Professional Documents
Culture Documents
1.
Melody Paulino Lopez was employed with Letran College Manila from
June 1979 to July 1, 1991
Career Orientation Day, then Guidance Counselor Lopez successfully
implemented an agenda where 1,070 of their elementary students had an
opportunity to witness and mingle with military men in uniform, capped
with the landing of helicopters on the quadrangle of the school compound
Lopez wrote a letter to respondent Rev. Fr. Alarcon, O.P. about a conspiracy of harassment, intimidation and persecution that had set in to
make her resign since the time she approached Gen. De Villa for help in
the Career Orientation
Unsavory reports unknown to Lopez surfaced in her 201 file, such as a
letter-complaint and an incident report when Lopez challenged a Ms.
Jarabelo to a fight
After the Career Orientation, Mr. Moralino, Elementary Principal, ordered to remove Lopez as Elementary Guidance Counselor
Lopez was given the position of Head Psychometrician whose responsibility was to supervise the test, but when tests were given in the elementary department, Mr. Moralino ordered the security guard not to let her
enter. Mr. Moralinos attitude towards complainant became negative
when he learned that complainant was a union member
Lopez was offered a sizable amount of money in exchange for her voluntary resignation because Fr. Alarcon wanted her out, but complainant refused
16 February 1991, Lopez who earlier had been suspended for 5 days, reported for work
11am, Mr. Ramon Mendoza asked from the security guard for the key to
the guidance counseling office, but respondent Fr. Edwin Lao refused to
give the key. Mr. Mendoza asked Lopez to intercede for him
o Respondents insist that Lopez uttered indecent and obscene remarks against Fr. Lao
o Lopez denied & accused Fr. Lao for embarrassing and humiliating her
Lopez was placed under preventive suspension for 30 days
Lopez filed a complaint with the Arbitration of NLRC for illegal suspension, praying for the lifting of said suspension, plus recovery of damages
Ad Hoc Committee was organized by Fr. Lao tasked to look into the
charges against Lopez for serious misconduct and offense by the employee against the person of her employer
Lopez received an official notice dated 08 May 1991 dismissing her from
employment for alleged acts of serious misconduct, commission of a crime
LA: petitioner was dismissed for just cause and with due process
NLRC: illegal dismissal due to absence of just cause and due process but ordered
private respondents to grant petitioner separation pay in lieu of reinstatement;
claim for damages was, however, dismissed
ISSUE: WoN finding of illegal dismissal ipso facto results in reinstatement of the
dismissed employee (NO)
3.
4.
NLRC affirmed and this NLRC decision became final and executory.
MPSI reinstated respondents on 26 February 1996 to the following
positions: Alfredo L. Lanza CRE-120; Rolando T. Rodolfo CRE-370;
Renato P. Villanueva CRE-412; Brendo S. Poquiz DWV-112.
<damages> Moral damages are recoverable when the dismissal of an employee is attended by bad faith or fraud or constitutes an act oppressive to labor,
or is done in a manner contrary to good morals, good customs or public policy.
Exemplary damages may be awarded if the dismissal is effected in a wanton,
oppressive or malevolent manner.
5.
6.
7.
MPSI appealed the Order to the NLRC, which modified it by deleting the
award of additional backwages in favor of respondent Brendo S. Poquiz.
2.
In a letter dated 9 June 1993 to MPSI, the AWU president sought the
dismissal from service of respondents who were expelled from AWU. On
11 June 1993, the MPSI issued a memorandum to respondents
terminating them effective immediately pursuant to the closed-shop
8.
Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, which reversed
the NLRC (for GAD) and ordered reinstatement. The CA held that at the
time of theor dismissal, they were already regular considering their
length of service. Citing LC280, as long as the employee has rendered at
least one year of service, he becomes a regular employee for the activity
2
2.
3.
5.
3.
NO. LC Art 223, as amended by RA 6715, and Sec 2 of NLRC Interim Rules on
Appeals under RA 6715 provide that an order of reinstatement by LA is immediately executory even pending appeal. This saving act is designed to stop, although
temporarily since the appeal may be decided in favor of appellant, a continuing
threat or danger to the survival or even life of the dismissed employee and his
family.
Reinstatement is the restoration to a state or condition from which one has been
removed or separated. The intent of the law in making a reinstatement order
immediatelyexecutory is much like a return-to-work order, i.e., to restore the
status quo in the workplace in the meantime that the issues raised and the proofs
presented by the contending parties have not yet been finally resolved. It is a legal provision which is fair to both labor and management because while execution
of the order cannot be stayed by the posting of a bond by the employer, the workers also cannot demand their physical reinstatement if the employer opts to reinstate them only in the payroll.
Payment of separation pay as a substitute for reinstatement is allowed
only under exceptional circumstances, viz: (1) when reasons exist which are not
attributable to the fault or are beyond the control of the employer, such as when
the employer -- who is in severe financial strait, has suffered serious business
losses, and has ceased operations -- implements retrenchment, or abolishes the
position due to the installation of labor-saving devices; (2) when the illegally dismissed employee has contracted a disease and his reinstatement will endanger
the safety of his co-employees; or, (3) where a strained relationship exists between
the employer and the dismissed employee.
As regards retrenchment, it is a management prerogative consistently recognized and affirmed by this Court. It is, however, subject to faithful compliance
with the substantive and procedural requirements laid down by law and jurisprudence. For retrenchment to be considered valid, the following substantial requirements must be met: (a) the losses expected should be substantial and not
merely de minimis in extent; (b) the substantial losses apprehended must be reasonably imminent such as can be perceived objectively and in good faith by the
employer; (c) the retrenchment must be reasonably necessary and likely to effectively prevent the expected losses; and (d) the alleged losses, if already incurred,
and the expected imminent losses sought to be forestalled, must be proved by sufficient and convincing evidence. In the discharge of these requirements, it is the
employer who has the onus, this being in the nature of an affirmative defense.
Normally, the condition of business losses is shown by audited financial documents like yearly balance sheets, profit and loss statements and annual income
tax returns. The financial statements must be prepared and signed by independent auditors, failing which these can be assailed as self-serving documents.
IN THIS CASE, Composite sought to justify the payment of separation pay instead of reinstatement on the basis of its implementation of a retrenchment program for serious and persistent financial difficulties. However, it only submitted
as evidence the notice of its intention to implement a retrenchment program,
which it sent to DOLE. It did not submit its financial statements duly audited by
Johnson & Johnson v Johnson Office and Sales Union GR No. 172799
JOHNSON & JOHNSON (PHILS.), INC. V. JOHNSON OFFICE & SALES UNION-FFW
(CELEBRADO)
Johnson & Johnson (Phils.), Inc., Janssen Pharmaceutica, and/or Rafael
Besa vs. Johnson Office & Sales Union-Federation of Free Workers
(FFW), Ma. Jesusa Bonsol and Rizalinda Hirondo
G.R. No. 172799 | July 6, 2007 | 2nd Division | Tinga, J.
FACTS:
Bonsol and Hirondo filed for illegal dismissal against Johnson & Johnson
(Phils.), Inc. and Janssen Pharmaceutica. LA dismissed the complaint, but
the NLRC ruled that the violations of company procedure committed by them did
not constitute serious misconduct or willful disobedience; hence, they were entitled to reinstatement.
Johnson & Johnson acceded to this, but offered its intention to pay separation
pay but Bonsol and Hirondo refused and insisted on their reinstatement.
The company insisted that they have the right to choose either the payment of
separation pay or the reinstatement based on the finding that while their termination was illegal, they were not entirely faultless as they did not follow the exact procedure in the performance of their duties and that reinstatement was no
longer feasible in view of the strained relations between the parties.
However, NLRC dismissed this because it recognized the right to choose of
Bonsol and Hirondo and disregarded Johnson & Johnsons claim of strained
relations. CA affirmed the NLRC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the option to choose between reinstatement or separation pay
belongs, by default, to the employees? (No.)
HELD:
NO. Johnson & Johnson, et. al are mistaken in holding that they have the prerogative to choose whether to reinstate them to their former positions or to just
pay their monetary award. Neither party can claim that it has the categorical
right to choose between reinstatement and the payment of the monetary award.
Ultimately, the NLRC has the authority to execute its judgment and to settle any
issue that may arise pertaining to the manner or details of implementing its
judgment.
Well-entrenched is the rule that an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to
reinstatement as a matter of right. However, where reinstatement is not feasible,
expedient or practical, as where reinstatement would only exacerbate the tension
and strained relations between the parties, or where the relationship between the
4
employer and employee has been unduly strained by reason of their irreconcilable
differences, particularly where the illegally dismissed employee held a managerial or key position in the company, it would be more prudent to order payment of
separation pay instead of reinstatement. The payment of separation compensation in lieu of the reinstatement of an employee who was illegally dismissed from
work shall be allowed if and only if the employer can prove the existence of circumstances showing that reinstatement will no longer be for the mutual benefit of the
employer and employee.
The NLRC properly exercised its authority to resolve the controversy when it categorically ordered the reinstatement to the former positions. The NLRC upheld
the continuing primacy of reinstatement as the available relief and made short
shrift that separation pay should be awarded in lieu of reinstatement. The Court
defers the common finding of the NLRC and Court of Appeals since the issue of
the existence of strained relations between the parties is factual in nature.
5.
Retuya vs Dumarpa
Facts:
-
Antonio Murilo (father) and Rodolfo Murillo (son) manage Insular Builders, Inc (all respondents). The petitioners were workers who have rendered services to corporations owned by the respondents.
The petitioners were told to temporarily stop working when the Murillos
engaged in a feud. Father discharged son from work and took over Insular Builders. Thereafter, father dismissed the petitioners but they were
made to continue doing the same work in Queen City Builders, a corporation managed by son.
Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of wages,
and other benefits. They claimed that they were terminated without valid cause and with no notice.
Defendants claim that petitioners are not their employees, and that it
was son who was employing them.
LA found for petitioners. Father and Insular Builders are liable. NLRC
reversed.
CA upheld LA ruling.
Issues:
W/N petitioners are entitled to the benefits? YES
W/N son is liable to pay solidarily with father and Insular Builders? NO
Held:
-
Illegally dismissed employees are entitled to back wages that should not
be diminished or reduced by the amount they have earned from another
employment during the period of their illegal dismissal.
Having been illegally dismissed, petitioners should be awarded back
wages in accordance with Bustamante v. NLRC. The fact that they
worked for a sister company immediately after being dismissed from Insular Builders, Inc. should not preclude such award.
While it may be true that petitioners continued to work in the same place
and office as in their previous employment, it is equally true that they
had in fact been illegally dismissed by their previous employer. Thus,
they lost their former work status and benefits in a manner violative of
the law. Be it noted that, without their consent, their employment was
changed -- from Insular, which was controlled by father; to Queen City,
which was managed and controlled by son. Thus, they became new employees of the latter firm and, as such, were deprived of seniority and
other employment benefits they had when they were still with their former employer
Moreover, petitioners are entitled to separation pay. As provided by Article 279 of the Labor Code, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to
the twin reliefs of 1) either reinstatement or separation pay, if reinstatement is no longer feasible; and 2) back wages. These are distinct
and separate reliefs given to alleviate the economic setback brought
about by the employees dismissal. The award of one does not bar the
other. Back wages may be awarded without reinstatement, and reinstatement may be ordered without awarding back wages.
The Court held here that son is not liable because he was not the employer of petitioners when they were dismissed from Insular Builders,
Inc. It was father who dismissed them, as evidenced by the Dismissal
Report submitted to the DOLE. In fact, the son was also dismissed together with petitioners.
6.
7.
Luz Catenza filed a complaint for illegal dismissal after Divine Word
sacked her for misdeeds and immoral acts of her husband Pablo, then
principal of the same school
Divine Word contends that it was her conduct of covering up and concealing said immoral acts committed by her husband against a student,
Remie Ignacio
Labor Arbiter submitted the case for decision without waiting for petitioner to rest its case
LA: reinstatement, backwages
NLRC: affirmed
Yes, Divine Word failed to prove their allegations about the alleged conduct of
Pedro and the supposed concealment by Luz.
It is very apparent that the main reason she was dismissed was because of the
alleged immoral conduct of her husband. He was never investigated or convicted.
Neither was there any proof to the covering up asserted by the school.
2.
The Labor Arbiter Francisco Robles dismissed Loreta's complaint for lack
of merit. He found it more probable that Loreta was dismissed from her
employment due to Wensha's loss of trust and confidence in her. This ruling was affirmed by the NLRC in its December 29, 2006 Resolution
Loreta moved for a reconsideration of the NLRC's ruling but her motion
was denied.
Loreta then went to the CA on a petition for certiorari. The CA reversed the ruling of the NLRC on the ground that it gravely abused its
discretion in appreciating the factual bases that led to Loreta's dismissal.
The CA noted that there were irregularities and inconsistencies in
Wensha's position.
No, because the school was afforded every opportunity to present their evidence,
but they repeatedly failed to appear at the 4 consecutive hearings scheduled.
There is no denial of due process where a party was afforded an opportunity to
present their case.
3.
they advised her to take a leave of absence for one month while they conducted an investigation on the matter.
No, while herself innocent, the continued presence of Catenza as a teacher in the
Catholic institution may well be met with antipathy and antagonism by some
sectors in the school community.
8.
9.
WENSHA SPA CENTER, INC. AND/OR XU ZHI JIE, VS. LORETAT. YUNG
Issue:
Held:
For a valid termination by the employer: (1) the dismissal must be for a
valid cause as provided in Article 282, or for any of the authorized causes
under Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code; and (2) the employee must
be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. A just and
valid cause for an employee's dismissal must be supported by substantial
evidence, and before the employee can be dismissed, he must be given
notice and an adequate opportunity to be heard.
As correctly found by the CA, the cause of Loreta's dismissal is questionable. Loss of trust and confidence to be a valid ground for dismissal must
have basis and must be founded on clearly established facts. It is the employer who bears the burden of proving that its dismissal of the employee
is for a valid or authorized cause supported by substantial evidence.
Facts:
Wensha Spa Center, Inc. in Quezon City is in the business of sauna bath
and massage services. is its president, respondent Loreta T. Yung was its
administrative
manager
at
the
time
of
her
termination
from employment.
Loreta introduced positive changes to Wensha which resulted in increased business. This pleased Xu so that on May 18, 2004, she was promoted to the position of Administrative Manager. Loreta recounted that
on August 10, 2004, she was asked to leave her office because Xu and a
Feng Shui master were exploring the premises.
Later that day, Xu asked Loreta to go on leave with pay for one
month. She did so and returned on September 10, 2004.
Upon her return, Xu and his wife asked her to resign from Wensha because, according to the FengShui master, her aura did not match that of
Xu. That same afternoon, Loreta went to the NLRC and filed a case for
illegal dismissal against Xu and Wensha.
10.
Cirilo A. Pial was an employee of DUP Sound Phils. (DUP), an entity engaged in the business of recording cassette tapes for various recording
companies.
1st Employment- May-December 1988
2nd Employment- October 1991 job of mastering tape; main function
was to adjust the sound level and intensity of the music to be recorded as
well as arrange the sequence of the songs to be recorded in the cassette
tapes
August 21, 2001- was absent from work due to sickness
Next day: office secretary told him not to report for work until such time
that they will advise him to do so as per Tan, the owners instruction
After 3 weeks, without receiving any notice, Pialagain called up their office, the secretary told him to look for another job since he was terminated.
Pial filed for unpaid service incentive leave pay, full backwages, separation pay.
LA: Illegally Dismissed. Reinstatement plus backwages, COLA and Service Incentive Pay
NLRC: Deleted backwages. No ID nor abandonment of work
CA reinstated the LA Decision
(1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable
reason
(2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship, with the
second as the more determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts
from which it may be deduced that the employee has no more intention to
work.
ISSUE/s:
HELD:
No Abandonment of Work
DUP failed to prove that the latter indeed stopped reporting for work
without any justifiable cause or a valid leave of absence
Even if he did abandonshould have afforded him due process by serving him written notices, as well as a chance to explain his side
Dismissal based on a just cause under Article 282: ER must give the EE
2 written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by
the employee before terminating the employment: a notice specifying the
grounds for which dismissal is sought and after hearing or opportunity to
be heard, a notice of the decision to dismiss
PLUS: refusal to report for work subsequent to the Labor Arbiter's issuance of an order for his reinstatement not abandonment of his job.
GR: failure to report for work after a notice to return to work has been
served does not necessarily constitute abandonment.
As defined under established jurisprudence, abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment. It
is a form of neglect of duty, hence, a just cause for termination of employment by the employer.
For a valid finding of abandonment:
DUP failed to submit sufficient evidence to show that dismissal was for a
justifiable cause and in accordance with due process
ON REINSTATEMENT:
THUS it cannot be said that petitioners intended to reinstate private respondent neither to his former position under the same terms and conditions nor to a substantially equivalent position.
The notice that petitioners sent is silent with regard to the position or
exact nature they wanted the private respondent to assume. He was then
assigned to a different job, as well as transfer of work assignment without any justification which cannot be deemed as faithful compliance with
the reinstatement order
He was placed in an untenable situation which practically left him with
no choice but to leave his assigned task also shows the strained relations
that has developed between the parties
Reinstatement is no longer viable where relations between the employer and the employee have been so severely strained, that it is not in
the best interest of the parties, nor is it advisable or practical to order reinstatement, or where the employee decides not to be reinstated.
In the case, reinstatement would be impractical and would hardly promote the best interest of the parties. Resentment and enmity between
petitioners and private respondent necessarily strained the relationship
between them or even provoked antipathy and antagonism as shown by
the acts of the parties subsequent to the order of reinstatement.
Besides, private respondent expressly prayed for an award of separation
pay in lieu of reinstatement from the very start of the proceedings before
the Labor Arbiter. By so doing, he forecloses reinstatement as a relief by
implication.
Where reinstatement is no longer viable as an option, separation pay
equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service should be
awarded as an alternative
LA: Not illegally dismissed. Chang offered to re-employ Ranara but the
latter refused. It was Ranara who chose not to work for Chang anymore.
NLRC: Affirmed LA. The offer to re-employ the petitioner should not be
disregarded in assessing the motives of the parties as it was a genuine effort on the part of the private respondents to settle the controversy.
Issue/Holding/Ratio
WON the petitioner was illegally dismissed. Yes, he was illegally dismissed without due process.
The secretary would not have presumed to dismissed him if she had not
been authorized to do so, considering the seriousness of this act. Neither
Chang nor his mother (OIC in his absence) reversed such act. They could
not have failed to notice that Ranara was replaced since they employ less
than ten persons.
Ranara could not have abandoned his work since he instituted an action
within three days of his termination.
The fact that his employer later made an offer to re-employ him did not
cure the vice of his earlier arbitrary dismissal. The wrong had been
committed and the harm done. Notably, it was only after the complaint
had been filed that it occurred to Chang, in a belated gesture of good will,
to invite Ranara back to work in his store.
Also it is expected that he wouldnt want to work for the respondents
again because it would be uncomfortable to work under the hostile eyes
of an employer who was forced to reinstate him.
It is clear that the petitioner was illegally dismissed without even the politeness of a proper notice. Without cause and without any investigation,
formal or otherwise, Ranara was simply told that he should not report
back for work the following day. When he did so just the same, thinking
she had only spoken in jest, he found that somebody else had been employed in his place. When he protested his replacement, he was even
scolded for being "hard-headed" and not accepting his dismissal.
The failure of the petitioner to file a motion for reconsideration of the
NLRC decision before coming to this Court was not a fatal omission. In
the interest of substantial justice, and especially in cases involving the
rights of workers, the procedural lapse may be disregarded to enable the
Court to examine and resolve the conflicting rights and responsibilities of
the parties.
Note: He failed to prove he started employment from 1991. Separation Pay must
be reckoned from January 1996. Backwages from August 22, 2001 until finality of
decision.
11.
Ranara v. NLRC
G.R. No. 100969; 14 August 1992; Cruz, J.
Facts
12.
Garcia v. PAL
GR No. 164856 / 20 Jan 2009 / J. Carpio Morales
FACTS
After due notice, PAL dismissed petitioners on 9 Oct for transgressing the
PAL Code of Discipline, prompting them to file for illegal dismissal.
Prior to the promulgation of the LA decision, PAL was placed by the SEC
under a rehabilitation receiver, as it was suffering severe financial losses.
PAL moved to quash the writ and lift the notice while petitioners moved to
release the garnished amount.
PAL filed an urgent petition for injunction with the NLRC which by
resolutions on 26 Nov 2001 and 28 Jan 2002, affirmed the validity of
the writ and notice, but suspended and referred the action to the
rehabilitation receiver for appropriate action.
HELD
First sub-issue:
The Genuino case ruled that the employer has a right to require the
dismissed employee on payroll reinstatement to refund the salaries
he received while the case was pending appeal if the decision of the
LA is later reversed on the ground that the dismissal is valid.
Thus it was argued that there is no point in releasing wages to petitioners since their dismissal was found to be valid, and to do so
would constitute unjust enrichment.
A subsequent finding of valid dismissal removes the basis for implementing the reinstatement aspect of a labor arbiter's decision
2.
The impossibility to comply with the reinstatement order due to corporate rehabilitation provides a reasonable justification for the failure to exercise the options under Art. 223 of the LC.
The SEC, by order of 28 Sep 2007, granted PAL's request to exit from rehabilitation proceedings. In view of this, SC moves to resolve remaining issue.
ISSUE
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect
is concerned, shall immediately be executory, pending appeal.
The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same
terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation,
or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll.
The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution
for reinstatement provided herein.
W/N petitioners may collect wages during the period between the LA order
of reinstatement pending appeal and the NLRC decision overturning the
LA. No, because of the second ground.
The social justice principles of labor law outweigh or render inapplicable the civil law doctrine of unjust enrichment.
There is a requirement for a writ of execution despite the immediately executory nature of the reinstatement aspect of the decision.
Even if the order of reinstatement by the LA is reversed on appeal, it is obligatory on the part of the employer to reinstate and pay the wages of
the dismissed employee during the period of appeal until reversal by the
higher court.
Facts:
October 1994: Magana was summarily replaced with another nurse. In lieu of
a nursing-related position, respondent offered petitioner the position of liaison officer. Finding the offer unacceptable and with her continued nonassignment, petitioner sued respondent and the Hotel in the NLRC for illegal
dismissal and payment of benefits and damages.
CA: dismissal was not illegal and removed the award of reinstatement wages.
Second sub-issue
2.
Here, petitioner exerted efforts to execute the LA decision but the writ of
execution was only issued after the reversal by the NLRC of the LA decision.
Unless there is a restraining order the implementation of the order of reinstatement is ministerial and mandatory.
But injunction or suspension of claims by legislative fiat (the receivership) partakes the nature of a restraining order that constitutes a legal justification for PAL's non-compliance.
Thus, the obligation to pay petitioners' salaries pending appeal did not attach.
PAL was effectively deprived of alternative choices under LC Art. 223, not
only by the statutory injunction but in view of the interim relinquishment
of management control to give way to full exercise of the powers of the rehabilitation receiver.
Dispositive:
13.
In any event, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated
employee, insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be
executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to
work under the same terms and conditions
prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer,
merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not
stay the execution for reinstatement provided herein.
Xxx
The Commission shall decide all cases within
twenty (20) calendar days from receipt of the
answer of the appellee. The decision of the
Commission shall be final and executory after
ten (10) calendar days from receipt thereof by
the parties.
Any law enforcement agency may be deputized
by the Secretary of Labor and Employment or
the Commission in the enforcement of decisions, awards or orders. (As amended by Section 12, Republic Act No. 6715, March 21,
1989)
Article 223 gives employers two options, namely, to (1) actually reinstate the
dismissed employees or, (2) constructively reinstate them in the payroll. Either way, this must be done immediately upon the filing of their appeal,
without need of any executory writ. This unusual, mandatory order by law to
execute reinstatement orders pending appeal, unheard of in ordinary civil
proceedings, is a police power measure, grounded on the theory that the
preservation of the lives of the citizens is a basic duty of the State, that is
more vital than the preservation of corporate profits. Then, by and pursuant
to the same power, the State may authorize an immediate implementation,
pending appeal, of a decision reinstating a dismissed or separated employee
since that saving act is designed to stop, although temporarily since the appeal may be decided in favor of the appellant, a continuing threat or danger to
the survival or even the life of the dismissed or separated employee and its
family.
The SC ruled that pending appeal, reinstatement wages under 223 is mandatory, and does not require an executor writ for it to be demanded by the employee ordered to be reinstated. Also, the subsequent ruling of a higher court
of the validity of the dismissal will not preclude the reinstatement wages
from being demandable; neither will it make the dismissed employee liable to
return reinstatement wages.
Respondent is not only bound to pay petitioner her reinstatement wages, had
it done so, it is precluded from recovering the amount paid post-reversal of
the arbiter's reinstatement order by the Court of Appeals.
15.
The Arbiter found Lansangan and Cendanas dismissal to be valid. Such finding
had, as stated earlier, become final, they not having appealed it. Lansangan and
Cendanas are not entitled to full backwages as their dismissal was not found to
be illegal. Agabon v. NLRC so states payment of backwages and other benefits
is justified only if the employee was unjustly dismissed.
16.
17.
18.
1995 termination notice it issued, petitioners expressly acknowledged that respondent began incurring absences without leave after [he was] put behind bars
due to [his] involvement in a killing incident. It clearly indicates that petitioners
knew early on of the situation of respondent. It also explains why in its reply before the LA, appeal before the NLRC and petition for certiorari before CA,
petitioners never questioned the truth about respondent's detention.
A.
Abandonment; When acts considered abandonment; To justify the dismissal of respondent for abandonment, petitioners should have established
by concrete evidence the concurrence of two elements: (1) that respondent
had the intention to deliberately and without justification abandon his employment or refuse to resume his work; (2), that respondent performed overt
acts from which it may be deduced that he no longer intended to work.
Bustamante v. NLRC
28 November 1996
J. Padilla
Petitioner
Osmalik S. Bustamante, Paulino A. Bantayan, Fernando L. Bustamante, Mario
D. Sumonod, and Sabu J. Lamaran
Respondent
National Labor Relations Commission, Fifth Division and Evergreen Farms, Inc.
First Division of SC promulgated a decision reversing the NLRC decision and
reinstating the LAs decision with the modification that backwages should be paid
to petitioners from the time of their illegal dismissal on June 25 1990 up to the
date of their reinstatement. If reinstatement was no longer feasible, one-month
salary shall be paid as ordered in the LAs decision in addition to the adjudged
12
Respondents
Issue
Whether or not the income derived by the employee elsewhere during the period
of his illegal dismissal should be deducted from the award of backwages. NO
Ratio:
Court explained different laws enacted over the years for computation. RA 875
Industrial Peace Act, PD 442 (Labor Code) RA 6715 amending Art 279 of the LC,
When RA 6715 took effect on 21 March 1989, the pertinent portion of Article 279
of the Labor Code was amended to read as follows:
TU,
NLRC affirmed LA
TOMAS
denied allegations, transfer had, for its sole consideration, the best interest of the company and that it was agreed into when they signed their
employment contracts
no reason to get back at the complainants on account of their refusal to
sign the adverted signature sheet, since majority of the employees in the
bargaining unit had already ratified
during their employment, complainants committed several offenses:
o Tungpalan failed to report for work; broke a breaker; signed an
overtime form but did not render overtime work, and had several unexcused absences
o Espiritu a number of tardiness and absences
o Regalado was suspended 7 days for absences, issued a memorandum for not wearing the proper uniform and for tardiness
o Paguirigan had 10 unexcused absences and was suspended
twice on such account
November 11, 1998, they reported for work, but not allowed entry & they
were instead instructed by Personnel Manager, Mr. Jessie Ongsitco, to
receive a Memorandum of Transfer which they refused
alleged that their transfer to a provincial post constituted constructive
dismissal
13
employer who bears the burden of proving that the transfer of an employee is for just and valid grounds, such as genuine business necessity,
and such transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the
employee. An employers failure to discharge such burden would make
him liable for unlawful constructive dismissal.
o combined circumstances of the immediate transfer of respondents to far-off provinces after their refusal to sign the signature
sheet of the document for the ratification of the Addendum to
the CBA, and petitioners emphasis on respondents alleged previous infractions at work, point to the fact that the transfers are
motivated by ill-will
o Petitioner, failed to sufficiently prove that transfer is for a just
and valid cause and not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to the employee, making it liable for constructive dismissal
Petitioner: CA erred in ordering payment of backwages from dismissal up to reinstatement instead of ordering backwages only from the time the CA ruled
SC: CA never ordered the reinstatement of respondents but instead ordered the
payment of separation pay. As to issue of backwages, where an employee
would have been entitled to reinstatement with full backwages, but circumstances, i.e., strained relationships, makes reinstatement impossible,
the more equitable disposition would be an award of separation
pay equivalent to at least one month pay, or one month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher, in addition to full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, computed from the time
the employees compensation was withheld from him up to the time of
his supposed actual reinstatement
since payment of backwages and separation pay were ordered only upon
CA Decision, and the case was further elevated to this Court, then the
supposed actual reinstatement, had reinstatement been feasible, would
have been upon the finality of this Courts decision
computation of full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and other benefits or their monetary equivalent, should be computed from the time
the respondents compensation was withheld from them up to
the time of the finality of this decision
21.
Gonzales not having reported on May 5, 1998, Angerbauer sent him telegram at his provincial address (why havent you explained blah blah security concerns - PLEASE CONSIDER THIS AS OUR FINAL ADVICE.)
Gonzales, claims to have received only in the afternoon of May 7; immediately repaired back to Manila on May 8, only to be humiliatingly and
ignominiously barred by the guard (a subordinate of [Gonzales]) from entering
May 7, Angerbauer issued Notice of Termination through an inter-office
memo (violations of rule no. 27, Type C, of the House Code of Discipline
Acts of gross disobedience or insubordination and provisions of the Labor Code, specifically Art. 282. Termination by Employer, par. (a) x x x
willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer
or representative in connection with his work.)
Gonzales filed a complaint] against Acesite, Angerbauer and Kennedy for
illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and payment of full
backwages, service incentive leave, 13th month pay, moral and exemplary
damages and attorneys fees. Gonzales, however, failed to appear in 2
consecutive hearings dismissed
Gonzales refiled his complaint for illegal dismissal against Angerbauer
and Kennedy, which he amended by impleading Acesite as respondent
LA: dismissed; Gonzales was dismissed for just cause and was not denied of due
process
NLRC reversed LA
2) pay backwages beginning for the period May 16, 1998, until he is
actually reinstated, inclusive of all his other fringe benefits or their monetary
equivalent;
4)
pay
(on strained relations, therefore pay instead of reinstatement alam nyo na yan!)
Gonzales position is one of trust and confidence, he being in charge of the over-all
security of said hotel. Thus, reinstatement is no longer possible.
moral and exemplary damages unwarranted
(Angerbauer and Kennedy as corporate offices NOT solidarily liable with Acesite
no inhuman treatment of Gonzales; bad faith or malice was not proven.
Angerbauer, acting on behalf of Acesite, was, like Gonzales, perhaps also too presumptuous in thinking that the telegrams ordering the latter to report for work
were all received on time, drawing him to hastily conclude that Gonzales intentionally disobeyed the orders)
(IMPROTANT PART!)
As to the deletion of the fringe benefits or their monetary equivalent,
not in accord with law and jurisprudence.
LC 279 - xxx An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to
reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full
backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from
him up to the time of his actual reinstatement.
(attorneys fees proper because Gonzales having been forced to litigate and incur
expenses to protect his rights and interest BUT reduce to P10,000)
22.
23.
REYES vs CA
15
General Manager of Philippine Malay Poultry Breeders in the Philippines (formed by Leong Hup). Salary of $5,500/month. Started employment in 1992.
Leong Hup and Phil. Malay suffered losses in 1996-1997 which caused them to
reduce production and retrench employees in Phil. Malay. Dr. Reyes gave verbal
notice to Francis Lau (President) that he will serve as GM only until Dec. 31,
1997, and submitted his letter of resignation of Jan. 12, 1998. He asks for the
benefits given to retrenched/resigned employees such as separation pay of 1
month salary for every year of service and the monetary equivalent of his sick and
vacation leaves.
Additionally, he asks for:
payment of underpaid salary from Dec. 1989- Dec. 31, 1997 + additional
1 salary payable every year at the rate of P26.30
office rentals at the rate of $300 for use of his residence as the office of
Phil. Malay
retention of the legal services of Quasha Ancheta Pena and Nolasco Law
Firm for the illegal recruitment case against him
Phil. Malay only offered him separation pay for 4 months, which Reyes did not
accept. He thus filed a complaint against respondent.
LA: granted Reyes all the benefits he claims, plus attorney's fees equivalent to
10% of the total claim
NLRC: omitted from the award: unpaid salary from Jan. 1, 1998- Jan. 18, 1998,
vacation leave pay, brand new car, office rentals, life insurance policy, moral
damages (P2.5 million), and exemplary damages (P2.5 million). It likewise reduced the amount of separation pay (basing it on 8 years of service instead of 9),
and also reduced the award of attorney's fees (excluding separation pay as its
basis).
Reyes appealed to the CA, but the CA dismissed such for failure to attach to the
petition his: position paper filed before the Labor Arbiter, his Memorandum of
Appeal, and the Labor Arbiter's decision. Reyes later attached these but the CA
still sustained its ruling.
Issues:
1.w/n CA erred in dismissing the petitition
2. w/n LA's decision should be reinstated
Held:
1. YES. Subsequent and substantial compliance of an appellant may call for the
relaxation of the rules of procedure. Clearly, petitioner had demonstrated willingness to comply with the requirements set by the rules. If we are to apply the rules
of procedure in a very rigid and technical sense, as the Court of Appeals did in
this case, the ends of justice would be defeated.
2. NO. The Court ruled on the following awards:
24.
Unpaid salary: NLRC correct in ruling that Reyes is not entitled to compensation from Jan. 1, 1998- Jan 19, 1998 as he did not prove that he
rendered services during that time
Damages: NLRC correct in deleting award for moral and exemplary
damages as respondents were not shown to have acted in bad faith nor in
a wanton, oppressive, or malevolvent manner
Car and insurance benefits: NLRC correct in omitting such as these are
only granted during the course of employment and should thus not be a
part of the separation package
Office rentals: NLRC correct in omitting this as claim for such is not
within the jurisdiction of labor courts. The rent agreement is based on
contractual, and not employer-employee, relations.
Sick and vacation leaves: NLRC shouldn't have deleted the award of vacation leaves to Reyes. Vacation and sick leaves are awarded as part of
the retrenchment packages whether or not these have been used.
Attorney's fees: NLRC erred in excluding separation pay as part of the
basis for attorney's fees, as such is part of the wages he recovered.
Art. 111. Attorney's fees-- (a) in cases of unlawful withholding of wages,
the culpable party may be assessed attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of
the amount of wages recovered....
There are 2 kinds of attorney's fees:
(1) Ordinary: reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for
the legal services he has rendered
(2) Extraordinary: a form of damages ordered by the court to be paid to
the litigant by the losing party pursuant to Art. 2208 of the Civil Code. In
labor cases in particular, the following provisions apply:
2208: In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot be recovered except:
(7) in actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and
skilled workers.
111 (Labor Code) Attorney's Fees: (a) in cases of unlawful withholding of
wages, the culpable party may be assessed attorney's fees equivalent to
10% of the amount of wages recovered. (b) It shall be unlawful for any
person to demand or accept, in any judicial or administrative proceedings
for the recovery of wages, attorney's fees which exceed 10% of the amount
of wages recovered.
M+W Zander Phil Inc v Enriquez GR No. 169173 ( 2009)
the same day, a Letter of Appeal was signed by 29 employees of M+W Zander,
opposing the appointment of Wiltschek.
A day after the Letter of Appeal was released, a number of employees did not
report to work.
Upon discovering respondent Enriquez's participation in drafting and in circulating the Letter of Appeal, as well as in the alleged work stoppage that occurred a day after the release of the Letter, M+W Zander sent a Notice to respondent Enriquez, requiring her to explain within 48 hours from receipt of
the notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against her for willful
breach of trust and using her authority and/or influence as Administration
Manager of M+W Zander over her subordinates to stage a "no work day" on.
It was indicated that willful breach of trust has a corresponding penalty of
dismissal. Meanwhile, respondent Enriquez was placed under preventive
suspension for 15 working days.
On March 1, 2002, a Notice of Termination was received by respondent informing her that her services as Administration Manager and Executive Assistant to the General Manager of M+W Zander are terminated effective the
same day. The respondent was found liable for "willful breach of trust and
confidence in using [her] authority and/or influence as Administrative Manager of M+W Zander Philippines over [her] subordinate to stage a 'no work
day' last February 1, 2002, which in turn disrupted vital operations in the
Company."
The Court found that Eriquez had been illegally dismissed.
ISSUE: Whether or not Enriquez is entitled to moral damages and attorneys
fees
HELD: Yes. She is entitled to moral damages and attorneys fees.
RATIO:
Moral damages are recoverable only where the dismissal of the employee was
attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or
was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. Such
an award cannot be justified solely upon the premise that the employer fired
his employee without just cause or due process. Additional facts must be
pleaded and proven to warrant the grant of moral damages under the Civil
Code, i.e., that the act of dismissal was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy; and, of course, that social humiliation,
wounded feelings, grave anxiety, and similar injury resulted therefrom.
In previous cases where moral damages and attorney's fees were awarded,
the manner of termination was done in a humiliating and insulting manner,
such as in the case of Balayan Colleges v. National Labor Relations
Commission where the employer posted copies of its letters of termination
to the teachers inside the school campus and it also furnished copies to the
town mayor and Parish Priest of their community for the purpose of maligning the teachers' reputation. So also in the case of Chiang Kai Shek School
tioner corporation and there appears to be no evidence on record that he acted maliciously or in bad faith in terminating the services of respondent. His
act, therefore, was within the scope of his authority and was a corporate act
for which he should not be held personally liable for.
25.
missed but reinstatement is no longer feasible. In fact, the rule is that an employee who voluntarily resigns from employment is not entitled to separation pay,
except when it is stipulated in the employment contract or collective bargaining
agreement (CBA), or it is sanctioned by established employer practice or policy.
Here, respondent was separated from his employment not on the grounds mentioned above. Neither was there a stipulation in his employment contract or CBA
or even a company practice or policy that would grant separation pay to employees who voluntarily resigned. Nevertheless, the labor tribunals as well as the CA
resolved to grant respondent his prayer for separation pay, explaining that he
deserved to receive the same as a gratuity for his loyalty and long service to the
company, not to mention the representation of Caludac that he would be given all
the benefits due him.
Clearly, the primary consideration that impelled respondent to tender his resignation letter was the assurance that he would be paid his separation pay. It is
thus unlikely for someone to just leave his employer for whom he has worked for
twelve (12) years without any expectation of financial assistance.
In Alfaro v. CA, the court held that as a general rule, separation pay need not be
paid to an employee who voluntarily resigns. However, an employer who agrees to
expend such benefit as an incident of the resignation should not be allowed to renege on the fulfillment of such commitment. In this case, Caludac, as OIC Branch
Manager in Tacloban City, represented petitioner and was responsible for overseeing respondent's work in pursuance of the company's goal of an increase in
sales and customer satisfaction. Such control was manifested through the communications of Caludac to respondent regarding the latter's performance.
Corollarily, the court cannot fault respondent for relying on Caludac's representations and promises, as in fact it was to him that he first verbally relayed his plan
to resign from the company. Not only the CA, but also the Labor Arbiter and the
NLRC, that was convinced that without the assurance of payment of benefits,
respondent would not have tendered his resignation letter.
On Respondent's claim for rest day pay differential:
The court upheld the decision of the NLRC that he was entitled to a rest day pay
differential. An examination of the vouchers submitted by respondent showed
that while complainant was paid bi-monthly, he was actually paid on the number
of days worked. Thus, every time he is absent, he will not be paid for the day. He
is for all intents and purposes, a daily paid employee. As such, he has to be paid
rest day pay when he works on his rest days. With complainant's categorical assertion that he worked during his rest days especially in the month of December,
the Labor arbiter did not err in awarding him rest day pay. There is however a
need to modify this award to cover only the period from July 1990 up to July 1993
as the claim before 1990 had already prescribed.
Respondent filed his claim for rest day differential in July 1993. It follows then
that he is only entitled to his rest day pay within the three-year period counted
from the time of the filing of his complaint, or from July 1990. Thus, the NLRC
correctly ruled that respondent's claim before July 1990 had already prescribed in
accordance with Article 291 of the Labor Code.
18
26.
Palteng v UCPB
27.
Triad Security and Allied Services v Ortega 481 SCRA 591 ( 2006)
Triad Security and Allied Services, Inc. and Que v. Ortega Jr. et al (2006).
FACTS:
They were found liable by the LA. Order of the Labor Arbiter:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
They already paid separation pay, backwages should no longer be included in the amount due.
The guards had already found other jobs. To award them backwages
would be unjust enrichment.
They claim that they owe only P603,794.77.
SC: RE remedies
Illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs: backwages and reinstatement. These are separate and distinct from each other. However, separation pay
is granted where reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained relations
between the employee and the employer. In effect, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement
is no longer viable and backwages.
Backwages and separation pay are, therefore, distinct reliefs granted to one who
was illegally dismissed from employment. The award of one does not preclude
that of the other as this court had, in proper cases, ordered the payment of both.
IN THIS CASE:
Triad only paid the separation pay more than years after LAs judgment. Until
the payment of separation pay is carried out, the employer should not be allowed
to remain unpunished for the delay, if not outright refusal, to immediately execute the reinstatement aspect of the labor arbiters decision.
28.
Reliefs and Remedies in Illegal Dismissal Cases> Backwages, Damages, Attorney's Fees
In a number of cases, the SC, despite ordering reinstatement or payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement, has not awarded backwages as penalty for the
misconduct or infraction committed by the employee. In the case at bar, petitioner
admitted that she granted the BP accommodation against Mercados personal
checks beyond and outside her authority. The LA, the NLRC and the CA all found
her to have committed an "error of judgment,","honest mistake" vis--vis a "major
offense."
Since petitioner was not faultless in regard to the offenses imputed
against her, SC held that the award of separation pay only, without
backwages, is proper.
29.
Business Day Information Systems and Services Inc v NLRC 221SCRA 9
( 1993)
Business Day Information Systems and Services Inc. v. NLRC
Businessday Information Systems due to financial reverses, some plant employees, including the private respondents, were laid off. BSSI retained some employees in an attempt to rehabilitate its business as a trading company. However,
barely two and a half months later, these remaining employees were likewise discharged because the company decided to cease business operations altogether.
At the conciliation proceedings before Labor Arbiter Manuel P. Asuncion, petitioners denied that there was unlawful discrimination in the payment of separation benefits to the employees. They argued that the first batch of employees was
paid "retrenchment" benefits mandated by law, while the remaining employees
were granted higher "separation" benefits because their termination was on account of the closure of the business.
In case of retrenchment of a company to prevent losses and closure of business
operation, the law provides:
Art. 283. Closure of establishment and reduction of personnel.-The employer may
also terminate the employment of any employee due to the installation of labor
saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or the closing or cessation of operations of the establishment or undertaking unless the closing is for
the purpose of circumventing the provisions of this Title, by serving a written
notice on the workers and the Ministry of Labor and Employment at least one (1)
month before the intended date thereof. In case of termination due to the installation of labor saving devices or redundancy, the worker affected thereby shall be
entitled to a separation pay equivalent to at least his one (1) month pay or to at
least one (1) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. In case of
retrenchment to prevent losses and in cases of closures or cessation of operations
of establishment or undertaking nut due to serious business losses or financial
reverses, the separation pay shall be equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least
one half (1/2) month pay for every year of service, whichever is higher. A fraction
of at least six (6) months shall be considered one (1) whole year." (Labor Code;
emphasis supplied.)
Undoubtedly, petitioners' right to terminate employees on account of retrenchment to prevent losses or closure of business operations, is recognized by law, but
it may not pay separation benefits unequally for such discrimination breeds resentment and ill-will among those who have been treated less generously than
others.
The law requires the granting of the same amount of separation benefits to the
affected employees in any of the cases. The respondent argued that the giving of
more separation benefit to the second and third batches of employees separated
was their expression of gratitude and benevolence to the remaining employees
who have tried to save and make the company viable in the remaining days of
operations. The law requires an employer to extend equal treatment to its employees. It may not, in the guise of exercising management prerogatives, grant
greater benefits to some and less to others. Management prerogatives are not
absolute prerogatives but are subject to legal limits, collective bargaining agreements, or general principles of fair play and justice (UST vs. NLRC, 190 SCRA
758). Article 283 of the Labor Code, as amended, protects workers whose employment is terminated because of closure of the establishment or reduction of
personnel (Abella vs. NLRC, 152 SCRA 141, 145).NLRC AFFIRMED.
30.
Labor Arbiter: There was valid dismissal. However the LA awarded separation
pay for del Rosarios 21 years of service without previous derogatory record.
NLRC: Dismissed Manila Waters appeal for failure to append a certification
against forum shopping.
CA: Affirmed the LAs award of separation pay considering that Del Rosario rendered 21 years of service to the company without previous derogatory record.
Issue: W/N del Rosario is entitled to separation pay. NO.
While Manila Water questioned the ruling of the LA, del Rosario did not appeal
his illegal dismissal so the court no longer dwelt on the question of his termination. Only the question of separation pay was discussed.
As a general rule, an employee who has been dismissed for any of the just causes
enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code is not entitled to a separation
pay. In exceptional cases, however, the Court has granted separation pay to a
legally dismissed employee as an act of "social justice" or on "equitable grounds."
In both instances, it is required that the dismissal (1) was not for serious misconduct; and (2) did not reflect on the moral character of the employee.
In the case of Toyota Motor Phils. Corp. Workers Association vs. NLRC, the court
expanded the exclusions on separation pay saying that it shall be allowed as a
measure of social justice only in instances where the employee is validly dismissed for causes OTHER THAN:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
32.
Manila Water Company v. Carlito del Rosario G.R. No. 188747, January
29, 2014
Manila Water vs. Carlito del Rosario
Perez, J.
Facts:
Manila Water conducted a hearing and del Rosario again confessed his
involvement. Manila Water proceeded to dismiss him from employment.
Del Rosario filed an action for illegal dismissal.
serious misconduct,
willful disobedience,
gross and habitual neglect of duty,
fraud or
willful breach of trust,
commission of a crime against the employer or his family, or
those reflecting on his moral character.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10. Caragdag assailed the decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator before the CA
thru certiorari. CA dismissed the petition outright for being the wrong
remedy (should have been a petition for review). Even if it were the
correct mode of appeal, it was filed out of time. MR was denied and
Caragdag is now before the SC thru a petition for review on certiorari.
22
11. In the meantime, the hotel also filed a petition for review with the CA on
the ground that the Voluntary Arbitrator committed a grievous error in
awarding financial assistance to Caragdag despite his finding that the
dismissal due to serious misconduct was valid. CA deleted the award,
citing PCIB v. Abad which held that the grant of separation pay or other
financial assistance to an employee dismissed for just cause is based on
equity and is a measure of social justice, awarded to an employee who
has been validly dismissed if the dismissal was not due to serious
misconduct or causes that reflected adversely on the moral character of
the employee. MR was denied and Caragdag filed a petition for review on
certiorari for this case as well.
II. Issues
Whether the CA erred in deleting the award of financial assistance in the amount
of P100,000.00 to Caragdag. NO
III. Holding
CA decisions affirmed.
IV. Ratio
Caragdag is entitled to financial assistance in the amount of P100,000 on
humanitarian considerations. Caragdags infractions were due to his being a
union officer and his acts did not show moral depravity. While it is true that the
award of financial assistance is given only for dismissals due to causes specified
under Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code, as amended, this Court has, by way
of exception, allowed the grant of financial assistance to an employee dismissed for
just causes based on equity.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
34.
2.
3.
A special audit was then conducted which showed that 67,748 PLDT
second-endorsed dividend checks, covered by 332 deposit slips, and with
a total amount of P6.713 million, were drawn on RCBC-Makati and made
payable to different payee corporations and prominent personalities.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
formers evident disobedience. NLRC also ruled that due process was
accorded. NLRC likewise sustained the award of separation pay as a
form of equitable relief.
9.
Both filed petitions for certiorari with the CA. CA reversed the NLRC
and held that the dismissal was effected without due process of law and
without just cause. The termination was preordained as manifested by
Equitable's lack of intention to even consider his explanation before the
decision to terminate him was arrived at. This is shown by the fact that
even before Dompor received the show cause memorandum, the
management, thru the audit team, had already recommended his
dismissal. Dompors appeal from the notice of dismissal was left
unheeded by Equitable. On the substantive aspect, the CA found no
transgression of bank internal rules but rather, compliance with the
limitations and restrictions imposed in connection with the acceptance
for deposit of second-endorsed checks, thereby exhibiting good faith, if
not, mere lapses in judgment. According to the CA, the potential loss that
Equitable may incur was merely speculative as no material harm was
actually sustained by the bank.
10. Dompor filed a motion to clarify and amend the dispositive portion of the
CA Decision to include his reinstatement without loss of seniority rights
and other privileges as provided for by the Labor Code. Equitable, on the
other hand, filed an MR to reverse the finding of illegal dismissal. CA
denied both motions.
II. Holding
NLRC and LA decisions are reinstated.
III. Ratio
We are aware that in several instances this Court has awarded separation pay as
a measure of social justice. However, separation pay shall be allowed as a
measure of social justice only in those instances where the employee is validly
dismissed for cause other than serious misconduct, and separation pay should not
be conceded to an employee who was dismissed based on willful disobedience.
Consequently, the same should be deleted.
1.
2.
Willful breach of trust requires that "the loss of confidence must not be
simulated; it should not be used as a subterfuge for causes which are
illegal, improper or unjustified; it may not be arbitrarily asserted in the
face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary; it must be genuine, not a
mere afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith; and, the
employee involved holds a position of trust and confidence."
3.
It was not denied that on June 27, 1996, Dompor was instructed by
management to stop accepting second-endorsed checks due to the
irregularities attendant to the transactions with Fuentes. Despite such
reasonable order, on two occasions, Dompor unhesitatingly
accommodated the request of Fuentes to accept her checks allegedly on
the strength of the Area Heads approval on the first instance and on the
second instance, Dompor justifies his acceptance of the checks as the
same were nevertheless returned and cancelled on the ground that the
checks include those payable to corporations.
5.
The return and cancellation of these checks do not change the fact that
Dompor had accepted for deposit checks which are payable to
corporations, thereby flagrantly violating bank guidelines.
6.
The CA put premium on Dompors efforts in doing his job well by increasing the
branchs deposit level and protecting the interest of Equitable notwithstanding
lapses in judgment, thus discounting bad faith in Dompors acts. The penalty of
dismissal is discordant with the infraction as no monetary prejudice was caused to
Equitable and in consideration of his many years of valuable service.
7.
35.
Marilyn Abucay was a traffic operator for PLDT. She was dismissed for cause
when two customers complained that she was demanding P3,800 from them to
facilitate their application for telephone line installation. The Labor Arbiter held
that the dismissal was valid but ordered PLDT to pay her 1 month pay for every
year of service (10 years total). PLDT appealed.
ISSUE: Was lower courts award of separation pay to an employee dismissed for
just
cause
contrary
to
law?
(YES in this case).
SC: A review of jurisprudence reveals that the award of separation pay despite
valid dismissal is:
1.
2.
3.
The award is grounded on equity and not law; authority to award such is
found in social justice and Constitutional preference for labor.
The application of such has not been consistent. Awards have been given
for a range of offenses and the amounts have also been different.
HOWEVER, there must be more consistency in its application, hence:
We should not rationalize compassion. I vote to affirm the grant of financial assistance. (Grino-Aquino)
NLRC should decide the amount to award depending on the facts of each
case (Fernan/Padilla)
Paduata v MECO GR no 170098 ( 2012)
25
2)
3)
gypsum board and cornice installers until they were dismissed for abandonment
of work.
The latter filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. LA declared the dismissals illegal and ordered it to pay the monetary claims. NLRC reversed the decision. CA
agreed with NLRC.
ISSUE:
Whether or not indemnity in the form of nominal damages must be paid to an
employee who is legally dismissed but the employer did not observe procedural
due process? (Yes)
HELD:
YES. They had abandoned their employment and were already working for another employer. They were frequently absent having subcontracted for an installation work for another company. Subcontracting for another company clearly
showed the intention to sever the employer-employee relationship. An employee
who deliberately absented from work without leave or permission from his employer, for the purpose of looking for a job elsewhere, is considered to have abandoned his job.
In this case, where the employer had a valid reason to dismiss an employee but
did not follow the due process requirement (because they thought sending letters
to their last known address as futile), the dismissal may be upheld but the employer will be penalized to pay an indemnity to the employee. This became known
as Belated Due Process Rule.
Where the dismissal is for a just cause, as in the instant case, the lack of statutory due process should not nullify the dismissal, or render it illegal, or ineffectual. However, the employer should indemnify the employee for the violation of
his statutory rights. The indemnity to be imposed should be stiffer to discourage
the abhorrent practice of dismiss now, pay later, which we sought to deter. The
sanction should be in the nature of indemnification or penalty and should depend
on the facts of each case, taking into special consideration the gravity of the due
process violation of the employer. The sanction should be in the nature of indemnification or penalty, and depends on the facts of each case and the gravity of the
omission committed by the employer.
The violation of the employees right to statutory due process by the employer
warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages. The amount
of such damages is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, taking into account the relevant circumstances. We believe this form of damages would serve to
deter employers from future violations of the statutory due process rights of employees. At the very least, it provides a vindication or recognition of this fundamental right granted to the latter under the Labor Code and its Implementing
Rules.
FACTS:
Separate Opinions
37.
26
FACTS
Ruben Serrano was the head of the security checkers section of Isetann Department Store. He was charged with the task of supervising security checkers in
their jobs (apprehending shoplifters and preventing pilferage of merchandise). On
October 11, 1991, the management sent him a letter immediately terminating his
services as security section head, effective on the same day. The reason given by
the management was retrenchment; they had opted to hire an independent security agency as a cost-cutting measure. Serrano filed a complaint for ID, illegal
layoff, ULP, underpayment of wages and non-payment of salary and OT pay with
the LA.
The LA rendered a decision in favor of Serrano. It stated that Isetann failed to
establish that it had retrenched its security division, that the petitioner was not
accorded due process, etc. and even stated that the day after Serranos dismissal,
Isetann employed a safety and security supervisor with similar duties to that
of the former.
The NLRC on the other hand reversed the LA but ordered Isetann to pay separation pay equivalent to one month per year of service, unpaid salary, et al. It held
that the phase-out of the security section was a valid exercise of management
prerogative on the part of Isetann, for which the NLRC cannot substitute its
judgment in the absence of bad faith or abuse of discretion on the part of the latter; and that the security and safety supervisors position was long in place prior
to Serranos separation from the company, or the phase-out of the Security Section.
ISSUE
Whether the petitioners dismissal was illegal.
RULING: Valid, but ineffectual (without legal effect) payment of backwages,
separation pay and other monetary claims
o. The Court held that the dismissal was due to an authorized cause under Art.
283 of the Labor Code, i.e. redundancy. However, while an authorized cause exists, Isetann failed to follow the procedural requirement provided byArt. 283 of
LC. For termination due to authorized causes, the employer must give a written
notice of termination to the employee concerned and to the DOLE at least 30 days
prior to its effectivity. This Isetann failed to do. The question now arises as
to whether the failure of Isetann to comply with the procedural requirements
renders the dismissal invalid, or, in the event that it is valid, what the appropriate sanction or penalty must be meted out. Prior to the doctrine laid down in the
decision rendered in Wenphil Corp.NLRC in 1989, the termination of
an employee, even for just cause but without following the requisite procedure,
renders such dismissal illegal, and therefore null and void.
In the Wenphil doctrine , this was reversed; the said rule was unjust to employers. Instead, the dismissal was held to be still valid but the employer was sanctioned by way of the payment of indemnity (damages)
Serrano vs NLRC
27
in that case, P1,000. The amount of indemnity will be depended on the circumstances of each case, taking into account the gravity of the offense committed by
the employer.
Now, the Court once again examines the Wenphil doctrine. Puno says that the
effect of the Wenphil doctrine was such that there has been a dismiss now, pay
later policy where the employers were able to circumvent the procedural requisites of termination, which is more convenient than the compliance with the 30day notice. Panganiban said that the monetary sanctions were too insignificant,
niggardly, sometimes even late. Both justices are of the opinion that the deprivation of due process which must be accorded to the employee renders the dismissal
illegal. Puno quoted that Legislative, Executive and Judicial proceedings that
deny due process do so under the pain of nullity. Panganiban stated that such
denial of due process renders decisions and proceedings void for lack of jurisdiction.
The present ruling of the Court held that the dismissal of the employee is merely
ineffectual, not void. The dismissal was upheld but it is ineffectual. The sanction
provided was the payment of back wages from the time of dismissal up to the decision of the court finding just or authorized cause. This was thought to balance
the interests of both parties, recognizing the employees right to notice and at the
same time the right of the employer to dismiss for any of the just and authorized
causes.
The Court also responded to the arguments of Justices Puno and Panganiban by
stating that the violation in the procedural requirement of termination is not a
denial of the fundamental right to due process. This is because of the ff reasons:
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
The due process clause is a limitation on governmental powers, inapplicable to the exercise of private power, such as in this case. The provision
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty and property without due
process of law pertains only to the State, as only it has the authority to
do the same.
The purpose of the notice and hearing under the Due process clause is to
provide an opportunity for the employee to be heard before the power of
the organized society is brought upon the individual. Under Art. 283,
however, the purpose is to give him time to prepare for the eventual loss
of his job and for DOLE to determine whether economic causes exist
to justify termination. It is not to give opportunity to be heard there is
no charge against the employee under Art. 283
The employer cannot be expected to be an impartial judge of his own
cause.4)
Not all notice requirements are requisites of due process. Some are simply a part of a procedure to be followed before a right granted to party can
be exercised; others are an application of the Justinian precept. Such is
the case here. The failure of the employer to observe a procedure for the
termination of employment which makes the termination of employment
merely ineffectual.
Art. 279 of the LC provides that only dismissal without just or authorized cause renders such dismissal illegal. To consider termination with28
40.
41.
Alba and de Guzman filed separate complaints for illegal dismissal and
payment of retirement benefits against Y.L. Land Corporation and Ultra
Motors Corporation, respectively
Yupangco was impleaded in his capacity as President of both corporations
LA: in favor of both, liable jointly
NLRC: certified the resolution as final and executory
LA issued a Writ of Execution which was returned unsatisfied prompting
issuance of an alias writ
Yupangcos club shares at the Manila Golf and Country Club was
distrained
Yupangco argues that he should not be made solidarily liable with the
corporations
2 other alias writs were issued
CA: set aside all writs
No, there is no proof that dismissal was effected with malice of bad faith. His liability can therefore only be joint.
In labor cases, corporate directors and officers are solidarily liable with the corporation for the termination of employees done with malice or in bad faith.
By declaring that respondents liability is solidary, the Labor Arbiter modified the
already final and executory October 25, 1999 Decision. That is impermissible,
even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact and law,
whether it be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court in the
land. The only recognized exceptions are the corrections of clerical errors or the
making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party
and in cases where the judgment is void. Said exceptions are not present in the
present case.
Since the alias writ of execution did not conform, is different from and thus went
beyond or varied the tenor of the judgment which gave it life, it is a nullity. To
maintain otherwise would be to ignore the constitutional provision against depriving a person of his property without due process of law.
42.
43.
2011)
Respondent Ronald Valderama was hired by Nationwide Security and Allied Serv
ices (NSAS) as security guard on April 18, 2002. He was assigned at the
Philippine Heart Center (PHC), Quezon City, until his relief on January
30, 2006.
Valderama was not given any assignment thereafter. Thus, on August 2,
2006, he filed a complaint for constructive dismissal and nonpayment
of 13th month pay, with prayer for damages against petitioner and Romeo Nolasco.
However, NSAS alleged that Valderama was not constructively or illegally dismissed, but had voluntarily resigned. NSAS averred that
Valderama has committed serious violations of the security rules in the
workplace. And by the order of the Operations Manager, he was relieved
from his post at the Philippine Heart Center and was directed to report
to the office. Despite his voluntary resignation, NSAS sent him a letter
through registered mail to report for the office and give information on
whether or not he was still interested for report for duty or not.
Valderama claims that he was relieved from PHC on January 30, 2006;
thereafter, he was not given a new assignment.
Except for NASA's bare assertion that respondent did not report to the
office for reassignment, no proof was offered to prove that respondent intended to sever the employer-employee relationship.
Jurisprudence is trite with pronouncements that the temporary inactivity or "floating status" of security guards should continue only for six
months. Otherwise, the security agency concerned could be liable for constructive dismissal. The failure of petitioner to give respondent a work
assignment beyond the reasonable six-month period makes it liable for
constructive dismissal. If there is a surplus of security guards caused by
lack of clients or projects, the security agency may resort to retrenchment
upon compliance with the requirements set forth in the Labor Code. In
this way, the security agency will not to be held liable for constructive
dismissal and be burdened with the payment of backwages.
However, Valderama did not bother to reply nor did he report to the office.
Issue:
Held:
Yes, he was. In cases involving security guards, a relief and transfer order in itself does not sever employment relationship between a security
guard and his agency.
An employee has the right to security of tenure, but this does not give
him a vested right to his position as would deprive the company of its
prerogative to change his assignment or transfer him where his service,
as security guard, will be most beneficial to the client.
Temporary "off-detail" or the period of time security guards are made to
wait until they are transferred or assigned to a new post or client does
not constitute constructive dismissal, so long as such status does
not continue beyond six months.
The onus of proving that there is no post available to which the security
guard can be assigned rests on the employer, viz.: When a security guard
44.
Bilbao was a former flight attendant of SaudiA from 1988 to 2004. She
was assigned at the Manila Office with regular flights from Manila to
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia and VV.
Due to operational requirements, 10 FAs including Bilboa were transferred to Jeddah Office, and she initially complied with the transfer order
but later resigned instead by tendering a resignation letter.
Bilbao ALSO executed and signed an Undertaking similar to that of a
Receipt, Release and Quitclaim wherein she acknowledged receipt of a
sum of money as full and complete end-of-service award with final settlement and have no further claims whatsoever against Saudi Arabian
Airlines
30
Bilbao then filed with the NLRC a complaint for reinstatement and payment of full backwages. Two other FAs also filed a complaint.
Resignation was not voluntary
Common theory: transfer to Jeddah was a prelude to their termination since they were all allegedly between 39 and 40 years of age
Defense of SaudiA:
Letters were handwritten and duly signed
Was not subjected to any force, intimidation, or coercion as they
wrote the letter.
Received without protest a generous separation package (despite
fact that those who voluntarily resigned are not entitled such)
Office transfer of FAs was a valid exercise of its management
prerogative
LA: Illegally dismissed. Backwages and separation pay granted.
NLRC: Reversed. Dismissed
Addtl. defense of SaudiA: claim of illegal dismissal was a mere
afterthought as they waited for almost one year from the date of
their alleged dismissal to file it.
CA: Affirmed NLRC.. Resignation of OWN FREE WILL AND VOLUNTARY ACT
ISSUE/s:
HELD:
On her Voluntary Resignation
Her resignation letter and undertaking that evidenced her receipt of separation
pay, when taken together with her educational attainment and the circumstances
surrounding the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal, comprise substantial
proof of Bilbaos voluntary resignation.
Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where one
believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the
service, and one has no other choice but to dissociate oneself from employment.
It is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with the intention of
relinquishing the office accompanied by the act of relinquishment.
As the intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the
acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered
in determining whether he or she, in fact, intended to sever his or her employment.
She tendered her resignation letter a week after her transfer to the Jeddah office,
a letter that used words of appreciation and gratitude (for support which Saudia
gave for 18 yrs of service) negates the notion that she was forced and coerced to
resign.
She also executed an Undertaking in favor of Saudia, wherein she declared that
she received her full and complete end-of-service award with final settlement.
She also waited for more than 10 months after separation to file a complaint for
illegal dismissal.
Even if the letter was prepared by SAUDIA, she couldnt have been coerced and
intimidated into signing it.
She was no ordinary employee who may not be able to completely comprehend and realize the consequences of her acts AND an educated individual.
There was no competent evidence to prove that she was forced or threatened by
Saudia. Bare and self-serving allegations of coercion or intimidation, unsubstantiated by evidence, do not constitute proof to sufficiently support a finding of
forced resignation.
No Illegal Dismissal
There was no showing that the Undertaking and resignation letter were executed
by Bilbao under force or intimidation
.
45.
Such leave was approved. However when he went back to work, he was
not allowed to do so by his supervisors. He was informed that only the
President could admit him back. He was not reinstated after 5 attempts
to return,
They admitted that Capulso was their employee, but alleged that he
went on terminal leave due to his illness, and eventually, filed a resignation letter.
31
The following are their documentary evidence: Sworn statement from the
supervisor that Capulso actually resigned, contract of employment with
Filipinas Paso evidencing that he was transferred to such company already, dated letter of resignation, undated letter of resignation, BIR
form, Individual income tax return and an alphabetical list of Filipinas
Pasos employees.
LA: For AZCOR
to Add Force or disregarded the clients budget ceiling, sent out several communications to clients containing erroneous data and computations, consistently failed to submit her reports, and submitted fictitious daily activity reports and reimbursement slips.
Add Force insisted that Mandapat resigned and was not dismissed. It explained that Mandapat was placed on preventive suspension because of the
risk she posed on its property and business. Add Force added that
Mandapats preventive suspension for 1 day can hardly be considered indefinite, given that she immediately resigned 1 day after the suspension.
LA: charges of gross and habitual neglect and loss of trust and confidence
were not substantiated, and declared Mandapat to have been constructively
dismissed.
CA: reversed the decisions of NLRC and LA. The CA sustained the preventive
suspension as a valid exercise of management prerogative pending investigation for a perceived violation of company rules. The CA ruled that Mandapat
chose to resign from her job and her resignation mooted the issue of preventive suspension.
46.
To constitute voluntary resignation, there must be an unconditional intent to do so. The fact that he went back to work and pursued this case
shows the lack of intent to resign. The resignation letters presented by
AZCOR are similarly worded, both of which were in English and had
blanks. These circumstances show that the letters were pre-drafted. He
was not even conversant in the English language due to his low level of
education. He even denied that the signatures therein were actually his.
Even if it was his however, AZCOR was not able to prove that Capulso
actually knew what he was signing when he signed the letter.
Furthermore, even if he delayed in filing the case (4 months after dismissal), such cannot operate against Capulso as he actually had 4 years to
file an action under the law. In these kinds of cases, the onus of proving
that the dismissal was for a just and authorized cause rests with the employer.
A'Prime Security Services v NLRC 322 SCRA 283 ( 2000)
47.
Ma. Socorro Mandapat was hired by Add Force Personnel Services, Inc. as
Sales and Marketing Manager to negotiate and consummate contracts with
clients who wanted to avail of Add Forces services.
Add Force gave Mandapat a show-cause notice directing her to explain why
she should not be disciplined for gross and habitual neglect of duties and willful breach of trust. The notice also placed her on preventive suspension during the course of the investigation. According to Add Force, during her 5-mo.
stint as Sales and Marketing Manager, Mandapat failed to close a single
deal, issued several proposals to clients which were grossly disadvantageous
Constructive dismissal exists when an act of clear discrimination, insensibility or disdain by an employer has become so unbearable to the employee leaving him with no option but to forego his continued employment.
Section 8, Rule XXIII, Book V, Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code,
as amended by Department Order No. 9, S. 1997:
Preventive suspension may be legally imposed on employee whose alleged violation is the subject of an investigation. The purpose of his suspension is to
32
prevent him from causing harm or injury to the company as well as to his fellow employees.
Section 9, Rule XXIII, Book V, Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code,
as amended by Department Order No. 9, S. 1997:
No preventive suspension shall last longer than 30 days and the employer
shall thereafter reinstate the worker in his former or in a substantially
equivalent position or the employer may extend the period of suspension provided that during the period of extension, he pays the wages and other benefits due to the worker. When preventive suspension exceeds the maximum
period allowed without reinstating the employee either by actual or payroll
reinstatement or when preventive suspension is for an indefinite period, only
then will constructive dismissal set in.
While no period was mentioned in the show-cause memorandum, the inclusion of the phrase during the course of investigation would lead to a reasonable and logical presumption that said suspension in fact had a duration
which could very well be not more than 30 days as mandated by law. And, as
the CA correctly observed, the suspension was rendered moot by Mandapats
resignation tendered a day after the suspension was made effective.
At most, she was merely given the option to either resign or face disciplinary
action, which the APSI had every right to conduct in light of the numerous infractions committed by Mandapat. There is nothing irregular in providing an
option to her. Ultimately, the final decision on whether to resign or face disciplinary actions rests on Mandapat alone.
Dispositive:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The 27 July 2007 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 98868 is AFFIRMED.
48.
Intercontinental Broadcasting Corporation v Amarllla GR No.
162775 (2006)
49.
The preventive suspension was also necessary to protect Add Forces assets
and operations pending investigation of Mandapat. As Sales Manager,
Mandapat had the power to enter into contracts that would bind Add Force,
regardless of whether these contracts would prove to be beneficial or prejudicial to its interest.
In a letter dated Dec 3, 1992, respondent, through its HR, informed petitioner
that she was approaching her 35th year of service with the university and was
due for automatic retirement on Nov 18, 1993, at which time she would be 57
years old. This was pursuant to respondents retirement plan for its employees
which provided that its members could be automatically retired "upon reaching
the age of 65 or after 35 years of uninterrupted service to the university.
The cutting-off of Mandapats internet access was not harassment but a consequence of the investigation against her and was intended to prevent her
from having further access to the companys network-based documents and
forms. Add Forces acts were just measures to protect itself while the investigation was ongoing.
Petitioner insisted that the compulsory retirement under the plan was tantamount to a dismissal and pleaded with respondent to be allowed to work until the
age of 60 because this was the minimum age at which she could qualify for SSS
pension. But respondent stood pat on its decision to retire her, citing "company
policy."
Petitioner filed a complaint in the NLRC for "termination of service with preliminary injunction and/or restraining order."
On Nov 18, 1993, respondent compulsorily retired petitioner.
ISSUES:
1) did respondents retirement plan imposing automatic retirement after 35 years
of service contravene the security of tenure clause in the 1987 Constitution and
the Labor Code?
2) did respondent commit illegal dismissal by retiring petitioner solely by reason
of such provision in its retirement plan?
HELD:
YES.
33
51.
Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corp v Caballeda 560 SCRA 115
(2008)
52.
fits must be reckoned from 1985, when petitioner was incorporated, and not in
1979.
Cabotaje filed a complaint in the NLRC for payment of retirement benefits under
RA 7641 (Retirement Pay Law).
LA: In favour of Cabotaje; new companys obligation to absorb employees
NLRC: Still in favour of Cabotaje, but reduced award to month pay for every
year of service
CA: Affirmed NLRC decision
ISSUES: Whether or not RA 7641 shall retroactively apply to the case at bar
(YES)
Whether or not 5 days SIL pay or just a 1/12 portion thereof should be included in
the month salary for purposes of computing retirement pay (YES 5 days SIL
pay shall be included)
Whether or not length of service of a retired employee in a dissolved company
should be included in his length of service with his last employer for computing
retirement pay (YES)
RESOLUTION: Petition DENIED; CA decision AFFIRMED
B.
C.
Components of One-half (1/2) Month Salary. For the purpose of determining the
minimum retirement pay due an employee under this Rule, the term one-half
month salary shall include all the following:
(a) Fifteen (15) days salary of the employee based on his latest salary rate. x x x;
(b) The cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leave;
(c) One-twelfth of the 13th month pay due an employee;
(d) All other benefits that the employer and employee may agree upon that should
be included in the computation of the employees retirement pay.
D.
53.
Piercing the corporate veil; ESIA and ESSI are the same corporation; (1) Cabotaje worked with both ESIA and ESSI; (2) His employment
with both security agencies was continuous and uninterrupted; (3) both agencies were owned by the Enriquezes; (4) ESIA and ESSI occupied the same office
Ozales v Unilab 559 SCRA 26 (2008)
34
sideration of the continued faithful service of the employee for the requisite
period.
The employer and the employee may establish such stipulations, clauses,
terms, and conditions as they may deem convenient; however, their stipulations, clauses, terms, and conditions should not be contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order, or public policy.
Oxales v Unilab
21 July 2008
J. Reyes
Issues:
1.
2.
Held:
The URP of Unilab should be upheld. In this case, RA 7641 or the Retirement Pay
Law does not apply in view of the URP which gives to the retiring employee more
than what the law requires.
1.
February 15, 1982, respondent Reuters Limited, Phils, a company engaged in news dissemination with offices worldwide, hired Marilyn
Odchimar Gerlach, petitioner, as its local correspondent
October 1, 1983, Reuters implemented a local Retirement Benefit Plan
for its Philippine-hired employees
o funded by the company, but an employee-participant may volunteer to contribute a percentage of his basic monthly salary
o Petitioner was automatically covered by the Plan by reason of
her age and length of service
o she opted not to contribute
o worked in Reuters Philippines up to December 23, 1983
35
LC 287. Retirement. Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement
age established in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract.
In case of retirement, the employee shall be entitled to receive such retirement benefits as he may have earned under existing laws and any collective bargaining agreement and other agreements."
Llora Motors, Inc. vs. Drilon: LC 287, does not in itself purport to impose
any obligation upon employers to set up a retirement scheme for their
employees over and above that already established under existing laws,
like the Social Security Act
respondent based petitioners retirement benefits on its Plan and established policy, which is in accord with the above provision
36
56.
FACTS:
Petitioners Roberto Ariola, Franco Mallare, Benjamin Biete and Hermogenes
Mamayson
("petitioners")
are
former
supervisors
of
respondent Philex Mining Corporation ("Philex"). In 1992, Philex sustained financial
losses in its operations. To save costs, Philex adopted several measures including
reducing personnel through early voluntary retirement and retrenchment programs. A workforce audit showed that Philex had 310 "excess positions." Philex re-assigned some of the employees belonging to this group while
others took early retirement, leaving 241 positions for retrenchment.
On 29 April 1993, Philex and the labor union representing the rank-and-file employees signed a Memorandum of Agreement ("rank-and-file's MOA") prescribing
the criteria for retrenchment. The following day, 30 April 1993, the union representing the supervisory employees also signed a Memorandum of Agreement
("supervisors' MOA") with Philex similarly prescribing the criteria for retrenchment.
On 14 May 1993, Philex informed the Department of Labor and Employment
("DOLE"), Cordillera Administrative Region, Baguio City, of its plan to retrench
241 employees.
On 1 June 1993, petitioners, with six other supervisors and 49 rank-and-file employees, received from Philex termination notices informing them of their retrenchment under their respective MOAs effective 30 June 1993. Philex paid
them separation pay. All of them signed Deeds of Release and Quitclaim
in Philex's favor.
It was alleged that the employees had availed of the early voluntary retirement
program of the company as VA Advincula mentioned in her decision. The vouchers signed by them indicating their receipt of payment of retirement.
ISSUE: Whether or not the employees retired or were retrenched
HELD: They did not retire; they were retrenched.
RATIO:
The vouchers which the petitioners signed show their receipt of "retirement gratuity." Although there is no dispute that petitioners received varied
amounts denominated in the vouchers in question as "retirement gratuity," the
records show that Philex paid these amounts because of petitioners' retrenchment.
Thus, in the letter dated 1 June 1993, addressed to petitioner Benjamin Biete
("Biete"), Tomas Z. Roxas, Jr. ("Roxas") of Philex Retirement Trust informed petitioner Biete that he was entitled to receive "retirement gratuity" equivalent to
one month salary for every year of service because "[Biete's] separation at the
instance of Philex MiningCorporation as a result of its retrenchment program.
Clearly, under Philex's Retirement Gratuity Plan, "retirement gratuity" is paid
not only to retiring employees but also to those who, like petitioners, are dismissed for cause "beyond their control" such as retrenchment. Indeed, Philex treated the "retirement gratuity" as petitioners' basic separation pay,
by reason of her wanton, arbitrary and illegal dismissal, she suffered damages
and incurred expenses, which should be assessed, in her favor.
The Labor Arbiter upheld the dismissal of Caguioa and ruled that the respondent
Bank in a valid exercise of management prerogative terminated her employment,
finding her to have violated its Code of Conduct. The NLRC reversed the decision
of the LA and declared that there was illegal dismissal. The CA held that Caguioa
had been illegally dismissed from employment for lack of clear and convincing
evidence which establish her direct participation in the alleged check discounting
activity/transaction remotely detrimental to the business and interest of the petitioner bank.
ISSUE: WON respondent was illegally dismissed.
60.
61.
Retirement
Rivera v Unilab
April 22, 2009 | BRION, J.
FACTS:
Petitioner Rivera commenced employment with respondent United Laboratories, Inc. (UNILAB) on April 7, 1958 as senior manufacturing
pharmacist. She later became Director of UNILAB's Manufacturing Division.
In 1959, UNILAB adopted a comprehensive retirement plan supported
by a retirement fund, consisting of Trust Fund A where it would put in
its contributions for the account of the member-employee and Trust Fund
B consisting of the contributions of the members themselves. Under the
plan, a member is compulsorily retired upon reaching the normal retirement date which is the date when the member has reached age 60 or has
completed 30 years of service, whichever comes first.
In 1988, Rivera completed 30 years of service and UNILAB retired
her pursuant to the terms of the plan. Rivera's accrued retirement benefits under Trust Fund A and Trust Fund B were withdrawn from the retirement fund and deposited in Trust Fund C, a special account from
which she could make withdrawals as she pleased.
At Rivera's request, UNILAB allowed her to continue working for the
company; she was even promoted to the position of Assistant VicePresident and rendered service to the company in this capacity until the
end of 1992, at which time, Rivera retired from employment with the
company.
From 1993 to 1994, Rivera served as a personal consultant under contract with UNILABs sister companies.
On December 16, 1992, the company amended its retirement plan,
providing, among others, for an increase in retirement benefits from 1
month to 1.5 months of terminal basic salary for every year of service.
Rivera asked that her retirement benefits be increased in accordance
with the amended retirement program.UNILAB did not reply to this letter and Rivera made two follow-up letters, reiterating her demand.
UNILAB denied Riveras request, and explained that since the upgrade
of the retirement benefit formula occurred in December 1992, the upgraded formula does not apply to her; what applied to her case is the
formula that governed in 1988, the year she compulsory retired from the
plan.
Rivera sought legal assistance and demanded a recomputation through
her lawyer. UNILAB again rejected the demand.
Rivera sought relief from the NLRC in an action against UNILAB for recovery of unpaid retirement pay differential.
LA dismissed the complaint for lack of merit.
NLRC denied Riveras appeal.
After the latters MR was denied, case was elevated to the CA which
ruled in favor of Rivera and remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter for
hearing on the merits. It found that Rivera's claim for retirement had not
yet prescribed but avoided ruling on the merits of the case by reason of
what it recognized as "an existing controversy as to the crucial fact of
when precisely petitioner retired from respondent company for purposes
of determining whether or not she is covered by respondent's amended
retirement plan so as to fix the amount of retirement benefits." MR filed
39
by respondent and partial MR filed by petitioner (asking the CA to resolve the remaining issues raised) were both denied. Hence, the present
petition.
Section 13 of the Rules to Implement the Labor Code, on the other hand,
provided that
In the absence of any collective bargaining agreement or other
applicable agreement concerning terms and conditions of employment which provides for retirement at an older age, an employee may be retired upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years.
These were the governing laws at the end of 1988 when the petitioner
compulsorily retired under the UNILAB retirement plan. Thus, her retirement was governed by the applicable agreement which was
the UNILAB retirement plan. Under the terms of this pre-1992
plan, her retirement was mandatory as she had reached 30 years
of service.
"Retirement" as a fact carries with it certain legal effects, one of which is
the retired employees termination of the services with the company as of
the retirement date. With this retirement, her coverage by the UNILAB
retirement plan ceased based on the express terms of the plan.
A twist in Riveras case is that she continued working beyond the compulsory separation from service that resulted from her retirement.
Whether she could or could not resume working with the company is, as
a rule, a consensual matter for the parties to agree upon, limited only by
company policies and the applicable terms of the retirement plan. Her
employment terms under this renewed employment are based on what
she and the company agreed upon. Whether these terms included renewed coverage in the retirement plan is an evidentiary gap that could
have been conclusively shown by evidence of deductions of contributions
to the plan after 1988. Two indicators, however, tell us that no such coverage took place. The first is that the terms of the retirement plan, before
and after its 1992 amendment, continued to exclude those who have rendered 30 years of service or have reached 60 years of age. Therefore, the
plan could not have covered her. The second is the absence of evidence of,
or of any demand for, any reimbursement of what Rivera would have
paid as contributions to the plan had her coverage and deductions continued after 1988. Thus, SC concluded that her renewed service did
not have the benefit of any retirement plan coverage
ISSUES/HELD:
1.
2.
3.
RATIO:
2.
3.
15, 1993 when she received her retirement pay check. It could not have
accrued on December 31, 1988 as what was clearly due her then was her
retirement pay up to that date, a matter that is not disputed. On the other hand, the first opportunity for her to claim her retirement pay differential corresponding to her claimed continuous work up to December 31,
1992 came only on January 15, 1993 when she received her final pay that
did not include her service after December 31, 1988. However, the running of the 3-year prescriptive period was effectively interrupted by her
first letter to the respondent on January 7, 1995 when she demanded additional retirement benefits under the 1992 amended retirement plan.
When petitioner then brought her case to the NLRC on August 9, 1996 it
was well within the prescriptive period.
Upon SCs examination of the records of the case, it found that the parties have freely made factual allegations in the course of the dispute
without any major dispute on any material factual issue. Thus, it held
that its in the position to completely rule on the case (Court also noted
that the case is already 13 years old and Rivera is already 78). Also, the
argument that SC will be violating the doctrine of the hierarchy of courts
if it acts on the case, is misplaced: the case had gone through the labor
tribunals and the CA who had all the opportunity to rule on the substantive aspect of the case, yet they failed to do so, or were sidetracked by the
issue of prescription.
Under the facts submitted, SC found that Rivera did retire from the
company on December 31, 1988 after 30 years of service pursuant
to the terms of the companys retirement plan. This was a mandatory retirement and she had no claim relating to the completeness of the
retirement pay she received as of that date.
Retirement in its ordinary signification is the termination of an employees service upon reaching retirement age. Prior to the Retirement Pay
Law (R.A. 7641), Article 287 of the Labor Code simply provided that Any employee may be retired upon reaching the retirement age
established in the collective bargaining agreement or other applicable employment contract; the employee shall be entitled
to receive such retirement benefits as he may have earned under
existing laws and any collective bargaining or other agreement.
Could she have availed of retirement benefits under the Retirement Pay Law that was signed on December 9, 1992 and became effective on December 31 of that year? Unfortunately for her, the answer is
still in the negative as she did not qualify under the terms of that
law when she was retired effective December 31, 1992. At that
point, she was not covered by any applicable retirement plan, as
heretofore discussed. In the absence of a plan, the Retirement Pay
Law requires that an employee must have served for at least 5
years to be entitled to coverage. As of December 31, 2002, her service
without any retirement plan coverage was only 4 years.
62.
KOREAN AIR CO., LTD. and SUK KYOO KIM, vs. ADELINA A.S. YUSON,
June 16, 2010
Nature
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
petition challenges the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals set aside the Resolution of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC), affirming the Decision of the Labor Arbiter.
Facts:
In July 1975, Korean Air Co., Ltd. (Korean Air) hired Adelina A.S. Yuson
(Yuson) as reservations agent. Korean Air promoted Yuson to assistant manager
in 1993, and to passenger sales manager in 1999. Korean Air had an
International Passenger Manual (IPM) which contained, among others, travel
benefit to its employees. However, Korean Air never implemented the travel
benefit under the manual. Instead, Korean Air granted all its employees travel
benefit as contained in the collective bargaining agreement (CBA). Yuson availed
of the travel benefit under the CBA during her stay in the company.
In April 2001, Yuson requested Korean Air that she be transferred from the
passenger sales department to the cargo department because she intended to
pursue a cargo agency business after her retirement. Korean Air then temporarily
transferred Yuson to the cargo department as cargo dispatch. Yuson continued
to receive the same compensation and exercise the same authority as passenger
sales manager.
In view of its net loss of over $367,000,000 in 2000 and in order to cut costs,
Korean Air offered its employees an early retirement program (ERP) not only for
Head Office staffs but throughout all Korean Air branches abroad. Yuson
accepted the offer for early retirement. However, Korean Airs Philippine general
manager Suk informed Yuson that she was excluded from the ERP because she
was retiring on 8 January 2002. Consequently, in a letter dated 1 September 2001
and addressed to Suk, Yuson claimed that Korean Air was bound by the perfected
contract and accused the company of harassment and discrimination.
ERP, for moral and exemplary damages, and for attorneys fees but directed to
pay complainant her retirement benefits.
On 14 February 2003, Tae and Yuson entered into a compromise agreement
and amicably settled the criminal case wherein Yuson accepted P1,671,546.92 as
retirement benefit under Article 287.
Yuson filed with the NLRC an appeal memorandum challenging Labor
Arbiter Santos decision. NLRCs decision adopted the report and
recommendations of Labor Arbiter Tamayo to order Korean Air and Suk to pay
Yuson her benefit under the ERP and to give her 10 Korean Air economy tickets.
Korean Air and Suk filed with the NLRC a motion for reconsideration. In its
resolution, NLRC set aside its previous decision and affirmed Labor Arbiter
Santos decision. Yuson filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The Court of Appeals set aside the NLRCs
resolution and affirmed the commissions decision.
Issues
1.
Whether or not Yusons claim for benefit under the ERP became moot when
she availed of the optional retirement under Article 287 of the Labor Code.
2.
3.
4.
Whether or not Korean Air should award Yuson 10 Korean Air economy
tickets.
Held:
1.
In her reply, Suk stated that the Early Retirement Program (ERP) was
not an absolute offer but rather an invitation to possible qualified employees to
consider the ERP subject to the approval and acceptance by the Company,
through the Head Office, in the exercise of its discretion. The ERP is supposedly
for employees who have still a number of years to serve the Company in order to
prevent further losses.
Thus, on 28 November 2001, Yuson filed with the arbitration branch of the
NLRC a complaint against Korean Air and Suk for payment of benefit under the
ERP, moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.
Consequently, on 8 January 2002, her 60th birthday, Yuson availed of the
optional retirement under Article 287 of the Labor Code, as amended.
In a Resolution dated 30 July 2002, the Bureau dismissed the complaint.
Labor Arbiter Santos denied for lack of merit Yusons claims for benefit under the
Yes, Yusons claim for benefit under the ERP became moot when she availed
of the optional retirement under Article 287 and accepted the benefit. By her
acceptance of the benefit, Yuson is deemed to have opted to retire under
Article 287.
2.
No, Yuson may not claim benefit under the ERP as there was no perfected
contract. Approval of applications for the ERP is within Korean Airs
management prerogatives. The exercise of management prerogative is valid
as long as it is not done in a malicious, harsh, oppressive, vindictive, or
wanton manner. In the present case, the Court sees no bad faith on Korean
Airs part. The 21 August 2001 memorandum clearly states that Korean Air,
41
on its discretion, was offering ERP to its employees. The memorandum also
states that the reason for the ERP was to prevent further losses. Korean Air
did not abuse its discretion when it excluded Yuson in the ERP. To allow
Yuson to avail of the ERP would have been contrary to the purpose of the
ERP.
3.
4.
No. Korean Air did not force Yuson to retire on 8 January 2002. The
surrounding circumstances show that Korean Air did not force Yuson to
retire on 8 January 2002. As admitted by complainant, she was set to
retire by January 2002 ; and in it was shown in the records of the case that
Yuson was about to retire sometime in January 2002, which in fact
happened.
his clearance, however, he was informed that the costs of his training
will be deducted from his retirement pay, which will be computed at the
rate of P 5,000.00 per year of service.
5.
6.
7.
8.
In its MR, PAL asseverated that the decision of the NLRC, directing the
computation of Elegirs retirement benefits based on Article 287 of the
Labor Code, instead of the CBA, was inconsistent with the disposition of
this Court in PAL v. APAP, where the SC sustained PALs position and
directed the payment of retirement benefits of the complainant pilot in
accordance with the PAL-ALPAP Retirement Plan. However, NLRC
denied PALs MR.
9.
CA agreed with PAL. Elegir filed an MR but the same was denied.
Yuson was not entitled to the tickets. Korean Air had never implemented the
IPM in the Philippines. Its, employees, including Yuson, received the travel
benefit under the CBA. During her 26-year stay in Korean Air, Yuson already
received more than 10 tickets.
The SC granted the petition and affirmed the Resolution of the National Labor
Relations Commission which, in turn, affirmed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter.
63.
2012
Bibiano C. Elegir vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc. G.R. No. 181995, July 16,
Elegir v. PAL
16 July 2012; Reyes, J.
Digest prepared by Jethro Koon
I. Facts
1.
2.
Elegir, who was then holding the position of A-300 Captain, submitted
his bid and was awarded the same. He, with seven (7) other pilots, was
sent for training at Boeing in Seattle. He completed his training on
September 19, 1995.
3.
4.
II. Issues
Whether Elegirs retirement benefits should be computed based on Article 287 of
the Labor Code or on PALs retirement plans. PAL retirement plans
Whether Elegir should reimburse PAL with the proportionate costs of his training.
YES
Whether interest should be imposed on the monetary award in favor of Elegir.
NO
III. Holding
42
CA affirmed
4.
After perusing the records of this case, SC failed to find any significant
fact or circumstance that could warrant a departure from the established
jurisprudence. Elegir admitted that as in Almario, the prevailing CBA
between PAL and ALPAP at the time of his retirement incorporated the
same3-year stipulation
5.
IV. Ratio
Elegirs retirement pay should be computed based on PALs retirement plans.
Elegir maintains that it is Article 287 of the Labor Code which should be applied
in the computation of his retirement pay since the same provides for higher
benefits. He pointed out that the pilot in PAL v. ALPAP retired at 45, while he
opted to retire at 52. He further emphasized that the ruling was anchored on a
finding that the retirement benefits that the pilot would get under Article 287 of
the Labor Code are less than those he would get under PALs retirement plans.
1.
2.
2.
If at all, the monetary award in favor of Elegir will earn legal interest
from the time the judgment becomes final and executory until the same
is fully satisfied, regardless of the nature of the breached obligation. The
imposition is justified considering that the interim period from the
finality of judgment, awarding a monetary claim and until payment
thereof, is deemed to be equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
64.
Eastern Mediterranean Maritime Ltd., et al. v Estanislao Surlo, et al.
G.R. No. 154213
2.
3.