Professional Documents
Culture Documents
3.
FACTS
- Respondent Genuine Labor Organization of Workers in Hotel,
Restaurant and Allied Industries Silahis International Hotel
Chapter (Union) and the petitioner Grand Boulevard Hotel (then
Silahis International Hotel, Inc.) executed a CBA covering the
period from July 10, 1985 up to July 9, 1988.
- Thereafter, Union filed several notices of strike on account of
alleged violations of CBA, illegal dismissal and suspension of EEs.
In these instances, SOLE issued a status quo ante bellum order
certifying the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory
arbitration pursuant to Article 263(g) of LC. After notice was
given by Hotel re its decision to implement retrenchment
program, Union informed the DOLE that the union will conduct a
strike vote referendum. The members of the Union voted to stage
a strike. Union informed the DOLE of the results of the strike vote
referendum. SOLE issued another status quo ante bellum order
certifying the case to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration and
enjoining the parties from engaging in any strike or lockout.
Then, another notice of strike was filed by Union on account of
the illegal dismissal of EEs pusrsuant to Hotels act of retrenching
around 171 EEs. Officers of the respondent union and some
members staged a picket in the premises of the hotel, obstructing
the free ingress and egress thereto. Because of this, they were
terminated.
- Hotel filed a complaint with NLRC for illegal strike against the
union, its members and officers. Petitioner Hotel alleged inter alia
that the union members and officers staged a strike on November
16, 1990 which lasted until November 29, 1990 without
complying with the requirements provided under Articles 263
and 264 of the Labor Code. It further alleged that the officers and
members of the respondent union blocked the main ingress to
and egress from the hotel.
- The respondent Union denied the material allegations of the
complaint and alleged that the petitioner committed ULP prior to
the filing of the Nov. 16, 1990 notice of strike. Hence, there was
no need for the union to comply with A263 and 264 of LC, as the
notice
- LA Linsangans Ruling: Unions failure to comply with the
requirements laid down in A263 and 264 of LC, the strike that
was staged was illegal. Considering the admissions of the
individual respondents that they participated in the said strike,
the termination of their employment by the petitioner was legal.
- In this case, union filed its notice of strike with the DOLE on Nov
16, 1990 and on the same day, staged a picket on the premises of
the hotel, in violation of the law. Union cannot argue that since
the notice of strike on Nov 16, 1990 were for the same grounds as
those contained in their notice of strike on September 27, 1990
which complied with the requirements of the law on the coolingoff period, strike ban, strike vote and strike vote report, the strike
staged by them on Nov16, 1990 was lawful. The matters
contained in the notice of strike of Sept 27, 1990 had already
been taken cognizance of by the SOLE when he issued on Oct 31,
1990 a status quo ante bellum order enjoining union from
intending or staging a strike. Despite SOLE order, the union
nevertheless staged a strike on Nov16, 1990 simultaneously with
its notice of strike, thus violating A264(a) LC
Grounds
- A strike that is undertaken, despite the issuance by the SOLE of
an assumption or certification order, becomes a prohibited
activity and, thus, illegal pursuant to A264 of LC: No strike or
lockout shall be declared after assumption of jurisdiction by the
President or the Secretary or after certification or submission of
the dispute to compulsory or voluntary arbitration or during the
pendency of cases involving the same grounds for the strike or
lockout.
- Even if the union acted in good faith in the belief that the
company was committing an unfair labor practice, if no notice of
strike and a strike vote were conducted, the said strike is illegal.
2. YES
Re: Effect of Illegality
Ratio Since a strike that is undertaken, despite the issuance by
the SOLE of an assumption or certification order, becomes a
prohibited activity and, thus, illegal pursuant to A264 of LC, the
union officers and members, as a result, are deemed to have lost
their employment status for having knowingly participated in an
illegal act.
Disposition Petition is GRANTED. LA Decision REINSTATED.
6.
20,000,000
9,825,491
29,825,491
P 48,608,612
According to petitioner, the management initially decided to costcut by implementing energy-saving schemes: prioritizing
acquisitions/purchases; reducing work weeks in some of the
hotels departments; directing the employees to avail of their
vacation leaves; and imposing a moratorium on hiring employees
for the year 2001 whenever practicable.[8]
Meanwhile, on August 31, 2001, the Union filed a notice of strike
due to a bargaining deadlock before the National Conciliation
Mediation Board (NCMB), docketed as NCMB-NCR-NS 08-25301.[9] In the course of the proceedings, HEPI submitted its
economic proposals for the rank-and-file employees covering the
years 2001, 2002, and 2003. The proposal included manning and
staffing standards for the 248 regular rank-and-file
employees. The Union accepted the economic proposals. Hence,
a new collective bargaining agreement (CBA) was signed on
November 21, 2001, adopting the manning standards for the 248
rank-and-file employees.[10]
Then, on December 21, 2001, HEPI issued a memorandum
offering a Special Limited Voluntary Resignation/Retirement
Program (SLVRRP) to its regular employees. Employees who
were qualified to resign or retire were given separation packages
based on the number of years of service.[11] The vacant
positions, as well as the regular positions vacated, were later
filled up with contractual personnel and agency employees.[12]
Subsequently, on January 21, 2002, petitioner decided to
implement a downsizing scheme after studying the operating
costs of its different divisions to determine the areas where it
could obtain significant savings. It found that the hotel could save
on costs if certain jobs, such as engineering services,
messengerial/courier services, janitorial and laundry services,
and operation of the employees cafeteria, which by their nature
were contractable pursuant to existing laws and jurisprudence,
were abolished and contracted out to independent job
contractors. After evaluating the hotels manning guide, the
following positions were identified as redundant or in excess of
what was required for the hotels actual operation given the
unsettled until the lapse of the requisite number of days from the
mandatory filing of the notice, the labor union may strike or the
employer may declare a lockout.
(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority
of the total union membership in the bargaining unit concerned,
obtained by secret ballot in meetings or referenda called for that
purpose. A decision to declare a lockout must be approved by a
majority of the board of directors of the corporation or
association or of the partners in a partnership, obtained by secret
ballot in a meeting called for the purpose. The decision shall be
valid for the duration of the dispute based on substantially the
same grounds considered when the strike or lockout vote was
taken. The [Department] may at its own initiative or upon the
request of any affected party, supervise the conduct of the secret
balloting. In every case, the union or the employer shall furnish
the [Department] the results of the voting at least seven days
before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off
period herein provided.
Accordingly, the requisites for a valid strike are: (a) a notice of
strike filed with the DOLE 30 days before the intended date
thereof or 15 days in case of ULP; (b) a strike vote approved by a
majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit
concerned obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that
purpose; and (c) a notice to the DOLE of the results of the voting
at least seven (7) days before the intended strike.[62] The
requirements are mandatory and failure of a union to comply
therewith renders the strike illegal.[63]
In this case, respondent fully satisfied the procedural
requirements prescribed by law: a strike notice filed on April 12,
2002; a strike vote reached on April 25, 2002; notification of the
strike vote filed also on April 25, 2002; conciliation proceedings
conducted on May 8, 20002; and the actual strike on May 10,
2002.
Substantively, however, there appears to be a problem. A valid
and legal strike must be based on strikeable grounds, because if
it is based on a non-strikeable ground, it is generally deemed an
illegal strike. Corollarily, a strike grounded on ULP is illegal if no
acts constituting ULP actually exist. As an exception, even if no
such acts are committed by the employer, if the employees
believe in good faith that ULP actually exists, then the strike held
pursuant to such belief may be legal. As a general rule, therefore,
where a union believes that an employer committed ULP and the
surrounding circumstances warranted such belief in good faith,
the resulting strike may be considered legal although,
subsequently, such allegations of unfair labor practices were
found to be groundless.[64]
Here, respondent Union went on strike in the honest belief that
petitioner was committing ULP after the latter decided to
downsize its workforce contrary to the staffing/manning
standards adopted by both parties under a CBA forged only four
(4) short months earlier. The belief was bolstered when the
management hired 100 contractual workers to replace the 48
terminated regular rank-and-file employees who were all Union
members.[65] Indeed, those circumstances showed prima
faciethat the hotel committed ULP. Thus, even if technically there
was no legal ground to stage a strike based on ULP, since the
attendant circumstances support the belief in good faith that
petitioners retrenchment scheme was structured to weaken the
bargaining power of the Union, the strike, by exception, may be
considered legal.
When
the
is a finding
entirely
on
surmises and
(2)
When
the
inference
made
is
manifestly
mistaken,
absurd or impossible;
(3)
Where there
is a grave abuse of
discretion;
(4)
When
the
judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts;
(5)
When
findings of fact
conflicting;
the
are
(6)
When
the
Court of Appeals, in making
its findings, went beyond
the issues of the case and
the same is contrary to the
admissions
of
both
appellant and appellee;
(7)
When
the
findings are contrary to
those of the trial court;
(8)
When
the
findings
of
fact
are
conclusions
without
SECTION 1.
Coverage.
Inter/intra-union disputes shall include:
(a)
cancellation of registration
of a labor organization
filed by its members or by
another
labor
organization;
(b)
(c)
audit/accounts examination
of union or workers
association funds;
(d)
deregistration of collective
bargaining agreements;
(e)
validity/invalidity
union
affiliation
disaffiliation;
(f)
validity/invalidity
acceptance/nonacceptance
for
membership;
of
or
of
union
(g)
validity/invalidity
of
impeachment/expulsion
of union and workers
association officers and
members;
(h)
validity/invalidity
voluntary recognition;
(i)
opposition to application
for union and CBA
registration;
(j)
violations
of
or
disagreements over any
provision in a union or
workers
association
constitution and by-laws;
(k)
disagreements
over
chartering or registration
of labor organizations and
collective
bargaining
agreements;
(l)
(m)
(n)
of
THE WITNESS
We have the transcript of stenographic notes
of that conference.
THE COURT
Were the demands of the Philippine Marine
Officers' Guild ever taken up in that
conference?
THE WITNESS
I think we did not take up the discussion of the
demands because we were threshing out the
legal points of majority representation.
THE COURT
So, in that last conference of August 17, the
principal subject-matter taken up was the
majority representation, was it?
THE WITNESS
I think the August 17 conference was a
continuation of the July 30th conference
(pp. 90-91, t.s.n. Jan. 10, 1956, Dinglasan
testifying.)
Indeed there is no finding in the decision that MARITIMA
asked PMOG to prove its majority representation during that
conference. The decision merely states the following:
But the best evidence of PMOG's true position is to
be found in what Tan stated in the second conference.
When asked by the conciliator whether the PMOG was
willing to submit to a certification election, Tan
answered: "No comment". It should be added that Tan
also manifested that PMOG would institute a
certification case with this Court. But the record shows
that no such case was ever filed by this union. (pp. 8687 of the Decision of the Trial Court.)
In view thereof, the contention of petitioner on this point
cannot be sustained.
b. The killing of the head of the picketers by the
chief of the company's security guard is the worst form
of interference.
Again, the allegation of the petitioner is devoid of factual
and legal basis. The reference is to the fatal stabbing of Modesto
Rodriguez, a MARITIMA employee striker, allegedly by Andres
Alarcon, MARITIMA chief security guard. Alarcon was prosecuted
in the Court of First Instance of Manila and was found guilty of
the crime of homicide. However, on appeal to the Court of
Appeals he was acquitted. The appellate court found:
That the slaying of Modesto Rodriguez was
manifestly committed without the concurrence of the
will of Alarcon as it has not been proved that he
participated or agreed with the criminal design of the
actual killer. As has been heretofore stated, the
presence of Alarcon in the scene of the commotion was
for the purpose of performing his duty as security guard
of the Compaia Maritima, and not to kill or harm
anybody. (People vs. Alarcon, 61 O.G. No. 10, p. 1380.)
Accordingly, it cannot be said that in this particular
connection MARITIMA interfered with the freedom of the
strikers to pursue union activities.
c. Refusal to reinstate and employ the employees
who have abandoned their strike and who have offered
to return to work unconditionally is an unfair labor
practice.
This proposition has no factual basis either. As heretofore
discussed, the COMPANIES, which include MARITIMA, were not
to blame for their failure to reemploy the strikers in view of the
injunction issued by this Court, restraining the CIR from
enforcing its return-to-work order upon which the offer to return
to work of the strikers was predicated. Furthermore, there is no
showing that the strikers renewed their offer to work after the
issuance of said injunction. It cannot be alleged, therefore, that
1.
KILUSANG MANGGAGAWA NG
LEGENDA (KML-INDEPENDENT); and
2.
NO UNION.
For its part, KML alleged that the Decision dated March 26,
2002 of the Bureau of Labor Relations in Case No. RO300-0108-CP-001
denying LEGENDs petition for cancellation and upholding KMLs
legitimacy as a labor organization has already become final and
executory, entry of judgment having been made on August 21, 2002.[15]
LEGEND thus prays that the September 20, 2001 Decision of the
Med-Arbiter dismissing KMLs petition for certification election be
reinstated.[24]
In its Comment filed before this Court dated March 21, 2006, KML
insists that the Decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations upholding its
legitimacy as a labor organization has already attained finality[25] hence
there was no more hindrance to the holding of a certification
election. Moreover, it claims that the instant petition has become moot
because the certification election sought to be prevented had already
been conducted.
Respondents Arguments
Our Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
LEGEND
has
timely
appealed
the
March
26, 2002
Decision
of
the
Bureau of
Labor
Relations
to
the
Court of
Appeals.
We cannot understand why the Court of Appeals totally
disregarded LEGENDs allegation in its Motion for Reconsideration that
the March 26, 2002 Decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations has not yet
attained finality considering that it has timely appealed the same to the
Court of Appeals and which at that time is still pending resolution. The
Court of Appeals never bothered to look into this allegation and instead
dismissed outright LEGENDs motion for reconsideration. By doing so,
the Court of Appeals in effect maintained its earlier ruling that the March
26, 2002 Decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations upholding the
legitimacy of KML as a labor organization has long become final and
executory for failure of LEGEND to appeal the same.
This is inaccurate. Records show that (in the cancellation of
registration case) LEGEND has timely filed on September 6, 2002 a
petition for certiorari[26] before the Court of Appeals which was docketed
as CA-G.R. SP No. 72659 assailing the March 26, 2002 Decision of the
Bureau of Labor Relations. In fact, KML received a copy of said petition
on September 10, 2002[27] and has filed its Comment thereto on
December 2, 2002.[28] Thus, we find it quite interesting for KML to claim
in its Comment (in the certification petition case) before this Court dated
March 21, 2006[29] that the Bureau of Labor Relations Decision in the
petition for cancellation case has already attained finality. Even in its
Memorandum[30] dated March 13, 2007 filed before us, KML is still
insisting that the Bureau of Labor Relations Decision has become final
and executory.
Our perusal of the records shows that on June 30, 2005, the
Court of Appeals rendered its Decision[31] in CA-G.R. SP No. 72659
reversing the March 26, 2002 Decision of the Bureau of Labor Relations
and reinstating the November 7, 2001 Decision of the Med-Arbiter which
canceled the certificate of registration of KML.[32] On September 30,
2005, KMLs motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of
merit.[33] On November 25, 2005, KML filed its Petition for Review
on Certiorari[34] before this Court which was docketed as G.R. No.
169972. However, the same was denied in a Resolution[35] dated
February 13, 2006 for having been filed out of time. KML moved for
reconsideration but it was denied with finality in a Resolution[36] dated
June 7, 2006. Thereafter, the said Decision canceling the certificate of
registration of KML as a labor organization became final and executory
and entry of judgment was made on July 18, 2006.[37]
The
cancellati
on
of
KMLs
certificat
e
of
registrati
on should
not
retroact
to
the
time of its
issuance.
Notwithstanding the finality of the Decision canceling the
certificate of registration of KML, we cannot subscribe to LEGENDs
proposition that the cancellation of KMLs certificate of registration
should retroact to the time of its issuance. LEGEND claims that KMLs
petition for certification election filed during the pendency of the petition
for cancellation and its demand to enter into collective bargaining
agreement with LEGEND should be dismissed due to KMLs lack of legal
personality.
x x x It is well-settled
rule that a certification
proceedings is not a litigation
in the sense that the term is
ordinarily understood, but an
investigation of a nonadversarial and fact finding
character. (Associated Labor
Unions (ALU) v. Ferrer-Calleja,
179
SCRA
127
[1989]; Philippine Telegraph
and Telephone Corporation v.
NLRC, 183
SCRA
451
[1990]. Thus, the technical
rules of evidence do not apply
if the decision to grant it
proceeds from an examination
of the sufficiency of the petition
as well as a careful look into
the arguments contained in the
position papers and other
documents.
At any rate, the
Court applies the established
rule correctly followed by the
public respondent that an
order to hold a certification
election is
proper despite
the pendency of the petition
for cancellation of the
registration certificate of the
respondent
union. The
rationale for this is that at
the time the respondent
union filed its petition, it still
had the legal personality to
perform such act absent an
order
directing
the
cancellation.[39] (Emphasis
supplied.)
In Capitol Medical Center, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano,[40] we also held
that the pendency of a petition for cancellation of union registration
does not preclude collective bargaining.[41] Citing the Secretary of Labor,
we held viz:
That there is a pending cancellation
proceedings against the respondent Union is
not a bar to set in motion the mechanics of
collective bargaining. If a certification election
may still be ordered despite the pendency of a
petition to cancel the unions registration
certificate x x x more so should the collective
bargaining process continue despite its
pendency.[42] (Emphasis supplied.)
In Association of Court of Appeals Employees v. FerrerCalleja,[43] this Court was tasked to resolve the issue of whether the
certification proceedings should be suspended pending [the petitioners]
petition for the cancellation of union registration of the
UCECA[44].[45] The Court resolved the issue in the negative holding that
an order to hold a certification election is proper despite the
pendency of the petition for cancellation of the registration
certificate of the respondent union. The rationale for this is that at the
time the respondent union filed its petition, it still had the legal
personality to perform such act absent an order directing a
cancellation.[46] We reiterated this view in Samahan ng Manggagawa sa
Pacific Plastic v. Hon. Laguesma[47] where we declared that a
certification election can be conducted despite pendency of a
petition to cancel the union registration certificate. For the fact is
that at the time the respondent union filed its petition for certification, it
still had the legal personality to perform such act absent an order
directing its cancellation.[48]
Based on the foregoing jurisprudence, it is clear that a
certification election may be conducted during the pendency of the
cancellation proceedings. This is because at the time the petition for
certification was filed, the petitioning union is presumed to possess the
legal personality to file the same. There is therefore no basis for
LEGENDs assertion that the cancellation of KMLs certificate of
registration should retroact to the time of its issuance or that it effectively
nullified all of KMLs activities, including its filing of the petition for
certification election and its demand to collectively bargain.
The
legitimac
y of the
legal
personali
ty of KML
cannot be
collateral
ly
attacked
in
a
petition
for
certificati
on
election.
We agree with the ruling of the Office of the Secretary of DOLE
that the legitimacy of the legal personality of KML cannot be collaterally
attacked in a petition for certification election proceeding. This is in
consonance with our ruling in Laguna Autoparts Manufacturing
Corporation v. Office of the Secretary, Department of Labor and
Employment[49] that such legal personality may not be subject to a
collateral attack but only through a separate action instituted particularly
for the purpose of assailing it.[50] We further held therein that:
This is categorically prescribed by Section 5, Rule V
of the Implementing Rules of Book V, which states
as follows:
b.
13th Month
Pay
(P692,720.96/12) 58
,060.88
c.
Leave Benefits
1.
Vacation
Leave
(30
days/annum)
P1,116.54 x
60
days
66,
992.40
2.
Sick
Leave
(30
days/annum)
P1,116.54 x
60
days
66,
992.40
3.
d.
Birthday
Leave
(1
day/annum)
P1,116.54
x 2
days
2,
233.08
e.
Uniform Allowance
P7,000/annum x 2
years
__14,000.
00
P949,699.72
II. Damages
a.
b.
III. Attorneys
award)
GRAND
TOTAL:
379.41[28]
MoralP500,000
.00
ExemplaryP250,00
0.00
Fees
(10%
__94,969.97
of
P2,744,
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A
QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE NOT IN ACCORD
WITH
THE
APPLICABLE
LAW
AND
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT REVERSED THE
DECISIONS OF THE NLRC AND THE LABOR
ARBITER HOLDING THE DISMISSAL OF
PETITIONER ILLEGAL IN THAT:
A.
B.
CONTRARY TO
THE FINDINGS OF
THE COURT OF
APPEALS,
RESPONDENTS
CHARACTERIZATI
ON
OF
PETITIONERS
POSITION
AS
REDUNDANT
WAS TAINTED BY
BAD FAITH.
THERE WAS NO
ADEQUATE
JUSTIFICATION
TO
DECLARE
PETITIONERS
POSITION
AS
REDUNDANT.
II
V
CONTRARY TO APPLICABLE LAW AND
JURISPRUDENCE, THE COURT OF APPEALS, IN