CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS

ROTATIONAL SCHEME OF APPOINTMENTS

GAMINDE v. COA
The term of office of Ms. Thelma P. Gaminde as Commissioner, Civil Service Commission,
under an appointment extended to her by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11, 1993. Expired
on February 02, 1999.However, she served as de facto Officer in good faith until February 02,
2000, and thus entitled to receive her salary and other emoluments for actual service
rendered.Consequently, the Commission on Audit erred in disallowing in audit such salary and
other emoluments, including that of her co-terminus staff.
SECURITY of TENURE
DE LOS SANTOS v. MALLARE
Yes. Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution ordains: "A Civil Service embracing all
branches and subdivisions of the Government shall be provided by law. Appointments in the
Civil Service, except as those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or highly
technical in nature, shall be made only according to merit and fitness, to be determined as far
as practicable by competitive examination." Section 670 of the Revised Administrative Code
provided that "Persons in the Philippine civil service pertain either to the classified service,"
and went on to say that "The classified service embraces all not expressly declared to be in the
unclassified service." Then section 671 described persons in the unclassified service as
"officers, other than the provincial treasurers and assistant directors of bureaus or offices,
appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly, and all other officers of the government whose
appointments are by law vested in the President of the Philippines alone."
Three specified classes of positions policy-determining, primarily confidential
and highly technical are excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of
officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution. None of these
exceptions obtain in the present case.
The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policy-determining, nor
highly technical. A confidential position denotes not only confidence in the aptitude of the
appointee for the duties of the office but primarily close intimacy which insures freedom of
intercourse without embarrassment or freedom from misgivings of betrayals of personal trust
or confidential matters of state. Nor is the position of city engineer policy-determining. A city
engineer does not formulate a method of action for the government or any of its subdivisions.
His job is to execute policy, not to make it. With specific reference to the City Engineer of
Baguio, his powers and duties are carefully laid down for him be section 2557 of the Revised
Administrative Code and are essentially ministerial in character. Finally, the position of city
engineer is technical but not highly so. A city engineer is not required nor is he supposed to
possess a technical skill or training in the supreme or superior degree, which is the sense in
which "highly technical" is employed in the Constitution. There are hundreds of technical men
in the classified civil service whose technical competence is not lower than that of a city
engineer. As a matter of fact, the duties of a city engineer are eminently administrative in
character and could very well be discharged by non-technical men possessing executive
ability.

CUEVAS v. BACAL
The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service does not automatically confer
security of tenure on its occupant even if he does not possess the required qualifications. Such
right will have to depend on the nature of his appointment, which in turn depends on his
eligibility or lack of it. A person who does not have the requisite qualifications for the position
cannot be appointed to it in the first place or, only as an exception to the rule, may be
appointed to it merely in an acting capacity in the absence of appropriate eligibles. Here, Atty.
Bacal has a rank of CESO III appointed to a position of CESO I. The appointment extended
to him cannot be regarded as permanent even if it may be so designated.
Security of tenure in the career executive service is acquired with respect to rank and not
toposition.The guarantee of security of tenure to members of the CES does not extend to the
particular positions to which they may be appointed a concept which is applicable only to first
and second-level employees in the civil service but to the rank to which they are appointed by
the President. Here, respondent did not acquire security of tenure by the mere fact that she was
appointed to the higher position of Chief Public Attorney since she was not subsequently
appointed to the rank of CESO I based on her performance in that position as required by the
rules of the CES Board.
Members of the Career Executive Service may be reassigned or transferred from one position
to another and from one department, bureau or office to another; provided that such
reassignment or transfer is made in the interest of public service and involves no reduction in
rank or salary; provided, further, that no member shall be reassigned or transferred oftener
than every two years. If a CESO is assigned to a CES position with a higher salary grade than
that of his CES rank, he is allowed to receive the salary of the CES position. Should he be
assigned or made to occupy a CES position with a lower salary grade, he shall continue to be
paid the salary attached to his CES rank. Here, there is a valid transfer of Atty. Bacal to the
Regional Office as it was made in the interest of public service and she is still compensated
according to her CES rank.
Respondents appointment to the position of Chief Public Attorney was merely temporary and
that, consequently, her subsequent transfer to the position of Regional Director of the same
office, which corresponds to her CESO rank, cannot be considered a demotion, much less a
violation of the security of tenure guarantee of the Constitution. The rule that outlaws
unconsented transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies only to an officer who is
appointed not merely assigned to a particular station. Such a rule does not proscribe a
transfer carried out under a specific statute that empowers the head of an agency to
periodically reassign the employees and officers in order to improve the service of the agency
BUKLOD ng KAWANING EIIB v. CORONA
It is a general rule that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. The
exception is when it comes to agencies, bureaus, and other offices under the executive
department, the president may deactivate them pursuant to control power over such offices,
unless such office is created by the Constitution. This is also germane to the presidents power
to reorganize the Office of the President. Basis of such power also has its roots in two laws
i.e., PD 1772 and PD 1416. These decrees expressly grant the President of the Philippines the
continuing authority to reorganize the national government, which includes the power to
group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and
classify functions, services and activities and to standardize salaries and materials.

Also, it cannot be said that there is bad faith in the abolition of EIIB. EIIB allocations have
always exceeded P100 million per year. To save the government some money, it needed to
abolish it and replace it with TF Aduana which has for its allocation just P50 million. Further,
TYF Aduana is invested more power that EIIB never had, i.e., search and seizure and arrest.
Lastly, EEIB employees right to security of tenure is not violated. Since there is no bad faith
in the abolition of EIIB, such abolition is not infirm. Valid abolition of offices is neither
removal nor separation of the incumbents. If the public office ceases to exist, there is no
separation or dismissal to speak of. Indeed, there is no such thing as an absolute right to hold
office. Except constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and
tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary.
MULTIPLE APPOINTMENTS
FLORES v. DRILON
Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official shall be eligible for
appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure.
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official i.e.
the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA).
This is precisely what the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation where a local
elective official will workfor his appointment in an executive position in government, and thus
neglect his constitutents.
Congress did not contemplate making the SBMA posts as automatically attached to the Office
of the Mayor without need of appointment. The phrase shall be appointed unquestionably
shows the intent to make the SBMA posts appointive and not merely adjunct to the post of
Mayor of Olongapo City.
Sec. 8 does not affect the constitutionality of the subject proviso. In any case, the VicePresident for example, an elective official who may be appointed to a cabinet post, may
receive the compensation attached to the cabinet position if specifically authorized by law.
Although Section 13(d) itself vests in the President the power to appoint the Chairman of
SBMA, he really has no choice but to appoint the Mayor of Olongapo City. The power of
choice is the heart of the power to appoint. Appointment involves an exercise of discretion of
whom to appoint. Hence, when Congress clothes the President with the power to appoint an
officer, it cannot at the same time limit the choice of the President to only one candidate. Such
enactment effectively eliminates the discretion of the appointing power to choose and
constitutes an irregular restriction on the power of appointment. While it may be viewed that
the proviso merely sets thequalifications of the officer during the first year of operations of
SBMA, i.e., he must be the Mayor of Olongapo City, it is manifestly an abuse of congressional
authority to prescribe qualifications where only one, and no other, can qualify. Since the
ineligibility of an elective official for appointment remains all throughout his tenure or during
his incumbency, he may however resign first from his elective post to cast off the
constitutionally-attached disqualification before he may be considered fit for appointment.
Consequently, as long as he is an incumbent, an elective official remains ineligible for
appointment to another public office.

As incumbent elective official, Gordon is ineligible for appointment to the position of

Chairman and CEO of SBMA; hence, his appointment thereto cannot be sustained. He
however remains Mayor of Olongapo City, and his acts as SBMA official are not necessarily
null and void; he may be considered a de facto officer, and in accordance with jurisprudence,
is entitled to such benefits.
EXTERNAL AUDIT
DBP v. COA
The rejection of Guingonas second proposal put an end to all efforts to grant the COA the sole
and exclusive power to examine and audit government agencies.
In sharp contrast, the Constitutional Commission placed the word exclusive to qualify the
authority of the COA under the second paragraph of the same Section 2. The word
exclusive did not appear in the counterpart provisions of Section 2 in the 1935 and 1973
Constitutions.[25] There is no dispute that the COAs authority under the second paragraph of
Section 2 is exclusive as the language of the Constitution admits of no other meaning. Thus,
the COA has the exclusive authority to decide on disallowances of unnecessary government
expenditures. Other government agencies and their officials, as well as private auditors
engaged by them, cannot in any way intrude into this exclusive function of the COA.
The qualifying word exclusive in the second paragraph of Section 2 cannot be applied to the
first paragraph which is another sub-section of Section 2. A qualifying word is intended to
refer only to the phrase to which it is immediately associated, and not to a phrase distantly
located in another paragraph or sub-section.[26] Thus, the first paragraph of Section 2 must be
read the way it appears, without the word exclusive, signifying that non-COA auditors can
also examine and audit government agencies. Besides, the framers of the Constitution
intentionally omitted the word exclusive in the first paragraph of Section 2 precisely to
allow concurrent audit by private external auditors.
The clear and unmistakable conclusion from a reading of the entire Section 2 is that the COAs
power to examine and audit is non-exclusive. On the other hand, the COAs authority to define
the scope of its audit, promulgate auditing rules and regulations, and disallow unnecessary
expenditures is exclusive.
Moreover, as the constitutionally mandated auditor of all government agencies, the COAs
findings and conclusions necessarily prevail over those of private auditors, at least insofar as
government agencies and officials are concerned.
Historically, the Central Bank has been conducting periodic and special examination and audit
of banks to determine the soundness of their operations and the safety of the deposits of the
public. Undeniably, the Central Banks power of supervision includes the power to examine
and audit banks, as the banking laws have always recognized this power of the Central Bank.
Hence, the COAs power to examine and audit government banks must be reconciled with the
Central Banks power to supervise the same banks. The inevitable conclusion is that the COA
and the Central Bank have concurrent jurisdiction, under the Constitution, to examine and
audit government banks.
However, despite the Central Banks concurrent jurisdiction over government banks, the
COAs audit still prevails over that of the Central Bank since the COA is the constitutionally
mandated auditor of government banks. And in matters falling under the second paragraph of

Section 2, Article IX-D of the Constitution, the COAs jurisdiction is exclusive. Thus, the
Central Bank is devoid of authority to allow or disallow expenditures of government banks
since this function belongs exclusively to the COA.

ACCOUNTABILITY of PUBLIC OFFICERS

IMPEACHMENT
GUTIERREZ v. HOUSE COMMITTEE on JUSTICE
ISSUE #1: Does the Supreme Court have the power to determine whether public respondent
committed a violation of the Constitution in the exercise of its discretion relating to
impeachment proceeding?
HELD: YES, under the doctrine of expanded judicial review. The Constitution did not intend
to leave the matter of impeachment to the sole discretion of Congress. Instead, it provided for
certain well-defined limits, or in the language of Baker v. Carr,"judicially discoverable
standards" for determining the validity of the exercise of such discretion, through the power of
judicial review.
There exists no constitutional basis for the contention that the exercise of judicial review over
impeachment proceedings would upset the system of checks and balances. Verily, the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole and "one section is not to be allowed to defeat
another." Both are integral components of the calibrated system of independence and
interdependence that insures that no branch of government act beyond the powers assigned to
it by the Constitution.
Indubitably, the Court is not asserting its ascendancy over the Legislature in this instance, but
simply upholding the supremacy of the Constitution as the repository of the sovereign will.
ISSUE #2: Is the petition premature and not yet ripe for adjudication?
HELD: NO. In the present petition, there is no doubt that questions on the validity of the
simultaneous referral of the two complaints and on the need to publish as a mode of
promulgating the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings of the House
(Impeachment Rules) present constitutional vagaries which call for immediate interpretation.
The unusual act of simultaneously referring to public respondent two impeachment complaints
presents a novel situation to invoke judicial power. Petitioner cannot thus be considered to
have acted prematurely when she took the cue from the constitutional limitation that only one
impeachment proceeding should be initiated against an impeachable officer within a period of
one year.
ISSUE #3: When is an impeachment complaint deemed initiated?
HELD: There are two components of the act of initiating the complaint: the filing of the
impeachment complaint AND the referral by the House Plenary to the Committee on Justice.
Once an impeachment complaint has been initiated (meaning, filed and initiated), another
impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official within a one year period.
ISSUE #4: Do the Impeachment Rules provide for comprehensible standards in determining
the sufficiency of form and substance?
HELD: YES. Contrary to petitioner contention, the Impeachment Rules are clear in echoing
the constitutional requirements and providing that there must be a "verified complaint or
resolution," and that the substance requirement is met if there is "a recital of facts constituting
the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the committee.

In fact, it is only in the Impeachment Rules where a determination of sufficiency of form and
substance of an impeachment complaint is made necessary. This requirement is not explicitly
found in the Constitution which merely requires a "hearing." ( Section 3[2], Article XI). In the
discharge of its constitutional duty, the House deemed that a finding of sufficiency of form and
substance in an impeachment complaint is vital "to effectively carry out" the impeachment
process, hence, such additional requirement in the Impeachment Rules.
ISSUE #5: May the Supreme Court look into the narration of facts constitutive of the offenses
vis--vis petitioners submissions disclaiming the allegations in the complaints?
HELD: NO. This issue would "require the Court to make a determination of what constitutes
an impeachable offense. Such a determination is a purely political question which the
Constitution has left to the sound discretion of the legislature (Francisco vs. House of
Representatives.)
ISSUE #6: Was petitioner denied of due process, because of the delay in the publication of the
Impeachment Rules?
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court discussed the difference between publication and
promulgation.
To recall, days after the 15th Congress opened on July 26, 2010 or on August 3, 2010, public
respondent provisionally adopted the Impeachment Rules of the 14th Congress and thereafter
published on September 2, 2010 its Impeachment Rules, admittedly substantially identical
with that of the 14th Congress, in two newspapers of general circulation.
Citing Taada v. Tuvera, petitioner contends that she was deprived of due process since the
Impeachment Rules was published only on September 2, 2010 a day after public respondent
ruled on the sufficiency of form of the complaints. She likewise tacks her contention on
Section 3(8), Article XI of the Constitution which directs that "Congress shall promulgate its
rules on impeachment to effectively carry out the purpose of this section."
Public respondent counters that "promulgation" in this case refers to "the publication of rules
in any medium of information, not necessarily in the Official Gazette or newspaper of general
circulation."
While "promulgation" would seem synonymous to "publication," there is a statutory difference
in their usage. The Constitution notably uses the word "promulgate" 12 times. A number of
those instances involves the promulgation of various rules, reports and issuances emanating
from Congress, the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman as well as other
constitutional offices.
To appreciate the statutory difference in the usage of the terms "promulgate" and "publish,"
the case of the Judiciary is in point. In promulgating rules concerning the protection and
enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, the
Supreme Court has invariably required the publication of these rules for their effectivity. As
far as promulgation of judgments is concerned, however, PROMULGATION means "the
delivery of the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication.
Promulgation must thus be used in the context in which it is generally understoodthat is, to
make known. Since the Constitutional Commission did not restrict "promulgation" to
"publication," the former should be understood to have been used in its general sense. It is
within the discretion of Congress to determine on how to promulgate its Impeachment Rules,

in much the same way that the Judiciary is permitted to determine that to promulgate a
decision means to deliver the decision to the clerk of court for filing and publication. It is not
for the Supreme Court to tell a co-equal branch of government how to promulgate when the
Constitution itself has not prescribed a specific method of promulgation. The Court is in no
position to dictate a mode of promulgation beyond the dictates of the Constitution.
Inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution is the sole
instance in the Constitution where there is a categorical directive to duly publish a set of rules
of procedure. (Neri vs. Senate)
Even assuming arguendo that publication is required, lack of it does not nullify the
proceedings taken prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment Rules which faithfully comply
with the relevant self-executing provisions of the Constitution. Otherwise, in cases where
impeachment complaints are filed at the start of each Congress, the mandated periods under
Section 3, Article XI of the Constitution would already run or even lapse while awaiting the
expiration of the 15-day period of publication prior to the effectivity of the Impeachment
Rules. In effect, the House would already violate the Constitution for its inaction on the
impeachment complaints pending the completion of the publication requirement. (Just like
what happened in this case, where the complaint was filed even before the 15th Congress open
its first session)
Given that the Constitution itself states that any promulgation of the rules on impeachment is
aimed at "effectively carry[ing] out the purpose" of impeachment proceedings, the Court finds
no grave abuse of discretion when the House deemed it proper to provisionally adopt the
Rules on Impeachment of the 14th Congress, to meet the exigency in such situation of early
filing and in keeping with the "effective" implementation of the "purpose" of the impeachment
provisions. In other words, the provisional adoption of the previous Congress Impeachment
Rules is within the power of the House to promulgate its rules on impeachment to effectively
carry out the avowed purpose.
Moreover, the rules on impeachment, as contemplated by the framers of the Constitution,
merely aid or supplement the procedural aspects of impeachment. Being procedural in nature,
they may be given retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of
procedural laws does not violate any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely
affected, nor is it constitutionally objectionable. The reason for this is that, as a general rule,
no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws." In the present case, petitioner
fails to allege any impairment of vested rights.
It bears stressing that, unlike the process of inquiry in aid of legislation where the rights of
witnesses are involved, impeachment is primarily for the protection of the people as a body
politic, and not for the punishment of the offender.
ISSUE #6: When do we reckon the start of the one-year ban?
Petitioner contends that it is reckoned from the filing of the first impeachment complaint
against her on July 22, 2010 or four days before the opening on July 26, 2010 of the 15th
Congress. She posits that within one year from July 22, 2010, no second impeachment
complaint may be accepted and referred to public respondent.
HELD: Francisco doctrine states that the term "initiate" means to file the complaint and
referral of the complaint to the Committee on Justice. Once an impeachment complaint has
been initiated, another impeachment complaint may not be filed against the same official

within a one year period. Therefore, the one-year period ban is reckoned not from the filing of
the first complaint, but on the date it is referred to the House Committee on Justice.
Petitioner submits that referral could not be the reckoning point of initiation because
"something prior to that had already been done. This is wrong. Following petitioners line of
reasoning, the verification of the complaint or the endorsement by a member of the House
steps done prior to the filing would already initiate the impeachment proceedings.
ISSUE #7: Does an impeachment complaint need to allege only one impeachable offense?
Petitioner argues that public respondent gravely abused its discretion when it disregarded its
own Impeachment Rules, which provides that "the Rules of Criminal Procedure under the
Rules of Court shall, as far as practicable, apply to impeachment proceedings before the
House." Petitioner invokes the application of Section 13, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure on one offense per complaint rule. To petitioner, the two impeachment complaints
are insufficient in form and substance since each charges her with both culpable violation of
the Constitution and betrayal of public trust.
HELD: The Constitution allows the indictment for multiple impeachment offenses, with each
charge representing an article of impeachment, assembled in one set known as the "Articles of
Impeachment." It, therefore, follows that an impeachment complaint need not allege only one
impeachable offense.
CORONA v. SENATE
Impeachment, described as "the most formidable weapon in the arsenal of democracy,"14 was
foreseen as creating divisions, partialities and enmities, or highlighting pre-existing factions
with the greatest danger that "the decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength
of parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt."15 Given their concededly
political character, the precise role of the judiciary in impeachment cases is a matter of utmost
importance to ensure the effective functioning of the separate branches while preserving the
structure of checks and balance in our government. Moreover, in this jurisdiction, the acts of
any branch or instrumentality of the government, including those traditionally entrusted to the
political departments, are proper subjects of judicial review if tainted with grave abuse or
arbitrariness.
Impeachment refers to the power of Congress to remove a public official for serious crimes or
misconduct as provided in the Constitution. A mechanism designed to check abuse of power,
impeachment has its roots in Athens and was adopted in the United States (US) through the
influence of English common law on the Framers of the US Constitution.
Our own Constitutions provisions on impeachment were adopted from the US Constitution.
Petitioner was impeached through the mode provided under Art. XI, par. 4, Sec. 3, in a manner
that he claims was accomplished with undue haste and under a complaint which is defective
for lack of probable cause. Petitioner likewise assails the Senate in proceeding with the trial
under the said complaint, and in the alleged partiality exhibited by some Senator-Judges who
were apparently aiding the prosecution during the hearings.
In the first impeachment case decided by this Court, Francisco, Jr. v.
Nagmamalasakit na mga Manananggol ng mga Manggagawang Pilipino, Inc. we ruled that the
power of judicial review in this jurisdiction includes the power of review over justiciable
issues in impeachment proceedings. Subsequently, in Gutierrez v. House of Representatives
Committee on Justice,17 the Court resolved the question of the validity of the simultaneous

referral of two impeachment complaints against petitioner Ombudsman which was allegedly a
violation of the due process clause and of the one-year bar provision.
On the basis of these precedents, petitioner asks this Court to determine whether respondents
committed a violation of the Constitution or gravely abused its discretion in the exercise of
their functions and prerogatives that could translate as lack or excess of jurisdiction, which
would require corrective measures from the Court.
Mootness
In the meantime, the impeachment trial had been concluded with the conviction of petitioner
by more than the required majority vote of the Senator-Judges. Petitioner immediately
accepted the verdict and without any protest vacated his office. In fact, the Judicial and Bar
Council is already in the process of screening applicants and nominees, and the President of
the Philippines is expected to appoint a new Chief Justice within the prescribed 90-day period
from among those candidates shortlisted by the JBC. Unarguably, the constitutional issue
raised by petitioner had been mooted by supervening events and his own acts.1wphi1
An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable
controversy so that a determination thereof would be without practical use and value.18 In
such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner would be entitled to and
which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.
IMPRESCRIPTIBILITY of STATEs RIGHT TO RECOVER
PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE v. DESIERTO
No. The so-called imprescriptibility as provided in Section 15 of Article XI of the Constitution
applies only to civil actions for recovery of ill-gotten wealth, and not to criminal cases, such as
the complaint against the respondents in OMB-0-96-0968. This is clear from the proceedings
of the Constitutional Commission of 1986. Since the law alleged to have been violated, i.e.,
paragraphs (e) and (g) of Section 3, R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the
applicable rule in the computation of the prescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as
amended, which provides, Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of
the violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof
and institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. In the present
case, it was well-nigh impossible for the State, the aggrieved party, to have known the
violations of R.A. No. 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made because, as
alleged, the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the beneficiaries of the
loans. Thus, the prescriptive period for the offenses with which the respondents in OMB-096-0968 were charged should be computed from the discovery of the commission thereof and
not from the day of such commission.