although held that, no valid notice was served on the
defendant, but only on the ground of limitation, the application filed by the defendant was
dismissed by the impugned order. Therefore, the impugned order is based on the finding arrived at
by the Court below i.e. first appellate Court regarding non service of notice on the defendant as well
as the period of limitation.
14. The Order XLI Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure empowers the respondents/ plaintiffs, to
support the decree, and without filing any appeal, to raise the grounds for deciding issues in their
favour, if had been decided against them, but it is necessary for them to raise the same by filing
cross-objection. It is also apparent from the explanation provided under Order XLI Rule 22 of the
Code of Civil Procedure and the language used under Order XLI Rule 22(1) of the Code of Civil
Procedure that, if any substantial issue had been decided against the respondents/plaintiffs, and
without that being decided in their favour, they are not in a position to support the order, it is
necessary for them to file a cross-objection and to challenge the finding recorded against them.
15. From the aforesaid discussions, it is held that-(1) learned Court below i.e. first appellate Court did not commit any illegality by recording the
finding that no legal notice was served on the defendant for 7-7-1999.
(ii) only on the date fixed for hearing of the appeal if the respondent does not appear can be ordered
ex parte. Here in the present case, neither the date 7-7-1999 nor 16-7-1999 was the date fixed for
hearing the appeal.

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(iii) It is not permissible for the plaintiffs to challenge the finding recorded by the Court below i.e.
first appellate Court regarding non-service of legal notice on the defendant without filing any
cross-objection regarding it.
16. The ex parte judgment and decree was passed on 21-9-1999. For setting aside the same,
limitation has been prescribed under Article 123 of the Limitation Act, which reads as below :
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Description of suit

Period of Limitation

Time from which

period begins to run
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Article 123.-- To set aside a
Thirty days.
The date of the decree or where
decree passed ex parte or to
the summons or notice was
re-hear an appeal decreed or
not duly served, when the apheard ex parte.
plicant had knowledge of the
Explanation.-- For the purdecree.
poses of this Article, substituted service under Rule 20
of Order V of the Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908, shall not be
deemed to be due service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

17. From the aforesaid provision, the limitation for presenting the application has been prescribed
i.e. 30 days from the date of the decree or where the summons or notice was not duly served when
the applicant had knowledge of the decree. In the present case, learned Court below i.e. first
appellate Court held that, no legal notice was served on the defendant, therefore, for limitation, the
date of knowledge of the decree plays a vital role as the limitation of 30 days will start from the date
of knowledge. Learned Court below i.e. first appellate Court held that, the defendant came to know
on 21-9-1999 that the judgment and decree has been passed on that date in Civil Appeal No.
7A/1999, if not, at least they had come to know the same on 21-2-2000, the date on which letter Ex.
D/3 was received by it.
18. B. Krishna Murthy (AW-1), the Territory Manager of the defendant deposed on oath that, for the
first time, he came to know on 12-4-2000 when the Court's Process Server came to execute the
possession warrant. In cross-examination, he admitted the fact that, a talk of compromise between
the parties was going on. Nowhere he accepted that he came to know the complete details of the
judgment and decree earlier to 12-4-2000. The fact that, B. Krishna Murthy (AW-1) came to know
about the passing of the judgment and decree against the defendant on 12-1-2000, finds support
also from the statement of Ashok Dayashankar Tiwari (AW-2) and Kisan Budhiya (AW-3). To rebut
the fact that only on 12-4-2000, the defendant came to know about the ex parte judgment and
decree, witness Dharam Prakash Saraf (NAW-1) has been produced, who in his statement, deposed
that, on 21-9-1999, he telephoned to Sales Manager Ashok Tiwari and informed him that, decree has
been passed. He also informed the Territory Manager B. Krishna Murthy. On 24-9-1999, he told B.
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Krishna Murthy that, he was not taking interest in the case, therefore, he will proceed to take
possession of the land. On 22-10-1999, again he gave the information regarding the case. On
8-2-2000, he visited Mumbai to meet Chairman U. Sunderajan, who was on leave, therefore, he
gave information regarding the judgment to his P. A. On 18-2-2000, he sent a letter, Ex. D-3. In that
letter, he disclosed that on 21-9-1999, information regarding judgment passed in appeal has been
given. Ex. D-3 and Ex. D-11 are the letters issued by this witness and also proved by him. In both the
letters, he has stated that the Chairman was on leave, therefore, at Mumbai, he could not meet the
chairman and talk to him. In both the letters, he did not mention that he unveiled the facts
regarding passing of the judgment and decree to his P. A. from both the documents, it is also
apparent that, regarding passing of the judgment and decree, except stating in Ex. D-3 that on
21-9-1999, on telephone, he gave information regarding judgment dated 21-9-1999, no other details
have been mentioned. Therefore, it appears that, in oral evidence, he exaggerated the fact regarding
unveiling the passing of judgment and decree, therefore, on 21-9-1999 or thereafter, any
information regarding judgment and decree was given by the plaintiffs to the defendant, other than
Ex. D-3, was not acceptable. Although from the date of receipt, of the letter Ex. D-3, it can be held
that, the information that, the ex parte judgment was passed on 21-9-1999, was received by the
defendant, but whether, as enumerated under Article 123 of the Limitation Act, that will amount to
knowledge or not, is an important stake, which requires to be decided on the facts of the case.
19. Before coming into force the Act of 1963, the Act of 1908 was in force, and present Article 123 of
the Limitation Act corresponds to Article 164 of the old Limitation Act. Hon'ble the Apex Court,
while dealing with the matter under Article 164 of the Limitation Act in Panna Lal v. Murari Lal
(dead) by his legal representatives reported in AIR 1967 SC 1384, observed as below (Para 4) :
(A) Limitation Act (1908), Article 164 --"Knowledge of the decree" -- Meaning of.
The expression "knowledge of the decree" in Article 164 means knowledge of the particular decree
which is sought to be set aside. When the summons was not duly served, limitation under Article
164 does not start running against the defendant because he has received some vague information
that some decree has been passed against him. It is a question of fact in each case whether the
information conveyed to the defendant is sufficient to impute to him knowledge of the decree within
the meaning of Article 164. The test of the sufficiency is not what the information would mean to a
stranger, but what it meant to the defendant in the light of his previous dealing with the plaintiff and
the facts and circumstances known to him. If from the information conveyed to him the defendant
has knowledge of the decree sought to be set aside, time begins to run against him under Article 164.
It is not necessary that a copy of the decree should be served on the defendant. It is sufficient that
the defendant has knowledge of the material facts concerning the decree, so that he has a clear
perception of the injury suffered by him and can take effective steps to set aside the decree.
20. Hon'ble the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, while dealing with the expression "knowledge of
decree" in Smt. Chhutbai V. Madanlal reported in AIR 1989 Madh Pra 330, observed as below :
Para 7 : "Now coming to the question of application being barred by time, we are of the opinion that
the appellate Court has completely misdirected itself in holding that the application was barred by
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time. The expression "knowledge of the decree" used in Article 123 of the Limitation Act, 1963,
means the knowledge of a particular decree, which is sought to be set aside. It has been held that
when the summons was not duly served on the petitioners, the limitation under Article 123 of the
Limitation Act does not start running against the petitioners because they received some vague
information that some decree has been passed against them See AIR 1967 SC 1384 Pannalal v.
Murarilal.
No doubt in this case, it has been held that it is a question of fact in each case whether the
information communicated to the defendant is sufficient to impute to him knowledge of the decree
within the meaning of Article 164 of the old Limitation Act. In the present case, the appellate Court,
itself has held that in the notice Ex. P-4, it has not been mentioned that from which Court the decree
was passed nor the date of the decree has been mentioned but as the case No. 1 has been mentioned
the petitioner could have gathered the knowledge by inspecting the Register of Civil Suit maintained
by the Courts. Admittedly in Mhow, there is not only one Civil Judge Class II, but there are two or
three Civil Judges. Therefore, this type of information cannot be said to be the knowledge of the
decree. There is no finding of the Appellate Court that from the notice Ex. A-4, the petitioners got
the knowledge of the decree, but, on the other hand, the finding is different that the petitioners
could have inspected the record and could have got the knowledge by finding out the particulars of
the decree. In our opinion, on such a finding of the appellate Court, the order of the appellate Court
holding that the application under Order 9, Rule 13, C. P. C. was barred by time, cannot be sustained
and deserves to be quashed.
21. From the aforesaid enunciations, it is clear that, only vague information that, judgment has been
passed on 21-9-1999, is not sufficient to satisfy the requirement of knowledge. The plaintiffs have
not given any information regarding the name of the Court, the name of the parties and the
particulars of the judgment and decree i.e. the decree passed, therefore, only mentioning in letter
Ex.D-3 that, on 21-9-1999, passing of judgment dated 21-9-1999 was informed on telephone, does
not come within the purview of knowledge. Hence, by virtue of the letter, Ex. D-3, whether it has
been served on the defendant or not, no inference can be drawn that the defendant had received
knowledge on 21-9-1999 or on 21-2-2000 regarding the decree.
22. From the aforesaid discussions and evidence tendered by both the parties, which are on record,
it was not proved that, the defendant had knowledge of the decree on 21-9-1999 or 21-2-2000, but
was proved that, the defendant came to know about the said judgment and decree on 12-4-2000,
when the Process Server of the Court came to execute the possession warrant, and thereafter, the
application for setting aside the ex parte decree was filed on 15-4-2000 i.e. within 30 days from
12-4-2000. The application was filed within the prescribed period of limitation, therefore, learned
Court below i.e. first appellate Court, in holding the application to be barred by time, committed
illegality.
23. Learned Counsel for the respondents/plaintiffs has contended that, B. Krishna Murthy is not a
competent person to sign the application under Order XLI Rules 19 and 21 read with Section 151 of
the Code of Civil Procedure filed by the defendant on the ground that the power of attorney in his
favour is not in accordance with law. On the other hand, learned Counsel for the
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appellant/defendant vehemently contended that, the power of attorney, issued in favour of B.

Krishna Murthy, is valid and according to law, as also he, being an authorised officer of the
defendant M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, entitled to file and sign the said application.
24. The Court below i.e. first appellate Court, in para 23 of the impugned order, held that, although
the power of attorney, Ex. P-2 was issued by M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited under its
common seal, yet the same bears signature of only one Director and one Secretary, whereas
signatures of two Directors were required for execution of the said document, and finding the same,
the Court below i.e. first appellate Court held that, the application under Order XLI Rule 21 read
with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure was not filed by a competent person.
25. Admittedly, the defendant is a corporation, therefore, the provisions of Order XXIX Rule 1 of the
Code of Civil Procedure will attract. The said provision reads as below :
Order XXIX. Rule 1 : "Subscription and verification of pleading.-- In suits by or against a
corporation, any pleading may be signed and verified on behalf of the corporation by the secretary
or by any director or other principal officer of the corporation who is able to depose to the facts of
the case.
26. Order VI Rule 14 of the Code of Civil Procedure contains the provisions for signing the
pleadings. That provision reads as below :
Order VI. Rule 14 : "Pleading to be signed.-- Every pleading shall be signed by the party and his
pleader (if any) : Provided that where a party pleading is, by reason of absence or for other good
cause, unable to sign the pleading, it may be signed by any person duly authorised by him to sign the
same or to sue or defend on his behalf.
27. From perusal of the aforesaid provisions, not only the power of attorney holder but also the
principal officer of the corporation was permitted to verify and sign the pleading. B. Krishna
Murthy, who signed the application, was the Territory Manager of the office established at Bhilai by
the defendant M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, and this fact has not been disputed by
the plaintiffs, therefore, B. Krishna Murthy, had power to sign the application even without power of
attorney, and at the most, that was required by the corporation to rectify the said action.
28. Hon'ble the Apex Court, in United Bank of India v. Naresh Kumar, reported in AIR 1997 SC 3,
held that, (Para 9) -In cases where suits are instituted or defended on behalf of a public corporation like bank; public
interest should not be permitted to be defeated on a mere technicality. Procedural defects which do
not go to the root of the matter should not be permitted to defeat a just cause. There is sufficient
power in the Courts, under the Code of Civil Procedure, to ensure that injustice is not done to any
party who has a just case. As far as possible a substantive right should not be allowed to be defeated
on account of a procedural irregularity which is curable.

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29. During the arguments, learned Counsel for the appellant/defendant, relying on Clause 95 of the
Memorandum and Articles of Association of Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, urged that, for
issuing power of attorney, signature of only one Director and counter-signature of Secretary is
sufficient. The said provision has not been challenged by the plaintiffs. Learned Court below i.e. first
appellate Court, vide impugned order, has held that, the power of attorney has been signed by one of
Directors of M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited and also bears the signature of its
Secretary.
30. From the aforesaid discussions, it appears that, the application under Order XLI Rules 19 and 21
read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been signed by B. Krishna Murthy, a
Principal Officer of M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited and duly authorised under power of
attorney to act on behalf of it, therefore, the application was filed by a competent person.
31. Apart from that, from the aforesaid provisions and the law enunciated by Hon'ble the Apex
Court, it is held that, when any case is prosecuted or defended by a corporation or company, that can
be signed by the principal officer of the company/corporation subject to rectification by the
company/corporation. Further held that, only on such type of irregularities, which can be cured at
any stage, justice should not be denied to the party entitled for it. Hence, if at all, learned Court
below i.e. first appellate Court was of the opinion that, the application was not signed by a
competent person, that should not be made a ground for its rejection.
32. It is manifest that, the application under Order XLI Rules 19 and 21 read with Section 151 of the
Code of Civil Procedure was filed by a competent person and also within the time prescribed for it,
therefore, the findings recorded by the Court below i.e., first appellate Court on these issues suffer
from gross illegality and are required to be set aside.
33. The appeal is allowed. On payment of cost of Rs. 5,000/- (Rupees Five Thousand only) to the
plaintiffs by the defendant within a period of one month from today, the impugned order, passed by
the Court below i.e. first appellate Court, so far as it relates to dismissal of the application filed by
the defendant under Order XLI Rules 19 and 21 read with Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
is set aside. The Court below i.e. first appellate Court shall re-hear the Civil Appeal No. 7A/1999, and
after affording proper opportunities to both the parties, decide the same afresh as early as possible
preferably within a period of three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order.
34. Both the parties are directed to appear before the Court below i.e. first appellate Court on 13th
June, 2005. No further notice shall be required to be served on the parties for their appearance
before the first appellate Court.

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