Bandali al-Jawzi's Min Tarikh al-Harakat al-Fikriyyat fi'l-Islam: The First Marxist

Interpretation of Islam
Author(s): Tamara Sonn
Source: International Journal of Middle East Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Feb., 1985), pp. 89-107
Published by: Cambridge University Press
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Int. J. Middle East Stud. 17 (1985), 89-107 Printed in the United States of America

Tamara Sonn

BANDALI

AL-JAWZI'S MIN TARIKH AL-HARAKA T

AL-FIKRIYYA T FI'L-ISLAM: THE FIRST MARXIST
INTERPRETATION

OF ISLAM

Bandali al-Jawzi (1871-1943) has been regaining popularity recently, particularly among his native Palestinians and Muslim nationalists of his adopted home,
the Soviet Union. In 1977, for instance, the Union of Palestinian Journalists and
Writers, in cooperation with the Oriental Institute of the Soviet Academy of
Sciences, commemorated Jawzi as an outstanding Palestinian author. At that
time a collection of various of his articles on the Arabic language and history
was published in Beirut, as well as an edition of his only book, Min Tharkh
al-Harakat al-Fikriyyat fil-Islam (The History of Intellectual Movements in
Islam), first published in 1928. It is this recent exposure which has brought to
light the value of Jawzi's contribution and has allowed his work to take its rightful place in Islamic intellectual history.
Jawzi's Min TarTkhis historically the first application of Marxism to the
genesis of Islam. As such, it initiated an entirely new phase in the history it
sought to trace and set the stage for such landmark works as Montgomery
Watt's Muhammad at Mecca and Muhammad at Medina. For the identifying
characteristic of this approach is an attempt to understand the appearance of the
Prophet and his work in terms other than those of divine intervention.1 The
merits of such an approach can and certainly have been argued. Ali Shari'ati
dismisses the very idea in the title of his work, Marxism and Other Western
Fallacies. He considers Marxism both illogical and dehumanizingly irreligious,
encouraging "the confinement of human needs and ideals to the narrow limits of
material consumption and power, and the triumph of economic needs over all
others."2 Maxime Rodinson, on the other hand, reasons thus:
It is perfectlypossible for a believerto rejectthe archaic,idealisticoutlook: God would
still be the first cause of naturaland social evolution for such a person, but he would
agree that God acts in natureby meansof what the philosophersused to call secondary
causes.... If God acts throughnaturallaws, why should he not act in the humanworld
throughsocial laws?3
In any event, the intent of Jawzi's work is unmistakable and, in the context he sets
forth, undoubtedly valuable. His goal is to reawaken the Islamic world to the
essential nature of Islam. By focusing on the motivating factors in the Prophet's
life and subsequent revolutionary movements in Islam, Jawzi hopes to rekindle
? 1985 C(amhribideUniversitrlPress 0020-7438/85/010089-19

$2.50

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90

Tamara Sonn

dedication in Muslim society to what he considers its ultimate ideal: social justice
based on the fundamental equality of all men before God. What follows is an
exegesis of Bandali al-Jawzi's History, in which the author attempts to trace the
progress of that goal from its genesis in the heart of the Prophet to the present
day, followed by a brief comment on its potential impact on modern Islamic
political thought.
Jawzi begins his book with an introduction entitled "The Unity of Social
Laws." In it he claims that the Islamic world is subject to the same laws of
history as Western nations and, in fact, that that is what he will try to show in
his book:
The historyof the East, the social and intellectuallife of its peoplein general,and that of
the Islamicpeople in particular,are subjectto the same laws and factorsto whichthe life
and historyof the westernnationsare subject,and . . . the nationsof the Easthavepassed
in their long life and will continueto pass throughthe same social stagesand changesas
the westernnations. For there is no differencein this sense betweenthe East and the
West,and one is not innatelysuperiorto the other.4
In so doing, he claims to be following the reasoning of Soviet historian V. V.
Bartol'd. Such early historians as Schlosser, Winckler, and especially Renan,
Jawzi notes, had attempted to explain why the Christian West had developed
from its "dark" ages to its current position at the forefront of modernity, while
the Islamic East had remained apparently stagnant. They had found the answer
in what was seen as the innately backward nature of the Islamic peoples. Since
those ideas are now "passe," however, Jawzi feels no need to refute them. Rather,
he tells us, the more modern historians (such as Bartol'd) have definitively shown
that it was the combined effect of such politicoeconomic factors as the barbarian
invasions, the Crusades, and the shift in trade routes which led to the temporary
eclipse of the East.
Yet Jawzi's purpose is not to trace Islamic intellectual history as a function of
such politicoeconomic factors. While he is, of course, imbued with a sensitivity
to their effects on society, the history he traces is not that of the Islamic peoples
but that of Islamic ideals. Indeed, he focuses specifically on only three groups:
the Babakis, the Isma'ilis, and the Qarmatians. Surely a history of the intellectual
movements of Muslims would be more comprehensive. In fact, his particular
view of the history of Islamic ideals constitutes a history of socialist ideals in
Islam. His implication, however, is not that Islamic ideals are essentially socialist. Rather, his view is simply that the true ideals of Islam have best been preserved in those communities which have, throughout Islamic history, sought to
implement socialist principles.
It is this subtle distinction which forms both the context and goal of Jawzi's
first chapter, entitled "The Economic Bases of Islam." In it the author clearly
establishes his Marxist approach:
For it is today well-establishedthat Islam,like othergreat religions,is not only religious
thought but a social and economic matteras well, or, more precisely,more so than it is
religiousthought.5

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Bandali al-Jawzi: The First Islamic Marxist

91

Citing such authorities as Caetani and deGoeje, he tells us, "The adherents of the
Islamic religion, like those of the other great religions before and after it, used
religion as a means of achieving other goals." The tone of this argument appears,
at first glance, somewhat hostile toward Islam. At the time Jawzi wrote, however, he was working within the context of a period of intensive self-examination
on the part of Islamic society. The decline of the Ottoman Empire, combined
with the emergence of the West, had brought into sharp contrast the weakness of
the Muslim world in the face of foreign domination, and thinkers of every stripe
were attempting to analyze its causes. Jawzi's contribution to that effort was an
analysis of the nature of the society Islam aims to establish; his conclusion was
that the principle of economic justice constitutes the basis of social solidarity
which is the fundamental vision of Islam. He therefore devotes Chapter I to
establishing those principles as the fons et origo of Islam.
Jawzi begins with a description of the socioeconomic milieu of Mecca at the
time of the birth of Islam. Like Lammens and Hartmann, he describes Mecca as
a rich commercial city, and contends that commercial activity, along with its
related values, was the dominant feature of Meccan life, even overshadowing the
yearly religious pilgrimage to the KaCbah.6His point in describing the level of
mercantile activity in seventh-century Mecca is to establish the extent to which
the quest for monetary profit had become the focal point of Meccan life, of
which he regards the pervasive existence of usury (ribi) as the greatest indication. Again relying directly on Lammens, Jawzi states that the practice of usury
was widespread among Meccan merchants and that their rates reached 100%.7
Rodinson questions Lammens's contention; he believes the practice of usury was
actually limited to a relatively smaller sector of Meccan commerce.8 Lammens's
description of the essential role played by transactions with a fixed time limit
and payment of interest as well as speculation in all types of goods is, however,
no doubt accurate.9 We need only consult the Qur'an to verify that a debtor who
could not pay his loan when due was given an extension, at the end of which
time the amount due was double that originally set: "Believers, devour not riba,
doubled and redoubled, and fear God."'0 Similarly, "Those who devour riba
shall not rise again." 1 (Indeed, riba was such an accepted practice that even the
Qur'anic injunctions against it were not sufficient to abrogate the practice. Later,
the Muslim legists went to great lengths to provide hiyal (means by which to
accommodate the practice).12
It was into such an atmosphere that the Prophet was born. Accordingly, Jawzi
presents Muhammad as the voice of social reform, uniquely qualified to serve
such a role. Mecca was ripe for social reform. Jawzi presents the Prophet as a
man of abiding sympathy for the plight of the underprivileged classes. No doubt
this group had never before been so carefully scrutinized or conscientiously
exposed to the light of history. More to the point, however, Jawzi believes that
no one was more suited to the challenge of rectifying the inequities in the social
structure than Muhammad, because of his unusual position in that social structure. Having been born into a less than prosperous branch of the powerful
Quarysh, Muhammad was well situated to witness the extravagances of the

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Tamara Sonn

wealthy in contrast to the humble lives of the poor. There are reports of others
similarly situated who likewise rejected certain aspects of Meccan life on the
grounds of its irreligiosity. Ibn Ishaq, for example, related that Waraqa b. Nawfal
and Zaid b. 'Amr b. Nufayl, both Qurayshites, spoke out against idolatry and
left their homes seeking "the true religion of Abraham." The former apparently
found it in Christianity. Zaid, on the other hand, followed his own course, worshipping the one, true God, observing a dietary regime, and condemning the
practice of female infanticide.13 However, what distinguished Muhammad from
these so-called Hanifis was his overriding concern not with the purity of religious
practice but with those whom religious practice sought to benefit.
It is Jawzi's description of the nature of the Prophet's mission that comprises the key to understanding his view of the economic bases of Islam. The key
passage follows:
Thesedifferencesin povertyand wealthamongthe membersof one tribewerewhatcalled
the attentionof the Arabprophetto the social strifefoundamongthe classesof peoplein
his communityand [lead him] to searchfor its sources.They were what caused him to
declarea war of words against the class of shamelessoppressorswho monopolizethe
resourcesof wealthand capitalizeon the burdensof the poor and artlessdwellersof the
desert.14

Thus, Jawzi characterizes the social strife in pre-Islamic Mecca as the vast discrepancy between poverty and wealth, and finds its source in the monopoly of
resources by the wealthy. He does not, however, attempt to characterize Islam as
essentially socialist or communist. Had he done so, he would have attempted to
denounce private ownership of property as conflicting with the Prophet's principles. On the contrary, however, the Qur'an clearly recognizes ownership of
private property as an integral part of life when, for instance, it prescribes rules
for inheritance.15Indeed, it recognizes as perennial and perfectly natural distinctions in levels of wealth among people: "Do not covet what Allah has bestowed
in bounty upon one more than another" (4:36). Similarly, the recognition of
wage labor is an implicit recognition of variations in levels of personal wealth.'6
In addition, a number of traditions surface in discussions carried on in the various schools of Islamic law concerning the practice of rental and land tax indicating that the Prophet himself as well as some of his companions and successors
had owned lands which they leased in return for a fixed amount.17 Furthermore,
the very existence of zakah (the pillar of Islam which requires the giving of alms
for the poor) as a principle of intervention in private wealth is, at the same time,
a recognition of the existence of private wealth. Finally, the Qur'an's attitude
toward trade is one of safeguarding its validity; it condemns fraudulent practice,
advocates honest dealings, and requires cessation of trade only during certain
religious celebrations. Thus, it too recognizes the validity of the endeavor to
augment personal holdings. Jawzi, in clear acknowledgment of this trend, is not
in agreement with those who hold that the Qur'an opposes private ownership of
land.18He states emphatically that we cannot "force the Meccan reformer among
the socialists or communists who say that his call was aimed at socialist or communist goals."19 Elsewhere:

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Bandali al-Jawzi: The First Islamic Marxist

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The opinion of some, that the Prophetintendedto abolish privateownershipof property

and makeit common,i.e., the propertyof the communityor nation,is false;suchextreme
communisticthoughtsdid not occur to the Prophetexcept in the first stage of his social
life.20
Having thus established that the Prophet did not seek to revolutionize the
Meccan economic system, Jawzi focuses on the nature of the Prophet's reform.
Rather than prohibiting or even impeding private ownership or enterprise, the
Prophet simply set such endeavors into a new perspective. Wealth, he taught, is
important neither for man's happiness nor for the salvation of his soul. While it
may be pleasant for those who have it, those who achieve it at the expense of
others will certainly have been better off without it. The ultimate reward of those
motivated by greed is eternal perdition, while those who suffer at their hands will
do so only temporarily; their reward will be eternal happiness. The Prophet did
not attack the advantages of wealth. He merely attacked the acquisition of
wealth based on the disadvantage of others, such as usury and the misuse of the
property of the helpless. In this he was a champion of the poor and neglected,
"the orphans and helpless and pitiful people."21 Ironically, no one recognized
this more clearly than the Meccan wealthy. They realized that if the poor received
their rights and ceased to be exploitable, their own power and wealth would be
significantly reduced. Jawzi regards this realization on the part of the Meccans
as an implicit admission of their guilt. So apparent was the inequity of the system, even to those whom it benefited that they realized the survival of the system
demanded the expulsion of the Prophet from their midst.
That the Prophet, realizing the Meccans' determination, willingly transferred
his nascent community to Medina is significant for Jawzi. It marked a turning
point in the development of the Prophet's work. No longer a beleaguered band
of nonconformists, they became a proper community in an atmosphere hospitable
to their nourishment and growth. More significantly, however, this stage provides for the student of Islam a glimpse of Islam's true goals. Free of the compulsion brought on by political opposition and the demands incurred under
political dominance, the community was able, under the direct guidance of the
Prophet, to develop as it chose. It is therefore to the Medinan Muslim community we must look for the true nature of Islam. As Jawzi states:
The Arabnationbeganto carryout [the Prophet's]ordersand deferto hisjudgmentin all
matters.Thus it becameeasy for him to carryout his promisesand realizewhat he had
beencalled to do in Meccain termsof social reformand what he had dreamtof for years
in termsof exaltedprinciplessuchas justice,brotherhood,freedomfor womenand slaves,
and fighting the causes of sufferingand povertyamong the citizens of his community,
indeed,in all the Arabcommunities.22
It is in this context that Jawzi makes some rather enigmatic statements regarding the Prophet's goals: "No doubt the Arab prophet did not intend by his words
and deeds in Mecca and Medina to uproot the causes of social evil and kill all its
roots, as the socialist groups today try to do irrespective of their name or tendencies"; and, "We can say that Muhammad excelled in describing the diseases
of Arab society and enumerating them, more so than in remedying them and

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Tamara Sonn

uprooting their causes." Jawzi himself is no doubt convinced that personal wealth
is indeed the unique source of social evils. He states that the Prophet, "if he had
wanted to kill the roots of all social disorders . . . would have resorted, after he
became a man of unlimited power in the Arabian peninsula, to other means
which we have mentioned." This is clearly a reference to what he pointed out
that the Prophet did not do: "remove wealth from its owners and distribute it to
the needy equally."23 The author then goes on to contrast the Prophet's chosen
means with those of such "European political reformers" as Lenin and Mussolini,
yet he does not deduce therefrom a defect in the Prophet's work. Rather, he
considers the Prophet's means as at once appropriate to the times and an indication of the Prophet's orientation. Nevertheless, he considers the failure to ban
private property responsible for the fact that after the Prophet's death, "the
whom the Prophet sought
poor, the prisoners, the orphans, the widows"-those
to benefit-were
once again plunged into their former plight. Despite the express
aims and practice of the Prophet and his early successors, Jawzi points out, the
money collected for the benefit of the needy was used "mostly for the needs of
the state." Accordingly, he concludes:
... it became as if the call of the Prophet and his social revolution, his labors and
those of his early caliphs, were only to strengthen his adversaries in their center, indeed to
augment their wealth and power. And even stranger, it was as if the Meccan merchants of
the past benefited from the Islamic movement and its ideas and principles, and that they
had established one of the greatest states in the world between which and the nation
which the Prophet founded there was scarcely any relationship.24
Jawzi's implication is, therefore, that had the Prophet actually removed wealth
from its owners and distributed it equally among all members of the community,
he would have thereby rooted out the source of evil in society and precluded
such a reversion. As it was, however, he did not
... completely kill the causes of discontent by prohibiting, for example, personal trade
and putting it completely under the control of the government which he founded in
Medina, or prohibiting slavery definitively, and taking property from its owners and making it the property of those who worked it, or monopolizing the rest of the sources of
individual wealth which were and are still the source of social evils, or using other means
demonstrated by some socialists of this century.2
Again, however, Jawzi does not conclude that the Prophet failed. On the contrary, he succeeded brilliantly at what he set out to accomplish. It was simply
that his goal was not that of modern communists:
... The Prophet was not an enemy of personal wealth or banking and was not against
the accumulation of all land in the hands of a few. Indeed, he was not in principle an
enemy of slavery nor an advocate of the necessity of complete equality of women ... in
terms of rights and duties. He was only against inequity in the operations of these social
systems and their excesses.26
The goal of the Prophet was not to change the principles of just society or to
create a revolutionary one; his goal was to reassert the established universal

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Bandali al-Jawzi: The First Islamic Marxist

95

principles of equality and justice and to establish a particular community based

thereupon.
Jawzi presents, therefore, a picture of the Prophet as an Arab social reformer.
His vision is that of a just society based on the universal principles of love,
equality, and brotherhood. His temporal goal, however, was to establish this
society in microcosm, as it were. Arabia was his laboratory. A society based on
such principles would be strong, unified, and prosperous, just as a society lacking respect for those principles would falter and disintegrate. Accordingly, the
Prophet did not seek to wipe out the sources of evil in society. A convinced
communist may believe that the root of all evil is private ownership and that the
disallowance thereof will effect a truly just society. The Prophet, however, correlates the strength of a society with its treatment of the weak, poor, and helpless.
The greed and cruelty of man which deadens his sensitivity to the plight of his fellow man is not analyzed except as the source of social fragmentation and decay.
It is Jawzi, then, not the Prophet, who believes that the root of social injustice is
in private ownership. Nevertheless, Jawzi analyzes, since the Prophet did not
legislate against it, even the society he created sank back into depravity soon
after his death, due to his followers' disposition of property in the empire they
built. This was particularly true in Persia. Still, the spirit of justice and equality
he inspired survived, as is evident in the history of revolutionary struggles to
return to that norm which punctuate the history of Islam. It is that history which
Jawzi, then, proceeds to present.
Before doing so, however, he devotes Chapter II, "The Arab Empire and the
Vanquished Nations," to describing the seeds of discontent sowed by the successors of the Prophet. In Chapter I Jawzi asserted that the goal envisioned by the
Prophet was a just society. He believed that all men are equal before God, and
that that equality should be reflected in the temporal order. While this did not
entail for him equal distribution of material possessions, it did preclude the
exploitation of any individual or group on the basis, or for the purpose, of economic advantage. The Prophet's teachings on such matters, however, were concerned not with matters of administrative detail but with the principles on which
that community should be based. It was up to the successors of the Prophet,
therefore, to implement those principles, taking into consideration the specific
circumstances involved in each case. Their challenge was to administer the
growing Islamic nation, balancing the increasing diversity of its elements with
the fundamental principle of equality which constituted its raison d'etre. In
Chapter II, Jawzi claims that the successors of the Prophet failed to meet that
challenge and thus sowed the seeds of discontent which flowered into the series
of revolutions by which he sees the history of Islam characterized.
Jawzi offers an explanation for the failure on the part of the Prophet's successors to adhere to their leader's principles. The practical demands involved in
conquering and settling, combined with those of administering the newly acquired
territories, seem sufficient to Jawzi to overwhelm even the most idealistic sensitivities. Nevertheless, he traces the root of the social disorders which plagued
the Islamic community to "the system of taxes which the Prophet established,
combined with the changes and additions thereto instituted by his caliphs,"

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Tamara Sonn

especially under 'Umar and the Umayyads.27The overall effect of their policies
was a system of taxes which were "a heavier burden on the shoulders of the
vanquished nations than on the victors."28
Jawzi does not deny the benefit accruing to those who converted to Islam.
Acknowledging the spiritual edification of those who truly grasped the principles
of Islam, he also recognizes the improvement in the overall security of the new
empire in contrast to that of the declining days of the Sasanid and Roman
regimes and the heavy demands made on them by their continued warfare and
ebbing fortunes. Similarly, he acknowledges that the status of the converts was,
in general, higher than that of nonconverts, the former being exempted at least
from the tribute tax. He reflects the attitude of the early conquerors, however,
when he claims that the non-Arab converts were not put on a status equal to
that of the Arab conquerors. This was the attitude revealed in the policy, attributed to Umar, of denying citizenship in the peninsula to all non-Muslims and of
restricting the Arab conquerors outside the peninsula to exclusively Arab garrison towns.29 This inequal treatment and the abuses in taxation in the conquered
lands reached such an extent, he notes, that they led to the murder of 'Umar by
the disgruntled slave of his Persian governor.30
The Umayyad caliphate, marking the shift in the center of power from Arabia
to Syria, should have brought relief. It is recorded that the Syrian populace
rejoiced over the new caliph.31 Additionally, Christians achieved very high status
in the Umayyad court. MuCawiyah'swife, Maysun, was a Christian, as were his
physician, whom he later appointed financial administrator of Hims, and the
court poet, al-Akhtal. However, the Umayyads' dual occupation with internal
struggles against pro-cAlids and continued territorial conquests in North Africa,
Khurasan, and beyond further strained the imperial budget. MuCawiyah'sgovernor in Basra and later Kufa, Ziyad b. Abih, ruled that center of Shicism with
an iron hand. And Lammens notes that in Syria, Egypt, and Iraq, the caliph
exploited the immense estates inherited from the former regime.33 Without
scruple, he says, drawing on Yacqubi, he had them incorporated into his civil list
and made into appanages.34This comment refers to another of the abuses which
became common during this period, that of granting leading Muslims the large
estates of previous landlords and treating them fiscally as Muslim properties in
the peninsula-that is, they were exempt from the kharaj (land tax) and subject
only to the zakah, which was much lower.35In the same vein, Jawzi mentions the
repressive measures taken by al-Hajjaj, the Khurasani governor, to guard against
depletion of the treasury. It is true, Jawzi notes, that 'Umar b. 'Abd al-Aziz
(cUmar II, 717-720 A.D.) sought to return to the policies of his predecessors,
according to which any Muslim, regardless of nationality, was exempt from tribute tax, while kharaj land continued to be joint property of the Muslim community.36 Unfortunately, this practice quickly led, as before, to a depleted
treasury and the ruling was soon overturned.37Again, there is evidence of bias
against non-Arabs and non-Muslims. For example, it was 'Umar b. CAbd alAziz who promulgated laws restricting the Christians and Jews from governmental positions and subjecting them to other humiliating regulations, such as
those concerning distinctive haircuts and clothing.38 The dissatisfaction thus

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engendered finally burst forth in the form of an open rebellion by the Iraqi army,
led by a Yemeni chief, Ibn al-Ash'ath, in which Basra and Kufa joined together.
Although the rebellion was put down, it marked the end of any expectation of
loyalty from the Iraqis of Basra and Kufa. It also, combined with the dissent of
the Shi'ites, who had never acknowledged the legitimacy of the Umayyads and
therefore become a symbol of the focus for all forms of dissatisfaction, eventually led to the downfall of the Umayyads.39
The 'Abbasid state established in its place, however, likewise failed to meet the
expectations of those who helped establish it. Indeed, Jawzi notes, for the dissatisfied classes it represented little more than a change of masters from the
Umayyads. He does not deny that improvements were made in state machinery.
He praises the farsighted and beneficent qualities of al-Mansur, which is surprising considering the treachery of that caliph, which included the murder of Abu
Muslim.40 Nevertheless, al-Mansur and his ministers from the Barmakid family
effected certain reforms which benefited the peasants. In addition to creating
mosques and other public works, they made vast improvements in agriculture.
Realizing that agricultural revenues were their chief support, they rehabilitated
old canals and built new ones, so that the entire Sawad was connected by a
network of channels.41 As a result of this and other improvements (e.g., in transportation and communications), the economy prospered during the first century
of the 'Abbasid reign. Ibn Khaldun tells us, for instance, that the land tax collected in the days of al-Ma'mun amounted to more than 400 million dirhems.42
It did not take long, however, to discover that the motivating force behind
such prosperity was concern for the welfare of the state only insofar as it
enhanced that of its leaders. No sooner had the cAbbasids become victorious, for
example, than they began a policy of oppression of the Umayyads and those who
had cooperated with the Umayyads. The historians of the age have immortalized
the story of the feast to which members of that house were invited and which
continued despite the slaughter of eighty of them; the bodies were simply covered
over and the merriment continued.43 The Persian freedman mentioned above,
Abu Muslim al-Khurasani, had led a group of Iranian peasants and clients, nominally allied with the Yemenis, in a triumphant revolt against the Umayyad governor in Khurasan.44This defeat had been under the black banner of Muhammad
which the 'Abbasids adopted as their standard, and had been instrumental in the
downfall of the Umayyads. Abu Muslim had also defeated al-Mansur's uncle,
the governor of Syria under al-Saffah, when the uncle disputed his nephew's
claim to the caliphate (745 A.D.). Once al-Mansur's claim was thus secured,
however, Abu Muslim was executed during an audience with the caliph.45Jawzi
also notes the attempt of al-Mansur, no doubt evidenced in his reliance on the
Barmakid family, to arbitrate between the interests of the Arabs and the Persians.
The wisdom of his approach is seen in the success of the administration. The
'Abbasids soon felt threatened by that success, however, and by the time of
Harun al-Rashid, despite the contributions of the Barmakid family to the welfare of the state, found it expedient to crush them.46
In addition, the abuses within the fiscal system, at the expense of the peasants,
continued virtually unabated. Aware that land taxes provided the main support

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of the state, the government of Persia had traditionally attempted to ensure the
highest yield possible from the land. Wise administrators realized the efficacy
within that effort of providing for the well-being of the peasants on whose labor
the crop depended-hence the policies of the Barmakids. On the local level,
however, the system was open to widespread abuse, since the assessment and
collection of taxes was, in the final event, left to individuals.
As often happens, the greater the dissatisfaction expressed by the populace,
the more cause they were given for dissatisfaction. Their increasing restiveness
led the caliphs steadily to increase military strength to combat the populace. The
entire reign of al-Ma'mun (812-833 A.D.), in fact, has been characterized as a
"time of trouble," so absorbed was he in quelling popular rebellions.47 Despite
his promotion of sciences and literature in the Arabic language, and the founding in Baghdad of the "house of wisdom" with its rich collection of manuscripts
and its observatory, it was not until the year 204 A.H. (819-820 A.D.) that alMa'mun was able to enter Baghdad and take possession of the caliphal palace.
In addition to the uprisings in Egypt and Syria, among the most bitter and
longstanding revolutions was that of the Khurramis, led by Babak, which Jawzi
examines in his next chapter, "Babak and His Socialist Doctrine."
It has been argued that Babak's revolution represented the desire of the Iranian
peoples to reassert their Persian culture against that imposed by the Arab
conquerors.48 Jawzi argues that such a movement would not have amassed a
following had it not been for the failure of the prevailing regime, regardless of
national affiliation, to provide a suitable social and economic milieu. He accepts
the testimony of Tabari and Baghdadi that Babak's movement indeed embraced
the communistic system of Mazdak.49 Perhaps most significant to Jawzi in
accepting that testimony is the similarity in the circumstances which brought the
two movements into historical light. As described in the foregoing chapter, the
condition of the peasants in Iran under Islam was no better, and perhaps worse,
than that under the Persians. The majority of land continued to be held by the
few privileged landowners, who exploited it to their immediate economic advantage. The peasants who worked the land were no more than commodities in that
system; indeed, they were little more than slaves. Jawzi considers this sufficient
explanation for the continued existence of communistic sentiment among the
manipulated masses. Their sustenance lay in the land to which they were enslaved
by private owners. It was, therefore, natural for them to consider their freedom
to lie in the freedom of the land which they worked. As the author of the Siyasat
Name points out, this did not entail strictly communal ownership but rather
distribution of land according to need: "Riches must be shared and distributed
according to need."50 Nevertheless, the Babakis, like the Mazdakis, sought
redemption from suffering at the hands of large-scale landowners in the reestablishment of communal living which had existed prior to the development of
feudalistic private property and which continued to live, in an idealized way, in
the minds of these peasants.
In response to traditional Sunni historiography, which denounces the Babakis
as thieves and godless brigands, Jawzi claims that, aside from the activities of
some who may have used the sect as a cover for illegal activities, and the leniency

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of the sect toward the drinking of wine and toward certain marriages disallowed
by Islam (although permissable in Zoroastrianism, for example), there is little
accuracy in these accounts. In particular, their attitudes toward women were
misunderstood, if not purposely misrepresented. For his part, Jawzi claims the
Babakis sought to raise the social status of women by giving them rights and
responsibilities on a par with those of men. This view is reflected in the analysis
of Soviet historian Belyaev:
As to the ugly legendabout a "communityof women,"this could have arisenas a reflection of the enlightenedposition of Khurramiwomenfolkin the distortedMoslemmirror
of the world.The peasantwomen(especiallyamongthe mountaineers)took a full part in
productivework and even in Moslemcountriesenjoyeda relativeindependenceentirely
alien to idle city women and especiallyto the wives and daughtersof the feudals, the
merchantsand the clergy.It is knownthat Khurramiwomenworeneitherthe veil nor any
restrictinggarmentssuch as the paranja,and were not subjectto any kind of seclusion,
for this wouldhavebeenincompatiblewith theirworkat homeand in the fields.51
Jawzi concludes his treatment of the Babaki movement with a detailed history
of the military and strategic aspects of their 20-year campaign against the caliphal
forces, followed by an assessment of their ultimate failure. Two factors, he
claims, account for their downfall. First, they limited their call to the Iranian
people. Jawzi feels that their chances for success would have been greater had
they sought to include all Islamic people in their call. Second, he notes that the
movement was weakened by its inclusion of partisans who were not so concerned
with its justice as with personal gain. It is known, for instance, that many of the
local ruling class were attracted by the Khurramis' initial successes against the
caliph and, jealous of their power, sought to protect their own property and
perhaps even reassert their autonomy by joining forces with or, at least, not
opposing the enemy of the caliph. Unfortunately, these were fickle friends and,
as al-Afshin achieved offensive strength, they retrenched on the side of the
dominant force.52 Both factors stood to be overcome through a more highly
developed system of indoctrination. The motivating force, that of social justice,
survived the demise of Babak and achieved momentum with the Khurramis'
legatees, the Isma'ilis, who are the subject of Jawzi's fourth chapter.
The historical link between the Khurramis and Isma'ilis is by no means a
settled matter,53 nor is it one that troubles Jawzi. He presumably accepts the
thesis, based primarily on the evidence of the Siyasat Name,54that the remnants
of the Mazdaki-Babaki movement were assimilated into Shi'ism. In any event,
he does not argue the issue, referring simply to the "ideological relationship"
between the two groups, based on similar social goals. In fact, Jawzi believes the
Isma'ilis represent an advanced stage in the development of those goals, for the
Ismacilis distinguished themselves, he claims, by learning from the mistakes of
their predecessors. As above, the most grievous defect in the Babaki program,
according to Jawzi, lay in their exclusivity. They were not concerned with
spreading their call for social justice beyond their regional boundaries; indeed,
they recruited their followers from the members of one class only, the oppressed
class. Jawzi credits the Ismacilis with having realized the fallacy of this policy

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and having set out actively to overcome it. Furthermore, he believes the Isma'ilis
overcame the defect in the Khurrami approach which prompted the latter to
attack only the system to which they were subject; the Isma'ilis extrapolated
from that to an attack on the ideological bases of all oppressive political systems.
The program adopted by the Isma'ilis was one of gradual initiation and had
two levels. The outer form (zahiriKya)was but a guise for the uninitiated. True
knowledge lay in grasping the inner (batiniyva) truth. The first step toward that
goal was, therefore, casting doubt on all standard beliefs in the exoteric form. As
Jawzi describes, missionaries were trained to sow such doubt only gradually. Not
all believers were capable of grasping the esoteric truth; those who displayed
such inability were to be left alone, while more capable minds were to be
advanced according to set stages of initiation.
Jawzi notes the effectiveness of this method of proselytizing in engendering
group solidarity through utter faith in the group leaders. Initiates were taught to
trust with their newly acquired truths no one except their teachers. He also notes
that this secrecy was the source of extreme suspicion on the part of the uninitiated. Isma'ilis were therefore accused of being everything from atheists, materialists, and anarchists to Persian nationalists and Sabians. And, like the Babakis,
they were considered sexually promiscuous and debauched because they permitted internecine marriages and the drinking of wine.
Without doubt, Isma'ili syncretism, esotericism, and secrecy obscured the
ultimate goals of the group and made it difficult for even their contemporary
partisans to render justice to their views. Jawzi warns, therefore, that extreme
caution must be exercised with regard to sources and that reliability must be
accorded only to IsmaCilisources themselves. Accordingly, in an effort to vindicate the IsmaCilis, and apparently accepting that the Fatimid caliphs were truly
Isma'ili, he cites the trend among some Fatimids toward monogamy as evidence
of Ismacili concern for family welfare.55 Similarly, he quotes Nasr Khusrow's
testimony that the Qarmatians avoid wine for the sake of social stability, although
the question of IsmaCililinks with that group is problematic.
More convincingly, he argues that the discrepancies in reports of their behavior
and beliefs result from their policy of addressing people in terms the particular
audience could best understand and accept. He refers to their two programs,
"maximum et minimum," meaning the exoteric and esoteric aspects of their
belief. He believes that the Isma'ilis did have an overall goal ensconced in their
complex programs, one centered on social values. Accordingly, he believes that
Isma'ilism is more properly termed a school of thought than a religion. Indeed,
he characterizes their attitude toward religious doctrine as follows: Since it clearly
does not benefit the ignorant classes-those who believe it blindly-it is of use
only to the ruling classes in maintaining their privileged positions. The enlightened few who can understand the esoteric meanings presented in essentially
exoteric religious dogma, on the other hand, are, as a result, not in need of it.
The Isma'ili doctrine is, therefore, not subversive of the truths contained in religious dogma. It simply considers dogma an obfuscation of doctrine, pointless for
those who cannot see through it and superfluous for those who can. This being
the case, the Isma'ilis were rationalists, according to Jawzi, differing from the

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Mu'tazilites in that they saw no need for reconciling religious doctrine and reason; they saw no need for religious doctrine at all.
Jawzi formulates the Isma'ili vision of a just society based on two principles:
equality of the sexes and abolition of private property. Such emphasis, however,
is open to question. Despite the Siyasat Niame'srepeated assertions of the identity
of Mazdakism and Qarmatianism, and Ibn Rizam's description of the Qarmatians
as communists, a question remains regarding the Qarmatians' relationship to
mainstream Isma'ilism.56 Jawzi obviously accepts the validity of the identity, but
he may have overstated the case in referring to communism and equality of the
sexes as the two most important aspects of the Isma'ili program, if he is speaking
in terms other than personal opinion, since Isma'ili literature itself is noticeably
lacking in communist doctrine. The best source we have of Isma'ili belief is their
"Epistles of the Brotherhood of Purity," in which, it is true, the privileged
classes (especially wealthy merchants and rural landowners) are attacked through
satirical descriptions of their behavior. Since the latter group devotes itself exclusively to amassing fortunes, it is no wonder "their condition is worse than that of
the wretched slaves and the poor and weak, their minds constantly tormented by
worries about their wealth."57Perhaps this is the source of their moral depravity,
which allows them to watch "their poor neighbors and orphan children of their
brother, and the downtrodden among their people, fallen on the roads, hungry
and ailing and afflicted and crippled, begging for a crust of bread . . . while they

do not pay any attention to them or pity them."58This is not, however, sufficient
justification to call the Isma'ilis communists or even socialists. Of their own
approach, the Epistles say
We do not seek assistancefrom any of our brothersin religiousmattersbeforewe assist
them in worldlyaffairs.If a brotherwereneedlessof us, that is what we want for him. If
he neededus, that is what we want from him, until we have providedfor him all that is
essential for him in worldly matters, so that he can be free from care and unify his
thoughtsfor us, therebybecomingindependentby the strengthof his soul, discernmentof
his reason and purity of his nature.9

Similarly, equality of the sexes does not seem to have played a major role in the
overall Isma'ili program. As Jawzi himself notes, it certainly was not accepted
by all Isma'ilis.60

Jawzi is on surer ground when he describes their emphasis on the brotherhood

of men or, as he puts it, "internationalism."6'

There is no doubt that the Isma'ilis

were unimpressed by ethnic, national, or racist sentiment. This was reflected in

their preaching against religious fanaticism, pivotal in their appeal to Muslims of
all sects, as well as to Christians, Jews, Mazdakis, Manicheans, Mandeans, and
Sabians. Indeed, this policy of extreme tolerance was viewed by Sunni confessionalists as utter lack of discretion and accounted in large part for allegations of
Isma'ili irreligiosity. Again, the Epistles state:
... It befits our brothers that they should not show hostility to any kind of knowledge
or reject any book. Nor should they be fanatical in any doctrine, for our opinion and our
doctrine embrace all doctrines, and resume all knowledge (4:105).

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... Thereare some men who think and believe,by their religionand doctrine,in pity
and sympathyfor all men. They lament those who are guilty and seek forgivenessfor
them. They have pity on all livingcreaturesand wish well to all. This is the religionof the
pure ones, the ascetics and the well-doersamong the believers.Such, too, are the doctrines of our noble brothers (4:108).62

Jawzi concludes his chapter on the Isma'ilis with a call for more study, particularly of their influence on the Christian Middle Ages, on monastic orders, and
on the development of guilds, for example. He then attributes the ultimate
demise of Isma'ilism to the combined effect of the Turkish and Christian inroads
into the area. The spirit of the Isma'ilis, however, did not die. He believes that
their emphasis on reason prepared the way for the great Islamic philosophers,
mentioning Al-Farabi, Ibn Sina, and Ibn Tufayl specifically, as well as the
science of tafsir (Qur'anic commentary) and the Sufi works of Ibn cArabi, AlGhazali, and Al-Hallaj even more so. Similarly, he believes it was Isma'ilism
which paved the way for liberal thought in Islam, particularly as expressed in the
poetry of Abu al-cAla al-Ma'arri and Ibn al-Hani.
The question of Isma'ili influence on the invaders from the West is one which
particularly fascinates Jawzi. He takes it up again in his conclusion. Before doing
so, however, he devotes a final chapter to the Qarmatians of Bahrain, that group
of Isma'ilis which actually can be called socialistic. Because Jawzi has characterized the ultimate goal of the Isma'ilis as social justice and has declared himself
personally convinced that private property is the root of social evils, it comes as
no surprise that he considers the Qarmatians the greatest of the Isma'ilis and
"most kindred to them."
Regardless of whether the Qarmatians were mainstream or dissident Isma'ilis,
historical sources generally support Jawzi's account of their development from
the time of their appearance in Kufa. Like deGoeje, Jawzi accepts Ibn Rizam's
description of ninth- and tenth-century Mesopotamia as a hotbed of social discontent. The best evidence of this is the Zanj rebellion of the late ninth century.
Tabari describes the condition of black slaves imported from the east coast of
Africa to work in the swamps and mines of lower Mesopotamia as so wretched
that they were persuaded to rebel in 869 A.D.64It took 14 years and numerous
expeditions before the caliphal armies were able to suppress the bloody rebellion.
Under such circumstances, Jawzi believes it is no wonder that a community such
as that of Hamdan al-Qarmati was successful.
Jawzi next turns to the internal order; picking up the theme of social justice,
he describes it as at once egalitarian and socialistic. He observes that Qarmatian
government was by a sort of administrative council. Although the six members
of the council were from a single leading family, that of Abu Tahir, they ruled in
consultation with their deputies, and government was effected by consensus of
the entire council. Although Jawzi does not explicitly state it, he implies a connection between the ideal form of Muslim government by a council of firstamong-equals on the one hand, and government through consultation on the
other. The comparison he does draw explicitly is to modern Soviet government.65
He allows that a detailed comparison of the two systems is beyond the scope of

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the work, yet his point of comparison is clearly the lack of an elite in either case.
While it is obvious that one could counter that Abu Tahir's family constitutes a
kind of elite, Jawzi notes that the Qarmatian government, like that of Soviet
Russia, was born of a revolution by the oppressed classes. Presumably, he
believes that the lack of an oppressed class precludes the emergence of an elite.
After summarizing the Qarmatian tax structure, Jawzi next examines the topic
of private property.66Astutely observing that the question of individual ownership of land at that time is anachronistic, he refers to the "communistic character"
of property administration. Not only were fields bought with common funds, but
there were no individual taxes. Furthermore, those in need were advanced funds,
without interest, until more solvent times, as were newcomers into the area (at
least those with skills). Also, grain was processed by state-owned and operated
mills. Finally, commerce was carried on with token money which could not be
exported. What he does not deal with, although he reports it, is the distinctly
noncommunistic nature of the government's exploitaion of slave labor. Nasr
Khusrow reports that the majlis (governing council) owned some 30,000 black
slaves for agricultural work. While there is no reason to assume that these slaves
were mistreated, as were those who finally launched the Zanj rebellion, slave
labor of any sort is clearly not in keeping with the principles of communism
which demand equal treatment for all people and ownership of the means of
production by the laborers. It is apparently for this reason that Jawzi presents
the community not as communist per se but as one which implemented communistic principles at least to a limited extent.
He concludes his treatment of the Qarmatians with a defense of their morals
and sincerity, particularly with regard to the 'Alids. Concerning morals, he
reiterates Nasr Khusrow's testimony that the Qarmatians were just, generous,
and temperate. His defense of their sincerity is, on the other hand, more complex. He feels compelled, first of all, to deny their apparent duplicity concerning
the Fatimids. While he admits that they at one time supported the Fatimids and
then turned against them, he explains the breach in terms of the Qarmatian
disillusionment with the Fatimid al-Mu'izz and his apparently worldly goals. It
was, therefore, as deGoeje relates, a doctrinal dispute which eventually led to the
open conflict between the two, one in which the Qarmatians believed they were
defending their revolutionary principles against the Fatimids, who had seemingly
abandoned these.67 Also, the conflict should not be interpreted as shallow commitment to the house of 'Ali. Jawzi explains that the purely religious practices of
the Qarmatians were insignificant; such principles as emanation and transmigration of souls, while ensconced in IsmaCilism, are more properly the domain of
metaphysics and need not concern the ordinary practitioner. The thrust of
Qarmatian beliefs was the ideals of social justice which the promised mahdi
would implement. That it was 'Alids who promised to do so was secondary,
therefore; the vehicle was insignificant relative to the principle. For this reason,
similarly, cultic practices were not important to the Qarmatians. While they did
not prohibit such practices and even allowed a mosque to be built for travellers,
the Qarmatians simply considered the practices unimportant in terms of social

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justice. Finally, Jawzi again shows his belief in socialism by attributing the success of the Qarmatian community, its longevity and prosperity, to that system;
and its ultimate demise to outside forces.
In his conclusion, Jawzi reasserts his regard for the Islamic social goals and his
belief in their enduring impact upon revolutionary movements, both Middle
Eastern and Western. In this vein he briefly traces the Babi and Bahai movements in Islam, noting an "ideological link" between them and Isma'ilism. He
also speculates on the influence of Isma'ili social doctrine and organizational
techniques on the development of such religious orders as the Jesuits, as well as
on the development of trade and craft guilds and the order of Freemasons.
Again calling for more research on the topic, he contends that, in any event,
what he has set forth should be sufficient to show that it was not the backwardness which prevented Islamic society from developing into a full-blown capitalistic society, as Western society did. He presents Islamic society as one led astray
and, in fact, overcome by foreign forces when its fundamental principles were
ignored; only in that sense were the Western invaders able to curtail its progress.
Yet, considering that Islamic society had developed up to the last precapitalist
stage set out by Marx, that of guilds, and in view of the fact that true Islamic
social goals are fundamentally in keeping with those of Marxist socialism, the
author concludes that Islamic society will indeed progress through the same
stages of development as the West-but, going the West one better, the capitalist
stage in Islamic society will be short.
It should be emphasized again, however, that it would be inaccurate to accuse
Jawzi of attempting to show that Islam is fundamentally socialist or that only a
socialist regime is truly Islamic. Rather, the author reveals himself to be personally convinced that socialism is ultimately just. Its relationship to Islam, however, is not presented as one of identity. In fact, as Jawzi expresses in the first
chapter, Islam specifically does not advocate socialism or communistic principles.
On the basis of its assertion of the equality of all men before God, however,
Islam envisions a society which reflects that equality in socioeconomic relations
among men. In this sense, therefore, a truly just socialist society reflects the
fundamental tenets of Islam. Jawzi's attempt to establish Islamic principles as
fundamentally in accordance with those of Marxism must, therefore, be taken at
face value. Had his goal been to promulgate class consciousness among his
native Arabs, to whom he dedicates his work, surely he would have concentrated
on that struggle in Islamic history. Rather, he concentrates on the basic compatibility of Islamic and socialist values. His case is, therefore, one for the reassertion of those fundamental values as the basis of solidarity and strength.
It is in this context, then, that the question of Jawzi's place in Islamic intellectual history must be considered. There is, of course, no denying that Jawzi is not
yet among those thinkers now considered as mainstream Islamic modernists,
such as Afghani, Abduh, or even his contemporary Constantine Zurayk. His
work has only recently been rediscovered and the extent of its impact remains to
be seen despite his blatantly revisionist approach to Islamic revolutionary history.
Jawzi's presentation is supported, to the extent he claims, by valid scholarship
and deserves consideration on that level. Perhaps more intriguing is the very
phenomenon of its recent revival, particularly in view of the current Middle

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Bandali al-Jawzi: The First Islamic Marxist

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Eastern struggle. It is not surprising that Jawzi's work has found ready acceptance
among Palestinian nationalists, for instance. On the other hand, the History,
attempts to show that Islam, despite its non-socialist underpinnings, is fundamentally conducive to the establishment of a just society in specifically socialist
terms. On the other, the basis of Jawzi's argument is that the goal of social
justice is universal. His conviction centers on the unique compatibility of Islamic
and socialist objectives-a society in which the equality of all men before God is
reflected in the temporal order. It is the burden of foreign domination and its
inevitable exploitation which have obfuscated those goals and impeded progress
toward their realization. Achieving national autonomy is therefore a necessary
prerequisite to the progress. Jawzi's work, then, could be considered attractive to
all those-socialists and non-socialists alike-committed to that struggle. In any
event, however, on the historical level, Jawzi's History, as the first Marxist
interpretation of the genesis of Islam, certainly deserves scrutiny as a fresh
approach to Islamic intellectual history and, as such, a contribution to it.
SCHOOLOF RELIGION
UNIVERSITY OF IOWA

NOTES
tThere are, of course, those who would dispute that this approach is essentially Marxist. For
purposes of the present article, I am adopting Maxime Rodinson's description: "All we [Marxists]
are rejecting here is the idea that the mission of the Prophet was an unexpected miracle in the
evolution of Arab society of the time." See M. Rodinson, Marxism and the Muslim World, Jean
Matthews, trans. (New York and London, 1981), p. 36.
2Ali ShariCati, Marxism and Other Western Fallacies, R. Campbell, trans. (Berkeley, 1980), p. 51.
3Rodinson, Marxism, pp. 35-36.
4Bandali al-Jawzi, Min TarTkhal-Harakat al-Fikrivyat fil-Islm (Beirut, 1928), pp. 10-11. (All
translations of Jawzi's work by author.)
5Ibid., p. 12.
6H. Lammens, La Mecque b la veille de I'hgire (Beirut, 1924), pp. 135 ff.; M. Hartmann, De,
Islamische Orient, Vol. II: Die Arahische Frage (Leipzig, 1909), p. 455.
'Jawzi, Min Tarkh, p. 18.
8M. Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism, Brian Pearce, trans. (Austin, 1973), p. 35.
9Lammens, La Mecque, pp. 136 ff., 155 ff., 213 ff.
t'Sura 3:125, The Koran Interpreted, Arberry, trans. (New York, 1955), p. 89.
"Sura 2:276, ibid., p. 69; cf. 30:69.
'2J. Schacht, Das Kitii al-Hijal fi'l-Fiqh (Hannover, 1924), discusses various hiyal. Cf. Rodinson,
Islam and Capitalism, p. 35.
'31bnHisham, Sirah, Wtistenfeld, ed. (Gottingen, 1858), p. 143;cf. Leone Caetani, Annali del'slam
(Milano, 1905), 1:181-92.
14Jawzi,Min TarTkh,p. 25.
'5On the recognition of private property in Islam, see L. Gardet, Ia Cite musulmane: vie sociale et
politique (Paris, 1954), pp. 79-90.
'6See, e.g., Sura 28:26 ff.; 18:76;36:21; 52:40.
'7Abu Yusuf Yaqub, Le Livre de l'imp6t foncier (Kitih al-Kharai), E. Fagnan, trans. (Paris,
1921), pp. 133-39.
'See, e.g., Nasir Ahmed Shaikh, Some Aspects of the Constitution and Economics of Is/am
(Woking, 1961), pp. 139-229. This trend in Islam is clearly set out in Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism, pp. 12-27.

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'9Jawzi, Min TarTkh,pp. 25-26.

20Ibid.,p. 33.
2lbid., p. 27.
22Ibid.,p. 30.
231bid.,p. 31.
241bid.,pp. 31 and 38-39.
25Ibid.,pp. 32-33.
26Ibid.,p. 33.
27Ibid.,p. 41.
28Ibid.
29Philip K. Hitti, Histort of the Arabs, 10th ed. (New York, 1970), p. 169.
30Tabari, Tar-kh al-Rusul wa'l-Muluk, M. deGoeje et al., eds. (Leiden, 1871-1901), 1:2,622-23;
Ya'qubi, Tarikh, Th. Houtsma, ed. (Leiden, 1883), 2:183.
3Tabari, TarTkh, 1:3409-10; Mas'udi, Kitib al-Tanb'h wa'l-lshraf, M. deGoeje, ed. (Leiden,
1893-1894), 5:80, 104.
32Ibn 'Asakir, Al-T7arkh al-KahTr, CAbdal-Qadir Badran and Ahmad 'Ubayd, eds. (Damascus,
1329-1351), 5:80, Ya'qubi, Tarnkh,2:265.
33Cf.Baladhuri, Futuh al-Buldan, M. deGoeje, ed. (Leiden, 1866), pp. 293 ff.
34Ya'qubi, Tarnkh,2:278 ff.
35C. Cahen, "Kharadj," Encyclopedia of Islam, 2nd ed. (Leiden, 1954-), 4:1,031.
36IbnCAsakir, Tahrkh,4:80; Ya'qubi, Tarikh, 2:362. Cf. H. A. R. Gibb, "The Fiscal Rescript of
CUmarII," Arabica, 2, 1 (January 1955), 1-16 for discussion of cUmariI's attempt to maintain unity
of Arabs as well as remove the grievances of the mawial (clients).
37Ya'qubi, Kitab al-Buldan, M. deGoeje, ed. (Leiden, 1892), p. 339. Cf. Ya'qubi, T7rTkh,2:227;
T. W. Arnold, The Preaching of Islam, 2nd ed. (London, 1913), p. 81.
38Cf. Ibn 'Asakir, T7rakh, 1:178-80; Al-lbshishi, Al-Mustatraf (Cairo, 1314), 1:100-101; Abu
Yusuf, Kitab al-Kharaj, pp. 152-53; A. S. Tritton, The Caliphs and Their Non-Muslim Subjects
(Oxford, 1930), pp. 5-35.
39This, notwithstanding the analysis of Jawzi's Min Tar?khby Werner Ende (Arabische Nation
und islamische Geschichte [Beirut, 1977], pp. 88-91) as a positive judgment on the Umayyads.
40Cf.Tabari, Tarnkh,3:330.
4lIbid., 3:391; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kimilfi'l- arlkh, C. J. Tornberg, ed. (Leiden, 1867-1874), 4:14.
42Hitti, History, p. 320.
43YaCqubi,Tar?kh,2:425-26; Mas'udi, Al-Tanb?h, 6:76; Ibn al-Athir, Al-Kamil, 5:329-30.
44Tabari, 7rTakh,2:1,953 ff.
451bid.,3:105-17.
461bid.,3:680.
47E. A. Belyaev, Arabs, Islam and the Arab Caliphate in the Earl! Middle Ages, A. Govritch,
trans. (Jerusalem, 1969), p. 218.
48See,for example, E. M. Wright, "Babak of Badhdh and Al-Afshin During the Years 816-41ADSymbols of Iranian Persistence Against Islamic Penetration in North Iran," The Muslim World, I
(1948), 43-59 and 2 (1958), 124-31.
49The Sivasat Name traces the link through the widow of Mazdak, Khurrama. She is said to have
founded a secret sect, the Khurramdiniyya, to which both Abu Muslim and Sinbad belonged, which
espoused the original Mazdaki principle of salvation through return to communal living. See Nizam
al-Mulk, Sivasat Name, C. Sch6fer, ed. and trans. (Paris, 1891-1897), p. 255.
5?Ibid.,p. 248.
5 Belyaev, Arabs, Islam, p. 239.
52Jawzi, Min Tar?kh,p. 88.
53SeeG. H. Sadighi, Les mouvements religieux Iraniens (Paris, 1938), for a detailed analysis.
54Nizamal-Mulk, Siyasat Name, p. 268.
55Fatimid legitimacy has been the subject of debate, although Jawzi's view is widely accepted. See
B. Lewis, The Origins of Isma'ilism (Cambridge, 1940), pp. 44 ff., for analysis.
56BernardLewis discusses the question in detail, ibid., and comes to the generally accepted conclusion that the Qarmatians were originally Isma'ilis but developed independently of Iraqi Isma'ilis.

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Bandali al-Jawzi: The First Islamic Marxist

107

57lkhwan al-Safa', Rasa'il Ikhwan al-Safa', Seyyed Hossein Nasr, trans., in Isma'ili Contributions to Islamic Culture (Tehran, 1977), pp. 33 ff.
"Ibid., p. 300.
591bid.,p. 40.
60Jawzi,Min TrrTkh,p. 109.
61Ibid., p. 110.
62Lewis, The Origins, p. 94.
63Thisis not to deny the passing comments of some others, such as Ibn Hazm (I. Friedlander, "The
Heterodoxies of the ShT'a,"JAOS, 28 [1907]: 37 and 29 [1908]: 19-20), and Ibn Hawqal (Al-Masalik
wa'l-Mamalik, M. deGoeje, ed. [Leiden, 1873], p. 210). Cf. Asin Palacios, Abenmasarra y su Escuela
(Madrid, 1914), pp. 99-103.
64Tabari, TarIkh, 3:1,785-86.
65Jawzi, Min Tar'kh, p. 149.
66Jawzi's discussion of taxation among Qarmatians is from deGoeje, Memoire, pp. 15 ff., which
follows Ibn Hawqal's account.
67DeGoeje, Memoire, pp. 59 ff.

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