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A.F.C.

Experience in Primary Reformer Tubes


During 30 Years "Failures, Avoiding Problems,
And Improving Performance"
During 30 years of operating three ammonia plants at the Abu Qir complex, the primary reformers in
the three plants were suffering from certain problems leading to many tube failures. The aim of this
paper is to transfer and exchange technical experiences with other ammonia and fertilizers
producers. In this paper we present the problems we have experienced and how we solved them.
Atef Hassan saad El-Din
Abu Qir Fertilizers Company (A.F.C.)

So, A.F.C. has three ammonia plants and as it is


known that steam reforming unit is considered
the main driving reactor in ammonia plant train.

Introduction

bu Qir fertilizers company (A.F.C.) is


considered
the
largest
nitrogen
fertilizers producer in North of Africa
and as one of the biggest industrial complexes in
the Middle East. A.F.C. consists of:
o Abu Qir
I

Abu Qir
II

o Abu Qir
III

Reformer
Tubes
Burners

I
288
126

II
240
108

III
192
90

The three reformer reactors are the top fired


type.

Ammonia plant 1000 t/d


(Uhde)
Urea plant (Prills) 1550 t/d
(Stamicarbon)
Commissioned in 1979.
Ammonia plant 1000 t/d
(Uhde)
Nitric acid plant 1800 t/d
(Uhde)
Ammonium Nitrate plant
(granules) 2400 t/d (Uhde and
Hydro Agri).
Commissioned in 1991.
Ammonia plant 1200 t/d
(uhde)
Urea plant (granules) 1750 t/d
(Stamicarbon and Hydro Agri)
Commissioned in 1998.

All our problems were related to tube failures.

Figure 1. Reformer (1) in A.F.C. started in 1979


Also A.F.C. is sharing as an investment partner
in many plants such as Alexfert and Helwan
fertilizers companies and also has a marine line
to export ammonia liquid via ship loading.

2011

The two main types of failure we faced were


failures outside and inside the furnace fire box
chamber.

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AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

(1) Failure outside fire box Chamber


(Stress corrosion cracking)

Examinations, investigation and analysis:


After stopping the plant and during the
shutdown period, many tests and examinations
were applied:

The failure happened in 1983 after 4 years of


operation of plant I.
This reforming furnace consists of six rows of
48 vertical tubes each.
Each row of tubes is welded directly on the top
of one refractory lined exit header connected on
to a single main header at end of furnace.

The three leaking tubes.

Some selected tubes.

All tubes.

Tests were applied as follows:

The vertical reformer tubes were made of


centrifugally
cast
material
(IN
519)
(24Cr, 24 Ni + BbNb).
The tubes were supplied with a short length of
extruded (15Mo3) (carbon 0.5Mo) welded to
the (IN 519) material. The welding material
was (Inconel 82/182)(70 Ni,15Cr+Fe).

Dye penetration test for all tubes.

Ultra sonic examination for all tubes.

Gamma-ray test for the three leaking


tubes and some selected tubes.

It was decided to cut one tube to investigate the


problem (tube 12A was selected).
All tests proved that there was no indication of
any original weld defect such as lack of fusion
or manufacturing faults.

Five weeks before an annual shutdown, 3 tubes


started to leak in the weld zone between (15
Mo3) Steel tube and the welding material
(Inconel 82/182) in the form of several pinholes.

The accurate visual examination for the cut tube


(destructive test) revealed no sign of damage,
distortion, overheating or hot gas by passing.

The green thermal indicating paint on the


outside of the three tubes [manifold containing
outlet pigtails] was in good condition!

In a microscopic examination for the cross


section of the tube, three separate leak spots at
the edge of the weld on the (15 Mo3) side were
detected.

The leaks were kept under observation until the


plant was stopped for annual shutdown.

On the inside close to these leak spots there


were two cracks at the root of the weld 40 mm
and 20 mm long respectively.

PROCESS GAS
(H2, CO, CO2, CH4, H2O )
REFORMER TUBE
( IN 519)

Inside the tube in the region of crack there was a


loss of thickness of the (15 Mo3) material of
approx. (0.5-1mm) as a result of corrosion.

CATALYST
GRID
FURNACE
BOTTOM
GAS TIGHT
BELLOWS
INSULATION
REFRACTOR
Y
FIELD WELD

The corrosion stopped at the (Inconel) weld


root.

LEAKAGE POINT
DISSIMILAR SHOP
WELD
IN 519 C-0.5MO

INCOLOY
LINER

Primary assessment for cause of damage

REFRACTOR
Y

When temperatures of external surface of tubes


were reviewed (in weekly reading log sheet) for
near history, the temperature was found
sometimes recorded (110oC : 120oC).

MANIFOLD
( C- 0.5 MO )

INCOLOY
TUBE

These values indicate that condensation took


place in the area of the defective weld.

Figure 2. Dissimilar metal weld area furnace


bottom

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

44

2011

Condensation alone is not sufficient to cause


S.C.C but the conditions created an environment
to form carbonic acid (Hydrogen, Carbon
dioxide and condensate).

Measures taken:
1) The 3 leaking tubes were replaced.
2) External insulation was applied just
above the weld in questions.

3Fe + 4H2O Fe3O4 + 4 H2 (1)

3) Ambient air passage into the bottom of


the reformer (manifolds) was limited by
erecting wind shields from 3 sides of the
furnace.

H2CO3 + Fe FeCO3 + H2 (2)


Reaction (1) alone should have caused a
magnetite protective layer and further corrosion
should have stopped.
But the presence of the carbonic acid [reaction
(2)] prevents the formation of magnetite layer
and wet corrosion starts and forms atomic
hydrogen on the metal surface.
The atomic hydrogen (H) can either combine to
form molecular hydrogen (H2) and escape as a
gas or can diffuse into the steel in its atomic
form (H) and that leads to a double action
affect:
a) It can be adsorbed at the location of lattice
defects at grain boundaries.
With an adequate supply of (H), the
molecules of (H2) form and very high
pressure builds up locally in this manner and
leads to concentration of stress.

Figure 3. Wind shield plates applied around


reformer headers reformer (1)

b) In addition, hydrogen atoms are deposited


on interlattic spaces, which also cause
internal stresses.

FURNACE
BOTTOM

Both processes make cracks easily formed under


the influence of stresses.
Conclusion:
The mechanism of hydrogen induced crack
formation is considered to be the most probable
cause of the weld failure.

EXTENSION OF
METAL SHEETING
(SKIRT)

134 MM

According to these evidences, the only counter


measure, which promised immediate success,
was to raise the temperature at the dissimilar
weld above the dew point.

DISSIMILAR WELD
36 MM
290
145

Figure 4. Extension of insulation sheet


reformer (1)

This could be achieved either by additional


outside surface insulation or by decreasing the
outside heat transfer coefficient or both.

2011

INSULATION WITH
METAL SHEETING

829 MM

45

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

At August 1999 (after 8 years in operation) and


one month before annual shutdown the common
phenomenon of tube rupture first appeared.
- Abnormal sound was observed inside the
furnace.
- Decreasing pressure of syn. gas comp.
Suction.
- Increasing of process gas flow rate to
reformer.
- Decreasing of excess O2 in the flue
gases.
- Increasing of flue gas flaps opening
(which controlling fire box pressure).
- Increasing of temperature indicators in
bottom of reformer.

Figure 5. Added skirt applied in reformer (1)


Results:
1- The temperature of the dissimilar weld
area was monitored and found to have
increased into the range of 200oC to
250oC depending in tube location.

The plant was stopped and the failed tube was


detected- it was tube (48B).

2- There was no further tube leaking up


until the next shutdown and thereafter.

Detecting the failed tube:


Usually the failed tube was detected by means
one of two methods
-If the plant was kept running, visual
check was done for tubes appearance via
inspection doors in furnace body.
-If the plant had an emergency stoppage,
ultrasonic leaking detection device was
used (probe 2000) which detect the
failed tube from outside to minimize the
time of shutdown. (Plant front was
pressurized with nitrogen while back
pressure valves kept closed.)

(2) Failure inside Furnace (Fire Box)


(Creep)
Creep was a more serious problem for the
reformer tubes in our plants with than S.C.C,
We always believed that aging or life time will
be the main reason for creep as the failure
mechanism and that was the right assessment,
but the majority of failures occurred in the
beginning of the last quarter of their predicted
lifetime.
And as known in normal operating conditions,
tube must act and perform until the end of their
life in safe mode (and may be for more than its
life time).
So for sure there were other reasons and factors
affecting the speed of creep formation.

Description and History of failure:


First failure of tube inside furnace chamber was
in plant (2) (which started in 1991) and
continued problem free until 1999.

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

Figure 6. Detecting failed tube with


ultrasonic probe.

46

2011

After repeating of failure in advanced


times it was proved that ultrasonic
inspection is good and trusted method to
detect the right defected tube.
As temporary repair:
- The tube was cut from intermediate
piece (15 Mo3) under dissimilar weld.
- Lifting the tube and carbon steel plug
was weld in the transfer header.
- The bottom and ceiling top was plugged
by metal sheet with welding.

(48C), (48D) were replaced as a preventive


action.
The causes of damage was owing to
- Excessive external heat transferred on
the area of tube which accelerated the
failure propagation, and this heat
resulted from radiation by the flue gas
tunnel and also from balance burners
which were usually ignited continuously
to increase rates.
- Surely aging of tubes could be a main
factor for failure, especially if the tube
resistance for heat load became poor and
that caused by any reason such like
carbon deposit or burners defects.
Similar failures occurred in all three plants
- Several times in plant II.
- Few times in plant I.
- Many times in plant III which was
progressing in aging also.
Table 1. History of Abu Qir (1) Reformers tubes
(started in 1979)
Date
10/9/1983

Figure 7. Crack of first failed tube in reformer (2)

1/9/1990
26/2/1998
30/6/2003
19/8/2003
15/9/2005

Event
Replacement of tubes (12A, 3F and 21C)
(Dissimilar problem).
Complete change for P.R tubes(annual
shutdown)
Replacement tube(8B)
Cutting and lifting tube (10 F)
Cutting and plugging (3F,7F,43F and 46F)
Complete change for P.R tubes A.S.D

Table 2. History of Abu Qir (2) Reformers tubes


(started in 1991)
Date
5/8/1999
15/9/1999
27/3/2003
3/4/2003
27/7/2003
17/4/2004

Figure 8. Plugging bottom of reformer Fire Box


Chamber.

27/10/2005
28/11/2005
9/5/2006
6/6/2006
22/6/2006
8/9/2006

As final repair:
At annual shutdown (After one month) a new
tube was installed to replace (48B), also tube

2011

47

Events
Cutting and Lifting tube (48 B)
Replacement tubes(48B,48C and 48D)Annual
shutdown
Cutting and lifting (43B)
Replacement of (43B,42B and 27E)
Cutting and lifting(20D)
Replace
(10A,5B,14B,45B,46B,47B,14C,20D
and38D)A.S.D
Cutting and plugging (43A)
Cutting and plugging(47C)
Cutting and plugging (44C)
Cutting and plugging (42A)
Cutting and plugging (44C)
Complete change for P.R tubes A.S.D

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

Table 3. History of Abu Qir (3) Reformers tubes


(started in 1998)
Date
17/2/2007
13/9/2007
17/12/2008
22/3/2009
2/4/2009

27/9/2009
11/10/2009
2/11/2009
16/5/2010
15/6/2010

new segments and new ceramic insulation fibers


(9-layers) were erected.

Events
Replacement of tube (16A)
Replacement of tubes(20D,and 39D)
Cutting and plugging tube (22A)
Cutting and plugging tube (7D)
Replacement
(22A,41A,47A,4D,6D7D,8D,14D,16D, 30D,
43D
,47D and 48D) Annual shutdown
Cutting and plugging (23A)
Cutting and plugging (9A)
Cutting and plugging (31A)
Cutting and plugging (45D)
Complete change for P.R tubes A.S.D

Figure 9. Defected plates in walls of reformer


(3)

Last changing of tubes in A.F.C.


Reformer (3) June 2010
Reformer (3) had to replace all 192 tubes (HPMA) with new ones after 12 years in service.

Last changing of catalyst in A.F.C.


Reformer (2) November 2010
Catalyst batch of reformer (2) was charged in
September 2006 and operated until November
2010 with no severe problems except slight
increasing in skin temperature of tubes. The
increase was expected due to defective and non
adjustment burners inside the chamber, plus also
due to catalyst lifetime.
The old catalyst was replaced with two new
different sized new catalysts, where 40% by
volume smaller size would be in the top part of
tubes and 60% larger size in the bottom part of
tubes.
The new catalyst in the especially upper region
was the (smaller) alkalized type which promoted
with potash to resist carbon deposits.

A.F.C. received a new package of tubes and its


alloy was also (HP-MA) category with a slight
change in percentage of Niobium (1.25%) and it
is given (Manurite XM) as the commercial
name.
Table 4. Time Line (3)
6/6/2010 The plant was stopped and started
cooling down.
7-10/6/
2010

1-Start cutting the old reformers


tubes at outlet header and pigtails
at upper of tubes.
2-Lifting the cut tube outside the
reformer and replacement the new
tubes
3-Assemply the pig tails and the
tubes with nozzles in the headers.
4-Brush the weld to be ready for
radiographic test.
5-Insulations were mounted at the
bottom and top of the tubes.

Table 5. Time Line (2)


23/11/2010
25/11-2/12
/2010

Some side walls of the furnace had damaged


during last months operation due to collapse of
internal ceramic insulations. It was replaced by

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

48

Plant stopped and cooling down


for plant front started.
1. Starts discharging of old
catalyst (240 tubes).
2. Finish discharging and start
inspection for empty tubes
with Lotis test.

2011

3/12/2010

The tube was plugged from down and a blind


flange was put to plug top of the tube (in
reformer 1 and 2) but in reformer (3) top inlet
pigtails was cut and plugged.
This action decreased the time of emergency
shutdown till ammonia production to 12 hrs.

3. Start filling new catalyst (the


larger) by means of Uniloader
of
(unidense)
under
supervision of vendor.
4. Start filling of (the smaller
size) catalyst.
5. Finishing filling of catalyst
.p over all tubes was
adjusted at 0.7bar.

CUTTING AND LIFTING FAILED TUBE AND START TAKE 24 HOURS


CUTTING AND LIFTING FAILED TUBE AND START TAKE 24 HOURS
START TILL AMMONIA PRODUCTION

FINAL INSPECTION OF WELD SEAM

FINAL INSPECTION OF WELD SEAM

-As a principle in A.F.C. it was tried to


decrease P over tubes in rows beside
furnace walls by increasing depth of
catalyst (empty length) in these tubes as
much as possible to make the flow
higher to compensate for the extra heat
radiation of walls.
-All burners were inspected and
repaired.

Preventive
shutdown.

measuring

in

PREPARATION FOR PLUG AND WELDING

LIFTING THE FAILED TUBE


LIFTING THE FAILED TUBE

22

CUTTING THE FAILED TUBE

DISMANTLING
DISMANTLING GAS
GAS INLET
INLET PIPE
PIPE

DETECTION OF FAILED TUBE

DETECTION OF FAILED TUBE

STOP AND PRESSURIZING WITH N 2

STOP AND PRESSURIZING WITH N2

12

16

20

24

12

16

20

24

CUTTING AND PLUGGING FAILED TUBE AND START TAKE 12 HOURS

CUTTING AND PLUGGING FAILED TUBE AND START TAKE 12 HOURS


START TILL AMMONIA PRODUCTION
6
INSPECTION
OF WELD
SEAM
START
TILL AMMONIA
PRODUCTION

CUTTING THE FAILED TUBE

INSPECTION OF WELD SEAM

DETECTION OF FAILED TUBE


STOP AND PURGE WITH N2

STOP AND PURGE WITH N2

2
2

DETECTION OF FAILED TUBE

Upgrading types of tubes alloy and


catalyst.

CUTTING THE FAILED TUBE

annual

(1) Decreasing time of emergency shutdown..


When first creep failure of tube appeared in
1999, the tube was cut and removed from
reformer chamber and the tube ends were
plugged. The overall time of shutdown and loss
of ammonia production was 24 hrs.
But while the failures were repeated and in the
same time the complete tube replacement was
anticipated soon due to end life of the tubes. Up
to that time we decided to cut and plug any
failed tube and leave it inside the reformer
chamber.

2011

PREPARATION FOR PLUG AND WELDING

So after around 30 years A.F.C. has acquired a


lot experience to deal with tube failure in
reformers and also to minimize interruption of
production caused by this problem generally.
The actions taken were:
Decreasing time of emergency shutdown
(unplanned outages)

START TILL AMMONIA PRODUCTION

12

16

20

24

12

16

20

24

(2) Preventive measuring during annual


shutdowns
We tried to predict and expect the tubes which
may be failed in near future to minimize the risk
of failure. Several methods were considered:
a) Circumference measuring (Go-No Go
test):
A manual inspection and detection method for
any creep progressing in tube utilizes an O-ring
and passing it around the tube from up to down.

49

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

Progressively smaller diameters are used till a


ring will stop in the creeping area.
This test need smooth surface for tubes.
It was used in shutdowns after the first failure
happened in plant 2 and revealed 2 tubes
defected.

A spinning probe is lowered down the inside of


the reformer tube and takes a large amount of
radius measurements (1000 to million
measurements) accurate to within 0.05mm.
This technology is capable of detecting
corrosion, pitting, ID expansion due to Creep,
open cracking and swelling in the tubes.
The advantage of this technology is possibility
to inspect the tubes over their entire length
including the part that projects through the
furnace floor.
Since this inspection needs empty tubes A.F.C.
only used this method during catalyst
replacement.

b) Eddy current inspection:


Eddy current measurements can be performed
from the outside of reformers tubes.
The method is based on variations in the flux
density of an induced electromagnetic field.
Both the test (induction) coil and the sensing
coil mounted on the outer surface of tube and
any crawler or creep shows up as anomalous
changes in the detected magnetic field.
The advantage of this inspection that no need
for empty tubes so it could be done without
discharging the catalyst also there is no need for
smooth surface of tubes while there is no actual
contact with the tube surface.
In A.F.C. we usually use this inspection for our
reformers during annual shutdowns.

(3) Upgrading type of tubes alloy and catalyst


-Tube alloys:
Since A.F.C. has three primary reformers
initially started in three different ages, so type of
tubes alloy varied from one to other.
Plant (1) 1979 used tubes alloy (IN 519)
Plant (2) 1991 used tubes alloy (HP-Nb) (36X)
Plant (3) 1998 used tubes alloy (HP-MA)
Tube failures resulting from known service
problems such as splitting caused by serious
overheating
The three types of alloys are considered
development and upgrading to be more resisting
for overheating.

Figure 10. Eddy current inspection in reformer


(3)
C) Inspection using Laser system:
It is considered as the most accurate
determination for the amount of creep strain in a
reformer tube by measurement of the internal
diameter during a catalyst change.

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

50

Relative

Cr
%

Ni
%

C
%

Additives

Strength

(IN519)
1970s

24

24

0.4

1.5 Nb

1.4

(HP-NB)
Mid 1970s

25

35

0.4

1.0Nb

1.9

(HP-MA)
Mid 1980s

25

35

0.4

Nb,W,
Ti , Zr

2.2

Material type

2011

Reformer (1)

Carbon cracking potential

So to improve of reformers tubes in our plants


and to keep it running at higher temperature and
pressure i.e. to make tube life increased, A.F.C.
had to change continuously the tubes with the
new generation of alloys as they appeared.
Started in 1979 with (IN 519),
Changed in 1990 to (36x)
and finally changed in 2005 to
(HP-MA)

Reformer (2)

Started in 1991 with (36X)


and finally changed in 2006 to
(HP. MA)

Reformer (3)

Started in 1998 with (HP-MA)


and changed in 2010 with (HPMA)

Process gas temperature profile

Carbon forming zone

Top

Distance down tube

bottom

Figure 11. Carbon Cracking Potential


This alkalized steam reforming catalyst was
installed in our reformers for many years and
that lead to improve performance of tubes and it
was appeared in skin wall temperature which
was varying from (875oC to 920oC) with old
catalyst and after using alkalized it changed to
the range of (865oC to 905oC).
Also A.F.C. transferred from charging catalyst
to the tubes from sock loading to unidense then
uniloader in last 10 years that make good
distribution for catalyst and contribute in
improving performance of reformers tubes.

i.e. Currently the three reformers all have tubes


of (HP-MA) alloy.
And now A.F.C. is planning to look for any new
type of tubes with upgraded alloy generated in
tube manufacturing market and reviewing
reference plants.

-Catalyst type:
The effect of the catalyst in the reformers tube
cant be overlooked but noticed carefully during
the whole age of the reformers in A.F.C.
The common problem of catalyst we suffered
from was carbon deposit which occurs when
reformer feed stock contains a significant
number of higher hydrocarbons or when the
reformer is very heavily loaded where the
carbon formed by thermal cracking for
hydrocarbons.
In last years, a new type of catalyst was
manufactured using a promoter to minimize
carbon formation and deposits.
Potassium is used as-Potash to give a
resistance for carbon formation.

2011

zed
ali
alk
h
t
Wi

Carbon cracking
Equilibrium line

st
aly
cat

Recommendations:
1. Monitor temperature of dissimilar metal
daily and maintain it between (200-250oC)
to keep it away from condensation.
-Also monitor skin temperature for tubes
2 times weekly at least.
2. Preventive measuring and scanning of
reformers tubes every shutdown (if
possible)
3. Change to upgraded type of tubes with
developmental alloys. Also change to types
of catalysts that resist heat loading.
4. No need for removing the failed tube after a
failure occurs as it could be plugged and
changed in next shutdown.

51

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

References:
1. Failure of dissimilar metal welds in
reformers tubes By Osama Elganainy,
Ammonia Safety Symposium 1984
2. Managing steam reformer tubes
By John Brightling (Nitrogen &
Methanol) magazine April 2002
3. Reformer tube failure in Ammonia
plant 2 By Mohammed Fawzy; Hossam
Assad Ammonia Safety Symposium
1999
4. Experiences of Abu Qir Fertilizers staff
from Production Maintenance
Welding and Inspection Groups

AMMONIA TECHNICAL MANUAL

52

2011

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