MINORS OPOSA VS DENR

DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J p:
In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology
which the petitioners dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational
responsibility" and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the
said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine
rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life-support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth."

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-777 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati,
Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal
plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented and joined by their
respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc.
(PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia,
engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources.
The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His substitution in this petition by the
new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the
petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the
plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit,
use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical rainforests."
The same was filed for themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of
said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court."

The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn." 4Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
". . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements."
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands
has a land area of thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant
rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora and fauna may be found; these
rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the
habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time
immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology,
the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest
cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses;
the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a
host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from the drying up of the
water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b)
salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible
examples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c)
massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the
volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum
approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the
country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural
communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of

rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical
reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as is presently experienced
by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of
windbreakers, (i) the flooding of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the
absorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso
dams constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and
the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon
dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the phenomenon
of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued deforestation are
so capable of unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial
notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as
documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
"CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests
constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said
rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left,
barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of
immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.

11. Public records reveal that defendant's predecessors have granted timber license agreements
('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial
logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex 'A'.
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per
hour nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included the Philippines will be bereft of forest
resources after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this
continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minors' generation and to generations yet unborn are
evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in
paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff
adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest
stands will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors and
their successors who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural
resource treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource
property he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled
to protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiffs have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2,
1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex 'B'.
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's, to the continuing serious
damage and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.

18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights
of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare,
barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines has
been abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy
enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy
of the State
'(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can
thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
'(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of
Filipinos and;
'(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity
and well-being'. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977).
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to
the Constitutional policy of the State to
a. effect 'a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth' and 'make full and
efficient use of natural resources (sic).' (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. 'protect the nation's marine wealth.' (Section 2, ibid);
c. 'conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic).' (Section 14, Article
XIV, id.);
d. 'protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature.' (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind the natural law and
violative of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.

22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to
arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life-support systems and continued rape of
Mother Earth." 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the
complaint based on two (2) grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him
and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the
petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action, (2) the
motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's
abuse of discretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to
dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause
of action against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the respondent Judge further
ruled that the granting of the reliefs prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts which is
prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of
Court and ask this Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the
respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the
plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit
their respective Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf
of the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains
sufficient allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21

of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR,
Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article
II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology,
the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's inalienable right to
self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the
respondent's correlative obligation, per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, the safeguard the people's right to
a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in
granting Timber License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available
involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause,
petitioners maintain that the same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They
likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled
that they may still be revoked by the State when public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a
specific legal right violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They
see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right"
which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens

patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action. They then
reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a
political question which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of
Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' recourse is not to file an action in court, but
to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done
by the State without due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of

time usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor
cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms
of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs
indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due
process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil
Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take
issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The
subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all
citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it becomes
impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that
the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all
concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule
3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the
latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent
their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for
themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned.
Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature
means the created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia,
the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that
their exploration, development and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future

generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time,
the performance of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits
of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of
the issues raised and arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the
petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having been issued with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order
read as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
"After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with
the defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) fell
short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and
protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC).
Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague
conclusions based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint
against the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color
and involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing
violence to the sacred principle of 'Separation of Powers' of the three (3) co-equal branches of the
Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction,
grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in

the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing renewing or approving new
timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to 'impairment of contracts' abhored
(sic) by the fundamental law." 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient
definiteness a specific legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint
is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the
complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
"SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature."
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same
article:
"SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them."
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles
and State Policies and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any
of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category
of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly
and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in
the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now
explicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers
that unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state

policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon
the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the second, the day
would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for
those to come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of
sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from
impairing the environment. During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the
1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido
Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:

"MR. VILLACORTA:

Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution air, water and
noise pollution?

MR. AZCUNA:

Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the correlative
duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of
environmental balance." 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the
country's forests. Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversibly
disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as
well as the other related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and
utilization of the country's natural resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on
10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency responsible for the

conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural
resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral resources, including those in reservation and
watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural
resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived
therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes
the following statement of policy:
"SEC. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the
sustainable use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest,
mineral, land, off-shore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and enhancement
of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population to
the development and use of the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but
for future generations as well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value
system including social and environmental cost implications relative to their utilization; development
and conservation of our natural resources."
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated in Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of
1987, 15 specifically in Section 1 thereof which reads:
"SEC. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the
full exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore
areas and other natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological
balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the
exploration, development and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the
different segments of the present as well as future generations.

(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social
and environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our
natural resources."
The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting
and enhancing the quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand,
specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of
the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:
"SEC. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily
responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional
mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the
country's natural resources."
Both E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as
the bases for policy formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific
statutes already paid special attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future
generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D. No.
1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the
State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive
in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other
requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of
the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for succeeding
generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is
as clear as the DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions
under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or
protect the same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs,
which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and
healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed
or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
". . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its
essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or
omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right." 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint
fails to state a cause of action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be considered;
furthermore, the truth or falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for the truth thereof is
deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such
alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the
complaint? 20 In Militante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should
"exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of
the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts
alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified.
If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After a careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the
introductory affirmative allegations, as well as the specific averments under the subheading CAUSE

OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the
basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing,
however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need to implead, as
party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 cannot be said to raise a political question. Policy
formulation or determination by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely
put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already
formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political
question doctrine is no longer the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the
impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The
second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
"Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a
distinguished member of this Court, says:
"The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the
settlement of conflicting rights as conferred by law. The second part of the authority represents a
broadening of judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden
territory, to wit, the discretion of the political departments of the government.

As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to
rule upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their
acts invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The

catch, of course, is the meaning of 'grave abuse of discretion,' which is a very elastic phrase that can
expand or contract according to the disposition of the judiciary."
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
"In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The
reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature,
we would still not be precluded from resolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us
that now covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the
Constitution clearly provides: . . ."
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of
contracts clause found in the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
"The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction,
grant the reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in
the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving
new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to 'impairment of contracts'
abhored (sic) by the fundamental law." 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping
pronouncement. In the first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even
invoke in his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted
with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue and unwarranted benefits and
advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the Government to
strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in
policy and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by
the petitioners, into every timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D.
No. 705) which provides:

". . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify,
replace or rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted
herein . . ."
Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a
contract, property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan

vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this Court held:

". . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of
forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within
the purview of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn
whenever dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
'A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a
contract between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is
granted; neither is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation'
(37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights,
neither is it property or property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576) . . ."
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive

Secretary: 26
". . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the
State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is
promoted. And it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to
qualified entities, and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular
concession area and the forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or
rescinded by the Chief Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed
contracts within the purview of the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres.

Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983,
125 SCRA 302]."
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
"SEC. 10. No law impairing the obligation of contracts shall be passed." 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does
not involve a law or even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing
timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting
further that a law has actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the same
cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause. This is because by its very
nature and purpose, such a law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of
the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology,
promoting their health and enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler Corp., 28 this
Court stated:
"The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is
understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health,
moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of
obligations of contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of
public health, safety, moral and general welfare."
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American

Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor General, 30 to wit:

" 'Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally
matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of
governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for
government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or

exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is
that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.' "
In court, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply
with respect to the prayer to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as
of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not entitled to
it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the
challenged Order of respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set
aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or
grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
||| (Oposa v. Factoran, Jr., G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
MANILA PRINCE HOTEL V GSIS

The Filipino First Policy enshrined in the 1987 Constitution, i.e., in the grant of

rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony,
the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, 1 is invoked by petitioner in
its bid to acquire 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) which
owns the historic Manila Hotel. Opposing, respondents maintain that the
provision is not self-executing but requires an implementing legislation for its
enforcement. Corollarily, they ask whether the 51% shares form part of the
national economy and patrimony covered by the protective mantle of the
Constitution.

The controversy arose when respondent Government Service Insurance System

(GSIS), pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government
under Proclamation No. 50 dated 8 December 1986, decided to sell through
public bidding 30% to 51% of the issued and outstanding shares of respondent
MHC. The winning bidder, or the eventual "strategic partner," is to provide

management expertise and/or an international marketing/reservation system,

and financial support to strengthen the profitability and performance of
the Manila Hotel. 2 In a close bidding held on 18 September 1995

only

two

(2)

bidders

participated:

petitioner ManilaPrince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino corporation,

which offered to buy 51% of the MHC or 15,300,000 shares at
P41.58 per share, and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with
ITT-Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the same
number of shares at P44.00 per share, or P2.42 more than the
bid of petitioner.
Pertinent provisions of the bidding rules prepared by respondent GSIS state
I. EXECUTION OF THE NECESSARY CONTRACTS WITH GSIS/MHC
1. The Highest Bidder must comply with the conditions set forth below
by October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995) or the Highest Bidder
will lose the right to purchase the Block of Shares and GSIS will instead
offer the Block of Shares to the other Qualified Bidders:
a. The

Highest

the GSIS/MHC

Bidder
the

must

negotiate

Management

and

Contract,

execute

with

International

Marketing/Reservation System Contract or other type of contract

specified by the Highest Bidder in its strategic plan for

the Manila Hotel . . . .
b. The Highest Bidder must execute the Stock Purchase
and Sale Agreement with GSIS . . . .
K. DECLARATION OF THE WINNING BIDDER/STRATEGIC PARTNER
The Highest Bidder will be declared the Winning Bidder/Strategic Partner
after the following conditions are met
a. Execution of the necessary contracts with GSIS/MHC not later
than October 23, 1995 (reset to November 3, 1995); and
b. Requisite approvals from the GSIS/MHC and COP
(Committee on Privatization)/ OGCC (Office of the Government
Corporate Counsel) are obtained."3

Pending the declaration of Renong Berhard as the winning bidder/strategic

partner and the execution of the necessary contracts, petitioner in a letter to
respondentGSIS dated 28 September 1995 matched the bid price of P44.00 per
share tendered by Renong Berhad. 4 In a subsequent letter dated 10 October
1995 petitioner sent a manager's check issued by Philtrust Bank for Thirty-three
Million Pesos (P33,000,000.00) as Bid Security to match the bid of the Malaysian

Group, Messrs. Renong Berhad . . . . 5 which respondent GSIS refused to accept.

On

17

October

1995,

perhaps

apprehensive

that

respondent GSIS has

disregarded the tender of the matching bid and that the sale of 51% of the MHC
may be hastened by respondent GSIS and consummated with Renong Berhad,
petitioner came to this Court on prohibition and mandamus. On 18 October 1995

the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining respondents from

perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm.
On 10 September 1996 the instant case was accepted by the Court En Banc after
it was referred to it by the First Division. The case was then set for oral
arguments with former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Fr. Joaquin G.
Bernas, S.J., as amici curiae.
In the main, petitioner invokes Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution and submits that the Manila Hotel has been identified with the

Filipino nation and has practically become a historical monument which reflects
the vibrancy of Philippine heritage and culture. It is a proud legacy of an earlier
generation of Filipinos who believed in the nobility and sacredness of
independence and its power and capacity to release the full potential of the
Filipino people. To all intents and purposes, it has become a part of the national
patrimony. 6 Petitioner also argues that since 51% of the shares of the MHC
carries with it the ownership of the business of the hotelwhich is owned by
respondent GSIS,

government-owned

and

controlled

corporation,

the hotel business of respondent GSIS being a part of the tourism industry is
unquestionably a part of the national economy. Thus, any transaction involving
51% of the shares of stock of the MHC is clearly covered by the term national

economy, to which Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, 1987 Constitution, applies. 7
It is also the thesis of petitioner that since Manila Hotel is part of the national
patrimony and its business also unquestionably part of the national economy
petitioner should be preferred after it has matched the bid offer of the Malaysian
firm. For the bidding rules mandate that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder

cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other
Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified
Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per share. 8
Respondents except. They maintain that: First, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of
the 1987 Constitution is merely a statement of principle and policy since it is not

a self-executing provision and requires implementing legislation(s). . . . Thus, for

the said provision to operate, there must be existing laws "to lay down conditions
under which business may be done." 9
Second, granting that this provision is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall
under the term national patrimony which only refers to lands of the public
domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all
marine wealth in its territorial sea, and exclusive marine zone as cited in the first
and second paragraphs of Sec. 2, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution. According to
respondents, while petitioner speaks of the guests who have slept in
the hotel and

the

events

that

have

transpired

therein

which

make

the hotel historic, these alone do not make the hotel fall under the patrimony of
the nation. What is more, the mandate of the Constitution is addressed to the
State, not to respondent GSIS which possesses a personality of its own separate
and distinct from the Philippines as a State.

lexlib

Third, granting that the Manila Hotel forms part of the national patrimony, the
constitutional provision invoked is still inapplicable since what is being sold is
only 51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the hotel building nor
the land upon which the building stands. Certainly, 51% of the equity of the MHC

cannot be considered part of the national patrimony. Moreover, if the disposition

of the shares of the MHC is really contrary to the Constitution, petitioner should
have questioned it right from the beginning and not after it had lost in the
bidding.

Fourth, the reliance by petitioner on par. V., subpar. J. 1, of the bidding rules
which provides that if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the

Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to the other Qualified Bidders that have
validly submitted bids provided that these Qualified Bidders are willing to match
the highest bid in terms of price per share, is misplaced. Respondents postulate
that the privilege of submitting a matching bid has not yet arisen since it only
takes place if for any reason, the Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of

Shares. Thus the submission by petitioner of a matching bid is premature since

Renong Berhad could still very well be awarded the block of shares and the
condition giving rise to the exercise of the privilege to submit a matching bid had
not yet taken place.

Finally, the prayer for prohibition grounded on grave abuse of discretion should
fail since respondent GSIS did not exercise its discretion in a capricious,
whimsical manner, and if ever it did abuse its discretion it was not so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law. Similarly, the petition for mandamus should fail
as petitioner has no clear legal right to what it demands and respondents do not
have an imperative duty to perform the act required of them by petitioner.
We now resolve. A constitution is a system of fundamental laws for the
governance and administration of a nation. It is supreme, imperious, absolute

and unalterable except by the authority from which it emanates. It has been
defined as the fundamental and paramount law of the nation. 10 It prescribes
the permanent framework of a system of government, assigns to the different
departments their respective powers and duties, and establishes certain fixed
principles on which government is founded. The fundamental conception in other
words is that it is a supreme law to which all other laws must conform and in
accordance with which all private rights must be determined and all public
authority administered. 11 Under the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, if a
law or contract violates any norm of the constitution that law or contract whether
promulgated by the legislative or by the executive branch or entered into by
private persons for private purposes is null and void and without any force and
effect. Thus, since the Constitution is the fundamental paramount and supreme

law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract.

Admittedly, some constitutions are merely declarations of policies and principles.

Their provisions command the legislature to enact laws and carry out the
purposes of the framers who merely establish an outline of government
providing for the different departments of the governmental machinery and
securing certain fundamental and inalienable rights of citizens. 12 A provision
which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing. But a provision which is complete in
itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary or enabling
legislation, or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right it
grants may be enjoyed or protected, is self-executing. Thus a constitutional
provision is self-executing if the nature and extent of the right conferred and the

liability imposed are fixed by the constitution itself, so that they can be
determined by an examination and construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is referred to the legislature for action. 13
As against constitutions of the past, modern constitutions have been generally
drafted upon a different principle and have often become in effect extensive
codes of laws intended to operate directly upon the people in a manner similar to
that of statutory enactments, and the function of constitutional conventions has
evolved into one more like that of a legislative body. Hence, unless it is expressly
provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional mandate,
the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing.
If the constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of selfexecuting, the legislature would have the power to ignore and practically nullify
the mandate of the fundamental law. 14 This can be cataclysmic. That is why the
prevailing view is, as it has always been, that
. . . in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered selfexecuting rather than non-self-executing. . . . Unless the contrary is
clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered
self-executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to
determine when, or whether, they shall be effective. These provisions
would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could
make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed
implementing statute. 15

Respondents argue that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987
Constitution is clearly not self-executing, as they quote from discussions on the
floor of the 1986 Constitutional Commission
MR. RODRIGO.
Madam President, I am asking this question as the Chairman of the
Committee on Style. If the wording of "PREFERENCE" is given to
"QUALIFIED FILIPINOS," can it be understood as a preference to
qualified Filipinos vis-a-vis Filipinos who are not qualified. So, why
do we not make it clear? To qualified Filipinos as against aliens?
THE PRESIDENT.
What is the question of Commissioner Rodrigo? Is it to remove the
word "QUALIFIED?"
MR. RODRIGO.
No, no, but say definitely "TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" as against whom?
As against aliens or over aliens?
MR. NOLLEDO.
Madam President, I think that is understood. We use the word
"QUALIFIED" because the existing laws or prospective laws will

always lay down conditions under which business may be

done. For example, qualifications on capital, qualifications on the
setting up of other financial structures, et cetera (italics supplied
by respondents).

MR RODRIGO.
It is just a matter of style.
MR. NOLLEDO.
Yes. 16

Quite apparently, Sec. 10, second par., of Art. XII is couched in such a way as
not to make it appear that it is non-self-executing but simply for purposes of
style. But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded from enacting further laws to
enforce the constitutional provision so long as the contemplated statute squares
with the Constitution. Minor details may be left to the legislature without the selfexecuting nature of constitutional provisions.
In self-executing constitutional provisions, the legislature may still enact
legislation to facilitate the exercise of powers directly granted by the constitution,
further the operation of such a provision, prescribe a practice to be used for its
enforcement, provide a convenient remedy for the protection of the rights
secured or the determination thereof, or place reasonable safeguards around the
exercise of the right. The mere fact that legislation may supplement and add to
or prescribe a penalty for the violation of a self-executing constitutional provision
does not render such a provision ineffective in the absence of such legislation.
The omission from a constitution of any express provision for a remedy for
enforcing a right or liability is not necessarily an indication that it was not
intended to be self-executing. The rule is that a self-executing provision of the
constitution does not necessarily exhaust legislative power on the subject, but
any legislation must be in harmony with the constitution, further the exercise of
constitutional right and make it more available. 17 Subsequent legislation

however does not necessarily mean that the subject constitutional provision is
not, by itself, fully enforceable.
Respondents also argue that the non-self-executing nature of Sec. 10, second
par., of Art. XII is implied from the tenor of the first and third paragraphs of the
same section which undoubtedly are not self-executing. 18 The argument is
flawed. If the first and third paragraphs are not self-executing because Congress
is still to enact measures to encourage the formation and operation of
enterprises fully owned by Filipinos, as in the first paragraph, and the State still
needs legislation to regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments
within its national jurisdiction, as in the third paragraph, then a fortiori, by the
same logic, the second paragraph can only be self-executing as it does not by its
language require any legislation in order to give preference to qualified Filipinos
in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy
and patrimony. A constitutional provision may be self-executing in one part and
non-self-executing in another. 19
Even the cases cited by respondents holding that certain constitutional provisions
are merely statements of principles and policies, which are basically not selfexecuting and only placed in the Constitution as moral incentives to legislation,
not as judicially enforceable rights are simply not in point. Basco v. Philippine

Amusements and Gaming Corporation 20 speaks of constitutional provisions on

personal dignity, 21 the sanctity of family life, 22 the vital role of the youth in
nation-building, 23 the

promotion

of

education. 25 Tolentino v. Secretary

provisions

on

social

justice

education. 28 Lastly, Kilosbayan,

of

social

justice, 24 and

Finance 26 refers
and

human

Inc. v. Morato 29 cites

the
to

values

of

constitutional

rights 27 and
provisions

on

on
the

promotion of general welfare, 30 the sanctity of family life, 31 the vital role of the
youth in nation-building 32 and the promotion of total human liberation and
development. 33 A reading of these provisions indeed clearly shows that they are
not judicially enforceable constitutional rights but merely guidelines for
legislation. The very terms of the provisions manifest that they are only
principles upon which legislations must be based. Res ipsa loquitur.
On the other hand, Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is a
mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no
further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its
very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It
is per sejudicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that [i]n the

grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and

patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos, it means just that
qualified Filipinos shall be preferred. And when our Constitution declares that
a right exists in certain specified circumstances an action may be maintained to
enforce such right notwithstanding the absence of any legislation on the subject;
consequently, if there is no statute especially enacted to enforce such
constitutional right, such right enforces itself by its own inherent potency and
puissance, and from which all legislations must take their bearings. Where there
is a right there is a remedy. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
As regards our national patrimony, a member of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission 34 explains
The patrimony of the Nation that should be conserved and developed
refers not only to our rich natural resources but also to the cultural

heritage of our race. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences

and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our lands, forests,
mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty
of our people.

We agree. In its plain and ordinary meaning, the term patrimony pertains to
heritage. 35 When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not
only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have
very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the
Filipinos.
Manila Hotel has become a landmark a living testimonial of Philippine heritage.
While it was restrictively an American hotel when it first opened in 1912, it
immediately evolved to be truly Filipino. Formerly a concourse for the elite, it has
since then become the venue of various significant events which have shaped
Philippine history. It was called the Cultural Center of the 1930's. It was the site
of the festivities during the inauguration of the Philippine Commonwealth.
Dubbed as the Official Guest House of the Philippine Government it plays host to
dignitaries and official visitors who are accorded the traditional Philippine
hospitality. 36

The history of the hotel has been chronicled in the book The Manila Hotel: The

Heart and Memory of a City. 37 During World War II the hotel was converted by
the Japanese Military Administration into a military headquarters. When the
American forces returned to recapture Manila the hotel was selected by the
Japanese together with Intramuros as the two (2) places for their final stand.

Thereafter, in the 1950's and 1960's, the hotel became the center of political
activities,

playing

host

to

almost

every

political

convention.

In

1970

the hotel reopened after a renovation and reaped numerous international

recognitions, an acknowledgment of the Filipino talent and ingenuity. In 1986
the hotel was the site of a failed coup d'etat where an aspirant for vice-president
was "proclaimed" President of the Philippine Republic.
For more than eight (8) decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the
triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is
impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for
sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Verily, Manila Hotel has become part
of our national economy and patrimony. For sure, 51% of the equity of the MHC
comes within the purview of the constitutional shelter for it comprises the
majority and controlling stock, so that anyone who acquires or owns the 51%
will have actual control and management of the hotel. In this instance, 51% of
the MHC cannot be disassociated from the hotel and the land on which
the hotel edifice stands. Consequently, we cannot sustain respondents' claim that
the Filipino First Policy provision is not applicable since what is being sold is only

51% of the outstanding shares of the corporation, not the Hotel building nor the
land upon which the building stands. 38
The argument is pure sophistry. The term qualified Filipinos as used in our
Constitution also includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by
Filipinos. This is very clear from the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional
Commission
THE PRESIDENT.

Commissioner Davide is recognized.

MR. DAVIDE.
I would like to introduce an amendment to the Nolledo
amendment. And the amendment would consist in substituting
the words "QUALIFIED FILIPINOS" with the following: "CITIZENS
OF THE PHILIPPINES OR CORPORATIONS OR ASSOCIATIONS
WHOSE CAPITAL OR CONTROLLING STOCK IS WHOLLY OWNED
BY SUCH CITIZENS."
xxx xxx xxx
MR. MONSOD.
Madam President, apparently the proponent is agreeable, but we
have to raise a question. Suppose it is a corporation that is 80percent Filipino, do we not give it preference?
MR. DAVIDE.
The Nolledo amendment would refer to an individual Filipino.
What about a corporation wholly owned by Filipino citizens?
MR. MONSOD.
At least 60 percent, Madam President.
MR. DAVIDE.
Is that the intention?
MR MONSOD.

Yes, because, in fact, we would be limiting it if we say that the

preference should only be 100-percent Filipino.
MR. DAVIDE.
I want to get that meaning clear because "QUALIFIED
FILIPINOS" may refer only to individuals and not to juridical
personalities or entities.
MR. MONSOD.
We agree, Madam President. 39
xxx xxx xxx
MR. RODRIGO.
Before we vote, may I request that the amendment be read
again.
MR. NOLLEDO.
The amendment will read: "IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS,
PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS COVERING THE NATIONAL
ECONOMY

AND

PREFERENCE

TO

PATRIMONY,
QUALIFIED

THE

STATE

FILIPINOS."

SHALL

And

the

GIVE
word

"Filipinos" here, as intended by the proponents, will include not

only individual Filipinos but also Filipino-controlled entities or
entities fully-controlled by Filipinos. 40
The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus

MR. FOZ.
Madam President, I would like to request Commissioner Nolledo
to please restate his amendment so that I can ask a question.
MR. NOLLEDO.
"IN THE GRANT OF RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES AND CONCESSIONS
COVERING THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY, THE
STATE SHALL GIVE PREFERENCE TO QUALIFIED FILIPINOS."
MR. FOZ.
In connection with that amendment, if a foreign enterprise is
qualified and a Filipino enterprise is also qualified, will the Filipino
enterprise still be given a preference?
MR. NOLLEDO.
Obviously.
MR. FOZ.
If the foreigner is more qualified in some aspects than the Filipino
enterprise, will the Filipino still be preferred?
MR. NOLLEDO.
The answer is "yes."
MR. FOZ.
Thank you. 41

Expounding further on the Filipino First Policy provision Commissioner Nolledo

continues
MR NOLLEDO.
Yes, Madam President. Instead of "MUST," it will be "SHALL
THE

STATE

SHALL

GIVE

PREFERENCE

TO

QUALIFIED

FILIPINOS." This embodies the so-called "Filipino First" policy.

That means that Filipinos should be given preference in the grant
of concessions, privileges and rights covering the national
patrimony. 42

The exchange of views in the sessions of the Constitutional Commission

regarding the subject provision was still further clarified by Commissioner
Nolledo 43
"Paragraph 2 of Section 10 explicitly mandates the "Pro-Filipino" bias in
all economic concerns. It is better known as the FILIPINO FIRST Policy.
. . . This provision was never found in previous Constitutions. . . .
The term "qualified Filipinos" simply means that preference shall be
given to those citizens who can make a viable contribution to the
common good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It
certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment
to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient,
since such an indiscriminate preference would be counterproductive and
inimical to the common good.

In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a

choice has to be made between a "qualified foreigner" and a "qualified
Filipino," the latter shall be chosen over the former."

Lastly, the word qualified is also determinable. Petitioner was so considered by

respondent GSIS and selected as one of the qualified bidders. It was prequalified by respondent GSIS in accordance with its own guidelines so that the
sole inference here is that petitioner has been found to be possessed of proven
management expertise in the hotel industry, or it has significant equity
ownership in another hotel company, or it has an overall management and
marketing proficiency to successfully operate the Manila Hotel. 44
The penchant to try to whittle away the mandate of the Constitution by arguing
that the subject provision is not self-executory and requires implementing
legislation is quite disturbing. The attempt to violate a clear constitutional
provision by the government itself is only too distressing. To adopt such a
line of reasoning is to renounce the duty to ensure faithfulness to the
Constitution. For, even some of the provisions of the Constitution which evidently
need implementing legislation have juridical life of their own and can be the
source of a judicial remedy. We cannot simply afford the government a defense
that arises out of the failure to enact further enabling, implementing or guiding
legislation. In fine, the discourse of Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., on constitutional
government is apt
The executive department has a constitutional duty to implement laws,
including the Constitution, even before Congress acts provided that
there are discoverable legal standards for executive action. When the

executive acts, it must be guided by its own understanding of the

constitutional command and of applicable laws. The responsibility for
reading and understanding the Constitution and the laws is not the sole
prerogative of Congress. If it were, the executive would have to ask
Congress, or perhaps the Court, for an interpretation every time the
executive is confronted by a constitutional command. That is not how
constitutional government operates. 45

Respondents further argue that the constitutional provision is addressed to the

State, not to respondent GSIS which by itself possesses a separate and distinct
personality. This argument again is at best specious. It is undisputed that the
sale of 51% of the MHC could only be carried out with the prior approval of the
State acting through respondent Committee on Privatization. As correctly pointed
out by Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., this fact alone makes the sale of the assets of
respondents GSISand MHC a "state action." In constitutional jurisprudence, the
acts of persons distinct from the government are considered "state action"
covered by the Constitution (1) when the activity it engages in is a "public

function;" (2) when the government is so-significantly involved with the private
actor as to make the government responsible for his action; and, (3) when the
government has approved or authorized the action. It is evident that the act of
respondent GSIS in selling 51% of its share in respondent MHC comes under the
second and third categories of "state action." Without doubt therefore the
transaction, although entered into by respondent GSIS, is in fact a transaction of
the State and therefore subject to the constitutional command. 46
When the Constitution addresses the State it refers not only to the people but
also to the government as elements of the State. After all, government is

composed of three (3) divisions of power legislative, executive and judicial.

Accordingly, a constitutional mandate directed to the State is correspondingly
directed to the three (3) branches of government. It is undeniable that in this
case the subject constitutional injunction is addressed among others to the
Executive Department and respondentGSIS, a government instrumentality
deriving its authority from the State.
It should be stressed that while the Malaysian firm offered the higher bid it is not
yet the winning bidder. The bidding rules expressly provide that the highest
bidder shall only be declared the winning bidder after it has negotiated and
executed the necessary contracts, and secured the requisite approvals. Since
the Filipino First Policy provision of the Constitution bestows preference
on qualified Filipinos the mere tending of the highest bid is not an assurance that
the highest bidder will be declared the winning bidder. Resultantly, respondents
are not bound to make the award yet, nor are they under obligation to enter into
one with the highest bidder. For in choosing the awardee respondents are
mandated to abide by the dictates of the 1987 Constitution the provisions of
which are presumed to be known to all the bidders and other interested parties.

Adhering to the doctrine of constitutional supremacy, the subject constitutional

provision is, as it should be, impliedly written in the bidding rules issued by
respondentGSIS, lest the bidding rules be nullified for being violative of the
Constitution. It is a basic principle in constitutional law that all laws and contracts
must conform with the fundamental law of the land. Those which violate the
Constitution lose their reason for being.

Paragraph V. J. 1 of the bidding rules provides that [i]f for any reason the

Highest Bidder cannot be awarded the Block of Shares, GSIS may offer this to
other Qualified Bidders that have validly submitted bids provided that these
Qualified Bidders are willing to match the highest bid in terms of price per
share. 47 Certainly, the constitutional mandate itself is reason enough not to
award the block of shares immediately to the foreign bidder notwithstanding its
submission of a higher, or even the highest, bid. In fact, we cannot conceive of
a stronger reason than the constitutional injunction itself.
In the instant case, where a foreign firm submits the highest bid in a public
bidding concerning the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the
national economy and patrimony, thereby exceeding the bid of a Filipino, there is
no question that the Filipino will have to be allowed to match the bid of the
foreign entity. And if the Filipino matches the bid of a foreign firm the award
should go to the Filipino. It must be so if we are to give life and meaning to
the Filipino First Policy provision of the 1987 Constitution. For, while this may
neither be expressly stated nor contemplated in the bidding rules, the
constitutional fiat is omnipresent to be simply disregarded. To ignore it would be
to sanction a perilous skirting of the basic law.
This Court does not discount the apprehension that this policy may discourage
foreign investors. But the Constitution and laws of the Philippines are understood
to be always open to public scrutiny. These are given factors which investors
must consider when venturing into business in a foreign jurisdiction. Any person
therefore desiring to do business in the Philippines or with any of its agencies or
instrumentalities is presumed to know his rights and obligations under the
Constitution and the laws of the forum

The argument of respondents that petitioner is now estopped from questioning

the sale to Renong Berhad since petitioner was well aware from the beginning
that a foreigner could participate in the bidding is meritless. Undoubtedly,
Filipinos and foreigners alike were invited to the bidding. But foreigners may be
awarded the sale only if no Filipino qualifies, or if the qualified Filipino fails to
match the highest bid tendered by the foreign entity. In the case before us,
while petitioner was already preferred at the inception of the bidding because of
the constitutional mandate, petitioner had not yet matched the bid offered by
Renong Berhad. Thus it did not have the right or personality then to compel
respondent GSIS to accept its earlier bid. Rightly, only after it had matched the
bid of the foreign firm and the apparent disregard by respondent GSIS of
petitioner's matching bid did the latter have a cause of action.
Besides, there is no time frame for invoking the constitutional safeguard unless
perhaps the award has been finally made. To insist on selling the Manila Hotel to
foreigners when there is a Filipino group willing to match the bid of the foreign
group is to insist that government be treated as any other ordinary market
player, and bound by its mistakes or gross errors of judgment, regardless of the
consequences to the Filipino people. The miscomprehension of the Constitution
is regrettable. Thus we would rather remedy the indiscretion while there is still
an opportunity to do so than let the government develop the habit of forgetting
that the Constitution lays down the basic conditions and parameters for its
actions.
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong Berhad
pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no alternative but to
award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and to execute the necessary

agreements and documents to effect the sale in accordance not only with the
bidding guidelines and procedures but with the Constitution as well. The refusal
of respondent GSIS to execute the corresponding documents with petitioner as
provided in the bidding rules after the latter has matched the bid of the
Malaysian firm clearly constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
The Filipino First Policy is a product of Philippine nationalism. It is embodied in
the 1987 Constitution not merely to be used as a guideline for future legislation
but primarily to be enforced; so must it be enforced. This Court as the ultimate
guardian of the Constitution will never shun, under any reasonable circumstance,
the duty of upholding the majesty of the Constitution which it is tasked to
defend. It is worth emphasizing that it is not the intention of this Court to
impede and diminish, much less undermine, the influx of foreign investments.
Far from it, the Court encourages and welcomes more business opportunities but
avowedly sanctions the preference for Filipinos whenever such preference is
ordained by the Constitution. The position of the Court on this matter could have
not been more appropriately articulated by Chief Justice Narvasa
As scrupulously as it has tried to observe that it is not its function to
substitute its judgment for that of the legislature or the executive about
the wisdom and feasibility of legislation economic in nature, the
Supreme Court has not been spared criticism for decisions perceived as
obstacles to economic progress and development . . . in connection with
a temporary injunction issued by the Court's First Division against the
sale of the Manila Hotel to a Malaysian Firm and its partner, certain
statements were published in a major daily to the effect that that

injunction "again demonstrates that the Philippine legal system can be a

major obstacle to doing business here."
Let it be stated for the record once again that while it is no business of
the Court to intervene in contracts of the kind referred to or set itself up
as the judge of whether they are viable or attainable, it is its bounden
duty to make sure that they do not violate the Constitution or the laws,
or are not adopted or implemented with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. It will never shirk that duty,
no matter how buffeted by winds of unfair and ill-informed criticism. 48

Privatization of a business asset for purposes of enhancing its business viability

and preventing further losses, regardless of the character of the asset, should
not take precedence over non-material values. A commercial, nay even a
budgetary, objective should not be pursued at the expense of national pride and
dignity. For the Constitution enshrines higher and nobler non-material values.
Indeed, the Court will always defer to the Constitution in the proper governance
of a free society; after all, there is nothing so sacrosanct in any economic policy
as to draw itself beyond judicial review when the Constitution is involved. 49
Nationalism is inherent in the very concept of the Philippines being a democratic
and republican state, with sovereignty residing in the Filipino people and from
whom all government authority emanates. In nationalism, the happiness and
welfare of the people must be the goal. The nation-state can have no higher
purpose. Any interpretation of any constitutional provision must adhere to such
basic concept. Protection of foreign investments, while laudable, is merely a
policy. It cannot override the demands of nationalism. 50

The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any commodity
to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of privatization. We are not
talking about an ordinary piece of property in a commercial district. We are
talking about a historic relic that has hosted many of the most important events
in the short history of the Philippines as a nation. We are talking about
a hotel where heads of states would prefer to be housed as a strong
manifestation of their desire to cloak the dignity of the highest state function to
their official visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and
continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of twentieth
century Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it has become truly a
reflection of the Filipino soul a place with a history of grandeur; a most

historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a country. 51

cda

This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined efforts of
respondents to sell the historical landmark this Grand Old Dame of hotels in
Asia to a total stranger. For, indeed, the conveyance of this epic exponent of
the Filipino psyche to alien hands cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in
whatever manner viewed, a veritable alienation of a nation's soul for some
pieces of foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot be
equally drawn from a qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos
if Manila Hotel and all that it stands for is sold to a non-Filipino? How much
of national pride will vanish if the nation's cultural heritage is entrusted to a
foreign entity? On the other hand, how much dignity will be preserved and
realized if the national patrimony is safekept in the hands of a qualified, zealous
and well-meaning Filipino? This is the plain and simple meaning of the Filipino

First Policy provision of the Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the

clarion call of the Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly
watchman of the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the
Constitution.
WHEREFORE,

respondents

GOVERNMENT

SERVICE

INSURANCE

SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON PRIVATIZATION and

OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE
and DESIST from selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to
RENONG

BERHAD,

and

to

ACCEPT

the

matching

bid

of

petitioner MANILA PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51%

of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and thereafter
to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale, to issue
the necessary clearances and to do such other acts and deeds as may be
necessary for the purpose.

SO ORDERED
|||

(Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 03, 1997)

MMDA concerned citizens

On December 18, 2008, this Court rendered a Decision in G.R. Nos. 171947-48
ordering petitioners to clean up, rehabilitate and preserve Manila Bay in their
different capacities. The fallo reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The September 28, 2005 Decision
of the CA in CA-G.R. CV No. 76528 and SP No. 74944 and the
September 13, 2002 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 1851-99 are

AFFIRMED

but

with

MODIFICATIONS

in

view

of

subsequent

developments or supervening events in the case. The fallo of the RTC

Decision shall now read:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering the abovenamed
defendant-government agencies to clean up, rehabilitate, and preserve
Manila Bay, and restore and maintain its waters to SB level (Class B sea
waters per Water Classification Tables under DENR Administrative Order
No. 34 [1990]) to make them fit for swimming, skin-diving, and other
forms of contact recreation.
In particular:
(1)Pursuant to Sec. 4 of EO 192, assigning the DENR as the primary
agency responsible for the conservation, management, development,
and proper use of the country's environment and natural resources, and
Sec. 19 of RA 9275, designating the DENR as the primary government
agency responsible for its enforcement and implementation, the DENR is
directed to fully implement its Operational Plan for the Manila Bay
Coastal Strategy for the rehabilitation, restoration, and conservation of
the Manila Bay at the earliest possible time. It is ordered to call regular
coordination meetings with concerned government departments and
agencies to ensure the successful implementation of the aforesaid plan
of action in accordance with its indicated completion schedules.

EcIaTA

(2)Pursuant to Title XII (Local Government) of the Administrative Code

of 1987 and Sec. 25 of the Local Government Code of 1991, the DILG, in
exercising the President's power of general supervision and its duty to

promulgate guidelines in establishing waste management programs

under Sec. 43 of the Philippine Environment Code (PD 1152), shall direct
all LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and
Bataan to inspect all factories, commercial establishments, and private
homes along the banks of the major river systems in their respective
areas of jurisdiction, such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San
Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the
Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-MarilaoObando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite)
River, the Laguna De Bay, and other minor rivers and waterways that
eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay; and the lands abutting
the bay, to determine whether they have wastewater treatment facilities
or hygienic septic tanks as prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, and
rules and regulations. If none be found, these LGUs shall be ordered to
require non-complying establishments and homes to set up said facilities
or septic tanks within a reasonable time to prevent industrial wastes,
sewage water, and human wastes from flowing into these rivers,
waterways, esteros, and the Manila Bay, under pain of closure or
imposition of fines and other sanctions.
(3)As mandated by Sec. 8 of RA 9275, the MWSS is directed to provide,
install, operate, and maintain the necessary adequate waste water
treatment facilities in Metro Manila, Rizal, and Cavite where needed at
the earliest possible time.
(4)Pursuant to RA 9275, the LWUA, through the local water districts and
in coordination with the DENR, is ordered to provide, install, operate,

and maintain sewerage and sanitation facilities and the efficient and safe
collection, treatment, and disposal of sewage in the provinces of
Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan where needed at the
earliest possible time.
(5)Pursuant to Sec. 65 of RA 8550, the DA, through the BFAR, is
ordered to improve and restore the marine life of the Manila Bay. It is
also directed to assist the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna,
Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan in developing, using recognized
methods, the fisheries and aquatic resources in the Manila Bay.
(6)The PCG, pursuant to Secs. 4 and 6 of PD 979, and the PNP Maritime
Group, in accordance with Sec. 124 of RA 8550, in coordination with
each other, shall apprehend violators of PD 979, RA 8550, and other
existing laws and regulations designed to prevent marine pollution in the
Manila Bay.
(7)Pursuant to Secs. 2 and 6-c of EO 513 and the International
Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, the PPA is
ordered to immediately adopt such measures to prevent the discharge
and dumping of solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated wastes
into the Manila Bay waters from vessels docked at ports and apprehend
the violators.

aSIATD

(8)The MMDA, as the lead agency and implementor of programs and

projects for flood control projects and drainage services in Metro Manila,
in coordination with the DPWH, DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime
Group, Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC),

and other agencies, shall dismantle and remove all structures,

constructions, and other encroachments established or built in violation
of RA 7279, and other applicable laws along the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan
Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the NavotasMalabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways and
esteros in Metro Manila. The DPWH, as the principal implementor of
programs and projects for flood control services in the rest of the
country more particularly in Bulacan, Bataan, Pampanga, Cavite, and
Laguna, in coordination with the DILG, affected LGUs, PNP Maritime
Group, HUDCC, and other concerned government agencies, shall remove
and demolish all structures, constructions, and other encroachments
built in breach of RA 7279 and other applicable laws along the
Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan)
River, the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna De Bay, and other rivers,
connecting waterways, and esteros that discharge wastewater into the
Manila Bay.
In addition, the MMDA is ordered to establish, operate, and maintain a
sanitary landfill, as prescribed by RA 9003, within a period of one (1)
year from finality of this Decision. On matters within its territorial
jurisdiction and in connection with the discharge of its duties on the
maintenance of sanitary landfills and like undertakings, it is also ordered
to cause the apprehension and filing of the appropriate criminal cases
against violators of the respective penal provisions of RA 9003, Sec. 27
of RA 9275(the Clean Water Act), and other existing laws on pollution.

(9)The DOH shall, as directed by Art. 76 of PD 1067 and Sec. 8 of RA

9275, within one (1) year from finality of this Decision, determine if all
licensed septic and sludge companies have the proper facilities for the
treatment and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic
tanks. The DOH shall give the companies, if found to be non-complying,
a reasonable time within which to set up the necessary facilities under
pain of cancellation of its environmental sanitation clearance.
(10)Pursuant to Sec. 53 of PD 1152, Sec. 118 of RA 8550, and Sec. 56
of RA 9003, the DepEd shall integrate lessons on pollution prevention,
waste management, environmental protection, and like subjects in the
school curricula of all levels to inculcate in the minds and hearts of
students and, through them, their parents and friends, the importance
of their duty toward achieving and maintaining a balanced and healthful
ecosystem in the Manila Bay and the entire Philippine archipelago.
(11)The DBM shall consider incorporating an adequate budget in the
General Appropriations Act of 2010 and succeeding years to cover the
expenses relating to the cleanup, restoration, and preservation of the
water quality of the Manila Bay, in line with the country's development
objective to attain economic growth in a manner consistent with the
protection, preservation, and revival of our marine waters.
(12)The heads of petitioners-agencies MMDA, DENR, DepEd, DOH, DA,
DPWH, DBM, PCG, PNP Maritime Group, DILG, and also of MWSS,
LWUA, and PPA, in line with the principle of "continuing mandamus,"
shall, from finality of this Decision, each submit to the Court a quarterly

progressive report of the activities undertaken in accordance with this

Decision.

cHSIDa

SO ORDERED.

The government agencies did not file any motion for reconsideration and the
Decision became final in January 2009.
The case is now in the execution phase of the final and executory December 18,
2008 Decision. The Manila Bay Advisory Committee was created to receive and
evaluate the quarterly progressive reports on the activities undertaken by the
agencies in accordance with said decision and to monitor the execution phase.
In the absence of specific completion periods, the Committee recommended that
time frames be set for the agencies to perform their assigned tasks. This may be
viewed as an encroachment over the powers and functions of the Executive
Branch headed by the President of the Philippines.
This view is misplaced.
The issuance of subsequent resolutions by the Court is simply an exercise of
judicial power under Art. VIII of the Constitution, because the execution of the
Decision is but an integral part of the adjudicative function of the Court. None of
the agencies ever questioned the power of the Court to implement the December
18, 2008 Decision nor has any of them raised the alleged encroachment by the
Court over executive functions.
While additional activities are required of the agencies like submission of plans of
action, data or status reports, these directives are but part and parcel of the

execution stage of a final decision under Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. Section
47 of Rule 39 reads:
Section 47.Effect of judgments or final orders. The effect of a
judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having
jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(c)In any other litigation between the same parties of their successors in
interest, that only is deemed to have been adjudged in a former
judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have
been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is clear that the final judgment includes not only what appears upon its face to
have been so adjudged but also those matters "actually and necessarily included
therein or necessary thereto." Certainly, any activity that is needed to fully
implement a final judgment is necessarily encompassed by said judgment.
Moreover, the submission of periodic reports is sanctioned by Secs. 7 and 8, Rule
8 of the Rules of Procedure for Environmental cases:
Sec. 7.Judgment. If warranted, the court shall grant the privilege of
the writ of continuing mandamus requiring respondent to perform an act
or series of acts until the judgment is fully satisfied and to grant such
other reliefs as may be warranted resulting from the wrongful or illegal
acts of the respondent. The court shall require the respondent to
submit periodic reports detailing the progress and execution of

the judgment, and the court may, by itself or through a

commissioner or the appropriate government agency, evaluate
and monitor compliance. The petitioner may submit its comments or
observations on the execution of the judgment.

EDISTc

Sec. 8.Return of the writ. The periodic reports submitted by the

respondent detailing compliance with the judgment shall be contained in
partial returns of the writ. Upon full satisfaction of the judgment, a final
return of the writ shall be made to the court by the respondent. If the
court finds that the judgment has been fully implemented, the
satisfaction of judgment shall be entered in the court docket. (Emphasis
supplied.)

With

the

final

and

executory

judgment

in MMDA,

the

writ

of

continuing mandamus issued in MMDA means that until petitioneragencies have shown full compliance with the Court's orders, the
Court exercises continuing jurisdiction over them until full
execution of the judgment.
There being no encroachment over executive functions to speak of, We shall
now proceed to the recommendation of the Manila Bay Advisory Committee.
Several problems were encountered by the Manila Bay Advisory Committee. 2 An
evaluation of the quarterly progressive reports has shown that (1) there are
voluminous quarterly progressive reports that are being submitted; (2)
petitioner-agencies do not have a uniform manner of reporting their cleanup,
rehabilitation and preservation activities; (3) as yet no definite deadlines have
been set by petitioner DENR as to petitioner-agencies' timeframe for their

respective duties; (4) as of June 2010 there has been a change in leadership in
both the national and local levels; and (5) some agencies have encountered
difficulties in complying with the Court's directives.
In order to implement the afore-quoted Decision, certain directives have to be
issued by the Court to address the said concerns.
Acting on the recommendation of the Manila Bay Advisory Committee, the Court
hereby resolves to ORDER the following:
(1)The Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), as lead
agency in the Philippine Clean Water Act of 2004, shall submit to the Court on or
before June 30, 2011 the updated Operational Plan for the Manila Bay Coastal

Strategy.
The DENR is ordered to submit summarized data on the overall quality of Manila
Bay waters for all four quarters of 2010 on or before June 30, 2011.
The DENR is further ordered to submit the names and addresses of persons and
companies in Metro Manila, Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga and
Bataan that generate toxic and hazardous waste on or before September 30,
2011.

DEaCSA

(2)On or before June 30, 2011, the Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG) shall order the Mayors of all cities in Metro Manila; the
Governors of Rizal, Laguna, Cavite, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan; and the
Mayors of all the cities and towns in said provinces to inspect all factories,
commercial establishments and private homes along the banks of the major river
systems such as but not limited to the Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the

National Capital Region (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers, the NavotasMalabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan)
Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River, the Imus (Cavite) River, and the Laguna De
Bay and other minor rivers and waterways within their jurisdiction that
eventually discharge water into the Manila Bay and the lands abutting it, to
determine if they have wastewater treatment facilities and/or hygienic septic
tanks, as prescribed by existing laws, ordinances, rules and regulations. Said
local government unit (LGU) officials are given up to September 30, 2011 to
finish the inspection of said establishments and houses.
In case of non-compliance, the LGU officials shall take appropriate action to
ensure compliance by non-complying factories, commercial establishments and
private homes with said law, rules and regulations requiring the construction or
installment of wastewater treatment facilities or hygienic septic tanks.
The aforementioned governors and mayors shall submit to the DILG on or before
December 31, 2011 their respective compliance reports which will contain the
names and addresses or offices of the owners of all the non-complying factories,
commercial establishments and private homes, copy furnished the concerned
environmental agency, be it the local DENR office or the Laguna Lake
Development Authority.
The DILG is required to submit a five-year plan of action that will contain
measures intended to ensure compliance of all non-complying factories,
commercial establishments, and private homes.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DILG and the mayors of all cities in Metro
Manila shall consider providing land for the wastewater facilities of the

Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) or its concessionaires

(Maynilad and Manila Water, Inc.) within their respective jurisdictions.
(3)The MWSS shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 the list of
areas in Metro Manila, Rizal and Cavite that do not have the necessary
wastewater treatment facilities. Within the same period, the concessionaires of
the MWSS shall submit their plans and projects for the construction of
wastewater treatment facilities in all the aforesaid areas and the completion
period for said facilities, which shall not go beyond 2037.
On or before June 30, 2011, the MWSS is further required to have its two
concessionaires submit a report on the amount collected as sewerage fees in
their respective areas of operation as of December 31, 2010.
(4)The Local Water Utilities Administration is ordered to submit on or before
September 30, 2011 its plan to provide, install, operate and maintain sewerage
and sanitation facilities in said cities and towns and the completion period for
said works, which shall be fully implemented by December 31, 2020.

TEDAHI

(5)The Department of Agriculture (DA), through the Bureau of Fisheries and

Aquatic Resources, shall submit to the Court on or before June 30, 2011 a report
on areas in Manila Bay where marine life has to be restored or improved and the
assistance it has extended to the LGUs in Metro Manila, Rizal, Cavite, Laguna,
Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan in developing the fisheries and aquatic resources
in Manila Bay. The report shall contain monitoring data on the marine life in said
areas. Within the same period, it shall submit its five-year plan to restore and
improve the marine life in Manila Bay, its future activities to assist the

aforementioned LGUs for that purpose, and the completion period for said
undertakings.
The DA shall submit to the Court on or before September 30, 2011 the baseline
data as of September 30, 2010 on the pollution loading into the Manila Bay
system from agricultural and livestock sources.
(6)The Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) shall incorporate in its quarterly reports
the list of violators it has apprehended and the status of their cases. The PPA is
further ordered to include in its report the names, make and capacity of the
ships that dock in PPA ports. The PPA shall submit to the Court on or before June
30, 2011 the measures it intends to undertake to implement its compliance with
paragraph 7 of the dispositive portion of the MMDA Decision and the completion
dates of such measures.
The PPA should include in its report the activities of its concessionaire that
collects and disposes of the solid and liquid wastes and other ship-generated
wastes, which shall state the names, make and capacity of the ships serviced by
it since August 2003 up to the present date, the dates the ships docked at PPA
ports, the number of days the ship was at sea with the corresponding number of
passengers and crew per trip, the volume of solid, liquid and other wastes
collected from said ships, the treatment undertaken and the disposal site for said
wastes.
(7)The Philippine National Police (PNP) Maritime Group shall submit on or before
June 30, 2011 its five-year plan of action on the measures and activities it
intends to undertake to apprehend the violators of Republic Act No. (RA) 8550 or
the Philippine Fisheries Code of 1998 and other pertinent laws, ordinances and

regulations to prevent marine pollution in Manila Bay and to ensure the

successful prosecution of violators.
The Philippine Coast Guard shall likewise submit on or before June 30, 2011 its
five-year plan of action on the measures and activities they intend to undertake
to apprehend the violators of Presidential Decree No. 979 or the Marine Pollution

Decree of 1976 and RA 9993 or the Philippine Coast Guard Law of 2009 and
other pertinent laws and regulations to prevent marine pollution in Manila Bay
and to ensure the successful prosecution of violators.
(8)The Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) shall submit to the
Court on or before June 30, 2011 the names and addresses of the informal
settlers in Metro Manila who, as of December 31, 2010, own and occupy houses,
structures, constructions and other encroachments established or built along the
Pasig-Marikina-San Juan Rivers, the NCR (Paraaque-Zapote, Las Pias) Rivers,
the Navotas-Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros Rivers, and connecting waterways
and esteros, in violation ofRA 7279 and other applicable laws. On or before June
30, 2011, the MMDA shall submit its plan for the removal of said informal settlers
and the demolition of the aforesaid houses, structures, constructions and
encroachments, as well as the completion dates for said activities, which shall be
fully implemented not later than December 31, 2015.

HIcTDE

The MMDA is ordered to submit a status report, within thirty (30) days from
receipt of this Resolution, on the establishment of a sanitary landfill facility for
Metro Manila in compliance with the standards under RA 9003 or the Ecological

Solid Waste Management Act.

On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA shall submit a report of the location of
open and controlled dumps in Metro Manila whose operations are illegal after
February 21, 2006, 3 pursuant to Secs. 36 and 37 of RA 9003, and its plan for
the closure of these open and controlled dumps to be accomplished not later
than December 31, 2012. Also, on or before June 30, 2011, the DENR Secretary,
as Chairperson of the National Solid Waste Management Commission (NSWMC),
shall submit a report on the location of all open and controlled dumps in Rizal,
Cavite, Laguna, Bulacan, Pampanga and Bataan.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DENR Secretary, in his capacity as NSWMC
Chairperson, shall submit a report on whether or not the following landfills
strictly comply with Secs. 41 and 42 of RA 9003 on the establishment and
operation of sanitary landfills, to wit:
National Capital Region
1.Navotas SLF (PhilEco), Brgy. Tanza (New Site), Navotas City
2.Payatas Controlled Dumpsite, Barangay Payatas, Quezon City
Region III
3.Sitio Coral, Brgy. Matictic, Norzagaray, Bulacan
4.Sitio Tiakad, Brgy. San Mateo, Norzagaray, Bulacan
5.Brgy. Minuyan, San Jose del Monte City, Bulacan
6.Brgy. Mapalad, Santa Rosa, Nueva Ecija
7.Sub-zone Kalangitan, Clark Capas, Tarlac Special Economic Zone

Region IV-A
8.Kalayaan (Longos), Laguna
9.Brgy. Sto. Nio, San Pablo City, Laguna
10.Brgy. San Antonio (Pilotage SLF), San Pedro, Laguna
11.Morong, Rizal
12.Sitio Lukutan, Brgy. San Isidro, Rodriguez (Montalban), Rizal
(ISWIMS)
13.Brgy. Pintong Bukawe, San Mateo, Rizal (SMSLFDC)
On or before June 30, 2011, the MMDA and the seventeen (17) LGUs in Metro
Manila are ordered to jointly submit a report on the average amount of garbage
collected monthly per district in all the cities in Metro Manila from January 2009
up to December 31, 2010 vis- -vis the average amount of garbage disposed
monthly in landfills and dumpsites. In its quarterly report for the last quarter of
2010 and thereafter, MMDA shall report on the apprehensions for violations of
the penal provisions of RA 9003, RA 9275 and other laws on pollution for the
said period.

HcSDIE

On or before June 30, 2011, the DPWH and the LGUs in Rizal, Laguna, Cavite,
Bulacan, Pampanga, and Bataan shall submit the names and addresses of the
informal settlers in their respective areas who, as of September 30, 2010, own or
occupy houses, structures, constructions, and other encroachments built along
the Meycauayan-Marilao-Obando (Bulacan) Rivers, the Talisay (Bataan) River,
the Imus (Cavite) River, the Laguna de Bay, and other rivers, connecting

waterways and esterosthat discharge wastewater into the Manila Bay, in breach
of RA 7279 and other applicable laws. On or before June 30, 2011, the DPWH
and the aforesaid LGUs shall jointly submit their plan for the removal of said
informal settlers and the demolition of the aforesaid structures, constructions
and encroachments, as well as the completion dates for such activities which
shall be implemented not later than December 31, 2012.
(9)The Department of Health (DOH) shall submit to the Court on or before June
30, 2011 the names and addresses of the owners of septic and sludge
companies including those that do not have the proper facilities for the treatment
and disposal of fecal sludge and sewage coming from septic tanks.
The DOH shall implement rules and regulations on Environmental Sanitation
Clearances and shall require companies to procure a license to operate from the
DOH.
The DOH and DENR-Environmental Management Bureau shall develop a toxic
and hazardous waste management system by June 30, 2011 which will
implement segregation of hospital/toxic/hazardous wastes and prevent mixing
with municipal solid waste.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DOH shall submit a plan of action to ensure that
the said companies have proper disposal facilities and the completion dates of
compliance.
(10)The Department of Education (DepEd) shall submit to the Court on or before
May 31, 2011 a report on the specific subjects on pollution prevention, waste
management, environmental protection, environmental laws and the like that it

has integrated into the school curricula in all levels for the school year 20112012.
On or before June 30, 2011, the DepEd shall also submit its plan of action to
ensure compliance of all the schools under its supervision with respect to the
integration of the aforementioned subjects in the school curricula which shall be
fully implemented by June 30, 2012.
(11)All the agencies are required to submit their quarterly reports electronically
using the forms below. The agencies may add other key performance indicators
that they have identified.
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(MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay, G.R. Nos. 171947-48, February 15, 2011)

MMD